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Case Doctrines in Conflict of Law
Case Doctrines in Conflict of Law
BROWNELL v. SUN LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA, G.R. No. L-5731; June 22, 1954
The extension of the Philippine Property Act of 1946 is clearly implied from the acts of the
President of the Philippines and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, as well as by the enactment of R.A. Nos.
7, 8 and 477.
It is evident, therefore, that the consent of the Philippine Government to the application of
the Philippine Property Act of 1946 to the Philippines after independence was given, not only by
the Executive Department of the Philippines Government, but also by the Congress, which
enacted the laws that would implement or carry out the benefits accruing from the operation of
the United States law. The respondent-appellant, however, contends that the operation of the law after
independence could not have actually taken, or may not take place, because both Republic Act No. 8 and
Republic Act No. 477 do not contain any specific provision whereby the Philippine Property Act of 1946 or
its provisions is made applicable to the Philippines. It is also contended that in the absence of such
express provision in any of the laws passed by the Philippine Congress, said Philippine Property Act of
1946 does not form part of our laws and is not binding upon the courts and inhabitants of the country.
A foreign law may have extraterritorial effect in a country other than the country of origin, provided
the latter, in which it is sought to be made operative, gives its consent thereto. This consent may be
either express or implied.
The consent of a Senate to the operation of a foreign law within its territory does not need to be
express; it is enough that said consent be implied from its conduct or from that of its authorized officers.
In the case at bar, our ratification of or concurrence to the agreement for the extension of the
Philippine Property Act of 1946 is clearly implied from the acts of the President of the Philippines and of
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, as well as by the enactment of Republic Acts Nos. 7, 8, and 477.
The operation of the Philippine Property Act of 1946 in the Philippines is not derived from the
unilateral act of the United States Congress, which made it expressly applicable, or from the saving
provision contained in the proclamation of independence. It is well-settled in the United States that its
laws have no extraterritorial effect. The application of said law in the Philippines is based
concurrently on said act (Philippine Property Act of 1946) and on the tacit consent thereto and the
conduct of the Philippine Government itself in receiving the benefits of its provisions.
Elements of a Treaty:
1. It must be in writing.
2. It must involve two or more States.
3. It must be governed by international law.
Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts , the “connecting
factor” or “point of contact” could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus
occurred. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said
as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because it is
in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing and
working here. According to her, she had honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its
rights and in the performance of its duties, “act with justice, give her her due and observe honesty and
good faith.” Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain acts or parts of the
injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment. For in our view what is important here
is the place where the over-all harm or the fatality of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social
standing and human rights of complainant, had lodged, according to the plaintiff below (herein private
respondent). All told, it is not without basis to identify the Philippines as the situs of the alleged tort.
As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that over-all injury occurred and lodged in the
Philippines. There is likewise no question that private respondent is a resident Filipina national, working
with petitioner, a resident foreign corporation engaged here in the business of international air carriage.
Thus, the “relationship” between the parties was centered here, although it should be stressed that this
suit is not based on mere labor law violations. From the record, the claim that the Philippines has the
most significant contact with the matter in this dispute, raised by private respondent as plaintiff below
against defendant (herein petitioner), in our view, has been properly established.
Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is the situs of the tort complaint of and
the place “having the most interest in the problem”, we find, by way of recapitulation, that the
Philippine law on tort liability should have paramount application to and control in the resolution of the
legal issues arising out of this case. Further, we hold that the respondent Regional Trial Court has
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the complaint; the appropriate venue is in Quezon
City, which could properly apply Philippine law. Moreover, we find untenable petitioner’s insistence that
“[s]ince private respondent instituted this suit, she has the burden of pleading and proving the applicable
Saudi law on the matter.” As aptly said by private respondent, she has “no obligation to plead and
prove the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since her cause of action is based on Articles 19
and 21” of the Civil Code of the Philippines. In her Amended Complaint and subsequent pleadings she
never alleged that Saudi law should govern this case. And as correctly held by the respondent appellate
court, “considering that it was the petitioner who was invoking the applicability of the law of Saudi Arabia,
thus the burden was on it [petitioner] to plead and to establish what the law of Saudi Arabia is.
IS FORUM NON-CONVENIENS APPLY? The Court has jurisdiction but still the court may
dismiss if it appears that it is inconvenient to the parties. Here, it is convenient.
WON Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of R.A. 6426, as amended by P.D.
1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient.
the application of the law depends on the extent of
In fine,
its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960
which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court. Legislative
body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient,
injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This
would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that “in case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and
justice to prevail. “Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizerzmente con damo de otro.” Simply stated,
when the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that would
respond to the vehement urge of conscience.
It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank No. 960 would be
used as a device by accused Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the guilty at
the expense of the innocent.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246,
insofar as it amends Section 8 of R.A. 6426 are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case
because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby REQUIRED to COMPLY with the writ
of execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-3214, “Karen Salvacion, et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y Northcott, by
Branch CXLIV, RTC Makati and to RELEASE to petitioners the dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli
y Northcott in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.
NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS and C.F. SHARP & COMPANY
INC, 241 SCRA 192
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until
the contrary is shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of the proceedings and the giving of due
notice therein.
Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment in an action in personam of a
tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right
as between the parties and their successors-in-interest by a subsequent title. The judgment may,
however, be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact. Also, under Section 3 of Rule 131, a court, whether of the Philippines or
elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction and has
regularly performed its official duty.
The party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its
validity. Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the
presumption of its validity. Being the party challenging the judgment rendered by the Japanese court,
SHARP had the duty to demonstrate the invalidity of such judgment. In an attempt to discharge that
burden, it contends that the extraterritorial service of summons effected at its home office in the
Philippines was not only ineffectual but also void, and the Japanese Court did not, therefore acquire
jurisdiction over it.
It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process
upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum. In this case, it is the
procedural law of Japan where the judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the
extraterritorial service of process on SHARP.
The service was regular applying the presumption of regularity. Even if it was not regular,
the law of Japan was not proved and so the doctrine of processual presumption concerning the
service of summons to foreign corporation: (1) resident agent (2) government officials designated
by law to that effect (3) to any officers or agent within the Philippines.
As to what this law is is a question of fact, not of law. It may not be taken judicial notice of
and must be pleaded and proved like any other fact. Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court provide that it may be evidenced by an official publication or by a duly attested or authenticated
copy thereof. It was then incumbent upon SHARP to present evidence as to what that Japanese
procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed extraterritorial service is invalid. It did not.
Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of the service of summons and the decision
thereafter rendered by the Japanese court must stand.
WON THE JAPANESE COURT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OF A FILIPINO CORPORATION
JAPAN BY SERVING A SUMMONS TRHOUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNEL. YES.
Alternatively in the light of the absence of proof regarding Japanese law, the presumption of
identity or similarity or the so-called processual presumption may be invoked. Applying it, the Japanese
law on the matter is presumed to be similar with the Philippine law on service of summons on a private
foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines.
The extraterritorial service of summons on it by the Japanese Court was valid not only
under the processual presumption but also because of the presumption of regularity of
performance of official duty. as much as SHARP was admittedly doing business in Japan through its
four duly registered branches at the time the collection suit against it was filed, then in the light of the
processual presumption, SHARP may be deemed a resident of Japan, and, as such, was amenable to
the jurisdiction of the courts therein and may be deemed to have assented to the said courts' lawful
methods of serving process. Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of summons on it by the Japanese
Court was valid not only under the processual presumption but also because of the presumption of
regularity of performance of official duty.
WON private respondent ITEC is an unlicensed corporation doing business in the Philippines.
Yes, private respondent had been "engaged in" or "doing business" in the Philippines for some
time now. This is the inevitable result after a scrutiny of the different contracts and agreements entered
into by ITEC with its various business contacts in the country, particularly ASPAC and Telephone
Equipment Sales and Services, Inc. (TESSI , for brevity). The latter is a local electronics firm engaged by
I TEC to be its local technical representative, and to create a service center for I TEC products sold
locally. Its arrangements, with these entities indicate convincingly I TEC's purpose to bring about the
situation among its customers and the general public that they are dealing directly with I TEC, and that I
TEC is actively engaging in business in the country.
A perusal of the agreements between petitioner ASPAC and the respondents shows that there
are provisions which are highly restrictive in nature, such as to reduce petitioner ASPAC to a mere
extension or instrument of the private respondent.
When I TEC entered into the disputed contracts with ASPAC and TESSI, they were carrying out
the purposes for which it was created, i.e., to market electronics and communications products. The
terms and conditions of the contracts as well as ITEC's conduct indicate that they established within our
country a continuous business, and not merely one of a temporary character.
WON the fact that ITEC is an unlicensed corporation doing business in the Philippines bars it
from invoking the injunctive authority of our courts.
Notwithstanding such finding that ITEC is doing business in the country, petitioner is
nonetheless estopped from raising this fact to bar ITEC from instituting this injunction case
against it.
A foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines may sue in Philippine Courts although not
authorized to do business here against a Philippine citizen or entity who had contracted with and
benefited by said corporation. To put it in another way, a party is estopped to challenge the
personality of a corporation after having acknowledged the same, by entering into a contract with
it. And the doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate existence applies to a foreign as well as to domestic
corporations. One who has dealt with a corporation of foreign origin as a corporate entity is estopped to
deny its corporate existence and capacity. The principle will be applied to prevent a person contracting
with a foreign corporation from later taking advantage of its noncompliance with the statutes chiefly in
cases where such person has received the benefits of the contract.
The rule is deeply rooted in the time-honored axiom of Commodum ex injuria sua non habere
debet — no person ought to derive any advantage of his own wrong. This is as it should be for as
mandated by law, "every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
The doctrine of lack of capacity to sue based on the failure to acquire a local license is based on
considerations of sound public policy. The license requirement was imposed to subject the foreign
corporation doing business in the Philippines to the jurisdiction of its courts. It was never intended
to favor domestic corporations who enter into solitary transactions with unwary foreign firms and then
repudiate their obligations simply because the latter are not licensed to do business in this country.
WON forum conveniens is applicable.
Petitioner's insistence on the dismissal of this action due to the application, or non application, of
the private international law rule of forum non conveniens defies well-settled rules of fair play. According
to petitioner, the Philippine Court has no venue to apply its discretion whether to give cognizance or not to
the present action, because it has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff in the case, the
latter allegedly having no personality to sue before Philippine Courts. This argument is misplaced
because the court has already acquired jurisdiction over the plaintiff in the suit, by virtue of his
filing the original complaint. And as we have already observed, petitioner is not at liberty to question
plaintiff's standing to sue, having already acceded to the same by virtue of its entry into the
Representative Agreement referred to earlier.
Thus, having acquired jurisdiction, it is now for the Philippine Court, based on the facts of the
case, whether to give due course to the suit or dismiss it, on the principle of forum non conveniens.
The Philippine Court may refuse to assume jurisdiction in spite of its having acquired jurisdiction.
Conversely, the court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the
following requisites are met: 1) That the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently
resort to; 2) That the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the
facts; and, 3) That the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision.
DOCTRINES INVOLVED:
ORIGIN OF FORUM SHOPPING: Forum-shopping originated as a concept in private
international law, where non-resident litigants are given the option to choose the forum or place wherein
to bring their suit for various reasons or excuses, including to secure procedural advantages, to annoy
and harass the defendant, to avoid overcrowded dockets, or to select a more friendly venue. To combat
these less than honorable excuses, the principle of forum non conveniens was developed whereby a
court, in conflicts of law cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most
"convenient" or available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.
In this light, Black's Law Dictionary says that forum shopping "occurs when a party attempts to have his
action tried in a particular court or jurisdiction where he feels he will receive the most favorable judgment
or verdict." Hence, according to Words and Phrases, "a litigant is open to the charge of "forum shopping"
whenever he chooses a forum with slight connection to factual circumstances surrounding his suit, and
litigants should be encouraged to attempt to settle their differences without imposing undue expenses and
vexatious situations on the courts".
FORUM-SHOPPING; AS A CHOICE OF VENUE AND AS A CHOICE OF REMEDY;
CONSTRUED: In the Philippines, forum shopping has acquired a connotation encompassing not
only a choice of venues, as it was originally understood in conflicts of laws, but also to a choice
of remedies.
As to the first (choice of venues), the Rules of Court, for example, allow a plaintiff to commence personal
actions "where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or
any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff" (Rule 4, Sec, 2 [b]).
As to remedies, aggrieved parties, for example, are given a choice of pursuing civil liabilities
independently of the criminal, arising from the same set of facts. A passenger of a public utility vehicle
involved in a vehicular accident may sue on culpa contractual, culpa aquiliana or culpa criminal — each
remedy being available independently of the others — although he cannot recover more than once. In
either of these situations (choice of venue or choice of remedy), the litigant actually shops for a forum of
his action. This was the original concept of the term forum shopping.
AS AN UNETHICAL PRACTICE; WHEN PRESENT: Eventually, however, instead of actually
making a choice of the forum of their actions, litigants, through the encouragement of their lawyers, file
their actions in all available courts, or invoke all relevant remedies simultaneously. This practice had not
only resulted to (sic) conflicting adjudications among different courts and consequent confusion enimical
(sic) to an orderly administration of justice. It had created extreme inconvenience to some of the parties to
the action.
Thus, "forum shopping" had acquired a different concept — which is unethical professional legal practice.
And this necessitated or had given rise to the formulation of rules and canons discouraging or altogether
prohibiting the practice.
What therefore originally started both in conflicts of laws and in our domestic law as a legitimate device
for solving problems has been abused and mis-used to assure scheming litigants of dubious reliefs.
There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks
a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only with
respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection with litigations commenced in the courts while an
administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat administrative processes and in
anticipation of an unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling. This is specially so, as in
this case, where the court in which the second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction.
IMPOSITION: In either case, forum shopping could be cited by the other party as a ground to ask
for summary dismissal of the two (or more) complaints or petitions, and for imposition of the other
sanctions, which are direct contempt of court, criminal prosecution, and disciplinary action against the
erring lawyer.