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7 strategies' or 'claims to legitimacy' used by rulers to create a support
Concepts of the Nation and
Legitimation in Belarus
Fabian Burkhardt
The durability of authoritarianism in Belarus is an anomaly by world
standards. Various studies have noted that Belarus's regime has signifi-
cantly exceeded the average lifespan of comparable authoritarian regime
types elsewhere around the globe. In July 2014, the Belarusian polit-
ical regime had outlived the average comparable political regime by
between 1 and 17 years, depending on the definition of such regimes. 1
This stability is particularly puzzling in the regional post-communist
context, where electoral protests toppled authoritarian incumbents in
Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan (see Bunce
and Wolchik, 2011; Hale, 2015). 2 Belarus too has experienced conditions
apparently advantageous for democratization, including an opposition
that has tried to imitate successful mobilization strategies from other
countries, popular support for democracy, a relatively high level of
economic development, a skilled workforce and geographical proxim-
ity to Europe. Despite circumstances similar to those in countries that
have overthrown authoritarian regimes, Belarus' trajectory has diverged
from that taken in Ukraine (Burant, 1995; Kuzio and Nordberg, 1999;
Korosteleva, 2004; Way, 2010).
Following the recent turn in scholarly focus from democratization
studies to the remarkable persistence of authoritarianism in the world
(Art, 2012), this chapter examines factors that have contributed to
authoritarian stability in Belarus. 3 The chapter draws on the litera-
ture on legitimacy and legitimation strategies (March, 2003; Burnell,
2006; Matveeva, 2009; Gerschewski, 2013; Halbig, 2013), as well as on
work examining national identity and opposition strategies (Way, 2010;
Kazakevich, 2011).
First, I argue that national identity can be viewed as a belief shared
between the governing powers and the governed. Because it amounts to
148
Fabian Burkhardt 149
a form of diffuse support, it thus belongs to the realm of 'legitimation
base (Gerschewski, 2013, p. 20). The presumption is that every regime,
whether democratic or authoritarian, requires a basic level of legitimacy
to sustain itself. Contrary to many studies on the subject, the main argu-
ment of this chapter is that authoritarian durability was not achieved
due to a lack of national identity, but through a gradual, adaptive pro-
cess of nation-building under President Aleksandr Lukashenko, leading
to a widely shared state-framed authoritarian national identity. 4
Second, this chapter examines why opposition parties and move-
ments and other civil society organizations in Belarus have 'mostly
failed to mobilize large numbers of committed activists or popular
support' (Way, 2010, p. 130). The chapter builds on Lucan Way's anal-
ysis that focuses on the relationship between national identity, the
incumbent autocrat and the population's prevailing identity beliefs.
Way argues that the opposition can use a national identity to mobi-
lize against the incumbent if this identity is shared by the majority of
the population and differs from the identity concept proposed by the
incumbent. If the identity of the majority to a large degree corresponds
to that propagated by the incumbent, mobilization on the grounds of
national identity is very unlikely to be successful for the opposition.
However, Way's model neglects the specific content of these national
identities. The struggle between the regime and the opposition for
'genuine Belarusianness' is not dichotomously structured, since views
on national identity differ even within the pro- and anti-incumbent
camps, and these views have changed over time (Lastouski, 2011a). The
regime and the opposition should thus not be regarded as two mono-
lithic blocks with homogenous views on national identity, as subgroups
within these camps hold varying concepts of national identity. Follow-
ing Belarusian political scientist Andrei Kazakevich, I distinguish four
concepts of the nation present both among regime proponents and
the opposition (Kazakevich, 2011). Authoritarian learning, 'authoritar-
ian preemption' (Silitski, 2005) and 'adaptive authoritarianism' (Frear,
2011) 5 have reinforced the regime's durability as the views on national
identity held by the incumbent and his supporters have evolved and
diversified. Moreover, diverging ideas on the nation within the opposi-
tion have prevented mobilization against the incumbent.
In the following section, the four major concepts of the nation in
Belarus are outlined. I then provide empirical evidence for the exis-
tence of these concepts among opposition actors and discuss how the
diverging concepts relate to the failure of the anti-incumbent camp to
1 SO Nation Co11cepts and Legitimation in Belarus
mobilize against Lukashenko. Finally, I sketch the Lukashenko regime's
legitimation strategies and note how they resonate with trends in public
opinion.
1. Authoritarian consolidation and concepts of the nation
in Belarus
Nationalism has positive connotations such as self-determination, polit-
ical legitimacy, cultural survival, patriotism and liberation from alien
rule. But it is also associated with militarism, intolerance, ethnocentrism
and even ethnic cleansing (Brubaker, 1999, p. 55). With regard to regime
type, it is widely assumed that national unity, conceived as a clear sense
of belonging to a political community, is a background condition which
needs to precede democratization (Rustow, 1970, p. 370-1). Divisions on
national or ethnic grounds are thought to be harmful in the process of
democratic consolidation (Dahl, 1971, p. 108). Yet, adopting the per-
spective held by Lucan Way, a pro-incumbent majority identity can also
be benef1clal for authoritarian stability, as this deprives the opposition
of an important tool for mobilization against the incumbent and also
makes the autocrat's legitimation claims more likely to resonate with a
large part of the population. 6
Many Belarus analysts construct binary models of cultural and politi-
cal division (Leshchenko, 2004; Bekus, 2010). For example, Leshchenko
distinguishes between a national project (promoted by the Belarusian
National Front opposition party) and President Aleksandr Lukashenko's
backward-looking, neo-Soviet project (2004: 339). She differentiates
between these two projects according to the following criteria: foun-
dation myth, the historical events deemed most important, selection
of enemy, language, vision of the future, economic policy and social
basis. However, while these criteria might be useful for analysis, such
a dichotomization tends to simplify the complex reality in Belarus
(Kazakevich, 2011; Lastouski, 2011a).
In contrast, Kazakevich distils four key conceptions or ideas of the
Belarusian nation from an analysis of public discourse between 1990
and 2009; these can be described as the ethno-cultural, the cultural-and-
political, the state-and-political and the Russo-centrist concepts.
1.1 Ethno-cultural concept
This concept is focused around the Belarusian ethnic community and
corresponds to the classical nationalism of the 19th and 20th centuries.
The Belarusian ethnos, origins (either real or imaginary) and ethnic
Fabian Burkhardt 151
culture are thought to be the core around which the national com-
munity's public institutions have been constructed. The community is
defined as an ethnos on the basis of common origins, language, history
and culture. A revival of the 'true' Belarusian culture and language plays
an important role. Under this conception, the new Belarusian nation-
state should be constructed in continuity with legitimate political
institutions of the past, including the Principality of Polotsk (10th-13th
century), the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (13th century-1795) and the
Belarusian People's Republic (1918-19). Among political actors, this con-
cept is usually attributed to the Belarusian People's Front (BPF) (Goujon,
1999; Sahm, 1999; Leshchenko, 2004). The BPF came into being in
October 1988 as a civil-society movement and evolved into a major
opposition force in the early 1990s (Wilson, 2011). In the 1995 parlia-
mentary elections, however, the BPF failed to win a single seat; in 1996,
its leader Zianon Pazniak went into exile, and in 1999, the party split
into two, leading to major coordination and mobilization problems in
the 2000s.
1.2 State-and-political concept
This concept figures prominently within Belarus' recent history, coming
to the fore via state sponsorship in the course of the proclamation of
a quasi-Belarusian state ideology in 2003. In theory, the concept comes
close to civic nationalism, but with certain caveats. Often, only eastern
Slavs or 'our people' according to some other criteria such as those
demonstrating political loyalty or conformance to a dominant behavior
pattern can be true citizens. Also, although in theory culturally neutral,
this conception of national identity often requires a practical distancing
from the ethno-cultural concept of Belarusianness, as well as a promo-
tion of Soviet or Russian cultural ideals. Another feature differentiating
it from civic nationalism is that instead of citizenship and civil society,
the state and its institutions are placed at the concept's center, accord-
ing to the formula 'statehood plus homeland' (Wilson, 2011, p. 205).
According to Natalia Leshchenko, the ideology is based on three pil-
lars, summarizable as the uniqueness, unity and sovereignty of Belarus
(Leshchenko, 2008, p. 1422). Uniqueness refers to Belarus as a spiri-
tual leader of east Slavic civilization, with Belarusians characterized as
Russians with 'a sign of quality'. Pluralism is regarded as harmful, and
the preservation of national unity is a key goal. A direct populist link
is postulated between the people and the president, who is deemed the
main defender of Belarusian sovereignty (despite the push for a unified
state with Russia in the first years of Lukashenko's presidency).
152 Nation Concepts and Legitimation in Belarus
1.3 The cultural-and-political concept
Proponents of this concept understand the nation as a cultural and
political community. Kazakevich holds that this concept is historically
closely connected to the ethno-political framework, but was able to
develop only after Belarus became independent. Thus, it is centered
on Belarusian independence and national sovereignty (as opposed to
a union state with Russia, for example) and can to a certain degree be
traced back to patriotism in support of the Belarusian Soviet Socialist
Republic. Different cultures within the Belarusian context can be inter-
preted as Belarusian, granting them a status as part of the national cul-
ture. For example, this framework allows 19th-century Polish-language
authors, West Russism, the Soviet past and other elements of local,
regional, and cultural Belarusian experience to be included as a part
of the national culture, even if they are not directly linked with
ethnic Belarusian traits. The Belarusian language is also given great
prominence, while Russian is viewed as a means of communication.
1.4 Russo-centrism
This concept of the nation is based on the presumption that there is
a single Russian people that consists of Great Russians, Little Russians
(Ukrainians) and White Russians (Belarusians), forming a tripartite unity
and thus a Russian super-ethnos. In Wilson's words, this could be
dubbed the 'one Rus' approach' and was consistent with Lukashenko's
initial Russophile foreign policy (Wilson, 2011, p. 19). In this sense, it is
logical that Russo-centrists place the union state with the Russian Feder-
ation and Russian culture or even civilization at the center of their world
view. Historically and historiosophically, this concept can be traced back
to West Russism, an Orthodox movement in the 1860s and 1870s with
strong support in Grodno (Hrodna) and Mogilev (Mahiliou) (Wilson,
2011, p. 69-77). However, the two concepts should not be confused,
as Russo-centrism also has roots in Russian nationalist and patriotic
thought (Lastouski, 2011b, p. 28). Kazakevich (2005) argues that Russo-
centrism was close to an official ideology from 1994 until the early
2000s, but was increasingly marginalized from 2001 onward.
1.5 Method and data
The following sections are based on 25 semi-structured interviews con-
ducted via Skype, telephone and in person in Minsk between july and
September 2012. A list of the main interviewees is provided in the
annex. Interviews can provide valuable additions to published docu-
ments, particularly in hybrid regimes that are often characterized by
Fabian Burkhardt 153
constrained public spheres and a lack of reliable public data. By drawing
heavily on interviews, this chapter is an attempt to counter the ten-
dency toward declining levels of field work in the non-democratic states
of the Eurasian continent (Goode, 2010). Pro-incumbent actors posed
the main challenge with regard to selection and access, as they were
far less open to being approached and were much less willing to talk
openly about the sensitive issue of national identity (see Koeker, 2014;
Voldnes et al., 2014). The sample of interviewees is of course not rep-
resentative either for Belarus as a whole or the interviewees' individual
categories. However, the sample appears to be broad enough to shed
light on the legitimation strategies and claims made by the incumbent
and by anti-incumbent groups.
2. Concepts of the Belarusian nation among oppositional
and civil-society actors
Parliamentary parties have played an increasingly negligible role in
Belarus, even compared to other post-Soviet states with powerful pres-
idencies. While 49 of the 110 seats went to deputies that belonged
to parties following the 1996 elections, in 2012 only 10 party mem-
bers were elected. The executive has not engaged in party-building
through means such as creating a party of power; however, 'meaningful
pluralism is nonetheless absent' (Bader, 2009, p. 101). Thus, the concept
of 'opposition' is broadened to include not only oppositional parties
but also NGOs (Chavusau, 2007), non-party opposition groups, public
associations such as trade unions (Rovdo, 2009, p. 235-8) and youth
movements (Nikolayenko, 2012; Stuzhinskaya, 2013).
Opposition groups are mainly divided along a left-right cleavage
(Chudakov et al., 2002, p. 136-57; Feduta et al., 2003; Rovdo, 2009,
p. 307-27; Medvedev, 2010, p. 117-23). Frear (2011, p. 197-206) enu-
merates further internal divisions such as conception of the Soviet
past and the legacy of communism; attitudes toward privatization and
the market economy; geopolitical perceptions of the European Union,
NATO and the Russian Federation; rifts between the older and younger
generations or between leading personalities; and lastly disagreements
between the center, the capital Minsk, and the periphery.
Following Way and Kazakevich, this section briefly outlines how the
four concepts of the Belarusian nation can be empirically found among
opposition forces.
Among right-of-center political parties, the ethno-political concept
is primarily found within the Conservative Christian Party of the
154 Nation Concepts and Legitimation in Belarus
Belarusian People's Front (CChP-BPF) and the Belarusian People's Front
(BPF). Both have their roots in the Belarusian People's Front founded
in 1988, but split at the sixth party congress in 1999 over cadre poli-
tics. CChP-BPF formed around former BPF leader Zianon Pazniak, while
BPF rejected Pazniak and regrouped around Vintsuk Viachorka (Rovdo,
2009, p. 308-11). While there are minor programmatic differences with
regard to the economy and the European Union, both adhere to the
same ethno-cultural concept of the nation. Valerii Buival, politician and
spokesperson of the CChP-BPF, puts it this way:
For me and for [our party] the issue of self-identification, national
culture of the Belarusian people, this is the main question [ ... ], to
preserve the national culture or national identity, and language, our
people, and our identity-shaping territory/
Russia is seen as an occupier that constrains Belarussian nation-building
and helps infiltrate and impede organizations that support ethnic
nationalist concepts. For Pazniak, the exiled party leader residing in
Warsaw, the Grand Duchy serves as the most important historical ref-
erence point for today's fight for independence from Russia and indeed
forms the basis for the future national state. Pazniak insists that in
the Soviet Union era, and particularly since Gorbachev, only a single
national project has existed among the Belarusian intelligentsia and
youth: the rebirth of Belarusian culture, including a transformation
of school curriculum, a recovery of historic truth, the protection of
monuments and the development of Belarusian arts.
Vintsuk Viachorka, who served as chairman of the competing BPF
from 1999 to 2007, concurs that the Belarusian nation needs to be 'built
to the end' (do-formirovanie), a process that was started long ago. His son
Franak Viachorka, once chairman of the BPF youth organization, thinks
that:
Problems occurring in the economic and the political spheres are
directly linked with identity, or more precisely with the lack thereof,
with its weakness. The Belarusian nation began to emerge together
with other European nations, but then there were many long years
of occupation.
Adherents of the ethno-cultural concept agree across party lines that
Belarus is merely a satellite of the Russian Federation, being dependent
on Russia for energy imports and more broadly for economic growth.
However, for the ethno-culturalists, this dependence is not merely
Fabian Burkhardt 155
economic, but is additionally due to the fact that Belarus' culture and
national identity depend on Russia.
The ethno-cultural concept of the Belarusian nation is often con-
flated with the opposition as a whole. The mobilization potential of
this concept is indeed the strongest of the four examined here, as it can
be easily framed in anti-incumbent terms, but internal rifts within the
opposition-activist community has undermined its instrumentalization
in this regard. Members of CChP-BPF and the BPF, for example, assert
that the other grouping is infiltrated by the Belarusian secret service and
accuse each other of being Russian agents.
Anti-incumbents who adhere to the cultural-and-political concept of
the nation place a high value on the cultural aspects of Belarusianness
and are often actively engaged in writing in the Belarusian language or
other cultural activities. However, a pragmatic attitude toward existing
Belarusian reality prompts them to argue that the political commu-
nity needs to be formed differently. This concept is spread across a
range of opposition groupings and individuals including the Belarusian
Christian-Democracy Party (BChDP); the Malady Front youth organi-
zation; the leader of the For Freedom Movement (FFM), Aleksandr
Milinkevich and public intellectuals such as philosopher and writer
Valentin Akudovich. Akudovich has declared that he opposes those
who support an ethno-linguistic model, as he is convinced that Belarus'
future will evolve according to a civic model comparable to that in
France.
Writing in the Belarusian language and referring to its specific cul-
ture is a key task for adherents to this conception; however, Akudovich
admits that he has realized that there is limited demand for such work
in Belarus: 'The language for me - it is everything. But some time
ago I even declared: "Belarus will never be purely Belarusian".' Iurii
Chausov, a political scientist and legal expert for the Assembly of NGOs
of Belarus, argues that identity-building started in Soviet times and that
this significantly impacted the Belarusian 'case'.
When you ask advocates of classical (ethnic) nationalism in Belarus
then you will only hear dissatisfaction with the weak national con-
sciousness in Belarus. But they are not thinking about the nation as
such, but about themselves, the political class, or some super-national
community, like Soviet people, Russians (rossiiskie) or Europeans.
Some think we are already Europeans but without being clear what
their own national belonging is. [ ... ] Sometimes it is said about
the Belarusian nation that it is split, that there are different inter-
pretations of Belarus, Soviet, nationalistic. But actually it is a fairly
156 Nation Concepts and Legitimation ill Belarus
harmonious conglomeration of diverse understandings about their
own identity.
According to Chausov, Lukashenko is the consequence rather than the
cause of a syncretic character to the Belarusian national conscious-
ness. Under this view, people voted for Lukashenko in 1994 because
he represented the contradictions in the way Belarusians think about
themselves, whether as Soviets, Belarusians, non-Russians or 'Russians
with a quality sign' as Lukashenka famously called the Belarusians. 'Not
one of the Belarusian national projects we have at the moment will win',
Chausov holds.
But if the country persists, then this conglomeration, and the fight
between democrats and authoritarians, will also remain. And this will
be the basis for the preservation of the Belarusian national identity.
On a more practical note, Alexander Milinkevich, leader of the FFM
and the united opposition candidate in the 2006 presidential elections,
argues that issues of political and economic reform have primacy over
questions of national identity. As a vice-mayor of Grodno/Hrodna in
the early 1990s, he actively contributed to ensuring that three-quarters
of school classes were taught in the Belarusian language. 'And I categor-
ically do not agree with the opinion that this was done in a coercive
way and that the process stopped because it was against the will of the
people', he says. However, post-1996 realities influenced his political
campaigning strategies in the 2000s:
I think that in terms of political work, economics and social issues
are important, and only on the third and fourth place we can talk
about national rebirth .... For me, national identity is not the main
issue, because I want to reach out to gain the trust of the people.
If I speak from morning to evening about language and culture, then
I won't achieve what is important for me. And for me rebirth is very
important.
To an even greater degree, Vitalii Rymashevskii, co-president of the
Belarusian Christian Democracy (BChD) party and a candidate in the
2010 presidential elections, thinks that for the BChD, a Belarusian is
First and foremost a European, a citizen of Belarus. I think the posi-
tion of our party is right: in our country different nationalities, Jews,
Fabian Burkhardt 157
Tatars, Poles and other minorities, should be allowed to reside. All
these people are entitled to call themselves Belarusians. We envisage
a non-violent, gradual transition towards Belarusian as the national
language.
Anti-incumbents' adherence to a state-and-political concept of the nation
might seem paradoxical at first glance because the concept is spon-
sored by pro-incumbent state actors, and being in opposition in Belarus
means dwelling in an 'isolated ghetto' (Rovdo, 2009, p. 327) and oppos-
ing not just other political actors, but often the state as such. The
state-and-political concept of the nation can be found in left-of-center
opposition groups such as the former Party of Belarusian Communists,
which was renamed 'A just World', or the Belarusian Congress of Demo-
cratic Trade Unions (BCDTU). 8 However, it is not entirely a left-of-center
phenomenon, as Vladimir Neklaev's Speak the Truth Movement (STM)
can also be placed in this category. Oppositional actors propagating this
concept usually lean toward a civic model of the nation guaranteed
by the state. Aleksandr Iaroshchuk, leader of the BCDTU, asserts that
Belarus does not exemplify the classical formula of state-building on the
basis of national identification:
If we speak about the prospects of building a sovereign and indepen-
dent state, we need to start from what we have, of course, without
losing the Belarusian language. What could consolidate Belarusian
society? I think the idea of independence [is the answerL even though
we have strong pro-Russian and also pro-European sentiments.
An advisor to Neklaev, Aleksandr Feduta emphasizes that the STM posi-
tion on the nation differs from both the ethno-culturalists and those
that adhere to the cultural-and-political concept. According to Feduta,
STM's candidates for the 2012 parliamentary elections included per-
sons belonging to six nationalities. Issues of national identity were
not discussed in STM's election campaign, as 'the more you discuss
them, the less they function as a unifying factor'. Feduta says that
for him personally, a Belarusian is a person who is aware of his or
her historical and cultural connection with the state, in particular
with the Republic of Belarus. Any more substantial qualifying criteria,
he fears, would have a disuniting or exclusionary effect. 'Our leader,
Vladimir Neklaev, is a great Belarusian poet. That is why automati-
cally pressure should be lifted from us for finding an answer to this
question.'
158 Nation Concepts and Legitimation in Belarus
Less surprising is the position of 'A Just World', which has its roots in
socialism's internationalist orientation. However, as this party is one of
the largest non-parliamentary opposition forces, this once more hints at
the problem of coalition-building with other movements that put more
emphasis on ethnocultural aspects of the nation.
Sergei Kaliakin, leader of the 'A Just World' party, does not think
national identity is a 'super important' question that should be a main
focus for the party. In his view, the state should concentrate on issues
such as national culture, history and language. Assimilation and inter-
mingling with the neighboring Polish and Russian cultures has been an
irreversible feature of Belarus' history.
Quite often for political purposes, this influence was used. Even today
some try to make use of this. But as for our party, I think this [the
issue of national identity] is important, but it's not the only and, by
far, not the most important issue.
This last statement suggests that for 'A Just World', but also in general
for adherents of the state-and-political concept of the nation, anti-
incumbent mobilization that draws inspiration from any concept of the
nation per se is viewed as a distraction or even as detrimental.
Russo-centric views are not common among opposition politicians and
are less grounded in historiosophy than in the 'pure concept' pro-
posed by pro-regime intellectual Lev Krishtapovich. One variant of this
concept is represented by Olga Abramova, who chaired the Belarusian
version of the liberal Russian party Iabloko. Her association 9 coined the
slogan 'Together with Russia to Europe'. The premise was that Russia
would ultimately transition toward a liberal democratic model, and
that it and Belarus would together move closer to Europe. Thus, rather
than focusing on specific concepts of the nation, the Belarusian Iabloko
oriented itself toward historical links between Belarus and Russia that
would enable them to travel a common path of transformation. 'I never
really thought about my national identity until the national democrats
forced me to think about my ethnic belonging', Abramova says.
But I always thought that I was born here, that I am Belarusian. I
articulate it the following way: I felt a part of a whole thing. All the
people living on this territory are, for me, Belarusians.
Valerii Frolov, a former member of the Central Committee of the
Belarusian Social Democratic Party (Assembly), illso complains that
Fabian Burkhardt 159
the 'traditional opposition seeks to bar us from the political space'
(Bulhakau and Komorowska, 2006, p. 165) and further deplores the
fact that a pro-Russian, sober-minded, constructive opposition attracted
little support, even though Belarus and Russia had so much in com-
mon. Frolov additionally accused ethno-culturalists such as Viktor
Ivashkevich, a BPF leader who died in 2013, of dividing opposition
forces by constructing an allegedly clear-cut binary statement: 'If you
are for Belarus, then you're against Russia. If you are for Russia, you will
pressure Belarusians' (ibid.).
To summarize, the goal of this section was to demonstrate that the
regime-opposition dichotomy is too simplistic, and that these concepts
of the nation differ significantly in their content. Of the four groups,
ethno-culturalists are most likely to use their concept of the nation as
a tool of mobilization against the regime. Although not entirely dis-
missive of the idea, adherents of the cultural-and-political concept are
more hesitant to use ideas of the nation for mobilization, while mem-
bers of the state-and-political and Russo-centrist oppositions perceive
nation-centered mobilization as deh·imental to the opposition cause.
3. National identity in the discourse of the regime
In the literature on post-Soviet Belarus, it is widely acknowledged
that Lukashenko changed course, from supporting Russo-centric ideas
(Lastouski, 2011b) with the intention of pushing forward the union
state with Russia to a stance as a Russian-language 'Belarusian nation-
alist' (Feduta, 2005, p. 653) promoting national independence and
sovereignty. This major change in the official state policy on national
identity took place in the years between 2001 and 2003 and remains a
hotly debated issue. For Ioffe (2007, p. 353), Lukashenko turned away
from neo-Sovietism and became 'a kind of nationalist' after Putin sug-
gested Russia could incorporate six Belarusian regions into the Russian
Federation in May 2002. While seemingly no one denies that the issue
of national independence became central to discourse in these years,
there is disagreement on whether Lukashenko can be viewed as a nation-
builder. According to David Marples, the Lukashenko regime does not
perform a nation-building function and lacks a consistent policy, leav-
ing its posture more appropriately described as 'national nihilism' (2007,
p. 65). Other scholars are of a different opinion and observe a 'slow insti-
tutionalization of nationhood' (see Bugrova, 1998i Ioffe, 2003i 2007i
Zaprudnik, 2003i Leshchenko, 2004i 2008i Feduta, 2005i Buhr et al.,
2011i Wilson, 2011).
160 Nation Concepts and Legitimation in Belarus
This section argues that in the 2000s, Lukashenko's regime pursued
two main legitimation strategies that fostered state-framed conceptions
of Belarusian nationhood: first, by promoting national independence
and sovereignty, and second, by supplementing its claims to legitima-
tion with culturalist policies and discourse.
3.1 Strategy 1: Championing national independence and
sovereignty
Under Lukashenko's leadership, Belarus tackled the perceived threat
emanating from an ever more assertive Russia beginning in the early
2000s. In a 2003 report entitled 'On the State of Ideological Work',
President Lukashenko stated:
To move forward we need to assess where we are, at the moment, in
the process of building an ideological foundation for an independent
Belarusian state. Belarusians did not inherit from their ancestors a
comprehensive ideology of independent statehood.
(cited after Rovdo, 2009, p. 13)
Whether there was truly no historical legacy for independent state-
hood is a matter hotly debated among historians, but more importantly,
Lukashenko claims that he will create the ideological basis. There-
fore, state sovereignty and independence are inextricably linked to his
personalist regime.
Even opposition-minded actors tend to agree that this claim to legiti-
macy has borne fruit over time. Iurii Chausov of the Assembly of NGOs
of Belarus thinks that the current Belarusian regime shows traits that
are characteristic of nationalism, but with a pronounced focus on the
state. Former opposition leader and presidential candidate Aleksandr
Milinkevich concedes that support for the idea of Belarusian sovereignty
has risen tremendously during Lukashenko's administration and that
those in power did, in fact, contribute to this to a certain degree.
Yet this was a feeling of independence, not a 'national' feeling, but a
feeling for one's territory, a feeling that we are in control of it, that
this territory has borders, and that we can build our lives here.
According to Milinkevich, the difference between the emerging
Belarusian experience and that of Central European states such
as Lithuania and Poland was that this growing consciousness of
sovereignty was not grounded in an ethno-cultural foundation. Rather,
state actors stressed how important it was to have one's own country
Fabian Burkhardt 161
and how important it was to govern it by oneself. 'Lukashenko under-
stood this as governing it single-handedly, but the people truly have
patriotic feelings and the wish to underpin the sovereignty', Milinkevich
argues. The major difference between this emerging Belarusian concept
and Western forms of civic nationalism is that the former is centered on
the state and the territory and is less connected with the development of
civil society or civil liberties and rights. This consequently comes close
to what Anthony Smith called 'bureaucratic nationalism' (Smith, 1990,
p. 11), the aim of which was to create 'territorial nations'. The culture
of the state is thereby relatively empty, and states 'can also make use
of new systems of communications, as well as their usual coercive and
extractive powers' (ibid.). The sociologist Oleg Manaev explains how
this Belarusian authoritarian variant differs from democratic polities:
The state exerts pressure on the society, on particular individuals,
infringes upon their rights, discriminating against them. But this
does not change the fundamental mechanisms of nation-building.
Aleksandr Feduta, Neklaev's advisor within the STM, thinks Lukashenko
is an adherent of the American or French civic model. Yet the difference
for Feduta is that citizenship in the Republic of Belarus is predicated on
the acknowledgement of the sovereignty of its (at times repressive) laws
and acceptance of the existing authoritarian political regime.
So, even if I accept the sovereignty of its laws, but not the cur-
rent reality, from the viewpoint of the Belarusian regime, I am not
a Belarusian, then I am a Polish, German or Russian spy.
3.2 Strategy 2: Adaptive claims to legitimacy as authoritarian
learning
In the course of the 2000s, President Lukashenko gradually incorporated
elements of the cultural-and-political concept into the state-framed
understanding of national identity. After 2007's conflict with Russia over
the delivery of natural gas, Belarus shifted responsibility for culture pol-
icy from the rather blunt ideologically driven Vladimir Matveichuk to
the more progressive diplomat Pavel Latushko, a Belarusian-language
speaker who as minister of culture acted more as a 'manager' providing
cultural patronage and supporting public-private partnerships.
Before, behind the marketing slogan 'Kupliaitse belaruskae!' (Buy
Belarusian [products]), there was a rather helpless wish of the state
to force Belarusian goods onto the domestic market. Now, the slogan
162 Nation Concepts and Legitimation in Belarus
has been transformed into a notion of Belarusian culture as a brand.
The incorporation of Belarusian culture into market relations was
accompanied by a heightened sense of national identity.
(Shutskii, 2014)
Sergey Pigarev, deputy chairman of the pro-incumbent public asso-
ciation and quasi-party of power Belaia Rus', explains the nexus of
independence and the association's policy of 'national unity' as follows:
We received independence for free. Nobody had to die, was shot at
Westerplatte, or had to sit [in a camp] in Siberia. That's why our leader
very carefully, in small steps, in an evolutionary way, takes Belarus in
a direction so that the nation is forming itself gradually. The process
is underway, but it's in a nascent phase. National unity means that
all representatives of absolutely all social groups are united. [ ... ] Our
slogan is: 'Belaia Rus' for national unity.' Every night, our slogan is
lit as an advertisement on the building of the national library. We are
already using the word 'nation' (natsiia). We have 'Belaia Rus' events
for a healthy nation (natsiia), which are held several times a year and
range from marathons to all kinds of other sports events. For the
nation to become stronger, for the people to feel Belarusian, we need
to build a strong state, and a truly independent one. There can only
be one nation in an independent state.
Independence, under the interpretation given the concept by Belaia
Rus', also entails a certain degree of differentiation from neighboring
countries. According to Pigarev, the Belarusians have a heightened sense
of social justice that has been lost by the Russians. The task of the state
has thus been to reign in the capitalism that has gone out of control in
Russia. For Belaia Rus', the desired society is one that can develop in a
dynamically yet stable manner.
According to Pigarev, the role of Belarus and the Belamsians in
winning World War II should be highlighted within the country's edu-
cational curriculum as a matter of national pride. In line with this
general goal, Culture Minister Latushko increased state efforts to 'mar-
ket' objects of the cultural patrimony with high symbolic value such as
the Brest Hero Fortress, the Khatyn Memorial Complex and the Liniia
Stalina (Marples, 2012; Shutskii, 2014).
Pigarev emphasizes the importance of the Belarusian language; how-
ever, this is an issue of considerable dispute, as oppositional actors claim
that the regime and its supporters have in fact undermined the national
Fabian Burkhardt 163
language's importance. Philosopher and opposition activist Valentin
Akudovich even claims that the current Belarusian state has done more
to destroy the Belarusian language than did the Russian Empire. Pigarev,
who in 2012 served as a fourth-term deputy in the Minsk City Parlia-
ment, asserts by contrast that there has been recent progress on this
front:
In my district there is a national secondary school and a national
kindergarten. People actually queue up to get in there. This means
that there is an interest in the national language, in the national
culture, in what actually defines, identifies and self-identifies the
nation.
Oleg Trusov, head of the Society for the Belarusian Language (TBM), who
also served as a member of parliament for the BPF in the 1990s, argues
that by strategically incorporating culturalist elements into its policies,
the regime placed opposition politicians in a dilemma, making it easy
to criticize them for alleged incoherence. The TBM had called for the
Belarusian government to use the Belarusian language during election
campaigns, and the head of the Central Election Commission agreed.
However, this led to a situation in which opposition activists adhering
to the state-and-political or Russo-centric concept of the nation would
fill out ballots in Russian, giving the regime an opportunity to accuse
'the opposition' of alleged incoherence and a lack of strategy.
Vitalii Rymashevskii, co-chairman of Belarusian Christian Democracy
(BChD) and a presidential candidate in 2010, says this was a conscious
move by the government, which 'understood that the Belarusian oppo-
sition and the Belarusian language are not inherently linked'. The costs
of modifying the state-and-political concept were relatively low, while
the regime gained a new option by which to delegitimize, and thus
demobilize, the opposition.
4. A nationalizing state
Representative opinion surveys indicate the growth of a distinc-
tive Belarusian national identity. The Independent Institute of Socio-
Economic and Political Studies (IISEPS) has been monitoring public
opinion since before Lukashenko came to power. One of its recurring
questions asks, 'In your opinion, how well is national identity devel-
oped among Belarusians?' In 1993, 5.2 percent of respondents replied
'strongly' or 'very strongly'; by 2013, this share had risen to 21.2 percent.
164 Nation Concepts and Legitimation in Be/ams
Also in 2013, 28.6 percent of respondents said that Belarusians do not
resemble any other nation, as compared to just 14.6 percent 20 years
earlier. On the other hand, the share of respondents who say the state
should support the revival of the Belarusian language has dropped
slightly, from 69.7 percent in 1993 to 65.9 percent in 2013; similarly, the
proportion opposing state support for the language's revival rose from
12.1 percent to 24.7 percent. It should be noted that the difference on
this issue between respondents claiming to trust and distrust Aleksandr
Lukashenko was less than 5 percent (IISEPS, 2013a). Moreover, over the
past 20 years, the percentage of respondents favoring restoration of the
Soviet Union has decreased by more than half, from 55.1 percent to
22.2 percent, while the share of those opposing such a restoration has
increased almost threefold, from 22.3 percent to 58.5 percent. Between
1999 and 2013, the proportion of those favoring integration with Russia
dropped from 47 percent to 28.1 percent, while the share opposing
integration rose from 34.1 percent to 51.4 percent. The most dramatic
change occurred in 2003, while the proportion opposing integration
climbed above that favoring it for the first time in 2008 (IISEPS, 2013b).
These survey results suggest that Belarus' population increasingly per-
ceives their country as an independent state with citizens who are
culturally or otherwise distinct from those in other nations. The figures
on state support for the Belarusian language are particularly striking,
as the state has gradually incorporated culturalist elements into its pol-
icy even as popular demand for such activity - at least with regard to
language support - has been shrinking.
Over the course of Lukashenko's administration, confidence in public
institutions has increased, while the willingness to engage in collective
action has decreased. In the 1999 and 2008 editions of the European Val-
ues Survey (EVS) and the 2014 World Values Survey (WVS), a respective
40.3 percent, 60.5 percent and 54.6 percent of the population expressed
confidence in the police; 23 percent, 37.6 percent and 65.3 percent
avowed confidence in the civil service; and a respective 46.5 percent,
61.6 percent and 54.9 percent expressed confidence in the justice sys-
tem. In the 1999 and 2008 editions of the EVS (unfortunately the 2014
WVS did not include these questions), a respective 63.3 percent and
71.6 percent of Belarusian respondents declared that they would never
sign a petition; 75.1 percent as compared to a later 84.8 percent said they
would never join a boycott; 54.2 percent compared to 66 percent said
they would never attend a lawful demonstration; and 82.2 percent as
compared to 92.2 percent said they would never join an unofficial strike.
Even more strikingly, support for gradual reforms sank from 87.1 percent
Fabian Burkhardt 165
in 1999 to 74.7 percent in 2008. Support for more sweeping reforms did
not grow in correspondence, as one might have expected; however, the
share of those asserting that the state needed to be defended against
subversive forces rose from 7.5 percent to 21.3 percent. This trend is
consistent with more recent IISEPS recent survey results following the
Euromaidan events in Ukraine. In 2014, 65.3 percent of respondents in
Belarus said they would never take part in similar events, as compared to
15.5 percent who said they would participate on the side of a 'Belarusian
Maidan', and 10.7 percent who said they would be willing to mobilize
voluntarily to defend the state (IISEPS, 2014).
These data indicate that the Lukashenko regime's nationalizing dis-
course has resonated with popular perceptions and attitudes. Official
communication has accommodated and fostered a growing sense of cul-
tural identity among Belarusians that in turn has contributed to public
endorsement of Lukashenko's regime (Korosteleva, 2012, p. 47; Hale,
2015, p. 258-9).
Conclusion
This chapter has inquired into the astonishing durability of authori-
tarianism in Belarus by focusing on concepts of the Belarusian nation
and their use in both opposition and incumbent discourses. First,
I argued that the Belarusian opposition's failure to trigger broad-based
mobilization based on national identity was not solely because the
majority identity was pro-incumbent, as Way has posited. Rather, this
chapter has rejected a simplistic dichotomy between regime and oppo-
sition and has instead derived four concepts of the Belarusian nation
from the statements of opposition and pro-incumbent actors, as sug-
gested by Kazakevich. Opposition groups propagate varying concepts
of the nation, and the ethno-cultural concept expressed by the BPF is
only one of these. The complexity of this constellation has hindered
oppositional mobilization around a shared idea of the nation. Therefore,
both context and content of national identity matter.
Secondly, since the 2000s, the Lukashenko regime has pursued at least
two legitimation strategies that have fostered a state-framed concep-
tion of Belarusian nationhood; first, the regime championed national
independence and sovereignty, and second, it proved itself capable of
authoritarian learning by supplementing its claims to legitimacy with
culturalist elements previously expressed by ethno-cultural or cultural-
and-political opposition actors. By reacting to a perceived external
threat as well as to growing popular demand for a Belarusian national
166 Nation Concepts and Legitimatio11 in Belarus
identity, the regime strengthened its own claim to legitimacy and
deprived the opposition of one potential driver of mobilization.
However, this does not mean that authoritarian stability will nec-
essarily persist into the long term. As noted by Gerschewski (2013),
repression and elite cooptation are elements as important as regime
legitimation, and the character of interaction between these three pillars
is often difficult to assess. Moreover, international factors - including
the performance legitimacy that depends in practical terms on Russia's
economic support, as well as how Belarus is perceived and esteemed in
the international arena- also need to be considered. According to many
interviewees, as well as recent findings in the literature on authoritar-
ian regimes (Tanneberg et al., 2013), severe economic turmoil generally
seems to be among the factors most likely to unhinge the Belarusian
regime.
Notes
1. Researchers of regime durability use different typologies to characterize
authoritarian regimes. In Geddes' (1999) typology, Belarus belongs to a
personalist regime type, which on average survives 18.8 years. For Hadenius
and Teorell (2007), Belarus is a multiparty-traditional regime, which has an
average lifespan of 5.87 years. Kailitz (2013) categorizes Belarus as an electoral
autocracy, a type which on average survives for 11.07 years. Taking July 2014
as a common point of reference, Belarus' current regime has outlasted these
average duration of these generic types by 1.2, 17.13 and 11.93 years, respec-
tively. For an overview of the literature on regime stability with a specific focus
on non-democratic regimes, see Schmidt (2003) and Bank (2009).
2. For a critical review of the literature on the color revolutions, see Stykow
(2010).
3. This research began as a collaborative project of the author with Tomasz
Zapart, and conduct of the interviews involved was possible only thanks to
his perseverance. The chapter benefited from useful comments at the 2012
JOE conference in Tutzing and the 2014 ASN convention at Columbia Uni-
versity. I am particularly grateful to Martin Brusis and Maharyta Fabrykant for
valuable advice and Elene Tskhadadze for research assistance with transcribing
the interviews.
4. Here I follow Rogers Brubaker, who argued that the civic-ethnic distinction
common in the studies of nationalism has both analytical and norma-
tive weaknesses. Instead, he proposes to distinguish between state-framed
and counter-state understandings of nationhood and forms of nationalism
(Brubaker, 1998, p. 300). This distinction particularly fits the Belarusian case,
because Brubaker admits that the state that frames the nation does not neces-
sarily have to be democratic. Furthermore, the state- rather than citizenship,
the citizen or civil society - is central to the concept. Therefore, a transposi-
tion of the American model of the civic nation to Belarus as suggested by Buhr
et al. (2011) is not convincing.
Fabimz Burkhardt 167
5. I would like to thank Matthew Frear, who generously provided his unpub-
lished manuscript to me.
6. This train of thought goes back to research on political culture. In stable polit-
ical regimes, political cultures and political systems are usually thought of as
congruent (see Almond and Verba, 1989).
7. If no source is given, the quote is from the author's interview. See also
appendix.
8. Representatives of the three social-democratic parties could not be included
in the interview project. But a tentative conclusion based on secondary
sources would be that former Head of State Stanislav Shushkevich's Belarusian
Social Democratic Assembly party is close to the ethno-cultural concept, the
Belarusian Social Democratic Party (Assembly) once headed by Aleksandr
Kazulin is primarily Russo-centric, and Mykola Statkevich's Belarusian Social
Democratic Party (People's Assembly) adheres to the cultural-and-political
concept of the nation.
9. The Belarusian authorities refused to register Iabloko as a political party.
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Annex: List of interview partners
Full interview transcripts (in Russian, Polish and German) are available upon
request from the author.
Abramova, Olga: Co-president of the Movement of Supporters for Democratic
Reform In the early 1990s; member of parliament (1996-2008); since 1997,
chairwoman of labloko, a Belarusian sister organization to the Russian Iabloko,
a liberal party.
Akudovich, Valentin: Philosopher and writer, has taught at the Belarusian
Collegium and elsewhere. He has written extensively about Belaruslan national
identity.
Buival, Valeri!: Politician representing the Conservative Christian Party of the
Belarusian People's Front.
Chausov (Chavusau), Iurii: Political scientist, legal expert for the Assembly of
NGOs of Belarus, the country's largest association of pro-democratic civil-
society organizations.
Feduta, Aleksandr: Contributed to Aleksandr Lukashenko's 1994 election cam-
paign and briefly worked in the presidential administration until1995. After-
ward, he mainly worked as a journalist. In ZOOS, he published the first
biography of the Belaruslan president, called Lukashenko: A Political Biography.
Since the presidential elections in 2010, he has served as a political advisor to
Vladimir Neklaev, leader of the Speak the Truth Movement.
Kaliakin, Sergei: Leader of the oppositional Belarusian left-wing party 'A just
World'.
Krishtapovich, Lev. Vice-director of the Informational-Analytical Center of the
Presidential Administration. Professor, historian and philosopher. Helped
develop the official Belarusian state ideology in 2002-03.
Fabian Burkhardt 171
Manaev, Oleg: Professor of sociology, co-founder of IISEPS, Belarus's main
independent opinion pollster.
Milinkevich, Aleksandr: Nominated by the Congress of Democratic Forces as the
opposition unity candidate for the 2006 presidential elections. Withdrew his
candidacy in the 2010 elections. Leader of the For Freedom Movement.
Pazniak, Zianon: One of the founders of the Belarusian People's Front in 1988.
Until his exile in 1996, he was leader of the BPF parliamentary group. Serves
as leader in exile of the Conservative Christian Party of the Belarusian People's
Front.
Plgarev, Sergei: Deputy chairman of the Belaia Rus' republican public associa-
tion, which functions as a quasi-party of power, although it Is not registered
as such. A total of 63 of the 110 deputies elected to parliament In 2012 are
members of Belaia Rus'.
Rymashevskil, Vitali!. Co-President of Belarusian Christian-Democracy (BChD).
Presidential candidate in the 2010 presidential elections.
Shevtsov, Iurii: Historian, analyst, political technologist. Head of the Center for
Issues of European Integration in Minsk. Author of the book United Nation: The
Phenomeno11 of Belarus.
Trusov, Oleg: Head of the Frantsishak Skaryna Belarusian Language Society since
1999. An archeologist by education, he was a member of parliament from
1990-1996. Co-founder of the Belarusian People's Front and the Belaruslan
Social Democratic Assembly.
Viachorka, Franak: Youth leader and media manager. Was a member of Young
Front and chairman of the youth organization of the BPF (Partiia BNF). In 2006
he was a staff member in Alexander Mllinkevich's campaign.
Viachorka, Vlntsuk: One of the founders and a leader of the Belarusian People's
Front (Partlia BNF) from 1999 to 2007.
Iaroshchuk, Aleksandr: Since 2002, has served as leader of the Belarusian
Congress of Democratic Trade Unions, the primary umbrella group for state-
independent trade unions in Belarus.
Also by the editors
]. Ahrens and H.W. Hoen (eds), Economic Development in Central Asia: Institutio11al
Politics and Legitimacy in
U11derpi1111i11gs of Factor Markets, Emerging Markets Studies, 2014.
]. Ahrens and H.W. Hoen (eds), I11stitutio11al Reform in Ce11tral Asia. Politico-
Post-Soviet Eurasia
Ecollomic Challenges, Central Asian Studies, 2013.
Edited by
]. Ahrens, R. Caspers and J. Weingarth (eds), Good Govema11ce in the 21st Century:
Co11(lict, Institutional Change and Development in tile Era of G/obalizatio11, 2011.
Martin Brusis
]. Ahrens and R. Ohr (eds), Ze/111 Jahre Vertrag vo11 Maastricllt, 2003.
Dil·ectOii Competence Network on I11stitutio11s and Institutional Chmtge in
]. Ahrens, Govema11ce and Economic Deve/opme11t. A Comparative Institutional Postsocialism, Ludwig Ma,~imilian University ofMtmich, Germany
Approach, 2002.
M. Brusis, K. Staronova and R. Zubek (eds), Strategic Policymaking In Centml mtd Joachim Ahrens
Eastern Europe, Network of Schools and Institutes of Public Administration in Professor of International Economics, Private University of Applied Sciences, Gottingen,
Central and Eastern Europe, 2008. Germany
M. Brusis and J. Emmanouilidis (eds), Thinking Enlarged. Tile Accession Countries
a11d the Future of the European U11ion, 2002. Martin Schulze Wessel
Chair for the History of East and Southeast Europe, Ludwig Maximilian U11iversity of
M. Schulze Wessel. Russ lands Blick aufPreu(Sen. Die polnische Frage in der Dip/omatie Munich, Germany
und politischen Offentlichkeit des Zarenreiches 1111d des Sowjetstaates 1697-1947,
1995.
M. Schulze Wessel. Revolution und religiOser Dissens. Der romisclt-katho/ische llltd
russisch-ortlwdoxe K/erus a/s Trager re/igiOsen Wande/s in den bohmischen Liindem
tmd der Habsburgennonarchie bzw. in Russ/and 1848-1922, 2011.
 Selection and editorial matter© Martin Brusis, Joachim Ahrens and
Contents

*
Martin Schulze Wessel 2016
Individual chapters© Respective authors 2016
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this
publication may be made without written permission.
No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted
save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence
permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency,
Saffron House, 6-10 Kirby Street, London EC1 N 8TS. List of Figures and Tables vii
Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication
may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. Acknowledgments viii
The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work
in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. List of Contributors ix
First published 2016 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN
Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, 1 The Politics of Legitimation in Post-Soviet Eurasia 1
registered in England, company number 785998, of Hound mills, Basingstoke, Martin Bmsis
Hampshire RG21 6XS.
Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin's Press LLC, 2 Comparing Legitimation Strategies in Post-Soviet
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.
Countries 18
Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies
and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Christian von Soest and Julia Grauvogel
Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, 3 State Capitalism in Eurasia: A Dual-Economy Approach to
the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.
ISBN 978-1-137-48943-2 Central Asia 47
This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully Joachim Ahrens, Herman W. Hoen and Martin C. Spechler
managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing
processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the 4 Legitimation and the Party of Power in Kazakhstan 72
country of origin. Adele Del Sordi
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 5 Legitimacy and State-Led Economic Policy in Georgia 97
Politics and legitimacy in post-Soviet Eurasia I edited by Joachim Ahrens, Martin Brusis, Christian Timm
Martin Schulze Wessel.
pages em
Summary: "Political legitimacy has become a scarce resource in Russia and other 6 Legitimacy, Accountability and Discretion of the Russian
post-Soviet states in Eurasia. Their capacity to deliver prosperity has suffered from Courts 121
economic crisis, the conflict in Ukraine and the ensuing confrontation with the West.
Will nationalism and repression enable political regimes to survive? This book Alexei Trochev
investigates the politics of legitimation in post-Soviet countries, focusing on how
political and intellectual elites exploit different modes of legitimation. Combining 7 Concepts of the Nation and Legitimation in Belarus 148
cross-national comparisons and country case studies, it addresses state-economy
relations, pro-presidential parties, courts, ideas of nationhood, historical and
Fabian Burkhardt
literary narratives. Weak economic performance, evidence of electoral fraud,
unresponsive governments and the waning authority of presidents continue to 8 State Programs, Institutions and Memory in Russia 172
jeopardize institutional legitimacy. Whilst incumbent elites have been able to shift Philipp Biirger
between legitimation modes, this collection argues that shifts towards nationalism,
artificial charisma and traditionalism will not be sufficient in the long term to
keep elites in power"- Provided by publisher.
9 Cynics, Loyalists and Rebels in Recent Russian Fiction:
ISBN 978-1-137-48943-2 (hardback) Literary Scenarios of Legitimation and the Pursuit of
1. Legitimacy of governments-Former Soviet republics. 2. Former Soviet
republics-Politics and government. 3. Elite (Social sciences)-Political 'Sovereign Democracy' 193
activity-Former Soviet republics. 4. Post-communism-Former Soviet republics. Alfred Sproede and Oleksandr Zabirko
I. Ahrens, Joachim, 1963- editor of compilation. II. Brusls, Martin,
editor of compilation. Ill. Schulze Wessel, Martin, 1962- editor of compilation.
JN6581.P58 2015
320.947-dc23 2015019851

v
vi Contents

10 Comparative Conclusions: Legitimacy and Legitimation in

Eurasian Post-Communist States 223
Figures and Tables
Leslie Holmes

Index 246
Figures
2.1 Legitimation strategies in Russia and the western PSE
states 25
2.2 Legitimation strategies in the Caucasus 29
2.3 Legitimation strategies in Central Asia 32
6.1 Court-ordered amounts to be paid by federal agencies 138
10.1 Eurasian democracy ratings, rank-ordered by 2013
percentile rank 237

Tables
1.1 Modes and objects of legitimation 11
2.1 Summary of claims to legitimacy 20
2.2 Regime dates assessed by experts 23
6.1 judge-approved detentions in Russia 126
6.2 Registered crimes of wrongful detention under article
301 of the criminal code in Russia, 1997-2010 127
6.3 'Citizen Versus Government' lawsuits in Russian courts
of general jurisdiction, 2007-2013 134
6.4 Lawsuits regarding unlawful government
actions/decisions at all levels handled by Russian courts
of general jurisdiction (thousands) 135
10.1 Economic performance of Eurasian post-communist
states 231
10.2 Inequality and unemployment in Eurasian
post-communist states 232
10.3 Perceived corruption levels in Eurasian post-communist
states, 2014 235
10.4 Multi-party parliamentary elections in Eurasian
post-communist states, 1992-2014 240

vii

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