Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Volume 3, Number 9
Enforcement AlertOffice of Regulatory Enforcement October 2000
Continued on page 3
October 2000 2
Enforcement Alert
Continued from page 2 ment may result in hydrocarbons or
other contaminants entering the acid gas
stream. Hydrocarbons can be very dis
of acid gas” is directing that gas away ruptive to the short- and long-term op BP Amoco Reduces
from the recovery plant, combusting it eration of the SRP. Historically, not
at a flare and releasing sulfur dioxide to SO2 Emissions from
much effort has been put into investi
the atmosphere. Acid gas flaring is not gating and correcting the root cause of Flaring Nearly 75%
a federally permitted operation and contamination or upsets. Instead, inci
should typically only occur during a
malfunction (a “sudden, infrequent, and
dents have been simply reported as
“malfunctions.” EPA, believes that re
F rom 1993 to 1995, the BP
Amoco facility in Oregon,
Ohio, experienced an annual av
not reasonably preventable failure of peated malfunctions for the same cause, erage of 16 flaring incidents and
equipment or processes to operate in a generally, could be predicted and pre- released approximately 180 tons
normal or usual manner”) (40 C.F.R. vented. If flaring results from a pre of SO2 . Under the procedures out-
Section 60.2). In EPA’s experience, fre ventable upset, EPA believes that it does lined in a Consent Decree with
quent and repetitive acid gas flaring is not represent good air pollution control EPA, BP Amoco has been able to
often not due to malfunctions. Acid gas practices and that it may violate the reduce that amount to an insignifi
flaring that is routine or preventable vio CAA. cant number (three flaring events
lates the NSPS requirement for operat in 1999 released a total of 49 tons
ing consistent with ‘Good Air Pollution of SO2) and each event was attrib
Control Practices’ to minimize emis Diagnosing, Preventing utable to a true “malfunction” as
sions at refineries with NSPS fuel gas defined in NSPS. This was accom
Excess Flaring
combustion devices and affected facili plished through equipment and op
Repeated or regularly occurring in erational changes that eliminated
ties including SRPs (40 C.F.R.Section
cidents of flaring can be anticipated and the root causes of such flaring. The
60.11(d)).
should not be classified as ‘malfunc protocol in the consent decree
tions.’ For example, regularly switch (http://www.epa.gov/oeca/ore/aed)
Chain Reaction: Upstream ing between high and low sulfur crude serves as a model in balancing the
may cause fluctuations of the acid gas concerns of Good Engineering
Upsets May Result in feed to the SRP. This can create opera Practice and good Pollution Con
Downstream Malfunctions tional problems for the SRP and/or its trol Practices for any flaring of acid
Properly designed, operated and pollution control equipment, resulting gas or sour water stripper gas.
maintained SRPs can typically receive in a perceived need to flare. These up-
and treat all acid gas produced at the sets should be addressed through im
refinery (most also are designed to treat proved operational control systems, im
sour water stripper gas). These gases proved and frequent training of opera- � Conduct a root-cause analysis
should not be flared except under emer tors, and continued optimal perfor of each flaring incident to identify if any
gency or malfunction conditions. mance of the SRP, not by bypassing or equipment and/or operational changes
flaring acid gas and sour water strip- are necessary to eliminate or minimize
Upsets in upstream process equip-
per gas. that cause so as to reduce or avoid fu
ture flaring events. As appropriate, cor
Another cause of flaring is inad rective measures should be taken and
equate capacity of the SRP and its as implemented. If the analysis shows that
The Agency also believes
sociated tail gas unit (TGU) to process
that, as with acid gas the same cause has happened before,
all the acid gas at the refinery. Refiner
flaring, good air pollution the incident should not be considered a
ies should ensure that their units have
control practices include malfunction and corrective measures
the capacity and can handle variable vol
investigating the causes should be taken to prevent future oc
umes that may occur during different
of flaring events and currences;
production levels.
taking corrective action to � Ensure there is adequate ca
avoid or reduce the Refineries should implement the fol
pacity at the SRP and TGU. Redun
probability of their lowing procedures to ensure that flar dant units can prevent flaring by allow-
recurrence. ing results only from a true emergency
or malfunction: Continued on page 4
October 2000 3
United States
Environmental Protection Agency
Office of Regulatory Enforcement
(2248A)
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20460
Official Business
Penalty for Private Use $300
‘Enforcement�Alert’ newsletter
Continued from page 3 ity to assess whether the flaring inci- E-mail: mccoy.patric@epa.gov; and
dent was caused by a true malfunction, regarding federally permitted release
which is considered acceptable engi- questions, contact Ginny Phillips, Of-
ing one unit to operate if the other needs neering practices. fice of Regulatory Enforcement,
to be shut down for maintenance or an Toxics and Pesticides Enforcement
upset; and A reference procedure for evaluat-
Division at (202) 564-6139,Email:
ing if good air pollution practices are
� Prepare an accurate estimate being used when future acid gas flar-
phillips.ginny@epa.gov.
of the total SO2 released (using clear ing events occur can be found in the
calculation procedures) for each acid
Consent Decree, C.A. No. 3:97CV7790
gas flaring incident.
N.D. Ohio, entered May 5, 1999 (see
Identifying the root cause of the flar- http://www.epa.gov/oeca/ore/aed). Useful Compliance
ing incident gives the refinery the op- For more information, contact Assistance Resources
portunity to fix the problem before it Patric McCoy at U.S. EPA’s Region 5
happens again. It also enables the facil- office in Chicago at (312) 886-6869, CAA Applicability Determination
Index:
http://www.epa.gov/oeca/eptdd/adi.html
EPCRA Section 304 requires that unpermitted releases of extremely haz- Office of Regulatory Enforcement:
ardous substances in excess of their reportable quantity be reported immedi- http://www.epa.gov/oeca/ore/
ately to the State Emergency Response Commission and Local Emergency
RCRA Online:
Planning Committee.The flaring of hydrogen sulfide may require reporting if
http://www.epa.gov/rcraonline/
more than 500 pounds (the reportable quantity) of SO2 are released within a
24-hour period. The Clean Air Act recognizes that accidents, malfunctions, Compliance Assistance Centers:
start ups and shut downs may cause excess emissions even when the facil- http://www.epa.gov/oeca/mfcac.html
ity has implemented reasonable measures to avoid them. However, it is still
Audit Policy Information:
important to alert emergency response personnel when these releases occur,
http://www.epa.gov/oeca/ore/
as even short periods of flaring can emit large quantities of SO2. For example, apolguid.html
a medium-sized refinery with an SRP that processes 500 tons of acid gas
each day could release as much as 40 tons of SO2 at the flare in only one Small Business Gateway:
hour, more than 150 times the reportable quantity. http://www.epa.gov/smallbusiness/
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