1

CRIMES AND SPECIAL PENAL LAWS sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because
the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred
thereby to the occupier, as we have held in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs.
Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113) and of Peralta vs. Director of
Prisons (75 Phil., 285), and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must
I. CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE LAW OF NATIONS necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government; that the
sovereignty vested in the titular government (which is the supreme power
which governs a body politic or society which constitute the state) must
be distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may
A. Crimes against national security
be destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but it cannot be
suspended because the existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended
Treason and espionage without putting it out of existence or divesting the possessor thereof at
least during the so-called period of suspension; that what may be
suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and
government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to
1. Treason the occupant; that the subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate
government in a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy
REV. PEN. CODE, art. 114
during the war, "although the former is in fact prevented from exercising
Rep. Act No. 7659 (1993) the supremacy over them" is one of the "rules of international law of our
times"; (II Oppenheim, 6th Lauterpacht ed., 1944, p. 482), recognized, by
Rep. Act No. 9346 (2006) necessary implication, in articles 23, 44, 45, and 52 of Hague Regulation;
and that, as a corollary of the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not
Rep. Act No. 10951 (2016)
suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of
the inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and
G.R. No. L-409 January 30, 1947 therefore there is no such thing as suspended allegiance, the basic theory
on which the whole fabric of the petitioner's contention rests;
ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner,
vs. Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty of the United State
ERIBERTO MISA, respondent. was suspended in Castine, set forth in the decision in the case of United
States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, 253, decided in 1819, and quoted in our
Claro M. Recto and Querube C. Makalintal for petitioner. decision in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Hernandez, Jr., for Dizon and Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra, in connection with the
respondent. question, not of sovereignty, but of the existence of a government de
factotherein and its power to promulgate rules and laws in the occupied
RESOLUTION territory, must have been based, either on the theory adopted
subsequently in the Hague Convention of 1907, that the military
occupation of an enemy territory does not transfer the sovereignty to the
In G.R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting
occupant; that, in the first case, the word "sovereignty" used therein
on the petition for habeas corpusfiled by Anastacio Laurel and based on a
should be construed to mean the exercise of the rights of sovereignty,
theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter
because as this remains vested in the legitimate government and is not
aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for
transferred to the occupier, it cannot be suspended without putting it out
the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the Revised
of existence or divesting said government thereof; and that in the second
Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate
case, that is, if the said conclusion or doctrine refers to the suspension of
government in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative
the sovereignty itself, it has become obsolete after the adoption of the
allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that
Hague Regulations in 1907, and therefore it can not be applied to the
there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the
present case;
proclamation of the Philippine Republic:

Considering that even adopting the words "temporarily allegiance,"

(1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and
repudiated by Oppenheim and other publicists, as descriptive of the
temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, which consists in
relations borne by the inhabitants of the territory occupied by the enemy
the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign;
toward the military government established over them, such allegiance
and that this absolute and permanent allegiance should not be confused
may, at most, be considered similar to the temporary allegiance which a
with the qualified and temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the
foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he
government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides, so long as he
resides in return for the protection he receives as above described, and
remains there, in return for the protection he receives, and which consists
does not do away with the absolute and permanent allegiance which the
in the obedience to the laws of the government or sovereign.
citizen residing in a foreign country owes to his own government or
(Carlisle vs. Unite States, 21 Law. ed., 429; Secretary of State Webster
sovereign; that just as a citizen or subject of a government or sovereign
Report to the President of the United States in the case of Thraser, 6 Web.
may be prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a foreign
Works, 526);
country, in the same way an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the
military forces of the enemy may commit treason against his own
Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of the
of a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or latter by giving them aid and comfort; and that if the allegiance of a citizen
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or subject to his government or sovereign is nothing more than obedience
to its laws in return for the protection he receives, it would necessarily
follow that a citizen who resides in a foreign country or state would, on
one hand, ipso factoacquire the citizenship thereof since he has enforce
public order and regulate the social and commercial life, in return for the
protection he receives, and would, on the other hand, lose his original
citizenship, because he would not be bound to obey most of the laws of
his own government or sovereign, and would not receive, while in a
foreign country, the protection he is entitled to in his own;
Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of the
rights of sovereignty by the legitimate government in the territory
occupied by the enemy military forces, because the authority of the
legitimate power to govern has passed into the hands of the occupant
(Article 43, Hague Regulations), the political laws which prescribe the
reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and citizens, are
suspended or in abeyance during military occupation (Co Kim
cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and dizon, supra), for the only reason that as
they exclusively bear relation to the ousted legitimate government, they
are inoperative or not applicable to the government established by the
occupant; that the crimes against national security, such as treason and
espionage; inciting to war, correspondence with hostile country, flight to
enemy's country, as well as those against public order, such as rebellion,
sedition, and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms, which are of
political complexion because they bear relation to, and are penalized by
our Revised Penal Code as crimes against the legitimate government, are
also suspended or become inapplicable as against the occupant, because
they can not be committed against the latter (Peralta vs. Director of
Prisons, supra); and that, while the offenses against public order to be
preserved by the legitimate government were inapplicable as offenses
against the invader for the reason above stated, unless adopted by him,
were also inoperative as against the ousted government for the latter was
not responsible for the preservation of the public order in the occupied
territory, yet article 114 of the said Revised Penal Code, was applicable to
treason committed against the national security of the legitimate
government, because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still
bound by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy occupation;
Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or
continue in force, unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances, those
laws that enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life
of the country, he has, nevertheless, all the powers of de
facto government and may, at his pleasure, either change the existing
laws or make new ones when the exigencies of the military service
demand such action, that is, when it is necessary for the occupier to do so
for the control of the country and the protection of his army, subject to
the restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague Regulations, the
usages established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the
requirements of public conscience (Peralta vs.Director of Prisons, supra;
1940 United States Rules of Land Warfare 76, 77); and that, consequently,
all acts of the military occupant dictated within these limitations are
obligatory upon the inhabitants of the territory, who are bound to obey
them, and the laws of the legitimate government which have not been
adopted, as well and those which, though continued in force, are in
conflict with such laws and orders of the occupier, shall be considered as
suspended or not in force and binding upon said inhabitants;
Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation
of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or subject to his government or
sovereign does not demand from him a positive action, but only passive
attitude or forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving the latter
aid and comfort, the occupant has no power, as a corollary of the
preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the operation of the law of
treason, essential for the preservation of the allegiance owed by the
inhabitants to their legitimate government, or compel them to adhere and
give aid and comfort to him; because it is evident that such action is not
demanded by the exigencies of the military service or not necessary for
the control of the inhabitants and the safety and protection of his army,
and because it is tantamount to practically transfer temporarily to the
occupant their allegiance to the titular government or sovereign; and that,
therefore, if an inhabitant of the occupied territory were compelled
illegally by the military occupant, through force, threat or intimidation, to
give him aid and comfort, the former may lawfully resist and die if
necessary as a hero, or submit thereto without becoming a traitor;
Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended
allegiance would lead to disastrous consequences for small and weak
nations or states, and would be repugnant to the laws of humanity and
requirements of public conscience, for it would allow invaders to legally
recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight
against their own government without the latter incurring the risk of being
prosecuted for treason, and even compel those who are not aid them in
their military operation against the resisting enemy forces in order to
completely subdue and conquer the whole nation, and thus deprive them
all of their own independence or sovereignty — such theory would
sanction the action of invaders in forcing the people of a free and
sovereign country to be a party in the nefarious task of depriving
themselves of their own freedom and independence and repressing the
exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to commit a
political suicide;
(2) Considering that the crime of treason against the government of the
Philippines defined and penalized in article 114 of the Penal Code, though
originally intended to be a crime against said government as then
organized by authority of the sovereign people of the United States,
exercised through their authorized representative, the Congress and the
President of the United States, was made, upon the establishment of the
Commonwealth Government in 1935, a crime against the Government of
the Philippines established by authority of the people of the Philippines, in
whom the sovereignty resides according to section 1, Article II, of the
Constitution of the Philippines, by virtue of the provision of section 2,
Article XVI thereof, which provides that "All laws of the Philippine
Islands . . . shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this
Constitution . . . and all references in such laws to the Government or
officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be construed, in so far as applicable,
to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this
constitution;
Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign
government, though not absolute but subject to certain limitations
imposed in the Independence Act and incorporated as Ordinance
appended to our Constitution, was recognized not only by the Legislative
Department or Congress of the United States in approving the
Independence Law above quoted and the Constitution of the Philippines,
which contains the declaration that "Sovereignty resides in the people and
all government authority emanates from them" (section 1, Article II), but
also by the Executive Department of the United States; that the late
President Roosevelt in one of his messages to Congress said, among
others, "As I stated on August 12, 1943, the United States in practice
regards the Philippines as having now the status as a government of other
independent nations — in fact all the attributes of complete and
respected nationhood" (Congressional Record, Vol. 29, part 6, page 8173);
 3
and that it is a principle upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States
in many cases, among them in the case of Jones vs. United States (137 U.S.,
202; 34 Law. ed., 691, 696) that the question of sovereignty is "a purely
political question, the determination of which by the legislative and
executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges,
as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects of the country.
Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution which provides that pending the final and complete
withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States "All citizens of the
Philippines shall owe allegiance to the United States", was one of the few
limitations of the sovereignty of the Filipino people retained by the United
States, but these limitations do not away or are not inconsistent with said
sovereignty, in the same way that the people of each State of the Union
preserves its own sovereignty although limited by that of the United
States conferred upon the latter by the States; that just as to reason may
be committed against the Federal as well as against the State Government,
in the same way treason may have been committed during the Japanese
occupation against the sovereignty of the United States as well as against
the sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth; and that the change of
our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect
the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed
during the Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the same
government and the same sovereign people, for Article XVIII of our
Constitution provides that "The government established by this
constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United
States and the proclamation of Philippine independence, the
Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the
Republic of the Philippines";
This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more extended
opinion, to deny the petitioner's petition, as it is hereby denied, for the
reasons above set forth and for others to be stated in the said opinion,
without prejudice to concurring opinion therein, if any. Messrs. Justices
Paras and Hontiveros dissent in a separate opinion. Mr. justice Perfecto
concurs in a separate opinion.
G.R. No. L-322 July 28, 1947
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO MANAYAO, ET AL., defendants.
PEDRO MANAYAO, appellant.
J. Antonio Araneta for appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Jose B. L. Reyes and Solicitor Ramon L.
Avanceña for appellee.
HILADO, J.:
Appellant Pedro Manayao and Filomeno Flores and Raymundo Flores were
charged with the high crime of treason with multiple murder in the
People's Court. The Floreses not having been apprehended, only Manayao
was tried. Convicted of the offense charged against him with the
aggravating circumstances of (1) the aid of armed men and (2) the
employment or presence of a band in the commission of the crime, he
was sentenced to death, to pay a fine of P20,000, an indemnity of P2,000
to the heirs of each of the persons named in the third paragraph of the
decision, and the costs. He has appealed from that decision to this Court.
On or about the 27th of January, 1945, the guerrillas raided the Japanese
in Sitio Pulong Tindahan, Municipality of Angat, Province of Bulacan. In
reprisal, Japanese soldiers and a number of Filipinos affiliated with
the Makapili, among them the instant appellant, conceived the diabolical
idea of killing the residents of Barrio Banaban of the same municipality
(Exhibits A, C, and C-1). Pursuant to this plan, said Japanese soldiers and
their Filipino companions, armed with rifles and bayonets, gathered the
residents of Banaban behind the barrio chapel on January 29, 1945.
Numbering about sixty or seventy, the residents thus assembled included
men, women and children — mostly women (Exhibits A, C, amd C-1; pp.
3-16, 29, 30, 65, 102, t.s.n.).
The children were placed in a separate group from the men and women —
the prosecution star witnesses, Maria Paulino and Clarita Perez, were
among the children (pp. 3, 40, t.s.n. ). Presently, the Japanese and their
Filipino comrades set the surrounding houses on fire (pp. 14, 48, 70, 71,
103, t.s.n.), and proceeded to butcher all the persons assembled,
excepting the small children, thus killing, among others, those known by
the following names: Patricia, Dodi, Banda, Tana, Uyang, Mina, Marta,
Sana, Eufemia, Doroteo, Andres, Perly, Tisiang, Urado, Pisan, Dorang,
Felisa, and Eulalia (pp. 8, 10, 13, 14, 31, 32, 47, 48, 61, 63, t.s.n.).
Appellant alone killed about six women, two of whom were Patricia and
Dodi whom he bayoneted to death in the presence of their daughters,
Maria Paulino and Clarita Perez, respectively (pp. 8, 10, 13, 31, 32, 35, 47,
48, t.s.n.). Patricia and Dodi pleaded with appellant for mercy, he being
their relative, but he gave the callous answer that no mercy would be
given them because they were wives of guerrillas (pp. 10, 42, 43, 49,
t.s.n.).
Appellant would also have killed the small children including Clarita Perez
and Maria Paulino if he had been allowed to have his way. For when all
but the small ones had been butchered, he proposed to kill them too, but
the Japanese soldiers interceded, saying that the children knew nothing of
the matter (pp. 15, 49, 51, 66, 67, t.s.n.). Appellant insisted in his proposal,
arguing that the children would be wives of guerrillas later when they
grew up, but the Japanese decided to spare them (p. 22, t.s.n.).
The foregoing facts have been clearly established by the testimony of
eye-witnesses — Clarita Paulino, Maria Perez, and Policarpio Tigas — to
the ruthless massacre of Banaban. There is a complete absence of
evidence tending to show motive on the part of these witnesses for falsely
testifying against appellant — such a motive is not even insinuated by the
defendant. Indeed, appellant's counsel frankly states (p. 3, brief) that he
"does not dispute the findings of fact of the People's Court." Speaking of
the testimony of Clarita and Maria, both aged ten years, the People's
Court, who heard, observed and saw them testify, had the following to
say:
The testimony of the last two in particular is entitled to very great weight.
They are simple barrio girls, only ten years old, whose minds have not yet
been tainted by feelings of hatred or revenge or by any desire to be
spectacular or to exaggerate. They were straight-forward and frank in
their testimony and did not show any intention to appeal to the
sentiments of the court. They could not have been mistaken as to the
presence and identity of the accused for they know him so well that they
referred to him by his pet name of "Indong Pintor" or Pedro, the painter.
They could not have erred in the narration of the salient phases of the
tragic events of January 29, 1945, in Banaban, for they were forced
eye-witnesses to and were involved in the whole tragedy, the burning of
the houses and the massacre committed by the accused and his Japanese
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masters took place in broad daylight and were not consummated in a
fleeting moment but during a time sufficient for even girls of tender age to
retain a trustworthy mental picture of the unusual event they could not
help but witness.
Not only this, but the testimony of Clarita Perez and Maria Paulino is so
clear, positive and convincing that it would be sufficient for conviction
without any further corroboration. Yet, there is ample corroborative proof.
Thus, Tomas M. Pablo declared that he had seen the corpses of the
massacred residents of Banaban shortly after the happening of the
heinous crime (p. 136, t.s.n.). And appellant himself admitted his
participation in the massacre in two sworn statements — one made on
August 28, 1945, before Lt. Jesus Cacahit, Detachment Commander of the
Angat 23d MP Command (Exhibit A; pp. 75-77, t.s.n.) and another made
on September 5, 1945 before Feliciano F. Torres, Assistant Provincial Fiscal
of Bulacan (Exhibits C, C-1; pp. 150-159, t.s.n.).
In No. 1 of his assignment of errors, appellant's counsel contends that
appellant was a member of the Armed Forces of Japan, was subject to
military law, and not subject to the jurisdiction of the People's Court; and
in No. 2 he advances the theory that appellant had lost his Philippine
citizenship and was therefore not amenable to the Philippine law of
treason. We cannot uphold either contention. We are of the considered
opinion that the Makapili, although organized to render military aid to the
Japanese Army in the Philippines during the late war, was not a part of
said army. It was an organization of Filipino traitors, pure and simple. As to
loss of Philippine citizenship by appellant, counsel's theory is absolutely
untenable. He invokes in its support paragraphs 3, 4, and 6 of section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 63, providing:
. . . A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways
and/or events:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or
laws of a foreign country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more;
(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a
foreign country;
xxx xxx xxx
(6) By having been declared, by competent authority, a deserter of the
Philippine Army, Navy, or Air Corps in time of war, unless subsequently a
plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted.
There is no evidence that appellant has subscribed to an oath of allegiance
to support the constitution or laws of Japan. His counsel cites (Brief, 4) the
fact that in Exhibit A "he subscribed an oath before he was admitted into
the Makapili association, "the aim of which was to help Japan in its fight
against the Americans and her allies.'" And the counsel contends from this
that the oath was in fact one of allegiance to support the constitution and
laws of Japan. We cannot uphold such a far-fetched deduction. The
members of the Makapili could have sworn to help Japan in the war
without necessarily swearing to support her constitution and laws. The
famed "Flying Tiger" who so bravely and resolutely aided China in her war
with Japan certainly did not need to swear to support the Chinese
constitution and laws, even if they had to help China fight Japan. During
the first World War the "National Volunteers" were organized in the
Philippines, pledged to go to Europe and fight on the side of the Allies,
particularly of the United States. In order to carry out that mission —
although the war ended before this could be done — they surely did not
have to take an oath to support the constitution or laws of the United
States or any of its allies. We do not multiply these examples, for they
illustrate a proposition which seems self-evident.
Neither is there any showing of the acceptance by appellant of a
commission "in the military, naval, or air service" of Japan.
Much less is there a scintilla of evidence that appellant had ever been
declared a deserter in the Philippine Army, Navy or Air Corps — nor even
that he was a member of said Army, Navy, or Air Corps.
Further, appellant's contention is repugnant to the most fundamental and
elementary principles governing the duties of a citizen toward his country
under our Constitution. Article II, section 2, of said constitution ordains:
"SEC. 2. The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in
the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render
personal, military or civil service." (Emphasis supplied.).
This constitutional provision covers both time of peace and time of war,
but it is brought more immediately and peremptorily into play when the
country is involved in war. During such a period of stress, under a
constitution enshrining such tenets, the citizen cannot be considered free
to cast off his loyalty and obligations toward the Fatherland. And it cannot
be supposed, without reflecting on the patriotism and intelligence of the
Legislature, that in promulgating Commonwealth Act No. 63, under the
aegis of our Constitution, it intended (but did not declare) that the duties
of the citizen solemnly proclaimed in the above-quoted constitutional
precept could be effectively cast off by him even when his country is at
war, by the simple expedient of subscribing to an oath of allegiance to
support the constitution or laws of a foreign country, and an enemy
country at that, or by accepting a commission in the military, naval or air
service of such country, or by deserting from the Philippine Army, Navy, or
Air Corps.
It would shock the conscience of any enlightened citizenry to say that this
appellant, by the very fact of committing the treasonous acts charged
against him, the doing of which under the circumstances of record he does
not deny, divested himself of his Philippine citizenship and thereby placed
himself beyond the arm of our treason law. For if this were so, his very
crime would be the shield that would protect him from punishment.
But the laws do no admit that the bare commission of a crime amounts of
itself to a divestment of the character of citizen, and withdraws the
criminal from their coercion. They would never prescribe an illegal act
among the legal modes by which a citizen might disfranchise himself; nor
render treason, for instance, innocent, by giving it the force of a
dissolution of the obligation of the criminal to his country. (Moore,
International Law Digest, Vol. III, p. 731.)
696. No person, even when he has renounced or incurred the loss of his
nationality, shall take up arms against his native country; he shall be held
guilty of a felony and treason, if he does not strictly observe this duty.
(Fiore's International Law Codified, translation from Fifth Italian Edition by
Borchard.)
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As to the third assignment of error, the Solicitor General agrees with
counsel that it is improper to separately take into account against
appellant he aggravating circumstances of (1) the aid of armed men and (2)
the employment of a band in appraising the gravity of the crime. We
likewise are of the same opinion, considering that under paragraph 6 of
article 14 of the Revised Penal Code providing that "whenever more than
three armed malefactors shall have acted together in the commission of
an offense it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band," the
employment of more than three armed men is an essential element of
and inherent in a band. So that in appreciating the existence of a band the
employment of more than three armed men is automatically included,
there being only the aggravating circumstance of band to be considered.
As to appellant's fourth assignment of error, the contention is clearly
unacceptable that appellant acted in obedience to an order issued by a
superior and is therefore exempt from criminal liability, because he
allegedly acted in the fulfillment of a duty incidental to his service for
Japan as a member of the Makapili. It is obvious that paragraphs 5 and 6
of article 11 of our Revised Penal Code compliance with duties to or
orders from a foreign sovereign, any more than obedience to an illegal
order. The construction contended for by appellant could entail in its
potentialities even the destruction of this Republic.
The contention that as a member of the Makapili appellant had to obey
his Japanese masters under pain of severe penalty, and that therefore his
acts should be considered as committed under the impulse of an
irresistible force or uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury, is no
less repulsive. Appellant voluntarily joined the Makapili with full
knowledge of its avowed purpose of rendering military aid to Japan. He
knew the consequences to be expected — if the alleged irresistible force
or uncontrollable fear subsequently arose, he brought them about himself
freely and voluntarily. But this is not all; the truth of the matter is, as the
Solicitor General well remarks, that "the appellant actually acted with
gusto during the butchery of Banaban." He was on that occasion even
bent on more cruelty than the very ruthless Japanese masters — so fate
willed it — were the very ones who saved the little girls, Clarita Perez and
Maria Paulino, who were destined to become the star witnesses against
him on the day of reckoning.
Conformably to the recommendation of the Solicitor General, we find
appellant guilty of the crime of treason with multiple murder committed
with the attendance of one aggravating circumstance, that of "armed
band," thus discarding the first aggravating circumstance considered by
the trial court. A majority of the Court voted to affirm the judgment
appealed from, imposing the death penalty, convicting defendant and
appellant to pay a fine of P20,000, an indemnity of P2,000 to the heirs of
each of the victims named in the third paragraph of the lower court's
decision, and the costs. But due to the dissent of Mr. Justice Perfecto from
the imposition of the death penalty, in accordance with the applicable
legal provisions we modify the judgment appealed from as regards the
punishment to be inflicted, and sentence defendant and appellant Pedro
Manayao to the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessories of
article 41 of the Revised Penal Code, to pay a fine of P20,000, an
indemnity of P2,000 to the heirs of each of the victims named in the third
paragraph of the lower court's decision, and the costs. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Hontiveros, Padilla, and
Tuason, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-856 April 18, 1949
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SUSANO PEREZ (alias KID PEREZ), defendant-appellant.
Crispin Oben and Isidro Santiago for appellant.
Assistance Solicitor General Manuel P. Barcelona and Solicitor Esmeraldo
Umali for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
Susano Perez alias Kid Perez alias Kid Perez was convicted of treason by
the 5th Division of the People's Court sitting in Cebu City and sentenced to
death by electrocution.
Seven counts were alleged in the information but the prosecution offered
evidence only on counts 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6, all of which, according to the
court, were substantiated. In a unanimous decision, the trial court found
as follows:
"As regards count No. 1 —
Count No. 1 alleges that the accused, together with the other Filipinos,
recruited, apprehended and commandeered numerous girls and women
against their will for the purpose of using them, as in fact they were used,
to satisfy the immoral purpose and sexual desire of Colonel Mini, and
among such unfortunate victims, were Felina Laput, Eriberta Ramo alias
Miami Ramo, Eduarda Daohog, Eutiquia Lamay, Feliciana Bonalos and
Flaviana Bonalos.
It would be unnecessary to recite here the testimonies of all the victims of
the accused; it sufficient to reproduce here succinctly the testimony of
Eriberta Ramo. She testified that on June 15, 1942, the accused came to
her house to get her and told her that she was wanted in the house of her
aunt, but instead, she was brought to the house of the Puppet Governor
Agapito Hontanosas; that she escaped and returned to Baclayon her
hometown; that the accused came again and told her that Colonel Mini
wanted her to be his Information Clerk; that she did not accept the job;
that a week later the accused came to Baclayon to get her, and succeeded
in taking some other girls Puppet Governor Agapito Hontanosas; that
Governor Hontanosas told her that Colonel Mini wanted her to be his wife;
that when she was brought to Colonel Mini the latter had nothing on but a
"G" string; that he, Colonel Mini threatened her with a sword tied her to a
bed and with force succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her; that
on the following night, again she was brought to Colonel Mini and again
she was raped; that finally she was able to escape and stayed in hiding for
three weeks and only came out from the hiding when Colonel Mini left
Tagbilaran.
"As regards count No. 2 —
Count No. 2 of the information substantially alleges: That accused in
company with some Japanese and Filipinos took Eriberta Ramo and her
sister Cleopatra Ramo from their home in Baclayon to attend a banquet
and a dance organized in honor of Colonel Mini by the Puppet Governor,
Agapito Hontanosas in order that said Japanese Colonel might select those
first who would later be taken to satisfy his carnal appetite and that by
means of threat, force and intimidation, the above mentioned two sister
were brought to the headquarters of the Japanese Commander at the
Mission Hospital in Tagbilaran where Eriberta Ramo was forced to lived a
life of shame. All these facts alleged in count No. 2 were testified to by
 6
said witnesses Eriberta Ramo her mother Mercedes de Ramo. It is not
necessary here to recite once more their testimony in support of the
allegations in court No. 2; this Court is fully convinced that the allegation
in said count No. 2 were fully substantiated by the evidence adduced.
"As regards count No. 4 —
Count No. 4 substantially alleges that on July 16, 1942, the two girls
named Eduardo S. Daohog and Eutiquia Lamay, were taken from their
homes in Corella, Bohol, by the accused and his companion named
Vicente Bullecer, and delivered to the Japanese Officer, Dr. Takibayas to
satisfy his carnal appetite, but these two, the accused Susano Perez and
his companion Vicente Bullecer, before delivering them to said Japanese
Officer, satisfied first their lust; the accused Susano Perez raping Eduarda
S. Daohog and his companion, Vicente Bullecer, the other girl Eutiquia
Lamay. Eduarda S. Daohog, testifying, said: that while on the way to
Tagbilaran, the accused though force and intimidation, raped her in an
uninhabited house; that she resisted with all her force against the desire
of the accused, but of no avail; that upon arriving in Tagbilaran, she was
delivered to the Japanese Officer named Takibayas who also raped her.
Eutiquia Lamay testified that on July 16, 1942, the accused and his
companion, Bullecer, went to her house to take her and her sister; that
her sister was then out of the house; that the accused threatened her with
a revolved if she refuses to go; that she was placed in a car where Eduarda
Daohog was; that while they were in the car, the accused carried Eduarda
out of the car, and their companion Bullecer took the other witness
(Eutiquia Lamay); that when the accused and Eduarda returned to the car,
the latter; Eduarda, covered her face, crying; that later, she and Eduarda
were taken to the Governor's house; that on arriving and in the presence
of the Puppet Governor Hontanosas, the Governor exclaimed: "I did not
call for these girls": but the accused replied saying: "These girls talked bad
against the Japanese , and that is why we arrested them"; that the said
Governor Hontañosas then, said: "Take them to the Japanese "; that the
accused and Bullecer brought the two girls to the Japanese headquarters;
that Eduarda was taken to one room by the Japanese Captain called Dr.
Takibayas, and she (Eutiquia Lamay) was taken to another room by
another Japanese living in that house; that she was raped by that Jap
while in the room; that she resisted all she could, but of no avail.
In the light of the testimonies of these two witnesses, Eduarda S. Daohog
and Eutiquia Lamay, all the allegations in Court No. 4 were fully proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
"As regards count No. 5 —
Count No. 5 alleges: That on or about June 4, 1942, the said accused
commandeered Feliciana Bonalos and her sister Flaviana Bonalos on the
pretext that they were to bee taken as witnesses before a Japanese
Colonel in the investigation of a case against a certain Chinese (Insik Eping),
and uponarriving at Tagbilaran, Bohol, the accused brought the aforesaid
two girls to the residence of Colonel Mini, Commander of the Japanese
Armed Forces in Bohol and by means of violence threat and intimidation,
said Japanese Colonel abused and had sexual intercourse with Flaviana
Bonalos; that the accused subsequently of Colonel Mini and through
violence, threat and intimidation, succeeded in having carnal knowledge
with her against her will; that two days, later, upon the pretext of
conducting the unfortunate girls to their home, said accused brought the
other girls Feliciana Bonalos to a secluded place in Tagbilaran, Bohol, and
in the darkness, by mean of threat and violence had carnal knowledge
with her against her will.
Feliciana Bonalos testifying in this count, declared that the accused came
to get her on the pretext that she was to be used as witness in a case
affecting certain Chinaman before Colonel Mini; that she and her younger
sister Flaviana were brought in a car driven by the accused; they were
brought to the house of Colonel Mini; that sister Flaviana was conducted
into a room and after remaining in the same for about an hour, she came
out with her hair and her dress in disorder; that Flaviana told her
immediately that she was raped against her will by Colonel Mini; that she
(Feliciana), after leaving the residence of said Jap officer, was taken by
Perez to an uninhabited house and there by threat and intimidation, the
accused succeeded in raping her; that when she returned to her (the
witness), Flaviana was crying; that the following day while conducting the
two girls back to their hometown, she (Feliciana) was also raped by the
accused in an uninhabited house, against her will.
Victoriana Arayan (mother of Feliciana and Flaviana Bonalos) testified as
following: That on June 15, 1942, the accused came and told her that the
Japanese needed her daughters to be witnesses; that accordingly, he
daughters, under that understanding, started for Tagbilaran; that later,
she went to Tagbilaran to look for her daughters and she found them in
the office of the Puppet Governor; that on seeing her, both daughters
wept and told her that they were turned over to the Japanese and raped
them; that her daughter Flaviana told her (the witness) that after the
Japanese had raped her the accused also raped her (Flaviana) in an
uninhabited house; that the accused did not permit her two daughter to
return home on the pretext that the Puppet Governor was then absent
and in the meanwhile they stayed in the house of the accused Perez; that
when her daughter returned to her house ultimately, they related to her
(mother) what happened; that both daughters told her they would have
preferred death rather than to have gone to Tagbilaran; that Feliciana told
her (the mother) that the accused had raped her.
The information give by Feliciana to her mother is admitted in evidence as
a part of the res gestae regardless of the time that had elapsed between
the occurrence and the time of the information. In the manner these two
witnesses testified in court, there could be no doubt that they were telling
the absolute truth. It is hard to conceived that these girls would assume
and admit the ignominy they have gone through if they were not true. The
Court is fully convinced that all the allegations contained in Court No. 5
have been proven by the testimonies of these two witnesses beyond
reasonable doubt.
"As regards count No. 6 —
Count No. 6, alleges: That the accused, together with his Filipino
companion apprehended Natividad Barcinas, Nicanora Ralameda and
Teotima Barcinas, nurses of the provincial hospital, for not having
attended a dance and reception organized by the Puppet Governor in
honor of Colonel Mini and other Japanese high ranking officers, which was
held in Tagbilaran market on June 25, 1942; that upon being brought the
Puppet Governor, they were severely reprimanded by the latter; that on
July 8, 1942, against said nurses were forced to attend another banquet
and dance in order that the Jap officers Mini and Takibayas might make a
selection which girls would suit best their fancy; that the real purpose
behind those forcible invitations was to lure them to the residence of said
Japanese Officer Mini for immoral purposes.
Natividad Barcinas, a Lieutenant of the P.A., testified at length. She
declared: That on June 29, 1942, she and companion nurses, saw the
accused coming to the hospital with a revolver and took them on a car to
the office of the Puppet Governor where they were severely reprimanded
 7
by the latter for not attending the dance held on June and receptions was
to select from among them the best girl that would suit the fancy of
Colonel Mini for immoral purposes that she and her companions were
always afraid of the accused Perez whenever he came to said hospital;
that on one occasion, one of the nurses on perceiving the approach of the
accused, ran up into her room, laid down on bed and simulated to be sick;
that said accused, not satisfied, went up into the room of that particular
nurse and pulled out the blanket which covered her and telling her that it
was only her pretext that she was sick.
The testimony of Lt. Natividad Barcinas is fully corroborated by that of
Nicanora Ralameda. Said testimony need not be reproduced here.
In a carefully written brief for the appellant these findings are not
questioned, but it is contended that the deeds committed by the accused
do not constitute treason. The Solicitor General submits the opposite view,
and argues that "to maintain and preserve the morale of the soldiers has
always been, and will always be, a fundamental concern of army
authorities, for the efficiency of rests not only on its physical attributes
but also, mainly, on the morale of its soldiers" (citing the annual report of
the Chief of Staff, United State Army, for the fiscal year ending June 30,
1933).
If furnishing women for immoral purposes to the enemies was treason
because women's company kept up their morale, so fraternizing with
them, entertaining them at parties, selling them food and drinks, and
kindred acts, would be treason. For any act of hospitality without doubt
produces the same general result. yet by common agreement those and
similar manifestation of sympathy and attachment are not the kind of
disloyalty that are punished as treason.
In a broad sense, the law of treason does not prescribe all kinds of social,
business and political intercourse between the belligerent occupants of
the invaded country and its inhabitants. In the nature of things, the
occupation of a country by the enemy is bound to create relations of all
sorts between the invaders and the natives. What aid and comfort
constitute treason must depend upon their nature degree and purpose. To
draw a line between treasonable and untreasonable assistance is not
always easy. The scope of adherence to the enemy is comprehensive, its
requirement indeterminate as was said Cramer vs. United States. 89 Law.
ed., 1441.
As general rule, to be treasonous the extent of the aid and comfort given
to the enemies must be to render assistance to them as enemies and not
merely as individuals and in addition, be directly in furtherance of the
enemies' hostile designs. To make a simple distinction: To lend or give
money to an enemy as a friend or out of charity to the beneficiary so that
he may buy personal necessities is to assist him as individual and is not
technically traitorous. On the other hand, to lend or give him money to
enable him to buy arms or ammunition to use in waging war against the
giver's country enhance his strength and by same count injures the
interest of the government of the giver. That is treason. (See United
States vs. Fricke, 259 F., 673; 63 C.J., 816, 817.)
Applying these principles to the case at bar, appellant's first assignment of
error is correct. His "commandeering" of women to satisfy the lust of
Japanese officers or men or to enliven the entertainment held in their
honor was not treason even though the women and the entertainment
helped to make life more pleasant for the enemies and boost their spirit;
he was not guilty any more than the women themselves would have been
if they voluntarily and willingly had surrendered their bodies or organized
the entertainment. Sexual and social relations with the Japanese did not
directly and materially tend to improve their war efforts or to weaken the
power of the United State. The acts herein charged were not, by fair
implication, calculated to strengthen the Japanese Empire or its army or to
cripple the defense and resistance of the other side. Whatever favorable
effect the defendant's collaboration with the Japanese might have in their
prosecution of the war was trivial, imperceptible, and unintentional.
Intent of disloyalty is a vital ingredient in the crime of treason, which, in
the absence of admission, may be gathered from the nature and
circumstances of each particular case.
But the accused may be punished for the rape of Eriberta Ramo, Eduarda
Daohog, Eutiquia Lamay and Flaviana Bonalos as principal by direct
participation. Without his cooperation in the manner above stated, these
rapes could not have been committed.
Conviction of the accused of rapes instead of treason finds express
sanction in section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 682, which says:
Provided further, That where, in its opinion, the evidence is not sufficient
to support the offense (treason) charged, the People's Court may,
nevertheless, convict and sentence the accused for any crime included in
the acts alleged in the information and established by the evidence.
All the above mentioned rapes are alleged in the information and
substantiated by the evidence.
Counsel assails the constitutionality of this of his provision as violative of
section 1, paragraph 17, Article III of the Constitution, which guarantees to
an accused the right "to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him." The contention is not well taken. The provision in
requires that the private crimes of which an accused of treason may be
convicted must be averred in the information and sustained by evidence.
In the light of this enactment, the defendant was warned of the hazard
that he might be founded guilty of rapes if he was innocent of treason and
thus afforded an opportunity to prepare and meet them. There is no
element of surprise or anomaly involved. In facts under the general law of
criminal procedure convicted for crime different from that designated in
the complaint or information is allowed and practiced, provided only that
such crime "is included or described in the body of the information, and
afterwards justified by the proof presented during the trial."
(People vs. Perez, 45 Phil., 599.)
The defendant personally assaulted and abused two of the offended girls
but these assaults are not charged against him and should be ruled out.
The crime of coercion alleged and founded on count No. 6. need not be
noticed in view of the severity of the penalty for the other crimes which
he must suffer.
We find the defendant guilty of four separate crimes of rape and sentence
him for each of them to an indeterminate penalty of from 10 year
of prision mayor to 17 year and 4 months of reclusion temporal, with the
accessories of law, to indemnify each of the offended women in the sum
of P3,000, and to pay the costs; it being understood that the total duration
of these penalties shall not exceed forty years.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., reserves his vote.
Montemayor, J., concurs in the result.
 8
G.R. No. L-399 January 29, 1948
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDUARDO PRIETO (alias EDDIE VALENCIA), defendant-appellant.
Alfonso E. Mendoza for appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Isidro C.
Borromeo for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
The appellant was prosecuted in the People's Court for treason on 7
counts. After pleading not guilty he entered a plea of guilty to counts 1, 2,
3 and 7, and maintained the original plea to counts 4, 5, and 6. The special
prosecutor introduced evidence only on count 4, stating with reference to
counts 5 and 6 that he did not have sufficient evidence to sustain them.
The defendant was found guilty on count 4 as well as counts 1, 2, 3, and 7
and was sentenced to death and to pay the fine of P20,000.
Two witnesses gave evidence on count 4 but their statements do not
coincide on any single detail. Juanito Albano, the first witness, testified
that in March, 1945, the accused with other Filipino undercovers and
Japanese soldiers caught an American aviator and had the witness carry
the American to town on a sled pulled by a carabao; that on the way, the
accused walked behind the sled and asked the prisoner if the sled was
faster than the airplane; that the American was taken to the Kempetai
headquarters, after which he did not know what happened to the flier.
Valentin Cuison, the next witness, testified that one day in March, 1945,
he saw the accused following an American and the accused were Japanese
and other Filipinos.
These witnesses evidently referred to two different occasions. The last
witness stated that the American was walking as well as his captors. And
there was no sled, he said, nor did he see Juanito Albano, except at night
when he and Albano had a drink of tuba together.
This evidence does not testify the two-witness principle. The two
witnesses failed to corroborate each other not only on the whole overt act
but on any part of it. (People vs. Adriano, 44 Off. Gaz., 4300; Cramer vs. U.
S., 65 S. Ct. 918.)
The lower court believes that the accused is "guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of treason complexed by murder and physical injuries,"
with "the aggravating circumstances mentioned above." Apparently, the
court has regarded the murders and physical injuries charged in the
information, not only as crimes distinct from treason but also as modifying
circumstances. The Solicitor General agrees with the decision except as to
technical designation of the crime. In his opinion, the offense committed
by the appellant is a "complex crime of treason with homicide."
Counts 1, 2, 3 and 7 are as follows:
1. On or about October 15, 1944, in the municipality of Mandaue, Province
of Cebu, Philippines, said accused being a member of the Japanese
Military Police and acting as undercover man for the Japanese forces with
the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the
enemy did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably
lead, guide and accompany a patrol of Japanese soldiers and Filipino
undercovers to the barrio of Poknaon, for the purpose of apprehending
guerrillas and locating their hideouts; that said accused and his
companions did apprehended Abraham Puno, tie his hands behind him
and give him fist blows; thereafter said Abraham Puno was taken by the
accused and his Japanese companions to Yati, Liloan, Cebu, where he was
severely tortured by placing red hot iron on his shoulders, legs and back
and from there he was sent back to the Japanese detention camp in
Mandaue and detained for 7 days;
2. On or about October 28, 1944, in the municipality of Mandaue, Province
of Cebu, Philippines, said accused acting as an informer and agent for the
Japanese Military Police, with the purpose of giving and with the intent to
give aid and comfort to the enemy, did, the, and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably lead, guide and accompany a group of Filipino
undercovers for the purpose of apprehending guerrillas and guerrilla
suspects; that the herein accused and his companions did in fact
apprehend Guillermo Ponce and Macario Ponce from their house; that
said accused and his companions did tie the hands of said Guillermo Ponce
and Macario Ponce behind their backs, giving them first blows on the face
and in other parts of the body and thereafter detained them at the
Kempei Tai Headquarters; that Guillermo Ponce was released the
following day while his brother was detained and thereafter nothing more
was heard of him nor his whereabouts known;
3. Sometime during the month of November, 1944, in the Municipality of
Mandaue, Province of Cebu, Philippines, for the purpose of giving and
with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy and her military
forces, said accused acting as an enemy undercover did, then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and treasonably lead, guide and
accompany a patrol of some 6 Filipinos and 2 Japanese soldiers to barrio
Pakna-an, municipality of Mandaue for the purpose of apprehending
guerrillas and guerrilla suspects, and said patrol did in fact apprehend as
guerrilla suspects Damian Alilin and Santiago Alilin who were forthwith
tied with a rope, tortured and detained for 6 days; that on the 7th day said
Damian Alilin and Santiago Alilin were taken about 1/2 kilometer from
their home and the accused did bayonet them to death;
7. In or about November 16, 1944, in Mandaue, in conspiracy with the
enemy and other Filipinos undercovers, said accused did cause the torture
of Antonio Soco and the killing of Gil Soco for guerrilla activities.
The execution of some of the guerrilla suspects mentioned in these counts
and the infliction of physical injuries on others are not offenses separate
from treason. Under the Philippine treason law and under the United
States constitution defining treason, after which the former was patterned,
there must concur both adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and
comfort. One without the other does not make treason.
In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be
accomplished by some kind of action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or
physical activity as opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer vs. U.S., ante.)
This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal
offense under another penal statute or provision. Even so, when the deed
is charged as an element of treason it becomes identified with the latter
crime and can not be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in
combination with treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can not be punished for
possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking the identical drug, and a
robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a
prosecution for robbery, because possession of opium and force and
trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a
defendant be made liable for murder as a separate crime or in conjunction
 9
with another offense where, as in this case, it is averred as a constitutive
ingredient of treason. This rule would not, of course, preclude the
punishment of murder or physical injuries as such if the government
should elect to prosecute the culprit specifically for those crimes instead
on relying on them as an element of treason. it is where murder or
physical injuries are charged as overt acts of treason that they can not be
regarded separately under their general denomination.
However, the brutality with which the killing or physical injuries were
carried out may be taken as an aggravating circumstance. Thus, the use of
torture and other atrocities on the victims instead of the usual and less
painful method of execution will be taken into account to increase the
penalty under the provision of article 14, paragraph 21, of the Revised
Penal Code, since they, as in this case, augmented the sufferings of the
offended parties unnecessarily to the attainment of the criminal objective.
This aggravating circumstance is compensated by the mitigating
circumstance of plea of guilty. it is true that the accused pleaded not guilty
to counts 4, 5 and 6 but count 4 has not be substantiated while counts 5
and 6 were abandoned.
In this first assignment of error, counsel seeks reversal of the judgment
because of the trial court's failure to appoint "another attorney de oficio
for the accused in spite of the manifestation of the attorney de oficio (who
defended the accused at the trial) that he would like to be relieved for
obvious reasons."
The appellate tribunal will indulge reasonable presumptions in favor of the
legality and regularity of all the proceedings of the trial court, including
the presumption that the accused was not denied the right to have
counsel. (U.S. vs. Labial, 27 Phil., 82.) It is presumed that the procedure
prescribed by law has been observed unless it is made to appear expressly
to the contrary. (U.S. vs. Escalante, 36 Phil., 743.) The fact that the
attorney appointed by the trial court to aid the defendant in his defense
expressed reluctance to accept the designation because, as the present
counsel assumes, he did not sympathize with the defendant's cause, is not
sufficient to overcome this presumption. The statement of the counsel in
the court below did no necessarily imply that he did not perform his duty
to protect the interest of the accused. As a matter of fact, the present
counsel "sincerely believes that the said Attorney Carin did his best,
although it was not the best of a willing worker." We do not discern in the
record any indication that the former counsel did not conduct the defense
to the best of his ability. if Attorney Carin did his best as a sworn member
of the bar, as the present attorney admits, that was enough; his
sentiments did not cut any influence in the result of the case and did not
imperil the rights of the appellant.
In conclusion, we find the defendant not guilty of count 4 and guilty of
treason as charged in counts 1,2,3 and 7. There being an aggravating
circumstance, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua. The
judgment of the lower court will be modified in this respect accordingly. In
all other particulars, the same will be affirmed. it is so ordered, with costs
of this instance against the appellant.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, Bengzon, and Padilla,
JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-477 June 30, 1947
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
APOLINARIO ADRIANO, defendant-appellant.
Remedios P. Nufable for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Lacson for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for treason by the People's
Court sentencing the accused to life imprisonment, P10,000 fine, and the
costs.
The information charged:
That between January and April, 1945 or thereabout, during the
occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese Imperial Forces, in the
Province of Nueva Ecija and in the mountains in the Island of Luzon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named
accused, Apolinario Adriano, who is not a foreigner, but a Filipino citizen
owing allegiance to the United States and the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, in violation of said allegiance, did then and there willfully,
criminally and treasonably adhere to the Military Forces of Japan in the
Philippines, against which the Philippines and the United States were then
at war, giving the said enemy aid and comfort in the manner as follows:
That as a member of the Makapili, a military organization established and
designed to assist and aid militarily the Japanese Imperial forces in the
Philippines in the said enemy's war efforts and operations against the
United States and the Philippines, the herein accused bore arm and joined
and assisted the Japanese Military Forces and the Makapili Army in armed
conflicts and engagements against the United States armed forces and the
Guerrillas of the Philippine Commonwealth in the Municipalities of San
Leonardo and Gapan, Province of Nueva Ecija, and in the mountains of
Luzon, Philippines, sometime between January and April, 1945. Contrary
to Law.
The prosecution did not introduce any evidence to substantiate any of the
facts alleged except that of defendant's having joined the Makapili
organization. What the People's Court found is that the accused
participated with Japanese soldiers in certain raids and in confiscation of
personal property. The court below, however, said these acts had not
been established by the testimony of two witnesses, and so regarded
them merely as evidence of adherence to the enemy. But the court did
find established under the two-witness rule, so we infer, "that the accused
and other Makapilis had their headquarters in the enemy garrison at
Gapan, Nueva Ecija; that the accused was in Makapili military uniform;
that he was armed with rifle; and that he drilled with other Makapilis
under a Japanese instructor; . . . that during the same period, the accused
in Makapili military uniform and with a rifle, performed duties as sentry at
the Japanese garrison and Makapili headquarters in Gapan, Nueva Ecija;"
"that upon the liberation of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, by the American forces,
the accused and other Makapilis retreated to the mountains with the
enemy;" and that "the accused, rifle in hand, later surrendered to the
Americans."
Even the findings of the court recited above in quotations are not borne
out by the proof of two witnesses. No two of the prosecution witnesses
testified to a single one of the various acts of treason imputed by them to
the appellant. Those who gave evidence that the accused took part in
 10
raids and seizure of personal property, and performed sentry duties and
military drills, referred to acts allegedly committed on different dates
without any two witnesses coinciding in any one specified deed. There is
only one item on which the witnesses agree: it is that the defendant was a
Makapili and was seen by them in Makapili uniform carrying arms. Yet,
again, on this point it cannot be said that one witness is corroborated by
another if corroboration means that two witnesses have seen the accused
doing at least one particular thing, it a routine military chore, or just
walking or eating.
We take it that the mere fact of having joined a Makapili organization is
evidence of both adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort.
Unless forced upon one against his will, membership in the Makapili
organization imports treasonable intent, considering the purposes for
which the organization was created, which, according to the evidence,
were "to accomplish the fulfillment of the obligations assumed by the
Philippines in the Pact of Alliance with the Empire of Japan;" "to shed
blood and sacrifice the lives of our people in order to eradicate
Anglo-Saxon influence in East Asia;" "to collaborate unreservedly and
unstintedly with the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy in the Philippines;"
and "to fight the common enemies." Adherence, unlike overt acts, need
not be proved by the oaths of two witnesses. Criminal intent and
knowledge may be gather from the testimony of one witness, or from the
nature of the act itself, or from the circumstances surrounding the act.
(Cramer vs. U.S., 65 Sup. Ct., 918.)
At the same time, being a Makapili is in itself constitutive of an overt act.
It is not necessary, except for the purpose of increasing the punishment,
that the defendant actually went to battle or committed nefarious acts
against his country or countrymen. The crime of treason was committed if
he placed himself at the enemy's call to fight side by side with him when
the opportune time came even though an opportunity never presented
itself. Such membership by its very nature gave the enemy aid and
comfort. The enemy derived psychological comfort in the knowledge that
he had on his side nationals of the country with which his was at war. It
furnished the enemy aid in that his cause was advanced, his forces
augmented, and his courage was enhanced by the knowledge that he
could count on men such as the accused and his kind who were ready to
strike at their own people. The principal effect of it was no difference from
that of enlisting in the invader's army.
But membership as a Makapili, as an overt act, must be established by the
deposition of two witnesses. Does the evidence in the present case meet
this statutory test? Is two-witness requirement fulfilled by the testimony
of one witness who saw the appellant in Makapili uniform bearing a gun
one day, another witness another day, and so forth?
The Philippine law on treason is of Anglo-American origin and so we have
to look for guidance from American sources on its meaning and scope.
Judicial interpretation has been placed on the two-witness principle by
American courts, and authoritative text writers have commented on it.
We cull from American materials the following excerpts which appear to
carry the stamp of authority.
Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Vol. 3, section 1396, p. 2282, says:
In England the original Statute of Edward, although requiring both
witnesses to be to the same overt act, was held to mean that there might
be one witness to an overt act and another witness to another overt act of
the same species of treason; and, in one case it has been intimated that
the same construction might apply in this country. But, as Mr. Wigmore so
succinctly observes: "The opportunity of detecting the falsity of the
testimony, by sequestering the two witnesses and exposing their variance
in details, is wholly destroyed by permitting them to speak to different
acts." The rule as adopted in this country by all the constitutional
provisions, both state and Federal, properly requires that two witnesses
shall testify to the same overt act. This also is now the rule in England.
More to the point is this statement from VII Wigmore on Evidence, 3d ed.,
section 2038, p. 271:
Each of the witnesses must testify to the whole of the overt act; or, if it is
separable, there must be two witnesses to each part of the overt act.
Learned Hand, J., in United States vs. Robinson (D.C.S.D., N.Y., 259 Fed.,
685), expressed the same idea: "It is necessary to produce two direct
witnesses to the whole overt act. It may be possible to piece bits together
of the overt act; but, if so, each bit must have the support of two
oaths; . . .." (Copied as footnote in Wigmore on Evidence,ante.) And in the
recent case of Cramer vs. United States (65 Sup. Ct., 918), decide during
the recent World War, the Federal Supreme Court lays down this doctrine:
"The very minimum function that an overt act must perform in a treason
prosecution is that it shows sufficient action by the accused, in its setting,
to sustain a finding that the accused actually gave aid and comfort to the
enemy. Every act, movement, deed, and word of the defendant charged to
constitute treason must be supported by the testimony of two witnesses."
In the light of these decisions and opinions we have to set aside the
judgment of the trial court. To the possible objection that the reasoning
by which we have reached this conclusion savors of sophism, we have only
to say that the authors of the constitutional provision of which our
treason law is a copy purposely made conviction for treason difficult, the
rule "severely restrictive." This provision is so exacting and so
uncompromising in regard to the amount of evidence that where two or
more witnesses give oaths to an overt act and only one of them is believed
by the court or jury, the defendant, it has been said and held, is entitled to
discharge, regardless of any moral conviction of the culprit's guilt as
gauged and tested by the ordinary and natural methods, with which we
are familiar, of finding the truth. Natural inferences, however strong or
conclusive, flowing from other testimony of a most trustworthy witness or
from other sources are unavailing as a substitute for the needed
corroboration in the form of direct testimony of another eyewitness to the
same overt act.
The United States Supreme Court saw the obstacles placed in the path of
the prosecution by a literal interpretation of the rule of two witnesses but
said that the founders of the American government fully realized the
difficulties and went ahead not merely in spite but because of the
objections. (Cramer vs. United States, ante.) More, the rule, it is said,
attracted the members of the Constitutional Convention "as one of the
few doctrines of Evidence entitled to be guaranteed against legislative
change." (Wigmore on Evidence, ante, section 2039, p. 272, citing
Madison's Journal of the Federal Convention, Scott's ed., II, 564, 566.) Mr.
Justice Jackson, who delivered the majority opinion in the celebrated
Cramer case, said: "It is not difficult to find grounds upon which to quarrel
with this Constitutional provision. Perhaps the farmers placed rather more
reliance on direct testimony than modern researchers in psychology
warrant. Or it may be considered that such a quantitative measure of
proof, such a mechanical calibration of evidence is a crude device at best
or that its protection of innocence is too fortuitous to warrant so
unselective an obstacle to conviction. Certainly the treason rule, whether
wisely or not, is severely restrictive." It must be remembered, however,
 11

that the Constitutional Convention was warned by James Wilson that

"'Treason may sometimes be practiced in such a manner, as to render
proof extremely difficult — as in a traitorous correspondence with an
enemy.' The provision was adopted not merely in spite of the difficulties it
put in the way of prosecution but because of them. And it was not by
whim or by accident, but because one of the most venerated of that
venerated group considered that "prosecutions for treason were generally
virulent.'"

Such is the clear meaning of the two-witness provision of the American

Constitution. By extension, the lawmakers who introduced that provision
into the Philippine statute books must be understood to have intended
that the law should operate with the same inflexibility and rigidity as the
American forefathers meant.

The judgment is reversed and the appellant acquitted with costs

charged de oficio.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, Hontiveros, and

Padilla, JJ., concur.
Paras, J., concurs in the result.

2. Conspiracy and proposal to commit treason

REV. PEN. CODE, art. 115

Rep. Act No. 10951 (2016)

3. Misprision of treason

REV. PEN. CODE, art. 116

4. Espionage

REV. PEN. CODE, art. 117

Commonwealth Act No. 616 (1941) or Espionage Law

Batas Pambansa Bilang 39 (1979) or Foreign Agents Act of C

1979