NOTES:

ARTICLE 2

 Tanada vs. Tuvera (24 April 1985)

 Tanada vs. Tuvera (29 December 1986)
 De Roy vs. Court of Appeals (29 January 1988)
o There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court Decisions in
the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their
becoming effective.
o It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep
abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have
been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance
reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as
the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
 Basa vs. Mercado
o The record shows that Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation
in view of the fact that it is published for the dissemination of local news
and general information; that it has a bona fide subscription list of paying
subscribers; that it is published at regular intervals and that the trial court
ordered the publication to be made in Ing Katipunan precisely because it
was a "newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Pampanga."
o Furthermore no attempt has been made to prove that it was a newspaper
devoted to the interests or published for the entertainment of a particular
class, profession, trade, calling, race or religious denomination. The fact
that there is another paper published in Pampanga that has a few more
subscribers (72 to be exact) and that certain Manila dailies also have a
larger circulation in that province is unimportant. The law does not require
that publication of the notice, referred to in the Code of Civil Procedure,
should be made in the newspaper with the largest numbers is necessary
to constitute a newspaper of general circulation.
 Farinas vs. Executive Secretary
o Finally, the Effectivity clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which
provides that it shall take effect immediately upon its approval, is
defective. However, the same does not render the entire law
invalid. In Taada v. Tuvera, this Court laid down the rule:
... the clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which
cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislator may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or
on any other date without its previous publication.
 Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may
in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-period shall be
shortened or extended.
Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated
in Tanada, Rep. Act No. 9006, notwithstanding its express
statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official
Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation.

ARTICLE 4

 Carolino vs. Senga

o Firstly, PD No. 1638 was signed by then President Ferdinand Marcos on
September 10, 1979. Under Article 4 of the Civil Code, it is provided that
laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. It is
said that the law looks to the future only and has no retroactive effect
unless the legislator may have formally given that effect to some legal
provisions;17 that all statutes are to be construed as having only
prospective operation, unless the purpose and intention of the legislature
to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily
implied from the language used; and that every case of doubt must be
resolved against retrospective effect.18 These principles also apply to
amendments of statutes.
PD No. 1638 does not contain any provision regarding its retroactive
application, nor the same may be implied from its language. In fact,
Section 36 of PD No. 1638 clearly provides that the decree shall take
effect upon its approval. As held in Parreno v. COA,19 there is no question
that PD No. 1638, as amended, applies prospectively. Since PD No. 1638,
as amended, is about the new system of retirement and separation from
service of military personnel, it should apply to those who were in the
service at the time of its approval.20 Conversely, PD No. 1638 is not
applicable to those who retired before its effectivity in 1979. The rule is
familiar that after an act is amended, the original act continues to be in
force with regard to all rights that had accrued prior to such
amendment.21
Moreover, Section 27 of PD No. 1638 specifically provides for the retirees
to whom the law shall be applied, to wit:

Section 27. Military personnel retired under Sections 4, 5, 10, 11

and 12 shall be carried in the retired list of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. The name of a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship
 shall be removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits
terminated upon such loss, (emphasis supplied)
Notably, petitioner's husband did not retire under those above-enumerated
Sections of PD No. 1638 as he retired under RA No. 340.
o Secondly, it has been held that before a right to retirement benefits or
pension vests in an employee, he must have met the stated conditions of
eligibility with respect to the nature of employment, age, and length of
service.22 Undeniably, petitioner's husband had complied with the
conditions of eligibility to retirement benefits as he was then receiving his
retirement benefits on a monthly basis until it was terminated. Where the
employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a
vested right to the benefits that is protected by the due process
clause.23 It is only upon retirement that military personnel acquire a
vested right to retirement benefits.24 Retirees enjoy a protected property
interest whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-
existing law.25
In Ayog v. Cusi,26 we expounded the nature of a vested right, thus:
"A right is vested when the right to enjoyment has become the property of
some particular person or persons as a present interest" (16 C.J.S. 1173).
It is "the privilege to enjoy property legally vested, to enforce contracts,
and enjoy the rights of property conferred by the existing law" (12 C.J.S.
955, Note 46, No. 6) or "some right or interest in property which has
become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or
controversy" (Downs vs. Blount 170 Fed. 15, 20, cited in Balboa vs.
Farrales, 51 Phil. 498, 502).
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. "A state
may not impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or
by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the
constitution of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police
power" (16 C.J.S. 1177-78).
It has been observed that, generally, the term "vested right" expresses the
concept of present fixed interest, which in right reason and natural justice
should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and
imperative right which an enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent
and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny (16 C.J.S. 1174, Note 71,
No. 5, citing Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. vs. Rosenthal, 192 Atl.
2nd 587).27
Petitioner's husband acquired vested right to the payment of his retirement
benefits which must be respected and cannot be affected by the
subsequent enactment of PD No. 1638 which provides that loss of Filipino
citizenship terminates retirement benefits. Vested rights include not only
 legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an
exemption from new obligations after the right has vested.28
In fact, Sections 33 and 35 of PD No. 1638 recognize such vested right, to
wit:
 Section 33. Nothing in this Decree shall be construed in any
manner to reduce whatever retirement and separation pay or
gratuity or other monetary benefits which any person is heretofore
receiving or is entitled to receive under the provisions of existing
law.
 Section. 35. Except those necessary to give effect to the provisions
of this Decree and to preserve the rights granted to retired or
separated military personnel, all laws, rules and regulations
inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree are hereby repealed
or modified accordingly.
Section 33 of PD No. 1638 is clear that the law has no intention to reduce
or to revoke whatever retirement benefits being enjoyed by a retiree at the
time of its passage. Hence, Section 35 provides for an exception to what
the decree repealed or modified, i.e., except those necessary to preserve
the rights granted to retired or separated military personnel.

 Atienza v. Brillantes - Exception: Procedural Rules - no vested rights accrue

o Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity
of a previous marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second
marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides:
 The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code
does not apply to him considering that his first marriage took place in 1965
and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second
marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of
the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first
marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is
given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is
particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent
has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of
Article 40 to his case.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights
may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The
retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a
 person who may feel that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of
Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that as a general rule no
vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v.
Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).
 Quiao v. Quiao - Vested Rights, defined
o Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the
respondent's marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the
same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is
Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family
Code. The latter provision is applicable because according to Article 256
of the Family Code "[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it
does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with
the Civil Code or other law."58
o Now, the petitioner asks: Was his vested right over half of the common
properties of the conjugal partnership violated when the trial court forfeited
them in favor of his children pursuant to Articles 63(2) and 129 of the
Family Code?
o We respond in the negative.
o Indeed, the petitioner claims that his vested rights have been impaired,
arguing: "As earlier adverted to, the petitioner acquired vested rights over
half of the conjugal properties, the same being owned in common by the
spouses. If the provisions of the Family Code are to be given retroactive
application to the point of authorizing the forfeiture of the petitioner's share
in the net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties, the same
impairs his rights acquired prior to the effectivity of the Family Code."59 In
other words, the petitioner is saying that since the property relations
between the spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership
of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over
half of the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to
Article 143 of the Civil Code, which provides: "All property of the conjugal
partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and
wife."60 Thus, since he is one of the owners of the properties covered by
the conjugal partnership of gains, he has a vested right over half of the
said properties, even after the promulgation of the Family Code; and he
insisted that no provision under the Family Code may deprive him of this
vested right by virtue of Article 256 of the Family Code which prohibits
retroactive application of the Family Code when it will prejudice a person's
vested right.
o However, the petitioner's claim of vested right is not one which is written
on stone. In Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,61 we define and explained
"vested right" in the following manner:
 A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do not
depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder, or to the
exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and
perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. The term
"vested right" expresses the concept of present fixed interest which,
in right reason and natural justice, should be protected against
arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative right which
enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable
individual rights, cannot deny.
 To be vested, a right must have become a title—legal or equitable
—to the present or future enjoyment of property.62 (Citations
omitted)
o In our en banc Resolution dated October 18, 2005 for ABAKADA Guro
Party List Officer Samson S. Alcantara, et al. v. The Hon. Executive
Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita,63 we also explained:]
 The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional
guaranty of due process that expresses a present fixed interest
which in right reason and natural justice is protected against
arbitrary state action; it includes not only legal or equitable title to
the enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new
obligations created after the right has become vested. Rights are
considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest,
absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed and
irrefutable.64 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
o From the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not be deprived of his
"vested right," he may lose the same if there is due process and such
deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.
o In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due
process. First, he was well-aware that the respondent prayed in her
complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her.65 In fact,
in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the
community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as
circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of
all the community properties of the parties.66 Second, when the Decision
dated October 10, 2005 was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned
the trial court's ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as "net profits,"
pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code.67 Thus, the petitioner
cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process.
o Furthermore, we take note that the alleged deprivation of the petitioner's
"vested right" is one founded, not only in the provisions of the Family
Code, but in Article 176 of the Civil Code. This provision is like Articles 63
and 129 of the Family Code on the forfeiture of the guilty spouse's share in
the conjugal partnership profits. The said provision says:
 Art. 176. In case of legal separation, the guilty spouse shall forfeit
his or her share of the conjugal partnership profits, which shall be
awarded to the children of both, and the children of the guilty
spouse had by a prior marriage. However, if the conjugal
partnership property came mostly or entirely from the work or
industry, or from the wages and salaries, or from the fruits of the
separate property of the guilty spouse, this forfeiture shall not apply.
 In case there are no children, the innocent spouse shall be entitled
to all the net profits.
o From the foregoing, the petitioner's claim of a vested right has no basis
considering that even under Article 176 of the Civil Code, his share of the
conjugal partnership profits may be forfeited if he is the guilty party in a
legal separation case. Thus, after trial and after the petitioner was given
the chance to present his evidence, the petitioner's vested right claim may
in fact be set aside under the Civil Code since the trial court found him the
guilty party.
o More, in Abalos v. Dr. Macatangay, Jr.,68 we reiterated our long-standing
ruling that:
 [P]rior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of
each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy,
which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does
not ripen into title until it appears that there are assets in the
community as a result of the liquidation and settlement. The interest
of each spouse is limited to the net remainder or "remanente
liquido" (haber ganancial) resulting from the liquidation of the affairs
of the partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the right of the
husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest
until the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or
after dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally determined that,
after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left
which can be divided between the spouses or their respective
heirs.69 (Citations omitted)
o Finally, as earlier discussed, the trial court has already decided in its
Decision dated October 10, 2005 that the applicable law in this case is
Article 129(7) of the Family Code.70 The petitioner did not file a motion for
reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. Thus, the petitioner is now
 precluded from questioning the trial court's decision since it has become
final and executory. The doctrine of immutability and unalterability of a final
judgment prevents us from disturbing the Decision dated October 10,
2005 because final and executory decisions can no longer be reviewed
nor reversed by this Court.71
o From the above discussions, Article 129 of the Family Code clearly applies
to the present case since the parties' property relation is governed by the
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains and since
the trial court's Decision has attained finality and immutability.
 People v. Francisca Talaro, et. al.
o On June 30, 2006, Republic Act No. 9346 (R.A. 9346), entitled An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, took effect.
Pertinent provisions thereof provide as follows:
 Section 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby
prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One
Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the
Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection is hereby
repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-
Nine (R.A. No. 7659) otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law
and all other laws, executive orders and decrees insofar as they
impose thedeath penalty are hereby repealed or amended
accordingly.
 Section 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be
imposed:
 (a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated
makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the
Revised Penal Code; or
xxxx
 SECTION 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion
perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion
perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under
Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, as amended.
o It has also been held in People vs. Quiachon that R.A. No. 9346 has
retroactive effect, to wit:
 The aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 9346 is applicable in this
case pursuant to the principle in criminal law, favorabilia sunt
amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to
accused are given retroactive effect. This principle is embodied
under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides as
follows:
  Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a
felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined
in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of
the publication of such laws, a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
o However, appellant is not eligible for parole because Section 3 of R.A. No.
9346 provides that persons convicted of offenses pushed with reclusion
perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by
reason of the law, shall not be eligible for parole.
o Hence, in accordance with the foregoing, appellant should only be
sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.

ARTICLE 6

 Famanila v. Court of Appeals

o A vitiated consent does not make a contract void and unenforceable. A
vitiated consent only gives rise to a voidable agreement. Under the Civil
Code, the vices of consent are mistake, violence, intimidation, undue
influence or fraud. 16 If consent is given through any of the
aforementioned vices of consent, the contract is voidable. 17 A voidable
contract is binding unless annulled by a proper action in court. 18
o Petitioner contends that his permanent and total disability vitiated his
consent to the Receipt and Release thereby rendering it void and
unenforceable. However, disability is not among the factors that may
vitiate consent. Besides, save for petitioner’s self-serving allegations,
there is no proof on record that his consent was vitiated on account of his
disability. In the absence of such proof of vitiated consent, the validity of
the Receipt and Release must be upheld. We agree with the findings of
the Court of Appeals that:
o In the case at bar, there is nothing in the records to show that petitioner’s
consent was vitiated when he signed the agreement. Granting that
petitioner has not fully recovered his health at the time he signed the
subject document, the same cannot still lead to the conclusion that he did
not voluntar[il]y accept the agreement, for his wife and another relative
witnessed his signing.
o Moreover, the document entitled receipt and release which was attached
by petitioner in his appeal does not show on its face any violation of law or
public policy. In fact, petitioner did not present any proof to show that the
consideration for the same is not reasonable and acceptable. Absent any
evidence to support the same, the Court cannot, on its own accord, decide
against the unreasonableness of the consideration. 19
 o It is true that quitclaims and waivers are oftentimes frowned upon and are
considered as ineffective in barring recovery for the full measure of the
worker’s right and that acceptance of the benefits therefrom does not
amount to estoppel. 20 The reason is plain. Employer and employee,
obviously do not stand on the same footing. 21 However, not all waivers
and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was
voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is
binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of
change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was
wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of the
settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul
the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person making
the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing,
and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the
transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking, 22 as
in this case.
o To be valid and effective, waivers must be couched in clear and
unequivocal terms, leaving no doubt as to the intention of those giving up
a right or a benefit that legally pertains to them. 23 We have reviewed the
terms and conditions contained in the Receipt and Release and we find
the same to be clear and unambiguous.
 Guy vs. Court of Appeals
o As regards Remedios' Release and Waiver of Claim, the same does not
bar private respondents from claiming successional rights. To be valid and
effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which
leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit
which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person
when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a
right.14
o In this case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The
Release and Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity the purpose of its
execution. It merely states that Remedios received P300,000.00 and an
educational plan for her minor daughters "by way of financial assistance
and in full settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind x
x x against the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim."15 Considering that
the document did not specifically mention private respondents' hereditary
share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of
successional rights.

ARTICLE 8
  PLDT vs. Alvarez
o With the Court En Banc�s reversal of the earlier Laurel ruling, then the
CA�s quashal of these warrants would have no leg to stand on. This is
the dire consequence of failing to appreciate the full import of the doctrine
of stare decisis that the CA ignored.
o Under Article 8 of the Civil Code, the decisions of this Court form part of
the country�s legal system. While these decisions are not laws pursuant
to the doctrine of separation of powers, they evidence the laws' meaning,
breadth, and scope and, therefore, have the same binding force as the
laws themselves.57 Hence, the Court�s interpretation of a statute forms
part of the law as of the date it was originally passed because the
Court�s construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent that the interpreted law carries into effect.5
o Article 8 of the Civil Code embodies the basic principle of stare decisis et
non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle
established matters) that enjoins adherence to judicial precedents
embodied in the decision of the Supreme Court. That decision becomes a
judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the
land. The doctrine of stare decisis, in turn, is based on the principle that
once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be
deemed settled and closed to further argument.59 The doctrine of
(horizontal) stare decisis is one of policy, grounded on the necessity of
securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions.60
o In the field of adjudication, a case cannot yet acquire the status of a
�decided� case that is �deemed settled and closed to further
argument� if the Court�s decision is still the subject of a motion for
reconsideration seasonably filed by the moving party. Under the Rules of
Court, a party is expressly allowed to file a motion for reconsideration of
the Court�s decision within 15 days from notice.61 Since the doctrine of
stare decisis is founded on the necessity of securing certainty and stability
in law, then these attributes will spring only once the Court �s ruling has
lapsed to finality in accordance with law. In Ting v. Velez�Ting,62 we
ruled that:
o The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to
doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on
the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided,
it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.

ARTICLE 15

 Garcia-Recio vs. Recio - Guidelines for pleading and proving foreign divorce
 o Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or
document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country
by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by
the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
 Republic vs. Orbecido III
o Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on,
one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?
o The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when
they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954
and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way
of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse
is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
o Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule
of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to
include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino
spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule
otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the
interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would
lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may
therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms,
so long as they come within its spirit or intent.
o If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse,
then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
o In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
 There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
  A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry.
o The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce
is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
o In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen,
there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and
Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently
obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin
requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present
in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be
allowed to remarry.