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No. CASES MAIN OWNER INSERT DIGEST HERE

I. Crimes against National

Security and Law of Nation

A. Treason

Doctrine: Absolute and permanent allegiance is not suspended during

enemy occupation. Hence, adherence to said enemy occupant, through
giving them aid and comfort, is an act of treason punishable under Article
114 of the RPC.

FACTS:Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus based on a theory that
a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort
during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason
defined and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason
(1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and,
consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then
suspended; and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands
upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic.

ISSUE:W/N Philippine government sovereignty was suspended and hence, Misa

cannot be prosecuted for treason.

Laurel vs. Misa, G.R. No. L-409,

1 Calamba, Dante
January 30, 1947
RULING: No. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a
territory occupied by the enemy to their legitimate government or sovereign is not
abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the
government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, and if
its is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the
legitimate government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular government
(which is the supreme power which governs a body politic or society constituting a
State).

What may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the
control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily
to the occupant. The political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties
and obligation of government and citizens, are suspended in abeyance during
military occupation. The petitioner is subject to the Revised Penal Code for the
change of form of government does not affect the prosecution of those charged
with the crime of treason because it is an offense to the same government and
same sovereign people.

Thus, Anastacio can be prosecuted for the crime of treason.

2 Cramer vs. US, 65 Sup. Ct. 918 Marjorie Maglana Cericon

Facts:

Anthony Cramer, a German by birth, had been residing in the United States
since 1925 and was naturalized in 1936. However, he had a strong connection to
his homeland. He openly opposed the participation of the United States in
World War II and refused to work on war materials. He also feared being
drafted but otherwise, no proof existed that he acted disloyalty to the United
States.
 One day, Cramer received a cryptic note under his door instructing him to go to
Grand Central Station in New York. The note was from Werner Thiel, who
previously worked with Cramer but returned to Germany to fight for the Nazis.
Cramer and Thiel spent time together. However, Cramer denied knowing that
the main reason Thiel returned to the United States was to sabotage the
American war effort. Cramer also worked to match Thiel up with Thiel’s former
fiancé. But after the second of these meetings, Thiel and his co-saboteur, who
was present briefly at one meeting, were arrested. Shortly after, Cramer was
arrested, tried, and found guilty.

Issue: Whether or not Cramer is guilty of Treason.

Held: Cramer is not guilty of treason. The court held that the crime of treason
has two elements: (1) adherence to the enemy and (2) giving aid or comfort.

Additionally, the accused must have more than an intent to betray and the traitor
must translate the intent into action. Each act must have two witnesses. The act
of adherence must confer some actual, tangible benefit on the enemy.

The Court found none of that. There was no proof by two witnesses of what
they said, or in what language they conversed;. No one could show that Cramer
gave them any information of value to their mission, or that he had any to give.
No one could show any effort at secrecy because they met in public places.
Lastly, no evidence existed that Cramer furnished them shelter, sustenance, or
supplies. He also did not give them encouragement or counsel.

3 People vs. Mangahas, G.R. Nos. Camacho, Alyssa RATIO: Commandeering foodstuffs from civilian populace for the Japanese soldiers is
L-5367 and L;5368 June 9, 1953 treason. Food supplies are indispensable in the conduct of war. Insufficiency of food
supplies tends to weaken the military power of the enemy (Japan)..

FACTS: In 1944, Makapilis raided Lawang, Norzagaray, and apprehended several

guerilla members. The Makapilis also stationed themselves in front of the municipal
building. Among them were respondents Cayetano and Mariano Mangahas, with which
they surrounded the house of Enriqueta de la Merced, went up and took and brought to the
garrison of the Makapilis near the municipal building foodstuffs intended for the guerillas,
consisting of 5 sacks of rice, 2 cans of salted beef, a basketful of camote and another of
tomatoes, a small bag of salt and a half sack of sardines, salmon and corned beef.

Enriqueta de la Merced and Engracia de la Cruz testified to the mentioned overt acts.
Thereafter, a group of armed Makapili took and carried away rice, shoes, helmet, clothes
and anything they could get hold in the house of Primo S. Cruz and at the same time
apprehended him and brought him to the San Jose garrison where Japanese soldiers were
stationed and since then Cruz has not returned and has not been seen.

Cavetano Mangahas and Mariano de los Santos Mangahas were charged with treason at
the Court of First Instance in Bulacan. Both the defendants have appealed the decision of
the lower court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants were guilty of the crime of treason

HELD: YES. Giving information to or commandeering foodstuffs for the enemy is

evidence of both adherence and aid or comfort. The defendant's act of commandeering
foodstuffs for the Japanese soldiers is sufficient proof of adherence to the enemy. The
phrase "adherence to enemy" means intent to betray.
 There is adherence to the enemy when a citizen intellectually or emotionally favors the
enemy and harbors sympathies or convictions disloyal to his country's policy or interest.

The claim that there is no proof of adherence to the enemy is without merit. The acts of
arresting guerillas commandeering foodstuffs, doing sentry work, drilling in the plaza,
going around town carrying firearms, are more than sufficient proofs of adherence to the
enemy. Moreover, Cayetano Mangahas' testimony that he was not present when the house
of Enriqueta de la Merced was raided, cannot prevail over the testimony of the latter and
Engracia de la Cruz who on that occasion saw the defendants among the raiders.
Therefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed by the Supreme Court.

4 People vs. Perez, G.R. No. Dacaldacal, Angelica FACTS:

L856, April 18, 1949 · The accused was convicted of treason by the People’s Court and
sentenced to death by electrocution.
· Seven counts were alleged in the information but the prosecution offered
evidence only on counts 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6, all of which were substantiated.
· Count 1: the accused allegedly recruited, apprehended and commandeered
numerous girls and women against their will to satisfy the immoral
purpose and sexual desire of Colonel Mini. The victim Eriberta Ramo
was brought by the accused to Colonel Mini. Colonel Mini threatened
here and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her.
· Count 2: the accused brought Eriberta and Cleopatra Ramo to attend a
banquet and a dance organized in honor of Colonel Mini.
· Count 4: the two girls named Eduarda S. Daohog and Eutiquia Lamay,
were taken from their homes by the accused and delivered to the
Japanese officer, Dr Takibayas. Before they were delivered, the accused
through force and intimidation, raped Eduarda S. Daohog.
· Count 5: The accused brought Feliciana Bonalos and her sister Flaviana
Bonalos to Colonel Mini. The sisters were, through violence, threat and
intimidation, raped by Colonel Mini and the accused.
· Count 6: That the accused, together with his Filipino companion
apprehended Natividad Barcinas, Nicanora Ralameda and Teotima
Barcinas, nurses of the provincial hospital, for not having attended a
dance and reception organized by the Puppet Governor in honor of
Colonel Mini and other Japanese high ranking officers.

ISSUE: WON the accused is guilty of treason

HELD: NO.
· In a carefully written brief for the appellant these findings are not
questioned, but it is contended that the deeds committed by the accused
do not constitute treason.
· If furnishing women for immoral purposes to the enemies was treason
because women's company kept up their morale, so fraternizing with
them, entertaining them at parties, selling them food and drinks, and
kindred acts, would be treason.
· For any act of hospitality without doubt produces the same general result.
yet by common agreement those and similar manifestation of sympathy
and attachment are not the kind of disloyalty that are punished as treason.
· In a broad sense, the law of treason does not prescribe all kinds of social,
business and political intercourse between the belligerent occupants of
the invaded country and its inhabitants.
· As general rule, to be treasonous the extent of the aid and comfort
given to the enemies must be to render assistance to them as enemies
and not merely as individuals and in addition, be directly in
furtherance of the enemies' hostile designs.
· The acts herein charged were not, by fair implication, calculated to
strengthen the Japanese Empire or its army or to cripple the defense
and resistance of the other side. Whatever favorable effect the
defendant's collaboration with the Japanese might have in their
prosecution of the war was trivial, imperceptible, and unintentional.
· Intent of disloyalty is a vital ingredient in the crime of treason, which, in
the absence of admission, may be gathered from the nature and
circumstances of each particular case.
· the evidence is not sufficient to support the offense (treason) charged, the
People's Court may, nevertheless, convict and sentence the accused for
 any crime included in the acts alleged in the information and established
by the evidence.

Facts: Cucufante Adlawan was charged with treason but was convicted with
“complex crime of crime of treason with murder, robbery, and rape.

Respondent Adlawan was charged with numerous acts relating to him adhering to
the Japanese forces, giving them aid or comfort, and committing felonious acts
against his fellow Filipinos such as torture and murder among other things.
Respondent pleaded guilty to all of them. However, he contended that the lower
court erred in holding that the crime committed by then accused is a complex
crime of treason with murder, rape and robbery.

People vs. Adlawan, G.R. No. Issue: Whether or not the conviction for the complex crime of treason with
5 Dapitan, Jairus murder, rape, and robbery is proper.
L456, March 19, 1949

Ruling: No.

The Supreme Court found merit in the contention that appellant should not have
been convicted of the so-called "complex crime of treason with murder, robbery,
and rape." The killings, robbery, and raping mentioned in the information are
therein alleged not as specific offenses but as mere elements of the crime of
treason for which the accused is being prosecuted. Being merged in and
identified with the general charge, they can not be used in combination with
treason to increase the penalty under article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant should, therefore, be held guilty of treason only.

Facts: Racaza was found guilty on fourteen counts of treason by the trial court.
The trial court found the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation,
superior strength, treachery and employment of means for adding ignominy to
the natural effects of the crime.

Issue: W/N the finding of the trial court is proper as regards the aggravating
circumstances?

Ruling: No.

- Evident premeditation, superior strength, and treachery are, by

their nature, inherent in the offense of treason and may not be
taken to aggravate the penalty. Adherence and the giving of aid and
comfort to the enemy is a long, continued process requiring fixed,
People vs. Racaza, G.R. No. reflective and persistent determination and planning. Treachery is
6 Marasigan-Daliva, Aerylle
L365, January 21, 1949 merged in superior strength. To overcome the opposition and wipe out
resistance movements, the use of a large force and equipment was
necessary. The enemy to whom the accused adhered was itself the
personification of brute, superior force, and it was this superior force
which enabled him to overrun the country and for a time subdue its
inhabitants by his brutal rule.
- AS TO IGNOMINY - But the law does abhor inhumanity and the
abuse of strength to commit acts unnecessary to the commission of
treason. There is no incompatibility between treason and decent,
human treatment of prisoners. Rapes, wanton robbery for personal
gain, and other forms of cruelties are condemned and the perpetration
of these will be regarded as aggravating circumstances of ignominy
and of deliberately augmenting unnecessary wrongs to the main
Criminal objective under paragraphs 17 and 21 of article 14 of the
Revised Penal Code
 B. Proposal or conspiracy to
commit treason

FACTS:
· Some written appointments of officials in the revolutionary army were, it
is claimed, signed by these two appellants (Manalo and Asuncion) and
sent to the Province of Zambales, where they were received by the other
two appellants.
ISSUE: WON the defendants are guilty of treason?
HELD: Only Sotero Batle is liable.
· The only evidence in the case against Manalo is testimony relating to
certain confessions made by the different defendants before the
provincial governor, provincial fiscal and other persons.
· However, there was no testimony given by these defendants during the
trial in the CFI.
· appellant Francisco Cruz Azuncion, who denied all connection with the
affair and swore that he did not know Bernardo Manalo
· Under these circumstances, statements made by persons other than
Manalo outside of the court and testified to third persons are hearsay and
not admissible against this appellant.
· As to the defendant Valentin Colorado, there is testimony that four of
these appointments were found in a trunk in his house by one Jose
Millora. We have already held that the mere possession of a document of
US vs. Manalo, G.R. No. L-2723, this kind is not sufficient to convict.
7 Diana, Salvador JR
August 19,1906 · There is evidence in the case that at the time these papers were received
by the appellant, Valentin Colorado, he did not know what they were,
and requested this councilman to open them.
· The Court was satisfied that the envelope contained the appointment in
question and that appellant did not act under the appointment but
immediately reported the receipt of them to the authorities.
· The evidence is not sufficient to support the judgment against Valentin
Colorado.
· As to Sotero Batle, it was proved that he, being a soldier in the
Constabulary stationed in Zambales, received from the appellant
Francisco Cruz Asuncion a letter relating to this revolutionary
organization. However, there is no evidence outside of this testimony
that he took any action in connection with the matter. We do not
think that he can be convicted under the testimony offered in this
case against him.
· As to Francisco Cruz Asuncion, it is proved that this letter found in the
possession of Batle was sent by him. It bore his signature and, as we have
said, referred to this proposed uprising. It also bore in various places
thereon the impression of a seal indicating the military character of the
organization. We think the evidence is sufficient to support the
conviction of this defendant.

US vs. Bautista, G.R. No. L-

8
2189, November 3, 1906

9 US vs. Bautista, G.R. No. L- Serrano, Maria Cristina Facts: The appellant in this case was convicted in the Court of First Instance of Manila
2189, Angela of the crime of conspiracy to overthrow, put down, and destroy by force the Government
November 3, 1906 of the United States in the Philippine Islands and the Government of the Philippine
Islands.

In 1903, a junta was organized and a conspiracy entered into by a number of Filipinos in
Hongkong, for the purpose of overthrowing the Government by force of arms and
establishing in its stead a government to be known as the republica universal democratica
filipina; that one Primo Ruiz was recognized as the head of this conspiracy and Artemio
Ricarte as chief of military forces to be organized in the Philippines; that Ricarde came to
Manila from Hongkong; after his arrival in Manila, he held a number of meetings whereat
was perfected the conspiracy in Hongkong; defendant Franscisco Bautista took part in
several meetings where the plans of the conspirators were discussed and perfected, at one
of these meetings Bautista, in answer to a question of Ricarte, assured him that the
necessary preparations had been made and that he "held the people in readiness."

10 People vs.Adriano, G.R. No.
L477, June 30, 1947
Argument of Counsel for appellant: the constitutional provision requiring the testimony of
at least two witnesses to the same overt act, or confession in open court, to support a
conviction for the crime of treason should be applied in this case
Issue: WoN appellant is guilty of conspiracy to commit treason.
Ruling: YES
The fact that one accused, of "conspiracy" to overthrow the Government has actually and
voluntarily accepted appointment by the conspirators as an officer of armed forces, raised
or to be raised for the furtherance of the designs of the conspirators, may be taken into
consideration as evidence of the criminal connection of the accused with the conspiracy.
That the crime of conspiring to commit treason is a separate and distinct offense from the
crime of treason, and that this constitutional provision is not applicable in such cases.
In other words: Attending a meeting where conspiracy to levy war against the
government was hatched, acceptance of appointment as officer of the armed forces to be
raised for the furtherance of the designs of the conspirators and assumption of obligation
as officer constitute the crime of conspiracy to commit t reason by levying war.
Guinto, Euan Doctrine: Being a Makapili is in itself constitutive of an overt act. It is not necessary,
except for the purpose of increasing the punishment, that the defendant actually went to
battle or committed nefarious acts against his country or countrymen. The crime of
treason was committed if he placed himself at the enemy's call to fight side by side with
him when the opportune time came even though an opportunity never presented itself.
Such membership by its very nature gave the enemy aid and comfort. The enemy derived
psychological comfort in the knowledge that he had on his side nationals of the country
with which his was at war. It furnished the enemy aid in that his cause was advanced, his
forces augmented, and his courage was enhanced by the knowledge that he could count on
men such as the accused and his kind who were ready to strike at their own people. The
principal effect of it was no difference from that of enlisting in the invader's army.
FACTS:
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for treason by the People's Court
sentencing the accused to life imprisonment, P10,000 fine, and the costs.
The accused ADRIANO was charged with Treason because of his involvement with the
Military Forces of Japan in 1945. He served as a member of the Makapili and participated
with the Japanese soldiers in certain raids and in confiscation of personal property.
The lower court, however, held that the act imputed against him, i.e. his membership as a
Makapili, had not been established by the testimony of 2 witnesses, as required by law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the two-witness rule is required in establishing the guilt of the
accused in the crime of treason
RULING: YES
Being a Makapili is in itself constitutive of an overt act. It is not necessary, except for the
purpose of increasing the punishment, that the defendant actually went to battle or
committed nefarious acts against his country or countrymen. The crime of treason was
committed if he placed himself at the enemy's call to fight side by side with him when the
opportune time came even though an opportunity never presented itself. Such membership
by its very nature gave the enemy aid and comfort. The enemy derived psychological
comfort in the knowledge that he had on his side nationals of the country with which his
was at war. It furnished the enemy aid in that his cause was advanced, his forces
augmented, and his courage was enhanced by the knowledge that he could count on men
such as the accused and his kind who were ready to strike at their own people. The
principal effect of it was no difference from that of enlisting in the invader's army.
But membership as a Makapili, as an overt act, must be established by the deposition of
two witnesses.
Meaning of Two-Witness Rule: Each of the witnesses must testify to the whole of the
 overt act; or, if it is separable, there must be two witnesses to each part of the overt act.
(VII Wigmore on Evidence) It is necessary to produce two direct witnesses to the whole
overt act. It may be possible to piece bits together of the overt act; but, if so, each bit must
have the support of two oaths; . . .." (Us vs Robinson) "The very minimum function that
an overt act must perform in a treason prosecution is that it shows sufficient action by the
accused, in its setting, to sustain a finding that the accused actually gave aid and comfort
to the enemy. Every act, movement, deed, and word of the defendant charged to constitute
treason must be supported by the testimony of two witnesses." (Cramer vs US)

The judgment is reversed and the appellant acquitted with costs charged de oficio.

C. Misprision of treason

D. Espionage

The petitioner avers he is a Chinese citizen apprehended in

February, 1945, by the Counter Intelligence Corps of the United
States Army, turned over last September, to the Commonwealth
Government, and since then detained by the respondent as a
political prisoner. Such detention, he claims, is illegal, because
he has not been charged before, nor convicted by, the judge of a
competent court, and because he may not be confined under Act
Go Tian Tek Santos vs. Misa, No. 682, as he owes allegiance neither to the United States nor
11 G.R. No. L-319, March 28, Lo, Jessa to the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
1946
Issue: Is the contention of the petitioner correct?

No. Petitioner's foreign status does not exclude him ipso facto
from the scope of Commonwealth Act No. 682. As stated by the
Solicitor-General, he might be prosecuted for espionage, a crime
not conditioned by the citizenship of the offender, and considered
as an offense against national security.

E. Inciting to war or Giving

motive for reprisals

F. Violation of Neutrality

G. Correspondence with
hostile country

A. Flight to enemy's country

B. Piracy

12 People vs. Tulin, G.R. No. Tiu, Kris Shelley Marie Facts:
111709, August 30, 2001 "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation was sailing off the coast of Mindoro near Silonay Island.

The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, was suddenly boarded, with the use of
an aluminum ladder, by seven fully armed pirates led by Emilio Changco, older
brother of accused-appellant Cecilio Changco. The pirates, including accused-
appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. were armed with rifles, caliber handguns,
and bolos. They detained the crew and took complete control of the vessel.

On April 10, 1991, the members of the crew were released in three batches with
the stern warning not to report the incident to government authorities for a period
of two days or until April 12, 1991, otherwise they would be killed.

On October 24, 1991, an Information charging qualified piracy or violation of

 Presidential Decree No. 532 (Piracy in Philippine Waters) was filed against
accused-appellants.

As for accused-appellant Hiong, he ratiocinates that he can no longer be

convicted of piracy in Philippine waters as defined and penalized in Sections 2[d]
and 3[a], respectively of Presidential Decree No. 532 because Republic Act No.
7659 (effective January 1, 1994), which amended Article 122 of the Revised
Penal Code, has impliedly superseded Presidential Decree No. 532. He reasons
out that Presidential Decree No. 532 has been rendered "superfluous or
duplicitous" because both Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
and Presidential Decree No. 532 punish piracy committed in Philippine waters. He
maintains that in order to reconcile the two laws, the word "any person"
mentioned in Section 1 [d] of Presidential Decree No. 532 must be omitted such
that Presidential Decree No. 532 shall only apply to offenders who are members
of the complement or to passengers of the vessel, whereas Republic Act No.
7659 shall apply to offenders who are neither members of the complement or
passengers of the vessel, hence, excluding him from the coverage of the law.

Issues:
Whether or not Hiong was guilty of piracy

Ruling:
Yes. To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its
amendment, provided that piracy must be committed on the high seas by any
person not a member of its complement nor a passenger thereof. Upon its
amendment by Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage of the pertinent provision
was widened to include offenses committed "in Philippine waters." On the other
hand, under Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the coverage of the
law on piracy embraces any person including "a passenger or member of the
complement of said vessel in Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or not, a
member of the complement or not, any person is covered by the law.

Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy
under Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction between the two
laws. There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or
interpret the law. All the presidential decree did was to widen the coverage of the
law, in keeping with the intent to protect the citizenry as well as neighboring states
from crimes against the law of nations. As expressed in one of the "whereas"
clauses of Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest forms of
lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries." For this reason,
piracy under the Article 122, as amended, and piracy under Presidential Decree
No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate laws.

Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code.
As such, it is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same
principle applies even if Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not with a
violation of qualified piracy under the penal code but under a special law,
Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters. Verily,
Presidential Decree No. 532 should be applied with more force here since its
purpose is precisely to discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters (People
v. Catantan, 278 SCRA 761 [1997]). It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of
the law penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against the whole
world (People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922]).

13 People vs. Lol-lo and Saraw, Ramirez, Ray Kristoffer FACTS:

G.R. No. L-17958, February 12,
1922
On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left Matuta, a Dutch
possession. In the second boat were eleven men, women, and
children, all subjects of Holland.

At about 7 o’clock in the evening, between the Islands of Buang

and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies, the said boat was surrounded
by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros, all armed.
 The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, they
took all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally
violated two of the women.

Holes were made in the boat in order to submerge it.

Two of the Moros were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women,
and Saraw.

Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian,

Tawi-Tawi, where they were arrested and charged in the Court
of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy.

The trial court rendered judgment finding the two defendants

guilty and sentencing each of them to life imprisonment.

A demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros,

on the grounds that the offense charged was not within the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of the
Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public
offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Philippine Courts has jurisdiction over the crime?

RULING:

All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is

robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful
authority and done animo furandi (intention to steal), and in the
spirit and intention of universal hostility.

Pirates are in law hostes humani generis (“enemy of mankind”).

Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all
mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any
country where the offender may be found or into which he may
be carried.

The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial

limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it
matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-
mile limit of a foreign state, “for those limits, though neutral to
war, are not neutral to crimes.” (U.S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5
Wheat., 184.

People vs. Siyoh, G.R. No.

14 Remulta,Reynalie Jane
L57292, February 18, 1986
 C. Mutiny

D. Hijacking

To those reading: There is some kind of mis-assignment ani nga case, kay the
case is not about hijacking but misappropriation of public funds. Nevertheless,
below are its details.

FACTS:

Defendant Germiniano Araneta was the chief clerk of the Municipal Treasurer’s
Office in Dauis Bohol. Respondent Araneta was in charge of collecting and
receiving fees for permits or licenses to kill large cattle. The charge of P1.50 per
permit is collected by the Municipal Treasurer Office through him. Because of an
incident related to his position, he was accused of the crime of misappropriation
of public funds through falsification of public documents.

It was alleged that on August 17, 1923, respondent Araneta collected and
received the sum of P1.50 from Crispo Penales in payment of the fee for the
permit to kill a cow (a heifer) belonging to Baldomero Doldole. Such payment was
entered as collection in the Record of General Collections under the date of
August 18. But the defendant allegedly simulated, falsified and counterfeit the
stub book of the permit to kill Large Cattle No. 68 previously issued to Damaso
Penales. This is because on the same day upon which the license in favor of
Damaso was issued, the accused issued another license to one Baldomero
Doldolea for the killing of a black cow, a year and a half old.

THUS, the respondent made the following alterations by changing: (a) the name
to Baldomero Doldolea; (b) changed the residence from Mayacabac to
POBLACION; (c) changed the age of the cow from 1 to 1 1/2; and (d) the mark of
the owner DP to D, to appear it that the said permit was issued to Doldolea
instead to that of Damaso Penales.

People vs. Araneta, G.R. No.
15
24622, January 28, 1926
On inspection of the books of the Municipal Treasurer (April 23, 1924), a deputy
auditor for the Province of Bohol discovered that no entry had been made in the
Abeto, Surallah R. Record of General Collections of the fee for the license issued to Baldomero
Doldolea. Respondent’s attention was called and reasoned that the case was an
oversight, he had omitted to make the entry. The following day the respondent
paid into the Municipal Treasury the sum of P1.50 and then entered the amount
as a collection.

The lower court then found the respondent guilty and sentenced him to suffer ten
years of prision mayor, with perpetual disqualifications from holding public office,
and to pay a fine 800 pesetas, with the costs.

The respondent appealed before the SC.

ISSUE: WON respondent Araneta committed the crime of misappropriation of

public funds.

HELD/DISCUSSION: YES

Respondent in his appeal, contended that it has not been proven by direct
evidence that he actually collected any fee from Baldomero Doldolea. To this the
Supreme Court ruled that it is sufficient to say that it was his duty to make
collection upon the issuance of the license and that the presumption is that he
performed his duty.

Respondent further contended that the imposition of the penalty of ten years of
prision mayor for the misappropriation of the small sum of P1.50 is cruel and
unusual and that the statutory provisions which authorize the imposition of such a
penalty are unconstitutional. This contention according to the Supreme Court is
also without merit. The Court clarified that the penalty was not imposed for the
crime of misappropriation alone but included the punishment for the falsification of
public documents as well. The penalty prescribed by Act No. 2712 for the offense
has been often applied and is, in the opinion of the Court, neither cruel nor
unusual.
 E.Terrorism

II. Crimes against the

Fundamental Law of the State

A. Arbitrary Detention

Facts:

A barrio lieutenant, seeing his servant quarreling his daughter, seized the servant.
An hour later, he sent him to the Justice of the Peace. The servant was kept in
detention from 5pm to 9am the next day when he was released by the Justice of
the Peace.

US vs. Gellada, G.R. No. L- Issue:

16
5151, January 31, 1910
Whether or not Gellaga is guilty of arbitrary detention under Article 124 of the
RPC.

Ruling:

Yes. He detained the offended party without any reason therefor, such as the
commission of a crime, and without having the authority to do so.

US vs. Agravante, G.R. No. Catapang, Joraine

17
3947, January 28, 1908 Vincent

US vs. Hawchaw, G.R. No.

18
L6909, February 20, 1912
Labrador Edrich John

19 People vs. Misa, 36 O.G. 3496 Layson, Cassandra

B. Delay in the delivery of

Detained Person

Soria vs. Desierto, G.R. Nos.

20 Puno, Janica
15352425, January 31, 2005

21 Lino vs. Fugoso, G.R. No. Belen, John Benjamin Facts:

L1159, January 30, 194
Pascual Montaniel and Pacifico Deoduco were arrested without warrant on Nov 8,
1946 and Nov 7, 1946 respectively. They were accused of inciting to sedition and
disobedience to police orders respectively. On Nov 11 when the petition for
habeas corpus was filed, the two were still under arrest, being in confinement for
a total of three days for Montaniel and four days for Deoduco without warrant and
without charges formally filed in court.

Upon investigation by the City Fiscal, it found that no sufficient evidence was
found to warrant the prosecution of either but both remained under custody
because of information filed with the municipal court charging Montaniel of unjust
vexation and Deoduco of disobedience of a person in authority which were both
 filed on Nov 12, 1946. And so far, no warrants of arrest or orders of commitment
are shown to have been issued by the municipal trial court pursuant to the
information thus filed.

Issue:

Whether or not the detention of Deoduco and Montaniel is Illegal.

Held: Yes.

Ratio:

Even assuming that they were legally arrested without warrant on November 7
and 8, 1946, respectively, their continued detention became illegal upon the
exploration of six hours without their having been delivered to the corresponding
judicial authorities.

It must be observed that in said informatons, the two petitioners are charged with
light offenses punishable by law with arresto mayor or a fine ranging from 5 to
200 pesos or both. Under Rule 108, section 10, when the offense charged is of
that character, "the judge with whom the complaint or information is filled, shall
not issue any warrant for order for the arrest of the defendant, but shall order the
latter to appear on the day and hour fixed in the order to answer the complaint of
information," although in particular instances he may also "order that a defendant
charged with such offense be arrested and not released except upon furnishing
bail." The general rule, therefore, is that when the offense charged is light the
accused should not be arrested, except in particular instances when the court
expressly orders it in the experience of its discretion.

In the instant case, the municipal court has not yet acted on the informations nor
exercised its discretion the arrest of the two petitioners and, therefore, they are
still detained not because of the informations filed against them but as a
continuance of their illegal detention by the police officers, While an arrest may be
made without warrant, there are reasonable grounds for the doing of such.
Therefore the prisoner cannot be retained beyond the period provided by law,
unless a warrant is procured from a competent court.

22 Sayo vs. Chief of Police of

Manila, G.R. No. L-2128, May Facts:
12,
1948 Petitioners, Sayo and Mostero, were arrested by Dumlao (police officer) based on
the complaint of Malinao charging the petitioners for the commission of the crime
of robbery. The police officer delivered the petitioners to the City Fiscal’s Office in
Manila.

Five days have past since the day of the delivery and the fiscal has yet to file an
information against the petitioners nor released them, which prompted them to file
a petition for habeas corpus.

Issue:

1. Whether or not a fiscal can be considered as “judicial authority” within

the meaning of Article 125 of the RPC?

2. Whether the fiscal can be held liable for Article 125 in this case? (Reyes
book)

Ruling:

1. No. Taking into consideration the history of the provisions of the above
quoted article, the precept of our Constitution guaranteeing individual liberty,
and the provisions of Rules of Court regarding arrest and habeas corpus, we
are of the opinion that the words "judicial authority", as used in said article,
 mean the courts of justices or judges of said courts vested with judicial
power to order the temporary detention or confinement of a person charged
with having committed a public offense, that is, "the Supreme Court and
such inferior courts as may be established by law".

The judicial authority mentioned in section 125 of the Revised Penal Code can
not be construed to include the fiscal of the City of Manila or any other city,
because they cannot issue a warrant of arrest or of commitment or temporary
confinement of a person surrendered to legalize the detention of a person
arrested without warrant.

2. No. If the Fiscal does not file the information within the period of six
hours prescribed by law and the arresting officer continues holding the
prisoner beyond the six-hour period, the fiscal will not be responsible for
violation of Article 125, because he is not the one who has arrested and
illegally detained the person arrested, unless he has ordered or induced the
arresting officer to hold and not release the prisoner after the expiration of
said period.

C. Delaying Release Law:

D. Expulsion Law:

23 Villavicencio vs. Lukban, G.R. Busque, JB Tomas FACTS:

No. 14639, March 25, 1919
Justo Lukban, who was then the Mayor of the City of Manila,
ordered the deportation of 170 prostitutes to Davao. His reason
for doing so was to preserve the morals of the people of Manila.
He claimed that the prostitutes were sent to Davao, purportedly,
to work for an haciendero Feliciano Ynigo. The prostitutes were
confined in houses from October 16 to 18 of that year before
being boarded, at the dead of night, in two boats bound for
Davao. The women were under the assumption that they were
being transported to another police station while Ynigo, the
haciendero from Davao, had no idea that the women being sent
to work for him were actually prostitutes.

The families of the prostitutes came forward to file charges

against Lukban, Anton Hohmann, the Chief of Police, and
Francisco Sales, the Governor of Davao. They prayed for a writ
of habeas corpus to be issued against the respondents to compel
them to bring back the 170 women who were deported to
Mindanao against their will.

During the trial, it came out that, indeed, the women were
deported without their consent. In effect, Lukban forcibly
assigned them a new domicile. Most of all, there was no law or
order authorizing Lukban's deportation of the 170 prostitutes.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mayor Lukban has the authority in

expelling the prostitutes in his City of Manila without due process
of law.

HELD:

NO. Law defines power. No official, no matter how high, is above

the law. Lukban committed a grave abuse of discretion by
deporting the prostitutes to a new domicile against their will.
There is no law expressly authorizing his action. On the contrary,
there is a law punishing public officials, not expressly authorized
by law or regulation, who compels any person to change his
residence Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as citizens of the
Philippines, entitled to the same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of
Rights, as every other citizen. Their choice of profession should
not be a cause for discrimination. It may make some, like
Lukban, quite uncomfortable but it does not authorize anyone to
compel said prostitutes to isolate themselves from the rest of the
human race. These women have been deprived of their liberty by
being exiled to Davao without even being given the opportunity to
collect their belongings or, worse, without even consenting to
being transported to Mindanao. For this, Lukban et. al must be
severely punished.

As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code in force

in these Islands provides:

Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by

regulations of a general character in force in the Philippines who
shall banish any person to a place more than two hundred
kilometers distant from his domicile, except it be by virtue of the
judgment of a court, shall be punished by a fine of not less than
three hundred and twenty-five and not more than three thousand
two hundred and fifty pesetas.

Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by

regulation of a general character in force in the Philippines who
shall compel any person to change his domicile or residence
shall suffer the penalty of destierro and a fine of not less than six
hundred and twenty-five and not more than six thousand two
hundred and fifty pesetas. (Art. 211.)

Court reasoned further that if the chief executive of any

municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a
private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the
municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official
action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was
under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction
over this other municipality, then the more the writ of habeas
corpus should be enforced.

Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally

parted with the custody of a person before the application for the
writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and
the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport
 these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials
must necessarily have the same means to return them from
Davao to Manila.

The Supreme Court said that the women were not chattels but
Filipino citizens who had the fundamental right not to be forced to
change their place of residence.

E. Violation of DomicileLaw:

US vs. Macaspac, G.R. No.

24 Padilla, Quinn Therese
3878, November 16, 1907

25 People vs. Sane, CA 40 OG Maturan, Jubelle Angeli

FACTS: March 1913 - Chua Lui, a resident of a city of Manila,
became one of the parties to a written lease in which he
secured the possession, use and occupation of a house in
Caloocan, a short distance beyond the city limits of the city of
Manila, for a period of five years. Soon after the execution of
the lease Chua Lui, Chua Tong and Chua Bee Cho moved
into the house and occupied the same.

Two or three weeks later - George W. Marshall, acting chief

of secret service of Manila, in company with three other
American officers and one Filipino officer, went to the house.
At the approach of the officers Koh Kieng Sien jumped from
the rear window of the house and ran across the fields. The
officers gave chase, overtook, and arrested the fleeing
Chinaman. They testified that the fugitive had with him a piece
of bamboo containing an opium pipe and a can of opium and
that when he saw himself hard pressed he threw them away,
evidently hoping of dispose of the incriminating evidence in
such a way as to deceive the officers. Having captured Koh
Kieng Sien, the officers then arrested Chua Tong, and Chua
Bee Cho and preferred against them a violation of section 31
of Act No. 1761 of the Philippine Commission, as amended by
section 3 of Act No. 1910 of the Philippine Legislature, (Opium
Law)

ISSUE: Was the entrance of the public officer against the

owner’s will? How will it affect the owner’s criminal liability? Is
the public officer liable for violation of domicile?

RULING:

When the entrance by the public officer must be against the

will of the owner, whether express or implied. If only without
the consent, the crime is not committed. When the detectives
secured the previous consent of the owner of the house to the
search without warrant, they are not liable.

It will be noted that to constitute a violation of domicile, the

 entrance by the public officer or employee must be against the
will of the owner of the dwelling, which presupposes
opposition or prohibition by said owner, whether express or
implied. If the entrance by the public officer or employee is
only without the consent of the owner of the dwelling, the
crime is not committed. Neither is the crime committed if the
owner of the dwelling consented to such entrance.

G.R. No. L-4335. February 19, 1908.

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PEDRO LINDIO, Defendant-

Appellant.

1. FORCIBLE ENTRY OF A DWELLING. — United States v. Arceo (3 Phil. Rep.,

381) followed as to what constitutes this offense.

Facts:

This is a prosecution for breaking into a dwelling (allanamiento de morada) with

violence and intimidation. It appears that the accused made his entry by cutting a
string fastening the door and that being inside he engaged in a quarrel with the
inmates. The defense makes the point that the entrance not being forbidden
cannot be said to have been against the will of the occupant and that there was
no violence in the manner of entry.

US vs. Lindio, G.R. No. 4335, ISSUE:

26 Mangub, Gay Marie
February 19, 1908
Whether or not accused was guilty of breaking into a dwelling with violence and
intimidation

HELD:

Yes. He is in error in both respects. The cutting of the fastenings of the door was
an act of violence and the threats against the inmates, accompanied with the
flourishing of his bolo, constituted intimidation. The case of the United States v.
Arceo (3 Phil. Rep., 381) in which this crime is analyzed and sufficiently
expounded, is direct authority to the effect that no express prohibition of entry is
required.

The defense of an alibi might merit serious consideration in this case did it not
appear to be reinforced with too many suspicious details.

The judgment of the court below did not take into consideration the aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity. For that reason, the punishment should be increased
to five years of prision correccional and the payment of a fine of 325 pesetas, with
the accessories of article 61 [Penal Code].

27 US vs. Clauck, G.R. No. 2977, Gonzales, Cyril G.R. No. L-2977 October 9, 1906
October 9, 190 THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,
vs. JERRY CLAUCK, defendant-appellant.

H. D. Terrell, for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee.
 FACTS:

At around 10-11 o’clock the night of January 23, 1903, Charles Barnes, together with
Jerry Clauck, was knocking the door at the house of Doroteo Alagaban, who lived in
barrio San Roque, Legaspi, Province of Albay. They were looking for him.

But when it was not opened, Charles Barnes kicked the door to open, causing the
breaking of the wooden bolt. Barnes and Clauck immediately entered the ground floor
where the store located. And the people sleeping in the upper floor were awakened.
The wife, Francisca Acuya, opened the window and looked out who entered. One of
those who entered asked about her husband if he was at home, and they requested her
to come downstairs, but she refused.

ISSUE:
W/O the defendant-appellant is guilty of crime of forcible entry of dwelling?

HELD:
Yes. But not the crime of forcible entry of a dwelling as punished in paragraph 1 of
article 491 of the Penal Code but under the crime defined and punished in paragraph 2
of the same article.

The crime of forcible entry of a dwelling as punished in paragraph 1 of article 491 of the
Penal Code is certainly quite different from the crime defined and punished in paragraph
2 of the same article.

The simple crime of forcible entry of a dwelling makes it essential that the entry be
effected against the will of the occupant of the house, so that if there were no previous
express prohibition against, or the owner was ignorant of, such entry at the time of its
occurrence, there can be no conviction for such crime, it being absolutely necessary in
order to convict that it be shown that the occupants of the house expressly objected to,
refused, or prohibited such entry.

However in the crime of forcibly entry of a dwelling committed with violence, force, or
intimidation it is to be presumed to such entry was effected against the will of the
occupants. It is logical to presume that the occupants of a house would not consent to
anyone entering the same forcibly or with violence or intimidation, and it is absurd to
claim that such entry would not have been effected against the will of the occupants.
The forcible entry by the defendant of the house in question, and at a late hour of the
night, by breaking open the front door while the occupants thereof were sound asleep,
shows that the house was entered against the will of the latter, and it is absurd to
presume that the occupants consented to such trespass.

The defendant pleaded "not guilty," but offered no evidence to exonerate himself from
the criminal liability incurred by him. He has therefore incurred the penalty prescribed
in paragraph 2 of article 491 of the Penal Code, and there being no aggravating or
extenuating circumstances to considered in this case, the penalty should be imposed in
its medium degree.

28 US vs. Dulfo, G.R. No. 4133, Maestre, Ismael Catalino, Jr. Facts: Appellant Pedro Dulfo was convicted of the crime of allanamiento de
August 10, 1908 morada (entering the house of another, against the will of the occupant) and
sentenced to three months' imprisonment in the provincial jail. He admitted
entering the house of Dagohoy, the complaining witness, between the hours of 12
and 2 on the night of the 14th day of February, 1907 when the owner of the house
was absent, having left it in charge of his daughters Maximina and Filomena. He
insisted that he had gone to the house at the invitation of the younger daughter
Filomena, who opened the door and admitted him. This was denied by Filomena.
The evidence however was conflicting to the denial.

The trial judge also appears to have been of opinion that the denials of the girl
Filomena could not be accepted as true, convicted the accused on the ground
 that the girl being 12 and 13 years of age, her invitation, and the opening of the
door by her, did not relieved the accused of criminal responsibility for entering the
house without the consent of the owner.

Issue: Whether the appellant Dulfo should be acquitted for the crime of forcible
entry?

Ruling: Dulfo should be acquitted.

The Court, by majority opinion in the case of the United States vs. Agas (4 Phil.
Rep., 129), acquitted the accused of the crime of allanamiento de morada, where
it appeared from the evidence that the defendant entered the house at the
request of one of the occupants thereof. It is an essential element of the offense
as defined and penalized in the Penal Code, that the entry must have been
made without the consent or, more accurately speaking, against the will of
the occupant of the dwelling house, and it is therefore the duty of the
prosecution to affirmatively established this fact before a conviction can be had
upon a complaint charging its commission. The Court also held, citing United
States vs. Arceo (3 Phil. Rep., 381), that to establish this fact the entry was
without the consent of the occupant may be presumed from circumstances, as
where one enters violently with force or intimidation. But the doctrine laid down in
these cases in no wise relieves the prosecution of the burden of affirmatively
establishing that entry was made against the prohibition of the occupant, either
express or implied.

The Court further cited the September 28, 1876 ruling of the Supreme Court of
Spain, where it held that the preposition contra (against) which is used in the
article of the Penal Code defining the crime of allanamiento de morada, signifies
negativa, oposicion, manifiesta a que se haga alguna cosa or refusal, opposition,
manifest opposition to the doing of any thing. Therefore, where the owner of a
house is not the sole occupant, it would be intolerable to hold that one is
guilty of this offense who is invited to enter by one of the members of the
household unless it clearly appeared that such member of the household
was forbidden to extend such invitation and that the person entering was
aware of that fact. All the members of a household must be presumed to have
authority to extend an invitation to enter, for to hold otherwise would be contrary
to almost universal customs and would impose an unreasonable burden on the
relations of outsiders with the various members of a household other than the
legal head of the house. It will not, therefore, be presumed that an entry of the
invitation of a member of the household was "against" (contra) the wish of the
householder, merely because it afterwards develops that such entry was in fact
without his consent, or, as in the case at bar, that he was absent and had no
opportunity to be give or to withhold his consent.

Hence, the Court held that the girl Filomena (who was at least 12 years of age,
and as appears from the evidence old enough to have carried on amorous
relations with the accused prior to the night in question, and who together with
her 18 year old sister appears to have been left in charge of the house during the
absence of her father), was old enough to justify the inference that when the
accused entered the house at her invitation, such entry was not against the
will of the occupant of the house, it appearing that her father was absent,
and there being no proof of an express prohibition on his part.

29 People vs. Barros, G.R. No. Bais, Jessa May

90640, March 29, 1994 Facts: From Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, to Nacagang,
Sabangan, Mountain Province, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused while being a passenger in
a Dangwa Bus with Plate No. ABZ 242, destined for Baguio City, without
lawful authority did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
carry with him as part of his baggage and transport about four (4) kilos of
dried marijuana which the accused intended for distribution and sale at
Baguio City.
M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan, both members of the
P.C. Mountain Province Command, rode the Dangwa Bus bearing Plate
No. ABZ-242 bound for Sabangan, Mountain Province.

Upon reaching Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, the bus

stopped and both M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan, who were seated at
the back, saw accused carrying a carton, board the bus and seated
himself on seat No. 18 after putting the carton under his seat.
Thereafter, the bus continued and upon reaching Sabangan, M/Sgt.
Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan before they alighted, it being their station, called
C2C Fernando Bongyao to inspect the carton under seat No. 18. After
C2C Bongyao inspected the carton, he found out that it contained
marijuana and he asked the passengers [who] the owner of the carton
was but nobody answered.

Accused Bonifacio Barros boarded the Dangwa Bus at Chackchakan,

Bontoc, Mountain Province bound for Baguio City. That when the
Dangwa Bus reached the P.C. Checkpoint, soldiers went inside the bus
and checked the baggages.

That accused was led by the soldiers to a house where his pasiking
was taken and his clothes removed and his wallet taken. Accused
was made to accept ownership of the carton of marijuana but he
refused.

The accused complains that he was not informed of his rights to remain
silent and to counsel, that he had not waived his rights as an accused
person, and that he had signed a confession involuntarily and without
the assistance of counsel. He essentially contends that the confession is
inadmissible as evidence against him.

Issue:

Whether or not the right of the accused against

unreasonable searches and seizures is violated? Yes.

Ruling: Note: Violation of domicile is committed by a public officer

authorized to implement a search warrant or warrant of arrest but
at the time of the incident, he is not armed with a warrant

So far as the record itself is concerned, therefore, it would appear that

there existed no circumstance which might reasonably have excited the
suspicion of the two (2) police officers riding in the same bus as
appellant Barros. They asked the police officers at the checkpoint at
Sabangan to inspect the box allegedly carried by appellant Barros
apparently on a mere guess that appellant Barros might be carrying
something in the nature of contraband goods.

There was, in other words, nothing to show that appellant Barros was
then in the process of "actually committing" or "attempting to commit" a
crime. 21 There was, moreover, nothing on the record that could have
reasonably led the two (2) police officers to believe that "an offense [had]
 in fact just been committed" when appellant Barros boarded the bus at
Chackchakan or when he was asked whether he owned the box here
involved at the checkpoint in Sabangan.

The two (2) police officers, according to the record, had no "personable
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested (appellant
Barros) had committed it.

It is, of course, possible that appellant Barros may in fact have been
guilty of transporting the four (4) kilos of marijuana. His guilt must,
however, be established by constitutional means. The non-admissibility
of evidence secured through a disregard of the constitutional right of the
accused against unreasonable searches and seizures is the sanction
imposed by the Constitution for disregard of such right; the sanction is a
powerful one, for it renders inutile the work done by the police officers,
by the prosecutor and by the trial court. It is a sanction which this Court
has no choice but to apply in the instant case.

Article 128. Violation of domicile. - The penalty of prision

correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any
public officer or employee who, not being authorized by judicial
order, shall enter any dwelling against the will of the owner thereof,
search papers or other effects found therein without the previous
consent of such owner, or having surreptitiously entered said
dwelling, and being required to leave the premises, shall refuse to
do so. If the offense be committed in the night-time, or if any
papers or effects not constituting evidence of a crime be not
returned immediately after the search made by the offender, the
penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods.

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 35, Bontoc, Mountain Province, in Criminal Case No. 687
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and appellant is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime charged, the evidence lawfully before the trial
court not being sufficient to establish his guilt thereof beyond reasonable
doubt.

People vs. Barros, G.R. No. Refer to number 29. (SAME

30
90640, March 29, 1994 CASE)

F. Obtaining and Serving Search

31
Warrant

People vs. Alvarez, G.R. No.

32 Sagulo
45358, January 29, 1937

People vs. Sy Juco, G.R. No.

33 Cajes
41957, August 28, 1937