NAME: SITI SARAH BINTI ISKANDAR SHAH

REG NUMBER: M20181001447

CEO COMPENSATION AND CSR

Reference Objectives Theory/ Model Variables Sample Findings Remarks
1 Mcguire, J., Oehmichen, J., analyze Behavioural Since the 84 -the This journal
Wolff, M., & Hilgers, R. how two Agency Model information needed companies performance can be a main
(2017). Do Contracts compensation -Prospect to calculate our excluded sensitivity of reference to
Make Them Care ? The design Theory compensation financial CEO pay is the next study
characteristics, variables is not firms and negatively as there are not
Impact of CEO -Agency
pay-performance provided in firms with associated with so many
Compensation Design on sensitivity and
Theory common missing data poor studies doing
Corporate Social duration of CEO compensation (2006-2011) social research in this
Performance. Journal of compensation, databases such as performance but area.
Business Ethics. affect corporate Execucomp, we also negatively
https://doi.org/10.1007/s social hand-collected all affects strong
10551-017-3601-8 performance. Compensation social
related data from performance.
firm proxy
statements. -pay-
performance
sensitivity
increases the
relevance of
potential
negative
consequences of
poor social
performance
2 Francoeur, C., Melis, A., Environmental Theory: Dependent Variable 520 large environment This study use
Gaia, S., & Aresu, S. stewardship, a Stewardship the 2009 CEO listed firms friendly firms a large of
(2017). Green or Greed ? stakeholder- theory compensation pay their CEOs sample and
An Alternative Look at enlarged view of less total using different
stewardship Model: The proportion compensation model instead
CEO Compensation and
theory, and OLS regression and rely less on of model jones
Corporate institutional models with
Environmental
NAME: SITI SARAH BINTI ISKANDAR SHAH
REG NUMBER: M20181001447
Commitment. Journal of theory to analyze industry-fixed of incentive-based incentive-based
Business Ethics, 140(3), the relationship effects compensation and compensation
439–453. between CEO total compensation. than
https://doi.org/10.1007/s compensation and environment
10551-015-2674-5 firms’ careless firms.
environmental Independent This negative
commitment variable: relationship is
Environmental stronger in
performance (EP). institutional
contexts where
national
environmental
regulations are
weaker.
3 Cai, Y, Jo, H., & Pan, C. examine the Theory: Independent 11,215 firm- the lag of CSR This study
(2011). Vice or Virtue? impact of corpo- agency theory variable: estimated year (1,946 adversely
The Impact of Corporate rate social CSR index from firms) affects both total
Social Responsibility on responsibility first-stage observations compensation
Executive (CSR) on CEO regressions during the and cash
compensation period of compensation,
Compensation. Journal Dependent Variable 1996–2010, after controlling
of Business Ethics, : employee relation, for various firm
104(2), 159–173. and use industry- and board
https://doi.org/10.1007/s median employee characteristics.
10551-011-0909-7 relation as an Our estimates
instrument (pg170) show that an
interquartile
increase in CSR
is followed by a
4.35% (2.78%)
decrease in total
(cash)
compensation
NAME: SITI SARAH BINTI ISKANDAR SHAH
REG NUMBER: M20181001447
4 F.Yang. (2015). Corporate how such Theory: The impact of CSR covers the that non-equity
Social Responsibility incentives affect Stakeholder residual incentive period from stakeholder
and Managerial firm leverage and Theory on LEVERAGE 1992 to 2006 incentives
Incentives, (August). cash holding Shareholder for 5727 decrease
Theory The impact of CSR firms leverage and
total incentive on increase cash
LEVERAGE holding, after
The impact of CSR controlling for
residual incentive CEO managerial
on CASH incentives and
other firm
The impact of CSR characteristics
total incentive on
CASH
This
5 Vromen, A. (2012). The effect a relationship agency theory Control variables : 584 U.S. larger firms
of incentive between CEO and stakeholder firm size, firm age, firms over have better CSP
compensation on compensation and theory industry sector and the years and that older
corporate social corporate social risk (pg23) 2003 until firms have
performance. performance. 2010 worse CSP. CSP
has increased
during the
financial crisis,
although a
causal
relationship
between the two
could not be
established
6 Macdonald, T. (2016). CEO relation between Agency theory Dependent 1995-2010 delta has no
Wealth Sensitivity and CEO variable: significant
Corporate Social compensation Ceo Compensation effect on CSR
Responsibility. structure and firm rating, while
Independent vega has a
variable: strong causal
NAME: SITI SARAH BINTI ISKANDAR SHAH
REG NUMBER: M20181001447
corporate social Firm Performance relation with
responsibility CSR
(CSR)
7 Rekker, S. A. C., Benson, K. examine the Agency Theory Dependent 1988 firms disaggregation
L., & Faff, R. W. (2014). relation between Variables: with 12,311 of CSR into its
Journal of Economics corporate social Salary, Bonus, firm-year components
and Business Corporate responsibility Long term observations matters. We
(CSR) and CEO compensation and document
social responsibility and
compensation Total evidence
CEO compensation
compensation. suggesting that
revisited: Do while employee
disaggregation , market relations, the
stress , gender matter ? environment
Journal of Economics and diversity are
and Business, 72, 84– important,
103. generally,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j. community and
jeconbus.2013.11.001 product quality
are not.both
times of crisis
and gender
matter. Once
they are
accounted for
interactively in
the model, the
general
relationship
between CSR
and CEO
compensation
weakens
8 Davidson, R. H., & Smith, A. the role of Agency Theory Dependent : Ceo a large CSR scores in
(2016). CEO individual CEOs compensation sample of firms with
Materialism and in explaining firms materialistic
NAME: SITI SARAH BINTI ISKANDAR SHAH
REG NUMBER: M20181001447
Corporate Social corporate social Independent: Firm CEOs are
Responsibility, 0–69. responsibility Performance unrelated to
(CSR) scores. We profitability on
average;
however this
association is
decreasing in
CEO power.
9 Cooper, E. (2017). Corporate to explore the support for the Dependent a large Firms with
social responsibility , research question stakeholder variable: CEO sample of better social
gender , and CEO whether corporate theory of CSR turnover firms over a performance
turnover. social and does not 21-year have higher
responsibility support period from rates of CEO
https://doi.org/10.1108/
(CSR) and gender entrenchment 1992 to 2013 turnover,
MF-02-2016-0049 influence the theory taken from performance
likelihood of firms cross- notwithstanding.
CEO turnover listed in the Further, for
ESG STATS, firms with
Execucomp, decreasing
and financial
Compustat performance, it
databases. is more likely
they will replace
their CEO if
they have strong
CSR vs firms
with weak CSR
records
10 Miles, P. C., & Miles, G. to explore Agency Theory CEO remuneration 1000 results indicate
(2013). Corporate social whether socially Company companies that companies
responsibility and responsible firms performance pulled from identified as
executive compensation : recognize the across more good corporate
exploring the link, 9(1), potential conflicts than 15 social
that come with industries performers do in
76–90. higher levels fact have lower
NAME: SITI SARAH BINTI ISKANDAR SHAH
REG NUMBER: M20181001447
https://doi.org/10.1108/1 ofexecutive levels of
7471111311307822 compensation, executive
and thus limit compensation
executive pay and there is
relative to what is some support
being paid in found for a
other firms positive
relationship
between social
and financial
performance
11 Ju Ahmad, N., Ahmad, J., to examine the Agency Theory Independent companies implies that dual
Rashid, A., & Gow, J. impact of CEO Stewardship Variable: CEO listed on the leadership
(2017). CEO Duality and duality on Theory duality Main Market structure
Corporate Social Corporate Social of Bursa reduces checks
Responsibility Dependent Malaysia and balance and
Responsibility
(CSR) reporting variable: Content from 2008 makes CEOs
Reporting : Evidence by public listed analysis until 2013. less accountable
from Malaysia, 14(2), companies in to all
69–81. Malaysia. stakeholders. As
https://doi.org/10.22495/ for regulators,
cocv14i2art7 this study will
provide valuable
input to assist in
their continuous
efforts to
improve
corporate
governance and
social
responsibility
practices that
may promote
the interest of
all stakeholders.
NAME: SITI SARAH BINTI ISKANDAR SHAH
REG NUMBER: M20181001447
12 Bezuidenhout, M. L. (2016). The main purpose Agency Theory Dependent secondary there is a
The relationship between of the study was Stewardship Variables: The data from the relationship
CEO remuneration and to determine Theory components of annual between CEO
company performance in whether there is a CEO remuneration reports of 18 remuneration
South African state- relationship will be the Schedule 2 and company
between CEOs’ SOEs. performance
owned entities, remuneration and Independent (mainly an
(November). company Variables : inverse
performance in Company relationship),
South Africa’s performance with no
Schedule 2 SOEs. CEO demographic consistent trend
Company Size between the
constructs
13 Fabrizi, M., & Mallin, C. explore the role of Agency theory the model with sample of both monetary
(2012). The role of Chief Executive CSR as dependent 597 US firms and non-
CEO’s personal Officers’ (CEOs’) variable over the monetary
incentives in driving incentives, split period 2005- incentives have
between monetary 2009. an effect on
corporate social
and non-monetary CSR decisions.
responsibility Michele (career concerns, Specifically,
Fabrizi, (September). incoming/departin monetary
g CEOs, power incentives
and designed to
entrenchment) in align the CEO’s
relation to and
corporate social shareholders’
responsibility interests have a
(CSR). negative effect
on CSR and
non-monetary
incentives have
a positive effect
on CSR.
NAME: SITI SARAH BINTI ISKANDAR SHAH
REG NUMBER: M20181001447
14 Heron, N. M. (2016). An examines the Agency theory CEO compensation a sample of no significant
Analysis of the relationship Stewardship and CSR US firms for association. then
Relationship between between CEO Theory Disclosure the period disaggregate the
CEO Compensation and compensation and 2007 through CSR firms by
Corporate Social corporate social 2014 disclosure type
responsibility and provide
Responsibility (CSR) disclosure evidence that:
Disclosure Type and type and quality. (1) relative to
Quality. non-CSR firms,
CEO
compensation is
lower in firms
providing only
corporate
governance-
related CSR
disclosures; (2)
CEO
compensation is
higher in firms
providing both
corporate
governance-
related and
social-related
CSR disclosure,
as compared to
firms providing
only corporate
governance-
related CSR
disclosure
15 Isaksson, L. (2010). “ investigated Market Independent firms were found predictive
Corporate Social publicly traded Orientation Variable: CSR all listed on support that
Responsibility : A Study multi-national Theory the enables
NAME: SITI SARAH BINTI ISKANDAR SHAH
REG NUMBER: M20181001447
of Strategic Management enterprises Communication Stockholm practitioners and
and Performance in (MNE’s) on the Timing stock academics to
Swedish Firms ”. Bond Stockholm Stock Since exchange and assess how their
University School of Exchange represented firm could
Business “ Corporate Index Variable: on the Index. structure (how
CSR This to specifically
Social Responsibility : A Dependent ‘set-up’) their
Study of Strategic Variable: Firm external- and
Management and Performance The internal
Performance in Swedish orientation to
Firms ”. Control Variable: increase their
Firm Size level of CSR.
16 Al, H., & Mahbub, S. (2017). examines the Agency Theory controlling for f UK the potential of
CEO Compensation and relationship governance and FTSE350 assured
Sustainability Reporting between firm characteristics, companies sustainability
Assurance : Evidence sustainability for 2011– reports in
from the UK. Journal of committees and 2015 assessing CEO
independent performance in
Business Ethics, external assurance sustainability-
(0123456789). on the inclusion related tasks,
https://doi.org/10.1007/s of sustainability- especially when
10551-017-3735-8 related targets in sustainability
CEO metrics are
compensation included in CEO
contracts. compensation
contracts.
Overall, our
results suggest
companies that
invest in
voluntary assur-
ance are more
likely to monitor
management’s
behaviour and
NAME: SITI SARAH BINTI ISKANDAR SHAH
REG NUMBER: M20181001447
be concerned
about the
achievement of
sustainability
goals.compensat
ion contracts.
Sustainability-
related
17 Hong, B., Li, Z., & Minor, D. to derive Social network CSR level- top five corporate
(2016). Corporate theoretical theory dependent variable executives governance as a
Governance and predictions about working at determinant of
Executive Compensation the relationship Independent each firm in managerial
between corporate variables: the Standard incentives for
for Corporate Social
gov- ernance and Executive and Poor’s social perfor-
Responsibility. Journal the existence of characteristics 500 Index mance, and
of Business Ethics, executive Firm characteristics (S&P 500) suggest that
136(1), 199–213. compensation Governance CSR activities
https://doi.org/10.1007/s incentives for characteristics are more likely
10551-015-2962-0 CSR. to be beneficial
to shareholders,
as opposed to an
agency cost.
18 Bian, C. (2016). CEO Option aims at examining Tobin’s Q Dependent : 137 largest The results also
Incentives, Firm Risk- the effects of executive (by market document
Taking and Shareholder Chief Executive compensation capitalisation positive
Value: Evidence from Officers’ (CEOs) ) Australian association
option incentives Independent: public firms, between CER
Australia.
on corporate risk- Managerial for the period and CFP only in
taking and share Characteristics 2003 to 2012 an industry’s
market cooling-off
performance period.
based
19 Kang, J. (2010). The Influence examine the role Stakeholder Dependent social temporal
of Ceo Decision-Making of CEOs and theory Variable: Financial performance difference in
and Corporate Strategy corporate Performance data for the financial
NAME: SITI SARAH BINTI ISKANDAR SHAH
REG NUMBER: M20181001447
on Corporate Social diversification on sample firms performance
Performance The corporate social Explanatory were and change
Influence of Ceo performance Variable : collected in stakeholder
Decision-Making and (CSP). Corporate social from the perceptions
Corporate Strategy on. performance (CSP) Kinder, toward CSP, can
Lydenberg, help researchers
Domini uncover fine-
(KLD) Social grained
Ratings relationships
database, between CSP
and financial
performance.
20 Pastorelli, R. (2014). Master to analyse the link Stakeholder Dependent Using a CEOs is
Dissertation CEO between CEOs Theory Variables: sample of 25 negatively
Characteristics and Firm characteristics -environmental firms from correlated with
CSR practices Author : and score the French their chances to
Romain Pastorelli organizational -social score CAC 40 over carry
outcomes, a seven-year environmental
Advisor : Martin especially CEOs’ Independent period CSR practices.
Goossen May 2014, likeliness to carry Variables: 2004 to 2010 the effect of
(May), 0–47. out corporate -CEO education CEO
https://doi.org/10.13140/ social -Nobility characteristics
2.1.3677.6008 responsibility -political on firm social
(CSR) connection and
environmental
strategy. It also
contributes to
the literature on
corporate social
responsibility by
identifying the
CEO as an
important
antecedent of
NAME: SITI SARAH BINTI ISKANDAR SHAH
REG NUMBER: M20181001447
firm CSR
practices
21 Mohammad, S. (2016). study the Legitimacy The independent 50 top listed companies listed
Corporate social Corporate Social Theory variable: company companies in in FTSE4Good
disclosure by the top Disclosure (CSD) ownership Malaysia Index and
malaysian listed report structure, the age of government-
companies. companies or related
businesses , or companies were
either it is listed in significantly
the FTSE4Good positive with
Index and extended dependant
reports variable of
Corporate
Social
Disclosure
(CSD).
Environment of
workplace and
Community
were also one of
the factors
having high
information in
Extended
Report of
company
samples.
22 Cieślak, K. (2018). Agency Relationship Agency theory The dependent 2465 firm- Type II agency
conflicts , executive between Agency variable is the yea, Swedish conflicts
compensation conflicts, natural logarithm of listed firms between
regulations and CEO pay executive the CEO total pay in the years controlling and
‑ performance compensation 2001–2013 non-controlling
regulations and The independent share- holders
sensitivity : evidence. CEO variables are are potentially
Journal of Management defined as follows: important for
NAME: SITI SARAH BINTI ISKANDAR SHAH
REG NUMBER: M20181001447
and Governance, 22(3), pay‑performance StockRet: the many European
535–563. sensitivity annual stock price companies
https://doi.org/10.1007/s return, ROA: return
10997-018-9410-3 on assets
NAME: SITI SARAH BINTI ISKANDAR SHAH
REG NUMBER: M20181001447

CSR AND EARNING MANAGEMENT

Reference Objectives Theory/ Model Variables Sample Findings Remarks
1 Laux, C., & Laux, V. (2009). analyze the board show that an
Board Committees, of directors' increase in CEO
CEO Compensation, and equilibrium equity incentives
Earnings strategies for does not
setting CEO necessarily
Management. The
incentive pay and increase earnings
Accounting overseeing management
Review, 84(3), 869-891. financial because directors
Retrieved from reporting and adjust their
http://www.jstor.org/stab their effects on oversight effort in
le/27784197 the level of response to a
earnings change in CEO
management. incentives
2 Hassen, R. B. E. N. (2014). to examine one of Model: Dependent : French Show that This journal
Executive compensation the motivations Model of The absolute value companies executive focusing on
and earning that could Dechow and of accruals listed on compensation is few things
management, 4(1), 84– encourage Dichev (2002), the SBF determined by the which are
managers to modified by Independent: 120, (2007 requirements of -Performance
105.
manage the Ball and -The total to 2010) earning (ROI)
https://doi.org/10.5296/ij accounting Shivakumar remuneration of Eliminated management. -The size of
afr.v4i1.5453 results, namely (2005b). directors financial firm
the managerial -The variable institutions It is indicate that -The share
remuneration. Jones model remuneration of and firms total leader
(Absolute value directors with compensation is -Growth
of accruals) missing negatively related -Opportunities
Control Variable: data. to the absolute -Cashflows
Theory : -Performance value of accruals. -Auditor
-agency theory (ROI) Finally 80
-contractual -The size of firm companies
political theory -The share leader to be tested
-Growth
NAME: SITI SARAH BINTI ISKANDAR SHAH
REG NUMBER: M20181001447
-Opportunities
-Cashflows
-Auditor
3 Zulfiqar, S., Shah, A., & Butt, Examines the Modified Cross Dependent Variable 53 listed Quality of This journal
S. A. (2014). Corporate relationship Sectional Jones : companies corporate focusing on
Governance and between quality Model Discretionary Excluded governance has few things
Earnings Management an of Corporate accruals financial been found which are
Governance and institutions significantly -Performance
Empirical Evidence
Earnings Independent and firms positively related -Auditor
Form Pakistani Listed
Management Variable: with with
Companies, (January quality of corporate missing discretionary Basically this
2009). Governance data. accruals journal is not
which means covering many
quality of elements as
corporate Hassen, R. B.
governance is E. N. (2014)
positively and the sample
related with is small.
earnings
management
4 Klerk, M. De, & Villiers, C. Examines one Model: Social Responsible 214 Companies with
De. (2018). Corporate type of corporate used a modified Investment and companies better CSR
social responsibility and misconduct, Jones’ (1991) CSR performance in Africa performance were
earnings management of namely, earnings model as (KIV) by Industry more likely to
management specified by engage in EM
South African
Dechow, Sloan through income
companies, (March). and Sweeney increasing
https://doi.org/10.4102/s (1995) discretionary
ajems.v21i1.1849 accruals. This
suggests that
managers who
inflate earnings
may engage in
CSR activities to
avoid unwanted
NAME: SITI SARAH BINTI ISKANDAR SHAH
REG NUMBER: M20181001447
scrutiny from
stakeholders.
5 Chih, H., Shen, C., & Kang, F. To investigate Econometric EM, CSR, Investor 1,653 a firm with CSR
(2016). Corporate Social whether the CSR- model protection and firm corporation in mind tends not
Responsibility, Investor related features of specific financial s in 46 to smooth
Protection, and Earnings 1,653 variables across countries earnings, and
Corporate Social corporations in 46 firms of 46 displays less
countries had a countries. interest in
Responsibility, Investor positive or CSR, Investor
Protection, and Earnings negative effect on Protection and
Management : Some the quality of Earnings
International Evidence, their publicly Management 195
(February released financial avoiding earnings
2008).https://doi.org/10. information losses and
1007/s10551-007-9383- during the 1993– decreases. It is,
7 2002 period. however,
prone to engage
in more earnings
aggressiveness,
but this tendency
can be mitigated
in a country
with strong legal
enforcement.
6 Yin, J. (2018). The Effects of examines the modified Jones Dependent Variable 2640 firms Chinese firms’
Corporate Social relationship model REM & AEM from year enhanced CSR
Responsibility on Real between Chinese Real Earning 2009-2014 generally
and Accrual-based firms’ corporate Management and decreases their
Earnings Management : social Accrual Earning EM practices.
responsibility Management On the contrary,
Evidence from China : (CSR) and their state-controlled
CSR and Real- and earnings firms and firms
Accrual-based Earnings management operating in more
Management, (May). (EM) practices. institutionally
https://doi.org/10.1111/a
NAME: SITI SARAH BINTI ISKANDAR SHAH
REG NUMBER: M20181001447
uar.12235 developed regions
are more
likely to engage
in REM, while
increasing their
CSR activities.
These findings
provide new
evidence that
managers in
Chinese firms
tend to
opportunistically
adopt CSR
practices
according to the
firm’s
institutional
environment.