Manotok v.

Barque, Part II : The December 18, 2008 En Banc

Resolution
Part I of this four-part series is a summary of the December 12, 2005 decision of the
Supreme Court 1st Division denying the Manotoks’ consolidated petitions and sustaining the
order for the cancellation of the their title without a direct proceeding before the RTC and for
the reconstitution of the Barques’ title.

In this entry, we look into the December 18, 2008 en banc resolution that reversed
the decision of the 1st Division and remanded the petitions to the CA for further proceedings.

The intervening facts

After the promulgation of the December 12, 2005 decision, the Manotoks filed several
motions for reconsideration with the 1st Division but these were all DENIED by the Court.

On May 2, 2006, the decision of the 1st Division was entered in the Book of Entries of
Judgment. But when the Barques moved for the execution of the decision, the Manotoks
sought the referral of the motion to the Court en banc, which the Court en banc accepted on
July 26, 2006.

On September 7, 2006, the Manahans sought to intervene in the case, alleging that
their predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Manahan, was issued Sales Certificate No. 511
covering the subject lot.

On December 18, 2008, the Court promulgated an en banc that SET ASIDE the
decision and resolutions of the 1st Division and RECALLED the entry of judgment. Voting 8-6
with 1 abstention, the Court REVERSED the decisions and resolutions of the CA and the
LRA, and REMANDED the cases to the CA for further proceedings.

How the court en banc voted

The Court en banc decided to accept the cases from the 1 st Division “on a pro hac
vice basis to lend much needed jurisprudential clarity as only the Court en banc can
constitutionally provide.”

J. Tinga wrote the opinion for the Court. He was joined by CJ Puno, and JJ. Austria-
Martinez, Velasco and Brion. Concurring with their respective separate opinions were J.
Carpio, with whom J. Carpio-Morales joined, and J. Corona.

J. Ynares-Santiago, the ponente of the 1st Division decision and resolutions, wrote a
dissenting opinion. She was joined by JJ. Quisumbing, Azcuna, Chico-Nazario,
Reyes, and Leonardo-De Castro. J. Nachura did not take part.

Issue: Can the Court en banc validly re-evaluate the decision of the 1st Division?

The Court first grappled with what it called “procedural unorthodoxies” involved in the
re-evaluation of the Manotoks’ petitions even after an entry of judgment had already been
made by the 1st Division in favor of the Barques.

The Court justified its pro hac vice re-evaluation of the petitions based on the
constitutional principle that “no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the [C]ourt in a
decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court
sitting en banc.” This, according to the Court, is necessitated by the argument “that the 2005
Decision of the First Division is inconsistent with precedents of the Court, and leaving that
decision alone without the imprimatur of the Court en banc would lead to undue confusion . . .
over whether the earlier ruling of the Division constitutes the current standard with respect to
administrative reconstitution of titles.”

Issue: Did the LRA and the CA have jurisdiction to annul the Manotoks’ title?
 The Court held that the LRA and the CA had no jurisdiction to direct the
annulment of the Manotoks’ title. It reasoned:

Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 . . . provides that “[a] certificate of title
shall not be subject to collateral attack [...and] cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.” Clearly, the cancellation of the
Manotok title cannot arise incidentally from the administrative proceeding for reconstitution of
the Barque title even if the evidence from that proceeding revealed the Manotok title as fake.
Nor could it have emerged incidentally in the appellate review of the LRA's administrative
proceeding.

There is no doubt that the Court of Appeals does not have original jurisdiction to
annul Torrens titles or to otherwise adjudicate questions over ownership of property. Its
exclusive original jurisdiction is determined by law, particularly by Batas Pambansa (B.P.
129). Section 9 of that law restricts the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
to special civil actions and to actions for annulment of judgments of the regional trial
court. Still, the Court of Appeals did acquire jurisdiction over the Barques’ and the Manotoks’
petitions, albeit in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the ruling of the LRA,
also pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. Thus, for the appellate court to be
able to direct the cancellation of a Torrens title in the course of reviewing a decision of the
LRA, the LRA itself must have statutory authority to cancel a Torrens title in the first place.

xxx xxx xxx

Nowhere in [Section 6 of P.D. No. 1529 where the general functions of the Land
Registration Commissioner are enumerated] is it stated that the LRA has the power to cancel
titles. Indeed, the Barques are unable to point to any basis in law that confirms the power of
the LRA to effect such cancellation, even under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26 as amended by
Rep. Act No. 6732, which authorizes the administrative reconstitution of titles in limited cases.
In fact . . . such laws take great care to ensure that a petition for administrative reconstitution
of title will not disturb existing Torrens titles.

It is thus clear that neither the Court of Appeals nor the LRA had jurisdiction to cancel
the Manotok title.

Issue: Did the LRA and the CA have jurisdiction to annul the Manotoks’ title?

The Court held that the LRA and the CA had no jurisdiction to direct the
annulment of the Manotoks’ title. It reasoned:

Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 . . . provides that “[a] certificate of title
shall not be subject to collateral attack [...and] cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.” Clearly, the cancellation of the
Manotok title cannot arise incidentally from the administrative proceeding for reconstitution of
the Barque title even if the evidence from that proceeding revealed the Manotok title as fake.
Nor could it have emerged incidentally in the appellate review of the LRA's administrative
proceeding.

There is no doubt that the Court of Appeals does not have original jurisdiction to
annul Torrens titles or to otherwise adjudicate questions over ownership of property. Its
exclusive original jurisdiction is determined by law, particularly by Batas Pambansa (B.P.
129). Section 9 of that law restricts the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
to special civil actions and to actions for annulment of judgments of the regional trial
court. Still, the Court of Appeals did acquire jurisdiction over the Barques’ and the Manotoks’
petitions, albeit in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the ruling of the LRA,
also pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. Thus, for the appellate court to be
able to direct the cancellation of a Torrens title in the course of reviewing a decision of the
LRA, the LRA itself must have statutory authority to cancel a Torrens title in the first place.
 xxx xxx xxx

Nowhere in [Section 6 of P.D. No. 1529 where the general functions of the Land
Registration Commissioner are enumerated] is it stated that the LRA has the power to cancel
titles. Indeed, the Barques are unable to point to any basis in law that confirms the power of
the LRA to effect such cancellation, even under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26 as amended by
Rep. Act No. 6732, which authorizes the administrative reconstitution of titles in limited cases.
In fact . . . such laws take great care to ensure that a petition for administrative reconstitution
of title will not disturb existing Torrens titles.

It is thus clear that neither the Court of Appeals nor the LRA had jurisdiction to cancel
the Manotok title.

Issue: Should the Supreme Court, after dismissing the Barques’ petition for
administrative reconstitution, act further on the apparent problems of the Manotoks’
title?

After noting the apparent flaws in the Manotoks’ claim, which it described as
“considerable and disturbing enough,” the Court decided to remand the case to the CA for
reception of evidence on the validity of the Manotoks’ title. It explained this extraordinary step
in the following wise:

It must be borne in mind that the disputed property is part of the “Friar Lands” over
which the Government holds title and are not public lands but private or patrimonial property
of the Government and can be alienated only upon proper compliance with the requirements
of Act No. 1120 or the Friar Lands Act.

xxx xxx xxx

The Alonso [v. Country Club] approach [of declaring that a former friar land still
legally belongs to the national government for failure of the private claimant to establish a
clear title thereto] especially appeals to us because, as in this case, the subject property
therein was a Friar Land which under the Friar Lands Law (Act No. 1120) may be disposed of
by the Government only under that law. Thus, there is greater concern on the part of this
Court to secure its proper transmission to private hands, if at all.

At the same time, the Court recognizes that there is not yet any sufficient evidence
for us to warrant the annulment of the Manotok title. All that the record indicates thus far is
evidence not yet refuted by clear and convincing proof that the Manotoks’ claim to title is
flawed. To arrive at an ultimate determination, the formal reception of evidence is in order.
This Court is not a trier of fact or otherwise structurally capacitated to receive and evaluate
evidence de novo. However, the Court of Appeals is sufficiently able to undertake such
function.

The Separate Concurring Opinion of Justice Carpio

Like the majority, J. Carpio holds that the the re-evaluation of the consolidated
petitions is proper even after entry of the 1st Division’s decision. He does not however join the
majority in remanding the case to the CA. He merely voted to GRANT of the Manotoks’
motion for reconsideration, REVERSE the 1st Division’s decision and resolution and
RECALL its Entry of Judgment, and DENY the petition for administrative reconstitution
respondents Heirs of Homer L. Barque, Sr.

J. Carpio argued that the doctrine of immutability is not applicable in this case since
“the 12 December 2005 Decision never became final and executory,” thus:

There are two compelling jurisdictional reasons why the 12 December 2005 Decision
of the First Division never became final and executory. First, the First Division has no
jurisdiction to overturn a doctrine laid down by the Court en banc or in division [“such as the
decision in Sps. Antonio and Genoveva Balanon-Anicete, et al. v. Pedro Balanon”]. xxx.
 xxx xxx xxx

Second, the doctrine of immutability and unalterability of decisions applies only if the
trial court or hearing officer has jurisdiction over the subject matter. A decision rendered by a
trial court or hearing officer without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void and cannot
become final and executory. Such decision cannot even become res judicata because there
can be no conclusiveness of judgment if the trial court or hearing officer has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter.

In these cases, the LRA has no jurisdiction to reconstitute administratively the title of
the Barques because such reconstitution constitutes an indirect or collateral attack on
the pre-existing Torrens title of the Manotoks over the same property. Section 48 of the
Property Registration Decree states that a “certificate of title shall not be subject to a
collateral attack.” The LRA, or even any court for that matter, has no jurisdiction to entertain
a collateral attack on a Torrens title. The Manotoks’ prior title must be deemed valid and
subsisting as it cannot be assailed through collateral attack in the reconstitution proceedings.

J. Carpio noted “a surfeit of forgeries and badges of fraud” regarding the Barque title.
He also distinguished the Manotoks’ and the Barques’ situations, thus: “[A]t the time of the
reconstitution of the Manotoks’ title, the Barques had no “duly issued existing Torrens title"
from the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. When the Barques filed the reconstitution of their
title, the Manotoks already had a prior title, which was the only “duly issued existing Torrens
title” over the property issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.”

On the question of whether the LRA has jurisdiction, in administrative reconstitution

proceedings, to rule which between two titles over the same property is valid, or who between
two claimants over the same property is the lawful owner, J. Carpio held in the negative, thus:

...[R]econstitution, even judicial reconstitution, does not confirm or adjudicate

ownership over a property. Reconstitution merely restores a missing certificate of title in the
same condition that it was when lost or destroyed, nothing more. If the original title had a
legal defect at the time of the loss or destruction, as when the land covered is part of the
public forest, the reconstituted title does not cure such defect. xxx.

On the question of whether equity can be used to justify the collateral attack on the
Manotoks’ title at the LRA level, he reasoned: “no court can extend equity jurisdiction to the
LRA where the law has expressly reserved exclusive original jurisdiction to the Regional Trial
Court. No court, invoking equity jurisdiction, can also allow a collateral attack on a Torrens
title, either before the LRA or before itself, in gross violation of Section 48 of the Property
Registration Decree expressly prohibiting collateral attacks on Torrens titles.”

The Separate Opinion of Justice Corona

J. Corona’s joined the majority in reversing the 1st Division and in remanding the case
to the CA for further proceedings. According to him, “the First Division . . . enlarged the scope
of the authority of the [LRA] in administrative reconstitution proceedings when it recognized
the authority of the LRA to rule that petitioners’ certificate of title was a sham, spurious and
not duly issued” since “under PD 1529, the LRA has no authority to rule on the authenticity
and validity of a certificate of title.”

The referral of the case to the CA for the “complete determination of contentious
factual issues” is necessitated because “the investigation and appreciation of facts is beyond
the province of [the Supreme Court] as it is neither a trier of fact nor capacitated to appreciate
evidence at the first instance. On the other hand, the [CA] has the competence to perform
that task.”

The dissenting opinion of Justice Ynares-Santiago

 J. Ynares-Santiago found no compelling reason to further require the referral of these
cases to the RTC or the CA for a re-litigation of the issues already raised and resolved by the
two divisions of the CA and affirmed by the Court's 1st Division in its final and executory
decision dated December 12, 2005. She reasoned that the doctrine of immutability of final
and executory decisions precludes the Court from taking this unprecedented action.

Particularly, the lady justice found “no justifiable basis to disturb the LRA finding that
[the Barques’] Plan FLS-3168-D indeed exists in the official files of LMB, DENR;” thus, she
held that “[the Barques’] title, TCT No. 210177, which describes Lot 823 as subdivided into
Lots 823-A and 823-B in accordance with Fls-3168-D, [is] in order.”

She would also sustain the LRA finding that the Manotoks’ reconstituted title is
“spurious, considering petitioners' failure to prove facts contrary to the LRA findings.” She
concluded that “since the property covered by [the Manotoks’] reconstituted title is not the
property in Matandang Balara that they are occupying as clearly shown by their own
documentary evidence, it necessarily follows that they are not the owners of such property.”

On the issue of the jurisdiction of the CA to order the cancellation of the Manotoks’
title and the reconstitution of the Barques’ title, she held:

The Court of Appeals . . . has the corresponding authority and jurisdiction to decide
the appealed case on the basis of the uncontroverted facts and admissions contained in the
petition, comment, reply, rejoinder, and memoranda, filed by the parties, and to apply the law
applicable in administrative reconstitution proceeding which is Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6732.

Section 10, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court specifically mandates that “the findings of
fact of the court or agency concerned, when supported by substantial evidence, shall be
binding on the Court of Appeals.” Since petitioners were not able to show that the LRA
findings of fact were unsupported by evidence, the Court of Appeals committed no error of
jurisdiction when it confirmed such findings.

Moreover, Section 11 of R.A. No. 6732 provides that:

SEC. 11. A reconstituted title obtained by means of fraud, deceit or other machination is
void ab initio as against the party obtaining the same and all persons having knowledge
thereof.

Thus, the Court of Appeals had the authority to order the cancellation of petitioners’
reconstituted TCT No. RT-22481 after it affirmed the findings of the LRA that petitioners’ TCT
No. RT-22481 is spurious and void ab initio. Having also affirmed the LRA finding that
respondents’ title, TCT No. 210177, is genuine, valid and existing, the Court of Appeals
likewise had the authority to order its reconstitution since this was the final step in the
administrative reconstitution process.

On the issue of whether the LRA has jurisdiction to administratively reconstitute the
Barques’ title despite the Manotoks’ previously reconstituted title, J. Ynares-Santiago held in
the affirmative. She cited the fact that it appears from the records that the location and
technical description of the properties described in the parties’ respective titles are not the
same. Thus, “[i]t is . . . misleading and baseless for [the Manotoks] to assert that their
previously reconstituted title . . . covers the same property as that identified and described in
[the Barques’ title] so as to deprive the LRA of jurisdiction over [the Barques’] petition for
reconstitution.”

However, even assuming that both parties’ respective titles cover the same property,
the LRA would still have jurisdiction over respondents' petition for reconstitution, thus:

As [the Manotoks] themselves admit, they caused the administrative reconstitution of

their TCT No. RT 22481 in 1991 under R.A. No. 6732. On the other hand, [the Barques’] TCT
No. 210177 shows that it was issued on September 24, 1975 by the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City. Its existence was likewise confirmed by the LRA in its Resolution of June 24,
1998 based on the logbook of the Register of Deeds, which contains the list of titles lost
during the fire that destroyed its records in 1988.

[The Barques’] TCT No. 210177 was, therefore, in existence at the time [the
Manotoks] filed their petition for reconstitution. In Alipoon v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled
that:
[I]nasmuch as TCT No. T-17224 has been in existence as early as March 16, 1933,
the issuance in 1989 of a reconstituted original certificate of title bearing the number
OCT No. RO 12890 (N.A.) over Lot No. 663 in the name of petitioners' parents Fausto
Alipoon and Silveria Duria is rendered legally doubtful, and the reconstituted title is
void.

It, therefore, follows that [the Manotoks’] reconstituted title, even assuming the same
to have been duly reconstituted, was deemed nullified by the mere existence of [the Barques’]
title at the time of the administrative reconstitution of [the Manotoks’] title. xxx.

On whether the LRA has jurisdiction to adjudicate the validity of the Manotoks’ title in
the administrative reconstitution proceedings filed by the Barques, J. Ynares-Santiago held in
the affirmative, reasoning that “[s]ince the LRA had the duty to resolve the petition for
reconstitution as well as [the Manotoks’] opposition thereto, it necessarily had to examine the
title of the parties, using its technical expertise, to determine if the petition for reconstitution
should be given due course, or denied as prayed for by the [Manotoks].”

On whether the LRA or the CA has jurisdiction to decide the ownership of the
disputed property in the administrative reconstitution of title filed by the Manotoks, J. Ynares-
Santiago also held in the affirmative: “[S]ince [the Manotoks] themselves laid before the LRA
and the Court of Appeals all their evidence to prove the genuineness of their reconstituted
title and their ownership of the property in dispute, the Court of Appeals had the
corresponding authority and jurisdiction to pass upon these issues.”