Association of Small landowners vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform

Facts:

Consolidated cases on the constitutionality of P.D 27, EO Nos. 228, and RA 6657. The petitioners
contend that it violates the separation of powers, due process, equal protection and constitutional
limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.

They contend that Pres. Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated E0 228. It also
violates Article XIII Section IV of the constitution for failure to provide retention limits.

It also deprives them on property rights as protected by due process and the equal protection
clause is also violated because the order places the burden of solving agrarian reform on the owners of
only agricultural land.

Issue:

Is the CARP/EO 228 unconstitutional?

Held:

The promulgation of Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 promulgated by the president was
authorized under section 6 of the transitory provision of the 1987 constitution.

As regards to retention limit (EO 228) it is no longer tenable because RA 6657 provide for such
limits.

In regards to the Equal Protection Clause, the petitioners have not shown that they belong to a
different class and entitled to different treatment.

In regards to the argument that the state should first distribute public agricultural lands. It is not
correct to say that only the latter shall be covered by CARP as the constitution calls for the “the just
distribution of Lands”.

The requirement for Public use is already settled in the constitution itself,

Roxas vs Court of Appeals

Facts:

Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas, namely,Â
Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located in the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas. Hacienda
Palico is 1,024 hectares in Hacienda Banilad is 1,050 hectares in area. Hacienda Caylaway isÂ
867.4571 hectares in area. (2) Before the law's effectivity, on May 6, 1988, [Roxas & Co.] filed with
respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell [VOS] Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O.
No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by . . . DAR in
accordance with the CARL. The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly authorized the
reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to non-agricultural. As a result, petitioner
informed respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion of Hacienda CaylawayÂfrom agricultural to
other uses.

Issue:

Whether the Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all situated in Nasugbu, Batangas, are non-
agricultural and outside the scope of Republic Act No. 6657.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that The DAR itself has issued administrative circulars governing lands which
are outside of CARP and may not be subjected to land reform. Administrative Order No. 3, Series of
1996 declares in its policy statement what landholdings are outside the coverage of CARP. The AO is
explicit in providing that such non-covered properties shall be reconveyed to the original transferors or
owners. These non-covered lands are: a. Land, or portions thereof, found to be no longer suitable for
agriculture and, therefore, could not be given appropriate valuation by the Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP); b. Those were a Conversion Order has already been issued by the DAR allowing the use of the
landholding other than for agricultural purposes in accordance with Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657 and
Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1994; c. Property determined to be exempted from CARP
coverage pursuant to Department of Justice Opinion Nos. 44 and 181; or d. Where a Presidential
Proclamation has been issued declaring the subject property for certain uses other than agricultural. In
the present case, Proclamation 1520 dated November 20, 1975 is part of the law of the land. It declares
the area in and around Nasugbu, Batangas, as a Tourist Zone. It has not been repealed, and has in fact
been used by DAR to justify conversion of other contiguous and nearby properties of other parties.
Furthermore, the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, affirmed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Batangas, expressly defines the property as tourist, not agricultural. The power to classify its territory is
given by law to the local governments.

Hacienda Luisita Inc. Vs Presidential Agrarian Reform Council

Facts:

The Tarlac development Corporation(TADECO), Hacienda Luisita Inc and the 5,848 qualified farm
worker beneficiaries entered into a Stock Distribution Option Agreement. The agreement consist of:

a. Production sharing equivalent to three percent of gross sales from the production of the
agricultural land payable to the farm worker benificiaries in cash dividends or incentive bonus,
irrespective of whether HLI makes money or not; and

b. Distribution of free homelots of not more than 240 sq meters to family benificiaries.
 A group of supervisors filed with the DAR a petition to revoke the SDOA alleging that HLI had
failed to give their dividends and the 1% share in gross sales as well as the 33percent share in the
proceeds of the sale of the converted 500 hectares of land(which is now the SCTEX).

Another petition was filed to revoke the said agreement who wanted distribution of lands and
not stock option.

The Dar finds the HLI has not complied with its obligations under RA 6657 despite the
implementation of the agreement, the PARC revoked the agreement.

Issues:

Was the DAR correct in revoking the said agreement?

Held:

The PARC was correct in revoking the said agreement. The HLi has not fully complied with its
undertaking to distribute homelots and the mechanics and timelines of the stock distribution violates
DAO 10.

Alita vs Court of Appeals

Facts:

The subject matter of the case consist of two parcels of land acquired by private respondent
predecessor through homestead patent under CA 141. Private respondents desires of cultivating these
lands but petitioner refuse to vacate relying on the provisions of PD 27 and 316.

Issues:

Is homestead patend exempted from PD 27?

Held:

No, PD 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and transferring
them ownership of landt hey till is a sweeping social legislation, a remedial measure promulgated to
social justice precepts of the constitution.

Natalia Realty vs DAR

Facts:

Natalia Realty Inc. is the owner of of a 125 hectare land in Antipolo Rizal. On April 18, 1979, PP
No. 1637 set adide 20321 hectares of land located in Antipolo, San Mateo and Montalban as townsite
areas to absorb the population overspill in the metropolis. The Natalia properties were situated in the
said areas.
 Private landowners were allowed to developed their properties into low cost housing
subdivisions within the reservation and has a permit from the Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission.

When Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law took effect,the Dar issued notice of coverage to the
undeveloped portions of the subdivision. Natalia sought the cancellation of the notice of coverage.

Issue:

Whether the undeveloped portions of the subdivision are covered by the CARL.

Held:

The undeveloped portions of the subdivision was not covered by CARLbecause they are not
agricultural lands. Agricultural Lands do not include residential, industrial, and commercial lands.

Luz Farms vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform

Facts:

Luz farms challenged the constitutionality of Sections 3(b),11,13 and 32 of RA6657 insofar as the
said law includes the lands devoted in raising of livestock, poultry, and swine in its coverage.

Issue:

Does agrarian reform includes lands devoted in raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its
coverage.

Held:

No, it is unconstitutional. In livestock, poultry, and swine farming no lanf is tilled and no crop is
harvested. It was never the intention of the framers of the constitution to include livestock, poultry
industry in the CARP.

Central Mindanao University vs DARAB

Facts:

Central Mindanao University owns 3000 hectares of land and in 1984 CMU adopted a livelihood
program under which its land resources were leases to its faculty and employees. Later the faculty and
employees filed in the DAR a complaint praying that they be declared as tenants under the CARL.

The DAR ruled that the faculty and employees were not tenants but they segregated the 400
hectares of land of the CMU to Agrarian Reform.

Issues:

Was the DAR correct in segregating these lands?

Held:

No, the school is in the best position to determine whether the land is necessary for use as
school site or campuses.

Caballes vs DAR

Facts:

The spouses Caballes acquired 60 meters of land by virtue of a deed of sale. Before the sale to
the spouses Caballes, Abajon constructed his house on a portion of said landholding paying a monthly
rental of 200 pesos to the owner. Abajon planted corn and bananas to the said landholding.

After the property was sold, the spouses told Abajon that the poultry they intented to build was
closed to his house and persuaded him to transfer, Abajon offer the spouses topay them but they refuse
then later the spouses told Abajon to vacate the property but he refused.

Yolanda Caballes filed a case against Abajon for malicious mischief for cutting down bananas in
the property, the case was refered on MAR and ruled that the case was not proper for hearing cause
Abajon is a tenant, the case was appealed and it was reversed, but in the Motion for reconsideration
filed by Abajon the decision states he is a tenant.

Issue:

Whether there is a tenancy relationship.

Held:

The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are 1.) The parties are the landowner and the
tenant 2.) The subject is agricultural land 3.) There is consent 4.) The purpose is agricultural production
5.) There is personal cultivation 6.) There is sharing of harvest. All of these elements must concur, the
abscence of one does not make one a de jure tenant.

The circumstances in the case indicates that private respondent was more of a caretaker.
Agricultural production is absent.

Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations Inc vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform

Facts:

The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued DAR AO 07 97 entitled “Omnibus Rules and procedures
governing the conversion of agricultural lands to non agricultural uses” which consolidatedall existing
implementing guidelines related to land used conversion.

Subsequently on March 30 1999 the Secretary of DAR issued A) 01-99 entitled “ Revised Rules
and Regulations on the conversion of Agricultural Lands to non Agricultural uses”.
 Then the Secretary issued another AO, AO No. 01-22 entitled “2002 Comprehensive rules on
land used conversion”.

In the same breath, petitioner contends that DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, was made in
violation of Section 65[11] of Republic Act No. 6657 because it covers all applications for conversion
from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to other agricultural uses, such as the conversion of
agricultural lands or areas that have been reclassified by the LGUs or by way of Presidential
Proclamations, to residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses on or after 15 June
1988. According to petitioner, there is nothing in Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657 or in any other
provision of law that confers to the DAR the jurisdiction or authority to require that non-awarded lands
or reclassified lands be submitted to its conversion authority. Thus, in issuing and enforcing DAR AO No.
01-02, as amended, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Issue:

Was the DAR correct in including reclassified lands into the term agricultural?

Held:

Under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or
other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988 have been included in the definition of agricultural
lands. In so doing, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform merely acted within the scope of his authority
stated in the aforesaid sections of Executive Order No. 129-A, which is to promulgate rules and
regulations for agrarian reform implementation and that includes the authority to define agricultural
lands for purposes of land use conversion. Further, the definition of agricultural lands under DAR AO No.
01-02, as amended, merely refers to the category of agricultural lands that may be the subject for
conversion to non-agricultural uses and is not in any way confined to agricultural lands in the context of
land redistribution as provided for under Republic Act No. 6657.

This Court held in Alarcon v. Court of Appeals[43] that reclassification of lands does not suffice.
Conversion and reclassification differ from each other. Conversion is the act of changing the current use
of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by the DAR while reclassification is the
act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential,
industrial, and commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements and
procedures for land use conversion. In view thereof, a mere reclassification of an agricultural land does
not automatically allow a landowner to change its use. He has to undergo the process of conversion
before he is permitted to use the agricultural land for other purposes.

Such inclusion does not unduly expand or enlarge the definition of agricultural lands instead it made
clear what are the lands that can be subject to Dar conversion authority.

Sta. Realty Development Corporation vs Juan Amante

Facts:

The Canlubang Estate in Laguna is a vast landholding previously titled in the name of the late
Speaker and Chief Justice Jose Yulo, Sr. Within this estate are two parcels of land (hereinafter referred to
as the subject property) covered by TCT Nos. 81949 and 84891 measuring 254.766 hectares and part of
Barangay Casile, subsequently titled in the name of Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation (SRRDC),
the majority stockholder of which is C.J. Yulo and Sons, Inc.

On December 6, 1985, Amante, et al., who are the private respondents in G.R. No. 112526 and
petitioners in G.R. No. 118838, instituted an action for injunction with damages in the Regional Trial
Court of Laguna (Branch 24) against Luis Yulo, SRRDC, and several SRRDC security personnel, docketed
as Civil Case No. B-2333. Amante, et al. alleged that: they are residents of Barangay Casile, Cabuyao,
Laguna, which covers an area of around 300 hectares; in 1910, their ancestors started occupying the
area, built their houses and planted fruit-bearing trees thereon, and since then, have been peacefully
occupying the land; some time in June 3, 1985, SRRDCs security people illegally entered Bgy. Casile and
fenced the area; SRRDCs men also entered the barangay on November 4, 1985, cut down the trees,
burned their huts, and barred the lone jeepney from entering the Canlubang Sugar Estate; as a result of
these acts, Amante, et al. were deprived of possession and cultivation of their lands. Thus, they claimed
damages, sought the issuance of permanent injunction and proposed that a right of way be declared.

Issue:

Does DARAB has jurisdiction over SRRDCs properties?

Held:

it is the DAR Secretary that originally declared the subject property as falling under the coverage
of the CARP.

Moreover, DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1990 (Rules and Procedure Governing Exemption
of Lands from CARP Coverage under Section 10, R.A. No. 6657) provides:

I. LEGAL MANDATE

The general policy under CARP is to cover as much lands suitable for agriculture as possible. However,
Section 10, RA 6657 excludes and exempts certain types of lands from the coverage of CARP, to wit:

A. Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for parks, wildlife, forest
reserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds and mangroves, national
defense, school sites and campuses including experimental farm stations operated by public or private
schools for educational purposes, seeds and seedlings research and pilot production centers, church
sites and convents appurtenant thereto, mosque sites and Islamic centers appurtenant thereof,
communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and penal farms actually worked by the
inmates, government and private research and quarantine centers; and

...

II. POLICIES

In the application of the aforecited provision of law, the following guidelines shall be observed:

A. For an area in I.A to be exempted from CARP coverage, it must be actually, directly and exclusively
used and found to be necessary for the purpose so stated.

...

C. Lands which have been classified or proclaimed, and/or actually directly and exclusively used and
found to be necessary for parks, wildlife, forest reserves, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, and
watersheds and mangroves shall be exempted from the coverage of CARP until Congress, taking into
account ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific
limits of public domain, as provided for under Sec. 4(a) of RA 6657, and a reclassification of the said
areas or portions thereof as alienable and disposable has been approved. (Emphasis supplied)

In order to be exempt from coverage, the land must have been classified or proclaimed and actually,
directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for watershed purposes.[68] In this case, at the
time the DAR issued the Notices of Coverage up to the time the DARAB rendered its decision on the
dispute, the subject property is yet to be officially classified or proclaimed as a watershed and has in fact
long been used for agricultural purposes. SRRDC relies on the case of Central Mindanao University
(CMU) vs. DARAB,[69] wherein the Court ruled that CMU is in the best position to determine what
property is found necessary for its use. SRRDC claims that it is in the best position to determine whether
its properties are necessary for development as park and watershed area.[70]
 But SRRDCs reliance on the CMU case is flawed. In the CMU case, the subject property from the
very beginning was not alienable and disposable because Proclamation No. 476 issued by the late
President Carlos P. Garcia already reserved the property for the use of the school. Besides, the subject
property in the CMU case was actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for
educational purposes.

In the present case, the property is agricultural and was not actually and exclusively used for
watershed purposes. As records show, the subject property was first utilized for the purposes of the
Canlubang Sugar Estate.[71] Later, petitioner claimed that the occupants were allowed to cultivate the
area so long as they do not plant crops being grown by the Canlubang Sugar Estate in order to avoid
confusion as to ownership thereof.[72] Thus, based on its own assertions, it appears that it had
benefited from the fruits of the land as agricultural land. Now, in a complete turnaround, it is claiming
that the property is part of a watershed.

Land Bank of the Philippines vs Heirs of Elueterio Cruz

Facts:

The unirrigated Riceland of Eleuterio Cruz was placed by the government under the operation
land transfer program under PD 27.

LBP pegged the value of the land at 106,935,76 based on the guidelines set forth under P.D 27
and EO 228 but respondent rejected the formula. The PARAD ruled that the just compensation shall be
80K per hectare.

Issue:

What was the correct formula?

Held:

Just compensation shall be determined in accordance with RA 6657. The decision of PARAD of
80K per hectare did not adhere to the formula prescribed by the regulations of DAR.