GABINO ALITA, JESUS JULIAN, JR., JESUS JULIAN, SR.
, issued land transfer certificates to which the defendants
PEDRO RICALDE, VICENTE RICALDE and ROLANDO
SALAMAR, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ENRIQUE M.
REYES, PAZ M. REYES and FE M. REYES, respondents.
G.R. No. 78517 February 27, 1989
FACTS:
The subject matter of the case consists of two (2) parcels of
land, acquired by private respondents' predecessors-in-
interest through homestead patent under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 141.
Private respondents herein are desirous of personally
cultivating these lands, but petitioners refuse to vacate,
relying on the provisions of P.D. 27 and P.D. 316 and
appurtenant regulations issued by the then Ministry of
Agrarian Reform (DAR for short), now Department of
Agrarian Reform (MAR for short).
On June 18, 1981, private respondents (then plaintiffs),
instituted a complaint against Hon. Conrado Estrella as then
Minister of Agrarian Reform, P.D. Macarambon as Regional
Director of MAR Region IX, and herein petitioners (then
defendants) for the declaration of P.D. 27 and all other
Decrees, Letters of Instructions and General Orders issued in
connection therewith as inapplicable to homestead lands.
Defendants filed their answer with special and affirmative
defenses of July 8, 1981.
Subsequently, on July 19, 1982, plaintiffs filed an urgent
motion to enjoin the defendants from declaring the lands in
litigation under Operation Land Transfer and from being
filed their opposition dated August 4, 1982.
On November 5, 1982, the then Court of Agrarian Relations
16th Regional District, Branch IV, Pagadian City (now
Regional Trial Court, 9th Judicial Region, Branch XVIII)
rendered its decision dismissing the said complaint and the
motion to enjoin the defendants was denied.
On January 4, 1983, plaintiffs moved to reconsider the Order
of dismissal, to which defendants filed their opposition on
January 10, 1983.
Thus, on April 29, 1986, the Regional Trial Court issued the
aforequoted decision prompting defendants to move for a
reconsideration but the same was denied in its Order dated
June 6, 1986.
On appeal to the respondent Court of Appeals, the same was
sustained.
ISSUE: W/N lands obtained through homestead patent are
covered by the Agrarian Reform under P.D. 27.
HELD: NO
We agree with the petitioners in saying that P.D. 27
decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of
the soil and transferring to them ownership of the land they
till is a sweeping social legislation, a remedial measure
promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the
Constitution. However, such contention cannot be invoked
to defeat the very purpose of the enactment of the Public
Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141. Thus,
The Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and Section 6. Retention Limits. …
protection of the poor. The law gives a needy citizen a piece ... Provided further, That original homestead grantees or
of land where he may build a modest house for himself and their direct compulsory heirs who still own the original
family and plant what is necessary for subsistence and for homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain
the satisfaction of life's other needs. The right of the citizens the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said
to their homes and to the things necessary for their homestead.'
subsistence is as vital as the right to life itself. They have a
right to live with a certain degree of comfort as become
human beings, and the State which looks after the welfare of
the people's happiness is under a duty to safeguard the
satisfaction of this vital right. (Patricio v. Bayog, 112 SCRA
45)

In this regard, the Philippine Constitution likewise respects

the superiority of the homesteaders' rights over the rights of
the tenants guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform statute. In
point is Section 6 of Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution which provides:

Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian

reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance
with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural
resources, including lands of public domain under lease or
concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights,
homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of
indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.

Additionally, it is worthy of note that the newly promulgated

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 or Republic
Act No. 6657 likewise contains a proviso supporting the
inapplicability of P.D. 27 to lands covered by homestead
patents like those of the property in question, reading,
Natalia Realty Inc and Estate Developers & Investors
Corp vs DAR
FACTS:
Petitioner Natalia is the owner of three contiguous parcels of
land located in Banaba, Antipolo, Rizal.
On 18 April 1979, Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 set
aside 20,312 hectares of land located in the Municipalities of
Antipolo, San Mateo and Montalban as townsite areas to
absorb the population overspill in the metropolis which
were designated as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite. The
Natalia properties are situated within the areas proclaimed
as townsite reservation.
EDIC, developer of Natalia, applied for and was granted
preliminary approval and locational clearances by the
Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. Petitioners
were likewise issued development permits after complying
with the requirements. Thus the Natalia properties later
became the Antipolo Hills Subdivision.
On 15 June 1988, CARL was enacted.
DAR, through MARO, issued a Notice of Coverage on the
undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision
which consisted of roughly 90.3307 hectares.
Natalia and EDIC protested to this.
Members of the Samahan ng Magsasaka sa Bundok Antipolo,
Inc. (SAMBA), filed a complaint against Natalia and EDIC
before the DAR Regional Adjudicator to restrain petitioners
from developing areas under cultivation by SAMBA
members.
DAR Regional ruled by temporarily restraining petitioners
from further developing the subdivision.
Petitioners elevated their cause to DARAB but the latter
merely remanded the case to the Regional Adjudicator for
further proceedings.
Natalia wrote respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform
reiterating its request to set aside the Notice of Coverage.
Neither respondent Secretary nor respondent Director took
action on the protest-letters.
Hence, this petition.
Natalia’s contention: Subject properties already ceased to be
agricultural lands when they were included in the areas
reserved by presidential fiat for townsite reservation.
OSG’s contention: The permits granted petitioners were not
valid and binding because they did not comply with the
implementing Standards, Rules and Regulations of P.D. 957,
otherwise known as "The Subdivision and Condominium
Buyers' Protective Decree," in that no application for
conversion of the NATALIA lands from agricultural to
residential was ever filed with the DAR. In other words,
there was no valid conversion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject properties shall be
included in the coverage of CARP
HELD:
NO.
Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall "cover,
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity
produced, all public and private agricultural lands." As to
what constitutes "agricultural land," it is referred to as "land
devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land. The deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission confirm this limitation. "Agricultural lands" are
only those lands which are "arable and suitable agricultural
lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial and
residential lands."
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped
portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any
language be considered as "agricultural lands." These lots
were intended for residential use. They ceased to be
agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in the
Lungsod Silangan Reservation.
Luz Farms vs Sec of DAR
FACTS:
Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in the livestock and
poultry business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by
the enforcement of some provisions of CARP.
Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657,
insofar as they are made to apply to it:
(a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock
(and poultry)" in the definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural
Enterprise or Agricultural Activity.
(b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as
"private agricultural lands devoted to commercial, livestock,
poultry and swine raising . . ."
(c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a
production-sharing plan.
(d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of
Agrarian Reform the authority to summarily determine the
just compensation to be paid for lands covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan
mentioned in Section 13
". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from
the production of such lands are distributed within sixty
(60) days of the end of the fiscal year as compensation to
regular and other farmworkers in such lands over and above
the compensation they currently receive xxx
ISSUE: The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality
of Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as
the said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and
swine in its coverage
HELD:
Said provisions are unconstitutional.
The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word
"agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of
the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and
poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-
mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.
Commissioner Tadeo: Ipinaaalam ko kay Commissioner
Regalado na hindi namin inilagay ang agricultural worker sa
kadahilanang kasama rito ang piggery, poultry at livestock
workers. Ang inilagay namin dito ay farm worker kaya hindi
kasama ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers.
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of
R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural lands devoted
to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the
definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that
the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be
covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There
is simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in
the coverage of agrarian reform.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by
SECRETARY JOSE MARI B. PONCE (OIC), Petitioner,
vs
DELIA T. SUTTON, ELLA T. SUTTONSOLIMAN and HARRY
T. SUTTON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 162070 October 19, 2005
FACTS:
The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited
by respondents which has been devoted exclusively to cow
and calf breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then
existing agrarian reform program of the government,
respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their
landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives
under the law.
On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (CARL) of 1988, took effect. It included in its coverage
farm used for raising livestock, poultry and swine.
On December 4, 1990, in an en banc decision in the case of
Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR, this Court ruled that lands
devoted to livestock and poultryraising are not included in
the definition of agricultural land. Hence, we declared as
unconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL insofar as
they included livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian
reform.
In view of the Luz Farms ruling, respondents filed with
petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as
their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattleraising
and thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL.
On December 21, 1992, the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer of Aroroy, Masbate, inspected respondents land and
found that it was devoted solely to cattleraising and
breeding. He recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be
exempted from the coverage of the CARL.
On April 27, 1993, respondents reiterated to petitioner DAR
the withdrawal of their VOS and requested the return of the
supporting papers they submitted in connection therewith.
Petitioner ignored their request.
On December 27, 1993, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993,
which provided that only portions of private agricultural
lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as
of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the
CARL.
In determining the area of land to be excluded, the A.O. fixed
the following retention limits, viz: 1:1 animalland ratio (i.e.,
1 hectare of land per 1 head of animal shall be retained by
the landowner), and a ratio of 1.7815 hectares for livestock
infrastructure for every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be
excluded from the operations of the CARL.
On February 4, 1994, respondents wrote the DAR Secretary
and advised him to consider as final and irrevocable the
withdrawal of their VOS as, under the Luz Farms doctrine,
their entire landholding is exempted from the CARL.
On September 14, 1995, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D.
Garilao issued an Order partially granting the application of
respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL.
Applying the retention limits outlined in the DAR A.O. No. 9,
petitioner exempted 1,209 hectares of respondents land for
grazing purposes, and a maximum of 102.5635 hectares for
infrastructure. Petitioner ordered the rest of respondents
landholding to be segregated and placed under Compulsory
Acquisition.
Respondents moved for reconsideration. They contend that
their entire landholding should b exempted as it is devoted
exclusively to cattleraising. Their motion was denied.
They filed a notice of appeal with the Office of the President.
On October 9, 2001, the Office of the President affirmed the
impugned Order of petitioner DAR. It ruled that DAR A.O. No.
9, s. 1993, does not run counter to the Luz Farms case as the
A.O. Provided the guidelines to determine whether a certain
parcel of land is being used for cattleraising. However, the
issue on the constitutionality of the assailed A.O. was left for
the determination of the courts as the sole arbiters of such
issue.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the
respondents. It declared DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, void for
being contrary to the intent of the 1987 Constitutional
Commission to exclude livestock farms from the land reform
program of the government.
ISSUE: W/N DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which prescribes
a maximum retention limit for owners of lands devoted to
livestock raising is constitutional.
HELD: NO.
In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid
as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to
regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage
of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention
limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the
1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to
exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock,
swine and poultryraising. The Court clarified in the Luz
Farms case that livestock, swine and poultryraising are
industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of
agriculture or agricultural activity. The raising of livestock,
swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is
an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great portion of
the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial
fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities,
drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders,
mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive
warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies,
antipollution equipment like biogas and digester plants
augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells,
elevated water tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and other
technological appurtenances.
Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock
farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from
the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in
issuing the assailed A.O.
Central Mindanao University vs DARAB
FACTS:
CMU is an agricultural university. From its beginning, the
school was the answer to the crying need for training people
in order to develop the agricultural potential of the island of
Mindanao. Those who planned and established the school
had a vision as to the future development of that part of the
Philippines.
Pres. Carlos Garcia issued Proclamation No. 476,
withdrawing from sale or settlement and reserving for the
Mindanao Agricultural College, a site which would be the
future campus of what is now the CMU.
In the course of the cadastral hearing of the school's petition
for registration of the aforementioned grant of agricultural
land, several tribes belonging to cultural communities,
opposed the petition claiming ownership of certain
ancestral lands forming part of the tribal reservations. Some
of the claims were granted so that what was titled to the
present petitioner school was reduced from 3,401 hectares
to 3,080 hectares.
In 1984, the CMU approved Resolution No. 160, adopting a
livelihood program called "Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program"
under which the land resources of the University were
leased to its faculty and employees. This arrangement was
covered by a written contract. Under this program the
faculty and staff combine themselves to groups of five
members each, and the CMU provided technical know-how,
practical training and all kinds of assistance, to enable each
group to cultivate 4 to 5 hectares of land for the lowland rice
project. Each group pays the CMU a service fee and also a
land use participant's fee. The contract prohibits
participants and their hired workers to establish houses or
live in the project area and to use the cultivated land as a
collateral for any kind of loan. It was expressly stipulated
that no landlord-tenant relationship existed between the
CMU and the faculty and/or employees. This particular
program was conceived as a multi-disciplinary applied
research extension and productivity program to utilize
available land, train people in modern agricultural
technology and at the same time give the faculty and staff
opportunities within the confines of the CMU reservation to
earn additional income to augment their salaries.
When petitioner Dr. Leonardo Chua became President of the
CMU in July 1986, he discontinued the Agri-Business
Management and Training Project, due to losses incurred
while carrying on the said project. Some CMU personnel,
among whom were the complainants, were laid-off when
this project was discontinued.
Another project was launched o develop unutilized land
resources, mobilize and promote the spirit of self-reliance,
provide socio-economic and technical training in actual field
project implementation and augment the income of the
faculty and the staff. This has the same nature as of the
Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program with an express provision
that there would be no tenant-landlord relationship.
The contract expired. Some were renewed, some were not.
The non-renewal of the contracts, the discontinuance of the
rice, corn and sugar cane project, the loss of jobs due to
termination or separation from the service and the alleged
harassment by school authorities, all contributed to, and
precipitated the filing of the complaint.
DARAB found that the private respondents were not tenants
and cannot therefore be beneficiaries under the CARP. At the
same time, the DARAB ordered the segregation of 400
hectares of suitable, compact and contiguous portions of the
CMU land and their inclusion in the CARP for distribution to
qualified beneficiaries.
Complainants Obrique, et al. claimed that they are tenants of
the CMU and/or landless peasants claiming/occupying a
part or portion of the CMU.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the complainants are tenants of CMU, hence,
beneficiaries of CARP
Whether or not CMU is subject to CARP
Whether or not DARAB has jurisdiction to hear and decide
Case No. 005 for Declaration of Status of Tenants and
coverage of land under the CARP
HELD:
First Issue:
We agree with the DARAB's finding that Obrique, et. al. are
not tenants. Under the terms of the written agreement
signed by Obrique, et. al., pursuant to the livelihood program
called "Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program", it was expressly
stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship existed
between the CMU and the faculty and staff (participants in
the project). The CMU did not receive any share from the
harvest/fruits of the land tilled by the participants. What the
CMU collected was a nominal service fee and land use
participant's fee in consideration of all the kinds of
assistance given to the participants by the CMU. Again, the
agreement signed by the participants under the CMU-IEP
clearly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship
existed, and that the participants are not share croppers nor
lessees, and the CMU did not share in the produce of the
participants' labor.
Obrique is not a landless peasant. The facts showed he was
Physics Instructor at CMU holding a very responsible
position was separated from the service on account of
certain irregularities he committed while Assistant Director
of the Agri-Business Project of cultivating lowland rice.
Others may, at the moment, own no land in Bukidnon but
they may not necessarily be so destitute in their places of
origin. No proof whatsoever appears in the record to show
that they are landless peasants.
In view of the above, the private respondents, not being
tenants nor proven to be landless peasants, cannot qualify as
beneficiaries under the CARP.
The portion of the CMU land leased to the Philippine Packing
Corporation (now Del Monte Phils., Inc.) was leased long
before the CARP was passed. The agreement with the
Philippine Packing Corporation was not a lease but a
Management and Development Agreement, a joint
undertaking where use by the Philippine Packing
Corporation of the land was part of the CMU research
program, with the direct participation of faculty and
students. Said projects were directly connected to the
purpose and objectives of the CMU as an educational
institution.
Second Issue: ordered the "segregation of a suitable compact and
It is our opinion that the 400 hectares ordered segregated contiguous area of Four Hundred hectares, more or less",
by the DARAB and affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its from the CMU land reservation, and directed the DAR
Decision dated August 20, 1990, is not covered by the CARP Regional Director to implement its order of segregation.
because: Having found that the complainants in this agrarian dispute
1. It is not alienable and disposable land of the public for Declaration of Tenancy Status are not entitled to claim as
domain; beneficiaries of the CARP because they are not share tenants
2. The CMU land reservation is not in excess of specific or leaseholders, its order for the segregation of 400 hectares
limits as determined by Congress; of the CMU land was without legal authority.
3. It is private land registered and titled in the name of its
lawful owner, the CMU;
4. It is exempt from coverage under Section 10 of R.A. 6657
because the lands are actually, directly and exclusively used
and found to be necessary for school site and campus,
including experimental farm stations for educational
purposes, and for establishing seed and seedling research
and pilot production centers.

Third Issue:
DARAB has no jurisdiction. Under Section 4 and Section 10
of R.A. 6657, it is crystal clear that the jurisdiction of the
DARAB is limited only to matters involving the
implementation of the CARP. More specifically, it is
restricted to agrarian cases and controversies involving
lands falling within the coverage of the aforementioned
program. It does not include those which are actually,
directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for,
among such purposes, school sites and campuses for setting
up experimental farm stations, research and pilot
production centers, etc.

In the case at bar, the DARAB found that the complainants

are not share tenants or lease holders of the CMU, yet it
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM vs. DEPARTMENT
OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS).G.R. No.
158228 March 23, 2004
FACTS:
Lot No. 2509 and Lot No. 817-D which were donated by the
late Esteban Jalandoni to respondent DECS (formerly
Bureau of Education). Consequently, titles thereto were
transferred in the name of respondent DECS. Respondent
DECS leased the lands to Anglo Agricultural Corporation for
10 agricultural crop years, commencing from 1984-1994.
The contract of lease was subsequently renewed for
another 10 agricultural crop years or until 2005. On June 10,
1993, Eugenio Alpar and several others, claiming to be
permanent and regular farm workers of the subject lands,
filed a petition for Compulsory Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) coverage with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office
(MARO) of Escalante. After investigation, MARO Jacinto R.
Piñosa, sent a "Notice of Coverage" to respondent DECS,
stating that the subject lands are now covered by CARP and
inviting its representatives for a conference with the farmer
beneficiaries.
The recommendation for coverage was approved by DAR
Regional Director Dominador B. Andres approved the r, the
dispositive portion of which reads: Respondent DECS
appealed the case to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform which
affirmed the Order of the Regional Director. Respondent
DECS filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
which set aside the decision of the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform. Hence, the instant petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject properties are exempt from the
coverage of Republic Act No.6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998 (CARL).
HELD:
No. While respondent DECS sought exemption from CARP
coverage on the ground that all the income derived from its
contract of lease with Anglo Agricultural Corporation were
actually, directly and exclusively used for educational
purposes, such as for the repairs and renovations of schools
in the nearby locality, the court is inclined with the
petitioner’s argument that the lands subject hereof are not
exempt from the CARP coverage because the same are
not actually, directly and exclusively used as school sites or
campuses, as they are in fact leased to Anglo Agricultural
Corporation. Further, to be exempt from the coverage, it is
the land perse, not the income derived therefrom, that must
be actually, directly and exclusively used for educational
purposes. Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the types
of lands which are exempted from the coverage of CARP as
well as the purposes of their exemption specifying those
“lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be
necessary for national defense, school sites and campuses,
including experimental farm stations operated by
public or private schools for educational purposes, …,
shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act. “Clearly, a
reading of the paragraph shows that, in order to be exempt
from the coverage: 1) the land must be "actually, directly,
and exclusively used and found to be necessary;" and 2) the
purpose is "for school sites and campuses, including
experimental farm stations operated by public or private
schools for educational purposes."
PROV. OF CAMARINES SUR vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 103125 May 17, 1993
FACTS:
On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
Province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129, Series
of 1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or
expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol
site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-
traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for
provincial government employees.
Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province, through its
Governor, Hon. Luis R. Villafuerte, filed two separate cases
for expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren
N. San Joaquin.
The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the
ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized
the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the
property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court of the
amount of P5,714.00, the amount provisionally fixed by the
trial court to answer for damages that private respondents
may suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not
prosper. The trial court issued a writ of possession in an
order dated January18, 1990.
Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the
petition, the Solicitor General stated that under Section 9 of
the Local Government Code, there was no need for the
approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain.
However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the
Province of Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of
the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to
expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing
project.
The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court,
allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of
private respondents' lands and the order denying the
admission of the amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered
the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings
until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall have
submitted the requisite approval of the Department of
Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the property
of the private respondents from agricultural to non-
agricultural land.
ISSUE 1: WON, the expropriation was for a public purpose.
YES. Modernly, there has been a shift from the literal to a
broader interpretation of "public purpose" or "public use"
for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised.
The old concept was that the condemned property must
actually be used by the general public (e.g. roads, bridges,
public plazas, etc.) before the taking thereof could satisfy the
constitutional requirement of "public use". Under the new
concept, "public use" means public advantage, convenience
or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare
and the prosperity of the whole community, like a resort
complex for tourists or housing project (Heirs of Juancho
Ardano v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 [1983]; Sumulong v.
Guerrero, 154 SC.RA 461 [1987]).
The expropriation of the property authorized by the
questioned resolution is for a public purpose. The
establishment of a pilot development center would inure to
the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the
Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational, the center
would make available to the community invaluable
information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the
cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers,
fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing
project also satisfies the public purpose requirement of the
Constitution. As held in Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA
461, "Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is
a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly
affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum the
general welfare."
ISSUE 2: WON a local government unit needs the approval of
the DAR to reclassify land before it can expropriate it.
The power of expropriation is superior to the power to
distribute lands under the land reform program. (Juancho
Ardana v Reyes).
It is true that local government units have no inherent power
of eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly
authorized by the legislature. It is also true that in delegating
the power to expropriate, the legislature may retain certain
control or impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof
by the local governments. While such delegated power may
be a limited authority, it is complete within its limits.
Moreover, the limitations on the exercise of the delegated
power must be clearly expressed, either in the law
conferring the power or in other legislations.
Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, was promulgated
pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local Government
Code, which provides:
A local government unit may, through its head and acting
pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian exercise the right
of eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings
for public use or purpose.
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that
local government units must first secure the approval of the
Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from
agricultural to non-agricultural use before they can institute
the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is
no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
which expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural
lands by local government units to the control of the
Department of Agrarian Reform.
Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to political
subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by
implication.
To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local
government units can no longer expropriate agricultural
lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools,
hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the
use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform,
because all of these projects would naturally involve a the approval of DAR. Likewise, there is nothing in CAR law
change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the which expressly subjects such expropriations under the
Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the control of DAR.
expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.

Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local

government unit that shall determine whether the use of the
property sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same
being an expression of legislative policy. The courts defer to
such legislative determination and will intervene only when
a particular undertaking has no real or substantial relation
to the public use.

There is also an ancient rule that restrictive statutes, no

matter how broad their terms are, do not embrace the
sovereign unless the sovereign is specially mentioned as
subject thereto.

The orders of the CA nullifying the trial court's order

allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of
private respondents' property and requiring the Province of
Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of
Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify private
respondents' property from agricultural to non-agricultural
use are set aside.

● Although local governments do not have inherent power

of eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly
authorized by legislature, and the latter may retain certain
control or impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof,
such delegated power although limited it is complete within
its limits. Nothing in the LGC limits this power by requiring
Roxas and Company, Inc. vs. DAMBA-NSFW and DAR
FACTS:
Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered
owner of three haciendas.
On July 27, 1987, the Congress of the Philippines formally
convened and took over legislative power from the
President. This Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657, the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988. The
Act was signed by the President on June 10, 1988 and took
effect on June 15, 1988. Before the law’s effectivity, on May
6, 1988, [Roxas & Co.] filed with respondent DAR a voluntary
offer to sell [VOS] Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the
provisions of E.O. No. 229.
Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under
compulsory acquisition by … DAR in accordance with the
CARL. On August 6, 1992 [Roxas & Co.], through its
President, sent a letter to theSecretary of …DAR
withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda Caylaway. The
Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly
authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from
agricultural to non-agricultural As a result, petitioner
informed respondent DAR that it was applying for
conversion of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to other
uses. The petitions nub on the interpretation of Presidential
Proclamation (PP) 1520 reads: DECLARING THE
MUNICIPALITIES OF MARAGONDON AND TERNATE IN
CAVITE PROVINCE AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF NASUGBU
IN BATANGAS AS A TOURISTZONE, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES Essentially, Roxas & Co. filed its application for
conversion of its three haciendas from agricultural to non-
agricultural on the assumption that the issuance of PP 1520
which declared Nasugbu, Batangas as a tourism zone,
reclassified them to non-agricultural uses. Its pending
application notwithstanding, the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award
(CLOAs) to the farmer-beneficiaries in the three haciendas
including CLOA No. 6654 which was issued on October 15,
1993 covering 513.983 hectares, the subject of G.R. No.
167505. Roxas & Co. filed with the DAR an application for
exemption from the coverage of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of 1988 on the basis of PP
1520 and of DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 6, Series of
1994
3 which states that all lands already classified as commercial,
industrial, or residential before the effectivity of CARP no
longer need conversion clearance from the DAR.
ISSUES:
Whether PP 1520 reclassified in 1975 all lands in the
Maragondon-Ternate-Nasugbu tourism zone to non-
agricultural useto exempt Roxas & Co.’s three haciendas in
Nasugbu from CARP coverage;
RULING:
PP 1520 DID NOT AUTOMATICALLY CONVERT THE
AGRICULTURAL LANDS IN THE THREE MUNICIPALITIES
INCLUDINGNASUGBU TO NON-AGRICULTURAL LANDS.
Roxas & Co. contends that PP 1520 declared the three
municipalities as each constituting a tourism zone,
reclassified all lands therein to tourism and, therefore,
converted their use to non-agricultural purposes.
The perambulatory clauses of PP 1520 identified only
"certain areas in the sector comprising the [three
Municipalities that] have potential tourism value" and
mandated the conduct of "necessary studies" and the
segregation of "specific geographic areas" to achieve its
purpose. Which is why the PP directed the Philippine
Tourism Authority (PTA) to identify what those potential
tourism areas are. If all the lands in those tourism zones
were to be wholly converted to non-agricultural use, there
would have been no need for the PP to direct the PTA to
identify what those "specific geographic areas" are. In the
above-cited case of Roxas & Co. v. CA, 9 the Court made it
clear that the "power to determine whether Haciendas
Palico, Banilad and Caylaway are non-agricultural, hence,
exempt from the coverage of the [Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law] lies with the [Department of Agrarian Reform],
not with this Court." The DAR, an administrative body of
special competence, denied, by Order, the application for
CARP exemption of Roxas & Co., it finding that PP 1520 did
not automatically reclassify all the lands in the affected
municipalities from their original uses. It appears that the
PTA had not yet, at that time, identified the "specific
geographic areas" for tourism development and had no
pending tourism development projects in the areas.
Further, report from the Center for Land Use Policy
Planning and Implementation (CLUPPI) indicated that the
areas were planted with sugar cane and other
crops.11Relatedly, the DAR, by Memorandum Circular No. 7,
Series of 2004,12came up with clarificatory guidelines and
therein decreed that B. Proclamations declaring general
areas such as whole provinces, municipalities, barangays,
islands or peninsulas as tourist zones that merely:(1)
recognize certain still unidentified areas within the covered
provinces, municipalities, barangays, islands, or peninsulas
to be with potential tourism value and charge the Philippine
Tourism Authority with the task to identify/delineate
specific geographic areas within the zone with potential
tourism value and to coordinate said areas’ development; or
(2) recognize the potential value of identified spots located
within the general area declared as tourist zone (i.e. x x x
x)and direct the Philippine Tourism Authority to coordinate
said areas’ development; could not be regarded as effecting
an automatic reclassification of the entirety of the land area
declared as tourist zone. This is so because "reclassification
of lands" denotes their allocation into some specific use and
"providing for the manner of their utilization and disposition
(Sec. 20, Local
Government Code) or the "act of specifying how agricultural
lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as
residential, industrial, or commercial, as embodied in the
land use plan." A proclamation that merely recognizes the
potential tourism value of certain areas within the general
area declared as tourist zone clearly does not allocate,
reserve, or intend the entirety of the land area of the zone for
non-agricultural purposes. Neither does said proclamation
direct that otherwise CARPable lands within the zone shall
already be used for purposes other than agricultural.
Moreover, to view these kinds of proclamation as a
reclassification for non-agricultural purposes of entire
provinces, municipalities, barangays, islands, or peninsulas
would be unreasonable as it amounts to an automatic and
sweeping exemption from CARP in the name of tourism
development. The same would also undermine the land use
reclassification powers vested in local government units in
conjunction with pertinent agencies of government

There being no reclassification, it is clear that said

proclamations/issuances, assuming [these] took effect
before June 15, 1988,could not supply a basis for exemption
of the entirety of the lands embraced therein from CARP
coverage. The DAR’s reading into these general
proclamations of tourism zones deserves utmost
consideration, more especially in the present petitions
which involve vast tracts of agricultural land. To reiterate,
PP 1520 merely recognized the "potential tourism value" of
certain areas within the general area declared as tourism
zones

It did not reclassify the areas to non-agricultural use. A mere

reclassification of an agricultural land does not
automatically allow a landowner to change its use since
there is still that process of conversion before one is
permitted to use it for other purposes.
Aninao vs Asturias
FACTS:
Subject of this case are several parcels of land situated in
Brgys. Baha and Talibayog, Calatagan, Batangas, and
formerly owned by Ceferino Ascue (Ascue).
Emancipation patents (EPs) covering the disputed lands
were issued to 323 agrarian reform beneficiaries pursuant
to Operation Land Transfer (OLT) of Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 27 and/or Executive Order (EO) No. 228
MARO sent a ‘Final Notification’ letter to the heirs of Ascue
relative to the payment of their land transfer claim
DAR Region IV Office requested the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) to open a trust account in favor of Ascue
in an amount corresponding to the valuation of his
agricultural property.
The heirs of Ascue, with the approval of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) at Balayan, Batangas handling the settlement
his estate (sic), sold to Asturias Chemical Industries, Inc.
(“Asturias”) the 807 hectares of land referred to at the
outset.
Years later, Asturias was disturbed by the initial activities
undertaken by the DAR to place its remaining landholding
under CARP
Asturias made it known that its Calatagan landholding could
no longer be considered for CARP coverage, it having
“already been declared as mineral land pursuant to a
Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (‘MPSA’) between
the government and Asturias” and that “an Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) [has already been] issued …for
the establishment of a cement plant within the area”
DAR Regional Director issued a certificate of exemption over
the remaining 284.9323 hectares of land of Ascue, now
owned by Asturias. The exemption order was based on the
findings that “only fifteen (15) hectares, more or less, are
planted with crops such as upland rice, bananas, corn and
coconut while the rest, with an area of 284.9323 hectares,
are undeveloped, slopes of more than 18%, rocky, swampy,
and/ or mangrove areas and therefore not suitable for
agricultural purposes.”
The Provincial Agrarian Reform Coordinating Committee
(PARCCOM) issued Res. No. 02 urging the Registry of Deeds
– Nasugbu, Batangas to cancel/consider null and void the
land transaction between Ascue and Asturias if proven that
it was concluded in violation of existing laws.
PARO of Batangas formed the Task Force o ascertain if the
standard operating procedures were followed in accordance
with the policies and guidelines of PD 27 and CARL; to
determine whether the property was planted to rice /corn
as of 1972 and to verify the existence of tenancy
relationship.
Asturias formally protested the OLT coverage of portions of
its Calatagan property and the threatened cancellation of its
titles . . . . The grounds cited for the protest fall under these
headings: (1) “The Asturias Landholding is NOT AND NEVER
WAS a RICE and CORN farm”; and (2) The issuance of the
alleged 818 EPs and the coverage of the Asturias property
under PD # 27 is ERRONEOUSAND WITHOUT DUE
PROCESS.”
DAR sustained the protest of Asturias and recalled/nullified
the coverage of the property in question under OLT. The
ruling was predicated on the following premises: (a) the
landholding is not primarily devoted to rice/corn
production; (b) the existence of tenancy relations has not
been clearly established; and (c) the property had long
ceased to be agricultural: it has become mineral land.
Subsequently, two (2) groups, each claiming to be farmer- In the matter of petitioners’ non-compliance with the
beneficiaries, separately moved for reconsideration. These procedural requirement on forum shopping, we find no
were denied reversible error in the appealed dismissal action of the
The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners’ petition for appellate court. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the
review for “being insufficient in form for failing to comply requirements on the filing of a certification against forum
with the requirements under Section 3, Rule 46 and Section shopping should be strictly complied with. It bears stressing
5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.” that a petition involving two or more petitioners must be
accompanied by a certification of non-forum shopping
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are farmer-beneficiaries accomplished by all petitioners, or by one who is authorized
of the subject property to represent them; otherwise, the petition shall be
considered as defective and, under the terms of Section 3,
HELD: Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, may be dismissed.
No.
As may be noted, EPs were issued to petitioners as agrarian
reform beneficiaries or successors-in–interests pursuant to
the OLT program under P.D. No. 27. To come within the
coverage of the OLT, there must be showing that the land is
devoted to rice or corn crops, and there must be a system of
share-crop or lease tenancy obtaining therein when P.D. No.
27 took effect on October 21, 1972.[18] If either requisite is
absent, exclusion from the OLT coverage lies and EPs, if
issued, may be recalled.
In the case at bench, it has been peremptorily determined by
OP and, before it, by the DAR, acting on investigations
reports of its provincial (Batangas) office, as reviewed and
validated by its regional office, that the OLT coverage of the
disputed landholdings was erroneous, it being established
that the lands covered are not primarily devoted to rice and
corn and that the tenancy relationship has not been clearly
established. Absent palpable error by both agencies, of
which this Court finds none, their determination as to the
use of the property and/or to the dubious status of
petitioners as de jure tenants is controlling.