282 SCRA 125 (89 SCAD 151) – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Due Process; Administrative

Bodies – Assistance by Counsel

Law on Public Officers – Right to Due Process – Public Office is Not a Property
Arsenio Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR-CAR. He was charged by Jeannette Zamudio,
the Regional Cashier, for dishonesty due to questionable gas expenses under his office. It was
alleged that he was falsifying gas receipts for reimbursements and that he had an unliquidated cash
advance worth P116,000.00. Zamudio also complained that she was unjustly removed by Lumiqued
two weeks after she filed the two complaints. The issue was referred to the DOJ. Committee
hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted
by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to
employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his
counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted
for resolution. The Investigating Committee recommended the dismissal of Lumiqued. DOJ Sec
Drilon adopted the recommendation. Fidel Ramos issued AO 52 dismissing Lumiqued.
Lumiqued appealed averring that his right to due process was violated as well as his right to security
of tenure.
ISSUE: Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an
administrative inquiry?
HELD: No. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the
presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It is
not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more
reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, Lumiqued invoked the right of an accused in
criminal proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued,
however, was not accused of any crime. The investigation conducted by the committee was for the
purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the law for the complaints
filed against him. The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the
Constitution or the law.
“. . . There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled
to be represented by counsel and that, without such representation, he shall not be bound by such
proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession
was not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its members, the
safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot
validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side.”

In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to

explain one’s side. Whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by the committee
was cured by Lumiqued’s appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration.
The Supreme Court also emphasized that the constitutional provision on due process safeguards
life, liberty and property. Public office is a public trust. It is not a property guaranteed of due process.
But when the dispute concerns one’s constitutional right to security of tenure, however, public office
is deemed analogous to property in a limited sense; hence, the right to due process could rightfully
be invoked. Nonetheless, the right to security of tenure is not absolute especially when it was
proven, as in this case, that the public officer (Lumiqued) did not live up to the Constitutional precept
i.e., that all public officers and employees must serve with responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency.

Sec. Of Justice v. Hon. Ralph Apolonio Exevea

FACTS:
Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines,
signed in Manila the “extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the
Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S
Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to
the United States.
On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to
handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Mark Jiminez through
counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition request from
the U.S Government and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have
received copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the request for the consistency of
Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the Philippine Government must
present the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.

ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold a citizen’s basic due process rights or the governments ironclad
duties under a treaty.

RULING: Petition dismissed.

The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien, and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our
Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of
the government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty
obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source
of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our
Constitution as part of the law of the land.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situation in
which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provision of the
constitution or statute of the local state.

Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the extradition request
and its supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a reasonable period within which to file
his comment with supporting evidence.

“Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no
further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere.
“The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations
in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the
constitution or statute of the local state.

“Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be
presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of
international law in observance of the incorporation clause in the above cited constitutional provision.

“In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a
rule of international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be
upheld by the municipal courts, for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are
accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.

“The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply
the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine
of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal
standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex
posterior derogate priori takes effect – a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a
treaty. In states where the Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the
Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution.
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs PURGANAN

In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees entitled to notice and hearing before warrants
for their arrest can be issued? Equally important, are they entitled to the right to bail and provisional
liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending? In general, the answer to these two novel
questions is “No.” The explanation of and the reasons for, as well as the exceptions to, this rule are
laid out in this Decision. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest
warrant issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on April 15,
1999: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States 371; (2) tax evasion; (3) wire fraud,; (4) false
statements, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1001 and 2; and (5) illegal campaign
contributions, II. “The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail and in allowing
Jimenez to goon provisional liberty because:

ISSUE: Is Respondent Entitled to Bail? Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as
follows:
“Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.”
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this constitutional provision secures the right to bail of
all persons, including those sought to be extradited. Supposedly, the only exceptions are the ones
charged with offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong. He also
alleges the relevance to the present case of Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which,
insofar as practicable and consistent with the summary nature of extradition proceedings, shall also
apply according to Section 9 of PD 1069. Exceptions to the “No Bail” Rule.
The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary
has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion and tyranny, as well as the power to
promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights. Furthermore, we believe that the right
to due process is broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right
to due process extends to the “life, liberty or property” of every person. It is “dynamic and resilient,
adaptable to every situation calling for its application.”

HELD:
By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal case in which guilt
or innocence is determined. Consequently, an extradition case is not one in which the constitutional
rights of the accused are necessarily available. It is more akin, if at all, to a court’s request to police
authorities for the arrest of the accused who is at large or has escaped detention or jumped bail.
Having once escaped the jurisdiction of the requesting state, the reasonable prima facie
presumption is that the person would escape again if given the opportunity.
 Case Digest: PGBI v. COMELEC
G.R. No.190529 : April 29, 2010

PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI), represented by its Secretary-General

GEORGE FGBF GEORGE DULDULAO, Petitioner, v.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.

BRION,J.:

FACTS:

For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en banc issued on October 13, 2009
Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-list groups or organizations from the list of registered
national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions.Among the party-list organizations
affected was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not
participate in the 2007 elections.PGBI filed its Opposition to Resolution No. 8679, but likewise
sought, through its pleading, the admission ad cautelam of its petition for accreditation as a party-list
organization under the Party-List System Act. The COMELEC denied PGBIs motion/opposition for
lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is legal basis for delisting PGBI.

HELD: COMELEC's decision is annulled.

POLITICAL LAW: delisting of any national, regional or sectoral party

The law is clear the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party,
remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral
party, organization or coalition if it: (a)fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding
elections;or(b)fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list
system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. The word or
is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things
enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies,as a
disjunctive word. Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law provides for two (2)
separate reasons for delisting.

To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for delisting; these
grounds cannot be mixed or combined to support delisting; and (b) the disqualification for failure to
garner 2% party-list votes in two preceding elections should now be understood to mean failure to
qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered.This is how Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should be understood and applied.

PGBIs situation a party list group or organization that failed to garner 2% in a prior election and
immediately thereafter did not participate in the preceding election is something that is not covered
by Section 6(8) of RA 7941.From this perspective, it may be an unintended gap in the law and as
such is a matter for Congress to address.The Court cannot and do not address matters over which
full discretionary authority is given by the Constitution to the legislature; to do so will offend the
principle of separation of powers.If a gap indeed exists, then the present case should bring this
concern to the legislatures notice.

On the due process issue, PGBI's right to due process was not violated for PGBI was given an
opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of Resolution No. 8679.The essence of due
process is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due process
is the opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential.
The requirement is satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing.
PGBI was not denied due process. In any case, given the result of this Resolution, PGBI has no
longer any cause for complaint on due process grounds.

The petition for review is GRANTED.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILS. VS. COMELEC [289
SCRA 337; G.R. NO. 132922; 21 APR 1998]

Monday, February 02, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP)
is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. It was declared to be
without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it
was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject law. Petitioner GMA Network,
on the other hand, had the requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge. Petitioner
operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of
Section 92, B.P. No. 881.

Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides:

“Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as the
“Comelec Time” which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the
area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio
broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time,
free of charge, during the period of campaign.”

Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure print space
in newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by
COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations
to provide free air time.

Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time
in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to
suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary
source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to
require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property.
According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each
day and, in this year’s elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELEC’s requirement
that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such.

Issues:

(1) Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies the
equal protection of the laws.

(2) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due process of
law and without just compensation.

Held: Petitioner’s argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by television stations,
is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more
individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and television
broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies
through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary
privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the
performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to operate
broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations, the state spends considerable
public funds in licensing and supervising them.

The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time as
against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just compensation for the print space
they may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending of
public funds which it does not do in the case of print media. To require the broadcast industry to
provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.

As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by
the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.
People vs jalosjos

FACTS

The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now

confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of
lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that
he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative
sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-
bailable offense.

ISSUE

Whether or not being a Congressman is a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-
appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law by reason of
the “mandate of the sovereign will”.

RULING

NO. While the Constitution guarantees: “x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
laws.” this simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights
enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The duties imposed by the “mandate of the people” are
multifarious. The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public
welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may
plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. Here, election to the position of Congressman is
not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are
not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and
restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the
law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. Hence, the performance of legitimate and
even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.
 Case Digest: Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission
G.R. No. 192935 : December 7, 2010

LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner, v. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF

2010,Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 193036

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG,
and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR., Petitioners, v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO
B. ABAD, Respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:

For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases both of which essentially assail the
validity and constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled "Creating the
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010."

In, G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative
power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional
authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor.

The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by
petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua,
Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives.

The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the
President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level
public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress
and the Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an "independent collegial body," it is
essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it
constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is one.

To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37,
Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it
cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending
parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt,
much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if
probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. Needless to
state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or sanctions.

ISSUES: Whether or not EO No. 1 is Unconstitutional

HELD: Yes. Petitions Granted.

POLITICAL LAW- equal protection clause

Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative power of the President,
the Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its
apparent transgression of the equal protection clause.

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its
inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive
departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through
whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same
class."Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of
the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate
and find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order.

In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class,
that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations
similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such
discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for
vindictiveness and selective retribution.
Comelec vs Conrado Cruz et. al November 20, 2009

Facts: The present petition seeks a review of the RTC’s decision granting the petition of the respon-
dents on declaring Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9164 (entitled An Act Providing for Syn-
chronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, amending RA No. 7160, as
amended,otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991) unconstitutional: Sec. 2. Term
of Office. The term of office of all barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials after the effectivity of
this Act shall be three (3) years.
No barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position: Provided, however, that the term of office shall be reckoned from the 1994 barangay
elections. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.
Antecedent: Before the October 29, 2007 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan
(SK)Elections, some of the then incumbent officials of several barangays of Caloocan City filed with
the RTC a petition for declaratory relief to challenge the constitutionality of the above-highlighted
proviso, based on the following arguments: (1) The term limit of Barangay officials should be applied
prospectively and not retroactively. (2) Implementation of paragraph 2 Section 2 of RA No. 9164
would be a violation of the equal protection of the law. (3) Barangay officials have always been a
political.

Issue: 1. WON the term limit should apply prospectively and not retroactively.
2. WON it violates the equal protection of the law.

Ruling: SC affirmed the constitutionality of Section 2, paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. 9164:1. No
retroactive application was made because the three-term limit has been there all along as early as
the second barangay law (RA No. 6679-changed the two-term limit by providing for at hree-
consecutive term limit). After the 1987 Constitution took effect; it was continued under the LGC and
can still be found in the current law.

2. No. The equal protection guarantee under the Constitution is found under its Section 2, Article III,
which provides: Nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. Essentially, the
equality guaranteed under this clause is equality under the same conditions and
among persons similarly situated.
It is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are different from one another
on the basis of substantial distinctions related to the objective of the law; when things or persons are
different in facts or circumstances, they may be treated differently in law. Appreciation of how the
constitutional equality provision applies inevitably leads to the conclusion that no basis exists in the
present case for an equal protection challenge. The law can treat barangay officials differently from
other local elective officials because the Constitution itself provides a significant distinction between
these elective officials with respect to length of term and term limitation. The clear distinction,
expressed in the Constitution itself, is that while the Constitution provides for a three-year term and
three-term limit for local elective officials, it left the length of term and the application of the three-
term limit or any form of term limitation for
determination by Congress through legislation. Not only does this disparate treatment recognize sub
stantial distinctions, it recognizes as well that the Constitution itself allows a non uniform treatment.
No equal protection violation can exist under these conditions. From another perspective, we see no
reason to apply the equal protection clause as a standard because the challenged proviso did not
result in any differential treatment between barangay officials and all other elective officials.

Case Digest: Arroyo vs. DOJ

G.R. No. 199082 : September 18, 2012

JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS; HON. LEILA DE LIMA, in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice;
HON. SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., in his capacity as Chairperson of the Commission on
Elections; and the JOINT DOJ-COMELEC PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE and
FACT-FINDING TEAM, Respondents.

FACTS:

The Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the creation of a joint committee with the
Department of Justice (DOJ), which shall conduct preliminary investigation on the alleged election
offenses and anomalies committed during the 2004 and 2007 elections.

The Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and constituting a Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and
manipulation cases composed of officials from the DOJ and the Comelec. In its initial report, the
Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial
elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato and Maguindanao were indeed perpetrated.
The Fact-Finding Team recommended that herein petitioners Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA), et al.
to be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage.

After the preliminary investigation, the COMELEC en banc adopted a resolution ordering that
information/s for the crime of electoral sabotage be filed against GMA, et al. while that the charges
against Jose Miguel Arroyo, among others, should be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

Consequently, GMA, et al. assail the validity of the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel and of
Joint Order No. 001-2011 before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
II. Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 violates the equal protection clause?

SECOND ISSUE: Joint Order No. 001-2011 does not violate the equal protection clause.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: equal protection

Petitioners claim that the creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team is in violation of the
equal protection clause of the Constitution because its sole purpose is the investigation and
prosecution of certain persons and incidents. They insist that the Joint Panel was created to target
only the Arroyo Administration as well as public officials linked to the Arroyo Administration.
While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those subjected to preliminary investigation, not all
respondents therein were linked to GMA as there were public officers who were investigated upon in
connection with their acts in the performance of their official duties. Private individuals were also
subjected to the investigation by the Joint Committee.

The equal protection guarantee exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate
discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences
among men, it does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons under like
circumstances and conditions shall be treated alike both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced.

DISMISSED.