Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Peralta Doctrines FINAL
Peralta Doctrines FINAL
2013-2016 Cases
POLITICAL LAW
DOUBLE JEOPARDY; Single act which constitutes a violation of two or more entirely
distinct and unrelated provisions of law
It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the
same offense or identical offenses. A simple act may offend against two (or more) entirely
distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional
fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the
information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. Phrased else wise, where two
different laws (or articles of the same code) defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them
is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same fact, if
each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other. Thus,
since the Informations filed against petitioner in this case were for separate and distinct offenses
— the first against Article 172 (2) of the Revised Penal Code and the second against Section 46 of
the Cooperative Code (RA 6938)—one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule on
double jeopardy. Besides, it is basic in criminal procedure that an accused may be charged with
as many crimes as defined in our penal laws even if these arose from one incident. Thus, where
a single act is directed against one person but said act constitutes a violation of two or more
entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, or by a special law and the Revised Penal
Code, as in this case, the prosecution against one is not an obstacle to the prosecution of the
other. (Asistio v. People, G.R. No. 200465, 20 April 2015)
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effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the
concerned natural-born Filipino. RA No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence.
This is only logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual
citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and
foreign citizenships, he may establish residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign
country of which he is also a citizen. However, when a natural-born Filipino with dual
citizenship seeks for an elective public office, residency in the Philippines becomes material.
Petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 did not automatically
make him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still prove that after becoming a
Philippine citizen on September 13, 2012, he had reestablished Uyugan, Batanes as his new
domicile of choice which is reckoned from the time he made it as such. (Caballero v. COMELEC,
G.R No. 209835, 22 September 2015)
Instead, a judgment of acquittal may be assailed by the People in a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court without placing the accused in double jeopardy. However, in such
case, the People is burdened to establish that the court a quo, in this case, the Sandiganbayan,
acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction or a denial of due process. (People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
199151-56, 25 July 2016)
The concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical reckoning of the
time involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right
has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are as follows: (1) the length
of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the
accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay. (People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 199151-56, 25 July 2016)
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President, he is free to amend, revoke or rescind political agreements entered into by his
predecessors, and to determine policies which he considers, based on informed judgment and
presumed wisdom, will be most effective in carrying out his mandate.
Moreover, under the Administrative Code, the President has the power to reserve for public use
and for specific public purposes any of the lands of the public domain and that the reserved
land shall remain subject to the specific public purpose indicated until otherwise provided by
law or proclamation. At present, there is no law or executive issuance specifically excluding the
land in which the LNMB is located from the use it was originally intended by the past
Presidents. The allotment of a cemetery plot at the LNMB for Marcos as a former President and
Commander-in-Chief,150 a legislator,151 a Secretary of National Defense, a military personnel,
a veteran, and a Medal of Valor awardee, whether recognizing his contributions or simply his
status as such, satisfies the public use requirement. The disbursement of public funds to cover
the expenses incidental to the burial is granted to compensate him for valuable public services
rendered. Likewise, President Duterte's determination to have Marcos' remains interred at the
LNMB was inspired by his desire for national healing and reconciliation. Presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty prevails over petitioners' highly disputed factual
allegation that, in the guise of exercising a presidential prerogative, the Chief Executive is
actually motivated by utang na loob (debt of gratitude) and bayad utang (payback) to the
Marcoses. As the purpose is not self-evident, petitioners have the burden of proof to establish
the factual basis of their claim. They failed. Even so, the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance
of factual issues since it is not a trier of facts (Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973, 8 November
2016).
PUBLIC FUNDS; Availing services of private legal counsel or law firm by gov’t agencies,
when allowed
COA Circular No. 95-011 stresses that public funds shall not be utilized for the payment of
services of a private legal counsel or law firm to represent government agencies in court or to
render legal services for them. Despite this, the same circular provides that in the event that
such legal services cannot be avoided or is justified under extraordinary or exceptional
circumstances, the written conformity and acquiescence of the OSG or the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), as the case may be, and the written concurrence of the
COA shall first be secured before the hiring or employment of a private lawyer or law firm. The
prohibition covers the hiring of private lawyers to render any form of legal service - whether or
not the legal services to be performed involve an actual legal controversy or court litigation. The
purpose is to curtail the unauthorized and unnecessary disbursement of public funds to private
lawyers for services rendered to the government, which is in line with the COA's constitutional
mandate to promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the
prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or
unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and properties. The Court has
invariably sustained the statutory authority of the OSG and the OGCC as well as the necessity
of COA concurrence in the cases of government-owned and/or controlled corporations, local
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government units, and even a state college like the CNSC. (Dr. Wenifredo T. Oñate v. Commission
on Audit, G.R. No. 213660, 5 July 2016)
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of the state prosecutors of the DOJ. Instead of a mere delegated authority, the other prosecuting
arms of the government, such as the DOJ, now exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the
Comelec to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses and to prosecute the same.
(Arroyo v. DOJ, G.R. No. 199082, 23 July 2013)
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LABOR LAW
The issue of whether or not an employer-employee relationship existed between petitioner and
respondents is essentially a question of fact. The factors that determine the issue include who
has the power to select the employee, who pays the employee’s wages, who has the power to
dismiss the employee, and who exercises control of the methods and results by which the work
of the employee is accomplished. Although no particular form of evidence is required to prove
the existence of the relationship, and any competent and relevant evidence to prove the
relationship may be admitted, a finding that the relationship exists must nonetheless rest on
substantial evidence, which is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. (Reyes v. Glaucoma Research Foundation, G.R. No.
189255, 17 June 2015)
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LABOR UNIONS; Disaffiliation
A local union has the right to disaffiliate from its mother union or declare its autonomy. A local
union, being a separate and voluntary association, is free to serve the interests of all its members
including the freedom to disaffiliate or declare its autonomy from the federation which it
belongs when circumstances warrant, in accordance with the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of association (National Union Of Bank Employees [Nube] v. Philnabank Employees
Association (Pema) And Philippine National Bank, G.R. No.174287, 12 August 2013)
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petitioners that they were being hired only for fixed periods in an agreement freely entered into
by the parties. Respondent’s act of hiring and re-hiring petitioners for periods short of the legal
probationary period evidences its intent to thwart petitioner’s security of tenure, especially in
view of an awareness that ordinary workers, such as petitioners herein, are never on equal
terms with their employers. It is rather unjustifiable to allow respondent to hire and rehire
petitioners on fixed terms, never attaining regular status. Hence, in the absence of proof
showing that petitioners knowingly agreed upon a fixed term of employment, petitioners are,
indeed, regular employees, entitled to security of tenure. (Basan v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines,
G.R. Nos. 174365-66, 4 February 2015)
A probationary employee does not enjoy permanent status. Nevertheless, he is accorded the
constitutional protection of security of tenure which means that he can only be dismissed from
employment for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance
with reasonable standards made known to him by the employer at the time of his engagement.
(Univac Development, Inc. v. Soriano, G.R. No. 182072, 19 June 2013)
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SEAFARERS’ CONTRACT; Claims for death and disability benefits
It is settled that the terms and conditions of a seafarer’s employment, including claims for death
and disability benefits, is a matter governed, not only by medical findings, but by the contract
he entered into with his employer and the law which is deemed integrated therein. (Wallem
Philippines Services, Inc. v. Heirs of Padrones, G.R. No. 183212, 16 March 2015)
For the death of a seafarer to be compensable, the same must occur during the term of his
contract of employment. If the seaman dies after the termination of his contract, his beneficiaries
are not entitled to death benefits. (Wallem Philippines Services, Inc. v. Heirs of Padrones, G.R. No.
183212, 16 March 2015)
For the death of a seaman to be compensable should occur during the term of his employment
contract and must be the result of a work-related illness or injury. In the present case, it is not
disputed that Awatin died on July 12, 2002, almost a year after the termination of his last
employment contract on July, 2001. It must be remembered that Awatin was repatriated not
because of any illness but because his contract of employment expired. There is no proof that he
contracted his illness during the term of his employment nor that his working conditions
increased the risk of contracting the illness which caused his death. While the Court adheres to
the principle of liberality in favor of the seafarer in construing the Standard Employment
Contract, we cannot allow claims for compensation based on surmises. When the evidence
presented negates compensability, we have no choice but to deny the claim, lest we cause
injustice to the employer. (Awatin v. Avantgarde Shipping Corporation, G.R. No. 179226, 29 June
2015)
The law, in protecting the rights of the employees, authorizes neither oppression nor self-
destruction of the employer - there may be cases where the circumstances warrant favoring
labor over the interests of management but never should the scale be so tilted as to result in an
injustice to the employer. (One Shipping Corp. v. Penafiel, G.R. No. 192406, 21 January 2015; Awatin
v. Avantgarde Shipping Corporation, G.R. No. 179226, 29 June 2015)
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The employer is liable to pay the heirs of the deceased seafarer for death benefits once it is
established that he died during the effectivity of his employment contract. However, the
employer may be exempt from liability if it can successfully prove that the seaman’s death was
caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act. In this case, since
petitioners were able to substantially prove that the seaman’s death is directly attributable to his
deliberate act of hanging himself, his death, therefore, is not compensable and his heirs not
entitled to any compensation or benefits. (Unicol Management Services, Inc. v. Malipot, G.R. No.
206562, 21 January 2015)
In labor cases, as in all cases which require the presentation and weighing of evidence, the basic
rule is that the burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue.47
In particular, in a case of claims for disability benefits, the onus probandi falls on the seafarer as
claimant to establish his claim with the right quantum of evidence; it cannot rest on
speculations, presumptions or conjectures. Such party has the burden of proving the said
assertion with the quantum of evidence required by law which, in a case such as this of a claim
for disability benefits arising from one's employment as a seafarer, is substantial evidence.
(Cagatin v. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, G.R. No. 175975, 22 June 2015)
ABANDONMENT; Elements
The filing by an employee of a complaint for illegal dismissal with a prayer for reinstatement is
proof enough of his desire to return to work, thus, negating the employer’s charge of
abandonment. To constitute abandonment, two elements must concur, to wit: (1) the failure to
report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever
the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor
and being manifested by some overt acts. In termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon
the employer to show that the dismissal was for a just and valid cause, and failure to discharge
the same would mean that the dismissal is not justified and, therefore, illegal. (Concrete
Solutions, Inc./ Primary Structures Corp. v. Cabusas, G.R. No. 177812, 19 June 2013)
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In case the employee's failure to work was occasioned neither by his abandonment nor by a
termination, the burden of economic loss is not rightfully shifted to the employer; each party
must bear his own loss. (MZR Industries v. Colambot, G.R. No. 179001, 28 August 2013)
APPEALS;
The period or manner of “appeal” from the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to
the Court of Appeals is governed by Rule 65, pursuant to the ruling of the Court in the case of
St. Martin Funeral Home vs. NLRC, 295 SCRA 494 (1998), in light of Section 4 Rule 65, as
amended, which states that the “petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice
of the judgment, or resolution sought to be assailed. (Cervantes vs, City Service Corporation, G.R.
No. 191616, 18 April 2016)
Before the services of an employee can be validly terminated, the employer must furnish him
two written notices: (a) a written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or
grounds for termination, and giving the employee reasonable opportunity to explain his side;
and (b) a written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due
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consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination.
The employer must inform the employee of the charges against him and to hear his defenses. A
full adversarial proceeding is not necessary as the parties may be heard through pleadings,
written explanations, position papers, memorandum or oral argument. (Alilem Credit
Cooperative, Inc. v. Bandiola, Jr., G.R. No. 173489, 25 February 2013; see also: First Philippine
Industrial Corporation v. Calimbas, G.R. No. 179256, 10 July 2013, Noblado v. Alfonso, G.R. No.
189229, 23 November 2015)
2. That the employer served written notice both to the employees and to the
Department of Labor and Employment at least one month prior to the
intended date of retrenchment;
5. That the employer used fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who
would be dismissed and who would be retained among the employees,
such as status, efficiency, seniority, physical fitness, age, and financial
hardship for certain workers. (Cabaobas v. Pepsi-Cola Products. Philippines,
Inc., G.R. No. 176908, 25 March 2015; see also: Beralde v. G.R. Nos. 205685-86,
22 June 2015)
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loss of confidence is that the employees concerned hold a position of trust and confidence. It is
the breach of this trust that results in the employer's loss of confidence in the employee. (Cruz v.
Bank of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 173357, 13 February 2013)
The filing of the complaint by the public prosecutor is sufficient ground for a dismissal of an
employee for loss of trust and confidence. The evidence supporting the criminal charge, found
sufficient to show prima facie guilt after preliminary investigation, constitutes just cause for
termination based on loss of trust and confidence. Additionally, an employee's acquittal in a
criminal case does not automatically preclude a determination that he has been guilty of acts
inimical to the employer's interest resulting in loss of trust and confidence. An acquittal in
criminal prosecution does not have the effect of extinguishing liability for dismissal on
the ground of breach of trust and confidence. (Matis v. Manila Electric Company, G.R. No. 206629,
14 September 2016)
It is a basic rule of evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegation. If he claims a
right granted by law, he must prove his claim by competent evidence, relying on the strength of
his own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of his opponent. The test for determining
on whom the burden of proof lies is found in the result of an inquiry as to which party would
be successful if no evidence of such matters were given. In an illegal dismissal case, the onus
probandi rests on the employer to prove that its dismissal of an employee was for a valid
cause. However, before a case for illegal dismissal can prosper, an employer-employee
relationship must first be established. Thus, in filing a complaint before the LA for illegal
dismissal, based on the premise that he was an employee of respondents, it is incumbent upon
petitioner to prove the employer-employee relationship by substantial evidence. (Reyes v.
Glaucoma Research Foundation, G.R. No. 189255, 17 June 2015)
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position would have felt compelled to give up his employment/position under the
circumstances. (Gan v. Galderma Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 177167, 17 January 2013; see also Paredes
v. Feed the Children Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 184397, 9 September 2015)
RESIGNATION; Defined
Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation where one believes that
personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, and one has no
other choice but to dissociate oneself from employment. It is a formal pronouncement or
relinquishment of an office, with the intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by the
act of relinquishment. As the intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of
relinquishment, the acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be
considered in determining whether he or she, in fact, intended to sever his or her employment.
(Gan v. Galderma Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 177167, 17 January 2013)
We held that the act of the employer moving the effectivity of the resignation is not an act of
harassment. The 30-day notice requirement for an employee’s resignation is actually for the
benefit of the employer who has the discretion to waive such period. Its purpose os to afford the
employer enough time to hire another employee if needed and to see to it that there is proper
turnover of the tasks which the resigning employee may be handling. Such rule requiring an
employee to stay or complete the 30-day period prior to the effectivity of his resignation
becomes discretionary on the part of management as an employee who intends to resign may be
allowed a shorter period before his resignation becomes effective. (Paredes v. Feed the Children
Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 184397, 9 September 2015)
ATTORNEY’S FEES
Anent the issue on the award of attorney's fees, Article 111 of the Labor Code provides that in
cases of unlawful withholding of wages, the culpable party may be assessed attorney's fees,
equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the amount of wages recovered. Likewise, we have
recognized that "in actions for recovery of wages or where an employee was forced to litigate
and, thus, incur expenses to protect his rights and interest, the award of attorney's fees is legally
and morally justifiable. (Tri-C General Services, Inc. v. Matuto, et al., G.R. No. 194686, 23 September
2015)
SOCIAL JUSTICE
We held that the law and jurisprudence guarantee security of tenure to every employee.
However, in protecting the rights of the workers, the law does not authorize the oppression or
self-destruction of the employer. Social justice does not mean that every labor dispute shall
automatically be decided in favor of labor. Thus, the Constitution and the law equally recognize
the employer’s right and prerogative to manage its operation according to reasonable standards
and norms of fair play. (Paredes v. Feed the Children Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 184397, 9 September
2015)
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CIVIL LAW
FUNERALS; Death
It should be emphasized that the internal organs of the deceased were removed only after he
had been declared brain dead; thus, the emotional pain suffered by respondent due to the death
of her son cannot in any way be attributed to petitioner. Neither can the Court find evidence on
record to show that respondent's emotional suffering at the sight of the pitiful state in which she
found her son's lifeless body be categorically attributed to petitioner's conduct. (Lim vs. Security
Bank Corporation, G.R. No. 188539, 12 March 2014)
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essential public services would stop if properties of public dominion would be subject to
encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale. (GEMASCO v. NHA, G.R. No. 175417, 9 February
2015).
Opposing possessory rights over certain areas of adjacent lots, arising from claims of ownership
thereof, cannot be resolved in a summary action such as an ejectment suit. The issues involved
in such a controversy should be fully threshed out in an action like accion reivindicatoria,
especially when plaintiff fails to establish actual prior possession. In a much earlier ruling of
this Court, it was already held therein that “[i]f [a party] is indeed the owner of the premises
subject of this suit and she was unlawfully deprived of the real right of possession or the
ownership thereof, she should present her claim before the regional trial court in an accion
publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the municipal trial court in a summary
proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry.” (Javier v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 186204, 2
September 2015)
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one that is alleged to have been acquired subsequent to the commencement of that relation, the
presumption will not apply. (Trinidad v. Imson, G.R. No. 197728, 16 September 2015)
The resolution of the issue of ownership, however, would entail going into factual matters.
Settled is the rule that questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review of certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Section 1 of Rule 45 states that petitions for review on
certiorari shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. Doubtless, in the
instant case, the issue of whether respondent possesses the subject property as owner, or
whether she occupies the same as a lessee, is a question of fact. Thus, as a rule, it is not
reviewable. Nonetheless, the Court has, at times, allowed exceptions from the above restriction.
(Trinidad v. Imson, G.R. No. 197728, 16 September 2015)
The fact that the Deed of Assignment and Transfer of Rights was put in writing and notarized
does note accord it the quality on incontrovertibility otherwise provided by the Parole Evidence
Rule. The rule on parole evidence is not, as it were, ironclad. Thus the second paragraph of
Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides the exceptions, to wit: Section 9. Evidence of
written agreements. – x x x However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to
the terms of written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading: (a) an intrinsic ambiguity,
mistake or imperfection on the written agreement; (b) the failure of the written agreement to
express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto; (c) the validity of the written
agreement; or (d) the existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors-in-
interest after the execution of the written agreement. (Trinidad v. Imson, G.R. No. 197728, 16
September 2015)
IMPLIED TRUST
As to whether or not an implied trust was created in respondent’s favor, the first sentence of
Article 1448 of the Civil Code provides that “[t]here is an implied trust when property is sold
and the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of
having the beneficial interest of the property.” This is sometimes referred to as purchase money
resulting trust, the elements of which are: (a) an actual payment of money, property or services,
or an equivalent, constituting valuable consideration; and (b) such consideration must be
furnished by the alleged beneficiary of a resulting trust. The principle of a resulting trust is
based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration, not legal title, determines the
equitable title or interest and are presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties.
They arise from the nature or circumstances of the consideration involved in a transaction
whereby one person thereby becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold
his legal title for the benefit of another. (Trinidad v. Imson, G.R. No. 197728, 16 September 2015)
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the acts or conduct of the p[arties rather than from direct expression of conduct. Certainly,
intent as an indispensable element, is a matter that necessarily lies in the evidence, that is, by
evidence, even circumstantial, of statements made by the parties at or before the time title
passes. Because an implied trust is neither dependent upon an express agreement nor required
to be evidenced in writing, Article 1457 of our Civil Code authorizes the admission of parole
evidence to prove their existence. Parole evidence that is required to establish the existence of
an implied trust necessarily has to be trustworthy and it cannot rest on loose, equivocal or
indefinite declarations. (Trinidad v. Imson, G.R. No. 197728, 16 September 2015)
A contract of adhesion is as binding as ordinary contracts, the reason being that the party
who adheres to the contract is free to reject it entirely. Contrary to petitioner's contention, not
every contract of adhesion is an invalid agreement. (Cabanting vs. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc.,
G.R. No. 201927, 17 February 2016)
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the same time a principal creditor of the other; (2) That both debts consist in a sum of money, or
if the things due are consumable, they be of the same kind, and also of the same quality if the
latter has been stated; (3) That the two debts be due; (4) That they be liquidated and
demandable; (5) That over neither of them there be any retention or controversy, commenced by
third persons and communicated in due time to the debtor. (Mondragon Personal Sales, Inc. v.
Sola, Jr., G.R. No. 174882, 21 January 2013)
SALES; Redemption
Redemption within the period allowed by law is not a matter of intent but a question of
payment or valid tender of the full redemption price. It is irrelevant whether the mortgagor is
diligent in asserting his or her willingness to pay. What counts is that the full amount of the
redemption price must be actually paid; otherwise, the offer to redeem will be ineffectual and
the purchaser may justly refuse acceptance of any sum that is less than the entire amount. (GE
Money Bank, Inc. v. Sps. Dizon, G.R. No. 184301, 23 March 2015)
There is no cogent reason for requiring the vendee to accept payment by installments from the
redemptioner, as it would ultimately result in an indefinite extension of the redemption period.
(GE Money Bank, Inc. v. Sps. Dizon, G.R. No. 184301, 23 March 2015, citing Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Co. v. Spouses Tan, et al. 590 Phil 827, 843 [2008])
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To be valid and effective, the offer to redeem must be accompanied by an actual tender of the
redemption price. Redemption price should either be fully offered in legal tender or validly
consigned in court. Only by such means can the auction winner be assured that the offer to
redeem is being made in good faith. (GE Money Bank, Inc. v. Sps. Dizon, G.R. No. 184301, 23
March 2015).
It has been the policy of the law to aid rather than defeat the right of redemption. Where no
injury will follow, a liberal construction is given to our redemption laws as well as to the
exercise of the right of redemption. Thus, in the following cases, the Supreme Court favorably
ruled for the original owner, successor-in-interest or redemptioner:
2. Mortgagee is estopped from asserting that the one-year redemption period already elapsed
In Ibaan Rural Bank Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the sheriff unilaterally and
arbitrarily extended the period of redemption to two years. The parties were not
even privy to the extension made by the sheriff. However, the Supreme Court
ruled that the bank cannot, after two years had elapsed, insist that the
redemption period was only one year. When it received a copy of the certificate
of sale registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds, it was deemed to have
actual and constructive knowledge of the certificate and its contents. The bank
was found guilty of estoppel in pais. By its silence and inaction, it was considered
that the mortgagors were misled to believe that they had two years within which
to redeem the subject lots.
On the last day of the one-year redemption period, one of the judgment
debtors in Castillo, et al. v. Nagtalon, et al. deposited with the deputy sheriff a sum
which represented 1/12 of the consideration of the execution sale plus 1% interest
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thereon. Said amount was found to be insufficient to effectively release the
subject properties. Nonetheless, because the tender of payment was timely made
and in good faith (since it was based on the honest mistake that the obligation
under the judgment is merely "joint"), the Court gave the opportunity to
complete the redemption within 15 days from the time the decision becomes
final and executory. (GE Money Bank, Inc. v. Sps. Dizon, G.R. No. 184301, 23 March
2015).
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ASSIGNMENT OF CREDIT
"An assignment of credit is an agreement by virtue of which the owner of a credit, known as the
assignor, by a legal cause, such as sale, dation in payment, exchange or donation, and without
the consent of the debtor, transfers his credit and accessory rights to another, known as the
assignee, who acquires the power to enforce it to the same extent as the assignor could enforce it
against the debtor. It may be in the form of sale, but at times it may constitute a dation in
payment, such as when a debtor, in order to obtain a release from his debt, assigns to his
creditor a credit he has against a third person." As a dation in payment, the assignment of credit
operates as a mode of extinguishing the obligation; the delivery and transmission of ownership
of a thing (in this case, the credit due from a third person) by the debtor to the creditor is
accepted as the equivalent of the performance of the obligation. (BSP v. Libo – on, G.R. No.
173864, 23 November 2015)
It is true that the character of the transactions between the parties is not only determined by the
language used in the document but by their intention. It must be stressed, however, that the
intent of the parties to the transaction is to be determined in the first instance, by the very
language which they used. A deed of assignment usually contains language which suggests that
the parties intended to effect a complete alienation of title to and rights over the receivables
which are the subject of the assignment. This language is comprised of works like "remise,"
"release and quitclaim" and clauses like "the title and right of possession to said accounts
receivable is to remain in said assignee" who "shall have the right to collect directly from the
debtor." The same intent is also suggested by the use of the words "agent and representative of
the assignee" in referring to the assignor. This concept of complete alienation of title and rights
in an assignment of credit is lacking. Thus, in the absence of such absolute conveyance of title to
qualify as an assignment of credit, the subject promissory note with trust receipt agreement
should be interpreted as it is denominated. The contract being that of a mere loan, and because
there was no valid assignment of credit, BSP's authority to foreclose the subject property has no
leg to stand on. (BSP v. Libo – on, G.R. No. 173864, 23 November 2015)
PLEDGE; Requisites
It must be stressed that for a contract of pledge to be valid, it is necessary that: (1) the pledge is
constituted to secure the fulfillment of a principal obligation;. (2) the pledgor be the absolute
owner of the thing pledged; and (3) the person constituting the pledge has the free disposal of
his property, and in the absence thereof, that he be legally authorized for the purpose. (BSP v.
Libo – on, G.R. No. 173864, 23 November 2015)
I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or
quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions
under Title XVIII on "Damages" of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of
recoverable damages.
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory
damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
a. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a
loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been
stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from
the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall
21
be 6% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial
demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
c. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory,
the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above,
shall be 6% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being
deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
And, in addition to the above, judgments that have become final and executory prior to 1 July
2013, shall not be disturbed and shall continue to be implemented applying the rate of interest
fixed therein. (Nacar v. Gallery Frames, G.R. No. 189871, 13 August 2013)
(See also: Cabanting v. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 201927, 17 February 2016; Heirs of
Leanro Natividad and Juliana V. Natividad v. Mauricio-Natividad, G.R. No. 198434, 25 February 2016)
22
that it exercised such degree of care. In this case, the petitioner failed to do so. (Travel & Tours
Advisers, Incorporated vs. Cruz, Sr., G.R. No. 199282, 14 March 2016)
23
the beneficiary to bring an action for reconveyance before prescription bars the same. (Iglesia
Filipina Independiente v. Heirs of Bernardino Taeza, G.R. No. 179597, 3 February 2014)
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; Original registration of title over the property
The right to the original registration of title over the property is dependent on the existence of:
(a) a declaration that the land is alienable and disposable at the time of the application for
registration and (b) open and continuous possession in the concept of an owner through itself or
through its predecessors-in-interest since 12 June 1945 or earlier. (Republic v. Roasa, G.R. No.
176022, 2 February 2015)
24
It has been repeatedly ruled that certifications issued by the CENRO, or specialists of the DENR,
as well as Survey Plans prepared by the DENR containing annotations that the subject lots are
alienable, do not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that the
property sought to be registered belongs to the inalienable public domain. It is important to
prove alienability by presenting a copy of the original classification of the land approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. Thus, as
it now stands, an application for original registration must be accompanied by: (1) CENRO or
PENRO certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records, in order to
establish that the land is indeed alienable and disposable. (Republic v. Lualhati, G.R. No. 183511,
25 March 2015)
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; Tax declarations and receipts, not conclusive evidence of
ownership
It bears stressing that tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or
of the right to possess land when not supported by any other evidence. The disputed property
may have been declared for taxation purposes in the names of the applicants for registration, or
of their predecessors-in-interest, but it does not necessarily prove ownership. They are merely
indicia of a claim of ownership. (Republic v. Lualhati, G.R. No. 183511, 25 March 2015)
It is a settled rule that albeit tax declarations and realty tax payment of property are not
conclusive evidence of ownership, they are nonetheless good indicia of the possession in the
concept of owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not
in his actual or at least constructive possession. Thus, her voluntary declaration of the subject
property for taxation purposes and payment of such tax strengthens her bona fide claim of title
over the property. (Tolentino v. Latagan, G.R. No. 179874, 22 June 2015)
A petition for judicial reconstitution of a registered interest, lien or encumbrance, may be filed
only when the certificate of title affected has not been totally destroyed, that is, when said
certificate of title is composed of more than one sheet and only the portion of the additional
sheet, on which such interest, lien or encumbrance was noted is missing. (Ungay Malobago
Mines, Inc. v. Republic, G.R. No. 187892, 14 January 2015)
25
LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; Proof of Alienable and Disposable Land
To prove that a land is alienable, the existence of a positive act of the government, such as
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports
of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statue declaring the land as alienable
and disposable must be established. Hence, a public land remains part of the inalienable public
domain unless it is shown to have been reclassified and alienated by the State to a private
person. (Central Mindanao University vs. Republic, G.R. No. 195026, 22 February 2016)
***
TAXATION LAW
26
of the requirements of due process, the Supreme Court has equally held that the claim of lack of
notice is a factual question. (Valbuenco, Inc. v. Province of Bataan, G.R. No. 173829, 10 June 2013)
27
REAL PROEPRTY TAX; UNCLOS/ Territoriality
Under Part VI, Article 79 of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
the Philippines clearly has jurisdiction with respect to cable lain in its territory that are utilized
in support of other installations and structures under its jurisdiction. (Capitol Wireless, Inc. vs.
Provincial Treasurer of Batangas, G.R. No. 180110, 30 May 2016)
***
COMMERCIAL LAW
28
as may be authorized by the Monetary Board, in any legal proceedings, action or specialized
legal studies. Under the same law, the BSP Governor may also delegate his power to represent
the BSP to other officers upon his own responsibility. (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas vs. Legaspi, G.R.
No. 205966, 2 March 2016)
29
Guillermo. Thus, the matter is clearly a labor dispute cognizable by the labor tribunals.
(Guillermo vs. Uson, G.R. No. 198967, 7 March 2016)
TRUST RECEIPTS
Suffice it to say that in a trust receipt transaction, the entrustee has the obligation to deliver to
the entruster the price of the sale, or if the merchandise is not sold, to return the merchandise to
the entruster. There are, therefore, two obligations in a trust receipt transaction: the first refers to
money received under the obligation involving the duty to turn it over to the owner of the
merchandise sold, while, the second refers to the merchandise received under the obligation to
"return" it to the owner. Clearly, this concept of trust receipt is inconsistent with that of an
assignment of credit where there is an absolute conveyance of title that would have in effect
given authority to BSP to foreclose the subject mortgage. Without a valid assignment of credit,
as in this case, BSF has no authority to foreclose the mortgaged property of the Spouses Libo-tin
to the Rural Bank of Hinigaran. Moreso, BSP could not possibly sell the subject property
without violating the prohibition against pactum commissorium since without a valid assignment
of credit, BSP cannot ipso facto appropriate to itself the Spouses Libo-on's mortgaged property to
the Rural Bank of Hinigaran. (BSP v. Libo – on, G.R. No. 173864, 23 November 2015)
30
***
CRIMINAL LAW
31
determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to
allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his act. As aptly pointed out by the Office of the
Solicitor General, the trial court conceded that the specific time when the accused determined to
commit the crime, and the interval between such determination and execution, cannot be
determined. After a careful review of the records, the Court agrees with the CA’s finding that
no evidence was adduced to prove the first and third elements of evident premeditation. (People
vs. Salahuddin, G.R. No. 206291, 18 January 2016)
32
to exceed P5,000.00 shall be imposed for falsification committed by a public
officer.21 Considering that malversation is the more serious offense, the imposable penalty for
Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents if the amount
involved exceeds P22,000.00 is reclusion perpetua, it being the maximum period of
the prescribed penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. (People v.
Valdez, G.R. Nos 216007-09, 8 December 2015)
Indeed, the trial is yet to proceed and the prosecution must still prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. It is not amiss to point that in charging a complex crime, the
information should allege each element of the complex offense with the same precision as if the
two (2) constituent offenses were the subject of separate prosecutions. Where a complex crime is
charged and the evidence fails to support the charge as to one of the component offenses, the
defendant can be convicted of the offense proven. (People v. Valdez, G.R. Nos 216007-09, 8
December 2015)
DEFENSE; Alibi
Alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable.
(People v. Gani, G.R. No. 195523, 5 June 2013; People v. Regaspi, G.R. No. 198309, 7 September
2015)
33
Noncompliance with the procedure outlined in Section 21, Article II of the IRR of RA 9165 shall
no render void and invalid such seizure as long as the arresting officers successfully preserved
the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items. (Raut-Raut v. Gaputan, A.M. No. P-
14-3214, 14 September 2015;)
The illegal sale of dangerous drugs absorbs the illegal possession thereof except if the seller was
also apprehended in the illegal possession of another quantity of dangerous drugs not covered
by or not included in the illegal sale, and the other quantity of dangerous drugs was probably
intended for some future dealings or use by the accused. Illegal possession of dangerous drugs
is therefore an element of and is necessarily included in illegal sale. Hence, convicting the
accused with the former does not violate his right to be informed of the accusation against him
for it is an element of the latter. In a similar manner, considering that illegal possession is
likewise an element of and is necessarily included in illegal importation of dangerous drugs,
convicting appellants of the former, if duly established beyond reasonable doubt, does not
amount to a violation of their right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against
them. Indeed, where an accused is charged with a specific crime, he is duly informed not only
of such specific crime but also of lesser crimes or offenses included therein. (People v. Chi Chan
Liu, G.R. No. 189272, 21 January 2015).
BIGAMY; Elements
What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of
competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void,
and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. (People v. Odtuhan, G.R. No.
191566, 17 July 2013)
34
RAPE; Delay in prosecuting the Offense
This Court also not persuaded by appellant's contention that AAA's delay in reporting the
crime indicates that the accusations against him are false. The failure of complainant to disclose
her defilement without loss of time to persons close to her or to report the matter to the
authorities does not perforce warrant the conclusion that she was not sexually molested and
that her charges against the accused are all baseless, untrue and fabricated. Delay in prosecuting
the offense is not an indication of a fabricated charge. Many victims of rape never complain or
file criminal charges against the rapists. They prefer to bear the ignominy and pain, rather than
reveal their shame to the world or risk the offenders' making good their threats to kill or hurt
their victims. (People of the Philippines v. Bensurto, G.R. No. 216061, 7 December 2016)
Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act; pregnancy as aggravatingFor this
crime, pregnancy or the presence of the woman's child are aggravating circumstances which
increase the imposable penalty, thus, they must be alleged and proven with competent evidence
for the penalty to be properly imposed. (Dinamling v People, G.R. No. 199522, 22 June 2015)
35
***
REMEDIAL LAW
CIVIL PROCEDURE; Appeals
At the outset, the Court notes that the instant case suffers from a procedural infirmity which
this Court cannot ignore as it is fatal to petitioner's cause. What petitioner essentially assails in
the present petition is the CA's denial of her motion to file an amended appellant's brief. It is
settled that the remedy of a party against an adverse disposition of the CA would depend on
whether the same is a final order or merely an interlocutory order. If the Order or Resolution
issued by the CA is in the nature of a final order, the remedy of the aggrieved party would be to
file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Otherwise, the
appropriate remedy would be to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. (Ola v. People, G.R.
No. 195547, 2 December 2015)
36
doctrine are as follows: (a) where there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be
addressed at the most immediate time; (b) when the issues involved are of transcendental
importance; (c) cases of first impression where no jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the
lower courts on the matter; (d) the constitutional issues raised are better decided by the Court; €
where exigency in certain situations necessitate urgency in the resolution of the cases; (f) the
filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ; (g) when petitioners rightly claim that
they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that could
free them from the injurious effects of the respondent’s acts in violation of their right to freedom
of expression; and (h) the petition includes questions that are dictated by public welfare and the
advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the appeal was
considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy. Since the present case includes questions that
are dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the
broader interest of justice, as well as to avoid multiplicity of suits and further delay in its
disposition, the Court shall directly resolve the petition for certiorari, instead of referring it to the
CTA. (Bureau of Customs v. Devanadera, G.R. No. 193253, 8 September 2015)
Forum shopping is considered anathema to the orderly administration of justice due to the
vexation it causes to the courts and the parties-litigants when a person who asks appellate
37
courts and/or administrative entities to rule on the same related causes and/or to grant the same
or substantially the same relief, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions by
the different courts or for a on the same issues. (Bandillion v. La Filipina Uygongco Corporation
(LFUC), G.R. No. 202446, 16 September 2015)
This Court has previously and emphatically held that, along with identical or closely identical
causes of action, one of the keys to determining whether forum shopping exists is whether the
“ultimate objective” of the party filing the actions is the same, although the relief prayed for in
the said actions were differently worded. (Bandillion v. La Filipina Uygongco Corporation (LFUC),
G.R. No. 202446, 16 September 2015)
When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of a warrant
of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the
court he must raise the question of the court’s jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest
opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the
merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person. (People v. Go, G.R. No. 168539, 25
March 2014)
Lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or
impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably
by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be
deemed to have submitted himself to that jurisdiction. Moreover, where the appearance is by
motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be
for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any
other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
38
court. Such an appearance gives the court jurisdiction over the person. (People v. Go, G.R. No.
168549, 25 March 2014)
CIVIL PROCEDURE; Supreme Court’s authority to review and reverse factual findings of
lower courts
While it is well settled that factual issues are not within the province of the Supreme Court, as it
is not a trier of facts and is not required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary
evidence de novo, nevertheless, the Supreme Court has the authority to review and, in proper
cases, reverse the factual findings of lower courts in these instances: (a) when the findings of
fact of the trial court are in conflict with those of the appellate court; (b) when the judgment of
the appellate court is based on misapprehension of facts; and (c) when the appellate court
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion. (NFF Industrial Corporation v. G & L Associated Brokerage, G.R. No. 178169, 12
January 2015)
39
CIVIL PROCEDURE; Indispensable party
The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void
for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even to those present. The
purpose of the rules on joinder of indispensable parties is a complete determination of all issues
not only between the parties themselves, but also as regards other persons who may be affected
by the judgment. A decision valid on its face cannot attain real finality where there is want of
indispensable parties. (Macawadib v. The Philippine National Police Directorate For Personnel And
Records Management, G.R. No. 186610, 29 July 2013)
40
CIVIL PROCEDURE; Motion to Quash
A motion to quash information is the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a
criminal complaint or information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law,
or for defects which are apparent in the face of the information. It is a hypothetical admission of
the facts alleged in the information. The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the
material averments in an information is whether or not the facts alleged therein, which are
hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined by law.
Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic of the information are not to be considered. To be sure, a
motion to quash should be based on a defect in the information which is evident on its fact.
Thus, if the defect can be cured by amendment or if it is based on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution is given by the court the opportunity to
correct the defect by amendment. If the motion to quash is sustained, the court may order that
another complaint or information be filed except when the information is quashed on the
ground of extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy. (People v. Odtuhan, G.R. No. 191566,
17 July 2013)
The requisite essential of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be
final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4)
there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and
causes of action. Should identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action be shown in the
two cases, then res judicata in its aspect as a "bar by prior judgment" would apply. If as between
the two cases, only identity of parties can be shown, but not identical causes of action, then res
judicata as "conclusiveness of judgment" applies. (Heirs of Timbang Daromimbang Dimaampao v.
Atty. Abdullah Alug, G.R. No. 198223, 18 February 2015)
41
CIVIL PROCEDURE; Judgments; Effect of void judgment
A void judgment or order has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In
contemplation of law, it is non-existent. Such judgment or order may be resisted in any action or
proceeding whenever it is involved. It is not even necessary to take any steps to vacate or avoid
a void judgment or final order; it may simply be ignored. It cannot be the source of any right
nor of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have
no legal effect. (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Spouses Orilla, G.R. No. 194168, 13 February 2013)
(a) Where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) Where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed
upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) Where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the
action is perishable;
(d) Where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
(e) Where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) Where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such
relief by the trial court is improbable;
(g) Where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) Where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object;
and
(i) Where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. (Olares v.
Manila Doctors College and/or Teresita O. Turla, G.R. No. 201663, 31 March 2014)
42
CIVIL PROCEDURE; Appeals; Petition for review on certiorari; Period to file
Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for review on certiorari under the
said Rule "shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order or
resolution appealed from or of the denial of the petitioner's motion for new trial or
reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment." Relative thereto, Section 2, Rule
52 of the same Rules provides that "no second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final
resolution by the same party shall be entertained." Since a second motion for reconsideration is
not allowed, then unavoidably, its filing does not toll the running of the period to file an appeal
by certiorari. Perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is not only mandatory but
also jurisdictional. For this reason, failure to file this petition within the 15-day period rendered
the assailed Decision and Resolutions final and executory, thus, depriving the Court of
jurisdiction to entertain an appeal therefrom. (Spouses Martires v. Chua, G.R. No. 174240, 20
March 2013)
CIVIL PROCEDURE; Appeals; Petition for review on certiorari vis-à-vis petition for
certiorari
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are two and separate remedies. A petition under Rule 45
brings up for review errors of judgment, while a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 covers
errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
Grave abuse of discretion is not an allowable ground under Rule 45. A petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a mode of appeal. However, the provision must be read in
relation to Section 1, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that any party may
appeal from a judgment or final order “unless the accused will thereby be placed in double
jeopardy.” The judgment that may be appealed by the aggrieved party envisaged in the Rule is
a judgment convicting the accused, and not a judgment of acquittal. The State is barred from
appealing such judgment of acquittal by a petition for review. A judgment of acquittal may be
assailed by the People in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court without
placing the accused in double jeopardy. (Villareal v. Aliga, G.R. No. 166995, 13 January 2014)
The authority of the CTA to take cognizance of petitions for certiorari questioning interlocutory
orders issued by the RTC in a local tax case is included in the powers granted by the
Constitution as well as inherent in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. (The City of Manila v.
Grecia-Cuerdo, G.R. No. 175723, 4 February 2014)
It would bear to point out that this Court is not abandoning the rule that, insofar as quasi-
judicial tribunals are concerned, the authority to issue writs of certiorari must still be expressly
conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the mere existence of their
appellate jurisdiction. This doctrine remains as it applies only to quasi-judicial bodies. (The City
of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo, G.R. No. 175723, 4 February 2014)
43
appear that there is a substantial controversy between the parties and one of them is committing
an act or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or
destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the
case. It persists until it is dissolved or until the termination of the action without the court
issuing a final injunction. (LEAP v. LWUA and DBM, G.R. No. 206808-09, 7 September 2016)
Where property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the value thereof
may be enhanced by the public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the
property may have depreciated its value thereby; or, there may have been a natural increase in
the value of the property from the time it is taken to the time the complaint is filed, due to
general economic conditions. The owner of the private property should be compensated only
for what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss
or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it is taken. This
is the only way that compensation to be paid can be truly just; i.e., "just not only to the
individual whose property is taken," "but to the public, which is to pay for it." (Republic of the
Philippines v. Tetro Enterprises, Incorporated, G.R. No. 183015, 15 January 2014)
Both equity and the law direct that a property owner should be compensated if his property is
taken for public use. Where private property is taken by the Government for public use without
44
first acquiring title thereto either through expropriation or negotiated sale, the owner’s action to
recover the land or the value thereof does not prescribe. (Contreras v. Spouses Tecson, G.R. No.
179334, 1 July 2013)
When a property is taken by the government for public use, jurisprudence clearly provides for
the remedies available to a landowner. The owner may recover his property if its return is
feasible or, if it is not, the aggrieved owner may demand payment of just compensation for the
land taken. For failure of respondents to question the lack of expropriation proceedings for a
long period of time, they are deemed to have waived and are estopped from assailing the power
of the government to expropriate or the public use for which the power was exercised.
(Contreras v. Spouses Tecson, G.R. No. 179334, 1 July 2013)
Interest runs as a matter of law and follows from the right of the landowner to be placed in as
good position as money can accomplish, as of the date of taking. (Contreras v. Spouses Tecson,
G.R. No. 179334, 1 July 2013)
Petitioner can file the action for ejectment without impleading his co-owners; a co-owner may
bring such an action, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs,
because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. A person who occupies the land
of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is bound
by an implied promise that he will vacate the same upon demand, failing which a summary
action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. (Catedrilla v. Lauron, G.R. No. 179011, 15
April 2013)
In summary ejectment suits (unlawful detainer and forcible entry), the only issue to be
determined is who between the contending parties has better possession of the contested
property. The Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts in Cities, and the Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over these cases and the proceedings
are governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure. On the other hand, an accion publiciana, also
known as accion plenaria de posesion, is a plenary action for the recovery of possession in an
ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better and legal right to possess, independently of
title. The main distinctions between these two remedies lie in the period within which the action
can be instituted and in the court which exercises jurisdiction over the matter. Actions for
unlawful detainer and forcible entry must be filed within one (1) year from the date possession
is lost, while an accion publiciana may be filed only after the expiration of that period but within
the period prescribed in the statute of limitations. An accion publiciana may only be filed with
the RTC, while a complaint for unlawful detainer or forcible entry may only be filed with the
first level courts. (Norberte, Jr. v. Mejia, G.R. No. 182886, 9 March 2015)
The decision of the BSP Monetary Board cannot be a proper subject matter for a petition for
declaratory relief since it was issued by the BSP Monetary Board in the exercise of its quasi-
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judicial powers or functions. The nature of the BSP Monetary Board as a quasi-judicial agency,
and the character of its determination of whether or not appropriate sanctions may be imposed
upon erring banks, is an exercise of quasi-judicial function. (The Honorable Monetary Board v.
Philippine Veterans Bank, G.R. No. 189571, 21 January 2015).
The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation and
notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. A
reading of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court shows that the Rules mandate two
sets of notices to different potential oppositors: one given to the persons named in the petition
and another given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be
considered interested or affected parties. Summons must, therefore, be served not for the
purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the requirements of fair play
and due process to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so
chooses. (Republic v. Lugsanay Uy, G.R. No. 198010, 12 August 2013)
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; Nature of search warrant and warrant of arrest
The requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are completely
different from those for the institution of a criminal action. For, indeed, a warrant, such as a
warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process. A search warrant is defined in
our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed
by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and
bring it before the court. A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of
discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because
of a public necessity. In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept
and provisions on search warrants, such warrant is definitively considered merely as a process,
generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action
to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. Clearly then, an application for
a search warrant is not a criminal action. Thus, the rule that venue is jurisdictional does not
apply thereto. (Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Romars International Gases Corporation, G.R.
No. 189669, 16 February 2015)
It is well settled that the absence or irregularity of preliminary investigation does not affect the
court’s jurisdiction over the case. Nor does it impair the validity of the criminal information or
render it defective. Dismissal is not the remedy. Neither is it a ground to quash the information
or nullify the order of arrest issued against the accused or justify the release of the accused from
detention. The proper course of action that should be taken is to hold in abeyance the
proceedings upon such information and to remand the case for the conduct of preliminary
investigation. (Arroyo v. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 199082, 23 July 2013)
In order to avoid delay in the proceedings, judges are reminded that the pendency of a motion
for reconsideration, motion for reinvestigation, or petition for review is not a cause for the
quashal of a warrant of arrest previously issued because the quashal of a warrant of arrest may
only take place upon the finding that no probable cause exists. Moreover, judges should take
note of the following:
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1. If there is a pending motion for reconsideration or motion for
reinvestigation of the resolution of the public prosecutor, the court may suspend
the proceedings upon motion by the parties. However, the court should set the
arraignment of the accused and direct the public prosecutor to submit the
resolution disposing of the motion on or before the period fixed by the court,
which in no instance could be more than the period fixed by the court counted
from the granting of the motion to suspend arraignment, otherwise the court will
proceed with the arraignment as scheduled and without further delay.
2. If there is a pending petition for review before the DOJ, the court may
suspend the proceedings upon motion by the parties. However, the court should
set the arraignment of the accused and direct the DOJ to submit the resolution
disposing of the petition on or before the period fixed by the Rules which, in no
instance, could be more than sixty (60) days from the filing of the Petition for
Review before the DOJ, otherwise, the court will proceed with the arraignment
as scheduled and without further delay. (Aguinaldo v. Ventus, G.R. No. 176033, 11
March 2005)
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apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise
admissible without need to account for the original. In the instant case, what is being
questioned is the authenticity and due execution of the subject deed of sale. There is no real
issue as to its contents. (Skunac Corporation v. Sylianteng, G.R. No. 205879, 23 April 2014)
Even if Januario’s utterances could not be appreciated as a dying declaration, his statements
may still be appreciated as part of the res gestae. Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts,
and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so
spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and
fabrication. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether
the act, declaration, or exclamation, is so interwoven or connected with the principal fact or
event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it
clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony. When Januario gave
the identity of the assailants to SPO3 Mendoza, he was referring to a startling occurrence which
is the stabbing by appellant and his co-accused. His utterance about appellant and his co-
accused having stabbed him, in answer to the question of SPO3 Mendoza, was made in
spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence. (People v. Gatarin, G.R. No. 198022, 7
April 2014)
The defense of frame-up or denial in drug cases requires strong and convincing evidence
because of the presumption that the law enforcement agencies acted in the regular performance
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of their official duties. The presumption that official duty has been regularly performed can
only be overcome through clear and convincing evidence showing either of two things: (1) that
they were not properly performing their duty, or (2) that they were inspired by any improper
motive (People of the Philippines v. Susan M. Tamaño and Jaffy B. Gulmatico, G.R. No. 208642, 16
December 2016).
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***
LEGAL ETHICS
SUSPENSION OF LAWYERS
When this Court orders a lawyer suspended from the practice of law, as in the instant case, the
lawyer must desist from performing all functions requiring the application of legal knowledge
within the period of suspension. Suffice it to say that practice of law embraces "any activity, in
or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience." It includes "[performing] acts which are characteristics of the [legal] profession" or
"[rendering any kind of] service [which] requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or
skill." (Feliciano v. Atty. Lozada, A.C. No. 7593, 11 March 2015).
It has been repeatedly held that to justify suspension or disbarment, the act complained off
must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt
as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of
decency. It is willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and
respectable members of the community. In the case at bench, Atty. Dabon’s intimate
relationship with a woman other than his wife showed his moral indifference to the opinion of
the good and respectable members of the community. It manifested his disrespect for the laws
on the sanctity of marriage and for his own marital vow of fidelity. It showed his utmost moral
depravity and low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, he has fallen
below the moral bar. Such detestable behavior warrants a disciplinary sanction. Even if not all
forms of extramarital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside of
marriage are considered disgraceful and immoral as they manifest deliberate disregard of the
sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our
laws. (Valdez v. Dabon, A.C. No. 7353, 16 November 2015)
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upon in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential information acquired
through their connection or previous employment. (Lee v. Simando, A.C. No. 9537, June 10, 2013;
See also: Tulio vs. Buhangi, A.C. No. 7110, 20 April 2016)
LAWYER AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION; Fairness and candor toward the legal profession
Indeed, the practice of law is not a right but merely a privilege bestowed upon by the State
upon those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by
law for the conferment of such privilege. One of those requirements is the observance of
honesty and candor. Candor in all their dealings is the very essence of a practitioner’s honorable
membership in the legal profession. Lawyers are required to act with the highest standard of
truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the conduct of litigation and in their relations with their
clients, the opposing parties, the other counsels and the courts. They are bound by their oath to
speak the truth and to conduct themselves according to the best of their knowledge and
discretion, and with fidelity to the courts and their clients. (Sonic Steel Industries, Inc. v. Chua,
A.C. No. 6942, 17 July 2013)
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NOTARIAL PRACTICE; Jurat
If the notary public knows the affiants personally, he need not require them to show their valid
identification cards.1âwphi1 This rule is supported by the definition of a "jurat" under Section 6,
Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. A "jurat" refers to an act in which an individual on
a single occasion: (a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or
document; (b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity; (c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of
the notary; and (d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument
or document. (Reyes v. Glaucoma Research Foundation, G.R. No. 189255, 17 June 2015)
Applying the above rule to the instant case, it is undisputed that the attorney-in-fact of
respondents who executed the verification and certificate against forum shopping, which was
attached to respondents' petition filed with the CA, is personally known to the notary public
before whom the documents were acknowledged. Both attorney-in-fact and the notary public
hold office at respondents' place of business and the latter is also the legal counsel of
respondents. (Reyes v. Glaucoma Research Foundation, G.R. No. 189255, 17 June 2015)
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