G.R. No. 119347. March 17, 1999.

* EULALIA RUSSELL, RUPERTO TAUTHO, FRANCISCO TAUTHO,

SUSANA T. REALES, APITACIO TAUTHO, DANILO TAUTHO, JUDITHA PROS, GREGORIO TAUTHO,
DEODITA T. JUDILLA, AGRIPINO TAUTHO, FELIX TAU-THO, WILLIAM TAUTHO, AND MARILYN
PERALES, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE AUGUSTINE A. VESTIL, ADRI-ANO TAGALOG, MARCELO
TAUTHO, JUANITA MEN-DOZA, DOMINGO BANTILAN, RAUL BATALUNA AND ARTEMIO
CABATINGAN, respondents.
Remedial Law; Actions; Jurisdiction; Complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is doubtless
one incapable of pecuniary estimation and therefore within the jurisdiction of said court.—The
complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is doubtless one incapable of pecuniary
estimation and therefore within the jurisdiction of said court.
Same; Same; Same; In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not
capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the
nature of the principal action or remedy sought.—In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, we had the
occasion to rule that: [I]n determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is
not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining
the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of
money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in
the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim.
However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money,
where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought,
this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be
estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now
Regional Trial Courts).
Same; Same; Same; Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation.—Examples of
actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are those for specific performance, support, or
foreclosure of mortgage or annulment of judgment; also actions questioning the validity of a
mortgage, annulling a deed of sale or conveyance and to recover the price paid and for
rescission, which is a counterpart of specific performance.
Same; Same; Same; While the complaint also prays for the partition of the property, this is just
incidental to the main action, which is the declaration of nullity of the document; It is axiomatic
that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the
allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the
plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein.—The main purpose of
petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null and void the document in which private
respondents declared themselves as the only heirs of the late spouses Casimero Tautho and
Cesaria Tautho and divided his property among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who
also claim to be legal heirs and entitled to the property. While the complaint also prays for the
partition of the property, this is just incidental to the main action, which is the declaration of
nullity of the document above-described. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and
the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some
of the claims asserted therein.
PETITION for certiorari to set aside order of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Br. 56.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Anacleto L. Caminade for petitioners.
Walter S. Lawas for private respondents.KAPUNAN, J.:Before us is a Petition for Certiorari to set
aside the Order dated January 12, 1995 issued by respondent Judge Augustine A. Vestil of the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 56, dismissing the complaint filed by petitioners
on ground of lack of jurisdiction, as well as his Order dated February 13, 1995 denying
petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of the order of dismissal.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On September 28, 1994, petitioners filed a complaint against private respondents,
denominated “DECLARATION OF NULLITY AND PARTITION,” with the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaue City, Branch 56, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-2275. The complaint, in substance,
alleged that petitioners are co-owners of that parcel of land, Lot 6149 situated in Liloan, Cebu
and containing an area of 56,977.40 square meters, more or less. The land was previously
owned by the spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho. Upon the death of said spouses,
the property was inherited by their legal heirs, herein petitioners and private respondents.
Since then, the lot had remained undivided until petitioners discovered a public document
denominated “DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF A PREVIOUS ORAL
AGREEMENT OF PARTITION,” executed on June 6, 1990. By virtue of this deed, private
respondents divided the property among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who are
also entitled to the said lot as heirs of the late spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho.
Petitioners claimed that the document was false and perjurious as the private respondents
were not the only heirs and that no oral partition of the property whatsoever had been made
between the heirs. The complaint prayed that the document be declared null and void and an
order be issued to partition the land among all the heirs.
On November 24, 1994, private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the case as the total assessed value of the
subject land is P5,000.00 which under Section 33(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by
R.A. No. 7691, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan,
Compostela.
Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss saying that the Regional Trial Court has
jurisdiction over the case since the action is one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation
within the contemplation of Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, as amended.
Sec. 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil
cases.—Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall exercise:x x x(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or
interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or in civil actions in
Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs:
Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property
shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. 4 An Act Expanding the
Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts, Amending for the purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980. 5 Id., at 21. 6 Id., at 22-23. 7 Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.—
Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: (1) In all civil actions in which
the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; x x x 742 742 SUPREME
COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Russell vs. Vestil On January 12, 1995, the respondent judge
issued an Order granting the Motion to Dismiss.8 A Motion for Reconsideration of said order
was filed by petitioners on January 30, 1995 alleging that the same is contrary to law because
their action is not one for recovery of title to or possession of the land but an action to annul a
document or declare it null and void,9 hence, one incapable of pecuniary estimation falling
within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Private respondents did not oppose the
motion for reconsideration.On February 13, 1995, the respondent judge issued another Order
denying the motion for reconsideration.10Hence, this petition wherein the sole issue raised is
whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. MAN-
2275.We find merit in the petition.Petitioners maintain the view that the complaint filed before
the Regional Trial Court is for the annulment of a document denominated as “DECLARATION OF
HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION,” which is clearly one
incapable of pecuniary estimation, thus, cognizable by the Regional Trial Court.Private
respondents, on the other hand, insists that the action is one for re-partition and since the
assessed value of the property as stated in the complaint is P5,000.00, then, the case falls
within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Compostela, Cebu.For
better appreciation of the facts, the pertinent portions of the complaint are reproduced
hereunder:x x x3. That the plaintiffs and the defendants are the legal heirs of spouses Casimero
Tautho and Cesaria N. Tautho who died long time ago;That in life the spouses became the
owners in fee simple of a certain parcel of land, which is more particularly described as
follows:A parcel of land containing 56,977.40 square meters, more or less, located at Cotcot,
Liloan, Cebu.designated as Lot 6149 per Technical Description and Certification issued by the
Office of the Land Management copy of which are hereto attached as Annexes “A” and “A-1”
and are made part hereof: total assessed value is P5,000.00;5. That the land passed to the
children of the spouses (who are all deceased except for defendant Marcelo Tautho), namely:
Zacarias, Epifania, Vicenta, Felicisimo, Maria, Lorencia and Marcelo, and which in turn passed to
the plaintiffs and defendants upon their death they being their descendants and legal heirs;
That the subject parcel of land has for year been undivided by and among the legal heirs of said
previous owners. That, very recently, plaintiffs discovered a public document, which is a
declaration of heirs and deed of confirmation of a previous oral agreement of partition,
affecting the land executed by and among the defendants whereby defendants divided the
property among themselves to the exclusion of plaintiffs who are entitled thereto; attached
hereto as Annex “B” and is made part hereof is xerox copy of said document;. That the
instrument (Annex “B”) is false and perjurious and is a complete nullity because the defendants
are not the only heirs of Casimero Tautho; plaintiffs are also legal heirs and descendants of said
deceased; moreover, there has been no oral partition of the property;. That pursuant to said
document (Annex “B”), defendants had procured tax declarations of the land for their supposed
“shares” to the great damage and prejudice of plaintiffs;. That the property in controversy
should be divided into seven (7) equal parts since Casimero Tautho and Cesaria N. Tautho had
seven children;. That the parties had failed to settle the controversy amicably at the barangay
level; attached hereto as Annex “C” is Certification to file Action;. That by reason of the
foregoing unjust and illegal act of defendants, plaintiffs were forced to bring instant action and
contract the services of the undersigned counsel with whom they bind themselves to pay
P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees.WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable
Court to declare null and void the document (Annex “B”) of declaration of heirs and
confirmation and to order the partition of the land into seven (7) equal parts; each part shall
respectively go to the seven (7) children of Casimero Tautho and considering six (6) of them
died already the same shall go to their children or descendants, and to order the defendants to
pay plaintiffs attorney’s fees in the amount of P30,000.00.Plaintiffs further pray for such other
reliefs and remedies just and equitable under the premises.We agree with petitioners.The
complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is doubtless one incapable of pecuniary
estimation and therefore within the jurisdiction of said court.In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, we
had the occasion to rule that:[I]n determining whether an action is one the subject matter of
which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and
whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on
the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to
recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of,
the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of
the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts
of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary
estimation are those for specific performance, support, or foreclosure of mortgage or
annulment of judgment;14 also actions questioning the validity of a mortgage,15 annulling a
deed of sale or conveyance and to recover the price paid16 and for rescission, which is a
counterpart of specific performance.17While actions under Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are also
incapable of pecuniary estimation, the law specifically mandates that they are cognizable by the
MTC, METC, or MCTC where the assessed value of the real property involved does exceed
P20,000.00 in Metro Manila, or P50,000.00, if located elsewhere. If the value exceeds
P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 as the case may be, it is the Regional Trial Courts which have
jurisdiction under Sec. 19(2).18 However, the subject matter of the complaint in this case is
annulment of a document denominated as “DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF
CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION.”The main purpose of petitioners in filing the
complaint is to declare null and void the document in which private respon dents declared
themselves as the only heirs of the late spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho and
divided his property among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who also claim to be
legal heirs and entitled to the property. While the complaint also prays for the partition of the
property, this is just incidental to the main action, which is the declaration of nullity of the
document above-described. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the
relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims
asserted therein.19WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Order dismissing Civil Case No. MAN-2275, as well as the Order denying the motion for
reconsideration of said Order, is SET ASIDE.The Regional Trial Court, Branch 56, Mandaue City is
ORDERED to proceed with dispatch in resolving Civil Case No. MAN-2275. No costs.SO
ORDERED. Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Melo and Pardo, JJ., concur.Petition granted, orders
set aside.Note.—What determines the nature of an action as well as which court has
jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.
(Cañiza vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 640 [1997])——o0o—— Russell vs. Vestil, 304 SCRA 738,
G.R. No. 119347 March 17, 1999
G.R. No. 175914. February 10, 2009.*RUBY SHELTER BUILDERS AND REALTY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. PABLO C. FORMARAN III, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial
Court Branch 21, Naga City, as Pairing Judge for Regional Trial Court Branch 22, Formerly
Presided By HON. NOVELITA VILLEGAS-LLAGUNO (Retired 01 May 2006), ROMEO Y. TAN,
ROBERTO L. OBIEDO and ATTY. TOMAS A. REYES, respondents.
Remedial Law; Actions; Docket Fees; Jurisdiction; Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only
upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee; Payment of docket fees is not only mandatory,
but also jurisdictional.—In Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA
562 (1987), the Court explicitly pronounced that “[t]he court acquires jurisdiction over any case
only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee.” Hence, the payment of docket fees is not
only mandatory, but also jurisdictional.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Docket fees under Section 7(a), Rule 141, in cases involving real
property depend on the fair market value of the same; Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 imposes a fixed
or flat rate of docket fees on actions incapable of pecuniary estimation.—The docket fees under
Section 7(a), Rule 141, in cases involving real property depend on the fair market value of the
same: the higher the value of the real property, the higher the docket fees due. In contrast,
Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 imposes a fixed or flat rate of docket fees on actions incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
Same; Same; Same; A real action is an action affecting title to or recovery of possession of real
property.—No matter how fastidiously petitioner attempts to conceal them, the allegations and
reliefs it sought in its Complaint in Civil Case No. 2006-0030 appears to be ultimately a real
action, involving as they do the recovery by petitioner of its title to and possession of the five
parcels of land from respondents Tan and Obiedo. A real action is one in which the plaintiff
seeks the recovery of real property; or, as indicated in what is now Section 1, Rule 4 of the
Rules of Court, a real action is an action affecting title to or recovery of possession of real
property.
Same; Same; Same; In computing the docket fees for cases involving real properties, the courts,
instead of relying on the assessed or estimated value, would now be using the fair market value
of the real properties (as stated in the Tax Declaration or the Zonal Valuation of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, whichever is higher) or, in the absence thereof, the stated value of the
same.—A real action indisputably involves real property. The docket fees for a real action
would still be determined in accordance with the value of the real property involved therein;
the only difference is in what constitutes the acceptable value. In computing the docket fees for
cases involving real properties, the courts, instead of relying on the assessed or estimated
value, would now be using the fair market value of the real properties (as stated in the Tax
Declaration or the Zonal Valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, whichever is higher) or, in
the absence thereof, the stated value of the same. PETITION for review on certiorari of a
decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Benito B. Nate for petitioner. Avelino V. Sales,
Jr. for respondents. Tomas A. Reyes for and by himself. CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking the reversal of the Decision dated 22 November 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 94800. The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision, affirmed the Order dated 24 March
2006 of the_______________1 Penned by Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo with
Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Ramon R. Garcia, concurring; Rollo, pp. 109-
120.2 Penned by Judge Novelita Villegas-Llaguno; id., at pp. 74-79. 285, FEBRUARY 10,
2009285Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development Corporation vs. Formaran IIIRegional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City, in Civil Case No. RTC-2006-0030, ordering petitioner
Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development Corporation to pay additional docket/filing fees,
computed based on Section 7(a) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended.The present
Petition arose from the following facts:
Petitioner obtained a loan3 in the total amount of P95,700,620.00 from respondents Romeo Y.
Tan (Tan) and Roberto L. Obiedo (Obiedo), secured by real estate mortgages over five parcels of
land, all located in Triangulo, Naga City, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) No.
38376,4 No. 29918,5 No. 38374,6 No. 39232,7 and No. 39225,8 issued by the Registry of Deeds
for Naga City, in the name of petitioner. When petitioner was unable to pay the loan when it
became due and demandable, respondents Tan and Obiedo agreed to an extension of the
same.In a Memorandum of Agreement9 dated 17 March 2005, respondents Tan and Obiedo
granted petitioner until 31 December 2005 to settle its indebtedness, and condoned the
interests, penalties and surcharges accruing thereon from 1 October 2004 to 31 December
2005 which amounted to P74,678,647.00. The Memorandum of Agreement required, in turn,
that petitioner execute simultaneously with the said Memorandum, “by way of dacion en
pago,” Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of respondents Tan and Obiedo, covering the same
parcels of land subject of the mortgages. The Deeds of Absolute Sale would be uniformly dated
2 January 2006, and Records do not disclose other details regarding the said loan, i.e., when it
was obtained, if it was reduced to writing, and when it exactly became due and demandable.
With an area of 4,343 square meters. With an area of 17,183 square meters. With an area of
8,203 square meters. With an area of 1,043 square meters. With an area of 616 square meters.
Rollo, pp. 39-42. 286286SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDRuby Shelter Builders and
Realty Development Corporation vs. Formaran IIIstate that petitioner sold to respondents Tan
and Obiedo the parcels of land for the following purchase prices:TCT No.Purchase Price38376P
9,340,000.0029918P 28,000,000.0038374P 12,000,000.0039232P 1,600,000.0039225P
1,600,000.00Petitioner could choose to pay off its indebtedness with individual or all five
parcels of land; or it could redeem said properties by paying respondents Tan and Obiedo the
following prices for the same, inclusive of interest and penalties:TCT No.Redemption
Price38376P 25,328,939.0029918P 35,660,800.0038374P 28,477,600.0039232P
6,233,381.0039225P 6,233,381.00In the event that petitioner is able to redeem any of the
afore-mentioned parcels of land, the Deed of Absolute Sale covering the said property shall be
nullified and have no force and effect; and respondents Tan and Obiedo shall then return the
owner’s duplicate of the corresponding TCT to petitioner and also execute a Deed of Discharge
of Mortgage. However, if petitioner is unable to redeem the parcels of land within the period
agreed upon, respondents Tan and Obiedo could already present the Deeds of Absolute Sale
covering the same to the Office of the Register of Deeds for Naga City so respondents Tan and
Obiedo could acquire TCTs to the said properties in their names.287, FEBRUARY 10,
2009287Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development Corporation vs. Formaran IIIThe
Memorandum of Agreement further provided that should petitioner contest, judicially or
otherwise, any act, transaction, or event related to or necessarily connected with the said
Memorandum and the Deeds of Absolute Sale involving the five parcels of land, it would pay
respondents Tan and Obiedo P10,000,000.00 as liquidated damages inclusive of costs and
attorney’s fees. Petitioner would likewise pay respondents Tan and Obiedo the condoned
interests, surcharges and penalties.10 Finally, should a contest arise from the Memorandum of
Agreement, Mr. Ruben Sia (Sia), President of petitioner corporation, personally assumes, jointly
and severally with petitioner, the latter’s monetary obligation to respondent Tan and
Obiedo.Respondent Atty. Tomas A. Reyes (Reyes) was the Notary Public who notarized the
Memorandum of Agreement dated 17 March 2005 between respondent Tan and Obiedo, on
one hand, and petitioner, on the other.Pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement, petitioner,
represented by Mr. Sia, executed separate Deeds of Absolute Sale,11 over the five parcels of
land, in favor of respondents Tan and Obiedo. On the blank spaces provided for in the said
Deeds, somebody wrote the 3rd of January 2006 as the date of their execution. The Deeds were
again notarized by respondent Atty. Reyes also on 3 January 2006.Without payment having
been made by petitioner on 31 December 2005, respondents Tan and Obiedo presented the
Deeds of Absolute Sale dated 3 January 2006 before the Register of Deeds of Naga City on 8
March 2006, as a result of_______________10 According to paragraph 7 of the Memorandum
of Agreement, the condoned interests, surcharges and penalties amounted to “P55,167,000.00
(as stated in paragraph 2 hereof)”; but paragraph 2 of the said Memorandum computed the
interests, penalties and surcharges from 1 October 2004 to 31 December 2005 condoned or
written-off by respondents Tan and Obiedo to be P74,678,647.00.11 Rollo, pp. 43-52.
288288SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDRuby Shelter Builders and Realty Development
Corporation vs. Formaran IIIwhich, they were able to secure TCTs over the five parcels of land in
their names.On 16 March 2006, petitioner filed before the RTC a Complaint12 against
respondents Tan, Obiedo, and Atty. Reyes, for declaration of nullity of deeds of sales and
damages, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order (TRO). The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 2006-0030.On the basis
of the facts already recounted above, petitioner raised two causes of action in its Complaint.As
for the first cause of action, petitioner alleged that as early as 27 December 2005, its President
already wrote a letter informing respondents Tan and Obiedo of the intention of petitioner to
pay its loan and requesting a meeting to compute the final amount due. The parties held
meetings on 3 and 4 January 2006 but they failed to arrive at a mutually acceptable
computation of the final amount of loan payable. Respondents Tan and Obiedo then refused
the request of petitioner for further dialogues. Unbeknownst to petitioner, despite the ongoing
meetings, respondents Tan and Obiedo, in evident bad faith, already had the pre-executed
Deeds of Absolute Sale notarized on 3 January 2006 by respondent Atty. Reyes. Atty. Reyes, in
connivance with respondents Tan and Obiedo, falsely made it appear in the Deeds of Absolute
Sale that Mr. Sia had personally acknowledged/ratified the said Deeds before Atty.
Reyes.Asserting that the Deeds of Absolute Sale over the five parcels of land were executed
merely as security for the payment of its loan to respondents Tan and Obiedo; that the Deeds
of Absolute Sale, executed in accordance with the Memorandum of Agreement, constituted
pactum commisorium and as such, were null and void; and that the acknowledgment in the
Deeds of Absolute Sale were falsified, petitioner averred:_______________12 Id., at pp. 53-
62.289, FEBRUARY 10, 2009289Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development Corporation vs.
Formaran III“13. That by reason of the fraudulent actions by the [herein respondents], [herein
petitioner] is prejudiced and is now in danger of being deprived, physically and legally, of the
mortgaged properties without benefit of legal processes such as the remedy of foreclosure and
its attendant procedures, solemnities and remedies available to a mortgagor, while [petitioner]
is desirous and willing to pay its obligation and have the mortgaged properties released.”13In
support of its second cause of action, petitioner narrated in its Complaint that on 18 January
2006, respondents Tan and Obiedo forcibly took over, with the use of armed men, possession
of the five parcels of land subject of the falsified Deeds of Absolute Sale and fenced the said
properties with barbed wire. Beginning 3 March 2006, respondents Tan and Obiedo started
demolishing some of the commercial spaces standing on the parcels of land in question which
were being rented out by petitioner. Respondents Tan and Obiedo were also about to tear
down a principal improvement on the properties consisting of a steel-and-concrete structure
housing a motor vehicle terminal operated by petitioner. The actions of respondents Tan and
Obiedo were to the damage and prejudice of petitioner and its tenants/lessees. Petitioner,
alone, claimed to have suffered at least P300,000.00 in actual damages by reason of the
physical invasion by respondents Tan and Obiedo and their armed goons of the five parcels of
land.Ultimately, petitioner’s prayer in its Complaint reads:“WHEREFORE, premises considered,
it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that upon the filing of this complaint, a
72-hour temporary restraining order be forthwith issued ex parte:(a) Restraining [herein
respondents] Tan and Obiedo, their agents, privies or representatives, from committing act/s
tending to alienate the mortgaged properties from the [herein petitioner] pending the
resolution of the case, including but not limited to the acts complained of in paragraph “14,”
above;_______________13 Id., at p. 58. 290290SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDRuby
Shelter Builders and Realty Development Corporation vs. Formaran III(b) Restraining the
Register of Deeds of Naga City from entertaining moves by the [respondents] to have
[petitioner’s] certificates of title to the mortgaged properties cancelled and changed/registered
in [respondents] Tan’s and Obiedo’s names, and/or released to them;(c) After notice and
hearing, that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued imposing the same restraints indicated
in the next preceding two paragraphs of this prayer; and(d) After trial, judgment be
rendered:1. Making the injunction permanent;2. Declaring the provision in the
Memorandum of Agreement requiring the [petitioner] to execute deed of sales (sic) in favor of
the [respondents Tan and Obiedo] as dacion en pago in the event of non-payment of the debt
as pactum commissorium;. Annulling the Deed[s] of Sale for TCT Nos. 29918, 38374, 38376,
39225 and 39232, all dated January 3, 2006, the same being in contravention of law;4.
Ordering the [respondents] jointly and solidarily to pay the [petitioner] actual damages of at
least P300,000.00; attorney’s fees in the amount of P100,000.00 plus P1,000.00 per court
attendance of counsel as appearance fee; litigation expenses in the amount of at least
P10,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of P300,000.00, plus the costs.[Petitioner]
further prays for such other reliefs as may be proper, just and equitable under the
premises.”14Upon filing its Complaint with the RTC on 16 March 2006, petitioner paid the sum
of P13,644.25 for docket and other legal fees, as assessed by the Office of the Clerk of Court.
The Clerk of Court initially considered Civil Case No. 2006-0030 as an action incapable of
pecuniary estimation and computed the docket and other legal fees due thereon according to
Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.Only respondent Tan filed an Answer15 to the
Complaint of petitioner. Respondent Tan did admit that meetings were_______________14 Id.,
at pp. 60-62.15 Id., at pp. 65-71.291, FEBRUARY 10, 2009291Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty
Development Corporation vs. Formaran IIIheld with Mr. Sia, as the representative of petitioner,
to thresh out Mr. Sia’s charge that the computation by respondents Tan and Obiedo of the
interests, surcharges and penalties accruing on the loan of petitioner was replete with errors
and uncertainties. However, Mr. Sia failed to back up his accusation of errors and uncertainties
and to present his own final computation of the amount due. Disappointed and exasperated,
respondents Tan and Obiedo informed Mr. Sia that they had already asked respondent Atty.
Reyes to come over to notarize the Deeds of Absolute Sale. Respondent Atty. Reyes asked Mr.
Sia whether it was his signature appearing above his printed name on the Deeds of Absolute
Sale, to which Mr. Sia replied yes. On 4 January 2006, Mr. Sia still failed to establish his claim of
errors and uncertainties in the computation of the total amount which petitioner must pay
respondent Tan and Obiedo. Mr. Sia, instead, sought a nine-month extension for paying the
loan obligation of petitioner and the reduction of the interest rate thereon to only one percent
(1%) per month. Respondents Tan and Obiedo rejected both demands.Respondent Tan
maintained that the Deeds of Absolute Sale were not executed merely as securities for the loan
of petitioner. The Deeds of Absolute Sale over the five parcels of land were the consideration
for the payment of the total indebtedness of petitioner to respondents Tan and Obiedo, and
the condonation of the 15-month interest which already accrued on the loan, while providing
petitioner with the golden opportunity to still redeem all or even portions of the properties
covered by said Deeds. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to exercise its right to redeem any of
the said properties.Belying that they forcibly took possession of the five parcels of land,
respondent Tan alleged that it was Mr. Sia who, with the aid of armed men, on board a Sports
Utility Vehicle and a truck, rammed into the personnel of respondents Tan and Obiedo causing
melee and disturbance. Moreover, by the execution of the Deeds of Absolute Sale, the
properties subject thereof were, ipso jure, delivered to respondents Tan and 292292SUPREME
COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDRuby Shelter Builders and Realty Development Corporation vs.
Formaran IIIObiedo. The demolition of the existing structures on the properties was nothing but
an exercise of dominion by respondents Tan and Obiedo.Respondent Tan, thus, sought not just
the dismissal of the Complaint of petitioner, but also the grant of his counterclaim. The prayer
in his Answer is faithfully reproduced below:“Wherefore, premises considered, it is most
respectfully prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered dismissing the complaint,
and on the counterclaim, [herein petitioner] and Ruben Sia, be ordered to indemnify, jointly
and severally [herein respondents Tan and Obiedo] the amounts of not less than
P10,000,000.00 as liquidated damages and the further sum of not less than P500,000.00 as
attorney’s fees. In the alternative, and should it become necessary, it is hereby prayed that
[petitioner] be ordered to pay herein [respondents Tan and Obiedo] the entire principal loan of
P95,700,620.00, plus interests, surcharges and penalties computed from March 17, 2005 until
the entire sum is fully paid, including the amount of P74,678,647.00 foregone interest covering
the period from October 1, 2004 to December 31, 2005 or for a total of fifteen (15) months,
plus incidental expenses as may be proved in court, in the event that Annexes “G” to “L” be
nullified. Other relief and remedies as are just and equitable under the premises are hereby
prayed for.”16Thereafter, respondent Tan filed before the RTC an Omnibus Motion in which he
contended that Civil Case No. 2006-0030 involved real properties, the docket fees for which
should be computed in accordance with Section 7(a), not Section 7(b)(1), of Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC which took effect on 16 August 2004. Since
petitioner did not pay the appropriate docket fees for Civil Case No. 2006-0030, the RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction over the said case. Hence, respondent Tan asked the RTC to issue an order
requiring petitioner to pay the correct and accurate docket fees pursuant to Section 7(a), Rule
141 of the_______________16 Id., at pp. 69-70.293, FEBRUARY 10, 2009293Ruby Shelter
Builders and Realty Development Corporation vs. Formaran IIIRules of Court, as amended; and
should petitioner fail to do so, to deny and dismiss the prayer of petitioner for the annulment of
the Deeds of Absolute Sale for having been executed in contravention of the law or of the
Memorandum of Agreement as pactum commisorium.As required by the RTC, the parties
submitted their Position Papers on the matter. On 24 March 2006, the RTC issued an Order17
granting respondent Tan’s Omnibus Motion. In holding that both petitioner and respondent
Tan must pay docket fees in accordance with Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, the RTC reasoned:“It must be noted that under paragraph (b) 2. of the said Section 7,
it is provided that QUIETING OF TITLE which is an action classified as beyond pecuniary
estimation “shall be governed by paragraph (a).” Hence, the filing fee in an action for
Declaration of Nullity of Deed which is also classified as beyond pecuniary estimation, must be
computed based on the provision of Section 7(A) herein-above, in part, quoted.Since [herein
respondent], Romeo Tan in his Answer has a counterclaim against the plaintiff, the former must
likewise pay the necessary filling (sic) fees as provided for under Section 7 (A) of Amended
Administrative Circular No. 35-2004 issued by the Supreme Court.”18Consequently, the RTC
decreed on the matter of docket/filing fees:“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the [herein
petitioner] is hereby ordered to pay additional filing fee and the [herein respondent], Romeo
Tan is also ordered to pay docket and filing fees on his counterclaim, both computed based on
Section 7(a) of the Supreme Court Amended Administrative Circular No. 35-2004 within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of this Order to the Clerk of Court, Regional_______________17 Id., at
pp. 74-79.18 Id., at p. 75. 294294SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDRuby Shelter Builders
and Realty Development Corporation vs. Formaran IIITrial Court, Naga City and for the latter to
compute and to collect the said fees accordingly.”19Petitioner moved20 for the partial
reconsideration of the 24 March 2006 Order of the RTC, arguing that Civil Case No. 2006-0030
was principally for the annulment of the Deeds of Absolute Sale and, as such, incapable of
pecuniary estimation. Petitioner submitted that the RTC erred in applying Section 7(a), Rule 141
of the Rules of Court, as amended, to petitioner’s first cause of action in its Complaint in Civil
Case No. 2006-0030.In its Order21 dated 29 March 2006, the RTC refused to reconsider its 24
March 2006 Order, based on the following ratiocination:“Analyzing, the action herein pertains
to real property, for as admitted by the [herein petitioner], “the deeds of sale in question
pertain to real property” x x x. The Deeds of Sale subject of the instant case have already been
transferred in the name of the [herein respondents Tan and Obiedo].Compared with Quieting
of Title, the latter action is brought when there is cloud on the title to real property or any
interest therein or to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to the real property (Art. 476,
Civil Code of the Philippines) and the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to or interest in
the real property which is the subject matter of the action (Art. 447, ibid.), and yet plaintiff in
QUIETING OF TITLE is required to pay the fees in accordance with paragraph (a) of Section 7 of
the said Amended Administrative Circular No. 35-2004, hence, with more reason that the
[petitioner] who no longer has title to the real properties subject of the instant case must be
required to pay the required fees in accordance with Section 7(a) of the Amended
Administrative Circular No. 35-2004 afore-mentioned.Furthermore, while [petitioner] claims
that the action for declaration of nullity of deed of sale and memorandum of agreement
is_______________19 Id., at p. 78.20 Id., at pp. 80-84.21 Penned by Judge Novelita Villegas-
Llaguno; id., at pp. 85-88.295, FEBRUARY 10, 2009295Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty
Development Corporation vs. Formaran IIIone incapable of pecuniary estimation, however, as
argued by the [respondent Tan], the issue as to how much filing and docket fees should be paid
was never raised as an issue in the case of Russell vs. Vestil, 304 SCRA 738.x x x xWHEREFORE,
the Motion for Partial Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.”22In a letter dated 19 April 2006, the
RTC Clerk of Court computed, upon the request of counsel for the petitioner, the additional
docket fees petitioner must pay for in Civil Case No. 2006-0030 as directed in the afore-
mentioned RTC Orders. Per the computation of the RTC Clerk of Court, after excluding the
amount petitioner previously paid on 16 March 2006, petitioner must still pay the amount of
P720,392.60 as docket fees.23Petitioner, however, had not yet conceded, and it filed a Petition
for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals; the petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 94800.
According to petitioner, the RTC24 acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, when it issued its Orders dated 24 March 2006 and 29 March 2006
mandating that the docket/filing fees for Civil Case No. 2006-0030, an action for annulment of
deeds of sale, be assessed under Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended. If the
Orders would not be revoked, corrected, or rectified, petitioner would suffer grave injustice
and irreparable damage.On 22 November 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision
wherein it held that:_______________22 Id., at pp. 86-88.23 Id., at p. 89.24 Judge Pablo C.
Fomaran, Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 21, Naga City, was named as a respondent in CA-G.R.
SP No. 94800 in his capacity as the Pairing Judge for RTC Branch 22, Naga City, which was
formerly presided by Judge Novelita Villegas-Llaguno, who retired on 1 May
2006.296296SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDRuby Shelter Builders and Realty
Development Corporation vs. Formaran III“Clearly, the petitioner’s complaint involves not only
the annulment of the deeds of sale, but also the recovery of the real properties identified in the
said documents. In other words, the objectives of the petitioner in filing the complaint were to
cancel the deeds of sale and ultimately, to recover possession of the same. It is therefore a real
action.Consequently, the additional docket fees that must be paid cannot be assessed in
accordance with Section 7(b). As a real action, Section 7(a) must be applied in the assessment
and payment of the proper docket fee.Resultantly, there is no grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the court a quo. By grave abuse of
discretion is meant capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, and mere abuse of discretion is not enough—it must be grave. The abuse must be
grave and patent, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily and
despotically.Such a situation does not exist in this particular case. The evidence is insufficient to
prove that the court a quo acted despotically in rendering the assailed orders. It acted properly
and in accordance with law. Hence, error cannot be attributed to it.”25Hence, the fallo of the
Decision of the appellate court reads:“WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DENIED. The
assailed Orders of the court a quo are AFFIRMED.”26Without seeking reconsideration of the
foregoing Decision with the Court of Appeals, petitioner filed its Petition for Review on
Certiorari before this Court, with a lone assignment of error, to wit:“18. The herein petitioner
most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a grave and serious reversible
error in affirming the assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court which are clearly contrary to
the pronouncement of this Honorable Court in the case of Spouses De Leon v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. _______________25 Rollo, pp. 118-119.26 Id.297, FEBRUARY 10, 2009297Ruby Shelter
Builders and Realty Development Corporation vs. Formaran IIINo. 104796, March 6, 1998, not
to mention the fact that if the said judgment is allowed to stand and not rectified, the same
would result in grave injustice and irreparable damage to herein petitioner in view of the
prohibitive amount assessed as a consequence of said Orders.”27In Manchester Development
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,28 the Court explicitly pronounced that “[t]he court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee.” Hence, the
payment of docket fees is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional.In Sun Insurance Office,
Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion,29 the Court laid down guidelines for the implementation of its previous
pronouncement in Manchester under particular circumstances, to wit:“1. It is not simply the
filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed
docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket
fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.2. The same rule applies to permissive
counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until
and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said
fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of
the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the
judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for
determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the
judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk_______________27 Id., at p. 27.28 G.R. No.
L-75919, 7 May 1987, 149 SCRA 562, 569.29 G.R. Nos. 79937-38, 13 February 1989, 170 SCRA
274, 285.298298SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDRuby Shelter Builders and Realty
Development Corporation vs. Formaran III of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce
said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.”In the Petition at bar, the RTC found, and the
Court of Appeals affirmed, that petitioner did not pay the correct amount of docket fees for
Civil Case No. 2006-0030. According to both the trial and appellate courts, petitioner should pay
docket fees in accordance with Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
Consistent with the liberal tenor of Sun Insurance, the RTC, instead of dismissing outright
petitioner’s Complaint in Civil Case No. 2006-0030, granted petitioner time to pay the
additional docket fees. Despite the seeming munificence of the RTC, petitioner refused to pay
the additional docket fees assessed against it, believing that it had already paid the correct
amount before, pursuant to Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as
amended.Relevant to the present controversy are the following provisions under Rule 141 of
the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC30 and Supreme Court Amended
Administrative Circular No. 35-200431:“SEC. 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts.—(a) For filing
an action or a permissive OR COMPULSORY counterclaim, CROSS-CLAIM, or money claim
against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing a third-party, fourth-party, etc. complaint,
or a complaint-in-intervention, if the total sum claimed, INCLUSIVE OF INTERESTS, PENALTIES,
SURCHARGES, DAMAGES OF WHATEVER KIND, AND ATTORNEY’S FEES, LITIGATION EXPENSES
AND COSTS and/or in cases involving property, the FAIR MARKET value of the REAL property in
litigation STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OR CURRENT ZONAL VALUATION OF THE
BUREAU OF INTERNAL_______________30 Re: Proposed Revision of Rule 141, Revised Rules of
Court.31 Guidelines in the Allocation of Legal Fees Collected Under Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court, as Amended, between the Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund and the Judiciary
Development Fund.299, FEBRUARY 10, 2009299Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development
Corporation vs. Formaran III REVENUE, WHICHEVER IS HIGHER, OR IF THERE IS NONE, THE
STATED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY IN LITIGATION OR THE VALUE OF THE PERSONAL PROPERTY
IN LITIGATION OR THE VALUE OF THE PERSONAL PROPERTY IN LITIGATION AS ALLEGED BY THE
CLAIMANT, is:[Table of fees omitted.]If the action involves both a money claim and relief
pertaining to property, then THE fees will be charged on both the amounts claimed and value of
property based on the formula prescribed in this paragraph a.(b) For filing:1. Actions where
the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated2. Special civil actions, except judicial
foreclosure of mortgage, EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDINGS, PARTITION AND QUIETING OF TITLE
which will3. All other actions not involving property[Table of fees omitted.]”The docket fees
under Section 7(a), Rule 141, in cases involving real property depend on the fair market value of
the same: the higher the value of the real property, the higher the docket fees due. In contrast,
Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 imposes a fixed or flat rate of docket fees on actions incapable of
pecuniary estimation.In order to resolve the issue of whether petitioner paid the correct
amount of docket fees, it is necessary to determine the true nature of its Complaint. The dictum
adhered to in this jurisdiction is that the nature of an action is determined by the allegations in
the body of the pleading or Complaint itself, rather than by its title or heading.32 However, the
Court finds it necessary, in ascertaining the true nature of Civil Case No. 2006-0030, to take into
account significant facts and circumstances beyond the Complaint of petitioner, facts and
circum-_______________32 Gochan v. Gochan, 423 Phil. 491, 501; 372 SCRA 256, 263-264
(2001).300300SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDRuby Shelter Builders and Realty
Development Corporation vs. Formaran IIIstances which petitioner failed to state in its
Complaint but were disclosed in the preliminary proceedings before the court a quo.Petitioner
persistently avers that its Complaint in Civil Case No. 2006-0030 is primarily for the annulment
of the Deeds of Absolute Sale. Based on the allegations and reliefs in the Complaint alone, one
would get the impression that the titles to the subject real properties still rest with petitioner;
and that the interest of respondents Tan and Obiedo in the same lies only in the Deeds of
Absolute Sale sought to be annulled.What petitioner failed to mention in its Complaint was that
respondents Tan and Obiedo already had the Memorandum of Agreement, which clearly
provided for the execution of the Deeds of Absolute Sale, registered on the TCTs over the five
parcels of land, then still in the name of petitioner. After respondents Tan and Obiedo had the
Deeds of Absolute Sale notarized on 3 January 2006 and presented the same to Register of
Deeds for Naga City on 8 March 2006, they were already issued TCTs over the real properties in
question, in their own names. Respondents Tan and Obiedo have also acquired possession of
the said properties, enabling them, by petitioner’s own admission, to demolish the
improvements thereon.It is, thus, suspect that petitioner kept mum about the afore-mentioned
facts and circumstances when they had already taken place before it filed its Complaint before
the RTC on 16 March 2006. Petitioner never expressed surprise when such facts and
circumstances were established before the RTC, nor moved to amend its Complaint accordingly.
Even though the Memorandum of Agreement was supposed to have long been registered on its
TCTs over the five parcels of land, petitioner did not pray for the removal of the same as a cloud
on its title. In the same vein, although petitioner alleged that respondents Tan and Obiedo
forcibly took physical possession of the subject real properties, petitioner did not seek the res-
301, FEBRUARY 10, 2009301Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development Corporation vs.
Formaran IIItoration of such possession to itself. And despite learning that respondents Tan and
Obiedo already secured TCTs over the subject properties in their names, petitioner did not ask
for the cancellation of said titles. The only logical and reasonable explanation is that petitioner
is reluctant to bring to the attention of the Court certain facts and circumstances, keeping its
Complaint safely worded, so as to institute only an action for annulment of Deeds of Absolute
Sale. Petitioner deliberately avoided raising issues on the title and possession of the real
properties that may lead the Court to classify its case as a real action.No matter how
fastidiously petitioner attempts to conceal them, the allegations and reliefs it sought in its
Complaint in Civil Case No. 2006-0030 appears to be ultimately a real action, involving as they
do the recovery by petitioner of its title to and possession of the five parcels of land from
respondents Tan and Obiedo.A real action is one in which the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real
property; or, as indicated in what is now Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is
an action affecting title to or recovery of possession of real property.33Section 7, Rule 141 of
the Rules of Court, prior to its amendment by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, had a specific paragraph
governing the assessment of the docket fees for real action, to wit:“In a real action, the
assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof shall be alleged
by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees.”It was in accordance with the
afore-quoted provision that the Court, in Gochan v. Gochan,34 held that although the caption
of the complaint filed by therein respondents Mercedes_______________33 Id.; Serrano v.
Delica, G.R. No. 136325, 29 July 2005, 465 SCRA 82, 88.34 Gochan v. Gochan,
id.302302SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDRuby Shelter Builders and Realty
Development Corporation vs. Formaran III Gochan, et al. with the RTC was denominated as one
for “specific performance and damages,” the relief sought was the conveyance or transfer of
real property, or ultimately, the execution of deeds of conveyance in their favor of the real
properties enumerated in the provisional memorandum of agreement. Under these
circumstances, the case before the RTC was actually a real action, affecting as it did title to or
possession of real property. Consequently, the basis for determining the correct docket fees
shall be the assessed value of the property, or the estimated value thereof as alleged in the
complaint. But since Mercedes Gochan failed to allege in their complaint the value of the real
properties, the Court found that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the same for non-
payment of the correct docket fees.Likewise, in Siapno v. Manalo,35 the Court disregarded the
title/denomination of therein plaintiff Manalo’s amended petition as one for Mandamus with
Revocation of Title and Damages; and adjudged the same to be a real action, the filing fees for
which should have been computed based on the assessed value of the subject property or, if
there was none, the estimated value thereof. The Court expounded in Siapno that:“In his
amended petition, respondent Manalo prayed that NTA’s sale of the property in dispute to
Standford East Realty Corporation and the title issued to the latter on the basis thereof, be
declared null and void. In a very real sense, albeit the amended petition is styled as one for
“Mandamus with Revocation of Title and Damages,” it is, at bottom, a suit to recover from
Standford the realty in question and to vest in respondent the ownership and possession
thereof. In short, the amended petition is in reality an action in res or a real action. Our
pronouncement in Fortune Motors (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals is instructive. There, we
said:A prayer for annulment or rescission of contract does not operate to efface the true
objectives and na-_______________35 G.R. No. 132260, 30 August 2005, 468 SCRA 330.303,
FEBRUARY 10, 2009303Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development Corporation vs.
Formaran IIIture of the action which is to recover real property. (Inton, et al. v. Quintan, 81 Phil.
97, 1948)An action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property is a real action. Its
prime objective is to recover said real property. (Gavieres v. Sanchez, 94 Phil. 760, 1954)An
action to annul a real estate mortgage foreclosure sale is no different from an action to annul a
private sale of real property. (Muñoz v. Llamas, 87 Phil. 737, 1950).While it is true that
petitioner does not directly seek the recovery of title or possession of the property in question,
his action for annulment of sale and his claim for damages are closely intertwined with the
issue of ownership of the building which, under the law, is considered immovable property, the
recovery of which is petitioner’s primary objective. The prevalent doctrine is that an action for
the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property does not operate to efface the
fundamental and prime objective and nature of the case, which is to recover said real property.
It is a real action.Unfortunately, and evidently to evade payment of the correct amount of filing
fee, respondent Manalo never alleged in the body of his amended petition, much less in the
prayer portion thereof, the assessed value of the subject res, or, if there is none, the estimated
value thereof, to serve as basis for the receiving clerk in computing and arriving at the proper
amount of filing fee due thereon, as required under Section 7 of this Court’s en banc resolution
of 04 September 1990 (Re: Proposed Amendments to Rule 141 on Legal Fees).Even the
amended petition, therefore, should have been expunged from the records.In fine, we rule and
so hold that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over its Civil Case No. Q-95-24791.”36It
was in Serrano v. Delica,37 however, that the Court dealt with a complaint that bore the most
similarity to the one at_______________36 Id., at p. 340.37 Supra note 33.304304SUPREME
COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDRuby Shelter Builders and Realty Development Corporation vs.
Formaran III bar. Therein respondent Delica averred that undue influence, coercion, and
intimidation were exerted upon him by therein petitioners Serrano, et al. to effect transfer of
his properties. Thus, Delica filed a complaint before the RTC against Serrano, et al., praying that
the special power of attorney, the affidavit, the new titles issued in the names of Serrano, et al.,
and the contracts of sale of the disputed properties be cancelled; that Serrano, et al. be
ordered to pay Delica, jointly and severally, actual, moral and exemplary damages in the
amount of P200,000.00, as well as attorney’s fee of P200,000.00 and costs of litigation; that a
TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction be issued ordering Serrano, et al. to immediately
restore him to his possession of the parcels of land in question; and that after trial, the writ of
injunction be made permanent. The Court dismissed Delica’s complaint for the following
reasons:“A careful examination of respondent’s complaint is that it is a real action. In
Paderanga vs. Buissan, we held that ‘in a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real
property, or, as stated in Section 2(a), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court, a real action is one
‘affecting title to real property or for the recovery of possession of, or for partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on a real property.’ ”Obviously, respondent’s
complaint is a real action involving not only the recovery of real properties, but likewise the
cancellation of the titles thereto.Considering that respondent’s complaint is a real action, the
Rule requires that “the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value
thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees.”We note,
however, that neither the “assessed value” nor the “estimated value” of the questioned parcels
of land were alleged by respondent in both his original and amended complaint. What he
stated in his amended complaint is that the disputed realties have a “BIR zonal valuation” of
P1,200.00 per square meter. However, the alleged “BIR zonal valuation” is not the kind of
valuation required by the Rule. It is the assessed value of the realty. Having utterly failed to
comply with the requirement of the Rule that he shall allege in his305, FEBRUARY 10,
2009305Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development Corporation vs. Formaran III complaint
the assessed value of his real properties in controversy, the correct docket fee cannot be
computed. As such, his complaint should not have been accepted by the trial court. We thus
rule that it has not acquired jurisdiction over the present case for failure of herein respondent
to pay the required docket fee. On this ground alone, respondent’s complaint is vulnerable to
dismissal.”38Brushing aside the significance of Serrano, petitioner argues that said decision,
rendered by the Third Division of the Court, and not by the Court en banc, cannot modify or
reverse the doctrine laid down in Spouses De Leon v. Court of Appeals.39 Petitioner relies
heavily on the declaration of this Court in Spouses De Leon that an action for annulment or
rescission of a contract of sale of real property is incapable of pecuniary estimation.The Court,
however, does not perceive a contradiction between Serrano and the Spouses De Leon. The
Court calls attention to the following statement in Spouses De Leon: “A review of the
jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining whether an action is one the subject
matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of
first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought.” Necessarily, the
determination must be done on a case-to-case basis, depending on the facts and circumstances
of each. What petitioner conveniently ignores is that in Spouses De Leon, the action therein
that private respondents instituted before the RTC was “solely for annulment or rescission” of
the contract of sale over a real property.40 There appeared to be no transfer of title or
possession to the adverse party. Their complaint simply prayed for:“1. Ordering the
nullification or rescission of the Contract of Conditional Sale (Supplementary Agreement) for
having violated the rights of plaintiffs (private respondents) guaranteed to them
under_______________38 Rollo, pp. 88-89.39 350 Phil. 535; 287 SCRA 94 (1998).40 Id., at pp.
541-543. 306306SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDRuby Shelter Builders and Realty
Development Corporation vs. Formaran III Article 886 of the Civil Code and/or violation of the
terms and conditions of the said contract.2. Declaring void ab initio the Deed of Absolute Sale
for being absolutely simulated; and3. Ordering defendants (petitioners) to pay plaintiffs
(private respondents) attorney’s fees in the amount of P100,000.00.”41As this Court has
previously discussed herein, the nature of Civil Case No. 2006-0030 instituted by petitioner
before the RTC is closer to that of Serrano, rather than of Spouses De Leon, hence, calling for
the application of the ruling of the Court in the former, rather than in the latter.It is also
important to note that, with the amendments introduced by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, which
became effective on 16 August 2004, the paragraph in Section 7, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court,
pertaining specifically to the basis for computation of docket fees for real actions was deleted.
Instead, Section 7(1) of Rule 141, as amended, provides that “in cases involving real property,
the FAIR MARKET value of the REAL property in litigation STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX
DECLARATION OR CURRENT ZONAL VALUATION OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
WHICH IS HIGHER, OR IF THERE IS NONE, THE STATED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY IN LITIGATION x
x x” shall be the basis for the computation of the docket fees. Would such an amendment have
an impact on Gochan, Siapno, and Serrano? The Court rules in the negative.A real action
indisputably involves real property. The docket fees for a real action would still be determined
in accordance with the value of the real property involved therein; the only difference is in
what constitutes the acceptable value. In computing the docket fees for cases involving real
properties, the courts, instead of relying on the assessed or estimated value, would now be
using the fair market value of the real properties (as stated in the Tax Declaration or
the_______________41 Id., at p. 537.307, FEBRUARY 10, 2009307Ruby Shelter Builders and
Realty Development Corporation vs. Formaran III Zonal Valuation of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, whichever is higher) or, in the absence thereof, the stated value of the same.In sum,
the Court finds that the true nature of the action instituted by petitioner against respondents is
the recovery of title to and possession of real property. It is a real action necessarily involving
real property, the docket fees for which must be computed in accordance with Section 7(1),
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended. The Court of Appeals, therefore, did not commit
any error in affirming the RTC Orders requiring petitioner to pay additional docket fees for its
Complaint in Civil Case No. 2006-0030.The Court does not give much credence to the allegation
of petitioner that if the judgment of the Court of Appeals is allowed to stand and not rectified,
it would result in grave injustice and irreparable injury to petitioner in view of the prohibitive
amount assessed against it. It is a sweeping assertion which lacks evidentiary support.
Undeniably, before the Court can conclude that the amount of docket fees is indeed prohibitive
for a party, it would have to look into the financial capacity of said party. It baffles this Court
that herein petitioner, having the capacity to enter into multi-million transactions, now stalls at
paying P720,392.60 additional docket fees so it could champion before the courts its rights over
the disputed real properties. Moreover, even though the Court exempts individuals, as indigent
or pauper litigants, from paying docket fees, it has never extended such an exemption to a
corporate entity.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby
DENIED. The Decision, dated 22 November 2006, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
94800, which affirmed the Orders dated 24 March 2006 and 29 March 2006 of the RTC, Branch
22, of Naga City, in Civil Case No. RTC-2006-0030, ordering petitioner Ruby Shelter Builders and
Realty Development Corporation to pay additional docket/filing fees, computed based on
Section 7(a), Rule Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development Corporation vs. Formaran III,
578 SCRA 283, G.R. No. 175914 February 10, 2009
G.R. No. 163021. April 27, 2007.* PATRICIO A. VILLENA, petitioner, vs. PATRICIO S. PAYOYO,
respondent.Civil Procedure; Courts; Jurisdictions; What determines the nature of the action and
which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the
relief sought.—In determining the jurisdiction of an action whose subject is incapable of
pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy sought must first be
ascertained. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable
of pecuniary estimation and the jurisdiction of the court depends on the amount of the claim.
But, where the primary issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money,
where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought,
such are actions whose subjects are incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence cognizable by the
RTCs. Verily, what determines the nature of the action and which court has jurisdiction over it
are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought. Same; Same; Same;
A case for breach of contract is a cause of action either for specific performance or rescission of
contract; An action for rescission of contract, as a counterpart of an action for specific
performance, is incapable of pecuniary estimation and therefore falls under the jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court.—A case for breach of contract is a cause of action either for specific
performance or rescission of contracts. An action for rescission of contract, as a counterpart of
an action for specific performance, is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and therefore falls
under the jurisdiction of the RTC. In the present case, the averments in the complaint show that
Payoyo sought the cancellation of the contracts and refund of the downpayments since Villena
failed to comply with the obligation to deliver the appliances and install the kitchen cabinets
subject of the contracts. The court then must examine the facts and the applicable law to
determine whether there is in fact substantial breach that would warrant rescission or
cancellation of the contracts and _______________ * SECOND DIVISION.
593 VOL. 522, APRIL 27, 2007 593 Villena vs. Payoyo entitle the respondent
for a refund. While the respondent prayed for the refund, this is just incidental to the main
action, which is the rescission or cancellation of the contracts. PETITION for review on certiorari
of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.The facts are stated in the opinion of the
Court. Argue Law Firm for petitioner. Inocentes, Lacuanan and Associates for
respondent.QUISUMBING, J.:This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision1 dated
November 21, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70513 and its Resolution2 dated
March 18, 2004, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. The appellate court had
affirmed with modification the Decision3 dated April 26, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Quezon City, Branch 78.The facts are undisputed.On October 28, 1997, respondent Patricio
Payoyo and Novaline, Inc., through its president, petitioner Patricio Villena, entered into a
contract for the delivery and installation of kitchen cabinets in Payoyo’s residence. The cabinets
were to be delivered within ninety days from downpayment of 50% of the purchase price. On
October 29, 1997, Payoyo paid Villena P155,183 as downpayment.On December 9, 1997,
Payoyo entered into another contract with Villena for the delivery of home appliances. On the
same day, Payoyo paid 50% of the purchase price equal to P29,638.50 as downpayment.
_______________ 1 Rollo, pp. 38-56. 2 Id., at pp. 58-59. 3 Id., at pp. 104-107. 594 594
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Villena vs. Payoyo However, Villena failed to install
the kitchen cabinets and deliver the appliances. Payoyo made several demands upon Villena
but the latter failed to comply.In a letter dated March 12, 1998, Payoyo demanded the
cancellation of the contracts and the refund in full of the downpayments amounting to
P184,821.50. Villena promised to install the kitchen cabinets on or before May 10, 1998 and to
deliver the appliances. Despite repeated demands, Villena again failed to do so.Payoyo sent
Villena two demand letters on June 24, 1998 and on July 28, 1998 asking the latter to either
deliver all items or return the downpayments.On October 26, 1998, Payoyo filed a complaint
for recovery of a sum of money and damages against Villena. Villena moved to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a cause of action. He argued that there was no ground to cancel
the contract; thus, there was no basis for refund. The trial court denied his motion. Villena
thereafter filed an answer with compulsory counterclaim citing as an affirmative defense
Payoyo’s failure to state a cause of action.On June 1, 1999, immediately after the trial court
issued a pre-trial order, Villena filed a second motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter but it was denied. Thereafter, trial ensued.The trial court
decided in favor of Payoyo, reasoning that the power to rescind is implied in reciprocal
obligations. Considering that Villena repeatedly failed to comply with his obligation, Payoyo had
the right to rescind the contract and demand a refund. The trial court ordered petitioner to pay
respondent P184,821.50 as actual damages plus 12% interest per annum from the date of filing
of the complaint and P20,000 as moral damages plus legal interest from judicial demand until
fully paid.The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision with the following modifications:
595 VOL. 522, APRIL 27, 2007 595 Villena vs. Payoyo “1) [Petitioner Villena is]
hereby ordered to pay [respondent Payoyo] actual damages in the amount of P 155,183.00 with
12% interest per annum from the date of the filing of the complaint;2) [Petitioner is] likewise
ordered to deliver the Indesit Multifunction Oven and Indesit Hob in favor of [respondent]
within thirty (30) days from the finality of this decision; and3) [Respondent] is hereby ordered
to pay the purchase price of the Indesit Multifunction Oven and Indesit Hob in favor of
[petitioner] on the day the delivery is made.”4The appellate court reasoned that while there
was delay in the delivery and installation of the kitchen cabinets, there was none in the delivery
of the appliances. The contract for said appliances did not specify the date of delivery but that
delivery should be made upon payment of the 50% balance of the purchase price. Considering
that Payoyo failed to pay the balance, Villena did not incur delay.Hence, the instant petition,
where petitioner raises the following issues:I.WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT HAD
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE.II.WHETHER OR NOT [THE]
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS (PETITIONER AND NOVALINE, INC.), ARE ESTOPPED FROM
QUESTIONING THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.5Simply, the
issue in this case is whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the complaint.Petitioner
maintains that the RTC should have dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. He posits
that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint since it is mainly for _______________ 4 Id.,
at p. 55. 5 Id., at p. 233. 596 596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Villena vs. Payoyo
recovery of a sum of money in the amount of P184,821.50 which is below the jurisdictional
amount set for RTCs.6 Moreover, petitioner contends that the issue of jurisdiction may be
raised at any time, even on appeal, since jurisdiction is conferred only by law and cannot be
acquired through or waived by any act or omission of the parties.7Respondent, on the other
hand, contends that the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint as the allegations therein show
that it is actually a case for rescission of the contracts. The recovery of a sum of money is
merely a necessary consequence of the cancellation of the contracts.8The pertinent portion of
Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,9
provides:“SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.—Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation;x x x x(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the
property in controversy exceeds One Hundred Thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other
cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds
Two Hundred Thousand pesos (P200,000.00).”In determining the jurisdiction of an action
whose subject is incapable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought must first be ascertained. If it is _______________ 6 Id., at p. 238. 7 Id., at p.
243. 8 Id., at p. 257. 9 AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURTS,MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS,AMENDING FOR
THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 129, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE “JUDICIARY
REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980.” 597 VOL. 522, APRIL 27, 2007 597 Villena vs. Payoyo
primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation and the jurisdiction of the court depends on the amount of the claim. But, where
the primary issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the
money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, such are
actions whose subjects are incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence cognizable by the
RTCs.10Verily, what determines the nature of the action and which court has jurisdiction over it
are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.11In our considered
view, the complaint, albeit entitled as one for collection of a sum of money with damages, is
one incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus, one within the RTC’s jurisdiction. The allegations
therein show that it is actually for breach of contract, thus,“x x x x7. Under their Contracts,
prestation and/or delivery of the items will be performed and delivered within NINETY (90)
DAYS from the receipt of downpayment. Plaintiff complied with its prestation but defendants
defaulted with their obligation;x x x x10. On 12 March 1998, plaintiff sent letter to defendants
requesting the latter for the cancellation of the purchase contracts and refund in full the (50%)
downpayment paid in the total amount of (P184,821.50) within five (5) days upon receipt of the
letter. . .x x x x12. On 24 March 1998, plaintiff and defendant Patricio A. Villena, personally
talked [to] each other regarding the full refund of_______________ 10 Huguete v. Embudo,
G.R. No. 149554, July 1, 2003, 405 SCRA 273, 278-279, citing Singsong v. Isabela Sawmill, No.
L27343, February 28, 1979, 88 SCRA 623, 637-638. 11 Huguete v. Embudo, Id., citing Cañiza v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110427, February 24, 1997, 268 SCRA 640, 647-648.
598 598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Villena vs. Payoyo the (50%)
downpayment in the amount of P184, 821.50. Defendant informed the plaintiff that it was their
fault because the order from their Australian supplier was made only on 15 December 1997.
Defendant promised plaintiff [delivery of] the three (3) Kitchen Cabinets on or before 10 [M]ay
1998, and the three (3) home appliances were considered fully paid applying the (50%)
downpayment of (P29,638.50) for home appliances only. But defendant did not fulfill his
promise;13. Despite all these, repeated demands for the installation of the (3) three kitchen
[c]abinets and complete delivery of home appliances were made, but defendants did nothing;x
x x x”12 (Emphasis added.)A case for breach of contract is a cause of action either for specific
performance or rescission of contracts.13 An action for rescission of contract, as a counterpart
of an action for specific performance, is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and therefore falls
under the jurisdiction of the RTC.14 In the present case, the averments in the complaint show
that Payoyo sought the cancellation of the contracts and refund of the downpayments since
Villena failed to comply with the obligation to deliver the appliances and install the kitchen
cabinets subject of the contracts. The court then must examine the facts and the applicable law
to determine whether there is in fact substantial breach that would warrant rescission or
cancellation of the contracts and entitle the respondent for a refund. While the respondent
prayed for the refund, this is just incidental to the main action, which is the rescission or
cancellation of the contracts.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision
dated November 21, 2003 of the Court of Ap-_______________ 12 Rollo, pp. 62-64. 13 Radio
Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136109, August 1, 2002,
386 SCRA 67, 71. 14 Russell v. Vestil, G.R. No. 119347, March 17, 1999, 304 SCRA 738, 745,
citing Lapitan v. Scandia, Inc., No. L-24668, July 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 479, 482.
599 VOL. 522, APRIL 27, 2007 599 Chiongbian-Oliva vs. Republic peals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 70513 and the Resolution dated March 18, 2004 are AFFIRMED.Costs against
petitioner.SO ORDERED. Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Tinga and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.Petition
denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.Note.—Jurisdiction is determined by the averments
in the complaint. (Perez vs. Cruz, 404 SCRA 487 [2003]) Villena vs. Payoyo, 522 SCRA 592, G.R.
No. 163021 April 27, 2007
G.R. No. 136109. August 1, 2002.* RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MANUEL DULAWON, respondents.Remedial Law;
Actions; Jurisdiction; In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not
capable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy sought must first
be ascertained.—In Russell, et al. v. Vestil, et al., the Court held that in determining whether an
action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of
the principal action or remedy sought must first be ascertained. If it is primarily for the recovery
of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and jurisdiction
over the action will depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, the action is one where the
subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, which is cognizable
exclusively by Regional Trial Courts. Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction over the subject matter of
a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of
the claims asserted therein.—It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the
relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims
asserted therein. Same; Same; Same; A breach of contract is a cause of action either for specific
performance or rescission of contracts; Actions for specific performance are incapable of
pecuniary estimation and therefore fall under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.—It is
settled that a breach of contract is a cause of action either for specific performance or
rescission of contracts. In Manufacturer’s Distributors, Inc. v. Siu Liong, the Court held that
actions for specific performance are incapable of pecuniary estimation and therefore fall under
the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.______________ * FIRST DIVISION.
68 68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Radio Communications of the
Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Balbin,
Reyes, Aguila & Associates for petitioner. Sarol & Dapeg Law Offices for private
respondents.YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals1 in CA-G.R. SP No. 45987 dated April 30, 19982 and its resolution dated October 15,
19983 denying the motion for reconsideration.On June 18, 1997, private respondent Manuel
Dulawon filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25, a complaint for breach
of contract of lease with damages against petitioner Radio Communications of the Philippines,
Inc. (RCPI). Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction contending
that it is the Municipal Trial Court which has jurisdiction as the complaint is basically one for
collection of unpaid rentals in the sum of P84,000.00, which does not exceed the jurisdictional
amount of P100,000.00 for Regional Trial Courts. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss,4
as well as petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.5 Hence, petitioner went to the Court of
Appeals on a petition for certiorari. On April 30, 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition. The dispositive portion thereof reads:“WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED
DUE COURSE and is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.______________ 1 Thirteenth Division,
composed of Associate Justices: Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, (Chairman and ponente), Romeo
J. Callejo, Sr., (member), and Mariano M. Umali (member). 2 Rollo, p. 48. 3 Ibid., p. 63. 4 Ibid.,
p. 39. 5 Ibid., p. 46.
69 VOL. 386, AUGUST 1, 2002 69 Radio Communications of the Philippines,
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals SO ORDERED.”6The motion for reconsideration of the foregoing
decision was denied on October 15, 1998. Hence, this petition.The issue for resolution in this
petition is whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by
private respondent.Pertinent portion of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7691, provides:SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.—Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation;x x x x x x x x x(8) In all other cases in which the
demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses,
and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the
abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).7Corollary
thereto, Administrative Circular No. 09-94, states:x x x x x x x x x2. The exclusion of the
term “damages of whatever kind” in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8)
and Section 33 (1) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the
damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action.
______________ 6 Ibid., p. 53. 7 Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7691, which took effect in
1994, and Circular 21-99, the jurisdictional amount for Regional Trial Court should be adjusted
as follows: Five years after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7691, the amount exceeds Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00); and five years thereafter, the amount exceeds Three
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00). However, in the case of Metro Manila, the above-
mentioned jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted after five years from the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 7691 such that the amount exceeds Four Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P400,000.00) [Feria, Noche, Civil Procedure Annotated, 2001, Vol. 1, pp. 163-164.]
70 70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Radio Communications of
the Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals However, in cases where the claim for damages is the
main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be
considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.x x x x x x x x x.In Russell, et al. v.
Vestil, et al.,8 the Court held that in determining whether an action is one the subject matter of
which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy
sought must first be ascertained. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim
is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and jurisdiction over the action will depend on
the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to
recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of,
the principal relief sought, the action is one where the subject of the litigation may not be
estimated in terms of money, which is cognizable exclusively by Regional Trial Courts.It is
axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is
determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought,
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein.9In
the case at bar, the allegations in the complaint plainly show that private respondent’s cause of
action is breach of contract. The pertinent portion of the complaint recites:x x x x x x x x
x2. That sometime during the end of the year 1995, defendant through its appropriate officials
negotiated with plaintiff the lease of a portion of the latter’s building x x x3. That the lease
contract was effective for a period of three (3) years of from January 1, 1996 to January 1, 1998
with advance payment for the year 1996. The advance was not however given in lump sum but
on______________ 8 304 SCRA 738, 744 [1999], citing Singson v. Isabela Sawmill, 88 SCRA 623
[1979]; Raymundo v. Court of Appeals, 213 SCRA 457 [1992]. 9 Russel, supra, citing Garcia v.
Court of Appeals, 273 SCRA 239 [1997]; Cañiza v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 640 [1997].
71 VOL. 386, AUGUST 1, 2002 71 Radio Communications of the Philippines,
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals installment. One check that was given in payment of one month’s
rental for 1996 was even stale and had to be changed only after demand;4. That as per contract
the monthly rental for 1997 was P3,300.00 while for 1998, it is P3,700.00;5. That the defendant
surreptitiously removed its equipments and other personalities from the leased premises and
failed to pay rentals due for the months of January to March 1997 to the damage and prejudice
of plaintiff; that this failure and refusal on the part of plaintiff accelerated the payment of all
rentals for each month for the years 1997 and 1998;6. That the acts of defendant amounts to a
breach of contract which is unlawful and malicious, as in fact, it caused plaintiff serious anxiety,
emotional stress, and sleepless nights for which he is entitled to moral damages;7. That plaintiff
conveyed his feelings to Mr. Ronald C. Manalastas as evidenced by a letter dated January 7,
1997 a copy of which is hereto attached to form part hereof as Annex “B”. This was later
followed by a letter of plaintiffs counsel a machine copy of which is hereto attached to form
part hereof and marked as Annex “C”. Both these letters landed on deaf ears thereby
aggravating the worries/anxieties of plaintiff;8. That the period agreed is for the benefit of both
parties and any unilateral termination constitutes breach of contract;9. That defendant actually
used the leased premises during the year 1996; that had it not been for the contract, plaintiff
could have leased the premises to other persons for business purposes; that this unlawful and
malicious breach of contract cannot be lawfully countenanced hence defendant must be taught
a lesson by being ordered to pay exemplary damages;x x x x x x x x x.10It is settled that a
breach of contract is a cause of action either for specific performance or rescission of
contracts.11 In Manufacturer’s Distributors, Inc. v. Siu Liong,12 the Court held that actions for
specific performance are incapable of pecuniary estimation and ______________ 10 Rollo, pp.
25-27. 11 Davao Abaca Plantation Company, Inc. v. Dole, Philippines, Inc., 346 SCRA 682, 688
[2000], citing Baguioro v. Barrios, et al., 77 Phil. 12 [1946]. 12 16 SCRA 680, 683 [1966]. 72 72
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals therefore fall under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.13 Here, the
averments in the complaint reveal that the suit filed by private respondent was primarily one
for specific performance as it was aimed to enforce their three-year lease contract which would
incidentally entitle him to monetary awards if the court should find that the subject contract of
lease was breached. As alleged therein, petitioner’s failure to pay rentals due for the period
from January to March 1997, constituted a violation of their contract which had the effect of
accelerating the payment of monthly rentals for the years 1997 and 1998. The same complaint
likewise implied a premature and unilateral termination of the term of the lease with the
closure of and removal all communication equipment in the leased premises.14 Under the
circumstances, the court has to scrutinize the facts and the applicable laws in order to
determine whether there was indeed a violation of their lease agreement that would justify the
award of rentals and damages. The prayer, therefore, for the payment of unpaid rentals in the
amount of P84,000.00 plus damages consequent to the breach is merely incidental to the main
action for specific performance. Similarly, in Manufacturer’s Distributor’s Inc.,15 the Court
explained—x x x x x x x x xThat plaintiff’s complaint also sought the payment by the
defendant of P3,376.00, plus interest and attorney’s fees, does not give a pecuniary estimation
to the litigation, for the payment of such amounts can only be ordered as a consequence of the
specific performance primarily sought. In other words, such payment would be but an incident
or consequence of defendant’s liability for specific performance. If no such liability is judicially
declared, the payment can not be awarded. Hence, the amounts sought do not represent the
value of the subject of litigation.“Subject matter over which jurisdiction can not be conferred by
consent, has reference, not to the res or property involved in the litigation nor to a particular
case, but to the class of cases, the purported subject of litigation, the nature of the action and
of the relief sought (Appeal of Maclain, 176 NW. 817).”______________ 13 See also
Amorganda v. Court of Appeals, 166 SCRA 203 [1988]. 14 Complaint, paragraphs 5 and 8;
Exhibit “B”, Rollo, p. 31. 15 Supra.
73 VOL. 386, AUGUST 1, 2002 73 Radio Communications of the Philippines,
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals Specifically, it has been held that:“The Court has no jurisdiction of a
suit for specific performance of a contract, although the damages alleged for its breach, if
permitted, are within the amount of which that court has jurisdiction.” (Mebane Cotton
Breeding Station vs. Sides, 257 SW. 302; 21 C.J.S. 59, note).x x x x x x x x xClearly, the
action for specific performance case, irrespective of the amount of rentals and damages sought
to be recovered, is incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence cognizable exclusively by the
Regional Trial Court. The trial court, therefore, did not err in denying petitioner’s motion to
dismiss.WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 45987 is AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED. Davide,
Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Vitug, Kapunan and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.Petition denied, judgment
affirmed.Note.—It is settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the
allegations in the complaint. (Unilongco vs. Court of Appeals, 305 SCRA 561 [1999]) Radio
Communications of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 386 SCRA 67, G.R. No. 136109
August 1, 2002
G.R. No. 160384. April 29, 2005.* CESAR T. HILARIO, for himself and as Attorney-in-Fact of
IBARRA, NESTOR, LINA and PRESCILLA, all surnamed HILARIO, petitioners, vs. ALLAN T.
SALVADOR, respondent.HEIRS OF SALUSTIANO SALVADOR, namely, REGIDOR M. SALVADOR
and VIRGINIA SALVADOR-LIM, respondents-intervenors.Actions; Pleadings and Practice; The
nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is
determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the
plaintiff and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are
entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein.—It bears stressing that the nature of the
action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by
the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the
law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs _______________ *
SECOND DIVISION.
816 816 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Hilario vs. Salvador are
entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein. The caption of the complaint is not
determinative of the nature of the action. Nor does the jurisdiction of the court depend upon
the answer of the defendant or agreement of the parties or to the waiver or acquiescence of
the parties. Same; Accion Publiciana; Accion Reinvindicatoria; Words and Phrases; An accion
reinvindicatoria is a suit which has for its object the recovery of possession over the real
property as owner while an accion publiciana is one for the recovery of possession of the right
to possess—it is also referred to as an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year after
the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the
realty.—We do not agree with the contention of the petitioners and the ruling of the CA that
the action of the petitioners in the RTC was an accion reinvindicatoria. We find and so rule that
the action of the petitioners was an accion publiciana, or one for the recovery of possession of
the real property subject matter thereof. An accion reinvindicatoria is a suit which has for its
object the recovery of possession over the real property as owner. It involves recovery of
ownership and possession based on the said ownership. On the other hand, an accion
publiciana is one for the recovery of possession of the right to possess. It is also referred to as
an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year after the occurrence of the cause of
action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. Same; Jurisdictions; Judicial
Notice; The jurisdiction of the court over an action involving title to or possession of land is now
determined by the assessed value of the said property and not the market value thereof,
assessed value being the fair market value of the real property multiplied by the assessment
level; The court cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of lands.—The
jurisdiction of the court over an action involving title to or possession of land is now
determined by the assessed value of the said property and not the market value thereof. The
assessed value of real property is the fair market value of the real property multiplied by the
assessment level. It is synonymous to taxable value. The fair market value is the price at which a
property may be sold by a seller, who is not compelled to sell, and bought by a buyer, who is
not compelled to buy. Even a cursory reading of the complaint will show that it does not
contain an allegation stating the assessed value of the property
817 VOL. 457, APRIL 29, 2005 817 Hilario vs. Salvador subject of the
complaint. The court cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of lands.
Absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it cannot thus be
determined whether the RTC or the MTC had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
petitioners’ action. Same; Same; Tax Declarations.—It is elementary that the tax declaration
indicating the assessed value of the property enjoys the presumption of regularity as it has
been issued by the proper government agency. Same; Same; Section 33(3) of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended, explicitly excludes from the determination of the jurisdictional amount the demand
for “interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs.”—
Unavailing also is the petitioners’ argumentation that since the complaint, likewise, seeks the
recovery of damages exceeding P20,000.00, then the RTC had original jurisdiction over their
actions. Section 33(3) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, quoted earlier, explicitly excludes from the
determination of the jurisdictional amount the demand for “interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs.” This Court issued Administrative Circular
No. 09-94 setting the guidelines in the implementation of R.A. No. 7691, and paragraph 2
thereof states that—2. The exclusion of the term “damages of whatever kind” in determining
the jurisdictional amount under Section 19(8) and Section 33(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by
R.A. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the
main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of
action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in
determining the jurisdiction of the court. Same; Same; Section 199(8) of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended, is applicable only to “all other cases” other than an action involving title to, or
possession of real property in which the assessed value is the controlling factor in determining
the court’s jurisdiction.—Neither may the petitioners find comfort and solace in Section 19(8)
of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, which states: SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.—Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: . . . (8) In all other cases in which the
demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation ex-
818 818 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Hilario vs. Salvador penses,
and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the
abovementioned items exceeds Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00). The said
provision is applicable only to “all other cases” other than an action involving title to, or
possession of real property in which the assessed value is the controlling factor in determining
the court’s jurisdiction. The said damages are merely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
main cause of action for recovery of possession of real property.PETITION for review on
certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.The facts are stated in the
opinion of the Court. Rudy T. Muyco for petitioners. Napoleon M. Victoriano for
respondent.CALLEJO, SR., J.:This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 63737 as
well as its Resolution2 denying the motion for the reconsideration of the said decision. The
AntecedentsOn September 3, 1996, petitioners Cesar, Ibarra, Nestor, Lina and Prescilla, all
surnamed Hilario, filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Romblon, Romblon,
Branch 71, against private respondent Allan T. Salvador. They alleged therein, inter alia, as
follows: _______________ 1 Penned by Associate Justice Mario L. Guariña III, with Associate
Justices Eubulo G. Verzola (deceased) and Martin S. Villarama, Jr., concurring. 2 Rollo, p. 57. 819
VOL. 457, APRIL 29, 2005 819 Hilario vs. Salvador 2. That, the plaintiffs are co-owners by
inheritance from Concepcion Mazo Salvador of a parcel of land designated as Cad. Lot No.
3113-part, located at Sawang, Romblon, Romblon, which property was [adjudged] as the
hereditary share of their father, Brigido M. Hilario, Jr. when their father was still single, and
which adjudication was known by the plaintiffs[’] father’s co-heirs;3. That, sometime in 1989,
defendant constructed his dwelling unit of mixed materials on the property of the plaintiffs’
father without the knowledge of the herein plaintiffs or their predecessorsin-interest;4. That,
demands have been made of the defendant to vacate the premises but the latter manifested
that he have (sic) asked the prior consent of their grandmother, Concepcion Mazo Salvador;5.
That, to reach a possible amicable settlement, the plaintiffs brought the matter to the Lupon of
Barangay Sawang, to no avail, evidenced by the CERTIFICATE TO FILE ACTION hereto attached
as ANNEX “B”;6. That, the unjustified refusal of the defendant to vacate the property has
caused the plaintiffs to suffer shame, humiliation, wounded feelings, anxiety and sleepless
nights;7. That, to protect their rights and interest, plaintiffs were constrained to engage the
services of a lawyer.3The petitioners prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered
in their favor, thus:WHEREFORE, it is prayed of this Honorable Court that after due process (sic),
an order be issued for the defendant to vacate and peacefully turn over to the plaintiffs the
occupied property and that defendant be made to pay plaintiffs:a. actual damages, as
follows:a.1. transportation expenses in connection with the projected settlement of the case
amounting to P1,500.00 and for the subsequent attendance to the hearing of this case at
P1,500.00 each schedule;_______________ 3 Rollo, p. 58.
820 820 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Hilario vs. Salvador a.2.
attorney’s fees in the amount of P20,000.00 and P500.00 for every court appearance;b. moral
and exemplary damages in such amount incumbent upon the Honorable Court to determine;
andc. such other relief and remedies just and equitable under the premises.4The private
respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the nature of the action, citing Section 33 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as amended by
Section 3(3) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691.5 He averred that—(1) the complaint failed to state
the assessed value of the land in dispute;(2) the complaint does not sufficiently identify and/or
describe the parcel of land referred to as the subject-matter of this action;both of which are
essential requisites for determining the jurisdiction of the Court where the case is filed. In this
case, however, the assessed value of the land in question is totally absent in the allegations of
the complaint and there is nothing in the relief prayed for _______________ 4 Rollo, pp. 58-59.
5 SECTION 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases.—Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:. . .(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions
which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the
assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s
fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation
purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent
lots.
821 VOL. 457, APRIL 29, 2005 821 Hilario vs. Salvador which can be picked-up
for determining the Court’s jurisdiction as provided by law. In the face of this predicament, it
can nevertheless be surmised by reading between the lines, that the assessed value of the land
in question cannot exceed P20,000.00 and, as such, it falls within the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Court of Romblon and should have been filed before said Court rather than
before the RTC. . . .6The petitioners opposed the motion.7 They contended that the RTC had
jurisdiction over the action since the court can take judicial notice of the market value of the
property in question, which was P200.00 per square meter and considering that the property
was 14,797 square meters, more or less, the total value thereof is P3,500,000.00. Besides,
according to the petitioners, the motion to dismiss was premature and “the proper time to
interpose it is when the [petitioners] introduced evidence that the land is of such value.”On
November 7, 1996, the RTC issued an Order8 denying the motion to dismiss, holding that the
action was incapable of pecuniary estimation, and therefore, cognizable by the RTC as provided
in Section 19(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended.After the denial of the motion to dismiss, the
private respondent filed his answer with counterclaim.9 Traversing the material allegations of
the complaint, he contended that the petitioners had no cause of action against him since the
property in dispute was the conjugal property of his grandparents, the spouses Salustiano
Salvador and Concepcion MazoSalvador.On April 8, 1997, Regidor and Virginia Salvador filed
their Answer-in-Intervention10 making common cause with the _______________ 6 Rollo, pp.
61-62. 7 Rollo, p. 65. 8 Id., at p. 73. 9 Id., at p. 75. 10 Id., at p. 79. 822 822 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED Hilario vs. Salvador private respondent. On her own motion, however,
Virginia Salvador was dropped as intervenor.11 During trial, the petitioners adduced in
evidence Tax Declaration No. 8590-A showing that in 1991 the property had an assessed value
of P5,950.00.12On June 3, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment finding in favor of the
petitioners. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:“WHEREFORE, as prayed for, judgment
is rendered:Ordering the defendant to vacate and peacefully turn over to the plaintiffs the
occupied property; andDismissing defendant’s counterclaim.SO ORDERED.”13Aggrieved, the
private respondent and respondentintervenor Regidor Salvador appealed the decision to the
CA, which rendered judgment on May 23, 2003 reversing the ruling of the RTC and dismissing
the complaint for want of jurisdiction. The fallo of the decision is as follows:“IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, the appealed decision is REVERSED, and the case DISMISSED, without prejudice to
its refilling in the proper court.SO ORDERED.”14The CA declared that the action of the
petitioners was one for the recovery of ownership and possession of real property. Absent any
allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) had exclu-_______________ 11 Id., at p. 88. 12 Rollo, p. 49. 13 Id., at p. 94. 14 Id., at p.
54. 823 VOL. 457, APRIL 29, 2005 823 Hilario vs. Salvador sive jurisdiction over the action,
conformably to Section 3315 of R.A. No. 7691.The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
of the said decision, which the appellate court denied.16 Hence, they filed the instant petition,
with the following assignment of errors:ITHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE INSTANT CASE, ACCION REINVINDICATORIA,
FALLS WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF
ROMBLON, AND NOT WITH THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ROMBLON.IITHE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ORDERING THE REFILING OF
THE CASE IN THE [PROPER] COURT, INSTEAD OF DECIDING THE CASE ON THE MERITS BASED ON
THE COMPLETE RECORDS ELEVATED BEFORE SAID APPELLATE COURT AND IN NOT AFFIRMING
IN TOTO THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT.17 The Ruling of the CourtThe lone issue for our
resolution is whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners, the plaintiffs in
_______________ 15 (3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to,
or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the
property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) . . . exclusive
of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs; Provided,
That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be
determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. 16 Rollo, p. 57. 17 Id., at p. 21. 824
824 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Hilario vs. Salvador the RTC, against the private
respondent, who was the defendant therein.The petitioners maintain that the RTC has
jurisdiction since their action is an accion reinvindicatoria, an action incapable of pecuniary
estimation; thus, regardless of the assessed value of the subject property, exclusive jurisdiction
falls within the said court. Besides, according to the petitioners, in their opposition to
respondent’s motion to dismiss, they made mention of the increase in the assessed value of the
land in question in the amount of P3.5 million. Moreover, the petitioners maintain that their
action is also one for damages exceeding P20,000.00, over which the RTC has exclusive
jurisdiction under R.A. No. 7691.The petition has no merit.It bears stressing that the nature of
the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined
by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the
law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some
or all of the claims asserted therein.18 The caption of the complaint is not determinative of the
nature of the action. Nor does the jurisdiction of the court depend upon the answer of the
defendant or agreement of the parties or to the waiver or acquiescence of the parties.We do
not agree with the contention of the petitioners and the ruling of the CA that the action of the
petitioners in the RTC was an accion reinvindicatoria. We find and so rule that the action of the
petitioners was an accion publiciana, or one for the recovery of possession of the real property
subject matter thereof. An accion reinvindicatoria is a suit which has for its object the recovery
of possession over the real property _______________ 18 Radio Communications of the
Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136109, 1 August 2002, 386 SCRA 67; Korea
Exchange Bank v. Filkor Business Integrated, Inc., G.R. No. 138292, 10 April 2002, 380 SCRA 381.
825 VOL. 457, APRIL 29, 2005 825 Hilario vs. Salvador as owner. It involves recovery of
ownership and possession based on the said ownership. On the other hand, an accion
publiciana is one for the recovery of possession of the right to possess. It is also referred to as
an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year after the occurrence of the cause of
action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.19The action of the
petitioners filed on September 3, 1996 does not involve a claim of ownership over the property.
They allege that they are co-owners thereof, and as such, entitled to its possession, and that
the private respondent, who was the defendant, constructed his house thereon in 1989 without
their knowledge and refused to vacate the property despite demands for him to do so. They
prayed that the private respondent vacate the property and restore possession thereof to
them.When the petitioners filed their complaint on September 3, 1996, R.A. No. 7691 was
already in effect. Section 33(3) of the law provides:Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases.—Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:. . .(3)
Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein
does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila,
where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided,
That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be
determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots._______________ 19 Cruz v. Torres, G.R.
No. 121939, 4 October 1999, 316 SCRA 193.
826 826 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Hilario vs. Salvador Section
19(2) of the law, likewise, provides that:Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.—The Regional Trial
Court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:. . .(2) In all civil actions, which involve the title
to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the
property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible
entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is
conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts.The jurisdiction of the court over an action involving title to or possession of land is now
determined by the assessed value of the said property and not the market value thereof. The
assessed value of real property is the fair market value of the real property multiplied by the
assessment level. It is synonymous to taxable value.20 The fair market value is the price at
which a property may be sold by a seller, who is not compelled to sell, and bought by a buyer,
who is not compelled to buy.Even a cursory reading of the complaint will show that it does not
contain an allegation stating the assessed value of the property subject of the complaint.21 The
court cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of lands.22 Absent any
allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it cannot thus be determined
whether the RTC or the MTC had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners’
action.We note that during the trial, the petitioners adduced in evidence Tax Declaration No.
8590-A, showing that the as-_______________ 20 Section 199 of Republic Act No. 7160. 21
Ouano v. PGTT International Investment Corporation, G.R. No. 134230, 17 July 2002, 384 SCRA
589. 22 Ibid. 827 VOL. 457, APRIL 29, 2005 827 Hilario vs. Salvador sessed value of the
property in 1991 was P5,950.00. The petitioners, however, did not bother to adduce in
evidence the tax declaration containing the assessed value of the property when they filed their
complaint in 1996. Even assuming that the assessed value of the property in 1991 was the same
in 1995 or 1996, the MTC, and not the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners
since the case involved title to or possession of real property with an assessed value of less than
P20,000.00.23We quote with approval, in this connection, the CA’s disquisition:The
determining jurisdictional element for the accion reinvindicatoria is, as RA 7691 discloses, the
assessed value of the property in question. For properties in the provinces, the RTC has
jurisdiction if the assessed value exceeds P20,000, and the MTC, if the value is P20,000 or
below. An assessed value can have reference only to the tax rolls in the municipality where the
property is located, and is contained in the tax declaration. In the case at bench, the most
recent tax declaration secured and presented by the plaintiffsappellees is Exhibit “B.” The loose
remark made by them that the property was worth 3.5 million pesos, not to mention that there
is absolutely no evidence for this, is irrelevant in the light of the fact that there is an assessed
value. It is the amount in the tax declaration that should be consulted and no other kind of
value, and as appearing in Exhibit “B,” this is P5,950. The case, therefore, falls within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Romblon which has jurisdiction
over the territory where the property is located, and not the court a quo.24It is elementary that
the tax declaration indicating the assessed value of the property enjoys the presumption of
regularity as it has been issued by the proper government agency.25 _______________ 23 See
Aliabo v. Carampatan, G.R. No. 128922, 16 March 2001, 354 SCRA 548. 24 Rollo, p. 54. 25
Ouano v. PGTT International Investment Corporation, supra. 828 828 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED Hilario vs. Salvador Unavailing also is the petitioners’ argumentation
that since the complaint, likewise, seeks the recovery of damages exceeding P20,000.00, then
the RTC had original jurisdiction over their actions. Section 33(3) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended,
quoted earlier, explicitly excludes from the determination of the jurisdictional amount the
demand for “interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and
costs.” This Court issued Administrative Circular No. 09-94 setting the guidelines in the
implementation of R.A. No. 7691, and paragraph 2 thereof states that—2. The exclusion of the
term “damages of whatever kind” in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19(8)
and Section 33(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691, applies to cases where the
damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in
cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action,
the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the
court.Neither may the petitioners find comfort and solace in Section 19(8) of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended, which states:SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.—Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:. . .(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the
property in controversy exceeds One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other
cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the above-mentioned items exceeds
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00).The said provision is applicable only to “all other
cases” other than an action involving title to, or possession of real property in which the
assessed value is the controlling factor in determining the court’s jurisdiction. The said damages
are
829 VOL. 457, APRIL 29, 2005 829 Hilario vs. Salvador merely incidental to, or
a consequence of, the main cause of action for recovery of possession of real property.26Since
the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners, all the proceedings therein,
including the decision of the RTC, are null and void. The complaint should perforce be
dismissed.27WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 63737 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.SO
ORDERED. Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga and ChicoNazario, JJ., concur.Petition
denied, assailed decision and resolution affirmed.Notes.—What really distinguishes an action
for unlawful detainer from a possessory action (accion publiciana) and from a reivindicatory
action (accion reinvindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the question of possession de facto.
(A. Francisco Realty and Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 349 [1998])
To determine which court has jurisdiction over the action, the complaint must allege the
assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon. (Laresma
vs. Abellana, 442 SCRA 56 [2004]) Hilario vs. Salvador, 457 SCRA 815, G.R. No. 160384 April 29,
2005
G.R. No. 126603. June 29, 1998.* ESTRELLITA J. TAMANO, petitioner, vs. HON. RODOLFO A.
ORTIZ, Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 89, Quezon City, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO, ADIB A.
TAMANO and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.Marriage; Husband and Wife;
Actions; Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; Jurisdiction; Venue; Personal actions, such as one
for declaration of nullity of marriage, may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of
the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides, at the election of the plaintiff; What determines the nature of an action and
correspondingly the court which has jurisdiction over it are the allegations made by the
plaintiff.—Under The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, Regional Trial Courts have
jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations. Personal
actions, such as the instant complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage, may be commenced
and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or
any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff. There should be no
question by now that what determines the nature of an action and correspondingly the court
which has jurisdiction over it are the allegations made by the plaintiff in this case. In the
complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by private respondents herein, it was
alleged that Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the provisions of the Civil
Code. Never was it mentioned that Estrellita and Tamano were married under Muslim laws or
P.D. No. 1083. Interestingly, Estrellita never stated in her Motion to Dismiss that she and
Tamano were married under Muslim laws. That she was in fact married to Tamano under
Muslim laws was first mentioned only in her Motion for Reconsideration. Same; Same; Same;
Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; A court’s jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon
defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss, or in a motion for reconsideration, but
only upon the allegations of the complaint.—Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court was not
divested of jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case despite the allegation in the Motion for
Reconsidera-________________ * FIRST DIVISION.
585 VOL. 291, JUNE 29, 1998 585 Tamano vs. Ortiz tion that Estrellita and
Tamano were likewise married in Muslim rites. This is because a court’s jurisdiction cannot be
made to depend upon defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss, or in a motion for
reconsideration, but only upon the allegations of the complaint. Jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a case is determined from the allegations of the complaint as the latter comprises a
concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s causes of action. Same;
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the complaint alleges that the couple were married in
accordance with the Civil Code, it is the said Code that is applicable in a complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage.—As alleged in the complaint, petitioner and Tamano were
married in accordance with the Civil Code. Hence, contrary to the position of petitioner, the
Civil Code is applicable in the instant case. Assuming that indeed petitioner and Tamano were
likewise married under Muslim laws, the same would still fall under the general original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Code of Muslim
Personal Laws (Presidential Decree 1083); Courts; The shari’a courts are not vested with original
and exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages celebrated under both civil and Muslim
laws—Regional Trial Courts are not divested of their general original jurisdiction under Sec. 19,
par. (6) of B.P. Blg. 129.—Article 13 of P.D. No. 1083 does not provide for a situation where the
parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites. Consequently, the shari’a courts are not
vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages celebrated under
both civil and Muslim laws. Consequently, the Regional Trial Courts are not divested of their
general original jurisdiction under Sec. 19, par. (6) of B.P. Blg. 129 which provides—Sec. 19.
Jurisdiction in Civil Cases.—Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: x x
x (6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. x x x xPETITION for review on certiorari of a
decision of the Court of Appeals.The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
586 586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Tamano vs. Ortiz
Emiliano S. Samson, R. Balderrama-Samson, Mary Anne B. Samson-Willis for petitioner. AQSA
Law Firm and Abbas & Associates for private respondents.BELLOSILLO, J.:This Petition for
Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals of 30
September 1996 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 39656 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court-Br. 89, Quezon City, denying the motion to dismiss as well as the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano.On 31 May 1958 Senator Mamintal
Abdul Jabar Tamano (Tamano) married private respondent Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano
(Zorayda) in civil rites. Their marriage supposedly remained valid and subsisting until his death
on 18 May 1994. Prior to his death, particularly on 2 June 1993, Tamano also married petitioner
Estrellita J. Tamano (Estrellita) in civil rites in Malabang, Lanao del Sur.On 23 November 1994
private respondent Zorayda joined by her son Adib A. Tamano (Adib) filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of Tamano and Estrellita on the ground that it was bigamous.
They contended that Tamano and Estrellita misrepresented themselves as divorced and single,
respectively, thus making the entries in the marriage contract false and fraudulent.Private
respondents alleged that Tamano never divorced Zorayda and that Estrellita was not single
when she married Tamano as the decision annulling her previous marriage with Romeo C. Llave
never became final and executory for noncompliance with publication requirements.Estrellita
filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City was without
jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action. She alleged that “only a party to the
marriage” could file an action for annul-
587 VOL. 291, JUNE 29, 1998 587 Tamano vs. Ortiz ment of marriage against
the other spouse,1 hence, it was only Tamano who could file an action for annulment of their
marriage. Petitioner likewise contended that since Tamano and Zorayda were both Muslims
and married in Muslim rites the jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case was vested in the
shari’a courts pursuant to Art. 155 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws.The lower court denied
the motion to dismiss and ruled that the instant case was properly cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City since Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil
Code and not exclusively in accordance with P.D. No. 10832 or the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied; hence, petitioner filed the instant
petition with this Court seeking to set aside the 18 July 1995 order of respondent presiding
judge of the RTC-Br. 89, Quezon City, denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss and the 22 August
1995 order denying reconsideration thereof.In a Resolution dated 13 December 1995 we
referred the case to the Court of Appeals for consolidation with G.R. No. 118371. Zorayda and
Adib A. Tamano however filed a motion, which the Court of Appeals granted, to resolve the
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage ahead of the other consolidated cases.The
Court of Appeals ruled that the instant case would fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of shari’a
courts only when filed in places where there are shari’a courts. But in places where there are no
shari’a courts, like Quezon City, the instant case could properly be filed before the Regional
Trial Court.Petitioner is now before us reiterating her earlier argument that it is the shari’a
court and not the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the
action. ________________ 1 Motion to Dismiss, p. 3; Rollo, p. 52. 2 Order, p. 2; Records, p. 20.
588 588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Tamano vs. Ortiz Under The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980,3 Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over all actions involving
the contract of marriage and marital relations.4 Personal actions, such as the instant complaint
for declaration of nullity of marriage, may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of
the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides, at the election of the plaintiff.5 There should be no question by now that what
determines the nature of an action and correspondingly the court which has jurisdiction over it
are the allegations made by the plaintiff in this case.6 In the complaint for declaration of nullity
of marriage filed by private respondents herein, it was alleged that Estrellita and Tamano were
married in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Never was it mentioned that
Estrellita and Tamano were married under Muslim laws or P.D. No. 1083. Interestingly,
Estrellita never stated in her Motion to Dismiss that she and Tamano were married under
Muslim laws. That she was in fact married to Tamano under Muslim laws was first mentioned
only in her Motion for Reconsideration.Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court was not divested
of jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case despite the allegation in the Motion for
Reconsideration that Estrellita and Tamano were likewise married in Muslim rites. This is
because a court’s jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon defenses set up in the answer, in
a motion to dismiss, or in a motion for reconsideration, but only upon the allegations of the
complaint.7 Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined from the allegations of
the complaint as the ________________ 3 Sec. 19, B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. 4 Sec. 19, B.P.
Blg. 129, as amended, otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. 5 Sec. 2,
Rule 4, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. 6 Sandel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
117250, 19 September 1996, 262 SCRA 109. 7Id., p. 110. 589 VOL. 291, JUNE 29, 1998 589
Tamano vs. Ortiz latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the
plaintiff’s causes of action.8Petitioner argues that the shari’a courts have jurisdiction over the
instant suit pursuant to Art. 13, Title II, P.D. No. 1083,9 which provides—Art. 13. Application.—
(1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both parties are
Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines.(2) In case of a marriage
between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this
Code, the Civil Code of the Philippines shall apply.(3) Subject to the provisions of the preceding
paragraphs, the essential requisites and legal impediments to marriage, divorce, paternity and
filiation, guardianship and custody of minors, support and maintenance, claims for customary
dower (mahr), betrothal, breach of contract to marry, solemnization and registration of
marriage and divorce, rights and obligations between husband and wife, parental authority,
and the property relations between husband and wife shall be governed by this Code and other
applicable Muslim laws.As alleged in the complaint, petitioner and Tamano were married in
accordance with the Civil Code. Hence, contrary to the position of petitioner, the Civil Code is
applicable in the instant case. Assuming that indeed petitioner and Tamano were likewise
married under Muslim laws, the same would still fall under the general original jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Courts.Article 13 of P.D. No. 1083 does not provide for a situation where the
parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites. Consequently, the shari’a courts are not
vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages ________________ 8
Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120730, 28 October 1996, 263 SCRA 660. 9 The Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines. 590 590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tamano vs. Ortiz celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. Consequently, the Regional Trial
Courts are not divested of their general original jurisdiction under Sec. 19, par. (6) of BP Blg.
129 which provides—Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases.—Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction: x x x (6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any
court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions x x x xWHEREFORE,
the instant petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the 18 July 1995
and 22 August 1995 orders of the Regional Trial Court-Br. 89, Quezon City, denying the motion
to dismiss and reconsideration thereof, is AFFIRMED. Let the records of this case be
immediately remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings until terminated.SO
ORDERED. Davide, Jr. (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.Petition
denied, judgment affirmed.Notes.—Under Muslim Law, it is not “immoral” by Muslim
standards for Judge Malik to marry a second time while his first marriage exists. (Sulu Islamic
Association of Masjid Lambayong vs. Malik, 226 SCRA 193 [1993]) A petition to resume the use
of maiden name filed by a Muslim divorcee is a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since
the law requires her to do so as her former husband is already married to another woman after
obtaining a decree of divorce from her in accordance with Muslim laws. (Yasin vs. Judge, Shari’a
District Court, 241 SCRA 606 [1995])——o0o——
Tamano vs. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584, G.R. No. 126603 June 29, 1998
.R. No. 156407. January 15, 2014.* THELMA M. ARANAS, petitioner, vs. TERESITA V.
MERCADO, FELIMON V. MERCADO, CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA.
TERESITA M. ANDERSON, and FRANKLIN L. MERCADO, respondents. Civil Law; Succession; The
approval of the inventory and the concomitant determination of the ownership as basis for
inclusion or exclusion from the inventory were provisional and subject to revision at anytime
during the course of the administration proceedings.—The assailed order of March 14, 2001
denying Teresita’s motion for the approval of the inventory and the order dated May 18, 2001
denying her motion for reconsideration were interlocutory. This is because the inclusion of the
properties in the inventory was not yet a final determination of their ownership. Hence, the
approval of the inventory and the concomitant determination of the ownership as basis for
inclusion or exclusion from the inventory were provisional and subject to revision at anytime
during the course of the administration proceedings. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals;
The final judgment rule embodied in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court,
which also governs appeals in special proceedings, stipulates that only the judgments, final
orders (and resolutions) of a court of law “that completely disposes of the case, or of a
particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable” may be the subject of
an appeal in due course.—An appeal would not be the correct recourse for Teresita, et al. to
take against the assailed orders. The final judgment rule embodied in the first paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court, which also governs appeals in special proceedings, stipulates
that only the judgments, final orders (and resolutions) of a court of law “that completely
disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be
appealable” may be the subject of an appeal in due course. The same rule states that an
interlocutory order or resolution (interlocu-_______________* FIRST DIVISION.195tory
because it deals with preliminary matters, or that the trial on the merits is yet to be held and
the judgment rendered) is expressly made non-appealable. Same; Same; Same; Multiple
Appeals; Multiple appeals are permitted in special proceedings as a practical recognition of the
possibility that material issues may be finally determined at various stages of the special
proceedings.—Multiple appeals are permitted in special proceedings as a practical recognition
of the possibility that material issues may be finally determined at various stages of the special
proceedings. Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court enumerates the specific instances in
which multiple appeals may be resorted to in special proceedings, viz.: Section 1. Orders or
judgments from which appeals may be taken.—An interested person may appeal in special
proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment: (a) Allows or disallows a will; (b)
Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of the
estate to which such person is entitled; (c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim
against the estate of a deceased person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset
to a claim against it; (d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;
(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, or
the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the
rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a
special administrator; and (f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects
the substantial rights of the person appealing, unless it be an order granting or denying a
motion for a new trial or for reconsideration. Civil Law; Succession; Settlement of Estates
Deceased Persons; Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of
administration may be granted at the discretion of the court to the surviving spouse, who is
competent and willing to serve when the person dies intestate.—Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of
the Rules of Court, the letters of administration may be granted at the discretion of the court to
the surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to serve when the person dies intestate.
Upon issuing the letters of administration to the surviving spouse, the RTC becomes duty-
196bound to direct the preparation and submission of the inventory of the properties of the
estate, and the surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty and responsibility to submit
the inventory within three months from the issuance of letters of administration pursuant to
Rule 83 of the Rules of Court. Same; Same; Same; The objective of the Rules of Court in
requiring the inventory and appraisal of the estate of the decedent is “to aid the court in
revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of the executor or the administrator, and in
making a final and equitable distribution (partition) of the estate and otherwise to facilitate the
administration of the estate.”—The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory
and appraisal of the estate of the decedent is “to aid the court in revising the accounts and
determining the liabilities of the executor or the administrator, and in making a final and
equitable distribution (partition) of the estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration of
the estate.” Hence, the RTC that presides over the administration of an estate is vested with
wide discretion on the question of what properties should be included in the inventory.
According to Peralta v. Peralta, 71 Phil. 66 (1940), the CA cannot impose its judgment in order
to supplant that of the RTC on the issue of which properties are to be included or excluded
from the inventory in the absence of “positive abuse of discretion,” for in the administration of
the estates of deceased persons, “the judges enjoy ample discretionary powers and the
appellate courts should not interfere with or attempt to replace the action taken by them,
unless it be shown that there has been a positive abuse of discretion.” As long as the RTC
commits no patently grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the
regular performance of its judicial duty. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Jurisdiction;
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and
limited.—There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is
special and limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of
the estate but are claimed to belong to third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent
and the estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial
court can do regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included
in the inventory of properties to be administered by the197 administrator. Such determination
is provisional and may be still revised. Same; Evidence; Notarized Documents; A notarized deed
of sale only enjoyed the presumption of regularity in favor of its execution, but its notarization
did not per se guarantee the legal efficacy of the transaction under the deed, and what the
contents purported to be.—The fact that the deed of absolute sale executed by Emigdio in
favor of Mervir Realty was a notarized instrument did not sufficiently justify the exclusion from
the inventory of the properties involved. A notarized deed of sale only enjoyed the
presumption of regularity in favor of its execution, but its notarization did not per se guarantee
the legal efficacy of the transaction under the deed, and what the contents purported to be.
The presumption of regularity could be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary. As the Court has observed in Suntay v. Court of Appeals: x x x. Though the
notarization of the deed of sale in question vests in its favor the presumption of regularity, it is
not the intention nor the function of the notary public to validate and make binding an
instrument never, in the first place, intended to have any binding legal effect upon the parties
thereto. The intention of the parties still and always is the primary consideration in determining
the true nature of a contract. Civil Law; Land Titles; The Torrens system is not a mode of
acquiring titles to lands; it is merely a system of registration of titles to lands.—The fact that the
properties were already covered by Torrens titles in the name of Mervir Realty could not be a
valid basis for immediately excluding them from the inventory in view of the circumstances
admittedly surrounding the execution of the deed of assignment. This is because: The Torrens
system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands; it is merely a system of registration of titles to
lands. However, justice and equity demand that the titleholder should not be made to bear the
unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the State’s agents, in the absence of proof of
his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third persons. The real purpose of the
Torrens system is to quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any question as to the legality
of the title, except claims that were noted in the certificate at the time of registration or that
may arise subsequent thereto. Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system shall forever be
sullied by the ineptitude and ineffi-198ciency of land registration officials, who are ordinarily
presumed to have regularly performed their duties. Same; Succession; Collation; Article 1061
of the Civil Code required every compulsory heir and the surviving spouse, to “bring into the
mass of the estate any property or right which he (or she) may have received from the
decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in
order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the
account of the partition.”—Article 1061 of the Civil Code required every compulsory heir and
the surviving spouse, herein Teresita herself, to “bring into the mass of the estate any property
or right which he (or she) may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the
latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the
determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.” Section 2, Rule
90 of the Rules of Court also provided that any advancement by the decedent on the legitime of
an heir “may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings, and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the
questions and on the heir.” Rule 90 thereby expanded the special and limited jurisdiction of the
RTC as an intestate court about the matters relating to the inventory of the estate of the
decedent by authorizing it to direct the inclusion of properties donated or bestowed by
gratuitous title to any compulsory heir by the decedent. Same; Same; The determination of
which properties should be excluded from or included in the inventory of estate properties was
well within the authority and discretion of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) as an intestate
court.—The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the
inventory of estate properties was well within the authority and discretion of the RTC as an
intestate court. In making its determination, the RTC acted with circumspection, and proceeded
under the guiding policy that it was best to include all properties in the possession of the
administrator or were known to the administrator to belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude
properties that could turn out in the end to be actually part of the estate. As long as the RTC
commits no patent grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the
regular performance of its judicial duty. Grave abuse of discretion means either that the judicial
or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an 199arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive
duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such
as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a
capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. PETITION for review
on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the
Court. Zosa & Quijano Law Offices for respondents. BERSAMIN, J.: The probate court is
authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties for purposes of their inclusion or
exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by the administrator, but its determination shall
only be provisional unless the interested parties are all heirs of the decedent, or the question is
one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the
probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction extends to matters
incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the
determination of the status of each heir and whether property included in the inventory is the
conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse. Antecedents Emigdio S. Mercado
(Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived by his second wife, Teresita V. Mercado
(Teresita), and their five children, namely: Allan V. Mercado, Felimon V. Mercado, Carmencita
M. Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and Maria Teresita M. Anderson; and his two chil-200dren
by his first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin L. Mercado and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas
(Thelma). Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned
corporate shares in Mervir Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson
Transportation Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He assigned his real properties in exchange for
corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in Badian, Cebu (Lot 3353 covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252) to Mervir Realty. On June 3, 1991, Thelma filed in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City a petition for the appointment of Teresita as the
administrator of Emigdio’s estate (Special Proceedings No. 3094-CEB).[1] The RTC granted the
petition considering that there was no opposition. The letters of administration in favor of
Teresita were issued on September 7, 1992. As the administrator, Teresita submitted an
inventory of the estate of Emigdio on December 14, 1992 for the consideration and approval by
the RTC. She indicated in the inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio had “left no real
properties but only personal properties” worth P6,675,435.25 in all, consisting of cash of
P32,141.20; furniture and fixtures worth P20,000.00; pieces of jewelry valued at P15,000.00;
44,806 shares of stock of Mervir Realty worth P6,585,585.80; and 30 shares of stock of Cebu
Emerson worth P22,708.25.[2] Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were
excluded from the inventory, Thelma moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the
inventory, and to be examined regarding it. The RTC granted Thelma’s motion through the
order of January 8, 1993._______________[1] Instead of administratrix, the gender-fair term
administrator is used. [2] Rollo, p. 118.201 On January 21, 1993, Teresita filed a compliance
with the order of January 8, 1993,[3] supporting her inventory with copies of three certificates
of stocks covering the 44,806 Mervir Realty shares of stock;[4] the deed of assignment
executed by Emigdio on January 10, 1991 involving real properties with the market value of
P4,440,651.10 in exchange for 44,407 Mervir Realty shares of stock with total par value of
P4,440,700.00;[5] and the certificate of stock issued on January 30, 1979 for 300 shares of stock
of Cebu Emerson worth P30,000.00.[6] On January 26, 1993, Thelma again moved to require
Teresita to be examined under oath on the inventory, and that she (Thelma) be allowed 30 days
within which to file a formal opposition to or comment on the inventory and the supporting
documents Teresita had submitted. On February 4, 1993, the RTC issued an order expressing
the need for the parties to present evidence and for Teresita to be examined to enable the
court to resolve the motion for approval of the inventory.[7] On April 19, 1993, Thelma
opposed the approval of the inventory, and asked leave of court to examine Teresita on the
inventory. With the parties agreeing to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court on
the issue of what properties should be included in or excluded from the inventory, the RTC set
dates for the hearing on that issue.[8]_______________ [3] Id., at p. 125. [4] Id., at pp. 127-
129. [5] Id., at p. 130. [6] Id., at p. 134. [7] Id., at p. 56. [8] Id., at p. 135.202Ruling of the RTC
After a series of hearings that ran for almost eight years, the RTC issued on March 14, 2001 an
order finding and holding that the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that
should be included, and accordingly ruled: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises
and considerations, the Court hereby denies the administratrix’s motion for approval of
inventory. The Court hereby orders the said administratrix to re-do the inventory of properties
which are supposed to constitute as the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado by including
therein the properties mentioned in the last five immediately preceding paragraphs hereof and
then submit the revised inventory within sixty (60) days from notice of this order. The Court
also directs the said administratrix to render an account of her administration of the estate of
the late Emigdio S. Mercado which had come to her possession. She must render such
accounting within sixty (60) days from notice hereof. SO ORDERED.[9] On March 29, 2001,
Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely sought the reconsideration of the order of
March 14, 2001 on the ground that one of the real properties affected, Lot No. 3353 located in
Badian, Cebu, had already been sold to Mervir Realty, and that the parcels of land covered by
the deed of assignment had already come into the possession of and registered in the name of
Mervir Realty.[10] Thelma opposed the motion. On May 18, 2001, the RTC denied the motion
for reconsideration,[11] stating that there was no cogent reason for the re-_______________
[9] Id., at p. 140. [10] Id., at p. 24. [11] Id., at p. 156.203consideration, and that the movants’
agreement as heirs to submit to the RTC the issue of what properties should be included or
excluded from the inventory already estopped them from questioning its jurisdiction to pass
upon the issue. Decision of the CA Alleging that the RTC thereby acted with grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to approve the inventory, and in ordering her as administrator to include
real properties that had been transferred to Mervir Realty, Teresita, joined by her four children
and her stepson Franklin, assailed the adverse orders of the RTC promulgated on March 14,
2001 and May 18, 2001 by petition for certiorari, stating: I THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT
JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF JURISDICTION (sic) AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE REAL PROPERTY WHICH WAS SOLD BY THE
LATE EMIGDIO S. MERCADO DURING HIS LIFETIME TO A PRIVATE CORPORATION (MERVIR
REALTY CORPORATION) BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE
EMIGDIO S. MERCADO. II THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF JURISDICTION (sic) AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING
THAT REAL PROPERTIES WHICH ARE IN THE POSSESSION OF AND ALREADY REGISTERED IN THE
NAME (OF) PRIVATE CORPORATION (MERVIR REALTY CORPORATION) BE INCLUDED IN THE
INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO S. MERCADO.204 III THE HONORABLE
RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE NOW ESTOPPED FROM
QUESTIONING ITS JURISDICTION IN PASSING UPON THE ISSUE OF WHAT PROPERTIES SHOULD
BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO MERCADO.[12] On
May 15, 2002, the CA partly granted the petition for certiorari, disposing as follows:[13]
WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is GRANTED partially. The
assailed Orders dated March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 are hereby reversed and set aside
insofar as the inclusion of parcels of land known as Lot No. 3353 located at Badian, Cebu with
an area of 53,301 square meters subject matter of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November
9, 1989 and the various parcels of land subject matter of the Deeds of Assignment dated
February 17, 1989 and January 10, 1991 in the revised inventory to be submitted by the
administratrix is concerned and affirmed in all other respects. SO ORDERED. The CA opined
that Teresita, et al. had properly filed the petition for certiorari because the order of the RTC
directing a new inventory of properties was interlocutory; that pursuant to Article 1477 of the
Civil Code, to the effect that the ownership of the thing sold “shall be transferred to the
vendee”_______________[12] Id., at p. 25. [13] Id., at pp. 21-34; penned by Associate Justice
Mercedes Gozo-Dadole (retired), and concurred by Associate Justice Salvador J. Valdez, Jr.
(retired/deceased) and Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino.205upon its “actual and
constructive delivery,” and to Article 1498 of the Civil Code, to the effect that the sale made
through a public instrument was equivalent to the delivery of the object of the sale, the sale by
Emigdio and Teresita had transferred the ownership of Lot No. 3353 to Mervir Realty because
the deed of absolute sale executed on November 9, 1989 had been notarized; that Emigdio had
thereby ceased to have any more interest in Lot 3353; that Emigdio had assigned the parcels of
land to Mervir Realty as early as February 17, 1989 “for the purpose of saving, as in avoiding
taxes with the difference that in the Deed of Assignment dated January 10, 1991, additional
seven (7) parcels of land were included”; that as to the January 10, 1991 deed of assignment,
Mervir Realty had been “even at the losing end considering that such parcels of land, subject
matter(s) of the Deed of Assignment dated February 12, 1989, were again given monetary
consideration through shares of stock”; that even if the assignment had been based on the
deed of assignment dated January 10, 1991, the parcels of land could not be included in the
inventory “considering that there is nothing wrong or objectionable about the estate planning
scheme”; that the RTC, as an intestate court, also had no power to take cognizance of and
determine the issue of title to property registered in the name of third persons or corporation;
that a property covered by the Torrens system should be afforded the presumptive
conclusiveness of title; that the RTC, by disregarding the presumption, had transgressed the
clear provisions of law and infringed settled jurisprudence on the matter; and that the RTC also
gravely abused its discretion in holding that Teresita, et al. were estopped from questioning its
jurisdiction because of their agreement to submit to the RTC the issue of which properties
should be included in the inventory. The CA further opined as follows: In the instant case,
public respondent court erred when it ruled that petitioners are estopped from ques-
206tioning its jurisdiction considering that they have already agreed to submit themselves to its
jurisdiction of determining what properties are to be included in or excluded from the inventory
to be submitted by the administratrix, because actually, a reading of petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration dated March 26, 2001 filed before public respondent court clearly shows that
petitioners are not questioning its jurisdiction but the manner in which it was exercised for
which they are not estopped, since that is their right, considering that there is grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of limited jurisdiction when it issued the assailed
Order dated March 14, 2001 denying the administratrix’s motion for approval of the inventory
of properties which were already titled and in possession of a third person that is, Mervir Realty
Corporation, a private corporation, which under the law possessed a personality distinct and
separate from its stockholders, and in the absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate
fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of Mervir Realty Corporation
should stand undisturbed. Besides, public respondent court acting as a probate court had no
authority to determine the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction
and even if public respondent court was not merely acting in a limited capacity as a probate
court, private respondent nonetheless failed to adjudge competent evidence that would have
justified the court to impale the veil of corporate fiction because to disregard the separate
jurisdictional personality of a corporation, the wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly
established since it cannot be presumed.[14] On November 15, 2002, the CA denied the
motion for reconsideration of Teresita, et al.[15] _______________[14] Rollo, pp. 32-33. [15]
Rollo, p. 35.207Issue Did the CA properly determine that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in directing the inclusion of certain
properties in the inventory notwithstanding that such properties had been either transferred by
sale or exchanged for corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent during his lifetime?
Ruling of the Court The appeal is meritorious. I Was certiorari the proper recourse to assail
the questioned orders of the RTC? The first issue to be resolved is procedural. Thelma
contends that the resort to the special civil action for certiorari to assail the orders of the RTC
by Teresita and her co-respondents was not proper. Thelma’s contention cannot be sustained.
The propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy depended on whether the
assailed orders of the RTC were final or interlocutory in nature. In Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo,[16]
the Court distinguished between final and interlocutory orders as follows: The distinction
between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the subject
matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to
be done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not
completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An in-
_______________ [16] G.R. No. 156358, August 17, 2011, 655 SCRA 553, 566-
567.208terlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be
held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is
interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial
court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory;
otherwise, it is final.The order dated November 12, 2002, which granted the application for the
writ of preliminary injunction, was an interlocutory, not a final, order, and should not be the
subject of an appeal. The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to
avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and
decision on the merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple
appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable length of
time, and will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties
may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental questions raised by him and as there are
interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An interlocutory order may be the
subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered, with the ground for
appealing the order being included in the appeal of the judgment itself.The remedy against an
interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65,
provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to. The
assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresita’s motion for the approval of the inventory
and the order dated May 18, 2001 denying her motion for reconsideration were interlocutory.
This is because the inclusion of the properties in the inventory was not yet a final determination
of their ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory and the concomitant determination of
the ownership as basis for inclu-209sion or exclusion from the inventory were provisional and
subject to revision at anytime during the course of the administration proceedings. In Valero
Vda. De Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals,[17] the Court, in affirming the decision of the CA to the
effect that the order of the intestate court excluding certain real properties from the inventory
was interlocutory and could be changed or modified at anytime during the course of the
administration proceedings, held that the order of exclusion was not a final but an interlocutory
order “in the sense that it did not settle once and for all the title to the San Lorenzo Village
lots.” The Court observed there that: The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining
whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate court
may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the
final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties
(3 Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pages 448-9 and 473; Lachenal vs.
Salas, L-42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266).[18] (Bold emphasis supplied) To the same
effect was De Leon v. Court of Appeals,[19] where the Court declared that a “probate court,
whether in a testate or intestate proceeding, can only pass upon questions of title
provisionally,” and reminded, citing Jimenez v. Court of Appeals, that the “patent reason is the
probate court’s limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or ownership, which
result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can only be settled in a
separate action.” In-_______________[17] No. L-39532, July 20, 1979, 91 SCRA 540. [18] Id., at
pp. 545-546. [19] G.R. No. 128781, August 6, 2002, 386 SCRA 216, 226-227.210deed, in the
cited case of Jimenez v. Court of Appeals,[20] the Court pointed out: All that the said court
could do as regards the said properties is determine whether they should or should not be
included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there
is a dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the administrator have to resort
to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the
probate court cannot do so. (Bold emphasis supplied) On the other hand, an appeal would not
be the correct recourse for Teresita, et al. to take against the assailed orders. The final
judgment rule embodied in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court,[21] which
also governs ap-_______________[20] G.R. No. 75773, April 17, 1990, 184 SCRA 367, 372. [21]
Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court (as amended under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC; effective
December 27, 2007) provides: Section 1. Subject of appeal.—An appeal may be taken from
a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein
when declared by these Rules to be appealable. No appeal may be taken from: (a) An order
denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment; (b) An
interlocutory order; (c) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal; (d) An order denying
a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise on the ground of
fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent; (e) An order of execution;
(f) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate
claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is pending,
unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; and (g) An order dismissing an action without
prejudice.211peals in special proceedings, stipulates that only the judgments, final orders (and
resolutions) of a court of law “that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter
therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable” may be the subject of an appeal in due
course. The same rule states that an interlocutory order or resolution (interlocutory because it
deals with preliminary matters, or that the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the
judgment rendered) is expressly made non-appealable. Multiple appeals are permitted in
special proceedings as a practical recognition of the possibility that material issues may be
finally determined at various stages of the special proceedings. Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules
of Court enumerates the specific instances in which multiple appeals may be resorted to in
special proceedings, viz.: Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be
taken.—An interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment
rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, where such
order or judgment: (a) Allows or disallows a will; (b) Determines who are the lawful heirs
of a deceased person, or the distributive share of the estate to which such person is entitled;
(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased person,
or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it; (d) Settles the
account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian; (e) Constitutes, in proceedings
relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, or the administration of a trustee
or guardian, a final determination in_______________In any of the foregoing circumstances,
the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action as provided in Rule 65.212 the
lower court of the rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the
appointment of a special administrator; and (f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in
the case, and affects the substantial rights of the person appealing, unless it be an order
granting or denying a motion for a new trial or for reconsideration. Clearly, the assailed orders
of the RTC, being interlocutory, did not come under any of the instances in which multiple
appeals are permitted. II Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion in directing the
inclusion of the properties in the estate of the decedent? In its assailed decision, the CA
concluded that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion for including properties in the
inventory notwithstanding their having been transferred to Mervir Realty by Emigdio during his
lifetime, and for disregarding the registration of the properties in the name of Mervir Realty, a
third party, by applying the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction. Was the CA
correct in its conclusion? The answer is in the negative. It is unavoidable to find that the CA, in
reaching its conclusion, ignored the law and the facts that had fully warranted the assailed
orders of the RTC. Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of
administration may be granted at the discretion of the court to the surviving spouse, who is
competent and willing to serve when the person dies intestate. Upon issuing the letters of
administration to the surviving spouse, the RTC becomes duty-bound to direct the preparation
and submission of the inventory of the properties of the estate, and the surviving spouse, as
the administrator, has the duty and responsibility213 to submit the inventory within three
months from the issuance of letters of administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court,
viz.: Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three months.—Within three
(3) months after his appointment every executor or administrator shall return to the court a
true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased which has come
into his possession or knowledge. In the appraisement of such estate, the court may order one
or more of the inheritance tax appraisers to give his or their assistance. The usage of the word
all in Section 1, supra, demands the inclusion of all the real and personal properties of the
decedent in the inventory.[22] However, the word all is qualified by the phrase which has come
into his possession or knowledge, which signifies that the properties must be known to the
administrator to belong to the decedent or are in her possession as the administrator. Section 1
allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that no properties appearing to
belong to the decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in the
possession of another person or entity. The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the
inventory and appraisal of the estate of the decedent is “to aid the court in revising the
accounts and determining the liabilities of the executor or the administrator, and in making a
final and equitable distribution (partition) of the estate and other-_______________[22] The
word all means “every one, or the whole number of particular; the whole number” (3 Words
and Phrases 212, citing State v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 66 Me. 488, 510). Standing alone, the word
all means exactly what it imports; that is, nothing less than all (Id., at p. 213, citing In re Staheli’s
Will, 57 N.Y.S.2d 185, 188).214wise to facilitate the administration of the estate.”[23] Hence,
the RTC that presides over the administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on the
question of what properties should be included in the inventory. According to Peralta v.
Peralta,[24] the CA cannot impose its judgment in order to supplant that of the RTC on the
issue of which properties are to be included or excluded from the inventory in the absence of
“positive abuse of discretion,” for in the administration of the estates of deceased persons, “the
judges enjoy ample discretionary powers and the appellate courts should not interfere with or
attempt to replace the action taken by them, unless it be shown that there has been a positive
abuse of discretion.”[25] As long as the RTC commits no patently grave abuse of discretion, its
orders must be respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial duty. There is no
dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited. The
trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are
claimed to belong to third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not by
virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial court can do regarding
said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of
properties to be administered by the administrator. Such determination is provisional and may
be still revised. As the Court said in Agtarap v. Agtarap:[26] The general rule is that the
jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate court or an intestate court, relates only to
matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased
persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of_______________[23] Siy
Chong Keng v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 60 Phil. 493, 500 (1934). [24] 71 Phil. 66 (1940).
[25] Id., at p. 68. [26] G.R. No. 177099, June 8, 2011, 651 SCRA 455.215ownership that arise
during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court merely exercises
special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a probate court or one in charge of
estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to
properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside
parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that
of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to
determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if there
is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary
action before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting
claims of title. However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and
convenience. First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate
proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property
without prejudice to final determination of ownership in a separate action. Second, if the
interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement,
or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of
third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on
ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement
and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether
the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.[27]
(Italics in the original; bold emphasis supplied) _______________ [27] Id., at pp. 471-473,
citing, among others, Coca v. Pizarras Vda. De Pangilinan, No. L-27082, January 31, 1978, 81
SCRA 278, 283; Alvarez v. Espiritu, No. L-18833, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 216It is clear to us
that the RTC took pains to explain the factual bases for its directive for the inclusion of the
properties in question in its assailed order of March 14, 2001, viz.: In the first place, the
administratrix of the estate admitted that Emigdio Mercado was one of the heirs of Severina
Mercado who, upon her death, left several properties as listed in the inventory of properties
submitted in Court in Special Proceedings No. 306-R which are supposed to be divided among
her heirs. The administratrix admitted, while being examined in Court by the counsel for the
petitioner, that she did not include in the inventory submitted by her in this case the shares of
Emigdio Mercado in the said estate of Severina Mercado. Certainly, said properties constituting
Emigdio Mercado’s share in the estate of Severina Mercado should be included in the inventory
of properties required to be submitted to the Court in this particular case. In the second place,
the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado also admitted in Court that she did not
include in the inventory shares of stock of Mervir Realty Corporation which are in her name and
which were paid by her from money derived from the taxicab business which she and her
husband had since 1955 as a conjugal undertaking. As these shares of stock partake of being
conjugal in character, one-half thereof or of the value thereof should be included in the
inventory of the estate of her husband. _______________892, 899; Cunanan v. Amparo, 80
Phil. 227 (1948); and Pascual v. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561 (1942).217 In the third place, the
administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado admitted, too, in Court that she had a bank
account in her name at Union Bank which she opened when her husband was still alive. Again,
the money in said bank account partakes of being conjugal in character, and so, one-half
thereof should be included in the inventory of the properties constituting as estate of her
husband. In the fourth place, it has been established during the hearing in this case that Lot
No. 3353 of Pls-657-D located in Badian, Cebu containing an area of 53,301 square meters as
described in and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252 of the Registry of Deeds for
the Province of Cebu is still registered in the name of Emigdio S. Mercado until now. When it
was the subject of Civil Case No. CEB-12690 which was decided on October 19, 1995, it was the
estate of the late Emigdio Mercado which claimed to be the owner thereof. Mervir Realty
Corporation never intervened in the said case in order to be the owner thereof. This fact was
admitted by Richard Mercado himself when he testified in Court. x x x So the said property
located in Badian, Cebu should be included in the inventory in this case. Fifthly and lastly, it
appears that the assignment of several parcels of land by the late Emigdio S. Mercado to Mervir
Realty Corporation on January 10, 1991 by virtue of the Deed of Assignment signed by him on
the said day (Exhibit N for the petitioner and Exhibit 5 for the administratrix) was a transfer in
contemplation of death. It was made two days before he died on January 12, 1991. A transfer
made in contemplation of death is one prompted by the thought that the transferor has not
long to live and made in place of a testamentary disposition (1959 Prentice Hall, p. 3909).
Section 78 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 provides that the gross estate of the
decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time of his death of all property to
the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer in
contemplation of death. So, the inventory to be approved in this case should still include the
said properties of Emigdio Mercado which were transferred by him in contemplation of death.
Besides, the said properties actually appeared to be still registered in the name of Emigdio S.
Mercado at least ten (10) months after his death, as shown by the certification issued by the
Cebu City Assessor’s Office on October 31, 1991 (Exhibit O).[28] _______________[28] Rollo,
pp. 139-140.218Thereby, the RTC strictly followed the directives of the Rules of Court and the
jurisprudence relevant to the procedure for preparing the inventory by the administrator. The
aforequoted explanations indicated that the directive to include the properties in question in
the inventory rested on good and valid reasons, and thus was far from whimsical, or arbitrary,
or capricious. Firstly, the shares in the properties inherited by Emigdio from Severina Mercado
should be included in the inventory because Teresita, et al. did not dispute the fact about the
shares being inherited by Emigdio. Secondly, with Emigdio and Teresita having been married
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code in August 3, 1988, their property regime was the
conjugal partnership of gains.[29] For purposes of the settlement of Emigdio’s estate, it was
unavoidable for Teresita to include his shares in the conjugal partnership of gains. The party
asserting that specific property acquired during that property regime did not pertain to the
conjugal partnership of gains carried the burden of proof, and that party must prove the
exclusive ownership by one of them by clear, categorical, and convincing evidence.[30] In the
absence of or pending the presentation of such proof, the conjugal partnership of Emigdio and
Teresita must be provisionally liquidated to establish who the real owners of the affected
properties were,[31] and which of the properties should form part of the estate of Emigdio. The
portions that pertained to the estate of Emigdio must be included in the inventory. Moreover,
although the title over Lot 3353 was already registered in the name of Mervir Realty, the RTC
made findings that put that title in dispute. Civil Case No. CEB-12692, a_______________[29]
See Family Code, Art. 105, 116. [30] Dewara v. Lamela, G.R. No. 179010, April 11, 2011, 647
SCRA 483, 490, citing Coja v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 151153, December 10, 2007, 539 SCRA
517, 528. [31] See Alvarez v. Espiritu, No. L-18833, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 892, 899.219
dispute that had involved the ownership of Lot 3353, was resolved in favor of the estate of
Emigdio, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252 covering Lot 3353 was still in Emigdio’s
name. Indeed, the RTC noted in the order of March 14, 2001, or ten years after his death, that
Lot 3353 had remained registered in the name of Emigdio. Interestingly, Mervir Realty did not
intervene at all in Civil Case No. CEB-12692. Such lack of interest in Civil Case No. CEB-12692
was susceptible of various interpretations, including one to the effect that the heirs of Emigdio
could have already threshed out their differences with the assistance of the trial court. This
interpretation was probable considering that Mervir Realty, whose business was managed by
respondent Richard, was headed by Teresita herself as its President. In other words, Mervir
Realty appeared to be a family corporation. Also, the fact that the deed of absolute sale
executed by Emigdio in favor of Mervir Realty was a notarized instrument did not sufficiently
justify the exclusion from the inventory of the properties involved. A notarized deed of sale only
enjoyed the presumption of regularity in favor of its execution, but its notarization did not per
se guarantee the legal efficacy of the transaction under the deed, and what the contents
purported to be. The presumption of regularity could be rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary.[32] As the Court has observed in Suntay v. Court of Appeals:[33] x x
x. Though the notarization of the deed of sale in question vests in its favor the presumption of
regularity, it is not the intention nor the function of the notary public to_______________[32]
San Juan v. Offril, G.R. No. 154609, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 439, 445-446 citing Nazareno v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138842, October 18, 2000, 343 SCRA 637, 652. [33] G.R. No. 114950,
December 19, 1995, 251 SCRA 430, 452-453, cited in Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
138842, October 18, 2000, 343 SCRA 637, 652.220validate and make binding an instrument
never, in the first place, intended to have any binding legal effect upon the parties thereto. The
intention of the parties still and always is the primary consideration in determining the true
nature of a contract. (Bold emphasis supplied) It should likewise be pointed out that the
exchange of shares of stock of Mervir Realty with the real properties owned by Emigdio would
still have to be inquired into. That Emigdio executed the deed of assignment two days prior to
his death was a circumstance that should put any interested party on his guard regarding the
exchange, considering that there was a finding about Emigdio having been sick of cancer of the
pancreas at the time.[34] In this regard, whether the CA correctly characterized the exchange
as a form of an estate planning scheme remained to be validated by the facts to be established
in court. The fact that the properties were already covered by Torrens titles in the name of
Mervir Realty could not be a valid basis for immediately excluding them from the inventory in
view of the circumstances admittedly surrounding the execution of the deed of assignment.
This is because: The Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands; it is merely a
system of registration of titles to lands. However, justice and equity demand that the
titleholder should not be made to bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of
the State’s agents, in the absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to
third persons. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and put a stop
forever to any question as to the legality of the title, except claims that were noted in the
certificate at the time of registration or that may arise subsequent thereto. Otherwise, the
integrity of the Torrens system shall forever be sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of
land_______________[34] Rollo, p. 138.221 registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed
to have regularly performed their duties.[35] Assuming that only seven titled lots were the
subject of the deed of assignment of January 10, 1991, such lots should still be included in the
inventory to enable the parties, by themselves, and with the assistance of the RTC itself, to test
and resolve the issue on the validity of the assignment. The limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an
intestate court might have constricted the determination of the rights to the properties arising
from that deed,[36] but it does not prevent the RTC as intestate court from ordering the
inclusion in the inventory of the properties subject of that deed. This is because the RTC as
intestate court, albeit vested only with special and limited jurisdiction, was still “deemed to
have all the necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction to make it effective.”[37] Lastly, the
inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be prepared and submitted for the important purpose
of resolving the difficult issues of collation and advancement to the heirs. Article 1061 of the
Civil Code required every compulsory heir and the surviving spouse, herein Teresita herself, to
“bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he (or she) may have received
from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous
title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in
the account of the partition.” Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court also provided that
any_______________[35] Rabaja Ranch Development Corporation v. AFP Retirement and
Separation Benefits System, G.R. No. 177181, July 7, 2009, 592 SCRA 201, 217, citing Republic v.
Guerrero, G.R. No. 133168, March 28, 2006, 485 SCRA 424, 445. [36] Reyes-Mesugas v. Reyes,
G.R. No. 174835, March 22, 2010, 616 SCRA 345, 350, citing Pio Barretto Realty Development,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, Nos. L-62431-33, August 3, 1984, 131 SCRA 606. [37] Pio Barretto
Realty Development, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra at p. 621.222 advancement by the
decedent on the legitime of an heir “may be heard and determined by the court having
jurisdiction of the estate proceedings, and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding
on the person raising the questions and on the heir.” Rule 90 thereby expanded the special and
limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court about the matters relating to the inventory
of the estate of the decedent by authorizing it to direct the inclusion of properties donated or
bestowed by gratuitous title to any compulsory heir by the decedent.[38] The determination of
which properties should be excluded from or included in the inventory of estate properties was
well within the authority and discretion of the RTC as an intestate court. In making its
determination, the RTC acted with circumspection, and proceeded under the guiding policy that
it was best to include all properties in the possession of the administrator or were known to the
administrator to belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude properties that could turn out in the
end to be actually part of the estate. As long as the RTC commits no patent grave abuse of
discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial duty.
Grave abuse of discretion means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the
respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the
duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[39]_______________ [38] Gregorio v. Madarang, G.R. No.
185226, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 340, 345. [39] Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company, G.R. No. 153852, October 24, 2012, 684 SCRA 410, 422-423.223In light of the
foregoing, the CA’s conclusion of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC was
unwarranted and erroneous. WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on
certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on May 15, 2002; REINSTATES
the orders issued on March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court in Cebu;
DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court in Cebu to proceed with dispatch in Special Proceedings No.
3094-CEB entitled Intestate Estate of the late Emigdio Mercado, Thelma Aranas, petitioner, and
to resolve the case; and ORDERS the respondents to pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.Sereno
(CJ.), Leonardo-De Castro, Villarama, Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur. Petition granted, judgment
reversed and set aside. Notes.—The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a mere
mathematical operation by the addition of the value of donations made by the testator to the
value of the hereditary estate; and second, it is the return to the hereditary estate of property
disposed of by lucrative title by the testator during his lifetime. (Arellano vs. Pascual, 638 SCRA
826 [2010]) The determination as to the existence of co-ownership is necessary in the
resolution of an action for partition. (Lacbayan vs. Samoy, Jr., 645 SCRA 677 [2011]) ——o0o—
— Aranas vs. Mercado, 713 SCRA 194, G.R. No. 156407 January 15, 2014
G.R. No. 127920. August 9, 2005.* EMILIO B. PACIOLES, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS
ADMINISTRATOR AND HEIR OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF MIGUELITA CHING-PACIOLES,
petitioner, vs. MIGUELA CHUATOCO-CHING, respondent.Courts; Probate Proceedings;
Jurisdictions; The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a
probate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and the
probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the determination of questions of
ownership that arise during the proceedings; A well-recognized exception to the rule is the
principle that an intestate or a probate court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership
when its purpose is to determine whether or not a property should be included in the
inventory.—The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a
probate court relates only to matters having to do with the settle-_______________ * THIRD
DIVISION.
91 VOL. 466, AUGUST 9, 2005 91 Pacioles, Jr. vs. Chuatoco-Ching ment of the
estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the determination of
questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is
that such court exercises special and limited jurisdiction. A well-recognized deviation to the rule
is the principle that an intestate or a probate court may hear and pass upon questions of
ownership when its purpose is to determine whether or not a property should be included in
the inventory. In such situations the adjudication is merely incidental and provisional. Thus, in
Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, we held: “x x x As a rule, the question of ownership is an
extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose
of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of
estate properties, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is
provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve
title.” Same; Same; Same; When a question arises as to ownership of property alleged to be a
part of the estate of the deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his
property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that
of the deceased and his estate, such question cannot be determined in the course of an
intestate or probate proceedings.—The RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its
jurisdiction. Its proper course should have been to maintain a hands-off stance on the matter. It
is well-settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of decisions, that
when a question arises as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of the
deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any
right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his
estate, such question cannot be determined in the course of an intestate or probate
proceedings. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions,
which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial
court. Jurisprudence teaches us that: [A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings
whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a
part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court
could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be
included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administra-
92 92 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Pacioles, Jr. vs. Chuatoco-
Ching tor. If there is no dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the
administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.” Same;
Same; Same; Land Titles; If a property covered by Torrens Title is involved, the presumptive
conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong
compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of
the property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary
action.—Even assuming that the intestate court merely intended to make a provisional or prima
facie determination of the issue of ownership, still respondent’s claim cannot prosper. It bears
stressing that the bulk of Miguelita’s estate, as stated in petitioner’s inventory, comprises real
estates covered by the Torrens System which are registered either in the name of Miguelita
alone or with petitioner. As such, they are considered the owners of the properties until their
title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action. We find this Court’s
pronouncement in Bolisay vs. Alcid relevant, thus: “It does not matter that respondent-
administratrix has evidence purporting to support her claim of ownership, for, on the other
hand, petitioners have a Torrens title in their favor, which under the law is endowed with
incontestability until after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in the law itself, which,
of course, does not include, bringing up the matter as a mere incident in special proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of deceased persons. x x x x x x In regard to such incident of
inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property covered by Torrens Title is involved, the
presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of
strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the
owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate
ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in
the persons named in the title. x x x”PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Cuevas,
Santos & Associates for petitioners.
93 VOL. 466, AUGUST 9, 2005 93 Pacioles, Jr. vs. Chuatoco-Ching Prospero
A. Crescini for respondent.SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:Oftentimes death brings peace only to the
person who dies but not to the people he leaves behind. For in death, a person’s estate
remains, providing a fertile ground for discords that break the familial bonds. Before us is
another case that illustrates such reality. Here, a husband and a mother of the deceased are
locked in an acrimonious dispute over the estate of their loved one.This is a petition for review
on certiorari filed by Emilio B. Pacioles, Jr., herein petitioner, against Miguela Chuatoco-Ching,
herein respondent, assailing the Court of Appeals Decision1 dated September 25, 1996 and
Resolution2 dated January 27, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571.3 The Appellate Court affirmed the
Order dated January 17, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 99, Quezon City denying
petitioner’s motion for partition and distribution of the estate of his wife, Miguelita Ching-
Pacioles; and his motion for reconsideration.The facts are undisputed.On March 13, 1992,
Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an estimated value of P10.5 million, stock
investments worth P518,783.00, bank deposits amounting to P6.54 million, and interests in
certain businesses. She was survived by her husband, petitioner herein, and their two minor
children. _______________ 1 Rollo at pp. 9-14. 2 Id., at pp. 16-17. 3 Entitled “Emilio B. Pacioles,
Jr. versus The Honorable Judge Felix De Guzman, as Presiding Judge of RTC Quezon City, Branch
99 and Miguela Ching.” 94 94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Pacioles, Jr. vs.
Chuatoco-Ching Consequently, on August 20, 1992, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified
petition4 for the settlement of Miguelita’s estate. He prayed that (a) letters of administration
be issued in his name, and (b) that the net residue of the estate be divided among the
compulsory heirs.Miguelita’s mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, filed an
opposition, specifically to petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of letters of administration on the
grounds that (a) petitioner is incompetent and unfit to exercise the duties of an administrator;
and (b) the bulk of Miguelita’s estate is composed of “paraphernal properties.” Respondent
prayed that the letters of administration be issued to her instead.5 Afterwards, she also filed a
motion for her appointment as special administratrix.6Petitioner moved to strike out
respondent’s opposition, alleging that the latter has no direct and material interest in the
estate, she not being a compulsory heir, and that he, being the surviving spouse, has the
preferential right to be appointed as administrator under the law.7Respondent countered that
she has direct and material interest in the estate because she gave half of her inherited
properties to Miguelita on condition that both of them “would undertake whatever business
endeavor they decided to, in the capacity of business partners.”8In her omnibus motion9 dated
April 23, 1993, respondent nominated her son Emmanuel Ching to act as special administrator.
_______________ 4 Records at pp. 1-9. The case was filed and docketed as SP No. Q-92-
131555. 5 See Opposition, Records at pp. 27-29. 6 See Motion for the Appointment of
Oppositor as Special Administratrix, Records at pp. 30-32. 7 See Motion to Strike-Out
Opposition, Records at pp. 91-99. 8 See Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion to Strike-Out
Opposition dated December 21, 1992, Records at pp. 101-106. 9 Records at pp. 137-140. 95
VOL. 466, AUGUST 9, 2005 95 Pacioles, Jr. vs. Chuatoco-Ching On April 20, 1994, the intestate
court issued an order appointing petitioner and Emmanuel as joint regular administrators of the
estate.10 Both were issued letters of administration after taking their oath and posting the
requisite bond.Consequently, Notice to Creditors was published in the issues of the Manila
Standard on September 12, 19, and 26, 1994. However, no claims were filed against the estate
within the period set by the Revised Rules of Court.Thereafter, petitioner submitted to the
intestate court an inventory of Miguelita’s estate.11 Emmanuel did not submit an inventory.On
May 17, 1995, the intestate court declared petitioner and his two minor children as the only
compulsory heirs of Miguelita.12On July 21, 1995, petitioner filed with the intestate court an
omnibus motion13 praying, among others, that an Order be issued directing the: 1) payment of
estate taxes; 2) partition and distribution of the estate among the declared heirs;and 3)
payment of attorney’s fees.Respondent opposed petitioner’s motion on the ground that the
partition and distribution of the estate is “premature and precipitate,” considering that there is
yet no determination “whether the properties specified in the inventory are conjugal,
paraphernal or owned in a joint venture.”14 Respondent claimed that she owns the bulk of
Miguelita’s estate as an “heir and co-owner.” Thus, she prayed that a hearing be scheduled.
_______________ 10 The order, insofar as Emmanuel Ching is concerned as co-administrator, is
the subject of an appeal before the 10th Division of the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 46763. 11 Records at pp. 337-346. Amended Inventory at pp. 347-353. 12 May 17, 1995,
Records at p. 360. 13 Records at pp. 366-371. 14 See Manifestation/Opposition to Omnibus
Motion dated July 20, 1995, Records at pp. 383-387. 96 96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED Pacioles, Jr. vs. Chuatoco-Ching On January 17, 1996, the intestate court allowed
the payment of the estate taxes and attorney’s fees but denied petitioner’s prayer for partition
and distribution of the estate, holding that it is indeed “premature.” The intestate court
ratiocinated as follows:“On the partition and distribution of the deceased’s properties, among
the declared heirs, the Court finds the prayer of petitioner in this regard to be premature. Thus,
a hearing on oppositor’s claim as indicated in her opposition to the instant petition is necessary
to determine ‘whether the properties listed in the amended complaint filed by petitioner are
entirely conjugal or the paraphernal properties of the deceased, or a co-ownership between
the oppositor and the petitioner in their partnership venture.’ ”Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution dated May 7, 1996.Forthwith, petitioner
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the
intestate court’s Order dated January 17, 1996 and Resolution dated May 7, 1996 which denied
petitioner’s prayer for partition and distribution of the estate for being premature, indicating
that it (intestate court) will first resolve respondent’s claim of ownership.The Appellate Court
dismissed the petition for certiorari, holding that in issuing the challenged Order and
Resolution, the intestate court did not commit grave abuse of discretion.The Appellate Court
ruled:“Regarding the second issue raised, respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in entertaining private respondent’s unsupported claim of ownership against the
estate. In fact, there is no indication that the probate court has already made a finding of title
or ownership. It is inevitable that in probate proceedings, questions of collation or of
advancement are involved for these are matters which can be passed upon in the course of the
proceedings. The probate court in exercising its prerogative to schedule a hearing, to inquire
into the propriety of private respondent’s claim,
97 VOL. 466, AUGUST 9, 2005 97 Pacioles, Jr. vs. Chuatoco-Ching is being
extremely cautious in determining the composition of the estate. This act is not tainted with an
iota of grave abuse of discretion.”Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but it was likewise
denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following assignments of
error:“IRESPONDENT COURT’S DECISION WHICH AFFIRMS THE INTESTATE COURT’S ORDER IS A
GRAVE ERROR FOR BEING CONTRARY TO THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE AND POLICY OF THE
LAW THAT ESTATE PROCEEDINGS MUST BE SETTLED EXPEDITIOUSLY.IIRESPONDENT COURT
COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN SUSTAINING THE INTESTATE COURT’S ORDER TO CONDUCT
HEARING ON THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE, AS SAID FUNCTION IS
OUTSIDE AND BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF THE INTESTATE COURT.IIIRESPONDENT COURT
GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE INTESTATE COURT’S ORDER AND RESOLUTION
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT RESPONDENT CHING’S OWNERSHIP CLAIMS ARE CONFLICTING,
FRIVOLOUS AND BASELESS.”The fundamental issue for our resolution is: May a trial court,
acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon questions of ownership involving properties
claimed to be part of the decedent’s estate?The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial
court either as an intestate or a probate court relates only to matters having to do with the
settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the
determination of questions of ownership that arise during the
98 98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Pacioles, Jr. vs. Chuatoco-
Ching proceedings.15 The patent rationale for this rule is that such court exercises special and
limited jurisdiction.16A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or
a probate court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its purpose is to
determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. In such situations the
adjudication is merely incidental and provisional. Thus, in Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,17 we
held:“x x x As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate
court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain
property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the probate
court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive,
and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.”The Court of Appeals
relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining the jurisdiction of the intestate court to
conduct a hearing on respondent’s claim. Such reliance is misplaced. Under the said principle,
the key consideration is that the purpose of the intestate or probate court in hearing and
passing upon questions of ownership is merely to determine whether or not a property should
be included in the inventory. _______________ 15 Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
108947, September 29, 1997, 279 SCRA 647; Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 42108,
December 29, 1989, 180 SCRA 635. In Jimenez vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
75773, April 17, 1990, 184 SCRA 367, the Court ruled: “It is hornbook doctrine that in a special
proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which
the probate court cannot pass upon with finality. This pronouncement no doubt applies with
equal force to an intestate proceeding x x x.” 16 Heirs of Oscar R. Reyes vs. Reyes, G.R. No.
139587, November 22, 2000, 345 SCRA 541; Jimenez vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, Ibid. 17
G.R. No. L-56340, June 24, 1983, 122 SCRA 885. 99 VOL. 466, AUGUST 9, 2005 99 Pacioles,
Jr. vs. Chuatoco-Ching The facts of this case show that such was not the purpose of the
intestate court.First, the inventory was not disputed. In fact, in her Manifestation and
Opposition18 dated September 18, 1995, respondent expressly adopted the inventory
prepared by petitioner, thus:“6. She adopts the inventory submitted by the petitioner in his
Amended Compliance dated October 6, 1994, and filed only on November 4, 1994 not October
5, 1995 as erroneously asserted in Par. 12 of the Omnibus Motion. Oppositor, however, takes
exception to the low valuation placed on the real estate properties and reserves her right to
submit a more accurate and realistic pricing on each.”Respondent could have opposed
petitioner’s inventory and sought the exclusion of the specific properties which she believed or
considered to be hers. But instead of doing so, she expressly adopted the inventory, taking
exception only to the low valuation placed on the real estate properties.And second,
Emmanuel, respondent’s son and representative in the settlement of Miguelita’s estate, did not
submit his own inventory. His mandate, as co-administrator, is “to submit within three (3)
months after his appointment a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate
of the deceased which have come into his possession or knowledge.”19 He could have
submitted an inventory, excluding therefrom those properties which respondent considered to
be hers. The fact that he did not endeavor to submit one shows that he acquiesced with
petitioner’s inventory.Obviously, respondent’s purpose here was not to obtain from the
intestate court a ruling of what properties should or should not be included in the inventory.
She wanted something else, i.e., to secure from the intestate court a final deter-
_______________ 18 Records at pp. 383-387. 19 Section 1, Rule 83 of the Rules of Court. 100
100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Pacioles, Jr. vs. Chuatoco-Ching mination of her
claim of ownership over properties comprising the bulk of Miguelita’s estate. The intestate
court went along with respondent on this point as evident in its Resolution20 dated May 7,
1996, thus:“On petitioner’s motion for partition and distribution of the estate of the late
Miguelita Ching Pacioles, it is believed that since oppositor had interposed a claim against the
subject estate, the distribution thereof in favor of the heirs could not possibly be implemented
as there is still a need for appropriate proceedings to determine the propriety of oppositor’s
claim. It must be mentioned that if it is true that oppositor owns the bulk of the properties,
which she allegedly placed/registered in the name of the deceased for convenience, Oppositor,
therefore, has a material and direct interest in the estate and hence, should be given her day in
Court.”It is apparent from the foregoing Resolution that the purpose of the hearing set by the
intestate court was actually to “determine the propriety of oppositor’s (respondent’s) claim.”
According to the intestate court, “if it is true that the oppositor (respondent) owns the bulk of
(Miguelita’s) properties,” then it means that she has a “material and direct interest in the
estate” and, hence, “she should be given her day in court.” The intended “day in court” or
hearing is geared towards resolving the propriety of respondent’s contention that she is the
true owner of the bulk of Miguelita’s estate.Surely, we cannot be deluded by respondent’s
ingenious attempt to secure a proceeding for the purpose of resolving her blanket claim against
Miguelita’s estate. Although, she made it appear that her only intent was to determine the
accuracy of petitioner’s inventory, however, a close review of the facts and the pleadings
reveals her real intention.Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its
jurisdiction. Its proper course should have been to maintain a hands-off stance on the matter. It
is well-settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of _______________
20 Records at pp. 437-440. 101 VOL. 466, AUGUST 9, 2005 101 Pacioles, Jr. vs. Chuatoco-
Ching decisions, that when a question arises as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of
the estate of the deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by
virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased
and his estate, such question cannot be determined in the course of an intestate or probate
proceedings. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions,
which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial
court.21 Jurisprudence teaches us that:“[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings
whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a
part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court
could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be
included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there
is no dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the
opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting
claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.”22Hence, respondent’s recourse is to
file a separate action with a court of general jurisdiction. The intestate court is not the
appropriate forum for the resolution of her adverse claim of ownership over properties
ostensibly belonging to Miguelita’s estate.Now, even assuming that the intestate court merely
intended to make a provisional or prima facie determination of the issue of ownership, still
respondent’s claim cannot pros-_______________ 21 Baybayan vs. Aquino, No. L-42678, April
9, 1987, 149 SCRA 186. 22 Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals, supra; Morales vs. Court of First
Instance of Cavite, G.R. No. L-47125, December 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 373; Cuizon vs. Ramolete, L-
51291, May 29, 1984, 129 SCRA 495. 102 102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pacioles, Jr. vs. Chuatoco-Ching per. It bears stressing that the bulk of Miguelita’s estate, as
stated in petitioner’s inventory, comprises real estates covered by the Torrens System which
are registered either in the name of Miguelita alone or with petitioner. As such, they are
considered the owners of the properties until their title is nullified or modified in an
appropriate ordinary action. We find this Court’s pronouncement in Bolisay vs. Alcid23
relevant, thus:“It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting to
support her claim of ownership, for, on the other hand, petitioners have a Torrens title in their
favor, which under the law is endowed with incontestability until after it has been set aside in
the manner indicated in the law itself, which, of course, does not include, bringing up the
matter as a mere incident in special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased
persons. x x xx x x In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property
covered by Torrens Title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be
given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder
thereof should be considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is
nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case at bar,
possession of the property itself is in the persons named in the title. x x x”Corrolarily, P.D. 1529,
otherwise known as, “The Property Registration Decree,” proscribes collateral attack against
Torrens Title, hence:“Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.A certificate of title
shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a
direct proceeding in accordance with law.”_______________ 23 L-45494, August 31, 1978, 85
SCRA 213.
 103 VOL. 466, AUGUST 9, 2005 103 Pacioles, Jr. vs. Chuatoco-Ching
Significantly, a perusal of the records reveals that respondent failed to present convincing
evidence to bolster her bare assertion of ownership. We quote her testimony, thus: “Q: I now
direct your attention to paragraph (5) appearing on page 1 of this sworn statement of yours
which I quote:” In accordance with the Chinese tradition and culture in the distribution of
properties to the legal heirs, we decided to give only a token to our daughter Miguelita and
leave the rest to our only son Emmanuel, with the undertaking that being the son he will take
full responsibility of the rest of the family despite his marriage. Madame witness, do you recall
having stated that in your sworn statement? A: Yes sir, but it was not carried out. Q: What
was actually given to your daughter Miguelita is only a token, is that right? A: Not a token, sir,
but one half of the share of the estate was given to Lita and the other half was given to
Emmanuel. Q: What went to Emmanuel was also 1/2, is that right? A: Yes, sir. Q: What
makes up the one half share of Lita, if you recall? A: What was given to her were all checks, sir,
but Icannot remember any more the amount.
x x x x x x Q: Summing up your testimony, Madame, you cannotitemize the
one half share of the estate of Miguelita, is that right? A: Yes, sir. Q: Was there any document
covering this partition of the estate among you, Emmanuel and Miguelita with respect to the
estate of your late husband? A: If I only knew that this will happen . . . Q: Samakatuwid po ay
walang dokumento? A: Wala po.”24 _______________ 24 TSN, February 26, 1993. 104 104
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Pacioles, Jr. vs. Chuatoco-Ching She further testified
as follows: “Q: Among the properties listed like the various parcels of land, stocks,
investments, bank accounts and deposits both here and abroad, interests and participation in
IFS Pharmaceuticals and Medical Supplies, Inc. and various motor vehicles, per your pleasure,
Madam Witness, how should these properties be partitioned or what should be done with
these properties? According to you earlier, you are agreeable for the partition of the said
properties with Emil on a 50-50 basis, is that right? A: Kung ano po ang sa akin, iyon ang dapat
na bumalik sa akin, sir. Q: Halimbawa ay ano po iyon? Real estate properties, parcels of land
located in Pag-Asa, in Silangan, in San Lazaro, in Sta. Cruz, in San Francisco del Monte and
shares of stock. Alinsunod sa inyo, paano po ang dapat na partihan o hatian ninyo ni Emil? A:
Kung ano ang sa akin. . .
x x x x x x Q: Ang tanong ko po sa inyo ay ganito, ito po ba ang inyong
iminungkahi kay Emil? Ito po ba ang inyong paghahatian or hindi? A: Iyo akin talaga na hindi
nila pinaghirapan, sir.”25 Unfortunately, respondent could not even specify which of the
properties listed in petitioner’s inventory belong to her. Neither could she present any
document to prove her claim of ownership. The consistently changing basis of her claim did
nothing to improve her posture. Initially, she insisted that the bulk of Miguelita’s estate is
composed of paraphernal properties.26 Sensing that such assertion could not strengthen her
_______________ 25 TSN, May 20, 1993. 26 Respondent’s Opposition dated October 28, 1992
reads: 105 VOL. 466, AUGUST 9, 2005 105 Pacioles, Jr. vs. Chuatoco-Ching claim of
ownership, she opted to change her submission and declare that she and Miguelita were
“business partners” and that she gave to the latter most of her properties to be used in a joint
business venture.27 Respondent must have realized early on that if the properties listed in
petitioner’s inventory are paraphernal, then Miguelita had the absolute title and ownership
over them and upon her death, such properties would be vested to her compulsory heirs,
petitioner herein and their two minor children.28At any rate, we must stress that our
pronouncements herein cannot diminish or deprive respondent of whatever _______________
“b) the bulk of the estate of the deceased consists of paraphernal property of the deceased
most of which were donations coming from the herein Oppositor, and therefore, the herein
Oppositor has a better right to its administration.” (Records at pp. 27-29) 27 Opposition to
Petitioner’s Motion to Strike-Out Opposition dated January 5, 1993, reads:“3. That, the
Petitioner cannot deny the fact that majority of the estate left by the decedent came from the
Oppositor by way of donation, and this was brought about by the fact that when the father of
the decedent died, the latter did not receive any kind of inheritance, as Chinese custom and
tradition dictate that female children inherit nothing from their deceased parents and the only
heirs entitled to inherit are the surviving spouse and the male children, which happens to be
the herein Oppositor and the only brother of the decedent in the person of Emmanuel Ching.
But the herein Oppositor, in the exercise of her liberality and sound direction, and with the end
in view of giving the decedent a share of the estate of her deceased husband, gave half of her
inherited property to the decedent, with an undertaking that the latter herein Oppositor and
they will undertake whatever business endeavor they decided to, in the capacity of business
partners.” (Records at pp. 101-106) 28 Pisueña vs. Heirs of Petra Unating, G.R. No. 132803,
August 31, 1999, 313 SCRA 384; Bongalon vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142441, November 10,
2004, 441 SCRA 553. 106 106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Pacioles, Jr. vs.
Chuatoco-Ching rights or properties she believes or considers to be rightfully hers. We
reiterate that the question of ownership of properties alleged to be part of the estate must be
submitted to the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.29WHEREFORE,
the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 41571 are hereby REVERSED.SO ORDERED. Panganiban (Chairman), Carpio-
Morales and Garcia, JJ., concur. Corona, J., On leave.Petition granted, assailed decision and
resolution reversed.Notes.—While courts in probate proceedings are generally limited to pass
only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be validated, in exceptional cases, courts
are not powerless to do what the situation constrains them to do, and pass upon certain
provisions of the will. (Ajero vs. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 488 [1994]) Succession laws and
jurisprudence require that when a marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or the
wife, the decedent’s entire estate—under the concept of conjugal properties of gains—must be
divided equally, with one half going to the surviving spouse and the other half to the heirs of
the deceased. (Heirs of Spouses Remedio R. Sandejas and Eliodoro P. Sandejas, Sr. vs. Lina, 351
SCRA 183 [2001])——o0o—— Pacioles, Jr. vs. Chuatoco-Ching, 466 SCRA 90, G.R. No. 127920
August 9, 2005
G.R. No. 173915. February 22, 2010.*
IRENE SANTE AND REYNALDO SANTE, petitioners, vs. HON. EDILBERTO T. CLARAVALL, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 60, Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, and VITA N.
KALASHIAN, respondents.

Actions; Jurisdiction; Jurisdictional Amount; In cases where the claim for damages is the main
cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in
determining the jurisdiction of the court.—But where damages is the main cause of action,
should the amount of moral damages prayed for in the complaint be the sole basis for
determining which court has jurisdiction or should the total amount of all the damages claimed
regardless of kind and nature, such as exemplary damages, nominal damages, and attorney’s
fees, etc., be used? In this regard, Administrative Circular No. 09-94 is instructive: x x x x 2. The
exclusion of the term “damages of whatever kind” in determining the jurisdictional amount
under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to
cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of
action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of
the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the
jurisdiction of the court.
Same; Same; Same; Where it is clear, based on the allegations of the complaint, that the main
action is for damages, the other forms of damages being claimed e.g., exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, are not merely incidental to or consequences of the
main action but constitute the primary relief prayed for in the complaint.—In the instant case,
the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 5794-R is for the recovery of damages for the alleged
malicious acts of petitioners. The complaint principally sought an award of moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, for the alleged shame
and injury suffered by respondent by reason of petitioners’ utterance while they were at a
police station in Pangasinan. It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based

_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
334

on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s causes of action. It is clear, based on the allegations of
the complaint, that respondent’s main action is for damages. Hence, the other forms of
damages being claimed by respondent, e.g., exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses, are not merely incidental to or consequences of the main action but constitute the
primary relief prayed for in the complaint.
Same; Same; It is a basic jurisprudential principle that an amendment cannot be allowed when
the court has no jurisdiction over the original complaint and the purpose of the amendment is
to confer jurisdiction on the court.—We find no error, much less grave abuse of discretion, on
the part of the Court of Appeals in affirming the RTC’s order allowing the amendment of the
original complaint from P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00 despite the pendency of a petition for
certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals. While it is a basic jurisprudential principle that an
amendment cannot be allowed when the court has no jurisdiction over the original complaint
and the purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction on the court, here, the RTC clearly
had jurisdiction over the original complaint and amendment of the complaint was then still a
matter of right.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Gerald C. Jacob for petitioners.
Thomas S. Padaco for respondent Vita N. Kalashian.

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before this Court is a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, filed by petitioners Irene and Reynaldo Sante assailing the Decision2
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 3-19.
2 Id., at pp. 96-103. Penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga, with Associate
Justices Fernanda Lampas-Peralta and Sesinando E. Villon, concurring.

335
dated January 31, 2006 and the Resolution3 dated June 23, 2006 of the Seventeenth Division of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87563. The assailed decision affirmed the orders of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 60, denying their motion to dismiss the
complaint for damages filed by respondent Vita Kalashian against them.
The facts, culled from the records, are as follows:
On April 5, 2004, respondent filed before the RTC of Baguio City a complaint for damages4
against petitioners. In her complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 5794-R, respondent alleged
that while she was inside the Police Station of Natividad, Pangasinan, and in the presence of
other persons and police officers, petitioner Irene Sante uttered words, which when translated
in English are as follows, “How many rounds of sex did you have last night with your boss, Bert?
You fuckin’ bitch!” Bert refers to Albert Gacusan, respondent’s friend and one (1) of her hired
personal security guards detained at the said station and who is a suspect in the killing of
petitioners’ close relative. Petitioners also allegedly went around Natividad, Pangasinan telling
people that she is protecting and cuddling the suspects in the aforesaid killing. Thus,
respondent prayed that petitioners be held liable to pay moral damages in the amount of
P300,000.00; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; P50,000.00 attorney’s fees; P20,000.00
litigation expenses; and costs of suit.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss5 on the ground that it was the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) and not the RTC of Baguio, that had jurisdiction over the case. They argued that
the amount of the claim for moral damages was not more than the jurisdictional amount of
P300,000.00, because the claim for exemplary damages should be excluded in computing the
total claim.

_______________
3 Id., at pp. 21-22.
4 Id., at pp. 23-27.
5 Id., at pp. 29-31.

336
On June 24, 2004,6 the trial court denied the motion to dismiss citing our ruling in Movers-
Baseco Integrated Port Services, Inc. v. Cyborg Leasing Corporation.7 The trial court held that
the total claim of respondent amounted to P420,000.00 which was above the jurisdictional
amount for MTCCs outside Metro Manila. The trial court also later issued Orders on July 7,
20048 and July 19, 2004,9 respectively reiterating its denial of the motion to dismiss and
denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed on August 2, 2004, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85465, before the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, on July 14, 2004,
respondent and her husband filed an Amended Complaint11 increasing the claim for moral
damages from P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss with Answer
Ad Cautelam and Counterclaim, but the trial court denied their motion in an Order12 dated
September 17, 2004.
Hence, petitioners again filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition13 before the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 87563, claiming that the trial court committed grave abuse
of discretion in allowing the amendment of the complaint to increase the amount of moral
damages from P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00. The case was raffled to the Seventeenth Division
of the Court of Appeals.

_______________
6 Id., at pp. 32-33.
7 G.R. No. 131755, October 25, 1999, 317 SCRA 327.
8 Rollo, p. 36.
9 Id., at p. 37.
10 Id., at pp. 38-44.
11 Id., at pp. 76-80.
12 Id., at p. 82.
13 Id., at pp. 45-53.

337
On January 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals, Seventh Division, promulgated a decision in CA-G.R.
SP No. 85465, as follows:

“WHEREFORE, finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of [the] Regional Trial Court of
Baguio, Branch 60, in rendering the assailed Orders dated June 24, 2004 and July [19], 2004 in
Civil Case No. 5794-R the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Orders are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 5794-R for damages is ordered DISMISSED for
lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.”14

The Court of Appeals held that the case clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the MTCC as the
allegations show that plaintiff was seeking to recover moral damages in the amount of
P300,000.00, which amount was well within the jurisdictional amount of the MTCC. The Court
of Appeals added that the totality of claim rule used for determining which court had
jurisdiction could not be applied to the instant case because plaintiff’s claim for exemplary
damages was not a separate and distinct cause of action from her claim of moral damages, but
merely incidental to it. Thus, the prayer for exemplary damages should be excluded in
computing the total amount of the claim.
On January 31, 2006, the Court of Appeals, this time in CA-G.R. SP No. 87563, rendered a
decision affirming the September 17, 2004 Order of the RTC denying petitioners’ Motion to
Dismiss Ad Cautelam. In the said decision, the appellate court held that the total or aggregate
amount demanded in the complaint constitutes the basis of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals
did not find merit in petitioners’ posture that the claims for exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees are merely incidental to the main cause and should not be included in the computation of
the total claim.

_______________
14 Id., at p. 93.

338
The Court of Appeals additionally ruled that respondent can amend her complaint by increasing
the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00, on the ground that the trial
court has jurisdiction over the original complaint and respondent is entitled to amend her
complaint as a matter of right under the Rules.
Unable to accept the decision, petitioners are now before us raising the following issues:

I.
WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION ON THE PART OF THE (FORMER) SEVENTEENTH DIVISION OF THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS WHEN IT RESOLVED THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
BAGUIO CITY BRANCH 60 HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE FOR
DAMAGES AMOUNTING TO P300,000.00;

II.
WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE
HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BAGUIO BRANCH 60 FOR
ALLOWING THE COMPLAINANT TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT (INCREASING THE AMOUNT OF
DAMAGES TO 1,000,000.00 TO CONFER JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE
CASE DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED AT THE COURT OF
APPEALS, SEVENTH DIVISION, DOCKETED AS CA G.R. NO. 85465.15

In essence, the basic issues for our resolution are:

1) Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the case? and
2) Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion in allowing the amendment of the
complaint?

_______________
15 Id., at p. 10.

339
Petitioners insist that the complaint falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTCC. They
maintain that the claim for moral damages, in the amount of P300,000.00 in the original
complaint, is the main action. The exemplary damages being discretionary should not be
included in the computation of the jurisdictional amount. And having no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case, the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it allowed the
amendment of the complaint to increase the claim for moral damages in order to confer
jurisdiction.
In her Comment,16 respondent averred that the nature of her complaint is for recovery of
damages. As such, the totality of the claim for damages, including the exemplary damages as
well as the other damages alleged and prayed in the complaint, such as attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses, should be included in determining jurisdiction. The total claim being
P420,000.00, the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint.
We deny the petition, which although denominated as a petition for certiorari, we treat as a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 in view of the issues raised.
Section 19(8) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,17 as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,18 states:

“SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.—Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
xxxx
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy
exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in
_______________
16 Id., at pp. 245-252.
17 Also known as “The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.”
18 An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
Otherwise Known as the “Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.”

340

Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).”

Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7691 further provides:

“SEC. 5. After five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the jurisdictional amounts
mentioned in Sec. 19(3), (4), and (8); and Sec. 33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by
this Act, shall be adjusted to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00). Five (5) years
thereafter, such jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted further to Three hundred thousand
pesos (P300,000.00): Provided, however, That in the case of Metro Manila, the
abovementioned jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted after five (5) years from the
effectivity of this Act to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00).”

Relatedly, Supreme Court Circular No. 21-99 was issued declaring that the first adjustment in
jurisdictional amount of first level courts outside of Metro Manila from P100,000.00 to
P200,000.00 took effect on March 20, 1999. Meanwhile, the second adjustment from
P200,000.00 to P300,000.00 became effective on February 22, 2004 in accordance with OCA
Circular No. 65-2004 issued by the Office of the Court Administrator on May 13, 2004.
Based on the foregoing, there is no question that at the time of the filing of the complaint on
April 5, 2004, the MTCC’s jurisdictional amount has been adjusted to P300,000.00.
But where damages is the main cause of action, should the amount of moral damages prayed
for in the complaint be the sole basis for determining which court has jurisdiction or should the
total amount of all the damages claimed regardless of kind and nature, such as exemplary
damages, nominal damages, and attorney’s fees, etc., be used?
In this regard, Administrative Circular No. 09-9419 is instructive:

_______________
19 Guidelines in the Implementation of Republic Act No. 7691.

341

“x x x x
2. The exclusion of the term “damages of whatever kind” in determining the jurisdictional
amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691,
applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main
cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or
one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the
jurisdiction of the court.” (Emphasis ours.)

In the instant case, the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 5794-R is for the recovery of damages
for the alleged malicious acts of petitioners. The complaint principally sought an award of moral
and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, for the alleged
shame and injury suffered by respondent by reason of petitioners’ utterance while they were at
a police station in Pangasinan. It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the
facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate
facts constituting the plaintiff’s causes of action.20 It is clear, based on the allegations of the
complaint, that respondent’s main action is for damages. Hence, the other forms of damages
being claimed by respondent, e.g., exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses,
are not merely incidental to or consequences of the main action but constitute the primary
relief prayed for in the complaint.
In Mendoza v. Soriano,21 it was held that in cases where the claim for damages is the main
cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in
determining the jurisdiction of the court. In the said case, the respondent’s claim of
P929,000.06 in damages and

_______________
20 Nocum v. Tan, G.R. No. 145022, September 23, 2005, 470 SCRA 639, 644-645.
21 G.R. No. 164012, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 260, 266-267.

342
P25,000 attorney’s fees plus P500 per court appearance was held to represent the monetary
equivalent for compensation of the alleged injury. The Court therein held that the total amount
of monetary claims including the claims for damages was the basis to determine the
jurisdictional amount.
Also, in Iniego v. Purganan,22 the Court has held:

“The amount of damages claimed is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, since it is the claim for all
kinds of damages that is the basis of determining the jurisdiction of courts, whether the claims
for damages arise from the same or from different causes of action.
x x x x”

Considering that the total amount of damages claimed was P420,000.00, the Court of Appeals
was correct in ruling that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case.
Lastly, we find no error, much less grave abuse of discretion, on the part of the Court of Appeals
in affirming the RTC’s order allowing the amendment of the original complaint from
P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00 despite the pendency of a petition for certiorari filed before the
Court of Appeals. While it is a basic jurisprudential principle that an amendment cannot be
allowed when the court has no jurisdiction over the original complaint and the purpose of the
amendment is to confer jurisdiction on the court,23 here, the RTC clearly had jurisdiction over
the original complaint and amendment of the complaint was then still a matter of right.24
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, for lack of merit. The Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals dated January 31, 2006 and June 23, 2006, respectively, are AFFIRMED. The Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 60

_______________
22 G.R. No. 166876, March 24, 2006, 485 SCRA 394, 402.
23 Siasoco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132753, February 15, 1999, 303 SCRA 186, 196.
24 Sec. 2, Rule 10, Rules of Court.

343
is DIRECTED to continue with the trial proceedings in Civil Case No. 5794-R with deliberate
dispatch.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Puno (C.J., Chairperson), Carpio-Morales, Leonardo-De Castro and Bersamin, JJ., concur.

Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.

Note.—Jurisdiction can neither be made to depend on the amount ultimately substantiated in
the course of the trial or proceedings nor be affected by proof showing that the claimant is
entitled to recover a sum in excess of the jurisdictional amount fixed by law—jurisdiction is
determined by the cause of action as alleged in the complaint and not by the amount ultimately
substantiated and awarded. (Gomez vs. Montalban, 548 SCRA 693 [2008])

——o0o—— Sante vs. Claravall, 613 SCRA 333, G.R. No. 173915 February 22, 2010
G.R. No. 139031. October 18, 2004.* MARIE ANTOINETTE R. SOLIVEN, petitioner, vs. FAST-
FORMS PHILIPPINES, INC., respondent.Courts; Jurisdictions; Damages; Administrative Circular
No. 09-94 specified the guidelines in the implementation of Republic Act No. 7691.—In
Administrative Circular No. 09-94 dated March 14, 1994, we specified the guidelines in the
implementation of R.A. 7691. Paragraph 2 of the Circular provides: “2. The exclusion of the
term ‘damages of whatever kind’ in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8)
and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the
damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in
cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action,
the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.”
(italics ours) Here, the main cause of action is for the recovery of sum of money amounting to
only P195,155.00. The damages being claimed by petitioner are merely the consequences of
this main cause of action. Hence, they are not included in determining the jurisdictional
amount. Same; Same; Appeals; A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.—The Court has constantly upheld the doctrine
that while jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a litigant’s participation in all stages of the
case before the trial court, including the invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative
relief, bars such party from challenging the court’s jurisdiction (PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 402 [1998]) A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction
of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to
obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Asset Privatization Trust vs.
Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 579 [1998]; Province of Bulacan vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 442
[1998]). The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party participating in the
proceedings and submitting his case for decision _______________ * THIRD DIVISION.
390 390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Soliven vs. Fastforms
Philippines, Inc. and then accepting judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of
jurisdiction, when adverse (Producers Bank of the Philippines vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, 298 SCRA 517 [1998], citing Ilocos Sur Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, 241 SCRA 36 [1995]).”PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision
and resolution of the Court of Appeals.The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Michelle B. Lazaro for petitioner. Jose T. Malang for respondent.SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
J.:For our resolution is the instant petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2
dated February 8, 1999 and Resolution dated June 17, 1999, both issued by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51946.Records show that on May 20, 1994, Marie Antoinette R.
Soliven, petitioner, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Makati City a complaint for
sum of money with damages against Fastforms Philippines, Inc., respondent, docketed as Civil
Case No. 94-1788.The complaint alleges that on June 2, 1993, respondent, through its president
Dr. Eduardo Escobar, obtained a loan from petitioner in the amount of One Hundred Seventy
Thousand Pesos (P170,000.00), payable within a period of twenty-one (21) days, with an
interest of 3%, as evidenced by a promissory note3 executed by Dr. Escobar as president of
respon-_______________ 1 Filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, amended.
2 Penned by Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and concurred in by then Presiding Justice Cancio
C. Garcia, now Associate Justice of this Court, and Justice Teodoro P. Regino (retired). 3 Annex
“A”, petitioner’s Complaint, Rollo at pp. 70, 78. 391 VOL. 440, OCTOBER 18, 2004 391
Soliven vs. Fastforms Philippines, Inc. dent. The loan was to be used to pay the salaries of
respondent’s employees. On the same day, respondent issued a post-dated check (dated June
25, 1993)4 in favor of petitioner in the amount of P175,000.00 (representing the principal
amount of P170,000.00, plus P5,000.00 as interest). It was signed by Dr. Escobar and Mr. Lorcan
Harney, respondent’s vice-president. About three weeks later, respondent, through Dr.
Escobar, advised petitioner not to deposit the postdated check as the account from where it
was drawn has insufficient funds. Instead, respondent proposed to petitioner that the
P175,000.00 be “rolled-over,” with a monthly interest of 5% (or P8,755.00). Petitioner agreed
to the proposal. Subsequently, respondent, through Dr. Escobar, Mr. Harney and Mr. Steve
Singson, the new president, issued several checks in the total sum of P76,250.00 in favor of
petitioner as payment for interests corresponding to the months of June, August, September,
October and December, 1993. Later, despite petitioner’s repeated demands, respondent
refused to pay its principal obligation and interests due.In her complaint, petitioner
prays:“WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that
judgment be rendered:(a) holding/declaring defendant (now respondent) guilty of breach of
contract x x x; and(b) ordering defendant to pay plaintiff (now petitioner) the following sums:
P195,155.00 as actual damages; P200,000.00 as moral damages; P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus the costs of suit.Plaintiff prays for such other
relief just and equitable in the premises.”_______________ 4 Exhibit “B”, Id., at pp. 70, 79.
392 392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Soliven vs. Fastforms
Philippines, Inc. Respondent, in its answer with counterclaim,5 denied that it obtained a loan
from petitioner; and that it did not authorize its then president, Dr. Eduardo Escobar, to secure
any loan from petitioner or issue various checks as payment for interests.After trial on the
merits, the court a quo rendered a Decision dated July 3, 19956 in favor of petitioner, the
dispositive portion of which reads:“22. WHEREFORE, the court hereby renders judgment as
follows:22.1. The defendant FASTFORMS PHILS., INC. is ordered to pay the plaintiff, MARIE
ANTOINETTE R. SOLIVEN, the following amounts:22.1.1. P175,000.00—the amount of the loan
and its interest covered by the check (Exh. 3);22.1.2. Five (5%) percent of P175,000.00—a
month from June 25, 1993 until the P175,000.00 is fully paid—less the sum of P76,250.00—as
interest;22.1.3. P50,000.00—as attorney’s fees.22.2. The COMPLAINT for MORAL and
EXEMPLARY damages is DISMISSED.22.3 The COUNTERCLAIM is DISMISSED; and22.4 Costs is
taxed against the defendant.”Respondent then filed a motion for reconsideration7 questioning
for the first time the trial court’s jurisdiction. It alleged that since the amount of petitioner’s
principal demand (P195,155.00) does not exceed P200,000.00, the complaint should have been
filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691.8 _______________ 5
Annex “D” Petition, Rollo at pp. 82-88. 6 Annex “E”, Id., at pp. 89-97. 7 Annex “F”, Id., at p. 98-
101. 8 Entitled “An Act Expanding The Jurisdiction Of The Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, And Municipal Circuit 393 VOL. 440, OCTOBER 18, 2004 393 Soliven vs.
Fastforms Philippines, Inc. Petitioner opposed the motion for reconsideration, stressing that
respondent is barred from assailing the jurisdiction of the trial court since it has invoked the
latter’s jurisdiction by seeking affirmative relief in its answer to the complaint and actively
participated in all stages of the trial.9In its Order dated October 11, 1995,10 the trial court
denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration, holding that it has jurisdiction over the case
because the totality of the claim therein exceeds P200,000.00. The trial court also ruled that
respondent, under the principle of estoppel, has lost its right to question its jurisdiction.On
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s Decision on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. The Appellate Court held that the case is within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan
Trial Court, petitioner’s claim being only P195,155.00; and that respondent may assail the
jurisdiction of the trial court anytime even for the first time on appeal.Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration but was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated June 17,
1999.11Hence, this petition.The fundamental issue for our resolution is whether the trial court
has jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 94-1788.Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691, which took
effect on April 15, 199412 or prior to the institution of Civil Case No. 94-1788, provides inter
alia that where the amount of the demand in civil cases instituted in Metro Manila exceeds
P200,000.00, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, _______________ Trial Courts,
Amending For The Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Otherwise Known As ‘The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980’.” 9 Rollo at p. 102. 10 Id., at pp. 108-109. 11 Annex “A-1’, Petition,
Rollo at pp. 52-53. 12 Par. 1 of SC Administrative Circular No. 09-94 dated March 14, 1994. 394
394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Soliven vs. Fastforms Philippines, Inc. attorney’s
fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the exclusive original jurisdiction thereof is lodged with the
Regional Trial Court.Under Section 3 of the same law, where the amount of the demand in the
complaint instituted in Metro Manila does not exceed P200,000.00, exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the exclusive original
jurisdiction over the same is vested in the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court.In Administrative Circular No. 09-94 dated March 14, 1994, we
specified the guidelines in the implementation of R.A. 7691. Paragraph 2 of the Circular
provides:“2. The exclusion of the term ‘damages of whatever kind’ in determining the
jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by
R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence
of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause
of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in
determining the jurisdiction of the court.” (italics ours)Here, the main cause of action is for the
recovery of sum of money amounting to only P195,155.00. The damages being claimed by
petitioner are merely the consequences of this main cause of action. Hence, they are not
included in determining the jurisdictional amount. It is plain from R.A. 7691 and our
Administrative Circular No. 09-94 that it is the Metropolitan Trial Court which has jurisdiction
over the instant case. As correctly stated by the Court of Appeals in its assailed
Decision:“Conformably, since the action is principally for the collection of a debt, and the
prayer for damages is not one of the main causes of action but merely a consequence thereto,
it should not be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.”
395 VOL. 440, OCTOBER 18, 2004 395 Soliven vs. Fastforms Philippines, Inc.
While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time, “this rule presupposes that estoppel
has not supervened.”13 In the instant case, respondent actively participated in all stages of the
proceedings before the trial court and invoked its authority by asking for an affirmative relief.
Clearly, respondent is estopped from challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction, especially when
an adverse judgment has been rendered. In PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court
of Appeals,14 we held:“Moreover, we note that petitioner did not question at all the
jurisdiction of the lower court x x x in its answers to both the amended complaint and the
second amended complaint. It did so only in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of
the lower court after it had received an adverse decision. As this Court held in Pantranco North
Express, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 105180, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 477, 491),
participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, that included invoking its authority
in asking for affirmative relief, effectively barred petitioner by estoppel from challenging the
court’s jurisdiction. Notably, from the time it filed its answer to the second amended complaint
on April 16, 1985, petitioner did not question the lower court’s jurisdiction. It was only on
December 29, 1989 when it filed its motion for reconsideration of the lower court’s decision
that petitioner raised the question of the lower court’s lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner thus
foreclosed its right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by its own inaction.” (italics ours)Similarly, in
the subsequent case of Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. vs. Cabrigas,15 we ruled:“In the
case at bar, it was found by the trial court in its 30 September 1996 decision in LCR Case No. Q-
60161(93) that private respondents (who filed the petition for reconstitution of titles) failed to
comply with both sections 12 and 13 of RA 26 and therefore, it had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case. However, private _______________ 13 Sesbreño vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 84096, January 26, 1995, 310 Phil. 671, 680; 240 SCRA 606, 612. 14 G.R. No.
107518, October 8, 1998, 297 SCRA 402. 15 G.R. No. 134895, June 19, 2001, 358 SCRA 715.
396 396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Soliven vs. Fastforms
Philippines, Inc. respondents never questioned the trial court’s jurisdiction over its petition for
reconstitution throughout the duration of LCR Case No. Q-60161(93). On the contrary, private
respondents actively participated in the reconstitution proceedings by filing pleadings and
presenting its evidence. They invoked the trial court’s jurisdiction in order to obtain affirmative
relief—the reconstitution of their titles. Private respondents have thus foreclosed their right to
raise the issue of jurisdiction by their own actions.“The Court has constantly upheld the
doctrine that while jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a litigant’s participation in all
stages of the case before the trial court, including the invocation of its authority in asking for
affirmative relief, bars such party from challenging the court’s jurisdiction (PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 402 [1998]) A party cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or
failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Asset Privatization
Trust vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 579 [1998]; Province of Bulacan vs. Court of Appeals, 299
SCRA 442 [1998]). The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party participating in
the proceedings and submitting his case for decision and then accepting judgment, only if
favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse (Producers Bank of the
Philippines vs. NLRC, 298 SCRA 517 [1998], citing Ilocos Sur Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs.
National Labor Relations Commission, 241 SCRA 36 [1995]).” (italics ours)WHEREFORE, the
instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated February 8, 1999 and Resolution
dated June 17, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51946 are REVERSED. The
Decision dated July 3, 1995 and Resolution dated October 11, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 60, Makati City in Civil Case No. 94-1788 are hereby AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.
Panganiban (Chairman) and Corona, JJ., concur. Carpio-Morales, J., On Leave.
397 VOL. 440, OCTOBER 18, 2004 397 Gonzaga vs. Court of Appeals Petition
granted, assailed decision and resolution reversed. Judgment and resolution of the trial court
affirmed.Note.—Active participation of a party in the proceedings is tantamount to an
invocation of the Court’s jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case,
and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or body’s jurisdiction. (Meat Packing
Corporation of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan, 359 SCRA 409 [2001])——o0o—— Soliven vs.
Fastforms Philippines, Inc., 440 SCRA 389, G.R. No. 139031 October 18, 2004
G.R. No. 144801. March 10, 2005.* DOMINADOR L. TARUC, WILBERTO DACERA, NICANOR
GALANIDA, RENERIO CANTA, JERRY CANTA, CORDENCIO CONSIGNA, SUSANO ALCALA,
LEONARDO DIZON, SALVADOR GELSANO and BENITO LAUGO, petitioners, vs. BISHOP PORFIRIO
B. DE LA CRUZ, REV. FR. RUSTOM FLORANO and DELFIN BORDAS, respondents.Remedial Law;
Actions; Jurisdictions; Religious Organizations; It is not for the courts to exercise control over
church authorities in the performance of their discretionary and official functions.—We agree
with the Court of Appeals that the expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious
institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and
canons, of said institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over church
authorities in the performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the
members of religious institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations. Same;
Same; Same; Same; In disputes involving religious institutions or organizations, there is one
area which the Court should not touch: doctrinal and disciplinary differences.—In the leading
case of Fonacier v. Court of Appeals, we enunciated the doctrine that in disputes involving
religious institutions or organizations, there is one area which the Court should not touch:
doctrinal and disciplinary differences. Thus, The amendments of the constitution, restatement
of articles of religion and abandonment of faith or abjuration alleged by appellant, having to do
with faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church
and having reference to the power of excluding from the church those allegedly unworthy of
membership, are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the
civil courts.PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals.The facts
are stated in the opinion of the Court. _______________ * THIRD DIVISION. 124 124
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Taruc vs. De la Cruz Saleto J. Erames for
petitioners. Nelson B. Panares, Dollfus R. Go and Eladio Ba. Anino II for respondents.CORONA,
J.:This is an appeal under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 45480 which reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Surigao City, Branch 32 in Civil Case No. 4907 and ordered said case dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction.The antecedents show that petitioners were lay members of the Philippine
Independent Church (PIC) in Socorro, Surigao del Norte. Respondents Porfirio De la Cruz and
Rustom Florano were the bishop and parish priest, respectively, of the same church in that
locality. Petitioners, led by Dominador Taruc, clamored for the transfer of Fr. Florano to
another parish but Bishop De la Cruz denied their request. It appears from the records that the
family of Fr. Florano’s wife belonged to a political party opposed to petitioner Taruc’s, thus the
animosity between the two factions with Fr. Florano being identified with his wife’s political
camp. Bishop De la Cruz, however, found this too flimsy a reason for transferring Fr. Florano to
another parish.Meanwhile, hostility among the members of the PIC in Socorro, Surigao del
Norte worsened when petitioner Taruc tried to organize an open mass to be celebrated by a
certain Fr. Renato Z. Ambong during the town fiesta of Socorro. When Taruc informed Bishop
De la Cruz of his plan, the Bishop tried to dissuade him from pushing through with it because Fr.
Ambong was not a member of the clergy of the diocese of Surigao and his credentials as a
parish priest were in doubt. The Bishop also appealed to petitioner Taruc to refrain from
committing acts inimical and prejudicial to the best interests of the PIC. He likewise advised
petitioners to
125 VOL. 453, MARCH 10, 2005 125 Taruc vs. De la Cruz air their complaints
before the higher authorities of PIC if they believed they had valid grievances against him, the
parish priest, the laws and canons of the PIC.Bishop De la Cruz, however, failed to stop Taruc
from carrying out his plans. On June 19, 1993, at around 3:00 p.m., Taruc and his sympathizers
proceeded to hold the open mass with Fr. Ambong as the celebrant.On June 28, 1993, Bishop
De la Cruz declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine Independent
Church for reasons of:(1) disobedience to duly constituted authority in the Church;(2) inciting
dissension, resulting in division in the Parish of Our Mother of Perpetual Help, Iglesia Filipina
Independiente, Socorro, Surigao del Norte when they celebrated an open Mass at the Plaza on
June 19, 1996; and(3) for threatening to forcibly occupy the Parish Church causing anxiety and
fear among the general membership.1Petitioners appealed to the Obispo Maximo and sought
reconsideration of the above decision. In his letter to Bishop De la Cruz, the Obispo Maximo
opined that Fr. Florano should step down voluntarily to avert the hostility and enmity among
the members of the PIC parish in Socorro but stated that:. . . I do not intervene in your diocesan
decision in asking Fr. Florano to vacate Socorro parish . . . .2In the meantime, Bishop De la Cruz
was reassigned to the diocese of Odmoczan and was replaced by Bishop Rhee M. Timbang. Like
his predecessor, Bishop Timbang did not find a valid reason for transferring Fr. Florano to
another parish. He issued a circular denying petitioners’ persistent clamor for the transfer/re-
assignment of Fr. Florano. Petitioners were _______________ 1 Rollo, p. 73. 2 Rollo, p. 129. 126
126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Taruc vs. De la Cruz informed of such denial but
they continued to celebrate mass and hold other religious activities through Fr. Ambong who
had been restrained from performing any priestly functions in the PIC parish of Socorro, Surigao
del Norte.Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a complaint for
damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop De la Cruz before the Regional Trial Court
of Surigao City, Branch 32. They impleaded Fr. Florano and one Delfin T. Bordas on the theory
that they conspired with the Bishop to have petitioners expelled and excommunicated from the
PIC. They contended that their expulsion was illegal because it was done without trial thus
violating their right to due process of law.Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the case before
the lower court on the ground of lack of jurisdiction but it was denied. Their motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied so they elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.The
appellate court reversed and set aside the decision of the court a quo and ordered the dismissal
of the case without prejudice to its being refiled before the proper forum. It held:. . . We find it
unnecessary to deal on the validity of the ex-communication/expulsion of the private
respondents (Taruc, et al.), said acts being purely ecclesiastical matters which this Court
considers to be outside the province of the civil courts.. . .“Civil Courts will not interfere in the
internal affairs of a religious organization except for the protection of civil or property rights.
Those rights may be the subject of litigation in a civil court, and the courts have jurisdiction to
determine controverted claims to the title, use, or possession of church property.” (Ibid., p.
466). . .Obviously, there was no violation of a civil right in the present case.. . .Ergo, this Court is
of the opinion and so holds that the instant case does not involve a violation and/or protection
of a civil or prop-
127 VOL. 453, MARCH 10, 2005 127 Taruc vs. De la Cruz erty rights in order
for the court a quo to acquire jurisdiction in the instant case.3Petitioners appealed from the
above decision but their petition was denied. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied, hence, this appeal.The only issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the courts
have jurisdiction to hear a case involving the expulsion/excommunication of members of a
religious institution.We rule that the courts do not.Section 5, Article III or the Bill of Rights of
the 1987 Constitution specifically provides that:Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights.In our jurisdiction, we hold the Church and the State to be separate and distinct from
each other. “Give to Ceasar what is Ceasar’s and to God what is God’s.” We have, however,
observed as early as 1928 that:upon the examination of the decisions it will be readily apparent
that cases involving questions relative to ecclesiastical rights have always received the
profoundest attention from the courts, not only because of their inherent interest, but because
of the far reaching effects of the decisions in human society. [However,] courts have learned
the lesson of conservatism in dealing with such matters, it having been found that, in a form of
government where the complete separation of civil and ecclesiastical authority is insisted upon,
the _______________ 3 Penned by Associate Justice Bennie A. Adefuin-de la Cruz and
concurred in by Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia (now Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court) and Renato C. Dacudao, Rollo, p. 82.
128 128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Taruc vs. De la Cruz civil
courts must not allow themselves to intrude unduly in matters of an ecclesiastical nature.4
(italics ours)We agree with the Court of Appeals that the expulsion/ex-communication of
members of a religious institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the
officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization. It is not for the courts to
exercise control over church authorities in the performance of their discretionary and official
functions. Rather, it is for the members of religious institutions/ organizations to conform to
just church regulations. In the words of Justice Samuel F. Miller:5. . . all who unite themselves
to an ecclesiastical body do so with an implied consent to submit to the Church government
and they are bound to submit to it.In the leading case of Fonacier v. Court of Appeals,6 we
enunciated the doctrine that in disputes involving religious institutions or organizations, there is
one area which the Court should not touch: doctrinal and disciplinary differences.7 Thus,The
amendments of the constitution, restatement of articles of religion and abandonment of faith
or abjuration alleged by appellant, having to do with faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship,
ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church and having reference to the power of excluding
from the church those allegedly unworthy of membership, are unquestionably ecclesiastical
matters which are outside the province of the civil courts. (emphasis ours)_______________ 4
Gonzales v. R. Archbishop, 51 Phil. 420, 434 (1928). 5 In Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 723; 20
Law ed., 666, quoted in Gonzales v. R. Archbishop, supra. 6 96 Phil. 417 (1955). 7 Bernas, J., The
1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 322.
129 VOL. 453, MARCH 10, 2005 129 Taruc vs. De la Cruz We would, however,
like to comment on petitioners’ claim that they were not heard before they were expelled from
their church. The records show that Bishop De la Cruz pleaded with petitioners several times
not to commit acts inimical to the best interests of PIC. They were also warned of the
consequences of their actions, among them their expulsion/excommunication from PIC. Yet,
these pleas and warnings fell on deaf ears and petitioners went ahead with their plans to defy
their Bishop and foment hostility and disunity among the members of PIC in Socorro, Surigao
del Norte. They should now take full responsibility for the chaos and dissension they
caused.WHEREFORE, the petition is herby DENIED for lack of merit.Costs against petitioners.SO
ORDERED. Panganiban (Chairman) and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur. Carpio-Morales, J.,
On Leave. Garcia, J., No Part.Petition denied.Note.—Interference of civil courts in internal
affairs of a religious organization, allowable for protection of civil or property rights. (Negros
District Conference, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 108 SCRA 458 [1981]) Taruc vs. De la Cruz, 453
SCRA 123, G.R. No. 144801 March 10, 2005
[No. 27619. February 4, 1928] RAUL ROGERIO GONZALEZ, by his guardian ad litem Adelaida
Gonzalez, plaintiff and appellee, vs. THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA,
defendant and appellant.ECCLESIASTICAL LAW; CHAPLAINCIES; VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE
PRESCRIBING ECCLESIASTICAL QUALIFICATIONS FOR CHAPLAIN.—The properly constituted
authorities of the Roman Catholic Apos-
421 VOL. 51, FEBRUARY 4, 1928 421 Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila tolic
Church have the power to adopt an ordinance prescribing ecclesiastical qualifications for
chaplains to be appointed to collative chaplaincies; and such ordinance will be effective as
regards an appointment to a benefice although at the time when the particular chaplaincy was
founded no ecclesiastical qualifications were prerequisite to the appointment.APPEAL from a
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Harvey, J.The facts are stated in the opinion
of the court.Feria & La O and Araneta & Zaragoza for appellant.Gibbs & McDonough for
appellee.STREET, J.:This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by Raul
Rogerio Gonzalez, through his guardian ad litem, Adelaida Gonzalez, against the Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila, a corporation sole, represented by His Grace, M. J. O'Doherty,
Apostolic Archbishop, for the purpose of obtaining a writ of mandamus requiring the
respondent to appoint the plaintiff to a vacant chaplaincy, to enforce an accounting for the
income of the chaplaincy for the period during which it- has been vacant, and to secure other
relief. Upon hearing the cause the trial court entered judgment which, as subsequently
amended, embraces three features, namely: First, ordering the defendant, the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila, as a corporation sole, and His Grace, Michael J. O'Doherty, Roman
Catholic Apostolic Archbishop of Manila, its sole representative, forthwith to appoint plaintiff,
Raul Rogerio Gonzalez, as chaplain of the said chaplaincy founded by Doña Petronila de
Guzman; secondly, ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff, through his guardian ad litem,
the sum of one hundred seventy-three thousand, seven hundred and twenty-five pesos
(P173,725) as the rents and income of the property of said chaplaincy from January 1, 1911, to
December 31, 1925, plus the rents and income accrued since December 31, 1925, from the
total of
422 422 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila
which should be deducted the expenses allowed by the court as legitimate charges against the
fund, and requiring the defendant, furthermore, to pay to the plaintiff, through his guardian or
guardian ad litem, from the date of plaintiff's appointment as chaplain, the net income of said
property from time to time as collected; thirdly, reserving to plaintiff any legal rights that he
may have with reference to the cancellation of the transfer certificate of title No. 17603 in a
proper proceeding before the fourth branch of this court, which branch has exclusive
jurisdiction of all cases relative to the registration of real estate in the City of Manila (Act No.
2347, sec. 11). From this judgment the defendant appealed.On March 13, 1816, Doña Petronila
de Guzman, a resident of what is now the district of Binondo, in the City of Manila, executed a
will in which she instructed her executor to take the steps necessary to the foundation of a
collative chaplaincy upon certain real property adjacent to her residence in Binondo. The part
of the will pertinent to the foundation is found in three paragraphs of the will which read as
follows:"Ninth Item: I declare and dispose that the new house situated in this said town and
bounded by this house of my residence toward the right of its exit, which between myself and
my deceased sister Da. Vicenta de Guzman we have constructed with our own money, at a cost
of one thousand six hundred pesos without including the value of the lot on which it is erected,
and I charge my executor to constitute said house into a collative chaplaincy, the foundation of
which they shall effect immediately after my death, choosing for chaplain D. Esteban de
Guzman, legitimate son of my grandson Dn. Jose Telesforo de Guzman, and in his default, the
nearest relative, and in default of the latter, a collegian of San Juan de Letran, who should be an
orphan mestizo, native of this said town, and I request the father chaplain to celebrate sixty
masses annually, which should be said in the churches of the City of Manila
423 VOL. 51, FEBRUARY 4, 1928 423 Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila or in
those outside of its walls, and in privileged altars, in behalf of the souls of my f ather, Dn. Tomas
de Guzman, and of my mother, Dña, Sebastiana de Jesus, and of my brothers and sisters, and
for me, the testatrix, after my days."Tenth Item: It is my will that for patron of said chaplaincy
my executors name the Father President of the College of San Juan de Letran."Eleventh Item: I
appoint my first executor as administrator of the chaplaincy which shall be founded on the
house referred to, during the minority of said chaplain."The property thus intended as the
foundation of the chaplaincy consists of the lots now known as Nos. 210-212 and 214, Rosario
Street, Manila, with the improvements thereon.After the death of the testatrix her executor,
Don Jose Telesforo de Guzman, on April 24, 1820, addressed a petition to the Archbishop,
informing him of the wishes of the testatrix and praying that the property be declared sufficient
and that the chaplaincy be created, with. the petitioner's son as chaplain and the petitioner
himself as administrator of the property during the minority of the son. This petition, addressed
by the executor to the Archbishop, in the part material to be here considered, reads as
follows:"Most Illustrious and Most Reverend Sir—Don Jose Telesforo de Guzman resident of the
town of Binondo with all due respect, before Your Illustrious Grace in the best legal form, I
present myself and say,—That the annexed testimony which with due solemnity I enclose
shows that my deceased great grandmother Da. Petronila de Guzman provided in her last will
the institution of a collative chaplaincy for one son of mine named Esteban Sixto de Guzman,
student of the Royal College of San Juan de Letran, for the patronage of which the Most
Reverend Father President of said college has been named, with a house of lime and stone
situated at Calle Rosario as capital, which,
424 424 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of
Manila, according to the certificate hereto attached, nets a rent of one hundred eighty pesos
annually, it being located on the Calle Real del Rosario; and I, being her testamentary executor
and appointed administrator of my above-mentioned son, present myself before Your Most
Illustrious Grace, praying that you declare the living sufficient and order that a title to said
chaplaincy issue to my said son and to me the administrator during his minority."In support of
this petition the executor of the will of the foundress executed, on April 26, 1820, a formal
document of endowment, setting aside for pious uses the property intended for the foundation
and transferring it to the spiritual properties of the archbishopric. This document, omitting
formal parts at the end, reads as follows:"In the City of Manila on the 26th day of April one
thousand eight hundred and twenty, before me the Clerk of Court and the undersigned
witnesses, (appeared) D. Jose Telesf oro, resident of the town of Binondo, and testamentary
executor of the deceased Da. Petronila de Guzman, as shown by the certificate which was
shown me and which appears to have been sealed and signed by the Public Clerk Dn. Francisco
Castro de Reyes, to me known, and said—"That whereas the said Petronila de Guzman,
deceased, has ordered in the ninth clause of her will that after her death a house of lime and
stone belonging to her be constituted into a chaplaincy, which house had been constructed by
her and her deceased sister Doña Vicenta de Guzman who died single, at a cost of one
thousand six hundred pesos without including the value of the lot whereon said house is
erected, in said town of Binondo, being bounded towards the right of its exit by the house in
which the said testatrix formerly lived, which was her own; and to accomplish the foundation of
said chaplaincy in accordance with law, the said executor appeared before the most Illustrious
and Most Reverend Metropolitan Archbishop, stating that (the chaplaincy) was subject to the
charge that the incumbent was required to say sixty masses an-
425 VOL. 51, FEBRUARY 4, 1928 425 Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila
nually, either in the churches of this City or in those without its walls, and in privileged altars,
for the benefit of the souls of her deceased parents, Don Tomas de Guzman and Doña
Sebastiana de Jesus, of the testatrix and of her brothers and sisters, electing as chaplain her
great grandson Don Esteban de Guzman, a student of the Royal College of San Juan de Letran,
and as administrator during the minority of the said chaplain, the executor himself, upon whom
she has conferred power to appoint as Patron of the chaplaincy the Father President of the said
Royal College of San Juan de Letran, asking that the said living (congrua), the rents of the
property of which amount at present to P180 per year, be declared sufficient, issuing the
corresponding title of chaplain to his said son (i. e., of the executor) ; and as a consequence
whereof he (i. e., the executor) segregates said property from temporal properties and
transfers it to the spiritual properties of this Archbishopric, with the restriction that, as a
spiritual property, it cannot be alienated or converted into any other estate for any cause, even
though of a more pious character, (the grantor) protesting that if the contrary should be done
from now until then, he declares null and without value or effect whatever may be done or
executed contrary to the tenor of these presents, and the said executor affirms and ratifies said
conditions before me and the witnesses hereinbelow named, so that by virtue of this Deed of
Foundation canonical collation may be conferred on the said appointed chaplain. And f or its
stability and greater validity he renounces with all solemnity the laws that may favor the said
decedent, inserting and repeating herein all the clauses that may be necessary with all the
requisites and conditions, so that the purpose which actuated her to do this act of piety may be
duly accomplished, with the solemnities above set forth and the conditions herein inserted,
which he asks and charges the above named chaplain and those who will succeed him to
respect, comply and execute ad perpetuam rei memoriam amen."
426 426 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila
The two documents from which we have just quoted appear to have been passed to the
procurator fiscal for comment; and this official made indorsement to the effect that no reason
occurred to him for opposing the project and that he accordingly recommended that the
establishment be effected. The matter was then brought to the attention of the Archbishop
who gave the necessary formal approval to the foundation and an appropriate decree to this
effect was entered. According to the note of this decree, His Grace declared that "concurring
entirely with what had been expressed by the promotor fiscal, he was approving and approved
the foundation of said chaplaincy, with all the circumstances and conditions specified in said
clause (of the will) and the deed of foundation, as also the charge of P1,700 upon said house,
erecting said sum into spiritual property and making it, as he makes it, by perpetual title, to be
of the ecclesiastical forum and jurisdiction." Since the foundation of this chaplaincy, five
chaplains have been appointed thereto by the Archbishop of Manila. The first and second
chaplains were great grandsons of the foundress, the third was a great great grandson, and the
fourth and fifth great great great grandsons. At the time of their appointments they were
respectively more than 13, 21, 22, 27 and 19 years old.The fifth and last chaplain or beneficiary
of the chaplaincy in question was Angel Gonzalez, father of the present plaintiff. This individual
resigned the office of chaplain, effective December 6, 1910, since which date the chaplaincy has
remained vacant. Though not of decisive importance in the case, the document by which Angel
Gonzalez was appointed to the chaplaincy on August 21, 1901, is perhaps instructive as
indicating the nature of the rights appurtenant to the office. Omitting the formal conclusion,
this document reads as follows:"Whereas, the Chaplaincy founded by Da. Petronila de Guzman,
the capital of which consists of a building of brick and mortar erected on its own lot located on
the Calle de
427 VOL. 51, FEBRUARY 4, 1928 427 Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila
Rosario, District of Binondo, is now vacant because of the renunciation by its last possessor D.
Fernando Maniquis y Guzman; now, therefore, the necessary requisites and qualifications
according to law being found concurring in D. Angel Gonzalez y Guzman, tonsured, a boarding
student in the College of San Juan de Letran of this City, we order to issue and do issue this
present title by virtue of which we elect and appoint the above-named D. Angel Gonzalez y
Guzman, as chaplain of the benefice above referred to, and by the manner and form which we
best can do, we hereby give him collation, canonical institution and real possession vel quasi of
the above-mentioned chaplaincy, which shall be administered as heretofore by the
administrator of the funds of this Holy Archbishopric, so that, as such chaplain he may possess
and enjoy it as an ecclesiastical benefice and by perpetual title with the obligation of ordering
to be said, by means of a priest, while he himself cannot say them, sixty masses annually
according to the will of the foundress, and with the understanding that every year he has to
show to our Court of Chaplaincies wherein this shall be recorded, that he has discharged said
masses, without which requisite the rent which for the purpose may be necessary shall be
withheld f rom him. And by virtue of Holy Obedience we order those to whom these presents
may concern to have and treat the said D. Angel Gonzalez y Guzman as the beneficiary and
possessor of said chaplaincy, and that they pay him well and faithfully the income which in the
future the capital may produce and that which it has produced while vacant, placing upon his
conscience the duty of complying with the annexed conditions and relieving us thereof."The
function of administering the property pertaining to the foundation appears to have been
exercised, at least since about 1863, by the Archbishop; and for this service a commission has
been charged against the incumbent whenever a chaplain has been in office. In September,
1914, a Torrens title in fee simple was issued for the prop-
428 428 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila
erty in the name of the Archbishop. During vacancies the duty of causing sixty masses to be said
per annum, as provided in the will, devolves upon the Archbishop; and this obligation has been
performed by the present respondent, at an expense of not more than P300 per year.The trial
judge found that, from January 1, 1911, to December 31, 1925, the administrator had obtained,
in the way of rents of the property, a total of P153,600. In addition to this there was collected,
in the year 1912, the sum of P20,125, as insurance, upon occasion of the destruction by fire of
the house belonging to the chaplaincy. The expenses of rebuilding and repairs, over the same
period, is stated to have been P24,503.34, All of the income thus received, less the expenses of
administration and cost of the masses, has been applied to the purposes of education,
beneficence, and charity, under the directions of the Archbishop, with the approval of His
Holiness, the Pope.Since the Council of Trent it has been the law of the Roman Catholic
Apostolic Church that no person who has received the first tonsure or who has already been
ordained in minority is eligible to a benefice before his 14th year (Council of Trent, Chap. 6, sec.
23, July, 1563), that is to say, he must be at least 13 years and 1 day old. With this exception
there seems to have been no ecclesiastical law or ordinance of the Church in force at the time
the chaplaincy in question was founded, prescribing ecclesiastical qualifications for incumbents
of the office of chaplain. However, in the year 1918 a new canon law was promulgated by the
Catholic Church to the effect that "the chaplaincies, or simple benefices, are conferred on
clericals of the secular clergy;" and in order to be a clerical, one must have received the first
tonsure. Also in order to take the first tonsure, one must have begun the study of theology, and
in order to study theology, one must be a bachelor.Raul Rogerio Gonzalez, the plaintiff in this
action, was born on September 16, 1912. He was therefore nearly 12
429 VOL. 51, FEBRUARY 4, 1928 429 Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila years
of age when this action was instituted on July 31, 1924. He is a son of Angel Gonzalez, the last
incumbent of the chaplaincy in question. At the trial the young man testified that he was then a
student in the sixth grade of the public school and that his inclinations and desires are towards
an ecclesiastical career. More than two years prior to the institution of this action he was
presented to the Archbishop of Manila, with the request that he be appointed to the chaplaincy
in question, he being at that time 10 years of age. The application was turned down by the
Archbishop in a letter, addressed to the boy's father, and dated March 20, 1922, on the ground
that the youth did not have the necessary qualifications under existing canon law. His Grace,
the Archbishop of Manila, testified that although he could not appoint plaintiff as chaplain of
the chaplaincy in question, he had made an offer at his expense to educate the plaintiff so that
he might obtain the necessary preparations to qualify himself as a cleric and might later be
appointed as chaplain. He added, however, that although he did not consider himself in duty
bound to make such an offer, the same was made for equitable motives in view of the claim of
the child as the nearest relative of the foundress of the said chaplaincy.In the deed of
foundation of April 26, 1820, the Presiding Father of the Royal College of San Juan de Letran is
designated as patron of the chaplaincy; and before this action was instituted, Father Calixto
Prieto, then rector of San Juan de Letran College, addressed a letter to the Archbishop,
presenting the plaintiff as candidate for the chaplaincy. Father Prieto stated that, prior to
presenting the plaintiff for the chaplaincy, he satisfied himself that the applicant was the heir to
the chaplaincy, but did not take account of his moral or intellectual qualifications, leaving these
matters to be passed upon by his superior. The application of the plaintiff was also indorsed by
other priests of the church.
430 430 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila
We now pass to the consideration of the nature of the chaplaincy, or office of chaplain, as
understood in Spanish and ecclesiastical law. In the first place, it is to be noted that the collative
chaplaincy is a f orm of ecclesiastical benefice, in which the incumbent is appointed and
canonically installed by the Bishop, or Archbishop, and given a living, constituting a charge upon
specified property, subject to the duty of saying masses and performing other pious or religious
duties. The collative chaplaincy is said to be a simple benefice. In the second place, the term
"collative chaplaincy" is used in contradistinction to "lay chaplaincy"; and the difference is that
the collative chaplaincy can be constituted only upon the intervention of ecclesiastical
authority, while the lay chaplaincy does not require such intervention.In the case before us it is
undeniable, and admitted, that the chaplaincy in question is of the sort known as the collative
chaplaincy. The documents of foundation expressly provide that this chaplaincy shall be of a
collative character; and to this end the property which was to serve as the foundation of the
chaplaincy was segregated by the executor of Doña Petronila de Guzman from other property
pertaining to her estate and transferred to the Church, with the effect of its being converted
into spiritual property for the pious use intended. Furthermore, in accepting the transfer, the
Archbishop declared that said property was raised to the status of spiritual property and that it
thereby passed to the ecclesiastical forum and jurisdiction. Speaking broadly, the substantial
effect of the conveyance of the property to the Church and the acceptance of the transfer by
the Archbishop in the manner above stated was that the legal title of the property became
vested in the Archbishop, subject to the ecclesiastical charge intended in the creation of the
chaplaincy.The trial judge found that the plaintiff is next kin (pariente más cercano) to the
foundress of the chaplaincy, in the sense intended in the Ninth Item of the will, and,
 431 VOL. 51, FEBRUARY 4, 1928 431 Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila
therefore, that he is qualified for the chaplaincy in point of relationship. Exception is taken to
this finding by the appellant, who maintains that there is no evidence in the record to support
it. We are of the opinion, however, that the proof on this point is sufficient, and we shall
assume in what is to follow that the necessary relationship on the part of the plaintiff to the
foundress exists.As has been already stated, this action was instituted shortly before the
plaintiff had reached the age of 12 years; and upon this fact the appellant plants the
proposition that the plaintiff is not qualified for the chaplaincy on point of his age. The appellee
has attempted to meet this criticism by the filing of an amended complaint on April 5, 1926,
when the plaintiff was in his 15th year. We shall therefore assume, for the purposes of this
decision, that the immaturity of the plaintiff in point of age is not a fatal obstacle to the
maintenance of the action; and at any rate in the view we take of the case this question may be
ignored.Upon turning our attention more directly to the legal aspects of the controversy, we
discover that the case of the plaintiff proceeds upon a train of reasoning which may be
expressed as follows, namely, that the Archbishop, as representative of the Church, is the
holder of the empty legal title to the property on which the chaplaincy is founded; that the
beneficial interest thereto is vested exclusively in the heirs of the foundress; that the plaintiff,
as her next of kin, has an unqualified right to be appointed to the chaplaincy, without regard to
his lack of ecclesiastical qualifications; that the plaintiff, having title to the chaplaincy, is entitled
to demand of the defendant the entire net income received by the latter as administrator of
the property during the pending vacancy, as well as the right to be paid the income that may
hereafter be produced by the property so long as the plaintiff shall occupy the post of chaplain.
In a word, it is the contention of the plaintiff that the foundation in question is a
432 432 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila
perfected trust, enforcible in a court of equity, that the Archbishop is a mere trustee, and that
the plaintiff is the present rightful beneficiary of the entire property.On the other hand, the
attorneys for the Archbishop challenge practically every phase of the plaintiffs presentation of
the case; and in this connection various propositions are submitted by them, which may
perhaps be fairly condensed as follows: That the transfer made by the executor of the
foundress of the property with which we are here concerned had the effect of conveying it to
the Archbishop, as representative of the Church, in whom, upon his acceptance of the same,
the entire property became vested, for the purpose of maintaining the chaplaincy in question,
and subject to all the circumstances and conditions specified in the documents; that the
collative chaplaincy thus constituted is an ecclesiastical benefice, the right of appointment to
which is vested exclusively in the Archbishop; that the Church, by lawful ordinance, effective in
1918, has required that, in order to be eligible to the office of chaplain, the candidate must
possess ecclesiastical qualifications, of the sufficiency of which the Archbishop is constituted
judge; that the plaintiff in this action does not possess the qualifications f or chaplain which
have thus been prescribed, and the Archbishop has so found and declared; that, by the laws of
the Church, the plaintiff, if aggrieved by the decision of the Archbishop, has a right of appeal to
His Holiness, the Pope, of which right the plaintiff has not availed himself; that, as the owner of
the property which is the subject of this foundation, the Archbishop has the free disposition, for
charitable, educational, and religious purposes, of the income derived from the property during
a vacancy in the office of chaplain, subject only to the obligation of causing masses to be said as
required in the documents of foundation; that the incumbent of the office of chaplain is
entitled, from the bounty of the Archbishop, to receive the income derived from the property
during his incumbency in the office to
433 VOL. 51, FEBRUARY 4, 1928 433 Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila the
extent necessary to secure a suitable living only, and that, as to the residue, it is the duty of the
chaplain to apply it to charitable and religious purposes; that the subject matter of this suit is
not a proper matter of cognizance in any civil court; and, finally, that the court of origin was
without jurisdiction to compel the Archbishop to perform a canonical function, to wit, to
appoint the plaintiff to an ecclesiastical office.While the field of controversy thus laid out is
extensive, it will be found, upon a careful survey of the ground, that the decision must in the
end turn upon one or two vital points, which are concerned with the right of the plaintiff to the
chaplaincy and the right of the court to compel the Archbishop to appoint the plaintiff to said
office.At the outset of the discussion we may state that we see no reason to question the
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action. The complaint alleges that the
plaintiff is beneficiary of a trust, and that the defendant, as trustee, has refused to recognize
the plaintiff's right to the office of chaplain and is diverting the income of the foundation to
unlawful uses. As was observed by Mr. Justice Miller, of the Supreme Court of the United
States, in the leading case of Watson vs. Jones (13 Wallace, 679, 723; 20 Law. ed., 666), it seems
hardly to admit of rational doubt that an individual may dedicate property by way of trust to
the purpose of sustaining religious doctrines, provided that in so doing he violates no law of
morality and gives to the instrument by which his purpose is to be accomplished the formalities
which the law requires. It also seems to be the obvious duty of the court, in a case properly
made, to see that the property so dedicated is not diverted from the trust which is thus
attached to its use; and so long as there is any one so interested in the execution of the trust as
to have a standing in court, it must be that he can prevent the diversion of the property or fund
to other and different uses. This is the general doctrine of courts of equity as to charities, 434
434 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila and it seems equally
applicable to ecclesiastical matters (23 R. C. L., p. 451). But while it may be, and is, the duty of
the court to inquire into a case of the character stated in this complaint, the rule to be applied
in determining the right to relief is to be sought in the principles governing the courts in dealing
with rights derived from ecclesiastical sources.The rule that appears to offer most assistance in
the solution of the case before us is that formulated by the Court of Appeals of South Carolina
in the case of Harmon vs. Dreher (Speers Eq., 87), to the effect that: Where a civil right depends
upon some matter pertaining to ecclesiastical affairs, the civil tribunal tries the civil right and
nothing more, taking the ecclesiastical decisions out of which the civil right has arisen as it finds
them, and accepting those decisions as matters adjudicated by another jurisdiction. The
proposition thus stated in Harmon vs. Dreher has subsequently been considered from different
points of view by many able courts, and it has uniformly been looked upon as a sound and
correct statement of the law in cases where it is of proper application. Among decisions in
which said rule has been quoted with approval are Watson vs. Jones (13 Wall., 679; 20' Law.
ed., 666) ; Lamb vs. Cain (129 Ind., 486; 14 L. R. A., 518; 29 N. E., 13); and White Lick Quarterly
Meeting of Friends vs. White Lick Quarterly Meeting of Friends (89 Ind., 136).Upon examination
of the decisions it will be readily apparent that cases involving questions relative to
ecclesiastical rights have always received the profoundest attention from ,the courts, not only
because of their inherent interest, but because of the far reaching effects of the decisions in
human society. Moreover, courts have learned the lesson of conservatism in dealing with such
matters, it having been found that, in a form of government where the complete separation of
civil and ecclesiastical authority is insisted upon, the civil courts must not allow themselves to
intrude unduly in matters of an ecclesiastical nature.
435 VOL. 51, FEBRUARY 4, 1928 435 Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila It will
be noted that the first and principal relief sought by the plaintiff in the case before us is to
obtain from the court an order, in the form of writ of mandamus or injunction, requiring the
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila to appoint the plaintiff to an ecclesiastical office, for that
the office of chaplain is of an ecclesiastical nature is undeniable. It is a sinister omen for the
plaintiff's case that no decision of any civil court whatever can be pointed to as a precedent for
such an exercise of judicial power, and the mere novelty of the proposition is an argument
against the soundness of the plaintiff's case. It is true that there are decisions from the
Supreme Court of Spain wherein the right to the possession of properties constituting the
foundation of chaplaincies has been debated, and numerous cases are found in modern
Spanish jurisprudence where actions have been maintained by heirs of the founders to recover
property constituting the foundation of chaplaincies; but such actions had their basis in the
Spanish legislation abolishing chaplaincies. But so far as our investigations go, and as far as the
industry of counsel has revealed, no case has been discovered where Bishop or Archbishop has
been compelled to appoint any person to the office of chaplain or other ecclesiastical benefice.
It is also true that there are, a few English and American decisions in which the rights of rectors,
or ministers, after the title to the ecclesiastical office had once been acquired, have been
sustained in the courts in the face of attempts to deprive them of their office. But so far as the
American courts are concerned, these cases proceed exclusively on the idea of supplying
redress for breach of contract; and neither American nor English jurisprudence supplies any
precedent for compelling the ecclesiastical authorities to appoint a person to an ecclesiastical
office.In dealing with the subject of the conclusiveness of the decisions of church authorities in
ecclesiastical matters the author of the monographic article on "Religious Societies,"
436 436 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila
in Ruling Case Law, has this to say: "* * * The judgment of the constituted church tribunal is
absolutely conclusive upon the civil courts, whether, in the opinion of the judges of such courts,
the decision appears to be right or wrong. Where a right of property turns upon such a
decision, the civil courts will allow the property to go in that direction in which the decision of
the church tribunal carries it. According to the rule broadly stated by some courts, when a civil
right depends upon some matter pertaining to ecclesiastical affairs, the civil tribunal tries the
right and nothing more., taking the ecclesiastical decisions out of which the civil right has arisen
as it finds them, and accepts such decisions as matters adjudicated by another legally
constituted jurisdiction."In conformity with the ideas above set forth, it is insisted, for the
appellant, that it was erroneous on the part of the trial court to order the defendant to perform
the canonical act of appointing the plaintiff chaplain of the chaplaincy in question, and
furthermore that the trial court erred in not accepting as conclusive the decision of the
Archbishop in regard to the question whether or not the plaintiff is ecclesiastically qualified to
be appointed chaplain. The authorities, we think, strongly indicate that there is merit in this
contention. But in our opinion there is another proposition, still more clear, upon which the
decision can be saf ely rested, and this is, that as a matter of fact the plaintiff does not possess
the qualifications necessary f or appointment to the office of chaplain and consequently that
the Archbishop was justified in refusing to appoint the plaintiff to that office. We shall therefore
provisionally assume that it is proper for the court to inquire into these qualifications and state
our conclusion with respect thereto.Under the law of the Church as it stood when this
chaplaincy was created, no ecclesiastical qualifications were required in a candidate for
appointment to the office of chaplain; but as we have already stated, a new canon became
effective in the Church in 1918 to the effect that, in order
437 VOL. 51, FEBRUARY 4, 1928 437 Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila to be
appointed chaplain, the candidate must be a clerical, and that in order to be a clerical, one must
have taken the first tonsure, as a prerequisite to which he must also be a bachelor who has
begun the study of theology. It is admitted that the plaintiff in this case does not possess these
qualifications, and it is abvious that if the new canon is to be applied to the chaplaincy in
question, the action of the Archbishop in refusing to appoint the plaintiff was correct and this
court must recognize the validity of his exclusion from the chaplaincy.That the new canon is
valid and applicable to candidates for chaplaincies already created is, in our opinion, obvious,
since it is general in terms and evidently intended to be applicable to all chaplains appointed in
the future. There is no reason discernible why the court should read into it an exception in
favor of candidates to chaplaincies already created. But it is said that, if interpreted in this
sense, the ordinance will be retroactive. This is in our opinion a mistake. If the Church had
attempted to make the ordinance applicable to chaplains already appointed, thereby depriving
them of an office as to which title had been previously acquired, the effect would be to make
the statute truly retroactive. But such is not the case now before us.When the foundress
caused this property to be originally conveyed to the Church as a foundation for the chaplaincy
in question, no restriction was imposed with respect to the requirement of ecclesiastical
qualifications for the chaplains to be appointed to the benefice; and in submitting the
appointment of the chaplains to the ecclesiastical authority, as resulted from the creation of a
collative chaplaincy, it must be considered as an implied term of the agreement that the
ecclesiastical qualifications for the spiritual office should be such as might be required by the
Church. As was said by Mr. Justice Miller in Watson vs. Jones (13 Wall., 679, 729), all who unite
themselves to an ecclesiastical body do so with an implied consent to
438 438 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila
submit to the Church government and they are bound to submit to it.The trial court appears to
have been of the opinion that the new canon of 1918 cannot be given effect as regards the
chaplaincy in question for the reason that to do so would impair the obligation of the trust
involved in the acceptance by the Archbishop of the provisions for the establishment of the
chaplaincy, with the result of impairing the obligation of a contract in violation of our Organic
Act. This idea is in our opinion fallacious. It is undeniable that under Spanish law an
acclesiastical canon such as we are now considering could have been adopted regardless of its
effect upon the foundation or the persons interested therein, and it cannot be admitted that an
obligation which could be changed under Spanish law has become immutable f rom the
promulgation by Congress of the constitutional provision forbidding the impairment of
contracts by legislative Acts. Under said constitutional provision obligations are to be respected
as they stand, and it was not intended that, by 'virtue of this provision, obligations should be
made more onerous to either party. If the proposition maintained by the plaintiff's attorneys be
true, then we are confronted with the spectacle of a chaplaincy which is a perpetual sinecure
for a chaplain without ecclesiastical qualifications. Perpetuities of any sort are objectionable,
but one of this character would be intolerable. As is justly said by the attorney for the
appellant, "It is unthinkable that qualifications for chaplains should remain stagnant and the
same forever." In passing upon a question of this character the court is not at liberty to ignore
the effects upon human society which would result from adopting the proposition upon which
the case for the plaintiff here rests.It follows from what has been said that the plaintiff has not
the requisite qualifications for the office of chaplain and the defendant, the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila, acted within the limits of his proper ecclesiastical
439 VOL. 51, FEBRUARY 4, 1928 439 Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila
authority in excluding the plaintiff from the chaplaincy in question. The trial court was
therefore in error in ordering the said defendant to appoint the plaintiff as chaplain of the
chaplaincy founded by Doña Petronila de Guzman. As corollary of this, there was also error on
the part of the trial court in ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff, through his guardian
ad litem, the amount awarded in paragraph (b) of the dispositive part of the appealed
decision.The appellant's brief contains an elaborate discussion of the rights of the respective
parties to the income of the property during the vacancy in the office of chaplain, and of the
extent of the rights of the plaintiff during the time that he might occupy the chaplaincy,—all on
the supposition that the right of the plaintiff to the office might be upheld by this court. But in
view of the fact that we are now to reverse the judgment in its principal features, with the
result that the plaintiff will not .be appointed chaplain, all discussion of his rights to the income,
based on the supposition of his appointment to the chaplaincy, becomes in a measure
academic. We shall therefore not enter into any discussion of this phase of the case, and shall
content ourselves by observing that if those who are interested in conserving the income
derived from the chaplaincy and in holding the defendant responsible for alleged improper
diversion of funds should see fit to proceed judicially in an independent proceeding, the action
should be brought as a class-suit in behalf of all the descendants of Doña Petronila de Guzman,
since under the present decision the minor plaintiff in this action has no particular title to
relief.In paragraph (c) of the dispositive part of the appealed decision the trial court reserved to
the plaintiff any legal rights that he may have with reference to the cancellation of transfer
certificate of title No. 17603, in a proper proceeding before the fourth branch of the Court of
First Instance of Manila. The plaintiff did not appeal from this
440 440 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila
disposition, and the appellant has not assigned error against said feature of the decision. We
shall therefore not interfere with the decision on this point, but we should perhaps observe
that if relief should be sought in the direction indicated the contention will probably in the end
resolve itself into the question whether. the Torrens certificate of title now held by the def
endant should be annotated so as to show that the property covered by the certificate is held
by the defendant subject to the conditions stated in the documents constituting the chaplaincy
in question; and of course such proceeding ought also to be brought as a class-suit.The
judgment appealed from is therefore reversed and the defendant, the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila, is hereby absolved from the complaint, without prejudice to the right of
proper persons in interest to proceed for independent relief in either of the directions above
indicated. So ordered, without express pronouncement as to costs..Villamor, Ostrand, and Villa-
Real, JJ., concur.MALCOLM, J., concurring:This is a most unusual case without a parallel in
American or Spanish jurisprudence. Involving as it does the relations which should exist
between the State and the Church, and the status of the Church with reference to the Judiciary,
the court should enter upon consideration of the questions involved reluctantly and cautiously.
This separate opinion is intended to expound the mental processes which have passed through
the writer's mind in arriving at a definite decision.The most logical method of approach is to
write down those statements of fact and those propositions of law regarding which there can
reasonably be no controversy. Then with these admitted facts and law as the basis, the issue
will readily disclose itself, and can be decided.There can be no dispute on any material fact. The
will of Doña Petronila de Guzman executed on March 13, 1816, the document of endowment
formulated by her executor
441 VOL. 51, FEBRUARY 4, 1928 441 Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila in
1820, and the acceptance of the endowment by the Archbishop of Manila, established what is
known in canon law as a collative chaplaincy. The great grandson of the testatrix was
specifically named as the first chaplain. Thereafter, it has been assumed that the chaplaincy
was to be occupied by the nearest relative in succession of the first chaplain, and in default of
the latter, a collegian of San Juan de Letran, who should be an orphan mestizo, native of
Manila. Chaplains have presented themselves for the office, and have been approved by the
church authorities without much trouble until the resignation of the last chaplain on December
6, 1910. Since that date, the chaplaincy has remained vacant. It is the purpose of this action of
mandamus to require the Apostolic Archbishop to appoint Raul Rogerio Gonzalez, the son of
the last chaplain, as chaplain, and to obtain an accounting of the income of the chaplaincy from
1910 until the present.It is well to repeat that the trust was provided for spiritual purposes. A
collative chaplaincy was erected. A chaplaincy, it has been said, "is an institution which has the
obligation to celebrate or cause to be celebrated annually a certain number of masses in a
determined church or altar, conforming to the will of the founder. A chaplaincy is either laical
or collative. * * * A collative chaplaincy is that instituted with the intervention of the
ecclesiastical authority, and requires a title of ordination. It is called ecclesiastical because it is
in the form of ecclesiastical benefice, and it is proper for the Bishop to confer it." (2 Alcubilla,
Diccionario de la Administración, p. 118 II Gutierrez, Códigos o Estudios Fundamentales sobre el
Derecho Civil Español, pp. 341-344.) The will of the founder of the collative chaplaincy entailed
the obligation on the part of "the father chaplain to celebrate sixty masses annually." The
document of endowment contemplated that "the incumbent was required to say sixty masses
annually." It transferred the parcel of land and building now 210, 212, and 214 Calle Rosario,
Binondo, Manila, to
442 442 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila
"the spiritual properties of the Archbishopric." The trust was accepted by the Archbishop "as
spiritual property * * * making it * * * to be of the ecclesiastic forum and jurisdiction." The
Supreme Court of Spain has held that properties aggregated to a chaplaincy with the approval
of the competent ecclesiastical authority become spiritualized, and form an integral part of its
endowment (Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo, June 1, 1863; 8 Jurisprudencia Civil, p.
364).When the endowment was created, there existed a unity of Church and State in the
Philippines. The change to American sovereignty caused the complete separation of Church and
State. All special privileges of the Roman Catholic Church were abolished. But the property of
the Church was protected since in the Treaty of Paris it was declared that the relinquishment or
cession of the Philippine Islands "cannot in any respect impair the property or rights which by
law belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds of * * * ecclesiastical or civil
bodies."With the Church and State standing apart in the Philippines, the jurisdiction of the civil
courts naturally does not extend to certain matters connected with the Church, but does
extend to certain other matters which can be taken under their purview. It is well settled that
the civil courts will take cognizance of cases involving property rights, and in so doing will
enforce the canons of a church. (Evangelista vs. Ver [1907], 8 Phil., 653.) It is the duty of the
courts to see that the property dedicated to a church is not diverted from the trust. (Watson vs.
Jones [1871], 13 Wall., 679.)The Catholic Church has obtained a fee simple Torrens title to the
property, the source of income of the chaplaincy. It has also been using the revenue of the
chaplaincy for educational purposes. Neither is permissible pursuant to the trust agreement.
Nor can the Church keep the chaplaincy vacant indefinitely and in the meantime appro-
443 VOL. 51, FEBRUARY 4, 1928 443 Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila priate
the rental of the property of the chaplaincy. To do any of these things would be to violate the
will of the foundress, for the foundation prohibited the alienation or conversion of the property
"into any other estate for any cause, even though it be of a more pious character," which would
make the foundation null and without value or effect. (See in this. connection Government of
the Philippine Islands vs. Avila [1918], 38 Phil., 383.)Up to this point, therefore, we find the
following to be the situation: A trust founded for spiritual purposes; chaplains named in
conformity with the foundation up to the year 1910; the will of the testatrix the supreme law
which must govern; the Church without right to obtain title in its own name to the property or
to divert the income from the purposes intended by the testatrix; and the courts with
jurisdiction to enforce property rights. Under this admitted state of affairs, the plaintiff would
have a clear right to ask the courts to assist him in getting into the chaplaincy and in securing
the income of the chaplaincy for himself. But further facts, which. will immediately be
mentioned, alter the situation, and at once disclose the troublesome crux of the case.When the
trust was established, aside from the general provisions of the Council of Trent, there were no
particular provisions applicable to chaplaincies. In 1918, the "Codex Juris Canonici" was
promulgated by the Pope. According to this new canon law, "The chaplaincies or simple
benefices are conferred on clericals of the secular clergy"; in order to be a "clerigo" one must
have "prima tonsura"; in order to have "prima tonsura" one must have begun the study of
theology; and in order to study theology one must be a "bachiller." Broadly speaking, Raul
Rogerio Gonzalez met the requirements of the Church before the canon law of 1918 went into
effect. After that law was provided, he did not meet the qualifications since he was not a
"clerigo," since he did not have "prima tonsura,"
444 444 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila
since he had not begun the study of theology, and since he was not a "bachiller."It was after the
canon law of 1918 was decreed that Raul Rogerio Gonzalez was presented for the chaplaincy by
the Rector of San Juan de Letran College, the patron of the chaplaincy—to be exact on February
25, 1922. The Archbishop of Manila considered the matter, and in a letter to the father of the
boy came to the conclusion "that the child, Raul Gonzalez, does not unite the qualifications of
chaplain of the said chaplaincy." The basis of the conclusion was mentioned as the new Code of
Canon Law, particularly canon 1442, in relation with canons 108 and 976. His Grace closed his
letter with this statement: "By the canons above mentioned, as well as other reasons which
could be advanced, I believe that the child Raul Gonzalez is not legally qualified to enjoy a
chaplaincy." No appeal from what amounted to a decision by the Archbishop was taken to the
Pope, but instead the authority of the civil courts was invoked. In this connection, it is the
established doctrine that in matters purely ecclesiastical the decisions of proper church
tribunals are conclusive upon the civil tribunals. (U. S. vs. Cañete [1918], 38 Phil., 253; Fussell
vs. Hail [1908], 233 111., 73.)The vital question, on the answer to which will depend a correct
decision, then is if the church authorities in giving application of the canon law of 1918 to the
spiritual trust, should be overruled by the civil courts.The trial judge, in his learned decision,
states the matter as forcefully and graphically as may be when he says: "The canon which the
defendant now invokes in support of the refusal to appoint plaintiff as chaplain was only
promulgated in the year 1918. The will was executed in 1816 and the order of the Archbishop
of Manila, approving the foundation of the chaplaincy in accordance with said will, was entered
in the year 1820." His Honor continues, "The court is of the opinion that the new canon law of
1918 cannot in this case be given a retroactive effect, for to
445 VOL. 51, FEBRUARY 4, 1928 445 Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila do so
would impair the obligation of the trust involved in the acceptance of the provision of said will
for the establishment of the chaplaincy, and it would impair the obligation of a contract in
violation of the Organic Act, the Jones Law." Much can be said in support of that position. In the
first place, the disposition of property in a will is governed by the law existing at the time of
execution—in this instance by the law as it was to be found in 1816. In the next place, the trust
agreement was in the nature of a civil contract, and as to contracts, existing statutes enter into
and become a part of them—in this instance the law as existing in 1820. But the last principle is
here not literally true, for the executor of the will renounced the laws which might favor the
foundress.The portion of the Organic Act, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, section 3,
paragraph 5, providing "That no law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be enacted" is
not applicable since the "law" there mentioned is an Act of the Philippine Commission or
Legislature or an ordinance or resolution of a municipal council, and does not include an
ecclesiastical law promulgated by the Pope for the Catholic world. The legislative power of the
state has not undertaken, as in the Dartmouth College Case, to remodel the charter of an
institution in most important particulars without the consent of the corporators. But following
the theory pertaining to the impairment of the obligation of contracts, and by analogy applying
the same principles to the canon law, it yet remains to be said that there are limitations on the
application of the constitutional provision. Thus, as significant restrictions, the state cannot
abridge or weaken any of the essential powers inherent in government; the state cannot
abdicate its trust over property; and the Legislature cannot withdraw from its successors the
power to take appropriate measures under the police power. Not only this, but charter
contracts are subject to state regulation. A party operating under a charter must conform to
such rules as the state may estab-
446 446 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila
lish. Added conditions or duties may be imposed provided they do not amount to a change in
the obligations or in the substantial rights of a party. Changes may be made in the general laws
even though incidental injury may result.Construing the canon law as we must if we are to
determine if it has retroactive and destroying effect, it is apparent that the highest power in the
Catholic Church provided a law universal in character operative on all chaplaincies after it went
into effect. The Pope did no more than did the civil authorities of Spain when in 1841 they
enacted a law regulating chaplaincies. As a matter of internal discipline, the Church was
attempting to make certain that all persons filling chaplaincies had the necessary training to
perform their duties. General regulations were prescribed to secure the ends for which
chaplaincies were erected. In the particular case before us, the father chaplain, the incumbent
of a "collative chaplaincy," was expected by the testatrix "to celebrate sixty masses annually,"
and it would not be at all unreasonable for the canon law to prescribe qualifications for the
holder of the chaplaincy sufficient to permit him to say the masses personally. The will did not
negative this in any manner when the property was turned over for spiritual uses. As far as the
will went, it intended to create a collative rather than a laical chaplaincy, thus subjecting the
institution to the authority and the laws of the Church, as every collative chaplaincy is so
subjected.The Supreme Court of Porto Rico has found perfectly applicable the principles of the
canon law to a case brought in the secular courts, for the reason that the rights and relations in
question "have been fixed by rules issued, in the exercise of its powers to govern its own
institutions, by the Roman Catholic Church, the personality of which has been fully recognized
by the Supreme Court of the United States and by the Supreme Court of Porto Rico, naturally
within the constitutional limitations and principles of international law." (Jones, Catholic Bishop
of
447 VOL. 51, FEBRUARY 4, 1928 447 Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila Porto
Rico, vs. Registrar of Property [1912], 18 Porto Rico, 124; Jones, Catholic Bishop of Porto Rico,
vs. Registrar of Property [1911], 17 Porto Rico, 211.)When the case between the father of the
applicant and the Church was here before, this court took under view the provision of the trust
agreement relating to the administration of the property. Mr. Justice Torres, speaking for the
court, said: "This provision must be understood to be mandatory, except as otherwise provided
by the canonical laws and as, pursuant therewith, the chief ecclesiastical authority may order
for, after the latter had accepted the foundation of the chaplaincy, the administration of its
property appertains to the authorities established by the Church, pursuant to the latter's own
laws, and this rule has been observed since 1863." (Gonzalez vs. Harty and Har-tigan [1915], 32
Phil., 328.)The parties seem much concerned with worldly considerations, with obtaining
control of the tidy sum involved. Yet if we would place ourselves in the position of the elderly
lady who conceived the foundation, it would be realized that what she desired was the saying
of masses for pious purposes by a descendant, and so instituted a foundation to attain that
purpose. The wishes of the foundress of the spiritual trust should govern and will rather be
subserved than thwarted by the application of the canon law of 1918 to the trust.It is not for
the courts to exercise control over the dignitaries of the Roman Catholic Church in the
performance of their discretionary and official duties. Rather is it for the applicant to conform
to just church regulations. The courts should ponder long bef ore compelling the def endant
Archbishop of Manila to appoint a particular person to a chaplaincy, in contravention of the
mandatory provisions of existing canon law.The all controlling considerations in the disposition
of this case are the intention of the foundress of the spiritual trust, which should be respected,
and the impropriety of
448 448 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila
the courts invading the religious realm and their attempting to order things to be done, the
performance of which appertain exclusively to the regularly constituted authorities of the
Roman Catholic Church.Premises conceded, the issue should be resolved by holding that the
court will not sanction the expedition of a writ of mandamus, directed to the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila, reversing him in his decision to apply the canon law of 1918 to the
foundation.I concur in the disposition of the appeal.JOHNS, J., dissenting:In 1816 the
Archbishop of Manila had not only ecclesiastical but also civil and political powers in the
Philippine Islands.In 1816 Petronila de Guzman was a resident of the City of Manila and a
devout Catholic and the owner therein of "a house of lime and stone situated at Calle Rosario,"
from which she received an annual net rental of P180. In accord with her religious belief, she
wished to perpetuate her family name and to found a chaplaincy and provided for the saying of
sixty masses annually by the Father chaplain "in the churches of the City of Manila or in those of
its vicinities, and in privileged altars, in behalf of the souls of my father, Dn. Tomas de Guzman,
and of my mother, Dña. Sebastiana de Jesus, and my brothers and sisters, and for me, the
testatrix after my days," and to that end and for that purpose, on March 13, 1816, she made
and published her last will and testament in which she charged that the executor of her estate
should ''constitute said house into a collative chaplaincy, the foundation of which they shall
effect immediately after my death, electing for chaplain D. Esteban de Guzman, legitimate son
of my grandson Dn. Jose Telesforo de Guzman, and in his default, the nearest relative, and in
default of the latter, a collegian (colegial) of San Juan de Letran, who should be
449 VOL. 51, FEBRUARY 4, 1928 449 Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila an
orphan mestizo, native of this town," in which it was further provided:"Tenth Item: It is my will
that for patron of said chaplaincy my executors name the Father President of the College of San
Juan de Letran."Eleventh Item: I appoint my first executor as administrator of the chaplaincy
which shall be founded on the house referred to, during the minority of said chaplain." After
the death of Petronila de Guzman, and on April 24, 1820, her executor Jose Telesforo de
Guzman, and under the provisions of the will, petitioned the Archbishop of Manila that the title
to the chaplaincy be issued to his son Esteban de Guzman and to him as administrator during
the minority of his son, which petition, among other things, recites:"That the annexed
testimony which with due solemnity I enclose shows that my deceased great grandmother Da.
Petronila de Guzman provided in her last will the institution of a collative chaplaincy for one
son of mine named Esteban Sixto de Guzman, student of the Royal College of San Juan de
Letran, for the patronage of which the most Reverend Father President of said College has been
named, with a house of lime and stone situated at Calle Rosario as capital, which, according to
the Certificate hereto attached, nets a rent of One Hundred Eighty Pesos Annually, it being
located on the Calle Real del Rosario; and I, being her testamentary executor and appointed
administrator of my above mentioned son, present myself before Your Most Illustrious Grace,
praying that you declare sufficient the income (congrua) referred to and order that a title to
said chaplaincy issue to my said son and to me the administrator during his minority. This is
what I beseech of Your Illustrious Grace, and to secure it to Your Illustrious Grace I humbly ask
and request that you so decree and order as I pray for. I swear according to form—FURTHER—
the deed of ownership of the house which I also 450 450 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila attach, I request that after this petition is terminated, said
document be delivered to me as above requested—JOSE TELESFORO DE GUZMAN. Manila, April
24, 1820—To the Promotor Fiscal—Subscribed and sealed before me, Doctor Rojas,
Secretary."April 26, 1820, the executor of the will, pursuant to such petition, executed a formal
document for the endowment of the chaplaincy, which, among other things, recites:"* * * And
to accomplish the foundation of said chaplaincy in accordance with law, the said executor
(Telesforo de Guzman) appeared before the Most Illustrious and Most Reverend Metropolitan
Archbishop, stating that he had the pension in consideration of which the chaplain had to say
sixty masses annually in the churches of this City or in those of its vicinities and in privileged
altars for the benefit of the souls of her deceased parents, Don Tomas de Guzman and Doña
Sebastiana de Jesus, of the testatrix and of her brothers and sisters, electing as chaplain her
great grandson Don Esteban de Guzman, a student of the Royal College of San Juan de Letran,
and as administrator (to act) during the minority of the said chaplain, the executor himself,
whom she has empowered to appoint as Patron of the chaplaincy the Father President of the
said Royal College of San Juan de Letran, asking that the said 'congrua' (pension, living or
maintenance) the rents of the property of which amount at present to P180 per year, be
declared sufficient. * * * And for its firmness and greater validity he renounces with all
solemnity the laws that may favor the said decedent, inserting and repeating herein all the
clauses that may be necessary with all the requisites and conditions, so that the purpose which
actuated her to do this act of piety may be duly accomplished, with the solemnities above set
forth and the conditions herein inserted, which he asks and charges the above named chaplain
and those who will succeed him to respect, comply and execute ad perpetuam rei mee
memoriam amen."
451 VOL. 51, FEBRUARY 4, 1928 451 Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila The
"Promotor Fiscal" having first approved as legal under the canonical law the proposed
endowment, the petition was granted by the Archbishop as follows:"That in conformity with
the representations of the Promotor Fiscal, he was disposed to approve and did approve the
foundation of the chaplaincy with all the circumstances and conditions provided for in said
clause (of the will) and in the deed of foundation, as well as the imposition (charge) of
seventeen hundred pesos against said building, converting said sum into spiritual property of a
perpetual character subject to the ecclesiastical forum and jurisdiction, etc."The last chaplain,
Angel Gonzalez, served until December 6, 1910, between whom and the defendant there was a
full, complete and final settlement of all of the accounts arising from, and growing out of, the
chaplaincy up to December 31, 1910. The defendant after December 6, 1910, declared the
chaplaincy in question vacant, and at all times since, it has remained and is now vacant. In this
situation, the plaintiff minor, Raul Rogerio Gonzalez, claiming to be the eldest son of Angel
Gonzalez, the last chaplain, and of his wife,. Adelaida Gonzalez, and the nearest relative in
succession to the first chaplain, Esteban de Guzman, and the legitimate successor to the said
chaplaincy, petitioned the defendant to be appointed chaplain, with all of the rights, powers
and duties as such, which petition was denied.The original complaint in this action and the one
on which the evidence was taken in the lower court was filed on August 5, 1924. The answer of
the defendant was filed on October 13, 1924. The testimony was completed on March 24,
1926, and on April 5, 1926, for the purpose of making his pleadings conform to his alleged
proofs, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, to which objection was made by the
defendant and overruled by the trial court.Upon such pleadings, including the amended
complaint, the lower court in a learned, exhaustive and well written opinion of ninety-five
printed pages, found all of the ma-
452 452 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila
terial facts for the plaintiff for whom it rendered judgment against the defendant as
substantially prayed for in the original and amended complaints.On appeal the defendant
assigns the following errors:"I. The trial court erred in ordering the defendant forthwith to
appoint plaintiff as chaplain of the Chaplaincy in question notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff
is only twelve (12) years old and is not a cleric."II. The trial court erred in declaring that the
defendant was not duly and legally authorized to use the income of said Chaplaincy for
analogous charitable and pious works during the time the Chaplaincy in question has been
vacant."III. The trial court erred in declaring that it had jurisdiction to compel the defendant to
do a canonical function, to wit: that of appointing plaintiff as chaplain of the Chaplaincy in
question."IV. The trial court erred in not accepting as conclusive the decision of the
ecclesiastical authority concerned, in regard to the question whether or not plaintiff is
ecclesiastically qualified to be appointed as chaplain."V. The trial court erred in not holding that
there is no evidence in record that plaintiff was the nearest relative of the foundress, and
therefore that plaintiff has not shown that he is entitled to be appointed chaplain."VI. The trial
court erred in sentencing the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P173,720 less certain
liquidated as well as unliquidated amounts referred to in the judgment."In the final analysis,
two important and decisive questions are presented. First, the construction which should be
placed upon the will of the foundress and its legal force and effect, and, second, whether or not
under the pleadings and upon the admitted facts, the judgment in favor of the plaintiff can
legally be sustained.In arriving at the solution of the first question, careful thought and
consideration should be given to the purpose and intent with which Petronila de Guzman
executed the
453 VOL. 51, FEBRUARY 4, 1928 453 Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila, will
in question so far as it can be ascertained and determined from the instrument itself.In truth
and in fact the house in question was constructed for the sole and specific purpose of providing
sufficient rental to insure the payment of the amount required to pay f or the specified number
of masses, and the will of the f oundress recites that the property had a net annual rental of
P180, and it specifically charged and enjoined upon the executor to found a chaplaincy and to
make all arrangements necessary for the saying of such perpetual masses. Upon her death such
application was made to the Archbishop, and the chaplaincy was founded and the chaplain
appointed in compliance with the terms and provisions of the will. A chaplaincy having thus
been founded, it is important to know the meaning of that word.Alcubilla, in his work entitled
"Diccionario de la Administración," published in 1886, vol. 2, p. 118, says: "A chaplaincy is an
institution which has the obligation to celebrate or cause to be celebrated annually a certain
number of masses in a determined church or altar, conforming to the will of the founder. A
chaplaincy is either laical or collative."A laical chaplaincy is that instituted without the
intervention of the ecclesiastical authority; it does not require a title in order to be ordained,
and the possessor is only obligated to cause to be celebrated, or to celebrate, if he is a priest, a
certain number of masses in accordance with the foundation. The laical or mercenary
chaplaincies are not subject to the ecclesiastical authority, which, with regard thereto, has no
other right than to investigate if the obligations are fulfilled; and this is one of the
characteristics which most distinguish the said chaplaincies from the collative chaplaincies; * *
*"A collative chaplaincy is that instituted with the intervention of the ecclesiastical authority
and requires a title of ordination. It is called ecclesiastical because it is in the form of
ecclesiastical benefice, and it is proper for the
454 454 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila
Bishop to confer it. When the foundation calls for relatives of the founder or of the persons
whom he designated as trunk, to enjoy the chaplaincy, the latter is called colativa familiar;
when individuals of a certain family are not called to the possession but the patron is
authorized to appoint, then the chaplaincy is called colativa simple or gentilicia."It is conceded
that the purpose and intent of the deceased was to found a "collative chaplaincy," and the will
provides that the position should be filled by certain specified relatives. It will be noted that the
deed of endowment of the executor of April 26, 1820, recites that he "appeared before the
Most Illustrious and Most Reverend Metropolitan Archbishop, stating that he had the pension
in consideration of which the chaplain had to say sixty masses annually in the churches of this
City, etc.," and that "the rents of the property of which amount at present to P180 per year, be
declared sufficient, issuing the corresponding title of chaplain to his said son." That is to say, to
found the chaplaincy and to insure the saying of the masses in question, the executor proposed
to the Archbishop that the estate had property which had a rental value of P180 per annum,
which he was ready and willing to pay for the founding of a chaplaincy and the saying of such
masses, and to insure the payment of the P180 annually, he was ready, able and willing to
convey the property in trust to the church for spiritual purposes. But it should be noted that his
proposition specifically provided that the property should not be used for any other or different
purpose, and that, "if the contrary should be done from now until then, he (the executor)
declares null and without value or effect whatever may be done or executed contrary to the
tenor of these presents." That must be construed as a specific limitation upon the rights,
powers and duties of the trustee, which would prohibit the use of the property by the trustee
for any other or different purpose than the one specified in the will.It will also be noted that the
proposition of the executor was accepted by the defendant upon the terms and condi-
455 VOL. 51, FEBRUARY 4, 1928 455 Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila tions
therein stated as provided for in the will of the foundress, and Esteban de Guzman, who was
then not 14 years of age, was duly appointed by the defendant as the first chaplain in the
chaplaincy as thus founded and entered upon the discharge of his duties.The second chaplain
was Vicente de Guzman, who was a brother of the first, and was appointed by the Archbishop
on April 7, 1838.The third chaplain was Mariano de Guzman, a nephew of the first, and he was
appointed October 11, 1867.The fourth chaplain was Fernando Maniquis, who was appointed
May 23, 1890, and served until November 17, 1897.The fifth and last chaplain was Angel
Gonzalez, the plaintiff's father, and he was appointed on June 20, 1901, and served until
December 6, 1910, and to whom the defendant accounted for all of the rentals of the property
of the chaplaincy from the date of the resignation of the preceding chaplain in November,
1897, and also the rentals of the property which were collected during his chaplaincy, and
when paid to him, they were appropriated by Angel Gonzalez to his own use.Although the
defendant held the title to the property in trust, yet, apparently prior to 1863, the different
chaplains had the control and management of the property, and collected the rentals, when in
that year for the first time the defendant took over the actual management of the property and
the collection of the rentals.As stated, Angel Gonzalez, the last chaplain, was appointed by the
defendant on June 20, 1901, and served until December 6, 1910, and to whom the defendant
not only accounted for all of the rentals of the property of the chaplaincy from November,
1897, the date of the resignation of the preceding chaplain, but also for the rentals received
from June 20, 1901, to December 6, 1910, during the period of his own chaplaincy. There is
nothing in the record tending to show what was done with the rentals
456 456 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of
Manila, collected from 1863 to 1897 or the amount of them, or to whom they were paid. But in
view of the fact that an accounting was had and made to Angel Gonzalez for the rentals from
the year 1897 to December 6, 1910, it is fair to assume that there must have been some kind of
a settlement or accounting between the defendant' and the former chaplains of the rentals
collected from 1863 to 1897. In any event, the record is conclusive that there was a full, final
and complete settlement between the defendant and Angel Gonzalez, as chaplain, for the
rentals collected from the year 1897 to December 6, 1910.Upon this question, the recitals
made in the original appointment of Angel Gonzalez, the last chaplain, are very important. After
giving the history of the foundation of the chaplaincy founded by Da. Petronila de Guzman, his
appointment recites:"* * * So that, as such chaplain he may possess and enjoy it as
Ecclesiastical benefice and by perpetual title with the obligation of ordering to be said, by
means of a priest, while he himself cannot say them, sixty masses annually according to the will
of the foundress, and with the understanding that every year he has to show to our Court of
Chaplaincies wherein this shall be recorded, that he has discharged said masses, without which
requisite the rent which for the purpose may be necessary shall be withheld from him. And by
virtue of Holy Obedience we order those to whom these presents may concern to have and
treat the said D. Angel Gonzalez y Guzman as the beneficiary and possessor of said chaplaincy,
and that they pay him well and faithfully the income which in the future the capital may
produce and that which it has produced while vacant."This order was made on August 21, 1901,
and remained in full force and effect until Angel Gonzalez resigned, and the final settlement
was made with him on December 6, 1910, at which time the chaplaincy was declare," vacant,
 457 VOL. 51, FEBRUARY 4, 1928 457 Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila, and
it has remained vacant ever since, and clause ten of the will provides:"It is my will that for
patron of said chaplaincy my executors name the Father President of the College of San Juan de
Letran."And clause eleven provides:"I appoint! my first executor as administrator of the
chaplaincy which shall be founded on the house referred to, during the minority of said
chaplain."That is to say, "the Father President of the College of San Juan de Letran" was made
Patron of the chaplaincy, and the executor under the will was made "administrator of the
chaplaincy during the minority of said chaplain," D. Esteban de Guzman, who was then a minor
less than 14 years of age.Hence, we have this situation. On March 13, 1816, Petronila de
Guzman made her last will and testament in which she sought to provide for the foundation of
a chaplaincy and the celebration of "sixty masses annually" in behalf of her own soul and the
souls of her father and mother and brothers and sisters, and in which she named the Father
President of the College of San Juan de Letran as Patron of the chaplaincy, and appointed her
executor as administrator of the chaplaincy during the minority of her son, D. Esteban de
Guzman, whom she appointed the first chaplain, whom she charged and enjoined to carry out
the terms and provisions of her will.Pursuant to that charge and by the terms of the will, the
executor made a formal application to the defendant to found the chaplaincy and to have D.
Esteban de Guzman, the minor, who was the "legitimate son of my grandson Don Jose
Telesforo de Guzman," appointed as first chaplain under the will, and to provide for the
celebration of "sixty masses annually," and the application was formally granted and the
chaplaincy was thus founded, and as provided in the will, the minor was appointed as the first
chap-
458 458 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila
lain under the chaplaincy, and to that end and for such use and purpose, the property was then
conveyed to the defendant in trust. From that date to 1901, four other chaplains have been
appointed. In 1863, and for the first time, the defendant took over the actual control and
management of the property and collected the rents, and the record is conclusive that from
1897 to December 6, 1910, the defendant accounted to Angel Gonzalez, the last chaplain, for
all of such rents and profits, and that in the final settlement, the defendant actually paid to
Angel Gonzalez the sum of P12,500 for and on account of such rentals and profits.It will be
noted that his order of appointment expressly recites that "he may possess and enjoy it as
Ecclesiastical benefice and by perpetual title with the obligation of ordering to be said, by
means of a priest, while he himself cannot say them, sixty- masses annually according to the
will of the f oundress," for which he shall duly report, and "without which requisite the rent
which for the purpose may be necessary shall be withheld from him," and that it was further
ordered that he should be recognized and treated "as the beneficiary and possessor of said
chaplaincy, and that they pay him well and faithfully the income which in the future the capital
may produce and that which it has produced while vacant." This is an- express recognition of
the foundation of the chaplaincy and of its continued existence, and of the right of the chaplain
to enjoy it as "ecclesiastical benefice and by perpetual title," and to collect and receive the
rents and profits of the chaplaincy not only during its existence, but "while vacant." Such are
the actual facts evidenced by written documents, about which there is not and cannot be any
dispute. In addition to which, His Grace Michael J. O'Doherty testified:"Q. Without reference to
your having seen the properties or not, your Grace acknowledges that these properties belong
to the chaplaincy in question?—A. Yes, sir; there is no question about that."
459 VOL. 51, FEBRUARY 4, 1928 459 Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila And it
appears that upon the foundation of the chaplaincy in the year 1820, it was expressly agreed
with the executor of the foundress that any attempt to use the funds of the property in
question for any other or different purpose than that provided in the will, no matter how pious
it might be, should be considered null and void.Upon such undisputed evidence, the trial court
made an express finding of fact that the defendant held the title to the property in trust and as
trustee under the terms and provisions of the will of the foundress, and that finding is well
sustained by the evidence.We are clearly of the opinion that by the terms and provisions of the
will and what has been done under it and through its own actions and conduct covering a
period of almost a century, the defendant is now estopped to claim or assert that it has a fee
simple title to the property or that it does not hold the title as trustee under the will of the
foundress.The next and most serious question is whether or not the def endant should be
required to account to the plaintiff and the judgment in his favor should be sustained.As stated,
the chaplaincy in question is a collative chaplaincy which required the title of ordination, and it
is called ecclesiastical because it is in the form of an ecclesiastical benefice, and the foundation
called for relatives of the foundress whom she designated as a trunk to enjoy the chaplaincy,
and hence it is called "colativa familiar."In the instant case, the trunk of the chaplaincy was D.
Esteban de Guzman, the legitimate son of D. Jose Telesforo de Guzman, who was a grandson of
the foundress, who was born on August 4, 1806, who was formally appointed chaplain by the
ecclesiastical authorities under the provisions of the will on the 16th of June, 1820, and at the
time of his appointment, he was less then 14 years of age.The second chaplain was Vicente de
Guzman, also a son of Jose Telesforo de Guzman, and a brother of the first
460 460 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of
Manila, chaplain, and he was born on November 22, 1816, and was appointed chaplain on April
7, 1838.The third chaplain was Mariano de Guzman, a son of Juan Bautista de Guzman and the
grandson of Jose Telesforo de Guzman, and he was born on January 20, 1845, and appointed on
October 11, 1867.The fourth chaplain was Fernando Maniquis, a son of Eugenia de Guzman and
grandson of Tomasa de Guzman, who was a sister of the first chaplain, Esteban de Guzman, and
he was born on May 3, 1870, and was appointed on May 23, 1890.The fifth and last chaplain
was Angel Gonzalez, a son of Escolastica de Guzman and grandson of Tomasa de Guzman, who
was a sister of the first chaplain, Esteban de Guzman, and he was born on August 18, 1882, and
was appointed on June 20, 1901.It is stipulated that no one of the five chaplains above
mentioned was a "clerigo" at the time of his appointment to the chaplaincy, and also:"9. That
according to the new canon law promulgated in the year 1918, 'las capellanías o beneficios
simples se confieren a clérigos del clero secular'; that in order to be a 'clerigo' one must have
'prima tonsura'; that in order to have 'prima tonsura' one must have begun the study of
theology; and that in order to study theology one must be a 'bachiller.'"13. That the plaintiff
Raul Rogerio Gonzalez is the legitimate son of said Angel Gonzalez and Adelaida Gonzalez, and
was born on September 16, 1912."It is not alleged, and plaintiff does not claim, that he is now a
priest or that he has a "prima tonsura," but it is alleged in the amended complaint:"I. That he is
a minor residing in the municipality of Baliwag, Province of Bulacan; that he will be 14 years of
age on the 16th day of September of the present year (1926) ; that Adelaida Gonzalez is his
mother and duly appointed and authorized guardian ad litem for the pur-
461 VOL. 51, FEBRUARY 4, 1928 461 Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila poses
of this action and that the def endant is a corporation sole, domiciled in the City of Manila, P. L,
and represented by His Grace, M. J. O'Doherty, apostolic archbishop."IV. That it is provided in
the said will that said chaplaincy should be occupied by the nearest relative- in succession of
the first chaplain, Esteban de Guzman."VI. That plaintiff is the eldest son of the said Angel and
Adelaida Gonzalez, and as such, the nearest relative in succession to the first chaplain, Esteban
de Guzman, and the legitimate successor to said chaplaincy; that plaintiff possesses the
necessary intelligence, aptitude and spiritual inclination for the career of priesthood; that the
testimonials of various Roman Catholic priests as to plaintiff's aptitude and inclination for the
priesthood marked Exhibits B, C, D and E for identification are hereto attached and made a part
of this amended complaint, and that there is no other person who has or claims to have the
right to said chaplaincy."IX. That subsequent to the settlement of accounts set forth in the
seventh paragraph of this amended complaint, the defendant in the month of September,
1914, wrongfully obtained and caused to be registered in its own name in the registry of
property of the City of Manila, a Torrens title in fee simple to said property free and clear of the
trust imposed upon it and upon the defendant as its administrator for the maintenance of said
chaplaincy. That a description of the property as thus wrongfully registered marked Exhibit F is
hereto attached and made a part of this amended complaint."XII. That the plaintiff through his
parents and attorneys has repeatedly made application to the defendant for appointment to
said chaplaincy; that at first no objection was made to plaintiff's right to or fitness for said
office, and defendant promised to appoint him, but later refused to do so, alleging at first that
he was too young and later declining to state its reasons for such refusal; that the language of
the will establishing said chaplaincy, and par-
462 462 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila
ticularly the eleventh paragraph thereof, expressly discloses the intention of the foundress to
fill said chaplaincy with minors without limitation as to their youthfulness; that Esteban de
Guzman, the first chaplain chosen by the foundress Petronila de Guzman, was less than 14
years of age on the date of his appointment by the defendant Archbishop of Manila."By the
stipulation of facts, paragraphs 1, 9 and 12 are admitted. Paragraph 4 is contested and
disputed, As to paragraph 6, there is no claim or pretense that any other person has or claims
to have a right to the chaplaincy. Neither is it claimed that the plaintiff is not the eldest son of
Angel and Adelaida Gonzalez, and there is no dispute as to the contents of Exhibits B, C, D and
E. But the defendant denies that the plaintiff is "the nearest relative in succession to the first
chaplain, Esteban de Guzman, and the legitimate successor to the said chaplaincy," or that he is
now spiritually qualified for a career of priesthood.After an exhaustive analysis of all of the
evidence pro and con, the trial court made the following finding of fact:"8. So far as the records
show, plaintiff is the nearest relative of the first chaplain, Esteban de Guzman. The fourth
chaplain, Fernando Maniquis, has a son who is of about the same age and in the same degree
of relationship from the first chaplain as the plaintiff, but he is not a candidate for appointment
to this chaplaincy, and his father expressly renounced such candidacy in open court while he
was testifying as a witness for plaintiff in this case. According to the Archbishop of Manila
himself, plaintiff is the only applicant for appointment to the chaplaincy in question.
(Deposition, p. 14.)"That finding is sustained by the evidence and is also accepted by the
majority opinion.The evidence is also conclusive that the plaintiff in al! things and respects has
the intellectual qualifications of a chaplain which specially appears from Exhibits B, C, D and E,
and the evidence is also conclusive that the plaintiff
463 VOL. 51, FEBRUARY 4, 1928 463 Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila
possesses even more learning and intelligence than any previous chaplain at the time of his
appointment and that he was personally recommended for the appointment by the Father
President of the College of San Juan de Letran, who, under the terms of the will, was the
"Patron of said chaplaincy," and that exclusive of the canonical law above quoted, the plaintiff
has all of the requisite qualifications of a chaplain, and that if it was not for that law, his
appointment would have been simply a matter of f orm and not of substance. Hence, the
question is squarely presented whether the promulgation of the canonical law in question in
1918 is a bar and can now be urged against his appointment as chaplain.It must be conceded
that prior to 1918, there was no law of the church which would prohibit the appointment of the
plaintiff as chaplain, and that upon the showing made prior to the promulgation of the law in
question, the plaintiff would have been appointed chaplain as a matter of course. It must also
be conceded that under the provisions of the existing canonical law, plaintiff does not have the
requisite qualifications to be appointed chaplain. The question is thus squarely presented
whether after the defendant has accepted and approved the will of the foundress and
appointed five different chaplains under its provisions and the conditions then existing, to the
last of whom it has accounted for the rents and profits during his chaplaincy, can it now ex
parte and of its own volition promulgate and enforce a canonical law which imposes new and
different terms and conditions and in legal effect nullifies the will of the foundress, which it has
recognized and enforced for nearly a century? Whatever may have been the rights, privileges
and prerogatives of the church while this country was under the dominion of Spain, it was held
by this court in United States vs. Balcorta (25 Phil., 273, 276), that:"The change of sovereignty
and the enactment of the fourteenth paragraph of section 5 of the Philippine Bill
464 464 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila
caused the complete separation of church and state, and the abolition of all special privileges
and all restrictions theretofore conferred or imposed upon any particular religious sect."The
Constitution of the United States prohibits the passing of an ex post facto law or of any law
impairing the obligation of contracts.In the celebrated case of Trustees of Dartmouth College
vs. Woodward (4 Law. ed. [U. S.], p. 629), in an opinion written by Chief Justice Marshall, the
Supreme Court of the United States held:"The charter granted by the British crown to the
trustees of Dartmouth College, in New Hampshire, in the year 1769, is a contract within the
meaning of that clause of the Constitution of the United States, art. 1, s. 10, which declares that
no state shall make any law impairing the obligation of contracts. The charter was not dissolved
by the revolution."An act of the state legislature of New Hampshire, altering the charter,
without the consent of the corporation, in a material respect, is an act impairing the obligation
of the charter, and is unconstitutional and void."Under its charter, Dartmouth College was a
private and not a public corporation. That a a corporation is established for purposes of general
charity, or for education generally, does not, per se, make it a public corporation, liable to the
control of the legislature."Commenting on this decision, Chancellor Kent, vol. 1, p. 418,
said:"The argument of the Supreme Court in this celebrated case contains one of the most f ull
and elaborate expositions of the constitutional sanctity of contracts to be met with in any of the
reports. 'The decision in this case did more than any other single act, proceeding from the
authority of the United States, to throw an impregnable barrier around all rights and franchises
derived from the grant of the government; and to give solidity and inviolability
465 VOL. 51, FEBRUARY 4, 1928 465 Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila to
the literary, charitable, religious and commercial institutions of our country/ "Since the
rendition of that decision, no court of last resort, under the jurisdiction of the United States
Flag, has ever declared any law valid, either legislative or canonical, that impaired the obligation
of a contract.In substance, both of those provisions in the Constitution of the United States are
incorporated in, and made a part of, the Organic Law of the Philippine Islands.Upon this
question, the majority opinion says:"It is undeniable that under Spanish law an ecclesiastical
canon such as we are now considering could have been adopted regardless of its effect upon
the foundation or the persons interested therein, and it cannot be admitted that an obligation
which could be changed under Spanish law has become immutable from the promulgation by
congress of the constitutional provision forbidding the impairment of contracts by legislative
Acts."That is to say, because in 1918 there was no law in Spain against impairing the obligation
of a contract, the defendant then had the legal right to promulgate a canonical law which did
impair the obligation of a contract. Therein lies the fallacy of the majority opinion. It overlooks
the underlying, fundamental fact that in 1918, and for a long time previous, this country was no
longer under the dominion of Spain, and that it was then under the laws of the United States in
which neither the church nor state can enact a law which will impair the obligation of a
contract.That statement is not good law, and is in direct conflict with, and overlooks the
provision of, article 3 of the Civil Code which says that:"Laws shall not have a retroactive effect
unless therein otherwise provided."That is to say, the Federal Constitution prohibits the law-
making power from passing any law which impairs 466 466 PHILIPPINE REPORTS
ANNOTATED Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila the obligation of a contract, and the Spanish
code expressly provides that no law shall have a retroactive effect "unless therein otherwise
provided." If the Legislature cannot enact a law which would impair the obligation of a contract,
how, in what manner and by what authority can the defendant promulgate a canonical law
which in legal effect impairs the obligation of a contract? Even under the Spanish code, how
and in what manner and by what authority can a canonical law be made retroactive unless the
canonical law also provides that it shall be retroactive ? Upon what legal principle is the
defendant church exempt from the express language of the Constitution, or the plain provisions
of the statute? It must be conceded that 'such provisions are binding upon private persons and
the legislative bodies of the government; hence, why are not they binding upon the defendant?
And why is it exempt? The execution of the will by the foundress and the acceptance of its
terms and conditions by the defendant and the conveyance to it of the property and the
appointment of the chaplain specified in the will and of four other chaplains in accord with its
terms and provisions, covering almost a century of time, and the admitted accounting to the
last chaplain, makes a valid, binding, executed contract between the foundress and the
defendant. Otherwise, the whole transaction from its inception was null and void and of no
legal force or effect.The deed of endowment recites that the expense of the construction of the
"house of lime and stone" was P1,600, exclusive of the value of the Iot on which it was situated,
and that the rental value of the house on April 26, 1820, was P180 per annum. It appears that
its rental value at present is P1,000 per month, and that the amount of the rents and profits
from December 6, 1910, to the rendition of the judgment on December 20, 1926, is P173,725,
less certain enumerated costs and expenses, from which the importance of this case becomes
very apparent.The defendant vigorously contends that the property in question became and is
now spiritual property, and that
467 VOL. 51, FEBRUARY 4, 1928 467 Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila as
such it is beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. Here, again, we must look to the purpose and
intent of the foundress and what has been done by the defendant under the terms and
provisions of the will. The building was constructed at a cost of P1,600, and at the time of the
execution of the will, it had a rental value of P180 per annum. The chaplaincy was founded and
provision was made for the saying of sixty masses annually, for which the P180 annual rent was
then deemed sufficient. In its acceptance of 1820, the defendant approved "the foundation of
the chaplaincy, etc., as well as the imposition (charge) of seventeen hundred pesos against said
building, converting said sum into spiritual property of a perpetual character, etc.," and it was
to that extent, and to that extent only, that the property was spiritualized. It was never the
purpose or intent of the foundress that it should be spiritualized above and beyond the amount
of the specified rental value at the time of the execution of the will. By the acceptance of the
deed of endowment upon the terms and conditions stated, and the founding of the chaplaincy,
the defendant declared itself satisfied with the P180 per annum as a full and complete
compensation for the saying of the sixty annual masses, and for nearly a century, it has taken
and accepted that compensation in full for those services, and it accounted to the last chaplain
for the amount of such rents and profits, less costs and expenses, and the amount of such
annual masses. Those facts alone are conclusive evidence that the defendant by its own actions
and conduct is now estopped to claim or assert that the property in question was spiritualized
above and beyond the original amount of P180 per annum. Such a construction is also in accord
with, and gives full force and effect to, the deed of the foundation in which it is said
that:"Property is segregated from temporal properties and transferred to the spiritual
properties of this Archbishopric, without its being possible to alienate or convert the property
as such into any other estate for any cause, even though it be of a more pious character,
protesting that if
468 468 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila
the contrary should be done from now until then, he (the executor) declares null and without
value or effect whatever may be done or executed contrary to the tenor of these presents,"
which immediately follow the words "the rents of the property of which amount at present to
P180 per year, be declared sufficient, issuing the corresponding title of chaplain to his said
son."It is conceded that in September, 1914, the defendant made an application to have the
property registered in its own name and to obtain a Torrens title, and that in truth and in fact it
did obtain and now holds a Torrens title in fee simple in its own name, and for aught that
appears upon the official record, the defendant is the sole and exclusive owner of the property
in its own right and name.It is also conceded that at all times since December 6, 1910, the
chaplaincy has been and is now vacant, and that the defendant has refused to appoint the
plaintiff as chaplain or to account to him for the rents and profits, and that, if the canonical law
of 1918 is to be applied and should be enforced, the plaintiff does not have the requisite
qualifications under the existing laws of the church to be appointed chaplain.Among other
things, the purpose of this action is to compel the defendant to appoint the plaintiff to the
vacant chaplaincy, and upon that point the lower court sustained the plaintiff's contention. We
frankly concede that the court should not interfere with the internal affairs of the church upon
any question of religion or any matter of spiritual nature. That is a constitutional right which is
expressly reserved to the church. Even so, when a church enters into a valid and binding
contract which involves temporal and property rights, the construction and legal force of such a
contract devolves exclusively upon the courts, and while they do not claim or exercise the
power to interfere with the spiritual matters of the church, they do claim and exercise the
power over the property rights
469 VOL. 51, FEBRUARY 4, 1928 469 Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila of the
church and any right arising from, or growing out of, a valid and binding contract over property
to which the church is a party.We frankly concede that the courts do not exercise or claim the
power to say to the church whom it should or should not appoint chaplain, to perform any
spiritual right or duty, or in the least to interfere with the spiritual affairs of the church, its
creed or religious belief, or the spiritual duties of any officer or member of the church. But the
question involved in this case is one of a property right founded upon a contract made between
the church and the foundress, and the purpose of this action is not to procure the appointment
of a chaplain with authority under the laws of the church to say the masses, for which the will
provides, or in any manner to interfere with the spiritual affairs of the church. The sole purpose
is to have a chaplain appointed with legal authority to receive and receipt for the net income of
the property.If, as the defendant contends, it has the sole and exclusive right at its option and
in its discretion to change, modify or enlarge the requisite qualifications for a chaplain, and the
sole and exclusive power in its own discretion to appoint a chaplain, it is fair to assume that in
the instant case, no chaplain would ever be appointed and that no accounting would ever be
made, for the simple reason that in no circumstances would any church or any other person
want to appoint a chaplain to whom, when appointed, it would be required to make an
accounting of the rents and profits of the property, as in the instant case, covering a period of
seventeen years, the rental value of which is now P1,000 per month, and that would be
especially true where the chaplaincy has been vacant seventeen years. If that is the law, the
defendant would have the power at its option and in its own discretion to impose new terms
and conditions for the appointment of a chaplain, with which no member of the Guzman family
could ever comply, and thus
470 470 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Gonzalez vs, Archbishop of Manila
defeat and prevent the appointment of any chaplain at any time in the future. That is not the
law; neither should the original contract be so construed.The chaplaincy has been vacant for
the last seventeen years, and if, under the existing canonical law, the defendant has the sole
and exclusive power to appoint and the appointee must be a "clerigo" with all of the necessary
qualifications, the question naturally arises who, if any one, will ever be appointed chaplain,
and when, if ever, would he be appointed? The stubborn fact remains that it has been vacant
for the last seventeen years, and that under the existing canonical law, no member of the
Guzman family would ever be appointed chaplain.Upon this question, in its brief, appellant
says:"For argument's sake, we shall admit that plaintiff has a right to the income of the
chaplaincy and that the same is a civil right. Such a right, however, would depend on whether
plaintiff is appointed chaplain of the said chaplaincy."In response to which, respondent says:"I
admit that you are the owner of the sum of over P150,000 which I have collected as rents of the
property of the chaplaincy, but you can only take and enjoy it if I give you the key, which I do
not propose to do."And'That its refusal to give the plaintiff that key is ajudicial decision final
and conclusive against plaintiff's right to recover that money."That is a statement of the whole
case in a nutshell.Previous to the promulgation of the canon law of 1918, any male descendant
of the first chaplain over 13 years of age was eligible to the position, and the will provides that
for the failure of such descendant, a student of San Juan de Letran School should be appointed.
Yet, that is
471 VOL. 51, FEBRUARY 4, 1928 471 Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila
nothing more than a high. school, or one of secondary education, and there is no claim or
pretense that any of its students is a "clerigo" or possesses the necessary qualifications to be
appointed chaplain under the canon law of 1918. That is to say, if that law is to be enforced, the
provisions of the will for the appointment of a chaplain, which were then valid under the laws
of the church, are wholly nullified, and for such reason, the chaplaincy would remain forever
vacant, against the clear intention and the express will of the foundress. By that construction
and defendant's course of conduct, there is no longer any beneficiary under the will of the
foundress, for the simple reason that there is no person to whom the defendant should
account. It is elementary that you cannot have a trust without a beneficiary. Under all of the
definitions of an express trust, there must be a trustee who holds the legal title to the property
for the use and benefit of some third person; otherwise, it is not a trust. Having accepted the
trust and having recognized it and performed the duties of trustee for nearly a century, the
defendant cannot now defeat or impair the trust by neglecting or refusing to appoint a
beneficiary to whom it should account for the net income of the property.It appears by its own
evidence that the defendant has been using the funds arising from the rents and profits "for
religious purposes, education, benefices, charity, etc.," and "I have done nothing more than
follow the custom which I found had been followed by my predecessor Mons. Harty." In
addition to which, under the Torrens System, it has applied for and obtained a title in fee simple
in its own name. If the will is to be ,so construed, then by and through the actions and conduct
of the defendant, it becomes void for want of a beneficiary,That question was squarely decided
in an exhaustive opinion by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, April
472 472 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila
6, 1926, 45 A. L. R., p. 1433, in which, among other things, the syllabus says:"Wills, Sec. 201—
requisites of bequest."2. To create a valid bequest there must be a beneficiary, or class of
beneficiaries, indicated in the will, capable of coming into court and claiming the benefit of the
bequest."(See 28 R. C. L., 339; 3 R. C. L. Sup., 1572.)"Trusts, Sec. 21—necessity of definite
beneficiary."3. To effect an enforceable private trust by will there must be a beneficiary, or
class of beneficiaries, indicated in the will, capable of coming into court and claiming the
benefit of the bequest."(See 26 R. C. L., 1189; 4 R. C. L. Sup., 1701; 5 R. C. L. Sup., 1444.)"Trusts,
Sec. 20—indefiniteness—effect."5. A gift to' trustees to dispose of the same as they think fit is
too uncertain to be carried out by the courts,"(See 26 R. C. L., 1184.)"Wills, Sec. 198—
ascertainment of beneficiaries."9. The identity of a beneficiary in a will is a question of fact to
be found from the language of the will, construed in the light of all the competent evidence,
rather than by the application of arbitrary rules of law."Trusts, Sec. 21—designation of
beneficiaries."10. Beneficiaries under a trust may be designated by class."Trusts, Sec. 44—
failure—effect."12. Where a gift is impressed with a trust, ineffectively declared, and incapable
of taking effect because of the indefiniteness of the cestui que trust, the donee will hold the
property in trust for the next taker under the will, or for the next of kin by way of a resulting
trust."(See 26 R. C. L., 1216; 5 R. C. L. Sup., 1446.)"That same legal principle is laid down by the
Supreme Court of Alabama in Festorazzi vs. St. Joseph Roman Cath-
473 VOL. .51, FEBRUARY 4, 1928 473 Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila olic
Church (25 L. R. A., 360, 362 and 363), and by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in McHugh vs.
McCole (72 N. W., 630, 632, 634-637). In legal effect, those decisions support the contention of
the plaintiff that, if the appointment of a chaplain is a matter which is left to the sole discretion
of the defendant, it must follow that in the instant case, the beneficiary is not made definite
and certain, and that the foundation is void for want of any person who is qualified to enforce
it, and, for such reason, the legal title to the property must revert to, and become vested in, the
heirs of the foundress.If the contention of the defendant is to prevail in the instant case, the
very fact that the chaplaincy has been vacant for the last seventeen years, and that no member
of the Guzman family or student of the San Juan de Letran College is qualified to fill the position
under the canonical law of 1918, and that under such conditions, a chaplain may never be
appointed under the provisions of the will in the future, would leave the whole question in the
realm of doubt, uncertainty and speculation as to when if ever there would be a beneficiary
under the will of the foundress. If there ever was any doubt as to how the deed of the
foundation should be construed, it has been forever removed by the course of conduct and the
long, continuous construction which has been placed upon it by all of the parties in interest,
including the legal descendants of the foundress and the defendant, in particular, in the
appointment of the five previous chaplains, the manner of their appointment, and the terms
and conditions upon which they were appointed, the conduct of the defendant, and the
accounting which it made to the last chaplain. All of such parties by their actions and conduct,
having approved and followed that construction for nearly a century, cannot at this time
contend for any other or different construction, in particular, where the contention would
defeat and destroy the will of the foundress.This case is one of first impression in this court,
and we doubt very much whether a similar case has ever been
474 474 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila
decided by any court. On page 17, the majority opinion says:"* * * it is a sinister omen for the
plaintiff's case that no decision of any civil court whatever can be pointed to as a precedent for
such an exercise of judicial power, and the mere novelty of the proposition is an argument
against the soundness of the plaintiff's case. * * *"Our answer is that each case is decided upon
its own facts, and that no case will ever be found with the same peculiar facts shown to exist in
the record, and it is for that reason that no case can be found either pro or con upon this
particular question.Be that as it may, the primary purpose of this action is to obtain an
accounting, for which the appointment of a chaplain is only an incident and not one of
substance, and, as stated, it is not sought to have a chaplain appointed for the saying of-
masses. We frankly concede that is a matter peculiarly within the province of the defendant
and over which this court does not have any control. The purpose here is confined and limited
to the appointment of a chaplain for ,administrative purposes only, to whom the defendant
should account for the net income of the property. Therein lies the distinction. In other words,
the plaintiff seeks to have a chaplain appointed for the sole and specific purpose of carrying out
the will of the foundress and to comply with the legal obligation arising out of the original
contract.The majority opinion suggests that the proper remedy, if any, would be an
independent action "brought as a classsuit in behalf of all the descendants of Doña Petronila de
Guzman, since under the present decision the minor plaintiff in this action has no particular
title to relief."The plaintiff here is a son of the last chaplain, Angel Gonzalez, who is a son of
Escolastica de Guzman, and grandson of Tomasa de Guzman, who was a sister of the first
chaplain, Esteban de Guzman, and this action is prosecuted by Adelaida Gonzalez, who is the
wife of Angel
475 VOL. 51, FEBRUARY 4, 1928 475 Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila
Gonzalez, the former chaplain and the mother of the plaintiff. It also appears that Fernando
Maniquis, who was the fourth chaplain, is a son of Eugenia de Guzman and the grandson of
Tomasa de Guzman, who was a sister of the first chaplain, Esteban de Guzman, and who
appeared and testified as a witness for the plaintiff, and in open court waived any right that his
minor son might have to be appointed chaplain. In other words, it appears from the record that
a number of the immediate descendants of the foundress appeared in court and testified as
witnesses on behalf of the plaintiff, and not one of them appeared to contest his claim from the
date of the filing of the original complaint on August 5, 1924, and there is no claim or pretense
that any descendant of the foundress is contesting plaintiff's right to prosecute this action or to
be appointed chaplain.Even from that point of view, under the allegations of the amended
complaint and its broad prayer for relief, there is much force in the contention that the instant
case could be construed as "a class-suit in behalf of all of the descendants of Doña Petronila de
Guzman."There is no dispute about any material fact, and in the final analysis, the only
questions involved are those of law and as to how they should be construed and applied to the
undisputed facts, and those questions are of vast importance to both the litigants, the
profession and the public in general, and in the orderly administration of justice, they should be
squarely met and decided as they now appear in this record.If, under the law, the defendant
should be required to make an accounting, it would not make any legal difference to it whether
such an accounting should be made in this action or in the so-called "class-suit." This
proceeding being equitable in its nature, if the judgment of the lower court in favor of the
plaintiff should be affirmed, it would have full and ample power to protect the legal rights of all
parties having or claiming an interest in the fund, by
476 476 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Lima vs. Lim Chu Kao reason of
which and upon the facts in the record, the judgment would be a legal bar to any other action
against the defendant. In that situation and in the interest of justice, it is the duty of this court
to decide this case on its merits.We are clearly of the opinion that the defendant holds the legal
title to the property in trust, and that under the terms and provisions of the will of the
foundress, it should make an accounting of the net income from its rents and profits, the
receipt of which it admits, and that whether this action should be construed as prosecuted by
the plaintiff under his right to be appointed chaplain for administrative purposes or in the
nature of a "class-suit," the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed, and for such
reasons, I dissent from the learned and well written majority opinion.Judgment reversed.
Gonzalez vs. Archbishop of Manila, 51 Phil. 420, No. 27619 February 4, 1928
G.R. No. 171855. October 15, 2012.*FE V. RAPSING, TITA C. VILLANUEVA and ANNIE F.
APAREJADO, represented by EDGAR APAREJADO, petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE MAXIMINO R.
ABLES, of RTC-Branch 47, Masbate City; SSGT. EDISON RURAL, CAA JOSE MATU, CAA MORIE
FLORES, CAA GUILLIEN TOPAS, CAA DANDY FLORES, CAA LEONARDO CALIMUTAN and CAA RENE
ROM, respondents.Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations of the
complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the
claims asserted therein.―It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations of the
complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the
claims asserted therein. As a necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be
made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for
otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendant. What
determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from
the allegations in the complaint. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought are the matters to be consulted.Same; Same; Same; Same; Military Tribunals; Republic
Act No. 7055; Republic Act No. 7055 is very clear that the jurisdiction to try members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) who commit crimes or offenses covered by the Revised
Penal Code, and which are not service-connected, lies with the civil courts.―In view of the
provisions of R.A. 7055, the military tribunals cannot exercise jurisdiction over respondents’
case since the offense for which they were charged is not included in the enumeration of
“service-connected offenses or crimes” as provided for under Section 1 thereof. The said law is
very clear that the jurisdiction to try members of the AFP who_______________* THIRD
DIVISION.196196SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDRapsing vs. Ables commit crimes or
offenses covered by the RPC, and which are not service-connected, lies with the civil courts.
Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the
court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed. There is no room for
interpretation, but only application. Hence, the RTC cannot divest itself of its jurisdiction over
the alleged crime of multiple murder.SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari
and Prohibition. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Alexis C. Albao for
petitioners.PERALTA, J.:Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, filed by petitioners Fe Rapsing, Tita C. Villanueva and Annie Aparejado,
as represented by Edgar Aparejado, seeking to set aside the Orders dated December 6, 20051
and January 11, 2006,2 respectively, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Masbate City, Branch
47, in Criminal Case No. 11846.The antecedents are as follows:Respondents SSgt. Edison Rural,
CAA Jose Matu, CAA Morie Flores, CAA Guillien Topas, CAA Dandy Flores, CAA Leonardo
Calimutan and CAA Rene Rom are members of the Alpha Company, 22nd Infantry Battalion, 9th
Division of the Philippine Army based at Cabangcalan Detachment, Aroroy,
Masbate.Petitioners, on the other hand, are the widows of Teogenes Rapsing, Teofilo
Villanueva and Edwin Aparejado, who were allegedly killed in cold blood by the
respondents._______________1 Rollo, pp. 81-82.2 Id., at p. 91.197VOL. 684, OCTOBER 15,
2012197Rapsing vs. AblesRespondents alleged that on May 9, 2004, around 1 o’clock in the
afternoon, they received information about the presence of armed elements reputed to be
New People’s Army (NPA) partisans in Sitio Gaway-gaway, Barangay Lagta, Baleno, Masbate.
Acting on the information, they coordinated with the Philippine National Police and proceeded
to the place. Thereat, they encountered armed elements which resulted in an intense firefight.
When the battle ceased, seven (7) persons, namely: Teogenes Rapsing y Manlapaz, Teofilo
Villanueva y Prisado, Marianito Villanueva y Oliva, Edwin Aparejado y Valdemoro, Isidro Espino
y Arevalo, Roque Tome y Morgado and Norberto Aranilla y Cordova were found sprawled on
the ground lifeless. The post-incident report of the Philippine Army states that a legitimate
military operation was conducted and in the course of which, the victims, armed with high-
powered firearms, engaged in a shoot-out with the military.On the other hand, petitioners
complained that there was no encounter that ensued and that the victims were summarily
executed in cold blood by respondents. Hence, they requested the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to investigate the case. After investigation, the NBI recommended to the
Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate City that a preliminary investigation be conducted against
respondents for the crime of multiple murder. In reaching its recommendation, the NBI relied
on the statements of witnesses who claim that the military massacred helpless and unarmed
civilians.On February 9, 2005, the provincial prosecutor issued a Resolution3 recommending the
filing of an Information for Multiple Murder. Consequently, respondents were charged with
multiple murder in an Information4 dated February 15, 2005, which reads:_______________3
Id., at pp. 39-41.4 Id., at p. 42.198198SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDRapsing vs.
AblesThe undersigned 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuses SSGT Edison Rural, CAA Jose
Matu. CAA Morie Flores, CAA Guillen Topas, CAA Dandy Flores, CAA Leonardo Calimutan and
CAA Rene Rom, stationed at Alpha Company, 22nd Infantry Battalion, 9th Division, Philippine
Army, Cabangcalan Detachment, Aroroy, Masbate, committed as follows:That on May 9, 2004,
at around 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon thereof, at Barangay Lagta, Municipality of Baleno,
Province of Masbate, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping with one another, taking
advantage of their superior strength as elements of the Philippine Army, armed with their
government issued firearms, with intent to kill, by means of treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot
Teogenes Rapsing y Manlapaz, Teofilo Villanueva y Prisado, Marianito Villanueva y Oliva, Edwin
Aparejado y Valdemoro, Isidro Espino y Arevalo, Roque Tome y Morgado and Norberto
Aranilla y Cordova, hitting them on different parts of their bodies, thereby inflicting upon them
multiple gunshot wounds which caused their deaths.CONTRARY TO LAW.Masbate City,
February 15, 2005.On July 28, 2005, a warrant5 for the arrest of respondents was issued by the
RTC of Masbate City, Branch 47, but before respondents could be arrested, the Judge Advocate
General’s Office (JAGO) of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) filed an Omnibus Motion6
with the trial court seeking the cases against respondents be transferred to the jurisdiction of
the military tribunal.7 Initially, the trial court denied the motion filed by the JAGO on the
ground that respondents have not been arrested. The JAGO filed a Motion for Recon-
_______________5 Id., at p. 43.6 Id., at pp. 45-56.7 Id.199VOL. 684, OCTOBER 15,
2012199Rapsing vs. Ablessideration,8 and in an Order9 dated December 6, 2005, the trial court
granted the Omnibus Motion and the entire records of the case were turned over to the
Commanding General of the 9th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, for appropriate
action.Petitioners sought reconsideration10 of the Order, but was denied by the trial court in
an Order11 dated January 11, 2006.Hence, the present petition with the following
arguments:IHON. JUDGE MAXIMINO ABLES GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN GRANTING THE MOTION TO TRANSFER THE INSTANT CRIMINAL
CASE OF MULTIPLE MURDER TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE MILITARY COURT MARTIAL, AS THE
SAID TRIBUNAL, BASED ON FACTS AND IN LAW, HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT
MURDER CASE.IIIT IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO EXCESS IN JURISDICTION
IF NOT GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW ON THE PART OF HONORABLE JUDGE MAXIMINO
ABLES TO HOLD THAT HIS ORDER DATED DECEMBER 6, 2005 COULD ONLY BE REVIEWED
THROUGH AN APPEAL, AS THERE IS NO TRIAL ON THE MERIT YET ON THE INSTANT CRIMINAL
CASE.12Petitioners alleged that the trial court gravely abused its discretion amounting to excess
of jurisdiction when it transferred the criminal case filed against the respondents to the
jurisdiction of the military tribunal, as jurisdiction over the_______________8 Id., at pp. 64-
70.9 Id., at pp. 81-82.10 Id., at pp. 83-87.11 Id., at p. 91.12 Id., at p. 12.200200SUPREME
COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDRapsing vs. Ables same is conferred upon the civil courts by
Republic Act No. 7055 (RA 7055).13 On the other hand, the respondents and the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) alleged that the acts complained of are service connected and falls
within the jurisdiction of the military court.The petition is meritorious. The trial court gravely
abused its discretion in not taking cognizance of the case, which actually falls within its
jurisdiction.It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations of the complaint
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein.14 As a necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made
to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for
otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendant. What
determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from
the allegations in the complaint. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought are the matters to be consulted.15In the case at bar, the information states that
respondents, “conspiring together and mutually helping with one another, taking advantage of
their superior strength, as elements of the Philippine Army, armed with their government-
issued firearms with intent to kill, by means of treachery and evi-_______________13 An Act
to Strengthen Civilian Supremacy Over the Military by Returning to the Civil Courts the
Jurisdiction Over Certain Offense Involving Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
Other Persons Subject to Military Law, and the Members of the Philippine National Police,
Repealing for the Purpose Certain Presidential Decrees.14 Reyes v. Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 142, G.R. No. 165744, August 11, 2008, 561 SCRA 593, 604.15 Cadimas v.
Carrion, G.R. No. 180394, September 29, 2008, 567 SCRA 101, 116.201VOL. 684, OCTOBER 15,
2012201Rapsing vs. Ablesdent premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot the [victims], hitting them on different parts of their
bodies, thereby inflicting upon them multiple gunshot wounds which caused their deaths.”16
Murder is a crime punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended,
and is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.17 Hence, irrespective of whether the killing was
actually justified or not, jurisdiction to try the crime charged against the respondents has been
vested upon the RTC by law.Respondents, however, contend that the military tribunal has
jurisdiction over the case at bar because the crime charged was a service-connected offense
allegedly committed by members of the AFP. To support their position, respondents cite the
senate deliberations on R.A. 7055. Respondents stress in particular the proposal made by
Senator Leticia Ramos Shahani to define a service-connected offense as those committed by
military personnel pursuant to the lawful order of their superior officer or within the context of
a valid military exercise or mission.18 Respondents maintain that the foregoing definition is
deemed part of the statute._______________16 Rollo, p. 42.17 Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended. Section 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases.―Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any
court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by
the latter.18 Senator Shahani. I would like to propose an addition to Section 1, but this will
have to be on page 2. This will be in line 5, which should be another paragraph, but still within
Section 1. This is to propose a definition of what “service-connected” means, because this
appears on line 8. My proposal is the following:“Service-Connected Offenses Shall Mean those
Committed by Military Personnel Pursuant to the Lawful Order of their 202202SUPREME
COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDRapsing vs. AblesHowever, a careful reading of R.A. 7055 indicate
that the proposed definition was not included as part of the statute. The proposed definition
made by Senator Shahani was not adopted due to the amendment made by Senator Wigberto
E. Tañada, to wit: Senator Tañada. Yes, Mr. President. I would just want to propose to the
Sponsor of this amendment to consider, perhaps, defining what this service-related offenses
would be under the Articles of War. And so, I would submit for her consideration the following
amendment to her amendment which would read as follows: AS USED IN THIS SECTION,
SERVICE-CONNECTED CRIMES OR OFFENSES SHALL BE LIMITED TO THOSE DEFINED IN ARTICLES
54 TO 70, ARTICLES 72 TO 75, ARTICLES 76 TO 83 AND ARTICLES 84 TO 92, AND ARTICLES 95 TO
97, COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 408 AS AMENDED.This would identify, I mean, specifically, what
these service-related or connected offenses or crimes would be. (Emphasis supplied.)The
President. What will happen to the definition of “service-connected offense” already put
forward by Senator Shahani?Senator Tañada. I believe that would be incorporated in the
specification of the Article I have mentioned in the Articles of War. _______________Superior
Officer or within the Context of a Valid Military Exercise or Mission.”I believe this amendment
seeks to avoid any confusion as to what “service-connected offense” means. Please note that
“service-connected offense,” under this bill, remains within the jurisdiction of military
tribunals.So, I think that is an important distinction, Mr. President. (Record of the Senate, Vol.
IV, No. 122, May 21, 1990, p. 837, cited in Navales v. Abaya, G.R. Nos. 162318 and 162341,
October 25, 2004, 441 SCRA 393, 415; 484 Phil. 367, 389-390 (2004).203VOL. 684, OCTOBER 15,
2012203Rapsing vs. AblesSUSPENSION OF THE SESSIONThe President. Will the Gentleman
kindly try to work it out between the two of you? I will suspend the session for a minute, if
there is no objection. [There was none.]It was 5:02 p.m.RESUMPTION OF THE SESSIONAt 5:06
p.m., the session was resumed.The President. The session is resumed.Senator Tañada. Mr.
President, Senator Shahani has graciously accepted my amendment to her amendment,
subject to refinement and style.The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being
none, the amendment is approved.19In the same session, Senator Tañada emphasized:Senator
Tañada. Section 1, already provides that crimes of offenses committed by persons subject to
military law ... will be tried by the civil courts, except, those which are service-related or
connected. And we specified which would be considered service-related or connected under
the Articles of War, Commonwealth Act No. 408.20 (Emphasis supplied.)The said amendment
was later on reflected in the final version of the statute as Paragraph 2 of Section 1. Section 1 of
R.A. 7055 reads in full:_______________19 Record of the Senate, Vol. IV, No. 122, May 21,
1990, p. 837, cited in Navales v. Abaya, G.R. Nos. 162318 and 162341, October 25, 2004, 441
SCRA 393, 415-416; 484 Phil. 367, 390 (2007).20 Record of the Senate, Vol. IV, No. 122, May 21,
1990, p. 839, cited in Navales v. Abaya, G.R. Nos. 162318 and 162341, October 25, 2004, 441
SCRA 393, 416; 484 Phil. 367, 391 (2004).204204SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATEDRapsing vs. AblesSection 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
other persons subject to military law, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces
Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code,
other special penal laws, or local government ordinances, regardless of whether or not civilians
are co-accused, victims, or offended parties which may be natural or juridical persons, shall be
tried by the proper civil court, except when the offense, as determined before arraignment by
the civil court, is service-connected, in which case the offense shall be tried by court-martial:
Provided, That the President of the Philippines may, in the interest of justice, order or direct at
any time before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil
courts.As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be limited to those
defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No.
408, as amended. (Emphasis supplied)The second paragraph of Section 1 of R.A. 7055 explicitly
specifies what are considered “service-connected crimes or offenses” under Commonwealth
Act No. 408 (CA 408), as amended,21 to wit:Articles 54 to 70:Art. 54. Fraudulent
Enlistment.Art. 55. Officer Making Unlawful Enlistment.Art. 56. False Muster.Art. 57. False
Returns.Art. 58. Certain Acts to Constitute Desertion.Art. 59. Desertion.Art. 60. Advising or
Aiding Another to Desert.Art. 61. Entertaining a Deserter.Art. 62. Absence Without
Leave.Art. 63. Disrespect Toward the President, Vice-President, Congress of the Philippines, or
Secretary of National Defense.Art. 64. Disrespect Toward Superior
Officer._______________21 Articles of War.205VOL. 684, OCTOBER 15, 2012205Rapsing vs.
AblesArt. 65. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer.Art. 66. Insubordinate
Conduct Toward Non-Commissioned Officer.Art. 67. Mutiny or Sedition.Art. 68. Failure to
Suppress Mutiny or Sedition.Art. 69. Quarrels; Frays; Disorders.Art. 70. Arrest or
Confinement.Articles 72 to 92Art. 72. Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners.Art. 73. Report
of Prisoners Received.Art. 74. Releasing Prisoner Without Authority.Art. 75. Delivery of
Offenders to Civil Authorities.Art. 76. Misbehavior Before the Enemy.Art. 77. Subordinates
Compelling Commander to Surrender.Art. 78. Improper Use of Countersign.Art. 79. Forcing
a Safeguard.Art. 80. Captured Property to be Secured for Public Service.Art. 81. Dealing in
Captured or Abandoned Property.Art. 82. Relieving, Corresponding With, or Aiding the
Enemy.Art. 83. Spies.Art. 84. Military Property.―Willful or Negligent Loss, Damage or
Wrongful Disposition.Art. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property Issued to
Soldiers.Art. 86. Drunk on Duty.Art. 87. Misbehavior of Sentinel.Art. 88. Personal Interest
in Sale of Provisions.Art. 88-A. Unlawfully Influencing Action of Court.Art. 89. Intimidation of
Persons Bringing Provisions.Art. 90. Good Order to be Maintained and Wrongs Redressed.Art.
91. Provoking Speeches or Gestures.Art. 92. Dueling.Articles 95 to 97:Art. 95. Frauds
Against the Government.Art. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.Art. 97.
General Article.206206SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDRapsing vs. AblesIn view of the
provisions of R.A. 7055, the military tribunals cannot exercise jurisdiction over respondents’
case since the offense for which they were charged is not included in the enumeration of
“service-connected offenses or crimes” as provided for under Section 1 thereof. The said law is
very clear that the jurisdiction to try members of the AFP who commit crimes or offenses
covered by the RPC, and which are not service-connected, lies with the civil courts. Where the
law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the court has
no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed. There is no room for interpretation, but
only application.22 Hence, the RTC cannot divest itself of its jurisdiction over the alleged crime
of multiple murder.WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate
City, Branch 47, dated December 6, 2005 and January 11, 2006, respectively, in Criminal Case
No. 11846 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 47, Masbate City, is
DIRECTED to reinstate Criminal Case No. 11846 to its docket and conduct further proceedings
thereon with utmost dispatch in light of the foregoing disquisition.SO ORDERED.Velasco, Jr.
(Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, ** Abad and Mendoza, JJ., concur.Orders of Regional Trial
Court of Masbate City, Br. 47, dated December 6, 2005 and January 11, 2006, respectively, in
Criminal Case No. 11846 reversed and set aside._______________22 Manlangit v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 158014, August 28, 2007, 531 SCRA 420, 428.** Designated Acting
Member, per Special Order No. 1343 dated October 9, 2012.207VOL. 684, OCTOBER 15,
2012207Rapsing vs. AblesNotes.―Though not raised below, the issue of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter may be considered by the reviewing court, as it may be raised at any
stage. (Buklod nang Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. vs. E.M. Ramos and Sons, Inc., 645
SCRA 401 [2011])Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings. (Republic vs. Bantigue Point Development Corporation, 668 SCRA 158 [2012])
Rapsing vs. Ables, 684 SCRA 195, G.R. No. 171855 October 15, 2012
G.R. No. 164242. November 28, 2008.*Destileria Limtuaco & CO., INC. and CONVOY
MARKETING CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. ADVERTISING BOARD OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.Remedial Law; Prohibition; Requisites to be Entitled to a Writ of Prohibition.—
Under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, for petitioners to be entitled to such recourse, it
must establish the following requisites: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, corporation,
board or person exercising functions, judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial; (b) the tribunal,
corporation, board or person has acted without or in excess of its/his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.Same; Same; Quasi-Judicial Function Distinguished from
Ministerial Function.—A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function by which he has
the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then
undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-
judicial function is a term which applies to the action and discretion of public administrative
officers or bodies, which are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts,
hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to
exercise discretion of a judicial nature. Ministerial function is one which an officer or tribunal
performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard for
the exercise of his/its own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.Same;
Same; The definition and purpose of a writ of prohibition excludes the use of the writ against
any person or group of persons acting in a purely private capacity, and the writ will not be
issued against private individuals or corporations so acting.—The acts sought to be prohibited
in this case are not the acts of a tribunal, board, officer, or person exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial, or ministerial functions. What is at contest here is the power and authority of a private
organization, composed of several members-organizations, which power and au-
_______________* THIRD DIVISION.456456SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDDestileria
Limtuaco & Co., Inc. vs. Advertising Board of the Philippinesthority were vested to it by its own
members. Obviously, prohibition will not lie in this case. The definition and purpose of a writ of
prohibition excludes the use of the writ against any person or group of persons acting in a
purely private capacity, and the writ will not be issued against private individuals or
corporations so acting.Same; Actions; Forum Shopping; Definition of Forum Shopping; Test in
Determining the Presence of Forum Shopping.—Forum shopping has been defined as the
“institution of two (2) or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the
supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition” or “the act of a
party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, of seeking another
(and possibly favorable) opinion in another forum other than by appeal or the special civil
action of certiorari.” The test in determining the presence of forum shopping is whether in the
two or more cases pending, there is identity of: (a) parties; (b) rights or causes of action; and (c)
reliefs sought, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration: all the
requisites, in fine, of auter action pendant.Same; Same; Same; Same; The test to determine
whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will
sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of
the two actions.—The test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to
ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity
in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would
sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar
to the subsequent action. The principle applies even if the reliefs sought in the two cases may
be different. Otherwise, a party could easily escape the operation of res judicata by changing
the form of the action or the relief sought.SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.
Prohibition. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.457VOL. 572, NOVEMBER 28,
2008457Destileria Limtuaco & Co., Inc. vs. Advertising Board of the Philippines Lorna Frances E.
Filipino for petitioners. Rudolph E. Jularbal and Geoffrey D. Andawi for respondent.AUSTRIA-
MARTINEZ, J.: The present dispute focuses mainly on the power of the Advertising Board of
the Philippines (AdBoard) to require its clearance prior to commercial advertising and to impose
sanctions on its members who broadcast advertisements without its clearance.AdBoard is an
umbrella non-stock, non-profit corporation created in 19741 composed of several national
organizations in the advertising industry, including: Advertising Suppliers Association of the
Philippines (ASAP), Association of Accredited Advertising Agencies Philippines (4As), Cinema
Advertising Association of the Philippines (CAAP), Independent Blocktimers Association of the
Philippines (IBA), Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), Outer Advertising Association
of the Philippines (OAAP), the Marketing & Opinion Research Society of the Philippines
(MORES), Philippine Association of National Advertisers (PANA) and the Print Media
Organization (PRIMO).Destileria Limtuaco & Co., Inc. (Destileria) was formerly a member of
PANA.In January 2004, Destileria and Convoy Marketing Corporation (Convoy), through its
advertising agency, SLG Advertising (SLG), a member of the 4As, applied with the AdBoard for a
clearance of the airing of a radio advertisement entitled, “Ginagabi (Nakatikim ka na ba ng
Kinse Anyos).”AdBoard issued a clearance for said advertisement. Not long after the ad started
airing, AdBoard was swept with complaints from the public. This prompted AdBoard to ask
_______________1 The AdBoard was originally named the Philippine Board of Advertising
(PBA) when it was first formed in May 1974.458458SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATEDDestileria Limtuaco & Co., Inc. vs. Advertising Board of the PhilippinesSLG for a
replacement but there was no response. With the continued complaints from the public,
AdBoard, this time, asked SLG to withdraw its advertisement, to no avail. Thus, AdBoard
decided to recall the clearance previously issued, effective immediately.2 Said decision to recall
was conveyed to SLG and AdBoard’s members-organizations.3Petitioners protested the
AdBoard’s decision, after which, they filed a Complaint which was later on amended, for
Dissolution of Corporation, Damages and Application for Preliminary Injunction with prayer for
a Temporary Restraining Order with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, docketed as Civil
Case No. 04-277.4 The Amended Complaint sought the revocation/cancellation of AdBoard’s
registration and its dissolution on the grounds, inter alia, that it was usurping the functions of
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB) by misrepresenting that it has the power to screen, review and
approve all radio and television advertisements. Petitioners seek the nullity of AdBoard’s “Code
of Ethics for Advertising” and “ACRC Manual of Procedures for Screening and Filing of
Complaints and Appeals.”5On May 20, 2004, AdBoard issued ACRC Circular No. 2004-02,
reminding its members-organizations of Article VIII of the ACRC Manual of Procedures, which
prohibits the airing of materials not duly screened by it.Petitioners then filed with the
Ombudsman a complaint for misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service against AdBoard’s officers._______________2 Rollo, pp. 128-129.3 Id.4 Entitled
“Destileria Limtuaco & Co., Inc. and Convoy Marketing v. Advertising Board of the Philippines,
Inc. and Oscar T. Valen­zuela.”5 Rollo, pp. 186-187.459VOL. 572, NOVEMBER 28,
2008459Destileria Limtuaco & Co., Inc. vs. Advertising Board of the PhilippinesOn July 16, 2004,
petitioners filed the present petition for writ of prohibition and preliminary injunction under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.Petitioners argue that their right to advertise is a constitutionally
protected right, as well as a property right. Petitioners believe that requiring a clearance from
AdBoard before advertisements can be aired amounts to a deprivation of property without due
process of law. They also argue that AdBoard’s regulation is an exercise of police power which
must be subject to constitutional proscriptions.On the other hand, AdBoard seeks the dismissal
of the petition for failure to observe the rule on hierarchy of courts and for failure to comply
with certain requirements for the filing of the petition, namely: statement of material dates,
attachment of certified true copy of ACRC Circular No. 2004-02, and defect in the certification
of non-forum shopping.As to the merits of petitioners’ arguments, AdBoard counters that it
derives its authority from the voluntary submission of its members to its jurisdiction. According
to AdBoard, there is no law that prohibits it from assuming self-regulatory functions or from
issuing clearances prior to advertising.The petition is bereft of merit.First of all, the petition
filed in this case is one for prohibition, i.e., to command AdBoard to desist from requiring
petitioners to secure a clearance and imposing sanctions on any agency that will air, broadcast
or publish petitioners’ ads without such clearance.6Under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, for petitioners to be entitled to such recourse, it must establish the following requisites:
(a) it must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions,
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted
without or in excess of its/his juris-_______________6 Rollo, p. 17.460460SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATEDDestileria Limtuaco & Co., Inc. vs. Advertising Board of the
Philippinesdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.7A respondent is said to be
exercising judicial function by which he has the power to determine what the law is and what
the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and
adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the
action and discretion of public administrative officers or bodies, which are required to
investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from
them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. Ministerial
function is one which an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a
prescribed manner and without regard for the exercise of his/its own judgment upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act done.8The acts sought to be prohibited in this case are not
the acts of a tribunal, board, officer, or person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial
functions.9 What is at contest here is the power and authority of a private organization,
composed of several members-organizations, which power and authority were vested to it by
its own members. Obviously, prohibition will not lie in this case. The definition and purpose of a
writ of prohibition excludes the use of the writ against any person or group of persons acting in
a purely private capacity, and the writ will not be issued against private individuals or
corporations so acting.10_______________7 Longino v. General, G.R. No. 147956, February 16,
2005, 451 SCRA 423, 436.8 Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., Inc. v. National Wages and
Productivity Commission, G.R. No. 144322, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 346, 357.9 Rivera v.
Espiritu, 425 Phil. 169, 180; 374 SCRA 351, 360 (2002).10 63C Am. Jur. 2d Prohibition §
39.461VOL. 572, NOVEMBER 28, 2008461Destileria Limtuaco & Co., Inc. vs. Advertising Board of
the PhilippinesMoreover, it appears that petitioners already filed Civil Case No. 04-277, wherein
they sought the revocation/can­cellation of AdBoard’s registration and dissolution and the
nullity of AdBoard’s Code of Ethics for Advertising and ACRC Manual of Procedures for
Screening and Filing of Complaints and Appeals (ACRC Manual), with the RTC. Although dubbed
differently, the present petition is obviously an attempt on petitioners’ part to have AdBoard’s
authority challenged in yet another forum. This is a clear act of forum shopping on petitioners’
part.Forum shopping has been defined as the “institution of two (2) or more actions or
proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would
make a favorable disposition” or “the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has
been rendered in one forum, of seeking another (and possibly favorable) opinion in another
forum other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari.”11 The test in determining
the presence of forum shopping is whether in the two or more cases pending, there is identity
of: (a) parties; (b) rights or causes of action; and (c) reliefs sought,12 such that any judgment
rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
adjudicata in the action under consideration: all the requisites, in fine, of auter action
pendant.13Civil Case No. 04-277 and the present petition both involve the same parties. The
petitioners in this case are Destileria Limtuaco & Co., Inc. and Convoy Marketing Corp., while
the respondent is AdBoard. On the other hand, the plaintiffs in_______________11 Clark
Development Corporation v. Mondragon Leisure and Resorts Corporation, G.R. No. 150986,
March 2, 2007, 517 SCRA 203, 213.12 Hyrdro Resources Contractors Corporation v. National
Irrigation Administration, G.R. No. 160215, November 10, 2004, 441 SCRA 614, 634.13 First
Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals, 322 Phil. 280, 306; 252 SCRA 259, 283
(1996).462462SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDDestileria Limtuaco & Co., Inc. vs.
Advertising Board of the PhilippinesCivil Case No. 04-277 also are petitioners, while the
defendant is still AdBoard, only with the addition of Oscar T. Valenzuela, who is the Executive
Director of AdBoard.Both cases also raise practically the same basic causes of action/issues and
seek the same relief.The test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to
ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity
in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would
sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar
to the subsequent action.14 The principle applies even if the reliefs sought in the two cases
may be different.15 Otherwise, a party could easily escape the operation of res judicata by
changing the form of the action or the relief sought.16There is identity in the causes of action in
Civil Case No. 04-277 and the present petition for prohibition inasmuch as there is identity in
the facts and evidence essential to the resolution of the identical issue raised in these cases.
Both cases were instituted after AdBoard recalled the clearance for petitioners’ Ginagabi
advertisement, and its members refused to air the same. Also, the main issue raised in the
present petition and one of the issues raised in Civil Case No. 04-277 refer to AdBoard’s
authority and the legality of the AdBoard Code of Ethics and ACRC Manual. The determination
of this issue in either case would clearly amount to res judicata in regard to the other.
Consequently, the present petition should be dismissed.WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED
for lack of merit. Destileria Limtuaco & Co., Inc. vs. Advertising Board of the Philippines, 572
SCRA 455, G.R. No. 164242 November 28, 2008
G.R. No. 167743. November 22, 2006.* HILARIO P. SORIANO, petitioner, vs. OMBUDSMAN
SIMEON V. MARCELO, HON. PLARIDEL OSCAR J. BOHOL, Graft Investigation Officer II, and
RAMON R. GARCIA, respondents.Remedial Law; Certiorari; Requirements for the Issuance of a
Writ of Certiorari.—A writ for certiorari may issue only when the following requirements are set
out in the petition and established: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. Same; Same; Same; Definition of “Grave Abuse of Discretion”; A writ
of certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of
judgment.—The Court has invariably defined “grave abuse of discretion” as follows: x x x By
grave abuse of _______________ * FIRST DIVISION.
572 572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Soriano vs. Marcelo
discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or
despotically. For certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of
power, the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil
law and common law traditions. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. The only question
involved is jurisdiction, either the lack or excess thereof, and abuse of discretion warrants the
issuance of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari only when the same is grave, as when the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or
personal hostility. A writ of certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. An error of judgment is one in which the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, which error is reversible only by an appeal.
Ombudsman; Jurisdictions; The Ombudsman and the City Prosecutor have concurrent
jurisdiction to investigate offenses involving public officers and employees; It is only in cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan that the Ombudsman has the primary jurisdiction to
investigate.—In this case, petitioner failed to establish his claim that the Ombudsman
committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in dismissing
his complaint. Indeed, the Ombudsman was justified in dismissing the administrative case
against respondent. The latter cannot be held administratively liable for the dismissal of the
complaint of petitioner against Nazareno and Hirang without the authority or approval of the
Ombudsman. It bears emphasizing that the Ombudsman and the City Prosecutor have
concurrent jurisdiction to investigate offenses involving public officers and employees. It is only
in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan that the Ombudsman has the primary jurisdiction to
investigate; hence, in such cases, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigating agency
of the government, the investigation of such cases. Same; Same; In cases within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, the prosecutor has the duty to forward the case to the Ombudsman for
proper disposition.—In cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the prosecutor has
the duty to forward the case to the Ombudsman for proper disposition. In such cases, Section 4
 573 VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 22, 2006 573 Soriano vs. Marcelo provides that no
complaint may be dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority
or approval of the Ombudsman or his deputy. Same; Same; When the case involves an offense
not in relation to office and cognizable by the regular courts, the investigating prosecutor is
under no obligation to forward his recommendations together with the records of the case to
the Ombudsman for a final disposition.—The impugned dismissals in the present case involve
complaints over offenses which were found to be committed not in relation to office and within
the jurisdiction of the regular courts (I.S. No. 01J-43460 is a complaint for perjury while I.S. No.
01H-32904 is a complaint for libel). When the case involves an offense not in relation to office
and cognizable by the regular courts, the investigating prosecutor is under no obligation to
forward his recommendations together with the records of the case to the Ombudsman for a
final disposition. Same; Same; Negligence of the subordinate cannot be ascribed to his superior
in the absence of evidence of the latter’s own negligence.—Neither can respondent be made
administratively liable for the dismissal of the Hirang case in which he had no participation. The
negligence of the subordinate cannot be ascribed to his superior in the absence of evidence of
the latter’s own negligence. PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of
the Court of Appeals.The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Gonzales & Associates
Law for petitioner.CALLEJO, SR., J.:Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. _______________ 1 Penned by
Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza, with Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Edgardo
P. Cruz, concurring; Rollo, pp. 27-35. 574 574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Soriano vs. Marcelo 85319 dated January 20, 2005 and its Resolution2 dated April 12, 2005
which denied the motion for reconsideration thereof.On July 9, 2001, Hilario P. Soriano, the
President of Rural Bank of San Miguel, Inc. (RBSM), filed a criminal complaint for violation of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 against Norberto Nazareno, Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation (PDIC) President and Chief Executive, charging the latter, among others, with illegal
pre-termination of RBSM’s lease contracts over certain lots while under receivership. Nazareno
filed his counter-affidavit appending thereto the affidavit of Teodoro Jose B. Hirang, the
Department Manager of the Takeover Center of the PDIC. Nazareno claimed that the notices of
termination of the lease contracts were without prejudice to the claim for reimbursement for
the remaining value of the bank buildings constructed on the leased lot with a book value of
P5,728,000.70.3Soriano filed a complaint for perjury against Hirang with the Office of the
Manila City Prosecutor. Soriano claimed that the statement of Hirang in his affidavit is totally
untrue and a deliberate falsehood because PDIC, or any of its authorized representatives, made
no reservation whatsoever concerning the claim for reimbursement when the lease contracts
were pre-terminated. Soriano relied on the letter of Deputy Receiver Mauricia Manzanares to
one of the lessors, attached to the complaint as Annex “D” thereof. The complaint was
docketed as I.S. No. 01J-43460.4 The case was assigned to Assistant City Prosecutor Joel
Lucasan.Soriano likewise filed a complaint for libel against Nazareno. He alleged therein that
Nazareno uttered malicious and libelous statements when he was interviewed by a reporter of
Business World on July 16, 2001. Nazareno declared in the interview that a case for estafa filed
in the Department of _______________ 2 Rollo, pp. 38-39. 3 Rollo, p. 53. 4 Id. 575 VOL. 507,
NOVEMBER 22, 2006 575 Soriano vs. Marcelo Justice (DOJ) against Soriano for alleged self-
dealing after a P10.5 million RBSM loan was used by affiliate Coconut Rural Bank in Batangas,
and that some other estafa cases for P100 million were also filed by the DOJ in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.5 The case was docketed as I.S. No. 01H32904.Thereafter, Soriano
filed a third criminal complaint in the Office of the Manila City Prosecutor for violation of
Articles 183 and 184 of the Revised Penal Code against Zenaida A. Cabais, the comptroller
appointed by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) to oversee the operations of RBSM,
particularly the proper utilization of emergency loans extended to it by the BSP. The complaint
alleged that Cabais submitted an affidavit in support of the Monetary Board in the petition filed
by RBSM against BSP with the CA. It further alleged that Cabais made a false statement in the
said affidavit when she stated that, before RBSM declared a bank holiday, it paid Force Collect
Professional Solution, Inc. and Sure Collect Professional Solution, Inc., which are allegedly
owned by Soriano and other RBSM officers, P5.3 million and P5.75 million, respectively, without
any supporting documents as payment of 25% collection fee. Soriano averred that this
statement is not correct as the manager’s checks for the said amounts were, in fact, withheld
and no payment was made to the two corporations.6 The case, docketed as I.S. No. 00D18089,
was assigned to Assistant City Prosecutor Anabel Magabilin.On January 14, 2002, Assistant City
Prosecutor Joel A. Lucasan recommended the dismissal of the criminal complaint against Hirang
in I.S. No. 01J-43460 for lack of probable cause. He noted that the Office of the Ombudsman
had not yet made a finding that Hirang made a deliberate and willful assertion of falsehood in
the affidavit submitted to it. He _______________ 5 Id., at pp. 57-58. 6 Id., at p. 75. 576 576
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Soriano vs. Marcelo opined that without such finding,
it cannot be concluded that Hirang had made such alleged falsehood which would constitute
the crime of perjury.7 First Assistant City Prosecutor Eufrosino A. Sulla approved this
recommendation for City Prosecutor Ramon R. Garcia.8 The criminal complaint was
consequently dismissed. Soriano filed a petition for review of the resolution with the DOJ on
March 21, 2002.9On January 24, 2002, Assistant City Prosecutor Yvonne G. Corpuz also
recommended the dismissal of the complaint for libel against Nazareno for lack of probable
cause. Prosecutor Corpuz made the following findings:“A perusal of the subject article shows
that they are true and fair reports on a matter of public interest. It must be noted that when
respondent Nazareno was interviewed by the reporter, Ms. Yap, he just mentioned facts which
the public was entitled to know because complainant Soriano headed a bank that dealt with the
public. These are matters of public interests and concerns of which the citizenry has the right to
be informed especially when it affects the integrity of the banking system. Being a matter of
public interest, the alleged defamatory articles are protected by the mantle of privilege
communication, which does away with presumption of malice. The privilege character of the
news article in question stems from constitutional guarantee of free speech and free
press.Moreover, malice in fact has not been shown in the case at bar. Respondent was not
prompted by ill will or spite. He merely makes a disclosure of facts and not an imputation
affecting character.”10City Prosecutor Ramon R. Garcia approved the recommendation of
Prosecutor Corpuz and the criminal complaint was therefore dismissed.11 Soriano filed a
petition for review of the resolution with the DOJ. _______________ 7 Id., at pp. 53-55. 8 Id., at
p. 69. 9 Id., at p. 80. 10 Id., at p. 73. 11 Id. 577 VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 22, 2006 577 Soriano
vs. Marcelo On the other hand, in I.S. No. 00D-18089, Assistant City Prosecutor Anabel D.
Magabilin recommended that the complaint against Cabais be dismissed for lack of probable
cause. However, City Prosecutor Garcia merely recommended to the Ombudsman the approval
of Prosecutor Magabilin’s findings. In a March 4, 2002 Indorsement,12 he forwarded the
records of the said complaint to the Office of the Ombudsman upon his finding that Cabais was
a public officer and that the complaint imputed against her was related to the performance of
her duties.On July 2, 2002, Soriano filed an Affidavit-Complaint13 charging City Prosecutor
Ramon Garcia with gross inexcusable negligence or manifest partiality in the performance of his
duties as City Prosecutor which resulted in unwarranted benefits to Hirang and Nazareno,
compromising public interest and injuring complainant’s private rights, and violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Soriano alleged in his affidavitcomplaint that respondent erred in
forwarding the records of I.S. No. 00D-18089 for perjury to the Ombudsman because in perjury,
public office is not an essential ingredient. Soriano averred that if public office was an
ingredient for perjury, then respondent should have forwarded his complaints against Hirang
and Nazareno to the Office of the Ombudsman together with his recommendations thereon for
final resolution, conformably with paragraph 1 of OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 dated
October 5, 1995. The Circular states that preliminary investigation and prosecution of offenses
committed by public officers and employees in relation to office whether cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan or the regular courts, and whether filed with the Office of the Provincial/ City
Prosecutor shall be under the control and supervision of the Office of the Ombudsman.
_______________ 12 Id., at p. 52. 13 Id., at pp. 47-51. 578 578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED Soriano vs. Marcelo Soriano likewise relied on Section 4(8), Rule II of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, which provides that, upon the termination of the
preliminary investigation, the investigating officer shall forward the records of the case
together with his resolution to the designated authorities for appropriate action; and that no
information may be filed and no complaint may be dismissed without the written authority or
approval of the Ombudsman in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan or of
the proper Deputy Ombudsman in all other cases.14 Soriano alleged that Hirang and Nazareno
committed the crime charged against them in relation to their office; hence, respondent Garcia
should not have dismissed the Hirang and Nazareno complaints without the written authority
or approval of the Deputy Ombudsman.Soriano averred that respondent acted unlawfully in
authorizing the dismissal of the complaints against Hirang and Nazareno instead of endorsing
the complaints to the Office of the Ombudsman, together with the recommendations for
dismissal, in the same way that the Cabais case was endorsed. He insisted that the special
treatment of the Nazareno and Hirang cases, which resulted in their dismissal without having
been reviewed by the Office of the Ombudsman, was uncalled for.15The Office of the
Ombudsman docketed the criminal aspect of the complaint as OMB-C-C-02-0416-G, and the
administrative aspect as OMB-C-A-02-0287-G.In his Counter-Affidavit,16 respondent declared
that although Nazareno was a public officer (being the President and Chief Executive Officer of
PDIC, a government-owned or controlled corporation), since the offense of libel for which he
was charged does not appear to have been committed in relation to his office, it is the regular
courts, particularly the RTC, _______________ 14 Id., at p. 48. 15 Id., at p. 51. 16 Id., at pp. 61-
66. 579 VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 22, 2006 579 Soriano vs. Marcelo not the Sandiganbayan,
that has jurisdiction over the case. The Business World interview was his personal and private
undertaking which was not related to the performance of his duty as PDIC President and Chief
Executive Officer. Hence, respondent retained the authority to conduct the preliminary
investigation of a complaint conformably with OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001, Series of
1995 which reads, thus:“(2) Unless the OMBUDSMAN under his constitutional mandate finds
reason to believe otherwise, offenses NOT IN RELATION TO OFFICE and cognizable by the
REGULAR COURTS shall be investigated and prosecuted by the OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL/CITY
PROSECUTOR, which shall rule thereon with finality.”17He cannot be faulted for the dismissal
of the Hirang case because the recommendation of the Investigating Prosecutor was approved
by First Assistant City Prosecutor Eufrosino A. Sulla. Under Office Order No. 24 which he issued
on February 5, 1996 and which remained in effect, only those cases involving offenses which
are within the trial jurisdiction of the RTCs shall be forwarded to him for final disposition. Those
cases for offenses cognizable by the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs) are forwarded to then
First Assistant City Prosecutor Vicenta Ofilada, whose functions were performed by incumbent
First Assistant City Prosecutor Sulla upon Ofilada’s retirement from the service.18Respondent
further averred that perjury is within the trial jurisdiction of the MeTC. The final disposition of
the said case, which includes the determination of whether or not it should be endorsed to the
Office of the Ombudsman, is vested with Prosecutor Sulla. He explained that he ordered the
indorsement of the case against Cabais to the Ombudsman for final disposition because Cabais,
being the comptroller appointed by the BSP to oversee the operations of the RBSM while the
latter was under receivership, was a public officer. _______________ 17 Id., at p. 131. 18 Id.
580 580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Soriano vs. Marcelo Hence, his actions in
the Hirang, Nazareno and Cabais cases cannot be considered as unlawful, irregular or
inconsistent or in total disregard of established procedure. Respondent averred that even if he
erred in his actions on said cases, said error cannot be made the basis of a criminal or
administrative action especially in the absence of any allegation, much less any evidence,
showing that such disposition was done out of certain extraneous consideration other than
plain appreciation of the evidence on hand. The remedy of complainant was to file a motion for
the reconsideration of his resolutions in the said cases and/or appeal to the DOJ which he, in
fact, did. Respondent pointed out that, on March 13, 2002, complainant, through counsel, filed
a 20-page petition for review with the DOJ in the Nazareno case. On March 21, 2002, he
appealed the Hirang case to the DOJ.19After due proceedings, the Ombudsman, through Graft
Investigator Plaridel Oscar J. Bohol, dismissed the administrative complaint against respondent
Garcia on October 25, 2002.20 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:“WHEREFORE, the
foregoing premises considered, the instant administrative case against RAMON R. GARCIA, City
Prosecutor of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila, with address at Room 208, City Hall
Building, Manila, is hereby DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.”21The Ombudsman held that Soriano’s
complaint was premature. It is not within the province of its administrative disciplinary
jurisdiction to review the quasi-judicial findings and decisions of government officials such as
the City Prosecutor of Manila. If complainant was dissatisfied with such findings of the City
Prosecutor, his remedy was to move for reconsideration or file a petition for review with the
DOJ, the proper office mandated by law to review the resolutions of the Office
_______________ 19 Id., at pp. 131-132. 20 Id., at pp. 129-134. 21 Id., at p. 134. 581 VOL.
507, NOVEMBER 22, 2006 581 Soriano vs. Marcelo of the City Prosecutor of Manila. The
Ombudsman noted that, on March 13, 2002 and March 21, 2002, complainant had, in fact, filed
the appropriate petition with the DOJ seeking the review of the Nazareno and Hirang
cases.Moreover, Section 20(1) of R.A. No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides that the
Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative
act or omission complained of if it believes that the complainant has an adequate remedy in
another judicial or quasijudicial body. The Ombudsman opined that, unless there is a final
determination by the appropriate office that, indeed, respondent Garcia abused his position
and/or violated pertinent rules in issuing the questioned resolution, any administrative
complaint against respondent was premature.22Soriano filed a Motion for Reconsideration23
which was likewise denied on February 16, 2004.24 Thereafter, he filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 with the CA submitting the sole issue—“Whether or not public respondents
gravely abused their discretion in rendering the impugned Order exonerating respondent
Ramon Garcia from any administrative liability and the Order denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.”25On January 20, 2005, the CA dismissed the petition.26 It stressed that
under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the public officer complained of should have acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. The appellate court held
that the assailed orders of the Ombudsman dismissing the complaint against respondent were
justified considering that there was no evident bad faith on his part nor was there any act of
irregularity from which an in-_______________ 22 Id., at pp. 133-134. 23 Id., at pp. 136-142. 24
Id., at pp. 147-152. 25 Id., at p. 159. 26 Id., at pp. 27-35. 582 582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED Soriano vs. Marcelo ference of malice or bad faith could be made. The CA found
satisfactory respondent Garcia’s explanation on why he could not be made liable. He explained
that, in Nazareno’s case, the alleged libelous act appears not to have been committed in
relation to the performance of his duty as PDIC Chief but as a personal remark based on existing
records. As for the Hirang case, he had no participation thereon, as the same was not
forwarded to his office for final disposition.27On April 12, 2005, the CA resolved to deny
Soriano’s motion for reconsideration of its decision.28 Dissatisfied, Soriano filed this petition
for review.In this petition, Soriano as petitioner avers that he is not asking the Office of the
Ombudsman to review or reverse or do any act relative to the resolutions of the Hirang and
Nazareno complaints. He avers that what he is questioning is respondent Garcia’s failure to
comply with OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-00129 which calls for the endorsement of said
_______________ 27 Id., at pp. 32-35. 28 Id., at pp. 38-39. 29 The Joint Circular reads: TO:
ALL GRAFT INVESTIGATION/SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICERS OF THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN ALL REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTORS AND THEIR ASSISTANTS, PROVINCIAL/CITY
PROSECUTORS AND THEIR ASSISTANTS, STATE PROSECUTORS AND PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SUBJECT: HANDLING COMPLAINTS FILED AGAINST PUBLIC
OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES, THE CONDUCT OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, PREPARATION OF
RESOLUTIONS AND INFORMATIONS, AND PROSECUTION OF CASES BY PROVINCIAL AND CITY
PROSECUTORS AND THEIR ASSISTANTS. x------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------x In a recent dialogue between the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and
the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, discussion centered around the latest pronouncement of the
SUPREME COURT on the extent to which the OMBUDSMAN may call upon the government
prosecutors for assistance in the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases cognizable by
his office and the conditions under which he may do so. Also discussed was Republic Act No.
583 VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 22, 2006 583 Soriano vs. Marcelo resolutions to the Office of the
Ombudsman for final action.30 _______________ 7975 otherwise known as “AN ACT TO
STRENGTHEN THE FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED” and its
implications on the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman on criminal offenses
committed by public officers and employees.Concerns were expressed on unnecessary delays
that could be caused by discussions on jurisdiction between the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
and the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, and by procedural conflicts in the filing of complaints against
the public officers and employees, the conduct of preliminary investigations, the preparation of
resolutions and informations, and the prosecution of cases by provincial and city prosecutors
and their assistants as DEPUTIZED PROSECUTORS OF THE OMBUDSMAN.Recognizing the
concerns, the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, in a series of
consultations, have agreed on the following guidelines to be observed in the investigation and
prosecution of cases against public officers and employees:1. Preliminary investigation and
prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and employees IN RELATION TO OFFICE
whether cognizable by the SANDIGANBAYAN or the REGULAR COURTS, and whether filed with
the OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL/CITY PROSECUTOR shall be under the control and supervision
of the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN.2. Unless the Ombudsman under its Constitutional
mandate finds reason to believe otherwise, offenses NOT IN RELATION TO OFFICE and
cognizable by the REGULAR COURTS shall be investigated and prosecuted, by the OFFICE OF
THE PROVINCIAL/CITY PROSECUTOR, which shall rule thereon with finality.3. Preparation of
criminal information shall be the responsibility of the investigating officer who conducted the
preliminary investigation. Resolutions recommending prosecution together with the duly
accomplished criminal informations shall be forwarded to the appropriate approving
authority.4. Considering that the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN has jurisdiction over public
officers and employees and for effective monitoring of all investigations and prosecutions of
cases involving public officers and employees, the OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL/CITY
PROSECUTOR shall submit to the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN a monthly list of complaints
filed with their respective offices against public officers and employees.Manila, Philippines,
October 5, 1995. (Sgd.) (Sgd.) TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. ANIANO A. DESIERTO Secretary
Ombudsman Department of Justice Office of the Ombudsman 30 Id., at pp. 18-19. 584 584
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Soriano vs. Marcelo Petitioner contends that
respondent acted in bad faith, or, at the very least, committed acts of irregularity from which
an inference of malice or bad faith could be made. He points out that Nazareno could not have
had access to said information and would not have disclosed such information against Soriano if
he was not the PDIC President. He, therefore, concludes that the impugned remarks were made
in relation to office or in the performance of public duties.31Respondents, through the Office of
the Solicitor General, point out that the dismissal of the administrative complaint against
respondent is final and immediately executory, and unappealable. Nonetheless, they aver that
the ruling of the CA, that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman
when he dismissed the administrative case, was correct. They maintain that the factual findings
of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary proceedings are entitled to great respect and
finality.32The petition is without merit.Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court reads:“Section 1.
Petition for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may
file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.The petition shall be
accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof,
copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a
sworn_______________ 31 Id., at pp. 19-21. 32 Id., at pp. 233-241.
585 VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 22, 2006 585 Soriano vs. Marcelo certification of
non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.”A writ for
certiorari may issue only when the following requirements are set out in the petition and
established:“(1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions;(2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and(3)
there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.”33The Court has invariably defined “grave abuse of discretion” as follows:“x x x By grave
abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised
arbitrarily or despotically. For certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious, arbitrary and
whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in accordance with
centuries of both civil law and common law traditions.”34Mere abuse of discretion is not
enough.35 The only question involved is jurisdiction, either the lack or excess thereof, and
abuse of discretion warrants the issuance of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari only when
the same is grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion, prejudice or personal hostility. A writ of certiorari is a remedy designed for the
correction of errors of juris-_______________ 33 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, 456 Phil. 755, 784-785; 409 SCRA 455, 480 (2003). 34 Rodson Philippines, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 141857, June 9, 2004, 431 SCRA 469, 480. 35 People of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144332, June 10, 2004, 431 SCRA 610, 617. 586 586 SUPREME
COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Soriano vs. Marcelo diction and not errors of judgment.36 An
error of judgment is one in which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, which
error is reversible only by an appeal.37We quote with approval the following discussion of the
Ombudsman on its finding that petitioner’s complaint was premature:“After a careful study of
the records, we find no sufficient cause to warrant further proceeding in the instant
administrative case. The complainant, by filing the instant administrative case, in effect, would
like this Office to, among others, rule on the legality of the resolution of the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila in I.S. No. 01J-43460 entitled “Soriano v. Hirang” and I.S. No. 01H-32904
entitled “Soriano v. Nazareno.”It must be emphasized that it is not within the province of this
Office’s administrative disciplinary jurisdiction to review the quasijudicial findings and decisions
of government officials. If the complainant is dissatisfied with the said findings, his remedy is to
move for reconsideration, and/or file a Petition for Review with the Department of Justice, the
proper office mandated by law to review the resolutions of the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Manila. In fact, on March 13, 2002 and March 21, 2002, the herein complainant, through
counsel, filed the appropriate Petition for Review in the Nazareno and Hirang cases,
respectively.Besides, it may be pointed out that Section 20(1) of Republic Act 6770, otherwise
known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides, thus:“Section 20. Exceptions.—The Office of
the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act or
omission complained of if it believes that:(1) The complainant has an adequate remedy in
another judicial or quasi-judicial body x x x”This is not to say, however, that the herein
complainant totally has no recourse to this Office. Should there be a final
determination_______________ 36 Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Galauran & Pilares
Construction Co., 204 Phil. 296, 300; 118 SCRA 664, 667 (1982). 37 People v. Court of Appeals,
supra, at p. 617.
587 VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 22, 2006 587 Soriano vs. Marcelo by the
appropriate office that, indeed, the herein respondent abused his position and/or violated
pertinent rules in issuing the questioned resolutions, the complainant may very well file before
this Office the appropriate complaint against the latter. Until then, therefore, the instant
administrative complaint is premature.”38It appears on record that, on January 27, 2003, the
DOJ had dismissed the petition for review of respondent in I.S. No. 01H-32904 (for libel) for lack
of merit. The DOJ ruled as follows:“Verily, we are not inclined to impute any form of malice on
the part of respondent. There is no sufficient overt acts performed by him from which we can
deduce that he, in providing the information that became the basis of the subject news item,
was motivated by personal ill-will, hatred, animosity, vengeance, resentment and aversion
against complainant (see People v. Quemel, CA 02583-CR, March 18, 1964; People v. Dianelan,
13 CAR 34). These would have shown his malice or, at least, his intention to inflict ulterior and
unjustifiable injury on complainant’s reputation, honor and credit (see People v. Cañete, 38
Phil. 253). What constitutes libel is not only the defamatory matter but also the malicious
attitude of the accused (Esteban v. Veneracion, et al., 16 CAR 1171).On the basis of the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official function and on evidence extant on
record, it readily appears that respondent narrated the information to the reporter exactly as
they are reflected on the records of PDIC. Even then, he relayed the information merely in
response to questions in an interview made by a reporter of a newspaper. Besides, respondent,
as head of the PDIC, merely performed his legal duty to fully disclose to the public all the
transactions of his office involving public interest. Certainly, the information disclosed by
respondent is a matter of public concern where everyone has an interest. Since respondent
merely discharged a legal duty, the presumption of malice in a defamatory statement is
necessarily negated. His statements in this regard are well within the mantle of protection of
privileged communication. It now behooves upon complainant to show that respondent had, in
fact, acted with malice. As stated above, it has not been_______________ 38 Rollo, pp. 132-
134.
588 588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Soriano vs. Marcelo shown
that respondent had acted with ill-motive in the publication of the subject news item.”39Earlier
on July 26, 2002, the DOJ had, motu proprio, resolved to dismiss the petition for review of
petitioner in I.S. No. 01J-43460, thus:“This resolves the petition for review of the resolution of
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila in the above-captioned case dismissing the
complaint against Teodoro Jose D. Hirang for perjury.Section 12(c) of Department Circular No.
70 dated July 3, 2000 provides that the Secretary of Justice may, motu proprio, dismiss the
petition if there is no showing of any reversible error in the appealed resolution.We considered
the arguments raised and discussed in the petition, as well as respondent’s comment thereon,
but found no cogent reason to justify a reversal of the assailed resolution. The evidence on
record, by and large, does not engender enough faith that respondent is guilty of the charge.
Here, respondent, at least, believes that the facts stated in his affidavit are true at the time he
subscribes the same, not to mention that, through the footnote on the affidavit, respondent
did, likewise, explain why no claim for reimbursement was made in some of the notices.In
passing, the date September 13, 2001 therein cited was just a typographical error in the light of
the attendant circumstances.WHEREFORE, we resolve to DISMISS the instant
petition.”40Patently, petitioner filed his complaint against respondent with the Ombudsman
despite the pendency of his petition for review in the DOJ. It turned out that the DOJ would
sustain the rulings of First Assistant Sulla and respondent, respectively. There was thus no
factual and legal basis to file any administrative complaint against respondent.In this case,
petitioner failed to establish his claim that the Ombudsman committed a grave abuse of
discretion amount-_______________ 39 Id., at p. 90. 40 Id., at pp. 92-93. 589 VOL. 507,
NOVEMBER 22, 2006 589 Soriano vs. Marcelo ing to excess or lack of jurisdiction in dismissing
his complaint. Indeed, the Ombudsman was justified in dismissing the administrative case
against respondent. The latter cannot be held administratively liable for the dismissal of the
complaint of petitioner against Nazareno and Hirang without the authority or approval of the
Ombudsman. It bears emphasizing that the Ombudsman and the City Prosecutor have
concurrent jurisdiction to investigate offenses involving public officers and employees. It is only
in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan that the Ombudsman has the primary jurisdiction to
investigate; hence, in such cases, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigating agency
of the government, the investigation of such cases.41Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure likewise provides:“SEC. 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its
review.—If the investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall
prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify under oath in the information that he,
or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and
his witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the complaint and
of the evidence submitted against him; and that he was given an opportunity to submit
controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint.Within
five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the
resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the
parties of such action._______________ 41 Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors
of the Department of Justice, G.R. No.159747, April 13, 2004, 427 SCRA 46, 70.
590 590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Soriano vs. Marcelo No
complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the
prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor
of the Ombudsman or his deputy.Where the investigating prosecutor recommends the
dismissal of the complaint but his recommendation is disapproved by the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy on the ground that a
probable cause exists, the latter may, by himself file the information against the respondent, or
direct another assistant prosecutor or state prosecutor to do so without conducting another
preliminary investigation.If upon petition by a proper party under such rules as the Department
of Justice may prescribe or motu proprio, the Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the
resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the
prosecutor concerned either to file the corresponding information without conducting another
preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information
with notice to the parties. The same Rule shall apply in preliminary investigations conducted by
the officers of the Office of the Ombudsman.” (Emphasis supplied)Hence, in cases within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the prosecutor has the duty to forward the case to the
Ombudsman for proper disposition. In such cases, Section 4 provides that no complaint may be
dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the
Ombudsman or his deputy.However, the impugned dismissals in the present case involve
complaints over offenses which were found to be committed not in relation to office and within
the jurisdiction of the regular courts (I.S. No. 01J-43460 is a complaint for perjury while I.S. No.
01H-32904 is a complaint for libel). When the case involves an offense not in relation to office
and cognizable by the regular courts, the investigating prosecutor is under no obligation to
forward his recommendations together with the records of the case to the Ombudsman for a
final disposition.
591 VOL. 507, NOVEMBER 22, 2006 591 Soriano vs. Marcelo Petitioner
ascribes administrative liability to respondent for allegedly not following OMB-DOJ Joint
Circular No. 95001 when he dismissed the Nazareno and Hirang cases. We are not
convinced.For one, respondent did not actually ignore OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001. In
fact, respondent dismissed the Nazareno case on the honest belief that he was complying with
the guidelines set forth in said circular. The Nazareno case was dismissed by respondent based
on the finding that the offense committed by respondent therein was not in relation to office.
Paragraph 2 of OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95001 provides that offenses not in relation to office
and cognizable by the regular courts shall be investigated and prosecuted by the Office of the
Provincial/City Prosecutor, which shall rule thereon with finality. Respondent is not obliged to
forward cases involving offenses not in relation to office to the Office of the Ombudsman.An
offense is deemed to be committed in relation to the accused’s office when such office is an
element of the crime charged or when the offense charged is intimately connected with the
discharge of the official function of the accused.42 Respondent found that the interview
Nazareno had given to Business World was his personal and private undertaking, and not
related to the performance of his duty as a PDIC officer. Whether or not such finding is correct
is beyond the reach of the administrative case filed against him; such question should be
properly resolved in the petition for review of the City Prosecutor’s resolution with the
DOJ.Neither can respondent be made administratively liable for the dismissal of the Hirang case
in which he had no participation. The negligence of the subordinate cannot be ascribed to
_______________ 42 Zapatos v. People, 457 Phil. 969, 983; 411 SCRA 148, 159 (2003). 592
592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Soriano vs. Marcelo his superior in the absence
of evidence of the latter’s own negligence.43Finally, it has been declared that OMB-DOJ Joint
Circular No. 95-001 is just an internal agreement between the Ombudsman and the
DOJ.44WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated January 20, 2005 and its Resolution dated April 12, 2005 are
AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED. Panganiban (C.J., Chairperson), Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez
and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.Note.—That
the power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is
not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government such
as the provincial, city and state prosecutors has long been settled in several decisions of the
Supreme Court. (Honasan II vs. Panel of the Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of
Justice, 427 SCRA 46 [2004])——o0o—— Soriano vs. Marcelo, 507 SCRA 571, G.R. No. 167743
November 22, 2006
G.R. No. 175049. November 27, 2008.*HEIRS OF SOFIA NANAMAN LONOY, namely, MANUEL
N. LONOY, OSCAR N. LONOY, WARREN N. LONOY, EXCELINO N. LONOY, EDGAR N. LONOY,
VICTOR N. LONOY, APOLLO N. LONOY, GEMMA N. LONOY-SAMSON, HEIRS OF RODOLFO N.
LONOY (ISABEL A. LONOY, ISABELITA A. LONOY-YOUNG, WINONA A. LONOY, RODERICK A.
LONOY, NANCY A. LONOY-PAYNAEN, ROBERT LONOY, ROMMEL A. LONOY, RAFAEL A. LONOY,
ZENAIDA LONOY-OPADA, HONEYLYN A. LONOY, MARITES LONOY CABURNAY, and RODOLFO
LONOY, JR.),HEIRS OF CORNELIA NANAMAN ADIS/ASEQUIA, namely, HEIRS OF ELSA N. ADIS,
BRICCIO N. ADIS, TOMAS N. ADIS, ROMY N. ADIS, JUSTINO N. ADIS, MERCITA N. ASEQUIA, and
TOMASITA N. ASEQUIA,HEIRS OF VICENTE NANAMAN (LUDEM NANAMAN, ET
AL.),_______________* THIRD DIVISION.186186SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDHeirs
of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy vs. Secretary of Agrarian ReformHEIRS OF MANUELA NANAMAN
AMARGA, namely, HEIRS OF CLARITA AMARGA-UBGUIA (VERLITO A. UBGUIA, DANILO A.
UBGUIA, ASTERIO A. UBGUIA, and CARLO A. UBGUIA),HEIRS OF ACOLON AMARGA (ALMIRANTE
AMARGA, SPARTACUS AMARGA, MELVIN AMARGA, and RODRIGO AMARGA), ALONSO N.
AMARGA, HERDA N. AMARGA, DELOS MIMBA AMARGA-TOGONON, HEIRS OF ASCONA
AMARGA UBAGAN (DEMOSTHENES A. UBAGAN, ET AL.),HEIRS OF NICODEMO N. AMARGA
(JIMMY AMARGA, MARIETTA AMARGA, BENIGNO AMARGA, NICODEMO AMARGA, JR., ALMA
AMARGA, FELIX AMARGA, ADOR AMARGA, LYDIA AMARGA, JUDY AMARGA, LOLOT AMARGA,
and MADONNA AMARGA),HEIRS OF ATANACIO NANAMAN AMARGA (GLORIOSA A. APOR,
NESTOR AMARGA, NORVILLA AMARGA, GENITA AMARGA, and GILMA AMARGA),HEIRS OF
OLIVA AMARGA-BADELLES (JOSE I. BADELLES, JIMBO BADELLES, JOHNSON BADELLES, ALITA
BADELLES-JALAGAT, NINIAN BADELLES, JONA A. BADELLES, CEFERINO A. BADELLES, OLIVER
BADELLES, OHARA A. BADELLES, MARIA BADELLES, SARAH A. BADELLES, JEBA A. BADELLES, and
MICHAELA A. BADELLES), andHEIRS OF MANSUETO N. AMARGA (EDNA AMARGA—surviving
spouse of JESSE AMARGA, DEÑA AMARGA-MAGHINAY, and MARLON AMARGA),HEIRS OF
GENARA NANAMAN SAKALL, namely, AMPARO SAKALL-DURANO, BENEDICTO N. SAKALL,
ISABELITA N. SAKALL, FRANCISCA SAKALL MARQUINA, 187VOL. 572, NOVEMBER 27,
2008187Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy vs. Secretary of Agrarian ReformHONORIO N. SAKALL,
VIRGINIA SAKALL ESTANISLAO, and NORMA N. SAKALL,HEIRS OF JULIETA NANAMAN, namely,
HEIRS OF JAIME NANAMAN/RIVERA (ANASTASIA LAUGAM NANAMAN—surviving spouse,
DULSORA NANAMAN, and GUILLERMO NANAMAN),HEIRS OF PIO NANAMAN/ROA (WILMA
NANAMAN, ALFREDO NANAMAN, DELIA NANAMAN, SALVADOR NANAMAN, HEIRS OF RAUL
NANAMAN, EVELYN NANAMAN, VIOLA NANAMAN, EDITHA NANAMAN, PINKY NANAMAN, and
ALEXANDER NANAMAN),HEIRS OF GREGORIO NANAMAN/DACAMPO (VICTOR NANAMAN,
VICENTE NANAMAN, GREGORIO NANAMAN, JR., and VIRGIE NANAMAN), andHEIRS OF
ORLANDO NANAMAN (EMILIA G. NANAMAN—surviving spouse, ALEX NANAMAN, EMMA
NANAMAN, HEIRS OF GEORGINA NANAMAN, GEORGE NANAMAN, RAMIL NANAMAN, and
CAROLYN NANAMAN),HEIRS OF ROSARIO NANAMAN RUEDAS, namely, HEIRS OF BERNARDO N.
RUEDAS (JULIA RUEDAS, JONATHAN RUEDAS, MARLON RUEDAS, MARIVIC RUEDAS, EDITHA
RUEDAS, and MARGIE RUEDAS-POGOY), andHEIRS OF JOSE “FEBE” NANAMAN (SOCORRO
NANAMAN, AIDA NANAMAN, LERMA NANAMAN-MORALES, EDUARDO NANAMAN, JOSEFA
NANAMAN, MARISA NANAMAN, ARTURO NANAMAN, and MARYFLOR NANAMAN), and ATTY.
ELPEDIO CABASAN as Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Gregorio Nanaman, petitioners,
vs. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB), LAND BANK 188188SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATEDHeirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy vs. Secretary of Agrarian ReformOF THE
PHILIPPINES, HEIRS OF NECIFORO CABALUNA, HEIRS OF ABDON MANREAL, TRANQUILINA C.
MANREAL, TITO L. BALLER, HEIRS OF HERCULANO C. BALORIO, ALICIA B. MANREAL, FELIPE D.
MANREAL, SALVACION MANREAL, HEIRS OF DOMINGO N. RICO, HEIRS OF DOMINGO V. RICO,
MACARIO VELORIA, HEIRS OF CUSTODIO M. RICO, HEIRS OF CLEMENTE M. RICO, MARTILLANO
D. OBESO, HEIRS OF PABLO F. RICO, respondents,CITY OF ILIGAN, HEIRS OF JUAN NANAMAN,
HEIRS OF LIMBANIA CABILI MERCADO, HEIRS OF MARIANO ANDRES CABILI,
respondents/unwilling co-petitioners.Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Pleadings and
Practice; Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court does not require that all supporting papers
and documents accompanying a petition be duplicate originals or certified true copies—what it
explicitly directs is that all petitions originally filed before the Court of Appeals shall be
accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order,
resolution or ruling subject thereof.—Section 3 of Rule 46 does not require that all supporting
papers and documents accompanying a petition be duplicate originals or certified true copies.
What it explicitly directs is that all petitions originally filed before the Court of Appeals shall be
accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order,
resolution or ruling subject thereof. Similarly, under Rule 65, governing the remedies of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, petitions for the same need to be accompanied only by
duplicate originals or certified true copies of the questioned judgment, order or resolution.
Other relevant documents and pleadings attached to such petitions may be mere machine
copies thereof. As to petitioners’ Petition for Prohibition in CA-G.R. SP No. 00365, the attached
annexes that were not duplicate originals or certified true copies, namely, Annexes “V,” “W,”
“HH,” “LL,” “NN,” “QQ,” “UU” and “VV,” were mere supporting documents and pleadings
referred to in the petition and were not themselves the judgments, orders or resolutions being
challenged in said Petition. At any rate, petitioners were able to attach certified true copies of
these annexes to their Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal of their Petition.189VOL.
572, NOVEMBER 27, 2008189Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy vs. Secretary of Agrarian
ReformSame; Same; Forum Shopping; The submission of a false certification or non-compliance
with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without
prejudice to the corresponding administrative or criminal actions.—Section 5 of Rule 7 of the
Rules of Court explicitly provides: Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping.—The plaintiff or
principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a
claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith:
(a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same
issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such
other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a
complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the
same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five
(5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been
filed. Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of
the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The
submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall
constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative
and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and
deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and
shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.Same; Same;
Ample jurisprudence exists to the effect that subsequent and substantial compliance of a
petitioner may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure in the interest of justice.—Ample
jurisprudence exists to the effect that subsequent and substantial compliance of a petitioner
may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure in the interest of justice. But to merit the
Court’s liberal consideration, petitioner must show reasonable cause justifying non-compliance
with the rules and must convince the Court that the outright dismissal of the petition would
defeat the administration of justice. Hence, deviation from the requirements of verification and
certification against forum shopping may only be allowed in special
circumstances.190190SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDHeirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy
vs. Secretary of Agrarian ReformProhibition; Words and Phrases; Prohibition is a legal remedy,
provided by the common law, extraordinary in the sense that it is ordinarily available only when
the usual and ordinary proceedings at law or in equity are inadequate to afford redress,
prerogative in character to the extent that it is not always demandable of right, to prevent
courts, or other tribunals, officers, or persons, from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction with
which they have not been vested by law.—Prohibition is a legal remedy, provided by the
common law, extraordinary in the sense that it is ordinarily available only when the usual and
ordinary proceedings at law or in equity are inadequate to afford redress, prerogative in
character to the extent that it is not always demandable of right, to prevent courts, or other
tribunals, officers, or persons, from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction with which they have
not been vested by law. The writ of prohibition, as the name imports, is one which commands
the person to whom it is directed not to do something which, by suggestion of the relator, the
court is informed he is about to do. If the thing be already done, it is manifest the writ of
prohibition cannot undo it, for that would require an affirmative act; and the only effect of a
writ of prohibition is to suspend all action and to prevent any further proceeding in the
prohibited direction. Prohibition, as a rule, does not lie to restrain an act that is already a fait
accompli.Land Registration; Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of
registration and the certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible.—The decree of
registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability
of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing
judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person, including the government and the
branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or
confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance [now
Regional Trial Court] a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later
than one year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case
shall such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has
acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase
“innocent purchaser for value” or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed
to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value. Upon the
expiration of 191VOL. 572, NOVEMBER 27, 2008191Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy vs. Secretary
of Agrarian Reformsaid period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title
issued shall become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in
any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other
persons responsible for the fraud.Prohibition; Land Titles; A certificate of title becomes
indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the issuance
of the order for the issuance of the patent.—A certificate of title becomes indefeasible and
incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the issuance of the order for
the issuance of the patent. Land covered by such title may no longer be the subject matter of a
cadastral proceeding, nor can it be decreed to another person.Same; Same; After the expiration
of the one-year period, a person whose property has been wrongly or erroneously registered in
another’s name may bring an ordinary action for reconveyance, or if the property has passed
into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, Section 32 of the Property Registration
Decree gives petitioners only one other remedy, i.e., to file an action for damages against those
responsible for the fraudulent registration.—After the expiration of the one-year period, a
person whose property has been wrongly or erroneously registered in another’s name may
bring an ordinary action for reconveyance, or if the property has passed into the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value, Section 32 of the Property Registration Decree gives petitioners
only one other remedy, i.e., to file an action for damages against those responsible for the
fraudulent registration.PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the Court of
Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Tomas O. Cabili for petitioners.
Providencio A. Abragan for administrator of the estate of G. Nanaman. Moises G. Dalisay, Jr.
for heirs of Juan Nanaman. Paul Centillas Zaide for private respondents.192192SUPREME
COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDHeirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy vs. Secretary of Agrarian
ReformCHICO-NAZARIO, J.:This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking (a) the reversal of the Resolution1 dated 13 July 2005 of the Twenty-
Second (22nd) Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00365, which dismissed the
Special Civil Action for Prohibition, Declaration of Nullity of Emancipation Patents, Injunction
with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order; and (b) the reversal of the
Resolution2 of the Twenty-First (21st) Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00365
dated 22 September 2006, which denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the
aforementioned Resolution.The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are set forth
hereunder.Action for Reversion of TitleThe spouses Gregorio Nanaman (Gregorio) and Hilaria
Tabuclin (Hilaria) were the owners of a parcel of agricultural land situated in Tambo, Iligan City,
consisting of 34.7 hectares (subject property), upon which they likewise erected their
residence. Living with them on the subject property were Virgilio Nanaman (Virgilio), Gregorio’s
son by another woman, and fifteen tenants.When Gregorio died in 1945, Hilaria administered
the subject property with Virgilio. On 16 February 1954, Hilaria and Virgilio executed a Deed of
Sale3 over the subject property in favor of Jose C. Deleste (Deleste)._______________1 Penned
by Associate Justice Arturo G. Tayag with Associate Justices Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. and Normandie
B. Pizarro, concurring; Rollo, pp. 350-352.2 Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. with
Associate Justices Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores and Mario V. Lopez, concurring; Rollo, pp. 387-
388.3 Records, pp. 132-133.193VOL. 572, NOVEMBER 27, 2008193Heirs of Sofia Nanaman
Lonoy vs. Secretary of Agrarian ReformUpon Hilaria’s death on 15 May 1954, Juan Nanaman
(Juan), Gregorio’s brother, was appointed as special administrator of the estate of the deceased
spouses Gregorio and Hilaria (joint estate). On 16 June 1956, Edilberto Noel (Noel) was
appointed as the regular administrator of the joint estate.The subject property was included in
the list of assets of the joint estate. However, Noel could not take possession of the subject
property since it was already in Deleste’s possession. Thus, on 30 April 1963, Noel filed before
the Court of First Instance (CFI), Branch II, Lanao del Norte, an action against Deleste for the
reversion of title over the subject property to the Estate, docketed as Civil Case No.
698.Through the years, Civil Case No. 698 was heard, decided, and appealed all the way to this
Court in Noel v. Court of Appeals. On 11 January 1995, the Court rendered its Decision4 in Noel,
affirming the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the subject property was the conjugal property
of the late spouses Gregorio and Hilaria, such that the latter could only sell her one-half (1/2)
share therein to Deleste. Consequently, the intestate estate of Gregorio and Deleste were held
to be the co-owners of the subject property, each with a one-half (1/2) interest in the
same.Operation Land Transfer ProgramWhile Civil Case No. 698 was still pending before the
CFI, Presidential Decree No. 275 was issued on 21 October 1972, which mandated that
tenanted rice and corn lands be brought under the Operation Land Transfer Program and be
awarded to farmer beneficiaries. In accordance therewith, the subject_______________4 Noel
v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 89; 240 SCRA 78 (1995).5 Decreeing The Emancipation of Tenants
From the Bondage of The Soil Transferring to Them The Ownership of the Land they Till and
Providing the Instruments and Mechanism Therefor.194194SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATEDHeirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reformproperty was
placed under the Operation Land Transfer Program.On 12 February 1984, the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) in the names of herein private
respondents, the tenants and actual cultivators of the subject property. The CLTs were
registered on 15 July 1986.Subsequently, on 1 August 2001, Original Certificates of Title (OCTs)
and Emancipation Patents (EPs) were issued in favor of the private respondents over their
respective portions of the subject property. Private respondents’ OCTs, EP numbers, and dates
of registration with the Register of Deeds of Iligan City are presented in the table below:Private
RespondentsOCT/EP Nos.Areas(has.)Registration Dates1. Heirs of Neciforo A. CabalunaOCT
No. P-01 (a.f.)/ EP No. 190251 1.0821 Sept. 20012. Heirs of Abdon P. ManrealOCT No. P-02
(a.f.)/ EP No. 000320292.579921 Sept 20013. Tranquilina C. ManrealOCT No. P-03(a.f.)/ EP
No. 1902531.36121 October 20014. Tito L. BallerOCT No. P-04 (a.f.)/ EP No. 190254 .44091
October 20015. Heirs of Herculano BalorioOCT No. P-05 (a.f.)/ EP No. 1902551.79371 October
20016. Alicia B. ManrealOCT No. P-06 (a.f.)/ EP No. 1902561.52331 October 20017. Felipe D.
ManrealOCT No. P-07 (a.f.)/ EP No. 190257 .97601 October 20018. Salvacion ManrealOCT No.
P-08 (a.f.)/ EP No. 190258 .55021 October 20019. Heirs of Domingo N. RicoOCT No. P-09
(a.f.)/ EP No. 1902612.78501 October 200110. Macario VeloriaOCT No. P-10 (a.f.)/ EP No.
190262 .57781 October 200111. Heirs of Custodio M. RicoOCT No. P-11 (a.f.)/ EP No.
1902631.44991 October 200112. Heirs of Clemente M. RicoOCT No. P-12 (a.f.)/ EP No. 190264
.73201 October 200113. Martillano D. ObesoOCT No. P-13 (a.f.)/ EP No. 1902652.04921
October 2001195VOL. 572, NOVEMBER 27, 2008195Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy vs. Secretary
of Agrarian Reform 14. Heirs of Pablo F. RicoOCT No. P-14 (a.f.)/ EP No. 190266 .26081
October 200115. Heirs of Domingo V. RicoOCT No. P-15 (a.f.)/ EP No. 1902671.80361 October
20016 Expropriation CaseDeleste passed away sometime in 1992.About a year earlier, in
1991, the subject property was surveyed. The survey of a portion of the land consisting of
20.2611 hectares, designated as Lot No. 1407, was approved on 8 January 1999.On 22
November 1999, the City of Iligan filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
4, Iligan City, for the expropriation of a 5.4686-hectare portion of Lot No. 1407, docketed as
Civil Case No. 4979. On 11 December 2000, RTC Branch 4 issued a Decision7 granting the
expropriation. Since the true owner of the expropriated portion could not be determined, as
the subject property had not yet been partitioned and distributed to any of the Heirs of
Gregorio and Deleste, the just compensation for the expropriated portion of the subject
property in the amount of P27,343,000.00 was deposited with the Development Bank of the
Philippines in Iligan City, in trust for RTC Branch 4.Petition for Nullification of the Emancipation
Patents (Heirs of Deleste)On 28 January 2002, the Heirs of Deleste,8 filed with the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a petition seeking to nullify private
respondents’ EPs. The petition was docketed as Reg. Case No. X-471-LN-
2002._______________6 Rollo, pp. 158-216.7 Id., at pp. 301-321.8 Josefa L. Deleste, Jose Ray L.
Deleste, Raul Hector L. Deleste and Ruben Alex L. Deleste.196196SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATEDHeirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy vs. Secretary of Agrarian ReformThe Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) rendered a Decision9 on 21 July 2003 declaring that the
EPs were null and void in view of the pending issues of ownership and the subsequent
reclassification of the subject property into a residential/commercial land.On appeal, docketed
as DARAB Case No. 12486, the DARAB reversed the ruling of the PARAD in its Decision10 dated
15 March 2004. The DARAB held, inter alia, that the EPs were valid, since it was the Heirs of
Deleste who should have informed the DAR of the pendency of Civil Case No. 698 at the time
the subject property was placed under the coverage of the Operation Land Transfer Program. It
further found that the question of exemption from the Operation Land Transfer Program lay
within the jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary or his authorized representative. The Heirs of
Deleste filed a Motion for Reconsideration11 of the aforementioned Decision, but the Motion
was denied by the DARAB in its Resolution dated 8 July 2004.The Heirs of Deleste thereafter
filed a Petition for Review12 with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85471,
challenging the Decision and Resolution in DARAB Case No. 12486. The Petition was denied by
the Court of Appeals in a Resolution13 dated 28 October 2004 as material portions of the
record and other supporting papers were not attached thereto, in accordance with Section 6 of
Rule 43.14 The Motion for Re-_______________9 Rollo, pp. 542-553.10 Penned by Assistant
Secretary Augusto P. Quijano with Undersecretary Rolando G. Mangulabnan, Assistant
Secretary Lorenzo R. Reyes and Assistant Secretary Rustico T. de Belen, concurring; Rollo, pp.
217-232.11 Rollo, pp. 659-674.12 Id., at pp. 685-704.13 Id., at pp. 705-706.14 Sec. 6.
Contents of the petition.—The petition for review shall (a) state the full names of the parties to
the case, without impleading the court or agencies either as petitioners or
respondents;197VOL. 572, NOVEMBER 27, 2008197Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy vs. Secretary
of Agrarian Reformconsideration15 of the Heirs of Deleste was likewise denied by the appellate
court in a Resolution16 dated 13 September 2005 for being pro forma.17Petition for
Prohibition During the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 85471 before the Court of Appeals, a
Petition for Prohibition, Declaration of Nullity of Emancipation Patents Issued by DAR and the
Corresponding [Original Certificates of Title] Issued by the [Land Registration Authority],
Injunction with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)18 was filed on 7 June 2005 by
herein petitioners Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy, et al. with the Court of Appeals, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 00365.Petitioners are more than one hundred twenty (120) individuals who
claim to be the descendants of Fulgencio Nanaman, Gregorio’s brother, and who collectively
assert their right to a share in Gregorio’s estate. Arguing that they were deprived of their
inheritance by virtue of the improper issuance of the EPs to private respondents without notice
to them, petitioners prayed that a TRO be forthwith issued,_______________(b) contain a
concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the review;
(c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award,
judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of such
material portions of the record referred to therein and other supporting papers; and (d) contain
a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule
42. The petition shall state the specific material dates showing that it was filed within the
period fixed herein.15 Rollo, pp. 707-730.16 Id., at pp. 734-736.17 On 25 January 2006, the
Heirs of Deleste filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Court, which was docketed
as G.R. No. 169913. As of the writing of this decision, the above-mentioned case is still pending
with the Second Division.18 Rollo, pp. 65-143.198198SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATEDHeirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reformprohibiting the DAR
Secretary, the Land Registration Authority (LRA), the DARAB, the Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP), as well as the RTC, Branch 4 of Iligan City, from enforcing the EPs and OCTs in the names
of private respondents until CA-G.R. SP No. 00365 was resolved. Petitioners further prayed that
judgment be subsequently rendered declaring the said EPs and the OCTs null and void.In a
Resolution19 dated 13 July 2005, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No.
00365 on the following grounds:“A perusal, however, of the instant petition disclose the
following defects and/or infirmities which constrain us to dismiss the petition:(a.) Annexes
“V,” “W,” “HH,” “LL,” “NN,” “QQ,” “UU” and “VV” are not duplicate originals or certified true
copies in violation to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, hence, sufficient ground for the
dismissal of the petition.(b.) There is no explanation why personal service was not resorted to
by petitioner in serving copies of the petition to adverse parties contrary to the provision of
Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court which provides:Sec. 11. Priorities in modes of
service and filing.—When-ever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers
shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to
other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not
done personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed.(c.)
Petitioners in the instant case are not parties to the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) case who’s (sic) Decision they now seek to be nullified in this
present petition for prohibition.(d.) Although a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) was obtained
in favor of Rodolfo Lonoy who signed in the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping, it can be gleaned, however, that_______________19 Id., at pp. 350-352.199VOL.
572, NOVEMBER 27, 2008199Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy vs. Secretary of Agrarian
Reformother heirs whose names appeared in the SPA have not signed therein. It is also
apparent that there was only one person who signed for the first four (4) heirs of Donny Ruedas
and only one person who signed in some of the heirs of Jose Febe Nanaman in the Special
Power of Attorney executed in favor of Rodolfo Lonoy.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.”Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration20 of the
afore-quoted Resolution, but the said Motion was denied by the appellate court in another
Resolution21 dated 22 September 2006, which reads:“After a careful evaluation of petitioners’
arguments vis-à-vis public respondents’ comment, We resolve to deny the instant motion.While
litigation is not a game of technicalities, and the rules should not be enforced strictly at the cost
of substantial justice, still it does not follow that the Rules of Court may be ignored at will and
at random to the prejudice of the orderly presentation, assessment and just resolution of the
issues. Procedural rules should not be belittled or dismissed simply because they may have
resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantial rights. Like all rules, they are required to be
followed except only for compelling reasons.WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, petitioners’
Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED and Our July 13, 2005 Resolution is
MAINTAINED.”Aggrieved, petitioners now come to this Court via the present Petition for
Review, raising the following issues:I.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED
CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE OR COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HASTILY DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS’
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION, ETC. IN CA-G.R._______________20 Id., at pp. 353-364.21 Id., at
pp. 387-388.200200SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDHeirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy vs.
Secretary of Agrarian ReformSP NO. 00365 ON PURELY TECHNICAL GROUNDS SOME OF WHICH
ARE PATENTLY ERRONEOUS OR UNTRUE.II.IN THE EVENT THAT THE OUTRIGHT AND HASTY
DISMISSAL OF CA-G.R. SP NO. 00365 WILL BE SET ASIDE, WHETHER OR NOT THE OTHER ISSUES
SHOULD BE RESOLVED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT INSTEAD OF REMANDING THE CASE TO THE
COURT OF APPEALS.III.WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN PLACING THE RESIDENTIAL-
COMMERCIAL LOT OF PETITIONERS UNDER THE COVERAGE OF AGRARIAN
REFORM.IV.WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, LRA, AND
DARAB VIOLATED PETITIONERS’ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS BY DEPRIVING
THEM OF THEIR INHERITANCE SHARES IN LOT 1407 WITHOUT IMPLEADING THEM AS
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES AND WITHOUT SERVICE OF SUMMONS UPON THEM.V.WHETHER OR
NOT RESPONDENTS SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, LRA, AND DARAB VIOLATED SECTION
6, RA 6657—COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW, BY PLACING THE INDIVIDUAL
INHERITANCE SHARES OF PETITIONERS IN LOT 1407 WHEN THE SAME IS WAY BELOW THE
LANDOWNER’S RETENTION LIMIT OF FIVE (5) HECTARES [OR SEVEN (7) HECTARES UNDER PD
27].VI.WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENTS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN MAKING PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARIES DESPITE THE UNDISPUTABLE ABSENCE OF CONSENT,
AGRICULTURAL201VOL. 572, NOVEMBER 27, 2008201Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform PRODUCTION, SHARING OF HARVESTS, AND OTHER ELEMENTS OF
A LEGITIMATE TENANCY RELATIONSHIP.VII.WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENTS ACTED
WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN REVIEWING [AND] OVERRULING JUDICIAL
DECISIONS CONSIDERING THAT THE POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OVER ACTS OF THE
EXECUTIVE OR LEGISLATIVE BRANCH BELONGS TO THE JUDICIARY AND NOT VICE
VERSA.[VIII.]WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENTS ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN
REVIEWING AND OVERRULING THE EARLIER JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF JUST
COMPENSATION BY RTC BRANCH 4, ILIGAN CITY, RE LOT 1407 PORTION AFFECTED BY THE
INTEGRATED BUS TERMINAL [AND] BAGSAKAN MARKET. [IX.]WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC
RESPONDENTS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN EXPROPRIATING THROUGH AGRARIAN REFORM LAND ALREADY JUDICIALLY
EXPROPRIATED FOR THE INTEGRATED BUS TERMINAL AND BAGSAKAN MARKET.22The primary
issue for resolution of this Court is whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in
dismissing outright petitioners’ Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 00365, without considering the merits
thereof.In its assailed Resolution dated 13 July 2005, the appellate court dismissed CA-G.R. SP
No. 00365 on several procedural grounds, among which was petitioner’s failure to attach to
their Petition the duplicate originals or certified true copies of some of their annexes, in
violation of Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court._______________22 Id., at pp. 1015-1017.
202202SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDHeirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy vs. Secretary of
Agrarian ReformThe Court of Appeals was mistaken in this regard.It should be recalled that
petitioners initiated before the Court of Appeals, in its original jurisdiction, CA-G.R. SP No.
00365, a Petition for Prohibition.Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court states the
requirements for a petition originally filed before the Court of Appeals, relevant portions of
which are reproduced below:“Sec. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance
with requirements.—x x x xIt shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof
of service thereof on the respondent with the original copy intended for the court indicated as
such by the petitioner, and shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or
certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material
portions of the record as are referred to therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent
thereto. The certification shall be accomplished by the proper clerk of court or by his duly
authorized representative, or by the proper officer of the court, tribunal, agency or office
involved or by his duly authorized representative. The other requisite number of copies of the
petition shall be accompanied by clearly legible plain copies of all documents attached to the
original.”Reference is also made to Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, particularly
governing petitions for prohibition, which pertinently provides:“Sec. 2. Petition for
Prohibition.—x x x xThe petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of the
judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant
and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third
paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.”Section 3 of Rule 46 does not require that all supporting
papers and documents accompanying a petition be duplicate203VOL. 572, NOVEMBER 27,
2008203Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform originals or certified
true copies. What it explicitly directs is that all petitions originally filed before the Court of
Appeals shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the
judgment, order, resolution or ruling subject thereof. Similarly, under Rule 65, governing the
remedies of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, petitions for the same need to be
accompanied only by duplicate originals or certified true copies of the questioned judgment,
order or resolution.23 Other relevant documents and pleadings attached to such petitions may
be mere machine copies thereof.24 As to petitioners’ Petition for Prohibition in CA-G.R. SP No.
00365, the attached annexes that were not duplicate originals or certified true copies, namely,
Annexes “V,”25 “W,”26 “HH,”27 “LL,”28 “NN,”29 “QQ,”30 “UU”31 and “VV,”32 were mere
supporting documents and pleadings referred to in the petition and were not themselves the
judgments, orders or resolutions being challenged in said Petition. At any rate, petitioners were
able to attach certified true copies of these annexes_______________23 Garcia v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 171098, 26 February 2008, 546 SCRA 595, 603-604.24 Id.25 Opposition
and/or Manifestation on the Joint Motion of Atty. Zaide.26 Certified Copy of 22 April 2005
Order of RTC Branch 1 in Spl. Proc. 596 granting the joint motion filed by Atty. Cabili, et al. to
complete partition of the NANAMAN share in Lot No. 1407, etc. consisting of 11.6259 hectares,
more or less, among the numerous heirs of GREGORIO NANAMAN.27 Letter of Regional Officer
Rajah, Housing & Land Use Regulatory Board, Cotabato City, to the effect that the 1975 Zoning
Ordinance was approved on 21 September 1978.28 Ordinance No. 99-3653.29 Cash Deposit Slip
from the Development Bank of the Philippines.30 Copy of the Decision and Entry of Judgment
in CA-G.R. SP No. 55370 entitled City of Iligan v. Hon. Macarambon.31 Business Permit No.
001947-0 issued to Fortunata Lira.32 Business Permit No. 002333-0 issued to Fortunata
Lira.204204SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDHeirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy vs. Secretary
of Agrarian Reformto their Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal of their
Petition.Another ground for which CA-G.R. SP No. 00365 was dismissed by the Court of Appeals
was the alleged failure by petitioners to provide an explanation as to why the Petition therein
was served upon adverse parties by registered mail instead of personal service, as required by
Section 11, Rule 1333 of the Rules of Court. To the contrary, petitioners provided such an
explanation,34 except that it was incorporated into the main body of the Petition, right before
the statement of the Relief prayed for. It was clearly stated therein that:EXPLANATION FOR
SERVICE BY MAILCopies of this petition were served upon respondents SECRETARY OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, LRA, DARAB, LBP, and counsels of other respondents to save time and
costs considering the number of parties to be served and the far distance of [the] LBP Office in
Cagayan de Oro City, the DAR/DARAB offices in Diliman, Quezon City, and the LRA office in East
Ave. corner NIA Road, Diliman, Quezon City. The Court, however, agrees with the Court of
Appeals that the failure of all the petitioners to sign the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in
favor of Rodolfo Lonoy, authorizing him to sign the verification and certification against forum
shopping on their behalf, was fatal to their Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 00365.Section 5 of Rule 7
of the Rules of Court explicitly provides:_______________33 Sec. 11. Priorities in modes of
service and filing.—When-ever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers
shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to
other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not
done personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed.34
Rollo, p. 139.205VOL. 572, NOVEMBER 27, 2008205Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy vs. Secretary
of Agrarian ReformSec. 5. Certification against forum shopping.—The plaintiff or principal
party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for
relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that
he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in
any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other
action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or
similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days
therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been
filed.Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of
the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The
submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall
constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative
and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and
deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and
shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.”In PET Plans,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals,35 this Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ dismissal of the petition,
since the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was signed by the company’s vice
president for legal affairs/corporate secretary without any showing that he was authorized to
do so.Indeed, ample jurisprudence exists to the effect that subsequent and substantial
compliance of a petitioner may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure in the interest of
justice. But to merit the Court’s liberal consideration, petitioner must show reasonable cause
justifying non-compliance with the rules and must convince the Court that the outright dis-
_______________35 G.R. No. 148287, 23 November 2004, 443 SCRA 510.206206SUPREME
COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDHeirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy vs. Secretary of Agrarian
Reformmissal of the petition would defeat the administration of justice.36 Hence, deviation
from the requirements of verification and certification against forum shopping may only be
allowed in special circumstances.In the present case, petitioners failed to provide the Court
with sufficient justification for the suspension or relaxation of the rules in their favor. In their
Motion for Reconsideration of the 13 July 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, petitioners
merely claimed that some of them signed for their co-petitioners, while others were at work so
that they could not sign the SPA in favor of Rodolfo Lonoy. Needless to say, the reason is flimsy
and unsatisfactory. That other petitioners were at work does not make it impossible to secure
their signatures, only a little more inconvenient. It is not, therefore, unreasonable for the Court
to demand in this case compliance with the requirements for proper verification of the Petition
and execution of the certificate against shopping.Furthermore, the Court takes note of another
procedural lapse committed by petitioners justifying the dismissal of their Petition for
Prohibition in CA-G.R. SP No. 00365, for it was the wrong remedy for them to pursue.According
to Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a petition for prohibition may be availed of under
the following circumstances:“Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition.—When the proceedings of any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may
file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered com-_______________36 United Paragon Mining Corporation v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 150959, 4 August 2006, 497 SCRA 638, 647-648.207VOL. 572, NOVEMBER
27, 2008207Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reformmanding the
respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or
otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.”Prohibition is a legal
remedy, provided by the common law, extraordinary in the sense that it is ordinarily available
only when the usual and ordinary proceedings at law or in equity are inadequate to afford
redress, prerogative in character to the extent that it is not always demandable of right, to
prevent courts, or other tribunals, officers, or persons, from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction
with which they have not been vested by law.37The writ of prohibition, as the name imports, is
one which commands the person to whom it is directed not to do something which, by
suggestion of the relator, the court is informed he is about to do. If the thing be already done, it
is manifest the writ of prohibition cannot undo it, for that would require an affirmative act; and
the only effect of a writ of prohibition is to suspend all action and to prevent any further
proceeding in the prohibited direction.38 Prohibition, as a rule, does not lie to restrain an act
that is already a fait accompli.39In this case, a close reading of the Petition for Prohibition filed
by the petitioners before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00365 would reveal that the
same is essentially more of an action for the nullification of the allegedly invalid EPs and OCTs
issued in the names of private respondents. The writ of prohibition is only sought by petitioners
to prevent the implementation of the EPs and OCTs. Considering that such EPs and OCTs were
issued in 2001, they had become indefeasible and incontrovertible by the time petitioners
instituted_______________37 Feria, “Civil Procedure Annotated,” Vol. II (2001 ed.), pp. 475-
476.38 Cabañero and Mangornong v. Torres, 61 Phil. 522, 525 (1935).39 Aguinaldo v.
Commission on Elections, 368 Phil. 253, 263; 308 SCRA 770, 780 (1999).208208SUPREME
COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDHeirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy vs. Secretary of Agrarian
ReformCA-G.R. SP No. 00365 in 2005, and may no longer be judicially reviewed.Section 32 of
the Property Registration Decree unequivocally provides:“Sec. 32. Review of decree of
registration; Innocent purchaser for value.The decree of registration shall not be reopened or
revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected
thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments, subject, however, to the
right of any person, including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of
any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual
fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] a petition for
reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one year from and after the
date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be
entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an
interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase “innocent purchaser for
value” or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent
lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value. Upon the expiration of said period of one
year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible.
Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by
action for damages against the applicant or any other persons responsible for the fraud.”In
Estribillo v. Department of Agrarian Reform,40 the Court affirmed the long-settled doctrine that
certificates of title issued in administrative proceedings are as indefeasible as certificates of title
issued in judicial proceedings. In the case at bar, the DAR had already issued the corresponding
OCTs after granting EPs to the tenant-beneficiaries in compliance_______________40 G.R. No.
159674, 30 June 2006, 494 SCRA 218.209VOL. 572, NOVEMBER 27, 2008209Heirs of Sofia
Nanaman Lonoy vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reformwith Presidential Decree No. 27 and Section
10541 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.
Hence, the OCTs issued to petitioners pursuant to their EPs have already acquired the same
protection accorded to other certificates of title issued judicially or administratively.A
certificate of title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year
from the date of the issuance of the order for the issuance of the patent. Land covered by such
title may no longer be the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding, nor can it be decreed to
another person.42_______________41 Sec. 105. Certificates of Land Transfer Emancipation
Patents.—The Department of Agrarian Reform shall pursuant to P.D. No. 27 issue in duplicate, a
Certificate of Land Transfer for every land brought under “Operation Land Transfer,” the
original of which shall be kept by the tenant-farmer and the duplicate, in the Registry of Deeds.
After the tenant-farmer shall have fully complied with the requirements for a grant of title
under P.D. No. 27, an Emancipation Patent which may cover previously titled or untitled
property shall be issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform.The Register of Deeds shall
complete the entries on the aforementioned Emancipation Patent and shall assign an original
certificate of title number in case of unregistered land, and in case of registered property, shall
issue the corresponding transfer certificate of title without requiring the surrender of the
owner’s duplicate of the title to be cancelled.In case of death of the grantee, the Department of
Agrarian Reform shall determine his heirs or successors-in-interest and shall notify the Register
of Deeds accordingly. In case of subsequent transfer of property covered by an Emancipation
Patent or a Certificate of Title emanating from an Emancipation Patent, the Register of Deeds
shall affect the transfer only upon receipt of the supporting papers from the Department of
Agrarian Reform.No fee, premium, of tax of any kind shall be charged or imposed in connection
with the issuance of an original Emancipation Patent and for the registration or related
documents.42 Estribillo v. Department of Agrarian Reform, supra note 40 at pp. 236-
237.210210SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDHeirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy vs. Secretary
of Agrarian ReformPrivate respondents’ EPs were issued in their favor on 1 August 2001 and
their OCTs were correspondingly issued and subsequently registered with the Register of Deeds
of Iligan City on 21 September 2001 and 1 October 2001. Petitioners directly went to the Court
of Appeals, instead to the Regional Trial Court as mandated by Section 32 of the Property
Registration Decree, to seek the nullification of the said EPs and OCTs and only on 7 June 2005,
or almost four (4) years after the issuance and registration thereof. Petitioners failed to
vindicate their rights within the one-year period from issuance of the certificates of title as the
law requires.After the expiration of the one-year period, a person whose property has been
wrongly or erroneously registered in another’s name may bring an ordinary action for
reconveyance,43 or if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for
value, Section 32 of the Property Registration Decree gives petitioners only one other remedy,
i.e., to file an action for damages against those responsible for the fraudulent
registration.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby
DENIED. No costs.SO ORDERED.Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Carpio,** Austria-Martinez and
Reyes, JJ., concur.Petition denied.Note.—An action for reconveyance respects the decree of
registration as incontrovertible but seeks the transfer of property, which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered_______________43 Gonzales v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
69622, 29 January 1988, 157 SCRA 587, 600.** Justice Antonio T. Carpio was designated to sit
as additional member replacing Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura per Raffle dated 21
October 2007. Heirs of Sofia Nanaman Lonoy vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 572 SCRA 185,
G.R. No. 175049 November 27, 2008
G.R. No. 144681. June 21, 2004.* PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION (PRC), CHAIRMAN
HERMOGENES P. POBRE, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER ARMANDO PASCUAL, BOARD OF
MEDICINE, CHAIRMAN RODOLFO P. DE GUZMAN, JOSE S. RAMIREZ, JUANITO B. BILLOTE,
RUBEN R. POLICARPIO, EDGARDO T. FERNANDO and RICARDO D. FULGENCIO II, petitioners, vs.
ARLENE V. DE GUZMAN, VIOLETA V. MENESES, CELERINA S. NAVARRO, JOSE RAMONCITO P.
NAVARRO, ARNEL V. HERRERA and GERALDINE ELIZABETH M. PAGILAGAN, ELNORA R.
RAQUENO, MARISSA A. REGODON, LAURA M. SANTOS, KARANGALAN D. SERRANO, DANILO A.
VILLAVER, MARIA ROSARIO L. LEONOR, ALICIA S. LIZANO, MARITEL M. ECHIVERRI, BERNADETTE
T. MENDOZA, FERNANDO F. MANDAPAT, ALELI A. GOLLAYAN, ELCIN C. ARRIOLA,
HERMINIGILDA E. CONEJOS, SALLY B. BUNAGAN, ROGELIO B. ANCHETA, OSCAR H. PADUA, JR.,
EVELYN D. GRAJO, EVELYN S. ACOSTA, MARGARITA BELINDA L. VICENCIO, VALENTINO P.
ARBOLEDA, EVELYN O. RAMOS, ACHILLES J. PERALTA, CORAZON M. CRUZ, LEUVINA P. CHICO,
JOSEPH A. JAO, MA. LUISA S. GUTIERREZ, LYDIA C. CHAN, OPHELIA C. HIDALGO, FERNANDO T.
CRUZ, MELVIN M. USITA, RAFAEL I. TOLENTINO, GRACE E. UY, CHERYL R. TRIGUERO, MICHAEL L.
SERRANO, FEDERICO L. CASTILLO, MELITA J. CAÑEDO, SAMUEL B. BANGOY, BERNARDITA B. SY,
GLORIA T. JULARBAL, FREDERICK D. FRANCISCO, CARLOS M. BERNARDO, JR., HUBERT S.
NAZARENO, CLARISSA_______________ * SECOND DIVISION.
506 506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC) vs. De Guzman B. BACLIG, DAYMINDA G. BONTUYAN, BERNADETTE H.
CABUHAT, NANCY J. CHAVEZ, MARIO D. CUARESMA, ERNESTO L. CUE, EVELYN C. CUNDANGAN,
RHONEIL R. DEVERATURDA, DERILEEN D. DORADO, SAIBZUR N. EDDING, VIOLETA C. FELIPE,
HERMINIO V. FERNANDEZ, JR., MARIA VICTORIA M. LACSAMANA, NORMA G. LAFAVILLA, RUBY
B. LANTIN, MA. ELOISA Q. MALLARI, CLARISA SJ. NICOLAS, PERCIVAL H. PANGILINAN, ARNULFO
A. SALVADOR, ROBERT B. SANCHEZ, MERLY D. STA. ANA and YOLANDA P. UNICA,
respondents.Actions; Mandamus; Words and Phrases; “Mandamus”, Explained.—Mandamus is
a command issuing from a court of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the
sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person
requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the
official station of the party to whom the writ is directed, or from operation of law. Section 3 of
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure outlines two situations when a writ of mandamus
may issue, when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully (1) neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust,
or station; or (2) excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the
other is entitled. Same; Same; Physicians; Medical Act of 1959; Statutory Construction; It is a
basic rule in statutory construction that each part of a statute should be construed in
connection with every other part to produce a harmonious whole, not confining construction to
only one section; To determine whether the petitioners Professional Regulation Commission
and the Board of Medicine members had the ministerial obligation to administer the
Hippocratic Oath to respondents-examinees and register them as physicians, recourse must be
had to the entirety of the Medical Act of 1959.—The appellate court relied on a single
provision, Section 20 of Rep. Act No. 2382, in concluding that the petitioners had the ministerial
obligation to administer the Hippocratic Oath to respondents and register them as physicians.
But it is a basic rule in statutory construction that each part of a statute should be construed in
connection with every other part to produce a harmonious whole, not confining construction to
only one section. The intent or meaning of the statute should be ascertained from the statute
taken as a whole, not from an isolated part of the provision. Accordingly, Section 20 of Rep. Act
No. 2382, as amended should be read in conjunction with the other provisions of the Act. Thus,
to determine whether the petitioners had the ministerial obligation to administer the
Hippocratic Oath to respondents and register them as physicians, recourse must be had to the
entirety of the Medical Act of 1959. 507 VOL. 432, JUNE 21, 2004 507 Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) vs. De Guzman Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In statutory
construction, the term “shall” is a word of command.—A careful reading of Section 20 of the
Medical Act of 1959 discloses that the law uses the word “shall” with respect to the issuance of
certificates of registration. Thus, the petitioners “shall sign and issue certificates of registration
to those who have satisfactorily complied with the requirements of the Board.” In statutory
construction the term “shall” is a word of command. It is given imperative meaning. Thus, when
an examinee satisfies the requirements for the grant of his physician’s license, the Board is
obliged to administer to him his oath and register him as a physician, pursuant to Section 20
and par. (1) of Section 22 of the Medical Act of 1959. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The
surrounding circumstances in the instant case call for serious inquiry concerning the
satisfactory compliance with the Board requirements by the respondents-examinees.—The
surrounding circumstances in this case call for serious inquiry concerning the satisfactory
compliance with the Board requirements by the respondents. The unusually high scores in the
two most difficult subjects was phenomenal, according to Fr. Nebres, the consultant of PRC on
the matter, and raised grave doubts about the integrity, if not validity, of the tests. These
doubts have to be appropriately resolved. Under the second paragraph of Section 22, the Board
is vested with the power to conduct administrative investigations and “disapprove applications
for examination or registration,” pursuant to the objectives of Rep. Act No. 2382 as outlined in
Section 1 thereof. In this case, after the investigation, the Board filed before the PRC, Adm.
Case No. 1687 against the respondents to ascertain their moral and mental fitness to practice
medicine, as required by Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 2382. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The
operative word in Section 8 of R.A. No. 2382 is “satisfactorily”, defined as “sufficient to meet a
condition or obligation” or “capable of dispelling doubt or ignorance.”—Section 8 of Rep. Act
No. 2382 prescribes, among others, that a person who aspires to practice medicine in the
Philippines, must have “satisfactorily passed the corresponding Board Examination.” Section 22,
in turn, provides that the oath may only be administered “to physicians who qualified in the
examinations.” The operative word here is “satisfactorily,” defined as “sufficient to meet a
condition or obligation” or “capable of dispelling doubt or ignorance.” Gleaned from Board
Resolution No. 26, the licensing authority apparently did not find that the respondents
“satisfactorily passed” the licensure examinations. The Board instead sought to nullify the
examination results obtained by the respondents. Same; Same; Same; Same; The function of
mandamus is not to establish a right but to enforce one that has been established by law.—The
function of mandamus is not to establish a right but to enforce one that has
508 508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC) vs. De Guzman been established by law. If no legal right has been violated,
there can be no application of a legal remedy, and the writ of mandamus is a legal remedy for a
legal right. There must be a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded. It
is long established rule that a license to practice medicine is a privilege or franchise granted by
the government. Same; Same; Same; Same; The power to regulate the exercise of a profession
or pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised by the State or its agents in an arbitrary,
despotic, or oppressive manner.—It must be stressed, nevertheless, that the power to regulate
the exercise of a profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised by the State or its
agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner. A political body that regulates the
exercise of a particular privilege has the authority to both forbid and grant such privilege in
accordance with certain conditions. Such conditions may not, however, require giving up one’s
constitutional rights as a condition to acquiring the license. Under the view that the legislature
cannot validly bestow an arbitrary power to grant or refuse a license on a public agency or
officer, courts will generally strike down license legislation that vests in public officials
discretion to grant or refuse a license to carry on some ordinarily lawful business, profession, or
activity without prescribing definite rules and conditions for the guidance of said officials in the
exercise of their power. Same; Same; Same; Same; Verily, to be granted the privilege to practice
medicine, the applicant must show that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications—without a definite showing that the aforesaid requirements and conditions
have been satisfactorily met, the courts may not grant the writ of mandamus to secure said
privilege without thwarting the legislative will.—In the present case, the aforementioned
guidelines are provided for in Rep. Act No. 2382, as amended, which prescribes the
requirements for admission to the practice of medicine, the qualifications of candidates for the
board examinations, the scope and conduct of the examinations, the grounds for denying the
issuance of a physician’s license, or revoking a license that has been issued. Verily, to be
granted the privilege to practice medicine, the applicant must show that he possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Furthermore, it must appear that he has fully
complied with all the conditions and requirements imposed by the law and the licensing
authority. Should doubt taint or mar the compliance as being less than satisfactory, then the
privilege will not issue. For said privilege is distinguishable from a matter of right, which may be
demanded if denied. Thus, without a definite showing that the aforesaid requirements and
conditions have been satisfactorily met, the courts may not grant the writ of mandamus to
secure said privilege without thwarting the legislative will. 509 VOL. 432, JUNE 21, 2004 509
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) vs. De Guzman Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
does not apply where a pure question of law is raised.—Section 26 of the Medical Act of 1959
provides for the administrative and judicial remedies that respondents herein can avail to
question Resolution No. 26 of the Board of Medicine, namely: (a) appeal the unfavorable
judgment to the PRC; (b) should the PRC ruling still be unfavorable, to elevate the matter on
appeal to the Office of the President; and (c) should they still be unsatisfied, to ask for a review
of the case or to bring the case to court via a special civil action of certiorari. Thus, as a rule,
mandamus will not lie when administrative remedies are still available. However, the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply where, as in this case, a pure question
of law is raised. On this issue, no reversible error may, thus, be laid at the door of the appellate
court in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, when it refused to dismiss Civil Case No. 93-66530.PETITION for
review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.The facts are stated
in the opinion of the Court. The Solicitor General for petitioners. Ericson O. Ang for private
respondents.TINGA, J.:This petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure seeks to nullify the Decision,1 dated May 16, 2000, of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 37283. The appellate court affirmed the judgment2 dated December 19, 1994, of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 52, in Civil Case No. 93-66530. The trial court
allowed the respondents to take their physician’s oath and to register as duly licensed
physicians. Equally challenged is the Resolution3 promulgated on August 25, 2000 of the Court
of Appeals, denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration. _______________ 1 Rollo, pp. 44-
67. Penned by Associate Justice Cancio C. Garcia, with Associate Justices B.A. Adefuin-De la
Cruz, and Renato C. Dacudao concurring. 2 CA Rollo, pp. 140-175. 3 Supra, note 1 at p. 408.
Penned by Associate Justice Cancio C. Garcia, with Associate Justices B.A. Adefuin-De la Cruz,
and Renato C. Dacudao, concurring. 510 510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) vs. De Guzman The facts of this case are as
follows:The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela City,
Metro Manila. They passed the Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by
the Board of Medicine (Board). Petitioner Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) then
released their names as successful examinees in the medical licensure examination.Shortly
thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the seventy-nine successful examinees from
Fatima College in the two most difficult subjects in the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry
(Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually and exceptionally high.
Eleven Fatima examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and ten got 100% in OB-Gyne, another
eleven got 99% in Bio-Chem, and twenty-one scored 99% in OB-Gyne. The Board also observed
that many of those who passed from Fatima got marks of 95% or better in both subjects, and
no one got a mark lower than 90%. A comparison of the performances of the candidates from
other schools was made. The Board observed that strangely, the unusually high ratings were
true only for Fatima College examinees. It was a record-breaking phenomenon in the history of
the Physician Licensure Examination.On June 7, 1993, the Board issued Resolution No. 19,
withholding the registration as physicians of all the examinees from the Fatima College of
Medicine.4 The PRC asked the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate whether any
anomaly or irregularity marred the February 1993 Physician Licensure Examination.Prior to the
NBI investigation, the Board requested Fr. Bienvenido F. Nebres, S.J., an expert mathematician
and authority in statistics, and later president of the Ateneo de Manila University, to conduct a
statistical analysis of the results in Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne of the said examination.On June 10,
1993, Fr. Nebres submitted his report. He reported that a comparison of the scores in Bio-Chem
and Ob-Gyne, of the Fatima College examinees with those of examinees from De La Salle
University and Perpetual Help College of Medicine showed that the scores of Fatima College
examinees were not only incredibly high but unusually clustered close to each other. He
concluded _______________ 4 Id., at p. 69. 511 VOL. 432, JUNE 21, 2004 511 Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) vs. De Guzman that there must be some unusual reason creating
the clustering of scores in the two subjects. It must be a cause “strong enough to eliminate the
normal variations that one should expect from the examinees [of Fatima College] in terms of
talent, effort, energy, etc.”5For its part, the NBI found that “the questionable passing rate of
Fatima examinees in the [1993] Physician Examination leads to the conclusion that the Fatima
examinees gained early access to the test questions.”6On July 5, 1993, respondents Arlene V.
De Guzman, Violeta V. Meneses, Celerina S. Navarro, Jose Ramoncito P. Navarro, Arnel V.
Herrera, and Geraldine Elizabeth M. Pagilagan (Arlene V. De Guzman, et al., for brevity) filed a
special civil action for mandamus, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction docketed
as Civil Case No. 93-66530 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 52. Their
petition was adopted by the other respondents as intervenors.Meanwhile, the Board issued
Resolution No. 26, dated July 21, 1993, charging respondents with “immorality, dishonest
conduct, fraud, and deceit” in connection with the Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne examinations. It
recommended that the test results of the Fatima examinees be nullified. The case was
docketed as Adm. Case No. 1687 by the PRC.On July 28, 1993, the RTC issued an Order in Civil
Case No. 93-66530 granting the preliminary mandatory injunction sought by the respondents. It
ordered the petitioners to administer the physician’s oath to Arlene V. De Guzman, et al., and
enter their names in the rolls of the PRC.The petitioners then filed a special civil action for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals to set aside the mandatory injunctive writ, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 31701.On October 21, 1993, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. SP No. 31701, with
the dispositive portion of the Decision ordaining as follows: _______________ 5 Id., at p. 96. 6
Id., at p. 92. 512 512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC) vs. De Guzman “WHEREFORE, this petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the lower court against petitioners is hereby
nullified and set aside.“SO ORDERED.”7Arlene V. de Guzman, et al., then elevated the foregoing
Decision to this Court in G.R. No. 112315. In our Resolution dated May 23, 1994, we denied the
petition for failure to show reversible error on the part of the appellate court.Meanwhile, on
November 22, 1993, during the pendency of the instant petition, the pre-trial conference in
Civil Case No. 93-66530 was held. Then, the parties, agreed to reduce the testimonies of their
respective witnesses to sworn questions-and-answers. This was without prejudice to cross-
examination by the opposing counsel.On December 13, 1993, petitioners’ counsel failed to
appear at the trial in the mistaken belief that the trial was set for December 15. The trial court
then ruled that petitioners waived their right to cross-examine the witnesses.On January 27,
1994, counsel for petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion stating the reasons for her non-
appearance and praying that the cross-examination of the witnesses for the opposing parties
be reset. The trial court denied the motion for lack of notice to adverse counsel. It also denied
the Motion for Reconsideration that followed on the ground that adverse counsel was notified
less than three (3) days prior to the hearing.Meanwhile, to prevent the PRC and the Board from
proceeding with Adm. Case No. 1687, the respondents herein moved for the issuance of a
restraining order, which the lower court granted in its Order dated April 4, 1994.The petitioners
then filed with this Court a petition for certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 115704, to annul the
Orders of the trial court dated November 13, 1993, February 28, 1994, and April 4,
_______________ 7 Id., at p. 175. Penned by Associate Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo and
concurred in by Presiding Justice Santiago M. Kapunan (later a member of the Supreme Court
and now retired) and Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez (now a member of the
Second Division of the Supreme Court). 513 VOL. 432, JUNE 21, 2004 513 Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) vs. De Guzman 1994. We referred the petition to the Court of
Appeals where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 34506.On August 31, 1994, the appellate
court decided CA-G.R. SP No. 34506 as follows:“WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari
with prayer for temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction is GRANTED and the Orders
of December 13, 1993, February 7, 1994, February 28, 1994, and April 4, 1994 of the RTC-
Manila, Branch 52, and all further proceedings taken by it in Special Civil Action No. 93-66530
are hereby DECLARED NULL and VOID. The said RTC-Manila is ordered to allow petitioners’
counsel to cross-examine the respondents’ witnesses, to allow petitioners to present their
evidence in due course of trial, and thereafter to decide the case on the merits on the basis of
the evidence of the parties. Costs against respondents.“IT IS SO ORDERED.”8The trial was then
set and notices were sent to the parties.A day before the first hearing, on September 22, 1994,
the petitioners filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion praying for the partial
reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506, and for the outright
dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530. The petitioners asked for the suspension of the
proceedings.In its Order dated September 23, 1994, the trial court granted the aforesaid
motion, cancelled the scheduled hearing dates, and reset the proceedings to October 21 and
28, 1994.Meanwhile, on October 25, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied the partial motion for
reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506. Thus, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court a
petition for review docketed as G.R. No. 117817, entitled Professional Regulation Commission,
et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.On November 11, 1994, counsel for the petitioners failed to
appear at the trial of Civil Case No. 93-66530. Upon motion of the respondents herein, the trial
court ruled that herein petitioners _______________ 8 Rollo, pp. 199-200. Penned by Associate
Justice Jaime M. Lantin, with Associate Justices Angelina S. Gutierrez (now a member of the
Supreme Court), and Conchita Carpio-Morales (likewise a present member of the Supreme
Court) concurring. 514 514 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC) vs. De Guzman waived their right to cross-examine the herein respondents.
Trial was reset to November 28, 1994.On November 25, 1994, petitioners’ counsel moved for
the inhibition of the trial court judge for alleged partiality. On November 28, 1994, the day the
Motion to Inhibit was to be heard, petitioners failed to appear. Thus, the trial court denied the
Motion to Inhibit and declared Civil Case No. 93-66530 deemed submitted for decision.On
December 19, 1994, the trial court handed down its judgment in Civil Case No. 93-66530, the
fallo of which reads:“WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered ordering the respondents to allow the
petitioners and intervenors (except those with asterisks and footnotes in pages 1 & 2 of this
decision) [sic],9 to take the physician’s oath and to register them as physicians.“It should be
made clear that this decision is without prejudice to any administrative disciplinary action
which may be taken against any of the petitioners for such causes and in the manner provided
by law and consistent with the requirements of the Constitution as any other professionals.“No
costs.“SO ORDERED.”10As a result of these developments, petitioners filed with this Court a
petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 118437, entitled Professional Regulation
Commission v. Hon. David G. Nitafan, praying inter alia, that (1) G.R. No. 118437 be
consolidated with G.R. No. 117817; (2) the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 31,
1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506 be nullified for its failure to decree the dismissal of Civil Case No.
93-66530, and in the alternative, to set aside the decision of the trial _______________ 9 Of
the intervenors in Civil Case No. 93-66530, Achilles Peralta and Evelyn Ramos were dropped as
parties per Order of the trial court dated August 24, 1993. The case was dismissed as to Sally
Bunagan, Reogelio Ancheta, Oscar Padua, Evelyn Grajo, Valentino Arboleda, Carlos Bernardo,
Jr., Mario Cuaresma, Violeta Felipe, and Percival Pangilinan as per Order dated November 25,
1994. Corazon Cruz and Samuel Bangoy were deemed by the trial court no longer entitled to
the avails of the suit for seeking extrajudicial relief from the Board of Medicine, as per its Order
dated November 25, 1994. See CA Rollo, pp. 140-141. 10 CA Rollo, pp. 174-175. 515 VOL.
432, JUNE 21, 2004 515 Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) vs. De Guzman court in
Civil Case No. 93-66530, order the trial court judge to inhibit himself, and Civil Case No. 93-
66530 be re-raffled to another branch.On December 26, 1994, the petitioners herein filed their
Notice of Appeal11 in Civil Case No. 93-66530, thereby elevating the case to the Court of
Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 37283.In our Resolution of June 7, 1995, G.R.
No. 118437 was consolidated with G.R. No. 117817.On July 9, 1998, we disposed of G.R. Nos.
117817 and 118437 in this wise:“WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 117817 is DISMISSED for
being moot. The petition in G.R. No. 118437 is likewise DISMISSED on the ground that there is a
pending appeal before the Court of Appeals. Assistant Solicitor General Amparo M. Cabotaje-
Tang is advised to be more circumspect in her dealings with the courts as a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with accordingly.“SO ORDERED.”12While CA-G.R. SP No.
37283 was awaiting disposition by the appellate court, Arnel V. Herrera, one of the original
petitioners in Civil Case No. 93-66530, joined by twenty-seven intervenors, to wit: Fernando F.
Mandapat, Ophelia C. Hidalgo, Bernadette T. Mendoza, Ruby B. Lantin-Tan, Fernando T. Cruz,
Marissa A. Regodon, Ma. Eloisa Q. Mallari-Largoza, Cheryl R. Triguero, Joseph A. Jao,
Bernadette H. Cabuhat, Evelyn S. Acosta-Cabanes, Laura M. Santos, Maritel M. Echiverri,
Bernadette C. Escusa, Carlosito C. Domingo, Alicia S. Lizano, Elnora R. Raqueno-Rabaino, Saibzur
N. Edding, Derileen D. Dorado-Edding, Robert B. Sanchez, Maria Rosario L. Leonor-Lacandula,
Geraldine Elizabeth M. Pagilagan-Palma, Margarita Belinda L. Vicencio-Gamilla, Herminigilda E.
Conejos, Leuvina P. Chico-Paguio, Elcin C. Arriola-Ocampo, and Jose Ramoncito P. Navarro,
manifested that they were no longer interested in proceeding with the case and moved for its
dismissal. _______________ 11 Id., at p. 205. 12 G.R. Nos. 117817 and 118437, 9 July 1998, 292
SCRA 155, 167. Penned by Associate Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, with Associate Justices Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., Jose C. Vitug, Artemio V. Panganiban, and Leonardo A. Quisumbing concurring. 516
516 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) vs. De
Guzman A similar manifestation and motion was later filed by intervenors Mary Jean I. Yeban-
Merlan, Michael L. Serrano, Norma G. Lafavilla, Arnulfo A. Salvador, Belinda C. Rabara, Yolanda
P. Unica, Dayminda G. Bontuyan, Clarissa B. Baclig, Ma. Luisa S. Gutierrez, Rhoneil R.
Deveraturda, Aleli A. Gollayan, Evelyn C. Cundangan, Frederick D. Francisco, Violeta V.
Meneses, Melita J. Cañedo, Clarisa SJ. Nicolas, Federico L. Castillo, Karangalan D. Serrano,
Danilo A. Villaver, Grace E. Uy, Lydia C. Chan, and Melvin M. Usita. The Court of Appeals ruled
that its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 would not apply to them.On May 16, 2000, the Court
of Appeals decided CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, with the following fallo, to wit:“WHEREFORE, finding
no reversible error in the decision appealed from, We hereby AFFIRM the same and DISMISS
the instant appeal. “No pronouncement as to costs.“SO ORDERED.”13In sustaining the trial
court’s decision, the appellate court ratiocinated that the respondents complied with all the
statutory requirements for admission into the licensure examination for physicians in February
1993. They all passed the said examination. Having fulfilled the requirements of Republic Act
No. 2382,14 they should be allowed to take their oaths as physicians and be registered in the
rolls of the PRC.Hence, this petition raising the following issues:IWHETHER OR NOT
RESPONDENTS HAVE A VALID CAUSE OF ACTION FOR MANDAMUS AGAINST PETITIONERS IN
THE LIGHT OF THE RESOLUTION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN G.R. NO. 112315 AFFIRMING
THE COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION DECLARING THAT IF EVER THERE IS SOME DOUBT AS TO THE
MORAL FITNESS OF EXAMINEES, THE ISSUANCE OF LICENSE TO PRACTICE MEDICINE IS NOT
AUTOMATICALLY GRANTED TO THE SUCCESSFUL EXAMINEES._______________ 13 Rollo, p. 67.
14 The Medical Act of 1959.
517 VOL. 432, JUNE 21, 2004 517 Professional Regulation Commission (PRC)
vs. De Guzman IIWHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS COULD PROCEED DESPITE
THE PENDENCY OF ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1687, WHICH WAS PRECISELY LODGED TO
DETERMINE THE MORAL FITNESS OF RESPONDENTS TO BECOME DOCTORS.15To our mind, the
only issue is: Did the Court of Appeals commit a reversible error of law in sustaining the
judgment of the trial court that respondents are entitled to a writ of mandamus?The
petitioners submit that a writ of mandamus will not lie in this case. They point out that for a
writ of mandamus to issue, the applicant must have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right
to the thing demanded and it is the duty of the respondent to perform the act required. Thus,
mandamus may be availed of only when the duty sought to be performed is a ministerial and
not a discretionary one. The petitioners argue that the appellate court’s decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 37283 upholding the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 93-66530 overlooked its
own pronouncement in CA-G.R. SP No. 31701. The Court of Appeals held in CA-G.R. SP No.
31701 that the issuance of a license to engage in the practice of medicine becomes
discretionary on the PRC if there exists some doubt that the successful examinee has not fully
met the requirements of the law. The petitioners stress that this Court’s Resolution dated May
24, 1994 in G.R. No. 112315 held that there was no showing “that the Court of Appeals had
committed any reversible error in rendering the questioned judgment” in CA-G.R. SP No. 31701.
The petitioners point out that our Resolution in G.R. No. 112315 has long become final and
executory.Respondents counter that having passed the 1993 licensure examinations for
physicians, the petitioners have the obligation to administer to them the oath as physicians and
to issue their certificates of registration as physicians pursuant to Section 2016 of
_______________ 15 Rollo, pp. 28-29. 16 SEC. 20. Issuance of Certificates of Registration,
grounds for refusal of [the] same.—The Commissioner of Civil Service (now Professional
Regulation Commission), the chairman, the members and the Secretary of the Board of Medical
Examiners (now Medical Board) shall sign and issue certificates of registration to those who
have satisfactorily complied with the requirements of the Board. They shall not issue a
certificate of registration to any candidate who has been convicted by a court of competent 518
518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) vs. De
Guzman Rep. Act No. 2382. The Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, found that
respondents complied with all the requirements of Rep. Act No. 2382. Furthermore,
respondents were admitted by the Medical Board to the licensure examinations and had
passed the same. Hence, pursuant to Section 20 of Rep. Act No. 2382, the petitioners had the
obligation to administer their oaths as physicians and register them.Mandamus is a command
issuing from a court of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign,
directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring
the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official
station of the party to whom the writ is directed, or from operation of law.17 Section 3 of Rule
6518 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure outlines two situations when a writ of mandamus
may issue, when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully (1) neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust,
or station; or (2) excludes another _______________ jurisdiction of any criminal offense
involving moral turpitude, or has been found guilty of immoral or dishonorable conduct after
the investigation by the Board of Medical Examiners (now Medical Board), or has been declared
to be of unsound mind. (As amended by Rep. Act No. 4224, which took effect June 19, 1965). 17
See United States v. Boutwell, 17 Wall (US) 604, 21 L. Ed 721; Laizure v. Baker, 11 P. 2d 560;
State ex rel Lyons v. McDowell, 57 A. 2d 94; Rader v. Burton, 122 N.E. 2d 856; Board of
Managers v. City of Wilmington, 70 S.E. 2d 833. 18 SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.—When any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such
other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act
required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained
by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.The petition shall also
contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of
section 3, Rule 46. 519 VOL. 432, JUNE 21, 2004 519 Professional Regulation Commission
(PRC) vs. De Guzman from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the other is
entitled.We shall discuss the issues successively.1. On The Existence of a Duty of the Board of
Medicine To Issue Certificates of Registration as Physicians under Rep. Act No. 2382.For
mandamus to prosper, there must be a showing that the officer, board, or official concerned,
has a clear legal duty, not involving discretion.19 Moreover, there must be statutory authority
for the performance of the act,20 and the performance of the duty has been refused.21 Thus, it
must be pertinently asked now: Did petitioners have the duty to administer the Hippocratic
Oath and register respondents as physicians under the Medical Act of 1959?As found by the
Court of Appeals, on which we agree on the basis of the records:It bears emphasizing herein
that petitioner-appellees and intervenor-appellees have fully complied with all the statutory
requirements for admission into the licensure examinations for physicians conducted and
administered by the respondent-appellants on February 12, 14, 20 and 21, 1993. Stress, too,
must be made of the fact that all of them successfully passed the same examinations.22The
crucial query now is whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that petitioners should
allow the respondents to take their oaths as physicians and register them, steps which would
enable respondents to practice the medical profession23 pursuant to Section 20 of the Medical
Act of 1959?The appellate court relied on a single provision, Section 20 of Rep. Act No. 2382, in
concluding that the petitioners had the min-_______________ 19 See Potter v. Anderson, 392
P. 2d 650; State ex rel Jester v. Paige, 213 P. 2d 441; State ex rel. Sharp v. Cross, 211 P. 2d 760;
St. George v. Hanson, et al., 78 S.E. 2d 885; State ex rel Vander v. Board of County Com’rs., et
al., 135 N.E. 2d 701. 20 See State ex rel Jester v. Paige, supra; Pedroso v. De Walt, et al., 340
S.W. 2d 566. 21 See State Board of Barber Examiners v. Walker, 192 P. 2d 723; State ex rel
Sharp v. Cross, supra; State ex rel Hacharedi v. Baxter, 74 N.E. 2d 242, 332 US 827, 92 L. Ed 402,
68 S. Ct 209. 22 Rollo, p. 58. 23 Id., at p. 59. 520 520 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) vs. De Guzman isterial obligation to administer the
Hippocratic Oath to respondents and register them as physicians. But it is a basic rule in
statutory construction that each part of a statute should be construed in connection with every
other part to produce a harmonious whole, not confining construction to only one section.24
The intent or meaning of the statute should be ascertained from the statute taken as a whole,
not from an isolated part of the provision. Accordingly, Section 20 of Rep. Act No. 2382, as
amended should be read in conjunction with the other provisions of the Act. Thus, to
determine whether the petitioners had the ministerial obligation to administer the Hippocratic
Oath to respondents and register them as physicians, recourse must be had to the entirety of
the Medical Act of 1959.A careful reading of Section 20 of the Medical Act of 1959 discloses
that the law uses the word “shall” with respect to the issuance of certificates of registration.
Thus, the petitioners “shall sign and issue certificates of registration to those who have
satisfactorily complied with the requirements of the Board.” In statutory construction the term
“shall” is a word of command. It is given imperative meaning. Thus, when an examinee satisfies
the requirements for the grant of his physician’s license, the Board is obliged to administer to
him his oath and register him as a physician, pursuant to Section 20 and par. (1) of Section 2225
of the Medical Act of 1959. _______________ 24 Sotto v. Sotto, No. 17768, 1 September 1922,
43 Phil. 688, 694. See also Araneta v. Concepcion and Araneta, No. L-9667, 31 July 1956, 99 Phil.
709, 712. 25 SEC. 22. Administrative investigations.—In addition to the functions provided for in
the preceding sections, the Board of Medical Examiners (now Medical Board) shall perform the
following duties: (1) to administer oath to physicians who qualified in the examinations (stress
supplied); (2) to study the conditions affecting the practice of medicine in all parts of the
Philippines; (3) to exercise the powers conferred upon it by this article with the view of
maintaining the ethical and professional standards of the medical profession; (4) to subpoena
or subpoena duces tecum witnesses for all purposes required in the discharge of its duties; and
(5) to promulgate, with the approval of the Commissioner of Civil Service (now Professional
Regulation Commission), such rules and regulations as it may deem necessary for the
performance of its duties in harmony with the provisions of this Act and necessary for the
proper practice of medicine in the Philippines. 521 VOL. 432, JUNE 21, 2004 521 Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) vs. De Guzman However, the surrounding circumstances in this
case call for serious inquiry concerning the satisfactory compliance with the Board
requirements by the respondents. The unusually high scores in the two most difficult subjects
was phenomenal, according to Fr. Nebres, the consultant of PRC on the matter, and raised
grave doubts about the integrity, if not validity, of the tests. These doubts have to be
appropriately resolved.Under the second paragraph of Section 22, the Board is vested with the
power to conduct administrative investigations and “disapprove applications for examination or
registration,” pursuant to the objectives of Rep. Act No. 2382 as outlined in Section 126
thereof. In this case, after the investigation, the Board filed before the PRC, Adm. Case No. 1687
against the respondents to ascertain their moral and mental fitness to practice medicine, as
required by Section 927 of Rep. Act No. 2382. In its Decision dated July 1, 1997, the Board
ruled: _______________ Administrative investigations shall be conducted by at least two
members of the Medical Board with one legal officer sitting during the investigation, otherwise
the proceedings shall be considered void. The existing rules of evidence shall be observed
during all administrative investigations. The Board may disapprove applications for examination
or registration, reprimand erring physicians, or suspend or revoke registration certificates, if the
respondents are found guilty after due investigation. (As amended by Rep. Act No. 4224,
effective June 19, 1965.) 26 SEC. 1. Objectives.—This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the
standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for registration of
physicians; and (c) the supervision, control, and regulation of the practice of medicine in the
Philippines. 27 SEC. 9. Candidates for board examinations.—Candidates for Board examinations
shall have the following qualifications:(1) He shall be a citizen of the Philippines or a citizen of
any foreign country who has submitted competent and conclusive documentary evidence,
confirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs, showing that his country’s existing laws permit
citizens of the Philippines to practice medicine under the same rules and regulations governing
citizens thereof;(2) He shall be of good moral character;(3) He shall be of sound mind;(4) He
shall not have been convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving
moral turpitude; 522 522 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC) vs. De Guzman “WHEREFORE, the BOARD hereby CANCELS the
respondents[’] examination papers in the Physician Licensure Examinations given in February
1993 and further DEBARS them from taking any licensure examination for a period of ONE (1)
YEAR from the date of the promulgation of this DECISION. They may, if they so desire, apply for
the scheduled examinations for physicians after the lapse of the period imposed by the
BOARD.“SO ORDERED.”28Until the moral and mental fitness of the respondents could be
ascertained, according to petitioners, the Board has discretion to hold in abeyance the
administration of the Hippocratic Oath and the issuance of the certificates to them. The writ of
mandamus does not lie to compel performance of an act which is not duly authorized.The
respondents nevertheless argue that under Section 20, the Board shall not issue a certificate of
registration only in the following instances: (1) to any candidate who has been convicted by a
court of competent jurisdiction of any criminal offense involving moral turpitude; (2) or has
been found guilty of immoral or dishonorable conduct after the investigation by the Board; or
(3) has been declared to be of unsound mind. They aver that none of these circumstances are
present in their case.Petitioners reject respondents’ argument. We are informed that in Board
Resolution No. 26,29 dated July 21, 1993, the Board resolved to file charges against the
examinees from Fatima College of Medicine for “immorality, dishonesty, fraud, and deceit in
the Obstetrics-Gynecology and Biochemistry examinations.” It likewise sought to cancel the
examination results obtained by the examinees from the Fatima College. _______________ (5)
He shall be a holder of the Degree of Doctor of Medicine or its equivalent conferred by a college
of medicine duly recognized by the Government; and(6) He must have completed a calendar
year of technical training known as internship the nature of which shall be prescribed by the
Board of Medical Education undertaken in hospitals and health centers approved by the Board.
(As amended by Rep. Act No. 5946, approved June 21, 1969). 28 Rollo, p. 419. 29 Id., at p. 99.
523 VOL. 432, JUNE 21, 2004 523 Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) vs. De Guzman
Section 830 of Rep. Act No. 2382 prescribes, among others, that a person who aspires to
practice medicine in the Philippines, must have “satisfactorily passed the corresponding Board
Examination.” Section 22, in turn, provides that the oath may only be administered “to
physicians who qualified in the examinations.” The operative word here is “satisfactorily,”
defined as “sufficient to meet a condition or obligation” or “capable of dispelling doubt or
ignorance.”31 Gleaned from Board Resolution No. 26, the licensing authority apparently did not
find that the respondents “satisfactorily passed” the licensure examinations. The Board instead
sought to nullify the examination results obtained by the respondents.2. On the Right Of The
Respondents To Be Registered As PhysiciansThe function of mandamus is not to establish a
right but to enforce one that has been established by law. If no legal right has been violated,
there can be no application of a legal remedy, and the writ of mandamus is a legal remedy for a
legal right.32 There must be a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing
demanded.33 It is long established rule that a license to practice medicine is a privilege or
franchise granted by the government.34It is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional
right35 of every citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable,
and equitable admission and academic requirements.36 But like all rights and freedoms
guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power
_______________ 30 SEC. 8. Prerequisite to the practice of medicine.—No person shall engage
in the practice of medicine in the Philippines unless he is at least twenty-one years of age, has
satisfactorily passed the corresponding Board Examination, and is a holder of a valid Certificate
of Registration duly issued to him by the Board of Medical Examiners (now Medical Board). 31
Webster’s New International Dictionary 2017 (1993 ed.). 32 See Fosdick v. Terry, 117 So. 2d
397, 398; Puritan Coal Corp. v. Davis, 42 S.E. 2d 807, 813. 33 Lemi v. Valencia, No. L-20768, 29
November 1968, 26 SCRA 203, 210; Ocampo v. Subido, No. L-28344, 27 August 1976, 72 SCRA
443, 452-453. 34 See Morse v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 122 S.W. 446, 448 (1909). 35
Const. Art. XIV, Sec. 5 (3). 36 Reyes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 94961 and 96491, 25 February
1991, 194 SCRA 402, 409-410. 524 524 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) vs. De Guzman of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace,
education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people.37 Thus, persons who desire to
engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required
to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. This regulation
takes particular pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the public from the potentially
deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among those who would practice medicine. In a
previous case, it may be recalled, this Court has ordered the Board of Medical Examiners to
annul both its resolution and certificate authorizing a Spanish subject, with the degree of
Licentiate in Medicine and Surgery from the University of Barcelona, Spain, to practice medicine
in the Philippines, without first passing the examination required by the Philippine Medical
Act.38 In another case worth noting, we upheld the power of the State to upgrade the selection
of applicants into medical schools through admission tests.39It must be stressed, nevertheless,
that the power to regulate the exercise of a profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be
exercised by the State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner. A political
body that regulates the exercise of a particular privilege has the authority to both forbid and
grant such privilege in accordance with certain conditions. Such conditions may not, however,
require giving up one’s constitutional rights as a condition to acquiring the license.40 Under the
view that the legislature cannot validly bestow an arbitrary power to grant or refuse a license
on a public agency or officer, courts will generally strike down license legislation that vests in
public officials discretion to grant or refuse a license to carry on some ordinarily lawful
business, profession, or activity without prescribing definite rules and conditions for the
guidance of said officials in the exercise of their power.41 _______________ 37 Primicias v.
Fugoso, No. L-1800, 27 January 1948, 80 Phil. 71, 75. 38 Philippine Medical Association v. Board
of Medical Examiners, No. L-25135, 21 September 1968, 25 SCRA 29. 39 Tablarin v. Judge
Angelina S. Gutierrez, No. L-78164, 31 July 1987, 152 SCRA 730, 743. 40 See Manchester Press
Club v. State Liquor Commission, 200 A. 407, 116 ALR 1093. 41 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 US
356, 30 L.Ed. 220, 6 S. Ct. 1064; City Council of Montgomery v. West, 42 So. 1000; In Re
Porterfield, 168 P. 525 VOL. 432, JUNE 21, 2004 525 Professional Regulation Commission
(PRC) vs. De Guzman In the present case, the aforementioned guidelines are provided for in
Rep. Act No. 2382, as amended, which prescribes the requirements for admission to the
practice of medicine, the qualifications of candidates for the board examinations, the scope and
conduct of the examinations, the grounds for denying the issuance of a physician’s license, or
revoking a license that has been issued. Verily, to be granted the privilege to practice medicine,
the applicant must show that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications. Furthermore, it must appear that he has fully complied with all the conditions
and requirements imposed by the law and the licensing authority. Should doubt taint or mar
the compliance as being less than satisfactory, then the privilege will not issue. For said
privilege is distinguishable from a matter of right, which may be demanded if denied. Thus,
without a definite showing that the aforesaid requirements and conditions have been
satisfactorily met, the courts may not grant the writ of mandamus to secure said privilege
without thwarting the legislative will.3. On the Ripeness of the Petition for MandamusLastly,
the petitioners herein contend that the Court of Appeals should have dismissed the petition for
mandamus below for being premature. They argue that the administrative remedies had not
been exhausted. The records show that this is not the first time that petitioners have sought
the dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530. This issue was raised in G.R. No. 115704, which
petition we referred to the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 34506.
On motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506, the appellate court denied the motion
to dismiss on the ground that the prayers for the nullification of the order of the trial court and
the dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530 were inconsistent reliefs. In G.R. No. 118437, the
petitioners sought to nullify the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506
insofar as it did not order the dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530. In our consolidated decision,
dated July 9, 1998, in G.R. Nos. 117817 & 118437, this Court speaking through Justice Bellosillo
opined that: _______________ 2d 706, 167 ALR 675; Anderson v. City of Wellington, 19 P. 719;
State v. Harris, 6 S.E. 2d 854. 526 526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) vs. De Guzman Indeed, the issue as to whether the Court of
Appeals erred in not ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530 sought to be resolved in
the instant petition has been rendered meaningless by an event taking place prior to the filing
of this petition and denial thereof should follow as a logical consequence.42 There is no longer
any justiciable controversy so that any declaration thereon would be of no practical use or
value.43 It should be recalled that in its decision of 19 December 1994 the trial court granted
the writ of mandamus prayed for by private respondents, which decision was received by
petitioners on 20 December 1994. Three (3) days after, or on 23 December 1994, petitioners
filed the instant petition. By then, the remedy available to them was to appeal the decision to
the Court of Appeals, which they in fact did, by filing a notice of appeal on 26 December
1994.44The petitioners have shown no cogent reason for us to reverse the aforecited ruling.
Nor will their reliance upon the doctrine of the exhaustion of administrative remedies in the
instant case advance their cause any.Section 2645 of the Medical Act of 1959 provides for the
administrative and judicial remedies that respondents herein can avail to question Resolution
No. 26 of the Board of Medicine, namely: (a) appeal the unfavorable judgment to the PRC; (b)
should the PRC ruling still be unfavorable, to elevate the matter on appeal to the Office of the
President; and (c) should they still be unsatisfied, to ask for a review of the case or to bring the
case to court via a special civil action of certiorari. Thus, as a rule, mandamus will not lie when
administrative remedies are still available.46 However, the _______________ 42 Citing Bautista
v. Board of Energy, G.R. No. 75016, 13 January 1989, 169 SCRA 167. 43 Citing Gancho-on v.
Secretary of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 108033, 14 April 1997, 271 SCRA 204, 208. 44
Rollo, pp. 340-341. 45 SEC. 26. Appeal from judgment.—The decision of the Board of Medical
Examiners (now Medical Board) shall automatically become final thirty days after the date of its
promulgation unless the respondent, during the same period, has appealed to the
Commissioner of the Civil Service (now Professional Regulation Commission) and later to the
Office of the President of the Philippines. If the final decision is not satisfactory, the respondent
may ask for a review of the case, or may file in court a petition for certiorari. 46 Ang Tuan Kai &
Co. v. Import Control Commission, No. L-4427, 21 April 1952, 91 Phil. 143, 145; Peralta v.
Salcedo, etc., No. L-10771, 30 April 1957, 101 Phil. 452, 454. 527 VOL. 432, JUNE 21, 2004
527 Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) vs. De Guzman doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply where, as in this case, a pure question of law is
raised.47 On this issue, no reversible error may, thus, be laid at the door of the appellate court
in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, when it refused to dismiss Civil Case No. 93-66530.As we earlier
pointed out, herein respondents Arnel V. Herrera, Fernando F. Mandapat, Ophelia C. Hidalgo,
Bernadette T. Mendoza, Ruby B. Lantin-Tan, Fernando T. Cruz, Marissa A. Regodon, Ma. Eloisa
Q. Mallari-Largoza, Cheryl R. Triguero, Joseph A. Jao, Bernadette H. Cabuhat, Evelyn S. Acosta-
Cabanes, Laura M. Santos, Maritel M. Echiverri, Bernadette C. Escusa, Carlosito C. Domingo,
Alicia S. Lizano, Elnora R. Raqueno-Rabaino, Saibzur N. Edding, Derileen D. Dorado-Edding,
Robert B. Sanchez, Maria Rosario Leonor-Lacandula, Geraldine Elizabeth M. Pagilagan-Palma,
Margarita Belinda L. Vicencio-Gamilla, Herminigilda E. Conejos, Leuvina P. Chico-Paguio, Elcin C.
Arriola-Ocampo, and Jose Ramoncito P. Navarro manifested to the Court of Appeals during the
pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, that they were no longer interested in proceeding with the
case and moved for its dismissal insofar as they were concerned. A similar manifestation and
motion were later filed by intervenors Mary Jean I. Yeban-Merlan, Michael L. Serrano, Norma G.
Lafavilla, Arnulfo A. Salvador, Belinda C. Rabarra, Yolanda P. Unica, Dayminda G. Bontuyan,
Clarissa B. Baclig, Ma. Luisa S. Gutierrez, Rhoneil R. Deveraturda, Aleli A. Gollayan, Evelyn C.
Cundangan, Frederick D. Francisco, Violeta V. Meneses, Melita J. Cañedo, Clarisa SJ. Nicolas,
Federico L. Castillo, Karangalan D. Serrano, Danilo A. Villaver, Grace E. Uy, Lydia C. Chan, and
Melvin M. Usita. Following these manifestations and motions, the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP
No. 37283 decreed that its ruling would not apply to them. Thus, inasmuch as the instant case
is a petition for review of the appellate court’s ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, a decision which
is inapplicable to the aforementioned respondents will similarly not apply to them.As to Achilles
J. Peralta, Evelyn O. Ramos, Sally B. Bunagan, Rogelio B. Ancheta, Oscar H. Padua, Jr., Evelyn D.
Grajo, Valentino P. Arboleda, Carlos M. Bernardo, Jr., Mario D. Cuaresma, Violeta C. Felipe,
Percival H. Pangilinan, Corazon M. Cruz and _______________ 47 See Madrigal v. Lecaroz, G.R.
No. 46218, 23 October 1990, 191 SCRA 20, 26. 528 528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) vs. De Guzman Samuel B. Bangoy,
herein decision shall not apply pursuant to the Orders of the trial court in Civil Case No. 93-
66530, dropping their names from the suit.Consequently, this Decision is binding only on the
remaining respondents, namely: Arlene V. de Guzman, Celerina S. Navarro, Rafael I. Tolentino,
Bernardita B. Sy, Gloria T. Jularbal, Hubert S. Nazareno, Nancy J. Chavez, Ernesto L. Cue,
Herminio V. Fernandez, Jr., Maria Victoria M. Lacsamana and Merly D. Sta. Ana, as well as the
petitioners.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, (1) the assailed decision
dated May 16, 2000, of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, which affirmed the
judgment dated December 19, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 52, in Civil
Case No. 93-66530, ordering petitioners to administer the physician’s oath to herein
respondents as well as the resolution dated August 25, 2000, of the appellate court, denying
the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and (2) the writ of
mandamus, issued in Civil Case No. 93-66530, and affirmed by the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP
No. 37283 is NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE.SO ORDERED. Puno (Chairman) and Callejo, Sr., JJ.,
concur. Quisumbing, J., No Part. Austria-Martinez, J., No Part. On Leave.Petition granted,
assailed decision and resolution reversed and set aside, writ of mandamus nullified and set
aside.Notes.—A party’s claim for “back wages” could be the appropriate subject of an ordinary
civil action, not mandamus. (Manalo vs. Gloria, 236 SCRA 130 [1994]) Even where a decision has
been rendered by a Department Secretary, an alter ego of the President under the Doctrine of
Qualified Political Agency, an appeal to the President is still proper where the law expressly
provides for exhaustion. (Valencia vs. Court of Appeals, 401 SCRA 666 [2003])——o0o——
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) vs. De Guzman, 432 SCRA 505, G.R.
No. 144681 June 21, 2004
G.R. No. 111876. January 31, 1996.* JOHANNA SOMBONG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and MARIETTA NERI ALVIAR, LILIBETH NERI and all persons holding the subject child ARABELLA
SOMBONG in their custody, respondents.Constitutional Law; Habeas Corpus; The essential
object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary
restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is
illegal.—In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a
particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas
corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of
liberty. “The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of
liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person
therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is
sufficient.” Same; Same; In order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint
of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.—
Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty
must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. This is the
basic requisite under the first part of Section 1, Rule 102, of the Revised Rules of Court, which
provides that “except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall
extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his
liberty.” Same; Same; The writ is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the
custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of her own free
will.—In the second part of ____________________________ * FIRST DIVISION.
664 664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Sombong vs. Court of
Appeals the same provision, however, Habeas Corpus may be resorted to in cases where “the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.” Thus, although the
Writ of Habeas Corpus ought not to be issued if the restraint is voluntary, we have held time
and again that the said writ is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody
of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of her own free will. Same;
Same; The writ of habeas corpus is presented for the purpose of determining the right of
custody over a child.—It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the question
of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of
the writ as a remedy; rather, the writ of habeas corpus is prosecuted for the purpose of
determining the right of custody over a child. Same; Same; In habeas corpus proceedings, the
question of identity is relevant and material, subject to the usual presumptions including those
as to identity of person.—Petitioner does not have the right of custody over the minor Cristina
because, by the evidence disclosed before the court a quo, Cristina has not been shown to be
petitioner’s daughter, Arabella. The evidence adduced before the trial court does not warrant
the conclusion that Arabella is the same person as Cristina. It will be remembered that, in
habeas corpus proceedings, the question of identity is relevant and material, subject to the
usual presumptions including those as to identity of person. These presumptions may yield,
however, to the evidence proffered by the parties. Civil Law; Child and Youth Welfare Code; The
code provides that in all questions regarding the care and custody, among others, of the child,
his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.—Considering that the child’s welfare is an
all-important factor is custody cases, the Child and Youth Welfare Code unequivocally provides
that in all questions regarding the care and custody, among others, of the child, his welfare
shall be the paramount consideration. In the same vein, the Family Code authorizes the courts
to, if the welfare of the child so demands, deprive the parents concerned of parental authority
over the child or adopt such measures as may be proper under the circumstances.
665 VOL. 252, JANUARY 31, 1996 665 Sombong vs. Court of Appeals PETITION
for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.The facts are stated in the opinion
of the Court. Ninfa N. Ward for petitioner. Josefin de Alban Law Office for private
respondent.HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:Every so often two women claim to be the legitimate parent
of the same child. One or the other, whether for financial gain or for sheer cupidity, should be
an impostor. The court is consequently called upon to decide as to which of them should have
the child’s lawful custody. This is the very nature of this case. The child herein had considerably
grown through the years that this controversy had unbearably lagged. The wisdom of the ages
should be of some help, delicate as the case considerably is. The earliest recorded decision on
the matter is extant in the Bible, I Kings 3. As it appears, King Solomon in all his glory resolved
the controversy posed by two women claiming the same child:“And the King said, Bring me a
sword. And they brought a sword before the King.“And the King said, Divide the living child in
two, and give half to the one, and half to the other.“Then spoke the woman whose the living
child was unto the King, for her bowels yearned upon her son, and she said, O my Lord, give her
the living child, and in no wise slay it. But the other said, Let it be neither mine nor thine, but
divide it.“Then the King answered and said, Give her the living child, and in no wise slay it; she is
the mother thereof.” (1 Kings, Chapter 3, Verses 25-27)King Solomon’s wisdom, was inspired by
God:“And all Israel heard of the judgment which the King had judged; and they feared the King:
for they saw that the wisdom of God was in him, to do judgment.” (Ibid, Verse 28).
666 666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Sombong vs. Court of
Appeals We do resolve the herein controversy inspired by God’s own beloved King.The Petition
for Review on Certiorari before us seeks the reversal of the decision1 of respondent Court of
Appeals2 which had reversed the decision3 of the Regional Trial Court4 which granted the
Petition for Habeas Corpus filed by petitioner.The following facts were developed by the
evidence presented by the opposing parties:Petitioner is the mother of Arabella O. Sombong
who was born on April 23, 1987 in Signal Village, Taguig, Metro Manila.5 Some time in
November, 1987, Arabella, then only six months old, was brought to the Sir John Clinic, located
at 121 First Avenue, Kalookan City, for relief of coughing fits and for treatment of colds.
Petitioner did not have enough money to pay the hospital bill in the amount of P300.00.
Arabella could not be discharged, then, because of the petitioner’s failure to pay the bill.
Petitioner surprisingly gave testimony to the effect that she allegedly paid the private
respondents by installments in the total amount of P1,700.00, knowing for a fact that the sum
payable was only P300.00. Despite such alleged payments, the owners of the clinic, Dra.
Carmen Ty and her husband, Mr. Vicente Ty, allegedly refused to turn over Arabella to her.
Petitioner claims that the reason for such a ____________________________ 1 Decision in CA-
G.R. SP No. 30574 penned by Associate Justice Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros and promulgated on
August 31, 1993; Rollo, pp. 30-41. 2 Sixth Division with members, Presiding Justice Nathanael P.
de Pano, Jr. and Associate Justices Asaali S. Isnani and Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros. 3 Decision in
Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-13700 penned by Judge Rodolfo A. Ortiz and promulgated on January 28,
1993; Rollo, pp. 42-51. 4 Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89. 5 Certified Xerox Copy
of the Certification of Live Birth of Arabella O. Sombong, dated April 7, 1992, issued by the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Taguig, Metro Manila; Rollo, p. 52. 667 VOL. 252,
JANUARY 31, 1996 667 Sombong vs. Court of Appeals refusal was that she refused to go out
on a date with Mr. Ty, who had been courting her. This allegedly gave Dra. Ty a reason to be
jealous of her, making it difficult for everyone all around.On the other hand and in contrast to
her foregoing allegations, petitioner testified that she visited Arabella at the clinic only after
two years, i.e., in 1989. This time, she did not go beyond berating the spouses Ty for their
refusal to give Arabella to her. Three years thereafter, i.e., in 1992, petitioner again resurfaced
to lay claim to her child. Her pleas allegedly fell on deaf ears.Consequently, on May 21, 1992,
petitioner filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the issuance of a Writ
of Habeas Corpus against the spouses Ty. She alleged therein that Arabella was being
unlawfully detained and imprisoned at No. 121, First Avenue, Grace Park, Kalookan City. The
petition was denied due course and summarily dismissed,6 without prejudice, on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction, the alleged detention having been perpetrated in Kalookan City.Petitioner,
thereafter, filed a criminal complaint7 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Kalookan City
against the spouses Ty. Dra. Ty, in her counter-affidavit, admitted that petitioner’s child,
Arabella, had for some time been in her custody. Arabella was discharged from the clinic in
April, 1989, and was, in the presence of her clinic staff, turned over to someone who was
properly identified to be the child’s guardian.In the face of the refusal of the spouses Ty to turn
over Arabella to her, she had sought the help of Barangay Captains Alfonso and Bautista of
Kalookan City, Mayor Asistio of the same city, and even Congresswoman Hortensia L. Starke
____________________________ 6 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City dated May
22, 1992. 7 I.S. No. 18-1506. 668 668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Sombong vs.
Court of Appeals of Negros Occidental. Their efforts to help availed her nothing.On September
4, 1992, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Kalookan City, on the basis of petitioner’s
complaint, filed an information8 against the spouses Ty for Kidnapping and Illegal Detention of
a Minor before the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City.9 On September 16, 1992, an order for
the arrest of the spouses Ty was issued in the criminal case. Facing arrest, Dra. Ty disclosed the
possibility that the child, Arabella, may be found at No. 23 Jesus Street, San Francisco del
Monte, Quezon City. The agents of the National Bureau of Investigation went to said address
and there found a female child who answered to the name of Cristina Grace Neri. Quite
significantly, the evidence disclosed that the child, Cristina, had been living with respondent
Marietta Neri Alviar since 1988. When she was just a baby, Cristina was abandoned by her
parents at the Sir John Clinic. On April 18, 1988, Dra. Fe Mallonga, a dentist at the Sir John Clinic
and niece of both Dra. Ty and respondent Alviar, called the latter up to discuss the possibility of
turning over to her care one of the several abandoned babies at the said clinic. Respondent
Alviar was told that this baby whose name was unknown had long been abandoned by her
parents and appeared to be very small, very thin, and full of scabies. Taking pity on the baby,
respondent Alviar and her mother, Maura Salacup Neri, decided to take care of her. This baby
was baptized at the Good Samaritan Church on April 30, 1988. Her Certificate of Baptism10
indicates her name to be Cristina Grace S. Neri; her birthday to be April 30, 1987; her birthplace
to be Quezon City; and her foster father and foster mother to be Cicero Neri and Maura
Salacup, respectively. Respondent Alviar was invited by the National Bureau of Investigation for
questioning on September 22, 1992 in the presence of Dra. Ty and petitioner. Cris-
____________________________ 8 Docketed as Crim. Case No. C-40946. 9 Branch 123. 10
True Copy of the Certificate of Baptism of Cristina Grace S. Neri; Rollo, p. 55. 669 VOL. 252,
JANUARY 31, 1996 669 Sombong vs. Court of Appeals tina was also brought along by said
respondent. At that confrontation, Dra. Ty could not be sure that Cristina was indeed
petitioner’s child, Arabella. Neither could petitioner with all certainty say that Cristina was her
long lost daughter.On October 13, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of
Habeas Corpus with the Regional Trial Court11 of Quezon City. The trial court conducted a total
of eight (8) hearings, for the period, from October 28, 1992 to December 11, 1992. On January
15, 1993, it rendered a decision granting the Petition for Habeas Corpus and ordering
respondent Alviar to immediately deliver the person of Cristina Grace Neri to the petitioner, the
court having found Cristina to be the petitioner’s long lost child, Arabella.The trial court, in
justification of its conclusions, discussed that:“On the issue of whether or not the minor child,
in question, is the daughter of the petitioner, there seems to be no question, to the mind of this
Court, that the petitioner, is, indeed, the mother of the child, registered by the name of
Arabella O. Sombong, per her Certificate of Birth x x x and later caused to be baptized as
Cristina Grace S. Nery (sic) x x x For, this child is the same child which was delivered by the Sir
John Clinic at Kalookan City, owned by Dra. Carmen Ty, to Dra. Fe Mallonga and later given to
the custody of the respondents. In fact, Dra. Carmen Ty, in her testimony admitted that the
petitioner is the mother of Arabella x x xOn the question of whether or not the petitioner has
the rightful custody of the minor child, in question, which is being withheld by the respondents
from her, as will authorize the granting of the petition for habeas corpus x x x there is no
question that the minor x x x is only about five (5) years old x x x it follows that the child must
not be separated from the mother, who is the petitioner, unless, of course, this Court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise.Heretofore, under the New Civil Code of the Philippines,
the compelling reasons which may deprive the parents of their authority or suspend exercise
thereof are stated. It was then provided in Article 332, supra, that:
____________________________ 11 Branch 89.
 670 670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Sombong vs. Court of
Appeals ‘The courts may deprive the parents of their authority x x x if they should treat their
children with excessive harshness x x x or abandon them. x x x’ (Italics supplied by the
RTC)Unfortunately, the foregoing article, which was under Title XI, parental authority, was
expressly repealed by Article 254 of the Family Code of the Philippines x x xx x x x x x x x
xIt can be seen, therefore, that the words ‘or abandoned them’ mentioned in Article 332 of the
New Civil Code x x x is (sic) no longer mentioned in the amending (of) Art. 231 of the Family
Code of the Philippines.It is clear x x x that under the law presently controlling, abandonment is
no longer considered a compelling reason upon the basis of which the Court may separate the
child below seven (7) years old from the mother.Conceivably, however, in paragraph 6 of Article
231, supra, the effects of culpable negligence on the part of the parent may be considered by
this Court in suspending petitioner’s parental authority over her daughter, in question x x xThe
question, therefore, is whether there is culpable negligence on the part of the petitioner so that
her parental authority over her child, in question, may at least be suspended by this Court.This
Court is not persuaded that the petitioner is guilty of culpable negligence vis-a-vis her daughter,
in question, upon the bases of the facts adduced. For, there is no question that from April, 1988
she kept on demanding from Dra. Carmen Ty x x x the return of her child to her but the latter
refused even to see her or to talk to her. Neither did Vicente Ty, the husband of Dra. Carmen
Ty, respond to her entreaties to return her daughter.x x x x x x x x xBesides, in the interim,
while petitioner was looking for her daughter, she made representations for her recovery with
Barangay Captains Alfonso and Bautista, and Mayor Asistio, all of Kalookan City, as well as with
Congresswoman Hortensia L. Starke to intervene in her behalf.It cannot be said, therefore, no
matter how remotely, that the petitioner was negligent, nay culpably, in her efforts for the
recovery of her daughter.
671 VOL. 252, JANUARY 31, 1996 671 Sombong vs. Court of Appeals x x x x
x x x x xCertainly, the respondents have no right to the parental authority of the child,
superior to that of the petitioner as they are not her parents. They have, therefore, no right to
the custody of petitioner’s daughter. The Sir John Clinic, or Dra. Carmen Ty, have (sic) no right
to deliver the child, in question, to Dra. Fe Mallonga. Neither had the latter the right and the
authority to gave (sic) the child to the respondents, whose custody of petitioner’s daughter is,
consequently, illegal.”12Herein private respondents filed an appeal from the decision of the
Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals. The Appellate Court took cognizance of the
following issues: (1) The propriety of the habeas corpus proceeding vis-a-vis the problem
respecting the identity of the child subject of said proceeding; (2) If indeed petitioner be the
mother of the child in question, what the effect would proof of abandonment be under the
circumstances of the case; and (3) Will the question of the child’s welfare be the paramount
consideration in this case which involves child custody.The Court of Appeals reversed and set
aside the decision of the trial court, ruling as it did that:“x x x the lower court erred in
sweepingly concluding that petitioner’s child Arabella Sombong and respondents’ foster child
Cristina Neri are one and the same person to warrant the issuance of the writ. x x xAs clearly
stated in the facts of this case, not even petitioner herself could recognize her own child when
respondents’ foster child Cristina Neri was presented to her before the NBI and respondent
court. Dr. Carmen Ty at the NBI investigation could not also ascertain whether or not Cristina
Neri and petitioner’s missing child are one and the same
person.____________________________ 12 Decision of the RTC of Quezon City in Sp. Proc. No.
Q-092-13700, pp. 5-10; Rollo, pp. 46-51.
672 672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Sombong vs. Court of
Appeals Before the lower court, petitioner-appellee presented two physicians from the Sir John
Clinic, namely, Dr. Carmen Ty and Dr. Angelina Trono to identify the child in question. But both
witnesses could not positively declare that Cristina Neri is the same missing child Arabella
Sombong of petitioner. Dr. Trono even declared in court that there were other babies left in the
clinic and that she could not be certain which baby was given to respondents (pp. 48-49, tsn,
Nov. 10, 1992). x x x Petitioner, herself, could not identify her own child, prompting the
respondent court to call for child Cristina Neri to come forward near the bench for comparison
of her physical features with that of her alleged mother, the petitioner (p. 32, tsn, Nov. 5,
1992). After a comparison of petitioner and Cristina Neri’s physical features, the lower court
found no similarity and to which petitioner agreed claiming that said child looked like her sister-
in-law (p. 33, id). When the lower court instructed petitioner to bring said sister-in-law in the
next hearing, petitioner stated they were not on good terms (p. 34, id.) No one, therefore, up to
this time has come forward to testify as a witness in order to positively identify respondents’
child Cristina Neri to be one and the same as petitioner’s missing child, Arabella Sombong.x x x
x x x x x xThe issuance of a writ of habeas corpus does not lie in this case considering that
petitioner is not entitled to the custody of Cristina Neri because she is not the mother of the
said child, and does not have the right to have custody over said child.x x x x x x x x xWe
do not agree with the lower court that the ground of abandonment of a child has been
repealed by Art. 231 of the Family Code for abandonment can also be included under the
phrase ‘cases which have resulted from culpable negligence of the parent’ (par. 2, Art. 231 of
the Family Code). What can be the worst culpable negligence of a parent than abandoning her
own child. This court does not believe petitioner-appellee’s explanation that she had been
negotiating for the discharge of her child for the past five years. That was too long a time for
negotiation when she could have filed immediately a complaint with the authorities or the
courts x x xAs to the issue of the welfare of the child, petitioner-appellee’s capability to give her
child the basic needs and guidance in life appear (sic) to be bleak. Before the lower court
petitioner-appellee filed a motion to litigate as pauper as she had no fixed income. She also
admitted that she had no stable job, and she had been separated
673 VOL. 252, JANUARY 31, 1996 673 Sombong vs. Court of Appeals from a
man previously married to another woman. She also confessed that she planned to go abroad
and leave her other child Johannes to the care of the nuns. The child Arabella Sombong
wherever she is certainly does not face a bright prospect with petitioner-appellee.”13This
prompted the petitioner to file this petition.We do not find the petition to be meritorious.
While we sympathize with the plight of petitioner who has been separated from her daughter
for more than eight years, we cannot grant her the relief she is seeking, because the evidence
in this case does not support a finding that the child, Cristina, is in truth and in fact her child,
Arabella; neither is there sufficient evidence to support the finding that private respondents’
custody of Cristina is so illegal as to warrant the grant of a Writ of Habeas Corpus. In general,
the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular person is
legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an
actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. “The writ of
habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime
specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential
object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary
restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is
illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.”14Fundamentally, in
order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the
nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. This is the basic requisite
under the first part of Section 1, ____________________________ 13 Decision of the Court of
Appeals, pp. 6-11; Rollo, pp. 35, 37-41. 14 Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778. 674 674
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Sombong vs. Court of Appeals Rule 102, of the
Revised Rules of Court, which provides that “except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the
writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty.”In the second part of the same provision, however, Habeas
Corpus may be resorted to in cases where “the rightful custody of any person is withheld from
the person entitled thereto.” Thus, although the Writ of Habeas Corpus ought not to be issued
if the restraint is voluntary, we have held time and again that the said writ is the proper legal
remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the
custody of a third person of her own free will.15It may even be said that in custody cases
involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying
rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy; rather, the writ of habeas corpus is
prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child.The controversy
does not involve the question of personal freedom, because an infant is presumed to be in the
custody of someone until he attains majority age. In passing on the writ in a child custody case,
the court deals with a matter of an equitable nature. Not bound by any mere legal right of
parent or guardian, the court gives his or her claim to the custody of the child due weight as a
claim founded on human nature and considered generally equitable and just. Therefore, these
cases are decided, not on the legal right of the petitioner to be relieved from unlawful
imprisonment or detention, as in the case of adults, but on the court’s view of the best
interests of those whose welfare requires that they be in custody of one person or another.
Hence, the court is not bound to deliver a child into the custody of any claimant or of any
person, but should, in the consideration of the facts, leave it in such custody as its welfare at
the time appears to require. In short, the child’s welfare is the supreme consideration.
____________________________ 15 Salvana v. Gaela, 55 Phil. 680. 675 VOL. 252, JANUARY
31, 1996 675 Sombong vs. Court of Appeals Considering that the child’s welfare is an all-
important factor in custody cases, the Child and Youth Welfare Code16 unequivocally provides
that in all questions regarding the care and custody, among others, of the child, his welfare
shall be the paramount consideration.17 In the same vein, the Family Code authorizes the
courts to, if the welfare of the child so demands, deprive the parents concerned of parental
authority over the child or adopt such measures as may be proper under the
circumstances.18The foregoing principles considered, the grant of the writ in the instant case
will all depend on the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the petitioner has the
right of custody over the minor; (2) that the rightful custody of the minor is being withheld from
the petitioner by the respondent; and (3) that it is to the best interest of the minor concerned
to be in the custody of petitioner and not that of the respondent.Not all of these requisites
exist in this case. The dismissal of this petition is thus warranted. I As to the question of
identity.Petitioner does not have the right of custody over the minor Cristina because, by the
evidence disclosed before the court a quo, Cristina has not been shown to be petitioner’s
daughter, Arabella. The evidence adduced before the trial court does not warrant the
conclusion that Arabella is the same person as Cristina. It will be remembered that, in habeas
corpus proceedings, the question of identity is relevant and material, subject to the usual
presumptions including those as to iden-____________________________ 16 Presidential
Decree No. 603, as amended. 17 Id., Article 8. 18 Family Code of the Philippines, Article 231.
676 676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Sombong vs. Court of Appeals tity of
person.19 These presumptions may yield, however, to the evidence proffered by the
parties.“Identity may be thought of as a quality of a person or thing,—the quality of sameness
with another person or thing. The essential assumption is that two persons or things are first
thought of as existing, and that then the one is alleged, because of common features, to be the
same as the other.”20Evidence must necessarily be adduced to prove that two persons, initially
thought of to be distinct and separate from each other, are indeed one and the same. The
process is both logical and analytical.“x x x it operates by comparing common marks found to
exist in the two supposed separate objects of thought, with reference to the possibility of their
being the same. It follows that its force depends on the necessariness of the association
between the mark and a single object. Where a certain circumstance, feature, or mark, may
commonly be found associated with a large number of objects, the presence of that feature or
mark in two supposed objects is little indication of their identity, because x x x the other
conceivable hypotheses are so numerous, i.e., the objects that possess that mark are numerous
and therefore any two of them possessing it may well be different. But where the objects
possessing the mark are only one or a few, and the mark is found in two supposed instances,
the chances of two being different are ‘nil’ or are comparatively small.Hence, in the process of
identification of two supposed objects, by a common mark, the force of the inference depends
on the degree of necessariness of association of that mark with a single object.For simplicity’s
sake, the evidential circumstance may thus be spoken of as ‘a mark.’ But in practice it rarely
occurs that the evidential mark is a single circumstance. The evidencing feature is usually a
group of circumstances, which as a whole constitute a feature capable of being associated with
a single object. Rarely can one circumstance alone be so inherently peculiar to a single object. It
is ____________________________ 19 Section 192, 39A C.J.S., p. 99. 20 Wigmore, John Henry,
Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Vol. 2, 1940 Edition, p. 385.
677 VOL. 252, JANUARY 31, 1996 677 Sombong vs. Court of Appeals by
adding circumstance to circumstance that we obtain a composite feature or mark which as a
whole cannot be supposed to be associated with more than a single object.The process of
constructing an inference of identity thus consists usually in adding together a number of
circumstances, each of which by itself might be a feature of many objects, but all of which
together make it more probable that they co-exist in a single object only. Each additional
circumstance reduces the chances of there being more than one object so associated.”21In the
instant case, the testimonial and circumstantial proof establishes the individual and separate
existence of petitioner’s child, Arabella, from that of private respondents’ foster child,
Cristina.We note, among others, that Dr. Trono, who is petitioner’s own witness, testified in
court that, together with Arabella, there were several babies left in the clinic and so she could
not be certain whether it was Arabella or some other baby that was given to private
respondents. Petitioner’s own evidence shows that, after the confinement of Arabella in the
clinic in 1987, she saw her daughter again only in 1989 when she visited the clinic. This
corroborates the testimony of petitioner’s own witness, Dra. Ty, that Arabella was physically
confined in the clinic from November, 1987 to April, 1989. This testimony tallies with her
assertion in her counter-affidavit to the effect that Arabella was in the custody of the hospital
until April, 1989. All this, when juxtaposed with the unwavering declaration of private
respondents that they obtained custody of Cristina in April, 1988 and had her baptized at the
Good Samaritan Church on April 30, 1988, leads to the conclusion that Cristina is not
Arabella.Significantly, Justice Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros, herself a mother and the ponente of
the herein assailed decision, set the case for hearing on August 30, 1993 primarily for the
purpose of observing petitioner’s demeanor towards the minor
____________________________ 21 Ibid, pp. 384-386. 678 678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED Sombong vs. Court of Appeals Cristina. She made the following personal but
relevant manifestation:“The undersigned ponente as a mother herself of four children, wanted
to see how petitioner as an alleged mother of a missing child supposedly in the person of
Cristina Neri would react on seeing again her long lost child. The petitioner appeared in the
scheduled hearing of this case late, and she walked inside the courtroom looking for a seat
without even stopping at her alleged daughter’s seat; without even casting a glance on said
child, and without even that tearful embrace which characterizes the reunion of a loving
mother with her missing dear child. Throughout the proceedings, the undersigned ponente
noticed no signs of endearment and affection expected of a mother who had been deprived of
the embrace of her little child for many years. The conclusion or finding of undersigned
ponente as a mother, herself, that petitioner-appellee is not the mother of Cristina Neri has
been given support by aforestated observation x x x.”22The process of constructing an
inference of identity having earlier been explained to consist of adding one circumstance to
another in order to obtain a composite feature or mark which as a whole cannot be supposed
to be associated with more than a single object, the reverse is also true, i.e., when one
circumstance is added to another, and the result is a fortification of the corporeality of each of
the two objects the identity of which is being sought to be established, the nexus of
circumstances correspondingly multiply the chances of there being more than one object so
associated. This is the situation that confronts us in this case, and so the inevitable but sad
conclusion that we must make is that petitioner has no right of custody over the minor Cristina,
because Cristina is not identical with her missing daughter, Arabella.
____________________________ 22 Decision of the Court of Appeals, p. 11; Rollo, p. 35. 679
VOL. 252, JANUARY 31, 1996 679 Sombong vs. Court of Appeals II Private respondents not
unlawfully witholding custody.Since we hold that petitioner has not been established by
evidence to be entitled to the custody of the minor Cristina on account of mistaken identity, it
cannot be said that private respondents are unlawfully withholding from petitioner the rightful
custody over Cristina. At this juncture, we need not inquire into the validity of the mode by
which private respondents acquired custodial rights over the minor, Cristina. This matter is not
ripe for adjudication in this instant petition for habeas corpus. III Private respondents have the
interest of the child Cristina at heart.We find that private respondents are financially, physically
and spiritually in a better position to take care of the child, Cristina. They have the best interest
of Cristina at heart. On the other hand, it is not to the best interest of the minor, Cristina, to be
placed in the custody of petitioner, had the petitioner’s custody rights over Cristina been
established. The Court of Appeals gave the reason:“As to the issue of the welfare of the child,
petitioner-appellee’s capability to give her child the basic needs and guidance in life appear (sic)
to be bleak. Before the lower court petitioner-appellee filed a motion to litigate as pauper as
she had no fixed income. She also admitted that she had no stable job, and she had been
separated from a man previously married to another woman. She also confessed that she
planned to go abroad and leave her other child Johannes to the care of the nuns. The child
Arabella Sombong
680 680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Sombong vs. Court of
Appeals wherever she is certainly does not face a bright prospect with petitioner-
appellee.”23In the light of the aforegoing premises, we are constrained to rule that Habeas
Corpus does not lie to afford petitioner the relief she seeks.WHEREFORE, the appealed decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 30574 is AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against
petitioner.SO ORDERED. Padilla (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ.,
concur.Decision affirmed in toto.Note.—The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement by which any person is deprived of his liberty. (Ordoñez vs. Vinarao, 239 SCRA 114
Sombong vs. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 663, G.R. No. 111876 January 31, 1996
 G.R. No. 230324. September 19, 2017.*

LORIE MARIE TOMAS CALLO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER JAIME H. MORENTE, BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION, OIC ASSOCIATES COMMISSIONERS, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, and BRIAN
ALAS, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, respondents.

Constitutional Law; Writ of Amparo; Extralegal Killings; Enforced Disappearances; The

protective writ of amparo is a judicial remedy to expeditiously provide relief to violations of a
person’s constitutional right to life, liberty, and security, and more specifically, to address the
problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.—The protective
writ of amparo is a judicial remedy to expeditiously provide relief to violations of a person’s
constitutional right to life, liberty, and security, and more specifically, to address the problem of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-
12-SC provides: Sec. 1. Petition.—The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The
writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The writ of amparo covers extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof.—The writ of amparo covers extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof. Enforced disappearance is defined under Republic Act (RA)
No. 9851, Section 3(g) of which provides: (g) “Enforced or involuntary disappearance of
persons” means the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization followed by a refusal to
acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of
those persons, with the intention of removing from the protection of the law for a prolonged
period of time.

_______________
* EN BANC.
192192SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDCallo vs. Morente

Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Extralegal Killings” and “Enforced
Disappearances,” Defined.—This Court also had the opportunity to define extralegal killings and
enforced disappearance: Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law,
i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced
disappearance has been defined by the Court as the arrest, detention, abduction or any other
form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting
with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the
disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law.
Same; Same; Rule on the Writ of Amparo; In Navia v. Pardico, 673 SCRA 618 (2012), the
Supreme Court (SC) clarified that with the enactment of Republic Act (RA) No. 9851, the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo is now a procedural law anchored, not only on the constitutional right to
life, liberty, and security, but also on a concrete statutory definition of “enforced or involuntary
disappearance.”—In Navia v. Pardico, 673 SCRA 618 (2012), this Court clarified that with the
enactment of RA No. 9851, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo is now a procedural law anchored,
not only on the constitutional right to life, liberty, and security, but also on a concrete statutory
definition of “enforced or involuntary disappearance.” Further, elements constituting enforced
disappearance as defined under RA No. 9851 were clearly laid down by this Court, viz.: (a) that
there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty; (b) that it be
carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization; (c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to
acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the
amparo petition; and (d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from
the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
Same; Same; Parties; While “any person” may file a petition for the writ of habeas corpus, in a
petition for the writ of amparo, the order of priority on who can file the petition should be
strictly followed.—While “any person” may file a petition for the writ of habeas corpus, in a
petition for the writ of amparo, the order of priority on who can file the petition should be
strictly followed. In this case,
193VOL. 840, SEPTEMBER 19, 2017193Callo vs. Morente

there was no allegation nor proof that Parker had no immediate family members or any
ascendant, descendant, or collateral relative within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity. In fact, no allegation was made on any of the familial relationship of Parker as only her
whereabouts from 2011 were alleged and discussed. Therefore, based on the order of priority,
Callo had no legal standing to file this petition.

PETITION for Writ of Amparo.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Hercules P. Guzman for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

CARPIO,** J.:

The Case

This is a petition for a writ of amparo (with Prayer to Issue Interim Reliefs of Immediate Release
of Danielle Tan Parker from Detention) under A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC (The Rule on the Writ of
Amparo). Petitioner Lorie Marie Tomas Callo (Callo) seeks the immediate release of Danielle
Tan Parker from the Immigration Detention Facility, Camp Bagong Diwa in Bicutan, Taguig City.

The Facts

Danielle Tan Parker (Parker) is a holder of Philippine Passport No. XX5678508 issued by the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) on 5 March 2010 and valid until 4 March 2015.
On 15 January 2013, Parker was charged for deportation for being an undesirable,
undocumented, and overstaying

_______________
** Designated Acting Chief Justice per Special Order No. 2483 dated 14 September 2017.

194194SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDCallo vs. Morente

alien, in violation of Section 37(a)(7) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, in
relation to Rule XVI, Office Memorandum No. ADD-01-004. It was alleged that Danielle
Nopuente was a fugitive from justice in the United States of America with an outstanding arrest
warrant issued against her. Subsequently, on 24 January 2013, a Summary Deportation Order
(SDO) was issued against Danielle Nopuente, also known as Isabelita Nopuente and Danielle
Tan Parker, upon verification that she arrived in the Philippines on 23 March 2011 under the
Balikbayan Program, with an authorized stay of a period of one year. Parker was not in the list
of approved applications of the DFA for dual citizenship and her American Passport had been
revoked by the United States Department of State. Thus, she was considered an
undocumented, undesirable, and overstaying alien, in violation of the Philippine Immigration
Act of 1940.
On 5 June 2014, pursuant to the SDO issued by the Bureau of Immigration, Parker was arrested
in Tagaytay City on the premise that Danielle Nopuente and Danielle Tan Parker are one and
the same person. She was then taken to the Immigration Detention Facility in Bicutan, Taguig
City. She is still currently detained in the Immigration Detention Facility as the deportation was
not carried out due to the fact that Parker is charged with falsification and use of falsified
documents before Branch 4, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Davao City.
On 12 September 2014, Parker, as petitioner, filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus before Branch
266, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. The Bureau of Immigration was able to produce the
body of Parker before the RTC. The Bureau of Immigration then alleged that as the SDO had
become final and executory, it served as the legal authority to detain Parker. The Bureau of
Immigration also argued that Parker cannot be released or deported without the final
disposition of her pending criminal case in Davao City.
195VOL. 840, SEPTEMBER 19, 2017195Callo vs. Morente
The RTC dismissed the petition, finding that the detention of Parker was legal.1 Parker then
appealed the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA affirmed the RTC and found that Parker
failed to prove that she was a Filipino citizen to warrant judicial intervention through habeas
corpus.2 The CA gave weight to the Certification dated 20 June 2015 issued by the Office of the
Consular Affairs of the DFA that there is “no available data” regarding any record/information
from the year 1990 onwards of Philippine Passport No. XX5678508. Parker no longer appealed
the denial of the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus and the decision of the CA became final
and executory on 5 January 2016.3
On 23 March 2017, Callo filed this petition for a writ of amparo with prayer to issue Interim
Reliefs of Immediate Release of Danielle Tan Parker from Detention. Callo argues that Parker is
a natural-born Filipino citizen and thus, there is no reason for her to be detained by the Bureau
of Immigration.

The Issue

The only issue in this case is whether or not the right to life, liberty, and security of Parker is
threatened by the respondents to warrant the issuance of the writ of amparo and subsequently
the award of the interim reliefs.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

Callo seeks the issuance of the writ of amparo and the interim reliefs available under A.M. No.
07-9-12-SC for the immediate release of Parker. Callo alleges that Parker is a natural-born
Filipino citizen and thus should not have been

_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 273-281.
2 Id., at pp. 344-352.
3 Id., at p. 353.

196196SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDCallo vs. Morente

detained by the Bureau of Immigration. Moreover, Callo alleges that the life of Parker is
endangered in the detention center; and thus, a writ of amparo with the interim reliefs prayed
for should be issued by this Court.
We disagree.
The protective writ of amparo is a judicial remedy to expeditiously provide relief to violations of
a person’s constitutional right to life, liberty, and security, and more specifically, to address the
problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. Section 1 of A.M.
No. 07-9-12-SC provides:

Sec. 1. Petition.—The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose
right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
(Emphasis supplied)

It is clear from the above quoted provision that the writ of amparo covers extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances or threats thereof.4 Enforced disappearance is defined under
Republic Act (RA) No. 9851,5 Section 3(g) of which provides:

(g) “Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons” means the arrest, detention, or

abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a
political organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to
give information on the fate or where-
_______________
4 Lozada, Jr. v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 686 Phil. 536; 670 SCRA 545 (2012).
5 Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other
Crimes Against Humanity. Approved on 11 December 2009.

197VOL. 840, SEPTEMBER 19, 2017197Callo vs. Morente

abouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time.

This Court also had the opportunity to define extralegal killings and enforced disappearance:

Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced disappearance has been
defined by the Court as the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of
liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of
liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place
such a person outside the protection of the law.6
In Navia v. Pardico,7 this Court clarified that with the enactment of RA No. 9851, the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo is now a procedural law anchored, not only on the constitutional right to
life, liberty, and security, but also on a concrete statutory definition of “enforced or involuntary
disappearance.” Further, elements constituting enforced disappearance as defined under RA
No. 9851 were clearly laid down by this Court, viz.:

(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State
or a political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate

_______________
6 Mamba v. Bueno, G.R. No. 191416, 7 February 2017, 817 SCRA 89.

7 688 Phil. 266; 673 SCRA 618 (2012).

198198SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDCallo vs. Morente

or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and

(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time.8
It is clear that the elements of enforced disappearance are not attendant in this case. There is
also no threat of such enforced disappearance. While there is indeed a detention carried out by
the State through the Bureau of Immigration, the third and fourth elements are not present.
There is no refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of freedom or refusal to give information on
the whereabouts of Parker because as Callo admits, Parker is detained in the Immigration
Detention Facility of the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration also does not deny
this. In fact, the Bureau of Immigration had produced the body of Parker before the RTC in the
proceedings for the writ of habeas corpus previously initiated by Parker herself.9 Similarly,
there is no intention to remove Parker from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of
time. As the Bureau of Immigration explained, Parker has a pending criminal case against her in
Davao City, which prevents the Bureau of Immigration from deporting her from the country.
Simply put, we see no enforced or involuntary disappearance, or any threats thereof, that
would warrant the issuance of the writ of amparo. For the issuance of the writ, it is not
sufficient that a person’s life is endangered. It is even not sufficient to allege and prove that a
person has disappeared. It has to be shown by the required quantum of proof that the
disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the
government or a political organization, and that there is a refusal to acknowledge the same or
to give information on the fate or whereabouts of the

_______________
8 Id., at p. 279; p. 634.

9 Rollo, p. 274.

199VOL. 840, SEPTEMBER 19, 2017199Callo vs. Morente

missing persons.10 In this case, Parker has not disappeared. Her detention has been sufficiently
justified by the Bureau of Immigration, given that there is an SDO and a pending criminal case
against her.
Callo contends that there is no cause to detain Parker because Parker, a natural-born Filipino
citizen, is a different person from Danielle Nopuente, the person against whom the SDO was
issued.
We disagree.
Callo has failed to prove that Danielle Tan Parker and Danielle Nopuente are two different
persons. In particular, we give weight to the fact that the DFA issued a certificate verifying that
there is no available data on Passport No. XX5678508, which was the Philippine passport used
by Parker.11 Moreover, the Certificate of Live Birth,12 which purportedly shows that Parker
was born in the Philippines on 21 March 1975 of Filipino parents, was only registered on 4
January 2010. There was no explanation given as to why Parker’s birth was registered only after
almost 35 years. Moreover, Callo only alleges facts from the year 2005, allegedly for purposes
of brevity.13 We do not see any reason why facts surrounding the existence of Parker should
only be presented from 2005. In fact, the only period that is thoroughly discussed about her is
from 2010 to 2011. To prove that Parker and Nopuente are two different persons, the life and
existence of Parker should have been alleged and proven since birth. In this case, there is no
allegation nor any proof as to who Parker was, or what she had been doing, before 2011. Taking
all these circumstances into perspective, Parker had failed to sufficiently prove that she is a
different person from Danielle Nopuente.

_______________

10 Navia v. Pardico, supra note 7, citing Section 3(g), RA No. 9851.

11 Rollo, p. 196.
12 Id., at p. 62.
13 Id., at p. 10.
200200SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDCallo vs. Morente

Callo contends that Parker’s life is endangered in the Immigration Detention Facility because of
the threats against her by her co-detainees and the living conditions of the facility which pose
health problems for Parker. Unfortunately, these allegations even if proven — will not support
the issuance of a writ of amparo. To repeat, the remedy of a writ of amparo is an extraordinary
remedy that is meant to balance the government’s awesome power and to curtail human rights
abuses.14 The writ covers extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof as
specifically defined under RA No. 9851. The circumstances of Parker, as alleged by Callo, do not
meet the requirements for the issuance of the writ of amparo.
Finally, we note that the petition for the writ of amparo was filed by Callo. However, there was
no allegation of her relationship to Parker.15 In Boac v. Cadapan,16 we emphasized the
importance of the exclusive and successive order of who can file a petition for a writ of amparo.
We held:

Petitioners finally point out that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen do not have the requisite
standing to file the amparo petition on behalf of Merino. They call attention to the fact that in
the amparo petition, the parents of Sherlyn and Karen merely indicated that they were
“concerned with Manuel Merino” as basis for filing the petition on his behalf.
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any qualified person or entity in the
following order:
(a) Any member of the immediate family, namely: the spouse, children and parents of the
aggrieved party;

_______________

14 Santiago v. Tulfo, 772 Phil. 203; 773 SCRA 558 (2015).

15 Rollo, p. 9.
16 665 Phil. 84, 107-108; 649 SCRA 618, 644-645 (2011).

201VOL. 840, SEPTEMBER 19, 2017201Callo vs. Morente

(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding
paragraph; or
(c) Any concerned Citizen, organization, association or institution, if there is no known
member of the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party.
Indeed, the parents of Sherlyn and Karen failed to allege that there were no known members of
the immediate family or relatives of Merino. The exclusive and successive order mandated by
the above quoted provision must be followed. The order of priority is not without reason — “to
prevent the indiscriminate and groundless filing of petitions for amparo which may even
prejudice the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.”
The Court notes that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen also filed the petition for habeas corpus
on Merino’s behalf. No objection was raised therein for, in a habeas corpus proceeding, any
person may apply for the writ on behalf of the aggrieved party.
It is thus only with respect to the amparo petition that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen are
precluded from filing the application on Merino’s behalf as they are not authorized parties
under the Rule. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, while “any person” may file a petition for the writ of habeas corpus, in a petition for the
writ of amparo, the order of priority on who can file the petition should be strictly followed. In
this case, there was no allegation nor proof that Parker had no immediate family members or
any ascendant, descendant, or collateral relative within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity
or affinity. In fact, no allegation was made on any of the familial relationship of Parker as only
her whereabouts from 2011 were alleged and discussed. There-

202202SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDCallo vs. Morente

fore, based on the order of priority, Callo had no legal standing to file this petition.
Given that there is no basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo, the interim reliefs sought for
are also denied. Moreover, we see no need to address the other issues raised by Callo in this
petition, specifically, the condition of the Immigration Detention Facility and the treatment of
Parker in said detention center. A petition for the writ of amparo is not the proper action to
resolve such issues.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Leonen, Jardeleza, Caguioa,
Martires and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
Sereno, CJ., On Official Leave.
Perlas-Bernabe, Tijam and Gesmundo, JJ., On Official Business.

Petition denied.

Notes.—A writ of Amparo is a special proceeding. It is a remedy by which a party seeks to

establish a status, a right or particular fact. It is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the
application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is seriously misplaced. (De Lima vs.
Gatdula, 691 SCRA 226 [2013])
The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the actual order called the
Writ of Amparo. The privilege includes availment of the entire procedure outlined in A.M. No.
07-9-12-SC, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. (Id.)
——o0o—— Callo vs. Morente, 840 SCRA 191, G.R. No. 230324 September 19, 2017
G.R. No. 183533. September 25, 2012.*IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF
AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF FRANCIS SAEZ,FRANCIS SAEZ,
petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR. GEN.
AVELINO RAZON, 22ND MICO, CAPT. LAWRENCE BANAAG, SGT. CASTILLO, CAPT. ROMMEL
GUTIERREZ, CAPT. JAKE OBLIGADO, CPL. ROMANITO QUINTANA, PVT. JERICO DUQUIL, CPL.
ARIEL FONTANILLA, A CERTAIN CAPT. ALCAYDO, A CERTAIN FIRST SERGEANT, PVT. ZALDY OSIO,
A CERTAIN PFC. SONNY, A CERTAIN CPL. JAMES, A CERTAIN JOEL, RODERICK CLANZA and
JEFFREY GOMEZ, respondents.Constitutional Law; Writ of Amparo; Writ of Habeas Data;
Despite the lack of certain contents, which the Rules on the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data
generally require, for as long as their absence under exceptional circumstances can be
reasonably justified, a petition should not be susceptible to outright dismissal.―Although the
exact locations and the custodians of the documents were not identified, this does not render
the petition insufficient. Section 6(d) of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is clear that the
requirement of specificity arises only when the exact locations and identities of the custodians
are known. The Amparo Rule was not promulgated with the intent to make it a token gesture of
concern for constitutional rights. Thus, despite the lack of certain contents, which the Rules on
the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data generally require, for as long as their absence under
exceptional circumstances can be reasonably justified, a petition should not be susceptible to
outright dismissal._______________* EN BANC.679VOL. 681, SEPTEMBER 25, 2012679Saez vs.
Macapagal-ArroyoSame; Same; Same; Section 19 of both the Rules on the Writ of Amparo and
Habeas Data is explicit that questions of fact and law can be raised before the Court in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. As a rule then, the Court is not bound by the
factual findings made by the appellate court which rendered the judgment in a petition for the
issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data.―Section 19 of both the Rules on the Writ of
Amparo and Habeas Data is explicit that questions of fact and law can be raised before the
Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. As a rule then, the Court is not bound
by the factual findings made by the appellate court which rendered the judgment in a petition
for the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data. Be that as it may, in the instant case,
the Court agrees with the CA that the petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proof
imposed upon him by the rules to establish his claims. It cannot be overemphasized that
Section 1 of both the Rules on the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data expressly include in their
coverage even threatened violations against a person’s right to life, liberty or security. Further,
threat and intimidation that vitiate the free will―although not involving invasion of bodily
integrity―nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security in the sense of “freedom
from threat”.Administrative Law; Doctrine of Command Responsibility; Presidency; Pursuant to
the doctrine of command responsibility, the President, as the Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), can be held liable for affront against the petitioner’s
rights to life, liberty and security.―Pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility, the
President, as the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP, can be held liable for affront against the
petitioner’s rights to life, liberty and security as long as substantial evidence exist to show that
he or she had exhibited involvement in or can be imputed with knowledge of the violations, or
had failed to exercise necessary and reasonable diligence in conducting the necessary
investigations required under the rules.Presidency; Presidential Immunity; Immunity from Suit;
The presidential privilege of immunity from suit cannot be invoked by a non-sitting president
even for acts committed during his or her tenure.―The Court also stresses the rule that the
presidential immunity from suit exists only in concurrence with the president’s incumbency.
Conversely, this presidential privilege of immunity cannot be680680SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATEDSaez vs. Macapagal-Arroyoinvoked by a non-sitting president even for acts
committed during his or her tenure. Courts look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of
immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a
right.MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a resolution of the Supreme Court. The facts are
stated in the resolution of the Court. Rex J.M.A. Fernandez for petitioner. The Solicitor General
for respondents.R E S O L U T I O NREYES, J.:For action is the Motion for Reconsideration1
dated September 26, 2010 filed by petitioner Francis Saez of the Court’s Resolution2 dated
August 31, 2010 denying the Petition for Review3 he filed on July 21, 2008.The Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Comment4 thereon stating that it does not find cogent grounds
to warrant setting aside the Court’s decision.Antecedent Facts On March 6, 2008, the petitioner
filed with the Court a petition to be granted the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas
data with prayers for temporary protection order,_______________1 Rollo, pp. 384-399.2 Id.,
at pp. 361-365.3 Id., at pp. 2-15. The petition bears the docket number G.R. No. 183533.4 Id., at
pp. 526-528.681VOL. 681, SEPTEMBER 25, 2012681Saez vs. Macapagal-Arroyo inspection of
place and production of documents.5 In the petition, he expressed his fear of being abducted
and killed; hence, he sought that he be placed in a sanctuary appointed by the Court. He
likewise prayed for the military to cease from further conducting surveillance and monitoring of
his activities, and for his name to be excluded from the order of battle and other government
records connecting him to the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).Without necessarily
giving due course to the petition, the Court issued the writ of amparo commanding the
respondents to make a verified return, and referred the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) for
hearing and decision. The case before the CA was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 00024 WOA.In
the Return of the Writ,6 the respondents denied the assignment in the units of Captains
Lawrence Banaag and Rommel Gutierrez and Corporal Ariel Fontanilla. The respondents also
alleged that the names and descriptions of “Capt. Alcaydo,” “a certain First Sergeant,” “Cpl.
James,” “Pfc. Sonny,” and “Joel” were insufficient to properly identify some of the persons
sought to be included as among the respondents in the petition.On the other hand,
respondents General Hermogenes Esperon, Jr. (Gen. Esperon), Capt. Jacob Thaddeus Obligado,
Pvt. Rizaldy A. Osio (Pvt. Osio), Pfc. Romanito C. Quintana, Jr. and Pfc. Jerico Duquil submitted
their affidavits.The CA conducted hearings with an intent to clarify what actually transpired and
to determine specific acts which threatened the petitioner’s right to life, liberty or
security.During the hearings, the petitioner narrated that starting April 16, 2007, he noticed
that he was always being followed by a certain “Joel,” a former colleague at Bayan Muna.
“Joel”_______________5 Id., at pp. 18-27. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 181770.6 Id.,
at pp. 98-130.682682SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDSaez vs. Macapagal-Arroyo
pretended peddling pandesal in the vicinity of the petitioner’s store. Three days before the
petitioner was apprehended, “Joel” approached and informed him of his marital status and
current job as a baker in Calapan, Mindoro Oriental. “Joel” inquired if the petitioner was still
involved with ANAKPAWIS. When asked by the CA justices during the hearing if the petitioner
had gone home to Calapan after having filed the petition, he answered in the negative
explaining that he was afraid of Pvt. Osio who was always at the pier.CA-G.R. SP No. 00024
WOAOn July 9, 2008, the CA rendered its Decision,7 denying on formal and substantial grounds
the reliefs prayed for in the petition and dropping former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as
a respondent. The CA ratiocinated:There was no attempt at all to clarify how petitioner came to
know about Zaldy Osio’s presence at their pier if the former had not gone home since the
petition was filed and what Zaldy Osio was doing there to constitute violation or threat to
violate petitioner’s right to life, liberty or security. This Court cannot just grant the privilege of
the writs without substantial evidence to establish petitioner’s entitlement thereto. This Court
cannot grant the privilege of the writs applied for on mere speculation or conjecture. This Court
is convinced that the Supreme Court did not intend it to be so when the rules on the writs of
Amparo and Habeas Data were adopted. It is the impression of this Court that the privilege of
the writs herein prayed for should be considered as extraordinary remedies available to address
the specific situations enumerated in the rules and no other.x x x xNot only did the petition and
the supporting affidavit x x x fail to allege how the supposed threat or violation of petitioner’s
[right_______________7 Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok, with
Associate Justices Mariano C. Del Castillo (now a Member of this Court) and Romeo F. Barza,
concurring; CA Rollo, pp. 180-201. 683VOL. 681, SEPTEMBER 25, 2012683Saez vs. Macapagal-
Arroyoto] life, liberty and security is committed. Neither is there any narration of any
circumstances attendant to said supposed violation or threat to violate petitioner’s right to life,
liberty or security to warrant entitlement to the privilege of the writs prayed for.x x x xA
reading of the petition will show that the allegations therein do not comply with the
aforestated requirements of Section 6 [Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data] of the pertinent rule.
The petition is bereft of any allegation stating with specific definiteness as to how petitioner’s
right to privacy was violated or threatened to be violated. He did not include any allegation as
to what recourses he availed of to obtain the alleged documents from respondents. Neither
did petitioner allege what specific documents he prays for and from whom or [sic] from what
particular office of the government he prays to obtain them. The petition prays “to order
respondents to produce any documents submitted to any of them in the matter of any report
on the case of FRANCIS SAEZ, including all military intelligence reports.”x x x xBoth the rules on
the writs of Amparo and Habeas Data (Section 17, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC and Section 16, A.M.
No. 08-1-16-SC) provide that the parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence.
Not only was petitioner unable to establish his entitlement to the privilege of the writs applied
for, the exigency thereof was negated by his own admission that nothing happened between
him and Joel after July 21, 2007. The filing of the petition appears to have been precipitated by
his fear that something might happen to him, not because of any apparent violation or visible
threat to violate his right to life, liberty or security. Petitioner was, in fact, unable to establish
likewise who among the respondents committed specific acts defined under the rules on both
writs to constitute violation or threat to violate petitioner’s rights to life, liberty or security or
his right to privacy thereof.x x x xx x x The ruling in David, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, et
al. (G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160, 224) is aptly instructive:“Settled is the
doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued
in any684684SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDSaez vs. Macapagal-Arroyo civil or
criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade
the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court
litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of
harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his
official duties and functions. x x x.” x x x xIV. The petition lacks proper verification in violation
of Section 12, 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.8On July 21, 2008, Petition for Review was filed
assailing the foregoing CA decision with the following issues submitted for resolution:WHETHER
OR NOT THE CA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DISMISSING THE PETITION AND DROPPING
GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO AS PARTY RESPONDENT. WHETHER OR NOT THE NOTARIAL
OFFICER’S OMISSION OF REQUIRING FROM THE PETITIONER IDENTIFICATION CARDS RELATIVE
TO THE LATTER’S EXECUTION OF THE VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM
SHOPPING JUSTIFIES THE DENIAL OF THE PETITION. WHETHER OR NOT THE CA COMMITTED
GROSS ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO CONCLUDE FROM THE EVIDENCE OFFERED
BY THE PETITIONER THE FACT THAT BY BEING PLACED IN THE ORDER OF BATTLE LIST, THREATS
AND VIOLATIONS TO THE LATTER’S LIFE, LIBERTY AND SECURITY WERE ACTUALLY COMMITTED
BY THE RESPONDENTS.9_______________8 Id., at pp. 195-199.9 Rollo, pp. 2-15.685VOL. 681,
SEPTEMBER 25, 2012685Saez vs. Macapagal-ArroyoCourt’s Resolution dated August 31,
2010On August 31, 2010, the Court issued the Resolution10 denying the petition for review for
the following reasons, viz.:A careful perusal of the subject petition shows that the CA correctly
found that the petition was bereft of any allegation as to what particular acts or omission of
respondents violated or threatened petitioner’s right to life, liberty and security. His claim that
he was incommunicado lacks credibility as he was given a cellular phone and allowed to go back
to Oriental Mindoro. The CA also correctly held that petitioner failed to present substantial
evidence that his right to life, liberty and security were violated, or how his right to privacy was
threatened by respondents. He did not specify the particular documents to be secured, their
location or what particular government office had custody thereof, and who has possession or
control of the same. He merely prayed that the respondents be ordered “to produce any
documents submitted to any of them in the matter of any report on the case of FRANCIS SAEZ,
including all military intelligence reports.”Petitioner assails the CA in failing to appreciate that in
his Affidavit and Fact Sheet, he had specifically detailed the violation of his right to privacy as he
was placed in the Order of Battle and promised to have his record cleared if he would
cooperate and become a military asset. However, despite questions propounded by the CA
Associate Justices during the hearing, he still failed to enlighten the appellate court as to what
actually transpired to enable said court to determine whether his right to life, liberty or security
had actually been violated or threatened. Records bear out the unsubstantiated claims of
petitioner which justified the appellate court’s dismissal of the petition.As to petitioner’s
argument that the CA erred in deleting the President as party-respondent, we find the same
also to be without merit. The Court has already made it clear in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo that
the President, during his or her tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any
civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will
degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if_______________10
Id., at pp. 361-365.686686SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDSaez vs. Macapagal-Arroyo
the President can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is
important that the President be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to
enable the President to fully attend to the performance of official duties and functions.11
(Citation omitted)Hence, the petitioner filed the instant motion for
reconsideration.12Petitioner’s Arguments Contrary to the CA’s findings, it had been shown by
substantial evidence and even by the respondents’ own admissions that the petitioner’s life,
liberty and security were threatened. Military personnel, whom the petitioner had named and
described, knew where to get him and they can do so with ease. He also became a military
asset, but under duress, as the respondents had documents allegedly linking him to the CPP
and including him in the order of battle. The petitioner claims that the foregoing circumstances
were not denied by the respondents.The petitioner likewise challenges the CA’s finding that he
was not rendered incommunicado as he was even provided with a cellular phone. The
petitioner argues that the phone was only given to him for the purpose of communicating with
the respondents matters relative to his infiltration activities of target legal organizations.The
petitioner cites Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,13 which pronounced that “in the
amparo context, it is more correct to say that the ‘right to security’ is actually the ‘freedom
from threat.’ ”14 According to the petitioner, his freedom from fear was undoubtedly violated;
hence, to him per-_______________11 Id., at pp. 363-364.12 Id., at pp. 384-399.13 G.R. No.
180906, October 7, 2008, 568 SCRA 1.14 Id., at p. 54.687VOL. 681, SEPTEMBER 25,
2012687Saez vs. Macapagal-Arroyotains a cause of action. Anent the quantum of proof
required in a petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo, mere substantial evidence is
sufficient. The petition “is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or
administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive
proceedings.”15 Sadly, in the petitioner’s case, the court not only demanded a greater
quantum of proof than what the rules require, but it also accorded special preference for the
respondents’ evidence.The petitioner also cites a speech delivered in Siliman University by
former Chief Justice Reynato Puno who expressed that “the remedy of habeas data can be used
by any citizen against any governmental agency or register to find out what information is held
about his or her person.” The person can likewise “request the rectification or even the
destruction of erroneous data gathered and kept against him or her.” In the petitioner’s case,
he specifically sought the production of the order of battle, which allegedly included his name,
and other records which supposedly contain erroneous data relative to his involvement with
the CPP.OSG’s Comment In the respondents’ comment16 filed by the OSG, it is generally
claimed that the petitioner advances no cogent grounds to justify the reversal of the Court’s
Resolution dated August 31, 2010.The Court’s Disquisition While the issuance of the writs
sought by the petitioner cannot be granted, the Court nevertheless finds
ample_______________15 Id., at p. 42.16 Rollo, pp. 526-528.688688SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATEDSaez vs. Macapagal-Arroyo grounds to modify certain pertinent
discussions, as embodied in the Resolution dated August 31, 2010.The petition conforms to the
re-quirements of the Rules on the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data Section 517 of A.M. No.
07-9-12-SC (Rule on the Writ of Am-paro) and Section 618 of A.M. 08-1-16-SC (Rule on the Writ
of_______________17 Sec. 5. Contents of Petition.―The petition shall be signed and
verified and shall allege the following: (a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner; (b) The
name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or
omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an
assumed appellation; (c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such
threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting
affidavits; (d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal
circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the
manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report; (e) The actions and
recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party
and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and (f) The relief
prayed for the petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs.18 Sec.
6. Petition.―A verified written petition for a writ of habeas data should contain: (a) The
personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent; (b) The manner the right to
privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the
aggrieved party; (c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or
information; (d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the
person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if known; (e) The
reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of
the database or information or files kept by the respondent. In case of threats, the689VOL.
681, SEPTEMBER 25, 2012689Saez vs. Macapagal-Arroyo Habeas Data) provide for what the
said petitions should contain.In the present case, the Court notes that the petition for the
issuance of the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data is sufficient as to its contents.
The petitioner made specific allegations relative to his personal circumstances and those of the
respondents. The petitioner likewise indicated particular acts, which are allegedly violative of
his rights and the alleged participation of some of the respondents in their commission. As to
the pre-requisite conduct and result of an investigation prior to the filing of the petition, it was
explained that the petitioner expected no relief from the military, which he perceived as his
oppressors, hence, his request for assistance from a human rights organization, then a direct
resort to the court. Anent the documents sought to be the subject of the writ of habeas data
prayed for, the Court finds the requirement of specificity to have been satisfied. The documents
subject of the petition include the order of battle, those linking the petitioner to the CPP and
those he signed involuntarily, and military intelligence reports making references to him.
Although the exact locations and the custodians of the documents were not identified, this
does not render the petition insufficient. Section 6(d) of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is
clear that the requirement of specificity arises only when the exact locations and identities of
the custodians are known. The Amparo Rule was not promulgated with the intent to make it a
token gesture of concern for constitutional rights.19 Thus, despite the lack of certain contents,
which the Rules on the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data generally require, for as long as their
absence under exceptional circumstances can be reasonably justified, a petition should not be
susceptible to outright dismissal._______________relief may include a prayer for an order
enjoining the act complained of; and (f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.19
Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, December 3, 2009, 606 SCRA 598, 702.690690SUPREME
COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDSaez vs. Macapagal-ArroyoFrom the foregoing, the Court holds
that the allegations stated in the petition for the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas
data filed conform to the rules. However, they are mere allegations, which the Court cannot
accept “hook, line and sinker”, so to speak, and whether substantial evidence exist to warrant
the granting of the petition is a different matter altogether.No substantial evidence exists to
prove the petitioner’s claims The Court has ruled that in view of the recognition of the
evidentiary difficulties attendant to the filing of a petition for the privilege of the writs of
amparo and habeas data, not only direct evidence, but circumstantial evidence, indicia, and
presumptions may be considered, so long as they lead to conclusions consistent with the
admissible evidence adduced.20With the foregoing in mind, the Court still finds that the CA did
not commit a reversible error in declaring that no substantial evidence exist to compel the
grant of the reliefs prayed for by the petitioner. The Court took a second look on the evidence
on record and finds no reason to reconsider the denial of the issuance of the writs prayed for.In
the hearing before the CA, it was claimed that “Joel” once inquired from the petitioner if the
latter was still involved with ANAKPAWIS. By itself, such claim cannot establish with certainty
that the petitioner was being monitored. The encounter happened once and the petitioner, in
his pleadings, nowhere stated that subsequent to the time he was asked about his involvement
with ANAKPAWIS, he still noticed “Joel” conducting surveillance operations on him. He alleged
that he was brought to the camp of the 204th Infantry Brigade in Naujan, Oriental Mindoro but
was sent home at_______________20 Id., at p. 690.691VOL. 681, SEPTEMBER 25, 2012691Saez
vs. Macapagal-Arroyo5:00 p.m. The petitioner and the respondents have conflicting claims
about what transpired thereafter. The petitioner insisted that he was brought against his will
and was asked to stay by the respondents in places under the latter’s control. The respondents,
on the other hand, averred that it was the petitioner who voluntarily offered his service to be a
military asset, but was rejected as the former still doubted his motives and affiliations.Section
19 of both the Rules on the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data is explicit that questions of fact
and law can be raised before the Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. As a
rule then, the Court is not bound by the factual findings made by the appellate court which
rendered the judgment in a petition for the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data.
Be that as it may, in the instant case, the Court agrees with the CA that the petitioner failed to
discharge the burden of proof imposed upon him by the rules to establish his claims. It cannot
be overemphasized that Section 1 of both the Rules on the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data
expressly include in their coverage even threatened violations against a person’s right to life,
liberty or security. Further, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free will―although not
involving invasion of bodily integrity―nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security
in the sense of “freedom from threat.”21It must be stressed, however, that such “threat” must
find rational basis on the surrounding circumstances of the case. In this case, the petition was
mainly anchored on the alleged threats against his life, liberty and security by reason of his
inclusion in the military’s order of battle, the surveillance and monitoring activities made on
him, and the intimidation exerted upon him to compel him to be a military asset. While, as
stated earlier, mere threats fall within the mantle of protection of the writs of amparo and
habeas data, in the peti-_______________21 Supra note 13, at p. 55.692692SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATEDSaez vs. Macapagal-Arroyotioner’s case, the restraints and threats
allegedly made lack corroborations, are not supported by independent and credible evidence,
and thus stand on nebulous grounds.The Court is cognizant of the evidentiary difficulties
attendant to a petition for the issuance of the writs. Unlike, however, the unique nature of
cases involving enforced disappearances or extrajudicial killings that calls for flexibility in
considering the gamut of evidence presented by the parties, this case sets a different scenario
and a significant portion of the petitioner’s testimony could have been easily corroborated. In
his Sinumpaang Salaysay22 dated March 5, 2008 and the Fact Sheet dated December 9, 200723
executed before the Alliance for the Advancement of People’s Rights-Southern Tagalog
(KARAPATAN-ST), the petitioner stated that when he was invited and interrogated at the
military camp in Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, he brought with him his uncle Norberto Roxas,
Barangay Captain Mario Ilagan and two of his bodyguards, and Edwardo Estabillo―five
witnesses who can attest and easily corroborate his statement―but curiously, the petitioner
did not present any piece of evidence, whether documentary or testimonial, to buttress such
claim nor did he give any reason for their non-presentation. This could have made a difference
in light of the denials made by the respondents as regards the petitioner’s claims.The existence
of an order of battle and inclusion of the petitioner’s name in it is another allegation by the
petitioner that does not find support on the evidence adduced. The Court notes that such
allegation was categorically denied by respondent Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Jr. who, in his Affidavit
dated March 31, 2008, stated that he “does not have knowledge about any Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) ‘order of battle’ which allegedly lists the petitioner as a member
of_______________22 CA Rollo, pp. 12-16.23 Id., at pp. 17-19.693VOL. 681, SEPTEMBER 25,
2012693Saez vs. Macapagal-Arroyo the CPP.”24 This was also denied by Pvt. Osio, who the
petitioner identified as the one who told him that he was included in the order of battle.25 The
2nd Infantry (Jungle Fighter) Division of the Philippine Army also conducted an investigation
pursuant to the directive of AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Esperon,26 and it was shown that the
persons identified by the petitioners who allegedly committed the acts complained of were not
connected or assigned to the 2nd Infantry Division.27Moreover, the evidence showed that the
petitioner’s mobility was never curtailed. From the time he was allegedly brought to Batangas
in August of 2007 until the time he sought the assistance of KARAPATAN-ST, there was no
restraint upon the petitioner to go home, as in fact, he went home to Mindoro on several
instances. And while he may have been wary of Pvt. Osio’s presence at the pier, there was no
claim by the petitioner that he was threatened or prevented by Pvt. Osio from boarding any
vehicle that may transport him back home. The petitioner also admitted that he had a mobile
phone; hence, he had unhampered access to communication and can readily seek assistance
from non-governmental organizations and even government agencies.The respondents also
belied the petitioner’s claim that they forced him to become a military informant and instead,
alleged that it was the petitioner who volunteered to be one. Thus, in his Sinumpaang
Salaysay28 executed on March 25, 2008, Pvt. Osio admitted that he actually knew the
petitioner way back in 1998 when they were still students. He also stated that when he saw the
petitioner again in 2007, the latter manifested his intention to become a military informant in
exchange for financial and other forms of assistance._______________24 Id., at p. 103.25 Id., at
p. 98.26 Id., at pp. 106-107.27 Id., at p. 87.28 Id., at pp. 96-98.694694SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATEDSaez vs. Macapagal-ArroyoThe petitioner also harps on the alleged
“monitoring” activities being conducted by a certain “Joel”, e.g., the latter’s alleged act of
following him, pretending to peddle pandesal and asking him about his personal circumstances.
Such allegation by the petitioner, however, is, at best, a conclusion on his part, a mere
impression that the petitioner had, based on his personal assessment of the circumstances. The
petitioner even admitted in his testimony before the CA that when he had a conversation with
“Joel” sometime in July 2007, the latter merely asked him whether he was still connected with
ANAKPAWIS, but he was not threatened “with anything” and no other incident occurred
between them since then.29 There is clearly nothing on record which shows that “Joel”
committed overt acts that will unequivocally lead to the conclusion arrived at by the petitioner,
especially since the alleged acts committed by “Joel” are susceptible of different
interpretations.Given that the totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner failed to
support his claims, the reliefs prayed for, therefore, cannot be granted. The liberality accorded
to amparo and habeas data cases does not mean that a claimant is dispensed with the onus of
proving his case. “Indeed, even the liberal standard of substantial evidence demands some
adequate evidence.”30The President cannot be automatically dropped as a respondent
pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility In Noriel Rodriguez v. Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo, et al.,31 the Court stated:_______________29 TSN, April 2, 2008, pp. 37-39.30 Miro v.
Dosono, G.R. No. 170697, April 30, 2010, 619 SCRA 653, 667.31 G.R. No. 191805, November 15,
2011, 660 SCRA 84.695VOL. 681, SEPTEMBER 25, 2012695Saez vs. Macapagal-Arroyoa.
Command responsibility of the President Having established the applicability of the doctrine of
command responsibility in amparo proceedings, it must now be resolved whether the
president, as commander-in-chief of the military, can be held responsible or accountable for
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. We rule in the affirmative.To hold someone
liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must obtain:a.
the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the
perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate;b. the superior knew or had reason to know that
the crime was about to be or had been committed; andc. the superior failed to take the
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators
thereof.The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses
control over the military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command
responsibility doctrine.On the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that although
international tribunals apply a strict standard of knowledge, i.e., actual knowledge, such may
nonetheless be established through circumstantial evidence. In the Philippines, a more liberal
view is adopted and superiors may be charged with constructive knowledge. This view is
buttressed by the enactment of Executive Order No. 226, otherwise known as the
Institutionalization of the Doctrine of ‘Command Responsibility’ in all Government Offices,
particularly at all Levels of Command in the Philippine National Police and other Law
Enforcement Agencies (E.O. 226). Under E.O. 226, a government official may be held liable for
neglect of duty under the doctrine of command responsibility if he has knowledge that a crime
or offense shall be committed, is being committed, or has been committed by his subordinates,
or by others within his area of responsibility and, despite such knowledge, he did not take
preventive or corrective action either before, during, or immediately after its commission.
Knowledge of the commission of irregularities, crimes or offenses is presumed when (a) the
acts are widespread within the government696696SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATEDSaez vs. Macapagal-Arroyo official’s area of jurisdiction; (b) the acts have been
repeatedly or regularly committed within his area of responsibility; or (c) members of his
immediate staff or office personnel are involved.Meanwhile, as to the issue of failure to
prevent or punish, it is important to note that as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces,
the president has the power to effectively command, control and discipline the military.
(Citations omitted)Pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility, the President, as the
Commander-in-Chief of the AFP, can be held liable for affront against the petitioner’s rights to
life, liberty and security as long as substantial evidence exist to show that he or she had
exhibited involvement in or can be imputed with knowledge of the violations, or had failed to
exercise necessary and reasonable diligence in conducting the necessary investigations required
under the rules.The Court also stresses the rule that the presidential immunity from suit exists
only in concurrence with the president’s incumbency.32 Conversely, this presidential privilege
of immunity cannot be invoked by a non-sitting president even for acts committed during his or
her tenure.33 Courts look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially
when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right.34The petitioner,
however, is not exempted from the burden of proving by substantial evidence his allegations
against the President to make the latter liable for either acts or omissions violative of rights
against life, liberty and security. In the instant case, the petitioner merely included the
President’s name as a party respondent without any attempt at all to show the latter’s actual
involvement in, or knowledge of the_______________32 Id., citing Estrada v. Desierto, G.R.
Nos. 146710-15, 146738, March 2, 2001, 353 SCRA 452.33 Lozada v. Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 184379-
80, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 545.34 Supra note 32.697VOL. 681, SEPTEMBER 25, 2012697Saez
vs. Macapagal-Arroyo alleged violations. Further, prior to the filing of the petition, there was no
request or demand for any investigation that was brought to the President’s attention. Thus,
while the President cannot be completely dropped as a respondent in a petition for the
privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data merely on the basis of the presidential
immunity from suit, the petitioner in this case failed to establish accountability of the President,
as commander-in-chief, under the doctrine of command responsibility.Compliance with
technical rules of procedure is ideal but it cannot be accorded primacy Among the grounds
cited by the CA in denying the petition for the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data
was the defective verification which was attached to the petition. In Tagitis,35 supporting
affidavits required under Section 5(c) of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo were not submitted
together with the petition and it was ruled that the defect was fully cured when the petitioner
and the witness personally testified to prove the truth of their allegations in the hearings held
before the CA. In the instant case, the defective verification was not the sole reason for the
CA’s denial of the petition for the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data.
Nonetheless, it must be stressed that although rules of procedure play an important rule in
effectively administering justice, primacy should not be accorded to them especially in the
instant case where there was at least substantial compliance with the requirements and where
petitioner himself testified in the hearings to attest to the veracity of the claims stated in his
petition.To conclude, compliance with technical rules of procedure is ideal but it cannot be
accorded primacy. In the proceedings_______________35 Supra note 19.698698SUPREME
COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDSaez vs. Macapagal-Arroyo before the CA, the petitioner himself
testified to prove the veracity of the allegations in his petition. Hence, the defect in the
verification attached to the petition was deemed cured.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED WITH FINALITY.SO ORDERED.Sereno (C.J.),
Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Perez, Mendoza and Perlas-
Bernabe, JJ., concur.Del Castillo, J., On official business.Abad, J., On leave.Villarama, Jr., J., On
official leave. Motion for Reconsideration denied with finality.Notes.―An amparo proceeding is
not criminal in nature nor does it ascertain the criminal liability of individuals or entities
involved, and neither does it partake of a civil or administrative suit―rather, it is a remedial
measure designed to direct specified courses of action to government agencies to safeguard
the constitutional right to life, liberty and security of aggrieved individuals. (Boac vs. Cadapan,
649 SCRA 618 [2011])The writ of habeas data provides a judicial remedy to protect a person’s
right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances where such information
is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. (Rodriguez vs.
Macapagal-Arroyo, 660 SCRA 84 [2011])――o0o―― Saez vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 681 SCRA 678,
G.R. No. 183533 September 25, 2012
G.R. No. 160143. July 2, 2014.*LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. BENECIO
EUSEBIO, JR., respondent.Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; The “just compensation”
guaranteed to a landowner under, Section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution is precisely the
same as the “just compensation” embodied in Section 9, Article III of the Constitution.—As one
of its arguments, the LBP theorizes that the government’s taking of private property in pursuit
of its agrarian reform program is not a “traditional” exercise of the eminent domain power but
one that equally involves the exercise of the State’s police power. As such, the LBP insists, the
just compensation for the property cannot exceed its market value as the loss resulting from
the State’s exercise of police power is not compensable. We disagree with the LBP on this point.
We debunked this very same argument in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms
Corporation, 667 SCRA 255 (2012), whose factual circumstances closely mirror and are, in fact,
related to those of the present case. In Honeycomb, we essentially pointed out that the “just
compensation” guaranteed to a landowner under, Section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution is
precisely the same as the “just compensation” embodied in Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution. That is, whether for land taken pursuant to the State’s agrarian reform program or
for property taken for purposes other than agrarian reform, the just compensation due to an
owner should be the “fair and full price of the taken property.”Same; Same; The clear intent of
the Constitutional guarantee of just compensation, whether understood within the terms of
Article III, Section 9 or of Article XIII, Section 4, is to secure to any owner the “full and fair
equivalent” of the property taken.—The clear intent of the Constitutional guarantee of just
compensation, whether understood within the terms of Article III, Section 9 or of Article XIII,
Section 4, is to secure to any owner the “full and fair equivalent” of the property taken.
Regardless of whether the taking was pursued in the “traditional” exercise of eminent domain
or in its “revolutionary”_______________* SECOND DIVISION.448448SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATEDLand Bank of the Philippines vs. Eusebio, Jr.exercise in the context of the
State’s agrarian reform program, just compensation has but one meaning and the State is
obligated to pay the “fair and full price of the property” even if the property is taken for social
justice purposes.Same; Same; Courts; Regional Trial Courts; Special Agrarian Courts;
Jurisdiction; Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657 explicitly vests in the Regional Trial Court-Special
Agrarian Court (RTC-SAC) the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine just compensation
for lands taken pursuant to the State’s agrarian reform program.—Jurisprudence settles that
the determination of just compensation is fundamentally a function of the courts. Section 57 of
R.A. No. 6657 explicitly vests in the RTC-SAC the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine
just compensation for lands taken pursuant to the State’s agrarian reform program. To guide
the RTC-SAC in the exercise of its function, Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the factors
that the RTC-SAC must take into account in its determination, i.e., cost of acquisition of the
land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation
by the owner, the tax declarations and the assessment made by the government assessors,
among others. On the other hand, to ensure the agrarian reform law’s proper implementation,
Section 49 of R.A. No. 6657 empowers the DAR to issue such rules and regulations necessary for
the purpose. Thus, corollary to the agrarian reform law’s guidelines, the DAR issued DAR AO 6-
92, as amended by DAR AO 11-94 and, recently, by DAR AO 5-98, that incorporated, into a basic
formula, Section 17’s enumerated factors providing the details by which “just compensation” is
to be properly approximated.Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Regional Trial Court-
Special Agrarian Court’s (RTC-SAC’s) duty to consider the factors enumerated under Section 17
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 and the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) formula that
embodies these factors in determining just compensation.—Equally settled in jurisprudence is
the RTC-SAC’s duty to consider the factors enumerated under Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and
the DAR formula that embodies these factors in determining just compensation. Our rulings in
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Banal, 434 SCRA 543 (2004), Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Celada, 479 SCRA 495 (2006), Land Bank of the Philippines v. Colarina, 629 SCRA 614 (2010) and
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Lim, 529 SCRA 129 (2007), to name a few, 449VOL. 728, JULY 2,
2014449Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Eusebio, Jr.were clear that the RTC-SAC must consider
the factors mentioned by Section 17, including the formula prescribed by the DAR’s
administrative orders in determining just compensation.Same; Statutes; The Department of
Agrarian Reform’s (DAR’s) issuances partake of the nature of statutes that have in their favor a
presumption of legality.—Recently, the Court, in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Yatco
Agricultural Enterprises, 713 SCRA 370 (2014), had the occasion to reiterate and stress the need
to apply and consider the factors and formula prescribed under Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and
the pertinent DAR issuances. Citing Land Bank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms
Corporation, 667 SCRA 255 (2012), we pointedly declared as grave error, on the RTC-SAC’s part,
its complete disregard of the DAR formula. We emphasized that the DAR’s issuances partake of
the nature of statutes that have in their favor a presumption of legality. And, unless the
administrative orders are declared invalid or the cases before them involve situations these
administrative issuances do not cover, the RTC-SAC must apply them with the equal force of the
law.Same; When acting within the parameters set by the law itself — in the proper observance
of the Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 factors and the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
formula — the Regional Trial Court-Special Agrarian Court (RTC-SAC) is not strictly bound to
conform to and apply them, particularly the DAR formula, to their minute detail as to effectively
deprive it of its discretion.—We clarified in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural
Enterprises, 713 SCRA 370 (2014) that, when acting within the parameters set by the law itself
— in the proper observance of the R.A. No. 6657 factors and the DAR formula — the RTC-SAC is
not strictly bound to conform to and apply them, particularly the DAR formula, to their minute
detail as to effectively deprive it of its discretion. “When faced with situations that do not
warrant the formula’s strict application, the [RTC--SAC] may, in the exercise of [its] discretion,
relax the formula’s application to fit the factual situations before [it].” It must, however, explain
and justify in clear terms the reason for any deviation from the prescribed factors and
formula.Same; Just Compensation; Trust Accounts; The explicit words of Section 16(e), Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 6657, did not include “trust accounts,” but only cash or bonds, as valid modes of
satisfying the government’s payment of just compensation.—We did not fail
to450450SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDLand Bank of the Philippines vs. Eusebio, Jr.
notice that the LBP, in this case, opened a trust account to provisionally pay Eusebio for the
property taken. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms Corporation, 667 SCRA
255 (2012), we struck down as void the DAR administrative circular that provided for the
opening of the trust accounts in lieu of the deposit in cash or in bonds contemplated in Section
16(e) of R.A. No. 6657. We pointedly declared that the explicit words of Section 16(e) did not
include “trust accounts,” but only cash or bonds, as valid modes of satisfying the government’s
payment of just compensation. Accordingly, we consider the LBP in delay and impose on it as
penalty an interest on the amount deposited in the trust account at the rate of 12% per annum
from the time the LBP opened the trust account until June 30, 2013 and beginning July 1, 2013,
until the account is converted into a cash or bond deposit account, at the rate of 6% per annum
per Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Circular No. 799. PETITION for review on certiorari of the
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.The facts are stated in the opinion of the
Court.LBP Legal Services Group for petitioner.Edelino B. Mong for respondent. BRION, J.:We
resolve in this petition for review on certiorari1 the challenge to the August 26, 2002 decision2
and the September 24, 2003 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
66022.The challenged decision affirmed in toto the June 29, 1999 judgment4 of the Regional
Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate,_______________1 Rollo, pp. 3-35.2 Penned by Associate
Justice Cancio C. Garcia, and concurred in by Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Eliezer R.
De los Santos; id., at pp. 38-48.3 Id., at pp. 36-37.4 Special Civil Case No. 4325, penned by
Judge Jacinta B. Tambago; id., at pp. 49-59. This case was tried jointly with Civil 451VOL. 728,
JULY 2, 2014451Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Eusebio, Jr.Branch 48, sitting as a Special
Agrarian Court (RTC-SAC) in Special Civil Case No. 4325 for Determination and Payment of Just
Compensation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
of 1988.The Factual AntecedentsRespondent Benecio Eusebio, Jr. was the owner of a 790.4-
hectare parcel of land situated in Corba, Cataingan, Masbate, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-4562 registered in the name of Ricardo Tañada. Eusebio purchased this parcel
of land from Tañada in 1980.On February 5, 1988, Eusebio voluntarily offered to sell the entire
790.4-hectare parcel of land to the government, through the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR), pursuant to R.A. No. 6657 for P19,500,000.00.5From the entire area of 790.4 hectares,
the DAR chose to acquire only P783.37 hectares6 and initially offered to purchase it at
P2,369,559.64. The DAR subsequently increased its offer to P3,149,718.20, per the Notice of
Land Valuation dated April 14, 1992. Eusebio rejected both offered amounts.On October 1,
1993, petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) revalued the acquirable portion at
P3,927,188.28, pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992 (DAR AO 6-92).
Eusebio likewise rejected this valuation through a letter dated October 26,
1993._______________Case No. 4323, entitled “Honeycomb Farm Corporation v. The
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, et al.” Civil Case No. 4323 eventually reached this Court and was
docketed as G.R. No. 169903. In a decision dated February 29, 2012, the Court REMANDED
Civil Case No. 4323 to the RTC--SAC of Masbate, Masbate, Branch 48, for determination of just
compensation.5 Id., at p. 81.6 See Field Investigation Report; id., at pp. 95-99. 452452SUPREME
COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDLand Bank of the Philippines vs. Eusebio, Jr.Meanwhile, the LBP
opened a trust account in the amount of P3,149,718.20 in favor of Eusebio and Tañada for the
covered portion. The DAR then took physical possession of the property, had TCT No. T-4562
cancelled in favor of the Republic of the Philippines, and distributed the property at cost to the
recognized farmer-beneficiaries.The parties subsequently referred the matter to the DAR
Adjudication Board (DARAB) for summary determination of just compensation. In a decision
dated January 8, 1994, the DARAB fixed the value of the property at P4,874,659.89.Eusebio
likewise found the DARAB’s valuation unacceptable. Hence, on July 18, 1994, Eusebio and
Tañada filed before the RTC-SAC an action for determination and payment of just
compensation against the DAR and the LBP. In the complaint, Eusebio and Tañada prayed for
just compensation in the amount of P20,000,000.00, plus damages and attorney’s fees
equivalent to 20% of the total compensation. They later amended the complaint increasing the
prayed just compensation to P25,000,000.00.During trial, the RTC-SAC appointed a Board of
Commissioners (Board) consisting of the Clerk of Court V — Atty. Norberto F. Mesa — as the
Chairman, with the following as members: the Branch Clerk of Court, Eusebio and Tañada’s
nominee — Engr. Hernando Caluag — and the DAR and the LBP’s nominee — Herbert Heath.
The Board conducted the ocular inspection on September 10, 1997 and arrived at the following
unanimous observation:7_______________7 Id., at p. 43.453VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014453Land
Bank of the Philippines vs. Eusebio, Jr.Notwithstanding the series of conferences, the Board
failed to reach a common and consolidated valuation for the acquired portion.8 Hence, the
Board submitted the separate valuation report of the parties’ respective nominees:Valuation of
Engr. Caluag:9Valuation of Heath:10 Engr. Caluag affirmed the contents of his report in open
court. He revealed that, in determining the property’s fair market value, he used as basis the
“records of sale and listings of similar properties offered for sale” and compared
the_______________8 Id., at pp. 113-116.9 Id., at pp. 106-112.10 Id., at p. 117.
454454SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDLand Bank of the Philippines vs. Eusebio,
Jr.properties using “such factors as location, type of development, crops planted, terrain, size
and element.”11 Finally, he factored in the necessary adjustments resulting from the current
real estate selling trends and the property’s location, size and development to arrive at the
total land valuation of P86,899,000.00.Heath, on the other hand, testified that, in arriving at the
total land valuation of P4,081,405.63, he used the guidelines enumerated under R.A. No. 6657
and other applicable agrarian statutes and issuances instead of the current land valuation that
Engr. Caluag employed in his valuation. He pointed out that per the records, the recognized
farmer-beneficiaries took possession of their respective portions of the property in 1992. Thus,
the improvements that the Board found on the property at the time it conducted the ocular
inspection in 1997 were clearly introduced by the farmer-beneficiaries.12 The RTC-SAC’s
DecisionIn its judgment13 of June 29, 1999, the RTC-SAC fixed the just compensation at
P25,000,000.00 for the entire 790.4-hectare parcel of land, and ordered the DAR and the LBP to
solidarily pay attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of the total just compensation. The RTC-SAC
brushed aside both valuations fixed by the parties’ respective nominees, particularly those fixed
by the DAR and the LBP which it regarded as unconstitutional and confiscatory. Consequently,
the RTC-SAC found as considerable just compensation the sum of P25,000,000.00 that Eusebio
and Tañada prayed for in their complaint; it, however, found as exorbitant and unreasonable,
and thus reduced to 10% from 20%, the claimed attorney’s fees._______________11 Id., at p.
54.12 Id., at p. 56.13 Supra note 4. 455VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014455Land Bank of the Philippines
vs. Eusebio, Jr. In a resolution dated October 21, 1999, the RTC-SAC denied the parties’
respective motions for reconsideration. The parties separately appealed the RTC-SAC’s ruling
before the CA.14 The CA’s RulingIn its August 26, 2002 decision,15 the CA affirmed in toto the
RTC--SAC’s judgment. Firstly, brushing aside Eusebio and Tañada’s position, the CA pointed out
that the just compensation should be fixed as of the time the government took possession of
the property and not as of the filing of the complaint. Thus, the CA declared unfair the
P86,899,000.00 valuation that Eusebio and Tañada’s nominee fixed based on the data
determined at the time of the filing of the complaint instead of at the time of the taking. The
CA, however, took note of the offer Eusebio made in 1988 to sell the entire 790.4 hectares at
P19,500,000.00 that it pointed out should at least set the ceiling price for the property’s
compensation.And secondly, likewise dismissing the DAR’s and the LBP’s contentions, the CA
noted that as early as 1992, a considerable portion of the property had already been cultivated
and developed. The CA also pointed out that the DAR and the LBP’s nominee merely confined
his determination to the factors enumerated under R.A. No. 6657 and the guidelines
enumerated under the pertinent DAR administrative orders, disregarding, in effect, the other
factors relevant to the determination of what the CA considered as the full and fair equivalent
of Eusebio’s property. Thus, the CA considered as too low and unreasonable the P4,081,405.63
valuation that the DAR and the LBP fixed as just compensation.Accordingly, the CA considered
as fair and equitable the amount the RTC-SAC fixed as just compensation, given
the_______________14 CA Rollo, pp. 25-53 and 82-117.15 Supra note 2. 456456SUPREME
COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDLand Bank of the Philippines vs. Eusebio, Jr.four-year time lapse
between 1988, when Eusebio offered to sell the property for P19,500,000.00 and 1992, when
the government actually deprived Eusebio of his property.The LBP filed the present petition
after the CA denied its motion for reconsideration16 in the CA’s September 24, 2003
resolution.17The Court initially denied the LBP’s petition for review on certiorari in a Resolution
dated November 10, 2003.18 On the LBP’s motion for reconsideration,19 the Court reinstated
the petition in a Resolution dated January 26, 2004.20The PetitionIn this petition,21 the LBP
concedes that the RTC-SAC has original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine just
compensation. Nevertheless, it argues that the RTC-SAC’s determination must be guided by the
valuation factors enumerated under R.A. No. 6657 and the implementing guidelines that the
DAR issued for the purpose. The LBP points out that the DAR, in the exercise of its rule-making
power granted under R.A. No. 6657, issued DAR AO 6-92, as amended by DAR AO 11-94 that
prescribes the formulae in the computation of just compensation for lands acquired pursuant
to R.A. No. 6657. Unless otherwise declared null and void, the LBP stresses that these DAR
administrative orders have the force and effect of law and are entitled to great respect, even by
this Court. In carrying out its functions under Executive Order No. 405,22 the LBP points out
that it, in turn, simply observed_______________16 Rollo, pp. 65-73.17 Supra note 3.18 Rollo,
p. 12119 Id., at pp. 126-138.20 Id., at p. 140.21 See petition, supra note 1. See also the LBP’s
Memorandum; Rollo, pp. 172-212.22 Issued on June 15, 1998. 457VOL. 728, JULY 2,
2014457Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Eusebio, Jr.and used the DAR prescribed formulae in
arriving at the 4,081,405.63 valuation, which, it emphasizes, the CA even noted in its
decision.Addressing directly the CA’s valuation, the LBP directs the Court’s attention to the
testimony of Eusebio’s witness23 and points out that when the government took possession of
the property in 1990, Eusebio and his family had already discontinued investing and had
stopped developing it from thereon; in addition, over 674 hectares of the acquired property’s
area was then cogonal. Thus, the marked difference in the property’s condition from the time
the government acquired it in 1990 up to the time the Board conducted its ocular inspection in
1997 should and must be properly accounted for as developments introduced by the farmer-
beneficiaries. Accordingly, the LBP argues, the valuation that the RTC-SAC and the CA made
clearly contravened the Court’s mandate that just compensation should be determined as of
the property’s time of taking, which in this case was, at the most, in 1992 when TCT No. T-4562
was cancelled and Certificates of Land Transfer were issued to the recognized farmer-
beneficiaries.Additionally, the LBP argues that R.A. No. 6657 directs the determination of just
compensation based on the covered property’s “actual use and income” and not on its
“potential or future use” as applied by the RTC-SAC when it relied on the market value
approach. The LBP also points out that the RTC-SAC did not offer any formula in arriving at the
P25,000,000.00 valuation.Finally, the LBP contends that the award of attorney’s fees was
erroneous for clear lack of basis and bad faith on its part.In its reply,24 the LBP additionally
emphasizes that the just compensation for property taken, pursuant to the government’s
agrarian reform program, should not and cannot be based on the property’s market value,
more so on the amount_______________23 Referring to Benecio Eusebio, Sr., father of
Eusebio; Rollo, p. 22.24 Id., at pp. 158-163. 458458SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATEDLand Bank of the Philippines vs. Eusebio, Jr. by which Eusebio offered it for sale.
The LBP points out that the “just compensation” in the realm of agrarian reform is vastly
different from “just compensation” in an ordinary eminent domain proceeding. The taking of
private property for purposes of agrarian reform is revolutionary, involving as it does both the
exercise of the power of eminent domain and police power. As such, the just compensation for
property taken, pursuant to the government’s agrarian reform program, cannot exceed its
market value.The Case for the RespondentEqually conceding to the RTC-SAC’s original and
exclusive jurisdiction to determine just compensation, Eusebio contends in his comment25 that
the CA correctly affirmed the RTC-SAC’s valuation for lack of reversible error. Eusebio stresses
that while the DAR, indeed, has the power to prescribe the formula and determine just
compensation, the RTC--SAC is, nevertheless, not bound by such determination as valuation of
property in eminent domain cases is essentially a judicial function. In this case, neither the
DAR’s valuation nor the Board’s report could have bound the RTC-SAC in the exercise of this
function; more so for, in this case, the Board failed to reach a common valuation. Finally,
Eusebio argues that the award of attorney’s fees is lawful as he was compelled to litigate or
incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of the LBP’s unjustified act.In his
memorandum,26 Eusebio adds that the various testimonial and documentary pieces of
evidence presented before the RTC-SAC, and which it fully considered, support the
P25,000,000.00 valuation for the property. Moreover, the factual findings of the RTC-SAC that
the CA affirmed deserve great weight and finality._______________25 Id., at pp. 141-156.26
Id., at pp. 218-228. 459VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014459Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Eusebio,
Jr.The IssueThe core issue for the Court’s resolution is whether the RTC-SAC’s determination of
just compensation for the property at P25,000,000.00, with 10% attorney’s fees, is proper.The
Court’s RulingWe find the LBP’s petition MERITORIOUS.The State’s agrarian reform program
and the constitutional guarantee of just compensationAs one of its arguments, the LBP
theorizes that the government’s taking of private property in pursuit of its agrarian reform
program is not a “traditional” exercise of the eminent domain power but one that equally
involves the exercise of the State’s police power. As such, the LBP insists, the just compensation
for the property cannot exceed its market value as the loss resulting from the State’s exercise
of police power is not compensable.We disagree with the LBP on this point.We debunked this
very same argument in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms Corporation,27
whose factual circumstances closely mirror and are, in fact, related to those of the present
case. In Honeycomb, we essentially pointed out that the “just compensation” guaranteed to a
landowner under, Section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution is precisely the same as the “just
compensation” embodied in Section 9, Article III of the Constitution. That is, whether for land
taken pursuant to the State’s agrarian reform program or for property taken for purposes other
than agrarian reform,_______________27 G.R. No. 169903, February 29, 2012, 667 SCRA 255,
264-267. 460460SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDLand Bank of the Philippines vs.
Eusebio, Jr. the just compensation due to an owner should be the “fair and full price of the
taken property.”28Citing the Court’s ruling in Ass’n. of Small Landowners in the Phils., Inc. v.
Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,29 we further stressed in Honeycomb that just
compensation paid for lands taken pursuant to the State’s agrarian reform program refers to
the “full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator x x x [the
measure of which] is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The word “just” is used to
intensify the meaning of the word ‘compensation’ to convey the idea that the equivalent to be
rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.” Similarly in Apo
Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines,30 we debunked the very same attempt of
the LBP to distinguish just compensation paid in what it calls as “traditional” exercise of
eminent domain from the just compensation paid in the context of an agrarian reform eminent
domain exercise. There, we categorically declared that “nothing is inherently contradictory in
the public purpose of land reform and the right of landowners to receive just compensation for
the expropriation by the State of their properties.”In other words, therefore, the clear intent of
the Constitutional guarantee of just compensation, whether understood within the terms of
Article III, Section 9 or of Article XIII, Section 4, is to secure to any owner the “full and fair
equivalent” of the property taken. Regardless of whether the taking was pursued in the
“traditional” exercise of eminent domain or in its “revolutionary” exercise in the context of the
State’s agrarian reform program, just compensation has but one meaning and the State is
obligated to pay the “fair and full_______________28 Id., at p. 265; italics ours.29 256 Phil.
777, 812; 175 SCRA 343, 378-379 (1989); italics ours.30 G.R. No. 164195, April 5, 2011, 647
SCRA 207, 226; italics ours. 461VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014461Land Bank of the Philippines vs.
Eusebio, Jr. price of the property” even if the property is taken for social justice purposes.The
determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function that the Courts exercise
within the parameters of the law; the RTC-SAC’s valuation in this case is erroneous for having
been rendered outside the contemplation of the lawJurisprudence settles that the
determination of just compensation is fundamentally a function of the courts.31 Section 57 of
R.A. No. 665732 explicitly vests in the RTC-SAC the original and exclusive jurisdiction to
determine just compensation for lands taken pursuant to the State’s agrarian reform
program.To guide the RTC-SAC in the exercise of its function, Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657
enumerates the factors that the RTC-SAC must take into account in its determination, i.e., cost
of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its_______________31 Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Celada, 515 Phil. 467, 477; 479 SCRA 495, 504 (2006); Land Bank of
the Philippines v. Escandor, G.R. No. 171685, October 11, 2010, 632 SCRA 504, 512; and Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises, G.R. No. 172551, January 15, 2014,
713 SCRA 370. See also Land Bank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms Corporation, supra
note 27 at pp. 268-269.32 Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657 pertinently provides:Section 57.
Special Jurisdiction.—The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all
proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act. [emphasis ours,
italics supplied] 462462SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDLand Bank of the Philippines vs.
Eusebio, Jr.nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax
declarations and the assessment made by the government assessors, among others.On the
other hand, to ensure the agrarian reform law’s proper implementation, Section 49 of R.A. No.
665733 empowers the DAR to issue such rules and regulations necessary for the purpose. Thus,
corollary to the agrarian reform law’s guidelines, the DAR issued DAR AO 6-92, as amended by
DAR AO 11-94 and, recently, by DAR AO 5-98, that incorporated, into a basic formula, Section
17’s enumerated factors providing the details by which “just compensation” is to be properly
approximated.Equally settled, however, in jurisprudence is the RTC-SAC’s duty to consider the
factors enumerated under Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and the DAR formula that embodies
these factors in determining just compensation.Our rulings in Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Sps. Banal,34 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada,35 Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Colarina,36 and Land Bank of the Philippines v. Lim,37 to name a few, were clear that the RTC-
SAC must consider the factors mentioned by Section 17, including the formula prescribed by
the DAR’s administrative orders in determining just compensation._______________33 Section
49 of R.A. No. 6657 reads:Section 49. Rules and Regulations.—The PARC and the DAR shall
have the power to issue rules and regulations, whether substantive or procedural, to carry out
the objects and purposes of this Act. Said rules shall take effect ten (10) days after publication
in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation. [italics supplied]34 478 Phil. 701, 709-
710; 434 SCRA 543, 554 (2004).35 Supra note 31 at p. 477; p. 500.36 G.R. No. 176410,
September 1, 2010, 629 SCRA 614, 624-632.37 555 Phil. 831, 837-839; 529 SCRA 129, 134
(2007). 463VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014463Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Eusebio, Jr. Recently, the
Court, in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises,38 had the occasion to
reiterate and stress the need to apply and consider the factors and formula prescribed under
Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and the pertinent DAR issuances. Citing Land Bank of the Philippines
v. Honeycomb Farms Corporation,39 we pointedly declared as grave error, on the RTC-SAC’s
part, its complete disregard of the DAR formula. We emphasized that the DAR’s issuances
partake of the nature of statutes that have in their favor a presumption of legality.40 And,
unless the administrative orders are declared invalid or the cases before them involve
situations these administrative issuances do not cover, the RTC-SAC must apply them with the
equal force of the law.In other words, our ruling in Yatco underscored the settled rule that, in
the exercise of the essentially judicial function of determining just compensation, the RTC-SAC
is not granted unlimited discretion. It must consider and apply the R.A. No. 6657-enumerated
factors and the DAR formula (that reflects these factors) as they provide the uniform
framework or structure by which just compensation for property subject to agrarian reform
should be determined. This uniform system, we pointed out, is important for it will ensure that
the RTC-SACs “do not arbitrarily fix an amount that is absurd, baseless and even contradictory
to the objectives of our agrarian reform laws as just compensation” in addition to ensuring that
“the just compensation fixed represents, at the very least, a close approximation of the full and
real value of the property taken that is fair and equitable for both the farmer-beneficiaries and
the landowner.”41 That the “just compensa-_______________38 Supra note 31.39 Supra note
27.40 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises, supra note 31 at p. 381,
citing Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada, supra note 31 at p. 507.41 Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises, supra at p. 382. 464464SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATEDLand Bank of the Philippines vs. Eusebio, Jr.tion” fixed should be fair and equitable
equally for both the farmer-beneficiaries and the landowner, to our mind, is a consideration
that should evenly be factored in the computation for ultimately the farmer-beneficiaries will
shoulder the cost of the distributed property.More importantly, however, we clarified in Yatco
that, when acting within the parameters set by the law itself — in the proper observance of the
R.A. No. 6657 factors and the DAR formula — the RTC-SAC is not strictly bound to conform to
and apply them, particularly the DAR formula, to their minute detail as to effectively deprive it
of its discretion. “When faced with situations that do not warrant the formula’s strict
application, the [RTC--SAC] may, in the exercise of [its] discretion, relax the formula’s
application to fit the factual situations before [it].”42 It must, however, explain and justify in
clear terms the reason for any deviation from the prescribed factors and formula.43In the
present case, we reaffirm and emphasize our ruling in Yatco — the situation where a deviation
is made in the exercise of judicial discretion must at all times be distinguished from the
situation where the RTC-SAC (and the CA in cases where it affirms the RTC-SAC’s valuation)
utterly and blatantly disregards the factors spelled out by the law and the implementing rules.
A deviation made in utter and blatant disregard of the prescribed factors and formula amounts
to grave abuse_______________42 Ibid. See also Land Bank of the Philippines v. Bienvenido
Castro, G.R. No. 189125, August 28, 2013, 704 SCRA 253 citing Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Chico, G.R. No. 168453, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 226, 243; and Apo Fruits Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164195, December 19, 2007, 541 SCRA 117, 131-132.43 Land Bank
of the Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises, supra note 31 at p. 382. See also Land Bank
of the Philippines v. Bienvenido Castro, supra.465VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014465Land Bank of the
Philippines vs. Eusebio, Jr. of discretion for having been taken outside the contemplation of the
law.44A determination of just compensation based merely on “conscience” — a consideration
entirely outside the contemplation of the law — is the precise situation that we find in this
case. We, therefore, set aside, as grave abuse of discretion, the RTC-SAC’s valuation.To be clear,
other than in “conscience,” the RTC-SAC did not point to any particular consideration that
impelled it to set the just compensation at P25,000,000.00. It did not refer to any factor or data
that it used as basis in arriving at this valuation. Worse, it did not cite any particular formula
that it used in its computation. In fact, a reading of the RTC-SAC’s decision reveals a marked
absence of any grounds by which it anchored its determination, more so of any explanation
why it fixed the amount of P25,000,000.00. This marked absence of basis, taken together with
these other considerations, convinced us that the RTC-SAC completely, even arbitrarily, relied
on the amount that Eusebio and Tañada prayed for in their complaint in fixing the property’s
just compensation.Arguably, the fixing of just compensation that is based on the landowner’s
prayer falls within the exercise of the RTC-SAC’s discretion and, therefore, should be upheld as
a valid exercise of its jurisdiction. Even within the context of this judicial prerogative principle,
however, the RTC--SAC’s reliance, in this case, on Eusebio and Tañada’s prayer was erroneous
for, as we pointed out above, the RTC-SAC did not at_______________44 Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises, supra note 31 at p. 383, citing Aldovino, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009, 609 SCRA 234; Gonzales v.
Solid Cement Corporation, G.R. No. 198423, October 23, 2012, 684 SCRA 344; and Pecson v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 182865, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA 634. See also Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Escandor, supra note 31 at p. 515, citing Land Bank of the Philippines
v. Barrido, G.R. No. 183688, August 18, 2010, 628 SCRA 454. 466466SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATEDLand Bank of the Philippines vs. Eusebio, Jr. all consider any factor or use any
formula, whether those prescribed by the law and the DAR issuances or otherwise, in arriving at
its valuation. This blind reliance on Eusebio and Tañada’s prayer and the utter disregard of the
prescribed factors and formula clearly amount to grave abuse of discretion for having been
taken outside the contemplation of the law. In acting as it did in this case, the RTC-SAC
committed exactly what the law and the regulations aimed at preventing in prescribing the
factors and the formula in the determination of just compensation — an arbitrary fixing of an
amount that is absurd, baseless and even contradictory to the objectives of our agrarian reform
laws as just compensation.Thus, we set aside, as grave abuse of discretion, the just
compensation of P25,000,000.00 that the RTC-SAC fixed for Eusebio’s property. We point out,
however, that we set aside this valuation not for the reasons urged by the LBP, i.e., the RTC-
SAC’s use of the market value approach and the fixing of the just compensation as of the time
of the filing of the complaint, but for the valuation’s clear lack of basis and for having been
made in utter disregard of the law’s parameters. Accordingly, we likewise set aside, for grave
error, the CA’s decision that affirmed in toto this RTC-SAC’s valuation.Payment through trust
accountA final point. We did not fail to notice that the LBP, in this case, opened a trust account
to provisionally pay Eusebio for the property taken. In Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Honeycomb Farms Corporation,45 we struck down as void the DAR administrative circular46
that provided for the opening of the trust accounts in lieu of the deposit in cash or in bonds
contemplated in Section 16(e) of R.A. No. 6657.47 We pointedly_______________45 Supra
note 27, citing Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 319 Phil. 246, 249; 249 SCRA
149, 157 (1995).46 See DAR Administrative Circular No. 9, Series of 1990.47 Section 16(e) of
R.A. No. 6657 provides: 467VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014467Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Eusebio,
Jr. declared that the explicit words of Section 16(e) did not include “trust accounts,” but only
cash or bonds, as valid modes of satisfying the government’s payment of just compensation.
Accordingly, we consider the LBP in delay and impose on it as penalty an interest on the
amount deposited in the trust account at the rate of 12% per annum from the time the LBP
opened the trust account until June 30, 2013 and beginning July 1, 2013, until the account is
converted into a cash or bond deposit account, at the rate of 6% per annum per Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas Circular No. 799.48Remand of the CaseConsidering the manifest lack of sufficient
data to guide this Court in the proper determination of just compensation following the
guidelines that we have at length discussed above, we deem it premature to determine with
finality the matter in controversy. We are not a trier of facts and we cannot receive any new
evidence from the parties to aid the prompt resolution of this case. Thus, we are compelled
to_______________SECTION 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands.—For purposes
of acquisition of private lands, the following procedures shall be followed:x x x x(e) Upon
receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response
from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take
immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall
thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries. [emphasis
ours]48 Effective July 1, 2013. It lowered to 6% from 12% the interest rate for loans and other
forbearance of money. 468468SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDLand Bank of the
Philippines vs. Eusebio, Jr. remand the case to the RTC-SAC for the reception of evidence and
the determination of just compensation with the cautionary reminder for the proper
observance of the factors enumerated under Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and of the formula
prescribed under the pertinent DAR administrative orders.WHEREFORE, in light of these
considerations, we hereby GRANT the petition. Accordingly, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the
decision dated August 26, 2002 and the resolution dated September 24, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 66022. We REMAND Special Civil Case No. 4325 to the Regional Trial
Court of Masbate, Masbate, Branch 48, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court which is directed to
determine with dispatch the just compensation due to respondent Benecio Eusebio, Jr. in
accordance with Republic Act No. 6657 and the pertinent issuances of the Department of
Agrarian Reform, subject to a 12% interest per annum from the time the Land Bank of the
Philippines opened the trust account in favor of Benecio Eusebio, Jr. and Ricardo Tañada up to
June 30, 2013, and to a 6% interest per annum beginning July 1, 2013 until the time the account
is actually converted into cash and/or Land Bank of the Philippines bond deposit accounts.SO
ORDERED.Carpio (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Perez and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.Petition
granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set aside.Notes.—A formula was outlined in
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative Order No. 5, Series of 1998 in computing
just compensation for lands subject of acquisition whether under voluntary offer to sell (VOS)
or compulsory acquisition (CA), to wit: LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1) Where: LV =
Land Value, CNI = Capitalized Net Income, CS = Comparable Sales, and MV = Market Value per
469VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014469Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Eusebio, Jr.Tax Declaration. (Land
Bank of the Philippines vs. Bona, 685 SCRA 153 [2012])The Court has consistently ruled that the
ascertainment of just compensation by the Regional Trial Court as Special Agrarian Court on the
basis of the landholding’s nature, location, market value, assessor’s value, and the volume and
value of the produce is valid and accords with Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657. (Land Bank of the
Philippines vs. Costo, 687 SCRA 122 [2012])——o0o—— Land Bank of the Philippines vs.
Eusebio, Jr., 728 SCRA 447, G.R. No. 160143 July 2, 2014
G.R. No. 182704. April 23, 2014.*LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. VICTORINO
T. PERALTA, respondent. Agrarian Reform; Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board;
Jurisdiction; The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) is vested with
primary and exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving the valuation of land and the preliminary
determination and payment of just compensation, fixing and collection of lease rentals,
disturbance compensation, amortization payments, and similar disputes concerning the
functions of the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP).—Under Section 1(b), Rule II of the 1994
Rules of Procedure of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (1994 DARAB
Rules), which is applicable in the present case, the DARAB is vested with primary and exclusive
jurisdiction over cases involving the valuation of land and the preliminary determination and
payment of just compensation, fixing and collection of lease rentals, disturbance compensation,
amortization payments, and similar disputes concerning the functions of the
LBP._______________ * FIRST DIVISION.529 Same; Same; Just Compensation; The
determination of the amount of just compensation by the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) is merely a preliminary administrative determination which is
subject to challenge before the Special Agrarian Courts (SACs) which have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation under Section 57, R.A.
No. 6657.—In Phil. Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, 322 SCRA 139 (2000), we explained that
the consequence of the said rule is that the adjudicator’s decision on land valuation attains
finality after the lapse of the 15-day period. Republic v. Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA 758 (1996),
and subsequent cases clarified that the determination of the amount of just compensation by
the DARAB is merely a preliminary administrative determination which is subject to challenge
before the SACs which have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation under Section 57, R.A. No. 6657. Same; Just
Compensation; Taking; The date of taking of the subject land for purposes of computing just
compensation should be reckoned from the issuance dates of the emancipation patents.—As to
the time of actual “taking,” this Court has already resolved the matter in the aforecited case of
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Angel T. Domingo, 543 SCRA 627 (2008), which held:
LBP’s contention that the property was taken on 21 October 1972, the date of effectivity of PD
27, thus just compensation should be computed based on the GSP in 1972, is erroneous. The
date of taking of the subject land for purposes of computing just compensation should be
reckoned from the issuance dates of the emancipation patents. An emancipation patent
constitutes the conclusive authority for the issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title in the
name of the grantee. It is from the issuance of an emancipation patent that the grantee can
acquire the vested right of ownership in the landholding, subject to the payment of just
compensation to the landowner. Same; Same; Carper Law (R.A. No. 9700); Under the new law,
the landowner’s challenge on the valuation of previously acquired lands as in the case at bar
may still be resolved on the basis of the old Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657.—The Court is mindful
of the new agrarian reform law, R.A. No. 9700 or the CARPER Law, passed by Congress on July
1, 2009, further amending R.A. No. 6657, as530 amended. In the recent case of Land Bank of
the Philippines v. Santiago, Jr., 682 SCRA 264 (2012), we held that under the new law, the
landowner’s challenge on the valuation of previously acquired lands as in the case at bar may
still be resolved on the basis of the old Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657, thus: That this case, despite
the new law, still falls under Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 is supported even by Republic
Act No. 9700, which states that “previously acquired lands wherein valuation is subject to
challenge shall be completed and resolved pursuant to Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657, as
amended. Same; Same; Same; Considering that respondent’s land had been previously
acquired under P.D. No. 27 but the valuation has been the subject of his challenge before the
Special Agrarian Court (SAC), the completion and final resolution of just compensation should
therefore be computed in accordance with Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 prior to its amendment
by R.A. No. 9700.—Considering that respondent’s land had been previously acquired under P.D.
No. 27 but the valuation has been the subject of his challenge before the SAC, the completion
and final resolution of just compensation should therefore be computed in accordance with
Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 9700. Given the insufficient
evidence for the determination of just compensation under Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and
applicable DAR regulations, and the absence of evidence in the records pertaining to the date
of issuance of the EPs to the tenant-beneficiaries, we are constrained to remand this case to
the SAC for reception of such and any other relevant evidence for a complete resolution of the
issue of just compensation, consistent with our disquisitions. PETITION for review on certiorari
of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals Mindanao Station. The facts are stated in
the opinion of the Court. LBP Legal Services Group for petitioner. Ravanera, Olegario,
Namalata & Associates for respondent. 531VILLARAMA, JR., J.: Before us is a petition for
review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision[1] dated July 5, 2007 and
Resolution[2] dated April 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) Mindanao Station in C.A.-G.R.
S.P. No. 00161. The CA affirmed with modification the Decision[3] December 14, 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, Branch 9 in Civil Case No. 3015.
Victorino T. Peralta (respondent) is the registered owner of two parcels of agricultural land
located at Sinangguyan, Don Carlos, Bukidnon covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-
9623[4] and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-10957.[5] Of the total area of more than 8
hectares, 2.73 hectares were placed under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) program and
distributed to tenant-beneficiaries pursuant to Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27. On October 17,
2000, respondent filed with the RTC, acting as Special Agrarian Court (SAC), a petition[6] for
judicial determination of just compensation for his landholding which he claimed was valued by
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) at the price of only
P17,240.00. Respondent alleged that based on his own investigation, the true valuation of lands
sold within the vicinity is P200,000/ha. while the valuation made by petitioner as af-
_______________[1] Rollo, pp. 64-78. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello with
Associate Justices Jane Aurora C. Lantion and Elihu A. Ybañez, concurring. [2] Id., at pp. 103-
104. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello with Associate Justices Jane Aurora C.
Lantion and Edgardo T. Lloren, concurring. [3] Records, pp. 203-218. Penned by Judge Rolando
S. Venadas, Sr. [4] Id., at p. 7. [5] Id., at p. 6. [6] Id., at pp. 1-5.532firmed by the DARAB was
fixed at only P6,315.02/ha., or 63 centavos per square meter which is highly unconscionable.
Petitioner filed its Answer[7] stating that the subject land was valued wayback in 1981 as
evidenced by the Landowner-Tenant Production Agreement (LTPA). It maintained that having
agreed to the stipulated price in the LTPA, respondent had waived his claim for a higher
compensation. Also, petitioner claimed that respondent’s cause of action has already
prescribed under Article 1144 of the Civil Code. In his Reply,[8] respondent asserted that he
had objected to petitioner’s valuation during the adjudication proceedings. As to the LTPA,
respondent said he signed it merely for the purpose of terminating the collection of rentals
from the tenant-beneficiaries. He insisted that there was no waiver of his right to be paid the
just and equitable value of his landholding. Upon agreement of the parties, a panel of
commissioners was constituted composed of Branch Clerk Domingo L. Apostol, Jr. (Chairman),
Municipal Assessor Filoteo Sanchez and LBP Field Investigation-Agrarian Reform Operation
Center Chief Engr. Jacinto Ritardo (Members).[9] On January 25, 2002, the commissioners
conducted an inspection of the subject land and reported the following findings: 1. That the
property is along the National Sayre Highway situated at Barangay Sinangguyan, Don Carlos,
Bukidnon one kilometer away more or less from Poblacion Norte, Don Carlos, Bukidnon. 2.
That it has generally flat or plain terrain suitable for any uses like Agricultural, Residential,
Commercial or Industrial._______________[7] Id., at pp. 15-17. [8] Id., at pp. 22-23. [9] Id., at
pp. 61-62.534 3. That it is fully planted with sugarcane which is the actual use of the
property.[10] Engr. Ritardo recommended the amount of P17,240.00 as compensation,
pursuant to the formula provided under PD 27 and using the values agreed upon in the LTPA.
On the other hand, Municipal Assessor Sanchez reported that the current market value for
taxation purposes of agricultural lands-sugarcane in Sinangguyan, Don Carlos, Bukidnon is
P119,000/ha. but the actual prevailing fair market value of surrounding properties is not less
than P200,000/ha. for agricultural lands.[11] In his Report submitted to the SAC, Chairman
Apostol, Jr. made the following recommendation:This commissioner as chairman of the panel,
after evaluating the reports of the commissioners of the plaintiff and the defendant and on the
basis of his appreciation of the value of the property, taking into consideration its accessibility
to the town proper, potentiality (ideal for residential use) productivity (planted to sugar cane
which is a high-yielding crop), physical features (flat topography, well-drained and rich top soil)
and the buying price of similar properties in the area (per interview conducted) is sustaining the
value submitted by the plaintiff’s commissioner in the amount of P200,000.00 per hectare. As
Municipal Assessor of the Municipality of Don Carlos, Bukidnon for many years, he has personal
knowledge of the value of the properties in the area. The defendant’s commissioner is duty-
bound to apply the valuation under Presidential Decree No. 27 because the property is covered
under this program, even if the Decree was signed in 1972 at the advent of Martial Law by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, some 30 years ago._______________[10] Id., at p. 82. [11] Id.,
at pp. 80, 82.534 This commissioner however, in order to “socialize” the valuation and make it
more convenient for the farmer-beneficiaries to pay the value of the land they till is
recommending the amount of P150,000.00 per hectare for the 2.7300 hectare prop[e]rty of the
plaintiff or a total just compensation of P409,500.00.[12] Before the case was submitted for
decision petitioner was allowed to present its two witnesses, after which it formally offered its
documentary evidence. Respondent opted not to present any witness and neither did it submit
documentary evidence. On December 14, 2004, the SAC rendered its decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff, declaring
the amount of FOUR HUNDRED NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P409,500.00) PESOS as just
compensation for the property of the plaintiff consisting of 2.7300 hectares portion of TCT No.
T-10957 and OCT No. P-9623 in the name of petitioner Victorino T. Peralta located at
Sinanguyan, Don Carlos, Bukidnon; ordering the defendant Land Bank of the Philippines to pay
the said amount exclusive of the amounts of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS as
attorney’s fee and TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) as cost of litigation, payable in cash and in
bonds, pursuant to the mode of payment under the agrarian reform program. SO
ORDERED.[13] In its Order dated February 23, 2005, the SAC likewise denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration, stating that “[e]ven if the amount payable to the landowner is
already Php73,604.95 as of September 16, 2004 after adding the compounded interest of 6%
per annum to the Php17,240.00 valua-_______________[12] Id., at pp. 83-84. [13] Id., at pp.
217-218.535tion by the LBP, the amount is still considered not fair and just from the time of the
‘taking’ in 1972 which is 33 years ago, considering the devaluation of the peso and the
landowner’s lost income opportunity for such long period of time.”[14] Petitioner appealed to
the CA arguing that respondent’s act of filing a petition for judicial determination of just
compensation with the SAC was in repudiation of the LTPA executed more than 19 years ago. If
indeed, respondent had a valid ground to repudiate the aforesaid agreement and being a
written agreement, the same should have been done within ten years from its execution on
September 15, 1981, pursuant to Article 1144 of the Civil Code. Petitioner reiterated that
respondent’s suit is likewise barred on the ground that the period to elevate the matter of just
compensation to the court from the DARAB had already lapsed. Not only did respondent fail to
indicate in his complaint before the RTC his date of receipt of the DARAB decision, more than
30 days had already lapsed before he brought the action in court. By Decision dated July 5,
2007, the CA affirmed with modification the judgment of the SAC by deleting the award of
attorney’s fees and litigation costs. The CA found that petitioner has not shown that it complied
with the requirement of full payment of the cost of respondent’s landholding. While it is true
that petitioner had made a valuation of the property as stated in the LTPA, using the formula
provided under P.D. No. 27, the CA stressed that the effort has not gone beyond that point as
no just compensation, as thus evaluated, had ever been made to the respondent prompting the
latter to file, sometime in 2000, a summary administrative proceeding before the DARAB, and
eventually a petition with the SAC praying for the fixing of just compensation pursuant to
Republic Act No. 6657. The CA thus ruled that since the application of the process of agrarian
reform to the subject land has remained incomplete as of the advent of R.A. No. 6657,
actual_______________[14] Id., at p. 235.536 title remains with respondent and the
completion of the agrarian reform process should now be undertaken under R.A. No. 6657, in
accordance with this Court’s ruling in Paris v. Alfeche[15] and as reiterated in Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Natividad.[16] Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by
the CA. Hence, this petition raising the following issues:A. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS DECISION AS IT HAD MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED THEREIN
RELEVANT FACTS WHICH WOULD HAVE JUSTIFIED A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION. B. WHETHER OR
NOT THE CARP LAW (R.A. 6657) HAS RENDERED INOPERATIVE THE VALUATION FORMULA AND
FACTORS PRESCRIBED IN PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 27, EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 228.[17]
Petitioner faults the CA in failing to appreciate that the LTPA valuation was agreed upon
between respondent and tenant-beneficiaries in September 1981, which valuation was
confirmed and validated for payment by DAR and LBP in 1982. Since the amount of the agreed
compensation has since then been made available to respondent, petitioner avers that no delay
can be imputed to the government. Additionally, petitioner points out that the DAR resolution
sustaining the LTPA valuation was ipso facto rendered final_______________[15] 416 Phil. 473,
448; 364 SCRA 110, 122 (2001). [16] 497 Phil. 738, 746-747; 458 SCRA 441, 451-452 (2005).
[17] Rollo, pp. 450-451.537 and executory after the lapse of fifteen days from respondent’s
notice thereof, without the matter of just compensation being elevated to the SAC pursuant to
Section 51 in relation to Section 16(f) of R.A. No. 6657. The matter of valuation had thus
become res judicata. It was only after 50 days from rendition of the DAR resolution and almost
20 years from execution of the LTPA, that respondent petitioned the SAC for determination of
just compensation. Lastly, petitioner argues that assuming that the SAC’s giving due course to
respondent’s petition was proper, the just compensation determined by said court was not in
accord with Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657, which pursuant to Section 5 of R.A. No. 9700[18] which
took effect on July 1, 2009, shall be the applicable law for “all previously acquired lands wherein
valuation is subject to challenge by landowners.” The petition is partly meritorious. Under
Section 1(b), Rule II of the 1994 Rules of Procedure of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (1994 DARAB Rules), which is applicable in the present case, the DARAB is
vested with primary and exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving the valuation of land and the
preliminary determination and payment of just compensation, fixing and collection of lease
rentals, disturbance compensation, amortization payments, and similar disputes concerning the
functions of the LBP. Rule XIII, Section 11 of the 1994 DARAB Rules
provides:_______________[18] “An Act Strengthening the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP), Extending the Acquisition and Distribution of All Agricultural Lands, Instituting
Necessary Reforms, Amending for the Purpose Certain Provisions of Republic Act No. 6657,
Otherwise Known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, as Amended, and
Appropriating Funds Therefor.”538Section 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination
and Payment of Just Compensation.—The decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and
preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the
Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian
Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to
only one motion for reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied) In Phil. Veterans Bank v. Court of
Appeals,[19] we explained that the consequence of the said rule is that the adjudicator’s
decision on land valuation attains finality after the lapse of the 15-day period. Republic v. Court
of Appeals[20] and subsequent cases[21] clarified that the determination of the amount of just
compensation by the DARAB is merely a preliminary administrative determination which is
subject to challenge before the SACs which have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
petitions for the determination of just compensation under Section 57, R.A. No. 6657. The
Court in Soriano v. Republic[22] summarized the 15-day period rule for challenging the DAR
valuation in just compensation cases, as follows:The Court notes that although the petition for
determination of just compensation in Republic v. Court of Appeals was filed beyond the 15-day
period, Republic v. Court of Appeals does not serve as authority for disregarding the 15-day
period to bring an action for judicial determination of just compensation. Republic v. Court of
Appeals, it should be noted, was decided at a time when_______________ [19] 379 Phil. 141,
148-149; 322 SCRA 139, 142 (2000). [20] 331 Phil. 1070; 263 SCRA 758 (1996). [21] Land Bank
of the Philippines v. Suntay, 561 Phil. 711; 535 SCRA 605 (2007); Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Martinez, 582 Phil. 739; 560 SCRA 776 (2008). [22] G.R. No. 184282, April 11, 2012, 669 SCRA
354, 362-363.539 Rule XIII, Section 11 was not yet present in the DARAB Rules. Further, said
case did not discuss whether the petition filed therein for the fixing of just compensation was
filed out of time or not. The Court merely decided the issue of whether cases involving just
compensation should first be appealed to the DARAB before the landowner can resort to the
SAC under Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657. In any event, any speculation as to the validity of Rule
XIII, Section 11 was foreclosed by our ruling in Philippine Veterans Bank where we affirmed the
order of dismissal of a petition for determination of just compensation for having been filed
beyond the 15-day period under said Section 11. In said case, we explained that Section 11 is
not incompatible with the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the SAC. In Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Martinez, we reaffirmed this ruling and stated for the guidance of the bench and
bar that “while a petition for the fixing of just compensation with the SAC is not an appeal from
the agrarian reform adjudicator’s decision but an original action, the same has to be filed within
the 15-day period stated in the DARAB Rules; otherwise, the adjudicator’s decision will attain
finality.” Notwithstanding the foregoing rulings, we noted in Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Umandap that “[s]ince the SAC statutorily exercises original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, it cannot be said that the
decision of the adjudicator, if not appealed to the SAC, would be deemed final and executory,
under all circumstances.” In certain cases, the Court has adopted a policy of liberally allowing
petitions for determination of just compensation even though the procedure under DARAB
rules have not been strictly followed, whenever circumstances so warrant. x x x x (Emphasis
supplied) In the case at bar, the DAR Regional Adjudicator issued his resolution ordering the
payment of P17,240.00 as just com-540pensation for respondent’s landholding on August 23,
2000. While respondent did not indicate the date when he received a copy of the said
resolution, the filing of the petition with the SAC was done only on October 17, 2000 or 55 days
from the issuance of the DAR resolution. Nonetheless, such failure to comply with the 15-day
period did not render the DAR valuation final and executory as to bar respondent’s action for
judicial determination of just compensation. We note that even before the conduct of DAR
proceedings and respondent’s filing of a petition with the SAC, R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known
as “The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988,” already took effect on June 15, 1988.
Hence, the parties litigated on the issue of whether P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 288 or R.A. No. 6657
should apply in determining just compensation in this case. The Court has, in several cases, for
reason of equity, applied R.A. No. 6657 in determining just compensation for lands acquired
under P.D. No. 27 and before the effectivity of R.A. No. 6657. In Gabatin v. Land Bank of the
Philippines,[23] this Court declared that the reckoning period for the determination of just
compensation is the time when the land was taken applying P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228.
However, in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad,[24] we ruled that where the agrarian
reform process is still incomplete at the time of effectivity of R.A. 6657, the just compensation
should be determined and the process concluded under the latter law. Thus:Land Bank’s
contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian reform on October 21,
1972, the time of the effectivity of PD 27, ergo just compensation should be based on the value
of the property as of that time and not at the time of possession in 1993, is likewise erroneous.
In Office of the President, Mala-_______________[23] 486 Phil. 366, 383-384; 444 SCRA 176,
189-190 (2004). [24] Supra note 16 at p. 746; p. 451.541cañang, Manila v. Court of Appeals, we
ruled that the seizure of the landholding did not take place on the date of effectivity of PD 27
but would take effect on the payment of just compensation. Under the factual circumstances
of this case, the agrarian reform process is still incomplete as the just compensation to be paid
private respondents has yet to be settled. Considering the passage of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA
6657) before the completion of this process, the just compensation should be determined and
the process concluded under the said law. Indeed, RA 6657 is the applicable law, with PD 27
and EO 228 having only suppletory effect, conformably with our ruling in Paris v. Alfeche. x x x
x It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline
provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DAR’s failure to determine the just
compensation for a considerable length of time. That just compensation should be determined
in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially imperative considering that
just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner
by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample.[25] (Emphasis
supplied; citations omitted) The above ruling was likewise applied in Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Heirs of Angel T. Domingo.[26] In the latter case, landowner Domingo filed a
petition for determination and payment of just compensation despite his receipt of LBP’s
partial payment. This Court held that since the amount of just compensation to be paid the
landowner has yet to be_______________[25] Id., at pp. 746-747; pp. 451-452. [26] 567 Phil.
593, 608; 543 SCRA 627, 641 (2008).542 settled, then the agrarian reform process was still
incomplete; thus it should be completed under R.A. No. 6657.[27] In Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Heirs of Maximo Puyat,[28] the same doctrine was applied where the Court noted
that both the taking of the landowner’s property and the valuation occurred during the
effectivity of R.A. No. 6657. Since the acquisition process under P.D. No. 27 remains incomplete
and is overtaken by R.A. No. 6657, the process should be completed under R.A. No. 6657, with
P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 having suppletory effect only.[29] Similarly, in Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Soriano,[30] this Court held that Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 should be the
principal basis of the computation for just compensation. While the lands involved therein were
acquired under P.D. No. 27, the Court noted that the complaint for just compensation was only
lodged before the court (SAC) on November 23, 2000 or long after the passage of R.A. No.
6657. In sum, if the issue of just compensation is not settled prior to the passage of R.A. No.
6657, it should be computed in accordance with the said law, although the property was
acquired under P.D. No. 27. Records confirm that petitioner had deposited its initial valuation
in the amount of P17,240.00 on April 2, 1982 and the same had already earned interest, the
total amount due plus increment is P73,604.95 as computed by LBP.[31] Respondent protested
this valuation even as he signed the LTPA for_______________[27] See Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Santiago, Jr., G.R. No. 182209, October 3, 2012, 682 SCRA 264, 277. [28] G.R. No.
175055, June 27, 2012, 675 SCRA 233, 243. [29] See also Land Bank of the Philippines v. Vda. de
Abello, 602 Phil. 710, 720; 584 SCRA 342, 353 (2009) and Lubrica v. Land Bank of the
Philippines, 537 Phil. 571, 581-582; 507 SCRA 415, 423-424 (2006). [30] G.R. Nos. 180772 &
180776, May 6, 2010, 620 SCRA 347, 353. [31] Records, p. 152.543 the benefit of the tenants-
beneficiaries and considering that his land had been divided and distributed to the said farmers.
Eventually, respondent challenged the valuation made by DAR in August 2000 which was still
based on P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228, by filing a petition with the SAC for judicial
determination of just compensation on October 17, 2000. Clearly, the agrarian reform process
initiated under P.D. No. 27 remains incomplete when R.A. No. 6657 took effect on June 15,
1988. As to the time of actual “taking,” this Court has already resolved the matter in the
aforecited case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Angel T. Domingo,[32] which
held:LBP’s contention that the property was taken on 21 October 1972, the date of effectivity
of PD 27, thus just compensation should be computed based on the GSP in 1972, is erroneous.
The date of taking of the subject land for purposes of computing just compensation should be
reckoned from the issuance dates of the emancipation patents. An emancipation patent
constitutes the conclusive authority for the issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title in the
name of the grantee. It is from the issuance of an emancipation patent that the grantee can
acquire the vested right of ownership in the landholding, subject to the payment of just
compensation to the landowner. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Salvador
Encinas,[33] this Court reiterated this long-established principle, thus:The “taking of private
lands under the agrarian reform program partakes of the nature of an expropriation
proceeding.” In computing the just compensation for expropriation proceedings, the RTC
should take into consideration the “value of the land at the time of the_______________[32]
Supra note 26 at p. 608. [33] G.R. No. 167735, April 18, 2012, 670 SCRA 52.544 taking, not at
the time of the rendition of judgment.” “The ‘time of taking’ is the time when the landowner
was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred to the
Republic.”[34] In DAR v. Tongson,[35] we remanded the case back to the SAC for reception of
evidence as to the date of the grant of the emancipation patents (EPs) which shall serve as the
reckoning point for the computation of just compensation due respondent. The date of the
issuance of EPs covering the subject lands have not been attached to the records of the case.
Here, the records likewise failed to show the date when such EPs have been issued to the
tenant-beneficiaries who signed the LTPA. Accordingly, the case should be remanded to the
SAC for reception of evidence thereof. Remand is also necessary for the reason that the SAC
based its determination of just compensation solely on the opinion of the municipal assessor as
to the current market value of respondent’s land which was not supported by any documentary
evidence. Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the factors to be considered in determining
just compensation to the landowner, viz.:SEC. 17. Determination of Just Compensation.—In
determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like
properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax
declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The
social and_______________[34] Id., at pp. 59-60, citing Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 171840, April 4, 2011, 647 SCRA 152, 169; Land Bank
of the Philippines v. Imperial, 544 Phil. 378, 388; 515 SCRA 449, 458-459 (2007); Gabatin v. Land
Bank of the Philippines, supra note 23; and Land Bank of the Philippines v. Livioco, G.R. No.
170685, September 22, 2010, 631 SCRA 86, 112-113. [35] G.R. No. 171674, August 4, 2009, 595
SCRA 181, 190-191.545 economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and
by the Government to the property as well as the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from
any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors
to determine its valuation. The above factors had already been translated into a basic formula
by the DAR pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 49 of R.A. No. 6657. Thus, the
Court held in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada,[36] that the formula outlined in DAR A.O.
No. 5, Series of 1998 should be applied in computing just compensation. The mandatory
application of the aforementioned guidelines in determining just compensation was reiterated
in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Lim[37] and Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Eleuterio
Cruz,[38] wherein we also ordered the remand of the cases to the SAC for the determination of
just compensation strictly in accordance with the applicable DAR regulations.[39] The Court is
mindful of the new agrarian reform law, R.A. No. 9700 or the CARPER Law, passed by Congress
on July 1, 2009, further amending R.A. No. 6657, as amended. In the recent case of Land Bank
of the Philippines v. Santiago, Jr.,[40] we held that under the new law, the landowner’s
challenge on the valuation of previously acquired lands as in the case at bar may still be
resolved on the basis of the old Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657, thus:_______________[36] 515
Phil. 467, 478-479; 479 SCRA 495, 508 (2006). [37] 555 Phil. 831, 845; 529 SCRA 129, 134
(2007). [38] 588 Phil. 345, 353-355; 567 SCRA 31, 39 (2008). [39] Land Bank of the Philippines
v. Heirs of Yujuico, G.R. Nos. 184719 & 184720, March 21, 2012, 668 SCRA 710, 731. [40] Supra
note 27 at p. 279.546 That this case, despite the new law, still falls under Section 17 of
Republic Act No. 6657 is supported even by Republic Act No. 9700, which states that
“previously acquired lands wherein valuation is subject to challenge shall be completed and
resolved pursuant to Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended,” viz.:Section 5. Section
7 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows: SEC. 7.
Priorities.—The DAR, in coordination with the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) shall
plan and program the final acquisition and distribution of all remaining unacquired and
undistributed agricultural lands from the effectivity of this Act until June 30, 2014. Lands shall
be acquired and distributed as follows: Phase One: During the five (5)-year extension period
hereafter all remaining lands above fifty (50) hectares shall be covered for purposes of agrarian
reform upon the effectivity of this Act. All private agricultural lands of landowners with
aggregate land holdings in excess of fifty (50) hectares which have already been subjected to a
notice of coverage issued on or before December 10, 2008; rice and corn lands under
Presidential Decree No. 27; all idle or abandoned lands; all private lands voluntarily offered by
the owners for agrarian reform: x x x Provided, furthermore, That all previously acquired lands
wherein valuation is subject to challenge by landowners shall be completed and finally resolved
pursuant to Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended: x x x. (Emphases supplied)
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9700, further amending Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657, as
amended, reads:547 Section 7. Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, is hereby
further amended to read as follows: SEC. 17. Determination of Just Compensation.—In
determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the value of the standing
crop, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation
by the owner, the tax declarations, the assessment made by government assessors, and
seventy percent (70%) of the zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), translated
into a basic formula by the DAR shall be considered, subject to the final decision of the proper
court. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and
by the Government to the property as well as the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from
any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors
to determine its valuation. (Emphases supplied; further amendments made to Section 17 of
R.A. No. 6657, as amended, are italicized) The foregoing shows that the Section 17 referred to
in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9700 is the old Section 17 under Republic Act No. 6657, as
amended; that is, prior to further amendment by Republic Act No. 9700. A reading of the
provisions of Republic Act No. 9700 will readily show that the old provisions, under Republic Act
No. 6657, are referred to as Sections under “Republic Act No. 6657, as amended,” as
distinguished from “further amendments” under Republic Act No. 9700. DAR AO No. 02-09, the
Implementing Rules of Republic Act No. 9700, which DAR formulated pursuant to Section 31 of
Republic Act No. 9700, makes the above distinction even clearer, to wit:548 VI. Transitory
Provision With respect to cases where the Master List of ARBs has been finalized on or before
July 1, 2009 pursuant to Administrative Order No. 7, Series of 2003, the acquisition and
distribution of landholdings shall continue to be processed under the provisions of R.A. No.
6657 prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 9700. However, with respect to land valuation, all
Claim Folders received by LBP prior to July 1, 2009 shall be valued in accordance with Section 17
of R.A. No. 6657 prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 9700. (Emphasis supplied) Thus, DAR AO
No. 02-09 authorizes the valuation of lands in accordance with the old Section 17 of Republic
Act No. 6657, as amended (prior to further amendment by Republic Act No. 9700), so long as
the claim folders for such lands have been received by LBP before its amendment by Republic
Act No. 9700 in 2009.[41] Considering that respondent’s land had been previously acquired
under P.D. No. 27 but the valuation has been the subject of his challenge before the SAC, the
completion and final resolution of just compensation should therefore be computed in
accordance with Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 9700. Given
the insufficient evidence for the determination of just compensation under Section 17 of R.A.
No. 6657 and applicable DAR regulations, and the absence of evidence in the records pertaining
to the date of issuance of the EPs to the tenant-beneficiaries, we are constrained to remand
this case to the SAC for reception of such and any other relevant evidence for a complete
resolution of the issue of just compensation, consistent with our
disquisitions._______________[41] Id., at pp. 279-281.549 WHEREFORE, the Decision dated
July 5, 2007 and Resolution dated April 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals Mindanao Station in
C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 00161 are hereby SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to the Special
Agrarian Court, Branch 9, of the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, for further
reception of evidence to determine just compensation strictly in accordance with Section 17 of
R.A. No. 6657, DAR AO No. 05, Series of 1998 and applicable DAR regulations. No
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro,
Bersamin and Reyes, JJ., concur. Judgment and resolution set aside, case remanded to Special
Agrarian Court, Br. 9 of Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Notes.—That it is
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), which has the power to
determine just compensation for parcels of land acquired by the State, pursuant to the agrarian
reform program, is made clear in Section 57 of RA 6657. (Land Bank of the Philippines vs.
Honeycomb Farms Corporation, 667 SCRA 255 [2012]) The Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board has jurisdiction over cases involving the cancellation of registered
Certificate of Land Ownership Awards relating to an agrarian dispute between landowners and
tenants. (Valcurza vs. Tamparong, Jr., 705 SCRA 128 [2013]) Land Bank of the Philippines vs.
Peralta, 723 SCRA 528, G.R. No. 182704 April 23, 2014
G.R. No. 177374. July 2, 2014.* MARIANO JOSE, FELICISIMO JOSE, deceased, substituted by
his children MARIANO JOSE, CAMILO JOSE, TIBURCIA JOSE, FERMINA JOSE, and VICTORIA JOSE,
petitioners, vs. ERNESTO M. NOVIDA, RODOLFO PALAYLAY, JR., ALEX M. BELARMINO, RODRIGO
LIBED, LEONARDO L. LIBED, BERNARDO B. BELARMINO, BENJAMIN G. ACOSTA, MODESTO A.
ORLANDA, WARLITO B. MEJIA, MAMERTO B. BELARMINO, MARCELO O. DELFIN and HEIRS OF
LUCINO A. ESTEBAN, represented by CRESENCIA M. VDA. DE ESTEBAN, respondents.Agrarian
Reform; Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board; Jurisdiction; The Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) has exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving the
cancellation of registered Emancipation Patents (EPs); the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) Secretary, on the other hand, has exclusive jurisdiction over the issuance, recall or
cancellation of EPs or Certificates of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs) that are not yet
registered with the Register of Deeds.”— “The DARAB has exclusive jurisdiction over cases
involving the cancellation of registered EPs[;] the DAR Secretary, on the other hand, has
exclusive jurisdiction over the issuance, recall or cancellation of [EPs] or Certificates of Land
Ownership Awards that are not yet registered with the Register of Deeds.” Thus, since
certificates of title have been issued in the respective names of the respondents as early as in
1990, the DAR Region I Director had no jurisdiction to cancel their titles; the same is true with
respect to the DAR Secretary. Thus, their respective January 30, 1991 and August 22, 1995
Orders are null and void; consequently, respondents’ EPs and titles subsist, contrary to
petitioners’ claim that they have been cancelled. Void judgments or orders have no legal and
binding effect, force, or efficacy for any purpose; in contemplation of law, they are
nonexistent._______________* SECOND DIVISION.553VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014.553Jose vs.
NovidaRemedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Courts; Supreme Court; The jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court (SC) in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals (CA) via Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is generally limited to reviewing errors of law.—As correctly
pointed out by the respondents, a review of the instant petition under Rule 45 is not a matter
of right but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and
important reasons therefor. Moreover, a petition for review under Rule 45 covers questions of
law only. “[T]he jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before it from the CA via
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is generally limited to reviewing errors of law. This
Court is not a trier of facts. In the exercise of its power of review, the findings of fact of the CA
are conclusive and binding and consequently, it is not our function to analyze or weigh evidence
all over again.” Same; Same; Same; Factual findings of administrative bodies charged with
their specific field of expertise, are afforded great weight by the courts.—It must be said as well
that “[f]actual findings of administrative bodies charged with their specific field of expertise, are
afforded great weight by the courts, and in the absence of substantial showing that such
findings were made from an erroneous estimation of the evidence presented, they are
conclusive, and in the interest of stability of the governmental structure, should not be
disturbed.” PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Simplicio M. Sevilleja for petitioners.
Honorato Y. Aquino for respondents. DEL CASTILLO, J.: This Petition for Review on
Certiorari[1] assails the September 25, 2006 Decision[2] and March 16, 2007 Resolution[3] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 48681, which affirmed the June 20, 1997
Decision[4] and June 24, 1998 Resolution[5] of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB), Quezon City in DARAB Case No. 1429. Factual Antecedents In
1990, herein respondents Ernesto M. Novida, Rodolfo Palaylay, Jr., Alex M. Belarmino, Rodrigo
Libed, Leonardo L. Libed, Bernardo B. Belarmino, Benjamin G. Acosta, Modesto A. Orlanda,
Warlito B. Mejia, Mamerto B. Belarmino and Marcelo O. Delfin, together with Cristina M.
Esteban, were each granted — as farmer-beneficiaries — Emancipation Patents (EPs) and
Certificates of Title[6] (covering one hectare each) over a parcel of land which formed part of a
16.4142-hectare agricultural land (subject property) in San Vicente, Alcala, Pangasinan which
was placed within the coverage of Operation Land Transfer.[7]_______________[1] Rollo, pp.
16-33. [2] Id., at pp. 198-216; penned by Associate Justice Regalado E. Maambong and
concurred in by Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Japar B. Dimaampao. [3] Id., at pp.
221-222. [4] Id., at pp. 110-117; concurred in by Undersecretaries Lorenzo R. Reyes, Artemio
A. Adasa, Jr., Assistant Secretaries Augusto P. Quijano and Sergio B. Serrano. [5] Id., at pp.
126-128; concurred in by Undersecretaries Lorenzo R. Reyes, Artemio A. Adasa, Jr., Assistant
Secretaries Clifford C. Burkley, Augusto P. Quijano and Sergio B. Serrano. [6] Id., at pp. 36, 201-
202. [7] Under Presidential Decree No. 27, “Decreeing the Emancipation of Tenants from the
Bondage of the Soil, Transferring to 555VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014.555Jose vs. NovidaOn January
4, 1991, petitioners Mariano, Camilo, Victoria, Tiburcia and Fermina, as well as Josefina and
Anecita — all surnamed Jose — filed with the Region I Office of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) at San Fernando, La Union (DAR Region I) a Petition for Reinvestigation and
Cancellation of Anomalously Prepared and Generated Emancipation Patents[8] against the
respondents, claiming that they are the bona fide and actual tenant-tillers of the subject
property; that they were issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) to the same; that they are
actually in possession of the same; and that the EPs issued to respondents were anomalous.
They prayed that the respondents’ EPs be cancelled; that new EPs be issued to them; and that
an investigation be conducted on the circumstances surrounding the issuance of respondents’
EPs, and the guilty parties prosecuted. On January 30, 1991, the DAR Region I Director issued
an Order[9] relative to the petitioners’ petition for reinvestigation and cancellation of EPs —
which was not docketed or assigned a case number — which held thus:WHEREFORE, premises
considered and by virtue of the powers vested in me under DAR Memorandum Circular 5-87
ORDER is hereby rendered as follows: 1. That herein petitioners have better right as
beneficiaries of the 16 hectares in question to the exclusion of the respondents due to the
defective installation as beneficiaries; 2. That Emancipation Patents be generated in favor of
the herein petitioners; 3. That [inasmuch] as payments on the land in question were already
made by the respondents who are not qualified to become beneficiaries of the estate,
the_______________them the Ownership of the Land They Till and Providing the Instruments
and Mechanism Therefor.”[8] Rollo, pp. 57-58. [9] Id., at pp. 59-61.556556SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATEDJose vs. Novidacomplainants are hereby ordered to pay the said amount
to the Administrator who shall likewise reimburse the same to the respondents, as suggested
by MARO Constancio Castillo to settle the problem at bar; and 4. That the PARO of
Pangasinan or his duly authorized representative is directed to implement this ORDER and if
necessary with the help of the PNP of the Municipality of Alcala, Pangasinan. SO ORDERED.[10]
On December 17, 1991, respondents filed a Complaint[11] for recovery of possession,
accounting, liquidation and damages with injunctive relief against petitioners Mariano and
Felicisimo Jose (Felicisimo), and Virgilio Jose (Virgilio). The case was docketed in the Region I
Office of the DARAB in Urdaneta, Pangasinan (DARAB Urdaneta) as Case No. 01-465-EP’91.[12]
Respondents alleged that Felicisimo was the original tenant of the subject property; that
Felicisimo obtained loans from one Benigno Siobal (Siobal) and one Rogelio Cerezo (Cerezo),
which were secured by a mortgage over the subject property; that Felicisimo did not redeem
the subject property from Siobal and Cerezo, but instead abandoned the same when he
migrated to the United States of America (U.S.A.) and became a naturalized citizen thereof; that
with the sanction of the DAR, the owners of the subject property subdivided the land and sold
portions thereof to respondents; and that on or about May 10, 1990, after Felicisimo returned
from the U.S.A., he and the other petitioners ousted respondents from the subject property,
using force, stealth, threats and intimidation. Respondents prayed that they be placed in
peaceful possession, cultivation and enjoyment of the land; that petitioners be declared as
usurpers and without right to the land; that an accounting be made of all lost harvests; that
injunc-_______________[10] Id., at pp. 60-61. [11] Id., at pp. 35-38. [12] Or Case No. 01-465-
EP’92 in other parts of the record.557VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014.557Jose vs. Novidative relief be
granted in order that petitioners shall desist from further disturbing respondents’ peaceful
possession, cultivation and enjoyment of the land; that petitioners be made to pay actual,
moral and exemplary damages in the amount of at least P180,000.00, P25,000.00 litigation
expenses, P50,000.00 attorney’s fees, and costs of suit. In their Answer with Counterclaim,[13]
petitioners alleged that in addition to Felicisimo, Mariano, and Virgilio, the subject property was
being cultivated by their siblings Tiburcia, Fermina, Victoria, and Josefina, and their mother
Aniceta Jose; that Felicisimo indeed mortgaged the subject property in 1981 to secure a loan of
P10,000.00, which was settled by letting the lender Siobal take exclusive possession of the land,
cultivating the same and keeping the harvests; that Siobal cultivated the subject property up to
1987, after which petitioners Camilo, Virgilio, Mariano, and the other siblings took over; that
when Felicisimo returned from the U.S.A. in 1990, Siobal attempted to negotiate another
agreement with him, but this time he refused; that petitioners — and not the respondents —
are the owner-beneficiaries of the subject property; that respondents have never been in
possession of the land; and that the case should be dismissed. By way of counterclaim,
petitioners sought to be awarded P100,000.00 actual damages, P20,000.00 exemplary
damages, P15,000.00 attorney’s fees, and P20,000.00 litigation expenses. On July 13, 1992, the
DARAB Urdaneta issued a Decision[14] in Case No. 01-465-EP’91, which held thus:The evidence
on record revealed that respondent Felicisimo E. Jose was the former tenant-lessee of the
16.4142 hectares in question; that on August 13, 1981, respondent Felicisimo E. Jose and his
wife Anecita Bautista mortgaged to Benigno Siobal x x x one-half (1/2)_______________[13]
Rollo, pp. 39-43. [14] Id., at pp. 73-76; penned by Provincial Adjudicator Alejandro T.
Tabula.558558SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDJose vs. Novidaof their real estate with
an area of 82,579 square meters in the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos; that
immediately after the execution of the mortgage contract, respondent Felicisimo Jose, who was
then the tenant over the same parcel of land of approximately eight (8) hectares more or less
delivered actual physical possession to Benigno Siobal and the other half portion or eight (8)
hectares plus to one Rogelio Cerezo; that the landholding in question was formerly owned by
the Galvan-Cabrera Estate which was covered by Operation Land Transfer (OLT) pursuant to the
provisions of P.D. No. 27; that Emancipation Patents were already issued to the complainants.
The evidence on record clearly disclosed that the former tenant-lessee, the respondent
Felicisimo Jose delivered actual physical possession of the landholding in question on August
13, 1981. From that date he lost his security of tenure as tenant and that his tenancy
relationship was terminated. The act of Felicisimo E. Jose in giving up his possession and
cultivation of the landholding in question and his going abroad in 1981 is a clear case of
abandonment, as enunciated in the case of “Mateo Balanay, et al. vs. Sergio Rafael, C.A.-G.R.
No. S.P.-01746 CAR, August 2, 1976.” Acceptance of new employment is an abandonment, how
much more [in] this instant case when the tenant-lessee went abroad. WHEREFORE, premises
considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows to wit: 1. DECLARING the complainants
the tenant-beneficiaries of the land in question; 2. DECLARING the respondents [to have] no
right whatsoever [to] the landholding in question; 3. ORDERING the respondents to desist
from disturbing the possession and cultivation of the complainants; 4. All other claims of the
parties are hereby denied for lack of evidence.559VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014.559Jose vs. Novida
SO ORDERED.[15] Meanwhile, on August 22, 1995, the DAR Secretary issued an Order[16]
affirming the January 30, 1991 Order of the DAR Region I Director in the petition for
reinvestigation and cancellation of EPs filed by petitioners against the respondents. The Order
reads in part:The issue to be resolved is who are the qualified beneficiaries over the subject
landholdings. Mariano Jose, et al. (petitioners) are the qualified beneficiaries of the subject
landholdings considering that CLT’s were already issued to them which is a recognition to the
grantees as the [parties] qualified to avail of the statutory mechanism for the acquisition of
ownership of the land tilled by them as provided under Presidential Decree No. 27. Moreover,
the Agreement entered into by Felicisimo Jose and Benigno Siobal wherein the subject
landholdings were used to answer the amount loaned by their father is considered as illegal
transaction therefore null and void (Memo Circular No. 7, Series of 1979). As to the allegation
of denial of due process, we find the same unmeritorious. Respondents’ subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration has the effect of curing whatever irregularity might have been committed in
the proceeding below x x x. WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Order is hereby issued
denying the instant appeal for lack of merit and the Order issued by the Regional Director is
hereby affirmed. SO ORDERED.[17] _______________[15] Id., at pp. 75-76. [16] Id., at pp. 96-
99. [17] Id., at pp. 98-99. However, on respondents’ motion for reconsideration, the DAR
Secretary issued another Order[18] on June 5, 1996 which declared thus:It appears that DARAB
Case No. 01-465-EP’92 entitled Ernesto M. Novida, et al. vs. Mariano Jose, et al., for Peaceful
Possession and Damages involving the same parties and same cause of action as in the case
herein is pending appeal before the DARAB Central Office. Likewise, records show that
Emancipation Patents Nos. 550853, 550854, 550855, 550849, 550851, 550848, 550852 and
550856 were already awarded to Respondents herein. The jurisdiction to cancel the same is not
with this Office but with the DARAB x x x. WHEREFORE, premises considered, Order is hereby
issued remanding the case to the DAR Adjudication Board for its proper disposition in the light
of DARAB Case No. 01-465-EP’92 pending before it. SO ORDERED.[19] The DARAB Quezon City
Decision Meanwhile, failing to obtain a reconsideration of the DARAB Urdaneta’s July 13, 1992
decision in Case No. 01-465-EP’91, petitioners interposed an appeal with the DARAB Quezon
City. Docketed as DARAB Case No. 1429, the appeal was premised on the arguments that the
DARAB Urdaneta erred in taking cognizance of the case, which is under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform as the subject property was covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP); and that there is another case between the
parties — for cancellation of anomalously prepared/generated Emancipation Patents —
pending in the Office of the DAR Secretary._______________[18] Id., at pp. 107-108. [19] Id.
561VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014.561Jose vs. Novida On June 20, 1997, the DARAB Quezon City
issued its Decision affirming in toto the July 13, 1992 decision of the DARAB Urdaneta. It held—
Based on the facts of the case and evidences adduced, Felicisimo Jose was the former
legitimate agricultural lessee of the Galvan-Cabrera estate. However, on August 13, 1981, he
and his spouse mortgaged one-half of the said property with an area of 82,579 square meters
to secure a loan of P10,000 from a certain Benigno Siobal and Rogelio Orezo[20] by delivering
the physical possession thereof to the mortgagees. Subsequently, respondent-appellant
(Felicisimo Jose) left for abroad to acquire his citizenship by naturalization in the United States
of America. Sometime in 1985, the subject landholding was subdivided into sixteen (16) farm
lots and the complainants-appellees[21] were installed by the mortgagee Benigno Siobal. Their
possession and cultivation were duly sanctioned by the landowner and DAR Team Leader of
Alcala, Pangasinan. They paid the rentals and later on the amortization payments to the subject
landholding. On January 6, 1991, their peaceful enjoyment and cultivation of their respective
landholdings was interrupted upon the unlawful dispossession, through force and intimidation
by the defendants-appellants,[22] who forcibly took over by destroying the corn plants by
hiring two (2) tractor operators despite the issuance of the tenant-farmers’ Emancipation
Patents. Complainants-appellees were compelled to file a criminal case of malicious mischief x x
x in addition to this instant agrarian case._______________[20] Should be Cerezo, based on the
record. [21] Herein respondents. [22] Herein petitioners.562562SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATEDJose vs. Novida xxxx We are not convinced by the arguments of the
respondents-appellants. There is an overwhelming evidence indicating that Felicisimo Jose
caused the execution of a Deed of Mortgage, for and in consideration of Ten Thousand
(P10,000) Pesos, using the subject landholding as security to the loan and transferring the
physical possession thereof to the mortgagees as per Document No. 254, Page 52, Book No.
XVII Series of 1981 as duly notarized by Porferio A. Tadeo x x x. In the interim, Felicisimo Jose
left for the United States of America. Sometime in 1985, the mortgagees, as legal possessors,
allowed the installation of the complainants-appellees with the consent of the Administrator of
the Galvan-Cabrera estate to be tenant-tillers who peacefully, openly and continuously
occupied and cultivated the land as lessees to their respective landholdings. Finally, on
December 7, 1990, all the sixteen (16) complainants-appellees received their Emancipation
Patents thru Secretary Benjamin C. Leong, Department of Agrarian Reform x x x. When
Felicisimo Jose left to pursue his desire to acquire his naturalization of citizenship in the United
States which amounted to a circumstance advantageous to him and his family, in effect, there
was literally an implied extinguishment and/or voluntary termination of the agricultural
tenancy relation on the part of the respondent-appellant as contemplated in Section 8(2) in
relation to Section 28(5) of RA 3844.[23] Both the elements of_______________[23]
Agricultural Land Reform Code. Section 8. Extinguishment of Agricultural Leasehold
Relation.—The agricultural leasehold relation established under this Code shall be extinguished
by: x x x x (2) Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee, written
notice of which shall be served three months in advance; x x x563VOL. 728, JULY 2,
2014.563Jose vs. Novida physical relinquishment of possession and intention to vacate were
consummated and remained undisputed findings of facts of the case. If ever DAR Regional
Director, Region I issued an Order dated January 30, 1991, to the effect that the respondents-
appellants have a better right as beneficiaries over the subject landholding, this said official
issuance of a lesser officer in the bureaucratic totem pole could not overrule nor nullify the acts
performed earlier by the head of agency or the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform
unless the cancellation/revocation is initiated by the Secretary himself. For the Emancipation
Patents dated December 7, 1990 were issued earlier to the farmer-beneficiaries. And with the
same token, that the enactment of our agrarian reform laws is principally intended to make the
small farmers more independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens and a source of a genuine
strength in our democratic society x x x. Clearly, those who renounce their citizenship should
yield to those rights and privileges intended for those with undivided loyalty and unquestioned
nationalism to the Filipino nation. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the challenged decision
is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Let the entire records of this case be remanded to the Adjudicator
a quo for the issuance of a Writ of Execution immediately. SO ORDERED.[24]
_______________Section 28. Termination of Leasehold by Agricultural Lessee During
Agricultural Year.—The agricultural lessee may terminate the leasehold during the agricultural
year for any of the following causes: x x x x (5) Voluntary surrender due to circumstances
more advantageous to him and his family. [24] Rollo, pp. 114-117.564564SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATEDJose vs. Novida Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[25] but
the DARAB Quezon City denied the same via its June 24, 1998 Resolution. The Assailed Court of
Appeal’s Decision Petitioners went up to the CA via Petition for Review[26] insisting that the
DAR Secretary has exclusive jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to the Revised (1989) DARAB
Rules of Procedure which state that matters involving the administrative implementation of the
CARP and other agrarian laws and regulations shall be the exclusive prerogative of and
cognizable by the DAR Secretary;[27] that in the January 30, 1991 Order of the DAR Region I
Director which was affirmed via the DAR Secretary’s August 22, 1995 Order, they were declared
to have better rights as beneficiaries and that respondents’ EPs should be cancelled; and that
respondents previously instituted two cases with the DARAB Urdaneta —
one_______________[25] Id., at pp. 118-125. [26] Id., at pp. 129-143. [27] RULE II
Jurisdiction of the Adjudication Board SECTION 1. Primary, Original and Appellate
Jurisdiction.—The Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both
original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies,
and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act
No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian
laws and their implementing rules and regulations. Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend
over but not be limited to the following: x x x x Provided, however, that matters involving
strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP and other agrarian laws and
regulations, shall be the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Secretary of the
DAR.565VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014.565Jose vs. Novida of them docketed as Case No. 01-318-EP’90
— which were dismissed. On September 25, 2006, the CA issued the assailed Decision,
decreeing as follows:WHEREFORE, the challenged DARAB decision and resolution dated June
20, 1997 and June 24, 1998 respectively, in DARAB CASE NO. 1429 are hereby AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.[28] The CA held that under Section 1, Rule II of the 1994 DARAB Rules of
Procedure,[29] the DARAB has primary and exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving
the issuance and cancellation of EPs;[30] the DAR Secretary had no power to cancel EPs, and
petitioners’ argument that such power is part of his administrative functions is misplaced. It
noted further_______________[28] Rollo, p. 215. [29] RULE II Jurisdiction of the Adjudication
Board SECTION 1. Primary And Exclusive Original and Appellate Jurisdiction.—The Board
shall have primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and
adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 228, 229, and 129-
A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27
and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. Specifically, such
jurisdiction shall include but not be limited to cases involving the following: x x x x f) Those
involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of Certificates of Land Ownership Award
(CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents (EPs) which are registered with the Land Registration
Authority. [30] Citing also Hilado v. Hon. Chavez, 482 Phil. 104; 438 SCRA 623
(2004).566566SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDJose vs. Novida that the DAR Secretary
himself recognized the DARAB’s jurisdiction over cases involving the cancellation of EPs when
he issued his June 5, 1996 Order in the undocketed case for reinvestigation and cancellation of
EPs filed by petitioners against the respondents.[31] The CA further upheld the DARAB’s
conclusion that petitioners in effect abandoned their rights as beneficiaries, and that
respondents’ installation as beneficiaries by the mortgagees (Siobal and Cerezo) was regular
and in accordance with law, and they paid the required amortizations as well. It held that as
landless farmers, respondents deserved the land more than petitioners, noting that one of
them was a naturalized American citizen; it would thus go against the rationale of the agrarian
laws to award land to such an individual. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[32]
but in its assailed March 16, 2007 Resolution, the CA stood its ground. Thus, the instant
Petition. Meanwhile, a substitution of parties was accordingly made in view of the death of
some of the parties.[33] Issues Petitioners submit the following assignment of errors: I. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN NOT SUSTAINING THE ORDER DATED
JANUARY 30, 1991 ISSUED BY THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, REGION I, BUREAU OF AGRARIAN
LEGAL ASSISTANCE (BALA), DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM (DAR), SAN FERNANDO, LA
UNION X X X, ORDER DATED 22 AUGUST 1995, ISSUED BY DAR_______________[31] Supra note
18. [32] Rollo, pp. 217-219. [33] Resolution of September 17, 2007 (no page number in the
Rollo); Resolution of June 25, 2008, pp. 286-287.567VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014.567Jose vs.
NovidaSECRETARY, AFFIRMING SAID ORDER DATED JANUARY 30, 1991 X X X AND IN NOT
REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 05 JUNE 1996 X X X ISSUED BY THE DAR
SECRETARY IN THE SAME CASE THERE BEING NO PENDING CASE INVOLVING THE SAME ISSUES
WITH THE X X X (DARAB) AND HENCE THE DAR SECRETARY HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE LAND
IN QUESTION TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE DARAB, QUEZON CITY. II. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN NOT REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE THE DARAB DECISION
DATED 20 JUNE 1997 X X X AND DARAB UNDATED RESOLUTION, DENYING PETITIONERS’
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE CA DECISION X X X, ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE
INSTANT CASE WAS BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT AND THAT THE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO
PROVE THAT THEY ARE AGRICULTURAL TENANTS OVER THE LAND IN QUESTION. III. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN ITS RESOLUTION DATED SEPTEMBER 5,
2005, EXPUNGING THE MEMORANDUM FOR PETITIONERS DATED 17 APRIL 2001 FILED VIA
REGISTERED MAIL ON 18 APRIL 2001 FOR LATE FILING.[34] Petitioners’ Arguments In their
Petition and Reply,[35] petitioners reiterate the January 30, 1991 Order of the DAR Region I
Director which the DAR Secretary affirmed through his August 22, 1995 Order, particularly
citing the pronouncement in said Orders that they are the actual tillers of the subject property,
and not_______________[34] Rollo, pp. 25-26, 27, 30. [35] Id., at pp. 292-
295.568568SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDJose vs. Novidarespondents. They add that
respondents failed to prove in Case No. 01-465-EP’91 that they are tenants of the land; that
respondents have never cultivated the subject property, and have never been in possession of
the same; that respondents are mere landgrabbers; that Felicisimo has settled his financial
obligations to Siobal; that respondents’ EPs have been cancelled by the DAR Region I Director
and the DAR Secretary; and that it was erroneous and unjust for the CA to have expunged their
Memorandum. Petitioners essentially pray for the reversal of the assailed dispositions, as well
as the reinstatement of both the January 30, 1991 Order of the DAR Region I Director and the
August 22, 1995 Order of the DAR Secretary in their petition for reinvestigation and
cancellation of EPs filed with the DAR Region I. Finally, petitioners pray that the DAR Region I
Director and the DAR Secretary be ordered to issue EPs in their favor. Respondents’ Arguments
In their Comment,[36] respondents point out that a review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure is discretionary and will be granted only when there are special and important
reasons therefor; that such special and important circumstances that should warrant review do
not obtain in petitioners’ case; that the CA is correct in stating that the DARAB has primary and
exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance and cancellation of EPs; and finally, that
based on the merits and consonant with the substance and intent of the agrarian laws,
respondents — and not petitioners — are entitled to the subject
property._______________[36] Id., at pp. 272-278.569VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014.569Jose vs.
Novida Our Ruling The Court affirms. When petitioners filed, on January 4, 1991, their
Petition for Reinvestigation and Cancellation of Anomalously Prepared and Generated
Emancipation Patents with the DAR Region I Office at San Fernando, La Union, certificates of
title have been issued to the respondents. Thus, the DARAB — and not the DAR Region I or the
DAR Secretary — had exclusive jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to law and the 1994 DARAB
Rules of Procedure.x x x. The DARAB derives its jurisdiction from RA 6657 or popularly known as
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988. Section 50 of RA 6657 confers
jurisdiction on the DARAB over agrarian reform cases or controversies as follows: Section 50.
Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR.—The DAR is hereby vested with the primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). It shall not be bound by technical rules of
procedure and evidence but shall proceed to hear and decide all cases, disputes, or
controversies in a most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the
facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity and the merits of the case. Towards
this end, it shall adopt a uniform rule of procedure to achieve a just, expeditious and
inexpensive determination for every action or proceeding before it.570570SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATEDJose vs. Novida To implement this particular provision of RA 6657
regarding the adjudication of agrarian reform matters, the DAR adopted the DARAB New Rules
of Procedure, issued on May 30, 1994. Under Section 1, Rule II of the said Rules of Procedure,
the DARAB has exclusive original jurisdiction over the following cases: (a) The rights and
obligations of persons, whether natural or juridical, engaged in the management, cultivation
and use of all agricultural lands covered by the CARP and other agrarian laws; (b) The
valuation of land, and the preliminary determination and payment of just compensation, fixing
and collection of lease rentals, disturbance compensation, amortization payments, and similar
disputes concerning the functions of the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP); x x x x (f) Those
involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of Certificates of Land Ownership Award
(CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents (EPs) which are registered with the Land Registration
Authority; (g) Those cases previously falling under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the defunct Court of Agrarian Relations under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 946, except
subparagraph (Q) thereof and Presidential Decree No. 815. x x x x Matters involving strictly the
administrative implementation of Republic Act. No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 and other agrarian laws as enunciated by
pertinent rules shall be the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Secretary of the
DAR.571VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014.571Jose vs. Novida (h) And such other agrarian cases,
disputes, matters or concerns referred to it by the Secretary of the DAR. Subparagraph (f)
stated above provides that the DARAB has exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving the
issuance, [correction and cancellation of CLOAs and EPs which are] registered with the Land
Registration Authority (the Registry of Deeds). The grounds for cancellation of registered EPs
were summarized by DAR Memorandum Order No. 02, Series of 1994, to wit: 1. Misuse or
diversion of financial and support services extended to the ARB; (Section 37 of R.A. No. 6657)
2. Misuse of land; (Section 22 of R.A. No. 6657) 3. Material misrepresentation of the ARB’s
basic qualifications as provided under Section 22 of R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, and other
agrarian laws; 4. Illegal conversion by the ARB; (Cf. Section 73, Paragraph C and E of R.A. No.
6657) 5. Sale, transfer, lease or other forms of conveyance by a beneficiary of the right to use
or any other usufructuary right over the land acquired by virtue of being a beneficiary in order
to circumvent the provisions of Section 73 of R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, and other agrarian
laws. However, if the land has been acquired under P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228, ownership may
be transferred after full payment of amortization by the beneficiary; (Sec. 6 of E.O. No. 228) 6.
Default in the obligation to pay an aggregate of three (3) consecutive amortizations in case of
voluntary land transfer/direct572572SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDJose vs. Novida
payment scheme, except in cases of fortuitous events and force majeure; 7. Failure of the
ARBs to pay for at least three (3) annual amortizations to the LBP, except in cases of fortuitous
events and force majeure; (Section 26 of RA 6657) 8. Neglect or abandonment of the
awarded land continuously for a period of two (2) calendar years as determined by the
Secretary or his authorized representative; (Section 22 of RA 6657) 9. The land is found to be
exempt/excluded from P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 or CARP coverage or to be part of the
landowner’s retained area as determined by the Secretary or his authorized representative; and
10. Other grounds that will circumvent laws related to the implementation of agrarian reform.
A study of the above enumerated grounds for the cancellation of registered EPs shows that it
requires the exercise by the DAR of its quasi-judicial power through its adjudicating arm,
DARAB. Thus, rightly so, the DARAB New Rules of Procedure provide that DARAB has exclusive
jurisdiction over cases involving the cancellation of registered EPs. But what about EPs that are
unregistered like the one issued to Angelina Rodriguez? The answer can be found in
Administrative Order No. 06-00, issued on August 30, 2000, which provides for the Rules of
Procedure for Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) Cases. These rules were issued pursuant to
Sections 49 and 50 of RA 6657. In contrast to the DARAB Rules of Procedure which govern the
exercise of DAR’s quasi-judicial function, Administrative Order No. 06-00 govern the
administrative function of the DAR. 573VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014.573Jose vs. NovidaUnder the
said Rules of Procedure for Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) Cases, the Agrarian Reform
Secretary has exclusive jurisdiction over the issuance, recall or cancellation of EPs/CLOAs that
are not yet registered with the Register of Deeds. Thus, Section 2 of the said Rules provides:
SECTION 2. Cases Covered.—These Rules shall govern cases falling within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary which shall include the following: (a) Classification and
identification of landholdings for coverage under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP), including protests or oppositions thereto and petitions for lifting of coverage; (b)
Identification, qualification or disqualification of potential farmer-beneficiaries; (c)
Subdivision surveys of lands under CARP; (d) Issuance, recall or cancellation of Certificates of
Land Transfer (CLTs) and CARP Beneficiary Certificates (CBCs) in cases outside the purview of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 816, including the issuance, recall or cancellation of Emancipation
Patents (EPs) or Certificates of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs) not yet registered with the
Register of Deeds; (e) Exercise of the right of retention by landowner; x x x x (q) Such other
matters not mentioned above but strictly involving the administrative implementation of RA
6657 and other agrarian laws, rules and regulations as determined by the Secretary. Clearly,
the cancellation of EPs that are not yet registered with the Register of Deeds falls within the au-
574574SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDJose vs. Novidathority of the Agrarian Reform
Secretary or DAR officials duly designated by him, in the exercise of his/their administrative
functions. x x x x x x x Second, even if the Court of Appeals ruling were based on the old
DARAB rules (the 1989 DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure) which provided that the DARAB had
primary jurisdiction over “cases involving the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT),
Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) and Emancipation Patent (EP) and the
administrative correction thereof,” we do not agree that the cancellation by the DARAB of the
subject EPs fell within the ambit of mere administrative correction. “Administrative correction”
refers only to the rectification of wrong or insufficient information in the patent and not to
something as substantial as the actual cancellation thereof. The meaning of “administrative
correction” is provided in DAR Administrative Order No. 02, Series of 1994: C. The
administrative corrections may include nonidentification of spouse, corrections of civil status,
corrections of technical descriptions and other matters related to agrarian reform.[37] The
above pronouncement was reiterated in this ponente’s ruling in Heirs of Lazaro Gallardo v.
Soliman:[38] “the DARAB has exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving the cancellation of
registered EPs[;] the DAR Secretary, on the other hand, has exclusive jurisdiction over the
issuance, recall or cancellation of [EPs] or Certificates of Land Ownership Awards that are not
yet registered with the Register of Deeds.”_______________ [37] Padunan v. Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, 444 Phil. 213, 223-229; 396 SCRA 196, 209 (2003). [38]
G.R. No. 178952, April 10, 2013, 695 SCRA 453. Underscoring supplied575VOL. 728, JULY 2,
2014.575Jose vs. Novida Thus, since certificates of title have been issued in the respective
names of the respondents as early as in 1990,[39] the DAR Region I Director had no jurisdiction
to cancel their titles; the same is true with respect to the DAR Secretary. Thus, their respective
January 30, 1991 and August 22, 1995 Orders are null and void; consequently, respondents’ EPs
and titles subsist, contrary to petitioners’ claim that they have been cancelled. Void judgments
or orders have no legal and binding effect, force, or efficacy for any purpose; in contemplation
of law, they are nonexistent.[40] For the above reasons, it necessarily follows that what
petitioners pray for in the instant Petition — i.e., the 1) reinstatement of the January 30, 1991
Order of the DAR Region I Director and the August 22, 1995 Order of the DAR Secretary —
which have been voided herein, and 2) issuance of EPs in their favor — are reliefs that this
Court may not grant. Next, as correctly pointed out by the respondents, a review of the instant
petition under Rule 45 is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, and will be
granted only when there are special and important reasons therefor.[41] Moreover, a petition
for review under Rule 45 covers questions of law only.[42] “[T]he jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in cases brought before it from the CA via Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is
generally limited to reviewing errors of law. This Court is not a trier of facts. In the exercise of
its power of review, the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding and consequently,
it is not our function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again.”[43]_______________[39]
Rollo, pp. 201-202. [40] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Orilla, G.R. No. 194168, February 13,
2013, 690 SCRA 610, 618-619. [41] Rules of Court, Rule 45, Section 6. [42] Rules of Court, Rule
45, Section 1. [43] Best Wear Garments v. De Lemos, G.R. No. 191281, December 5, 2012, 687
SCRA 355, 363.576576SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDJose vs. Novida This Court finds
that no special and important reasons exist to warrant a thorough review of the assailed CA
Decision. Quite the contrary, the Court is satisfied with and can simply rely on the findings of
the DARAB Urdaneta, DARAB Quezon City, and the CA — as well as the very admissions of the
petitioners themselves — to the effect that respondents fulfilled all the requirements under the
agrarian laws in order to become entitled to their EPs; that Felicisimo voluntarily surrendered
and abandoned the subject property in favor of his creditors, who took over the land and tilled
the same until 1987; that Felicisimo migrated to the U.S.A. and became a naturalized American
citizen; that in 1991, respondents were illegally dispossessed of their landholdings through
force and intimidation by the petitioners after Felicisimo returned from abroad; and that as
between petitioners and respondents, the latter are legally entitled to the subject property.
These identical findings are not only entitled to great respect, but even finality. For petitioners
to question these identical findings is to raise a question of fact.[44] It must be said as well
that “[f]actual findings of administrative bodies charged with their specific field of expertise, are
afforded great weight by the courts, and in the absence of substantial showing that such
findings were made from an erroneous estimation of the evidence presented, they are
conclusive, and in the interest of stability of the governmental structure, should not be
disturbed.”[45] Finally, the Court finds it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised by the
parties, including petitioners’ claim that it was erroneous and unjust for the CA to have
expunged their Memorandum._______________[44] Malayang Manggagawa ng Stayfast Phils.,
Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 155306, August 28, 2013, 704 SCRA 24,
40. [45] Sugar Regulatory Administration v. Tormon, G.R. No. 195640, December 4, 2012, 686
SCRA 854, 867.577VOL. 728, JULY 2, 2014.577Jose vs. Novida WHEREFORE, the Petition is
DENIED. The September 25, 2006 Decision and March 16, 2007 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 48681 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.Carpio (Chairperson), Brion,
Perez and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur. Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Notes.—The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) has no jurisdiction to
pass upon the issue of ownership over standing crops and improvements between a landowner
and a lessee. (Heirs of Leonardo Banaag vs. AMS Farming Corporation, 680 SCRA 597 [2012])
For the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) to acquire jurisdiction over
the case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between the parties. (Ladano vs. Neri, 685
SCRA 134 [2012]) ——o0o—— Jose vs. Novida, 728 SCRA 552, G.R. No. 177374 July 2, 2014