Roe v Wade Roe v Wade

Summary: Appellant Jane Roe, a pregnant mother who wished to obtain

an abortion, sued on behalf of all woman similarly situated in an effort to
prevent the enforcement of Texas statutes criminalizing all abortions
[Abortion] except those performed to save the life of the mother.

Statutes that make criminal all

abortions except when medically
advised for the purpose of saving the Facts:
life of the mother are an
unconstitutional invasion of privacy · Texas statutes made it a crime to procure or attempt an abortion except
when medically advised for the purpose of saving the life of the mother
· Jane Roe sought a declaratory judgment that the statutes were
unconstitutional on their face and an injunction to prevent Dallas County
District Attorney Wade from enforcing the statutes
· Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant, and that she was
unable to receive a legal abortion by a licensed physician because her life
was not threatened by the continuation of her pregnancy and that she was
unable to afford to travel to another jurisdiction to obtain a legal abortion
· Roe sued on behalf of herself and all other women similarly situated,
claiming that the statutes were unconstitutionally vague and abridged her
right of personal privacy, protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and
Fourteenth Amendments.

Issue. W/N Texas statutes invading a right to terminate pregnancy in

the concept of personal liberty in the 14 Amendment’s Due Process
th

Clause, Bill of Rights, or the rights in the 9 Amendment is

th

unconstitutional

Ruling: Yes. An abortion statute that forbids all abortions, except in the
case of a lifesaving procedure on behalf of the mother, is unconstitutional
based upon the right to privacy. However, it does allow for regulation of
abortion when the statute is tailored to uphold a compelling state
interest, such as the health of the mother or the viable fetus. The court
declined to answer the question of when life begins.
· The right to personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but
the right is not unqualified and must be considered against
important state interests in regulation.
· At common law abortion performed before quickening (the first
recognizable movement of the fetus in utero) was not an
indictable offense, and it is doubtful that abortion was ever a firmly
established common law crime even when it destroyed a quick
fetus
· Three reasons have been advanced for the historical enactment
of criminal abortion laws: 1) Laws are the product of a Victorian
social concern to discourage illicit sexual conduct, but this
argument has been taken seriously by neither courts nor
commentators 2) Abortion procedure is hazardous, therefore the
State’s concern is to protect pregnant women. However, modern
medical techniques have altered the situation, with abortions
being relatively safe 3) The State’s interest is in protecting the
prenatal life. However, this is somewhat negated by the fact that
the pregnant woman cannot be prosecuted for the act of abortion.

C. Procedural Due Process

Procedural Due Process serves as a restriction on actions of judicial and quasi-judicial agencies of the government
Procedural due process relates to the mode of procedure which government agencies must follow in the enforcement
and application of laws

Requisites: C J N O H
1. Impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matters before it
2. Jurisdiction properly acquired over the person of the defendant and over property which is the subject
matter of the proceeding
3. The defendant must be given notice and an Opportunity to be heard
4. Judgment rendered upon lawful hearing and based on evidence adduced

The fundamental elements of Procedural Due Process:

1. Notice (to be meaningful, must be as to time and place)
2. Opportunity to be heard
3. Court/tribunal must have jurisdiction

Procedural Due Process in Administrative Cases (Ang Tibay v CIR)

1. Right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondents legal
rights
2. A real opportunity to be heard personally or with assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence
in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights
3. A tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality
4. A finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the
hearing or contained the records or made known to the parties affected

Ang Tibay v CIR (Court of Industrial FACTS:

Relations)
[Leather Soles]
Due Process in Procedural hearings
SUMMARY: Ang Tibay allegedly ran
low of leather supplies and are unable
to commit to the Philippine Army
enough leather products. This lead to
the owner, Teodoro, to decide to lay off
some of its employees. All being part of
NLU, they filed against Teodoro with
unfair labor practice as ground, they
were alleging that NWB was being
unjustly favored as nobody from them
was laid off. The CIR ruled in favor of
Teodoro, however the NWB appealed
to the SC, who affirmed the decision.
There was then a motion for a new trial
filed by NLU with new and solid
evidence that made the SC grant their
motion in the light of procedural due
process.
 Petitioner Ang Tibay, a leather company, experienced shortage
of leather soles on 1938, making it necessary for Toribio Teodoro
(owner) to temporarily lay off some of its employees (who in this
case, apparently are members of the National Labor Union Inc.).
 The NLU claims that Ang Tibay is guilty of unfair labor practices
because Teodoro is discriminating against the NLU and is
unjustly favoring the National Workers’ Brotherhood
(company/employer union dominated by him) because nobody
from NWB was included in those laid off.
 Aggrieved, the employees filed a case against Ang Tibay to the
CIR, alleging it of unfair labor practice, that Teodoro’s claim of
shortage of leather is entirely false and unsupported by records
of the BOC and the Books of Accounts, and was only in fact a
scheme to discharge members of the NLU from work.
 CIR ruled in favor of NLU.
 By appeal to the SC, the ruling was reversed after the SC found
that there was no merit to NLU’s contention.
 NLU then prays for the vacation of the judgment rendered by the
SC with the following claims, among others:
o That Teodoro’s claim of shortage of leather soles in ANG
TIBAY is entirely false and unsupported
o Shortage of leather materials was but a scheme to
systematically discharge all members of NLU from work
o NWB is dominated by Teodoro
 NLU hence filed for a Motion for New Trial, with which Ang Tibay
filed an opposition for. Hence, this motion

DOCTRINE: The Court of Industrial ISSUES: WON NLU was denied due process by the CIR - YES
Relations may be said to be free from
the rigidity of certain procedural RULING:
requirements but it does not mean that
it can, in justifiable cases coming
before it, entirely ignore or disregard  Motion for new trial granted, case is remanded to the CIR with
the fundamental and essential instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as
requirements of due process in trials may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the
and investigations of an administrative requirements set forth.
case.  Cir is a special court whose functions are stated in CA No. 103. It
is more of an administrative board than a part of the integrated
judicial system. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial
functions in the determination of disputes between employers and
employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and
extensive, as far as issues are concerned with employers and
laborers, landlords and tenants, among others.
 Its duty is to prevent or arbitrate disputes which are submitted to
the Secretary of Labor which are to be dealt by the Court for the
sake of public interest, which is possible through reconciliation of
parties and/or inducing them to settle by amicable agreement.
 SC had the occasion to point out that CIR is not narrowly
constrained by technical rules of procedure, and CA No. 103
requires it to act according to justice and equity and substantial
merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms
and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence
but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and
equitable.
 However, this does not entail that CIR is free from the rigidity of
certain procedural requirements most specially the fundamental
and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal
primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings:
o Right to a hearing
o Tribunal must consider evidence presented
o Decision must have something to support itself
o Evidence must be substantial
o Decision must be based on evidence presented at a
hearing
o Tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate
o The board or body should, in all controversial questions,
render to its decision in such manner that the parties to
the proceeding can know the various issue involved, and
the reason for the decision rendered
 Since there was a failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved
due to failure to receive all relevant evidence, the motion for a
new trial was granted.

Silva v Ocampo Facts:

[Ice Plant] Belen Cabrera filed in the Public Service Commission an application for
a certificate of public convenience to install, maintain and operate in the
City of Lipa an ice plant. Eliseo Silva opposed the application on the
ground that his ice plant was adequate to meet the needs of the public and
that public convenience did not require the operation of another ice plant.
Commissioner Feliciano Ocampo commissioned Attorney Antonio H.
Aspillera, chief of the legal division, to receive the evidence. Based on the
evidence received by Aspillera, the Commission granted the
application.

On appeal, however, the Supreme Court held that the proceedings had
before Attorney Aspillera were null and void being in violation of section 3
of the Public Service Act, as amended, and set aside the decision of the
Commission and ordered that the case returned for re-hearing.
 At the re-hearing before the Commission, Commissioner Ocampo opined
that the applicant has the right either to re-submit her former evidence or
to present evidence de novo and that it is not intended by the decision of
this Court to curtail her right to choose between these two
alternatives. Based on this evidence, Commissioner Ocampo granted to
the applicant a provisional permit subject to the condition that it may be
cancelled or revoked at any time and without prejudice to whatever
final decision may be rendered in the case. The motion for
reconsideration of oppositor having been denied, he filed this petition for
certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not Commissioner Ocampo acted in a manner contrary to the
ruling of the Supreme Court when he allowed the re-submission of the
evidence of the applicant.

Held:
NO. The Supreme Court held that while the evidence presented by the
applicant has been admitted in violation of the directive of this Court,
however, such evidence may serve as justification, if the Commission so
finds it, to warrant the issuance of a provisional permit. There is nothing in
the law which prohibits the Commission from receiving any pertinent
evidence for the purpose of acting on a petition for the provisional permit.

The law is silent as to the procedure to be followed with regard to

provisional permit. The law even empowers the Commission to act,
without hearing, on certain matters of public interest, "subject to
established limitations and exceptions and saving provisions, to the
contrary" (section 17, Com. Act 146, as amended). There being no
express prohibition in the law, nor any provision to the contrary, SC
hold that the re-submitted evidence may serve as basis for the
issuance of a provisional permit to the applicant.

The Commission found that the applicant had made considerable

investment to acquire and install her 10-ton ice plant in the city of Lipa and
that there was an urgent need for ice not only by the people of that city but
also of the towns of Cuenca, Alitagtag and Ibaan, which condition had
existed and continued to exist since the original decision in this case had
been rendered, for which reasons the Commission found sufficient warrant
the issuance of a provisional permit. In so granting such provisional permit,
the Commission partly said: "If the best interests and convenience of the
public are to be subserved, applicant should be granted a provisional
permit, to continue operating her plant while this case is being litigated. To
order the closing down of applicant's plant in the face of the evidence
showing that the public needs her service would be a disservice to the
public. This provisional authority should be granted because the public's
need for the service is urgent and the hearing and final determination of
this case will necessarily take time."

Halili v PSC FACTS:

[Bus Route]
A petition for certiorari was filed seeking for the revocation and
annulment of an order by respondent Public Service Commission dated
July 3, 1952 which changed part of the route of the bus service established
by the respondent CAM Transit Co., Inc., between Balara and City Hall,
Manila. Petitioner herein is the holder of various certificates of public
convenience to operate auto-truck services between Balara and various
points in the City of Manila and its suburbs.
 On July 2, 1952, CAM Transit Co., Inc. filed a petition with the respondent
Commission alleging that the route authorized in its City Hall(Manila)-
Balara line is entirely different from that supported by the evidence
presented in the hearing, and praying that the certificate be amended. On
the following day, July 3, and without previous notice to the petitioner or a
previous hearing thereon, ordered the modification of the line in
accordance with the petition.

ISSUES:
WON the order of the amendment of the route, without notice to the
petitioner and other interested parties, or hearing in which the latter may
be given opportunity to be present, was lawfully and validly issued by the
Commission.
WON petitioner’s right to due process was violated.

HELD:
The order by the Commission of amending the route was not validly issued
and petitioner’s right to due process was violated.

In the first place, the power to issue provisional permits is expressly

authorized. In the second place, the change ordered is not provisional
merely, like that granted in a provisional permit, but final and permanent in
character. In the third place, even if the Commission is not bound by the
rules in judicial proceedings, it must bow its head to he constitutional
mandate that no person shall be deprived of a right without due process of
law. The "due process of law" clause of the Constitution binds not
only the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, but also each
and everyone of its branches, agencies, etc.(16 C.J.S., 1149.)

"Due process of law, or, in the mean accord with the procedure outlines in
the law, or, in the absence of express procedure, under such safeguards
for the protection of individual rights as the settled maxims of law permit
and sanction for the particular class of cases to which the one in question
belongs," (16 C.J.S., 1141.) In the case at bar, the Public Service Act does
not include the amendment made in the disputed order among those may
be ordered without notice or hearing in accordance with Section 17 of the
Act. Is the amendment, without notice or hearing, permitted by the well
settled maxims of law? We declare it is not, because due process of law
guarantees notice and opportunity to be heard to persons who would
be affected by the order or act contemplated.

In a General sense it means the right to be heard before some tribunal

having jurisdiction to determine the question in dispute.

By "due process of law" is meant orderly proceeding adopted to the

nature of the case, before a tribunal having jurisdiction, which
proceeds upon notice, with an opportunity to bee heard, with full
power to grant relief.

Some legal procedure in which the person proceeded against, if he is to

be concluded thereby, shall have an opportunity to defend himself.

A course of proceeding according to these rules and principles which have

been established in our system of jurisprudence for the protection and
enforcement of private rights.

Ynot v IAC FACTS:

[Carabaos]

SUMMARY: President Marcos issued
EO 626-A prohibiting the movement
and slaughtering of carabaos. Ynot
was transporting six carabaos in a
pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when
they were confiscated by the police
station commander. Ynot sued for
recovery but were unable to be
produced. RTC sustained the
confiscation, and appealed to the IAC,
upholding the same. Hence this
petition.
DOCTRINE: Due process is violated
because the owner of the property
confiscated is denied the right to be
heard in his defense and is
immediately condemned and
punished.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
Continuation of Procedural Due Process
Diosdado Guzman v National University
[Mass actions and boycott]
 EO 626-A prohibiting interprovincial movement of carabaos and
the slaughtering of carabaos.
 Ynot transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to
Iloilo, when they were confiscated by the police station
commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of EO 626-A
 Ynot sued for recovery, and the RTC issued a writ of replevin
upon filing of bond. RTC sustained confiscation, since they could
not longer be produced, order the confiscation of the bond.
 Ynot appealed the decision to the IAC, which upheld the RTC
decision.
 Hence this petition. Alleging that the EO is unconstitutional as it
violates the due process
ISSUE/s: WON EO 626-A violates due process - YES
RULING: EO 626-A is declared unconstitutional
RATIO:
 The minimum requirements of due process are notice and
hearing, which generally speaking, may not be dispensed with
because they are intended as a safeguard against official
arbitrariness.
 There are instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted
without violation of due process in view of the nature of the
property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general
welfare from a clear and present danger.
 In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by
the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only
after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a
supersedeas bond of P12,000., which was ordered confiscated
upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial
court.
 The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the
petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which were
carried out forthright. The measures struck at once and pounce
upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus
denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.
 Due process is violated because the owner of the property
confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is
immediately condemned and punished.
FACTS:
Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel
Ramaculat Students of respondent National University, have come to
this Court to seek relief from what they describe as their school's
"continued and persistent refusal to allow them to enrol."
 In their petition "for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with
prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction" dated August 7, 1984,
they alleged that they were denied due to the fact that they were
active participation in peaceful mass actions within the
premises of the University.

The respondents on the other hand claimed that the petitioners'

failure to enroll for the first semester of the school year 1984-1985 is
due to their own fault not because of their alleged exercise of their
constitutional and human rights. That as regards to Guzman, his
academic showing was poor due to his activities in leading boycotts
of classes. That Guzman "is facing criminal charges for malicious
mischief before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in connection
with the destruction of properties of respondent University. The
petitioners have "failures in their records, and are not of good
scholastic standing"

Issue: Whether or not a school or university have the right to deny

acceptance of students without due process. (no)

Ruling:
Under the Education Act of 1982, the petitioners, have the right
among others “to freely choose their field of study subject to existing
curricula and to continue their course up to graduation except in case
of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations.”

Petitioners were being denied this right , or being disciplined without

due process, in violation of the admonition in the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools that ” no penalty shall be imposed
upon any student except for cause as defined in the Manual and/or
in the school rules and regulations as duly promulgated and only after
due investigation shall have been conducted.”

The petition was granted and the respondents are directly allowed
the petitioners to enroll without prejudice to any disciplinary
proceedings.

Tatad v SB Tatad vs SB (March 21, 1988)

(AMBRAY) Ponente: Yap

Facts:
-Tatad seeked to annul the resolution of Tanodbayan and
Sandiganbayan
-He alleged that Antonio Delos Reyes (former Head Executive
Assistant of then Department of Public Information and Assistant
Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Broadcasts) filed a formal report
with the Legal Panel, Presidential Security Command (PSC),
charging Tatad, who was then the Secretary and Head of the
Department of Public Information, for violating Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act but no action was taken
-5 years later, Tatad submitted resigned as Minister of Public
Information
-2 months after, de los Reyes filed a complaint with the Tanodbayan
accusing Tatad of graft and corruption practices as Secretary of
Public Information
-President Marcos accepted his resignation
 -Tatad moved to dismiss the complaint claiming immunity by virtue of
PD 1791 but was denied
-The Tanodbayan approved a resolution of informations to be filed
against Tatad:
1) Giving his brother in law’s corporation unwarranted
benefits
2) Receiving a check from a corporation as consideration for
the for the release of a check for printing services
3) 3 counts of failure to file his SALN
-Tatad filed with Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the information
and one of the grounds is that the prosecution deprived Tatad of due
process of law
-He claimed that Tanodbayan violated the constitutional mandate of
“due process” in prolonging the termination of the preliminary
investigation and in filing the corresponding informations only after
more than a decade from the offenses, which amounted to loss of
jurisdiction and authority to file the informations
-Sandiganbayan dimsmissed it saying that it would be premature for
the court to grant the radical relief

Issue: W/N The Prosecution’s long delay in the filing of these cases
had deprived Tatad of his constitutional right to due process and the
right to a speedy disposition of the cases

Ruling: Yes.
-The long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by
the Tanodbayan is violative of the constitutional right to due process
-Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the
conduct of preliminary investigation is part of the procedural due
process
-The criminal cases were dismissed

Guiani v SB Petitioners: Datukan Guiani and other regional officials of Cotabato

(HERNANDEZ) and DPWH-ARMM who are accused of graft and corruption

Respondent: Sandiganbayan, Office of the Special Prosecutor,

Office of the Ombudsman and the Commission on Audit

RECIT-READY VERSION: Guiani and other officials of Cotabato and

DPWH-ARMM were accused of graft and corruption. A complaint
against them was instituted in 1992. After a long and hard
investigation done by COA and Graft Investigation Officers,
informations against the accused petitioners were filed only in 1998.
In 1999, petitioners filed for a motion to quash the informations. They
also assail that their rights under Art III Sec 16 were violated because
of the length of time between the initial complaint and the filing of the
informations. The SC ruled that their Sec 16 rights were not violated.
Sec 16 prohibits vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. In the
case at bar, the delay was caused not only by the reasonably
thorough investigation done by COA and Graft Investigation Officers,
but also by the delay in the filing of the counter-affidavits of the
petitioners themselves. This delay in the filing of the counter-affidavits
signifies an implied waiver of their Sec 16 rights. Thus, the petition
was dismissed and the SC directed the Sandiganbayan to proceed
with the arraignment of the accused.

FACTS (take note of the dates!):

After the creation of ARMM, Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) began the implementation of regional, provincial
and district impact projects to be funded from the infrastructure seed
money of P615 Million from the Office of the Regional Governor of
ARMM.

October 15, 1992: COA conducted a physical inspection of the project

and found several irregularities:

1. Bloating of the accomplishment reports for the Cotabato-Lanao

Road
2. Overpayment by the government of 4.1M pesos
3. Mobilization fees advanced to contractors amounting to 15.7M
pesos remain
unrecouped
4. Advanced payments of 13.5M and 880K pesos, which were not
found in the
list of allowed pre-payments
5. Designs for the Awang Nuro Road were submitted AFTER the
bidding, which
was in violation of PD 1594 (designs first, bid after)
6. An engineering survey contract, which cost 200K, was
unnecessary

December 8, 1992: Executive Secretary directed the Ombudsman to

conduct preliminary investigations. A short and perhaps
unsubstantiated two-page report from COA was attached to the letter
of request sent by the Executive Secretary. Thereafter, COA
instituted a complaint against herein petitioners for violation of the
Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019)

July 31, 1998 (SIX YEARS AFTER THE COMPLAINT WAS FIRST
DOCKETED): Graft Investigation Officers recommended the
indictment of the petitioners.

October 8, 1998: This recommendation was approved by the Deputy

Ombudsman and the Ombudsman. Immediately thereafter, 21
informations were filed against the petitioners.

November 10, 1998: The Sandiganbayan issued an Order stating

that it was not persuaded at that time that probable cause exists
against the accused, considering that the resolution of the
Ombudsman merely relied on the report of the COA. It opined that
the alleged irregularities must be shown by further documentary
proof. Hence, the Sandiganbayan directed the prosecution to submit
adequate proof of the existence of probable cause within sixty days
therefrom.

May 20, 1999: Special Prosecution Officer Lucero recommended the

dismissal of the cases. However, this was disregarded by the
Ombudsman, who subsequently ordered the prosecution of the
cases.

September 27, 1999: The petitioners filed with the Sandiganbayan an

Omnibus Motion to quash the informations, to defer the issuance of
warrants of arrest and to defer their arraignment. The Sandiganbayan
did not act on the Omnibus Motion considering that petitioners had
not submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of said court Petitioners
then posted surety bonds. Arraignment and pre-trial was set on
February 22, 2001.

February 15, 2001: Hearing of the petitioners’ motion to quash. They

assail that their constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases was
violated; thus, they assert the dismissal of their cases.
Sandiganbayan denied the motion to dismiss.

ISSUE/HELD: W/N the petitioners’ rights under Section 16 were

violated – NO. Petitions dismissed. SC ordered Sandiganbayan to
proceed with the arraignment of the accused.

RATIO:
I. The “unexplained” delay was explained

A. Rojas, the Graft Investigation Officer assigned to the case,

requested for a
more substantiated report from COA on the irregularities in the
DPWH- ARMM project on March 2, 1993. COA was able to submit
this only on July 20, 1994. The authenticated report was submitted
only on November 16, 1994.

B. On May 5, 1995, Rojas requested the petitioners to file their

counter- affidavits. The last counter-affidavit was received on August
28, 1995 after extensive extensions.

C. Two reply-affidavits to two counter-affidavits were issued by the

Office of the Court Administrator on February 24, 1996 and May 29,
1996.

D. The Graft Investigation Officer issued a resolution on July 31,

1998.

II. Jurisprudence – Tatad v. Sandiganbayan

A. Petitioners invoke the case of Tatad v. Sandiganbayan

1. In that case, a complaint was filed against Tatad in 1974 for graft
and corruption

2. It was only in 1979 when the complaint was acted on. Note that in
1979, a feud arose between Tatad and President Marcos.

3. The Supreme Court opined that the resurrection of the 1974 case
only in 1979 (a dubios and “blatant departure from the established
procedure”) was propelled by political motivations.

4. “Only by strict adherence to the established procedure may the

public’s perception of the impartiality of the prosecutor be enhanced.”

B. However, since the circumstances of the Tatad case differ

significantly
with that of the case at bar, the principles laid down in the former
cannot be utilized for the ratio of the latter.

III. Case-to-case basis

 A. Violations of Section 16 must be taken in a case-to-case basis, i.e.
“particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances
peculiar
to each case.”

B. The right to speedy disposition of cases is violated only “when the

proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delay.”

C. The following factors may be considered in determining W/N the

delay is
reasonable:

1. length of delay
2. reasons for such delay,
3. assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused
4. prejudice caused by the delay

D. “The records of this case show that petitioners raised their

objections to the perceived delay in the resolution of the complaints
against them only on September 27, 1999 xxx It would appear,
therefore, that petitioners impliedly acquiesced in the delay in the
proceedings.”

1. The right to speedy disposition of cases may be waived, either

explicitly or impliedly, as in this case.

E. Section 16 rights may not be utilized to deprive the State of a

reasonable opportunity of fairly indicting criminals. “A party's
individual rights should not work against and preclude the people's
equally important right to public justice.”

Abraham Tolentino v Comelec Facts:

(LORENZO)  In the May 14, 2007 elections, all the parties ran for elective
local offices in Tagaytay City. Tolentino and De Castro were
proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor and Vice-Mayor,
respectively. The private respondents contested the election
results in 116 ballot boxes by filing three separate election
protests against the proclaimed winning candidates for
Mayor, Vice-Mayor and Members of the Sanggunian
Panlungsod. The protests were raffled to the Second
Division of the COMELEC. The records do not contain the
order for the consolidation of the cases, but it appears that
they were consolidated previously inasmuch as the caption
of all orders issued by the Division indicated the joining of
the cases.
 After finding the protests sufficient in form and substance,
the Division required the City Treasurer of Tagaytay City to
inventory the protested ballot boxes and to turn them over
to the Election Officer of Tagaytay City for delivery and
submission to the COMELEC’s Electoral Contests
Adjudication Department (ECAD) in Manila.
 However, the Division resolved not to suspend the revision
proceedings, and instead directed the Election Officer of
Tagaytay City to deliver the affected ballot boxes to the SET,
with the remainder of the ballot boxes to be deposited in the
ECAD Ballot Box Storage Area in Manila. [9]
  40 ballot boxes out of the 116 protested ones were set aside
due to apparent sealing defects or irregularities.
 On January 12, 2009, the Division suspended the revision
proceedings until all the contested ballot boxes were already
in the custody of the COMELEC.
 On May 8, 2009, the Division issued the first assailed order
in G.R. Nos. 187958 and 187961-62, formally requesting the
SET to allow the revision to proceed within its premises
 Tolentino moved to reconsider this order, but the Division
denied his motion through its second assailed order
 In furtherance of his cause, Tolentino filed on June 30, 2009
his supplement to the petition, alleging that events had
[23]

transpired subsequent to the filing of his petition. He stated

that the revision proceedings concerning EPC 2007-07
conducted within the SET premises on June 3 to 8, 2009
involved only 28 ballot boxes because the Revision
Committee suspended the revision of the set-aside 16 ballot
boxes.
Issues:
 Whether there was a violation of Tolentino’s right to due
process by the non-observance of the cardinal rules of due
process in administrative adjudications and by the piece-
meal resolution of the pending incidents.
Ruling:
 Gauged upon the foregoing guidelines, Tolentino’s gripe
was unwarranted. He was not denied procedural due
process. The Division had required him to provide the
names of his revisors whose tasks included the raising of
objections, the claiming votes for him, or the contesting of
the votes in favor of his opponent. He has neither alleged
being deprived of this opportunity, nor indicated any
situation in which his revisors were denied access to the
revision proceedings. He could not also insist that the
COMELEC did not consider his legal and factual
arguments; besides, he could still raise them in his
memorandum should he chose to. During the revision
stage, he should raise all objections, present his evidence
and witnesses, and file his memorandum before the case
would be submitted for resolution. Such manner of
presenting his side would fully meet the demands of due
process, for, as the Court has explained the nature of due
process in Stayfast Philippines Corporation v. National
Labor Relations Commission:
 The essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain ones side or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of.
 A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all
times and in all instances essential. The
requirements are satisfied where the
parties are afforded fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain
their side of the controversy at hand.
What is frowned upon is absolute lack
of notice and hearing. xxx
 A review of the records proves that the parties,
including Tolentino, were afforded ample
 opportunity to ventilate their respective claims, to
raise their objections, to claim votes, and to
contest the votes of their opponents through their
duly designated revisors.

Winston Garcia v Mario Molina Facts:

(NEPO) 1. Molina and Velasco are both Attorney V of the GSIS. They
received two separate Memoranda from Petitioner charging
Doctrine: Where the denial of the themwith grave misconduct. Velasco, in addition was also
fundamental right to due process is accused of violating Rules of Office Decorum and gross
apparent, a decision rendered in disregard insubordination.Both were suspended for 90 days without
of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. pay
2. In their answer, both respondents denied the charges and
averred that Petitioner acted in bad faith in charging them
falsely.They also opposed to their suspension for lack of
factual and legal basis. Respondents filed an Urgent Petition
for to Lift Preventive Suspension Order before Civil Service
Commission (CSC) as well as Petition to Transfer
Investigation. CSC failed to resolve both motions
3. Respondents filed with CA a Special Civil Action for
Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for TRO. CA granted
the Petition and agreed that the investigation should be
done by CSC and not GSIS
Issues:
1. W/N preliminary investigation in administrative proceeding
is an essential requisite to the conduct of adjudication -
YES
2. W/N the respondents were denied due process of law - YES
Ratio:
1. The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service has the following steps
a. Complaint
b. Counter-Affidavit/Comment
c. Preliminary Investigation
d. Investigation Report
e. Formal Charge
2. The filing by petitioner of formal charges against the
respondents without complying with the mandated
preliminary investigation or at least give the respondents the
opportunity to comment violated the latter's right to due
process. Hence, the formal charges are void ab initio and
may be assailed directly or indirectly at anytime
3. Where the denial of the fundamental right to due
process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard
of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. This rule is
equally true in quasi-judicial and administrative
proceedings, for the constitutional guarantee that no man
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process is unqualified by the type of proceedings (whether
judicial or administrative) where he stands to lose the same
4. Although administrative procedural rules are less stringent
and often applied more liberally, administrative proceedings
are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural
principles, such as the right to due process in investigations
and hearings.||
5. Due Process in Administrative Proceedings
. the right to actual or constructive notice to the institution of
proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal rights;

Gamboa v Chan
(ROQUE)
Doctrine: Forwarding of information or
intelligence report gathered by PNP to the
commission is NOT an intrusion of
petitioner's right to privacy.
a. a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the
assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's
favor, and to defend one's rights;
b. a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so
constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a
reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and
c. a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial
evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained
in the records or made known to the parties affected
6. It is well-settled that a decision rendered without due
process is void ab initio and may be attacked at anytime
directly or collaterally by means of a separate action, or by
resisting such decision in any action or proceeding where it
is invoked
RULING: Petition DENIED for lack of merit
Facts:
Former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Admin No. 275
creating Zeñarosa Commission which was formed to investigate the
existence of private army groups in the country in view of eliminating
and dismantling them permanently in the future. Upon conclusion of
its investigation, the Commission submitted a confidential report to
the office of the President.
Marynette Gamboa was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte. Gamboa
alleged that the Philippine National Police Ilocos Norte conducted
surveillance operation against her and her aides and classified her as
PAG coddler. Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP
forwarded in the Report’s enumeration of individual maintaining
PAGs.
Gamboa’s association with PAG was published and released in the
different forms of media, publicly tagging her as a PAG coddler.
Alleging that her right to privacy was violated, Gamboa filed a petition
before the RTC for the issuance of writ of habeas data to destroy the
unverified reports from the PNP database and restrain PNP from filing
baseless reports against her.
The RTC ruled that the inclusion of Gamboa in the report violates her
right to privacy. However RTC dismissed Gamboa’s petition for writ
of habeas data saying that Gamboa failed to establish the source of
the information.
Issues:
1. W/N the forwarding or information to intelligence report by
the PNP to the Commission was an unlawful act that
violated the petitioner’s right to privacy.
2. W/N resort to petition for writ of habeas data will prosper.
Held:
NO.
It is clear that the issuance of AO 275 articulates a legitimate aim
which is to investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate
 objective of dismantling them permanently. Pursuant to the state
interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the powers and functions
accorded to the Commission and the PNP, the latter collected
information on individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs, monitored
them and counteracted their activities. One of those individuals is
herein petitioner Gamboa.

The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy

designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and
freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to
enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks
to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself,
particularly in instances in which such information is being collected
through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be
emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted,
there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one
hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.

In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable to prove
through substantial evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals
maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to
harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard,
respondents sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted
against her were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was
implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of
regularity, which she failed to overcome. [T]he state interest of
dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private
life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the
PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate.
Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.

Heirs of Bugarin v Republic Facts:

(ALEJO) This case seeks to annul and set aside the SandiganBayan
Resolution which ordered the forfeiture of some of the properties of
the late NBI Director Bugarin pursuant to the decision of the Supreme
Court in Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan. The heirs of
Bugarin pray that the Sandiganbayan be compelled to conduct
hearings for the purpose of properly determining the properties of
Bugarin that should be forfeited in favor of the Republic, this despite
the fact that the SC in Republic has already decreed that properties
of Bugarin acquired from 1968 to 1980 which were disproportionate
to his lawful income during the said period (P2,170,163.00 from 1968
to 1980 against his total income for the period 1967 to 1980 totaling
only P766,548.00) be forfeited in favor of the Republic. The petitioner
sallege that they were denied of their due process.

Issue:
1. W/N Bugarin’s Heirs were denied of due process - NO
2. Whether Sandiganbayan has Jurisdiction in forfeiture
proceedings - YES

Ratio:
1. The essence of due process is the right to be heard. Based
on the foregoing, Bugarin or his heirs were certainly not
denied that right. The Court emphasizes that due process is
satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their respective sides of the
controversy. Thus, when the party seeking due process was
in fact given several opportunities to be heard and airs his
 side, but it is by his own fault or choice he squanders these
chances, then his cry for due process must fail
2. Supreme Court declared that Sandiganbayan may likewise
take cognizance of forfeiture proceedings.Petitioners should
have realized in the fallo, as well as in the body of the
Republic decision, that the properties listed by this Court
were all candidates for forfeiture at that point, no additional
proof or evidence was required! All that was needed was for
the Sandiganbayan, as the court of origin, to make sure that
the aggregate sum of the acquisition costs of the properties
chosen remained within the amount which was
disproportionate to the income of Bugarin during his tenure
as NBI Director. To reiterate, the case was only remanded
to the Sandiganbayan to implement the Court’s ruling in the
Republic case

Ruling: Wherefore the petition is Denied

Melendrez v PAGC Facts:

(AMBRAY) -Dr. Melendres was the Exec Director of the Lung Center of the
Philippines
-15 physicians complained against him and the Secretary of Health
issued Department Order
-A Fact-Finding Committee was created and found cases against
Melendres:
1) Procurement of presentation banner without holding
public bidding
2) Falsification of documents in the hiring of architectural
consultant
3) Violation of auditing rules on the drawing of petty cash
advances
4) Unauthorized implementation of a reorganization plan
unapproved by the Board of Trustees

-Melendres then was charged with the cases and issued with
preventive suspension
-The physicians still addressed to PGMA that he does not deserve
the position as LCP Exec Director because of his abusive behavior
-Exec Secretary Romulo issued AO directing the PAGC to conduct a
formal investigation and ordering his preventive suspension for 90
days
-PAGC Hearing Commissioner Buenaflor directed Melendres to
submit his counter-affidavit within 10 days and he did
-The next day, he filed a Motion for Inhibition on Buenaflor in
terminating the case that deprived him of his right to due process
under Sec. 22 of URACC, which Buenaflor denied
-Melendres argued that the PAGC order is a patent nullity because
Buenaflor terminated the proceedings with undue haste

Issue: W/N Melendres was deprived of his right to due process

Ruling: NO.
-Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all
situations require trial-type proceeding.
-It is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and
given an opportunity to explain or defend himself.
-As long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his or interests
in due course, he is not denied due process.
Tua v Mangrobang
SUMMARY: Rosanna filed in behalf of her
children a petition for issuance of TPO,
pursuant to RA 9262 against her husband,
after claims of threats and harm done. The
RTC issued the TPO, to which Ralph replied
with a motion to lift the TPO because it is
violative of his due process. Without
awaiting for the decision, Ralph then filed
with the CA an injunction to restrain all
orders and decisions of the RTC. The CA
denied for lack of merit, and hence this
petition.
DOCTRINE: It is a constitutional
commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process
must yield to the necessities of protecting
vital public interests, among which is
protection of women and children from
violence and threats to their personal safety
and security
FACTS:
1. Rosanna and Ralph are married with three kids, Joshua
Raphael, Jesse Ruth Lois, and Jezreel Abigail.
2. Rosanna filed with the RTC of Cavite a verified Petition for
herself and in behalf of her minor children, for the issuance
of a protection order, pursuant to RA 9262 or the Anti-
Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004,
against her husband, Ralph Tua.
3. Rosanna claimed that she and her children suffered from
petitioner’s abusive conduct; that petitioner had threatened
to cause her and the children physical harm for the purpose
of controlling her actions or decisions; that she was actually
deprived of custody and access to her minor children; and
that she was threatened to be deprived of her and her
children's financial support.
4. The RTC issued a Temporary Protection Order, after Ralph
allegedly took the children.
5. Ralph replied with a Petition with Urgent Motion to Lift TPO,
and contended that the issuance of the TPO is
unconstitutional for being violative of the due process clause
of the Constitution.
6. Without awaiting for the resolution of his Comment on the
petition and motion to lift TPO, Ralph filed with the CA a
petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and hold departure order assailing the
TPO issued by the RTC.
7. The CA issued a temporary restraining order to temporarily
enjoin the parties
8. Ralph filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction with Manifestation, praying that the
enforcement of all orders, decision to be issued by the RTC
and all the proceedings therein be restrained.
9. The CA denied the petition because the petition assailing
the TPO and motion to quash should have been filed in the
RTC. And that the issuance of the TPO is valid.
10. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
WoN the issuance of the TPO in RA 9262 violates due process.
NO

WoN there is an invalid delegation of legislative power to the court

and to barangay officials to issue protection orders.

WoN CA erred in not finding RTC to commit grave abuse of discretion

in issuing the TPO.

RULING: MR denied

RATIO:
1. Ralph directs his constitutional attack on Section 15 of RA
9262 contending that had there been no ex parte issuance
of the TPO, he would have been afforded due process of
law and had properly presented his side on the matter; that
the questioned provision simply encourages arbitrary
enforcement repulsive to basic constitutional rights which
affects his life, liberty and property.
2. A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts
of violence against women and their children, their family or

Cudia v PMA Superintendent
(HERNANDEZ)
Petition: Petition for Mandamus
Petitioner: First Class Cadet Aldrin Jeff P.
Cudia
Respondent: The Superintendent of the
Philippine Military Academy, The Honor
household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs.
Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further
harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate
the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.
3. Since “time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further
violence is to be prevented,” the court is authorized to issue
ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing
when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and
there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is
necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and
imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence,
which is about to recur.
4. The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be
challenged as violative of the right to due process.
5. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process must yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which
is protection of women and children from violence and
threats to their personal safety and security.
6. It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex
parte, the court shall likewise order that notice be
immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an
opposition within 5 days from service.
7. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may
have in support of one’s defense. “To be heard” does not
only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also
through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either
through oral arguments or pleadings is accorded, there is no
denial of due process defense. “To be heard” does not only
mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also
through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either
through oral arguments or pleadings is accorded, there is no
denial of due process
8. The act of congress to entrust the issuance of protection
orders to courts and barangay officials is in pursuance of
authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes
involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before
the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations
of such rights.
9. It is within the court’s discretion, based on the petition and
the affidavit attached thereto, to determine that the violent
acts against women and their children for the issuance of a
TPO have been committed.
10. It is a settled doctrine that there is GAD when there is a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; such as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility; it must be so patent and gross
so as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
Facts:
Petitioner, Cadet First Class Cudia, was a member of the Siklab Diwa
Class of 2014 of the Philippine Military Academy. He was supposed
to graduate with honors as the class salutatorian, receive the
Philippine Navy Saber as the top Navy Cadet graduate and be
commissioned as an ensign of the Navy.
Committee of 2014 of the PMA and HC
members, and the Cadet Review and
Appeals Board (CRAB)
Ponente: Peralta, J.
Date: February 24, 2014
Petitioner was issued a Delinquency Report (DR) because he was
late for two minutes in his ENG 412 class, other cadets were also
reported late for 5 minutes. The DRs reached the Department of
Tactical Officers and were logged and transmitted to the Company of
Tactical Officers (TCO) for explanation. Cudia incurred the penalty of
11 demerits and 13 touring hours.
Several days after, Cudia was reported to the Honor Committee (HC)
per violation of the Honor Code. Lying that is giving statements that
perverts the truth in his written appeal stating that his 4th period class
ended at 3:00 that made him late for the succeeding class.
Cudia submitted his letter of explanation on the honor report. The HC
constituted a team to conduct the preliminary investigation on the
violation, it recommended the case be formalized. Cudia pleaded not
guilty. The result was 8-1 guilty verdict and upon the order of the
Chairman, the HC reconvened in the chambers, after, the Presiding
Officer announced a 9-0 guilty verdict.
The HC denied Cudia’s appeal. The Headquarters Tactics Group
(HTG) conducted a formal review and checking of findings. Special
orders were issued placing Cudia on indefinite leave of absence and
pending approval of separation from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. Cudia submitted a letter to the Office of the Commandant
of Cadets requesting his re-instatement. The matter was referred to
Cadet Review and Appeals Board (CRAB) and it upheld the decision.
Cudia wrote a letter to President Aquino but the President sustained
the findings of the CRAB. CHR-CAR issued a resolution finding
probable cause for Human Rights Violations.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the PMA committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing Cudia in utter disregard of his right to due
process and in holding that he violated the Honor Code through lying.
2. Whether or not the court can interfere with military affairs
Ruling:
1. No. The determination of whether the PMA cadet has rights
to due process, education, and property should be placed in the
context of the Honor Code. All the administrative remedies were
exhausted. A student of a military academy must be prepared to
subordinate his private interest for the proper functioning of the
institution. The PMA may impose disciplinary measures and
punishments as it deems fit and consistent with the peculiar needs of
the institution. PMA has regulatory authority to administratively
dismiss erring cadets. PMA has a right to invoke academic freedom
in the enforcement of the internal rules and regulations.
2. Yes. The court is part of the checks-and-balance machinery
mandated by Article VIII of the Constitution. The court’s mandate
(according to Section 1, Article 8) is expanded that the duty of the
courts is not only to “settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable” but also “to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government” even if the latter
does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. No
one is above the law, including the military, especially in violations of
Constitutionally guaranteed rights.

Roquero v UP Manila Chancellor
(LORENZO)
DOCTRINE: Section 16, Article III:
Section 16. All person shall have the right to
a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative
bodies.
Dispositive:
The petition is denied. The dismissal of Cudia from PMA is affirmed.
FACTS:
 Roquero is seeking the reversal of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
 A complaint against petitioner Wilfredo G. Roquero (an
employee of UP-Manila assigned at the Philippine General
Hospital (PGH) Security Division as Special Police Captain)
was filed by Imelda O. Abutal for demanding sexual favors
from her while conducting an interview for the position of
Lady Guard of Ex-Bataan Security Agency to be assigned
at UP-PGH; He, therefore, is liable for GRAVE
MISCONDUCT.
 The prosecution, however, failed to submit its formal offer of
evidence within the period agreed upon.
 Thereafter, on 10 August 1999, when the case was called,
only petitioner and his counsel appeared. Atty. Flor merely
called by telephone and requested Atty. Docena to reset the
case to another date. Atty. Docena then ordered the
resetting of the hearing on the following dates: 11 August
and 21 August 1999. On 11 August 1999, only petitioner and
his counsel came. No representative from the prosecution
appeared before the ADT. Atty. Flor again called and asked
for the postponement of the hearing. By reason thereof,
Atty. Docena issued an Order, which reads as follows:
 The continuation of the hearing of this case is hereby set to
September 29, 1999 at 2:00 p.m., with the understanding
that if and when the parties fail to appear at said hearing
date, this case shall be deemed submitted for resolution
based on the evidences already obtaining in the record of
the case.
 On said date, the representative from the prosecution again
failed to appear.
 Petitioner Captain Wilfredo Roquero then filed with the
Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 87776, alleging therein that
the ADT committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied
the motion to dismiss the administrative case filed against
him.
 On 22 October 1999, petitioner filed a Motion through
counsel praying that complainant (private respondent
herein) be declared to have waived her rights to formally
offer her exhibits since complainant was not able to file her
Formal Offer within the given period of fifteen (15) days from
1 July 1999 or up to 16 July 1999.
ISSUE:
 Whether the failure of the ADT to resolve Roquero’s Motion
despite having filed after almost five years violated the
constitutional right of Roquero to a speedy disposition of
cases.
RULING: We find merit in the petition.
  Indeed, while Section 27 of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in Civil Service states that the failure
to submit the formal offer of evidence within the given
period shall be considered as waiver thereof, the ADT in
fact allowed the prosecution to present its formal offer
almost five (5) years later or on 24 January 2004. Starting
on that date, petitioner was presented with the choice to
either present his evidence or to, as he did, file a motion to
dismiss owing to the extraordinary length of time that ADT
failed to rule on his motion.
 We cannot accept the finding of the Court of Appeals that
there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
ADT because a formal offer of evidence was filed by the
prosecution, a copy of which was received by
petitioners counsel. The admission by ADT on 8 June
[8]

2004 of the formal offer of exhibits belatedly filed did not

cure the 5-year delay in the resolution of petitioners 1999
motion to deem as waived such formal offer of evidence.
Indeed, the delay of almost five (5) years cannot be justified.

 While it is true that administrative investigations should not

be bound by strict adherence to the technical rules of
procedure and evidence applicable to judicial proceedings,
the same however should not violate the constitutional right
of respondents to a speedy disposition of cases.

Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 16. All person shall have the right to a speedy disposition of
their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

 The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is

not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but
extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and
administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including
judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the
Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious
action by all officials who are tasked with the administration
of justice.
 Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of
whether that right has been violated, the factors that may be
considered and balanced are as follows: (1) the length of
delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or
failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the
prejudice caused by the delay.
 The violation of the right to a speedy disposition of the case
against petitioner is clear for the following reasons: (1) the
delay of almost five (5) years on the part of ADT in resolving
the motion of petitioner, which resolution petitioner
reasonably found necessary before he could present his
defense; (2) the unreasonableness of the delay; and (3) the
timely assertions by petitioner of the right to an early
disposition which he did through a motion to dismiss. Over
and above this, the delay was prejudicial to petitioners
cause as he was under preventive suspension for ninety
(90) days, and during the interregnum of almost five years,
the trial of the accusation against him remained stagnant at
the prosecution stage.
Galman v SB FACTS: Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino,
(NEPO) Jr. He was killed from his plane that had just landed at the Manila
International Airport. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-
blank into the back of his head by an assassin. The military
investigators reported within a span of three hours that the man who
shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and
was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman) was a communist-
hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in turn.

President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to

investigate due to large masses of people who joined in the ten-day
period of national mourning yearning for the truth, justice and
freedom.

The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in
rejecting the military version stating that "the evidence shows to the
contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations. Only the
soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him; that
Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy,
not a communist plot. Only difference between the two reports is
that the majority report found all the twenty-six private respondents
above-named in the title of the case involved in the military
conspiracy; " while the chairman's minority report would exclude
nineteen of them.

Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the
killer.

Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court

from rendering a decision in the two criminal cases before it, the Court
resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed
for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply
to respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a
three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for
the prosecution.

But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in
reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the TRO issued ten
days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision.
The same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day
period counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's
memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not served
on them).

Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the

dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such action and urging
that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits that the people
are entitled to due process.

However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting

all the accused of the crime charged, declaring them innocent and
totally absolving them of any civil liability. Respondents submitted
that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case
had become moot and academic. Thereafter, same Court majority
denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for
reconsideration alleging that respondents committed serious
irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of
justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners
and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an
accused.

(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy

clause.

RULING: Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted

and ordering a re-trial of the said cases which should be conducted
with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements
of due process.

Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months

later when former Pres. was no longer around) affirmed the
allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he revealed
that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were
ordered by Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case.
Malacañang wanted dismissal to the extent that a prepared resolution
was sent to the Investigating Panel. Malacañang Conference planned
a scenario of trial where the former President ordered then that the
resolution be revised by categorizing the participation of each
respondent; decided that the presiding justice, Justice Pamaran,
(First Division) would personally handle the trial. A conference was
held in an inner room of the Palace. Only the First Lady and
Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro were with the President.
The conferees were told to take the back door in going to the room
where the meeting was held, presumably to escape notice by the
visitors in the reception hall waiting to see the President. During the
conference, and after an agreement was reached, Pres. Marcos told
them 'Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang kayo;' and that on their way
out of the room Pres. Marcos expressed his thanks to the group and
uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'.

The Court then said that the then President (code-named Olympus)
had stage-managed in and from Malacañang Palace "a scripted and
predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-
Galman murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the Aquino-
Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted
under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond
their capacity to resist. Also predetermined the final outcome of the
case" of total absolution of the twenty-six respondents-accused of all
criminal and civil liability. Pres. Marcos came up with a public
statement aired over television that Senator Aquino was killed not by
his military escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore,
not a source of wonder that President Marcos would want the case
disposed of in a manner consistent with his announced theory thereof
which, at the same time, would clear his name and his administration
of any suspected guilty participation in the assassination. such a
procedure would be a better arrangement because, if the accused
are charged in court and subsequently acquitted, they may claim the
benefit of the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid another
prosecution if some other witnesses shall appear when President
Marcos is no longer in office.
More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of
witnesses. The disappearance of witnesses two weeks after Ninoy's
assassination. According to J. Herrera, "nobody was looking for these
persons because they said Marcos was in power. The assignment of
the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran; no evidence at all that the
assignment was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle, except the
uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran himself. The custody
of the accused and their confinement in a military camp, instead of in
a civilian jail. The monitoring of proceedings and developments from
Malacañang and by Malacañang personnel. The partiality of
Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: That President Marcos had
wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be
denied. In rendering its decision, the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in
favoring the presidential directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of the
accused was clearly obvious. The evidence presented by the
prosecution was totally ignored and disregarded.

The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming
resources of the government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt
and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman
murder cases. "This is the evil of one-man rule at its very worst." Our
Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall address any
order or suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case
or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of
justice."

Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This

criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by
public respondents at the secret Malacañang conference (and
revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera)
completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab
initio its verdict. The courts would have no reason to exist if they were
allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity
to subvert and suppress the truth. More so, in the case at bar where
the people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the
integrity of our judicial system is at stake.

There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a

void judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double
jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no
judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. It neither binds nor bars
anyone. All acts and all claims flowing out of it are void.

Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. In this

case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal
of their petition and lifting of the TRO enjoining the Sandiganbayan
from rendering its decision had been taken cognizance of by the
Court which had required the respondents', including the
Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no restraining order was
issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not have
precipitately issued its decision of total absolution of all the accused
pending the final action of this Court. All of the acts of the respondent
judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to
lack of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner.

With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now
be tried before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor.
Respondents accused must now face trial for the crimes charged
 against them before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor
with all due process.

The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the

people, under our system of government, is to fill the public posts.
Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no constituency,
serve no majority nor minority but serve only the public interest as
they see it in accordance with their oath of office, guided only the
Constitution and their own conscience and honor.

EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS

Second part of Article III Sec 1

A. Rationale for Equal Protection Principle

a. Equal Protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both
as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed
b. Similar subjects should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly
discriminate against others
c. Does not require absolute equality, but merely that all persons be treated alike under like conditions both
as to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed
d. Moreover, it is required that the law be enforced and applied equally
B. General equal protection
It applies to all persons, both citizens and aliens. The Constitution places the civil rights of aliens on equal
footing with those of the citizens
C. Exceptions
Statutes may validly limit exclusively to citizens the enjoyment of rights or privileges connected with public
domain, public works, or natural resources of the State

Rationale: Aliens do not naturally possess the sympathetic consideration and regard for customers with
whom they come in daily contact, nor the patriotic desire to help bolster the nation’s economy, except
insofar as it enhances their profit, nor the loyalty and allegiance which the national owes to the land. These
limitations on the qualifications of aliens have been shown on many occasions and instances, especially in
times of crisis and emergency (Ichong v Hernandez)

CLASSIFICATION (S-G-Ex-A)
1. Substantial distinctions
2. Germane to the purposes of law
3. Must not be limited to existing conditions only
4. Must apply equally to all members of the class

Tests in determining compliance with Equal Protection Clause

1. Rational Basis Test
 Requires only that government must not impose differences in treatment except upon some
reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of regulation
 Demands that the classification in the statute reasonably relates to the legislative purpose
2. Intermediate Scrutiny Test
 Requires that the classification (means) must serve an important governmental objective (ends)
and is substantially related to the achievement of such object
 E.g. classification based on sex
3. Strict Scrutiny Test
 Used to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gener, or races as well as
other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection
 Applied when challenged statute either:
o Classifies on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic
o Infringes fundamental constitutional rights
4. Intensified Means Test or the Balancing of Interest/Equality Test
  Closely scrutinizes the relationship between the classification and the purpose, based on spectrum
of standards, by gauging the extent to which constitutionally guaranteed rights depend upon the
affected individual’s interest

Rubi v Provincial Board of Mindoro Law Involved:

(ROQUE) Section 2145 of Admin Code of 1917
"SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christians upon sites selected by
provincial governor. — With the prior approval of the Department
Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed
necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants
to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be
selected by him and approved by the provincial board." In connection
with the above-quoted provision, there should be noted Section 2759
of the same Code, which reads as follows:|||
"SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Chritian to take up appointed
habitation. — Any non-Christian who shall refuse to comply with the
directions lawfully given by a provincial governor, pursuant to section
two thousand one hundred and forty-five of this Code, to take up
habitation upon a site designated by said governor shall upon
conviction be imprisoned for a period not exceeding sixty days."

FACTS:
The provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, selected a site in the sitio
of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent settlement of
Mangyanes in Mindoro. Pursuant to the provisions of section 2145 of
the revised Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the vicinities of
the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco
River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi’s place in
Calapan are directed to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao,
Naujan Lake.

This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other

Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the
Mangyanes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the
provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said
to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against
their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the
provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from
the reservation.

Issue:
Whether Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprives a person
of his liberty of abode and is therefore unconstitutional (OR W/N
Section 2145 of the Admin Code of 1917 violates due process of law
and the equal protection of laws)

Held:
No. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a
person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to
him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in
reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute
slavery and involuntary servitude. The court further ruled that section
2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police
power and thus constitutional.

Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty.

Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.

Ormoc Sugar Company v Ormoc City
SUMMARY: The Municipal Board of Ormoc
City passed Ordinance No. 4 imposing a tax
equivalent of 1% per export sale to foreign
countries on all productions of centrifugal
sugar milled at Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.
After paying said municipal taxes, Ormoc
Sugar filed a complaint with the CFI
declaring that the enacted ordinance
violates the equal protection clause and that
the City had no authority to pass such tax
ordinance. The CFI, however, upheld that
the City is well within its authority to pass tax
ordinances under RA 2264, and that the
ordinance was valid. On appeal to the SC,
the Court reversed the decision of the CFI
and declared such ordinance
unconstitutional and violative of the equal
protection clause, because it only taxes
Ormoc Sugar and does not apply to future
conditions. In effect, it does not tax any
subsequently established sugar mills who
belong to the same class.
DOCTRINE: Equal protection clause applies
only to persons or things identically situated
and does not bar a reasonable classification
of the subject of legislation, and a
classification is reasonable where (1) it is
based on substantial distinctions which
make real differences; (2) these are
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the
classification applies not only to present
conditions but also to future conditions which
are substantially identical to those of the
present; (4) the classification applies only to
those who belong to the same class.
One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with
when the degree of civilization of the. Manguianes is considered.
They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the
Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been
followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal
protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be
reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.
The public policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is
shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The
Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be
confined for a time, as we have said, for their own good and the good
of the country.
FACTS:
1. The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No.
4, imposing “on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar
milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., a municipal tax
equivalent to 1% per export sale to the USA and other
foreign countries.”
2. Payments for said tax were made by Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc. for a total of P12,087.50
3. Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the CFI a
complaint against the City of Ormoc alleging that the
ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal
protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation.
4. It further alleged that the tax is neither a production nor a
license tax which Ormoc City under Sec 2 RA 2264 is
authorized to impose; and that the tax amounts to a customs
duty, fee or charge in violation of paragraph 1 Sec 2 of RA
2264 because the tax is both the sale and export of sugar.
5. City Ormoc asserted that the tax ordinance was within the
city’s power to enace under the Local Autonomy Act and that
the same did not violate the constitutional limitations.
6. CFI rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of
the ordinance. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN City of Ormoc can impose tax ordinances - YES
2. WoN Ordinance No. 4 violates the equal protection clause –
YES
RULING: Reversed. Ordinance is unconstitutional
RATIO:
1. The production of sugar alone is not taxable; the only time
the tax applies is when the sugar produced is exported.
2. Contrary to Sec 2287 not allowing municipal councils to
impose tax, Sec 2 of RA 2264 gave chartered citites,
municipalities and municipal districts authority to levy for
public purposes just and uniform taxes, licenses or fees.
3. Equal protection clause applies only to persons or things
identically situated and does not bar a reasonable
classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification
is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial
distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification
applies not only to present conditions but also to future
conditions which are substantially identical to those of the
 present; (4) the classification applies only to those who
belong to the same class.
4. A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the
questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only
centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc
Sugar Company, Inc. and none other.
5. At the time of the taxing ordinance’s enactment, Ormoc
Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central
in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be
reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future
conditions as well.
6. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive
as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central,
of the same class as Ormoc Sugar, for the coverage of the
tax.

Cruz v NCIP FACTS:

(ALEJO) Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition
and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the
constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371,
otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997
(IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The
petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the
ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and
other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
1. Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution? -
NO
2. WN IPRA violates the Due Process Clause? - NO

RATIO:
1. No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the
Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law
that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural
resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the
natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the
State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs
over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely
gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which
the resources are found, the right to the small scale
utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a
priority in their large scale development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not

part of the lands of the public domain. They are private lands
and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept
of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant
from the State. However, the right of ownership and
possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a
limited form of ownership and does not include the right to
alienate the same.

Ruling: petition dismissed

Victoriano v Elizalde Rope Workers’ FACTS:

Union

SUMMARY: Petitioner Victoriano is a
worker of Elizalde Roper Factory Inc., nad
thus was a member of the Company’s Labor
Union. He was by default a member
because of RA 875 which allowd companies
to require their employees to be part of their
union upon employment. RA 875 was
amended by RA 3350 however which
exempts employees with religions that
prohibit them from joining labor unions from
the requirement of companies. Victoriano,
being a member of Iglesia ni Cristo which
bans membership in unions, files for
resignation from the Union. The Union
however declined and questioned the
constitutionality of the statute. The lower
court ruled in favor of petitioner Victoriano.
SC affirmed the CFI decision and ruled that
RA 3350 passed the two requirements to
withstand the constitutional prohibition on
the no-establishment of religion clause of the
Constitution. RA 3350 has a secular purpose
of finding gainful employment which does
not go against their religious beliefs. The
primary effect is also the protection of the
laborer from menacing collective bargaining
agreements. The effect of favoring laborers
of one religion is only incidental.
DOCTRINE: A statute, in order to withstand
the strictures of constitutional prohibition (on
the no-establishment of religion clause of the
constitution), must have: (a) a secular
purpose and (b) a primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion.
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN Republic Act No. 3350 violates the establishment clause of
the
1. Petitioner Benjamin Victoriano is a member of the religious
sect known as the Iglesia ni Cristo. He had been in the
employ of respondent Elizalde Rope Facotry Inc.
(Company).
2. As such employee he was a member of the Elizalde Rope
Workers’ Union (Union) which had with the Company a
collective bargaining agreement which reads:
“Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition
of employment for all permanent employees workers
covered by this Agreement.”
3. Under Republic Act No. 875, prior to its amendment by
Republic Act No. 3350, the employer was not precluded
(prevented) from:
Making an agreement with a labor organization to require
as a condition of employment membership therein, if such
labor organization is the representative of the employees.
4. On June 18, 1961, however, Republic Act No. 3350 was
enacted, introducing an amendment to paragraph (4)
subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic Act
No. 875, as follows:
“But such agreement shall not cover members of any
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in
any such labor organization.”
5. Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the
affiliation of its members with any labor organization,
Petitioner Victoriano presented his resignation to appellant
Union.
6. The management of the Company in turn notified Appellee
and his counsel that unless the Appellee could achieve a
satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the Company
would be constrained to dismiss him from the service.
7. In its answer, the Union invoked the “union security clause”
of the collective bargaining agreement and assailed the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350.
8. The lower court decided that defendant Company is
enjoined from dismissing plaintiff Victoriano from his present
employment. Hence this appeal.
Constitution – NO

RULING: Instant appeal is dismissed. CFI decision is affirmed.

RATIO:
1. On freedom of association: Republic Act No. 3350 merely
excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of the
closed shop agreement the employees belonging to any
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members
with any labor organization.
2. What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of
said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join
labor unions even when said unions have closed shop
agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed
shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be
refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole
ground that they are not members of the collective
bargaining union.
3. It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far from infringing
the constitutional provision on freedom of association,
upholds and reinforces it.
4. It does not prohibit the members of said religious sects from
affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members
the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with
labor unions.
5. If the members of said religious sects prefer to sign up with
the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to
their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so;
the law does not coerce them to join; neither does the law
prohibit them from joining; and neither may the employer or
labor union compel them to join.
6. Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the
constitutional provision on freedom of association.
7. On contract rights: the free exercise of religious profession
or belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the
latter must, therefore, yield to the former.
8. The Supreme Court of the United States has also declared
on several occasions that the rights in the First Amendment,
which include freedom of religion, enjoy a preferred position
in the constitutional system.
9. Religious freedom although not unlimited, is a fundamental
personal right and liberty, and has a preferred position in the
hierarchy of values.
10. It is only where unavoidable necessary to prevent an
immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of
the community that infringement of religious freedom may
be justified and only to the
smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger.
11. On violation of Sec. 1(7) of Article 3 of the 1935 Constitution
(which is
Sec. 5 of Art. 3 of our 1987 Constitution): Any legislation
whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one
or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the
religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be
characterized as being only indirect.
12. But if the stage regulates conduct by enacting, within its
power, a general law which has for its purpose and effect to
advance the state’s secular goals, the statute is valid
despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless
the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such
burden.
13. The statute, in order to withstand the strictures of
constitutional prohibition, must have:
a. a secular (non-religious) legislative purpose
b. a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion.
14. Assessed by these criteria, Republic Act No. 3350 cannot
be said to violate the constitutional inhibition of the “no-
establishment” (of
religion) clause of the constitution.
15. On the first requirement: The purpose of Republic Act No.
3350 is secular,worldly, and temporal, not spiritual or
religious or holy and eternal.
16. It was intended to serve the secular purpose of advancing
the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, by
averting that certain persons be refused work, or be
dismissed from work, or be dispossessed of their right to
work and of being impeded to pursue a modest means of
livelihood, by reason of union security agreements.

Estrada v SB
SUMMARY: Petitioner Estrada, then
President of the PH, is being prosecuted of
Plunder, and is assailing the same, as he
claims it is unconstitutional due to its
vagueness—specifically Secs. 1 par (d), 2,
and 4. The Office of the Ombudsman filed
before the Sandiganbayan 8 Informations,
which the petitioner petitioned to be
remanded to the Ombudsman for
preliminary investigation due to failure to
specify under part “d” the charges. The
Sandiganbayan then ofund probable cause
to charge the President of Plunder, which
17. To help its citizens to find gainful employment whereby they
can make a living to support themselves and their families
is a valid objective of the state.
18. On the second requirement: The primary effects of the
exemption from closed shop agreements in favor of
members of religious sects that prohibit their members from
affiliating with a labor organization, is the protection of said
employees against the aggregate force of the collective
bargaining agreement, and relieving certain citizens of a
burden on their religious beliefs; and by eliminating to a
certain extent economic insecurity due to unemployment,
which is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare
of the people of the State, the Act also promotes the well-
being of society.
19. It is our view that the exemption from the effects of closed
shop agreement does not directly advance, or diminish, the
interests of any particular religion.
20. Although the exemption may benefit those who are
members of religious sects that prohibit their members from
joining labor unions, the benefit upon the religious sects is
merely incidental and indirect.
21. On the violation of the constitutional prohibition against
requiring a religious test for the exercise of a civil right: The
Act does not require as a qualification, or condition, for
joining any lawful association membership in any particular
religion or in any religious sect
22. Neither does the Act require affiliation with a religious sect
that prohibits its members from joining a labor union as a
condition or qualification for withdrawing from a labor union.
23. Joining or withdrawing from a labor union requires a positive
act. Republic Act No. 3350 only exempts members with
such religious affiliation from the coverage of closed shop
agreements.
24. A conscientious religious objector need not perform a
positive act or exercise the right of resigning from the labor
union·he is exempted from the coverage of any closed shop
agreement that a labor union may have entered into.
25. Fernando, Concurring: Fernando concurrs fully and entirely
with the Ponencia. Between the freedom of belief and the
exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to
travel. If the exercise of said religious belief clashes with the
established institutions of society and with the law, then the
former must yield, and give way to the latter. The
Government steps in and either restrains said exercise or
even prosecutes the one exercising it.
FACTS
1. Petitioner Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be
prosecuted under RA 7080 (Plunder), as amended by RA
7659, assailing it due to one of its “defects” of being vague.
2. The provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by the petitioner
to have transgressed constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1,
par. (d), 2 and 4.
3. April 4, 2001, Office of the Ombudsman filed before
Sandiganbayan 8 Informations.
4. April 11, 2001, petitioner Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion
for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for
preliminary investigation with respect to specification “d” of
the charges in the Information in one of the cases, and for
reconsideration/investigation of the offences to give the
accused (Estrada) an opportunity to file counter-affidavits
eventually justifies the issuance of the
warrant of arrest of Estrada—he filed an MR
which was denied. He filed a Motion to
Quash the Information, which was countered
by the petition of the Government, which
was again denied. Estrada then filed a
petition before the SC, who ruled in favor of
the respondents, and that the Plunder Law
is Constitutional as it does not contain
vagueness.
DOCTRINE: As long as the law affords
some comprehensible guide or rule that
would inform those who are subject to it what
conduct would render them liable to its
penalties, its validity will be sustained.
and other documents necessary to prove lack of probable
cause.
5. The grounds raised were only lack of preliminary
investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses,
and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. Ambiguity
and vagueness of the law were never raised in that Omnibus
Notion.
6. April 25, 2001, Sandiganbayan (3rd division) issued a
Resolution finding probable cause for plunder to justify for
the issuance of warrants for arrest of Estrada. Estrada filed
an MR which was denied.
7. June 14, 2001 petitioner Estrada moved to quash the
Information in the case on ground that the facts did not
constitute an indictiable offense since the law on which it
was based was unconstitutional for vagueness.
8. June 21, 2001 the Government filed its Opposition to the
Motion to Quash, which was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
1. WoN RA 7080 (Plunder Law), as amended by RA 7659 is
unconstitutional for being vague and thus violating the right to due
process of the petitioner - NO

RULING: SC ruled that RA 7080 (Plunder Law), as amended by RA

7659 is Constitutional

RATIO:
1. Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining
to the validity of legislation is predicated on the basic
principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be in
harmony with the Constitution—which the court gives value.
It is assumed that the legislature is ever conscious of the
borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed
the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose
of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the
majority.
2. This is why, in La Union Credit Cooperative v. Yaranon, the
SC ruled that as long as there is some basis for the decision
of the court, the constitutionality of the challenged law will
not be touched and the case will be decided on other
available grounds. Hence, the onerous task of rebutting the
presumption weighs heavily on the party challenging the
validity of the statute.
3. Petitioner in this case has miserably failed to discharge his
burden and overcome the presumption of constitutionality of
the Plunder Law.
4. The Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and
well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to
determine the nature of his violation.
5. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or
rule that would inform those who are subject to it what
conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity
will be sustained. It’s quite obvious that the assailed statute
punishes the act of a public officer in amassing or
accumulating ill- gotten wealth of at least 50M through a
series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1 par (d)
of the Plunder Law.

Biraogo v Truth Commission
SUMMARY: Biraogo assails in the SC the
constitutionality of EO 1 which created the
PTC, an ad hoc committee assigned to
invesitate the members of the previous
(Arroyo) administration with regard to graft
and corruption. Biraog contends that it is
6. The factual assertions indicated in the Information clearly
show that the elements of crime are easily understood and
provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the
prohibited acts.
7. Petitioner however, bewails the failure of the law to provide
for the statutory definition of the terms “combination” and
“series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt
or criminal acts” found in Sec. 1 par. (d) and Sec. 2, and the
word “pattern” in Sec. 4.
8. Despite the above submissions of the petitioner, the court
ruled that a statute is nto rendered uncertain and void
merely because general terms are used therein, or because
of the employment of terms without defining them; much
less do we have to define every word we use. After all,
there’s no positive constitutional or statutory command
requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an
enactment. As long as legislative will is clear, the word in a
statute will not result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the
law.
9. It cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give
a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to
penalized.
10. According to the court, a statute/ act may be said to be
vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ in its application.
11. But this doctrine does not apply as against legislations that
are merely couched in imprecise language but which
nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased;
or those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable
to certain types of activities. The first may be saved by
proper construction while no challenge may be mounted as
against the second whenenver directed against such
activities.
12. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have
been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its
provisions, especially where because of the nature of the
act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in
advance as in all other statutes.
13. It is evident that the ambiguity that petitioner is claiming is
more imagined than real. Ambiguity where none exists
cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in the
statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of
scientific precision in the law.
14. The SC once held in Gallego v. Sandiganbayan, that courts
are loathed to declare a statute void for
uncertainty/vagueness unless the law itself is so imperfect
and deficient in its details, and is susceptible of no
reasonable construction that will support and give it effect.
FACTS:
1. The genesis of the two cases (1st case yung kay Biraogo)
at hand can be traced to the events prior to the historic May
2010 elections, when Senator Aquino III declared his
staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his
slogan, “Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap”.
2. To transform his campaign slogan into reality, PNoy found a
need for a special body to investigate reported cases of graft
and corruption allegedly committed during the previous
admin. Hence, his signing of EO 1.
violative of the equal protection clause of the
constitution, as it specifically investigates
only the previous administration. The SC
indeed ruled that it is violative and hence
void, as it fails to be applied to all members
of the same class since it will only
investigate the Arroyo Admin, and not all the
past administrations.
DOCTRINE: Not to include past
administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection
clause cannot sanction. Such differentiation
clearly reverberates to label the commission
as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective
retribution. Hence, in for a classification to
be reasonable as far as a class is
concerned, it must be applied to ALL
members, and not to only a particular one.
3. By virtue of EO 1, the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is
created. This is a mere ad hoc body formed under the office
of the President with the primary task to investigate reports
of graft and corruption committed by third- level public
officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices
and accessories during the previous administration, and
thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the
President, Congress, and the Ombudsman.
4. Basically, PTC’s function is to collect and assess evidence
of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It
cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists
as to warrant the filing of an information. It cannot impose
criminal, civil, or administrative penalties or sanctions.
5. The characteristics of truth commissions, such as the PTC,
are as follows:
a. They examine only past events
b. They investigate patterns of abuse committed over a period
of time, as opposed to a particular event
c. They are temporary bodies that finish their work with the
submission of a report containing conclusions and recommendations
d. They are officially sanctioned, authorized, or empowered by
the state
6. After barely a month of the issuance of EO 1, the petitioners
asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and enjoin
PTC from performing its functions. They are claiming that,
EO 1 violates the equal protection clause because it
selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials
and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption
is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the
other administrations, past and present, who may be
indictable. Hence, this petition.
7. Respondents, through OSG, on the other hand, in their
consolidated comment argue that it does nto violate equal
protection clause because it was validly created for laudable
purposes.
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN EO 1 is violative of the equal protection clause - YES
RULING: SC granted the petition.
RATIO:
1. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept
of due process,
as every unfair discrimination offends the reuqirements of
justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate
clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty
against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
government.
2. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of
the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed
partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the
sharper weapon to cut down is the equal protection clause.
3. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public
bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals
in a similar manner.
4. The concept of equal justice under the law requires the state
to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions
between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant
to a legitimate governmental objective.
 5. Equal protection does not require universal application of
the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it
simply requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification.
6. Such classification shall pass the reasonableness test:
a. Rests on substantial distinctions
b. Germane to the purpose of the law
c. Not limited to existing conditions
d. Applies equally to all members of the same class
7. SC ruled that, EO 1 should be struck down as violative of
the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the
envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out
the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and
corruption during the previous administration only. The
intent to single out the previous administration is plain,
patent and manifest.
8. It must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but
just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is nto a class of its own. Not to include
past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot
sanction. Such differentiation clearly reverberates to label
the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective
retribution.
9. “Superficial differences do nto make for a valid
classification” (Justice Isagani Cruz)
10. It could be argued that considering that the PTC is an ad
hoc body, its scope is limited. The Court, however, is of the
considered view that although its focus is restricted, the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws
should not in any way be circumvented.
11. Corona, C.J, separate: Given the indubitably clear mandate
of EO 1, does the identification of the Arroyo Admin as the
subject of the Truth Commsision’s investigation pass the
jurisprudential test of reasonableness? Stated differently,
doe sthe mandate of EO 1 violate equal protection clause of
the Constitution? Yes.
12. Carpio, dissenting: These are not only reasonable but also
compelling grounds for the Truth Commission to prioritize
the investigation of the Arroyo Admin. To prioritize based on
reasonable and even compelling grounds is not to
discriminate, but to act sensibly and responsibly. In any
event, there is no violation of the equal protection clause just
because the authorities focus their investigation or
prosecution on one particular alleged law-breaker, for surely
a person accused of robbery cannot raise as a defense that
other robbers like him all over the country are not being
prosecuted. By the very nature of an investigation or
prosecution, there must be a focus on particular act or acts
of a person or a group of persons. A claim of selective
prosecution that violates the equal protection clause be
raised only by the party adversely affected by the
discriminatory act.
13. Carpio-Morales, dissenting: petitioners cannot properly
assert the equal protection caim of the previous admin.
While legislators have locus standi in certain cases, their
legal standing as such is recognized only insofar as assailed
issuance affects their functions as legislators. Breach of
equal protection clause raised by petitioner-legislators on
behalf of the Executive Department of the immediate past
admin has nothing to do with the impairment of the powers

ii.it is so unconnected to any conceivable objective, that is absurd,
Garcia v Drilon
SUMMARY: Rosalie and Jesus got married
in 2002, and their relationship bore 2
children (the other child Jo-Ann’s was
Rosalie’s but Jesus adopted her). Their
of Congress. Carpio-Morales finds nothing arbitrary or
unreasonable in the Truth Commission’s defined scope of
investigation. In issues involving the equal protection
clause, the test developed by jurisprudence is that of
reasonableness which has 4 requisites:
. Classifaction rests on substantial distinctions
a. Germane to the purpose of the law
b. Not limited to existing conditions only
c. Applies equally to all members of the same class
14. Nachura, concurring and dissenting: In the era of equal
protection analysis a court objects the legislative/ executive
action to one of the three levels of scrutiny, depending on
the class of persons and rights affected by the action:
. Rational basis scrutiny – presence of any plausible
legitimate objective for the classification, where the classification
serves to accomplish at objective to any degree, no matter how tiny,
would validate the classification. To be invalidated, the test requires:
i.it has absolutely no conceivable legitimate purpose
utterly arbitrary, whimsical, or erven perverse
a. Intermediate scrutiny
b. Strict scrutiny
15. Peralta, separate concurring: The distinctions cited by the
OSG are not substantial to separate the previous
administration as a distinct class from prior administrations
as subject matter for investigation for the purpose of ending
graft and corruption. There is no substantial distinction cited
between public officers who may be involved in reported
cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration and public officers who may be involved in
reported cases of graft and corruption during prior
administrations in relation to the purpose of ending graft and
corruption.
16. Abad,separate dissenting:The idea behind the“equal
protection clause”is that public authorities should treat all
persons or things equally in terms of rights granted to and
responsibilities imposed on them. As an element of due
process, the equal protection clause bars arbitrary
discrimination in favor of or against a class whether in what
the law provides and how it is enforced.
17. Sereno,dissenting:The majority decision defeats the
constitutional mandate on public accountability; it effectively
tolerates impunity for graft and corruption. Its invocation of
the constitutional clause on equal protection of the laws is
an unwarranted misuse of the same and is a disservice to
those classes of people for whom the constitutional
guarantee was created as a succor. The majority decision
accomplished this by completely disregarding the
“reasonableness” and all its jurisprudential history as
constitutional justification for classification and by replacing
the analytical test of reasonableness with mere recitations
of general case doctrines to arrive at its forced conclusion.
FACTS:
1. On March 2004, Congress enacted RA 9262 entitled “An Act
Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children,
Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing
Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes”.
2. Rosalie Jaype-Garcia filed in her and her minor children’s
behalf a TPO against her husband, Jesus pursuant to RA
relationship turned sour when Rosalie found
out Jesus was having an affair with the
manager of one Robinson’s Bank of
Bacolod. Jesus started beating Rosalie and
Jo-Ann up, and threatened to cut off financial
support.
Rosalie filed a case against her husband
Jesus under RA 9262, in which the RTC of
Bacolod issued several TPOs, amending
these and extending the same. Jesus
questioned said TPOs and the
constitutionality of RA 9262 for being
violative of the due process clause. The CA
first issued a TRO on the TPOs but then
dismissed the petition, which prompted
Jesus to file an appeal with the Court.
The Court ruled that RA 9262 is NOT
violative of the due process clause, as the
two requirements for substantive due
process are present, namely the interest
being curbing domestic violence against
women and children, and the means RA
9262 which includes the issuance of TPOs.
DOCTRINE: It is a constitutional
commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process
must yield to the necessities of protecting
vital public interests, among which is
protection of women and children from
violence and threats to their personal safety
and security.
9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional,
psychological abuse as a result of marital infidelity.
3. Jesus was very strict, even stopped Rosalie from pursuing
her career as a lawyer. Things turned for the worse when
Jesus started having an affair with a bank manager of
Robinson’s bank, Bacolod.
4. Threats were made regarding halting financial support
because Rosalie intended to file a case against her
husband’s paramour. He beat her up and her daughter, and
left them.
5. Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent
danger of violence against Rosalie and her children exists
or is about to recur, the RTC of Bacolod issues a TPO.
6. The TPO included things like prohibiting him from being
within 1000 meters from them and their help, drivers and
conjugal home., giving monthly support, letting the family
use 2 cars, giving up all his firearms and etc.
7. A series of amended TPOs and extensions were granted
because Jesus would not comply with those indicated, he
continued to harass them.
8. There were incidents such as attempted kidnapping on the
two youngest boys, and physical abuse and threats on Jo-
Ann, the eldest. She subsequently filed a criminal complaint
against her father for violation of RA 7610, or the Special
Protection of Children Against Child Abuse Exploitation and
Discrimination Act.
9. Jesus filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with
prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order,
challenging (1) the constitutionality of RA 9262 for being
violative of due process and equal protection, and (2) the
validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil case for being
“an unwanted product of an invalid law”.
10. The CA then issued a 60-day TRO against said TPOs, but
dismissed the petition for failure of Jesus to raise the
constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court in
the civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the
same.
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN RA 9262 is violative of substantive due process – NO
2. WoN the family courts have jurisdiction to rule on
constitutionality – YES
RATIO:
1. On jurisdiction: family courts are on the same level as RTCs,
and RTCs are clothed with jurisdiction to decide on
constitutionality of laws. The issue of constitutionality of RA
9262 should have been raised at the earliest opportunity.
2. The intent of Congress in enacting RA 9262 was to curb
domestic violence against women and children, as statistics
show that they are those usually victimized in families.
3. RA 9262 contains sections giving the courts authority to
issue Temporary Protection Orders, to prevent further acts
of violence against women and their children. Its purpose is
to safeguard the offended parties from further harm,
minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the
opportunity and ability to regain control of their life
4. Since “time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further
violence is to be prevented”, courts can issue ex parte a
TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life,
limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy, or when the
violence is likely to recur.
5. The removal and exclusion of Jesus in the VAWC case from
the residence of Rosalie, regardless of ownership of the
residence, is not unconstitutional. Jesus may be removed
and excluded from the residence, but only temporarily for
the purpose of protecting Rosalie.
6. Such removal and exclusion may be permanent only when
no property rights are violated.
7. From the foregoing, it can be seen that the two requisites for
substantial due process are present: national interest which
is curbing of domestic violence against women and children,
and the law RA 9262 which includes the issuance of TPOs,
to protect the victims of this kind of abuse.