Conflict Party

The Iran-Iraq War, known as many names, one of it is the Imposed War and Holy Defense
in Iran. It was initially referred to in English as the “Persian Gulf war” prior to the “Gulf War” of
1990.1 The actor of this war was Iraq lead by Saddam Hussein and Iran lead by Ayatollah and
other actors such as United States and The Soviet Union that had a beneficial agenda with the war.
The war began when Iraq invaded Iran, launching a simultaneous invasion by air and land into
Iranian territory on 22 September 1980 following a long history of border disputes, and fears of
Shia insurgency among Iraq's long-suppressed Shia majority influenced by the Iranian Revolution.
Iraq was also aiming to replace Iran as the dominant Persian Gulf state. Although Iraq hoped to
take advantage of the revolutionary chaos in Iran and attacked without formal warning, they made
only limited progress into Iran and within several months were repelled by the Iranians who
regained virtually all lost territory by June 1982. For the next six years, Iran was on the offensive.2
Despite calls for a ceasefire by the United Nations Security Council, hostilities continued until 20
August 1988. The war finally ended with a United Nations brokered ceasefire in the form of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 598, which was accepted by both sides. It took several weeks
for the Iranian armed forces to evacuate Iraqi territory to honor pre-war international borders
between the two nations.

During the time of the war Iraq had a majority Shia population. The nation was governed
by the Sunni, Ba’ath regime of Saddam Hussein. As a self-appointed leader of the nation, Saddam
Hussein was a powerful dictator. Furthermore, as a member of the Ba’ath party he was focused
on achieving secular political goals. However, contrary to its representation, the population of Iraq
was and still is majority Shia.

On 22 September 1980, Iraq launched a full-scale invasion on Iran. The Iraqi Air Force
launched surprise airstrikes on ten Iranian airfields with the objective of destroying the Iranian Air
Force on the ground. The attack destroyed some of Iran's airbase infrastructure but failed to destroy
a significant number of aircraft. The Iraqi Air Force was only able to strike in depth with a few
MiG-23BN, Tu-22 and Su-20 aircraft, largely ineffective due to Iran's sheer size. Three MiG-23s

1
“The Longest War-Never Again", http://www. Iranian.com/main/blog/fair/longest-war-never-again).Iranian.com.
Retrieved 28/5/2018.
2
Molavi, Afshin (2005). The Soul of Iran. Norton. p. 152.
managed to attack Tehran, striking its airport but damaging only a few aircraft.3 The next day, Iraq
launched a ground invasion of Iran along front measuring 644 kilometers, in three simultaneous
thrusts.4 The purpose of the invasion, according to Saddam Hussein, was to blunt the edge of
Khomeini's movement and to thwart his attempt to export his Islamic revolution to Iraq and the
Persian Gulf states. Saddam hoped that by annexing the oil-rich province of Khuzestan that he
would send such a blow to the prestige of the Islamic Republic, that it would lead to the downfall
of the new government, or at very least put an end to Iranian calls for his overthrow.5

The objectives of Iraq’s invasion of Iran were to take control of the Shatt al-Arab waterway
by Iraqis. The Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein claimed as a reason for the invasion a territorial
dispute over the Shatt al-Arab, the waterway which forms the boundary between the two countries.
However, the conflict was rooted in regional rivalry. Saddam Hussein felt directly threatened by
the Islamic Revolution which had brought Ayatollah Khomeini to power in Iran the year before. 6
Saddam’s desire for Iraqi hegemony played a dominant role in his decision to invade Iran. Using
the rhetoric of the nascent Islamic Republic to Iraq’s advantage, Saddam had the necessary
conditions available to garner support and manipulate the masses, including his Arab neighbors.

The influence of religion on politics was deeply strategic and helped facilitate adherence
to Saddam’s strategy of invasion and war. He utilized sectarianism as a weapon of war by
effectively linking Sunnism to religious nationalism. By strategically politicizing ancient Sunni-
versus-Shia sectarianism he created a sense of national unity in support of the nation’s Sunni/Arab
identity against the Shia/Persians.7 Additionally, Iraq was defining the war in terms of the battles
the early Arabs fought in the seventh century against the Persians. As a result of this strategy, the
conflict was shaped in the context of Arab against Persian, Muslim against infidel and the
Prophet’s armies versus Zoroastrian fire worshippers. This played on the fears of Sunni Arab
nations and generated support. It also proved to be an effective tool, because Arab states feared
the Iranian regime’s provocative rhetoric, expansionist policies and activities in the region. The

3
Cordesman, Anthony and Wagner,Abraham R. .1990. “The Lessons of Modern War: Volume Two – The Iran-Iraq
Conflict”. Westview. p. 102
4
“The Iran–Iraq War”. https://www.saylor.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/HIST351-11.1.4-Iran-Iraq-War.pdf.
Retrieved 31/05/2018.
5
Karsh, Efraim. 2002, “The Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988, London: Osprey, Pg 27.
6
“The Iran-Iraq War”. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4260420.stm. Retrieved 31/05/2018
7
“The Iran-Iraq War; The Use of Religion as a Tool”, https://www.e-ir.info/2016/02/07/the-iran-iraq-war-the-use-of-
religion-as-a-tool/, Retrieved 29/05/2018.
result was the formation of a strong coalition to defeat Iran, its strategy of revolution and Shia
revivalism.

On the Iranian side, Khomeini and other Iranian leadership framed the war as one for the
defense not only for Iran, but of Islam and the revolution. Moreover, Iranian leadership actively
sought to export the Islamic Revolution to other countries, particularly those with Shia populations
such as Iraq.8 Overall, the new government strategically used the sectarian elements of the war to
its advantage and blurred national boundaries, parsimoniously dividing the world into good (Shia)
and evil (Sunni). As such, while Iranian politicians were steering their religious rhetoric to fit their
interests and agendas, they heightened the concern of neighboring Sunni nations who had Shia
populations.

Khomeini’s attempt to inspire Islamic revivalism and unity on one hand, and supporting
Shia groups in Pakistan, Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan and Bahrain on the other, had transformed
Iran into a provocative agitator of Shia communities in Muslim countries. This further solidified
the apprehension and suspicion of Sunni nations, such as Saudi Arabia. By extension, this greatly
enhanced Saddam’s ability to use religion as a tool of war to attempt to acquire Iranian territory
and regional dominance. “Not since the first Safavid-Ottoman war in the sixteenth century, and
the Shia-Sunni character of that war, has ideology and propaganda played so major a role in a
conflict between Iran and a neighboring power”.

As for the other actors such as the United States and the Soviet Union, both superpowers,
the United States and the Soviet Union, were caught off-guard by start of the war. The United
States of course, had been attempting to solve the hostage crisis since before the war started and
was not on friendly terms with Iran. And, the U.S. had not had diplomatic relations with Soviet
backed Iraq since 1968. The Soviets had not been welcomed in Iran by the Shah and were tied
down in Afghanistan. Khomeini, a religious fanatic, was definitely not willing to deal with the
Soviets. When Iraq invaded, the Soviets immediately stopped supplying weapons since Iraq had
not consulted them concerning the attack. The Soviet Union did, however, sign a treaty of “peace
and friendship” with Iraq after the war began and has been supplying weaponry ever since.9

8
“The Iran-Iraq War; The Use of Religion as a Tool”, https://www.e-ir.info/2016/02/07/the-iran-iraq-war-the-use-of-
religion-as-a-tool/, Retrieved 29/05/2018.
9
“Superpower Involvement”. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1985/SRE.htm, Retrieved
29/05/2018.
 It would seem that neither superpower has any desire to see either side win the war. The
balance of power in the region is at stake and a decision remains delicately poised. When the war
started both superpowers calculated that it would be over quickly, at which time they could
influence the winners and losers. A wait-and-see attitude prevailed, and, as the world waited, the
war continued with less and less chance of superpower involvement.

Rujukan:

Cordesman, Anthony and Wagner,Abraham R. .1990. “The Lessons of Modern War: Volume Two – The Iran-Iraq
Conflict”. Westview. p. 102

Karsh, Efraim. 2002, “The Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988, London: Osprey, Pg 27.

Molavi, Afshin 2005. The Soul of Iran. Norton. p. 152.

“The Iran–Iraq War”. https://www.saylor.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/HIST351-11.1.4-Iran-Iraq-War.pdf.

Retrieved 31/05/2018.

“The Iran-Iraq War”. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4260420.stm. Retrieved 31/05/2018

“The Iran-Iraq War; The Use of Religion as a Tool”, https://www.e-ir.info/2016/02/07/the-iran-iraq-war-the-use-of-

religion-as-a-tool/, Retrieved 29/05/2018.

“The Iran-Iraq War; The Use of Religion as a Tool”, https://www.e-ir.info/2016/02/07/the-iran-iraq-war-the-use-of-

religion-as-a-tool/, Retrieved 29/05/2018.

“Superpower Involvement”. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1985/SRE.htm, Retrieved

29/05/2018.