ROE vs WADE
hazardous, therefore the State’s concern is to protect
Brief Fact Summary. Appellant Jane Roe, a pregnant
mother who wished to obtain an abortion, sued on behalf
of all woman similarly situated in an effort to prevent the
enforcement of Texas statutes criminalizing all abortions
except those performed to save the life of the mother.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Statutes that make criminal all
abortions except when medically advised for the purpose
of saving the life of the mother are an unconstitutional
invasion of privacy.
Facts. Texas statutes made it a crime to procure or attempt
an abortion except when medically advised for the
purpose of saving the life of the mother. Appellant Jane
Roe sought a declaratory judgment that the statutes were
unconstitutional on their face and an injunction to
prevent defendant Dallas County District Attorney from
enforcing the statutes. Appellant alleged that she was
unmarried and pregnant, and that she was unable to
receive a legal abortion by a licensed physician because
her life was not threatened by the continuation of her
pregnancy and that she was unable to afford to travel to
another jurisdiction to obtain a legal abortion. Appellant
sued on behalf of herself and all other women similarly
situated, claiming that the statutes were
unconstitutionally vague and abridged her right of
personal privacy, protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth,
Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
ssue. Do the Texas statutes improperly invade a right
possessed by the appellant to terminate her pregnancy
embodied in the concept of personal liberty contained in
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, in the
personal marital, familial, and sexual privacy protected
by the Bill of Rights or its penumbras, or among the rights
reserved to the people by the Ninth Amendment?
Held. The right to personal privacy includes the abortion
decision, but the right is not unqualified and must be
considered against important state interests in regulation.
The abortion laws in effect in the majority of the States are
of relatively recent vintage, deriving from statutory
changes generally enacted in the latter half of the 19th
century. At common law abortion performed before
quickening (the first recognizable movement of the fetus
in utero) was not an indictable offense, and it is doubtful
that abortion was ever a firmly established common law
crime even when it destroyed a quick fetus.
Three reasons have been advanced for the historical
enactment of criminal abortion laws. The first is that the
laws are the product of a Victorian social concern to
discourage illicit sexual conduct, but this argument has
been taken seriously by neither courts nor commentators.
The second reason is that the abortion procedure is
pregnant women. However, modern medical techniques
have altered the situation, with abortions being relatively
safe particularly in the first trimester. The third reason is
the State’s interest is in protecting the prenatal life.
However, this is somewhat negated by the fact that the
pregnant woman cannot be prosecuted for the act of
abortion.
For the stage prior to the approximate end of the first
trimester, the abortion decision must be left to the medical
judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician,
and may not be criminalized by statute.
For the stage subsequent to the approximate end of the
first trimester, the State may regulate abortion in ways
reasonably related to maternal health based upon the
State’s interest in promoting the health of the mother.
For the stage subsequent to viability, the State may
regulate and even proscribe abortion, except where
necessary for the preservation of the mother’s life, based
upon the State’s interest in the potential of the potential
life of the unborn child.
Dissent. Justice Rehnquist. The right to an abortion is not
universally accepted, and the right to privacy is thus not
inherently involved in this case.
Discussion. The Court finds that an abortion statute that
forbids all abortions except in the case of a life saving
procedure on behalf of the mother is unconstitutional
based upon the right to privacy. However, it does allow
for regulation and proscription of abortion when the
statute is narrowly tailored to uphold a compelling state
interest, such as the health of the mother or the viable
fetus. The court declined to address the question of when
life begins.
Bowers v. Hardwick - 478 U.S. 186, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986)
RULE:
The rights qualifying for heightened judicial protection
includes those fundamental liberties that are implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty
nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed. A different
description of fundamental liberties characterizes them as
liberties that are deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition. Neither of these formulations would
extend a fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in
acts of consensual sodomy.
FACTS:
Respondent was charged with violating O.G.C.A. § 16-6-
2 (1984), which criminalized sodomy. Respondent
allegedly engaged in sodomy with another adult male in
the bedroom of his home. After the district attorney
decided not to present the matter to the grand jury unless
further evidence developed, respondent brought suit in
federal district court, challenging the constitutionality of
the statute insofar as it criminalized consensual sodomy.
ISSUE:
Does the U.S. Constitution protect the fundamental right
to engage in homosexual sodomy?
ANSWER:
No.
CONCLUSION:
The engagement in homosexual sodomy is not protected
by the Constitution through a fundamental right. The
court of appeals held that § 16-6-2 violated respondent's
fundamental rights because his homosexual activity was
a private and intimate association that was beyond the
reach of state regulation by reason of U.S. Const. amends.
XI and XIV. Reversing that judgment, the Court held that
the Due Process Clause of U.S. Const. amend. XIV did not
confer any fundamental right on homosexuals to engage
in acts of consensual sodomy, even if the conduct
occurred in the privacy of their own homes.
Lawrence v. Texas
Brief Fact Summary. Police found two men engaged in
sexual conduct, in their home, and they were arrested
under a Texas statute that prohibited such conduct
between two men.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. While homosexual conduct is
not a fundamental right, intimate sexual relationships
between consenting adults are protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Facts. In Houston, Texas, Harris County Police officers
were dispatched to a private home in response to a
reported weapons disturbance. They entered (the right to
enter does seem to have been questioned) the home
where John Geddes resided, and observed Lawrence and
another man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a sex act. The
men were arrested, held over night and charged with
violating a Texas statute making it a crime for two
persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate
sexual conduct. Specifically the statute provided “A
person commits and offense if he engaged in deviate
sexual intercourse with another individual of the same
sex” and goes on to define deviate sexual intercourse as
follows: “ any contact between any part of the genitals of
one person and the mouth or anus of another person or
the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another
person with an object”. The two men were then convicted
before a Justice of the Peace.
Issue. The issue is whether a statute prohibiting specific
sex acts violates liberty under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Held. Yes, intimate sexual conduct, between consenting
adults, is a liberty protected under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Dissent. Justice Scalia: He believes that since the court
does not find homosexual sodomy to be a fundamental
right, and merely describes it as an “exercise in liberty”, a
rational basis scrutiny should be applied, and in doing so,
the law would be upheld. In addition, the courts
willingness to overturn Bowers rather than use stare
decicis, is inconsistent with other case law such as
Planned Parenthood, and thus, feels the court should be
consistent and stable rather than being “manipulative in
invoking the doctrine”. Since all laws, by definition (as
example, prostitution, using heroin, etc) affect liberty,
they would all be unconstitutional under this court’s
ruling.
Concurrence.
Justice O’Connor: She does not join the court in
overturning Bowers, but rather, reaches her conclusion
based on equal protection, rather than any due process
clause. She states that even using a rational basis review
“we have consistently held that some objectives, such as
a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group, are
not legitimate state interests”. She comes to this
conclusion based on the fact that sodomy is not
prohibited between opposite sex partners, thus unfairly
targets same sex partners and makes them unequal in the
eyes of the law. Since this law brands homosexuals as
criminals, it makes it more difficult for them to be treated
like everyone else, thus violating equal protection and
legally sanctioning discrimination.
Discussion. (Written by Justice Kennedy) The court does
not focus on protecting sodomy specifically, but rather,
personal relationships. It explains that despite the fact
that the statutes in questions purport to only prohibit sex,
“Their penalties and purposes, though, have more far-
reaching consequences, touching upon the most private
human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private
of places, the home.” The court found it alarming that the
statute in question sought to control a personal
relationship, stating that forming personal relationships
is one of the liberties we have, and should be able to
choose such relationships without fear of being punished addressed a proven problem nor required a showing of
or classified as criminals. individualized suspicion of drug use, thus, it violated the
students' constitutional right to be free from
The court focuses on the fact that the laws should not
unreasonable searches.
target relations between consenting adults in private, as
this is what liberty hinges on. The court states that adults ISSUE:
are entitled to respect for their private lives, and “Their
Was the school policy of requiring students to undergo
right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them
drug testing violative of the students’ constitutional right
the full right to engage in their conduct without
against unreasonable searches?
intervention of the government”. The court ultimately
applies a rational basis review, stating that the Texas ANSWER:
statute in question furthers no legitimate state interest
which can justify an intrusion into a personal and private No.
life of an individual.
CONCLUSION:
This case overrules Bowers v Hardwick, which had held
The United States Supreme Court held that the policy did
that there is no fundamental right to engage in sodomy,
not constitute an unreasonable search because it
or homosexual activities. Bowers was based on the fact
reasonably served the board's important interest in
that historically sodomy has been outlawed, but this court
detecting and preventing drug use among its students.
finds that historically it was only outlawed to protect
The board's general regulation of extracurricular
individuals from sexual predators, and that rationale
activities diminished the expectation of privacy among
should not be used when consenting adults are involved,
students, and the board's method of obtaining urine
specifically stating “The present case does not involve
samples and maintaining test results was minimally
minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured
intrusive on the students' limited privacy interest.
or coerced or who are situated in relationships where
Further, the drug testing policy was a reasonably effective
consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve
means of addressing the board's concerns about
public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve
preventing drug use in the board's schools in the face of
whether the government must give formal recognition to
the evidence of increased drug use at the schools.
any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”
OPLE vs TORRES
Bd. of Educ. v. Earls - 536 U.S. 822, 122 S. Ct. 2559 (2002)
The topic of this case covers delineation of Legislative and
RULE:
Executive powers
The court generally determines the reasonableness of a
Facts:
search by balancing the nature of the intrusion on the
individual's privacy against the promotion of legitimate Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative
governmental interests. In certain limited circumstances, Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National
the government's need to discover latent or hidden Computerized Identification Reference System" on two
conditions, or to prevent their development, is important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a
sufficiently compelling to justify the intrusion on privacy usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two,
entailed by conducting such searches without any it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected
measure of individualized suspicion. Therefore, in the zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights
context of safety and administrative regulations, a search sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger
unsupported by probable cause may be reasonable when barriers against further erosion.
special needs, beyond the normal need for law
Petitioner contends that the establishment of a national
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause
computerized identification reference system requires a
requirement impracticable.
legislative act. The issuance of A.O. No. 308 by the
FACTS: president of the republic of the Philippines is, therefore,
an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers
Respondent students sued petitioner board of education,
of the congress of the Republic of the Philippines.
alleging that the board's drug testing policy was
unconstitutional since the board failed to identify a Issue:
special need for testing students who participate in
WON the issuance of A.O. No. 308 by the president of the
extracurricular activities, and the policy neither
republic of the Philippines is an unconstitutional
usurpation of the legislative powers of the congress of the
Republic of the Philippines?
Ruling:
Yes, the issuance of A.O. No. 308 by the president of the
republic of the Philippines is an unconstitutional
usurpation of the legislative powers of the congress of the
Republic of the Philippines.
The Court held that the Constitution, as the will of the
people in their original, sovereign and unlimited
capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the
Philippines. The grant of legislative power to Congress is
broad, general and comprehensive. The legislative body
possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil
government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by
usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress,
unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In fine,
except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or
impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and
extends to matters of general concern or common interest.
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws,
the President executes the laws. The executive power is
vested in the Presidents. It is generally defined as the
power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power
of carrying the laws into practical operation and
enforcing their due observance. The President has the
duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the
maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he
is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices
under his control to enable him to discharge his duties
effectively.
In this case, A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not
appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. It
establishes for the first time a National Computerized
Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a
delicate adjustment of various contending state policies
— the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy
interest against dossier-gathering by government, the
choice of policies, etc. Regulations are not supposed to be
a substitute for the general policy-making that Congress
enacts in the form of a public law. Although
administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the
authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an
independent source of power to make laws.
Hence, the issuance of A.O. No. 308 by the president of
the republic of the Philippines is an unconstitutional
usurpation of the legislative powers of the congress of the
Republic of the Philippines.
KILUSANG MAYO UNO vs. THE DIRECTOR-
GENERAL, NEDA
FACTS:
President Arroyo issued EO 420 directing a unified ID
system among the various government agencies and
GOCCs for the purpose of having a uniform ID for all
government agencies. Kilusang Mayo Uno and others
assailed this EO for being a “usurpation of legislative
powers by the president” and it infringes the citizens’
right to privacy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not
EO 420 on Unified ID System among government
agencies infringes on the citizens right to privacy.
(Executive Order 420 of April 13, 2005 was issued for the
adoption of a unified multi-purpose identification (ID)
system for the government)
RULING:
No. All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and
other government entities have been issuing ID cards in
the performance of their governmental functions. There
have been no complaints from citizens that the ID cards
of these government entities violate their right to privacy,
and in the collection and recording of personal
identification data.
Moreover, EO 420 applies only to government entities
that already maintain ID systems and issue ID cards
pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws.
EO 420 does not grant such government entities any
power that they do not already possess under existing
laws.
DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DETAILMAN-PTGWO
and PEDRO A. TECSON vs. GLAXO WELLCOME
PHILIPPINES, INC.
FACTS: Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson (Tecson) was hired by
respondent Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc. (Glaxo) as
medical representative on October 24, 1995, after Tecson
had undergone training and orientation.
Thereafter, Tecson signed a contract of employment
which stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study
and abide by existing company rules; to disclose to
management any existing or future relationship by
consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or
employees of competing drug companies and should
management find that such relationship poses a possible
conflict of interest, to resign from the company. Code of
Conduct of Glaxo similarly provides these conditions;
that otherwise, the management and the employee will
explore the possibility of a “transfer to another
department in a non-counterchecking position” or
preparation for employment outside the company after
six months.
Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo’s products
in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.
Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic
relationship with Bettsy, an employee of Astra
Pharmaceuticals3(Astra), a competitor of Glaxo. Bettsy
was Astra’s Branch Coordinator in Albay. She supervised
the district managers and medical representatives of her
company and prepared marketing strategies for Astra in
that area.
Even before they got married, Tecson received several
reminders from his District Manager regarding the
conflict of interest which his relationship with Bettsy
might engender. Still, love prevailed, and Tecson married
Bettsy in September 1998.
Tecson’s superior reminded him that he and Bettsy
should decide which one of them would resign from their
jobs. Tecson requested for time to comply with the
company policy against entering into a relationship with
an employee of a competitor company. He explained that
Astra, Bettsy’s employer, was planning to merge with
Zeneca, another drug company; and Bettsy was planning
to avail of the redundancy package to be offered by Astra.
Tecson again requested for more time resolve the
problem. Thereafter, Tecson applied for a transfer in
Glaxo’s milk division, thinking that since Astra did not
have a milk division, the potential conflict of interest
would be eliminated. His application was denied in view
of Glaxo’s “least-movement-possible” policy.
Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao
City-Agusan del Sur sales area. Tecson asked Glaxo to
reconsider its decision, but his request was denied.
Tecson defied the transfer order and continued acting as
medical representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines
Norte sales area.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CASE: Because the parties
failed to resolve the issue at the grievance machinery
level, they submitted the matter for voluntary arbitration,
but Tecson declined the offer. On November 15, 2000, the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB)
rendered its Decision declaring as valid Glaxo’s policy on
relationships between its employees and persons
employed with competitor companies, and affirming
Glaxo’s right to transfer Tecson to another sales territory.
CA sustained; MR denied.
Petitioner’s Contention: that Glaxo’s policy against
employees marrying employees of competitor companies
violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution
because it creates invalid distinctions among employees
on account only of marriage. They claim that the policy
restricts the employees’ right to marry; that Tecson was
constructively dismissed
GLAXO argues: that the company policy prohibiting its
employees from having a relationship with and/or
marrying an employee of a competitor company is a valid
exercise of its management prerogatives and does not
violate the equal protection clause;
The policy is also aimed at preventing a competitor
company from gaining access to its secrets, procedures
and policies; that Tecson can no longer question the
assailed company policy because when he signed his
contract of employment, he was aware that such policy
was stipulated therein.
ISSUE: WON Glaxo’s policy against its employees
marrying employees from competitor companies is valid
HELD: The Court finds no merit in the petition.
Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing
formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential
programs and information from competitors, especially
so that it and Astra are rival companies in the highly
competitive pharmaceutical industry.
The prohibition against personal or marital relationships
with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo’s
employees is reasonable under the circumstances because
relationships of that nature might compromise the
interests of the company. In laying down the assailed
company policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its interests
against the possibility that a competitor company will
gain access to its secrets and procedures.
That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic
interests cannot be denied. No less than the Constitution
recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce
such a policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on
investments and to expansion and growth.
Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to the
constitutional policy on social justice and the protection
of labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be
decided in favor of the workers. The law also recognizes
that management has rights which are also entitled to
respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play.21
EQUAL-PROTECTION: Glaxo does not impose an
absolute prohibition against relationships between its
employees and those of competitor companies. Its
employees are free to cultivate relationships with and
marry persons of their own choosing. What the company
merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between the
employee and the company that may arise out of such
relationships.
Moreover, records show that Glaxo gave Tecson several
chances to eliminate the conflict of interest brought about
by his relationship with Bettsy.
PETITION DENIED.
Other Issue on Constructive dismissal:
The Court finds no merit in petitioners’ contention that
Tescon was constructively dismissed when he was
transferred from the Camarines Norte-Camarines Sur
sales area to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur
sales area, and when he was excluded from attending the
company’s seminar on new products which were directly
competing with similar products manufactured by Astra.
Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an
involuntary resignation resorted to when continued
employment becomes impossible, unreasonable, or
unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or diminution
in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility or
disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the
employee.30 None of these conditions are present in the
instant case.
CHURCHILL & TAIT v. RAFFERTY
FACTS:
Plaintiffs put up a billboard on a private land located in
Rizal Province “quite distance from the road and strongly
built, not dangerous to the safety of the people, and
contained no advertising matter which is filthy, indecent,
or deleterious to the morals of the
community.” However, defendant Rafferty, Collector of
Internal Revenue, decided to remove the billboards after
due investigation made upon the complaints of the
British and German Consuls.
Act No. 2339 authorized the then Collector of Internal
Revenue to remove after due investigation, any billboard
exposed to the public view if it decides that it is offensive
to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance.
In the agreed statement of facts submitted by the parties,
the plaintiffs "admit that the billboards mentioned were
and still are offensive to the sight."
The Court of First Instance perpetually restrains and
prohibits the defendant and his deputies from collecting
and enforcing against the plaintiffs and their property the
annual tax mentioned and described in subsection (b) of
section 100 of Act No. 2339, effective July 1, 1914, and
from destroying or removing any sign, signboard, or
billboard, the property of the plaintiffs and decrees the
cancellation of the bond given by the plaintiffs.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON Act No. 2339 was a legitimate exercise of the police
power of the Government?
HELD:
YES. Things offensive to the senses, such as sight, smell
or hearing, may be suppressed by the State especially
those situated in thickly populated districts. Aesthetics
may be regulated by the police power of the state, as long
as it is justified by public interest and safety.
Moreover, if the police power may be exercised to
encourage a healthy social and economic condition in the
country, and if the comfort and convenience of the people
are included within those subjects, everything which
encroaches upon such territory is amenable to the police
power of the State.
Hence, the judgment of the CFI is reversed.
UNITED STATES V. LUIS TORIBIO
FACTS:
Toribio was found by the trial court of Bohol violating
Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the
registration, branding, and slaughter of Large Cattle. The
act prohibits the slaughter of large cattle fit for
agricultural work or other draft purposes for human
consumption.
Appellant Toribio slaughtered or caused to be
slaughtered his carabao without a permit from the
municipal treasurer of the municipality.
It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of
Bohol, wherein the animal was slaughtered there is no
municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant
contends that under such circumstances the provisions of
Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of
large cattle without a permit of the municipal treasure.
Appellant contends that he applied for a permit to
slaughter the animal but was not given one because the
carabao was not found to be “unfit for agricultural work”
which resulted to appellant to slaughter said carabao in a
place other than the municipal slaughterhouse.
Appellant then assails the validity of a provision under
Act No. 1147 which states that only carabaos unfit for
agricultural work can be slaughtered.
Appellant also contended that the act constitutes a taking
of property for public use in the exercise of the right of
eminent domain without providing for the compensation
of owners, and it is an undue and unauthorized exercise
of police power of the state for it deprives them of the
enjoyment of their private property.
ISSUE(s):
WON the prohibition and the penalty imposed in Act No.
1147 is limited only to the slaughter of large cattle at the
municipal slaughterhouse.
WON Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration, branding
and slaughter of large cattle, is an undue and
unauthorized exercise of police power.
HELD:
1. NO. The prohibition and penalty imposed in Act No.
1147 applies generally to the slaughter of large cattle for
human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly
secured from the municipal treasurer, and specifically to
the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal
slaughterhouse without such permit.
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of
two or more constructions, that construction should be
adopted which will most tend to give effect to the
manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object
for which the statute was enacted, and a construction
should be rejected which would tend to render abortive
other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object
which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment.
Ynot v Intermediate Appellate Court 148 SCRA 659
Nature: Review on Certiorari
Keywords: Requirements of due process; Fundamental
Powers of the State: POLICE POWER
Summary: RTC - sustained confiscation of the carabaos;
and decline to rule on the constitutionality of the EO for
lack of authority. IAC - upheld RTC decision. SC -
reversed CA decision.
Facts: There had been an existing law which prohibited
the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the
law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the
movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as
the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was
caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He
was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred
EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be
heard or his right to due process. He said that the
authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate
carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional.
The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a
valid exercise of police power in order to promote general
welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter
of carabaos
Issue:
1. Whether or not the said Executive Order is valid.
Ratio: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed
violates due process. EO 626-A created a presumption
based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of
carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a
subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot
should be given to defend himself and explain why the
carabaos are being transferred before they can be
confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is
an invalid exercise of the police power because the
method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and,
worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated
because the owner of the property confiscated is denied
the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the
guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on
judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of
separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid
delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned
therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
Ruling: WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is
hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed
above, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount
thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs. SO
ORDERED.
Note: The minimum requirements of due process
are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may
not be dispensed with because they are intended as a
safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying
commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence
of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty
as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient
rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that
every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is
entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster
described almost two hundred years ago in the famous
Dartmouth College Case, 14 as "the law which hears
before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and
renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the
rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach
of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance,
would degrade the due process clause into a worn and
empty catchword.
United States v. Causby - 328 U.S. 256, 66 S. Ct. 1062 (1946)
RULE:
The flight of aircraft is lawful unless at such a low altitude
as to interfere with the then existing use to which the
land, or the space over the land, is put by the owner, or
unless so conducted as to be imminently dangerous to
persons or property lawfully on the land. Subject to that
right of flight, ownership of the space above the land is
declared to be vested in the various owners of the land
beneath and a Constitutional taking may be found.
FACTS:
The lower court granted respondent landowners a
judgment for the value of property destroyed, and
damage to their property, resulting from the taking of an
easement over their property by low-flying United States
military aircraft.
ISSUE:
Does the frequent and regular flights by the United States
military at low altitudes directly over the landowner’s
property amount to taking of property despite absence of
actual physical invasion?
ANSWER:
Yes.
CONCLUSION:
The court agreed with the finding that there had been a
taking of respondents' property within the meaning of
U.S. Const. amend. V. The court held that a physical
invasion of the property was not necessary where there
was an intrusion so immediate and direct as to subtract
from respondents' full enjoyment and use of the property.
Further, the damages were not merely consequential;
they were the product of a direct invasion of respondents'
domain. The United States Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the action, however, on the basis that the
record was not clear whether the easement taken was
temporary or permanent. The court remanded the cause
for a determination of the necessary findings regarding
the nature of the easement.
REPUBLIC vs PLDT G.R. No. L-18841
FACTS: PLDT, is a public service corporation holding a
legislative franchise to install, operate and maintain a
telephone system throughout the Philippines and to carry
electrical transmission of messages within the Philippines
and between the Philippines and the telephone systems
of other countries.
The RCA Communications, Inc., is an American
corporation authorized to transact business in the
Philippines and is the grantee, by assignment, of a
legislative franchise to operate a domestic station for the
reception and transmission of long distance wireless
messages and to operate broadcasting and radio-
telephone and radio-telegraphic communications
services.
Sometime in 1933, the defendant, PLDT, and the RCA
Communications, Inc., entered into an agreement
whereby telephone messages, coming from the United
States and received by RCA’s domestic station, could
automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT; and
vice-versa. The arrangement was later extended to radio-
telephone messages to and from European and Asiatic
countries.
Soon after its creation in 1947, the Bureau of
Telecommunications set up its own Government
Telephone System by utilizing its own appropriation and
equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to
enable government offices to call private parties.
However, its application for these trunk lines contained a
statement whereby it states that it would abide by the
rules and regulations of PLDT.
The Director of Telecommunications entered into an
agreement with RCA Communications whereby the
Bureau would convey overseas calls from RCA to local
residents. Defendant PLDT then complained to the
Bureau that they had used the trunk lines not for
government offices only but also to serve the general
public; which is in direct competition of PLDT. The
Bureau did not respond, thus PLDT severed the lines.
After failure to negotiate terms, the Bureau filed a suit
against defendant in the CFI of Manila praying that PLDT
be commanded to execute a contract with plaintiff for the
use of the latter’s telephone system under such terms as
the court would deem just and a preliminary injunction
to prevent further severance or to restore those that had
already been severed.
The lower court ruled that it could not force PLDT to
enter into a contract, nor is the Bureau not allowed to
service the general public with telephone connections.
Thus, this appeal
ISSUE: w/n the trunk lines of PLDT can be validly
expropriated
HELD:
Yes. The court a quo has apparently overlooked that
while the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate
a contract with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the
sovereign power of eminent domain, require the
telephone company to permit interconnection of the
government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as
the needs of the government service may require, subject
to the payment of just compensation to be determined by
the court.
Nominally, of course, the power of eminent domain
results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and
possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent
reason appears why the said power may not be availed of
to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned
property, without loss of title and possession. It is
unquestionable that real property may, through
expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of
way. The use of the PLDT’s lines and services to allow
inter-service connection between both telephone systems
is not much different. In either case private property is
subjected to a burden for public use and benefit. If, under
section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State may,
in the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to
public ownership upon payment of just compensation,
there is no reason why the State may not require a public
utility to render services in the general interest, provided
just compensation is paid therefor. Ultimately, the
beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be the
users of both telephone systems, so that the
condemnation would be for public use.
REPUBLIC VS. VDA. DE CASTELLVI
GR # L-20620 August 15, 1974 (Constitutional Law –
Eminent Domain, Elements of Taking)
FACTS: After the owner of a parcel of land that has been
rented and occupied by the government in 1947 refused
to extend the lease, the latter commenced expropriation
proceedings in 1959. During the assessment of just
compensation, the government argued that it had taken
the property when the contract of lease commenced and
not when the proceedings begun. The owner maintains
that the disputed land was not taken when the
government commenced to occupy the said land as lessee
because the essential elements of the “taking” of property
under the power of eminent domain, namely (1) entrance
and occupation by condemnor upon the private property
for more than a momentary period, and (2) devoting it to
a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property,
are not present.
ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of property has taken
place when the condemnor has entered and occupied the
property as lesse.
HELD: No, the property was deemed taken only when
the expropriation proceedings commenced in 1959.
The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator
must enter a private property, (2) for more than a
momentary period, (3) and under warrant of legal
authority, (4) devoting it to public use, or otherwise
informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in
such a way as (5) substantially to oust the owner and
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.
In the case at bar, these elements were not present when
the government entered and occupied the property under
a contract of lease.
BEL-AIR ASSOCIATION V. IAC (1989)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Before the Court are six consolidated petitions, docketed
as G.R. nos. 71169, 74376, 76394, 78182, 82281 and 60727.
The first five petitions for a motion for reconsideration
raise the issue of whether Jupiter Street is for the exclusive
use of Bel-Air Village residents. Meanwhile, the last
petition (G.R. 60727) raises the lone issue of whether or
not the Mayor of Makati could have validly opened
Jupiter and Orbit Streets to vehicular traffic.
Facts
· Ayala Corporation (original owner of the property
subsequently subdivided as Bel-Air Village) executed
a Deed of Donation covering Jupiter and Orbit streets to
Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA).
· Respondents allege that upon instructions of the
Mayor of Makati, studies were made by the on the
feasibility of opening streets in Bel-Air Village calculated
to alleviate traffic congestions along the public streets
adjacent to Bel-Air Village.
o Accordingly, it was deemed necessary by the
Municipality of Makati in the interest of the general
public to open to traffic several village streets including
Jupiter and Orbit streets.
· Respondent’s claim: BAVA had agreed to the
opening of Bel-Air Village streets and that the opening
was demanded by public necessity and in the exercise of
police power.
· Petitioner’s counter-argument: It has never agreed
on the opening of Jupiter and Orbit streets. By virtue of
its ownership of the streets, it should not be deprived
without due process of law and without just
compensation.
ISSUES/HOLDING
a. W/N the Mayor of Makati could have validly
opened Jupiter and Orbit streets? – YES
b. If yes, what is the nature of the state power being
invoked by the Mayor? – POLICE POWER
RATIO
a. BAVA cannot rightfully complain that the Mayor of
Makati, in opening up Jupiter and Orbit streets, had acted
arbitrarily.
Citing Sangalang v. IAC, the Court held that Jupiter street
lies as the boundary between Bel-Air Village and Ayala
Corporation’s commercial section. Being considered as
merely a boundary – and hence not part of Ayala’s real
estate development projects – it cannot be said to have
been for the exclusive benefit of Bel-Air Village residents.
The very Deed of Donation executed by Ayala Corp.
covering Jupiter and Orbit Streets, amongst
others, effectively required both passageways open to the
general public.
o “…the property will be used as a street for the use of
the members of the DONEE (BAVA), their families,
personnel, guests, domestic help and under certain
reasonable conditions and restrictions, by the general
public…”
As the Court asserted in Sangalang, the opening of
Jupiter and Orbit streets was warranted by the demands
of the common good, in terms of traffic decongestion and
public convenience.
b. The act of the Mayor now challenged is in the concept
of police power.
o The demolition of the gates at Orbit and Jupiter streets
does not amount to deprivation of property without due
process of law or expropriation without just
compensation – there is no taking of property involved.
o Police power as the “state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare.”
o Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not
unrestricted license to act accordingly to one’s will. It is
subject to the far more overriding demands and
requirements of the greater number.
o Public welfare when clashing with the individual
right to property should not be made to prevail through
the state’s exercise of its police power.
o The exercise of police power, however, may not be
done arbitrarily or unreasonably. But the burden of
showing that it is unjustified lies on the aggrieved party.
o In the case at bar, BAVA has failed to show that the
opening up of Orbit and Jupiter streets was unjustified or
that the Mayor acted unreasonably.
o The fact that the opening has led to the loss of privacy
of BAVA residents is no argument against the
Municipality’s effort to ease vehicular traffic in Makati.
The duty of local executive is to take care of the needs of
the greater number, in many cases at the expense, of the
minority.
DISPOSITIVE: Motion for reconsideration by Bel-Air
Village Association is DENIED with FINALITY. The
petition in G.R. 60727 is GRANTED.
EPZA VS. DULAY [148 SCRA 305; G.R. No. L-59603; 29
Apr 1987]
Facts: The four parcels of land which are the subject of
this case is where the Mactan Export Processing Zone
Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private
respondent San Antonio Development Corporation (San
Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are registered
under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to
the government without them reaching the agreement as
to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then
issued an order for the appointment of the commissioners
to determine the just compensation. It was later found out
that the payment of the government to San Antonio
would be P15 per square meter, which was objected to by
the latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of
just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair
market value declared by the owner of the property
sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever
is lower. Such objection and the subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the
reception of the commissioner’s report. EPZA then filed
this petition for certiorari and mandamus enjoining the
respondent from further hearing the case.
Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory
mode of determining just compensation in PD 1533 is
unconstitutional.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the mode
of determination of just compensation in PD 1533 is
unconstitutional.
The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes
impermissible encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It
tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which
under the Constitution is reserved to it for financial
NPC VS CA
In this case, NPC was undoubtedly negligent because it
opened the spillway gates of the Angat Dam only at the
height of typhoon “Welming” when it knew very well
that it was safer to have opened the same gradually and
earlier, as it was also undeniable that NPC knew of the
coming typhoon at least four days before it actually
struck. Thus, NPC cannot escape liability.
FACTS:
On August 4, 1964, Engineering Construction, Inc.
(ECI)executed a contract with the National Waterworks
and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA), whereby ECI
undertook to furnish all tools, labor, equipment, and
materials (not furnished by Owner), and to construct the
proposed 2nd Ipo-Bicti Tunnel, Intake and Outlet
Structures, and Appurtenant Structures, and
Appurtenant Features, at Norzagaray, Bulacan, and to
complete said works within eight hundred (800) calendar
days from the date the Contractor receives the formal
notice to proceed.
The project involved two (2) major phases: the first phase
comprising the tunnel work covering a distance of seven
(7) kilometers, passing through the mountain, from the
Ipo river, a part of Norzagaray, Bulacan, where the Ipo
Dam of the National Power Corporation (NPC) is located,
to Bicti; the other phase consisting of the outworks at both
ends of the tunnel.
By September 1967, the ECI already had completed the
first major phase of the work, namely, the tunnel
excavation work. As soon as the ECI had finished the
tunnel excavation work at the Bicti site, all the equipment
no longer needed there were transferred to the Ipo site
where some projects were yet to be completed.
Record shows that on November 4, 1967, typhoon
‘Welming’ hit Central Luzon, passing through NPC’s
Angat Hydro-electric Project and Dam at Ipo,
Norzagaray, Bulacan. Strong winds struck the project
area, and heavy rains intermittently fell. Due to the heavy
downpour, the water in the reservoir of the Angat Dam
was rising perilously at the rate of sixty (60) centimeters
per hour. To prevent an overflow of water from the dam,
NPC caused the opening of the spillway gates.
The appellate court sustained the findings of the trial
court that the evidence preponderantly established the
fact that due to the negligent manner with which the
spillway gates of the Angat Dam were opened, an
extraordinary large volume of water rushed out of the
gates, and hit the installations and construction works of
ECI at the Ipo site with terrific impact, as a result of which
the latter’s stockpile of materials and supplies, camp
facilities and permanent structures and accessories were
either washed away, lost or destroyed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the destruction and loss of the ECI’s
equipment and facilities were due to force majeure.
RULING:
No, the destruction and loss of the ECI’s equipment and
facilities were not due to force majeure.
It is clear from the appellate court’s decision that based
on its findings of fact and that of the trial court’s, NPC
was undoubtedly negligent because it opened the
spillway gates of the Angat Dam only at the height of
typhoon “Welming” when it knew very well that it was
safer to have opened the same gradually and earlier, as it
was also undeniable that NPC knew of the coming
typhoon at least four days before it actually struck. And
even though the typhoon was an act of God or what we
may call force majeure, NPC cannot escape liability
because its negligence was the proximate cause of the loss
and damage.
As the SC has ruled in Juan F. Nakpil & Sons v. Court of
Appeals:
“Thus, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an
act of God, there concurs a corresponding fraud,
negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any
manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided for in
Article 1170 of the Civil Code, which results in loss or
damage, the obligor cannot escape liability.
“The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine
strictly requires that the act must be one occasioned
exclusively by the violence of nature and human agencies
are to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause
of the mischief. When the effect, the cause of which is to
be considered, is found to be in part the result of the
participation of man, whether it be from active
intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the whole
occurrence is thereby humanized, as it was, and removed intended improvement rests in the discretion of the
from the rules applicable to the acts of God. grantee power subject however to review by the courts in
case of fraud, bad faith or gross abuse of discretion. The
“Thus, it has been held that when the negligence of a
choice of property must be examined for bad faith,
person concurs with an act of God in producing a loss,
arbitrariness or capriciousness and due process
such person is not exempt from liability by showing that
determination as to whether or not the proposed location
the immediate cause of the damage was the act of God.
was proper in terms of the public interests.
To be exempt from liability for loss because of an act of
God, he must be free from any previous negligence or Republic vs De Knecht
misconduct by which the loss or damage may have been
Fact: The Petitioner On February 20, 1979 filed in the
occasioned.”
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal in Pasay City an
De Knecht vs. Bautista G.R. No. L-51078 expropriation proceedings against the owners of the
houses standing along Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets
Fact: The petitioner alleges that than ten (10) years ago,
among them is the respondent and some fifteen other
the government through the Department of Public
defendant who filed a motion to dismiss alleging lack of
Workmen’s and Communication (now MPH) prepared a
jurisdiction, pendency of appeal with the President of the
to Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) to Roxas Blvd;
Philippines, prematureness of complaint and arbitrary
that the proposed extension, an adjunct of building
and erroneous valuation of the properties, filed an ex
program, the Manila — Cavite Coastal Read Project,
parte urgent motion for the issuance by the trial court of
would pass through Cuneta Ave. up to Roxas Blvd that
a restraining order to restrain the Petitioner from
this route would be a straight one taking into account the
proceeding with the taking of immediate possession and
direction of EDSA but later decided to make the proposed
control of the property sought to be condemned. In June,
extension go through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets
1979 the Petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a writ
which petitioner being one of them residents, that
of possession of the property to be expropriated which
President Marcos referred the matter to the Human
the lower court granted and created a Committee of three
Settlements Commission (HSC) for investigation and
to determine the just compensation for the lands involved
recommendation which recommended the original plan;
in the proceedings. Respondent filed with this Court a
notwithstanding the said recommendation, the MPH
petition for certiorari and prohibition, and directed
insisted on implementing the revised plan; In February
against the order of the lower court dated June 14, 1979
1979, the government filed in the Court of First Instance
praying that the Petitioner be commanded to desist from
(CFI) of Rizal, presided by the respondent Judge, a
further proceeding in the expropriation action and from
complaint for expropriation against the petitioner.
implementing said order where the court granted in favor
respondent judge issued a writ of possession dated June
of the respondent. Adrian Avilado Antazo
14, 1979 authorizing the Republic of the Philippines to
take and enter upon the possession of the properties On August 8, 1981 defendants Maria Del Carmen Roxas
sought be condemned. The petitioner contends that Vda. de Elizalde and others moved to dismiss the
“Respondent court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction or expropriation action in compliance with the dispositive
gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order to take portion of the aforesaid decision of this Court which had
over and enter upon the possession of the properties become final and in order to avoid further damage to
sought to be expropriated-petitioner having raised a same defendants who were denied possession of their
constitutional question which respondent court must properties. On September 2, 1983, the Republic filed a
resolve before it can issue an order to take or enter upon motion to dismiss said case due to the enactment of the
the possession of properties sought to be expropriated. Batas Pambansa Blg. 340 expropriating the same
The petitioner assails the choice of the revised Streets properties and for the same purpose. The lower court in
route on the following grounds: an order of September 2, 1983 dismissed the case by
reason of the enactment of the said law. The motion for
Issue: Whether the expropriator can choose any property
reconsideration thereof was denied in the order of the
it wanted?
lower court dated December 18, 1986.
Held: No, The choice of property to be expropriated
Respondent appealed from said order to the Court of
cannot be without rhyme or reason. The condemnor may
Appeals wherein in due course a decision was rendered
not choose any property it wants. Where the legislature
on December 28, 1988 in favor of the respondents and
has delegated a power of eminent do-main, the question
setting aside the decision of the CA.
of the necessity for taking a particular fine for the
Issue: whether an expropriation proceeding that was
determined by a final judgment of this Court may be the
subject of a subsequent legislation for expropriation.
Held: Yes, While it is true that said final judgment of the
Supreme Court on the subject becomes the law of the case
between the parties, it is equally true that the right of the
petitioner to take private properties for public use upon
the payment of the just compensation is so provided in
the Constitution and our laws. Such expropriation
proceedings may be undertaken by the petitioner not
only by voluntary negotiation with the land owners but
also by taking appropriate court action or by legislation.
Manotok v. NHA 150 SCRA 89 (1987)
F: Petitioners are the owners of two large estates
known as the Tambunting Estate and Sunog-Apog in
Tondo, Manila, both of which were declared expropriated
in two decrees issued by President Marcos, PD 1669 and
PD 1670. The petitioners contend that the decrees violate
their constitutional right to due process and equal
protection since by their mere passage their properties
were automatically expropriated and they were
immediately deprived of the ownership and possession
thereof without being given the chance to oppose such
expropriation. The government on the other hand
contends that the power of eminent domain is inherent in
the State and when the legislature or the President
through his law-making powers exercises this power, the
public use and public necessity of the expropriation and
the fixing of the just compensation become political in
nature and the courts must respect the decision.
Issue
Ermita Malate Manila Hotel and Motel Operators vs City
of Manila
Facts: On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of Manila
passed Ordinance No. 4760 with the following provisions
questioned for its violation of due process:
refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or
customer unless it fills out a prescribed form in the lobby
in open view; prohibiting admission o less than 18 years
old; usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o
150% and 200% respectively (tax issue also);
making unlawful lease or rent more than twice every 24
hours; and cancellation of license for subsequent
violation. The lower court issued preliminary injunction
and petitioners raised the case to SC on certiorari.
Issue: Is the ordinance compliant with the due process
requirement of the constitution?
Held: Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power to
minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. There
is no violation o constitutional due process for being
reasonable and the ordinance is enjoys the presumption
of constitutionality absent any irregularity on its face. .As
such a limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression
against the command of due process. It is neither
unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to
curb the opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use
to which such premises could be, and, according to the
explanatory note, are being devoted. Taxation may be
made to implement a police power and the amount,
object, and instance of taxation is dependent upon the
local legislative body. Judgment of lower court reversed
and injunction lifted.

W/N THE DECRESS IN QUESTION DEPRIVED THE

PETITIONERS OF THEIR PROPERTIES WITHOUT DUE
PROCESS OF LAW

HELD: The challenged decrees are unfair in the

procedures adopted and the powers given to the NHA.
The Tambunting subdivision is summarily proclaimed a
blighted area and directly expropriated by decree
without the slightest semblance of a hearing or any
proceeding whatsoever. The expropriation is instant and
automatic to take effect immediately upon the signing of
the decree. No deposit before the taking is required. There
is not provision for any interest to be paid upon unpaid
installments. Not only are the owners given absolutely no
opportunity to contest the expropriation, or question the
amount of payments fixed by the decree, but the decision
of the NHA are expressly declared beyond judicial
review. PD 1669 and 1670 are declared unconstitutional.