THE MIRROR OF IMAGINATION: THE INFLUENCE OF "TIMAEUS" 70e ff

Author(s): ANNE SHEPPARD

Source: Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies. Supplement, No. 78, ANCIENT
APPROACHES TO PLATO'S "TIMAEUS" (2003), pp. 203-212
Published by: Wiley
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 THE MIRROR OF IMAGINATION:
THE INFLUENCE OF TIMAEUS 70e ff *

ANNE SHEPPARD

In Timaeus 70e ff. Plato gives an account of the lowest part of the soul, the é7UÔ
or appetitive, part, as located 'between the midriff and the navel', 'like a wi
proceeds to an account of both the liver and the spleen which gives them a
role. The liver in this account fonctions like a mirror which reflects images comi
rational part of the soul and so enables that part to exercise some control over
appetitive part:

eiôóxeç ôè aúxò (bç Àóyou ļuev ouxe ouvTļoeiv ëjneÀÀev, eï xe tzt' Kai |Liex
xivòç aí>xo)v aioô"noeG)ç, oúk è^ípuxov aúxò xò jueÀe iv xivcòv èooixo Àóyc
ôè eiôcoÀcov Kai, (pavxaa|LiáxG)v vukxóç xe Kai, peô' Tļļiepav juáÀioxa
il/uxaycoynoaixo, touto) ôf) ôeòç e7tißoi)Äei3aag auxô xf]v fļTīaTog iôéav ouveoxr|oe
Kai 8ÔT1K8V eiç XT)V CKCIVOI) KCCTOlKTļOlV, TIDKVÒV KOÙ ÀCIOV Kai À0t1LX7ipÒV Kai yÀUKÌ)
Kai TriKpoTTļTcc 8%ov jLLr|xavT]oá|uevoç, ïva év aúxô xôv ôiavormáxoov f| 8K toO voö
(pepojuevT] ôi3va|niç, olov év KaxoTixpco ôexojLievcp xutcouç Kai Kaxiôeîv eïôcoÀa
7rapé%ovTi, (poßoi juèv aúxó, ÒTtóxe ļnepei xÍ1ç 7tiKpóxT]xoç xP^evri ouyyeveí,
XaÀeTrf] Ttpooevexôeíoa arceiA/rj, Kaxà Tiàv ímopeiy vûaa oÇeœç xò rjrcap, xoAaiôri
Xpwjuaxa éjLKpaivoí, ouváyouoá xe 7tâv puoòv Kai xpaxí) tioioí, Xoßov ôè Kai
ôoxàç TtúÀaç xe xò jnèv éÇ ópôoú KaxaKá|i7rxouoa Kai ovoníòoa, xà ôè
é|LX(ppáxxoDoa ouyKÀeíouoá xe, Xvnaç Kai aoaç itapexoi, Kai ox' aí) xávavxía
(pavxáojLiaxa aTroÇcoypaípoí 7tpaóxr|xóç xiç ex ôiavoíaç éTtiTtvoia, xrjç |uèv
7iiKpóxr|xoç f|ODXÍav rcapexouoa xco jLnļxe Kiveîv 'it'tz TtpooaTtxeoôai xrjç évavxíaç
èauxrj (puoecoç éûeÀeiv, yÀuKÚxr|xi ôè xfj Kax' éiceîvo ouju(puxa) 7tpòç aúxò xpcojuevr)
Kai Tiávxa ópôà Kai, A,eía aúxoO Kai éÀeúôepa aTīeuūuvouoa, ïÀeœv xe Kai
ei)iļļLiepov Tioioí xf]v irepi xò TļTīap ^X^Ç l^oípav Kaxa)KiOļnevr)v, èv xe xrj vukxi
ôiaycoyfjv exouoa jnexpíav, inavxeícp xpw|uevT]v Kaô' urcvov, éTreiôf] Àóyoi) Kai
(ppovT1oea)ç où pexeîxc.

And knowing that it would not understand reason or be capable of paying attention to
rational argument even if it became aware of it, but would easily fall under the spell of
images and phantoms by day or night, god played upon this weakness and formed the

* An earlier version of this paper was given at the Institute of Classical Studies on 30 April 2001. 1 am grateful to all
those who contributed to the discussion on that occasion and in particular to Peter Adamson, Han Baltussen, Bob
Sharpies and Anna Somfai. Translations are my own where not otherwise attributed.

Ancient approaches to Plato's ' Timaeus '

203

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204 ANCIENT APPROACHES TO PLATO' S TIMAEUS

liver, which he put into the creature's stall. He made it smooth an

and bitter, so that the influence of the mind could project though
receive and reflect in the form of visible images, like a mirror.
cause fear, it makes use of the liver's bitterness and plays a ste
quickly infusing the whole organ with bitterness and giving it a
time it contracts the liver and makes it all wrinkled and rough
the lobe, blocking and closing the vessels leading to it and so
By contrast, gentle thoughts from the mind produce images of
will neither produce nor have connection with anything of a cont
and so bring relief from bitterness, using the organ's innate sweet
and smooth and free, and making the part of the soul that lives i
cheerful and gentle, and able to spend the night quietly in di
reason and understanding are beyond it. (Plato, Timaeus 71 a3-d

After some further remarks on inspired prophecy, Plato proceeds

spleen as an organ whose function is to remove any impurities f

r| ô' au toû yeíiovoç ainrć) auoiaoiç Kai êôpa oTîÀayxvou

%ápiv 8K6ÍV0U, toû Ttapéxeiv aírcò ÀapTtpòv áei Kai Kaôa
TrapeoKeDaajLievov Kai exoipov áei TuapaKeíjuevov éKjuaye

The structure and position of the organ immediately on its left e

bright and clean, like a duster kept handy to clean a mirror.
(Plato, Timaeus 72c 1-5, trans. Desmo

This strange account of the liver and the spleen had a conside
Platonist accounts of the imagination. In particular the lin
imagination, dreams, and inspired prophecy made it possible for
Platonist tradition to set quite a high value on the imagination de
and appearances so evident elsewhere in Plato's work.2 My concer
specific aspect of the account, the comparison of the liver to a m
passages from later Platonists which describe the imagination as
these passages draw not only on the Timaeus but also on some
mirror as an image, blending together discrete passages of Pla
features of the Timaeus ' account while neglecting others. In order
first consider references to mirror-images and to reflections gen
Sophist , and Alcibíades I.3

1 1 should like to thank Barry Thompson for drawing my attention to the relevance

2 Large claims are made for the influence of Timaeus 70eff. both in M. W. Bun
classical and medieval thought (Urbana, Illinois 1927) and in G. Watson, Phan
1988). I have discussed its influence on some discussions of dreams and insp
inspiration in Neoplatonism', in Studies in Plato and the Platonic tradition. Essay
M. Joy al (Aldershot 1997) 201-10.
3 For a fuller list of Platonic references to mirrors see R. Ferwerda, La signification
la pensée de Plotin (Groningen 1965) 11-12. Alcibíades I was accepted in antiquity
a considerable influence; for a recent defence of its authenticity see Plato. Alcibíades
14-26.

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 ANNE SHEPPARD: THE INFLUENCE OF TIMAEUS 70e ff 205

The argument against poetic mimesis in Republic 10 includes a st

between painting and holding up a mirror to the world:

Oí) xodeTîôç, rjv ó' éyo5, àXXà noXXaxfì Kai Ta%i) ôrmiODpyoiJiLxev
nov, ei 'ûeÀeiç Aaßa>v KaT07tTpov rapicpepeiv TtavTaxfv Taxi) |nèv r
Kai Tà év tć> oůpavco, Ta%ù ôè oauTÓv Te Kai TaMa Çàa Kai okciî
Travia öoa vuvôf) éÀeyeTO.

Not a difficult one. You could do it quickly and in many places. The qu
carry a mirror with you everywhere; you will then quickly make the sun
the heavens, the earth as quickly, yourself and all the other living creatu
articles, plants and all that was mentioned just now.
(Plato, Republic 596d8-e3, trans. G. M. A. Gr

The comparison, as it is expressed here, provides a vivid illustration of the

to the painter and, by implication, the poet in this argument: they are m
work offers only an insubstantial reflection of the physical world.
Such reflections also appear as the lowest level in the Divided Line o

"Qorcep toívuv ypa|LiļLifļv ôí%a xex|Lir||Lxévr|v Aaßcov âviaa Tļniļļua

èKCttxpov tò TļLifļļua àvà tòv at>TÒv Àóyov, tó Te toû ópo)|uevou ye
vooujnévou, Kai ooi ëoTai oa(pr|veía Kai àoatpeía rcpòç ãÀÀr
ópa)|Li6va) tò juèv eTepov TjurjjLia eiKÓveç - Àéyco ôè Tàç eÍKÓvaç Ti
OKiáç, eTieiTa Tà év toíç iíôaoi (pavTaojuaTa Kai év toîç öoa TiuKvá
(pavà ouveoTTļKev, Kai uâv tò toioûtov, ei KaTavoeîç.

It is like a line divided into two unequal parts, and then divide each se
ratio, that is, the section of the visible and that of the intelligible. Yo
sections related to each other in proportion to their clarity and obscurity
of the visible consists of images - and by images I mean shadows in th
then the reflections in water and all those on close-packed, smooth and
and all that sort of thing, if you understand me.
(Plato, Republic 6. 509d6-510a3, trans. G. M. A. G

The reflections 'on close-packed, smooth and bright materials' me

presumably reflections both on naturally shiny surfaces and in mirrors,
the Line makes clear both that all types of image and reflection have a ver
status and, at the same time, that such reality as they do possess derives fr
objects which they represent.
Similarly in the Sophist , when Socrates asks Theaetetus what they sho
asked what they mean by an image (eïôœÀov) such as the sophist prod
replies:

4 The words tīukv« te Kai Àeîa Kai cpavà, 'close-packed, smooth and bright', at 510a2 are standard in Platonic
descriptions of mirrors. Cf. not only Timaeus 71b2, quoted above, (where I take ÀafiTipóv to be an exact synonym
of (pavóv) but also Àeìov Ka' Àap k pó v at Timaeus 46b3, in an attempt to explain the workings of mirrors and 'other
smooth reflecting surfaces' (Travia öoa ēptpavfļ Kai Xcîa, 46a3-4), a passage pointed out to me by Han Baltussen.

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206 ANCIENT APPROACHES TO PLATO' S TIMAEUS

AfļAov on (piļoojuev xá xe év xoîç ûôaoi Kai KaxÓTrxpo

yeypaļu|ueva Kai xà xeximco^éva Kai xàXXa öaa nov xoi

Of course we will say images in water and in mirrors, as well as

I suppose, everything else of that kind. (Plato, Sophist 239d7-9)

The image of the mirror is used in a much more positive way towards the end of Alcibíades
I. Socrates there urges on Alcibiades the importance of self-knowledge, knowledge of hi
own soul, and explains how a soul can know itself by an analogy with how an eye can se
itself:

' EvvevorļKag ouv öxi xoû éjuPÀeTtovxoç eiç xòv óípôaÀjLiòv xò TtpóocoTtov
éjLKpaívexai év xrj xoû KaxavxiKpù oiļ/ei oiorcep év Kaxorcxpa), ô ôf] Kai Koptļv
KaÀoûjuev, eïôoûAov ov xi xoû éjuPÀeTtovxoç;

You know that if you look into someone's eyes, your face appears in the pupil of the
person opposite you, as if in a mirror, which we actually call the 'statuette' and which is
a sort of image of the one who is looking? {Alcibíades I, 132e7-133a3)

I have translated õij/iç here as 'pupil', following Denyer in his recent edition,5 but when
Socrates proceeds to draw the analogy with the soul he exploits the idea that sight is the
excellence of the eye and uses ôi|nç ambiguously to mean both 'pupil' and 'sight':

EQ. 'OípúaÀjnóç áp' ei [léXXei iôeîv aúxòv, eiç ò(pôaÀ|nòv aûxcp PÀeTtxeov, Kai xoû
ô|LL|jaxoç eiç ckcivov xòv xóttov év cp xuyxávei r| ócpôaÀ|noú ápexf] eyyiyvoļLievr|-
ëoxi ôè xoûxo Trou oij/iç;
AA. Oííxcoç.
SÜ. TAp' oív, a) (píÀe 'AAKißiaöri, Kai il/uxf) ei [léXXex yvaioeoûai ai)XTļv, eiç
i(;i)Xfìv aûxrj PÀeTixéov, Kai juáÀiax' eiç xoûxov aûxrjç xòv xóttov év œ éyyíy vexai
r| i|xuxf1ç àpexf) oo(pía, Kai eiç âÀÀo cp xoûxo xuyxávei Õ|lioiov õv;
AA. "EiLioiye ôokcí, a) ScoKpaxeç.

Soe.: If the eye is going to see itself, it must look at an eye, and at that place in the eye
where the excellence of the eye resides; I suppose this is the pupil/sight?
Ale.: That's right.
Soc.: So, my dear Alcibiades, if the soul too is going to know itself, it must look at a soul,
and particularly at that place in it where the excellence of soul, wisdom, resides, and at
anything else which resembles this?
Ale.: I think so, Socrates. {Alcibíades I, 133b2-l 1)

Socrates proceeds to identify the relevant 'place in the soul' as th

resembles it as God. Ultimately, it seems, self-knowledge is to be
into the soul of another, a friend, for example, but by contemplati

5 See Denyer, above n.3, 232-33, on the meanings of both õi1riç and Koptļ here.
6 133c8-17 offer a further reference to mirrors, claiming that just as mirrors offer b
are found in another eye, so too God will provide the soul with a better understandin
another human soul. However these lines, preserved only in the indirect tradition,

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 ANNE SHEPPARD: THE INFLUENCE OF TIMAEUS 70e ff 207

Later thinkers within the Platonic tradition use the image of the mir
and it can be difficult in any given case to say with certainty that they
Platonic use of the image. I shall discuss passages from Philo of
Porphyry, and Proclus which all, in my view, owe something to the in
ff. We shall find that in each case other influences are also at work. T
of passages reveals something of the way in which later Platonists
reminiscences even when they are not directly commenting on parti
I begin with a passage from Philo's allegorical treatise, On the Mig

rjç ôeíyjiaTO oaíprj Kai év toîç 0G)|naTiK0Îç Kai év toîç aioûr|Toî<

(pcoÀeoîç KaTÓ'|ieoôe, totc jLièv év xoîç ßaöeoiv uttvoiç - àva
Kai TCDV aioihļaecDV Kai tôv aÀÀcov oaa Kaxà tò ocò|na
7rpooojuiÀeîv apxexai (bç Ttpòç KcnroTtTpov áípopôv áA/qôeiav,
Trávô' öoa ćk tcòv Karà xàç aioôrçoeiç (paviaoiòv à7rejLiáÇaT
jLieÀÀóvTcov áil/euôeoTaTaç ôià tg)v óveípcov juavceíaç évôou
xaíç éypriYÓpoeoiv.

You will be able to descry sure indications of this, even while held
caves of the body and of the objects of sense. In deep sleep the min
withdrawing from the perceptions and all other bodily faculties, be
with itself, fixing its gaze on truth as on a mirror, and, having purge
all the impressions made upon it by the mental pictures presented by
with Divine frenzy and discerns in dreams absolutely true prophec
to come. Thus is it at times. Or again it may be in waking hours.
(Philo, Migr. 190, trans. F. H. Colson and G. H.

This passage contains a number of ideas also found in Timaeus 70e ff.
the mind sees visions while we are asleep and mention of inspired
come by means of dreams (á'|/euôeoTaTaç ôià tôv òveípov ļjav
specifically the mind is said to Tix its gaze on truth as on a mirror'
á(popô)v áÀT1Ô8iav); the impressions of sense-perception are
(āTīoppinļ/tžļjevog, aTreļna^aTo) so that truth may appear. The truth a
gaze is to be found within the soul8 and although Philo makes no ment
it seems likely that both Timaeus 71a-d, on the liver as an imaginati
72c, on the spleen as the duster which wipes it clean, lie behind his
Alcibíades I, on the soul, or the self, as a mirror, is also in the back
by Philo's subsequent development of the idea that knowledge of one
leads on to the knowledge of God, the Divine Mind.9 Whereas in A
point of the comparison between the soul and the eye is that we can

to be later than the rest of the text: see Denyer, above n.3, 236-37. They are not directly
later Platonists discussed in this paper but might lie behind Philo, Migr. 192ff., which im
of Philo discussed below.
n

I am grateful to Ioannis Remoundos for first drawing this passage to my attention.

8 Cf. the immediately preceding words, éauTcô 7ipooopiÀeîv ãpxetai.

9 See especially §195, naůcov àicpipcùç èaircòv eïoetai taxa 7tou Kai ůeóv, and cf. n.6 above.

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208 ANCIENT APPROACHES TO PLATO' S TIMAEUS

in the mirrors which are other people, in Philo the mirror is w

introspection that we gain knowledge both of ourselves and
combination of Alcibíades I with the Timaeus facilitates the emph
the Timaeus passage connects the individual soul to the gods, by
no concern with relationships between souls.
The comparison with a mirror plays a significant part in the a
((pavTaoia) offered by both Plotinus and Proclus and also appear
is well known, suggests in Ennead 4.3 (27). 31 that we have not
powers' (cpavTaoTiKa). Immediately before that passage he com
power to a mirror which reflects thought:

Tò ôè tg)v ôiavoi1oeo)v tí; apa ye Kai toútíov tò (pavxaoxiK

voīļoei TuapaKoÀouôeî (pavxaoía, Tá%a av Tať)TT1<; irjç (p
oi$crrļ<; toû ôiavoi1jLiaToç, pevoúoriç oûtcdç av eïr| toû yvooaô
jufļ, ãXXo ti CīļTTļTeov. ïaax; ó' av eītļ toû Àóyou toû tò voiļjuaTi
ruapaKOÀouôoûvToç r| TrapaSo^tļ eiç tò (pavTaoTiKÓv. tò pèv yàp votļļia cxjnepèç
Kai outīo) olov 7tpoeA,r|A,i)ôòç eiç tò êÇo) evôov ôv Àavôávei, ó ôè Xóyoç àvaTCTÚÇaç
Kai ércaycov ck toû voT1|LiaToç eiç tò (pavTaoTiKÓv èôei^e tò vórijua oíov év
KaTOTīTpa), Kai r| ávTÍA,r|i|;iç auToû oí5to) Kai r| jiovf] Kai f| ļnvtļjLir|.

But what is it that remembers thoughts? Does the image-making power remember these
too? But if an image accompanies every intellectual act, perhaps if this image remains,
being a kind of picture of the thought, in this way there would be memory of what was
known; but if not, we must look for some other explanation. Perhaps the reception into
the image-making power would be of the verbal expression which accompanies the act
of intelligence. The intellectual act is without parts and has not, so to speak, come out into
the open, but remains unobserved within, but the verbal expression unfolds its content
and brings it out of the intellectual act into the image-making power, and so shows the
intellectual act as if in a mirror, and this is how there is apprehension and persistence and
memory of it. (Plotinus, Ennead 4.3 (27). 30, trans. A. H. Armstrong)

It would be hard to claim on the basis of this passage alone that Plotinus' comparison of
the imagination to a mirror owes anything to the Timaeus. He is trying to make sense of the
Aristotelian claim10 that there is no thinking without images and in so doing offers an account
of the relationship of thinking to imagination which builds Aristotle's powers of the soul into
a hierarchy based on Platonist metaphysics. However he seems more clearly to have the
Timaeus in mind in a passage from a later treatise which addresses the same issue:

Kai ëoiKev r| àvTÍA/r|i|;iç eivai Kai yíveoôai àvaKápTTTOvToç toû voīļjuaTog Kai toû
évepyoûvTOç toû KaTà tò Çfjv Trjç i1n)xiiç oîov àTîaxjôévToç uáÀiv, oioTtep év
KaTÔTîTpq) Třepí tò Àeîov Kai ÀajLXTrpòv Tļou^aCov. <bç oûv év toîç toioûtoiç
TiapóvTOÇ jnèv toû KaTÓTtTpou éyéveTO tò eïôcoÀov, ļLifļ rcapóvToç ôè fļ juf] oûtg>ç
éxovToç évepyeía rcápeoTiv ou tò eïôcoÀov iļv áv, oûtco Kai Tuepi i|;uxrļv Tļau^iav
|nèv ayovToç toû év rļļiīv toioûtou, ą> épípaíveTai Tà Trjç ôiavoíaç Kai toû voû

10 See De An. 431al6-17, 432a9ff.

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 ANNE SHEPPARD: THE INFLUENCE OF TIMAEUS 70e ff 209

eiKovioļuara, évopâiai lama Kai oîov aioÔT1T<î>ç yivóoKeiai ju

y vakreax;, oxi ò voûç Kai, r| ôiávoia évepyeí. ouyKpaoôeviroç ôè
acojLiaToç Tapaxi:o|iévr|v apļuoviav aveu eiôoSÀou rj ôiávoia k
aveu (pavraoíaç r| vorļoig Tòte- axrce Kai toioûtov av ti voo
TTļv vóriaiv yíveoôai oúk ouot]ç if'ç vo^aewç (pavcaoíaç.

It seems as if awareness exists and is produced when intellectual act

when that in the life of the soul which is active in thinking is in a w
happens with a mirror-reflection when there is a smooth, bright, u
these circumstances when the mirror is there the mirror-image is
is not there or is not in the right state the object of which the im
[all the same] actually there. In the same way as regards the soul, wh
in us which mirrors the images of thought and intellect is undistur
know them in a way parallel to sense-perception, along with the pr
is intellect and thought that are active. But when this is broken be
the body is upset, thought and intellect operate without an image,
activity takes place without a mind-picture. So one might come to th
that intellectual activity is [normally] accompanied by a mind-pi
mind-picture. (Plotinus, Ennead 1.4 (46). 10, trans. A. H. Armstrong)

Here the words Àeîov Kai Àa|Li7i:póv, 'smooth and bright', do recall the use of those same
adjectives in Timaeus 71b2.n Plotinus uses the word eïôoÀov of the image in the mirror.
This is of course one of the regular Greek words for an image but it is worth noting that it is
the word Plato uses both in Timaeus 71b5 and in Sophist 239d8. Plotinus has no concern here
with dreams or inspired prophecy and certainly would not want to locate any part of the soul
in a bodily organ such as the liver. Nevertheless it seems plausible that the Timaeus ' use of
the mirror as a image lies behind his own use of that image, at least in 1.4 (46). 10 and
perhaps also in 4.3 (27).30.12
Plotinus' pupil, Porphyry, like a number of other later Platonists, connected the
imagination with the astral body of the soul, a semi-corporeal 'vehicle' which it acquires in
the course of its descent. For Porphyry, this vehicle survives the death of the body but will
eventually dissolve as the soul returns to its divine origin. Porphyry also believed that the
daemons had an astral body although not, of course, a material body such as human beings
have.13 Platonists who believed in the astral body could appeal to several Platonic texts which
allude to o^iļļuaira or 'vehicles' for souls, among them Timaeus 41el-2, 44e2 and 69c7.

11 Cf. also 46b3 and n.4 above. However, since Plotinus here is using the mirror as an illustrative image rather than
discussing optics, he is more likely to have 71b in mind than 46b.

12 On Plotinus' wider use of the mirror as an image, see Ferwerda, above n.3, 9-23.

13 On the astral body see R. C. Kissling, 'The ôxr|1ja-7tveû|ua of the Neoplatonists and the De insomniis of Synesius
of Cyrene', AJPh 43 (1922) 318-30; E. R. Dodds, 'Appendix II. The astral body in Neoplatonism', in Proclus. The
elements of theology. A revised text with translation, introduction, and commentary (2nd edn, Oxford 1963) 313-21;
A. Smith, Porphyry's place in the Neoplatonic tradition (The Hague 1974) 152-58; M. Di Pasquale Barbanti,
Ochema-pneuma e phantasia nel neoplatonismo: aspetti psicologici e prospettive religiose, Symbolon 19 (Catania
1998).

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 2 1 0 ANCIENT APPROACHES TO PLATO' S TIMAEUS

Porphyry uses the image of the mirror when describing the rel
imagination of daemons and their astral body:

ei ļnev a (pavxaCójueôa eiç xà aúxôv o(0]uaxa oíoí xe rjļuev à

ô fjôr| Àóyoç Kpaxeí to òç ôaíiuovaç xà eïôr| xòv (pavxaaiuá
TrapaKeíjLievov aúxoíç áepcoôeç Ttveūļua ôiaôeiKvuvai xpóÇ
àppi1Tcp ôè tpÓTTO) xàç éjLKpáoeiç xfjç (pavxaoíaç G)07tep év K
aiiobç àépi ôiaôeíicvuvxaç, éveôexexo eiicáÇeiv xt)v (pavx
'|;uxfļ(; év xcò OTteppaxi Kaô' éauxfjv ôiaximoûv xò oâ)|na.

If we were able to wipe off what we imagine onto our own bodies, j
common that the daemons display the shapes of their imagining
body which accompanies them or goes with them, not colouring
the reflections of what they imagine in the air around them as
inexpressible way, then it would be possible to suppose that the im
in the sperm models the body in its own image.
(Porphyry, Ad Gaurum VI. 1, 42.6-1 1 Kalb

Ad Gaurum is a short work in which Porphyry discusses how the

He makes frequent reference to Plato and specifically mentions the
appetitive part of the soul 'in the region of the liver' at 53.8ff.15 I
that he has the mirror-image of 71b in mind in the passage quoted
that his use of the image is rather different both from Plato and
immediate context he is considering the belief that women give
resemble whatever their mothers have been looking at when concei
taken as an argument that sperm must already possess 'ima
(pavxaoxncq). Porphyry rejects this whole argument and the pass
counterargument that mental images cannot be transferred onto bod
He considers the possibility that the daemons can do something like t
from their imagination onto their astral body - although nothing
to actually believing this - but denies that human beings have suc
imagination which is here compared to a mirror but the astral bod
imagination projects reflections of its own contents. However, since i
metaphysical and psychological level reflects the one above it, the
can itself use something on a lower level as a kind of mirror is
Plotinian picture of the imagination as reflecting the activity of in

14 This work is attributed to Galen in the single manuscript in which it survives b

attributing it to Porphyry have been generally accepted: see K. Kalbfleisch, 'Die neu
zugeschriebene Schrift npòç Taûpov Tļ rcepì tccòc; éfûJjuxoÛTai tà epßpua aus der P
Male herausgegeben', Abhandlungen der preussischen Akademie der Wissenschafte
further bibliography see A. Smith, Porphyrii philosophi fragmenta (Stuttgart 1993

15 Ti e pi tò rjTiap; cf. Timaeus 71d2. See also Ad Gaurum 37.27ff. and Kalbfleisch's
his edition, above n.14, 79. Porphyry is using Plato in the course of his argument ra
interpretation of Timaeus 70e ff.; note his statement at 53.19 that the presence and abs
0L> TOTClKlļ.

16 The remark of Watson, above n.2, 105, repeated in ANRW vol. II.36.7 (Berlin 1994) 4798, 'Also in Porphyry, as
in Plotinus, the mirror simile is applied to phantasia (Ad Gaurum VI. 1)' is rather misleading.

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 ANNE SHEPPARD: THE INFLUENCE OF TĪMAEUS 70e ff 211

When we turn to Proclus we find the mirror-image once again app

itself, notably in two passages from the Commentary on Euclid , wher
his theory of mathematical projection:17

K0Ù ouTG) ôeî voeîv tò jnèv é7rÍ7reôov olov 7tpoßeßAr|juevov

K8Í|nevov, TtavTa ôè (bç èrìì toiítg) xfļv ôiávoiav ypáípouoav,
oîov éTTiTréôcp KaTÓTtTpa) 7tpooeiKao|Liévr|ç, tgûv ôè év ôiavoía
éju(páoeiç eiç ckcívo KaTa7te|i7i;óvT(ov.

And thus we must think of the plane as projected and lying befo
understanding as writing everything upon it, the imagination becom
plane mirror to which the principles of the understanding send
themselves. (Proclus, In Eue. 121.2-7, trans. G. Morrow (modified))

oioTrep ot>v r| (pi3oiç 7roir|TiKG)ç tóův aiaór|T¿)v o^rijuatcov rcpoeoTTļKev, outco

r| iļru^fļ Kaxà tò y vgxjtikòv évepyoûoa TtpoßaAAei Kepi irļv (pavTaoíav oioTtep e
KttTOTīTpov toùç tcòv oxr||LiáTG)v Àóyouç, r| ó' év eiôcoÀoiç amà ôe^o^evri K
é|j(páoeiç êxouaa tôv èvôov õvtíov ôià toútcov Tfj iļn)XTi TtapexeTai tt)v eiç
eïoa) oxpo(pfļv Kai Ttpòç éauTTjv tt)v ànò tôv eiôcSÀcov évepyeiav- otov eï
éairròv òpôv év KaTÓTiTpa) Kai úaujuáoaç tt)v xrjç cpuoecaç ôúva|uiv Kai tt)v éauxo
juop(pfļv èauTÒv iôeív ôeÀi1oeiev Kai Aaßoi Súvapiv ToiaiĪTTļv, oioxe oÀcoç ópâv K
ópaxòv aTtoTeÀeaôfjvai. Kai yàp iļn)xri toûtov tòv TpÓTtov éÇa) éairnrjç eiç
(pavtaoíav fiXénovoa Kai éoKiaypa(pr|juéva ox^juata ôecojuevri Kai tò KáXXoç
ai)xâ)v éKTîÀayeîoa Kai ttjv xá^iv ãyaxai toùç éairnrjç Àóyouç, ácp' a>v Kai xaÛ
Kai áyaaôeíoa tò juèv toútcov kccààoç cbç év eiôcóÀoiç (pepójuevov acpitļai, Çr|T
ôè tò èauTfjç.

Therefore just as nature stands creatively above the visible figures, so the soul, exercising
her capacity to know, projects on the imagination, as on a mirror, the principles of the
figures; and the imagination, receiving in pictorial form these reflections of the ideas
within the soul, by their means affords the soul an opportunity to turn inward from the
pictures and attend to herself. It is as if a man looking at himself in a mirror and
marvelling at the power of nature and of his own appearance should wish to look upon
himself directly and possess such a power as would enable him to become at the same
time the seer and the object seen. In the same way when the soul is looking outside herself
at the imagination, seeing the figures depicted there and being struck by their beauty and
orderedness, she is admiring her own principles from which they are derived; and though
she adores their beauty, she dismisses it as something reflected and seeks her own beauty.
(Proclus, In Eue. 141.2-19, trans. G. Morrow (modified))

The first of these passages presents the relationship between understanding and imagination
in a way very similar to that in which Plotinus presents the relationship between thought and

17 On this theory see A. Sheppard, ' Phantasia and mathematical projection in Iamblichus', Syllecta Classica 8 (1997)
1 13-20; D. J. O'Meara, Pythagoras revived : Mathematics and philosophy in late antiquity (Oxford 1989) 132-34;
I. Mueller, 'Mathematics and philosophy in Proclus' commentary on Book I of Euclid's Elements' , in Proclus, lecteur
et interprète des anciens , eds J. Pépin and H. D. Saffrey (Paris 1987) 305-18; W. Beierwaltes, Denken des Einen
(Frankfurt 1985) 256fř.

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2 1 2 ANCIENT APPROACHES TO PLATO' S TIMAEUS

'the image-making power' in Ennead 4.3 (27).30. The second

imagination as a mirror rather further, presenting the imaginati
soul.18 In both passages, and particularly in the second one,
imagination is presented as something positive: the mirror reflect
a higher psychological and ontological level and the sight of them t
that higher level. Although Proclus does not make direct referen
either passage, it is possible to see several Platonic uses of the m
employment of it. The connection of the imagination with a mirr
the Timaeus , as we have seen, while the idea that looking at ones
direct contemplation of one's self surely recalls Alcibíade
psychological and ontological levels are mere images, reflections,
them derives from the metaphysics of the Republic and specifical
Divided Line. It is instructive to consider not only what Proclus
Platonic texts but also what aspects of them he chooses not to de
inspired prophecy would be out of place in a discussion of the ps
and Proclus, like Plotinus, would not want to locate any functions o
ones such as imagination, in a bodily organ such as the liver. Lik
idea from Alcibíades I, that we can see ourselves 'reflected' in th
something solitary and introspective, if not, indeed, narcissistic.1
By the time we reach Proclus we have come a long way from P
of the liver. None of the authors considered in this paper is com
passage and we have seen that for all of them its influence comb
other material, including other Platonic texts. Yet all of them were
the Timaeus for it to be at least plausible that in connecting the
they had 70e ff. in mind. Only Philo picks up the idea in 72c that t
Only Porphyry alludes to the role of the liver in Plato's accoun
committed to a literal interpretation of the physiological details
worrying about the details of Plato's story, they have responded to
developing that in directions of their own. We often think
particularly, Neoplatonist commentators as somewhat scholastic
but investigation of the influence of Timaeus 70e ff. shows a mo
side to their methods of interpretation. Perhaps there is a lesson
respond to some of the stranger stories told by Plato.

Royal Holloway, University of London

18 Cf. Proclus, In Crat. 19.6-12 and A. Sheppard, ' Phantasia and analogia in
Classical essays for Donald Russell on his seventy-fifth birthday , eds D. Innés, H
345-50, although I failed there to note the significance of Alcibíades 1 132-33 in th

19 141.10ff. could also be an allusion to the myth of Narcissus and imply a Neopla
that story. Note that such an interpretation would be significantly different from t
by Plotinus in Enn. 1.6 (1). 8. For other discussions of the whole passage see A. C
l'âme selon Proclus', in Le Néoplatonisme (Paris 1971) 241-51 and J. M. Cockin
York 1991) 67.
20 The idea is also used in some Christian texts, and in Arabic philosophy. I am indebt
Adamson respectively for this information.

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