The November 2010 elections in 

Burma and its prospects for political reform

by Angela Faye Oon

The upcoming November 7 general elections is set to be Burma’s most important and defining political event in twenty

years. It will result – in form, if nothing else – in institutional transformation: from military dictatorship to a

parliamentary system of government. Hence, change is coming. The question is: what does this change herald, and

what are the prospects for political reform[1] in a country where the ruling authority has not changed in five decades?

Reasons for holding elections

The first question to ask is why the military junta decided to hold parliamentary elections in the first place. Why not

continue to rule indefinitely as it always had done? Although Prime Minister Lt-General Khin Nyunt’s 2003 “roadmap to

democracy” had provided for general elections, there was no timeline specified and in 2007 the plan seemed to have

been abandoned altogether. Its revival can be attributed to external pressure brought to bear on the State Peace and

Development Council (SPDC) by its closest allies – China, India and ASEAN. Internally, the SPDC likely also calculated

that there were advantages to taking the election gamble to gain some semblance of political legitimacy.

Arguably, the greatest external pressure the SPDC received was from its main patron, China. For years, China has been

vocal in urging the regime to institute political reforms and resolve its differences with the ethnic separatist groups that

operate along the Sino-Burmese border. China needs Burma to ensure long-term stability within its borders; since the

1990s, it has built up extensive commercial interests in Burma with bilateral trade reaching 2.4 billion in 2007-2008. It

is also building 1,200 miles of oil and gas pipelines through Burma as part of its energy security policy (Storey 2009).

Episodes such as the 2007 Kokang Incident further demonstrated that political instability in Burma would go against

China’s strategic and economic interests, and the so-called 2007 “Saffron Revolution” proved Beijing’s fears to be

correct – that the junta’s political intransigence and deteriorating socio-economic conditions inside the country would

provoke a major crisis. Pressuring the junta to hold elections and transition toward a more inclusive political landscape

would presumably pacify Burma’s increasingly unhappy populace and reduce the chances of civil unrest.

ASEAN had also been pressuring the SPDC to “make greater progress on its roadmap toward democracy and national

reconciliation” (Tarrant 2007). In a departure from its usual policy of non-interference in its member states’ affairs, at

the January 2007 ASEAN Summit a statement was issued urging Burma to adopt democratic reforms. It was an

indication of ASEAN’s unhappiness over how the issue of Burma had divided the regional group and tarnished the

grouping’s international image. Burma’s trade with those countries meant it also had reasons to assuage ASEAN’s

concerns.

In short, it became necessary in the last few years for the SPDC to demonstrate in a concrete way that political change

is going to take place in Burma, and if properly managed a general election could confer political legitimacy even as the

junta continues to hold de facto power.

 

No political will to change

Looking at the reasons why the junta finally decided to hold elections, the prospects for true political reform look dim.

The raison d’être for the move is to create theappearance of reforms to pacify both the international community and

the Burmese population, not to take any truly meaningful steps toward democracy. A simple analysis provides the

reasons for the military’s determination to cling to power; not only are there no incentives for it to change the status

quo, but there are significant disincentives should it cede power to pro-democracy actors.

Basically, over the years the Tatmadaw has built up something akin to a separate kingdom of its own wherein members

of the military are accorded special privileges: they live in their own housing compounds, their children go to special

schools, they shop at special department stores, are allowed to invest in military-owned enterprises and enjoy lucrative

business concessions from the government. In short, the Tatmadaw is riding the gravy train of plundered state assets.

All this would be threatened should a strong opposition emerge to demand that it be held accountable to the people.

Thus the junta’s primary aim is to hold on to power. To that end, they will allow nothing to threaten the security of the

regime. Anything perceived as a threat to regime survival – such as the risk of losing the elections – cannot be allowed.

Hence there is no chance that the elections would be free and fair. Aung San Suu Kyi cannot be released, nor can

hundreds of other political prisoners. Media coverage of the elections continues to be censored. Political parties and

candidates have been disqualified from participation without explanation, and election procedures have been blatantly

manipulated to make certain that the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), the military junta’s political

party, will take up most of the seats in the People’s Assembly and the National Assembly. Under the new constitution,

the military is guaranteed representation in parliament and has veto power over constitutional amendments, ensuring

that it has closed all possible institutional loopholes that could see it legally ousted from parliament.

For those still speculating about how Burma’s November 7 elections will pan out, the May 2008 constitutional

referendum provides an instructive template. Despite the fact that Cyclone Nargis – the worst natural disaster to befall

Burma in its recorded history – devastated the country a week before the referendum took place, the junta claimed an

unbelievable 98.12% voter turnout, of which 93.82% supposedly supported the referendum (People’s Daily Online

2008). It is thus likely that the USDP will also ‘win’ the upcoming elections by an overwhelming majority. Since one of

the main objectives of holding elections is to provide a veneer of political legitimacy for the junta, the USDP will almost

certainly win by a large margin – improbably large though that margin might be.

The Burmese people’s gloomy prognostication that “the regime will cling to power until the last bullet” (Kingston 2008)

appears to be well-founded.

Real prospects

However, the outlook for a measure of genuine political reform is not completely bleak. Even though at present all the

evidence indicates that real change is unlikely to occur, it is also unclear what might transpire during and after the
elections. As previously mentioned, the elections will bring about formal institutional change, which will allow non-

military personnel to participate in the governance of the country. This ‘chink in the armour’ – the new parliamentary

architecture that breaks the stranglehold of the military occupying all seats of power – is the new (if minute) fault line

which opposition parties will be hoping to take advantage of. In change there is opportunity, and one can be sure that

any opportunities will be exploited to the fullest by the various stakeholders. There is also the possibility – remote

though it seems at present – that the 663 elected members of the two houses of parliament might include a significant

cohort of independent opposition and non-Burman ethnic peoples who will actually develop policies that will move the

country toward an era of democratisation.

It is also possible to take the long view and see the forthcoming elections as the first step toward reform and

democracy, as part of a sustained process of “incremental change” (Kingston 2008: 37). In this optimistic view, the

junta’s concession toward democratic transition should be rewarded by other states. The generous provision of training

programs and technical assistance projects would help Burma to build up its institutional capacities, which is an

important step toward nation-building and the social and political emancipation of its peoples.

Beyond the elections, it is important to keep in mind that there will eventually be a generational change in the military

leadership as younger members of the Tatmadaw rise to positions of power. And these new faces might hold the actual

key to political reforms, as power would already be vested in them to effect change should they have the political will to

do so. Since it is unlikely that the military would ‘collapse from within’ due to practices and informal procedures

developed over the years that reinforce the continuity and robustness of the Tatmadaw as an institutional structure,

including an internal system for dealing with differences and disagreements amongst senior officials (Kyaw 2009), the

only other way the junta can lead the way towards genuine reform is if it chooses to do so. As they say, more

improbable things in this world have happened.

Bibliography 

Ian Storey (2009) ‘Emerging Fault Lines in Sino-Burmese Relations: The Kokang Incident’, China Brief 9(18): 5-8.

Jeff Kingston (2008) ‘Burma’s despair’, Critical Asian Studies 40(1): 3-43.

Kyaw Yin Hlaing (2009) ‘Setting the rules for survival: why the Burnese military regimes survives in an age of

democratization’, The Pacific Review  22(3): 271 – 291.

People’s Daily Online (2008) ‘Myanmar formally announces ratification of new constitution draft’, 30 May; accessed

athttp://english.people.com.cn/90001/90777/90851/6421254.html, 16 October 2010.

Tarrant, B. (2007) ‘ASEAN leaders weigh charter, wrangle over Myanmar’, Reuters, 13 January; accessed

at http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/SP264580.htm, 16 October 2010.

 
Win Min (2008) ‘Looking inside the Burmese military’, Asian Survey 48(6): 1018 – 1037.

[1] In this essay, I shall take political reform to mean conscientious movement towards a more democratic system of

governance, although an exploration of other variations of “reform” in the context of Burma would also be important

and highly relevant.