Jim Hollensbe

History as Film
Dr. Mark Kehren
May 11, 2009

The Finest Picture of Cold War Tensions:

An Analysis of The Missiles of October and Thirteen Days:

Kenny O’Donnell, the Special Assistant to President John F. Kennedy, was quoted with

words that bellow through the decades following October of 1962: “If the sun comes up

tomorrow it is only because of men of good will, and that’s all there is between us and the

devil.”1 The Cuban Missile Crisis occurred at the peak of the Cold War and gave way to a climax

that very few people knew the real magnitude of. Dramatized-documentaries such as The

Missiles of October, released in 1974, and Thirteen Days, released in 2000, illustrate just how

high hostilities and tensions rose between the United States and the Soviet Union over this two

week period. Arrogantly unaware of which side had started the confrontation, U.S. and Soviet

diplomats waited in fear for the other to falter. These two films provide different avenues for the

cinematographic explanation of the military, political, and diplomatic factions of the Cuban

Missile Crisis between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Thirteen Days was directed by Roger Donaldson, who was also the director of Dante’s

Peak and The Bank Job. It carries the name of Robert F. Kennedy’s account of the inside story of

the Cuban Missile Crisis, but in reality it is based off of The Kennedy Tapes – Inside the White

House During the Cuban Missile Crisis by Ernest May and Philip Zelikow. A key aspect to this

film is that a great deal of it is portrayed through the point of view of Kenny O’Donnell, who is a

long time friend of the Kennedy brothers. This more current film will be compared The Missiles

of October. The made-for-TV movie was directed by Anthony Page, who is a Tony-award
1
Thirteen Days. Dir. Roger Donaldson. Perf. Bruce Greenwood, Kevin Costner. DVD. New Line Cinema, 2000.
 Hollensbe |2

winning film and stage director. This film also goes into great detail on the inner-office dealings

during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Rather than being taken from O’Donnell’s perspective, much of

the film follows Robert Kennedy’s aforementioned book, Thirteen Days. These films vary

widely from each other in the fact that the later film is staged more like a play than a typical,

action-filled Hollywood movie.

A large difference between these two films is the use of action, special effects, and other

cinematographic features that most productions of this manner would normally include. Thirteen

Days mixes condensed political and diplomatic proceedings with action in the air and sea.

Whether it is the Air Force flying intelligence missions over Cuba or the Navy enforcing the

eventual U.S. blockade, the 2000 film did not miss any opportunity to show explosions, speed,

and hostile encounters. The Missiles of October, conversely, stuck mainly to the political

dealings. This film conscripts the events that the earlier film subtlety touched upon. This level of

political depth left very little room for the action to be dramatized.

This paper’s main axis of comparison will be the aesthetics of the time that each movie

was respectably developed and the influence this had on the representation of relations between

the United States and the Soviet Union. While each film gives accounts of the actions and

communications within the White House and around Washington D.C. during the Cuban Missile

Crisis, each of them portray the Soviet position in a different way. The differences in the

reception of Soviet issues can be seen between 1974 and 2000. Cold War tensions were still high

and frightening in America during the 1970s, while the ability to use historical retrospect in 2000

is obviously used in Thirteen Days. Interestingly enough, The Missiles of October contains more

of what can be considered a Soviet vantage point. This perspective, however, cannot be

predisposed as entirely or majorly accurate. The 1974 film provides an intriguing look into how
 Hollensbe |3

Americans thought they were viewed by the Soviets and how the Soviets were undoubtedly

viewed by them. This paradox is avoided in the 2000 film, where the plot focuses more upon

archival documents to portray the Soviet proceedings.

Historical Background

The beginning of the Cuban Missile Crisis is marked as October 14, 1962. On this day,

the United States was oblivious to the danger of Cuba outside of the presence of communism in

the Western Hemisphere. Major Richard S. Heyser of the United States Air Force was set for a

highly routine reconnaissance mission over the island of Cuba that would last a mere twelve

minutes.2 Heyser flew a CIA U-2F plane, one of the most powerful and sophisticated planes of

the time, equipped with many radar tracking detectors to sense any type of hostile fire. The

planes U-2 camera was set to take about 4,000 paired aerial photos that had the capability of

producing pictures with high resolution from heights of well over 70,000 feet.3

The mission was executed without a hitch. Upon landing at McCoy Air Force Base in

Orlando, Florida, the two large rolls of film were removed from the plane and quickly sent to the

Naval Photographic Intelligence Center (NAVPIC), in Suitland, Maryland. During debriefing,

Heyser referred to his mission as “a milk run,” which is Air Force terminology for a mission that

experienced no enemy fighters and no reaction or recognition from opposing forces.4 With no

knowledge on what the film contained, NAVPIC’s interpretation was about to change the course

of the Cold War and drive the world to the brink of obliteration.

The following day passed with very little work yet directed to the Kennedy

Administration. The president was in the middle of Congressional elections and was busy

2
Brugioni, Dino. Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Random House, 1991.
3
Ibid, 185.
4
Ibid, 186.
 Hollensbe |4

campaigning.5 These campaign trips became a key distraction for the president during the Cuban

Missile Crisis. Kennedy’s Democratic Party was in danger of losing Congressional seats so he

was highly committed to the campaign project.6 It would also become extremely important for

the president to keep his prior campaigning appointments in order to keep the American public in

the dark on the international hostilities that would quickly begin rising.7 When his presence was

of critical importance, the press was informed that President Kennedy had taken ill and was

unable to complete his planned appointments.8

While Kennedy was on the campaign trail, Arthur C. Lundahl, director of the National

Photographic Interpretation Center, was preparing his presentation that he would indubitably

have to deliver to the president. Lundahl had previously noted that long, boring presentations

were not his style, but rather ones that were powerful.9 The U-2’s aerial photographs served as

his muscle. These photographs were difficult for the untrained eye to interpret and it was

Lundahl’s job to provide an explanation to Kennedy and his Cabinet.10

At 9 p.m. on October 15, the first member of the Kennedy Administration was made

aware of the circumstances. Ray Cline, who would become the CIA’s chief analyst during the

Cuban Missile Crisis, called the home of National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, informing

him that: “Those things we’ve been worrying about in Cuba are there.”11 The next morning,

Bundy had to give Kennedy “the most disturbing information any President has received since

5
Ibid, 187.
6
For greater detail on the 1964 Congressional elections and their influence on the Cuban Missile Crisis address
page 116 of: George, Alice L. Awaiting Armageddon: How Americans Faced the Cuban Missile Crisis. Chapel Hill, NC:
University of North Carolina Press, 2003.
7
Stern, Sheldon M. Averting the Final Failure: John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003.
8
Strober, Deborah H., and Gerald S. Strober. The Kennedy Presidency: An Oral History of the Era. Dulles, VA:
Brassey’s, Inc., 2003.
9
Brugioni, 192.
10
Stern, 59.
11
Brugioni, 207.
 Hollensbe |5

Pearl Harbor.”12 In the months leading up to October of 1962, Russian Ambassador Anatoly

Dobrynin met with Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy and relayed the Kremlin’s promise that

no “ground-to-ground missiles or offensive weapons” would be placed in Cuba.13 The debate

over offensive versus defensive weapons would rage on over the coming weeks.

One thing that the CIA found strange was why the Soviet Union would be moving these

weapons into Cuba during the month October. The Caribbean fall is notorious for heavy winds,

incredible amounts of rain, frequent storms, and occasional hurricanes. “Lundahl believed that

the Soviets had planned to move the missile in and set them up under this weather umbrella.”14

Had the Kremlin been planning an attack on America, Lundahl’s theory justified this time frame.

More specifically, there have been two claims made on the objectives of Soviet Chairman Nikita

Khrushchev in placing these missiles in Cuba. The first was Khrushchev’s own assertion that

assured President Kennedy that the buildup was for strictly defensive purposes. The second was

that the Soviet Union wanted to close the strategic gap of nuclear balance between the world’s

two great powers that was leaning heavily in favor of the United States.15 Secretary Rusk

reiterated years later that the Soviet reasoning for placing the missiles in Cuba was never exactly

known.16

“From the outset, the overriding question was clear: could the United States eliminate this

apparent Soviet provocation without initiating an armed clash which could easily spin out of

control?”17 Tensions between American and Soviet diplomats were immediately high. Neither

side wanted to hint at what intelligence information they actually possessed but each side knew

12
Divine, Robert A., ed. The Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Markus Weiner Publishing, 1988.
13
Kennedy, Robert F. Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: W.W. Norton & Company,
1968.
14
Brugioni, 205.
15
White, Mark J. The Cuban Missile Crisis. London: MacMillan Press, 1996).
16
Strober, 388.
17
Stern, 59.
 Hollensbe |6

that the other was not completely in the dark. During the fateful thirteen days of October,

President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev were nearly engaged in daily communication,

despite the eight hour time difference between Moscow and Washington D.C. Each leader

continuingly accused the other of being irrational and being the force behind pushing the world

to the brink of total nuclear war.18

During the Crisis, there was essentially two specific courses of action, either an airstrike

—most likely followed by a ground attack—or a blockade of Cuba. The blockade would be a

political measure to show the Soviets that America saw the missiles as posing the greatest threat

to their national security. Within the White House, there were two groups that were categorized

as “hawks” or “doves” by an unnamed source.19 The hawks argued in favor of the military

approach of an air strike. They were led by former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who was

asked to provide his advice during the meetings based on his extensive diplomatic experience.20

Other strong hawks included Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor;

Director of the CIA, John McCone; Secretary of the Treasury, C. Douglas Dillon; as well as all

the branches and heads of the military.21

Leading the “doves” was Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy. Secretary of Defense

Robert McNamara, his predecessor Robert Lovett, and former Ambassador to Russia Llewellyn

Thompson joined the Attorney General. Thompson stressed that if the United States gave

Khrushchev an ultimatum that he would give an irrational response based on impulse rather than

reasoning.22 Secretary McNamara continually stated, very bluntly, that the military course would
18
For more information on the day-to-day letters between Kennedy and Khrushchev, refer to this source:
Kennedy, Robert F., Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company,
1968), 57-61. The chapter is entitled “There were almost daily conversations with Khrushchev,” and it will provide
a greater depth of the international political proceedings.
19
Divine, 70.
20
Kennedy, 16.
21
Divine, 71.
22
Divine, 71.
 Hollensbe |7

kill Russians. This would be detrimental because it would obviously force the Soviet Union to

retaliate just as the United States would if Americans were killed.23 Kennedy’s military advisors

had no clear argument against McNamara but saw their vision of American superiority as enough

justification.

The position of Secretary of State Dean Rusk was a unique one. Through his

understanding of both the political and military implications, Secretary Rusk portrayed his

hesitation in the effectiveness of the blockade but also feared the diplomatic consequences of any

type of attack on Cuba.24 President Kennedy held a similar position on the issue while leaning

slightly toward the blockade, in a way, “hedging his bets.” He authorized military operations to

get underway so the United States could be prepared for the worst if it came to that. It was clear

he needed to act but was not convinced on how to act.25

A third option that was rejected with extreme prejudice was proposed by Adlai

Stevenson, American Ambassador to the United Nations. Stevenson was described as “a man

who tries to understand and reach for certainty before he strikes.”26 He proposed that the United

States government offer a negotiation with the Soviet Union, trading the American military base

in Guantanamo Bay and missiles in Turkey and Italy in exchange for the Soviet missiles to be

pulled out of Cuba.27 Despite how feasible that this proposal now seems, Stevenson was heavily

criticized by many of the influential government officials as a “coward” and an “appeaser.”28

There was an incredible amount of stress put on President Kennedy from his military

advisors, exclusive members of Congress, and eventually the American public to react harshly to

23
Stern, 116.
24
George, 109.
25
Stern, 87.
26
White, 164.
27
George, 109.
28
White, 176.
 Hollensbe |8

this form of Soviet aggression.29 The level of emotional tension and stress can be seen in Sheldon

Stern’s account of the animosity between Kennedy and Air Force Chief of Staff, General Curtis

LeMay on the morning of Friday, October 19:

“In other words, you’re in a pretty bad fix at the present time,” LeMay declared, almost
taunting the President.
Kennedy had not heard, or perhaps thought he had heard incorrectly, “What’d you say?”
he asked matter-of-factly.
“I say, you’re in a pretty bad fix,” LeMay repeated smugly.
“You’re in with me,” Kennedy replied, with an acerbic laugh, “personally.”30

The committee came to a consensus on the night of Sunday, October 21. Their decision was to

impose the blockade of Cuba but call it a “quarantine” since the use of a blockade is technically

an act of war. This was determined the best course of action because it would stop any additional

offensive weapons from being placed in Cuba as well as keep the military option open if

necessary.31

The following evening, President Kennedy addressed the nation about the national

security risk that the Cuban missiles were posing and announced the blockade that would take

effect at 10:00 a.m. on October 27. The day after that, October 23, Premier Khrushchev sent a

telegram to Kennedy expressing his feelings on, what he called, “a naked interference in

domestic affairs of the Cuban Republic and the Soviet Union.”32 The actions of the American

government were justified, however, through the unanimous support of the blockade by the

Organization of American States as well as Adlai Stevenson’s diplomatic measures at the U.N.33

29
Strober, 289.
30
Stern, 126.
31
Ibid, 119.
32
French, Thomas, ed. The Kennedy-Khrushchev Letters. Woodlands, TX: New Century Books, 2001.
33
For more information on the specific role of the United Nations proceedings during the Crisis, under the helm of
Secretary-General U Thant, refer to this short journal article:
Ben, Philip. “U Thant and the Cuban Crisis.” New Republic 147, no. 20 (November 1962): 6-7.
 Hollensbe |9

Following days of negotiations, Khrushchev and the Kremlin conceded to American

diplomacy and the turning of world opinion. In his letter to President Kennedy, Khrushchev

stated, “We are willing to remove from Cuba the means which you regard as offensive. We are

willing to carry this out and to make this pledge to the United Nations.”34 Thankfully, cooler

heads had prevailed and the world escaped a possible World War III that would have been

characterized with the extreme use of nuclear weapons.

Film Analysis

“We were eyeball to eyeball, and I think the other fellow just blinked.” Secretary of State

Dean Rusk’s infamous line rings through about every book or article available on the Cuban

Missile Crisis and is highlighted with particular importance in both The Missiles of October and

Thirteen Days. What each film—categorized as docu-dramas—tries to portray is that the

American and Soviet governments understood that “the real danger was that someone will strike

first out of fear of striking second.” An essential way to view these films is to realize that they

shed more light on the emotional aspect of the Crisis, rather than strictly the historical side.

Roger Ebert said it best: “Things might not have happened exactly like this, but it sure did feel

like they did.”35 While both are historically sound in comparison to other films of their nature,

The Missiles of October stresses an exaggerated heroism of President Kennedy and Thirteen

Days gives a large role to Kevin Costner’s seemingly unimportant character, Kenny O’Donnell.

The Missiles of October can be seen as more historically accurate. It delves into a variety

of sources when dealing with the political events within the White House, between Kennedy and

Khrushchev, and within the meetings of the United Nations.36 The film gives an admirable
34
Thomas, 321.
35
Ebert, Roger. "Thirteen Days Movie Review." Chicago Sun-Times Online. Available from
http://rogerebert.suntimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20010112/REVIEWS/101120304/1023. Internet;
accessed 15 April 2009.
36
Although it discusses political proceedings of both sides, a level of bias must be considered because The Missiles
of October is majorly based on the memoirs of Robert F. Kennedy, who received writing credits by the major-
 H o l l e n s b e | 10

depiction of a trying time for citizens and government officials of both America and the Soviet

Union.

The 1974 film is a made-for-TV movie that was staged as a theatrical play and it is hard

not to picture the opening and closing of curtains at the beginning and end of each act. Following

an approach that can be described as “less is more,” The Missiles of October ignores the action

and thrills of more military-minded films and focuses specifically on inner office dealings and

international politics.37 The acting is excellent and many of the actors are well known and can be

recognized today, namely Martin Sheen who plays Attorney General Kennedy. The technical

quality for the time period is sufficient. Even without a high level of action, the film helps the

audience deeply feel the events through the use of actual footage that was being aired in America

during October of 1962.

Thirteen Days, on the other hand, is a much more dramatized account of the Crisis. The

essential component of the 2000 film is its unlikely protagonist, Kenny O’Donnell. Costner’s

character is hardly mentioned in substantial first-hand accounts but serves a valuable purpose.

The Missiles of October, on the other hand, must be followed very closely to even catch the

appearance of O’Donnell’s character. Whether or not it shows the reality of the Kennedy

Administration, O’Donnell is seen as a sort of utility player for the White House. He is a close

advisor to the President who connects with him on a very personal level and also becomes the

main distance needed between the political proceedings and the press. The impression is given

that significant members of the media trust in O’Donnell to be capable of providing a valuable

source. When one journalist mentions to him that the United States is invading Cuba, O’Donnell

threatens him to keep quiet and warns him not to “inflame the situation.” His threat involves

writer, Stanley Greenberg.

37
Ruddy, T. Michael. “Society for History Education: The Missiles of October.” The History Teacher 9, no. 3 (May
1976): 486-487. http://www.jstor.org/stable/492345 (accessed April 29, 2009).
 H o l l e n s b e | 11

“cutting him out of the loop,” further signifying that O’Donnell has some level of control within

the White House.38

The threesome of Kenny O’Donnell, President Kennedy, and Attorney General Kennedy

is a fundamental element of Thirteen Days. O’Donnell was Robert’s roommate at Harvard and

served as John’s campaign manager. The Kennedy brothers are also very close to one another, as

history often portrays. These three can be seen as one in their stance on which course of action

would be best to take, which is not particularly true because President Kennedy avoided taking

any unambiguous stance until all implications were brought to light. The president is seen as

allowing his relationship with his brother and friend guide his decision making based on

emotional factors.

This difference in the portrayal of President Kennedy becomes a large and noticeable bias

in The Missiles of October. He generally comes off as an American saint that saved the world

when it was on the brink of nuclear obliteration. While this point can be argued, it is more

historically rational to see Kennedy as perhaps a young president that escalated the situation

because of political pressures from the public and his closest advisors. His level of control over

the proceedings is an interesting reference because even when he was uncertain, William

Devane’s character still seems calm and collected.

During the debate on whether or not the blockade line should be extended, Devane

remarked, “Every step I take to prevent a war becomes a step back into one.”39 This gives the

impression that although Kennedy was advised by a variety of department heads and officials,

every choice was of his own volition. Not that he completely ran the show but more that it was

his plan that was followed and his actions that succeeded. When the movie is about to reach its

38
Thirteen Days, 2000.
39
The Missiles of October. Dir. Anthony Page. Perf. William Devane, Martin Sheen, Howard Da Silva. VHS. 1974.
 H o l l e n s b e | 12

climax of possible nuclear war, Devane gives a stressful and emotionally drained expression to

Sheen and hesitantly questions if he had made the right judgments.

The control issue between the Kennedys and O’Donnell, a man with no particular power,

also comes into question when comparing these two films. Interestingly enough, the decisions

that are said to have been made by Kennedy are often confirmed in The Missiles of October and

claimed as O’Donnell’s influence in Thirteen Days. In particular, the decision to keep face with

the campaign trips has been documented as a consensus among Kennedy and his advisors. In

The Missiles of October, Kennedy alone mentions it as a rule of thumb at the beginning of the

Crisis. In Thirteen Days, O’Donnell provides the idea and rationale behind not cancelling the

campaign trip to Chicago or else the press would know something was up.

Cinematographic differences in the films are highly noticeable but relatively minor in

importance. The monumental difference between The Missiles of October and Thirteen Days is

the portrayal of the Soviet Union, specifically Chairman Nikita Khrushchev. In Thirteen Days,

Khrushchev is a ghost. He is seen as a violent and short-tempered monster that is half the world

away and an even greater distance from being understood. While it is obvious that during the

Cold War, no Soviet was viewed positively by an American, Khrushchev is talked about as if he

is some modernized version of Adolf Hitler that believes so highly in the superiority of his nation

that he would be willing to destroy half the world to prove it.

It would be difficult to argue that The Missiles of October sheds a positive light on

Khrushchev and the Soviet Union, but it surprisingly attempts to give a less biased view on the

Soviet perspective. This film bestows the Soviet evil on the Kremlin more than on Khrushchev.

Not that the Soviet Chairman is shown as a great individual but he is depicted as a

comprehensible one. There are times where one can see the biases playing out, as this was
 H o l l e n s b e | 13

written and produced when Cold War hostilities were still flaring. Khrushchev is normally

yelling or talking sternly and at one time explodes. “I’m not interested in the destruction of the

world,” he yelled, “but if we all want to meet in hell then it’s up to you!”40 Yet in this statement

of rage, Khrushchev’s character is given a much more human identity than Thirteen Days ever

offers.

The very best line that can be credited to the humanization of Nikita Khrushchev occurs

at the height of diplomatic negotiations, while the world waited. In a groggy and worried tone,

full of emotional and mental distress, Khrushchev remarked, “Our nights are their days and our

days are their nights. Kennedy works when I sleep, then he sleeps when I work. Perhaps soon we

can both sleep.”41 Unlike what the audience hears in Thirteen Days, it does not appear that

Khrushchev is driving the world to the brink of total-nuclear war. It certainly does not give the

impression that Kennedy is the practitioner of “brinksmanship,” but rather the closest advisors

and officials surrounding both leaders. Each side cannot wait to go after each other. Kennedy and

Khrushchev’s understandings of the lasting ramifications are perhaps the only voices of reason.

In fact, in The Missiles of October, meetings of the Kremlin echo meetings of the White House

in a certain manner. The other members of the Kremlin have the same radical views as the

military leaders of the United States, believing that the Crisis can only be solved through force.

Like Kennedy, Khrushchev provided a rational approach that would help avoid the situation

from escalating to detrimental events.

More importantly, both films accurately show the level of Cold War tension and

paranoia, even strictly within the American government. The Missiles of October is able to

portray this tension and discontent within the Soviet government as well. They both characterize

40
The Missiles of October, 1974.
41
Ibid, 1974.
 H o l l e n s b e | 14

the language of the Cold War. Thirteen Days has a climactic scene between Secretary

McNamara and the leader of Navy where McNamara is over taken by his emotions. “This is not

a blockade that can be run by rules of engagement!” he angrily warns, “This is language. This is

President Kennedy speaking directly to Chairman Khrushchev!”42 This statement has a very high

level of explanatory capability of the Cold War.

The Missiles of October and Thirteen Days are two films that provide a highly historic

account of the Cuban Missile Crisis. While given a highly emotional perception, each movie

properly engages its audience in the events of the time period. Although the protagonist, special

effects, and Soviet vantage point vary, each movie still provides a steadfast historical exposé.

They show the vital role played by the diplomatic and domestic actions of those in power in the

governments of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus, the Cuban Missile Crisis

should be considered the height of the Cold War and the clearest picture of its international

tensions.

42
Thirteen Days, 2000.