Deignan A. Littlemore J. and Semino E. 2 PDF

1 Figurative language
1.1 The scope of this book

It is well known that ‘figurative language’ is often used in speaking
and writing to express ideas and emotions, and to affect the views
and attitudes of others. However, there is increasing evidence that the
use of figurative language varies depending on the nature of the com-
municative activity, or, more specifically, depending on factors such
as topic, audience, mode of communication, situational context, and
so on. In this book we propose a systematic approach to variation in
the use of figurative language, and particularly metaphor and meton-
ymy, in different ‘genres’ and ‘registers’, which we define in Chapter
2 (Swales, 1990; Martin and Rose, 2003, 2008). A central notion in
our approach is that texts are produced by and for members of differ-
ent ‘discourse communities’ – groups of people who ‘have texts and
practices in common’ (Barton, 2007: 75). We show that the forms and
functions of figurative language can differ significantly from genre to
genre and across registers. We argue that this both reflects and shapes
the discourse communities associated with different genres and,
more specifically, the goals, conventions, expertise and ideologies of
the members of the discourse communities that texts are produced
by or meant for. We investigate the use of figurative language across
a variety of genres and registers (both written and spoken), and con-
sider a range of instances of communication that involve crossing the
boundaries between different discourse communities.
We begin with two concrete examples that show how differences
in genre can explain, respectively, the contrast between metaphorical
and non-metaphorical uses of the same expression, and the contrast
between different metaphorical uses of the same expression. Our first
example concerns the term copy in the debate about cloning. This
term has been used both in scientific papers and in media reports,
but in different ways. As Nerlich et al. (2000: 232) point out, the
use of copy ‘may have an entirely value-free literal meaning’ when it
occurs, for instance in an article written for Scientific American by Ian
Wilmut, the embryologist in charge of the team that famously cloned
Dolly the Sheep. In that context, copy refers to the reproduction of
1
2 Figurative Language, Genre and Register
an organism’s genetic code in a laboratory, so that the two organisms

are genetically identical. Similarly, in an academic paper cloning is
defined as ‘the production of an identical or near-identical genetic
copy of an organism’ (Savulescu, 1999: 88). In contrast, in media
reports copy tends to be used evaluatively in order to describe a whole
(hypothetical) human being as nothing more than a reproduction of
another individual. This use can be described as potentially meta-
phorical, as it may suggest that the relationship between a clone and
the donor organism is similar to the relationship between inferior
reproductions and unique originals in the context of photocopying,
the visual arts and so on. As a consequence, the use of copy in the
media can contribute to the representation of potential human clones
as ‘instant duplicates of adult humans’ devoid of individual identity
(Nerlich et al., 2000: 231). This is the case, for example, in an article
in the UK newspaper The Daily Mail, commenting on the claim that
human cloning had been achieved by the members of a movement
known as the Raelians:
Natural twins are not deliberately produced to resemble each other.
A cloned child would always be a copy, deliberately produced to fulfil the
potential already demonstrated by another.
Two of the women who the cult claims are carrying clones are said to be
seeking copies of dead children.
(The Daily Mail, 30 December 2002)
Such differences in the use of the same expressions can have impor-
tant implications, for example for the ways in which research work is
perceived outside of the academic discourse community. Nerlich et al.
(2000: 30) suggest that, by using the term copy in Scientific American,
Wilmut had ‘fallen into a semantic trap’, as the general metaphorical
associations of the word undermined his attempt to persuade the gen-
eral public of the therapeutic potential of cloning techniques.
Our second example involves a metaphor that was originally used
in a highly influential paper published in the journal Science in 1965,
and then adapted to serve a different purpose in books meant for a
general audience. In the paper published in Science, Roger Melzack
and Patrick Wall introduced a ‘new theory’ of pain mechanisms, in
order to explain why the sensation of pain is not always straight-
forwardly associated with damage to the body: it can occur in the
absence of any such damage (e.g. phantom limb pain), or fail to occur
in spite of considerable damage (e.g. reports on the part of wounded
soldiers that they felt no pain while on the battlefield). Melzack and
Figurative language 3
Wall argued that a particular area of the spinal cord, the substantia
gelatinosa:
… acts as a gate control system that modulates the synaptic transmission
of nerve impulses from peripheral fibers to central cells.
(Melzack and Wall, 1965: 975)
Melzack and Wall called their theory the ‘gate control theory of pain’
and used expressions such as gate and open / close as metaphorical
technical terms throughout their paper in order to capture specific pro-
cesses within the nervous system that account for when and to what
extent pain sensations are experienced, as in the extracts below:
Thus, if a gentle pressure stimulus is applied suddenly to the skin, the
afferent volley contains large-fiber impulses which not only fire the T cells
but also partially close the presynaptic gate, thereby shortening the bar-
rage generated by the T cells.
The small fibers show considerable spontaneous activity, which would

have the effect of keeping the gate open.
Since the publication of Melzack and Wall’s original paper, the ‘gate’
metaphor has been repeatedly adapted and developed in a range of
different texts aimed at different audiences. For example, in a self-
help book for chronic pain sufferers (Cole et al., 2005), readers are
told that:
In chronic pain there are no treatments that can shut the gate and keep it
closed all the time. However, there are ways to close the gate as much as
possible so that fewer pain messages pass through the pain system. […]
You can use the skills described in Part II of this book to gain some control
over how much the gate is open or closed. […]
What closes the gate and stops pain? Circle those things or activities that
you know affect your own gate and add more if you can […].
(Cole et al., 2005: 41; italics in original)
Here the ‘gate’ metaphor is realized more flexibly and by a wider

range of expressions than in the case of Melzack and Wall’s paper
(e.g. the use of shut in shut the gate). In addition, the metaphor is
used to describe the effects of an individual’s everyday activities,
rather than to explain the details of chemical processes invisible to
the naked eye: in Melzack and Wall’s paper, the gate is opened or
closed by changes or states within the nervous system (e.g. activity/

ies in the nervous system and brain, any lesion that …, any central
nervous system condition that …); in Cole et al.’s book, the gate is
described as an individual characteristic of each sufferer (your own
gate), and may be opened or closed by ordinary experiences that are
partly under the person’s control (e.g. going for a walk or getting
stressed). These differences in the use of the metaphor reflect differ-
ences in genre, audience and function: in Melzack and Wall’s paper,
the metaphor is employed as part of a scientific account of when and
how pain is experienced; in Cole et al.’s book, the function of the
metaphor is to suggest that pain is not inevitable and to empower
readers to take control of their own pain. This kind of adaptation
of technical metaphors can potentially benefit the readers of books
such as Cole et al.’s, but also, perhaps inevitably, involves simplifica-
tion and some degree of imprecision (a more detailed discussion is
provided in Semino, 2011).
In order to account for the specific ways in which words are (or
are not) used metaphorically in our two examples, it is useful to con-
sider the discourse communities to which writers and readers belong,
and the goals associated with the genre under which a text can be
subsumed. Our examples also show, however, that the boundaries
between discourse communities and genres are not watertight. On
the one hand, a particular metaphor can be adopted and adapted
within a different genre from that in which it was originally intro-
duced: this is the case with the ‘gate’ metaphor for pain. On the other
hand, a non-metaphorical use of an expression can be (mis)inter-
preted as metaphorical by readers or listeners who do not belong to
the same discourse community as the writer or speaker: this applies
to Wilmut’s use of copy in Scientific American, as Nerlich et al.
(2000) suggest.
Even when a particular expression is used in broadly similar ways
within and outside a particular discourse community, the nuanced
figurative meaning that it has within the community may not always
be accessible to ‘outsiders’. For example, the metaphorical use of
transmission to describe an approach to teaching is probably readily
comprehensible to all users of English. However, the following cita-
tions of its use within the discourse community of foreign language
teachers suggest that it has highly negative connotations that may not
be fully accessible outside the discourse community:
Focus in recent times on realistic pedagogy means that we can no longer

depend on a transmission model of training.
(Pani, 2001: 355)
[…] current pedagogical thinking seems to be shifting away from the

traditional behavioristic model of teaching as transmission of knowledge.
(Kohonen, 1992: 30)
The members of the discourse community of foreign language teach-

ers share a great deal of knowledge about the aspects of the ‘transmis-
sion’ metaphor that account for its rejection in these quotations, such
as the fact that viewing teaching as transmission positions learners in
a passive role. Readers who do not belong to this professional dis-
course community may not, however, fully appreciate what exactly is
negatively described as a transmission model of teaching and why.
Similarly, Caballero and Suarez-Toste (2010) discuss a range of
examples of figurative language used in wine-tasting notes that are
unlikely to be comprehensible in all their nuances to someone who
is not a member of the discourse community of writers and readers
of this very specialized genre. For example, most speakers of English
would have some understanding of what is meant by describing a
wine as young or mature. However, non-members of the discourse
community might be less sure exactly what is connoted by these terms
in the context of the description of a particular wine: whether they
are neutrally descriptive or evaluative, and if so, whether positive or
negative.
Examples such as these show the importance of shared group
knowledge in interpreting figurative language, something that is
sometimes neglected by mainstream theories of metaphor interpre-
tation. The aim of this book is to explore the use of figurative lan-
guage in relation to a variety of discourse communities, to identify the
main patterns of variation, and to explain them within a systematic
approach to genre and register.
1.2 This book in the context of current research on

figurative language
Recent research into figurative language, and in particular metaphor
and metonymy, has, in very general terms, followed two main
strands.
The first strand includes broadly cognitive approaches, which are con-
cerned with the mental structures and processes involved in the produc-
tion and interpretation of metaphor and, to a lesser extent, metonymy
(e.g. Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Sperber and Wilson, 1995; Glucks-
berg, 2001). The dominant paradigm within cognitive approaches is
Conceptual Metaphor Theory, hereafter CMT (e.g. Lakoff and John-
son, 1980, 1999; Grady, 1997; Kövecses, 2002, 2010). Within CMT,
metaphor and metonymy are seen primarily as cognitive tools that play
a central role in human conceptual systems. As Kövecses observes in
relation to metaphor,
metaphor in the cognitive linguistic view means primarily conceptual

metaphor, as opposed to linguistic metaphor.
(Kövecses, 2010: 33)
More specifically, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) pointed out the pres-
ence of pervasive patterns of conventional linguistic metaphors in
English and other languages, as in the case of the following ways
of describing arguments: Your claims are indefensible, He attacked
every weak point in my argument, His criticisms were right on target
(Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 4). Lakoff and Johnson interpret these
linguistic patterns as evidence of conventional patterns of meta-
phorical thought, known as ‘conceptual metaphors’. For example,
the linguistic expressions we have just quoted are seen as linguistic
realizations of the conceptual metaphor argument is war (Lakoff
and Johnson, 1980: 3–6). A conceptual metaphor consists of system-
atic correspondences, or mappings, between a source domain (e.g.
war) and a target domain (e.g. argument), such as the correspon-
dences between two people arguing and opposing armies, criticizing
an idea and military attack, and so on. Typically, source domains
are more concrete, embodied, simple, accessible and clearly delin-
eated than target domains, which tend to be relatively more abstract,
subjective, complex, inaccessible and poorly delineated. The choice
of source domain highlights some aspects of the target domain and
backgrounds others. For example, the war source domain highlights
the competitive aspects of arguments and backgrounds their poten-
tial collaborative aspects.
Whereas metaphor is defined in CMT in terms of mappings across
domains, metonymy is described as involving mappings within
domains (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 35–40; Barcelona, 2002;
Kövecses, 2002: 143–62; Croft and Cruse, 2004: 216–20). For example,
the use of the expression the White House to refer to the US presi-
dent and/or the members of the US administration is described as
involving a mapping between different elements of the domain that
may be called us government, namely, between the location of the
president’s residence and office on the one hand, and the members of
the administration, including the president, on the other (Barcelona,
2002). This use of metonymy can be seen as an example of a more
general pattern that is captured via the ‘conceptual metonymy’ the
place for the institution (e.g. Kövecses, 2002: 144).
Overall, within the cognitive strand in research on metaphor and

metonymy, the study of language is a means to an end: linguistic meta-
phors and metonymies do not constitute the main object of study,
but are seen as evidence of mappings at the conceptual level, or are
constructed by researchers in order to be used as stimuli in controlled
laboratory experiments. As a consequence, claims about metaphor
and metonymy as conceptual tools have tended to be illustrated with
citations from unspecified sources, largely dissociated from their lin-
guistic co-text and non-linguistic context. For instance, in an explo-
ration of the different understandings of the term ‘dead metaphor’,
Lakoff’s examples include He still can’t grasp the basic ideas of quan-
tum mechanics and I caught all the subtleties of the argument (Lakoff,
1987: 145). Lakoff does not give the sources of the examples, which
themselves offer few, if any, clues as to their context. Similarly, the
examples of metaphor that are invented for the purposes of psycho-
linguistic experiments tend to be generic, decontextualized sentences
or short texts. As Steen puts it, this does not take into account that
‘all language use is genre-regulated’, and that ‘[p]eople use language
on particular occasions in specific roles, for particular goals, about
particular topics, in particular settings, and against the background
of specific norms and expectations’ (Steen, 2007: 352–3).
The second, related and rapidly developing, strand of research on
figurative language has focused particularly on metaphor, and attempts
to describe patterns of linguistic (and non-linguistic) metaphor in use in
order to arrive at adequate explanatory models. Researchers in this area
have explored the ways in which figurative language is used in authen-
tic communicative situations, such as education, politics or business,
in order to perform different functions, such as explaining, persuad-
ing, entertaining, evaluating or supporting particular ideologies (e.g.
Cameron, 2003; Koller, 2004; Musolff, 2004; Charteris-Black, 2005;
Littlemore and Low, 2006; Semino, 2008). In this second tradition,
which proponents sometimes call ‘real world metaphor research’ (e.g.
Low et al., 2010), models such as CMT are a possible means, not the
end, and language is the main object of study, with all the complexities
and indeterminacies of naturally occurring data in context. The work
in this book positions itself in this second tradition, and, specifically,
examines the impact of contextual factors on figurative language use.
While this second strand of research is primarily concerned with
the description of figurative language in context, it has produced find-
ings that need to be taken into serious consideration when theoriz-
ing about figurative language in more general terms. For example,
research by Cameron (2003) has shown that metaphor in spoken
educational discourse is most often manifested in verbal rather than
nominal form – a fact which raises doubts about the adequacy of the
theories of metaphor comprehension that are primarily based on ‘A
is B’ metaphorical statements (e.g. Glucksberg, 2001). Other research
has shown that it is not always easy to differentiate between meta-
phor and metonymy in authentic discourse (Moon, 1998; Deignan,
2005) and that explanations of metaphor use that are based on the
notion of broad conceptual ‘domains’ may not be equally appropri-
ate to all situations (Semino, 2008). Most importantly, research in
the area of discourse analysis is starting to show that a ‘one size fits
all’ approach to figurative language may not be appropriate. Rather,
when analysing the forms and functions of figurative language, it is
important to take account of the discourse community, genre and
register in which it is used (e.g. Caballero, 2003, 2006).
Both of the strands of research on figurative language we have
identified are based on the notion that metaphor, in particular, ‘mat-
ters’ because it is pervasive in language (and, it is increasingly being
claimed, in non-verbal communication, e.g. Cienki and Müller, 2008).
However, classic works in CMT in particular tend to treat language
as an undifferentiated whole, and do not provide any specific detail
on what ‘pervasiveness’ means in terms of the actual frequency of
metaphor use in language and communication. This can be seen as a
consequence of the emphasis on metaphorical thought, which may or
may not necessarily have an observable manifestation in language, or
communicative behaviour more generally.
In contrast, the second ‘discoursal’ or ‘real-world’ strand in research
on figurative language tends to focus on the use of metaphor, and, to
a lesser extent, metonymy in specific datasets, and to make claims
about the particular characteristics of figurative uses in those datasets,
including factors such as the frequency of figurative expressions. Some
important findings have started to emerge from this kind of work on
the nature of actual metaphor use. The use of metaphorical expres-
sions does seem to be pervasive, but not perhaps to the extent that is
suggested by general claims concerning the ‘ubiquity’ of metaphor in
language and thought (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Gibbs, 1994).
The findings of different projects relying on slightly different iden-
tification methods suggest that, on average, the frequency of meta-
phorical expressions may range between 3 and 18 occurrences per
100 words (e.g. Cameron, 2003; Cameron and Stelma, 2004; Steen
et al., 2010). However, linguistic metaphors do not tend to be evenly
spread across texts, but often cluster at particular points, where the
density of metaphor use is much higher than average (Cameron and
Stelma, 2004). Metaphor clusters have been found to occur, for example,
in places where the content of the message is particularly difficult
or face threatening. In Chapter 5, we analyse metaphor clusters in

talk. In addition, there is increasing evidence that the frequency, form
and function of metaphor use vary depending, broadly speaking, on
the context of communication, and particularly on genre and register
(e.g. Steen et al., 2010).
Cameron (1999a) has suggested that the use of metaphor may
exhibit ‘systematicity’ at three different levels:
(a) ‘local systematicity of metaphors within a particular discourse event’
(e.g. a specific, one-off metaphor that is used systematically throughout a
poem);
(b) ‘discourse systematicity of metaphors within use in specific discourse
communities’ (e.g. metaphors used in scientific articles concerned with a
particular topic); and
(c) ‘global systematicity of metaphors across a range of discourse types
and content’ (e.g. the general metaphorical tendency to talk about time in
terms of movement in space, as in the passing of time or the holidays are
approaching).
(Cameron, 1999a: 129; emphasis in original)
More recently, Cameron (2010a and 2010b) has proposed the notion
of ‘systematic metaphor’ in order to capture the use of semantically
related linguistic metaphors in relation to the same topic within a par-
ticular discourse event. For example, Cameron et al. (2010: 130–31)
note a tendency within a focus group discussion to describe violent
conflict as a game with rules, and terrorists as breaking the rules.
These patterns are captured by the systematic metaphors VIOLENT
CONFLICT IS A GAME WITH RULES and TERRORISTS BREAK THE RULES. Sys-
tematic metaphors are formulated in ways that resemble the concep-
tual metaphors of CMT, but they should not be seen as equivalent.
Conceptual metaphors are intended to capture relatively permanent
cross-domain mappings within the conceptual system of the speakers
of a language. In contrast, systematic metaphors are generalizations
on the language used by participants ‘talking-and-thinking’ in a par-
ticular communicative context (Cameron et al., 2010).
In this book we are particularly concerned with what Cameron
calls ‘discourse systematicity’, which has been identified as an impor-
tant level at which to study patterns and variation in the use of meta-
phor and figurative language more generally:
Any discourse community will have words and phrases, not only meta-
phorical but also technical, that emerge over various timescales as specific
in form, use and meaning.
(Cameron, 2010b: 88)
People who share a discourse world – such as prisoners, football fans,

engineers, parents, are likely to have a shared language in which expres-
sions that seem metaphorical to outsiders have become conventionalized.
(Cameron and Maslen, 2010: 112)
Cameron (2010a: 6) mentions Cooper’s (1986: 165) observation

that the jargon associated with prison inmates includes metaphorical
expressions specific to that group, such as screws for prison wardens.
Some of the other examples mentioned by Cooper are actually best
seen as instances of context-specific metonymy. For example, the term
porridge is sometimes used to refer to prison. This relies on an associ-
ation between prison and the food traditionally fed to prison inmates
in Britain (Carter, 1998: 55).
In a large-scale quantitative study, Steen et al. (2010) identified
‘metaphor-related words’ in four sections of the BNC Baby (a subcorpus
of the British National Corpus) that they refer to as representing different
‘registers’: fiction, news, academic writing and conversation. This study
is the most extensive to date of those that fall within the second, linguisti-
cally focused strand of research into figurative language, and raises some
important questions about variation in metaphor use. We will return to
Steen et al.’s work later in this chapter and throughout the book.
To conclude this section, we should acknowledge that our distinc-
tion between the two main strands in research on figurative language
is inevitably a generalization, and does not therefore apply in a clear-
cut fashion to studies that contribute to both strands. Some studies
within CMT are in fact based on patterns observed in actual lan-
guage use (e.g. Kövecses, 2000), and recognize the presence of varia-
tion in metaphor use within languages and cultures, as well as across
languages and cultures (e.g. Kövecses, 2005). Conversely, linguists
working with large electronic corpora have investigated metaphorical
and metonymic expressions in large language corpora in order to test
the validity of existing claims about conceptual metaphors, and to
place such claims on a firmer empirical footing (e.g. Deignan, 2005;
Semino, 2005; Stefanowitsch and Gries, 2006).
1.3 Our approach to figurative language

The term ‘figurative language’ is rather problematic, as it does not
capture a homogeneous and clearly defined subset of uses of lan-
guage, or of ways of processing language. In this book, we use it
as the most appropriate general term for the specific phenomena
we are concerned with, namely: metaphor (including metaphorical
expressions, similes, analogies, etc.) and metonymy. A range of other
phenomena have been included under the label ‘figurative language’,

such as irony, hyperbole and euphemism. However, metaphor and
metonymy have been described as ‘two of the major figurative modes
by which people conceptualize their experience’ (Gibbs, 1994: 13),
and the ‘major types of figurative usage’ (Croft and Cruse, 2004: 183;
see also Jakobson, 1956). We will therefore only consider phenomena
such as hyperbole and euphemism when they interact with metaphor
and metonymy in our data.
In this section we outline our approach to identifying linguistic meta-
phors and metonymies by briefly discussing two extracts from data
that will be analysed in later chapters. This approach builds on recent
work on metaphor identification in language in particular (Pragglejaz
Group1, 2007; Cameron and Maslen, 2010; Steen et al., 2010).
The extract below is taken from a conversation between two aca-
demics in the Department of International Development at Birming-
ham University, UK (Chapter 5 provides a detailed discussion of this
conversation). One of the academics is introducing a colleague to dif-
ferent approaches to the structure and management of organizations.
At this particular point, she is talking about the advantages and dis-
advantages of an approach to managing organizations that focuses
on explicit internal structures and processes:
I mean it’s almost like the left ha… the left hand of the piano isn’t it?
keeping the beat going but it can become a bit sterile
The use of underlining in the extract demonstrates the conventions

that we will use in the rest of the book: we have used continuous
underlining for what we regard as a metaphorically used word (ster-
ile), and dashed underlining for the open-class words included in a
simile (like the left ha… the left hand of the piano …).2 Both stretches
of text involve what may be described as a potential ‘incongruity’ or
‘clash’ between the ‘contextual’ meanings of the underlined expres-
sions (or, more generally, the topic of the utterance), and the ‘basic’
meanings of these expressions. In the case of sterile, what we regard
as the basic meaning is a property of land that does not produce
crops, or of animals that do not produce offspring.3 In the case of
the underlined words included in the simile, the basic meanings are
to do with music, playing the piano, and the parts of the body most
involved in this process. Basic meanings, in other words, are the most
concrete and embodied meanings of words, and tend to be (though
are not always) historically older than conventional metaphorical
meanings of words (Pragglejaz Group, 2007). In the extract above,
these meanings are arguably alien to the topic of organizations, but
are being exploited to explain some characteristics of a particular
type of organization. More precisely, the use of the adjective sterile

involves talking about a potential disadvantage of certain types of
organizations in terms of the barrenness of animals or land. On the
basis of the preceding stretch of the conversation, this disadvantage
can be expressed as a lack of creativity and dynamism, which may
result in a lack of effectiveness, particularly in terms of earning money
for the organization. In contrast, the simile expresses an advantage of
the same type of organization in terms of the beat-keeping role of the
notes played on the piano by the player’s left hand. This advantage
can be identified as day-to-day reliability and predictability of activi-
ties within the organization.4
Both expressions involve talking about something (some aspects of
organizations) in terms of something else that is quite different (steril-
ity and piano playing) on the basis of a comparison or a perception of
similarity between the two different things, i.e. a similarity between
the function of left-hand notes on the piano and of clear, reliable
internal procedures in organizations; and a similarity between infer-
tile animals or land and the inability of members of organizations to
operate creatively and effectively, for example by making money for
the organization.
In our analyses of figurative language, we focus primarily on
nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs and prepositions. We do not, by
and large, attempt to establish contrasts between basic and contex-
tual meanings for other word classes.5 This explains why we have
only underlined some of the words that are part of the simile in the
extract above. When we count figurative expressions in our data,
we similarly limit ourselves to nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs
and prepositions. Our approach is therefore broadly similar to the
identification method described in Steen et al. (2010), which is a
development of Pragglejaz Group (2007). The most substantial dif-
ferences between the two approaches are that (a) we do not include
in our analyses what Steen et al. call ‘implicit metaphors’, such as
a pronoun referring back to a metaphorically used word, and (b)
we cross the boundaries between parts of speech within lemmas in
looking for relevant basic meanings of expressions. For instance,
in deciding on the metaphoricity of the verb squirrel in expressions
such as She squirreled away at the nicotine-laden gum – from the
British National Corpus – we consider the animal meaning of the
noun squirrel to be the basic meaning. Steen et al. would not do
so because of the difference in part of speech between the verb to
squirrel and the noun squirrel: the noun still refers to the animal as
its basic meaning, while the verb does not have a basic meaning that
relates to the animal’s behaviour.
Different approaches to metaphor describe the essence of metaphoric-

ity in different ways. Cameron (1999b, 2010a, 2010b), for example,
adopts as her starting point Burke’s (1945) definition of metaphor
as a ‘device for seeing something in terms of something else’ (Burke,
1945, quoted by Cameron, 2010a: 3). More generally, Cameron
views metaphor as a resource that people use while ‘talking-and-
thinking’ in specific communicative settings (Cameron, 2010b: 88).
In her terms, the contrast between the basic meanings of metaphori-
cal expressions and the current topic is resolved through a ‘transfer of
meaning in context’ (Cameron and Maslen, 2010: 102). In the terms
used within CMT, the basic meanings of the underlined expressions
belong to source conceptual domains (e.g. sterile people / land
and piano playing) that are different from the target conceptual
domain corresponding to the current topic (organizations). From
this perspective, the underlined expressions above are linguistic realiza-
tions of cross-domain mappings in conceptual structure, such as
between the inability to conceive offspring and the inability to work
effectively, or the regular beat kept by the left hand of a piano player
and the reliability of activities within an organization. Although this
approach to metaphor is sometimes set in opposition to approaches
involving similarity or comparison, CMT does include the notion of
‘constructed’ or ‘perceived’ similarity in its definition of metaphor
(Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 147–58; Kövecses, 2002: 67–77).
The difference between what we have called metaphorical expres-
sions and similes is a topic of debate (e.g. Glucksberg, 2008). For the
purposes of identification, the difference can be expressed as follows
(Pragglejaz Group, 2007; Steen et al., 2010). In the case of sterile, the
meaning of the adjective in context contrasts with the basic meaning
but can be understood by establishing a comparison, or perceiving a
similarity, with the basic meaning. In contrast, the words that make
up the simile are used in their basic meanings6, but the explicit state-
ment of similarity made by means of like suggests that the scenario
evoked by the basic meanings is intended as a description of some
aspect of the topic, or target domain. A further difference that applies
to our specific example is to do with the degree of conventionaliza-
tion of different metaphorical uses of language. We will return to this
notion below. Later in this chapter, and in Chapter 5, we will broaden
our scope to take into account non-verbal expressions of metaphor-
icity in the lecturer’s conversation with her colleague.
Our next example is taken from a conversation among staff in a
nursery in the UK (a detailed discussion is provided in Chapter 6).
One member of staff is going through preparations for the children’s
lunch when she says:
and who else has Lisa got, she’s got Ellie and she’s got urm Jack and one
meat bowl 7
Here, and in the rest of the book, dotted underlining indicates that
the relevant expression is an example of metonymy. In the example,
meat bowl is used to refer to a child who will be having dishes that
include meat, as opposed to vegetarian children who are given a veg
bowl. The basic meaning of meat bowl is the physical container of
meat-based food; the contextual meaning is the child who will be
given meat-based food for lunch. The contextual meaning is under-
stood via a relationship of ‘contiguity’ (as opposed to comparison)
with the basic meaning, namely, the association between each child
and the type of food they are offered for lunch. In terms of CMT,
this particular example of metonymy can be described as involving
a mapping between two elements of what we may call the domain
of mealtimes in the nursery, namely, between the types of food on
offer and the children who eat different types of food. Importantly for
our purposes, the use of metonymy relies on background knowledge
that can be context-specific. The extract above, for example, assumes
knowledge of the two lunch options in the nursery, and of the fact
that the most relevant characteristic of the children during lunchtime
preparations is which of the two lunch options they should receive. A
similar use of metonymy is mentioned by Nerlich et al. (1999), who
reported on a child’s use of the expression I like being a sandwich to
mean that he liked being one of the children who took sandwiches
into school for lunch, instead of eating food from the school can-
teen. This kind of metonymy has received a considerable amount of
attention in the CMT literature and has been seen as evidence of the
conceptual metonymy consumed goods for customer (e.g. Bar-
celona, 2000; expressions, such as The ham sandwich is waiting for
his check, have been discussed by Nunberg, 1979; Lakoff and John-
son, 1980: 35; and Ruiz de Mendoza, 2000). For our purposes, these
uses of metonymy are relevant as they tend to be linked to communi-
cation among members of particular discourse communities in work-
place settings, such as canteens and restaurants. Similarly, in a dental
surgery attended by one of the authors, the receptionist routinely uses
the expression There’s a toothache waiting to see you when talking to
the dentist. Here toothache is used metonymically to refer to a patient
who has come to the surgery without an appointment because of an
acute dental problem, as opposed to patients who are on the day’s
appointments list (Deignan, 2005: 58).
In the terms used by Steen et al. (2010), the phenomena we are con-
cerned with can be described as forming a fairly coherent set, because
they involve ‘indirectness in conceptualization’ – a semantic contrast

that can be bridged either in terms of contiguity (metonymy) or in
terms of a cross-domain mapping based on comparison or perceived
similarity (metaphorical expressions, similes, etc.). As for the latter
case, Steen et al. (2010: 11) further distinguish between two different
modes of linguistic realizations of cross-domain mappings:
(a) language that is used ‘indirectly’, i.e. metaphorical expressions
involving a contrast between basic and contextual meanings, such as
sterile above; and
(b) language that is used ‘directly’, i.e. with no contrast between
basic and contextual meanings, as in the case of similes, analogies, as
well as ‘explicit invitations of comparison’, such as Shall I compare
thee to a summer’s day?, in Shakespeare’s Sonnet 18.
Steen et al. use the label ‘metaphor-related words’ to refer to both
direct and indirect linguistic expressions of cross-domain mappings.
More generally, labels such as ‘linguistic metaphor’ or ‘metaphor
vehicle’ tend to be used to capture different types of linguistic realiza-
tions of cross-domain mappings (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980), or
different ways in which language may reflect the process of ‘seeing
something in terms of something else’ (Burke, 1945; quoted in Cam-
eron, 2010a: 3). In the course of this book, we will distinguish between
metaphorical expressions, similes and so on whenever appropriate.
However, we will also use the general terms ‘linguistic metaphor’ or
‘metaphor in language’ in order to refer generally to linguistic expres-
sions that involve the form of incongruity that can be resolved by
means of a comparison based on a perceived similarity between two
unlike entities, properties or processes.
There are a number of further reasons for including both metaphor
and metonymy within the scope of this book. As we have suggested,
metaphor and metonymy can be clearly defined and exemplified
as separate phenomena. However, they interact in important ways
(Goossens, 1995; Barcelona, 2002; Croft and Cruse, 2004: 217–21;
Deignan, 2005: 53–71; Steen, 2007: 57–72). Some uses of metaphor
have their basis in metonymy. For example, in Chapter 9 we suggest
that burning is used metaphorically in the expression burning pain
when it describes the pain associated with problems in the nervous
system, as, for example, in the case of sciatica. However, this meta-
phorical description is based on a metonymic association between
physical damage, and specifically damage caused by fire, and the sen-
sation of pain (e.g. the burning pain caused by contact with a flame).
In addition, metaphorical and metonymic expressions can interact
by occurring in close proximity to one another, as part of a single
description of a particular situation. In Act 5 of Shakespeare’s Romeo
and Juliet, for example, which is discussed in Chapter 8, Romeo utters

the line, My bosom’s lord sits lightly in his throne, while in exile in
Mantua. This line can be interpreted as a reference to Romeo feeling
happy, in spite of his banishment (Levenson, 2000: 330). Within this
interpretation, bosom does not simply refer to a part of the body,
but stands metonymically for the emotions that are associated with
it; and lord is used metaphorically to personify Romeo’s heart. This
metaphor is developed in the rest of the line by the description of the
lord sit[ting] lightly in his throne. Here the metonymic interpretation
of bosom and the metaphorical interpretation of lord sits lightly in
his throne depend on one another for an understanding of the line as
a whole.
Having outlined our approach to figurative language, we now dis-
cuss the notions of ‘conventionality’ versus ‘creativity / novelty’ and
of ‘deliberateness’ versus ‘non-deliberateness’ in relation to the use of
metaphor and metonymy.
1.3.1 Conventionality and novelty

In the previous sections we pointed out that different uses of figurative
language generally, and of metaphorical expressions in particular, can
vary in terms of how conventional or novel they can be described to
be. The distinction between conventional and novel or creative meta-
phors is both important and problematic, and has been approached
in a number of different ways (e.g. Lakoff and Turner, 1989; Mül-
ler, 2008; Goatly, 2011). In this book, we treat conventionality and
novelty in the use of figurative language as a matter of degree, and
we approach this issue by taking into account several interacting per-
spectives, including:
• the uses of individual words or multi-word expressions;
• patterns of figurative language use in the relevant text or discourse event;
• patterns of figurative language use in relevant texts produced by the
discourse community of which the speaker / writer is part; and
• general patterns of figurative language use in the relevant language,
which may reflect conventional conceptual metaphors or metonymies
(Semino, 2011)
Here we exemplify our approach to conventionality and novelty in
the use of metaphor with reference to different metaphorical descrip-
tions of the experience of having cancer. Example (1) opposite is a
headline that appeared in the UK newspaper The Guardian after the
death of Alex Higgins, a former snooker world champion:
(1) Alex Higgins dies after long battle with cancer

(The Guardian, 24 July 2010)
The basic meaning of battle is to do with military confrontation

between opposing armies. Here, however, the noun is used meta-
phorically to refer to the difficult experience of being ill with cancer
and of trying to recover from, or live with, the disease. This meta-
phorical use of the noun can be described as conventional, as battle
is frequently used in relation to a variety of non-military situations,
and specifically to the experiences of cancer sufferers. The Macmillan
English Dictionary for Advanced Learners, for example, lists as one
of the meanings of battle that of ‘a situation in which someone is try-
ing very hard to deal with a difficult situation’, and includes the fol-
lowing as one of the examples illustrating this meaning: She has lost
her battle against breast cancer. Moreover, the whole prepositional
phrase after a long battle with cancer is so frequently used in formal
death announcements, news reports and obituaries as to have become
something of a cliché (Semino, 2008: 178). More generally, this use
of battle can be seen as part of a wider metaphorical tendency to
describe difficult enterprises, including illness and cancer, in terms of
physical or military fights (e.g. Reisfield and Wilson, 2004). This gen-
eral tendency involves a number of related expressions, such as war,
fight, struggle, attack and so on, and has been seen as evidence of a
conventional conceptual metaphor in English that has been formu-
lated as life is war (Kövecses, 2005: 84). In other words, Example (1)
includes a conventional metaphorical use of a particular expression
which is part of a conventional pattern of metaphor use in the specific
genre of news reporting, the discourse relating to cancer and illness,
and the description of difficult experiences in English generally.
Let us now consider two further examples in which cancer is talked
about in terms of military metaphors. Example (2) is the title of a self-
help book for cancer sufferers, while Example (3) is an extract from a let-
ter written by a war historian while recovering from cancer treatment:
(2) A cancer battle plan: six strategies for beating cancer from a recovered
“hopeless case”
(Frähm and Frähm, 1997)
(3) [t]he attack was successful, although I am expecting a counterattack

any moment from all sides, if any more of those nodes are malignant. Not-
withstanding, I have surrounded myself by barbed wire, land mines, and
several squads of infantry, and we are ready to take on all comers.
(quoted by Reisfield and Wilson, 2004: 4025)
Example (2) contains two clear instances of expressions that meta-

phorically describe the activities of cancer sufferers in terms of physi-
cal struggle and aggression (battle and beating). In addition, strategies
can also be seen as a military metaphor, as, arguably, the most basic
meaning of strategy is related to war. The metaphorical use of all
three expressions in (2) can be described as conventional, but their
occurrence in close proximity to one another creates a local pattern
that is traditionally described as an ‘extended’ metaphor, and that can
be regarded as involving some degree of creativity.
In Example (3) several expressions associated with war are used
metaphorically to describe cancer treatment (attack, land mines,
squads of infantry, etc.) and the possibility of the cancer starting to
grow again (counterattack). The use of these expressions is consis-
tent with the general patterns we have mentioned above, and may
therefore be seen from a CMT perspective as realizing the same con-
ventional conceptual metaphor as battle in Examples (1) and (2).
However, with the exception of attack, the metaphorical expres-
sions we have underlined in Example (3) do not have conventional
metaphorical uses to do with difficult enterprises or cancer. In other
words, the extract involves creativity both in the choice of individual
metaphorical expressions and in the creation of an extended meta-
phor that evokes a very specific metaphorical scenario of preparation
for battle.
The most radical instances of novelty in metaphor use occur when
a particular instance of metaphor cannot be straightforwardly related
to broader metaphorical patterns in a particular genre or register, or in
a language more generally. In the terms used within CMT, this would
involve a novel pairing of source and target domains. Several striking
examples of such novel metaphors in relation to cancer have been
reported as part of a project that was carried out at St James’s Uni-
versity Hospital in Leeds, in the North of England (Saul, 2008). The
project involved a group of 27 teenagers and young adults suffering
from cancer. Its title, ‘What colour is my cancer?’, was inspired by the
question asked by a young patient after an operation for the removal
of a tumour. Participants were invited to view via a microscope slides
containing samples from their own cancers. It was found that ‘young
people who previously referred to their cancer as an “alien” now com-
pare it to “beautiful planets” or “a plate of jelly beans”’ (www.leedsth.
nhs.uk/news/newsitem.php?newsID=265; accessed January 2010).
The tendency to describe cancer metaphorically as a threatening
alien has been noted elsewhere (Skott, 2002), and is consistent with
the metaphors of physical struggle and war that we have already
described as generally conventional. While such metaphors may be
appropriate and motivating for some individuals (Reisfield and Wil-

son, 2004), they are often seen as having potentially negative effects,
both for patients’ morale and self-image and for public perceptions
of the disease: within ‘war’ metaphors, for example, cancer is usu-
ally the enemy, the patient may be constructed as the battlefield, and
not getting better may be described as being defeated (e.g. Sontag,
1979; Semino, 2008: 175-8). The descriptions of their own can-
cers attributed to the young people who took part in the project at
St James’s Hospital involve very different metaphors. First, the cancer
is described in terms of its visual appearance through the microscope,
rather than in terms of its relationship with the patients and effects
on them. This tends to involve what Lakoff and Turner (1989) call
‘image metaphors’. Second, the entities evoked by descriptions such
as beautiful planets or a plate of jelly beans are harmless and pleasant
objects from areas of experience that are not normally exploited in
talk about cancer or disease. In other words, these are radically cre-
ative metaphors that can afford a different, less threatening view of
the disease than is the case with more conventional descriptions. The
experience of viewing the cancer cells and describing their appear-
ance was shown to affect positively the way in which participants felt
about the disease. A larger study is currently exploring the long-term
effects of such a change in perspective (Saul, 2008).
As we have already noted, conventionality and novelty in the use
of figurative language can often only be appropriately described in
relation to the members of particular discourse communities. For
example, as we will see in Chapter 6, staff working in a nursery in the
UK use the expression loose nappy as a euphemism for a child hav-
ing diarrhoea. Within this expression, nappy can be taken as a met-
onymic reference to stool, and ‘loose’ as a metaphorical description
of liquid stool, or of the gut that produces it (as in the more widely
used expression loose bowel). This use of the phrase is quite different
from the more literal interpretation that someone not working in that
particular community might arrive at. Conversely, for the members of
the relevant discourse community, the use of this expression is entirely
conventional, and unlikely to be perceived to be figurative at all.
For the purposes of studies such as ours, the metaphoric and/or
metonymic ‘potential’ of linguistic expressions needs to be recog-
nized even when those particular figurative uses are highly conven-
tional, either in language generally or within a particular discourse
community. The latter case is particularly relevant for our purposes,
because communication problems may arise when outsiders have to
interpret or use expressions that have developed specialized figurative
meanings for the members of a particular discourse community, and/or
that have entirely lost their figurative potential for the members of
that community.
A consideration of discourse communities may also be appropriate
in order to account properly for creative uses of figurative language.
For example, the use of the ‘pain gate’ metaphor in the scientific paper
we mentioned above (Melzack and Wall, 1965) can be described as
creative in relation to how pain is metaphorically talked about in
English generally. However, the creativity of this use of metaphor,
and of the theory it is used to name, can only be fully appreciated in
relation to the discourse community of medical professionals and sci-
entists concerned with pain. The notion of a pain ‘gate’ contrasts with
the metaphors that dominated previous accounts of pain mechanisms.
These accounts were influenced, to different extents, by Descartes’s
description of pain in terms of an alarm bell. Descartes argued that
the application of harmful stimuli to the body automatically causes
pain, ‘just as by pulling at one end of a rope one makes to strike at the
same instant a bell which hangs at the other end’ (Descartes, 1644;
quoted in Melzack and Wall, 1965: 150). In contrast, Melzack and
Wall talked about a gate that may be more or less open or closed in
order to suggest that pain sensations are not an automatic reaction to
physical damage, but rather depend on a more complex combination
of factors.
1.3.2 Deliberate and non-deliberate metaphor

The distinction between conventional and novel metaphors is rele-
vant to a further distinction between ‘deliberate’ and ‘non-deliberate’
uses of metaphor that has recently been proposed in order to account
for the variety of uses of language that can be broadly described as
‘metaphorical’ (e.g. Cameron, 2003: 100–110; Steen, 2008). Meta-
phor scholars tend to make explicit, as we have done in the previous
section, that their analyses aim to capture ‘potential’ metaphoricity in
language. In other words, expressions are analysed as metaphorical on
the basis of explicit theoretical and methodological criteria. This does
not mean that the analyst claims that the relevant expressions are nec-
essarily intended as metaphorical by their producers, or recognized
and/or processed as metaphorical by their interpreters (e.g. Cameron,
2003; Cameron and Maslen, 2010; Steen et al., 2010). Steen (2008),
however, has suggested that textual evidence may be used to identify
those metaphors that are used ‘deliberately’. He proposes that:
a metaphor is used deliberately when it is expressly meant to change the
addressee’s perspective on the referent or topic that is the target of the
metaphor, by making the addressee look at it from a different conceptual

domain or space, which functions as a conceptual source.
(Steen, 2008: 222)
Steen provides some suggestions as to the characteristics of deliberate

metaphors, such as novelty and the presence of signalling expressions.
Krennmayr (2011) builds on Steen’s work (2008) in order to pro-
pose the following questions that are relevant to the identification of
deliberate uses of metaphor, or, more precisely, of ‘potentially’ delib-
erate uses of metaphor:
• Is the metaphorical unit signalled (e.g. by a simile or other signalling
device)?
• Is the metaphorical unit in the form of A = B?
• Is the metaphorical unit expressed directly?
• Is the metaphorical unit novel?
• Is the metaphorical unit surrounded by metaphorical expressions from
compatible semantic fields, which are somehow connected?
• Is the metaphorical sense of the unit particularly salient through, for
example, alluding to the topic of the text?
• Does the metaphorical unit participate in word play?
• Does the metaphorical unit elicit rhetorical effects such as, for example,
persuasion or humour?
(Krennmayr, 2011: 154–5)
As this list makes clear, there is some overlap between the uses of
metaphor captured by these criteria and the uses of metaphor we
have described as ‘novel’ in the previous section. However, there is
no straightforward equivalence between novelty and deliberateness
in metaphor use, nor between conventionality and lack of deliber-
ateness. On the one hand, a conventional use of metaphor may be
described as deliberate because it is accompanied by an explicit ‘tun-
ing’ or ‘signalling’ device such as figuratively speaking (Cameron and
Deignan, 2003; Goatly, 2011; Steen et al., 2010, use the term ‘metaphor
flags’). On the other hand, an apparently novel use of metaphor may
be described as non-deliberate if there is evidence that it is the result
of a slip of the tongue, or the speaker’s unfamiliarity with conventions
in a foreign language. In addition, not all the criteria listed above
need to be met in order for a metaphor to be described as deliberate
in Steen’s and Krennmayr’s terms.
The distinction between deliberate and non-deliberate metaphors is
intuitively appealing, but also rather problematic both in theoretical and
methodological terms. Gibbs (2011) questions the adequacy of linguis-
tic evidence as the basis for claims about deliberateness in metaphor use,
especially considering that the expressions which can be used to signal
metaphoricity, such as as it were, can also occur in the absence of figura-

tive language. Gibbs also points to a considerable body of experimental
findings which suggest that the processing of highly conventional meta-
phorical expressions can involve the activation of source domains, and
argues that the distinction between deliberate and non-deliberate meta-
phors seems to ignore the complex role of consciousness in thought,
action and creativity (Gibbs, 2011; further contributions to this debate
can be found in Deignan, 2011, and Steen, 2011).
Despite these caveats, it is sometimes useful for analysts to be
able to point out those uses of metaphor that appear to be explicitly
intended to ‘change the addressee’s perspective’ on a topic by making
them look at the topic ‘from a different conceptual domain’ (Steen,
2008: 222). This is the case especially when the analysis is concerned
with the specific functions that metaphor is being used to perform (e.g.
to explain or persuade). In the course of the book we will therefore not
attempt to operationalize the deliberate versus non-deliberate distinc-
tion systematically, but we will in some cases point out that there is
overwhelming evidence of the intention to draw the addressee’s atten-
tion to a different conceptual domain or area of experience, in order
to put forward a particular view of the current topic. Consider, for
example, the following extract from a conversation between an aca-
demic and a student on different approaches to the management of
organizations (more detail is provided in Chapter 5):
Or I suppose you could think of it as a piano
This is the left hand of the piano
Keeping the old beat going
the keys going
And this bit could be the fancy fiddly bits
at the right hand side
on the right hand side
the right hand of the piano
high notes
The speaker uses a tuning device to explicitly invite the addressee

to think about the topic in terms of a different area of experience
(you could think of it as). While uttering the words quoted above,
she also makes gestures that could be interpreted as ‘piano playing’
and which are attentively observed by her interlocutor. In this case,
there is therefore both verbal and gestural evidence that the speaker
intends to draw the addressee’s attention to a domain (piano playing)
that is different from the current topic, but that can be used to eluci-
date the speaker’s point (Müller, 2008). In addition, the speaker later
confirmed in the course of an interview that musical metaphors are
part of the ‘toolkit’ that she uses to explain the central concepts of her
discipline (more detail is provided in Chapter 5). However, in many
other cases, the notion of deliberateness in metaphor use cannot be
adequately operationalized.
1.4 Aims and overview of this book

In this book we do not aim to provide a systematic quantitative account
of figurative language use in different sections of a balanced corpus,
as reported, for example, by Steen et al. (2010). Rather, we build on
the results that have already been obtained in earlier research in order
to propose and demonstrate an approach to the study of variation in
the use of figurative language that centres on the notions of genre and
register. This approach is applied in a series of studies that show a
range of aspects of variation in the forms, frequencies and functions
of metaphor and metonymy in the language used by members of dif-
ferent discourse communities as they communicate with insiders or
outsiders to those communities.
In Chapter 2, we discuss research on the use of figurative language
in specific text-types, and argue that for such research to be both
more rigorous and replicable, a coherent and consistent description
of text-types is needed. The chapter goes on to introduce and discuss
the notions of genre and register, in order to arrive at an explicit
and comprehensive analytical framework that is used in the analyses
of figurative language in the remainder of the book. In Chapter 3,
we demonstrate the applicability and strengths of our framework by
applying it to the analysis of metaphor in two datasets we had ana-
lysed in previous studies: a corpus of academic discourse (Littlemore,
2001) and a speech by Tony Blair (Deignan and Semino, 2010).
In Chapters 4 to 9, our method of analysis is applied to a range of
datasets that vary in terms of different aspects of genre and register,
in order to demonstrate and explain variation in the use of figurative
language. Quantitative methods are employed where relevant and
possible to support our qualitative analyses of relatively small datasets.
Chapters 4 and 5 are both concerned with the use of figurative language
in science – respectively a ‘hard’ science in Chapter 4 and a social sci-
ence in Chapter 5. We begin with written scientific communication in
Chapter 4, where we compare the use of figurative language in two
specialist journal articles on the one hand and an article from a popu-
lar science magazine on the other. All three articles are concerned
with the same topic – climate change – and are based on the same
data. Specialist and popularizing scientific articles contrast, however,
in terms of what discourse communities are addressed (specialists vs.
a general educated audience) and in terms of the tenor of the commu-

nication (peer-to-peer communication vs. communication between a
better informed writer and a less informed readership). We combine
close qualitative analysis of the data with searches in large reference
corpora in order to show how these differences are reflected in differ-
ences in figurative language use, particularly in terms of frequency of
use and function. In Chapter 5, we move to spoken communication
about a social scientific topic – different approaches to organizations
in management science. We adopt a qualitative approach in order
to compare the ways in which an academic uses figurative language
to introduce some aspects of her discipline in a conversation with
a colleague from a cognate area (i.e. a member of the same broad
academic discourse community) as opposed to a conversation with a
student from a different area (i.e. an outsider to the discourse com-
munity). We show particularly how some metaphors and metonymies
are only used with one of the two interlocutors, and how the ‘same’
metaphors and metonymies are used differently with the two inter-
locutors. As both conversations were video-recorded, we consider
the relationship between figurative language use and metaphors and
metonymies in images and gestures.
In Chapters 6 and 7, we discuss the use of figurative language in,
respectively, leisure and workplace activities involving children. In
Chapter 6, we consider the distinctive forms and functions of the figu-
rative language used by staff working in a children’s nursery depend-
ing on whether they speak with one another, with the children in
their care, and with the children’s parents. We reflect specifically on
the problems and misunderstandings that may arise when members
of staff use what we may call ‘insider’ figurative language to speak to
people who are not members of their professional discourse commu-
nity. We use corpus tools to compare our data with larger reference
corpora in order to investigate the extent to which particular uses
of language are distinctive characteristics of the particular discourse
community of nursery staff. In Chapter 7, we discuss the ways in
which figurative language is used by members of different discourse
communities revolving around a children’s football club. We compare
the metaphors and metonymies used in the manager’s (written) online
match reports with those used in the speech produced by supporters
watching a match from the touchline. We also show how interviews
with two of the team’s members suggest that the children themselves
do not always understand the figurative language that is used to sup-
port them while they play, and to report on their matches afterwards.
We exploit corpus-linguistic methods in order to compare the two
datasets with each other and, where relevant, with larger reference
corpora.
Chapters 8 and 9 deal with the use of metaphor and metonymy in
different forms of art, and therefore involve discussions of creativity
and aesthetic effects. Both chapters are devoted to data where the
notion of ‘discourse community’ applies more loosely than in pre-
vious chapters, but where the contrast between ‘experts’ and ‘non-
experts’ is particularly stark and relevant. In Chapter 8, we look at the
range of ways in which the figurative language used in Shakespeare’s
Romeo and Juliet is adapted in a ‘simplified’ version of the play aimed
at (primarily native English-speaking) secondary school pupils. In this
chapter we therefore consider diachronic changes in the use of figura-
tive language and include some reflections on the aesthetic merit of
the simplified version of particular instances of figurative language
use as compared with the original. A corpus comparison tool is used
in order to support some of our claims about differences in figura-
tive language use in the two versions of the play. In Chapter 9, we
compare the use of metaphor and metonymy in two different genres
concerned with the expression of pain sensations: a questionnaire
produced by medical professionals and completed by patients; and a
book containing a set of photographic images which were collabora-
tively created by an artist and several chronic pain sufferers. The pho-
tographs were produced as part of a project aimed at giving patients
an opportunity to describe their pain experiences in their own terms
using the visual mode. As the images are accompanied by lengthy ver-
bal descriptions produced by the sufferers, we consider in detail the
interactions between visual and verbal metaphors and metonymies.
Our claims about the creativity of particular uses of metaphor and
metonymy are supported by data from large corpora of English.
In Chapter 10, we draw our findings together in order to reflect
on the different ways in which figurative language varies depending
on genre and register, to discuss the implications of our analyses for
figurative language theory, and to identify useful directions for future
research in the area of contextualized figurative language study.
Notes
1. ‘Pragglejaz’ is an acronym formed with the initials of the first names of the ten
members of the group: Peter Crisp, Ray Gibbs, Alan Cienki, Gerard Steen,
Graham Low, Lynne Cameron, Elena Semino, Joseph Grady, Alice Deignan
and Zoltan Kövecses.
2. The word bit can also be described as metaphorically used, but here we are focus-
ing on the figurative description of the topic of organizations in particular.
3. According to the Oxford English Dictionary (2010 online edition), the oldest
uses of sterile (attested around the turn of the sixteenth century) applied to
unproductive land and barren human beings, especially women. In the Mac-
millan English Dictionary for Advanced Learners the meaning that is listed
first in fact relates to absence of bacteria. This meaning is first attested in the
Oxford English Dictionary towards the end of the nineteenth century.
4. Here we are using the term ‘simile’ for explicit statements of comparison that
involve clearly ‘unlike’ things, or what may be described as elements of two
different conceptual domains in the relevant context. The same structure ‘X is
like Y’ can also of course be used to express non-metaphorical comparisons,
as in My house is like yours and Coffee is like tea (see Croft and Cruse, 2004:
211; Glucksberg, 2008).
5. In a few specific cases we include pronouns in our analyses. This applies, for
example, to the use of animate pronouns (e.g. he or she) to refer to inanimate
entities, which we include as instances of personification.
6. In the case of our simile, there are further complications, as some expressions
work metaphorically in relation to the piano-playing scenario (e.g. keeping
and going in keeping the beat going), and the left hand of the piano met-
onymically suggests the notes played by the piano player using the left hand.
7. Here and throughout the book, we have changed the names of participants in
order to preserve anonymity.
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1 Figurative language

1.1 The scope of this book

an organism’s genetic code in a laboratory, so that the two organisms

(The Daily Mail, 30 December 2002)

The small fibers show considerable spontaneous activity, which would

Here the ‘gate’ metaphor is realized more flexibly and by a wider

closed by changes or states within the nervous system (e.g. activity/

Focus in recent times on realistic pedagogy means that we can no longer

[…] current pedagogical thinking seems to be shifting away from the

The members of the discourse community of foreign language teach-

1.2 This book in the context of current research on

metaphor in the cognitive linguistic view means primarily conceptual

Overall, within the cognitive strand in research on metaphor and

or face threatening. In Chapter 5, we analyse metaphor clusters in

People who share a discourse world – such as prisoners, football fans,

Cameron (2010a: 6) mentions Cooper’s (1986: 165) observation

1.3 Our approach to figurative language

phenomena have been included under the label ‘figurative language’,

The use of underlining in the extract demonstrates the conventions

type of organization. More precisely, the use of the adjective sterile

Different approaches to metaphor describe the essence of metaphoric-

they involve ‘indirectness in conceptualization’ – a semantic contrast

and Juliet, for example, which is discussed in Chapter 8, Romeo utters

1.3.1 Conventionality and novelty

(1) Alex Higgins dies after long battle with cancer

The basic meaning of battle is to do with military confrontation

(3) [t]he attack was successful, although I am expecting a counterattack

Example (2) contains two clear instances of expressions that meta-

appropriate and motivating for some individuals (Reisfield and Wil-

1.3.2 Deliberate and non-deliberate metaphor

metaphor, by making the addressee look at it from a different conceptual

Steen provides some suggestions as to the characteristics of deliberate

metaphoricity, such as as it were, can also occur in the absence of figura-

The speaker uses a tuning device to explicitly invite the addressee

1.4 Aims and overview of this book

a general educated audience) and in terms of the tenor of the commu-

Cameron, L. (2010a) ‘What is metaphor and why does it matter?’, in Cameron,

Goatly, A. (2011) The Language of Metaphors (2nd edn.), London: Routledge.

Steen, G. (2007) Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage, Amsterdam: John

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