Phil 8: Introduction to Philosophy of Science

Outline 4: New Riddle of Induction

I. Aim of the Argument

 Nelson Goodman shows that justifying the Principle of Uniformity of

Nature is insufficient to justify induction.

 He will show that no matter how the world is, there is some way in which
unobserved instances are like observed instances.

 Because the PUN is trivial, it is insufficient to justify induction.

II. The Argument

 Grue: An object is “grue” if and only if it is first observed before the year
2050 and green, or if it is not first observed before the year 2050 and blue.

 The PUN supports the inference that all emeralds are green from the
premise that all emeralds observed so far have been green.

 But, the PUN also supports the inference that all emeralds are grue from the
premise that all emeralds observed so far have been grue.

 Is an emerald first observed in 2051 going to be green or grue (i.e. blue)?

 The PUN fails to distinguish between the good inductive argument that uses
“is green” and the bad inductive argument that uses “is grue”.

III. The New Riddle and Possible Responses

 According to the new riddle, to justify induction is to give a non-arbitrary,

non-circular justification for the claim that predicates such as “green” are
okay to use in inductive arguments, but predicates such as “grue” are not.

 Possible Response 1: “Grue” is defined disjunctively, in terms of a particular

time, and in terms of when an object is first observed. Predicates with
definitions like that ought not be used in inductive arguments.

 Response 1 is unconvincing: Let an object be “bleen” if and only if it is first

observed before the year 2050 and blue, or not first observed before 2050
 and green. Then, “green” is definable in terms of “grue” and “bleen” as
follows:

An object is “green” if and only if it is first observed before

2050 and grue, or not first observed before 2050 and bleen.

 Possible Response 2: We could only learn the predicate “grue” by definition,

whereas we learn what “green” is some other way, and that is why “green”
may be used in inductive arguments, but “grue” may not.

 Response 2 is unconvincing: lots of terms are introduced through definition

but nevertheless usable in inductive arguments.

 Possible response 3: The important difference between “green” and “grue” is

that “green” is entrenched in our language, and “grue” is not.

 Possible response 3 is unsatisfying: It’s hard to believe that the only

important difference between “green” and “grue” is that we happened to use
“green” in English, and to not use “grue”.

 Possible response 4: The predicate “green” refers to a “natural property” or

“natural kind”. The predicate “grue” does not.

 Response 4 just passes the buck: What’s a natural property/natural kind?