The Kurds in Turkey

Author(s): Martin van Bruinessen

Source: MERIP Reports, No. 121, State Terror in Turkey (Feb., 1984), pp. 6-12+14
Published by: Middle East Research and Information Project, Inc. (MERIP)
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3011035
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 by most Kurdish intellectuals. Improved educational
opportunities, the gradual integration of the region into the
Turkish economy and the resulting labor migration from
east to west led to the rapid emergence, beginning in the
late 1960s and early 1970s, of a broadly-based Kurdish
national movement. The military perceived this movement
as a major threat to Turkey's national security, and
immediately after the 1980 coup initiated a concerted effort
to wipe it out completely.
Turkey's military and bureaucratic elites have always
been extremely wary of all forms of expression of Kurdish
national sentiment. They have invariably reacted with
repressive measures more severe than those directed
against any other perceived threat to state security,
including communism. The Turkish elite has an obsession
with territorial integrity and national unity that seems to
be rooted in the trauma of the gradual dismemberment of
the Ottoman Empire. Fears that the Armenians would
prove to be a fifth column in an armed conflict with Russia
led to their deportation and the massacre of hundreds of
thousands of them in 1915. Similarly, the Kurds have been
suspected of disloyalty and collusion with foreign powers:
with the British and French in the 1920s and 1930s, when
these were still considered enemies, and later with the
Russians. The present military leadership proclaims to
believe that the Kurdish movement in Turkey was
masterminded by the Soviet Union, and they have spared
no effort to destroy it. The strategic location of Kurdistan,
close to the Soviet border and the oil wells of northern Iraq,
and only a few hours' flying time from the Gulf, added to
the military's concern with potential separatism.
The strong reaction which Turkey's governing class
shows towards even moderate forms of Kurdish ethnic
awareness is not born of strategic considerations or fear of

in Turkey foreign subversion alone. The ideology of national unity

has come to replace religion as the chief legitimation of
state power in Turkey. This national unity was forged by
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, and Turkish official historians
have provided it with a "scientific" base by "proving,"
reactionary. The same is true, a fortiori, of Kurdish rebel? among other things, that the Kurds are really Turks.*
lions with a nationalist aspect. The fact that such rebellions Challenges of this idea?such as, for instance, the claim
were often led by "obscurantist" religious or tribal leaders that the Kurds constitute a separate nation?provoke a
conveniently corroborated this view. reaction similar to the desecration of the flag or
Kurdish nationalists also see a causal connection Ataturk's statue.
between the underdevelopment of the eastern provinces
and the fact that they are largely inhabited by Kurds. They
regard this underdevelopment as the result, at least in part,
The Kurds
of purposeful Turkish government policy which expressly and The First Republic
impeded the development of the eastern provinces out of
fear that economic and educational progress During might the first years of the Republic, there were several
rekindle the Kurds' nationalist demands. There is some serious Kurdish rebellions led by religious and tribal
evidence that governments up to 1945 adhered to such a
policy, but this was no longer the case after the Menderes
period. Beginning in the 1950s, and especially during ?The
theofficial Turkish views on history have been expounded in the works of the Turkish
Historical Society, established by Ataturk in 1930 with the express aim of writing history
1970s, many roads were built, hydroelectric dams con? according to Turkish nationalist needs. See B. Lewis, "History-writing and national
structed and schools established. There have been notice? revival in Turkey," Middle Eastern Affairs IV (1953), pp. 218-227. The re-emergence of
Kurdish nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s was answered by a large number of
able improvements, although the area remains much more "scholarly" publications claiming to prove that all Kurdish tribes have Turkish origins.
The first academic who openly challenged this official view of history was the (Turkish)
underdeveloped than the western part of the country. The sociologist Ismail Be?ikc.i, in his book The Turkish thesis on history and the Kurdish
eastern provinces also became more integrated in the problem (in Turkish, Ankara 1977). For this publication, he was sentenced to three years'
imprisonment. Since the 1980 coup, the semi-official Turkish Cultural Research Institute
Turkish economy, but in a way later qualified as "colonial"
has reissued no fewer than six books purporting to demonstate the Kurds' Turkishness.

Merip Reports ? February 1984

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authorities and a few nationalist intellectuals. By the late calling the Kurds a separate nation and denouncing the
1930s, the eastern provinces were pacified. Every Kurdish national oppression to which they were subjected.4
village of some size was closely controlled by a Turkish These discussions remained restricted to a relatively
police post. The Kurdish language, Kurdish dress, Kurdish limited circle of students and intellectuals. In the late
folklore, Kurdish names?all had been forbidden. Many 1960s, some of these Kurdish intellectuals made a first
Kurds were exiled to other parts of the country, whilesuccessful attempt to reach a wider public by organizing
Turkish immigrants from the Balkans were settled in mass rallies in the major cities of eastern Turkey. The word
Kurdistan. The government policy of forced assimilation "Kurd" was not even uttered at these meetings, but there
seemed to bear fruit. In the towns, everyone spoke were very vocal protests against the regional inequalities
Turkish, and Kurdish nationalist sentiment seemed toof which people had, because of better communications,
disappear altogether. become more aware. Participation in the meetings was
The Menderes years (1950-60) brought a certain measure very broad: besides the local Kurdish intellectuals and
of liberalization and relaxation of the policy of forced professionals, there were also tribal leaders and landlords,
assimilation. Most of the village police posts were abolished. many urban craftsmen, and workers and peasants.
The government tried to keep the area under control by Sometimes entire local branches of the Kemalist Republican
co-opting Kurdish tribal and religious leaders and landlords. People's Party actively joined these rallies, until party
Through the party system, these local authorities allied leader Ismet Inonu forbade them to.5
themselves with political forces in the capital. They con?
trolled large numbers of local votes, in exchange for which Growth of a Kurdish Movement
they received spoils to distribute among their followers.
Thus the positions of these traditional leaders were rein? In 1969, Kurdish intellectuals in Ankara established the
forced, both vis-a-vis the central government and vis-a-vis first legal Kurdish organization, the Revolutionary Cultura
the local population. After the military coup of 1960, the Society of the East (DDKO is its Turkish acronym). Simi
now-deposed Prime Minister Adnan Menderes claimed thatsocieties were soon formed in several other cities. "The
a number of these Kurdish authorities, not content with East" meant "Kurdistan," as everyone knew, but in order
their increased powers, had been plotting to achieve full to maintain legality no open reference to Kurdistan or
independence for the Kurdish provinces.1 This charge was Kurds could be made. In their monthly bulletin, the DDKO
probably much exaggerated, but it is certain that among the wrote mainly about the economic problems of eastern
younger and better educated members of aristocratic Turkey, the oppression of Kurdish villagers by (Kurdish)
Kurdish families there was much resentment of the landlords and tribal leaders, and the brutal and violent
Kemalist policies, especially assimilation, and an indistinct behavior of Turkish army units in Kurdish villages.6
but powerful nationalist sentiment. This feeling had Thebeen
DDKO and the Kurds active in the WPT (between
strengthened and stimulated by the coup d'etatwhom of 'Abdthere was some overlap) represented what might be
el-Karim Qassem in Iraq in 1958, when Mullah Mustafa called the left wing of the emerging Kurdish movement. A
Barzani was invited back to Iraq and there was much talk
more exclusively nationalist wing, strongly under Barzani's
of cultural rights and autonomy for the Kurds there. influence, established in 1964 as a sister to the clandestine
Although the military officers who deposed Menderes Democratic Party of Kurdistan (DPK) in Iraq. Barzani had
and took power themselves in 1960 made some efforts fallen outtowith Qassem in 1961, and in the 1960s his armed
revive the assimilation policies of the pre-1950 period, rebelliontheagainst successive governments steadily expanded
constitution they promulgated in 1961 granted much his wider
effective control of northern Iraq. Barzani's successes
civil liberties than had perviously existed in Turkey. didThere
much to stimulate the aspirations of the Kurds in
was more press freedom, and it became possible to Turkey. The conservative DPK found its supporters mainly
establish less docile trade unions and political associations. among the traditional Kurdish elite. It saw autonomy or
A few journals appeared devoted entirely to the history, even independence for the Kurds of Turkey as its aim, while
folklore and economic problems of Kurdistan (still the left wing of the Kurdish movement so far only spoke of
euphemistically called "the east").2 These publications cultural rights and social and economic equality. Towards
were invariably banned upon appearance, but this did not the end of the 1960s, the DPK split: the young and
prevent other journals and books from being published, ambitious Dr. ?ivan established his own, more radical
including such great classics of Kurdish literature andDPK, with a left populist program. He withdrew with some
history as Mem u Zin and the Sharafnama.3 followers to Iraq and began to make plans for an armed
The Turkish left, which emerged in those same years insurrection in Turkish Kurdistan. This cannot have
and organized itself in the Worker's Party of Turkey (WPT), pleased Barzani, who did not wish to antagonize the
took some interest in the Kurdish problem. Discussions Turkish on and Persian governments. After the Turkish
the causes of the underdevelopment of eastern Turkey andmilitary intervention of 1971, the leaders of the rival DPK,
its remedies filled political and academic journals. At first, Sait Elfi and his friends, also fled to Iraq. Under
these left forces followed the Kemalist tendency to see thecircumstances that remain obscure, both Elfi and ?ivan
problem purely in terms of regional inequalities. Gradually, were killed, which put an end to the activities of both DPKs
the Kurdish members of the WPT succeeded in getting thefor some time.*
view accepted that the problem also had an aspect *It
ofseems that Elgi was killed by Sivan, and the latter then condemned to death and
executed by Barzani. Among the Kurdish organizations, different canonized accounts
national, or at least ethnic, inequality and cultural exist of what really happened, most of them involving provocations by the Turkish
oppression. In 1970, the party congress passed a resolution
intelligence service, MIT.

8 Merip Reports ? February 1984

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 The March 1971 military intervention meant a rupture The new generation, as university or secondary school
in the Kurdish movement in several other respects. The students, engaged in the political discussions on imperial?
Workers' Party of Turkey and the DDKO were banned, and ism, underdevelopment, class struggle and the national
most active members imprisoned. The military raided the problem, discussions that had rapidly spread outside
Kurdish villages to intimidate the population. Two-and-a- narrow intellectual circles. This younger generation of
half years later, when parliamentary democracy was migrants was the main motor of the Kurdish movement in
restored and a Kurdish movement slowly began to the 1970s. Most of the Kurdish organizations were first
established in Ankara and Istanbul, and from there spread
reorganize itself, it was a different movement, more radical
in its national demands and at the same time broader in its to Kurdistan. Urban-educated teachers and students
social base. Like the Turkish left, however, it soon splitreturning
into to their villages brought the new political ideas,
many rival groups. in simplified form, to the countryside and attempted t
At the risk of being too schematic, we can identify mobilize
some the peasants.
factors that contributed to the growth and radicalization of This was only possible in the relatively liberal political
the Kurdish movement through the 1970s. The most crucial climate of the years 1974-78, a consequence not of the

factor may have been the migration from the Kurdish governments' benevolence but of their weakness. In fact,
provinces to the cities of western Turkey. This reached both the Constitution and the Penal Code had been amended
enormous proportions in the 1960s and continued unabated in 1971 to make a sharper prosecution of Kurdish activities
during the 1970s. Such large numbers of migrants could no possible. The state apparatus, including the police and the
longer be gradually urbanized and assimilated as earlier judiciary, had become politicized and was ridden with
generations had been. Rather, they lived together in their partisan rivalries. Each of the coalition governments of the
own closed communities, to some extent maintaining their period had such a narrow margin of parliamentary support
traditional lifestyle. They were more aware than they had that it could not afford to antagonize even small sectors of
been before of the great gap in development and ways of life the electorate. There was therefore no consistently strong
between western and eastern Turkey. Occasional discrimi? repression of Kurdish activities until the 1979 proclamation
nation strengthened their awareness of being different. of martial law in the Kurdish provinces.

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 Another important factor in this politicization was the time was ripe for the armed phase in this struggle, actually
Kurdish disappointment with Bulent Ecevit. Before the opened the offensive in 1979 against some particularly
1973 elections, Ecevit had toured the eastern provinces and powerful and oppressive chieftains. This precipitated a
promised that he would, as a prime minister, take special minor civil war between supporters and opponents of these
care of the problems of the east. Few of his promises, chieftains, with government forces taking the latter side.
however, materialized, and a few years later Ecevit clashed
openly with Kurdish supporters who had dared to raise
moderately nationalist slogans. Kurdish suspicions that The Major Kurdish Organizations
they could expect little from Turkish politicians if even
Ecevit left them in the lurch drew many people to the In 1974-75, the old DDKO were revived under the name of
Kurdish nationalist organizations proclaiming that Kurds Revolutionary-Democratic Cultural Associations (DDKD),
should take what the Turks refused to give. In the 1977 first in Ankara and then in other cities and towns. An
elections, an unprecedented number of independents stood attempt to bring all Kurdish progressives together in these
as candidates for the Kurdish provinces. Some had broken DDKD failed: political differences and personal rivalries
loose from Ecevit's RPP, while others were known to be caused the major branches to split. Some branches
close to Kurdish nationalist organizations. continued independently; others came under the control of
The Kurdish left experienced a similar disappointment one or another of the political movements that gradually
with the Turkish leftwing parties and organizations. Most took shape. Each of these established its own clubs and
of these did recognize that the Kurds were subjected to associations. The first political current to surface is usually
cultural oppression, and that the eastern provinces were known by its monthly journal OzgilrlUk Yolu (The Road to
underprivileged and economically exploited. Their auto? Freedom) which appeared from mid-1975 until its ban early
matic solution, though, was the socialist revolution that in 1979. Its leading members had been active in the
would occur under the leadership of the (Turkish) proletariat.Workers Party of Turkey in the 1960s, and they continued
Many Turkish leftists considered Kurdish national to represent the same brand of socialism and moderate
demands, in the present situation, untimely or even Kurdish national and cultural demands that had then been
reactionary. The entire left accepted the Leninist doctrine characteristic of the WPT. The Ozgurliik Yolu group
of a nation's right to self-determination. They resolved thisconsidered an alliance of the Kurdish oppressed classes
inconsistency by refusing to consider the Kurds as a with the revolutionary Turkish working class the proper
nation, or by adding the rider that this right could only be strategy to end class and national oppression. It was a
exercised under the leadership of the proletariat.* As atypically urban organization of workers and intellectuals,
result, many Kurds left the Turkish parties and organiza? numerically small but with some influence in trade unions
tions of which they were members and joined the separate and the teachers' union.
Kurdish organizations that mushroomed after 1975. Another group grew up around the publishing house
The Kurdish movement did not turn away from the left: Komal and the journal Rizgari (Liberation). It had less con?
almost .all Kurdish organizations claimed to be Marxist- fidence in the Turkish left. Unlike the Ozgurliik group, this
Leninist, however little the rank and file knew about group spoke out against supporting the Republican People's
socialist theory. All considered the Kurds a nation apart Party in the critical 1977 elections. The Kurds, it said, had
and demanded the right of self-determination, althoughnothing good to expect from Kemalists; as a colonized
this did not mean for all the establishment of a separatepeople, they should be more concerned with their own
state. One by one, they all also adopted the thesis thatliberation than with the political problems of the colonizing
Kurdistan is a colony of the Turkish ruling classes. They nation. This liberation would be achieved through a socialist
began to look for inspiration to the liberation movements revolution under the leadership of the Kurdish proletariat.
elsewhere in the world, such as southern Africa and Problems in the identification of a proletariat in Kurdistan,
Vietnam. Most of the Kurdish organizations claimed to see
disagreements on the attitude towards the Soviet Union,
the struggle against class oppression inside Kurdistanand as other ideological and personal conflicts led to a split in
equally important, although they frequently accused1979. each Ala Rizgari (Flag of Liberation) took a more critical
other of failing to address this issue. Some made a attitude towards the Soviet Union and otherwise had less
rigid political ideas than the group that continued under the
connection between the national and the class struggle: the
old name. The only really anti-Soviet Kurdish organization
chief exploiters?landlords and tribal or religious leaders-
was the Maoist Katoa, which never gained much following
were often allied, through the various political parties, with
outside some student circles. It was formally established in
the central state. The left organizations therefore labelled
them "collaborators," and proclaimed that breaking their 1976 and split two years later over disagreements about
power was one primary aim in the "anti-feudal and anti- China's Three Worlds theory.
colonial struggle." One organization, thinking that theLarge segments of the nationalist wing of the Kurdish
movement were also attracted to left ideologies during the
1970s. ?ivan's KDP dissipated after his death, but a group
?This is my crude summary. The various left parties took different positions at different
times and rarely stated them so bluntly or simplistically as I do here. The only one among
of was
the major left organizations and parties that did recognize the Kurds as a nation and his sympathizers gained control of some of the largest
willing to grant them unconditionally the right to self-determination was Kurtulu?,DDKDthe branches. They went on calling themselves Revolu?
most intellectual of the various groups that emerged from the original youth and student
movement Dev Gen?. Since the 1980 coup, much has changed. In their foreign exile, tionary
all Democrats, and used the name DDKD for the new
local associations that they opened. The Revolutionary
the Turkish left movements have made many concessions to the Kurds, and almost all
now agree that Kurdistan is a Turkish colony and that the Kurdish movement is an
important revolutionary force. Democrat movement soon became the largest of the Kurdish

io Merip Reports ? February 1984

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organizations; by 1978 it claimed to have no fewer than 40
branches, with some 50,000 members. It called itself Marxist
and sought cooperation with the (pro-Soviet) Communist
Party of Turkey. In its publications, it directed itself mainly
to intellectuals and youth, while its membership included
people from all walks of life, even "feudal" elements. On
many important issues it never had a clear standpoint.
The remnants of Elci's KDP continued for some time to
exist as little more than an extension of the Iraqi KDP, and
it almost dissolved after the collapse of Barzani's movement
in 1975. A year or two later, a group of younger and more
militant members, calling themselves KUK (National
Liberation of Kurdistan), gained a controlling majority in
the central committee. They sent the party on a course of
active support for the "Provisional Leadership" of the Iraqi
KDP (led by Barzani's sons), which from Iran and Turkey
had resumed guerrilla warfare in northern Iraq. Both the
"Provisional Leadership" and the KUK claimed to have
become Marxist-Leninist, and the KUK later broke entirely
with the remnants of the old, "feudal" KDP.
The most radical of the Kurdish movements is the PKK
(Workers' Party of Kurdistan), better known by the nick?
name Apocus (after Apo, the short form of their leader
Abdullah Ocalan's name). This small group emerged in
Ankara in 1974 from a Dev Gene branch* and left the capital
for revolutionary agitation in Kurdistan. In 1979 it trans?
formed itself into a party (the PKK) and proclaimed the
armed struggle against feudalism and colonialism. The
party's program was a curious brand of Marxism-Leninism
and ultranationalism, with the ultimate aim of establishing
an independent, united Kurdistan (i.e., including the parts
presently in Iran, Iraq and Syria). Armed struggle, they
claimed, was the only way to achieve this. Kurdish
"collaborators" were to be attacked as much as the
"colonizers," and in practice, rival Kurdish organizations
came under attack. In the districts the party claimed as
"liberated areas," feudal and tribal lords had lost their
power and some of the villagers looked upon the PKK as
their liberators. But the party lost much sympathy as a
result of its own brutal and violent behavior. Most of its
members and sympathizers were very young, poorly
educated and of humble backgrounds. In its composition the
PKK was, no doubt, the most proletarian (lumpen-
proletarian according to its detractors) among the Kurdish
organizations.7
Most of these organizations were pro-Soviet, or at least
embraced brands of socialism they associated with the
Soviet Union. Since Turkey was a NATO country and
Kurdistan had special strategic value for the West, no
Western power seemed likely to help the Kurds in their
struggle for more rights, while possibly the Soviet Union
might. Ozgurltik Yolu, the DDKD and Rizgari competed
with each other, and with the Communist Party of Turkey,
for recognition by Moscow as the party representing
Kurdish communists. None of the groups received such
recognition, although there are indications that the PKK
received indirectly?through Palestinian connections?

*Dev Gene (Revolutionary Youth), also known as Dev Yoi (Revolutionary Way), was
active in the mid and late 1970s. It grew out of the Turkish People's Liberation Army
(TPLA). See Ahmet Samim, "The Tragedy of The Turkish Left," New Left Review 126
(March-April 1981).?Eds.-

Merip Reports ? February 1984 11

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material aid from the Soviet Union. The CPT called on all have died (or been killed) in prison, while many others seem
Kurdish communists to leave the Kurdish organizations to be close to death.*
which, it said, were all feudal-dominated. As a reaction, Together with the suppression of Kurdish activists, the
policy of assimilation received new impetus. A general
three of the pro-Soviet groups established a common action
platform, known as the National Union of Forces, earlycampaign
in to improve literacy in Turkish, and intensive
1980, but this soon fell apart. Turkish-language courses were introduced in primary
schools. Provincial commanders had their own programs
to stamp out the use of Kurdish, at least in the towns.
Cultural Rights and Repression Traditional Kurdish clothes, which had reappeared in the
1970s, have been banned again.
Although all of the Kurdish organizations saw national The militarization of eastern and southeastern Turkey
self-determination as an ultimate goal, their activities were has accelerated since the coup. Additional troops sent to
primarily directed towards the achievement of culturalthe east seem there to stay. The transfer of Second Army's
rights. Their journals devoted some attention to the Kurdishheadquarters from Konya to Malatya will be completed in
language, literature and culture, in addition to the purely1983. Two of Turkey's four armies will then be based in the
political articles. They published Kurdish grammars andeast, so that the area will remain under close military
dictionaries (and circulated them clandestinely, since they supervision.8 The major reason for this militarization is
were immediately outlawed). They gave Kurdish literacy probably the increased strategic importance of eastern
courses, since very few Kurds could read and write their own Turkey since the changes of regime in Afghanistan and
language. The journals began to use more and more Kurdish Iran. There have long been several NATO and US military
alongside Turkish. In 1979, there even appeared a journal installations in the area, chiefly for electronic surveillance,
entirely devoted to Kurdish literature, Tirej. Each group and the US wants to establish new bases there. Press
organized its cultural evenings, with Kurdish music and reports on the establishment of a headquarters for the
songs (besides the required political speeches); troupes touredRapid Deployment Force at Van, or three new US airfield
the villages with Kurdish-language political theater. Whilein eastern Turkey, have been routinely but not convincingly
all this had to be done clandestinely, there were many denied in Ankara.9
attempts to get such activities legalized and to promulgate This militarization will make it difficult for the Kurdish
the use of Kurdish in primary education. Turkey's progres? movement of the 1970s to reorganize on a significant scale.
sive teachers' union, Tob-Der, in which the Kurdish left wasAt the same time, Western strategic interest in the area will
strongly represented, resolved at its 1978 congress that the safeguard the generals from serious criticism of their
first years of education should be in the child's native treatment of the Kurds. The organized Kurdish movement
language.* These attempts failed to produce any softeningappears to have been defeated for the time being, but it will
of the ban on Kurdish language and culture. take a long time for the increased ethnic and national
The seeming tolerance of the mid-1970s came to an end awareness that it stimulated and represented to die out. ?
with the proclamation of martial law in 1979. Since the
military takeover of 1970 the ban on Kurdish language has The most shocking reports about the treatment of Kurdish prisoners are by two Kurdish
been implemented more strictly than ever. The present lawyers, !*}. Kaya and H. Yildirim, who themselves spent over half a year each in prison,
apparently because they defended PKK members. The two later escaped to Europe.
military leaders of Turkey have left no doubts as to theirAccording to both, the authorities are slowly killing the prisoners (Kaya in Der Spiegel,
July 12,1982, and in his book Diyarbakir'da iskence (n.p., 1982); Yildirim in many press
position: the entire Kurdish movement must be eliminated; interviews early in 1983).
everything conducive to Kurdish ethnic awareness must be
destroyed. In all areas where Kurdish nationalists have Footnotes
been active, military operations were carried out and the Thus an article in the Kemalist daily Cumhuriyet of May 31,1960, (four days after the
villages were raided. The army and police acted with coup). The following day 485 influential Kurds were arrested and kept detained in a camp
unprecedented brutality in order to intimidate the popula?for several months. 55 of the most influential of them?all but one being members of
Menderes' Democratic Party?were exiled to western Turkey for two years. This
tion. The government arrested tens of thousands of people, experience seems rather to have kindled their nationalism than stifled it: several of them
later played some part in the Democratic Party of Kurdistan. (See also I. Begikcj, Dogu
and interrogated them, often under severe torture. Persons Anadolu'nun duzeni, 2nd ed., Istanbul 1970, pp. 328-339).
suspected of contacts with Kurdish organizations were
o

The first of these journals, Ileri Yurt, had already appeared in 1958. It was followe
detained practically indefinitely. Most of the leading Dide-Firat (1962), Dide kaynagi(1962), Deng(1963), Roja Newe (1963), Denge Taze (1
Yeni Akis. (1966). They were all in Turkish, and expressed themselves in careful ter
members of the Kurdish organizations apparently have A 17th-century epic poem, by Ahmedi Khani, and a 16th-century chronical o
been arrested, along with the vast majority of the rank and Kurdish emirates, respectively. Both were translated into Turkish by Mehmed
Bozarslan.
file. Their treatment in prison and in the courtroom is much
Text of the resolution in I.Ch.Vanly, Survey of the national question of Turkish
harsher still than that of Turkish left activists. The Kurdistan, published by the Kurdish workers' organization Hevra, n.p., n.d. (1971),
pp. 51-52. After the military intervention of 1971 the WPT was banned because of this
members of the violent PKK have been treated with special
resolution.
cruelty. In mass trials directed at this party, the state hasve sagda vurusanlar, Ankara 1971,71. Report on the meetings and
Metin Toker, Solda
demanded over 600 death sentences. About ten of them the nature of the speeches in I.Begikci, Dogu Anadolu'nun duzeni, pp. 438-450.
The DDKO's bulletins of 1970-71 have been integrally reprinted in Devrimd Dogu
Kultur Ocaklari dava dosyasi (Files of the DDKO trial), Ankara 1975, pp. 479-581.
*The military prosecutor gave this as the main reason (or one of the main reasons) This
whysurvey of the Kurdish organizations is based on interviews with members of most
Tob-Der was banned immediately after the September 1980 coup. Earlier, a small left-
organizations and a reading of their journals. Two other such surveys, more detailed at
wing party, the TEP, which had adopted the principle of education in the native some points, deserve mention: a series of articles in the Turkish daily Aydinlik, June 18 -
language in its program, was banned for that reason. See M. Simon, "The trialJulyof the18, 1979, and Chris Kutschera, "La poudriere kurde," Le Monde Diplomatique,
Tiirkiye Emekci Partisi (Turkish Workers' Party) before the Constitutional Court of
September 1980, pp. 6-8. ^ ? _ 1A
Turkey," The Review (International Commission of Jurists) No. 24, June 1980, 53-64. See van Bruinessen, page 14

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 captains and a man in civilian clothes.
platform, but at about 1 pm the officer in days. A prisoner who tried to help him
charge ordered him into the water Huseyin Yildirim was very nervous and was taken and tortured. His feet were
again. When he refused to get into it heasked them if they had come to watch still swollen and he could only stand
was hit and pushed in. After this he wasthe torture. They said that they just supported. He was taken to a room
taken to another cell and given food, wanted to speak to him. They were sorry where he met three judges, one of whom
sheets and cigarettes. He could not eat for the torture; it would not be necessary he had known previously. Then he was
because of the damage to his mouth andif he answered their questions. The man taken away and tortured again for
teeth and when he smoked a cigarette hein the civilian clothes began to beat him; three days.
fainted. After two hours in this cell he he was hung on the cross again and After April 1982 his treatment im?
was taken back to the cell filled with given electric shocks; he fainted and proved?he thinks because of outside
water and left there for the rest of the when he recovered consciousness he interest in his case. On May 15, his
night. The next morning he was takenwas on the floor. Then the soles of his treatment improved even more; he was
to a dry cell, where he remained for 10feet were beaten. He did not know if the allowed to stay in bed and have the
days during which he was hit contin? officers were still in the room. Papers window open. Three doctors came to
ually. He was then taken, supported bywere already prepared with questions examine him every day and gave him
two soldiers, to a kogus (large dormitory?and spaces for his answers. He was serum. He was taken to court on June 15.
like room) and asked to identify prisonersasked many questions about PKK and After a month of good treatment he was
he knew. All were PKK members exceptthere were questions designed to impli? still in a bad condition and unable to
Mehdi Zana (former mayor of Diyar- cate other people in supporting PKK. At stand. On July 2, he was again taken to
bakir), Mahmut ?ahin and Pa?a Uzun. about 5 pm he was taken back to his cell. court and this time his release was
He was then put in a cell by himself. In the morning he was forced to eat the ordered. He was actually released on
The following day at about 8 am three sheets of paper on which he had July 14, but his trial continued.
soldiers came and beat him again. . . written. After his release, Hiiseyin Yildirim
Hiiseyin Yildirim was not given any For four nights he was taken and immediately took up his defense of the
food; he was very cold. He does not know tortured. On the fifth night he was PKK members on trial. He complained
how long he was kept in this cell; again given electric shocks, hung by one in court about the procedures and was
probably about 20 days. . . foot. The civilian, who was again pre? told that he could not continue as
Hiiseyin Yildirim became very de? sent, said he would die. defense counsel because he was on trial
pressed and refused to eat. Almost every Then for two or three days the torture himself. The court adjourned and two
day he was beaten and asked why he ceased. He was given bread, cheese and days later Hiiseyin Yildirim was de?
acted as lawyer for PKK members. tea. After 90 days he was not able to tained again and held for three days. He
When he could not walk he was dragged move and sat all day covered with a was beaten on the soles of his feet and
upstairs. He was kicked in the mouth, sheet. A doctor accompanied by soldierson his hands. After his release
had his head pushed against the iron came and examined him, injected him he was under constant surveillance and
bars and was hit with sticks. On? day with Novalgin and gave him vitamin repeatedly harassed. He was advised to
they came at about 2 pm and said that pills. For two or three days his state of leave Turkey and did so on October
they were going to hang him. He was health was so bad that he could not 11,1982. ?
taken to a room containing torture recognize anyone. He was moved to a
equipment in which there were three kogus where he stayed for one or two
US radar base near Di
are also near this city,

van Bruinessen, from p

General Evren, in a public spee
"traitors" claimed that the second
population there. "Whose land is
need to oppress the people of the r
real Turkish citizens? . . ." Orgeneral Kenan Evren in soylev ve demecleri (12-9-1981
-12-9-1982), Ankara 1982, p. 49. Many local people must have felt that this was hardly a
denial of the "traitors'" claims.
Q
New Statesman, May 14, 1982, (on the Rapid Deployment Force base at Van);
Cumhuriyet, October 7, 1982, (on the necessity of a base in Eastern Turkey against
possible Soviet invasion in Iran); Jack Anderson in the Washington Post, October 24,
1982, (on three new US air bases in Eastern Turkey in exchange for more military aid).
The airport of Van has recently been modernized, and at some places in Kurdistan roads
have been widened to the extent that military airpraft can land on them.

14 Merip Reports ? February 1984

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