MAQUILING VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS  Result of Elections – Arnado won and was proclaimed Mayor.
G.R. No. 195649 / April 16, 2013 / SERENO, C.J. / Qualifications / EFHDy
NATURE PETITION for certiorari
PETITIONERS Casan Macode Maquiling
RESPONDENTS Commission on Elections, Rommel Arnado y Cagoco, Linog G.
Balua
SUMMARY. Arnado was a natural born Filipino who subsequently gained US
citizenship through naturalization, losing his PH citizenship in the process. However,
in order to be qualified to run for the position of Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte, he gained back his PH citizenship through repatriation, taking 2 oaths of
allegiance to the country and renouncing his US citizenship. He won the election,
prompting his opponents to file a case of disqualification against him, arguing that he
was still a foreigner as evidenced by his continuous use of his US passport even after
his Oath of Allegiance to the PH. The SC ruled that Arnado was indeed disqualified.
The use of a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive
and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality. Arnado did not lose his
Filipino citizenship, but regained his US citizenship and became a dual citizen. Under
sec. 40(d) of the LGC, those with dual citizenships are expressly disqualified from
running for local gov’t positions. The effect of this is that Maquiling, the losing
candidate with the highest number of votes, should be declared Mayor. As ruled in
Jalosjos v. COMELEC, when there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their
victory is voided and the next qualified candidate with the most votes wins the
election. In cases like this, the winner is not considered a second-placer, but the “first-
placer” amongst the qualified candidates.
DOCTRINE. The use of a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship
is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality. Under sec.
40(d) of the LGC, those with dual citizenships are expressly disqualified from running
for local gov’t positions.
DISSENT, BRION, J.: Arnado’s use of a foreign passport was just an isolated act and
it cannot be considered as an express renunciation of his PH citizenship.
FACTS.
 Background – Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. He
subsequently lost his PH citizenship when he underwent naturalization as a US
citizen. He then regained his PH citizenship under RA 9225 by taking two Oaths of
Allegiance to the RP (one on July 10, 2008 and one on April 3, 2009). These oaths
were accepted, and an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition was issued in his favor. He also executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of
his US citizenship. >>> All this made him qualified to file his Certificate of
Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte for the 2010 local elections.
 Case for DQ – Another candidate for mayor, Balua, filed a petition to disqualify
Arnado and/or to cancel his CoC. He contended that Arnado was not a resident of
Kauswagan, and that he was still a foreigner based on the following: (a)
certification by the Bureau of Immigration indicating that his nationality was “USA-
American”; and (b) Arnado’s travel record indicating that he had been using his
US Passport even after his Oath to the PH.
 COMELEC ordered Arnado to file his answer >> Arnado failed to file ansser >>
Balua filed motion to declare him in default
 COMELEC did not act on the motions in time, so the elections pushed through
before petition was decided.
 Continuation of DQ case – Arnado only filed his answer after winning. He
submitted the following documents to show he was qualified: (a) Affidavit of
Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance; (b) a Join-Affidavit of City Engineer and other
neighbors of Arnado, attesting that he was a long-time resident of Kauswagan; (c)
certification from Punong Barangay of Kauswagan stating he was a bona-fide
resident; (d) certification from Municipal Local Gov’t that Arnado’s father was also a
resident, and even served as Mayor; (e) Voter Certification showing that Arnado
had been a registered voter in Kauswagan since April 3, 2009
 COMELEC First Division – Ruled against Arnado. It treated the case as one for
disqualification, not as one of cancellation of CoC. First ruled that Arnado was not a
US resident because Balua was not able to present sufficient evidence. However,
in terms of citizenship, the COMELEC ruled that Arnado was not Filipino because
of his act of consistently using his US passport (used it six times) after renouncing
his US citizenship. Thus, they annulled his proclamation as Mayor and ruled that
the winner of Vice-Mayor should succeed in his place pursuant to Sec. 44 of the
LGC.
 Intervention by petitioner Maquiling – Petitioner was another candidate for
Mayor and garnered the second highest number of votes. He intervened and
argued that while COMELEC was correct in DQing Arnado, they were wrong in
ruling that Vice-Mayor should succeed as Mayor under Sec. 44 LGC. He argues
that he should be proclaimed winner for being the qualified candidate who garnered
the most votes.
 COMELEC En Banc – Reversed the First Division’s ruling and stated that Arnado
was qualified. Ruled that the use of a US passport does not operate to revert back
his status as a US/dual citizen since no law provides such.
 The principle of continuity of citizenship, which provides that once a
person becomes a citizen, it is assumed that he desired to continue to be
one until he voluntarily denationalizes or expatriates himself. In this case,
Arnado should be presumed to have remained Filipino despite his use of
the US passport absent any clear and unequivocal proof of expatriation.
 Furthermore, Arnado’s claim that he had no choice but to use his US
passport because he had not been given notice of the issuance of his PH
passport yet was a valid excuse. He was only able to claim his PH
passport 3 months after its issuance, and he used it ever since.
ISSUES & RATIO.
1. WON the intervention of a rival candidate in a DQ case is proper when there
has been no proclamation of a winner yet. – YES.
 In this case, Maquiling intervened at the stage when Arnado filed an MR of
the COMELEC First Division ruling before the COMELEC En Banc. The
COMELEC decided to treat the case as one for Disqualification, so the
applicable law is Sec. 6 of RA 6646 (Electoral Reform Law of 1987), which
allows interventions during DQ proceedings even after the election, as
long as there has been no final judgment on the eligibility of the candidate
yet.
 The fact that the COMELEC En Banc had already ruled that Maquiling had
not shown the requisites for the exemption to the “second-placer rule” and
therefore would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case is of no
moment, and does not deprive him the right to elevate the matter to the
SC.
  Arnado argues that the case has attained finality because the original
petitioner and respondents did not appeal the En Banc decision >>> SC =
no finality precisely because Maquiling elevated it to SC. It is only after SC
has ruled upon issues that DQ case originally filed by Balua will attain
finality.
2. WON Arnado was qualified to run for local office. – NO. His use of a US
passport after renouncing US citizenship amounts to an undoing of such
renunciation.
 The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a
positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s citizenship. It does
not divest PH citizenship regained by repatriation, but recants the Oath of
Renunciation of foreign citizenship, which is required to run for elective
position.
 Renunciation of foreign citizenship: Initially, Arnado complied with the
twin requirements of Oath of Allegiance + Renunciation under RA9225 Sec.
5(2) to be eligible to run for an elective position. By renouncing his foreign
citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a PH citizen.
 However, this legal presumption of citizenship is not permanent, and may be
open to attack when, after such renunciation, the person performs positive
acts showing his continued possession of foreign citizenship.
 APPLIED: The important thing to determine is WoN Arnado was solely a PH
citizen when he filed his CoC. In this case, between the date he renounced
his US citizenship and the date he filed his CoC, he used his US passport to
travel six times. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and
voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before
immigration authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with
all attendant rights and privileges granted by the USA.
 The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be
professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an
absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full
divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which
granted the citizenship.
 Even if the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated
in CA631 constituting loss of PH citizenship, it nevertheless is an act which
repudiates the very oath of renunciation required by a dual citizen to be
qualified to run for a local elective position. He was therefore under the
disqualification under Sec. 40 (d) of the LGC.
1 Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country; (2) By express renunciation of citizenship; (3) By
subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country
upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more; (4) By accepting commission in the military,
naval or air service of a foreign country; (5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed
forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted:
and (7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force
in her husband’s country, she acquires his nationality.
 Dual Citizenship: COMELEC was correct in ruling that Arnado did not lose
his PH citizenship. All that happened was a reversion to his status as a dual
citizen, which was fatal to his eligibility.
 There are two classes of dual citizens: (a) those who acquired foreign
citizenship through positive act of naturalization; (b) those who are
considered dual citizens by virtue of birth. >>> Those in the first class need
to take both an Oath of Allegiance to PH and an Oath of Renunciation of
foreign citizenship. Those in the second class only need to take an Oath of
Allegiance because the mere act of filing for a CoC carries with it an implied
renunciation of foreign citizenship.
 >>> Arnado belongs to the first class. Basically, Arnado actually complied
with the twin requirements under RA9225, but lost it subsequently. The
purpose of the LGC in disqualifying dual citizens from running for any
elective public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has
earlier renounced his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently represents
himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public office.
 Qualification Requirements are continuing in nature: In this case, the
citizenship requirement must be possessed not just at the time of
renunciation of the foreign citizenship, but continuously. Therefore, Arnado’s
act of using his US passport stopped this continuity.
 The case of Yu v. Defensor-Santiago can be compared to this case: Yu
was a Portugese dude who sought naturalization as a Filipino and later
renewed his Portugal passport. In the case at hand, Arnado’s act of using his
US passport was also a positive act of representation as a US citizen.
 COMELEC En Banc, in ruling in favor of Arnado, stated that he had a
justifiable excuse because he used his PH passport as soon as he got
it, which was 3 months after its issuance.
 >>> SC said this was erroneous. His PH Passport was issued on June.
Three months from June is only September. If indeed Arnado used his PH
passport continuously once he got it, he would not have used his US
passport on November 2009. Also, his subsequent use of a PH passport will
not cure the defect caused by the use of his US passport.
3. WON Maquiling should be proclaimed Mayor as the recipient of the 2 nd
highest number of votes. – YES.
 First of all, Topacio v. Paredes, the case that provided for the principle
that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner in an election must
be re-examined
 This case involved the 1912 elections in the town of Imus, Cavite for the
position of municipal president between Abad and Topacio. Topacio
received the most votes while Abad was the second-placer. Abad then
contested the election on the ground that Topacio was ineligible because he
was running for a second time without observing the four-year interruption
rule under Act No. 2045.
 Said case contained the oft-quoted phrase of “the wreath of victory cannot
be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the
sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally
cast ballots.”
 >>> First, the SC said that this phrase was only obiter dictum because the
issue in that case was NOT WoN Abad can be proclaimed the winner as
second-placer because of Topacio’s disqualification. The issue that the court
 actually ruled on was WoN the CFI has jurisdiction to try a DQ case based
on the eligibility of the person who obtained the most votes. The ruling was
that since a CFI’s jurisdiction is confined “to determine which of the
contestants as been duly elected”, the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when
he “declared that no one had been legally elected president of the
municipality” where the only question raised was whether or not Topacio was
eligible to be elected and to hold the office of municipal president.
 Second, we have to look at the context upon which the phrase was used.
The phrase was located in a paragraph that was comparing (a) the situation
where a candidate is not entitled to a position because of fraud in the
elections itself, and (b) the situation where a candidate is ineligible because
of his own qualifications. In the first situation, a winner can be proclaimed
because there was a contest in the strict sense of the word. For instance, if it
is found that one candidate won because fraud in vote-counting, and that it is
clear that another other candidate should have won, such rightful candidate
can be proclaimed the winner. On the other hand, in the second situation,
there is no actual contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from
an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the
eligibility of the one receiving a plurality.
 The popular vote does not cure the ineligibility of a candidate: The
ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. When a person who is not
qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes,
even the will of the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the
defect in the qualifications of the candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample
upon the very law that sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of
candidates. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to trump
mandatory provisions is not democracy nor republicanism, but electoral
anarchy. This principle has been laid down by several cases such as
Frivaldo v. COMELEC, Quizon v. COMELEC, and Velasco v. COMELEC.
 Maquiling is not a second-placer, but the first-placer among the
qualified candidates and should thus be proclaimed winner: As ruled in
the cases of Jalosjos v. COMELEC and Aratea v. COMELEC, a void CoC
cannot produce any legal effect. Thus, all the votes cast in favor of the
ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determine the winner of an
election.
 However, this does not mean that the entire elections are rendered void.
Votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and
total expression of sovereign voice, and the votes cast in favor of the other
legitimate candidates should also be respected. When there are participants
who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded
to the next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications
 There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC that when
the voters are well aware within the realm of notoriety of a candidate’s
disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the
eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed
elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules
affecting qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible ones. The
electorate’s awareness of a candidate’s disqualification is not a prerequisite
for the DQ to attach to the candidate. The very existence of disqualifying
circumstance makes the candidate ineligible.
 That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has
assumed office is of no moment. The subsequent disqualification based
on a substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of
candidacy voids not only the CoC but also the proclamation. Sec. 6 of RA
66462 provides that when a candidate has not been declared DQ’d by final
judgment yet, but is subsequently proclaimed the winner, the COMELEC or
Court shall continue with the trial and may suspend the proclamation of such
candidate when evidence of guilt is strong. In this case, the only reason
Arnado was able to continue with his candidacy without suspension was
because he only filed his answer to the DQ case against him when the
elections were already conducted.
DECISION.
Petition GRANTED. Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified from
running for any local elective position. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is hereby
DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10 May
2010 elections.
NOTES.
DISSENT, BRION, J.
Arnado’s use of US passport on November 24, 2009 was an isolated act and a
matter of practicability, since he was returning to the PH, having used US
passport before. (Risky daw na gumamit siya ng US passport palabas ng PH
tapos pagbalik niya PH passport na siya)
 Arnado’s Philippine passport was issued on June 18, 2009, but he was not
immediately notified of the issuance so that and he only received his
passport three months after or sometime in September 2009. Clearly, when
Arnado travelled on April 14, 2009, June 25, 2009 and July 29, 2009, he had
no Philippine passport that he could have used to travel to the United States
to attend to the winding up of his business and other affairs in America.
 A travel document issued by the proper Philippine government agency (e.g.,
a Philippine consulate office in the US) would not suffice because travel
documents could not be used; they are issued only in critical instances, as
determined by the consular officer, and allow the bearer only a direct, one-
way trip to the Philippines.
 Although Arnado received his Philippine passport by the time he returned to
the Philippines on November 24, 2009, he could not use this without risk
of complications with the US immigration authorities for using a travel
document different from what he used in his entry into the US on July
29, 2009. Plain practicality then demanded that the travel document
2 Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to
be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election,
the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence
of his guilt is strong.
 that he used to enter the US on July 29, 2009 be the same travel
document he should use in leaving the country on November 24, 2009.
 Given these circumstances, Arnado’s use of his US passport in travelling
back to the Philippines on November 24, 2009 was an isolated act that could
not, by itself, be an express renunciation of the Philippine citizenship he
adopted as his sole citizenship under RA 9225.

What the law requires in an express renunciation, not mere inference from
conduct
 I loathe to rule that Arnado’s use of his US passport amounts to an express
renunciation of his Filipino citizenship, when its use was an isolated act that
he sufficiently explained and fully justified.
 I emphasize that the law requires express renunciation in order to lose
Philippine citizenship. The term means a renunciation that is made distinctly
and explicitly and is not left to inference or implication; it is a renunciation
manifested by direct and appropriate language, as distinguished from that
which is inferred from conduct.
 Other than the use of his US passport in two trips to and from the United
States, the record does not bear out any indication, supported by evidence,
of Arnado’s intention to reacquire US citizenship.
 To my mind, in the absence of clear and affirmative acts of reacquiring US
citizenship either by naturalization or by express acts (such as the
reestablishment of permanent residency in the United States), Arnado’s use
of his US passport cannot but be considered an isolated act that did not
undo his renunciation of his US citizenship. What he might in fact have done
was to violate American law on the use of passports, but this is a matter
irrelevant to the present case.
 Thus, Arnado remains to be a “pure” Filipino citizen and the loss of his
Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed or inferred from his isolated act of
using his US passport for travel purposes.

The People of Kauswagan have spoken and any doubt should be resolved in favor of
their verdict.

*Digester’s note: Hindi sakto yung argument’s ni J. Brion sa ponencia. Ang sabi ng
ponencia DQ si Arnado dahil dual citizen siya (fact of using foreign passport means
he represented himself as US citizen also.) Argument ni J. Brion ay he did not lose his
Filipino Citizenship, w/c is totoo naman in the case of dual citizenship.
Risos-Vidal vs. Comelec
Facts:
In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for
the crime of plunder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and
perpetual absolute disqualification. On October 25, 2007, however, former President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former
President Estrada, explicitly stating that he is restored to his civil and political rights.
In 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President. None of
the disqualification cases against him prospered but he only placed second in the
results.
In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of
Candidacy, this time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of
Manila.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada before the
Comelec stating that Estrada is disqualified to run for public office because of his
conviction for plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with
perpetual absolute disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local
Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC).
The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President
Estrada’s right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon
vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Alfredo Lim, who garnered
the second highest votes, intervened and sought to disqualify Estrada for the same
ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor
of Manila.
Issue:
May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office despite having been
convicted of the crime of plunder which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification to hold public office?
Held:
Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and
political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the
focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former
President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered
by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and
constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact
conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to and accepted by
former President Estrada does not actually specify which political right is restored, it
could be inferred that former President Arroyo did not deliberately intend to restore
former President Estrada’s rights of suffrage and to hold public office, orto otherwise
remit the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. Even if her intention was the
contrary, the same cannot be upheld based on the pardon’s text.
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-
C, provides that the President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant
pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency, to wit:
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and
remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of
all the Members of the Congress.
xxxx
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of
election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the
favorable recommendation of the Commission.
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in
which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases;
(2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving
violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorable
recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any
act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of
the President.
The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows
that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are
included in the pardon. The sentence which states that “(h)e is hereby restored to his
civil and political rights,” expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to
the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41
of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were
expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in
relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute
pardon granted to him
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded
in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition
– a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows any person
who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of
an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office,
whether local or national position.

The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon
conditional.

Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e.,
"[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any
elective position or office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against
the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek public
elective office have been restored.

This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or
limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights"as
being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an
act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the
enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not form
part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative
language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral
part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to
make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of
the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.

Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction

to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where
the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand
nor restrict its operation much less prevail over its text.

If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on Respondent’s

promise never to seek a public office again, the former ought to have explicitly stated
the same in the text of the pardon itself. Since former President Arroyo did not make
this an integral part of the decree of pardon, the Commission is constrained to rule
that the 3rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to the pardon
extended to former President Estrada. (Risos-Vidal vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 206666,
January 21, 2015)
 ARNADO v COMELEC
GR 210164 / AUG 18 2015 / DEL CASTILLO, J. / LocGov – Qualifications / BUNYI
NATURE Petition for Certiorari assailing COMELEC decision
PETITIONERS Rommel C. Arnado
RESPONDENTS COMELEC
SUMMARY. While the case (Maquiling v. Comelec) involving his supposed
disqualification in the 2010 elections was pending, Arnado filed COC for the 2013
elections. SC then decided Maquiling case and ruled that Arnado should be
disqualified for the 2010 elections because his use of his US passport negated his
2009 Affidavit of Renunciation of his US Citizenship. Arnado executed an Affidavit
Affirming his 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation. COMELEC disqualified him again ruling
that at the time he filed his COC for the 2013 elections, his 2009 Affidavit of
Renunciation was deemed recalled by his use of his US passport, pursuant to SC
decision of Maquiling, and his subsequent Affidavit Affirming the 2009 AOR was too
late and should have been filed before the filing of his COC for the 2013 elections. SC
affirmed his disqualification saying he did not satisfy the requirements in RA 9225,
Sec.5(2) at the time he filed the aforementioned COC and that his landslide victory
cannot override eligibility requirements.
DOCTRINE. Election victory cannot be used as a magic formula to bypass election
eligibility requirements; otherwise, certain provisions of laws pertaining to elections
will become toothless, one of which is LGC Sec. 39 which specifies the basic positive
qualifications of local government officials (Velasco v CA). There is no reason why the
Court should not follow the same policy when it comes to disqualifications
enumerated under Sec. 40 of the same law. After all, "the qualifications set out in
Sec. 39 are roughly half of the requirements for election to local public offices. The
other half is contained in the succeeding section which lays down the circumstances
that disqualify local candidates."
FACTS.
 PET Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship
after he was naturalized as a US citizen. Arnado applied for repatriation under RA
9225. Jul 10 2008, he took an Oath of Allegiance and an Order of Approval of
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor. Apr 3 2009, he
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation (AOR) of his foreign citizenship. Nov 30
2009, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the mayoralty post of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte for the May 2010 elections.
 Balua, another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado on the
ground that he remained a US citized because he continued to use his US
passport for entry to and exit from the Philippines after executing his AOR. While
the petition was pending, Arnado won the May 2010 elections.
 Oct 5 2010, Comelec First Division issued a resolution holding that Arnado’s
continued use of his US passport negated his AOR and he was disqualified.
Comelec nullified his proclamation and held that the rule on succession should be
followed. Arnado filed MR while Maquiling, another mayoralty candidate who got
the 2nd highest amount of votes, intervened and assailed the application of the
rule on succession.
 Comelec En Banc reversed and ruled that Arnado's use of his US passport did not
revert his status to dual citizenship. It appreciated Arnado's explanation that he
continued to use his US passport because he did not yet know that he had been
issued a Philippine passport at the time. Maquiling filed a petition before the SC to
assail this.
 Oct 1 2012, Arnado filed his COC again for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan for
the May 2013 elections. RESP Capitan filed his COC for the same position.
 Apr 6 2013, Court decided the Maquiling case: reversed Comelec En
Banc,disqualified Arnado from running for elective position, and declared
Maquiling as the duly elected mayor in the May 2010 elections. They ruled that
Arnado's act of consistently using his US passport effectively negated his AOR.
 May 9 2013, Arnado executed an Affidavit Affirming his Apr 3 2009 AOR.
 May 10 2013, Capital filed a petition to disqualify Arnado based on Maquiling. May
13 2013, however, Arnado won by getting 84% of the votes. May 14 2013, he was
proclaimed as the winning candidate. Capitan filed another petition seeking to
nullify Arnado’s proclamation.
 Sep 6 2013, Comelec Second Division disqualified Arnado and held that at the
time he filed his COC on Oct 1 2012, Arnado still failed to comply with the
requirement of RA 9225 of making a personal and sworn renunciation of any and
all foreign citizenship. His Apr 3 2009 AOR was deemed withdrawn or recalled
when he subsequently traveled abroad using his US passport, as held in
Maquiling. He failed to execute another AOR for the May 13 2013 elections and
the Affidavit Affirming his Apr 3 2009 AOR should have been executed before the
filing of his COC. Comelec En Banc affirmed. It annulled Arnado’s proclamation
and declared Capitan as the duly elected mayor.
 Dec 26 2013, Arnado filed Urgent Motion for Issuance of Status Quo Ante Order
or TRO. Jan 14 2014, Court granted the TRO. Capital filed an Ugent Motion to
Dissolve TRO claiming he had already been proclaimed as mayor. Feb 25 2014,
Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order directing the parties to allow Arnado to
continue performing as mayor pending resolution of case.
ISSUES & RATIO.
[MINOR ISSUES]
 Arnado: Filed a petition for certiorari.
SC: Wrong. Petition for certiorari is limited to the determination of whether the
respondent tribunal acted with GADALEJ. In the absence of grave abuse of
discretion, a Rule 64 petition will not prosper. There is no showing that the
Comelec En Banc acted capriciously or whimsically in issuing its Dec 9 2013
Resolution. Neither did it act contrary to law or jurisprudence.
 Arnado: Capitan’s petition was filed late and violated the rule against forum-
shopping.
SC: Arnado failed to substantiate his claim of forum-shopping and has not shown
that the petitions involved the same parties, issues, and reliefs. Besides, the
petitions had different parties (1st was Capital and Arnado while 2nd included
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Kauswagan) and sought different reliefs (1st
was to disqualify Arnado, 2nd was to annul Arnado’s proclamation as mayor).
Furthermore, the petition for disqualification was seasonably filed because it was
filed after filing of the COCs but before Arnado’s proclamation pursuant to
Comelec’s Rules of Procedure.
 Arnado: Comelec committed GAD when it decided the case before resolving
Capitan’s motion to consolidate.
SC: Arnado did not attach a copy of the motion to his petition which is sufficient
ground of dismissal already. Arnado, not being the movant, is not in a position to
 question the alleged inaction of Comelec on the motion. Arnado, in filing an MR of
the Comelec En Banc decision and appealing to this court, effectively abandoned
said motion for consolidation. Under, CRP3, consolidation is only permissive and
not mandatory. Consolidation of cases here is not necessary since the 2 cases do
not even involve same parties and reliefs sought.
 Arnado: Comelec violated its own rules when it decided case without setting it for
trial.
SC: Proceedings in a special action for disqualification of candidates under CRP
Rule 25 are summary in nature where a trial type proceeding may be dispensed
with. Technical rules of evidence should not be rigorously applied in administrative
proceedings specially where the law calls for the proceeding to be summary in
character. When the Comelec En Banc reviews and evaluates a party's
petition/answer and the supporting papers attached, the same is tantamount to a
fair "hearing" of his case.
 Arnado: Violation of due process when Commissioner Yusoph was allowed to
participate in the deliberation of the Comelec En Banc Resolution. Commisioner
Yusoph penned both the Comelec 2nd Division and Comelec En Banc
Resolutions.
SC: Commissioner Yusoph, with 2 others, signed the 2nd Division Resolution but
there is no indication that he wrote it because it is not stated who the ponente is.
The same is true for the En Banc Resolution; as a per curiam resolution, it was
arrived at by the En Banc as a whole and without any particular ponente.
[MAJOR ISSUES]
WON Arnado has satisfied the twin requirements of RA 9225 Sec. 5(2) at the
time he filed his COC for May 13 2013 elections – NO
 Under LGC Sec. 4(d), a person with "dual citizenship" is disqualified from running
for any elective local position. In Mercado v. Manzano, it was clarified that "dual
citizenship" must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance.'' Subsequently,
Congress enacted RA 9225 allowing natural-born citizens of the Philippines who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization abroad to
reacquire Philippine citizenship and to enjoy full civil and political rights upon
compliance with the requirements of the law. They may now run for public office in
the Philippines provided that they: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and, (2) make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath prior to or at the time of filing of their
COC.
 Comelec ruled that Arnado failed to comply with the second requisite of Sec. 5(2)4
of RA 9225 because, as held in Maquiling v. Comelec, his April 3 2009 Affidavit of
Renunciation was deemed withdrawn when he used his US passport after
executing said affidavit. Consequently, at the time he filed his COC on October 1
2012 for the May 13 2013 elections, Arnado had yet to comply with said second
3 Comelec Rules of Procedure
4 Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities- Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under
this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: (2) Those seeking elective public office in the
Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing
laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;
requirement. While Arnado submitted an affidavit dated May 9 2013, affirming his
April 3 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, the same would not suffice for having been
belatedly executed.
 Comelec did not commit GAD because the reason for Arnado’s disqualification to
run for public office during the 2010 elections — being a candidate without total
and undivided allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines – still subsisted when
he filed his COC for the 2013 elections on October 1 2012. The Comelec En Banc
merely adhered to the ruling of this Court in Maquiling.
WON Arnado should be given the opportunity to correct the deficiency in his
COC since Maquiling was promulgated after the lapse of the period for filing a
COC for the 2013 elections and, besides, shortly after learning og the Maquiling
decision, Arnado substantially complied by executing an affidavit on May 9
2013 affirming his April 3 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation – NO
 The ruling in Maquiling is novel in the sense that it was the first case dealing with
the effect of the use of a foreign passport on the qualification to run for public
office of a natural-born Filipino citizen who was naturalized abroad and
subsequently availed of the privileges under RA 9225. It was settled in that case
that the use of a foreign passport amounts to repudiation or recantation of the oath
of renunciation. However, the Court in Maquiling did not consider the novelty of
the issue as to excuse Arnado from strictly complying with the eligibility
requirements to run for public office or to simply allow him to correct the deficiency
in his qualification by submitting another oath of renunciation.
 The circumstances surrounding the qualification of Arnado to run for public office
during the May 10 2010 and May 13 2013 elections are the same. Arnado's use of
his US passport in 2009 invalidated his oath of renunciation resulting in his
disqualification to run for mayor of Kauswagan in the 2010 elections. Since then
and up to the time he filed his CoC for the 2013 elections, Arnado had not cured
the defect in his qualification. Maquiling, therefore, is binding on and applicable to
this case following the salutary doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere.
 As early as 2010, the year when Balua filed a petition to disqualify him, Arnado
has gotten wind that the use of his US passport might pose a problem to his
candidacy. Thus, when Arnado filed his COC on October 1 2012, he was not
totally unaware that the use of his US passport after he had executed the Affidavit
of Renunciation might have an impact on his qualification and candidacy. At that
time, Maquiling had already reached this Court. But despite the petitions filed
against him questioning his qualification to run for public office in 2010, Arnado
filed his COC on October 1 2012 unmindful of any possible legal setbacks in his
candidacy for the 2013 elections and without executing another Affidavit of
Renunciation. Arnado should be made to face the consequences of his inaction
since he could have remedied it at the time he filed his COC on October 1 2012 or
even before that. There is no law prohibiting him from executing an Affidavit of
Renunciation every election period if only to avert possible questions about his
qualifications.
WON the alleged November 30 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of
Allegiance can be given any probative weight – NO
 The alleged Affidavit of Renunciation is highly suspect. The original or certified
true copy thereof was not presented. In addition, such crucial evidence sufficient
to alter the outcome of the case was never presented before the Comelec much
less in the Maquiling case. It only surfaced for the first time in this petition. As a
 rule, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the
proceedings below. Basic considerations of fairness and due process impel this
rule.
 Likewise, this Court does not countenance the late submission of evidence.
Arnado should have offered the Affidavit dated 7 February 2007 during the
proceedings before the COMELEC. CRP Rule 43, Sec. 1 states that "In the
absence of any applicable provisions of these Rules, the pertinent provisions of
the ROC shall be applicable by analogy or in suppletory character and effect" and
ROC Rule 132, Sec. 34 categorically enjoins the admission of evidence not
formally presented. Since the said Affidavit was not formally offered before the
COMELEC, respondent had no opportunity to examine and controvert it. To admit
this document would be contrary to due process. Additionally, the piecemeal
presentation of evidence is not in accord with orderly justice.
 Moreover, in Maquiling it was mentioned that Arnado used his US passport on
January 12 2010 and March 23 2010. Balua likewise presented a certification from
the Bureau of Immigration certifying that the name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco"
appears in the available Computer Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on
file as of 21 April 20105. Despite this statement in Maquiling, Arnado never
bothered to correct or refute it.
[PART OF THE DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE WAS SPENT ANSWERING THE
DISSENTING OPINIONS]
 J. Leonen: Dissents and maintains the same position he had taken in Maquiling
that Arnado's use of his US passport in 2009 is an isolated act justified by the
circumstances at that time. At any rate, Arnado started to use his Philippine
passport in his travels abroad beginning December 11 2009 and thenceforth. This
is borne out by Arnado's Philippine passport.
SC: J. Leonen is not only reviving an issue that had already been settled with
finality in the Maquiling case, but he is also going beyond the issues raised in this
petition. Arnado's argument in this case-that he is qualified to run for mayor as he
has satisfied the requirements of Sec. 5(2) of RA 9225 relative to the May 13 2013
elections- is premised only on the alleged newly discovered November 30, 2009
Affidavit. Nothing more. He does not claim in this case that his use of US passport
in his travel abroad in 2009 is an isolated act, as J. Leonen insists. Courts do not
have jurisdiction over issues neither raised in the pleading nor tried with the
express or implied consent of the parties. Furthermore, points of law, theories,
issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower tribunal need not
be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be
raised for the first time at such late stage. Basic considerations of due process
underlie this rule.
 J. Brion: Dissents and states that what was cancelled by virtue of Maquiling was
only the April 3 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation where Arnado expressly renounced
any foreign citizenship; not the July 10 2008 Oath of Allegiance which carried with
it an implied abdication of foreign citizenship. The requirement of an express
renunciation does not negate the effect of, or make any less real, the prior implicit
renunciation of citizenship and allegiance made upon taking the oath of allegiance.
SC: Again, this was never raised in this petition. At any rate, the execution of an
Oath of Allegiance is required by Sec. 3 of RA 9225. For those who avail
themselves of RA 9225 and intend to run for public office, Sec. 5(2) thereof
5 Travel records provide: “NATIONALITY: USA-AMERICAN PASSPORT”
provides the additional requirement of making a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenships prior to or at the time of filing of their COC.
When the law expressly requires an explicit renunciation, an implicit one would be
insufficient. Furthermore, even assuming that Arnado's 2008 implied renunciation
is sufficient, the same has also been negated by his use of his US passport in
2009, following the ruling in Maquiling. Otherwise, we would give more weight to
an implied renunciation than to an express one specifically required by law.
Besides, the Maquiling Decision holding that Arnado's use of his US passport
effectively recanted his Affidavit of Renunciation has already become final and
immutable.
 J. Leonen: Maintained that Arnado used his Philippine passport in travelling
abroad in early 2010 by relying on the copy attached to the rollo of the Maquiling
case.
SC: Such copy of Arnado’s Philippine passport is a mere "Certified True Copy
From The Macidne Copy On File" as attested to by Comelec Records Officer Ill. A
machine copy or photocopy is a mere secondary evidence and cannot be admitted
in evidence until and unless the offeror has proven the due execution and the
subsequent loss or unavailability of the original. In this case, however, Arnado's
Philippine passport is not missing. Thus, said photocopy of Arnado's Philippine
passport cannot sway us to depart from the uncontroverted certification of the
Bureau of Immigration that Arnado used his US passport on January 12 2010 and
March 23 2010. Consequently, even assuming that the recently discovered
November 30 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance is true and
authentic, Arnado once more performed positive acts on January 12 2010 and
March 23 2010, which effectively negated the alleged November 30 2009 Affidavit
resulting in his disqualification to run for office.
WON landslide election victory can override eligibility requirements – NO
 In Maquiling, this Court emphasized that popular vote does not cure the ineligibility
of a candidate. Thus, while in this case Arnado won by landslide majority (84% of
votes) during the 2013 elections, the same "cannot override the constitutional and
statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications." Garnering the most
number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because
the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is
not a matter of popularity.
 Election victory cannot be used as a magic formula to bypass election
eligibility requirements; otherwise, certain provisions of laws pertaining to
elections will become toothless, one of which is LGC Sec. 39 which
specifies the basic positive qualifications of local government officials
(Velasco v CA). There is no reason why the Court should not follow the
same policy when it comes to disqualifications enumerated under Sec. 40 of
the same law. After all, "the qualifications set out in Sec. 39 are roughly half
of the requirements for election to local public offices. The other half is
contained in the succeeding section which lays down the circumstances
that disqualify local candidates."
DECISION.
Petition DISMISSED. Comelec resolutions AFFIRMED. Status Quo Ante Order
LIFTED.
CONCURRING – C.J. SERENO
 Considering that the Court had pinpointed the defect in Arnado's oath of
renunciation, the simple act of taking the oath anew would have been enough
compliance with the requirement of the law. It did not matter that Maquiling was
promulgated months after Arnado had filed for candidacy. Since he was not totally
unaware that the use of his US passport might have adverse consequences on his
candidacy for the 2013 elections, the Decision concludes that he should have
been prudent enough to remedy whatever defect there might have been in his
citizenship.
 The certification from the Bureau of Immigration indicated that Arnado arrived in
the country using his US passport on 12 January 2010 and 23 March 2010. The
Court gave full credence to the certification, not only because it carried with it the
presumption of regularity, but more important, Arnado never bothered to refute the
contents thereof. On the basis of this finding, the Court rejected the claim that
Arnado's use of his US passport several times were mere isolated acts that were
done only because he was not yet issued his Philippine passport. To my mind, this
is the turning point of Maquiling that regrettably still applies in this case: that
whatever professions of faith and allegiance to the Republic that Arnado claims
when his citizenship is in question, the fact remains that during the instances that
he used his US passport despite having a Philippine passport in his possession,
those same professions became hollow. And, that up to the filing of Arnado's
Certificate of Candidacy for the 2013 elections, he failed to remedy the fatal blow
that such repeated use of his US passport dealt on his electoral qualifications.
DISSENTING – J. BRION
 To be voted upon to an elective office, a natural-born Filipino citizen who has
implicitly renounced foreign allegiance when he or she swears allegiance to the
Republic under RA 9225 must still make his or her previous implicit renunciation
"express” and must "make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship (Sec. 5(2) RA 9225)." The requirement of an express
renunciation, however, does not negate the effect of, or make any less real, the
prior implicit renunciation of citizenship and allegiance made upon taking the oath
of allegiance. The oath of allegiance not only allows these natural-born Filipinos to
re-acquire Philippine citizenship; thereby, they also implicitly renounce their
citizenship and allegiance to any and all foreign country as they assert allegiance
to the "supreme authority of the Philippines and maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto". The oath of renunciation, on the other hand, complements their oath of
allegiance through the express manifestation, for purpose of running for public
office, that the candidate is a "pure" Filipino. Arnado became a "pure" Philippine
citizen when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippines on July 10 2008, and
his oath of renunciation on April 3 2009.
 The Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the May 9 2013
Confirmation of Oath of Affirmation was out of time. First, at the time the October 1
2012 COC was filed, the prevailing ruling, although then contested before the
Court, was the Comelec en banc ruling that did not consider Arnado disqualified.
Second, since the Comelec did not accept Arnado's May 9 2013 Affidavit of
Renunciation (for the May 2013 Elections) in the light of the Maquiling ruling
(affecting the May 2010 elections), he was placed in an impossible situation of
being disqualified in the May 2013 Elections for a ruling applicable only to the May
2010 Elections, without being given the opportunity to submit his compliance for
the May 2013 Elections. Third, Arnado's May 9, 2013 Affidavit of Renunciation,
submitted to comply with his May 2013 candidacy, was rejected because it should
have been filed on October 1 2012 when he filed his CoC for the May 2013
elections. If the Maquiling ruling of April 16, 2013, which addressed the separate
2010 disqualification case, was made to retroactively apply to October 1, 2012, in
the separate 2013 disqualification case, then a retroactive opportunity should also
be given in the 2013 disqualification case to comply with what retroactively applied
in Maquiling. To the extent that Arnado was denied the chance to submit a
replacement oath of renunciation in 2013, there was an unfair and abusive denial
of opportunity equivalent to grave abuse of discretion.
 If the Maquiling ruling of April 16 2013, which addressed the separate 2010
disqualification case, was made to retroactively apply to October 1 2012, in the
separate 2013 disqualification case, then a retroactive opportunity should also be
given in the 2013 disqualification case to comply with what retroactively applied in
Maquiling. To the extent that Arnado was denied the chance to submit a
replacement oath of renunciation in 2013, there was an unfair and abusive denial
of opportunity equivalent to grave abuse of discretion.
 The Maquiling ruling is limited to Arnado's qualification to run for public office and
only for the purpose of the May 2010 elections. First, the Maquiling ruling only
considered the material facts surrounding the May 2010 Elections. Second,
Maquiling declared as recanted only the express renunciation that Arnado
executed on April 3, 2009, not the implied renunciation that Arnado made on
several occasions when he swore allegiance to the supreme authority of the
Republic. Third, Arnado became a "pure" Philippine citizen as of April 3, 2009, a
legal consequence that Maquiling recognized and conceded. Fourth, even
Maquiling did not perpetually and absolutely disqualify Arnado from running for
any elective public office, or from running in any elections as they declared that
"he is disqualified from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections."
 Arnado's May 9 2013 Affidavit of Renunciation, affirming his April 3 2009 Affidavit,
cured any alleged defect in his
 qualification to run for public office during the May 2013 Elections. Granting that
Arnado's use of his US passport amounted to a withdrawal of the express
renunciation he made of his allegiance to the US, this withdrawal does not erase
the fact that he did make an express renunciation of his US citizenship. To my
mind, this express renunciation, even if recanted, may still be re-affirmed, in the
same way a statement already made and subsequently denied, can be re-
confirmed. Thus, Arnado's 2013 Affidavit of Renunciation can validly re-affirm the
2009 express renunciation that the Court held to have been recanted in Maquiling.
 The intervening Maquiling ruling did not and could not have invalidated his status
as a ''pure" Philippine citizen who was qualified to run and had filed a valid COC
for the May 2013 Elections. Under the circumstances, Arnado had effectively
become a "pure" natural-born Philippine citizen again on October 1 2012, when he
executed the retroactive and curative May 9 2013 Affidavit of Renunciation, and
which status continued well beyond the May 2013 Elections.
 When Arnado filed his CoC on October 1 2012, the Comelec En Banc, in its
February 2 2011 Resolution declared him as qualified to run for the elective office.
Hence, Arnado did not need to execute another Affidavit of Renunciation because
of this standing Comelec ruling. This Comelec ruling still stood and had not yet
been overturned at the time Arnado filed his CoC on October 1 2012 for the May
2013 Elections. Arnado, therefore, had every right and reason to rely on this
Comelec ruling and to believe that he was not disqualified to run in the May 2013
Elections. I concede that, as the events have shown, he should, in retrospect,
have exercised greater care and have taken every.step to secure his qualification
 to run for public office. His failure, however, should not and cannot affect his discretion over the sovereign will of the people. In case of doubt, political laws
qualification which then stands and is authoritatively affirmed by the Comelec. must be so construed as to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely
 Arnado's persistent assertions of his allegiance to the Republic and renunciation expressed through the ballot.
of his US citizenship more than sufficiently proved his determined resolve to
profess allegiance only to the Republic. These continuing assertions should have
resolved any doubt in favor of his qualification.
 Under the circumstances, the Comelec committed GADALEJ. First, it relied
completely and indiscriminately on the Maquiling ruling - the wrong and irrelevant,
or at the very least, incomplete - consideration in deciding the underlying
disqualification case; and second, it did not make its own finding of facts and
evaluation of the evidence, independent of Maquiling, and disregarded relevant
facts and evidence subsequent to Maquiling - a clear misapprehension of the
facts.
 At any rate, all doubts should be resolved in favor of Arnado's qualification. The
mandate of the people of Kauswagan that twice elected Arnado as their Mayor
should be respected and upheld. Court should respect and uphold the will of the
electorate.

CONCURRING & DISSENTING – J. LEONEN

 Petitioner was already a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his Certificate of
Candidacy on October 1 2012. Petitioner has performed all the acts required by
RA 9225 in order to reacquire his Filipino citizenship. Petitioner took his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 10 2008. On April 3 2009, he
executed his Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. Petitioner alleges
that he executed his Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance on
November 30 2009. On May 9 2013, he again executed the Affidavit Affirming
Arnado's "Affidavit of Renunciation Dated April 3 2009." Petitioner renounced his
American citizenship no less than three times before he filed his Certificate of
Candidacy on October 1 2012.
 Petitioner's use of his American passport was an isolated act required by the
circumstances. At that time, he had not yet been issued his Philippine passport.
Petitioner could use only his American passport when he traveled on April 14 2009
since the Consulate of the Philippines had not yet issued him a Philippine
passport. When petitioner received his Philippine passport sometime in
September 2009, he could not immediately use it to exit the United States since
he entered the country using an American passport. If he exited using a Philippine
passport, one presumably without an American visa, immigration authorities of
both the Philippines and the United States would have questioned his travel
documents. He would have had no choice but to use his American passport to exit
the United States. However, petitioner did use his Philippine passport in his
subsequent travels.
 Even if the ponencia applied the ruling in Maquiling, Amado should have already
been qualified to run in the 2013 Elections. Amado, by using his US passport after
renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation
he took. Therefore, it can be reasonably concluded that, per Maquiling, petitioner's
use of his Philippine passport signifies his Philippine citizenship.
 Election laws must be interpreted to give effect to the will of the people. Petitioner
garnered an overwhelming 8,902 votes, 84% of the total votes case in the 2013
mayoralty elections. If he is disqualified, Florante Capitan, his opponent who
garnered 1,707 votes, a mere 16% of the total votes cast, will become the duly
elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. This court will have substituted its
 AGUSTIN v. COMELEC
November 10, 2015 | Bersamin, J. | Disqualification
Digester: Valena, Maria Patricia S.
SUMMARY: Petitioner Agustin was a dual citizen of both the Philippines and the US,
having been naturalized as an American citizen in 1997. He renounced his American
citizenship on October 2, 2012.
On October 5, 2012, he filed his CoC for the position of Mayor of the Municipality of
Marcos, Ilocos Norte. Rival candidate Pillos filed a Petition to Deny Due
Course/Cancen the COC, alleging that Agustin made a material representation
therein: he stated that he had been a resident of the municipality for 25 years, despite
the fact that he registered as a voter there only in May 2012.
The COMLEC En Banc cancelled the COC, but on the ground that the same was
invalid for Agustin’s failure to prove his compliance with RA 9225 and not on the
grounds alleged in the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed the cancellation of the
COC, but on a different ground – the COC was valid at the time of filing, as Agustin
had already renounced his American citizenship at that time. However, he was
subsequently rendered disqualified by his act of using his US passport to travel to
Hawaii on October 6, 2012: this operated as a repudiation of his renunciation of his
American citizenship, which resulted in his reversion to his previous status of a dual
citizen disqualified under the LGC.
DOCTRINE: Section 40. Disqualifications.—The following persons are disqualified
from running for any elective local position: (d) Those with dual citizenship.
FACTS:
 1997: Petitioner was naturalized as a citizen of the United States of America
(USA).
 On October 5, 2012, he filed his CoC for the position of Mayor of the Municipality
of Marcos, Ilocos Norte as the official candidate of the Nacionalista Party.
o He declared in his CoC that he was eligible for the office he was seeking to
be elected to; that he was a natural-born Filipino citizen; and that he had
been a resident of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte for 25 years.
 October 10, 2012: respondent Salvador S. Pillos, a rival mayoralty candidate,
filed in the COMELEC a Petition To Deny Due Course and/or to Cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy of Arsenio A. Agustin (SPA No. 13-023).
o Petitioner made a material misrepresentation in his CoC by stating that he
had been a resident of the Municipality of Marcos for 25 years despite having
registered as a voter therein only on May 31, 2012.
o Prayed for an order to immediately deny due course and or to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of Arsenio A. Agustin.
 Petitioner’s Answer:
o The one-year requirement referred to residency, not to voter registration;
o Residency was not dependent on citizenship, such that his travel to Hawaii
for business purposes did not violate the residency requirement pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence;
o As regards citizenship, he attached a copy of his Affidavit of Renunciation of
U.S./American Citizenship executed on October 2, 2012.
 COMELEC Second Division denied the petition for lack of merit.
o As far as registration as a voter is concerned, it should suffice that they are
duly registered upon the filing of their COCs or within the period prescribed
by law for such registration.
o No evidence presented to prove that petitioner was a resident/citizen of
another country.
 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION:
o The certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration reflected that the
petitioner had voluntarily declared in his travel documents that he was a
citizen of the USA;
o When he travelled to Hawaii, USA on October 6, 2012, he still used his
USA passport despite his renunciation of his USA citizenship on
October 2, 2012 and after filing his CoC on October 5, 2012.
o The petitioner’s declaration of his eligibility in his CoC constituted material
misrepresentation because of his failure to meet the citizenship and
residency requirements.
 April 23, 2013: COMELEC En Banc issued its assailed resolution cancelling
and denying due course to the petitioner’s CoC
o Having admitted his dual citizenship, Agustin had the burden of proving
through his evidence that he complied with the statutory requirements
imposed upon dual citizens provided under Republic Act 9225 xxx
o Having failed to sufficiently show that he complied with the provisions of RA
9225, Agustin’s COC must be cancelled and/or denied due course.
Consequently, the Motion for Reconsideration is only granted as against
Respondent Agustin
 May 3, 2013: petitioner filed a Verified Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
with Leave of Court. He attached copies of the Order of Approval dated
February 12, 2012 and his Oath of Allegiance dated March 9, 2012, both issued
by the Consulate General of the Philippines in Honolulu, Hawaii. He further
attached certifications issued by Election Officers in Ilocos Norte attesting that
the documents ad been received by the COMELEC and retained in its files. He
explained that the documents were not presented during the course of the
proceedings because the sole issue raised by Pillos’ Petition had involved only
his compliance with the one-year residency requirement.
 Pillos submitted a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution and Comment on the
Verified Motion for Reconsideration with Leave of Court to implement the
cancellation of the petitioner’s COC.
 On election day, May 13, 2013, the name of the petitioner remained in the
ballot, and he won, obtaining 5,020 votes, the highest among the contending
parties.
 Petitioner then filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Verified Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration with Leave of Court. He subsequently instituted this case,
alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the COMELEC En Banc (for the 23 April 2013
resolution).
 Meanwhile, the COMELEC En Banc, pointing out that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration of an En Banc resolution was not allowed, issued the writ of
execution.
RULING: Petition denied.
Whether petitioner is eligible as a candidate for the position of Mayor of the
Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte – NO.
 The Court finds and declares that the petitioner made no material
misrepresentation in his CoC; hence, there is no legal or factual basis for
 the cancellation of the CoC. Even so, he was disqualified to run as Mayor of
the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte for being a dual citizen. With his
disqualification having been determined and pronounced by final judgment before
the elections, the votes cast in his favor should not be counted. Accordingly, his
rival, respondent Pillos, should be proclaimed duly elected Mayor for obtaining
the highest number of votes in the elections.
On whether administrative due process was observed - YES
 PETITIONER: the COMELEC En Banc gravely abused its discretion in resolving
Pillos’ motion for reconsideration based on a ground that was neither the basis of
nor raised in the Petition; non-presentation of his Oath of Allegiance should not
be fatal to his constitutional right to run for public office especially because the
sole ground for the Petition had dealt only with the residency requirement, and
Pillos could have included citizenship as a ground by the amendment of his
petition, but he did not move for that purpose; he duly complied with the
requirements for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship pursuant to
Republic Act No. 9225, and the proof of the reacquisition had been submitted to
the Election Officers in Ilocos Norte; and the COMELEC, by not at least holding a
clarificatory hearing to ascertain and confirm such matters, violated his right to
due process by denying to him the opportunity to prepare for his defense.
 COURT: Petitioner’s citizenship came to the fore because he himself asserted
his Philippine citizenship in his answer to Pillos’ petition, in order to bolster his
allegation of compliance with the one-year residency requirement. As such, he
could not credibly complain about being denied due process, especially
considering that he had been able to file an opposition to Pillos’ motion for
reconsideration. Election cases: due process is satisfied by giving the opportunity
to seek the reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
Whether the COC was valid – YES, but!!! the use of his USA passport after his
renunciation
of foreign citizenship rendered him disqualified from continuing
as a mayoralty candidate
 A valid CoC arises upon the timely filing of a person’s declaration of his intention
to run for public office and his affirmation that he possesses the eligibility for the
position he seeks to assume, and it renders the person making the declaration a
valid or official candidate.
 The petition of Pillos was in the nature of the Sec. 78 petitioni to deny due course
to or to cancel the CoC of the petitioner because it contained allegations
pertaining to a Sec. 78 petition, namely: (a) the petitioner as a candidate made a
representation in his CoC; (b) the representation referred to a material matter that
would affect his substantive right as candidate (that is, the right to run for the
position for which he filed his CoC); and (c) he made the false representation with
the intention to deceive the electorate as to his qualification for public office, or he
deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise
render him ineligible. Pillos further challenged the petitioner’s eligibility for public
office based on his failure to comply with the one-year residency requirement
stated in the LGC, and ultimately specifically prayed that the COMELEC “issue
an order to immediately deny due course and or to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of respondent Arsenio A. Agustin.”
 BUT, the COMELEC En Banc canceled the petitioner’s CoC not because of
his failure to meet the residency requirement but because of his failure “to
sufficiently show that he complied with the provisions of RA 9225.” Such
basis for cancellation was unwarranted considering that he became eligible to run
for public office when he expressly renounced his USA citizenship, by which he
fully complied with Section 5(2) of RA 9225.ii
 Petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance on March 9, 2012 and executed his
Affidavit of Renunciation on October 2, 2012. By his Oath of Allegiance and his
renunciation of his USA citizenship, he reverted to the status of an exclusively
Filipino citizen. On October 5, 2012, the date he filed his CoC he was, therefore,
exclusively a Filipino citizen, rendering him eligible to run for public office. His
CoC was valid for all intents and purposes of the election laws because he did
not make therein any material misrepresentation of his eligibility to run as Mayor
of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte.
 BUT, on October 6, 2012, he travelled abroad using his USA passport, thereby
representing himself as a citizen of the USA. He continued using his USA
passport in his subsequent travels abroad despite having been already issued his
Philippine passport. He thereby effectively repudiated his oath of renunciation on
October 6, 2012, the first time he used his USA passport after renouncing his
USA citizenship on October 2, 2012. Consequently, he could be considered an
exclusively Filipino citizen only for the four days from October 2, 2012 until
October 6, 2012. Such reversion disqualified him from being elected to public
office in the Philippines pursuant to Sec. 40(d) of the LGC.iii
 A candidate is ineligible if he is disqualified to be elected to office, and he is
disqualified if he lacks any of the qualifications for elective office. Even if it made
no finding that the petitioner had deliberately attempted to mislead or to
misinform as to warrant the cancellation of his CoC, the COMELEC could still
declare him disqualified for not meeting the requisite eligibility under the LGC.
On the effect of the disqualification
 The effect of the petitioner’s disqualification under the April 23, 2013 resolution
depended on when the disqualification attained finality. The distinction exists
because of Sec. 6 of RA 6646 (The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987)iv –
basically a candidate who is disqualified by final judgment before an election
cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted.
 Cayat v COMELEC: The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by
final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him
shall not be counted. This is a mandatory provision of law xxx Section 6 of the
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers two situations. The first is when the
disqualification becomes final before the elections, which is the situation covered
in the first sentence of Section 6. The second is when the disqualification
becomes final after the elections, which is the situation covered in the second
sentence of Section 6.
 Even if his disqualification did not subvert the validity of his CoC, the petitioner
would be reduced to a noncandidate under the terms of Section 6, should it
be shown that the disqualification attained finality prior to the 2013
elections. The effect was to render the votes cast in his favor stray, resulting in
Pillos being proclaimed the winning candidate.
 PILLOS: the April 23, 2013 resolution was already deemed final and executory as
of May 4, 2013; hence, the writ of execution was issued on June 18, 2013; and
that the petitioner’s disqualification thus attained finality prior to the May 13, 2013
elections.
 COURT: Correct! Although petitioner filed his Verified Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration with Leave of Court, such filing did not impede the April 23,
 2013 resolution from being deemed final and executory because MR’s are not
allowed under Section 1(d), Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
 The April 23, 2013 resolution became final and executory as of May 4, 2013 upon
the lapse of five days from its promulgation without a restraining order being
issued by the Supreme Court.

Panadero v. COMELEC / 2016 / J.
Reyes 3 cases consolidated:
1st case: PETS: USec. Austere Panadero and Regional Dir. Rene
Burdeos (DILG) RESPS: COMELEC
2nd case: PETS: USec Austere Panadero and Regional Dir. Rene Burdeos
(DILG) RESPS: COMELEC and Mohammad Exchan Gabriel Limbona
3rd case: PET: Mangondaya Asum Tago RESPS: COMELEC and Mohammad
Exchan Gabriel Limbona
SUMMARY: Limbona was found guilty of administrative
misconduct by the Ombudsman when he was Brgy Chairman.
The latter ordered his dismissal from government service.
When Limbona ran for mayor, a disqualification case was filed
against him in the COMELEC which was resolved in his favor
saying the administrative case did not disqualify him from
running for Mayor. Meanwhile, The DILG USec. tried
implementing their order through the Regional Dir but the camp
of Limbona presented them the COMELEC Resolution finding
him qualified to run. Through a petition by Limbona, the
COMELEC cited petitioners in indirect contempt and imposed
penalties of fines and imprisonment. The Petitioners argue that
they are beyond the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and cannot
be cited in indirect contempt. SC limited the discussion on
contempt power of COMELEC and ultimately sided with
petitioners.
DOCTRINE: Ratio a,b,c.
FACTS:
1. In 2009, Office of Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon and approved by
Ombudsman Gutierrez found Limbona guilty of grave misconduct,
oppression and conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the service
while he was Chairman of Brgy. Kalanganan Lower, Pantar, Lanao Del
Norte, in relation to the killing of former Municipal Vice Mayor Onos. He
was dismissed from public service with accessory penalties of
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual
disqualification from re-employment in the government.
2. In 2013, DILG Sec Panadero was ordered to implement it against Limbona.
Meanwhile, Limbona won as Municipal Mayor of Pantar. DILG Sec Panadero
directed RD Burdeos of DILG Region X, to cause immediate implementation.
3. In 2014, RD Burdeos reported that he received from Limbona’s camp, a
resolution from COMELEC First Division dismissing the petition for
disqualification filed by Malik Alingan against Limbona which discussed the
eligibility to run after Ombudsman found him guilty in 2009. The resolution
declared that the administrative misconduct in 2008 was condoned by people
when Limbona was elected in 2010 as Mayor thus not a ground for
disqualification for 2013 elections.
4. While RD Burdeos sought clarification from Ombudsman Carpio-Morales on
applicability of the Aguinaldo doctrine, USec. Panadero issued a memorandum
directing him to proceed with the implementation of Ombudsman’s decision.
Limbona sought the Office of the President to revoke the DILG Memo against
him. It was dismissed on the ground that petitioners were justified in the
implementation of the Ombudsman’s decision. DILG served the dismissal order
of Limbona leading to his removal from office and assumption of Vice Mayor
Tago to his position.
5. Limbona filed with COMELEC a petition to cite petitioners for indirect
contempt. DILG now received endorsement from Ombudsman to implement
the order against Limbona. Petitioners argue:
a. COMELEC Resolution was not yet final because it remained
pending with COMELEC En Banc thus petition of Limbona was
premature
b. COMELEC had no jurisdiction over petitioner and the decision of
Ombudsman
c. Petitioners not in bad faith as they merely implemented final and
executory decision of Ombudsman
6. COMELEC En Banc said that the condonation was inapplicable to Limbona’s
case as he was elected as Mayor (2010-2013), which was different from his
position of Brgy. Chairman (2007-2010) when the administrative case was
filed. Nonetheless, Limbona was qualified to run because he wasn’t removed
from post of Brgy. Chairman and was able to finish the term prior to finality of
the Ombudsman decision. Sec 40(b) of LGC disqualified persons running for
any elective office when “removed from office as a result of an administrative
case” thus petitioners were cited in indirect contempt. Petitioners violated the
final and executory decision of the COMELEC finding Limbona qualified to
run and ordering Tago to assume his post.
7. Petitioner’s arguments before the SC:
a. 1st case (Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64)
i. COMELEC has no jurisdiction over acts of Ombudsman
ii. No basis to hold them in contempt
iii. Aguinaldo doctrine doesn’t apply
b. 2nd case (Petition for Certiorari with very urgent application for a
writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO)
i. COMELEC cannot motu proprio amend its decision by
imposing fine and imprisonment
 the DILG even seeking clarification from Ombudsman which later
ii. COMELEC had no jurisdiction reiterated instructions to implement the decision.

iii. NOTE: COURT issued TRO against issuance of arrest f. Limbona’s recourse to nullify the actions of DILG officials couldn’t be
warrants pending determination of merits on the petition allowed through a petition for contempt. His petition to revoke with OP
was dismissed in fact, as to revoke USec. Panadero’s memo would
c. 3rd case (Petition for Certiorari) encroach upon disciplining authority of the Ombudsman.

i. Petitioners did not commit acts constituting indirect 2. FALLO: Wherefore, the petitions are granted. The resolutions dated November
contempt as his assumption to office had legal bases 17, 2004 and January 5, 2015 of the COMELEC en banc are ANNULLED AND
(Ombudsman and DILG issuances, LGC provision on SET ASIDE.
succession)

ISSUE: WoN COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in finding petitioners in

contempt of court and imposing fines and imprisonment?

NOTE: The determination of petitions is limited to the COMELEC resolutions on the

finding of indirect contempt and penalties imposed.

1. YES. First off, the power of Contempt is given to Comelec by virtue of Art
VII, Sec 52(e) of the Omnibus Election Code. In defining indirect contempt,
we look at Sec 2, Rule 29 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. However,
petitioners are not guilty of such act.

a. COMELEC Resolution is different from the Ombudsman’s

decision with 2 distinct issues. Former related to
Limbona’s qualifications. Implementation of one will not
result to the violation of the other.

b. COMELEC’s decision to allow Limbona’s candidacy did

not disregard Ombudsman’s decision. The fact of
conviction in the administrative case except no removal as
required by law transpired during Limbona’s prior tenure
as a public official.

c. Actions of DILG were mere implementation of

Ombudsman’s decision which neither argued nor declared
Limbona to be disqualified from the mayoralty. Limbona,
even if qualified for 2013 elections, did not mean he could
no longer be dismissed from service as a result of the
administrative case. Ombudsman’s decision carried other
sanctions other than dismissal which couldn’t have been
rendered ineffective by the COMELEC’s decision in the
disqualification case.

d. Rivulet Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Parungao says “To be

contemptuous, an act must be clearly contrary to or prohibited
by the order of the court.”

e. In any case, even if COMELEC issuances barred DILG from

service of dismissal order, petitioners couldn’t be guilty of contempt
because records indicate that there was good faith on the part of
 Campol vs Balao-As
G.R. No. 197634 / November 28, 2016 / Jardeleza, J./ Locgov /JMB
NATURE Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
PETITIONERS Julius B. Campol
RESPONDENTS Mayor Ronald S. Balao-As and Vice Mayor Dominador I.
Sianen
SUMMARY. Campol was illegally dismissed. The CA ruled that reinstatement was no
longer possible since Campol has a new job at PAO and his backwages should only
be until his employment in PAO. The SC detailed previous jurisprudence to show and
explain that the current rule now is to reinstate an illegally dismissed employee
despite having new employment and for backwages until reinstatement.
DOCTRINE. The reinstatement of an illegally dismissed employee is proper even
when another person is already occupying the position. An employee of the civil
service who is ordered reinstated is also entitled to the full payment of his or her
backwages during the entire period of time that he or she was wrongfully prevented
from performing the duties of his or her position and from enjoying its benefits. Any
income he may have obtained during the litigation of the case shall not be deducted
from this amount. This is consistent with our ruling that an employee illegally
dismissed has the right to live and to find employment elsewhere during the pendency
of the case. At the same time, an employer who illegally dismisses an employee has
the obligation to pay him or her what he or she should have received had the illegal
act not be done. It is an employer's price or penalty for illegally dismissing an
employee.
FACTS.
 Campol served the Municipality of Boliney, Abra since 1999 as Secretary to
the Sangguniang Bayan (SB). He held the position in a permanent capacity with
salary grade 24.
 2004 elections: Balao-as and Sianen won as mayor and vice-mayor, respectively
and assumed office in July 2004.
 The SB passed a resolution terminating Campol as SB Secretary on the ground
that he was absent without approved leave from Aug 1 - Sept 30, 2004. However,
when the resolution was transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP), it
referred the matter to CSC-Abra. CSC-Abra then wrote Sianen informing him that
Campol cannot be removed from his position because he is protected by the
Administrative Code. The SP followed this advice. The Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG)-Abra also took the same position. Despite the
unanimous position of these three agencies, Sianen issued Memorandum Order
No. 001, Series of 2004, which dropped Campol from the rolls. Campol
challenged the memorandum.
 CSC-CAR: ruled in Campol’s favor.
 CSC: Campol was properly dropped from the rolls.
 Campol’s Arguments:
o Campol contested the allegation that he committed absences without
any approved leave. To substantiate his claim, Campol stated that he in
fact received his salary for September 2004. He also sought to prove,
through the logbook of meetings that he kept as Secretary of the SB,
that he was present on August 2, 9, 16, 23, 30 and September 6, 13 and
20, 2004. He also claimed that Sianen denied his application for sick
leave from September 16 to 24, 2004 so as to make it appear that he
was absent for more than 30 days.
o Campol challenged the propriety of his summary dismissal arguing that
he was deprived of his right to due process.
 CA: no ground to justify Campol’s dismissal, however, because of Campol was
already employed with the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), reinstatement was no
longer possible. Campol is entitled to backwages from his dismissal until October
2005, prior to his employment in PAO.
 Campol contests CA’s ruling. He explained that he was forced to find another job
in order to provide for his two young daughters. He relates that during the
pendency of this case, his wife, a PAO lawyer, was gunned down on September
5, 2005. Thus, in the face of the loss of his wife and his continuing
unemployment, Campol had no choice but to accept a job from the agency that
formerly employed his wife. He highlights that his position as SB Secretary falls
under salary grade 24 while his employment with PAO as administrative aide IV
is only salary grade 4.
ISSUES & RATIO.
4. WON Campol is entitled to reinstatement and to the payment of his backwages
from the time of his dismissal until he is reinstated. – YES.
Note: Campol’s dismissal was in 2004 and the decision ruling that he was illegally
dropped from the rolls was promulgated only in 2010. Had it not been for the
improper appreciation of the applicable laws and jurisprudence, Campol should
have been reinstated to his rightful position as SB Secretary 5 years ago.
Law on Reinstatement
 Section 2, paragraph 3 of Article IX-B of the Constitution states -
No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended
except for cause provided by law.
 The CA did not cite any law or jurisprudence to support its ruling, but it was in
the tenor of the 1988 Ginson v. Mun. of Murcia and 1991 Regis, Jr. v. Osmeña,
Jr. cases. Both cases ruled that reinstatement was subject to the condition that
no other employment has been obtained. None of these cases fully explains
the rationale for such condition.
 In a 1960 case, Tan v. Gimenez we have pursued the doctrine that an
employee of the civil service illegally dismissed from office has the right to
reinstatement. Any other employment he or she obtains while waiting for the
court to rule on the propriety of his or her dismissal should not be construed as
an abandonment of his or her position. This was reiterated in a 1961 case,
Gonzales v. Hernandez. In Tañala v. Legaspi, citing Batungbakal v. National
Development Company, it was held that the reinstatement of an illegally
dismissed employee is proper even when another person is already occupying
the position. More recent cases have moved away from the ruling in Ginson
and Regis in favor of Tan and Tañala, such as the 2000 case of Salvador v.
CA, 2001 case of Canonizado v. Aguirre.
 The doctrine in Tan, Tañala, Gonzales, Salvador and Canonizado is the proper
rule. It is more in keeping with the constitutional value placed on security of
tenure. To follow the ruling in Ginson and Regis is to rule in favor of penalizing
an illegally dismissed employee. It will render pointless the right of employees
of the civil service to security of tenure. It is a doctrine that values technicalities
more than justice. It forces an illegally dismissed employee to choose between
 pursuing his or her case and to fight for his or her rights or to simply accept his
or her dismissal and find employment elsewhere. This is not the kind of
doctrine that rightfully embodies our aspiration to uphold the Constitution and
to render justice.
 In the eyes of the law, the position never became vacant since Campol was
illegally dropped from the rolls. Hence, the incumbency of the person who
assumed the position is only temporary and must give way to Campol whose
right to the office has been recognized by the proper authorities.
We said, "[i]t is an obligation of the employer because it is 'the price or penalty
the employer has to pay for illegally dismissing his employee."
 Employees in the Civil Service should be accorded the same right.
DECISION.
Petition granted.

The Law on Backwages

 Ginson, Regis, Cristobal v. Melchor, Balquidra v. CFI of Capiz, Branch II,
Laganapan v. Asedillo, Antiporda v. Ticao, and San Luis v. Court of Appeals:
limited backwages to a period of 5 years. All cases do not provide for an
exhaustive explanation for this 5-year cap. Except in Cristobal, a 1977 case,
where it was held that the award of backwages should be for a fixed period of
five years, applying by analogy the then prevailing doctrine in labor law
involving employees who suffered unfair labor practice. We highlight that this
rule has been rendered obsolete by virtue of RA 6175 which amended the
Labor Code. Under the Labor Code, employees illegally dismissed are entitled
to the payment of backwages from the time his or her compensation was
withheld up to the time of his or her actual reinstatement.
 (Correct ruling according to SC) In 2005, jurisprudence on backwages veered
away from the Cristobal ruling. In CSC v. Gentallan, an illegally dismissed
government employee who is later ordered reinstated is entitled to
backwages and other monetary benefits from the time of her illegal
dismissal up to her reinstatement. This is only fair and just because an
employee who is reinstated after having been illegally dismissed is
considered as not having left her office. This ruling was reiterated in the
2005 case of Batangas State University v. Bonifacio, 2007 case Romagos v.
Metro Cebu Water District, and 2010 case CSC v. Magnaye, Jr.
 This entitlement to full backwages also means that there is no need to deduct
Campol's earnings from his employment with PAO from the award. The right to
receive full backwages means exactly this-that it corresponds to Campol's
salary at the time of his dismissal until his reinstatement. Any income he may
have obtained during the litigation of the case shall not be deducted from this
amount. This is consistent with our ruling that an employee illegally dismissed
has the right to live and to find employment elsewhere during the pendency of
the case. At the same time, an employer who illegally dismisses an employee
has the obligation to pay him or her what he or she should have received had
the illegal act not be done. It is an employer's price or penalty for illegally
dismissing an employee.
 Note that even in labor law, this is now the prevailing rule. In Bustamante v.
NLRC, we reversed the prior doctrine that an employee illegally dismissed is
entitled to backwages less the salary he or she received from his or her
employment during the pendency of the case. In Equitable Banking
Corporation v. Sadac, we added that in arriving at the doctrine in Bustamante,
this Court ceased to consider equity as the determining factor in ascertaining
the amount of backwages that should be awarded in cases where the illegally
dismissed employee obtains employment during the pendency of his or her
case. What is determinative is the employer's obligation to pay full backwages.
 MATURAN v COMELEC
MARCH 28,2017 | BERSAMIN | DISQUALIFICATION|
MIKEE
PETITIONERS: JOEL T. MATURAN
RESPONDENTS: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ALLAN PATIÑO
SUMMARY: PET filed CoC. RESP Patiño a registered voter moved to disqualify him
on ground that he failed to file his SOCE twice in the past (2010 and 2013 elections).
PET argues that he already paid fine for 2010 election and that in the 2013 election
he had withdrawn from the election so he did not need to file a SOCE. COMELEC
disqualifies him saying that he was required to file for both elections and since he did
not file more than once according to Sec 14 of RA 7166 he should be perpetually
disqualified from running for office. SC agreed with this. His defense of GF with
regard the 2013 election is of no moment. Section 14 uses the word “EVERY
CANDIDATE” it makes no distinction. It also uses the word “SHALL” making it
mandatory. So PET’s failure to file constitutes a violation of said RA.
DOCTRINE: Penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office may be
properly imposed on a candidate for public office who repeatedly fails to submit his
Statement of Contributions and Expenditures (SOCE) pursuant to Section 14 of
Republic Act No. 7166.1 The penalty does not amount to the cruel, degrading and
inhuman punishment proscribed by the Bill of Rights.
FACTS:
2. October 16, 2015, the PET filed his CoC for the position of Provincial
Governor of Basilan for 2016 National and Local Elections.
3. RESP Allan Patiño: registered voter of Basilan, filed a petition for the
disqualification of the petitioner on the ground that based on the list issued
by the COMELEC Campaign Finance Officer the latter had failed to file his
SOCE corresponding to the 2010 and 2013 elections.
4. PET Counter: petition had been rendered moot on account of his withdrawal
from the mayoralty race during the 2013 elections; and that, consequently,
he could only be held accountable for the failure to file his SOCE
corresponding to the 2010 elections when he ran for Provincial Governor of
Basilan, and for which he had already paid a fine of ₱l5,000.00.
5. June 6, 2016: the COMELEC First Division declared petitioner
PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED to hold public office.
Upon verification from the CFO, Maturan in fact does not have a
SOCE on record for the 2010 elections. Accordingly, per
COMELEC Resolution No. 15-0495, an administrative fine in the
amount of Php 15,000.00 was imposed upon him. Maturan
admitted that he paid said fine on 23 November 2015.
Likewise, for his 2013 candidacy, Maturan does not have a SOCE
on record with the CFO. Maturan argued that by virtue of the
withdrawal of his candidacy on 12 May 2013, just a day before the
elections, he is not required to file his SOCE.
Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a
statement of contributions and expenditures because he was a
'non-candidate,' having withdrawn his certificate of candidacy three
days after its filing. Petitioner posits that "it is ... clear from the law
that the candidate must have entered the political contest, and
should have either won or lost." –WITHOUT MERIT! Section 14 of
R.A. No. 7166 states that "every candidate" has the obligation
to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. Law
does not make a distinction, it says “every”. COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 2348 (sec 13) stating that it pertains to
all candidates who filed their candidacy. Section 14 of the law
uses the word "shall." As a general rule, the use of the word
"shall" in a statute implies that the statute is mandatory, and
imposes a duty which may be enforced, particularly if public
policy is in favor of this meaning or where public interest is
involved.
6. COMELEC EN BANC: AFFIRMED.
ISSUES + RATIO
W/N COMELEC committed GADALEJ when it declared that PET. Maturan is
perpetually disqualified? –NO
5. The petitioner's allegation of GAD on the part of the COMELEC for
imposing upon him the penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold
public office is hollow. In imposing the penalty, the COMELEC clearly
acted within the bounds of its jurisdiction in view of the clear
language of Section 14 of R.A. No.
7166, viz.:
Section 14. Statement of Contributions and
Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File Statement. - Every
candidate and treasurer of the political party shall, within thirty
(30) days after the day of the election, file in duplicate with the
offices of the Commission the full, true and itemized statement of
all contributions and expenditures in connection with the election.
xxxx
Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to
file the statements or reports in connection with electoral
contributions and expenditures are required herein shall constitute
an administrative offense for which the offenders shall be liable to
pay an administrative fine ranging from One thousand pesos
(₱l,000.00) to Thirty thousand pesos (₱30,000.00), in the discretion
of the Commission.
The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from
receipt of notice of such failure; otherwise, it shall be
enforceable by a writ of execution issued by the Commission
against the properties of the offender.
xxxx
For the commission of a second or subsequent offense
under this section, the administrative fine shall be from Two
thousand pesos (₱ 2,000.00) to Sixty thousand pesos (₱60,000.00),
in the discretion of the Commission. In addition, the offender shall
be subject to perpetual disqualification to hold public office.
8. Nonetheless, the petitioner submits that he only failed to submit his
SOCE once, in 2010. He pleads GF because he thought that he was no
longer required to submit his SOCE for the 2013 elections because of his
 having withdrawn from the mayoral race in that year. His plea of good
faith is undeserving of consideration.
9. The petitioner should have paid heed to the 1995 ruling in Pilar v.
Commission of Elections,10 which the COMELEC properly cited in
its assailed resolution. Based on Pilar, every candidate, including
one who meanwhile withdraws his candidacy, is required to file his
SOCE by Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166. Accordingly, the petitioner
could not invoke good faith on the basis of his having withdrawn his
candidacy a day before the 2013 elections.

W/N PET. for disqualification is moot with re: 2013 grounds? No. He still liable
for it as the COMELEC explained that all candidates are required to file. (SEE
COMELEC decision above which is underlines and in bold)

W/N imposition of perpetual disqualification for those who failed to file

their SOCE more than once is gracely excessive?

b PET: invoking Section 19(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides: Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. x x x .
i. He contends that the failure to file the SOCE is an offense far
less grave than the serious crimes under the Revised Penal
Code and the grave offenses under the civil service laws.
c SC: We have always deferred to the wisdom of Congress in enacting a law.
We can only enforce a statute like R.A. No. 7166 unless there is a clear
showing that it contravenes the Constitution. The petitioner has not
demonstrated herein how R.A. No. 7166 could have transgressed the
Constitution. On the contrary, a review of R.A. No. 7166 convincingly
indicates that perpetual disqualification from public office has been
prescribed as a penalty for the repeated failure to file the SOCE and does
not constitute cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. Penalty is intended
to underscore the need to file the SOCE as another means of ensuring the
sanctity of the electoral process.
d We have already settled that the constitutional proscription under the Bill of
Rights extends only to situations of extreme corporeal or psychological
punishment that strips the individual of his humanity. NOT flagrantly and
plainly oppressive and wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense
as to shock the moral sense of the community
 ALBANIA v. COMELEC e Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials… three years and no … more
G.R. No. 226792 / 6 Jun 2017 / Peralta, J. / MATConejero than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office … not considered
as interruption in continuity of service for the full elective term; Section 43. Term of
NATURE Rule 64 petition for certiorari Office. - (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive
PETITIONERS Sofronio Albania terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation …
RESPONDENTS COMELEC, Edgardo Tallado f Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - … may
be filed … exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained
SUMMARY. Edgardo Tallado served for the last three months of the 2007-2010 therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false… not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided … not
term after filing a petition for correction of manifest error against the proclaimed later than fifteen days before the election.
Governor of Camarines Norte, Jesus Typoco. Tallado then ran and won the
gubernatorial races in 2010 and 2013, after which he filed COC for the same
position in the 2016 election. Albania as a registered taxpayer filed a case for
disqualification against Tallado for violating the three-term limit and for having been
suspended by the Ombudsman. The COMELEC 2nd division dismissed the case as
the case was for denial/cancellation of COC and was filed out of time; moreover,
Tallado did not fully serve his first term which did not count as part of the three
terms, and was not disqualified by suspension. The COMELEC en banc’s
resolution affirmed this decision, and is herein assailed by Albania. SC affirmed the
en banc as the involuntary interruption of his service as Governor by Typoco’s
assumption of office meant no full term served and no violation of the three-term
limit rule when Tallado ran again.
DOCTRINE. An involuntarily interrupted term cannot be considered as one term for
purposes of counting the three-term limit rule that is embodied in Section 8 of
Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 of the LGC.1

FACTS.
7. Edgardo Tallado’s petition for correction of a manifest error against co-candidate
Jesus
Typoco’s proclamation as Governor of Camarines Norte was granted 5 Mar 2010.
Tallado assumed his duly-elected gubernatorial office for the last three months of
the 2007-2010 term from 22 Mar to 30 June 2010.
8. Tallado ran and won as Governor of Camarines Norte in the 2010 and 2013
elections after which he filed COC for the fourth time on 16 Oct 2015 for the 2016
race.
9. Sofronio Albania as registered voter of Poblacion Sta. Elena filed on 13 Nov 2015
a
petition to disqualify Tallado based on Rule 25 of COMELEC Resn. 9523 and on 2
grounds: o Violation of the three term limit rule under Section 43 LGC
o Tallado’s suspension by a 2 Oct 2015 Ombudsman order for one year without
pay, together with its accessory penalties, for oppression and grave abuse of
authority
10. Tallado in his verified Answer argued four points:
6. the petition should have been one to deny due course to or cancel COC
under Rule 23 of COMELEC Resn. 9523, in relation to Section 78 OEC on
eligibility, as it was
primarily based on alleged ineligibility through violation of the three-term limit
rule
10. this petition has prescribed based on Section 23 Rule 23 where the petition
should be filed 25 days after he filed COC or on 10 Nov 2015 and not 13
Nov
 ii. he did not violate the three-term limit as he did not fully serve the 2007-2010
term o his suspension from office is not a ground for a petition for disqualification
as
Section 40(b) LGC refers to removal and not suspension by administrative
case
d. The COMELEC Second Division on 22 Apr 2016 dismissed the petition and agreed
with all Tallado’s arguments. The COMELEC en banc in its assailed 24 Aug 2016
resolution dismissed Albania’s MR and echoed the Division’s findings, hence this
petition where Albania alleges GADALEJ on the four issues corresponding to
Tallado’s arguments.
ISSUES & RATIO.
2. Whether the COMELEC erred in treating this disqualification petition as one
for denial or cancellation of COC based on the grounds invoked—NO. The
COMELEC was correct in doing so as the two grounds invoked by Albania are
not found within the applicable provisions of Secs. 12 and 68 of BP 881 OEC or
in Sec. 40 LGC.
Suspension from office is not a ground for a petition for disqualification as
Section 40 (b) clearly speaks of removal and not suspension as a result of
an administrative offense for disqualification from an elective local position.
The alleged violation of the three-term limit rule is an ineligibility which is a
proper
ground for a petition to deny or cancel COC under Section 78 OEC.
o Section 74 of the OEC provides that the candidate shall state his
candidacy
and eligibility in his COC, “eligible” meaning having no ineligibilities
to run o A violation of the three-term limit rule is an ineligibility which by
false material representation is a proper ground for a petition to deny
due
course to or to cancel a COC under Section 78 OEC2.
The Constitution has vested in the COMELEC broad powers of enforcement
and administration of election laws, authority to promulgate rules of
procedure, and power to resolve controversies, including determine the true
nature of the cases filed before it based on its averments
3. Whether the petition was filed out of time—YES. A petition under Section 78
of the OEC must comply with the period prescribed under Rule 23 and not Rule
25 as argued by Albania. Since Tallado filed COC on 16 Oct 2015, the petition
should have been filed not later than 25 days from that date or on 10 Nov 2015
and not 28 days after or on 13 Nov.
Petition for denial/cancellation of
Petition for disqualification COC
Under Rule 25, COMELEC Resn. Under Rule 23, COMELEC Resn.
95233 95234
Filing period under Sec. 3 is any day Filing period under Sec. 2 is within five
after 5
the last day for filing of COC, but not days from the last day for filing of
later COC;
but not later than 25 days from the
than the date of proclamation filing
of the assailed COC, or later than 5
days if
the COC is by a substitute candidate
f. Rule 25 - Disqualification of Candidates, Section 1. Grounds…. declared by
final decision of a competent court.. or Commission … disqualification
provided by law or the Constitution.
g. Rule 23 - Petition to Deny Due Course to r Cancel COC, Section 1. Ground for
Denial or Cancellation of COC - … any elective office … exclusive ground that any
material representation contained therein as required by law is false.
3. Whether Tallado violated the three-term limit rule on running for office—NO.
Since Tallado did not serve the full 2007-2010 term as governor, such cannot be
considered as one term for purposes of assessing a violation of the three-term
threshold.
• The second of two conditions was missing for disqualification of a candidate based
on violation of the three-term limit rule
o the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the
same local government post
o he has fully served three consecutive terms
• The Court applied Abundo v. COMELEC, which has similar facts, in ruling that an
involuntary interrupted term is not considered as one term for the three-term limit. o
Abundo won an election protest and assumed the mayoralty post for
around a year and a month from 9 May 2006 until 30 June 2007.
Abundo was not considered to have served the full 2004-2007 term as his
full term was substantially reduced.
The almost two-year period during which Abundo 's opponent served as
Mayor was considered an involuntary interruption of
o Here, Tallado did not serve the full 2007-2010 term since he did not win as
Governor of Camarines Norte in the 2007 elections, but served three months after a
petition for correction of manifest error which cannot be considered as one term for
purposes of the three-term threshold.
• Tallado did not hold the full term of three years to which he was supposedly entitled
to based on the definition of the term ”term”
o Aldovino Jr. v. COMELEC: Art. X, Sec. 8 refers to a "term" as a 3-year period of time
during which a local official has title to office and can serve.
o Appari v. CA (2007 resn): "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period
of time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office. According to
Mechem, the term of office is the period during which an office may be held.
Upon term expiry, rights, duties and authority of a public officer must ipso
facto cease, unless authorized by law to holdover.
The most natural, frequent method by which a public officer
ceases to be such is by expiration of elective/appointive term.
o Gaminde v. COA: term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold
office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall
succeed one another.
4. Whether Tallado’s suspension disqualified him from office—NO. The penalty
of suspension cannot be a bar to his candidacy so long as he meets the qualifications
for the office as provided under Section 66(b) of R.A. No. 7160.
DECISION.
Petition denied. COMELEC en banc resolution affirmed.
TAN VS. CRISOLOGO
November 8, 2017 | Martires, J
PETITIONER: VIVIENNE TAN
RESPONDENT: VINCENT “BINGBONG” CRISOLOGO
SUMMARY: Vivienne Tan was a naturalized US citizen who sought to run for QC 1 st
district representative. However, she only took her Oath of Allegiance to the PH, as
required by RA 9225, after she had applied to be a registered voter. Crisologo
challenged her inclusion in the voter’s list, saying she was not a citizen at the time of
her registration, and that she failed to meet the residency requirement. SC held that
she was not a PH citizen at the time she registered.
DOCTRINE
1. RA 9225 makes a distinction between 1) those who lost PH citizenship
before RA 9225 and reacquired it under the same and 2) those who lost PH
citizenship after RA 9225 and retained citizenship.
2. Tan took her Oath of Allegiance to the US on 19 Jan 2003, before the
enactment of RA 9225. If retroactive application is permitted, then the
distinction is RA 9225 is rendered futile.
3. To consider that the reacquisition of the PH citizenship retroacts to the date
it was lost = absurd scenario where the person would still be considered a
PH citizen when he had renounced his citizenship.
FACTS
1. 19 Jan 1993: Vivienne Tan became a naturalized US citizen.
2. 20 August 2003: RA 9225 was enacted.
3. 26 Oct 2009: Tan applied to be a registered voter in Quezon City. She
indicated that she was a Filipino by birth. The Election Registration Board
approved her application on 16 Nov 2009.
4. 30 Nov 2009: Tan took her Oath of Allegiance to the PH in Makati.
5. 1 Dec 2009: Tan filed a petition before the Bureau of Immigration for the
reacquisition of her PH citizenship and executed a declaration renouncing
allegiance to the US. The BI confirmed her reacquisition.
6. 1 Dec 2009: Tan filed her Certificate of Candidacy to run as QC 1st District
representative.
7. 28 Dec 2009: Bingbong Crisologo filed a petition before the MeTC seeking to
exclude Tan from the voter’s list, alleging 1) she was not a PH citizen when
she registered as a voter and 2) she failed to meet the residency
requirement.
8. MeTC ruled to exclude Tan from the voter’s list, holding that she was not a
PH citizen at the time she registered as a voter.
9. Tan appealed to the RTC. RTC reversed the MeTC and dismissed
Crisologo’s petition. RTC opined that the question of her citizenship was
cured by Tan’s subsequent Oath, Petition for Reacquisition, the BI’s Order
granting the said petition, and Sworn Declaration re: renouncing her
allegiance to the US.
10. The RTC decision became final and executory due to RA 8189. Hence,
Crisologo filed for certiorari before the CA.
11. The CA held that the RTC committed GADALEJ in reversing the MeTC
decision, hence this Petition.
ISSUE/HELD
W/N Tan can be considered a PH citizen at the time she registered as a voter – NO.
Basically, no legal basis for the retroactive application of RA 9225. Her inclusion in
the voter’s list is highly irregular.
W/N when PH citizenship is reacquired after taking the Oath as required by RA 9225,
the effect on citizenship status retroacts to period before taking said oath - NO
RATIO
1. The reacquisition of PH citizenship under RA 9225 requires only the taking
of an oath of allegiance to the PH.
2. RA 9225 makes a distinction between 1) those who lost PH citizenship
before RA 9225 and reacquired it under the same and 2) those who lost PH
citizenship after RA 9225 and retained citizenship.
3. Tan took her Oath of Allegiance to the US on 19 Jan 2003, before the
enactment of RA 9225. If retroactive application is permitted, then the
distinction is RA 9225 is rendered futile.
4. An interpretation giving RA 9225 retroactive effect as contemplated by Tan
would cause confusion, especially with respect to Sec. 3, RA 9225. Verba
legis.
5. The Court also used the holistic approach, citing Mactan-Cebu Intl Airport
Authority vs. Urgello. The law must not be read in truncated parts; its
provisions must be read in relation to the whole law.
6. RA 9225 contains to provision regarding the retroactivity of its effects as
regards natural-born citizens who became naturalized citizens of a foreign
country before RA 9225.
7. To consider that the reacquisition of the PH citizenship retroacts to the date
it was lost = absurd scenario where the person would still be considered a
PH citizen when he had renounced his citizenship.
8. Rule is also that statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective
operation, unless legislature intended to tive them a retroactive effect.
9. Citing Maquiling vs COMELEC (penned by CJ Sereno): the renunciation of
foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any
time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual
renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and
political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship.
10. We cannot consider one a Filipino citizen unless and until his or her
allegiance to the Republic of the PH is reaffirmed.
NOTES

GARCIA ET AL. VS COMELEC
Posted by kaye lee on 10:58 AM
G.R. No. 111511 October 5, 1993 [Initiative and Referendum; Recall proceeding]
FACTS:
Enrique T. Garcia was elected governor of Bataan in the 1992 elections. Some
mayors, vice-mayors and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12)
municipalities of the province constituted themselves into a Preparatory Recall
Assembly to initiate the recall election of petitioner Garcia. They issued Resolution
No. 1 as formal initiation of the recall proceedings. COMELEC scheduled the recall
election for the gubernatorial position of Bataan.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary
injunction to annul the Resolution of the COMELEC because the PRAC failed to
comply with the "substantive and procedural requirement" laid down in Section 70 of
R.A. 7160 (Local Government Code 1991). They pointed out the most fatal defect of
the proceeding followed by the PRAC in passing the Resolution: the deliberate failure
to send notices of the meeting to 65 members of the assembly.
probability is that no one political party can control its majority. Thirdly, sec. 69 of the
Code provides that the only ground to recall a locally elected public official is loss of
confidence of the people. The members of the PRAC are in the PRAC not in
representation of their political parties but as representatives of the people. By
necessary implication, loss of confidence cannot be premised on mere differences in
political party affiliation. Indeed, our Constitution encourages multi-party system for
the existence of opposition parties is indispensable to the growth and nurture of
democratic system. Clearly then, the law as crafted cannot be faulted for
discriminating against local officials belonging to the minority.
Moreover, the law instituted safeguards to assure that the initiation of the recall
process by a preparatory recall assembly will not be corrupted by extraneous
influences. We held that notice to all the members of the recall assembly is a
condition sine qua non to the validity of its proceedings. The law also requires a
qualified majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members to convene in
session and in a public place. Needless to state, compliance with these requirements
is necessary, otherwise, there will be no valid resolution of recall which can be given
due course by the COMELEC.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the people have the sole and exclusive right to initiate recall
proceedings.
2) Whether or not the procedure for recall violated the right of elected local public
officials belonging to the political minority to equal protection of the law.

RULING:
1) No. There is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely suggest that the people
have the "sole and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall
proceeding." The Constitution did not provide for any mode, let alone a single mode,
of initiating recall elections.
The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is for Congress to
"enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure through a system of decentralization
with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum . . ." By this
constitutional mandate, Congress was clearly given the power to choose the effective
mechanisms of recall as its discernment dictates.
What the Constitution simply required is that the mechanisms of recall, whether one
or many, to be chosen by Congress should be effective. Using its constitutionally
granted discretion, Congress deemed it wise to enact an alternative mode of initiating
recall elections to supplement the former mode of initiation by direct action of the
people. The legislative records reveal there were two (2) principal reasons why this
alternative mode of initiating the recall process thru an assembly was adopted, viz: (a)
to diminish the difficulty of initiating recall thru the direct action of the people; and (b)
to cut down on its expenses.

2) No. Under the Sec. 70 of the LGC, all mayors, vice-mayors and sangguniang
members of the municipalities and component cities are made members of the
preparatory recall assembly at the provincial level. Its membership is not apportioned
to political parties. No significance is given to the political affiliation of its members.
Secondly, the preparatory recall assembly, at the provincial level includes all the
elected officials in the province concerned. Considering their number, the greater
 PARAS v. COMELEC
November 4, 1996 | Francisco, J. | Removal/Recall
Digester: Sumagaysay, Rev
SUMMARY: Petitioner Paras is the Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan who won
in 1994. A petition for recall was made and during the first recall election on
November 13, 1995, more than 25% of the voters signed the petition. Petitioner
opposed this so a second recall election was scheduled on December 16, 1995.
Petitioner filed a TRO with the RTC which was initially granted but dismissed (he
misrepresented that the recall election was without COMELEC approval). Petitioner
now opposes this third recall election scheduled saying that the SK elections were
coming up on May 1996 and that the LGC states that no recall one year shall take
place preceding a local election. The Court rejected petitioner’s arguments invoking
LegMeth principles on harmonizing the laws and that if the SK election which is set by
R.A. No. 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within
the purview of the phrase regular local election, as erroneously insisted by petitioner,
then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the
Local Government Code. Nevertheless, the petition is now moot and academic as it is
only 7 months from the next elections.
DOCTRINE: *from the book: “Regular local elction” refers to an election where the
office held by the local official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by
the electorate. Hence, a recall for the punong barangay is not barred when a
sangguniang kabataan election is scheduled within one year.
The law prohibits recall election during the last year of the term of a local official
because of the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the local elective
official concerned. The electorate could choose the official’s replacement in the said
election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a
recall election.
FACTS:
 Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula,
Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A
petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of
the barangay. Acting on the petition for recall, COMELEC resolved to approve
the petition, scheduled the petition signing and set the recall election on
November 13, 1995. At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the
petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law.
 The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view of petitioners
opposition. COMELEC set anew the recall election, this time on December 16,
1995. To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the RTC
Cabanatuan a petition for injunction, with the trial court issuing a TRO. After
conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the this, dismissed the
petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should not be
cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was
without COMELEC approval.
 In a resolution, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall election
on January 13, 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer
for injunction.
 Petitioner’s argument: Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 states that no
recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials assumption
to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election. Petitioner
insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the
first Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter. In support thereof,
petitioner cites Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo, where the Court
considered the SK election as a regular local election. Petitioner maintains that
as the SK election is a regular local election, hence no recall election can
be had for barely four months separate the SK election from the recall
election.
RULING: Petition dismissed for having become moot and academic.
Whether petitioner’s interpretation is correct – NO. But recall couldn’t be made
anyway cause next election is near.
 It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must
be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment.
 The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall
election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with
paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official
may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his
term of office.
 Thus, subscribing to petitioners interpretation of the phrase regular local election
to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the
Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by
initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if the SK election which is
set by R.A. No. 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be
deemed within the purview of the phrase regular local election, as erroneously
insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile
the recall provision of the Local Government Code.
 In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that
the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not
presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. An
interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision
being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed,
emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless,
inoperative or nugatory.
 It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be
interpreted in harmony with the Constitution. Thus, the interpretation of Section
74 of the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof,
should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of
Article X of the Constitution to enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms
of recall, initiative, and referendum x x x.
 Moreover, petitioners too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which
we cannot countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following
admonition:
o We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to
constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its
 authors. That intention is usually found not in the letter that killeth
but in the spirit that vivifieth.
 The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a
statute, as in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.
 Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local
government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against
the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local
election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election
for the office of the local elective official concerned. The electorate could
choose the officials replacement in the said election who certainly has a
longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall election.
 It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the
Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an election where
the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be
contested and be filled by the electorate.
 Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation
stated under Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that the next regular election
involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the
same having been scheduled on May 1997.

NOTES:
 LGC, SEC. 74. Limitations on Recall. (a) Any elective local official may be the
subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of
confidence.
o (b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of
the officials assumption to office or one (1) year immediately
preceding a regular local election.
 CLAUDIO v. COMELEC
and
PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY OF PASAY CITY v. COMELEC
May 4, 2000 | Mendoza, J. | Removal
Digester: Santos, Ihna
SUMMARY: Claudio is the Mayor of Pasay City. Various barangay officials of Pasay
convened to create the Preparatory Recall Assembly of Pasay City. Claudio argued
that preparations for his recall were laid down prior to the 1-year prohibition stated in
Sec. 74, LGC. He contends that “recall” as stated in said provision refers to all the
initiatory acts of recall to the filing to the election. SC otherwise and said that “recall”
refers to the actual day of recall election. As long as the election is held outside the 1-
year period from assumption to office of the local official sought to be recalled, the
preliminary proceedings to initiate a recall can be held even before the end of the 1 st
year in office of said local official.
DOCTRINE: A recall is a process which begins with the convening of the preparatory
recall assembly (PRA) or the gathering of the signatures at least 25% of the
registered voters of a local government unit, and then proceeds to the filing of a recall
resolution or petition with the COMELEC, the verification of such resolution or petition,
the fixing of the date of the recall election, and the holding of the election on the
scheduled date. As used in of Sec. 74(b) of the LGC, “recall” refers to the election
itself by means of which voters decide whether they should retain their local official or
elect his replacement.
Sec. 74 deals with restrictions on the power of recall while Sec. 69 provides that “the
power of recall shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit
to which the local elective official belongs.” Since the power vested on the electorate
is not the power to initiate recall proceedings but the power to elect an official into
office, the limitations in Sec. 74 cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall
proceedings. In other words, the term “recall” in paragraph (b) refers only to the recall
election, excluding the convening of the PRA and the filing of a petition for recall with
the COMELEC, or the gathering of the signatures of at least 25% of the voters for a
petition for recall.
FACTS:
 This is a consolidated petition of:
1. Petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Claudio, seeking the
nullification of the resolution giving due course to the petition for his recall
as Mayor of Pasay City
2. Petition for mandamus filed by the Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) of
Pasay City to compel Comelec to set the date for the holding of recall
elections in Pasay pursuant to the resolution of the Comelec (In the matter
of the preparatory recall assembly resolution no. 01, S-1999 adopted on
May 29, 1999 for the recall of Mayor Jovito Claudio of Pasay City)
 Jovito Clausio was the duly elected mayor of Pasay City in the 1998 elections.
He assumed office on July 1, 1998.
 Sometime during May 1999, the chairs of several barangays in Pasay gathered
to discuss the possibility of filing a petition for recall against Claudio for loss of
confidence.
 On May 19, 1999, at the residence of barangay chair Benjamin Lim, Jr., several
barangay chairs formed an ad hoc committee for the purpose of convening the
PRA. Richard Advincula was designated chair.
 On May 29, 1999, 1,073 members of the PRA composed of barangay chairs,
kagawads and sangguniang kabataan chairs of Pasay, adopted Resolution No.
01, S-1999 (Resolution to initiate the recall of Jovito Claudio as Mayor of Pasay
for loss of confidence). Said resolution was formally submitted to the
 As scheduled, the petition for recall was filed on July 2, 1999 at the Office of the
Election Officer. This was accompanied by an affidavit of service of the petition
on the Office of the City Mayor.
 Pursuant to the rules of the Comelec, copies of the petition were posted on the
bulletin boards of the local Comelec Office, the City Hall, the Police Department,
the public market, and the church in Pasay. Subsequently, a verification of the
authenticity of the signatures on the resolution was conducted by the election
officer of Pasay designated by the Comelec.
 Oppositions to the petition was filed by Claudio, Langub, and Angeles, alleging
procedural and substantive defects:
1. the signatures affixed to the resolution were actually meant to show
attendance at the PRA meeting
2. most of the signatories were only representatives of the parties
concerned who were sent there merely to observe the proceedings
3. the convening of the PRA took place within the 1-year prohibited period
4. the election case filed by Trinidad in SC, seeking the annulment of the
proclamation of Claudio as mayor of Pasay, should first be decided
before recall proceedings against Claudio could be filed
5. the recall resolution failed to obtain the majority of all the members of
the PRA, considering that 10 were actually double entries, 14 were not
duly accredited members of the barangays, 40 sangguniang kabataan
officials had withdrawn their support, and 60 barangay chairs executed
affidavits of retraction
 In its Oct. 18, 1999 resolution, Comelec granted the petition for recall and
dismissed the oppositions against it.
o On the issue of whether the PRA was constituted by a majority of its
members: COMELEC held that the 1,073 members who attended the May
29, 1999 meeting were more than necessary to constitute the PRA,
considering that its records showed the total membership of the PRA was
1,790, while the statistics of the DILG showed that the total membership of
the PRA was 1,876. In either case, since only a majority is required to
constitute the PRA, clearly, a majority had been obtained in support of the
recall resolution. Based on the verification made by the election officer,
COMELEC found the signatures of 958 members of the PRA sufficient.
o On whether the pendency of the case questioning the proclamation of
Claudio was a prejudicial question which must first be decided before any
recall election could be held: COMELEC ruled that it was not and that
Claudio was merely using the pendency of the case to delay the recall
proceedings.
o On whether the petition for recall violated the bar on recall within 1 year
from the elective official’s assumption of office: COMELEC ruled in the
negative, holding that recall is a process which starts with the filing of the
petition for recall. Since the petition was filed on July 2, 1999, exactly one
year and a day after petitioner Claudio’s assumption of office, it was held
that the petition was filed on time.
RULING: 1st petition dismissed for lack of merit; 2nd petition dismissed for being moot
and academic
Whether the petition for mandamus (2nd case) should prosper – NO, moot and
academic
 In its Resolution No. 3121, dated March 9, 2000, the COMELEC set the date of
the recall elections in Pasay City on April 15, 2000. Consequently, the petition for
mandamus in to compel the COMELEC to fix a date for the recall elections in
Pasay City is no longer tenable.
Whether the word “recall” in Sec. 74(b) of the LGC includes the convening of
the Preparatory Recall Assembly and the filing by it of a recall resolution – NO.
 Sec. 74 – Limitations on Recall.
(a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once
during his term of office for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official’s
assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local
election.
 Claudio: Contends that the term “recall” in Sec. 74(b) refers to a process, in
contrast to the term “recall election” found in Sec. 74(a), which obviously refers to
an election. He claims that when several barangay chairmen met and convened
on May 19, 1999 and unanimously resolved to initiate the recall, followed by the
taking of votes by the PRA on May 29, 1999 for the purpose of adopting a
resolution to initiate his recall as Mayor of Pasay for loss of confidence, the
process of recall began and, since May 29, 1999 was less than a year after he
had assumed office, the PRA was illegally convened and all proceedings held
thereafter, including the filing of the recall petition on July 2, 1999, were null and
void.
 Comelec: The process of recall starts with the filing of the petition for recall and
ends with the conduct of the recall election. Since the petition for recall in this
case was filed on July 2, 1999, exactly 1 year and a day after Claudio’s
assumption of office, the recall was validly initiated outside the 1-year prohibited
period.
 Both Claudio and the COMELEC thus agree that the term “recall” as used in Sec.
74 refers to a process. They disagree only as to when the process starts for
purposes of the 1-year limitation in paragraph (b) of Sec. 74.
 SC: Recall is a process which begins with the convening of the preparatory
recall assembly or the gathering of the signatures at least 25% of the
registered voters of a local government unit, and then proceeds to the filing
of a recall resolution or petition with the COMELEC, the verification of such
resolution or petition, the fixing of the date of the recall election, and the
holding of the election on the scheduled date. However, as used in Sec.
74(b), “recall” refers to the election itself by means of which voters decide
whether they should retain their local official or elect his replacement.
 Reasons in support of this conclusion:
1. Sec.74 deals with restrictions on the power of recall. It is in fact entitled
“Limitations on Recall.” On the other hand, Sec. 69 provides that “the
power of recall shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local
government unit to which the local elective official belongs.” Since the
power vested on the electorate is not the power to initiate recall
proceedings but the power to elect an official into office, the
limitations in Sec. 74 cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall
proceedings. In other words, the term “recall” in Sec. 74(b) refers
only to the recall election, excluding the convening of the PRA and
the filing of a petition for recall with the COMELEC, or the
gathering of the signatures of at least 25 % of the voters for a
petition for recall.
2. The second reason why the term “recall” in Sec. 74(b) refers to recall
election is to be found in the purpose of the limitation itself. There are
two limitations in Sec. 74(b) on the holding of recalls: (1) that no recall
shall take place within one year from the date of assumption of
office of the official concerned, and (2) that no recall shall take
place within 1 year immediately preceding a regular local election.
The purpose of the first limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for
judging the performance of an elective local official.
 In the Bower case cited by SC in Angobung v. COMELEC, it
was held that “The only logical reason which we can
ascribe for requiring the electors to wait one year before
petitioning for a recall election is to prevent premature
action on their part in voting to remove a newly elected
official before having had sufficient time to evaluate the
soundness of his policies and decisions.”
 The one-year limitation was reckoned as of the filing of a
petition for recall because the Municipal Code involved in that
case expressly provided that “no removal petition shall be
filed against any officer or until he has actually held office
for at least twelve months.” But however the period of
prohibition is determined, the principle announced is that the
purpose of the limitation is to provide a reasonable basis
for evaluating the performance of an elective local official.
 Hence, in this case, as long as the election is held outside
the 1-year period, the preliminary proceedings to initiate a
recall can be held even before the end of the first year in
office of a local official.
 As already stated, it is not the holding of PRA nor the adoption
of recall resolutions that produces a judgment on the
performance of the official concerned; it is the vote of the
electorate in the election that does. Therefore, as long as the
recall election is not held before the official concerned has
completed one year in office, he will not be judged on his
performance prematurely.
3. To construe the term “recall” in Sec. 74(b) as including the
convening of the PRA for the purpose of discussing the
performance in office of elective local officials would be to unduly
restrict the constitutional right of speech and of assembly of its
members. The people cannot just be asked on the day of the
election to decide on the performance of their officials. The
crystallization and formation of an informed public opinion takes time. To
hold, therefore, that the first limitation in paragraph (b) includes the
holding of assemblies for the exchange of ideas and opinions among
citizens is to unduly curtail one of the most cherished rights in a free
society. Indeed, it is wrong to assume that such assemblies will always
 eventuate in a recall election. To the contrary, they may result in the
expression of confidence in the incumbent.
 SUMMARY: The term “recall” in Sec. 74(b) refers to the recall election and not to
the preliminary proceedings to initiate recall –
1. Because Sec. 74 speaks of limitations on “recall” which, according to
Sec. 69, is a power which shall be exercised by the registered voters of
a local government unit. Since the voters do not exercise such right
except in an election, it is clear that the initiation of recall proceedings is
not prohibited within the one-year period provided in paragraph (b);
2. Because the purpose of the first limitation in paragraph (b) is to provide
voters a sufficient basis for judging an elective local official, and final
judging is not done until the day of the election; 
 Claudio was that some of the names in the petition were double entries, that
3. Because to construe the limitation in paragraph (b) as including the
initiation of recall proceedings would unduly curtail freedom of speech
and of assembly guaranteed in the Constitution. 
 before the petition for recall could be given due course. The order of the
 In this case, as the recall election in Pasay City is set on April 15, 2000, more
than 1 year after Claudio assumed office as mayor of that city, we hold that there
is no bar to its holding on that date.
Whether the phrase “regular local election” in Sec. 74(b) of the LGC includes
the election period for that regular election or simply the date of such election –
simply the date of such election; election/campaign period of 45 days prior to
election day not included
 Claudio: Contends that the date set by the COMELEC for the recall election is
within the second period of prohibition in Sec. 74(b). He argues that the phrase
“regular local elections” in Sec. 74(b) does not only mean “the day of the regular
local election” which, for the year 2001 is May 14, but the election period as well,
which is normally at least forty five (45) days immediately before the day of the
election. Hence, he contends that beginning March 30, 2000, no recall election
may be held.
 SC: The law is unambiguous in providing that “no recall shall take place
within 1 year immediately preceding a regular local election.” Had
Congress intended this limitation to refer to the campaign period, which
period is defined in the Omnibus Election Code, it could have expressly
said so.
 Moreover, Claudio’s interpretation would severely limit the period during which a
recall election may be held. Actually, because no recall election may be held until
1 year after the assumption of office of an elective local official, presumably on
June 30 following his election, the free period is only the period from July 1 of the
following year to about the middle of May of the succeeding year. This is a period
of only 9 months and 15 days, more or less. To construe the second limitation
in Sec. 74(b) as including the campaign period would reduce this period to
8 months. Such an interpretation must be rejected, because it would devitalize
the right of recall which is designed to make local government units “more
responsive and accountable.”
 Indeed, there is a distinction between election period and campaign period.
Under the Omnibus Election Code, unless otherwise fixed by the COMELEC, the
election period commences 90 days before the day of the election and ends thirty
(30) days thereafter. Thus, to follow Claudio’s interpretation that the second
limitation in Sec. 74(b) includes the “election period” would emasculate even
more a vital right of the people.
Whether the recall resolution was signed by majority of the PRA and duly
verified – YES.
 Claudio: Contends that a majority of the signatures of the members of the PRA
was not obtained because 74 members did not really sign the recall resolution.
The 74 merely signed their names on pages 94-104 of the resolution to signify
their attendance and not their concurrence. Claudio claims that this is shown by
the word “Attendance” written by hand at the top of the page on which the
signatures of the 74 begin.
 SC: Contention has no basis. This claim is being raised for the first time in this
case. It was not raised before the COMELEC, in which the claim made by
some members had withdrawn their support for the petition, and that Trinida’d
pending election protest was a prejudicial question which must first be resolved
COMELEC embodying the stipulations of the parties and defining the issues to
be resolved does not include the issue now being raised by Claudio.
 Although the word “Attendance” appears at the top of the page, it is apparent that
it was written by mistake because it was crossed out by two parallel lines drawn
across it. Apparently, it was mistaken for the attendance sheet which is a
separate document. It is absurd to believe that the 74 members of the PRA who
signed the recall resolution signified their attendance at the meeting twice. It is
more probable to believe that they signed pages 94-104 to signify their
concurrence in the recall resolution of which the pages in question are part.
 As to the issue of verification: This issue was not raised before the COMELEC
itself. It cannot, therefore, be raised now.
Dissenting Opinion, J. Puno:
 The right of recall is a double-edged sword· rightly used, it can promote the
greater good, but when wrongly used, it can result in greater evil.
 2 kinds of recall:
1. recall initiated directly by the people
2. recall initiated by the people thru the Preparatory Recall Assembly
 There are recalls as pointed out in the case of Angobung that should be avoided:
(1) recalls borne by the ill motive of a few; (2) recalls that disrupt the smooth
running of government; and (3) recalls that destabilize the local government unit.
 The standard mechanisms in recall statutes to avoid these evils are: (1) the
setting of a waiting period before a petition for recall can be initiated, and (2) the
fixing of a minimum percentage of voters’ signatures to kick-start a petition for
recall.
1-year waiting period:
 As clearly explained in the case of Bowers, the reason for fixing a waiting period
is “to prevent premature action on their part in voting to remove a newly elected
official before having had sufficient time to evaluate the soundness of his political
policies and decisions.” On the other hand, the reason for requiring a minimum
number of voters’ signatures is “to insure that an official will not have to defend
his policies against frivolous attacks launched by a small percentage of
disenchanted electors.” It will further avoid expenditure of public funds for
frivolous elections.
 Beyond debate, the ideal interpretation of the waiting period must bring about this
pristine purpose – to give the voters a sound basis for their decision to recall or
not to recall an official whom they have elected just a year ago. That sound basis
cannot exist in a vacuum. “Sound basis” requires affording the official concerned
a fair and reasonable opportunity to accomplish his program for the people. By
no means will there be a reasonable opportunity if from Day One after
assumption of office, the process of recall can already be initiated against said
official. To allow early recall initiative is to encourage divisive, expensive,
wasteful politics. It will also put a premium on the politics of compromise – the
politics where public interest always comes out second best.
 On why why J. Puno do not share the majority ruling that the one-year waiting
period is a limitation on the right of the people to judge an incumbent on election
day itself but not a limitation on their right to initiate the recall process: The
rationale for fixing the election day one year after the assumption of office is
different from the rationale for prohibiting premature recall initiative. The rationale
of the first is for the benefit of the people, to give them sufficient time to assess
intelligently the performance of the incumbent, while the rationale of the second
is for the benefit of the incumbent, to give him a fair chance to govern well, to
serve the people minus the unnecessary distractions from the itch of too much
politics.
 The ruling of the majority recognizes the rationale of the first but not the
rationale of the second. Its ruling that sanctions too early a recall initiative, and
worse, that allows endless recall initiatives will deprive an incumbent a fair
opportunity to prove himself thru the politics of performance.
 Recall is a powerful weapon given to our people but, like any power, it can be
abused. For this reason, the legislature carefully defined its limitations for its
misuse can bring about the disuse of a valuable means to terminate the misrule
of misfits in government. Our lawmakers know that the paradox of power is that
to be effective it must be restrained from running riot. Section 74 of the LGC
spelled out these restraints. Section 74(a) limits the number of times an official
can be subjected to recall during his term of office to only one time. Section 74(b)
limits the periods when the power can be exercised. It sets two periods: the first,
sets the beginning, i.e., one year after an officials’ assumption of office; the
second, sets the end, i.e., one year immediately preceding a regular election.
These limitations should be strictly followed considering the short 3-year term of
office of local officials.
 Majority ruling’s failures:
o By holding that recall initiatives can start right after day one of an official’s
assumption to office, the majority failed to recognize the need for stability
of a public office.
o By holding that these initiatives can be undertaken not once, not twice but
endlessly within one year after an official’s assumption to office, the
majority exposed our people to an overdose of politics.
o By holding that recall initiatives can be done prematurely, the majority
forgot that such initiatives are meaningful only if they are used to adjudge
an official’s performance in office.
o By holding that recall initiatives can be done even without giving an official
a fair chance to serve the people, the majority has induced incumbents to
play the politics of compromise instead of the politics of performance.
o By holding that recall initiatives can be done at any one’s caprice, the
majority has cast a blind eye on the expenses that accompany such
exercise. These expenses have to be repaid later, an undeniable cause of
cronyism and corruption in government.
 The bottomline is that our law intends recall as a mechanism of good
government. It can never fulfill that intent if we allow its use to foment too much
politics. We need not be adepts in the alleyways of politics to say that too much
politics is the root of a lot of evils in our country. Our 1987 Constitution sought to
check this bad political cholesterol plaguing our government. Any attempt to
restore this fiat should draw more than a phlegmatic posture.
Majority’s reaction to J. Puno’s dissent:
 J. Puno: The purpose of the one-year period in Sec. 74(b) is to provide the
local official concerned a “period of repose” during which “his attention
should not be distracted by any impediment, especially by disturbance due
to political partisanship.”
 Majority: Unfortunately, the law cannot really provide for a period of
honeymoon or moratorium in politics. From the day an elective official
assumes office, his acts become subject to scrutiny and criticism, and it is
not always easy to determine when criticism of his performance is politically
motivated and when it is not. The only safeguard against the baneful and
enervating effects of partisan politics is the good sense and self-restraint of the
people and its leaders against such shortcomings of our political system. A
respite from partisan politics may have the incidental effect of providing respite
from partisanship, but that is not really the purpose of the limitation on recall
under the law. The limitation is only intended to provide a sufficient basis for
evaluating and judging the performance of an elected local official.
o J. Puno’s comment: The ruling of the majority that the law cannot
really provide for a period of honeymoon or moratorium in politics
betrays historical amnesia. This legal mechanism has long been
installed to regulate our labor-management relations, a volatile
relationship, then and now.
o Remember: Certification year rule pursuant to which no petition for
certification election can be ordered in the same bargaining unit
more often than once in twelve months. Hence, for one year, the
employee representative is shielded from any initiative calling for a
certification election to change representative. This progressive
mechanism is still contained in Article 231 of our Labor Code. To
jog our memory, this legal mechanism was taken from the Wagner
Act of the United States which had a provision that no election can
be directed in any bargaining unit or in any subdivision, where in
the preceding 12-months period, a valid election has been held.
This 12- month ban on certification election of the Wagner Act has
never been challenged as violative of freedom of speech and of
assembly of members of minority unions who wish to be elected as
employee bargaining representative.
 J. Puno: The judgments of PRAs are not “as politically unassailable as
recalls initiated directly by the people.”
o Cited the “embarrassing repudiation by the people of Caloocan
City’s Preparatory Recall Assembly” when, instead of ousting
Mayor Rey Malonzo, they reelected him.
 Majority: It is no disparagement of the PRA that in the ensuing election the local
official whose recall is sought is actually reelected. Laws converting
municipalities into cities and providing for the holding of plebiscites during which
the question of cityhood is submitted to the people for their approval are not
always approved by the people. Yet, no one can say that Congress is not a good
judge of the will of the voters in the locality.
o In the case of recall elections in Caloocan City, had it been shown
that the PRA was resorted to only because those behind the move
to oust the incumbent mayor failed to obtain the signatures of 25%
of the voters of that city to a petition for his recall, there may be
some plausibility for the claim that PRAs are not as good a gauge
of the people’s will as are the 25% of the voters.
o Indeed, recalls initiated directly by 25% of the registered voters of a
local government unit cannot be more representative of the
sentiments of the people than those initiated by PRAs whose
members represent the entire electorate in the local government
unit. Voters who directly initiate recalls are just as vulnerable
to political maneuverings or manipulations as are those
composing PRAs.
 The other point regarding J. Puno’s claim is that the question here is not whether
recalls initiated by 25% of the voters are better. The issue is whether the one-
year period of limitation in paragraph (b) includes the convening of the PRA.
Separate and Dissenting Opinion, J. Kapunan:
 Disagrees with the main opinion that the term “recall” under Sec. 74(b) of LGC
refers to the recall election alone.
 “Recall” under Sec. 74(b) is not limited to the election itself, but, rather, it is a
process which begins once the PRA makes its first affirmative acts towards the
recall of the elective local official concerned, i.e. the convening of the PRA and
the passing by the PRA of a recall resolution during a session called for the said
purpose, and culminates with the holding of the recall election.
o Majority: The power of recall can be exercised solely by the electorate and
not by the PRA through the filing of a petition for recall with the COMELEC,
or the gathering of the signatures of at least 25% of the voters for a petition
for recall.
 This is so since the majority equates the power of recall with the
electorate’s power to replace or retain the local official concerned during
the recall elections. In furtherance of this premise, the majority concludes
that since the power vested on the electorate is not the power to initiate the
recall proceedings but the power to elect an official into office, the
limitations in Sec. 74 cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall
proceedings.
o Why J. Kapunan disagrees: Since our form of government is a
representative democracy, it cannot be claimed that the initiation of the
recall process by the PRA is not an initiation by the people.
o Garcia v. Comelec: Initiation by the PRA is also initiation by the people,
albeit done indirectly through their representatives. It is not constitutionally
impermissible for the people to act through their elected representatives.
Nothing less than the paramount task of drafting our Constitution is
delegated by the people to their representatives, elected either to act as a
constitutional convention or as a congressional constituent assembly. The
initiation of a recall process is a lesser act and there is no rhyme or reason
why it cannot be entrusted to and exercised by the elected representatives
of the people.
 The recall process may be considered as composed of 2 distinct but continuous
phases: (1) the initiatory phase and (2) the election phase. As such, for purposes
of determining whether the recall was instituted within the allowable period under
Sec. 74(b), the reckoning point should be the initiatory phase which is the time of
convening and passing of the recall resolution. This should be so since it is from
this moment that the process of recall comes into being. It is at this precise
moment when the PRA, as representatives of the electorate, concretizes its
stand and makes an affirmative act of its intent to recall the elected local official.
Nonetheless, it is still up to the people to affirm or reject the move to recall the
incumbent official during the election called for the purpose.
 It can readily be observed that Senator Pimentel used the phrase “move to recall”
in describing the activity which can only be undertaken during the freedom
period. This is significant because the use of the phrase “move to recall” is
instructive of the concept envisioned by the primary author of the law in providing
for the limitations on recall. It connotes a progressive course of action or a step-
by-step process. As such, the word “move,” when used in conjunction with the
word “recall,” can pertain to no other than the entire recall process which begins
with the convening of the PRA and the passing of the recall resolution and ending
with the recall election. It cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be construed as
referring to the election alone.
 J. Kapunan also disagrees to the observation of the majority that to construe the
limitation in Sec. 74(b) as including the initiation of recall proceedings would
unduly curtail freedom of speech and of assembly guaranteed by the
Constitution. - Reason: The people can assemble and discuss their opinions
and grievances against the incumbent official, at any time during his term and as
often as they would like, because it is their right to do so. An exercise of their
right to peaceably assemble and exchange views about the governance of the
local official would not be violative of the limitations set forth in Sec. 74(b).
 However, once notice is sent, during the prohibited period, stating that the
purpose of the meeting is to convene the PRA and to pass a recall resolution,
and the same is actually approved, then Sec. 74(b) is transgressed. In this
instance, the limitation of the electorate’s freedom of speech and assembly is not
violated since the time bar provision is imposed by the legislature in the exercise
of its police power. The limitation in Sec. 74(b) is analogous to the prohibition
under Sec. 80 of BP 881 (Omnibus Election Code), which prohibits a person from
engaging in any election campaign or partisan political activity except during the
campaign period. The limitation on the freedom of speech and assembly imposed
by Sec. 80 has never been questioned as being unconstitutional.
 There is no logical reason to support the view that the recall process should be
counted only from the time of the filing of the recall resolution or petition with the
COMELEC. Although the filing of the petition for recall with the COMELEC is,
admittedly, an important component in the recall process, it, however, cannot be
considered as the starting point of the same. The filing of the petition being
merely a consequential mechanical act, is just a next step in the process of recall
after PRA’s acts of convening the recall assembly and passing the recall
resolution. Once a petition for recall is filed, the only role of the Comelec is the
verification of its authenticity and genuineness. After such verification the
Comelec is mandated by law to set the date of the recall election. Clearly, the
role of the Comelec in the recall process under Sec. 70 of LGC is merely
ministerial in nature. Such being the case, it cannot be correctly argued that the
crucial moment in the recall process is the actual filing of the petition with the
Comelec.
Adormeo v. COMELEC
GR No. 147927, 4 February 2002, Quisumbing, J.
Digested by Paula Filart • Law 154 – Local Government
Topic: Recall
Tagala was elected Mayor in the ’92-’95 elections and re- elected in ’95-’98 elections.
He lost in 1998 election however was elected into the office of Mayor in the recall
election and served unexpired term of the former mayor. He now runs as a candidate
for Mayor of Lucena. His rival contends that he is disqualified because he has already
served 3 consecutive terms. SC holds that he has not.
FACTS
 RESP Ramon Talaga Jr. was elected mayor of Lucena City in May 2002 for
which he served the full term (1st term). He was re-elected in 1995, and
served the full term again (2nd term).
o In the 1998 elections, he lost to Bernard Tagarao.
o May 2000 – A recall election was held in and RESP won. He served
the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 2001.
 In the May 2001 elections, PET Adormeo and RESP ran for the position of
mayor of Lucena City.
 PET filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy and/or Disqualification of RESP.
o He alleged that RESP was elected and had served as city mayor
for 3 consecutive terms, the 3rd term being the unexpired term of
Tagarao after winning the recall elections in 2000. Serving the
unexpired term of office is considered 1 term.
o Art. VIII of the Constitution speaks of “term” and does not mention
“tenure”
o PET’s candidacy constituted a violation of Sec. 8, Art. X of the 1987
Constitution.
 RESP argues that he was not elected for 3 consecutive terms but only for 2.
o His defeat in the 1998 elections interrupted the consecutiveness of
his years as mayor, and thus his mayorship was not for 3
consecutive terms of 3 years each.
o “3 consecutive terms” means continuous service for 9 years and
that the 2 years from 1998-2000 by Tagarao prevented him from
having 3 consevutive years of service.
 CEMELEC 1st division disqualified RESP. COMELEC en banc reversed and
ruled in favor of RESP.
 RESP was proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor.
1.157That the official concerned has been elected for 3 consecutive terms in
the same local government post; and
2. That he has fully served 3 consecutive terms.
(Lonzanida v COMELEC)
 In this case, RESP was not elected for 3 consecutive terms.
o For nearly 2 years, he was a private citizen. The continuity of his
mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections.
 His victory in the recall election cannot be deemed a violation of Sec. 8
Art. X as “voluntary renunciation”6 for clearly it is not.
o Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced
term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely,
involuntary severance from office for any length of time short
of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of
continuity of service.
o Purpose of the provision is to bar any attempt to circumvent the 3-
term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office.
 PET’s invocation of Fr. Bernas’ comment that “if one is elected
representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired term,
no matter how short, will be considered one term for the purpose of
computing the number of successive terms allowed” is untenable.
o Fr. Bernas’ comment is pertinent only to members of the House of
Representatives. Unlike local government officials, there is not
recall election provided for members of Congress.
DISPOSITIVE
Petition DISMISSED.

ISSUES & HOLDING

 W/N RESP was disqualified to run for mayor. – NO. He did not serve for 3
consecutive terms.

RATIO
The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be
elected as well as the right to service in the same elective position. (Borja Jr. v
COMELEC) 6
“Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as
 Two conditions for the application of the disqualification:
an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was
elected.”
Socrates v COMELEC 1. WON the 129/158
COMELEC Resolution giving due course to the PRA Recall Resolution
G.R. No. 154512, 12 Nov 1992, Carpio, J. is valid? YES. COMELEC findings showed compliance with notice and
Digested by Janelle Gomendoza • Law 154 – Local Government majority required were obtained.
Topic: Term of Office/3 Term Limit Rule; Recall
2. [Relevant] WON COMELEC committed GAD in upholding Hagedorn’s
qualification to run for mayor in the recall election despite the constitutional and
Hagedorn ran in the recall election during the interim of his prohibitive period (aka
statutory prohibitions against a 4th consecutive term? NO. The period before the
supposed 4th term). Court held that the limitation in the Constitution and LGC is not a
recall election is an interruption
strict 3 yr limit or entire term, but only that there is a certain interruption. He became
RATIO
qualified when Socrates was recalled as incumbent.
1. COMELEC findings of fact are accorded finality by the SC in absence of
patently erroneous findings.
FACTS
 Proponents for the recall sent notices of convening of the PRA to the
 In 2002, 312 of 528 members of the incumbent barangay officers of Puerto
members as shown by the Proof of Notice attached to each notice sent
Princesa convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) from
 Notices were also posted in conspicuous places particularly at the Brgy. Hall.
9am to 12nn
The proponents also utilized broadcast mass media in the dissemination.
o It was convened to initiate a recall of incumbent Mayor Socrates who
 City Election Officer of Puerto Princesa City certified that majority of PRA
assumed office on June 30, 2011.
members approved the Recall Resolution.
o The members of the PRA designated Mark Hagedorn, president of the
o Not a single member/signatory of the PRA complained or objected
Association of Brgy. Captains, as interim chair of the PRA.
as to the veracity and authenticity of the signatures
 On the same date, PRA passed a recall resolution which declared its loss of
 Provincial Election Supervisor found everything to be in order.
confidence in Socrates and called for his recall. PRA requested COMELEC to
 Acting Director IV of Region IV recommended that the “PRA was validly
conduct the recall election
constituted and that majority of all members approved the Recall Resolution
 While Socrates filed a petition to deny the recall, the COMELEC gave due course
against Mayor Socrates.”
and scheduled it.
 SC: we do not find any valid reason to hold that the COMELEC’s findings of
 Aug. 23, 2002: Edward Hagedorn (Hagedorn) filed his certificate of candidacy
fact are patently erroneous
(CoC) for mayor in the recall election
 Socrates’s constitutional right to information was not violated since he was
o Subsequently, Adovo and Gilo (and others) filed a petition before the
notified through notice of the PRA meeting. He even sent his representative
COMELEC to disqualify Hagedorn from running in the recall election
and counsel who were present during the entire PRA proceedings
and to cancel his CoC
 This case is a consolidation of several petitions:
2. Hagedorn was qualified to run for mayor in the recall election of Sept. 24,
o Socrates sought to nullify the COMELEC Resolution which gave due
2002
course to the recall because not all members of the PRA were allegedly
 Legal Basis of 3 term limit: Sec. 8, Art. X of 1987 Constitution7 and Sec. 43
notified
of 1991 LGC
o Sandoval sought an extension of the recall campaign period since the
COMELEC resolution only gave 10 days. He prayed for at least 15
days. (SC granted additional 15 days on top of the 10 days, thus this
has become moot)
7
o Adovo and Gilo assailed the COMELEC Resolution which declared Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
Hagedorn qualified to run. They prayed for a TRO to enjoin the which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall
proclamation serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
 In the meantime, Hagedorn garnered the highest number of votes in the recall for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
election as against Socrates and Sandoval. his service for the full term for which he was elected.
o Hagedorn filed a motion to lift the order restraining the COMELEC from
proclaiming the winning candidate and to allow him to assume office. “Section 43. Term of Office. – (a) x x x
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in
ISSUES & HOLDING the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
  These provisions have 2 parts:
o 1st: elective local official cannot serve for more than 3 consecutive
terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count.
o 2nd: voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does NOT
interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary
severance for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and
prevents the service before and after the interruption from being
joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.
 After 3 consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate
re-election for a 4th term.
o The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the
same office following the end of the 3rd consecutive term
o Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered
by the prohibition for 2 reasons:
 A subsequent election, like a recall election is no longer an
immediate re-election after 3 consecutive terms
 The intervening period constitutes an involuntary
interruption
 Intention of the framers is only to prohibit an immediate re-election for a 4th
term following 3 consecutive terms.
o The Constitution does NOT prohibit a subsequent re-election for a
4th term as long as it is not immediately after the end of the 3 rd
consecutive term.
o A recall election, midway in the term following the 3rd consecutive
term, is a subsequent election but NOT an immediate re-election
after the 3rd term
 Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate re-
election to run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of
office
o What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive 4th term
 Hagedorn’s candidacy in the recall on Sept. 24, 2002 is not an immediate re-
election after his 3rd consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001.
o The immediate re-election that the Constitution barred Hagedorn
referred to the regular elections in 2001
o Hagedorn was elected consecutively in ’92, ’95, ’98 and served his
full 3 consecutive terms as mayor of Puerto Princesa. Thus under
the law, he could no longer run in 2001.
 From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on Sept. 24, 2002, the mayor
was Socrates. During the same period Hagedorn was a private citizen.
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for
which the elective official was elected.”
o This period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of service not
because of voluntary renunciation but because of a legal
prohibition.
o Hagedorn’s new recall term from Sept. 24, 2002 to Jun. 30, 2004 is
NOT a seamless continuation of his previous 3 consecutive terms.
o One cannot stitch it together as to make the recall a 4 th consecutive
term because factually it is not. An involuntary interruption broke
the continuity.
 “Voluntary renunciation rule” in the Constitution is to bar any attempt to
circumvent the limit by voluntarily renouncing the office and at the same time
respect the people’s choice and grant their elected official full service of a
term.
o Voluntary renunciation does not cancel the renounced term.
Conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time
short of full term amounts to an interruption of continuity.
 CAB: Hagedorn was out of office for 15 months. Although short of the full 3
years, the Constitution did not intend the hiatus to be the full 3 years (a
term).
o The clear intent is that the interruption “for any length of time” as
long as the cause is involuntary is sufficient to break an elective
local official’s continuity of service.
o Citing Adormeo v COMELEC, SC held that Hagedorn’s recall term
does not retroact to include Socrates’s tenure.
 The concept of term limits is in derogation of the sovereign will of the people
to elect leaders of their own choosing. Term limits must be construed strictly
to give the fullest possible effect to the sovereign will of the people.
 HOWEVER, an official elected in recall election serves the unexpired term of
the recalled official. This unexpired term is in itself one term for purposes of
counting the 3 term limit although less than 3 years.
 In summary:
1. Hagedorn is not running for immediate reelection following his three
consecutive terms as mayor which ended on June 30, 2001;
2. Hagedorn’s continuity of service as mayor was involuntarily
interrupted from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 during which
time he was a private citizen;
3. Hagedorn’s recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004
cannot be made to retroact to June 30, 2001 to make a fourth
consecutive term because factually the recall term is not a fourth
consecutive term; and
4. Term limits should be construed strictly to give the fullest possible
effect to the right of the electorate to choose their leaders
DISPOSITIVE
WHERERFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.
C.J. Davide Concurring & Dissenting
 Concurs on the COMELEC giving due course to the Recall election but dissents
in allowing Hagedorn to run as Mayor
 The term of office covered by the recall is from May 2001 to June 2004 which is
his prohibited 4th term
 For one to be able to run again after three consecutive terms, he has to rest for
the entire immediately succeeding fourth term.
 Hagedorn cannot have suffered involuntary severance from office because there
was nothing to be severed. Disqualification is not synonymous with involuntary
severance.
 Involuntary severance should be one that took place during any of his 3 terms to
be excluded in the computation. In Hagedorn’s case, no such took place during
his 3 terms.
 Voluntary renunciation is also one that should take place at any time during any
of the 3 consecutive terms.
 A declaration allowing Hagedorn to be re-elected in a special election (also
considered a term) is to subvert the rationale of the limit.
 An elective official who is qualified to seek a 4th term because of the limit but
obsessed to hold on to power would spend the first part of the 4 th term
campaigning for the recall of the incumbent especially if he has a solid following
and strong political machinery.
 Note that the President of the Association of Brgy. Captains is one Mark
Hagedorn who was also designated by PRA as interim Chairman.

- “May the 4th be with you” -

 Goh v. Bayron
November 25, 2014| Carpio, J| Recall
Digester: Mercado, Carlo Robert M.
SUMMARY: COMELEC issued Resolutions 9864 and 9882, the first raising an issue
as to the funding of recall elections in Puerto Princesa City for the position of City
Mayor (a post currently held by Mayor Bayron.), and the second suspending recall
elections on the ground that the COMELEC does not have appropriations to conduct
said election. In essence, COMELEC is arguing that since there is no specific line-
item appropriation, the COMELEC cannot have funds to conduct the recall election.
Petitioner Goh assailed these provisions before the SC.
The SC, in ruling for Goh, said that the 2014 GAA provides the line item appropriation
to allow the COMELEC to perform its constitutional mandate of conducting recall
elections This is found in the Programs category of its 2014 budget.Moreover, in the
discharge of its functions, among which is to conduct recall elections, the item named
“Current Operating Expenditures” may be used. More importantly, the COMELEC
admits in its Resolution No. 9882 that the COMELEC has “a line item for the” Conduct
and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes and plebiscites” Thus, there is no
need for supplemental legislation to authorize the COMELEC to conduct recall
elections for 2014. Moreover, should the funds appropriated in the 2014 GAA be
deemed insufficient, then the COMELEC Chairman may exercise his authority to
augment such line item appropriation from the COMELEC’s existing savings, as this
augmentation is expressly authorized in the 2014 GAA.
DOCTRINE:
Specific appropriation
To be valid, an appropriation must indicate a specific amount and a specific purpose.
However, the purpose may be specific even if it is broken down into different related
sub-categories of the same nature.
For example, the purpose can be to “conduct elections,” which even if not expressly
spelled out covers regular, special, or recall elections.
The purpose of the appropriation is still specific - to fund elections, which naturally
and logically include, even if not expressly stated, not only regular but also special or
recall elections.
The Constitution only requires a corresponding appropriation for a specific purpose or
program, not for the sub-set of projects or activities
Authority to augment through savings
This (an actual deficiency in its operating funds for the current year) is a situation that
allows for the exercise of the COMELEC Chairman’ss power to augment actual
deficiencies in the item for the “Conduct and supervision of recall votes” in its budget
appropriation.
FACTS
 This case is about the COMELEC Resolutions No. 9864 and 9882
o 9864 found the petition seeking the recall (recall petition) of Mayor
Lucilo R. Bayron (Mayor Bayron)8, the incumbent mayor of Puerto
8
The grounds of the petition for recall was loss of trust and confidence
brought about by gross violation of pertinent provisions of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, gross violation of pertinent provisions of the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials, Incompetence, and other related gross
Princesa City, sufficient in form and substance. However, Resolution
No. 9864 suspended all proceedings under the recall petition because
the Financial Services Department raised an issue as to the funding
of the entire process of recall
o 9882 suspended any proceeding relative to recall as the recall process,
as stated in said Resolution, does not have an appropriation in the
General Appropriations Act of 2014 and the 2014 GAA does not
provide the COMELEC with legal authority to commit public funds
for the recall process
 In other words, COMELEC is of the position that they do not have funds to
conduct the recall election
 In this petition, Alroben J. Goh assails the aforementioned resolutions on the ff
points:
o The 2014 GAA provides for an appropriation or line item budget to serve
as a contingency fund for the conduct of recall elections.
o COMELEC may lawfully augment any supposed insufficiency in funding
for the conduct of recall elections by utilizing its savings.
o The proper, orderly and lawful exercise of the process of recall is within
the exclusive power and authority of the respondent commission.
HELD The 2014 GAA provides the line item appropriation to allow the COMELEC to
perform its constitutional mandate of conducting recall elections. There is no need for
supplemental legislation to authorize the COMELEC to conduct recall elections for
2014.
W/N COMELEC has the authority to a
Intro which is also the summary
 The 1987 Constitution expressly provides the COMELEC with the power to
“[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.”
 The 1987 Constitution not only guaranteed the COMELEC’s fiscal autonomy, but
also granted its head, as authorized by law, to augment items in its
appropriations from its savings
o The 2014 GAA provides such authorization to the COMELEC Chairman
The COMELEC’s budget in the 2014 GAA
Goh
 Goh asserts that the 2014 GAA provided COMELEC with an appropriation for the
conduct of recall elections in the total amount of Php2,735,321,000.
 As evidence, Goh
o Reproduced the COMELEC’s budget allocation in the 2014 GAA
o Pointed out that the COMELEC has Php1,483,087,000 appropriated
under Operations, and that the Php1,401,501,000 for current
operating expenditure is allocated per region
o Further states that COMELEC’s personnel themselves admitted to
the existence of funds in the ff situations:
inexcusable negligence/dereliction of duty, intellectual dishonesty and emotional
immaturity
 o Atty. Maria Lea R. Alarkon, Acting Director III of the COMELEC’s FSD,
during the 3 September 2013 budget hearing before the Senate’s
Subcommittee A of the Committee on Finance,
 for the specifics of our MFO [Major Final Output] budget, x x x
conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall and
plebiscites, 1,527,815,000;
o Online news article which quoted COMELEC spokesperson James
Jimenez
 saying that “lack of budget (should) not (be) an issue. x x x We
always have a ‘standby’ budget for recall, plebiscite, etc.”
o Letter dated 28 May 2014 from Rep. Isidro T. Ungab, Chairman of the
House of Representative’ Committee on Appropriations, addressed to
Hon. Douglas S. Hagedorn, Representative of the Third District of
Palawan
 “[t]he FY 2014 budget of the COMELEC as authorized in the
FY 2014 General Appropriations Act amounts to
P2,735,321,000, of which P1,401,501,000 is appropriated for
the conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall
votes and plebiscites
COMELEC
 There is a lack of appropriation or line item for a contingency fund for the conduct
of recall elections in the 2014 GAA
 The amount of Php1,483,087,000 referred to by [Goh] allegedly for the conduct
and supervision of election, referenda, recall votes and plebiscites, actually refers
to operating expenditures for “Personnel Services” under the program
“Regulation of Elections.”
 The amount of Php1,401,501,000, on the other hand, is the total amount allotted
for “Personnel Services” (Php1,360,975,000) and “Maintenance and Other
Operating Expenses”(Php40,526,000) for Regional Allocation.
 I think what COMELEC means here is that the appropriations were not
specifically for recall elections
SC
I. On issue of absence of specific appropriation
Rule on appropriations
 To be valid, an appropriation must indicate a specific amount and a specific
purpose.
o However, the purpose may be specific even if it is broken down into
different related sub-categories of the same nature.
 For example, the purpose can be to “conduct elections,” which
even if not expressly spelled out covers regular, special, or
recall elections.
 The purpose of the appropriation is still specific - to
fund elections, which naturally and logically include,
even if not expressly stated, not only regular but also
special or recall elections.
 The Constitution only requires a corresponding
appropriation for a specific purpose or program, not
for the sub-set of projects or activities
As applied
 Despite Resolution No. 9882’s statement about the alleged failure of the
2014 GAA to provide for a line item appropriation for the conduct of recall
elections, we hold that the 2014 GAA actually expressly provides for a line
item appropriation for the conduct and supervision of recall elections.
o This is found in the Programs category of its 2014 budget, which
the COMELEC admits in its Resolution No. 9882 is a line item for
the “Conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes
and plebiscites.”
 In addition, one of the specific constitutional functions of the COMELEC is
to conduct recall elections. When the COMELEC receives a budgetary
appropriation for its “Current Operating Expenditures” such appropriation
includes expenditures to carry out its constitutional functions, including
the conduct of recall elections.
o Thus, in Socrates v. COMELEC, recall elections were conducted even
without a specific appropriation for recall elections in the 2002 GAA.
 More importantly, the COMELEC admits in its Resolution No. 9882 that the
COMELEC has a line item for the “Conduct and supervision of elections,
referenda, recall votes and plebiscites”
II. On issue of authority of COMELEC Chairperson to augment the project of “recall
elections” from their savings
COMELEC
 Despite the Php2 billion to Php10.7 billion savings existing in the COMELEC’s
coffers, the COMELEC asserts that it cannot legally fund the exercise of recall
elections.
 COMELEC is authorized to augment only for deficiency in operating expenses,
but in recall elections capital outlay is needed, thus the situation cannot permit
the COMELEC to augment the approproation
SC
 The power to augment from savings lies dormant until authorized by law.
Flexibility in the use of public funds operates only upon legislative fiat.
As applied
 The 2014 GAA provides a line item appropriation for the COMELEC’s conduct of
recall elections. Since the COMELEC now admits that it does not have sufficient
funds from its current line item appropriation for the “Conduct and supervision of
recall votes” to conduct an actual recall election (see last roman numeral), then
there is therefore an actual deficiency in its operating funds for the current year.
 This (an actual deficiency in its operating funds for the current year) is a
situation that allows for the exercise of the COMELEC Chairman’ss power
to augment actual deficiencies in the item for the “Conduct and supervision
of recall votes” in its budget appropriation.
Debunking COMELEC’s arguments
 The conduct of recall elections requires only operating expenses, not capital
outlays.
o The COMELEC’s existing personnel in Puerto Princesa are the same
personnel who will evaluate the sufficiency of the recall petitions and
conduct the recall elections.
 There is no constitutional requirement that the budgetary appropriation must
be loaded in “contingent funds”
 o The Congress has plenary power to lodge such appropriation in current
operating expenditures

Summary-Conclusion
 Considering that there is an existing line item appropriation for the conduct of
recall elections in the 2014 GAA, we see no reason why the COMELEC is unable
to perform its constitutional mandate to “enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of recall.”
 Should the funds appropriated in the 2014 GAA be deemed insufficient, then the
COMELEC Chairman may exercise his authority to augment such line item
appropriation from the COMELEC’s existing savings, as this augmentation is
expressly authorized in the 2014 GAA.
 MARMETO v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 213953 / SEP. 26, 2017 / DEL CASTILLO, J. / RECALL / ZEDY
NATURE Petition for Review on Certiorari and Mandamus
PETITIONERS Engr. Oscar A. Marmeto
RESPONDENTS COMELEC
SUMMARY. Marmeto filed in behalf of the Muntinlupa People Power (MPP) a
proposed ordinance with the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Muntinlupa. The
proposal sought the creation of a sectoral council and the appropriation of the
amount of ₱200 million for the livelihood programs and projects that would benefit
the people of Muntinlupa City. SP failed to act so Marmeto filed a petition to invoke
initiative power under LGC. Comelec denied petition for lack of SP’s authority to
enact such ordinance. Marmeto refiled proposed ordinance with the newly
constituted SP, which again remain unacted. Marmeto filed another petition with
Comelec. Comelec denied petition for alleged lack of appropriation to conduct
initiatives. SC ruled that the 2014 GAA appropriated funds to Comelec for the
“conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes and plebiscites,”
which include the conduct of initiatives. Hence, funds were allocated for the
purpose of conducting initiatives. However, SC affirmed Comelec’s dismissal of the
first petition for lack of SP’s authority to enact the proposed ordinance. SC ruled
that:
(A) The creation of a separate local legislative body is ultra vires
(B) The sectoral council's proposed function overlaps with the Local Development
Council
(C) The LGC requires local government funds and monies to be spent solely for
public purposes, and provides transparency and accountability measures to
ensure this end
DOCTRINE. The term "election" in the GAA appropriation is comprehensive
enough to include other kinds of electoral exercises, including initiative
elections.
FACTS.
● Marmeto filed in behalf of the Muntinlupa People Power (MPP) a proposed
ordinance with the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Muntinlupa. The proposal
sought the creation of a sectoral council and the appropriation of the amount of
₱200 million for the livelihood programs and projects that would benefit the
people of Muntinlupa City.
● For failure of the SP to act on the proposition within 30 days from its filing,
Marmeto filed a petition for initiative with the same body to invoke the power of
initiative under the LGC. (First Petition)
● (Here’s how the petition ended up with the Comelec) The secretary of SP of
Muntinlupa wrote a letter to the COMELEC stating that the proposal could not be
acted upon by the Sanggunian because the City's budget for FY 2013 had
already been enacted. Thus, a new appropriation ordinance was needed to
provide funds for the conduct of the initiative.
● COMELEC issued Resolution No. 13-0904 (First Resolution) setting aside
Marmeto's initiative petition because the propositions therein were beyond the
powers of the Sanggunian Panglunsod to enact and were not in accordance with
the provisions of existing laws and rules.
● Comelec denied Marmeto’s MR. Nonetheless, it noted that Marmeto might opt to
re-file his initiative petition, since the then newly-elected members of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Muntinlupa might be more sympathetic to
Marmeto' s propositions.
● Marmeto filed a second proposed ordinance with the SP. Again, no favorable
action was done by the Sanggunian within 30 days from the filing of the proposal,
prompting Marmeto file a second initiative petition with the Office of the City
Election Officer. (Second Petition)
● On April 1, 2014, Marmeto filed a Supplemental Petition to comply with the
requirements of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, which provided the Rules and
Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative
and Referendum on National and Local Laws.
● On July 22, 2014, the COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution No. 14- 0509
(Second Resolution) which effectively dismissed Marmeto's second initiative
petition for lack of budgetary allocation, considering the absence of any provision
in Comelec’s FY 2014 budget for the expenses for local initiative or any other
election activity, that the power of local initiative cannot be invoked by Engr.
Marmeto will entail expenses on the part of the Comelec.
● Marmeto filed the present certiorari and mandamus petition.
ISSUES & RATIO.
1. WON COMELEC is mandated to enforce and administer the laws on local
initiative and referendum – YES
● (See notes for the discussion on the concept of initiative)
● The Constitution mandated the Congress to "provide for a system of initiative and
referendum, x x x whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or
approve or reject any act or law or part thereof by the Congress or local
legislative body x x x."9 In compliance, the Congress enacted RA No. 6735 on
August 4, 1989 which provided for a system of initiative and referendum on
national and local laws.
● Since the LGC codified all laws pertaining to local governments, the provisions
on local initiative and referendum found in RA No. 6735 were reiterated, with
slight modifications, in Sections 120 to 127 of the LGC; all other provisions in RA
No. 6735 not inconsistent within the Sections 120 and 127 of the LGC remained
valid and in effect.
● RA No. 6735 and the LGC are thus the pertinent laws on local initiative and
referendum which the COMELEC is mandated to enforce and administer
under Article IX-C, Section 2(1) of the Constitution.
2. WON COMELEC committed GAD for dismissing the second petition for
alleged lack of budgetary allocation for its conduct – YES
● SC discussed Goh v. Bayron and applied it to this case. (Dinelete ko na yung
extensive discussion ng Goh kasi may digest naman na tayo nung case)
● There is no reason not to extend the Goh ruling to the present case. In fact,
Marmeto's second initiative petition was also filed in 2014; in dismissing
Marmeto' s petition for lack of funds, the COMELEC was referring to its budget
under the FY 2014 GAA.
● Although Goh involved the conduct of recall elections, the ₱1.4 billion
9 Article VI, Sec. 32.
 appropriation under the FY 2014 GAA was for the "conduct and supervision
of elections, referenda, recall votes and plebiscites."
● The term "election" is comprehensive enough to include other kinds of
electoral exercises, including initiative elections. As earlier mentioned, the
COMELEC's constitutional mandate is to enforce and administer all laws relative
to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. The
Constitution further states that the "[f]unds certified by the [COMELEC] as
necessary to defray the expenses for holding regular and special elections,
plebiscites, initiatives, referenda, and recalls, shall be provided in the regular or
special appropriations and, once approved shall be released
automatically."10 Thus, the budgetary allocation for the "regulation of elections"
identified as the COMELEC's MFO 1 should necessarily also cover expenses for
the conduct of initiative elections.
● The Court also notes that, aside from the ₱1.4 billion appropriation for the
"conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes and
plebiscites," the COMELEC was also given ₱1.6 billion in the FY 2014 GAA
for the "management and supervision of elections and other electoral
exercises."
● Thus, as in Goh , the COMELEC was provided with budgetary allocation for the
conduct of initiative elections. The COMELEC, therefore, committed grave abuse
of discretion in dismissing Marmeto' s second initiative petition on the ground that
there were no funds allocated for the purpose.
3. WON COMELEC has the power to review whether the propositions in an
initiative petition are within the power of the concerned Sanggunian to
enact - YES
● (SC first discussed why it may rule upon this issue)
● COMELEC: the propositions raised in Marmeto’s second petition were matters
that were not within the powers of the SP to enact.
● Marmeto: The arguments the COMELEC now raises were not the grounds which
the COMELEC cited in the Second Resolution that is assailed in the
present petition. He points that the second petition dismissed his second initiative
petition solely for lack of specific budgetary allocation. There was no mention in
the assailed resolution that the propositions in his second initiative petition were
not within the powers of the Sanggunian to enact. This ground was instead cited
by the COMELEC in its First Resolution which dismissed Marmeto's first
initiative petition. Hence, he opines that the propriety of the propositions
contained in his second initiative petition, not being covered by the assailed
COMELEC resolution, cannot be reviewed in the present petition.
● SC: In several cases, this Court considered issues which were not raised
by either party when these issues are necessary for the complete
resolution of the cases. If the Court can review unassigned errors which are
necessary to arrive at a just resolution of the case, with all the more reason can it
review a matter raised as a defense by a party to uphold the validity of a
resolution assailed in the case.
● (SC now discussed the issue itself)
● Section 124(b) of the LGC provides that "[i]nitiatives shall extend only to subjects
or matters which are within the legal powers of the Sanggunian to enact." Section
10 Art. IX-C Sec. 11.
127 of the LGC gives the courts authority to declare "null and void any
proposition approved pursuant to this Chapter36 for violation of the Constitution
or want of capacity of the Sanggunian concerned to enact the said
measure." Significantly, the power of the courts to nullify propositions for being
ultra vires extends only to those already approved, i.e. those which have been
approved by a majority of the votes cast in the initiative election called for the
purpose. In other words, the courts can review the terms only of
an approved ordinance. It will be premature for the courts to review the
propositions contained in an initiative petition that has yet to be voted for by the
people because at that point, there is no actual controversy that the courts may
adjudicate.
● This begs the question of which tribunal can review the sufficiency of an
initiative petition?
● Inasmuch as the COMELEC also has quasi-judicial and administrative
functions, it is the COMELEC which has the power to determine whether the
propositions in an initiative petition are within the powers of a
concerned Sanggunian to enact.
● In SBMA v. Comelec, the Court ruled that -while regular courts may take
jurisdiction over 'approved propositions' per said Sec. 18 of R.A. 6735, the
Comelec in the exercise of its quasi-judicial and administrative powers may
adjudicate and pass upon such proposals insofar as their form and
language are concerned x x x and it may be added, even as to content,
where the proposals or parts thereof are patently and clearly outside the
'capacity of the local legislative body to enact.' x x x”
● The COMELEC's power to review the substance of the propositions is also
implied in Section 12 of RA No. 6735, which gives this Court appellate power to
review the COMELEC's "findings of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition
for initiative or referendum x x x."
4. Marmeto 's propositions in his initiative petition are beyond the powers of
the Sanggunian Panlungsod ng Muntinlupa to enact – YES
● Marmeto's initiative petitions propose the following:
(1) The creation of a sectoral council composed of 12 members from various
sectors who will serve as the people's representatives for the implementation
and management of livelihood programs and projects;
(2) The sectoral council will also stand as the people's representatives that will
directly propose, enact, approve, or reject ordinances through initiative or
referendum;
(3) An appropriation of ₱200 million to be allocated for livelihood projects of the
people and other purposes. The net income from the projects will then be
used for the delivery of basic services and facility for Muntinlupa residents;
(4) The MPP will create the implementing guidelines and procedure for the
utilization of the appropriated funds, and conduct programs and project
feasibility studies. It shall comply with the prescribed accounting and auditing
rules of, and submit monthly accomplishment report to the local government
unit (LGU). It shall also observe transparency and accountability in fund
management.
● These propositions, however, are either sufficiently covered by or violative of the
LGC for reasons explained below.
● (A) The creation of a separate local legislative body is ultra vires
o Under the LGC, local legislative power within the city is to be exercised by
 the Sangguniang Panlungsod,11 which shall be comprised of elected district
and sectoral representatives.12 The sectoral representatives, moreover, shall
be limited to three members, coming from enumerated/identified sectors.13
o Significantly, nothing in the LGC allows the creation of another local
legislative body that will enact, approve, or reject local laws either
through the regular legislative process or through initiative or
referendum.
o Even Marmeto's claim that the sectoral council will not legislate but will
merely "facilitate" the people's exercise of the power of initiative and
referendum is rendered unnecessary by the task the COMELEC must
assume under the LGC. Section 122(c) of the LGC provides that the
COMELEC (or its designated representative) shall extend assistance in the
formulation of the proposition.
● (B) The sectoral council's proposed function overlaps with the Local
Development Council
o The LGC requires the establishment in each LGU of a local development
council, whose membership includes representatives of POs/NGOs
operating within the LGU.14 These local development councils are primarily
tasked with developing a "comprehensive multi-sectoral development
plan"51 in their respective LGUs. City development councils are specifically
tasked to exercise the following functions:
(1) Formulate long-term, medium-term, and annual development plans and
policies;
(2) xxx;
(3) Appraise and prioritize socio-economic development programs and
projects;
(4) x x x;
(5) Coordinate, monitor, and evaluate the implementation of development
programs and projects; and
(6) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law or competent
authority.
o Given these functions of the city development council, there is a clear
overlap with those proposed by Marmeto to be performed by the
sectoral council and/or MPP.
● (C) The LGC requires local government funds and monies to be spent
solely for public purposes, and provides transparency and accountability
measures to ensure this end
o The Court finds disturbing in Marmeto' s initiative petitions the authority of
the proposed sectoral council to utilize, manage, and administer public funds
as it sees fit.
o The fundamental principles in local fiscal administration provided in the LGC
state that no money shall be paid out of the local treasury except in
11 Sec. 48.
12 Sec. 41, (a) and (b).
13 Sec. 41, (c).
14 Sec. 107.
pursuance of an appropriations ordinance or law, 15 and that local
government funds and monies shall be spent solely for public purposes.16
o Marmeto' s petition proposes the appropriation of ₱200 million for the
livelihood programs and projects of Muntinlupa residents. Significantly, the
utilization of this amount is subject to the guidelines to be later
implemented by Marmeto's MPP. That these guidelines will be drafted
and implemented subsequent to the initiative elections denies the
Muntinlupa residents of the opportunity to assess and scrutinize the
utilization of local funds, and gives Marmeto and his organization an
almost complete discretion in determining the allocation and
disbursement of the funds. It is no justification that the funds will be
used for public purposes on the claim these will be applied to
programs and projects that will eventually redound to the benefit of the
public.
o Our laws have put in place measures to ensure transparency and
accountability in dealing with public funds,17 since "[p]ublic funds are
the property of the people and must be used prudently at all times with
a view to prevent dissipation and waste."18 These measures may be
subverted or rendered inapplicable when the management and utilization of
the funds is turned over to private persons or entities.
o Although comprised of Muntinlupa residents and voters, Marmeto' s
MPP remains a private organization and its members cannot be
considered as public officers who are burdened with responsibility for
public funds and who may be held administratively and criminally
liable for the imprudent use thereof.
DECISION.
Petition denied.
NOTES.
● Initiative has been described as an instrument of direct democracy
whereby the citizens directly propose and legislate laws. As it is the citizens
themselves who legislate the laws, direct legislation through initiative (along with
referendum) is considered as an exercise of original legislative power, as
opposed to that of derivative legislative power which has been delegated by the
sovereign people to legislative bodies such as the Congress.
● Section 1 of Article VI of the Constitution recognizes the distinction between
original and derivative legislative power by declaring that "legislative power shall
be vested in the Congress x x x except to the extent reserved to the people by
the provision on initiative and referendum." The italicized clause pertains to the
original power of legislation which the sovereign people have reserved for their
exercise in matters they consider fit. Considering that derivative legislative power
is merely delegated by the sovereign people to its elected representatives, it is
15 Sec. 305, (a).
16 Sec. 305 (b).
17 Presidential Decree No. 1445 or the Government Accounting Code of the Philippines, and Sections 335
to 354 of the LGC.
18 Yap v. Commission on Audit, 633 Phil. 174, 188 (2010).
deemed subordinate to the original power of the people.
 he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

iThere are two remedies available under existing laws to prevent a candidate from running in an
electoral race. One is by petition for disqualification, and the other by petition to deny due course
to or to cancel his certificate of candidacy.

Fermin v COMELEC: A petition for disqualification can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the

OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a
CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that
is false. The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section
68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or
denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a
CoC.
xxx
Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and
statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate
subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC,
following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed,
the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under
Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate,
with the distinction mainly in the fact that a “Section 78” petition is filed before proclamation,
while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate.

Sec. 78, Omnibus Election Code:

Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.—A verified petition seeking to
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on
the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof
is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later
than fifteen days before the election.
ii Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.—Those who retain or reacquire Philippine

citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

Section 40. Disqualifications.—The following persons are disqualified from running for any
iii

elective local position:

xxxx
(d) Those with dual citizenship.

ivSection 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.—Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment
to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for
any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and