Presented By

Dhananjay Anumandla
Dhruba Chattaraj
Mahesh Borgude
Shaunak Sontakke
 Contents
 Introduction – What / Why / When
 ERP History and Evolution
 Leading ERP Providers
 Prerequisites of ERP
 Factors that cause an ERP to Fail
 Case Study
 Lessons Learned
 Conclusion
 ERP – What is it ??
 Enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems integrate internal and
external management of information across an entire organization—
embracing finance/accounting, manufacturing, sales and
service, customer relationship management, etc. ERP systems
automate this activity with an integrated software application. ERP
facilitates information flow between all business functions inside the
organization, and manages connections to outside stakeholders.

 Enterprise system software is a multi-billion dollar industry that

produces components that support a variety of business functions.
IT investments have become the largest category of capital
expenditure in United States-based businesses over the past
decade. Enterprise systems are complex software packages that
offer the potential of integrating data and processes across
functions in an enterprise.
ERP – Why is it needed ??
 Separate systems were being maintained during 1960/70 for traditional business
functions like Sales & Marketing, Finance, Human Resources, Manufacturing, and
Supply Chain Management. These systems were often incongruent, hosted in
different databases and required batch updates. It was difficult to manage business
processes across business functions e.g. procurement to pay and sales to cash
functions. ERP system grew to replace the islands of information by integrating
these traditional business functions.

Successful implementation of an ERP system will have following advantages

1. Business integration and Improved Data Accuracy
2. Planning and MIS
3. Improved Efficiency and Productivity
4. Establishment of Standardized Procedures
5. Flexibility and technology
 ERP – When ??
 In 1990 Gartner Group first employed the acronym ERP as an
extension of material requirements planning (MRP),
later manufacturing resource planning and computer-
integrated manufacturing. Without supplanting these terms,
ERP came to represent a larger whole, reflecting the evolution
of application integration beyond manufacturing. Not all ERP
packages were developed from a manufacturing core. Vendors
variously began with accounting, maintenance, and human
resources. By the mid–1990s ERP systems addressed all core
functions of an enterprise. Beyond corporations, governments
and non–profit organizations also began to use ERP systems.
 ERP - History
• MRP - (From the 60's& 70’s) includes only
Material Planning Projections

 MRP II (From the 80's& 90’s) includes ALL

Manufacturing Resources for "What If" Pro-Active
Process Simulations

• ERP (From the 80's& 90’s) includes ALL Business

Management Systems, Philosophies and
Performance Evaluation at All Levels
 ERP System Evolution Course
1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
Market Mass Market Market Segments Niche Market Individuals
Characteristics
Demand Focus Cost Quality Feasibility Timelines
Manufacturing Mass production of Small-scale production Mass production of Mass production of
Method limited product lines of various product various product lines customized products
lines
Structured Centralized Decentralized Centralized Virtual
Management System MRP II JIT/TQC ERP + SCM EERP + SCM
Management Focus Focuses on sales, Focuses on cost, Focuses on research and Focuses on a global
production, quality, efficiency, and development, sales, operating model that
materials, and promptness of material production allocation and combines internal
financial supply. distribution, service, and external
management, integration and optimal customers and
planning and utilization of internal manufacturers.
implementation of financial resources.
manufacturing
material integration.

Application Tertiary Large area Large area Worldwide Worldwide

Operation Cycle Periodic Periodic Periodic / Ad hoc Ad hoc

ERP’s Evolution and Functions
 Leading ERP Providers
 ERP now………………Extended ERP
 Market Share of ERP in 2012

Market Size - 24.5 Billion USD

SAP ORACLE Sage INFOR MICROSOFT

25% 13 % 6% 6% 5%

 Growth of 2.2 % over 2011

Factors that cause an ERP to Fail
 Employee Resistance
 Lack of Top Management Commitment
 Inadequate Training and education
 Inadequate Requirement Definition
 Inadequate Resources
 Unrealistic Expectations of Benefits and ROI
 Poor ERP package Selection
Factors that cause an ERP to Fail
 Extensive Customization
 Change Management
 User Acceptance
 Going Live is not the end of journey
 Anticipation of performance dip after live
 Failure of accommodating evolution of Business Process
 Companies should anticipate a temporary dip in
performance after going live
 Case Study

FoxMeyer Case
- A Failure of Large ERP Implementation
Background of FoxMeyer
 Business - FoxMeyer was the fifth largest drug wholesaler in the United States
(1995) with annual sales of about 5 billion US$ and daily shipments of over 500,000
items. The business of the company was principally in healthcare services.

 Distribution - The company had 25 distribution centers located throughout

USA. It conducted business mainly through two operating units: FoxMeyer Corp.
and Ben Franklin Retail Stores, Inc. The latter was engaged in franchising and
wholesaling to the franchised stores; while the former was engaged in the
distribution to the individual units and chain stores and in the provision of
managed care and information-based services.
 What others say about the
Failure
 According to Christopher Cole, chief operating officer at
Pinnacle, the FoxMeyer mess was "not a failure of
automation. It was not a failure of commercial software
per se. It was a management failure". Perhaps
management had unrealistic expectations.
 Did management expect technology to be a "magic
bullet"? In reality, it was the opposite.
 FoxMeyer was driven to bankruptcy in 1996, and the
trustee of FoxMeyer announced in 1998 that he is suing
SAP, the ERP vendor, as well as Andersen Consulting, its
SAP integrator, for $500 million each.
 Project -Details
 With the goal of using technology to increase efficiency,
the Delta III project began in 1993.
 FoxMeyer conducted market research and product
evaluation and purchased SAP R/3 in December of that
year.
 FoxMeyer also purchased warehouse-automation from a
vendor called Pinnacle, and chose Andersen Consulting to
integrate and implement the two systems.
 Implementation of the Delta III project took place during
1994 and 1995.
 Project Risks
 Customer Mandate A definite morale problem among the
warehouse employees. This was not surprising, since the
project's Pinnacle warehouse automation integrated with
SAP R/3 threatened their jobs of FoxMeyer employees.
This distrust grew so large that disgruntled workers
damaged inventory, and orders were not filled, and
mistakes occurred as the new system struggled with the
volume of transactions $34 million worth of inventory
were lost.
Project Risks Continued….
 Risky Scope – FoxMeyer was an early adopter of SAP R/3.
After the project began, FoxMeyer signed a large contract
to supply University Health System Consortium (UHC).
This event exacerbated the need for an unprecedented
volume of R/3 transactions. Although, prior to the
contract, testing seemed to indicate that R/3 on HP9000
servers would be able to cope with the volume of
transactions, in 1994 R/3 could process only 10,000
customer orders per night, compared with 420,000 under
FoxMeyer's original mainframe system
Project Risks Continued….
 Execution - of the project was an issue due to the
shortage of skilled and knowledgeable personnel.
FoxMeyer did not have the necessary skills in-house and
was relying on Andersen Consulting to implement R/3
and integrate the ERP with an automated warehouse
system from Pinnacle. Although at the height of the
project there were over 50 consultants at FoxMeyer,
many of them were inexperienced and turnover was
high.
Project Risks Continued….
 Environment - FoxMeyer must have realized the project
was in trouble, its perceived dependence on consultants
and vendors prevented it from seeing how it could gain
control. Since FoxMeyer was competing on price, it
needed a high volume of transactions to be profitable. Yet
with the UHC contract "the focus of the project
dramatically changed", contributing to rising project costs
(eventually over $100 million), lowering FoxMeyer's
already narrow margins and erasing the profitability.
Factors Responsible
The failure of the ERP can be viewed from two perspectives:

 Planning

 Implementation
Factors Responsible - Planning
 Poor selection of the Software -SAP R/3 was originally designed for
manufacturing companies and not for wholesalers, especially those doing large number of
transactions. R/3 has never been used by a distributor until that time. It lacked many
requirements needed for successful wholesale distribution.

 No consideration of other consultants’ advice— FoxMeyer did

not listen to other consultants’ advice in the early stage of the project, A Chicago-based
consultant firm warned FoxMeyer that SAP would not be able to deliver what FoxMeyer
needed. FoxMeyer selected SAP mainly because of its reputation.

 Lack of contingency planning—there was no contingency planning to deal

with changes in the business operations. For example, a major customer, Phar- Mor Inc. that
accounted for more than 15% of FoxMeyer’s business, declared bankruptcy shortly after
FoxMeyer’s launched SAP. Much of the Phar-Mor business was gone to competitors.

 No end user involvement—The project was done using a top-down

approach.
Factors Responsible - Implementation
 No restructuring of the business process was done—SAP was not
fully integrated because FoxMeyer was incapable of reengineering their business processes in order
to make the software more efficient.
 Insufficient Testing—Due to the rushed schedule, some modules testing was skipped.
Besides, the system was not properly tested to identify its shortcoming
in handling large amounts of orders. There was inadequate testing and insufficient time to debug the
system to ensure its functionality.
 Over-ambitious project scope— the project team members and information
system staff were unfamiliar with the R/3 hardware, systems software and application software. The
project scope was enlarged with simultaneous implementation of a $18m computerized warehouse
project.
 Dominance of IT specialists’ personal interest—since the project was
new for the wholesaling industry, the IT specialists wanted to learn the system and secure their
employment in the SAP technology business. They placed their personal interest of getting
experience in SAP implementation over the company’s interest in getting suitable software
technology.
Factors Responsible - Implementation
 Poor Management support—initially management were supportive and
committed to the project. However, once the implementation started, management was
reluctant to acknowledge the system problems. Management failed to understand the
complexity and risks in the process and agreed to have 90 days early implementation although
the system was not fully tested. Management failed to recognize the timelines and resources
required in the implementation process.

 Lack of end-user cooperation—the user requirements were not fully

addressed and there was no training for end users. Employees had no chance to express their
priorities and business needs. Workers especially at the warehouses were threatened by the
implementation. The automated warehouse created many problems. Employee morale was
low because of the layoffs. They knew their jobs were soon to be eliminated. As the end users
were not fully involved, they felt they didn’t have the ownership for the project and did not
work closely with the IT specialists to solve problems.
Other Factors
 Social Factors - It is likely that Andersen Consulting and SAP needed to
externally justify the Delta project. They probably did not consider de-
escalating the project since abandonment would not be good publicity.
Moreover their "norms for consistency" were such that perseverance with
project problems usually paid off for them.

 Organizational Factors - Both FoxMeyer's CEO and CIO were strong

advocates of the project. However in February 1996, Thomas Anderson,
FoxMeyer Health's president and CEO (and champion of the company's
integration/warehouse-automation projects) was asked to resign due to
delays in the new warehouse and realizing the SAP system's projected
savings. A change in management is often needed for de-escalation. But it
was too late for FoxMeyer.
Impacts of ERP Failure
 Less Production

 Thomas Anderson, FoxMeyer Health's president and CEO was

asked to resign due to delays in the new warehouse and
realizing the SAP system's projected savings.

 FoxMeyer was driven to bankruptcy in 1996, and the trustee

of FoxMeyer announced in 1998 that he is suing SAP, the ERP
vendor, as well as Andersen Consulting, its SAP integrator, for
$500 million each (Caldwell 1998, Stein 1998).
Lessons Learned: Planning
 Software Selection:
 Project steering committee should have a high level of technical and
operational expertise in software selection process
 Contingency Plan:
 Develop contingency plan of how to survive in case of system failure
 Stipulate clearly the roll back procedures in case of deploying any new
system
 Stakeholder’s Involvement:
 An ERP project should get involvement of all stakeholders, including the
end users and customers
 All stakeholders should understand the goals and expectations of the
project and needs to be encouraged to voice-up their opinion
 Impact analysis should be done to determine the nature and extent to
which different units will be affected.
Lessons Learned : Implementation
 Inclusion of the necessary business process reengineering
 ERP cannot be expected to improve profits without the prior accomplishment of improved
supply chain planning systems, enterprise optimization systems, customer relations
management, transportation and logistics management and warehouse management
 ERP installation is not the end process;
 Thorough testing
 Develop an organized comprehensive testing plan, encourage user participation in the testing,
and make sure adequate testing scenarios are conducted to the new system.
 Realistic project scope
 Scope should be clearly identified with realistic time targets.
 Close Monitoring of project status
 Top management and the implementation team should have a close communication with the
software vendor, consulting firms and IT people, ensuring that the project progress is running
on the right track, and the project goals are continuously adhered to.
 Seek end user support
 Employees should be well trained in software.
 Identify the change agents and create a high morale to meet the new challenges.
 Post implementation review
 Develop quality assurance and control programs to ensure system checks are in place.
 Develop business metrics to measure project’s intended benefits versus what has actually been
achieved,
Conclusion
 Is this an extreme case? Clearly. Is this unusual? Sadly, no.

• Implementations of ERP systems are struggling throughout the

world.

• They take too long, cost too much and fail to deliver the promised
benefits of competitive advantage and cost reduction.

• Despite high investment required to implement ERP systems,

statistics show that more than 70 percent of ERP implementations,
whether self-created or designed by established ERP software
vendors, fail to achieve their corporate goals.
Conclusion .. continued
 In a landmark study, the Standish Group, a market research company specializing in software
and electronic commerce, looked at implementations in companies with more than $500
million in revenues. The study found that the average cost overrun was 178 percent; the
average schedule overrun was 230 percent of original expectations, and the average slide in
functional improvements was an astonishing 59 percent deficit.
Thank You……………