American Journal of Primatology 2237-248 (1982)

REVIEW ARTICLE

Self-Awareness and the Emergence of Mind in Primates

GORDON G. GALLUP, JR.
Department of Psychology, State Universzty of New York at Albany

To date humans, chimpanzees, and orangutans are the only species which have
been shown capable of recognizing themselves in mirrors. Several species of
macaques have now been provided with years of continuous exposure to mir-
rors, but they still persist in reacting to their reflection as if they were seeing
other monkeys. Even gibbons (apes)and gorillas (great apes) seem incapable of
learning that their behavior is the source of the behavior depicted in the image.
Most primates, therefore, appear to lack a cognitive category for processing
mirrored information about themselves. The implications of these data for tra-
ditional views of consciousness are considered briefly, and a recent attempt to
develop an operant analog to self-recognition is critically evaluated. Finally, an
attempt is made to show that self-awareness, consciousness, and mind are not
mutually exclusive cognitive categories and that the emergence of self-aware-
ness may be equivalent to the emergence of mind. Several indices of “mind
which can be applied to nonhuman species are discussed in the context of an
attempt to develop a comparative psychology of mind.

Key words: mirrors, self-recognition,self-awareness,consciousness, introspection, mind

INTRODUCTION
In front of a mirror any visually capable organism is ostensibly an audience to its own
behavior. However, many animals react to themselves in mirrors as if they were seeing
other animals and engage in a variety of species-typical social responses directed toward
the reflection [Gallup, 19681. In principle, mirrors enable organisms to see themselves as
they are seen by others, but, unlike humans, most animals seem incapable of recognizing
the dualism implicit in such stimulation, and even after prolonged exposure fail to dis-
cover the relationship between their behavior and the reflection of that behavior in a
mirror.

SELF-RECOGNITION IN CHIMPANZEES
After pondering the possibility of an evolutionary discontinuity in the ability to
decipher such information, I conducted a study to see if chimpanzees could learn to rec-
ognize themselves in mirrors [Gallup, 19701. First, I gave a number of chimpanzees indi-
vidual exposure to a mirror. Invariably their initial reaction was to respond as if they
were seeing another chimpanzee, and for the first few d they all engaged in a variety of
social gestures while watching the reflection. After about 3 d, however, the tendency to

Received September 24, 1981; accepted November 17, 1981

Address reprint requests to Gordon G. Gallup, Jr.. Department of Psychology, State University of Ncw York a t
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238 Gallup
treat the image as a companion disappeared. This was replaced by the emergence of a
self-directed orientation. That is, rather than responding to the mirror as such, they
began using the mirror to respond to themselves. Under conditions of self-directed
behavior they used the reflection to gain visual access to and experiment with otherwise
inaccessible information about themselves, such as grooming parts of the body they had
not seen before and making faces at the reflection.
Prior to the development of a self-directed orientation, all the chimpanzees showed an
avid interest in the mirror as measured by viewing time, but with the development of
self-directed behavior this interest diminished.
In an attempt to clarify these observations, I devised an unobtrusive and more rigor-
ous test of self-recognition. After the last d of mirror exposure, each chimpanzee was
anesthetized and the mirror was removed. Once the chimpanzee was completely uncon-
scious, I painted the uppermost portion of an eyebrow ridge and the top half of the oppo-
site ear with a bright red, odorless, nonirritating, alcohol-solubledye. The animal was
then returned to its cage and allowed to recover in the absence of the mirror.in 70s
The significance of this technique is threefold. First, the chimpanzees had no way of
knowing about the application of red marks since the procedure was accomplished under
deep anesthesia. Second, the dye was carefully selected because of its complete lack of
tactile and olfactory properties. Finally, the marks were strategically placed at predeter-
mined points so that upon recovery it would be impossible for the dye to be seen without
a mirror.
Following recovery, all subjects were observed to determine the number of times any
marked portion of the face was touched in the absence of the mirror. The mirror was then
reintroduced as an explicit test of self-recognition. Upon seeing the reflection, all the
chimpanzees showed mark-directed responses, consisting of attempts to touch marked
areas on themselves while watching the image. In addition, there was a dramatic
increase in viewing time, and several noteworthy attempts to visually examine and
smell the fingers which had been used to touch these facial marks.
In a further attempt to eliminate any doubt about the source of these reactions, several
comparable chimpanzees which had never seen themselves in mirrors were also anethe-
tized and marked. However, when presented with the mirror there were no mark-directed
responses whatsoever, patterns of self-directed behavior were completely absent, and
the dye was ostensibly ignored. Marked chimpanzees without prior mirror exposure all
responded to the reflection as if confronted with another chimpanzee.

ABSENCE OF SELF-RECOGNITION IN OTHER PRIMATES

These findings have been replicated a number of times [Gallup et al, 1971; Hill et al,
1970; Lethmate & Ducker, 1973;R.L. Thompson, personal communication; S.P. Spitzer,
personal communication; Suarez & Gallup, 19811, and have been extended to include
orangutans [Lethmate & Ducker, 1973;Suarez & Gallup, 19811. However, with the excep-
tion of humans and these two species of great apes, all other primates tested have failed
to recognize themselves, even after extended exposure to mirrors. To date, spider
monkeys, capuchins, squirrel monkeys, stumptailed macaques, rhesus monkeys, crab-
eating macaques, pigtailed macaques, liontailed macaques, mandrills, olive baboons,
hamadryas baboons, two species of gibbons, and even gorillas have been systematically
tested using these procedures; none have shown any indication that they were capable of
realizing that their behavior was the source of the behavior depicted in the mirror [J.R.
Anderson, personal communication; Benhar et al, 1975;M. Bertrand, personal commun-
ication; Gallup, 1970, 1977a; Gallup et al, 1980; N.N. Geberer, personal communication;
Ledbetter & Basen, in press; J. Lethmate, personal communication; Lethmate & Ducker,
1973; K. Pribram, personal communication; R.L. Thompson, personal communication].
 Emergence of Mind 239
Thus, in the process of trying to resolve one apparent evolutionary discontinuity I
appear to have uncovered another.
In one attempt to salvage the conceptual integrity of other primates, I gave a crabeat-
ing macaque 5 months, or over 2,400 h of mirror exposure [Gallup, 1977al. But to no
avail. At the end of that period she failed to show any signs of self-recognition, and con-
tinued to respond to her image as if she were seeing another monkey. Robert L. Thomp-
son [personal communication] recently completed a study in which a pigtailed macaque
was kept in a cage containing a polished metal mirror for 1 yr, but the monkey still gave
no evidence of self-recognition, and social responses directed toward the reflection con-
tinued at a diminished rate for the entire year. Finally, a French psychologist [M.
Bertrand, personal communication] has made systematic observations of a home-reared
pigtailed macaque which had had daily access to mirrors for 7 yrs, but still finds that it is
incapable of recognizing its own reflection, and even now occasionally makes social
responses to the image. In stark contrast with other primates, chimpanzees and
orangutans begin to show signs of self-recognition in as few as 2 or 3 d of mirror expo-
sure [Gallup, 1970; Suarez & Gallup, 19811.
Perhaps the most surprising failure to find self-recognition involves gorillas. There
have now been at least three controlled, experimental attempts to demonstrate self-rec-
ognition in gorillas [Ledbetter & Basen, in press; J. Lethmate, personal communication;
Suarez & Gallup, 19811,with little or no success as yet. We even devised a special control
procedure to counter the possibility that gorillas are simply not interested in superim-
posed body marks [Suarez & Gallup, 19811. Thus, in addition to applying dye to facial
features, we also marked each gorilla on the wrist to see if they would touch and inspect
marks that could be seen directly. After recovery from anesthesia all the gorillas showed
an avid interest in their marked wrists, but not one of the gorillas used the mirror to
respond to comparable marks on the face. Moreover, as further evidence for the fact that
gorillas are oblivious to the source and significance of what they see in a mirror, when
allowed to confront themselves with marks on their faces they showed no increase in
viewing time.
Whereas it should be noted that Patterson I19781 claims that the gorilla named Koko
can recognize herself on the basis of “labeling”the reflection in a gestural mode, this
qualifies as nothing more than a demonstration of associative learning. A child held in
front of a mirror and told its name over and over might learn to associate the name with
its reflected image, but this would not mean it had learned to recognize itself. Similarly,
to qualify as self-recognitionthe results of any test require additional collateral evidence
of other unprompted self-directed behaviors, such as using the mirror for grooming and
other forms of self-inspection. As yet, the spontaneous use of a mirror for such purposes
by gorillas has yet to be demonstrated under laboratory conditions.
In terms of neurological asymmetries, it is interesting to note that LeMay and
Geschwind [1975]have found that the gorilla brain is the least lateralized of all great ape
brains. For psychological reasons I used to think that the distinction between monkeys,
apes, and great apes was important, but now I am less convinced. When it comes to the
study of cognitive processes there is a certain danger in letting ourselves become
intellectually shackled by taxonomic categories based largely on gross morphology.
But, since it is admittedly difficult to deal with negative instances, we have felt
compelled to try to devise alternative means of making the identity of the reflection
more explicit in a continuing effort to show self-recognition in other primates. For
example, in one instance we attempted to capitalize on the rhesus monkey’s well-
developed capacity for individual recognition as a means of facilitating self-recognition
[Gallup et al, 19801. Individual recognition is what underwrites practically all stable
social relations. Clearly, the formation of a dominance hierarchy would be impossible
 240 Gallup

without the capacity to recognize and respond differentially to conspecifics. On this

basis, we decided to give familiar cagemates paired access to a common mirror. In princi-
ple, each member of the pair should be able to correctly identify and recognize the reflec-
tion of its companion, thereby raising the question in a more direct way about the source
of the remaining unfamiliar animal they see in the mirror.
So far we have tried this technique with several pairs of rhesus monkeys, but as yet
have failed to find even the slightest indication of self-recognition. In fact, we now have
a pair of monkeys, caged together from infancy, which have had continuous access to
themselves in the same mirror since 1978, but as time goes on they tend to show pro-
gressively more social behavior to the reflection, rather than less.
Although monkeys can learn to use mirrored cues to manipulate objects they cannot
otherwise see [Brown et al, 19651, they appear incapable of learning to sufficiently inte-
grate features of their own reflection to use mirrors to respond to themselves. Again, it
is not. that they are incapable of learning to respond to mirrored cues. When looking at
the reflection of an experimenter or a bit of food they can detect the inherent dualism as
important! it pertains to objects other than themselves and, after adequate experience, do respond
appropriately by turning away from the mirror to gain more direct access to the object
of the reflection [Tinklepaugh, 19281. Yet, for some curious reason, they completely fail
to correctly interpret mirrored information about themselves.
Taken collectively, my interpretation of these results is that most primates lack an
essential cognitive category for processing mirrored information about the self [Gallup,
1977b]. I t is clear that this is not a consequence of perceptual-motor deficits. Rhesus
monkeys have little or no difficulty learning to respond to mirrored cues, and careful
consideration will show that the perceptual-motor skiils needed for individual recogni-
tion are part and parcel of those required for self-recognition. What is missing, I think, is
a sense of self. One of the unique features of mirrors is that the identity of an observer
and his reflection in a inirror are necessarily one and the same. l'herefore. if you do not
know who you are, how could you possibly know who it is you are seeing when confront-
ed with your mirror image'? The capacity to correctly infer the identity of the reflection
presupposes an identity on the part of the organism making that inference. Thus, the
monkey's Lendency to concinue to react to himself in a mirror as if he were seeing another
monkey may be due to the absence of a sufficiently well integrated self-concept.

AN OPEKANT ANALOG'!
On the other hand. in the most recent of a series of attempts to show that cognitive pro-
cesses may be reducible to sets of reinforcement contingencies, Epstein, Lanza, and
Skinner [ 19811 have argued that self-recognition in chimpanzees need not be taken as
evidence of self-awareness. They base this claim on the demonstration that pigeons can
be taught to respond to marks on themselves wiLn the use of a mirror.
Skinner's paradigm was one in which three mirror-nave pigeons were given 10 d of
training, involving daily sessions of up to 2 h. Training consisted of four phases. First,
using food reinforcement, they taught pigeons, maintained at 80% body weight, to peck
directly at blue stick-on dots positioned on different parts of the body. Next, with the
mirror exposed, they taught birds to peck at blue dots on the wall of the test chamber. In
the third phase, they projected dots briefly and reinforced pecks at the spot on the wall
where the dot had been. Finally, dots were flashed only when the pigeon could see them
in the mirror, and birds were reinforced for turning and pecking the place where the dot
had been.
On the test trial, pigeons were fitted with bibs and a blue dot was placed on the breast
so that if a bird lowered its head the bib would covet- the dot. When placed in front of a
mirror without reinforcement, they recorded the number of times the pigeon would
lower its head and/or peck ostensibly at the position on the bib that corresponded to the
dot.
 Emergence of Mind 241
First, I will start with a couple of annoying procedural problems. Since none of the
pigeons ever received mirror exposure prior to training, there must have been consider-
able social behavior occurring in the test chamber throughout training and testing as
birds are notorious for showing persistent and unabated tendencies to react to them-
selves in mirrors as if they were seeing other birds. Knowing, I suspect, it would compro-
mise their objectives, any mention of such behavior is completely omitted from
Skinner’s report. I t is also curious to note, since reinforcement was not available during
testing, that the test phase was essentially an extinction session. Pigeons reliably show
aggressive behaviors under conditions in which food reward is omitted [e.g., Cohen &
Looney, 19731, and, since bobbing and pecking were the dependent variables, the situa-
tion could easily have been contaminated by extinction-induced aggressive tendencies.
Putting these methodological problems aside, however, it seems to me that any time an
animal requires extensive training to perform a task, it can be difficult to disentangle
the intellectual achievements of the subject from those of the people who designed the
conditioning procedure [Gallup, 1977~1.What you get out of a conditioning regime often
represents little more than what was programmed in. Such tactics, in other words, entail
the very real hazard of cognitive and procedural masking. Suffice it to say that these
kinds of problems are now surfacing in embarrassing ways in many of the so-called
chimpanzee language-learning projects. My technique, on the other hand, is free from
contamination due to manipulative intervention. I simply create the opportunity for
organisms to decipher the significance of mirrored information about themselves.
Chimpanzees do not have to be taught to recognize themselves in mirrors.
In defense of their use of conditioning procedures, Skinner argues that pigeons do not
respond spontaneously to marks on themselves in mirrors because they lack the neces-
sary response repertoire. But, instead of teaching pigeons the prerequisite responses
and conducting a test of self-recognition using my paradigm, they taught pigeons the
criterion response. By analogy, if I were to teach someone the correct answers to ques-
tions on an I& test it might increase his I& score, but it is doubtful that this would have
much effect on his intelligence. The logic of an excuse based on response repertoires is
further flawed by the existence of elaborate preening behaviors in birds, and by the fact
that monkeys and chimpanzees have overlapping response repertoires; yet, as we have
seen, monkeys seem completely incapable of recognizing themselves in mirrors.
Skinner also fails t o acknowledge the fact that I anticipated the essence as well as the
shortcomings of his paradigm several years ago [Gallup, 19801. The problem is that con-
vergent validation is required to demonstrate self-recognition. Chimpanzees use mirrors
spontaneously for purposes of grooming and various other forms of self-inspection.
Skinner reports no such evidence of unprompted self-directed behaviors in pigeons, and
therefore responses to superimposed body marks are rendered inconclusive.
I will concede that reinforcement works, but in and of itself this has no bearing on self-
awareness or any other cognitive phenomenon. Having taught a pigeon to peck a
sequence of keys which read “two plus two equals four” would say nothing about the
existence of mathematical skills in pigeons nor would it have any particular bearing on
the acquisition of such skills.
An another level, it is interesting to note that some of the evidence most damaging to
Skinner‘s position about cognitive phenomena is evidence that has been provided by
none other than operant psychologists themselves. For instance, if, as Skinner would
have us believe, language acquisition is simply a matter of appropriate reinforcing con-
tingencies, then there is no reason why Niin Chimpsky or even Barnabus the albino rat
should be unable to master the subtleties of syntax and sentence construction in a
gestural mode. Yet the principle conclusion of the work by Terrace and his colleagues
[Terrace et al, 19791is that in spite of careful operant tutoring chimpanzees cannot mas-
ter the fundamentals of symbolic communication, and that all previous claims concern-
ing language acquisition in chimpanzees are confounded by cueing, prompting, and
imitation.
242 Gallup

Finally, as evidence that Skinner’s pigeons are performing like mindless automatons, I
would expect that if another marked pigeon behind glass was substituted for the mirror
on the test trial, the pigeon would behave just as it would in front of a mirror and
attempt to peck a corresponding area on itself.

THE BIDIRECTIONAL PROPERTIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Having spoken of Skinner’s pigeons as mindless automatons, I will outline a con-
ceptual framework I have been working on in an attempt to triangulate the coordinates
of mind. What I intend to show is that self-awareness, consciousness, and mind may be
part and parcel of the same process. Indeed, the tendency to treat these as separate
entities has probably served to confuse rather than clarify issues about cognition. In my
view, self-awareness subsumes both consciousness and mind.
First I will start with consciousness, and then I will attempt to provide some closure on
mind. Just as unconsciousness implies the absence of awareness, it seems to me that in
the most rudimentary sense consciousness is awareness. To be aware of an object or an
event is to be conscious of it. By this definition most organisms behave as ifthey were
conscious, at least in the sense of being able to monitor features of the environment and
respond to stimulation. Even an earthworm can react to certain stimuli, and as such
would appear to manifest a primitive sense of awareness. The problem with this
approach is that reactivity does not necessarily presuppose awareness (e.g., spinal
reflexes). But the special feature of consciousness is that it can be bidirectional. Not only
can I attend to a variety of things in the world around me, but I can become the object of
my own attention. I can conceive of myself, think about myself, and my brain can even
speculate about the mechanisms which underly its own functioning. Innther words, the
bidirectional properties of consciousness translate into awareness and self-awareness.
While the earthworm might act as if it were conscious in the former sense, I seriously
doubt that there is an earthworm alive today which is aware of its own existence. For
that matter, based on their inability to recognize themselves in mirrors, I suspect that
the same limitation applies to goldfish, rats, cats, dogs, and most primates.
If self-awareness is what makes it possible to become aware of one’s own existence,
then the ultimate expression of this capacity would be to discover the reasons for that
existence. Once you can become the object of your own attention you can begin to think
about yourself. Organisms which are aware of themselves are in the position, at least in
principle, to begin formulating questions about themselves in relation to historical as
well as future events. I concur with Dawkins [1976] that “intelligent life on a planet
comes of age when it first works out the reason for its own existence.”Clearly,the appeal
of religion, psychology, and more recently, sociobiology is related to the quest for such a
state. But having raised the issue of existence, a logical next step is to contemplate your
eventual nonexistence. In other words, the unique price we pay for self-awareness is the
realization of the inevitability of our own individual demise.

MIND AS A BY-PRODUCT OF SELF-AWARENESS

Now I will turn to the question of mind. Until recently “mindhad been a dirty word in
psychology because as traditionally conceived it was devoid of any empirical status.
Someone once characterized the history of psychology and the rise of behaviorism by
saying that psychology first lost its soul, then it lost its consciousness, and now it seems
to be in danger of losing its mind. So in a sense what I am attempting is a resurrection of
mind in the context of comparative psychology.
First, I will start with some definitions. In my view, mind is represented by the ability
to monitor your own mental states. Using a computer analogy, amind can be thought of
as a subroutine which monitors and modulates particular features of the system at
large, and on that basis makes inferences about similar systems. Thus, if I define self-
 Emergence of Mind 243

awareness as the ability to becomfithe object of your own attention, consciousness as

being aware of your own existence, and mind as the ability to monitor your own mental
states, then it should be evident that these are not mutually exclusive cognitive
categories. But how does one determine if organisms can attend to their own mental
states, and what might be the source and significance of such a capacity?
An attempt to conceptualize mind from a scientific perspective has to translate into a
set of empirical questions, otherwise mind will remain a purely speculative issue rather
than a substantive one. As yet there is no way that I can experience your experience, or
for that matter the experience of any organism other than myself. But, as illustrated in
part by self-recognition, we ought to be able to map the experience of other organisms
through a series of inferences. And, with inferences of an appropriate kind we should be
able to determine if their experience contains an option for monitoring their own mental
states.
I t is important to address this problem in principle and in practice. My initial assump-
tion is that organisms which are aware of themselves are also aware of their own mental
states, in the sense of being able to differentiate between feelings of hunger, anger, fear,
and the like. I t is not unreasonable to further assume that they ought to be able to reflect
on such states, and maybe even simulate such states. In a sense then, evidence of mind
must be evidence of introspection, and it seems to me that organisms which lack the
capacity to become the object of their own attention should be unable to introspect. For
an alternative account of consciousness based on introspection see Humphrey [1980].
This is not to deny the existence of feelings which serve to energize behavior in a large
number of species, but if they lack the ability to monitor such states, I would argue that
they are mindless.
From this perspective the process of operationalizing mind becomes fairly straightfor-
ward. For instance, whether or not an organism is capable of monitoring its own mental
states ought to be related to the exent to which it imputes such states to others. For an
individual with a mind it should be tempting to suppose that mental states also exist in
other individuals. When we see people in situations which are similar to those we have
encountered, we tend to assume that their experience is similar to our own. Thus,
humans not only attribute purpose, intent, and various other mental states to one
another, but there is a primitive and almost irresistible tendency to generalize such
attributions to pets and other animals (e.g., “the dog loves his master,” “the cat is
hungry,”or “the baby monkey is sad and lonely”).Clearly, the tendency to impute mental
states to others presupposes the capacity to monitor such states on the part of the indi-
vidual making such inferences. In a sense, therefore, evidence of anthropomorphism
becomes prima facie evidence of mind.
Not only should mindless species be incapable of “zoomorphizing,”but according to
this analysis, they ought to differ from those with the ability to attend to their own
mental states in a number of ways. For example, there should be less continuity between
mental states in organisms without minds. Not only should mental states be more stim-
ulus-bound, but the transition between different mental states ought to occur more rap-
idly in mindless animals. Macaques, for instance, can vacillate back and forth between
threats and apparent disinterest so abruptly in the presence of humans that there
appears to be little carryover whatsoever. Because of their inability to attribute mental
states to others, mindless species should also fail to exhibit gratitude, grudging,
sympathy, empathy, attribution, intentional deception, and sorrow.
Table I summarizes some of these empirical markers of mind. The strategy here is one
of construct validation. In effect, what I have attempted to do, based on the available
data, is build a nomological net around the construct of mind. Having established such
operational anchor points I ought to be able to cast that net, figuratively speaking,
across an array of biological phenomena and retrieve it to see if it contains any minds.
244 Gallup
TABLE I. Empirical Markers of Mind
Traits Hard-wired analoes Self-aware instances
Attribution Unlearned reactions to Attribution of intenth and
conspecific threat postures responsibilitya:
and predators anthropomorphismd
Deception Mimicry Intentional distortion and/or
withholding of informationg
Reciprocal Altruism Alarm Calls Reciprocal aid giving; selec-
tively withholding aid from
cheaters and s t e a l e r s
Empathy Responses to appeasement Providing solace to injured
gestures and reactions to conspecificsaJ
infant distress calls
Reconciliation Preferential contact between
opponents following an
aggressive encounterf
Pretending Injury feigning; death Certain forms of deceptionc
feigning
aGoodall, 1968.
hHebb, 1979.
CMenzel, 1975.
dPremack & Woodruff, 1978.
eSavage-Rurnbaugh,Rumbaugh & Boysen, 1978.
fde W a d & van Roosrnalen, 1979.
gWoodruff & Premack. 1979.

While each of the traits listed in Table I represents an index of mind, note that I have
listed two instances: hard-wired analogs and examples which entail self-awareness. Only
the latter qualify as evidence of mind because they all require making inferences,
attributions, andlor assumptions about states of mind in other individuals.
As illustrated by the fact that most of the traits listed in Table I have hard-wired
parallels, mind represents a subtle advantage. The presence of mind is not obvious
because we take mind for granted. Because we have minds it is difficult to imagine what
it would be like without a mind. Perhaps the closest approximation to mindlessness in
the literature pertaining to humans is what has been called “blindsight”[see Humphrey,
1980; Weiskrantz et al, 19741. Blindsight is a phenomenon whereby destruction of the
visual cortex produces patients who think they are blind, but if persuaded to guess can
be shown capable of correctly identifying the position of objects in space and even their
form. Such patients, therefore, are still capable of processing certain kinds of visual
information but they are not aware of it. In other words, they are not aware of being
aware and as such approximate the conditions that prevail in species where conscious-
ness lacks a reflective or bidirectional component. These individuals have been rendered
mindless in the visual modality.
The presence or absence of mind is also obscured by the fact that it has been to the dis-
tinct advantage of organisms during evolution to act as if they had minds. Take a baby
duckling’s initial reaction to the silhouette of a hawk. I t is not necessary that the duck
have any insight into the significant danger posed by hawks or their ostensible inten-
tions. The only thing that counts is that they respond appropriately during their first
encounter with a hawk. Indeed, a first encounter would preclude the effective use of
attributions.
 Emergence of Mind 245

Mimicry is another excellent case in point. Various forms of mimicry clearly qualify as
unambiguous instances of deception. But mimicry requires no deliberate intent to
deceive, nor does it presuppose any conscious knowledge about how the target animal is
likely to interpret such misinformation. In fact, mimicry is not only an adaptation
shown by some animals, but it is widely employed by plants for such diverse purposes as
predator evasion and pollination.
As a further illustration of what I mean by a hard-wired instance of mind, Sackett
[1966] has shown that at about 60-75 d of age, infant rhesus monkeys reared in social
isolation begin to show differential reactions to pictures of adult males as a function of
whether or not they are engaged in threat postures. In the absence of ever having had
any experience with adult males there would be no basis upon which to make that dis-
tinction. From an adaptive point of view, however, it is not important that they know,
but only that they act as if they knew something about the apparent intentions of
threatening adult males.

MIND IN CHIMPANZEES AND ORANGUTANS

It is especially important to note that all instances of mind listed in the right-hand
column of Table I have been drawn from research on chimpanzees. Not only is this con-
sistent with the proposition that the emergence of self-awareness is equivalent to the
emergence of mind, but the model is formulated in such a way that it is testable. Organ-
isms failing to show evidence of being able to become the object of their own attention
should likewise fail to evidence anything other than hard-wired analogs to most of the
traits listed in Table I.
The existing evidence on behalf of mind in chimpanzees ranges from the anecdotal to
that based on more rigorous research. Starting with some examples of the former, Hebb
[1979]described an exchange between two adult female chimpanzees housed in adjacent
cages, in which one took a mouthful of water and spit it at the other only to miss com-
pletely. In spite of the fact that the chimpanzee who was spit at suffered no untoward
consequences, she nevertheless reacted by threatening and screaming at her neighbor.
Among several alternatives, this could be interpreted to mean that she was reacting to
the perceived intentions of the other animal. Clearly, she was not responding to the mere
stimulus consequences of the act.
As a result of extensive field observations, Goodall [1968]has described instances of
what might appear to be attribution of responsibility among chimpanzees. For example,
she has found that when two infants are playing together if one is hurt by the other,
rather than reprimanding the aggressor, the mother of the victim will often attack the
offender’s mother. Blame for the incident therefore seems to be placed on the perpetra-
tor’s mother as opposed to the playmate. Similar attributions among humans are like-
wise clearly differentiated on the basis of perceived social maturity.
Premack and Woodruff [1978]have done some ingenious recent research which bears
directly on the question of mind, although they pose the issue in a way that is somewhat
different from the model I have outlined. They concern themselves neither with the
question of self-awareness, precursors to mind, or the issue of species limits. But what
they have shown is that chimpanzees appear to make attributions and inferences about
mental states in humans. For example, if shown the videotape of a person shivering, the
chimpanzee will choose among an array of alternative photographs the one depicting the
person activating a familiar heater. Similarly, if shown a human actor trying to get out of
a locked cage, play an unplugged phonograph, or attempting to wash down a floor with a
hose not attached to the faucet, the chimpanzee will pick photographs which provide
correct solutions to each of these problems.
In another set of studies, Woodruff and Premack [1979]have provided compelling evi-
dence on behalf of the chimpanzee’s capacity to engage in deliberate deception. Using a
246 Gallup

paradigm which involved the exchange of information in human-chimpanzee dyads

about the location of hidden incentives, they found that when the human and chim-
panzee were required to compete rather than cooperate for the goal, chimpanzees would
selectively withhold information or even provide misinformation as a means of mislead-
ing their opponent. They conclude that the ability to provide either accurate or inac-
curate information, depending upon the context and characteristics of the other member
of the pair, constitutes evidence for intentionality.
Under less contrived conditions, Menzel [ 1973, 19751 found that chimpanzees could
convey complex information to one another about the direction, probable location, and
relative desirability or undesirability of different hidden objects that only one chimpan-
zee had seen. Moreover, after brief experience with this kind of problem in a large out-
door enclosure, the uninformed chimpanzees began to extrapolate the location of hidden
food based on the leader’s initial movements and would often run ahead of him in an at-
tempt to gain priority access. In instances of highly prized items, informed chimpanzees
were then observed attempting to ostensibly mislead others by moving initially in direc-
tions unrelated to the location of the incentive. In time, the followers reacted by aban-
doning an extrapolation strategy and reverted to keeping the leader under continuous
surveillance. I t would appear, therefore, that in the absence of formal training chimpan-
zees have a natural language based on inferences they make about mental states among
one another using subtle gestures, postures, and eye movements.
Still another example consistent with the proposition that chimpanzees have minds,
are reactions to injury. In most animals reactions to injured but unrelated adult conspe-
cifics range from complete indifference to attack, Among chickens, if another chicken is
hurt and bleeding it is not uncommon for it to be pecked to death. In the case of chimpan-
zees, however, injury frequently elicits solace and primitive aid-giving behavior
[Goodall, 1968; de Waal & van Roosmalen, 19791. Chimpanzees even show signs of
engaging in reconciliation. Evidence presented by de W a d and van Roosmalen clearly
demonstrates preferential contact among many opponents following an aggressive
encounter.
Thus, it would appear that chimpanzees have entered a cognitive domain which sets
them apart from most other primates. Perhaps the model outlined here explains why,
almost a decade ago, Menzel[1973]concluded that while mentalistic terms do not neces-
sarily explain what chimpanzees do, they often result in accurate predictions and suc-
cinct descriptions of such behavior. If my analysis is correct, orangutans should also
exhibit behaviors consistent with a capacity to attribute mental states to others based
on introspection.

CRITERIA FOR EVIDENCE OF MIND

How does one distinguish between hard-wired analogs and legitimate states of mind?
The problem is further compounded by the fact that, through kin selection, organisms
have been selected to act in ways that maximize their net genetic representation in sub-
sequent generations, and as a consequence (I have argued), organisms have evolved in
many instances to act as if they had minds. However, as a first approximation, evidence
which can be used to disentangle these two alternatives can be brought to bear from at
least three dimensions.
First, to qualify as compelling evidence of mind, apparent instances of attribution or
imputation should involve individuals other than kin. Indeed, with a few exceptions
(such as predator-prey relations), the ideal case would be one in which attributions are
made about individuals of another species. Interspecific instances of mental inference
are, in other words, less likely to be genetically contaminated.
For similar reasons, the more biologically irrelevant the imputed mental state the bet-
ter (e.g., the desire to watch television, as opposed to an apparent “desire”to eat or evade
predation). Moreover, as distinct from self-aware instances, hard-wired analogs of mind
 Emergence of Mind 247

should differ in one other way. If a particular case of apparent attribution is hard-wired,
then it should be pretty much independent of specific experiences (as in the case of
Sackett’s socially isolated rhesus monkeys). As such, hard-wired attribution should pre-
vail in spite of (not because of) specific rearing histories.
By these criteria, Premacks [1978] example of a chimpanzee’s reaction to a human
attempting to play a disconnected phonograph qualifies as a relatively pure instance of
mind. It seems to have involved imputing a mental state to another species, it is clearly
neutral as far as biological dispositions are concerned, and it is predicated on prior experi-
ence with phonographs. In the last analysis, however, a single instance of mind, no
matter how compelling, will not suffice for multiple instances which cut across the cate-
gories listed in Table I. To make a strong case for the presence of mind requires conver-
gent validation.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Having argued that introspection is the basis for mind, it is encumbent upon me before
I finish, to explain why introspection is so shallow it was abandoned by psychologists
long ago as a means of generating a meaningful data base. In a reductionistic sense, self-
awareness must be a by-product of complex, highly organized neurochemical events.
But, as evidenced in part by those who subscribe to a strict operant point of view, the
central nervous system operates in such a way as to be virtually oblivious to its own
existence. I t is only in very recent times that people have come to accept the fact that
the brain (as opposed to the heart, pineal gland, viscera, etc.) is the basis for mental
activity. The reason this realization was so long in coming is that major portions of the
central nervous system and corresponding psychological capacities evolved primarily to
do business with the complexities of the external world. Self-awareness and mind are a
product of selective pressures resulting from one fairly restricted part of that world,
namely intraspecific competition coupled with the need for cooperation. Mind is an
adaptation to dealing with intricate social pressures which arise out of tactics based on
reciprocal altruism, cheating, grudging, and deception. A mind may be a reproductive
advantage in a particular social psychological context, but it does not follow that in and
of itself a mind will guarantee good psychology,
I want to make two additional points. The first concerns language. From this perspec-
tive language can be thought of as nothing more than a vehicle for sharing (and perhaps
influencing) states of mind. The significance of language based on symbolic communica-
tion can be best illustrated by drawing a distinction between informational states of
mind and emotional states of mind. Emotional states of mind can be communicated
fairly effectively by nonverbal cues, whereas this is not true of informational states of
mind. The latter are based on representations involving numerical, spatial, andlor tem-
poral relations. Therefore, I would argue that the primary difference between human
and chimpanzee minds is in terms of their informational content. Humans can be charac-
terized by having much more highly organized informational states of mind.
Finally, if my theory of mind is correct it would mean that the famous quote from
Descartes, ”I think, therefore I am,” would have to be revised to read “I am, therefore I
think.”

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author thanks J. Bennett, R. Puccetti, J.C. Mancuso, S.D. Suarez, J.M. Suls, and
L.B. Wallnau for criticism and comment on an earlier version of this paper, and N.K.
Humphrey, who unwittingly provided some provocative ideas which prompted, in part,
the present formulation.
Portions of this paper were presented at the XVIIth International Ethological Con-
ference, Oxford, England, September 1981.
248 Gallup
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