27. Manuel Barredo vs Court of Appeals, GR No.

L-17863, November 28, 1962, digested

(Special Proceedings – Claims against estate; Rule 86, Sec. 2: Statute of Non-Claims)

Facts: On 23 and 30 August and 6 September 1945, a notice to creditors requiring them their claims with the
clerk of court previously fixed within 6 months reckoned from the date of its first publication and expiring
February 23, 1946, was published by the administrator of the intestate estate of Charles McDonough.

On 22 October 1947, the heirs of Fausto Barredo filed their belated claim to collect the face value of a
promissory note for P20,000.00 plus interest and attorney’s fees against the said estate. The promissory note
was secured by a mortgage in favor of Fausto Barredo over the leasehold rights of McDnough The original
lease, the extension of its term, and the mortgage were all annotated at the back of the certificate of title of
the land. A deed of extrajudicial partition of the secured credit was also made by the heirs and was
annotated at the back of the aforesaid title.

The claim was opposed by the administrator. The lower court allowed it after hearing, but was reversed by
the Court of Appeals.

In the case at bar, petitioner contends that the one month period referred to in Section 2 of Rule 87 of Rules
of Court is to be counted from and after the expiration of the 6 month period fixed in the published notice to
claims. The respondent administrator argues that the one-month period for filing late claims should be
counted from the expiration of the regular 6-month period.

Section 2, Rule 87 provides:

SEC. 2. Time within which claims shall be filed. — In the notice provided in section 1, the court shall state the
time for the filing of claims against the estate, which shall not be more than twelve nor less than six months
after the date of the first publication of the notice. However, at any time before an order of distribution is
entered, on application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim within the time previously limited, the
court may, for cause shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be filed within a time not
exceeding one month.

Issue: WON the tardy claim will be allowed.

Held: No. The claim was filed outside of the period previously fixed with an insufficient cause. A tardy claim
may be allowed, at the discretion of the court, upon showing of cause for failure to present said claim on
time.

The one-month period specified in this section is the time granted claimants, and the same is to begin from
the order authorizing the filing of the claims. It does not mean that the extension of one month starts from
the expiration of the original period fixed by the court for the presentation of claims. (Paulin vs. Aquino, L-
11267, March 20, 1958)

However, the probate court’s discretion in allowing a claim after the regular period for filing claims
but before entry of an order of distribution presupposes not only claim for apparent merit but also that
cause existed to justify the tardiness in filing the claim. Here, petitioners alleged as excuse for their tardiness
the recent recovery of the papers of the late Fausto Barredo from the possession of his lawyer who is now
deceased. This ground insufficient, due to the availability, and knowledge by the petitioners, of the
annotation at the back of the certificate of title of the mortgage embodying the instant claim, (as well as the
payment of P20,000.00 made by the Japanese military authorities.)
The order of the trial court allowing the late claim without justification, because under Section 2, Rule 8 of
the Rules of Court, said court has no authority to admit a belated claim for no cause or for an insufficient
cause.

28. Sikat vs. Villanueva

Facts:
Petitioner Sikat, as judicial administrator of the intestate estate of Mariano P. Villanueva,filed
a complaint against QuiteriaVda. de Villanueva, as judicial administratrix of the intestate estate of
Pedro Villanueva, praying that the decision of the committee on claims and appraisal in the
intestate proceedings of the aforesaid Pedro Villanueva with regard to the credit of the late Mariano
P. Villanueva be confirmed by the court, and the defendant as judicial administratrix, be ordered to
pay the plaintiff the amount of P10,192.92, with legal interest from July 15, 1919 until fully paid,
and the costs.
In answer to the complaint, the defendant denied each and every allegation thereof, and set
up a special defense of prescription, and a counterclaim for P15,536.69 which she alleges the estate
of Mariano P. Villanueva owes to the estate of Pedro Villanueva; and she prayed for judgment
absolving her from the complaint and sentencing the plaintiff to pay her said amount with interest
and costs.
The lower court ruled against petitioner. Hence, the present appeal.
Issue:
WON the trial court erred in holding that the aforesaid claim of Mariano P. Villanueva's
estate against Pedro Villanueva estate has already prescribed.
Held:
No. the SC ruled that taking into account the spirit of the law upon the settlement and
partition of estates, and the fact that the administration of Mariano P. Villanueva's estate had
knowledge of Pedro Villanueva's death, and instituted the intestate proceedings for the settlement
of the latter's estate in the Court of First Instance of Albay and filed Mariano P. Villanueva's claim
against it, which was not allowed because this court held those proceedings void for lack of
jurisdiction, the estate of Mariano P. Villanueva was guilty of laches in not instituting the same
proceedings in the competent court, the Court of First Instance of Manila, until after three years had
elapsed, and applying the provisions of section 49 of the Code of Civil Procedure by analogy, we
declare the claim of Mariano P. Villanueva to have prescribed. To hold otherwise would be to permit
a creditor having knowledge of his debtor's death to keep the latter's estate in suspense indefinitely,
by not instituting either testate or intestate proceedings in order to present his claim, to the
prejudice of the heirs and legatees. Even in the case of the summary settlement of an estate under
section 598, as amended by Act No. 2331, the Code of Civil Procedure limits the time within which a
creditor may file his claim to two years after the settlement and distribution of the estate.

29. IN RE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESTATE OF PASCUAL VILLANUEVA. MAURICIA G. DE

VILLANUEVA,petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
This is a case certified by the Court of Appeals on the ground that the issues involved are purely of
law.
  The widow Mauricia G. Villanueva, on December 19, 1949, petitioned the Court of First
Instance of Agusan, for letters of Administration (Sp. Proc. No. 67). The petition was set for
hearing and Notice thereof was published on February 25, March 4, and 11, 1950, in the
Manila Daily Bulletin.
 At the hearing, other heirs while agreeing to the placing of estate under administration,
opposed the appointment the widow. The name of Atty. Teodulo R. Ricaforte, suggested and
all the parties agreed.
 After the taking the required oath, Atty. Ricaforte entered upon the performance of his
duties. Under date of November 9, 1950 the Clerk of the Agusan CFI, issued the Notice to
Creditors through Morning times of City on November 16, 23 and 30, 1950 which expired on
November 16, 1961.
 On July 20, 1953 Philippine National Bank (PNB) filed in the administration proceedings,
Creditor’s Claim in the amount of P 1,347.45 (including interest) which such obligation was
due and demandable since December 20, 1940.
 On October 12, 1954, the PNB filed a Motion for Admission of Claim.
 On November 5, 1954, Atty. Ricaforte opposed the alleging that he had no knowledge or
information insufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations therein.
 The appellant PNB, on November 14, 1958, more than four (4) Years after the opposition of
the claim presented by the administrator, filed a pleading captioned "Petition for an
Extension of time within which to File the Claim of Philippine National Bank", alleging,
among others, that Sec. 2, Rule 87 of the Rules, allows the filing of claims even if the period
stated in the notice to creditors elapsed, upon cause shown and on such terms as equitable;
that its failure to present the claiming with the period stated in the notice, was its lack of
knowledge of administration proceedings, for while said maintains a branch office in Agusan,
the employees did not come to know of the proceedings, the notice has been published in
the Morning Times, a newspaper very limited circulation.
 Appellant Bank moved to reconsider the above Order, arguing that the statute of limitations
had been suspended by the Moratorium Law, and that the courts can extend the period
limited in the notice, under special circumstances, and on grounds of equity.
 The Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merits.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Moratorium Law had suspended the prescriptive period for filing the
claim under consideration.
HELD:
The important issue presented is whether or not the in question is already barred.
Admittedly, the claim was filed outside of the period provided for in the Order of the lower
court, within which to present claims against the estate. The period fixed in the notice
lapsed on November 16, 1951 and the claim was filed on July 20, 1953 or about 1 year and 8
months late.
The lower did not find any justifiable reason to give the extension and for one thing, there
was no period to extend, the same had elapsed.
WHEREFORE, the order subject of the appeal is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant
Philippine National Bank, in both instances.

30. BELAMALA VS POLINAR

Facts:
 This is an appeal from judgment of the Court of First Instance allowing a money claim of appellee
Belamala against the estate of the deceased Mauricio Polinar, for damages caused to the claimant.
The claimant Buenaventura Belamala is the same offended party in Criminal Case against the same
Mauricio Polinar for Frustrated Murder; COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BOHOL rendered a decision
thereof, convicting the said Mauricio Polinar of the crime of serious physical injuries and sentenced
him to pay to the offended party Buenaventura Belamala.
The accused (the late Mauricio Polinar) appealed, however, while the appeal of said Mauricio
Polinar was pending before the Court of Appeals, he died; and no Notice or Notification of his death
has ever been filed in the said Court of Appeals. The CA then affirmed the decision of the CFI. The
appellant contended that the claim should have been prosecuted by separate action against the
administrator, and not to be enforced by filing a claim against the estate.
Issue:
W/N the appellant Polinar’s contention is correct.
Held:
Yes. The appellant, however, is correct in the contention that the claim should have been
prosecuted by separate action against the administrator, as permitted by sections 1 and 2 of Revised
Rule 87, since the claim is patently one "to recover damages for an injury to person or property"
(Rule87, sec. 1). Belamala's action cannot be enforced by filing a claim against the estate under Rule
86,because section 5 of that rule explicitly limits the claims to those for funeral expenses,
expenses for last sickness, judgments for money and "claims against the decedent, arising from
contract, express or implied;" and this last category (the other three being inapposite) includes only
"all purely personal obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort" (Leung
Ben vs. O'Brien, 38 Phil.182, 189-194) and Belamala's damages manifestly have a tortious
origin.Hajan/Saldon

31. Stronghold Insurance Company Inc. vs. Republic Asahi Corp.

GR No. 147561 22 June 2006

Facts:
Republic Asahi Glass Corp. (RAG) contracts with Jose D. Santos Jr. Construction (JDS) for the
construction of roadways and drainage systems in RAG's compound. JDS does so and files the
required compliance bond with Stronghold Insurance Inc. (SII) acting as surety. The contract is 5.3
million pesos while the bond is 795 thousand pesos.

However, JDS falls woefully behind schedule, prompting RAG to rescind the contract and demand
the compliance bond. The owner of JDS dies and JDS Construction disappears. SII refuses to pay the
bond claiming that the death of JDS owner extinguishes the obligation.

Issue:
Whether or not the death of the debtor extinguishes the compliance bond or money claims of RAG
from SII

Held:
No. Sec. 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the prosecution of money claims arising
from the contract against the estate of a deceased debtor. Evidently, those claims are not actually
extinguished.
What is extinguish is only the obligee's action or suit filed before the court which is not then acting
as a probate court. Whatever monetary liabilities or obligations JDS had under his contracts with
respondent were not intransmissible by their nature, by stipulation or by provision of law.
Furthermore, the liability of petitioner is contractial in nature, because it excuted a performance
bond, as a surety, petitioner is solidarily liable with Santos in accordance with the Civil Code.

32. Gabriel v. Bilon GR 146989, june 2006

Bilon, Brazil and Pagaygay are jeepney drivers driving jeepneys owned by Melencio Gabriel. They are
paying P400/day for their boundary. Later, the drivers were required to pay an additional P50.00 to
cover police protection, car wash, deposit fee, and garage fees.

The three drivers refused to pay the additional P50.00. On April 30, 1995, when the drivers reported
to work, they were not given any jeepney to drive. Eventually, they were dismissed. The three
drivers sued Gabriel for illegal dismissal.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the drivers and ordered Gabriel to pay the drivers their
backwages and their separation pay amounting to about a total of P1.03M.

On April 18, 1997, the LA promulgated its decision and on the same day sent a copy thereof to
Gabriel but Flordeliza (wife of Gabriel) refused to receive the copy. Apparently, Gabriel died on April
4, 1997. The copy was resent via registered mail on May 28, 1997. Flordeliza appealed to the LA on
June 5, 1997.

The LA dismissed the appeal; it ruled that the appeal was not on time because the promulgation
was made on April 18, 1997 and that the appeal on June 5, 1997 was already beyond the ten day
period required for appeal.

The National Labor Relations Commission reversed the LA. It ruled that there was no employee-
employer relationship between the drivers and Gabriel. The Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC but
it ruled that the separation pay should not be awarded but rather, the employees should be
reinstated.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal before the LA was made on time. Whether or not there was an
employer-employee relationship between the drivers and Gabriel. Whether or not there was a
strained relation between Gabriel and the drivers.

HELD: The appeal was made on time because when the promulgation was made Gabriel is already
dead. The ten day requirement to make an appeal is not applicable in this situation because Gabriel
was not yet properly substituted by the wife. The counting of the period should be made starting
from the date when the copy was sent via registered mail. Therefore, the appeal filed on June 5 was
made on time.

There exists an employer-employee relationship between the drivers and Gabriel. The fact that the
drivers do not receive fixed wages but get only that in excess of the so-called “boundary” [that] they
pay to the owner/operator is not sufficient to withdraw the relationship between them from that of
employer and employee.

The award of the separation pay is not proper. It was not shown that there was a strained
relationship between Gabriel and the drivers so as to cause animosity if they are reinstated. The
Strained Relations Principle is only applied if it is shown that reinstatement would only cause
antagonism between the employer and the employee; and that the only solution is separation and
the payment of separation pay.

33. Union Bank of the Philippines vs. Santibañez

G.R. No. 149926
Feb. 23, 2005
Facts:
The First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M. Santibañez (Efraim), father of
herein respondents, entered into a loan agreement in the amount of P128,000.00 on May 31, 1980.
The amount was intended for the payment of the purchase price of one unit Ford 6600 Agricultural
All-Purpose Diesel Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and Edmund executed a promissory note in favor
of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in 5 equal amortizations of P43,745.95 due on May 31, 1981
and every May 31st thereafter up to May 31, 1985.

On Dec. 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement of P123,156.00,
this time, Efraim and Edmund executed a promissory note plus a Continuing Guaranty Agreement
for this loan. The amount was now intended to pay the balance of the purchase price of another
unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and one unit Howard
Rotamotor Model AR 60K.

Sometime in February1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Subsequently in March

1981, testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo. On April 9,1981, Edmund, as one of
the heirs, was appointed as the special administrator of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs,
who are the respondents in this case, executed a Joint Agreement dated July 22, 1981, wherein they
agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the 3 tractors; that is, 2 tractors for
Edmund and 1 for Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to
FCCC corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them.

On Aug. 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and
between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor, among
others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to Uinion Savings and Mortgage Bank.

Demand letters for the settlement of his account were sent by herein petitioner bank to
Edmund but the latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay. Thereafter, on Feb. 5, 1988, the
petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim, the respondents herein,
before the RTC of Makati City. Summonses were issued against both, but one intended for Edmund
was not served since he was in the US and there was no information on his address or the date of
his return to the Philippines. Thus, the complaint was narrowed down to respondent Florence S.
Ariola (Florence).
 On Dec. 7, 1988, Florence filed her answer and alleged that the loan documents did not bind
her as she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her
brother was not approved by the probate court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable
under the same. RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit saying that the claim should have
been filed with the probate court before which the estate of the late Efraim was pending, as the
sum of money being claimed was an obligation incurred but the said decedent. The trial court also
found that the joint agreement was in effect a partition of the estate of the decedent; however, it
was void because it had not been approved by the probate court and there can be no valid partition
until after the will has been probated. It was further declared that petitioner failed to prove that it is
now the defunct Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC had assigned its assets and
liabilities.

The petitioner appealed before the CA asserting that the obligation of the deceased had
passed to his legitimate children and heirs; the unconditional signing of the joint agreement, it was
no longer necessary to present the same before the probate court for approval. On the other hand,
respondent Florence maintained that the money claim of the petitioner should have been
presented before the probate court.

The appellate court found the appeal was not meritorious holding that it should have been
filed before the probate court as provided under Sec. 1, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. It further held
that the partition was null and void, since no valid partition may be had after the will has been
probated. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the claim should have been filed before the probate court in accordance
with Sec. 1, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court

Held:
SC held in the affirmative citing the vintage case of PyEng Chong vs. Herrera, “..This
requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor
or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine
whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the
speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the
distributes, legatees, or heirs. The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of
the claims against the decedent’s estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as
possible, pay off it debts and distribute the residue. ”

The Court further held that the petitioner failed to prove that it is now the defunct Union
Savings and Mortgage Bank, thus, the petitioner’s personality to file the complaint is wanting, it
failed to establish its cause of action, quoting the case Republic vs. CA, 107 SCRA 504. Petition was
denied and CA decision was affirmed.

34.AlanSheker vs Estate of Alice Sheker

GR. No. 155733, Jan 27, 2006
Topic: Statute of non-claims

Facts:
The will of Alice Sheker was admitted by the court and thereafter all creditors were ordered
to file their respective claims against the estate. On Oct. 7, 2002, a contingent claim for agent's
commission in the total amount of P481,250.00 was filed by petitioner.
However, the executrix of the estate moved for the dismissal of the money claim on the
ground that no docket fee was paid, no certification for non-forum shopping was attached, and no
written explanation was made as to why there was no personal service of the claim. The court
thereon dismissed the claim.

Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in dismissing the money claim for failure to pay the docket
fee, attach a cert. of non-forum shoping, and make a personal service.

Ruling:
The court erred in strictly applying Sec. 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court because such calls
also for practicabiliy for it to apply other than the absence of special provisions.
The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory
pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent is
an initiatory pleading.
On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of Appeals, that the trial court
has jurisdiction to act on a money claim (attorney's fees) against an estate for services rendered by
a lawyer to the administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate even without
payment of separate docket fees because the filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may order the payment of
such filing fees within a reasonable time.
On the issue of personal service, as in Musa v. Amor, a written explanation why service was
not done personally “might have been superfluous" because the distance from the petitioner's
residence and the respondent court is very far.

Petition granted.

35. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
FATCS:
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y
Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision
penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4,
1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy
secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its
Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the
Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission
of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant
did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor
General, relying on the case ofPeople v. Sendaydiego 1 insists that the appeal should still be resolved
for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor
General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal
extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked the
ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil obligation
in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if
accused should die before final judgment is rendered.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil
liability.
HELD:
Yes.
Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the
death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in sensostrictiore."
Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the
same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil
Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result
of the same act or omission:
a) Law 20
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1,
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be
enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the
source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate
civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to
its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case,
the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the
criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21 of the Civil Code, that should thereby
avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. 22
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas
extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e.,
rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
36. HILADO v CA (2009)

FACTS:
Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was survived by his wife, private
respondent Julita Campos Benedicto (AdministratrixBenedicto), and his only daughter, Francisco
Benedicto-Paulino. At the time of his death, two (2) civil case were pending against Benedicto
involving petitioner.
AdministratrixBenedicto, then submitted an Inventory of the Estate, List of Personal and Real
Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband, which included as among the
liabilities. Thereafter, the Manila RTC required private respondent to submit a complete and
updated inventory and appraisal report pertaining to the estate.
On September 24, 2001, petitioner filed with the Manila RTC: (1) Manifestation/Motion Ex
AbundantiCautela, praying that they be furnished with copies of all processs and orders pertaining
to the intestate proceedings; (2) Omnibus motion praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline for the
submission by private respondent of the required inventory of the decedent’s estate; and (3)
pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of private respondent in her
administration of the estate, and assailing the inventory that had been submitted thus far as
unverified, incomplete and inaccurate.

37. Nacar v NistalGR L-3306, December 8, 1982

Facts:
Nacar filed a petition for certiorari etc to annulorder of respondent judge
Nistal.Theorderdirected attachment of seven carabaos& stop judge from proceeding with case.
Japitana filed aclaim against estate of Nacar with preliminaryattachment. It was said that Nacar
about todispose the property with intent to defraud. Nicarfiled motion to dismiss to dissolve writ of
thepreliminary injunction & attachment, Judge deniedthe motion. The Supreme Court directed
issuanceof preliminary mandatory injunction.

Issue:
Whether or not Japitana can file claims againstestate of IsabeloNacar.

Held:
No filing of money claim, ex-contracts by actionagainst the admin is not allowed. It should be
filedin the administration proceeding of the estate of the deceased in the case at bar, the claim of
therespondent arising from a contract may bepursued only in the same administrative proceeding
that maybe taken to settle the estateof the deceased.

38. ATTY. GEORGE S. BRIONES, petitioner, vs. LILIA J. HENSON-CRUZ, RUBY J. HENSON, and
ANTONIO J. HENSON, respondents.
Topic: Statute of Non-Claims
FACTS:
Respondent Ruby J. Henson filed on February 23, 1999 a petition for the allowance of the
will of her late mother, Luz J. Henson, with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.
 Lilia Henson-Cruz, one of the deceased’s daughters and also a respondent in this petition,
opposed Ruby’s petition. Lilia prayed that her mother’s holographic will be disallowed and that she
be appointed as the Intestate Administratrix.
Lilia subsequently moved for the appointment of an Interim Special Administrator of the
estate of her late mother.
The trial court then designated petitioner Atty. George S. Briones as Special Administrator of
the estate. Atty. Briones accepted the appointment, took his oath of office, and started the
administration of the estate.
The following are among the significant highlights of his administration:
1. On February 16, 2000, Atty. Briones moved that the trial court approve Special
Administrator’s fees of P75,000.00 per month. These fees were in addition to the
commission referred to in Section 7, Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court. The trial court
granted the motion but reduced the fees to P60,000.00 per month, retroactive to the
date Atty. Briones assumed office. [Briones vs. Henson-Cruz, 563 SCRA 69(2008)]
2. On January 8, 2002, Atty. Briones submitted the Special Administrator’s Final Report for
the approval of the court. He prayed that he be paid a commission of P97,850,191.26
representing eight percent (8%) of the value of the estate under his administration.
3. The trial court handed down an Order dated April 13, 2002, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the court hereby:
…2. Suspends the approval of the report of the special administrator except the
payment of his commission, which is hereby fixed at 1.8% of the value of the estate.
The heirs of Luz Henzon filed on April 9, 2002 a Notice of Appeal with the RTC assailing the
Order dated April 3, 2003 insofar as it directed the payment of Atty. Briones’ commission. They
subsequently filed their record on appeal.
On July 26, 2002, the respondents filed a Petition for Mandamus with the appellate court.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. Hence, this case.

ISSUE: WON the trial court may order the payment of the Special Administrator’s commission
which was fixed at 1.8% of the value of the estate

HELD:
Yes. To quote from the Order: “the court hereby suspends the approval of the report of the
special administrator except the payment of his commission, which is hereby fixed at 1.8% of the
value of the estate.” Under these terms, it is immediately apparent that the special administrator’s
commission is the court’s definite and final word on the matter, subject only to whatever a higher
body may decide if an appeal is made from the court’s ruling.
From an estate proceeding perspective, the Special Administrator’s commission is no less a
claim against the estate than a claim that third parties may make. Section 8, Rule 86 of the Rules
recognizes this when it provides for “Claim of Executor or Administrator Against an Estate.”
Under Section 13 of the same Rule, the action of the court on a claim against the estate “is
appealable as in ordinary cases.” Hence, by the express terms of the Rules, the ruling on the extent
of the Special Administrator’s commission—effectively, a claim by the special administrator against
the estate—is the lower court’s last word on the matter and one that is appealable.

39. Saligumba vs Palanog

SALIGUMBA VS. PALANOGGR. 143365, DECEMBER 4, 2008Facts:
Spouses Palanog filed a complaint for Quieting of Title with Damages against defendants, spouses
Valeria Saligumba and Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. (spouses
Saligumbas), before the Regional Trial Court. In the complaint, spouses Palanog alleged that they ha
ve been in actual, open, adverse and continuous possession as owners for more than 50 years of a
parcel of land. The spouses Saligumbas allegedly prevented them from entering and residing on the
subject premises and had destroyed the barbed wires enclosing the land. At the trial, only the
counsel for spouses Palanogs appeared. It appeared that Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. and Valeria Saligumba
died. No motion for the substitution of the spouses was filed nor an order issued for the
substitution of the deceased spouses Saligumbas despite notices sent to them to appear, never
confirmed the death of Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. and Valeria Saligumba. After a lapse of more than two
years, the trial court rendered a judgment declaring spouses Palanog the lawful owners of the
subject land. No motion for reconsideration or appeal having been filed. After 10 years, Palanog
filed a Complaint seeking to revive and enforce the said decision. She further requested that the
heirs and children of spouses Saligumbas be impleaded as defendants. Petitioners thus question the
decision as being void and of no legal effect because their parents were not duly represented by
counsel of record. Petitioners further argue that they have never taken part in the proceedings nor
did they voluntarily appear or participate in the case. It is unfair to bind them in a decision rendered
against their deceased parents. Therefore, being a void judgment, it has no legal nor binding effect
on petitioners. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON an action for quieting of title, which is an action involving real property, is extinguished upon
death of the party?
Ruling:
No. The case is an action for quieting of title with damages which is an actioninvolving real
property. It is an action that survives pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 as the claim is not extinguished
by the death of a party. And when a party dies in an action that survives, Section 17 of Rule 3 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides that after a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the
court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be
substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may
be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the
opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time
to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of
the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed
by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be
substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator
and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.