What are the implications of the deployment of private military and security companies

(PMSCs) for the nature of armed conflicts?

Since the end of the Cold War, private military and security companies (hereinafter referred to as
PMSCs) have become increasingly involved in armed conflicts all over the world. It is estimated
that more than 100 PMSCs ran operations in over 100 countries during the last decade of the 20 th
century and that these companies represented already by 1990 approximately $55 million US in
total annual revenues, as researcher Caroline Holmqvist pointed out in a pioneering paper published
in 20051. States, international organizations, and multinational corporations rely to an ever
increasing extent on PMSCs to provide a wide array of services, such as logistics administration,
policing, infrastructure building, training for government officials, and conducting military
operations. As for the United States, more than one half of the personnel it has deployed in Iraq and
Afghanistan since 2003 have been contractors, some of which are deeply intertwined with the
military and the foreign policy community (Avant and De Nevers 2011, p. 1). In sum, scholars of
International Relations agree that PMSCs play a critical role in modern warfare2.

Avant and De Nevers (2011, pp. 1-2) argue that PMSCs have “a different relationship to the US
government, the American public, and domestic and international law than do military personnel”,
and that “these differences pose both benefits and risks”. In the best case scenario, PMSCs can
contribute to global governance by quickly mobilizing high-skilled professionals from around the
world with the capacity to manage “a global demand for security that US forces alone cannot meet”.
In this sense, empirical evidence supports the argument that the use of PMSCs increases the client’s
military effectiveness in conflict settings3. In fact, data show that weak states have deployed PMSCs
to enhance their military power, thus improving the capacity to counter armed opposition in their
territory and rendering direct foreign military interventions unnecessary (Petersohn 2015, pp. 21-
23). PMSC deployment in weak states, so this argument goes, leads to briefer conflicts.

In the worst case, these companies may become a hazard for the client state when they follow
practices that are wasteful and antithetical to the client’s interests, undermine global stability, hinder
transparency and accountability, and pay dubious attention to the values this state and the
1 “Private security companies. The case for regulation”, SIPRI policy paper, 9: 1-60. Quoted in Macías (2012).
2 For the sake of historical accuracy, we must acknowledge that the monopoly of the state over violence is the
exception in world history, rather than the rule, and that the private provision of military services has existed since
at least the year 2000 B.C.E. (Macías 2012, p. 227).
3 We define the term ‘military effectiveness’ as “the ability of the client’s forces to inflict damage upon the enemy
and expand military operations” (Petersohn 2015, p. 3).
international community hold dear (Avant and De Nevers 2011, p. 2). In the next paragraphs, we
will focus on the challenge of holding PMSCs accountable for their actions and omissions during
conflict and the impact this may have on the values and principles represented by military forces.

As Macías (2012, p. 221) points out, the lack of international legally binding 4 regulations on the
deployment of PMSCs in conflict settings limits our capacity to hold these companies and their
employees accountable for their actions. At the same time, the absence of negative incentives may
distort the behavior of contracted security personnel, which is a factor that matters a lot for the
success of military missions. In this regard, Avant and De Nevers (2011, p. 8) contend that
“commanders are less likely to notice or to punish offenses committed by contractors than offenses
committed by troops. Over time, a lack of punishment can be expected to lead to more lax behavior;
indeed, many have claimed that this outcome is the case in Iraq and Afghanistan”. This culture of
impunity, coupled with the fact that contractors usually operate outside the legal and command and
control framework of the military, creates fertile ground for the kind of questionable behavior that
may put an entire mission in jeopardy.

The hazards of impunity and lack of accountability were most evident after news broke on
September 16, 2007, that 17 innocent Iraqi civilians had been killed and 20 had been wounded by
employees of Blackwater Security Consulting, at the time a contractor offering security services to
officials of the US State Department. The shooting, which took place in Nisour Square, Baghdad,
outraged the population and strained ties between Baghdad and Washington 5. According to Avant
and De Nevers (2011, p. 6), both Iraqis and Americans “had consistently reported this type of
behavior long before” the so-called Nisour Square massacre made headlines worldwide. In fact,
Avant and De Nevers also point out that “some of the tactics developed to protect clients, such as
driving fast through intersections and rapid resort to force, alienated the local population in ways
that undermined the broader counterinsurgency strategy”.

In order to understand the profound implications of the privatization of security for the values and
principles represented by military forces, we should take into consideration the principal-agent
4 At the international level, there have been several efforts to establish regulations for PMSCs, codes of conduct for
personnel, and standards for the legal responsibilities of companies and individuals that try to address some of these
concerns. These initiatives include the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies, developed
by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and ratified
in 2008, and the International Code of Conduct for Private Seurity Service Providers, a set of principles for private
security providers created through a multistakeholdrer initiative led by the Swiss Directorate of Political Affairs.
5 See https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-usa/u-s-troops-in-iraq-will-need-immunity-u-s-chief-
idUSTRE7711PX20110802.
problem. In the context of the relation between PMSCs and state clients, the dilemma occurs when
the former are able to take actions on behalf of the latter in circumstances where they are motivated
to act in their own interests, which in turn are contrary to those of their principals. Although PMSCs
are far from being capable of challenging the state’s monopoly of the use of violence, today’s
military forces have become very dependent on PMSCs to carry on many of its traditional duties.
Therefore, given that PMSCs are fundamentally driven by the pursuit of short-term returns whereas
states follow longer-term strategic plans, we should always be aware of the potential conflicts of
interest between PMSCs and their clients. In this regard, Avant and De Nevers (2011, p. 6) contend
that both in Afghanistan and Iraq “private forces have tended to focus on the strict terms of their
contracts (protecting particular people or facilities) rather than on the overarching goals of the
United States (effectively countering the insurgency)”. This is a clear example of the principal-agent
problem.

PMSCs’ short-term agenda can inadvertently undermine the state clients’ effort to exercise force in
a way that is consistent with “principles drawn from theories of democracy (civilian control of the
military and abidance by the rule of law), liberalism (respect for human rights), and the laws of
war” (Avant and De Nevers 2011, p. 8). Concerns about lax industry background checking of
employees raise doubts as to the impact of contracting on the values represented by military forces.
PMSCs’ own immediate economic goals can lead them to take a particular action, such as shooting
a group of suspiciously-looking civilians, that thwarts the state clients’ effort to build up a long-term
soft power strategy6.

As we have seen, the use of PMSCs by states presents some risks. Even though these companies
may increase their client’s military effectiveness in conflict settings, the lack of international legally
binding regulations on the deployment of PMSCs and the absence of negative incentives can distort
the behavior of contracted security personnel, which is a factor that matters a lot for the success of
military missions. Any responsible state or international organization that plans to deploy a PMSC
on the ground should be aware of the uncomfortable trade-offs these companies pose.

6 This does not mean, of course, that the military is immune to bad decision-making. In the context of the War on
Terror, the Bush Administration’s determination to combat global terrorism without regard for international
institutions, laws, and norms ultimately fueled the jihadi insurgency in Iraq and damaged the credibility of US
forces around the world (Hallams 2011, pp. 7-8). The extent to which PMSCs contributed to this chain of bad
decision-making would be difficult to assess.
Víctor González Descarga
Universitat Ramon Llull – School of Communication and International Relations
Master’s degree in International Relations – Global Governance Module

Bibliography:

AVANT, D. and DE NEVERS, R. (2011), “Military contractors and the American way of life”,
Daedalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 140 (3): 1-12

HALLAMS, E. (2011), “From crusader to exemplar: Bush, Obama and the reinvigoration of
America’s soft power”, 6 (1): 1-24

MACÍAS, A. (2012), “The impact of PMSC on the role of today’s military”, Opera, 12: 221-238

PETERSOHN, U. (2015), “Private military and security companies (PMSCs), military

effectiveness, and conflict severity in weak states, 1990-2007”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61
(5): 1046-1072