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Mediated public diplomacy: Satellite TV news in the Arab world and

perception effects
Shahira Fahmy, Wayne Wanta and Erik C Nisbet
International Communication Gazette 2012 74: 728
DOI: 10.1177/1748048512459144

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Article

the International
Communication Gazette
Mediated public 74(8) 728–749
ª The Author(s) 2012
diplomacy: Satellite TV Reprints and permission:
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news in the Arab world DOI: 10.1177/1748048512459144

gaz.sagepub.com

and perception effects

Shahira Fahmy
University of Arizona, USA

Wayne Wanta
University of Florida, USA

Erik C Nisbet
Ohio State University, USA

Abstract
Using Entman’s work on mediated public diplomacy, the authors conducted an Arabic-
language online survey of news consumers on Arab websites, including one US-funded
media outlet. They examined factors leading to gaps in exposure and perceptions of
credibility for three Arab news outlets. Specifically, they examined variables that differ-
entiated between exposure to and perceived credibility regarding the three satellite
news media – al-Jazeera, al-Arabiya, and al-Hurra. Results showed that issue importance
and attitudes toward the United States were significant predictors of exposure gaps
between the US-funded network and other Arab media. Exposure gaps were also pow-
erful predictors of perceived credibility.

Keywords
al-Arabiya, al-Hurra, al-Jazeera, credibility, mediated public diplomacy

Corresponding author:
Shahira Fahmy, University of Arizona, College of Social and Behavioral Sciences, School of Journalism, School of
Middle Eastern and North African Studies, Department of Communication, 845 N. Park Avenue, Marshall
Building 328, P.O. Box 210158B, Tucson, AZ 85721-0158, USA.
Email: sfahmy@email.arizona.edu

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Fahmy et al. 729

The United States has made several attempts to improve its image in the Arab world,
from altering trade relationships to offering funding to combat terrorism. An important
initiative began in 2004 when al-Hurra, a satellite network funded by the United States,
was launched. Questions remain about the effectiveness of this new medium, however.
The current study examines factors that could affect the perceived credibility among
three media, including al-Hurra. It examines factors related to exposure to al-Hurra,
al-Arabiya, and al-Jeezera. Since exposure gaps likely exist between these three media,
variables that influence this gap could explain whether al-Hurra has been effective in
reaching individuals. Religious and political backgrounds, as well as demographics, may
play some role in how the three media are viewed by the public. This study thus also
explores Entman’s theoretical model on mediated US public diplomacy that suggests the
success of the United States in promoting favorable foreign policies mainly depends on
audiences’ positive political attitudes towards it.
Satellite news networks have spread widely across the Middle East for over a decade.
Adopting a western broadcasting style, these satellite networks, including al-Jazeera and
al-Arabiya have used advertising as a source of revenue, and broadcast a wide range of
news and public affairs programming shows, as well as entertainment and family-
oriented offerings (Ayish, 2001; Seib, 2007). Some critics cited the spread of these
TV networks – that use state-of-the-art technology – as a key factor in spreading of
anti-US sentiments in the Arab world. Thus in an effort to win the hearts and minds
of the Arab public, al-Hurra, a network adopting a more western style of reporting and
funded by the United States, has recently emerged as a viable media option.
Data for this study come from an Arabic-language online survey conducted in 2008 of
transnational Arab TV users. In cooperation with the al-Arabiya and al-Hurra
networks a link to the online survey was posted prominently on the front-page of the offi-
cial al-Arabiya and al-Hurra websites (in Arabic). Employing these survey data this
study examines perceptions of Arab media consumers. Specifically, the present study
examines factors that differentiate between exposure to and perceived credibility about
the three satellite news media – al-Jazeera, al-Arabiya, and al-Hurra.

The rise of satellite TV in the Arab world

Historically TV stations in Arab countries operated within ministries of information and
were funded by the government. Overall the media in these countries enjoyed few press
freedoms and Arab people had little reason to trust the information they received from
their government-controlled media (see Rugh, 2004). Governments in the Arab world
held a monopoly over television, based on the belief that television should serve as a
government operation designed to promote national development goals (Ayish, 2004;
Boyd, 1999; Fahmy and Johnson, 2007b; Rugh, 2004).
For decades local TV stations in the Arab world mainly presented protocol news.
These included shots of heads of state delivering long, dry speeches that were in line with
government policies. After the first Gulf War, however, Lynch (2006) and other media
scholars suggested that the rise of Arabic satellite news stations (such as al-Jazeera and
al-Arabiya) largely eliminated Arab governments’ monopoly over the news and also

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730 the International Communication Gazette 74(8)

served to positively transform the Arab region politically and culturally (El-Nawawy and
Iskandar, 2002; Rugh, 2004; Seib, 2007). Indeed scholars agree that the rise of these net-
works has caused Arab governments to use state-of-the-art technology and to encourage
more professional-style news-gathering and broadcasting (Ayish, 2001, 2004; Johnson
and Fahmy, 2010; Seib, 2007).

Al-Arabiya network
In March 2003, to compete with al-Jazeera network, Saudi Arabia’s Middle East Broad-
casting Centre (MBC) launched al-Arabiya channel. Unlike the US-funded al-Hurra
station – which broadcast both news and entertainment – al-Arabiya is an all-news
channel that positioned itself as a moderate alternative to rivals such as al-Jazeera
(Al-Saggaf, 2006; Riegert, 2006; The Economist, 2005; Zayani and Ayish, 2006).
Designed to be an independent voice and modeled on al-Jazerra’s style of broadcast-
ing al-Arabiya tried to provide multiple perspectives on news events, with a focus on
news of interest to Arab viewers (Zayani and Ayish, 2006). On one hand, similar to its
competitor al-Jazeera, it would not shy away from presenting controversial topics. In
fact its creator, Walid Al-Ibrahim, asserted that the network considers itself a vehicle
of change in the Arab world ‘toward democracy and an opponent of dictatorship, repres-
sion and Islamic extremism’ (Zayani and Ayish, 2006: 483). On the other hand, unlike its
rival, it avoided the talk shows that have generated many of the criticisms leveled toward
al-Jazeera (Lynch, 2006). Al-Arabiya emphasized instead hourly news bulletins,
commentaries, business, sports, and documentaries (Zayani and Ayish, 2006). As Zayani
and Ayish explain:

Al-Arabiya strives to match al-Jazeera’s proclaimed independence while avoiding its

provocative style, eschewing its sensationalistic appeal, insisting on making a clear distinc-
tion between fact and opinion, and steering clear from the politics of other Arab and
especially Gulf countries. By and large, al-Arabiya pitched itself as a neutral channel that
cares for Arab interests and staying away from pursuing ambiguous agendas and other
parties’ interests (p. 483).

Indeed, al-Arabiya has presented itself as being more moderate and mainstream than al-
Jazeera. As chief editor Abdul Rahman al-Rashed explained, ‘We attract liberal-minded
people. Al-Jazeera attracts fanatics’ (The Economist, 2005). The more moderate tone has
even extended to the Iraq War coverage. For instance, while al-Jazeera focused on civil-
ian and Iraqi resistance during the marine offensive against Fallujah, al-Arabiya por-
trayed the event as the storming of a terrorist haven (The Economist, 2005). Indeed,
because of its Saudi ownership, critics of al-Arabiya have claimed that its content is
more controlled than al-Jazeera because it reflects loyalty to both Saudi Arabia and the
United States (The Economist, 2005; Zayani and Sahraoui, 2007).
However, al-Arabiya also resembles al-Jazeera in a way that has helped it appeal to
the Arab audience: it has raised the ire of the US government. Though al-Arabiya has
taken a more moderate approach to the Iraq War (Blake, 2005; The Economist, 2005;
Zayani and Ayish, 2006), it has also emphasized the human toll of the conflict in terms

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Fahmy et al. 731

of civilian deaths (Fahmy and Johnson, 2007a) as well as broadcast messages from insur-
gents and shown visuals of slain soldiers (Blake, 2005).1 Also similar to al-Jazeera,
al-Arabiya has suffered the consequences. Both satellite stations were locked out of offi-
cial press conferences by the Iraqi government and al-Arabiya’s Baghdad office was shut
down for more than two months. Further, a car bomb exploded outside al-Arabiya’s
compound in 2004, collapsing the first floor and killing five employees (Blake, 2005).
According to an audience poll by IPSOS-STAT, al-Arabiya has surpassed al-Jazeera
in ratings among Arab audiences (Snyder, 2006a, 2006b). Snyder (2006a, 2000b) sug-
gests that al-Arabiya has been able to surpass its main competitor because its content
includes family-oriented material and a series of exclusive interviews and controversial
interview topics, making it a moderate news outlet that is in tune with what viewers want
to watch. But scholars debated the findings of this IPSOS-STAT poll, especially when
polls by Zogby International (Aslawsat, 2006) and Shibley Telhami (2008), reported
al-Jazeera is the first choice for international news among 45% of Arab audiences
surveyed.
Regarding the credibility of al-Arabiya, in a survey of 150 students that were ran-
domly selected from the University of Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates, Ayish
(2004) found the credibility of al-Arabiya ranking third, behind al-Jazeera and the Abu
Dhabi TV channels. The Arab Advisors Group (2004), however, rated al-Jazeera and
al-Arabiya channels as equally credible.

The evolution of public diplomacy

In US foreign policy there has been a strong and ongoing tradition of public diplomacy.
Historically, public diplomacy has been defined as the engagement between one govern-
ment and the people of another country with the aim of managing the international
environment (Cull, 2009). One example of engagement could be in the form of promot-
ing an idea, such as promoting positive attitudes toward US foreign policy.
Edmunc Gullion first coined the term public diplomacy in 1965. The term referred to
the process of international information and cultural relations. The United States quickly
adopted the public diplomacy term because it offered a benign alternative to terms like
‘propaganda and psychological warfare’ (see Cull, 2009: 17), thus allowing for a clear
distinction between democratic practices in the United States and propaganda policies
pursued by the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
Over the years Gilboa (2002) explains public diplomacy has used media to cultivate
favorable views toward a specific country. For example as early as 1978, the United
States Information Agency (USIA) used the term public diplomacy to justify its influ-
ence over Voice of America (VOA) radio that broadcast news to engage foreign publics
of many countries beyond the United States’s borders.
Nowadays the world has moved toward new public diplomacy, thus shifting public
diplomacy mechanisms into communicating with publics of other countries using new,
and global technologies (such as the US funding of al-Hurra satellite television in the
Arab world). Recently, based on this new public diplomacy direction, Joseph Nye
(2004) used the term ‘soft power,’ referring to the ability of achieving desired changes
in the international environment using culture attractiveness rather than military or

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732 the International Communication Gazette 74(8)

Table 1. Information on satellite TV stations examined.

TV network Year established Funding Based city/country

al-Jazeera 1996 Emir of Qatar Doha/Qatar

al-Arabiya 2003 Mainly from Saudi Arabia Dubai/UAE
al-Hurra 2004 US Congress Washington area/United States

economic power. A good example of soft power public diplomacy is the US-funded al-
Hurra TV network. Its broadcasting not only includes news but also the broadcasting of
NBA basketball games, music and other entertainment content that could be deemed cul-
turally attractive for the Arab public.

Al-Hurra network
As part of a large-scale mediated public diplomacy effort to improve United States’s
image in the Middle East, al-Hurra TV station (meaning ‘The Free One’ in Arabic) was
launched in 2004 (see Table 1) to explain the US foreign policy and provide a compre-
hensive view of US culture and society (see Baylouny, 2005; El-Nawawy, 2006, 2007).
Further, some observers noted that in an effort to gain popularity it provided viewers
with both news and entertainment content (including cookery shows, travel shows, and
sport games).
In terms of news, the station’s directors have claimed that its main objective is to
provide relatively fresh and balanced versions of news events. As Mouafac Harb
(2004: 21), the former news director of al-Hurra explained: ‘We do our work the way
it is supposed to be done. We play it straight and we behave like news professionals
because that is what we are.’
The Arab-language satellite television channel broadcasts to 22 Middle Eastern coun-
tries. Because Arab viewers are savvy media consumers who can pick from hundreds of
satellite channels, however, the question arises as to how successful the US-funded
station has been in winning the hearts and minds of Arab audiences (Wise, 2005). Since
the network was created and funded by the United States, political observers have
claimed that Arab viewers perceive it as a propaganda station – with the aim of selling
the US government’s policies in the region – and therefore always hold its credibility
under suspicion (El-Nawawy, 2006, 2007; Wise, 2005). On issues such as the Palesti-
nian/Israeli conflict, for example, al-Hurra’s claim of objectivity may hold little appeal
for Arab viewers, particularly because they could potentially seek alternative news out-
lets to support their preconceived notions regarding the Middle Eastern conflict
(El-Nawawy, 2006). Further, critics have argued that the network has hardly achieved
its claimed goal of objective reporting. Baylouny (2005), for example, found that its cov-
erage heavily relied on US officials, with President Bush’s speeches extensively covered
and the US war efforts portrayed in a positive light. Al-Hurra has also been criticized for
what it cannot cover, such as airing interviews with leaders of terrorist groups or present-
ing negative views regarding the coalition efforts in Iraq. Supporters of the network,
however, noted that al-Hurra has not acted as a puppet of US foreign policy. In their

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Fahmy et al. 733

view, the station does indeed report stories that reflect negatively on the US occupation
in Iraq, including anti-US protests in the Middle East (see Wise, 2005). Because of
broadcasting stories that are both anti-American and anti-Israeli, for example, the net-
work has come under criticism from the US Congress and other government and public
officials (Linzer, 2008; Whitlock, 2008).
Overall, al-Hurra has received a mixed reception from its target audience and polling
results have not been clear-cut. While a recent study by IPSOS-STAT, for example,
found that approximately 26 million viewers watched al-Hurra station in the last week
(Whitlock, 2008), Shibley Telhami, an expert on US policy in the Middle East, and par-
ticularly on the role of the news media in shaping political identity and public opinion in
the region, explained that the network’s impact on public opinion in the Arab world has
been negligible. He described its influence as ‘less than zero. . . . For most people in the
region . . . it’s not really on the radar screen’ (Linzer, 2008). Similarly, Zogby Interna-
tional found in a 2008 survey that only 2% of Arab viewers listed the network as their
primary source of international news.
To gauge the credibility of the TV station, a survey of students in five Arab countries
revealed the network’s overall credibility was relatively low (El-Nawawy, 2006, 2007).
Another Arabic-language survey posted on al-Jazeera website compared the credibility
of the three networks under study (in addition to local Arab stations). Results confirmed
the perceived low credibility of al-Hurra by Arab viewers. Respondents judged al-
Jazeera as most credible, followed by al-Arabiya. Respondents rated al-Hurra and local
Arab stations lowest on all credibility measures examined (see Johnson and Fahmy,
2010).
These results are not surprising however. Wise (2005) explains that in the Arab world
people are generally skeptical of news from al-Hurra TV. For many Arabs al-Hurra
news appears to be a spin from a government (the United States) they don’t particularly
trust to begin with (Wise, 2005).
Heavy users of the channel, however, were more likely to judge it as credible
(El-Nawawy, 2006, 2007), which supports earlier credibility studies that suggest people
judge the media they rely on as the most credible (e.g. ASNE, 1985; Auter et al., 2004,
2005; Johnson and Fahmy, 2008; Wanta and Hu, 1994; Westley and Severin, 1964).
Overall, while the network that has been known to cover more positive and upbeat stories
(e.g. Wise [2005] explains when Hamas founder Sheikh Yassin was assassinated al-
Jazeera, and al-Arabiya, and other channels carried wall-to-wall live coverage of the
event, while al-Hurra continued to broadcast a cookery show). Thus, it is indeed unclear
whether al-Hurra has achieved its primary aim of shifting perceptions of Arab audiences
in favor of US policy. Interestingly, El-Nawawy (2006, 2007) reported that students’ atti-
tudes toward US foreign policy have actually worsened since they began watching
al-Hurra.

Theoretical framework
Entman (2008) attempted to theorize mediated public diplomacy extending the cascad-
ing network activation model to the international communication process. He explained
the success and failure of US government efforts to promote favorable framing of US

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734 the International Communication Gazette 74(8)

foreign policies (such as the launching of al-Hurra network) depends most notably on
the cultural and the political congruency between the United States and, in this case, the
audiences of Arab nations. Entman (2008: 93–94) wrote that ‘activating and spreading
pro-United States counter-frames in foreign nations requires a degree of congruence
between the target nation’s dominant political culture and the facts of US policy, or
cultural overlap or ambiguity as minimum.’ Thus the authors’ primary goal here is not
to use Entman’s model to analyze frames of foreign policy coverage but to understand
how Arab audiences’ perceptions of various factors (such as having positive values and
attitudes toward the US political culture) could influence their degree of perceived
credibility toward US mediated public diplomacy initiatives, such as al-Hurra TV.
A review of the literature suggests that for the most part US presidents often control
frames of foreign policy in US media (see Bennett, 1990; Sobel, 2001). This suggests that
on issues, in which foreign policy matters the president and his government completely
dominate media framing (Bennett, 1990; Entman, 2004; Robinson, 2002). However, in the
case here, Arab audiences’ interaction with the media of their own countries could cer-
tainly have an impact regarding whether they would be inclined to believe media
produced by the US government. The following scenarios for example illustrate the impor-
tance of cultural and political congruency suggested by Entman (2008) in establishing
more or less promising conditions for successful mediated public diplomacy.
Consider the contrast between Arab reactions to the US-led interventions during the
first Gulf War and the most recent war in Iraq in 2003. In the first scenario, the Gulf War
was perceived as an unprovoked invasion by Saddam Hussein against the sovereign
nation of Kuwait. Thus, it was easier then to gain Arab elite and public support when the
first President Bush intervened. In the second scenario, however, the pre-emptive strike
launched on Iraq by the United States and its allies evoked negative reactions and rejec-
tion of US foreign policy in much of the Arab world. In this case, Arabs and Arab media
did not favor the US framing of that war and their frame happened not to coincide with
the White House frame. In fact the US administration was out of luck.
Regarding Arabs’ perceptions, Fahmy and Johnson (2007a) reported in a study of 638
online users of al-Jazeera that respondents perceive US media such as CNN have a dif-
ferent audience and therefore US news is not catered to audiences in the Arab world,
missing valuable information available in other media sources (such as Arab media). For
example the majority of the respondents in their study supported the broadcasting of
graphic scenes of the recent Iraq War on Arabic television – scenes deemed too graphic
to be made available in US media. One Arab viewer clarified this: ‘Al Jazeera doesn’t
show unpleasant pictures or scenes, these are the real pictures of the truth . . . and if any
government [USA)] objects to this coverage then it should stop making bad news, which
means stop causing those unpleasant scenes and not criticizing the media [Arab media]
for broadcasting it’ (Fahmy and Johnson, 2007a: 256).
Ironically, Dallek (1982) explains that when the United States tends to intervene in
foreign countries, most of the US public sees the act as altruistic. Further, Jentleson and
Britton (1998) explain if the public then is convinced of the prudence and success of this
policy, they will support it. Foreign nations give the United States no such benefit of the
doubt (e.g. see quote in paragraph above). Entman (2008: 95) illuminates that ‘many
other nations’ political cultures are generally more congruent with oppositional framings

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Fahmy et al. 735

of U.S. policies,’ and thus, complicating the task of foreign elites who do or had been
supporting the United States such as former President Mubarak in Egypt, for example.
Thus, Arab media have little incentive to antagonize their audiences by supporting the
United States when US foreign policies could potentially conflict with the Arab political,
religious cultures and media of their own countries.
As mentioned earlier, new public diplomacy typically uses media to cultivate favor-
able views toward a specific country. Entman (2008) clarifies that public diplomacy
involves targeted efforts using mass communication – such as the US-funded al-Hurra
network launched to increase support of US foreign policies among Arab audiences
beyond US borders – making clear distinctions between elite and mass publics.
However, opposition and resistance by publics and elites to mediated public diplomacy
might occur when US policies for example threaten the widely perceived national inter-
ests of another Arab country (such as the occupation of Iraq or the Palestinian territories).
The elites and publics according to Entman (2008) might well reject then even the most
sophisticated mediated public diplomacy initiatives.
Is there still some hope then? According to a 2003 study by Gentzkow and Shapiro,
they suggested that Muslims exposed to CNN were more likely to reject the belief that
the 9/11 attack was not carried out by Arabs. Ideally, according to Entman (2008),
mediated public diplomacy could stimulate favorable portrayals of the United States
in foreign Arab/Muslim media, yielding a more favorable public opinion toward the
United States. These positive sentiments would then feed back to foreign elites in these
countries who would then support the United States publicly – leading to even more pos-
itive media coverage and mutual understanding between the United States and the Arab
World.
However, the opposite might be more familiar. Arab allies of the United States (Saudi
Arabia is a good example) might remain silent or in some cases even actively oppose the
US foreign policy in a culture that is deeply rooted in a political environment of skepti-
cism toward the United States among its elites, news professionals and the public. These
negative anti-US sentiments would then naturally feed back, creating further opposition
and negative media coverage toward the United States.
Indeed, many nations – specifically after 9/11 and during the Iraq War – have
developed hostile feelings toward the United States almost on principle, and many are
still skeptical. The United States as a super-power has had to deal with anti-US senti-
ments from foreign publics throughout the world – especially among the more literate
and developed countries. For example, in a recent poll, several countries rated the United
States’ global influence as predominantly negative. These countries included: Canada,
Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Britain, Spain, France, Russia, Germany, South Korea, China
and Iraq, among others (BBC World Service Global Poll, 2006).

Research questions
Given the vast differences among the three Arab media, the current study was designed
to examine differences among viewership and impact. The authors examined predictors
in terms of gaps in exposure and credibility. Gaps were used rather than absolute

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736 the International Communication Gazette 74(8)

constructed measures to allow for more precise evaluations regarding the impact of
potential predictors examined:

RQ1: What are the predictors (sociodemographics, religion and cultural beliefs,
political orientations, issue importance and perceptions of the United States)
regarding gaps in frequency of exposure between al-Hurra and al-Arabiya,
al-Hurra and al-Jazeera, and al-Arabiya and al-Jazeera TV channels?
RQ2: What are the predictors (sociodemographics, religion and cultural beliefs, polit-
ical orientations, issue importance and perceptions of the United States) regarding
gaps in perceived credibility between al-Hurra and al-Arabiya, al-Hurra and
al-Jazeera, and al-Arabiya and al-Jazeera TV channels?

Method
Data collection
In winter 2008, the lead author, who is fluent in Arabic contacted senior executives
of al-Arabiya and al-Hurra networks in the Middle East, requesting their assistance
in putting a URL on the Arabic websites of their news organizations. Note that the
authors had also planned on including al-Jazeera network in this study but unfortu-
nately the executives backed out of participating in this project the day the survey
was conducted.
The questionnaire was posted in the Arabic language. It was first written in English
and then translated into Arabic and once more back-translated into English. Back-
translation was done to ensure accurate translation and cultural compatibility with the
Arab culture. The questionnaire was then pre-tested to ensure collecting valid and
reliable data.
A link to the survey hyperlink was posted for four weeks – from 27 March 2008 to 25
April 2008. It was posted prominently on the front-pages of the official al-Arabiya and
al-Hurra websites (in Arabic) only. After paying a major university survey center to con-
duct the survey, a total of 1109 questionnaires were completed by 25 April 2008, with a
cooperation rate of 15.3%. This rate was based on the number of visitors who visited the
URL of the online questionnaire on the two websites.

The dependent measures: Perceived credibility and overall exposure

Previous literature suggests that how credible one views a medium is strongly related to
how often one relies on it (ASNE, 1985; Auter et al., 2004, 2005; Johnson and Fahmy,
2008; Wanta and Hu, 1994; Westley and Severin, 1964).

Perceived credibility. For each channel this variable was measured by asking respondents
on five-point scales to rate the ‘overall competence,’ ‘overall balance,’ and ‘overall trust-
worthiness’ of each channel. The respondent scores were combined into one
additive index assessing perceived credibility of al-Hurra (M ¼ 7.9, SD ¼ 3.9,
a ¼ .91), al-Jazeera (M ¼ 10.9, SD ¼ 3.9, a ¼ .89), and al-Arabiya (M ¼ 11.1,

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Fahmy et al. 737

Table 2. Overall exposure and perceived credibility measures.

al-Jazeera al-Arabiya al-Hurra

Overall exposure
How many days a week do you watch each of the
following TV channels?
- Every day 49.1% 54.7% 16.5%
- 5–6 days 6.7% 9.0% 3.0%
- 3–4 days 9.0% 10.6% 5.3%
- 1–2 days 19.4% 15.7% 14.5%
- Never 15.9% 10.0% 60.7%

How often do you visit the websites of each of the

following TV channels?
- Several times a day 20.1% 34.0% 3.8%
- About once a day 14.7% 28.8% 4.2%
- A few times a week 13.1% 14.2% 5.8%
- About once a week 8.0% 6.4% 3.3%
- About once a month 16.7% 8.1% 7.8%
- Never/not sure 27.4% 8.5% 75.1%

Perceived credibility
Overall competence
- Very and somewhat competent 73.5% 76.3% 30.4%
- Very and somewhat incompetent 21.8% 20.5 43.5
- Not sure 4.7% 3.2% 26.1%
Overall balance
- Very and somewhat balanced 59.5% 64.6% 27.4%
- Very and somewhat unbalanced 36.0% 32.0% 45.4%
- Not sure 4.5% 3.4% 27.2%
Overall trustworthiness
- Very and somewhat trustworthy 66.5% 70.9% 30.2%
- Very and somewhat untrustworthy 30.4% 26.8% 49.2%
- Not sure 3.1% 2.3% 20.6%

SD ¼ 3.7, a ¼ .88). Constructed measures for each channel were subtracted from each
other to create indicators of credibility gaps among TV channels.

Overall exposure to each Arab TV channel. This variable was measured by combining two
survey items. The first survey measure asked respondents how many days a week res-
pondents watched al-Hurra (M ¼ 2.7, SD ¼ 2.6), al-Arabiya (M ¼ 5.9, SD ¼ 2.6), and
al-Jazeera (M ¼ 5.4, SD ¼ 2.9). The second survey item asked respondents how often they
visited the website of al-Hurra (M ¼ 1.7, SD ¼ 1.4), al-Arabiya (M ¼ 4.5, SD ¼ 1.6), and
al-Jazeera (M ¼ 3.4, SD ¼ 1.9) on a six-point scale ranging from ‘never’ to ‘several times a
day.’ The measures for each TV channel were standardized and combined into one overall
measure of exposure frequency. Constructed measures for each channel were then sub-
tracted from each other to create indicators of exposure gaps between TV channels.
The measures for perceived credibility and exposure are reported in Table 2.

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The independent measures

The web-based questionnaire specifically explored five independent variables dealing
with sociodemographics,2 religious and cultural beliefs,3 political orientations,4 issue
importance,5 and perceptions of the United States6 (this set of five variables are fully
described in the endnotes section). The authors selected these variables based on past lit-
erature and previous polls dealing with media in the Arab world (e.g. Nisbet, 2007a,
2007b; Telhami, 2005, 2008).
Regarding issue importance for example, past literature suggests this variable acts as
a function of media use and individuals’ predispositions when forming opinions or mak-
ing judgments (see Iyengar, 1990). Issue importance has therefore been used in several
studies surveying Arab populations, such as polls by Zogby International (Telhami,
2005, 2008). In fact two of the items used to measure this variable were borrowed from
a survey conducted by Zogby International and the University of Maryland (Telhami,
2005). In this survey respondents from six Arab countries were asked to rate the impor-
tance of each of the following: ‘Advancing democracy’ and ‘Resolving the Israel–Pales-
tinian conflict.’ The authors decided to add a third item to this variable: ‘Resolving the
Iraqi conflict.’ The choice is justified due to the importance of the Iraq War at the time
this study was conducted.7 Numerous questions related to how Arabs feel about the war
in Iraq have also appeared in surveys by Zogby International (e.g. Telhami, 2005, 2008).

Data analysis
Two different sets of analyses were then conducted employing ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression models. The first set of analyses examined predictors of gaps in fre-
quency of exposure between al-Hurra and al-Arabiya, al-Hurra and al-Jazeera, and
al-Arabiya and al-Jazeera TV channels. The second set of analyses examined predictors
of gaps in perceived credibility again between al-Hurra and al-Arabiya, al-Hurra and
al-Jazeera, and al-Arabiya and al-Jazeera TV channels.
The five sets of independent variables were entered into the models for both analyses:
sociodemographics, religious and cultural beliefs, political orientations, issue impor-
tance, and perceptions of the United States. The criterion measures in the first analyses
were constructed by assessing exposure to al-Hurra, al-Jazeera, and al-Arabiya and sub-
sequently creating three measures of exposure gaps between TV channels by subtracting
respondents’ scores for frequency of exposure to al-Arabiya from their frequency of
exposure to al-Hurra, frequency of exposure to al-Jazeera from frequency of exposure
to al-Hurra, and frequency of exposure to al-Jazeera from frequency of exposure to
al-Arabiya. The second analyses predicted credibility gaps between the three sets of
TV channels by constructing measures of perceived credibility for each Arab TV chan-
nel, then again subtracting respondents’ scores for perceived credibility of al-Arabiya
from perceived credibility of al-Hurra, perceived credibility of al-Jazeera from that
of al-Hurra, and the perceived credibility of al-Jazeera from the perceived credibility
of al-Arabiya. In addition, the constructed exposure gap measures for each set of TV
channels from the first analysis were also included in the second analyses as predictors
of perceived credibility gaps between channels.

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Fahmy et al. 739

Results
Demographics and characteristics
Demographically, respondents were from 48 different countries, with 30% of the respon-
dents from Saudi Arabia. More than 8 in 10 reported they were from the Middle East and
the rest of the respondents were from Europe and the United States. The mean age of
respondents was 30 and males greatly outnumbered females (93.3 to 6.7%). About
70% reported they were Sunni Muslims and almost 9 in 10 (88.1%) explained religion
is ‘important’ or ‘very important’ in their daily lives. The majority was employed and
about 70% had a yearly income between US$15,001 and US$20,000.
Regarding background, respondents represented a fairly educated background with
more than 7 in 10 (73.3%) having bachelor or graduate degrees. The majority (54.3%)
reported they were ‘very proficient’ and ‘proficient’ in the English language, but more than
8 in 10 (85.7%) reported they have never visited the United States. In terms of perceptions
of US foreign policy, more than 8 in 10 of the respondents (83%) ‘disagree’ or ‘strongly
disagree’ with the US policy toward Iraq, and 9 in 10 of respondents (90%) ‘disagree’ or
‘strongly disagree’ with the US policy toward the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Overall, the
majority of the respondents (67.5%) do not support the US war on terrorism. In terms of
watching the transnational TV channels under study, about 40% of the respondents watch
al-Hurra once a week. With regard to the other two channels, the majority of the respon-
dents watch al-Jazeera (55.8%) and al-Arabiya (63.7%) 5–7 days a week.
Though the survey is a convenience sample and cannot be considered representative
of the general Arab population, it does provide data on Arab audiences who select and
rely on transnational Arab TV as one of their major sources of information. Furthermore,
as Hayes (2005) notes, sample representativeness is less of a concern when examining
relationships between variables and communication processes (as is the case in this
study) rather than determining specific population parameter estimates. Lastly, Internet
surveys have been shown to lead to an increase in self-disclosure and reduction in self-
censorship, demand characteristics, and interviewer bias (Buchanan, 2000; Davis, 1999;
Smith and Leigh, 1997), which may be important factors when conducting survey data
collection within this population.

Predictors of gaps in frequency of exposure

According to the findings of Research Question 1 (Table 3)8 key factors that predicted
exposure to al-Hurra over al-Arabiya were the importance of resolving the Iraq conflict
(b ¼ .15, p  .001), identification with the United States (b ¼ .11, p  .01), confidence
in the United States (b ¼ .09, p  .01), and support for political Islam (b ¼ .09, p  .05).
Conversely, respondents who placed more importance on resolving the Israeli/Palesti-
nian conflict favored al-Arabiya over al-Hurra (b ¼ –.14, p  .001).
A similar pattern of variables predicted favoring al-Hurra over al-Jazeera, with
confidence in the United States (b ¼ .20, p  .001), placing more importance on Iraq
(b ¼.18, p  .001) and less importance on Israel/Palestine (b ¼ .26, p  .001), and social
identification with the United States (b ¼.15, p  .001) all associated with greater expo-
sure to al-Hurra compared to al-Jazeera. In addition, Arab TV audiences who placed

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740 the International Communication Gazette 74(8)

Table 3. OLS regression predicting exposure gaps.

al-Hurra vs. al-Hurra vs. al-Arabiya vs.

Predictors al-Arabiya al-Jazeera al-Jazeera

Religious and cultural beliefs

Muslim religiosity .03 .01 .00
Gender equality (support) .09 .01 .07
% Incremental explained R2 2.5 4.2 .3

Political orientations
Nationalist identity .06 .05 .12**
Support for political Islam .09* .01 .11***
Demand for democracy .06 .01 .07
Support for press freedom .00 .04 .08*
% incremental explained R2 1.3 2.4 4.6

Issue importance
Importance of Israeli/Palestinian .14*** .26*** .12**
conflict
Importance of the Iraq conflict .15*** .18*** .04
Importance of democracy .03 .08* .06
% Incremental explained R2 2.5 6.8 1.6

Perceptions of the United States

Social identification w/ United .11** .15*** .03
States
Confidence in the United States .09* .20*** .12**
% Incremental explained R2 2.4 6.7 1.4

Total % explained R2 35.5 42.4 21.1

*** p  .001, **p  .01, *p  .05. Reported are standardized betas. Controlling for residence in Saudi Arabia,
Iraq, age, education, gender, English proficiency, previous visits to the United States.

importance on advancing democracy in their countries (b ¼.08, p  .05) favored greater

exposure to al-Hurra over al-Jazeera.
A somewhat different pattern emerged when examining the exposure gap between
al-Arabiya and al-Jazeera. A nationalist political orientation (b ¼.12, p  .01) and con-
fidence in the United States (b ¼.12, p  .01) predicted greater exposure to al-Arabiya
than al-Jazeera. Conversely, respondents who support the role of Islam in politics (b ¼
–.11, p  .001), value press freedom (b ¼ –.08, p  .05), and place a great deal of impor-
tance on the Israeli/Palestinian conflict (b ¼ –.12, p  .01) are more likely to favor
watching al-Jazeera over al-Arabiya.

Predictors of gaps in perceived credibility

Table 4 presents the results of the findings of Research Question 2. The second analysis
employs OLS regression and reports standardized beta coefficients and incremental
explained variance in each model. As a means to explore patterns of mediation two sets

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Fahmy et al. 741

Table 4. OLS Regression predicting credibility gaps.

al-Hurra vs. al-Hurra vs. al-Arabiya vs.

al-Arabyia al-Jazeera al-Jazeera

Predictors Model 1 Model 1 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6

Religious and cultural beliefs

Muslim religiosity .01 .03 –.02 –.02 –.03 –.03
Gender equality (support) .12* .06 .01 .01 –.07 .02
% Incremental explained R2 2.9 2.9 5.3 5.3 1.7 1.7

Political orientations
Nationalist identity .08* .04 .07 .04 .14*** .06*
Support for political Islam .14*** .09* .07 .06 .17*** .10***
Demand for democracy .05 .02 .00 .01 .04 .01
Support for press freedom .10** .10** .02 .00 .09* .04
% Incremental explained R2 3.1 3.1 3.9 3.9 7.9 7.9

Issue importance
Importance of Israeli/Palestinian .14** .12 .21*** .04 .14*** .06
conflict
Importance of the Iraq conflict .11** .12 .11*** .00 .05 .03
Importance of democracy .01 .11 .07* .02 .06 .02
% Incremental explained R2 1.9 1.9 5.1 5.1 2.3 2.3

Perceptions of the United States

Social identification w/ United States .12** .05 .08 .03 .01 .03
Confidence in the United States .07 .01 .24*** .11*** .23*** .15***
% Incremental explained R2 1.9 1.9 6.3 6.3 3.9 3.9

Exposure gaps
al-Hurra vs. al-Arabiya .59***
al-Hurra vs. al-Jazeera .67***
al-Arabiya vs. al-Jazeera .68***
% Incremental explained R2 22.3 25.8 36.1

Total % explained R2 24.5 46.8 40.1 65.9 25.4 61.5

*** p  .001, **p  .01, *p  .05. Reported are standardized betas. Controlling for residence in Saudi Arabia,
Iraq, age, education, gender, English proficiency, previous visits to the United States.

of models are presented for each channel comparison, one set without exposure gaps as
predictors (models 1, 3, 5) and one set with exposure gaps included as an independent
variable in the analysis (models 2, 4, 6).
Without including exposure in the analysis (model 1), support for gender equality (b ¼
.12, p  .05), support for political Islam (b ¼ .14, p  .001), social identification with the
United States (b ¼ .12, p  .01), support for press freedom (b ¼ .10, p  .01), placing more
importance on Iraq (b ¼ .11, p  .01) and less importance on the Israel/Palestine conflict (b
¼ –.14, p  .01) were all associated with respondents perceiving al-Hurra as more credible
than al-Arabiya. Once the al-Hurra/al-Arabiya exposure gap (b ¼ .59, p  .001) is entered

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742 the International Communication Gazette 74(8)

into the analysis (model 2), most of these associations are completely mediated except for
support for political Islam (b ¼ .09, p  .05) and support for press freedom (b ¼ .10, p 
.01).
Turning to the perceived credibility of al-Hurra compared to al-Jazeera, without
including exposure (model 3) respondents who expressed confidence in the United States
(b ¼ .24, p  .001) and placed more importance on Iraq (b ¼ .11, p  .001) and advan-
cing democracy (b ¼ .07, p  .05), but less importance on the Israel/Palestine conflict (b
¼ –.21, p  .001), perceived al-Hurra as more credible than al-Jazeera. However, once
the al-Hurra/al-Arabiya exposure gap (b ¼ .67, p  .001) is included in the analysis
(model 4), only confidence in the United States (b ¼ .11, p  .001) remained as
predictor.
The last set of models compares the perceived credibility of al-Arabiya to that of
al-Jazeera. In model 5 (without exposure included), respondents who expressed a
national political identification (b ¼.14, p  .001) and confidence in the United States
(b ¼ .23, p  .001) were more likely to perceive al-Arabiya as more credible. Conver-
sely, the results of model 5 suggest that respondents who place more importance on
Israel/Palestine (b ¼ –.14, p  .001), support the role of Islam in politics (b ¼ –.17,
p  .001), and value press freedom (b ¼ –.09, p  .05) are more likely to perceive
al-Jazeera as more credible than al-Arabiya. After including the al-Arabiya/al-Jazeera
exposure gap (b ¼ .68, p  .001) in the analysis (model 6), the importance of the Israel/
Palestine conflict and support for press freedom are completely mediated, while support
for political Islam (b ¼ .10, p  .001), nationalist identification (b ¼ .06, p  .05), and
confidence in the United States (b ¼ .15, p  .001) are partially mediated.

Discussion
The present study examined variables that could predict media use and perceived cred-
ibility of three networks in the Middle East, including one funded by the United States.
The survey results suggest that respondents’ stands on issues lead to higher use of media,
but exposure mediates any possible effect of issue stance on perceived credibility. In
other words, respondents tended to choose their media based on the individuals’ issue
stands. If they generally supported US policy, respondents tended to use al-Hurra much
more frequently than the other two media. Respondents with anti-US sentiments used
al-Hurra less than the other two media. Respondents, however, did not necessarily
believe their chosen medium was highly credible once exposure level was accounted for.
Exposure level was an intervening variable that lessened any direct effect of issue stance
on credibility.
Several other findings are worth noting. First, exposure gaps between the US-funded
al-Hurra and the other two Arab media were based almost entirely on issue stance and
perceptions of the United States. These variables were especially important in the
comparison of al-Hurra and al-Jazeera. Generally, the exposure gaps between al-Hurra
and the two other media could be predicted by differences in the perceived importance of
the Israel/Palestine conflict, the perceived importance of the Iraq War, by their social
identification and their confidence in the United States. Their level of support for polit-
ical Islam also was a significant predictor of the gap between al-Hurra and al-Arabiya.

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Fahmy et al. 743

Thus, if respondents had views toward the United States that were positive and if respon-
dents perceived the Israel/Palestine conflict as more important than the Iraq conflict,
these respondents tended to use the US-funded medium more than Arab media.
Respondents’ attitude toward the importance of democracy was also significant in
predicting the exposure gap between al-Hurra and al-Jazeera. Notably, the total
explained variance rose from 35.5% for the gap between al-Hurra and al-Arabiya (the
medium with views that were closer to the United States) to 42.4% for the gap between
al-Hurra and al-Jazeera (the medium that was furthest away from US views).
Credibility gaps between the three media produced several different results. Without
accounting for exposure, support for gender equality was a significant predictor of the
credibility gap between al-Hurra and al-Arabiya. Notably, this was the only variable
dealing with religious and cultural beliefs that produced a statistically significant result.
Unlike the exposure analyses, political orientation played a significant role in predict-
ing credibility gaps between al-Hurra and al-Arabiya. Here, nationalist identity, support
for political Islam, and support for press freedom were all statistically significant. All
except nationalist identity remained significant after accounting for exposure.
The issue importance results for the credibility gaps without accounting for exposure
were identical to the tests for exposure gaps (importance of the Israeli/Palestinian con-
flict and importance of the Iraq War were significant for comparisons of al-Hurra and
both other media, and importance of democracy was significant for the comparison of
al-Hurra and al-Jazeera). However, all issue importance variables were removed from
the models after the introduction of the exposure gap variable. In other words, exposure
to the medium was much more powerful of a predictor of credibility than the issue
variables. On the surface, this result appears to conflict with the results of Rimmer and
Weaver (1987) that found credibility and exposure were unrelated. However, Rimmer
and Weaver examined the effects of credibility on exposure, while this analysis tested
the effects of exposure on credibility. Perhaps, people don’t base their media use on cred-
ibility, but instead base their perceptions of credibility on their media use (see Chaffee
and Schleuder, 2006; Johnson et al., 2000).
While the US-funded al-Hurra differed from the two Arab media based mainly on
issue stances and exposure gaps, differences between al-Arabiya and al-Jazeera dealt
with political orientations, perceptions of the United States, and exposure gaps. Although
the overall explained variance of exposure gaps between the two Arab media was the
lowest among the comparisons (21.1%), five variables were significant predictors:
nationalist identity, support for political Islam, support for press freedom, the importance
of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, and confidence in the United States.
These variables also predicted credibility gaps. However, two variables – support for
press freedom and importance of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict – dropped out of the
model when exposure gaps were included.
Broadly, then, the findings point to the strong influence of exposure on perceived
credibility of the media. Exposure is such a powerful predictor of credibility that few
other variables remain viable factors once exposure is accounted for in these analyses.
Because exposure is key to perceptions of media credibility, it stands to reason that
factors influencing exposure may hold promise for the effectiveness of al-Hurra.
Notably, religious and cultural beliefs were not a significant predictor of media exposure

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744 the International Communication Gazette 74(8)

gaps. Rather, issue importance and attitudes toward the United States influenced expo-
sure gaps. Thus, al-Hurra appears to be attracting viewers who already are predisposed
to support US foreign policy. This finding thus offers a quantitative contribution to Ent-
man’s theoretical model on ‘mediated US public diplomacy,’ suggesting that the success
of US government efforts to promote favorable framing of US foreign policies through
mediated communication (e.g. via al-Hurra TV) mainly depends on favorable political
attitudes toward the United States by Arab audiences. In other words Arab audiences’
predisposed perceptions and attitudes toward the United States influence the degree of
congruency and perceived credibility with US public diplomacy initiatives, including the
launching of al-Hurra network in the Arab world.
The results here, however, only suggest the direction of effects – issue stance leading
to exposure leading to perceived credibility. The reverse is also possible: perceived cred-
ibility of a news medium could lead to higher levels of exposure. The higher levels of
exposure could lead to effects on the issue stances of respondents. This possible model
could be examined in future research.
Finally, the authors acknowledge that this study unfortunately did not include the
results of an online survey posted on the URL of the website of al-Jazeera. Thus given
that this network did not participate in this study the possibility exists that the data might
be slanted. It is possible that additional results from al-Jazeera might have produced
different interpretations of the variables predicting overall exposure and perceived cred-
ibility of the three networks examined here.
Indeed, more than in the past additional research about media in the Arab world is
needed. The post-9/11 era reasserted the issue of anti-American feelings among many
populations in the Arab world. In addition considerable tension between the United
States and the Arab world still exists specifically regarding the Israeli/Palestinian con-
flict, US complaints about Iran’s nuclear program, the recent high profile US occupation
of Iraq for almost eight years, and the ongoing war in the neighboring Muslim country of
Afghanistan. Further, according to Howard (2010) the Internet has had an active role in
enhancing terrorist networks. Currently political leaders in the Arab world face a
dilemma by the development of an online public sphere (see Howard, 2010). The new
information technologies that have improved the economic situations in these countries
have also undermined their non-democratic power structures – many of which were
supported by the US government (e.g. former President Mubarak for almost three
decades). Thus further research is still warranted to better understand how political atti-
tudes toward the United States influence the way news consumers select and process
mediated information in the Arab world.
As a final point, the Arab Spring throughout the Middle East and North Africa (such as
the recent revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya) appears to have been sparked by
Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and other social media. Therefore the credibility of and expo-
sure to social media and how they affect behaviors of citizens and governments in various
parts of the Arab world seem to be a fruitful area of research. It would be interesting for
example to see whether Entman’s model – suggesting that the success and failure of
mediated efforts to promote favorable attitudes toward US foreign policies depends on the
cultural and the political congruency between the United States and Arab audiences – could
still be sustained under the new media environment. Further research should investigate the

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Fahmy et al. 745

future role of US public diplomacy in using social media in the region and how this role
could shape the perceptions of Arabs and their leaders regarding the upcoming democracies
in the region and the promotion of positive political attitudes toward the US government.

Funding
The lead author Shahira Fahmy received funding from the School of Journalism at Southern
Illinois University at Carbondale to conduct this research.

Notes
1. Pintak (2006) noted that both al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya networks have attempted to tone down
war coverage and become more fair and balanced. Both networks have avoided terms such as
martyr and terrorist in their coverage, for example. Moreover, al-Arabiya channel has taken the
additional step of trying to minimize coverage of dead bodies.
2. Age was measured with a continuous variable with a respondent range of 18–80 years of age (M ¼
30.6, SD ¼ 9.5). Education was measured on a seven-point scale, ranging from ‘no education at
all’ to ‘graduate studies’ (M ¼ 5.6, SD ¼ 1.1). Gender was dummy coded with women coded high
(6.7%). Previous visits to the United States was assessed on a four-point scale ranging from
‘never’ to ‘3 or more times’ (M ¼ 1.3, SD ¼ .79). English proficiency was assessed by asking
respondents to self-rate their proficiency with English on a five-point scale, ranging from ‘not
at all proficient’ to ‘very proficient’ (M ¼ 3.5, SD ¼ 1.3). Dichotomous variables were created
indicating whether the respondent resided in either Saudi Arabia (29.6%) or Iraq (8.4%).
3. Muslim religiosity was measured by combining two survey items. The first item asked respon-
dents how important their religion was in their life on a five-point scale ranging from ‘not very
important’ to ‘very important,’ with non-Muslims coded ‘0’ (M ¼ 4.0, SD ¼ 1.8). The second
item asked Muslims how often they prayed on a seven-point scale ranging from ‘hardly ever’ to
‘five times every day’ (M ¼ 5.3, SD ¼ 2.8). Both measures were standardized and combined
into one latent variable measuring Muslim religiosity (r ¼ .85). Support for gender equality was
measured by asking respondents on a four-point scale, ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to
‘strongly agree,’ whether they agree with three different statements: (a) ‘women should have
the right to divorce’ (M ¼ 2.3, SD ¼ 1.1), (b) ‘women should have the right to decide NOT
to wear a veil’ (M ¼ 2.6, SD ¼ 1.1), and (c) ‘a woman should be allowed to become the
President or Prime Minister of an Arab or Muslim country’ (M ¼ 2.6, SD ¼ 1.1). The three
survey items were combined into one additive index (M ¼ 7.5, SD ¼ 2.8, a ¼ .77).
4. Nationalist identity was measured by combining two variables. The first component measure was
composed of a dichotomous indicator that indicated respondents believed that their government
should base its decisions mostly on what is ‘best for their country’ (55.5%) as compared to what
is best for ‘for Arabs,’ ‘for Muslims,’ or ‘for the world as a whole.’ The second component measure
was based on two items that asked, ‘when you think about yourself, which of the following is your
most important identity’ and ‘which is your second most important identity?’ Respondents who
replied ‘their country’ on the first question received a score of ‘2’ (27.3%), respondents who replied
‘their country’ on the second question received a score of ‘1’ (32.5%), and those who did not reply
‘their country’ on either scored a ‘0’ (40.2%). These two component measures were standardized
and combined into one additive index of nationalist identity (r ¼ .45). Support for political Islam
was assessed by a single item asking respondents on a four-point scale ranging from ‘strongly dis-
approve’ to ‘strongly approve’ of whether they approve of a country being ‘governed only by

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Islamic parties and religious leaders’ (M ¼ 1.9, SD ¼ 1.1). Demand for democracy was also
assessed by a single item on a three-point scale, with demand coded high (M ¼ 2.2, SD ¼ .80), ask-
ing respondents which statement was closest to their opinion: (a) ‘democracy is preferable to any
other form of government,’ (b) ‘in certain situations, a non-democratic government can be prefer-
able,’ or (c) ‘to people like me, it doesn’t matter what form of government I have.’ Lastly, support
for press freedom was assessed by combining four measures. Respondents were asked on a four-
point scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’ whether they agreed that (a) ‘Arab
TV should be allowed to freely criticize Arab politicians’ (M ¼ 4.4, SD ¼ 1.0), (b) ‘Arab TV should
be allowed to freely discuss sex related issues such as female circumcision or Orfi marriages’ (M ¼
3.8, SD ¼ 1.3), (c) ‘Arab TV should be allowed to freely criticize Arab religious leaders’ (M ¼ 3.9,
SD ¼ 1.3), and (d) ‘Press freedom is NOT necessary for democracy’ (M ¼ 4.1, SD ¼ 1.3). The four
items were combined into one additive index (M ¼ 16.5, SD ¼ 3.4, a ¼ .66).
5. Issue importance was measured by asking respondents ‘on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is
‘‘Least important’’ and 5 is ‘‘Most important,’’ ‘how important are the following issues facing
your country today?’ These issues were: ‘resolving the Israeli/Palestinian conflict’ (M ¼ 3.6,
SD ¼ 1.4), ‘resolving the Iraqi conflict’ (M ¼ 3.8, SD ¼ 1.4), and ‘advancing democracy’
(M ¼ 3.9, SD ¼ 1.5).
6. Social identification with the United States was measured by asking respondents their agree-
ment with four statements on a four-point scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly
agree’: (a) ‘I like American ideas about democracy’ (M ¼ 2.4, SD ¼ 1.1), (b) ‘I dislike Amer-
ican music, movies, and television’ (M ¼ 2.9, SD ¼ 1.0), (c) ‘it is good that American ideas and
customs are spreading in my country’ (M ¼ 1.7, SD ¼ .90), and (d) ‘American values and
beliefs are very different from my own’ (M ¼ 1.9, SD ¼ 1.0). Items were reversed coded as
necessary and combined into one additive index assessing identification (social differentiation)
with the United States (M ¼ 8.9, SD ¼ 2.7, a ¼ .62). Confidence in the United States was
assessed by a single item that asked respondents ‘in general, how much confidence do you have
in the United States to do what is right?’ on a five-point scale ranging from ‘none’ to a ‘great
deal’ (M ¼ 1.7, SD ¼ 1.1).
7. Media scholar El-Nawawy (2006) explains that if the United States desires to improve its image
in the Arab world, it should leave Iraq and adopt an even-handed policy on the Israeli/Palesti-
nian conflict.
8. Reported coefficients and incremental variance for the sociodemographic variables are not
reported in Table 3 or Table 4, though these variables were included as controls in both sets
of analyses.

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