464178

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JOU14410.1177/1464884912464178JournalismWaisbord

Special issue article

Journalism

Democracy, journalism, and 14(4) 504­–521

© The Author(s) 2012
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DOI: 10.1177/1464884912464178
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Silvio Waisbord
George Washington University, USA

Abstract
Contemporary populism in Latin America suggests that normative arguments about
the relation between journalism and democracy are premised on contrasting models of
media democracy. There is no single model of media ethics to offer a single foundation
for media democracy. The model represented by the Anglo-American tradition of the
liberal press assigns the market a central role, and envisions limited participation of
civil society and the state. Instead, models of citizen-based media democracy place civic
society at the center, and grant limited and regulated participation to the market and the
state. Populism, I argue, fits none of these options. Instead, it offers a model that places
the state at the center of media systems and approaches market and civil society as
opposed or subjected to the designs of the government. It sees journalism as inevitably
divided between ‘popular-national’ and ‘foreign-oligarchic’ interests, and views the state
as a necessary instrument to redress imbalances in democracies and press systems. The
case of populism confirms that answers to questions about journalism and democracy
are embedded in contrasting visions about the necessary relations between the state,
market, and civil society in democratic life.

Keywords
Journalism, media democracy, media policy, populism

Introduction
Giving a straight answer to the question ‘how much democracy does journalism need?’
is impossible. Neither journalism nor democracy are unequivocal concepts. Both are
complex, intellectually rich and contested ideas.

Corresponding author:
Silvio Waisbord, School of Media and Public Affairs, George Washington University, 805 21st Street NW,
Suite 400, Washington, DC 20052, USA.
Email: waisbord@gwu.edu
Waisbord 505

For centuries, philosophers and political scientists have discussed the multiple mean-
ings of democracy. This debate continues as reflected in recent writings discussing the
strengths and limitations of various models of democracy. Democracy seems incompre-
hensible without such multiple qualifiers as representative, liberal, participatory, delega-
tive, communitarian, civil, radical, monitory, socialist, conservative, and western (Held,
1997; Keane, 2009). Thus, any attempt to clarify the relationship between journalism and
democracy needs to spell out the model of democracy involved. What may seem fine
journalism for representative democracy is misguided for other models. Only if we are
specific about which model of democracy is it possible to define specifically what jour-
nalism is expected to do.
Journalism is not an unambiguous concept either. It is seen in multiple, contra-
dictory ways (Zelizer, 2004). Some scholars believe that journalism refers to the
provision of news and information (Schudson, 2008). Even if one wishes that jour-
nalism should contribute to democracy, the fact is that journalism has always
churned out information with no obvious connection to any model of democracy.
From crime to sports to entertainment, journalism has historically developed news
genres whose links to fundamental questions about democratic life are far from
self-evident. Consequently, journalism and democracy should be kept separate.
Despite long-standing democratic expectations, journalism has a complex relation-
ship to citizenship and public life. This position stands in contrast to arguments that
make a specific understanding of democracy the essence of journalism. For exam-
ple, communitarian theorists believe that journalism and participatory democracy
are inseparable. Journalism embodies the very central values that define their model
of ‘good democracy’, such as civic dialogue, rationality, and public discourse. For
them, democratic communication is the soul of journalism (Carey, 1989; Munson
and Warren, 1997).
Answers are contingent on competing understandings of each concept. The complex-
ity of journalism and democracy and their relationship, however, has not discouraged
scholars from providing straight answers. Perhaps the most famous, and ambitious,
attempt to settle this question was made by Siebert et al. (1963) in their classic book,
Four Theories of the Press. They proposed a particular interpretation of the United States
experience as the embodiment of the ideal relationship between journalism and democ-
racy. With its legal framework and private press, US democracy was presented as the
paragon of this relationship. For its authors, it represented the culmination of the long
development of the press and journalism in the West. Unquestionably, they were not
alone, as their argument, embedded in the liberal theory of the press, fairly reflected a
widespread conviction in academic scholarship during the post-war era according to
which the US press was the crowning achievement of the long march of modern democ-
racy. This argument defined the normative boundaries and analytical parameters of aca-
demic studies during subsequent decades.
Several critics found serious problems with this position. They questioned its idealized
and narrow interpretation of the evolution of journalism and democracy in the USA
(Nerone, 1995). They charged that it ignored the limitations of the private model of the
press as well as the pluralism of journalistic expressions in the USA and the West. Its
universalistic assumptions disregarded various models of journalism across media
506 Journalism 14(4)

systems in western democracies (Curran, 1996; Hallin and Mancini, 2004; McQuail,
1991). By offering alternatives to the liberal model supposedly represented by the US
press, the critics tacitly questioned whether a single answer can be given to define the
ideal relationship between democracy and journalism. The evolution of the press and
democracy in Western Europe showed various arrangements. Upholding a universal
model is problematic because the relationship can be approached from multiple theoreti-
cal perspectives and normative models.
Along this line of argument, my interest in this article is to discuss the ambiguity of
the relationship between journalism and democracy by analyzing this question in the
context of populism in contemporary Latin America. The resurgence of populism in
the region in the past decade offers an interesting opportunity to continue to problema-
tize the relation between journalism and democracy.
Latin American populism could be justifiably seen as a particular case, given its his-
torically conflictive relationship with democracy (Arditi, 2007; Ellner, 2011; Rovira
Kaltwasser, 2011) and, one may add, with the press as a fundamental institution of demo-
cratic governance. Populism has challenged the liberal-democratic tradition identified
with individual rights and markets and, instead, championed a model of democracy
embedded in notions about popular democracy, nationalism, and equality. Populism sees
itself as a movement that overcomes the social and political gaps of liberal democracy.
Its theorists believe that liberal democracy’s institutional and social weaknesses pave the
way for populism (Panizza, 2005). Populism’s complex relation with liberalism thus
makes it an interesting case to analyze the articulation between democracy and journal-
ism (Aibar Gaete, 2007; Hawkins, 2010).
Populist experiences suggest that normative arguments about the relation between
journalism and democracy are premised on contrasting models of media democracy.
However, there is no single model of media ethics to offer a single foundation for
media democracy (Christians et al., 2009). Instead, models of media democracy are
anchored in conflicting perspectives about desirable relations between the state, civil
society, and markets. The model represented by the Anglo-American tradition of the
liberal press assigns the market a central role, and envisions limited participation of
civil society and the state. Instead, models of citizen media democracy place civil
society at the center, and grant limited and regulated participation to the market and
the state.
Populism, I argue, fits neither of these two options, which largely reflect western
theories and experiences. Instead, it offers a model that places the state at the center
of media systems and approaches market and civil society as either opposed or sub-
jected to the designs of the government. Its statist model of media democracy sees
journalism as inevitably divided between ‘popular-national’ and ‘foreign-oligarchic’
interests. It views the state as a necessary instrument to redress imbalances in democ-
racies and press systems. For different reasons, populism’s answer to the question
about the relationship between journalism and democracy stands in direct opposition
to both the liberal and civic arguments. The case of populism confirms that answers
to questions about journalism and democracy are embedded in contrasting visions
about the necessary relations between the state, market, and civil society in demo-
cratic life.
Waisbord 507

The resurgence of populism and media policy activism

The resurgence of populism has profoundly reshaped the political landscape in contem-
porary Latin America. Once considered the political expression of a specific historical
juncture in the region, the transition from traditional to modern societies (Germani et al.,
1973), populism has remained an essential phenomenon of the region’s politics.
Undoubtedly, populism is a contested term. Some analysts identify populism with certain
economic policies such as import substitution industrialization, Keynesian economics,
and social welfarism. For others, it represents a style of political leadership characterized
by charismatic leaders, demagogy, mass mobilization, and a strong Executive. In terms
of political ideology, populism never neatly fitted the left-right continuum, as it has
drawn from nationalism, conservativism, and workerism.
The current wave of populism has not helped to settle taxonomic questions. On the
contrary, it has spawned another round of debates about the defining elements of pop-
ulism and its differences to leftist governments in the region (Ellner, 2008; Roberts,
2007). During the past decade, the label ‘populism’ has been applied to characterize the
administrations of the late Nestor Kirchner (2003–2007) and Cristina Fernandez de
Kirchner (2007–present) in Argentina, Evo Morales (2006–present) in Bolivia, Rafael
Correa (2007–present) in Ecuador, Daniel Ortega (2007–present) in Nicaragua, and
Hugo Chavez (1999–present) in Venezuela.
For the purpose of this article, Ernesto Laclau’s (1978, 2005) work is an appropriate
starting point to discuss journalism, democracy, and populism. Laclau’s work has been a
central point of reference in recent scholarly debates about populism in Latin America
and elsewhere. His ideas underpin positive assessments about the achievements of popu-
list administrations on social justice and participation (see Buxton, 2011; Cannon, 2009).
Laclau has been the intellectual darling of populist presidents who have mentioned and
invited him on numerous occasions. In his early work, Laclau (1978) defined populism
in terms of a particular interpellation of the people, in Althusser’s sense. It is a political
discourse that appeals to ‘the people’ in order to oppose hegemonic ideas. It constructs
the people, an imaginary concept, by constantly invoking its existence and defining its
essence and goals. In his more recent work, Laclau (2005) has argued that populism is an
empty signifier, a notion grounded in Lacan’s work. What is characteristic of it is the
construction of ‘the people’ as a political agent mobilized against an enemy. It is a rhe-
torical appeal that brings together disparate popular demands in critical historical junc-
tures – a crisis of hegemony, as classically discussed by Gramsci (1971). Populism
reflects a political rupture in which a society cannot absorb popular demands. It unifies
a range of identities and demands under a common discourse and the leader. Leaders
successfully appeal to the people in order to use that moment to catapult the underdog,
the subaltern classes, to the political center-stage, and, by doing so, become identified
with popular identities. The leader is ‘the name’ of the people, that semantically unde-
fined and empty category. Populist mobilization signals the re-foundation of the political
order – the remaking of politics from the bottom up. This process, expectedly, is highly
conflictive as popular interests clash against anti-popular, anti-national, oligarchic
groups. Populism’s Manichean view of politics is not simply a discursive instrument, a
mere appeal to play ‘old politics’ and manipulate citizens. Instead, it is constitutive of its
508 Journalism 14(4)

unique conception of politics in a particular juncture. Despite sporadic references to

actual experiences, Laclau’s argument is largely theoretical. It is based on a mix of nor-
mative expectations and selected evidence. Having received wide attention in recent
debates, Laclau’s ideas offer a good starting point to understand populism’s conception
of media democracy. Understanding the logic of these reforms is necessary to contextu-
alize populism’s view about the articulation between journalism and democracy.
Just as its predecessors did in previous decades, contemporary populism has actively
tried to spearhead major changes in media systems. These changes were aimed at
achieving three goals: strengthening the media power of the President, bolstering com-
munity media, and exercising tighter control of the press through legislation and judi-
cial decisions.
One set of decisions has been aimed at strengthening the media reach of the Executive.
In some cases, such as in Ecuador and Venezuela, governments ordered the expropriation
of private broadcasting networks and newspapers from companies that had strongly
opposed their policies. Governments also increased funding and expanded the number of
state-owned media outlets (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2000–2011; Organization
of American States, 2011). They have also continued the discretionary allocation of gov-
ernment advertising and the manipulation of economic and financial decisions to favor
allies and punish enemies, such as condoning debts on state-owned bank loans, granting
tax breaks and favorable import permits, and easing access to newsprint. Although they
were defended as the expression of the communication rights of the people against anti-
popular interests, these policies have been intended to curb the power of targeted private
companies, and expand the media arsenal of the Executive.
A second key issue has been populism’s policies on community media. Hundreds of
community radio and television stations have long existed in legal limbo in the region
(AMARC, 2011). Not recognized by laws, they have survived on shoestring budgets
and remained subject to closures and persecution. Most countries still lack legislation
to regulate the functioning and funding of community media. Despite these difficul-
ties, the number of community media has continued to grow due to wider access to
cheaper technology, spotty law enforcement, and local interest (Hernandez and
Marchesi Garcia, 2008).
Community media have been the backbone of the political-communication structure
of the governments of Evo Morales and Hugo Chavez, particularly in their battles
against leading commercial media. In Venezuela, according to official statistics, there
are 244 radio stations, 37 television stations, and over 200 newspapers run by communi-
ties (Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, 2010). The government has regularly pro-
vided them with equipment and funding (Cañizalez, 2009). After the 2002 coup, during
which community media defended the embattled Chavez (Castillo, 2003), the govern-
ment lauded their contribution to the ‘revolutionary’ project and called for a regulatory
framework. A bill to regulate ‘popular communication’ was drafted with participation
from community organizations, but, at the time of this writing, has yet not been passed
by Congress. In Bolivia, the government-controlled Congress approved the General
Law of Telecommunications, Information Technologies, and Communication in 2011,
which assigns a third of broadcasting licenses to the state, a third to the private sector,
17 percent for the ‘community social sector’ and 17 percent for ‘original indigenous
Waisbord 509

populations’. In Argentina, the 2009 broadcasting law pushed by the Fernandez de

Kirchner administration grants a third of licenses to ‘social organizations’ (such as neigh-
borhoods, cooperatives, unions, churches, and other organizations), a long-standing
demand from community media activists.
A third set of actions has dealt with legislation and judicial decisions intended to regu-
late press content. Ecuador’s President Correa has frequently used libel and contempt
laws to discourage press criticism (Cerbino and Ramos, 2009). In 2009, he brought a
lawsuit for contempt against the daily La Hora and its president for not retracting an
editorial after publishing an editorial that was critical of the President. A judge dismissed
the lawsuit because he considered it did not offend the President. Correa also brought a
lawsuit against two journalists who authored a book that denounced his brother for cor-
ruption and favoritism in state contracts. He also brought charges of ‘insult’ against the
leading daily El Universo and one of its star columnists in 2011. After a judge ruled in
favor of the President, slapping the accused with multimillion-dollar fines, Correa
decided to pardon the journalists and the newspaper.
In Bolivia, President Morales sponsored the ‘Law against racism and all forms of
discrimination’ in 2010. Freedom of expression groups and journalistic organizations
questioned two articles that, in their mind, were intended to control content. Article 16
stipulates economic penalties and the suspension of broadcasting licenses for media that
publicize or promote ‘racist and discriminatory ideas’. Article 23 states that journalists
and media owners accused of racism cannot claim special legal status. President Hugo
Chavez’s 2004 Law on Social Responsibility in Radio and Television also establishes
controls on media content. Article 8 bans messages that ‘incite or promote hatred’,
‘foment citizens’ anxiety or alter public order’, ‘disrespect authorities’, ‘encourage
assassination’, or ‘constitute war propaganda’. Article 29, for example, bars television
and radio stations from broadcasting messages that ‘promote, defend, or incite breaches
of public order’ or ‘are contrary to the security of the nation’. Press freedom organiza-
tions raised concerns about the impact of the law’s broad and vaguely worded restrictions
on critical news. Such concerns materialized when the government fined Globovision,
which remains the only television station that is critical of the administration, for cover-
ing deadly prison riots in mid-2011.
These sets of media policies illustrate populism’s ‘media activism’, its intention to
drive forward a revolutionary rupture, in Laclau’s sense. The attempt to reorganize the
media on different foundations reflects the crisis of cultural hegemony in which a new
political formation represented by populist leaders and their social coalition supersedes
the old order. It represents the confrontation between a conception of media politics that
reflects popular demands and culture against the old order embodied by traditional media
corporations. Although it is debatable whether populism has effectively transformed the
old media order, a point that is considered below, its ambition to spearhead major trans-
formations in media systems is undeniable.
Populism’s ‘media rupture’ has been the touchstone for heated debates about press and
democracy. Endless controversy has taken place among presidents and cabinet members,
with frequent verbal fusillades against oppositional media and journalists, and one-sided
coverage of the governments by oppositional media. Civic groups identified with popu-
list, nationalist and socialist causes have generally applauded government decisions, on
510 Journalism 14(4)

the basis that they restrict the power of media corporations and diversify media ownership
(Diaz Rangel and Tremamunno, 2002). In contrast, leading news companies, trade organi-
zations, and freedom of expression groups have regularly criticized official policies. They
have basically countered with liberal arguments that skeptically view any form of state
intervention on press issues and the existence of libel and defamation laws that can be
used by public officials. Organizations working on civil liberties and government account-
ability have been concerned with populism’s lack of accountability in media policies, its
tendency to build a media arsenal under control of the Executive, its reluctance to promote
official transparency, and its permanent diatribes against dissenting views (Cañizalez and
Lugo-Ocando, 2008)

Populist journalism
Populism’s view of the ideal relationship between journalism and democracy needs to
be placed in the context of media reforms. Its understanding of journalism is anchored
in a binary vision that embraces Schmittian politics, a world divided between friends
and foes (De la Torre, 2008). Populism denies the notion that journalism is or can be
autonomous. It believes, instead, that it is inevitably embedded in broad political-
economic relations. Journalism is seen as an instrument in the informational struggle
between ‘popular’ and ‘anti-popular’ interests. There is no journalism as a specific set
of occupational practices with norms and routines separated from the press – the politi-
cal, economic, and legal institution that produces news and information. Both are the
same. Journalism is indistinguishable from press ownership and the overall legal and
economic environment that shapes the functioning of news organizations. Journalists
are viewed as employees of news organizations, the pawns of business and political
goals rather than news workers with varying levels of autonomy from ownership inter-
ests. In fact, populism rejects the notion of journalism as a profession that exercises
control over news production. Instead, it is seen as an occupation fully dependent on
political and economic forces.
Populism flatly rejects the public trustee model of ‘professional journalism’. It dis-
misses its core ideals (e.g. evenhandedness, objectivity, fourth estate, independence,
and watchdog reporting) as illusory given the political-economic context of media
systems (Garcia de Madariaga and Solis Dominguez, 2008; Samar and Garcia, 2011).
Like the Marxist critique, it views professionalism as an ideological construction, a
distorted representation of reality, the expression of the bourgeoisie, as Presidents
Correa (2011) and Chavez have regularly put it. The ideals of a professional journalism
are considered to be mere window-dressing for other interests, an influential and well-
financed instrument of the opposition. Journalism is viewed as an occupation that can-
not be separated from ownership. It is necessarily a conduit for commercial, political
and social interests. Journalists in mainstream news organizations are mere willing or
unwilling pawns of corporate interests. ‘Professional journalism’ is dismissed as a dili-
gent messenger for large corporations that protect oligarchic and imperialistic designs.
Because they receive the lion’s share of media advertising, the mainstream media are
seen as the voice of conservative businesses that dominate key economic sectors and
are opposed to official policies.
Waisbord 511

By questioning core principles of professionalism, populism contradicts core ideals of

the liberal model of the press. It questions liberalism’s ideal of ‘freedom of the press’
(Amaral and Monteiro, 2011). It negates the notion that journalism’s role should be skep-
tical of governments and should scrutinize official secrecy and wrongdoing. It rejects the
ethics of evenhanded reporting. It mocks the notion of neutrality or fairness, or the social
trustee model of journalism. The ‘bad journalists’, in President Correa’s phrase, who are
frequently castigated by heads of state and supporters, are those who work for media
organizations not aligned with the government.
Populism believes that only the journalism that unabashedly defends the government
is the ‘good’ journalism. Good, honest journalism, President Chavez said, are those who
have ‘the responsibility of patriotic consciousness and commitment, and the memory of
the [Venezuelan] people’ (Da Corte, 2011). Within populism’s dualistic view of media
politics, defenders portray this form of journalism against ‘professional’ reporting that
they view as the representative of oligarchic, imperialistic, corporate interests. Populist
journalism justifies its partisan biases on the grounds that there is no ‘non-ideological’
news. Just as mainstream journalism defends editorial and other market interests, popu-
list journalism defends specific positions. Corporate journalism pretends to serve the
public interest while marching in lockstep with anti-popular, anti-national interests. The
difference is that populist journalism supports a different set of interests, and that it pub-
licly admits its lack of neutrality.
‘Populist journalism’ has received different names. It has been called ‘militant jour-
nalism’ in Argentina, ‘necessary journalism’ in Venezuela, ‘Sandinista journalism’ in
Nicaragua (Cuadra Garcia, 2009; Simpson, 2009) and ‘committed journalism’ in Ecuador
(Punin Larrea, 2011). Despite different names, they share the same vision of a journalism
defined by its opposition to the ‘enemies of the people’. In Argentina, Martin Garcia, the
former director of the government-run news agency, defended the notion of the ‘militant
journalist’ who:

… writes the truth in the service of the people. I’m a militant first, and a journalist second …
With whom would I be objective? On the other side, there were those who threw people alive
to the river, and baby kidnappers. With them, there can’t be objectivity. (Rosenberg, 2010)1

Nicaraguan journalist Consuelo Sandoval, founding member of the Foro de Periodistas

Sandinistas, writes:

We decided to break off the shackles with media business who, under the pretense of
independence, impartiality, and objectivity, have used us to defend their political-party interests.
We were tired of lies, misunderstandings, manipulation, half-truths, dirty campaigns, twisted,
mean-spirited, and biased information, hidden truths. For these reasons, we decided to organize
the Foro de Periodistas Sandinistas. (Sandoval, 2009)

Populist journalism, then, refers to a model of journalistic practice that is ostensibly

identified with populist administrations and rejects the idea of professional journalism.
Critics, instead, disparage these labels as mere rhetorical tricks to hide the essence of
populism’s preferred journalism – government propaganda or ‘official’ journalism. In all
cases, the intensification of the debate about ‘professional’ vs. ‘populist’ journalism has
512 Journalism 14(4)

resulted in the polarization of news coverage and divisions inside journalism.

Consequently, there is no consensus in journalism about fundamental ethics that should
be rigorously observed – critical issues that should sustain journalism as an occupation
defined by shared norms and common goals.
Populism journalism is clearly placed in the long tradition of advocacy reporting in
Latin America.2 It defends advocacy over ‘professional’ journalism. Just as populist
administrations like to trumpet its ‘anti-establishment’ goals, populist journalism views
itself as the opposite of a press that represents the political-economic status quo. It is
practiced by government-owned media as well as private media whose owners are sym-
pathetic to populist administrations (and are typically economically favored by govern-
ments). The expansion of government-run news outlets, the massive injection of funds
into state-run media and official advertising, and the perpetuation of old media cronyism
have provided suitable platforms for populist journalism.

Populism’s media statism

Should populist media policies and vision of journalism be considered democratic, as
their defenders argue? Or should they be considered authoritarian, as critics tirelessly
point out? Divergent assessments indicate that ‘media democracy’, a concept and ideal
frequently bandied about, remains remarkably ambiguous.
For progressives who believe that the fundamental problem for media democracy in
Latin America is the unchecked power of large media companies (the so-called ‘poder
fáctico’ or ‘real power’), populism’s opposition to selected large news corporations
represents its commitment to media pluralism (De Moraes, 2011; Sel, 2010). In their
mind, populist policies are democratic for they are intended to diversify media systems
dominated by economic and political elites. They applaud presidents for confronting
conservative publishers and dismantling privileges that they had historically enjoyed.
Populism’s media politics illustrate Laclau’s notion of its ‘rupture’ of the old hegem-
onic order.
One can reasonably credit populism with having turned the issue of media owner-
ship into a matter of public debate. Historically, governments rarely raised questions
about media concentration and inequalities in media access (Becerra and Mastrini,
2006; Fox and Waisbord, 2002). Instead, they opted for quid pro quo politics with
media moguls to secure favorable news coverage. Recent attention to critical issues in
media democracy – ownership, content, funding, voice – is, arguably, the result of
populism’s strong push. Populist presidents regularly ‘speak the unspeakable’ – media
ownership, industrial interests, market structure, editorial policies, issues that are not
in news or policy agendas. So, for example, when President Correa affirms that the
‘basic problem’ is that the media are ‘private business with profit-making goals that
offer a fundamental good for society’, he puts his finger on an important matter for
democratic governance (EFE, 2012). Aside from rhetoric, populism has also endorsed
legislation to split news companies from cross-media and industrial interests, like
Argentina’s 2009 broadcasting law and Ecuador’s ‘anti-monopoly’ bill.
The issue of ownership, certainly, deserves wide attention given significant inequalities
in media systems, rampant commercialism, and elected officials’ traditional reluctance to
Waisbord 513

address them. The fact that leading news companies are generally the media arm of large
industrial conglomerates, with dominant positions in key economic sectors such as agricul-
ture, mining, and banking, hardly fits any definition of media democracy (Becerra and
Mastrini, 2006; Hughes and Prado, 2011; Lugo-Ocando, 2008). Considering that editorial
and industrial interests deeply influence newsrooms, they are unlikely to eagerly scrutinize
policy decisions and business practices that affect parent companies.
Populism’s view of media democracy, however, is problematic for two reasons. First,
to say that populism has been committed to democratizing journalism and media systems
by tackling ownership concentration ignores two facts: it has neither curbed the power of
all media corporations nor expressed interest in bolstering all community media.
Populism has maintained amicable relations with media moguls that have dutifully toed
the official line, and generously supported their business ambitions through clientelistic
practices. President Ortega’s family has handsomely benefitted from government lar-
gesse. Individual entrepreneurs with close ties to the government have remarkably
expanded their business during the Kirchner administrations. Far from dismantling
media cronyism and discretionalism, populism has actually capitalized on these practices
to strengthen the communicative power of the Executive and reward political allies. It
has continued to concentrate key media decisions in the hands of presidents rather than
trying to strengthen congressional power and citizens’ participation (Waisbord, 2010).
By the same token, populism’s position about citizens’ media is ambiguous. While it
supports community media ideologically sympathetic to governments, it has confronted
or ignored civic media that have been critical of the government. Despite its rhetorical
commitment to community media, populist journalism uneasily fits the tradition of
‘alternative’ communication in the region.3 Discursively, it vindicates core ideals of
alternative movements and the radical critique of the capitalist media, namely, its opposi-
tion to ‘corporate’ journalism. Presidents defended community media as counter-
hegemonic, revolutionary journalism that supports their policies – that is, as subsidiary
to the state. Populism, however, is contrary to the notion of community media as coun-
terweight to the state, as structures to promote associational life outside the purview of
the government, as autonomous spaces for citizens to come together to discuss common
interests. These demands have been at the center of the vibrant community media move-
ments in the region for decades. This ambivalent approach underlies tensions in the inter-
action between community media and populism. Studies show that the latter’s clientelistic
approach uneasily coexists with local efforts to keep moderate autonomy vis-a-vis the
government in Chavez’s Venezuela (Fernandes, 2011; Schiller, 2011).
A second problem is that populism’s diagnosis of the challenges for media democracy
is limited. While it pinpoints problems caused by market dynamics, such as concentrated
ownership, it ignores the domination of particular interests in the uses of state mecha-
nisms. Its resolute statism does not recognize any possible abuses or pitfalls in state
intervention in the media. The discretionary use of public resources to augment presiden-
tial communicative capacity remains a critical problem throughout the region. This is
reflected in the perpetuation of media clientelism, the use of press laws that curb speech,
and the manipulation of the judiciary. Populism has not only ignored these issues, it has
also continued a long tradition of unregulated state interventionism. It has ignored the
need to strengthen congressional and/or civic oversight over media matters.
514 Journalism 14(4)

State intervention is not necessarily negative, as market fundamentalists insist. Nor is

it necessarily positive if driven by ‘popular’ policies, as populists argue. State interven-
tion in media systems can pursue democratic or non-democratic goals through demo-
cratic or non-democratic mechanisms. The problem is that populist reforms have tended
to strengthen the communicative capacity of the Executive rather than to benefit the
public through overhauling commercial media systems, bolstering public broadcasting,
and/or strengthening truly autonomous citizens’ media. They have tried to rearticulate
the relations between the state and the market in ways that favor presidential power vis-
a-vis media opponents. Populism neither aims to dislodge journalism from the state, as
liberals hope, nor promotes public participation in the news or the press. It is wary of
strengthening journalism that may challenge or gain autonomy from the state. Instead, it
relies on a transformative state with minimal constraints and counterbalancing
mechanisms.
Populism’s uncritical statism is grounded in its dyed-in-the-wool anti-liberalism.
Studies have pointed out the contradictory relationship between populism and liberal
democracy (Arditi, 2010; Motta, 2011). For some academics, the logic of populism is
contrary to the logic of liberal democracy because it advocates the indivisible nature of
the people as a homogeneous body (Abts and Rummens, 2007). Liberalism, instead, is
premised on the existence of conflict and difference, and the need of rights to protect
individuals from an intrusive state. Populism is contrary to liberalism’s notion that
democracy requires strong mechanisms such as elections and other procedures to restrain
political power, to keep permanent checks on rulers (Pasquino, 2005). Whereas critics
believe that populism’s relationship with liberalism is fraught with unsolvable problems
that ultimately are toxic for democracy, defenders think that its anti-liberalism is a badge
of honor. Populism’s skepticism, if not opposition, to constitutional institutions is neces-
sary to transcend the limitations of democracy and free-market capitalism. Frequent
presidential tirades against political parties and ‘neoliberal’ market policies, as well as
populism’s self-perception of a movement that supersedes representative democracy,
illustrate its anti-liberalism.
There is no question that broad characterizations of populism as ‘anti-liberal’ tread on
slippery conceptual terrain. They run the risk of missing significant differences among
populisms. In Latin America, populist governments have taken different positions about
liberal principles and institutions. Whereas some governments decisively opposed demo-
cratic institutions and circumvented or abolished constitutional rule, others did not.
Contemporary populism has not done away with essential institutions of constitutional
democracy. It has not shut down Congress and the Judiciary, suspended elections, banned
political parties, or eliminated individual rights. Furthermore, populist governments
have held open and competitive elections and, in some cases, have been re-elected.
Unlike authoritarian regimes, populism has not imposed prior censorship or killed dis-
sident reporters and publishers. To mistake populism for authoritarianism given its antip-
athy towards liberalism is not only wrong, but it also adds further conceptual fuzziness.
Populism’s anti-liberalism on press issues is anchored in the conviction that the state
is necessarily a force of good that does not require strong and effective checks and bal-
ances. Populist media policies, as well as its conception of journalism, are embedded in
the conviction that the state is inherently a positive force of transformation, and,
Waisbord 515

therefore, that accountability mechanisms (including a critical press) are not necessary.
State interventionism is justified by the unquestionable goodness of the government to
produce political, economic, and social transformations. This belief flouts liberalism’s
core notion that the press requires a legal framework that safeguards independence from
the government in order to foster expression and scrutiny of official actions. Nor does
populism share the notion that journalism is a vehicle for the expression of citizens or, to
be true to populist language, of the people. It disregards the notion that ‘the people’ need
mediating channels and, instead, favors ‘direct communication’ with the leader (De la
Torre, 2008; Sorj, 2010).
Populism’s anti-liberalism is reflected not only by its use of legal mechanisms and the
manipulation of the judiciary to curb journalistic criticism. It is also expressed in the lack
of interest in strengthening mechanisms to facilitate the publicizing of government pro-
ceedings. Populist governments have not been committed to passing national freedom of
information legislation. No administration has made significant efforts to pass such laws
in over a decade. Nor have they made significant efforts to enforce existing laws, as in
the case of Ecuador and Nicaragua, by encouraging citizens to demand information and
bolstering the capacity of government agencies to respond to requests (Alianza Regional
por la Libre Expresión e Información, 2011; Chamorro, 2008).
Presidents have also discretionarily used laws and influenced judges to castigate
media critics. Chavez arbitrarily decided not to renew the license of Radio Caracas
Television (RCTV), the station that with Globovision openly supported the 2002 coup
against him, as well as dozens of private stations. Likewise, Correa has unilaterally
decided to expropriate media properties that were owned by bankrupt industrial
conglomerates.
Populist administrations have also tried to weaken critical news organizations by
reducing or withdrawing official advertising (Mastrini and Marino, 2009). Certainly, it
would be mistaken to single out populist governments for such actions, given that
government manipulation of public funds has been historically common throughout
the region. Yet populism has ignored the need to implement democratic regulations to
reduce the ability of state and federal government officials to exercise undue influence
on the press.
Also, populist presidents have enacted media management strategies that undermine
the ability of the press to monitor governments. They have been fond of holding press
conferences without giving reporters the opportunity to ask questions, or have avoided
them altogether. Instead, they have frequently opted for private forms of information dis-
semination by meeting with sympathetic journalists and publishers. Another common
practice has been to give regular speeches on radio and television, forcing broadcast sta-
tions to carry them. Again, this practice has not been uncommon in Latin American his-
tory, yet populist presidents have shown a remarkable fondness for such broadcasts
(Bisbal, 2009).
So, should populism’s model be characterized as ‘democratic’ or ‘anti-democratic’?
Because there is no single model of democratic media or journalism, the use of ‘demo-
cratic’ does little to dispel existing confusion. What needs to be discussed, then, is the
role that competing models of journalism and democracy assign to the state, markets and
civil society.
516 Journalism 14(4)

Populism’s model is clearly statist. It assumes that strengthening the state, particularly
vis-a-vis ‘anti-popular’ media corporations, is necessary to promote media pluralism. It
is not rabidly anti-market, like communist regimes. It supports market-based media as
long as they do not question the government. It envisions markets, as well as civic soci-
ety, as divided between ‘loyal’ and ‘enemy’ media depending on whether they support or
oppose the government.
Populism’s inveterate, unregulated statism contradicts both liberal and citizen models
of media democracy. It shuns political liberalism’s fundamental skepticism about state
interference in ‘the free circulation of ideas’ in the marketplace. Populist governments
have restricted market-based media through expropriation and persecution, shown impa-
tience with dissenting voices, and aggressively expanded the state-owned press. These
actions are ‘undemocratic’ because they go against the separation of press and the state
and the legal protection of journalism.
Populism also contradicts conceptions that underscore the importance of institutional
arrangements that foreground citizen voices and protect them from the long hand of
governments and markets. This principle underlies the idea of autonomous public broad-
casting and citizens’ media as central requirements for media democracy. This view does
not completely espouse liberalism’s ingrained skepticism about ‘unregulated’ govern-
ment, but finds it too limited to understand contemporary challenges to media democracy
(Curran, 1996). It is concerned with bolstering alternatives that foster civic expression
outside state- and market-dominated media. From this perspective, then, ‘unregulated
statism’ controlled by the Executive is worrisome, particularly in a region with a heavy
legacy of government discretionialism and weak accountability. It perpetuates structural
problems for media democracy, namely, the concentration of presidential power and
media patrimonialism (Waisbord, 2009).

One question, many answers

Populism’s convoluted relationship with the press and democracy offers a cautionary tale
about making journalism synonymous with democracy or assuming that the question
‘how much democracy does journalism need?’ can be easily answered. Answers depend
on competing models of media democracy, and the comparative weight assigned to
states, markets, and civil society in media systems.
Populism’s answer is that only state policies can effectively support what the state
considers a truly democratic journalism. Such journalism is not the journalism that scru-
tinizes government or informs about the workings of representational democracy, as
envisioned by liberals. Populism does not believe that democracy needs, to paraphrase
Schudson’s (2008) expression, an ‘unlovable press’. Populism has no use for the notion
that journalism serves the public good and citizenship, or promotes dialogue among
members of a political community. Nor does populism believe that journalism needs
much democracy, basically because it minimizes, if it is not completely blinded to, the
democratic arrangements that journalism demands. Populism’s main concern is about
journalism as an institution in support of goals other than sensu stricto democracy –
whether popular sovereignty, social rights, and government programs. It does not believe
in the liberal-democratic notion of journalism as a public trustee that contributes to the
Waisbord 517

common good. Instead, the ‘good’ journalism defends the government, champions popu-
lar demands, and channels people’s voices; the ‘bad’ journalism represents ‘anti-
popular’, reactionary interests. State interventionism is justified as a way to redress the
power of news corporations and strengthen the presence of the people.
In summary, populist arguments stand in opposition to liberal positions that jour-
nalism demands constitutional democracy with effective restrictions on governments.
It also contradicts the citizen model that identifies democratic journalism with a
vibrant civil society as the backbone of public life. These positions are present in
ongoing debates about journalism, democracy, and populism in academia, news-
rooms, and media activists in Latin America. But there is no common vision about the
necessary relation between journalism and democracy.4 Normative models of journal-
ism are contested – there is no single set of desirable ethics unanimously considered
best-suited for democratic goals. In fact, questions such as ‘what should journalism
do in a democracy’ or how much democracy journalism needs are a matter of bitter
divisions.
One can reasonably argue that populism has deepened such divisions in Latin
America through actively promoting a dualistic view of journalism. The lack of con-
sensus over desirable models of journalism, certainly, is not new in the region.
Neither the press nor journalism have been institutions unified around common prin-
ciples and ethical norms. Just as the press was divided by political and economic
differences, journalism has been split by different allegiances – partisan, ideological,
ethical.
These cases suggest that the study of the relationship between journalism and democ-
racy not only needs to consider different answers embedded in competing models of
media democracy. It should also consider the particular history and configuration of
press systems and journalistic practices. Furthermore, the analysis needs to be sensitive
to current changes in democracy and journalism. As democratic ideals expand globally,
it is not clear what democracy means given the myriad of ‘really existing’ democracies
(Keane, 2009). Democracies experiment with different mechanisms, suffer setbacks, and
make progress. Nor is it obvious what defines journalism. Journalism is being reinvented
given unprecedented political, economic, and technological changes (Waisbord, 2012).
The diversification of reporting practices and news organizations throws into question
whether journalism can be rightly considered one uniform institution with well-defined
sets of practices across settings.
As both democracy and journalism continue to evolve around the world, the notion of
one feasible path or single desirable vision of ‘democratic journalism’ belongs to aca-
demic antiquarianism. If it is claimed that journalism is only intelligible in the context of
democracy, then what that means is not obvious. Its functions and roles vary widely
across conceptual models and contemporary democracies. It is not self-evident that one
model is inherently superior or applicable globally. In a globalized world, any argument
about idealized, necessary relations between democracy and journalism should be sub-
mitted to the tests of parochialism and contingency – probing its empirical and normative
premises and generalizability across settings. Amidst different democracies and journal-
isms, it is imperative to address and compare differences to refine analytical frameworks
and normative expectations.
518 Journalism 14(4)

Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial or
not-for-profit sectors.

Notes
1. Garcia was referring to actions carried out by the military dictatorship that ruled between
1976 and 1983.
2. Advocacy journalism characterized the partisan press during the post-independence era and
the formation of party systems in the 19th century. In the early 20th century, advocacy jour-
nalism was practiced not only by the party press, but also by publications that expressed the
rise of other forms of political mobilization associated with trade unions, nationalist groups,
and religious associations. It gradually receded from the mainstream as commercial news
organizations adopted the ‘professional’ model. The consolidation of the commercial press,
however, did not relegate partisan journalism to the margins of press systems. Because leading
news organizations did not enforce strict separation between editorial positions and straight
reporting, the ‘professional’ model remained weakly institutionalized. Despite the rhetorical
commitment to professionalism by publishers’ and journalists’ groups, the ideal of ‘profes-
sional journalism’ never gained a firm footing in the mainstream, commercial press. It was not
uncommon for dominant news companies to prioritize editorial sympathies, openly support
military coups or specific policies and parties during democratic periods, over a commitment
to fairness and neutrality. The fortunes of advocacy journalism varied widely according to the
perpetual political instability and the cycle of authoritarian and democratic governments that
defined the region during the last century. Leftist news organizations and reporters were the
main targets of persecution by military dictatorships and other right-wing governments.
3. Latin America has a decades-long history of alternative, community media. Since the 1950s,
hundreds of broadcasting stations and newspapers were established that rejected the com-
mercialism of market-based media and opposed governments. They became symbols of
resistance during dictatorships. Community media have survived in legal limbo for countries
lacking legislation to regulate their situation. They have frequently been the targets of police
raids and judicial decisions.
4. One of the most telling examples of the absence of common visions in the academic com-
munity in Latin America was the decision by Argentina’s Universidad de La Plata to grant the
‘freedom of expression’ award to President Hugo Chavez in 2011. The decision, expectedly,
was widely supported by populist supporters and criticized by opponents. The decision was
particularly significant given that the University is home to the oldest journalism school in the
region. The award is named after Rodolfo Walsh, a journalist who pioneered a political brand
of ‘new journalism’ in the region. A member of a Peronist guerilla group, he was killed by a
death squad in Buenos Aires in March 1977 during the military dictatorship.

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Author biography
Silvio Waisbord is professor in the School of Media and Public Affairs at George Washington
University. He is the author of Reinventing Professionalism: News and Journalism in Global
Context (Polity, 2012). He is editor-in-chief of the International Journal of Press/Politics.