A new Cordillera Autonomous Region

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Published April 4, 2018, 12:05 AM

In the widespread concern shown by our officials for the proposed Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao, we have tended to forget the other autonomous region provided in our Constitution – the
Cordilleras of Northern Luzon. This is the home of some 1.2 million indigenous peoples generally known to
lowlanders as Igorots although they actually belong to several ethnolinguistic groups.

Before the Holy Week break, Sen. Juan Miguel Zubiri filed a bill to establish the Autonomous Region of the
Cordillera (ARC) to replace the present Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR). The CAR had been set up,
along with the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), pursuant to Section 15, Article X of the
Constitution which provides:

“There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, consisting of provinces,
cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage,
economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and
the national sovereignty, as well as the territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.”

In the 31 years of the 1987 Constitution, Zubiri said the Cordillera region has yet to achieve real autonomy. It
is today a progressive region contributing 1.8 percent to the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
principally through its agricultural production of cabbage, rice, and corn.

With greater autonomy as the ARC, the Cordilleras under the Zubiri bill will continue to have an annual
assistance of P10 billion for the first five years and P5 billion for the next five years, while the local
government units will continue to receive their Internal Revenue Allotments (IRA) like the rest of the nation’s
LGUs.

But as an autonomous region, it will have “the opportunity to decide on what policies and programs will best
fit the region and, at the same time, have the freedom to pursue their political, economic, social, and cultural
development within the framework of the national sovereignty and in accordance with the local practices and
cultural heritage and identity,” Zubiri said.

The Cordilleras people are well known to the rest of the country for their distinctive mountain culture. They
now live in the provinces of Abra, Apayao, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga, and Mountain Province, and the city of
Baguio. The provinces and city which vote in a plebiscite for the establishment of the autonomous region
would form the ARC.

The organization of ARC in the far north of the country could serve as model for other regions of the country
should a federal system of government be set up for the country under a new Constitution. There will be the
other region in the far south – the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region, for which a law has also been filed in
Congress.
In between these two regions will be several other possible autonomous regions – Northern Luzon’s Ilocano
provinces, Central Luzon, Metro Manila, Southern Luzon, Bicol, Western, Central,, and Eastern Visayas,
Northern and Southern Mindanao. These will have to await the approval and ratification of a new Constitution.

In the meantime, we can watch the development and growth of ARC and Bangsamoro, learn from their
problems and trials, to help in the formation and development of the other proposed regions of the country.

the issue has been put forth in a plebiscite twice, but in both cases, the creation of the autonomous
region was thumbed down.
from wikipedia:
Several attempts at legalizing autonomy in the Cordillera region have failed in two separate
plebiscites.[18][19] An affirmative vote for the law on regional autonomy is a precondition by the
1987 Philippine Constitution to give the region autonomy in self-governance much like the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao in southern Philippines. The first law Republic Act No.
6766, took effect on October 23, 1989[20] but failed to muster a majority vote in the plebiscite on
January 30, 1990.[19][18] The second law, Republic Act No. 8438 passed by Congress of the
Philippines on December 22, 1997,[21] also failed to pass the approval of the Cordillera peoples in a
region-wide referendum on March 7, 1998.[18][19]

CAR is a very strange grouping of provinces.

The Benguet natives are linguistically closer to the natives of Nueva Vizacaya and the Pangasinense
people, but the latter two aren't part of CAR. Nueva Viscaya should have been part of CAR if
"mountain people" is our criteria on who are included.
Over 90% of Abra are Ilocanos, yet it's part of CAR and not Region 1. Baguio serves as the location
for CAR regional offices, yet you still need to traverse Region 1 (La Union and Ilocos Sur), before
you can get to Abra from Baguio.
Only the people of Ifugao, Mountain Province, Kalinga, and Apayao have a common linguistic
grouping under the Central Cordilleran language family, but their homelands are spread out. It's
relatively easy to go to Mountain Province and Ifugao from Baguio, but to Kalinga and Apayao? Man,
you'll need to descend first to either Region 1 or Region 2 before you can get to Kalinga and Apayao
from Baguio.
So why is Baguio its "regional capital?" The CAR region has been nonsensical to me for along time
now. Bontoc, Mountain province is a more logical choice for a "regional capital" in my opinion.
These provinces, aside from Benguet, were largely poor and undeveloped provinces of the
Philippines before, and they were grouped together not exactly for autonomy but for development
purposes. The region is of the same unique topography, and most of the problems faced by these
provinces are the same. So might as well group them together so the national government can
implement uniform policies, plans, etc. for the entire region to combat the common problems they
have.
The call for Cordilleran autonomy is actually a new movement, largely caused by what they saw with
ARMM/Bangsamoro. Should Cordillera become autonomous, all other regions in the Philippines may
call the same, like the Visayan regions. As a person who advocate for decentralization and
federalism, I have no objections to these kind of movements really.

There was a plebiscite then in CAR simultaneously with ARMM I think in the 1990s. ARMM voted
yes. As for CAR, I think only Mountain Province voted yes. They could have been the only CAR
member but the Supreme Court found it absurd to have a region consisting of only one so they did
not went with it. They were given a chance but the people wouldn't want like just like Scotland voting
no for independence.
Cordillera: Still not
autonomous after 21 years of
preparation
Published July 22, 2008 5:23pm

BAGUIO CITY, Philippines - More than half of the people of the Cordillera
Administrative Region (CAR) have no idea that the 1987 Constitution provides
for their autonomy. That's why after 21 years since the Constitution was
passed, they still have not become the Cordillera Autonomous Region – not
even after two plebiscites, one in 1995 and another in 1998, both of which
failed. To be exact, 64 percent of the people in the region know nothing about
autonomy, according to a survey conducted from October 2007 to January
2008 by the Regional Development Council. "This is lamentable, and at the
same time an eye opener," Baguio Rep. Mauricio Domogan told several
hundred participants of the Walk Cordillera Walk advocacy campaign on
Monday at the Baguio Athletic Bowl. It was Juan Ngalob, the director of the
National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), who cited the results of
the survey. Last Monday also happened to be the 21st anniversary of CAR,
which was was created on July 15, 1987, supposedly as a first step to its
becoming an autonomous region. More statistics While other parts of the
country are clamoring for federalism and autonomy, Cordillerans have no idea
what such concepts could mean to them, politically or economically. Ngalob
cited more figures that should worry Cordillera politicians: • 40 percent of
Cordillerans do not know if the CAR is ready to become autonomous. • More
than a third think CAR is not ready yet to become autonomous. • 66 percent of
Cordillerans would not know how to vote should a third organic act need to be
ratified in a plebiscite, as set in the Constitution. • Only 19 percent would vote
to ratify an organic act. • 15 percent said they would votes against ratifying an
organic act. Refocusing efforts But Ngalob remains confident that the
groundwork has been laid down and that an information campaign could still
lead to autonomy. According to Ngalob, the government has decided to
refocus its efforts to regional development and autonomy to enable local
officials to deliver functions devolved by the national government, such as
sharing taxes among regional agencies. To achieve that, Domogan said some
local officials are now proposing to amend Executive Order 220 which paved
the way for the creation of the CAR. "Let us work together to achieve what is
good under EO220 without giving up the dream for autonomy," Domogan
said. An autonomy law for the Cordillera is being crafted now, according to the
legislator. He admitted that how past political leaders in the region here
wanted to ram through the organic act without people really understanding the
meaning of autonomy. Shift To federalism Autonomy advocate Gabino
Ganggangan, a former mayor of Sadanga town in Mountain Province, claims
that the first two autonomy drafts were government sponsored laws that were
"planned to fail." The issue of autonomy, he said, had become so unpopular
that even the earlier prime movers had shifted strategy by adopting a more
prominent stance for federalism. Leaders of the newly unified Cordillera
Peoples Liberation Army (CPLA) and its political arm, the Cordillera Bodong
Administration (CBA) has agreed to pursue Cordillera autonomy’s political and
economic development agenda this time. But it will do so in a wider and
broader scope through a federal form of national governance, according to
Miguel Guimbatan Jr., who had helped the CPLA and CBA. Lawyer Joel Obar,
a former CBA chief executive, explained that the term autonomy has lost its
meaning after being misused, abused, and tainted with several negative
connotations. "Federalism is an answer," Obar said. Obar still encourages
advocates to resume their passion for self-determination and self-governance
through federalism. He suggests a separate federal state also for the
Cebuano’s, the Ilongos, and the Warays. Newly elected CPLA chief of staff
Mando Mosing, alias Ka Mando, said: "Federalism has been our stand even
before the autonomy concept was introduced. We have a unique resource
base and cultural background. Development efforts should start from here." In
1986, Mosing received the peace tokens from President Corazon Aquino
during the Mount Data peace accord with the CPLA.Common culture,
common aspirations The upland region of the Cordillera is still composed of
indigenous people in the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Mountain Province,
Ifugao, Kalinga, and Apayao. Each have diversified practices but with a
distinct and common cultural heritage, history, and aspirations. CBA president
Marcelina Bahatan suggests that other areas with distinct culture and
resources might want to develop and be governed with their own unique way
through a federal regional government. A national movement to shift to a
federal form of government is gaining ground with the proposal of maintaining
11 federal estates. From north to south, they are: 1. Northern Luzon 2.
Cordillera 3. Central Luzon 4. Metro Manila 5. Southern Luzon 6. Bicol 7.
Western Visayas and Palawan 8. Central and Eastern Visayas 9. Northern
Mindanao and Zamboanga Peninsula 10. Davao Region and Central
Mindanao 11. Bangsamoro (Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao)
According to the federalism proposal: "Each is an autonomous regional
government of the federal republic. The territory of the different 'estados' is
determined by a combination of geographic contiguity of their component
areas, their ethnic, linguistic and other cultural aspects, and their socio-
economic potential and viability." - GMANews.TV

House members have expressed support for the passage of House Bill 5343, seeking
to establish the Autonomous Region of the Cordillera (ARC), which is being pushed by
political leaders of the present Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR).

In a hearing conducted by the House committee on constitutional amendments chaired by

Rep. Roger Mercado (Lone District, Southern Leyte), Baguio City Mayor Mauricio Domogan
expressed hope for the passage of HB 5343, principally authored by Rep. Teddy Brawner
Baguilat, Jr. (Lone District, Ifugao), as an Organic Act for the ARC.

Domogan said the proposed ARC will finally be acceptable to the people of the Cordilleras
and will not suffer the same fate as Republic Act 6766 and RA 8438, which were rejected by
the people in two plebiscites held in 1990 and 1998, respectively.

Rep. Romeo Acop (2nd District, Antipolo City), who hails from Benguet, said the House can
provide support for the approval of HB 5343 to make the Cordillera Region a stronger
autonomous region.

But Acop said there should be unity within the CAR before the approval of the bill to ensure
its adoption in an eventual plebiscite.
Domogan believes the measure will strengthen what they have started at the CAR. He
elaborated on the problems they encountered brought about by the lack of funding from the
national and local governments under the present political setup.

One of the problems they faced is the delayed restoration of the Banaue Rice Terraces party
due to the lack of funding, according to Domogan.

House Bill 5343 aims to establish a political entity and provide for its basic structure of
government in recognition of the justness and cause of the Cordillerans and to secure their
identity and posterity and allow for meaningful governance.

In his explanatory note of the bill, Baguilat said the two previous Organic Acts for an ARC
were enacted but failed ratification mainly because of the people’s lack of information and
discussion on the pros and cons of governance.

During the hearing, Deputy Minority Leader and ABS Party-list Rep. Eugene Michael de Vera
said the basic problem in any failure of implementation of the law is leadership deficiency.

Mercado said the implementation of some local government projects have not been
completed although funds were properly given to different departments.

“How come that some roads or buildings are not yet completed… there are buildings that
have no roof,” said Mercado.

Mercado said the national government can coordinate the needs of a specific region, but the
implementation in the localities is the problem.

Meanwhile, Rep. Alfredo “Albee” Benitez (3rd District, Negros Occidental) inquired about the
tax collection of the CAR. Cordillera Regional Development Council (CRDC) Vice
Chairperson Milagros Rimando said the CAR collected P5.7 billion in 2016 and P4.8 billion
in 2015. The amounts are lesser than the funding allocated by the national government to
the CAR, according to Rimando.

Domogan said the CAR tax collections are rather small because major companies operating
in CAR remit their tax payments through their head offices in Metro Manila.
The committee conducted the hearing to discuss with officials of the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and the CAR about their current situation, structure, and
functions in relation to a possible creation of federal states in the event of a shift from a
unitary to a federal form of government.

The Bangsamoro Organic

Law: Everything you need to
know
By Ver Marcelo, CNN Philippines, Jul 24, 2018
We answer your most glaring questions on the Bangsamoro
Organic Law.
Children draw peace murals outside Malacañan Palace after the conclusion of the signing of the
Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro between the Philippine government and the MILF on
March 27, 2014.
Metro Manila (CNN Philippines) — In a historic move, President Rodrigo Duterte
signed the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL), creating the Bangsamoro Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao, home to minority Muslims fighting for self-determination in
the predominantly Roman Catholic Philippines.

During a speech in Zamboanga City on July 26, the President said he had signed the
new law.

READ: Duterte signs Bangsamoro Organic Law

Duterte, the first Philippine President who hails from the South, promised to help the
Moro people resolve their grievances, many of which stem from disputes on ancestral
land and decades of neglect. But he is just the latest in a string of leaders to attempt to
put an end to decades of conflict in the troubled region.

Numerous administrations have conducted peace negotiations with rebel groups such
as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF), resulting in multiple versions of the proposed law, which was earlier called
Bangsamor Basic Law.

Here is a guide to help you understand what the Bangsamoro Organic Law is, and what
the Moro people are aiming for.

What is the BOL and why do we need one?

The BOL, now officially called the Organic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (OLBARMM), is the result of decades-long peace
negotiations between the rebel groups in Mindanao, mainly the MILF, and the Philippine
Government.

The OLBARMM abolishes the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM),

established in 1989 through Republic Act No. 6734 and strengthened in 2001 through
Republic Act No. 9054. Officials have earlier called the ARMM a failure, marred by
corruption and mismanagement.

The new law then creates the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(BARMM), or simply the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region.

University of the Philippines Islamic law and politics professor Jamel Cayamodin said
the Bangsamoro law is designed to address the grievances, sentiments, and demands
of Muslims in the region.
"When you talk about the BBL, it's the advocacy of every Muslim… For the past years,
since martial law, the Muslims have been asking for self-determination," Cayamodin
said.

He added the MILF previously called for total independence when under the helm of its
founder Salamat Hashim. When Hashim died in 2003, the rebel group toned down its
demands and instead lobbied for a truly autonomous region.

Cayamodin said provinces in the ARMM are consistently among the poorest sectors of
the country, mainly due to corrupt and inefficient government officials. Clan wars or Rido
were also prevalent in the region.

TIMELINE: Road to peace in Mindanao: The Bangsamoro Organic Law

In 2011, Malacañang said former President Benigno Aquino III considers the ARMM a
"failed experiment."

After multiple rounds of talks that spanned almost a decade, the government and the
MILF signed the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) in 2012.

In 2014, the two parties signed the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro
(CAB), which incorporated the FAB and annexes on transitional arrangements, wealth,
power-sharing, and water territories. It served as the basis of the draft BBL.

Several versions of the BBL have been proposed by lawmakers, including the first
version submitted by Aquino to Congress in 2014. In 2015, a House committee
approved the draft and renamed it the Basic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous
Region. The Senate, meanwhile, passed its version of the bill and renamed it the
Bangsamoro Autonomous Region Law.

While there were efforts to pass the BBL during the Aquino administration, the length
and complexity of the bill led the Senate to temporarily defer its proceedings. The 16th
Congress eventually failed to pass the measure before it adjourned.

The OLBARMM - the latest version of the BBL passed during the Duterte administration
- reconciles versions of the proposed measure acceptable to both the government and
the rebel groups.

MILF Vice Chairman Ghazali Jaafar, who also chairs the Bangsamoro Transition
Commission (BTC) that created the first draft of the BBL, earlier said they will not accept
an autonomy that is equal to or less than the ARMM, which was the result of peace
deals between the government and the MNLF.
How will the OLBARMM quell the rebellion in Mindanao?
In the peace deal that led to the creation of CAB in 2014, the MILF promised to
decommission its troops and end the decades-long rebellion once the national
government delivers its commitment of a new Bangsamoro region.

The MILF will then create its own political party to be involved in the governance of the
new entity.

Jaafar said they are satisfied with the version approved by the bicameral conference
committee.

"Satisfied kami, maganda po 'yung proceeding ng both Senate and House of

Representatives. Doon sa provisions ng Bangsamoro Organic Law, more or less, ang
gusto (naming) mapasama ay napasama sa provisions," Jaafar said.

[Translation: We are satisfied, as there were good proceedings in both Senate and
House of Representatives. The provisions we want were more or less included in the
Bangsamoro Organic Law.]

He added the MILF will work with the MNLF to achieve a unified government in the
region.

"Hanggang ngayon, nakakausap ko 'yung prominent leaders ng MNLF in Davao. At sa

pag-uusap naming ito, hindi nila nasabi sa akin na hindi sila pabor sa BBL. Pabor sila
sa BBL," Jaafar said. "Natitiyak ko naman na tutulong sila, at hindi sila sasalungat. After
all, itong gobyerno na ito ay inclusive to everyone."

The MILF is a breakaway group of the MNLF. The establishment of the ARMM is the
result of negotiations between the government and the MNLF.

"Hindi po ito gobyerno ng MILF o MNLF. Ito po ay gobyerno ng lahat ng tao na

nandoon," he added.

[Translation: Until now, I still get to talk to prominent leaders of MNLF in Davao. In all
our conversations, they never told me they were against BBL. They are for BBL. I am
sure they will help and will not oppose. After all, this government is inclusive to
everyone. This is not a government of the MILF or MNLF. This is a government of all
the people residing there.]
 Under the OLBARMM, Moro Islamic Liberation Front combatants may join the police force of the Bangsamoro
region.
What are the differences between the ARMM and the BARMM?
 Political structure and justice system
While the ARMM has a unitary form of government, the BARMM will have a
parliamentary-democratic one. This means that the legislative and executive bodies in
the ARMM are independent, while those in the BARMM are more closely related and
empowered to enact its own laws.

In the ARMM, the residents elect their regional governor and vice governor. The
regional governor has his own Cabinet and advisory council. The legislative power lies
with the regional legislative assembly, whose 24 members are also elected by the
people.

In the BARMM, the residents will elect an 80-member parliament representing different
parties, districts, and sectors, including indigenous peoples. The members of the
parliament will then elect a chief minister and two deputy chief ministers among
themselves. The chief minister shall also appoint members of his Cabinet.

For the judiciary, both autonomous regions give Shari'ah courts jurisdiction over cases
exclusively involving Muslims in the region. The OLBARMM gives the Supreme Court
the authority to grant the incumbent Shari'ah District and Court judges who are not
regular members of the Philippine Bar a period to qualify. Tribal laws will still apply to
disputes of indigenous peoples within the region.

 Fiscal autonomy and special development fund

Regional government officials under the ARMM must justify their funding before the
Congress like other agencies. This resulted in the dependency of the supposed
autonomous region on the national government for its annual budget.

Meanwhile, the BARMM will have an automatic allocation of the annual block grant,
equivalent to five percent of the net national internal revenue of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and the Bureau of Customs.

The region's share in government revenue taxes, fees, charges, and taxes imposed on
natural resources will increase to 75 percent from the current 70 percent.

The national government will also allocate the Bangsamoro P5 billion annually for a
period of ten years, which will be used for the rehabilitation of conflict-affected areas.

 Territory
The ARMM covers the provinces of Basilan, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and
Tawi-Tawi. The same provinces also comprise the BARMM.
 However, a plebiscite still has to determine if 39 barangays in North Cotabato, six
municipalities in Lanao del Norte, and the cities of Cotabato in Maguindanao and
Isabela in Basilan will be included in the Bangsamoro territory. The plebiscite will be
held within three to five months after Duterte signs the law.

Lanao del Norte and North Cotabato will also have to vote as provinces if they are
willing to let go of their towns and barangays to join the Bangsamoro.

Contiguous areas may also be included in the BARMM if there is a local government
resolution or a petition where at least 10 percent of registered voters seek to join the
plebiscite.

For territorial waters, existing laws define only municipal waters nationwide, including
those in ARMM. These cover 15 kilometers from the low-water mark of coasts that are
part of the territory. The Organic Law, meanwhile, introduces regional waters for the
BARMM extending up to 19 kilometers from the low-water mark.

 Inland waters
According to the administrative code of the ARMM, inland bodies of water in the region
like Lake Lanao remain an "integral part of the national territory" of the country.

For the BARMM, all inland waters will be preserved and managed by the Bangsamoro
government. However, those that are utilized for energy in areas outside the BARMM
will be co-managed by the Bangsamoro government and the Department of Energy.

All government revenues from the development and usage of natural resources within
the BARMM will go to the Bangsamoro government, but revenues from fossil fuels and
uranium will be equally shared with the national government.

 Defense and security

Like the ARMM, the national government will be responsible for the defense and
security of the BARMM.

The Philippine National Police will also organize, maintain, and supervise a Police
Regional Office to enforce the law.

Members of the MNLF and MILF may be admitted to the police force. The qualifications
for age, height, and educational attainment may be waived if availed within five years
after the ratification of the OLBARMM. Recruits from the two rebel groups must fulfill the
requirement on educational attainment within 15 years.

 Bangsamoro identity
Republic Act 9054, which strengthened the ARMM, provided an all-encompassing
definition of the Bangsamoro people.

Section 3(b), Article X of the law states that they are "citizens who are believers in Islam
and who have retained some or all of their own social, economic, cultural, and political
institutions."

The OLBARMM, meanwhile, recognizes and retains the historical and geographical
identity of the Bangsamoro people.

Section 1, Article II of the Organic Law states that Bangsamoro People are "those who,
at the advent of the Spanish colonization, were considered natives or original
inhabitants of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago and its adjacent islands, whether of
mixed or of full blood," including their spouses and descendants.
Filipino Muslims perform 'Tarawih' prayer as they start the Islamic holy month of Ramadan at the Pink Mosque
in Datu Saudi Ampatuan, Maguindanao, Philippines.
How will the transition take place?
The transition from ARMM to BARMM will take place after the Commission on Elections
holds a plebiscite, ratifying the latter.

President Duterte will then appoint 80 members to the Bangsamoro Transition Authority
(BTA), which automatically includes the incumbent officials of the Regional
Government. There must also be representatives for non-Moro indigenous
communities, youth, women, settler communities, traditional leaders, and other sectors.

Duterte will also appoint an interim Chief Minister among the BTA members, who will
then organize an interim Cabinet. Government personnel in education, health, and
social welfare agencies will be retained.during this time.

The BTA will hold legislative and executive powers and is considered the Bangsamoro
government during the transition.

The first local elections will be held in 2022. The BTA will be dissolved once elected
officials assume office.

"When you talk about the BBL, it's the advocacy of

every Muslim… For the past years, since martial law,
the Muslims have been asking for self-determination."
— Professor Jamel Cayamodin
Is the OLBARMM constitutional?
One of the major roadblocks faced by all versions of the BBL is constitutionality.

In 2008, the Supreme Court declared the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral
Domain (MOA-AD) unconstitutional due to the failure of the government and the MILF to
engage and consult the affected communities. The MOA-AD proposed the creation of
an autonomous political region in Mindanao with its own police, military, and judicial
systems.

However, lawmakers and the BTC conducted several consultations with various
communities for the OLBARMM.

House Majority Floor Leader Rodolfo Fariñas said they even changed the wording of
the law from a "basic law" to an "organic law" to adhere to the Constitution.

He added the draft measure originally proposed for the new entity to be referred as the
Bangsamoro, but it was changed to Bangsamoro Autonomous Region to make it "very
clear" that it is an autonomous region of the Philippines.
However, Fariñas said lawmakers still welcome questions of constitutionality on the
OLBARMM, even if it is brought up to the Supreme Court.

"Of course, that's their right. And we want them to bring it [up so] it will pass the test of
constitutionality," Fariñas said.

How will the Bangsamoro government work with the national government?
The Bangsamoro government will have an asymmetrical relationship with the national
government, as the BARMM will have more autonomy than other regions in the country.

While the national government will retain powers over constitutional and national
matters such as foreign affairs and defense, the Bangsamoro government will have
exclusive powers over some areas including budgeting, administration of justice,
agriculture, customary laws, creation of sources of revenue, disaster risk reduction and
management, economic zones, ancestral domain, grants and donations, human rights,
local government units, public works, social services, tourism, and trade and industry.

Various intergovernmental bodies will also be created to improve relations and resolve
issues between the national and Bangsamoro governments.

These bodies include the Philippine Congress-Bangsamoro Parliament Forum, the

Fiscal Policy Board, the Joint Body for Zones of Joint Cooperation, the Infrastructure
Development Board, the Energy Board, and the Bangsamoro Sustainable Development
Board.
The Muslim community in Mindanao is counting on the passage of the Bangsamoro Organic Law to hopefully
attain the peace they long for.
CNN Philippines' Correspondent David Santos, and Digital Producers Amanda Lingao
and Alyssa Rola contributed to this report.

The history and implications of the

Bangsamoro Organic Law
By Marrian Pio Roda Ching
Updated 15:15 PM PHT Tue, August 21, 2018
9

Now that the Bangsamoro Organic Law has been passed, issues have been raised not only about its
language, but about its consistency with past agreements. Photo from WIKIMEDIA COMMONS

Manila (CNN Philippines Life) — There are laws, and then there are legacies.

After more than two decades of talks between the Philippine government and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) has finally been
ratified by the 17th Congress, with a ceremonial signing by the president in Malacañang
Palace last Aug. 6.

As President Rodrigo Duterte handed MILF Chairman Al-Haj Murad Ebrahim a copy of
the legislation, he said that he hopes it will “finally end decades of conflict that is rooted
in the Bangsamoro’s right to self-determination and recognition of their unique identity.”

This is the same hope which the Bangsamoro people have carried in their hearts
through decades of war and conflict — through military operations and misencounters,
through displacement and death.

It was only a month ago when the Congress bicameral conference committee on the
Bangsamoro Organic Law approved what is now the most recent document in a long
history of legislative measures for genuine autonomy in the south.

This new organic law is the promise of light at the end of a long, dark tunnel. The light,
however, feels no less distant.

***

At the heart of the Mindanao peace process which gave birth to the BOL is the struggle
of the Bangsamoro people to assert their right to self-determination. This assertion,
however, tends to be limited by the language of lawmaking.
And while their assertion is solid in the language of history that predates the Philippines,
the language used in legislation is the language of the Philippine Constitution.

The BOL is drafted to affirm the Bangsamoro’s right to self-determination through

legislation, as it seeks to address decades, if not centuries, of historical injustices
committed against the Bangsamoro people.

“When land is taken away from the Bangsamoro, why

don’t they get to vote on it? When the Bangsamoro
tries to take back what it is rightfully theirs, why do
others have to decide on their claim?”
However, the language of the new organic law seems to suggest dilution instead of
affirmation. “Right to self-determination” has been edited to the “right to chart their
political future through a democratic process that will secure their identity and posterity,”
while the words “asymmetrical political relationship” and “parity of esteem,” both of
which were also in the 2014 draft of the said law, have been deleted entirely.

But beyond technicalities, the more striking change is seen in terms of the language of
ownership. While all final drafts by the Bangsamoro Transition Commission, the House
of Representatives, and the Senate clearly state whose voice is embodied by the then
proposed legislation — “We, the Bangsamoro People” — the ratified BOL takes on a
different tone:

“In recognition of the aspirations of the Bangsamoro people and other inhabitants in the
autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao [...] the Filipino people, by the act of the
Congress of the Philippines, do hereby ordain and promulgate this Organic Law.”

The law shifts from a language of ownership that says “ours” to a language of distinction
that says “theirs.” In the same way the Bangsamoro is displaced from the lands of their
ancestors, they are also displaced in the language of the law.

***

While the Philippines built itself as a nation colonized and plundered, treaties and other
documents leading to its so-called independence have consistently undermined existing
political structures and established communities — nations, even — of peoples in the
peripheries, despite the latter’s strong objections to the language of these documents.

Take, for example, the 1898 Treaty of Paris, through which Spain relinquished its claim
over its colonies. As Spain “cede[d] to the United States the archipelago known as the
Philippine Islands,” it also unjustly annexed to a colonized country the lands which the
Bangsamoro people successfully defended against the Spanish.
Despite strong objections from Bangsamoro leaders, the United States would also
eventually cede to the Philippine Republic areas it never owned nor conquered. In 1921,
leaders in Sulu wrote to the United States government and said that “it would be an act
of great injustice to cast our people aside, turnover our country to the Filipinos in the
north to be governed by them without our consent and thrust upon us a government not
of our own people, nor by our people, nor for our own people.”

In the 1924 Zamboanga Declaration, leaders from Maguindanao, Lanao, and

Zamboanga wrote, “it is our firm intention and resolve to declare ourselves independent
Constitutional Sultanate to be known to the world as Moro Nation,” while the 1935
Dansalan Declaration of the Meranaws declared that “our public land should not be
given to other people other than the Moro Nation.”

All these early assertions fell on deaf ears.

***

Decades later, the 1976 Tripoli Agreement was signed between the Philippine
government and the Moro National Liberation Front. It will later become the basis for the
“establishment of autonomy in the Southern Philippines within the realm of the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.” However, the
autonomous region’s initial 13 provinces was reduced to five provinces and two cities by
virtue of a plebiscite.

Thus begins the era of the Bangsamoro having to vote in a plebiscite to be part of a
region that represents their people, now a minority in the lands their forefathers fought
for.

Their history speaks of war victors and lands unconquered, that to ask them to cast a
vote so they can be part of a region that is rightfully theirs is borderline unreasonable,
especially when one annexed to a country without their consent. The recently passed
BOL is no exception, as it requires six municipalities and 39 barangays to not only vote
yes to the plebiscite, but for their mother units to vote yes on their behalf as well.

Meanwhile, history tells us of the provinces of Sultan Kudarat and North Cotabato which
required no plebiscite when both were carved out of what used to be the “Empire
Province of Cotabato.” The municipalities of President Quirino and Esperanza were
added to the province of Sultan Kudarat. All it took was Marcos’ Presidential Decree
341, which also then renamed the municipality of Lambayong to “Mariano Marcos,” the
name of the dictator’s father. It was reverted back to its original name by RA 6676in
1988.

History also tells us of sultanates and kingdoms annexed to a country of the colonized
and conquered without any plebiscite, despite objections from the Bangsamoro people.
When land is taken away from the Bangsamoro, why don’t they get to vote on it? When
the Bangsamoro tries to take back what it is rightfully theirs, why do others have to
decide on their claim?

***

Located more than a thousand kilometers south of Manila is Camp Darapanan, the seat
of MILF leadership. On the way to the camp, one can see handmade banners made of
green cloth lining the streets of Cotabato City and Maguindanao, with the words
“Alhamdulillah, Bangsamoro Government” written with white paint.

The banners are from six years ago, when the Framework Agreement was presented to
an emotional audience, and where the realization that a new autonomous region was
within reach dawned on the consciousness of the Bangsamoro people.

The words on the banners may have faded but they are still legible despite age. “Praise
be to Allah.”

“This legacy is not for any president or legislator to

claim or own, but for the Bangsamoro people to build
and work on.”
These are the same banners that greeted more than 50,000 MILF members and
supporters last month, as they followed the roads to Darapanan yet again, this time for
the Bangsamoro Consultative Assembly. During the program, MILF Vice Chairman and
Bangsamoro Transition Commission Chairman Ghazali Jaafar handed over a copy of
the BOL to Ebrahim, who then turned to the audience as he showed the last page which
bore the signature of the president.

“Transitioning from a revolutionary organization and running a government will be a

challenge, and we will be facing this challenge squarely because there is no other way,”
Ebrahim said to the audience.

Pushing for a new Bangsamoro law has always been part of the MILF’s assertion since
the time of the Ramos administration, based on the government’s commitment to affirm
the Bangsamoro’s right to self-determination.

During the assembly at Camp Darapanan, Jaafar said that the BOL is “not a perfect law
for us but certainly it is a good law for us to start with.”

Now that the BOL has been passed, issues have been raised not only about its
language, but also about its consistency with past agreements. Despite these, the MILF
has accepted the BOL.

***
In an editorial published by the MILF Committee on Information last Aug. 2, it explained
that the people of the struggle — the mujahideen — “subscribe to the idea that it is men
more than law that determines or assures the success of organizations, nations, and
states. The imperfections in the law are paid for or balanced by sustained constructive
engagements with government and their agencies, including private institutions, as well
as the international communities.”

The language of another may have failed the Bangsamoro people countless times, but it
takes more than language to win the peace and claim justice for all.

While the ARMM regional government has won numerous gains for the Bangsamoro in
terms of good governance and institutional reform, the new Bangsamoro region will
require changes never attempted before. Future leaders of the region must ensure that
the transition to this new region will be seamless, as the transition offers the possibility
of finally solving old problems that persist despite the region’s best efforts in the past
decade.

In 2018 alone, tens of thousands have had to evacuate from their homes in
Maguindanao, Basilan, Lanao del Sur, and Sulu, due to military operations against local
terror groups. Countless communities need to be rebuilt, including the city of Marawi
which means so much to Bangsamoro history and Meranaw identity. While figures on
education, health, and employment have been improving in recent years, poverty
continues to persist across the region and sociopolitical power remains in the hands of
the few.

There are laws, and there are legacies. In the case of the Bangsamoro, the fate of their
people lies not only in legislation but in the long history of persuasion and perseverance.

This legacy is not for any president or legislator to claim or own, but for the Bangsamoro
people to build and work on. The work continues.

MANILA, Philippines – Six years after the peace deal between the Aquino administration and
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and 6 months after the Bangsamoro law was signed
by President Rodrigo Duterte, voters in the Bangsamoro region will cast their "yes" or "no" votes
on Monday, January 21.

If majority of residents vote “yes,” they will have – according to the law – a new Bangsamoro
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) with more power, resources, and possibly
bigger territory. (READ: 6 scenarios for the Bangsamoro vote)

The creation of BARMM will also signal the start of a process where rebels from the MILF will
start running the bureaucracy and end their decades-long struggle for independence.

To understand Monday’s historic vote, here are some things to know about the Bangsamoro
plebiscite:
1. What are people deciding on?

The plebiscite is a vote to create the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(BARMM), which will replace the current Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).

Residents in key areas in Mindanao will be asked whether or not they want to ratify Republic
Act 11054 also known as the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL). This vote will essentially put the
law in effect.

The BOL provides for the creation of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region, which seeks to
replace – and outdo – the ARMM in terms of geographic scope, power, and resources.

PEACE PROCESS. ARMM Governor Mujiv Hataman recalls the long road to peace, thanking both former
President Benigno Aquino III and President Rodrigo Duterte for their commitment to the Bangsamoro peace
process. Photo by Carmela Fonbuena/Rappler

According to the Commission on Elections (Comelec), more than 2.8 million people –
over 150,000 of whom are former MILF combatants – will vote in the plebiscite to create the
new region. Some 20,000 cops and soldiers will also be deployed to secure the voting exercise.

If majority of residents in all areas vote “yes,” the new BARMM would be comprised of the
provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, Cotabato City, 6 towns in
Lanao del Norte, and 67 barangays in North Cotabato.

2. Why are there two plebiscite dates?

Voting for the plebiscite has been scheduled to take place on two dates. The first will be on
Monday in the ARMM, Cotabato City, and Isabela City.

If majority of voters in these areas agree to creating BARMM, a second voting on February 6
will be held in Lanao del Norte (except Iligan City) and 7 towns North Cotabato.

Results from the January 21 vote can be expected no later than Saturday next week, January 26.

Other Stories
Hataman declines position in Bangsamoro Transition Authority
During the turnover ceremony, the outgoing ARMM governor tells BARMM Interim Chief Minister Al-Haj Murad
Ebrahim he wants to focus on Basilan, where he is running for congressman

Duterte names Bangsamoro Transition Authority members

Malacañang releases the appointment papers of 76 Bangsamoro Transition Authority members

Comelec: Bangsamoro Organic Law 'deemed ratified'

The historic vote creates the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, a more powerful political
entity that allows the Bangsamoro people a chance at genuine self-governance

3. What are the places to watch out for?

Key areas to watch include Sulu, Cotabato City, and Lanao del Norte. In the run-up to the
plebiscite, these places have indicated a "no" vote.

In Sulu, Vice Governor Sakur Tan filed a petition before the Supreme Court in October 2018,
questioning the BOL’s constitutionality. Tan argued that votes in ARMM should not be counted
as one geographical area. He also questioned the lack of an opt out provision, even if the rest of
ARMM wants to be included.

In Lanao del Norte, the 6 municipalities to be included in the new region will only become part
of BARMM if a majority of the entire province also agrees. But the ruling Dimaporo clan has so
far showed no sign of willingness to let go of certain parts of its provincial territory.

These 6 municipalities have faced the same problem in the past. They previously voted to be
included in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite under Republic Act No. 9054, but their
mother units voted against it.

In Cotabato City, the MILF will have to contend with its popular mayor Cynthia Guiani, who has
been vocal against the city's inclusion in the new region.
Tensions have also grown as Guiani accused an MILF commander of supposedly masterminding
the deadly New Year’s Eve blast in Cotabato City. It’s an accusation the MILF denied as they
condemned the attack.

Cotabato is also considered a crucial city for the plebiscite. If the city votes against joining the
proposed new region, the BARMM's regional government will have to move government offices
to a new capital.

4. What is the history?

It has taken years to arrive at the chance to create BARMM.

The BOL is the culmination of a peace deal signed between the past administrations and the
MILF. It builds upon the gains of previous Moro peace agreements since the 1970s.

Former president Aquino had wanted the law passed before he stepped down, but a botched
police operation in Mamasapano, Maguindanao, in 2015 derailed its approval.

Despite this, discussions were again taken up under the administration of President Duterte, the
first Mindanao president.

While the plebiscite seeks to create a new and more powerful entity, what’s also at stake is
peace in conflict-torn region. Years of war and rebellion have claimed the lives of over 150,000
in Mindanao.

For this reason, both the government and MILF rallied for the law, saying it is a "formula for
peace, development, and progress."

BANGSAMORO. President Rodrigo Duterte signs the landmark Bangsamoro Organic Law. Malacañang file photo

5. What is the impact on Mindanao residents?

If residents agree with the BOL, the Bangsamoro people will be a step closer to self-rule.

The law paves the way for the creation of the Bangsamoro government, which will be headed by
a chief minister and a ceremonial leader called a Wali.
 A regional parliament of 80 members will also be created to pass laws and decide on the region’s
budget. Here, representatives from regional parties, districts, and sectors will be allocated a
portion of the seats.

The Bangsamoro government will also enjoy exclusive powers over some areas such as
budgeting, economic zones, social services, and a justice system.

Once the BOL is ratified, the MILF is expected to become the dominant political force in the
region since they will automatically occupy a majority of the 80-member Bangsamoro Transition
Authority (BTA).

The BTA will be largely in charge of governing the new region until the May 2022 elections,
when new officials will be elected.

According to results of a survey conducted by peace-building organization International Alert

Philippines in December 2018, residents who agree with the BOL believe that it will create more
government jobs. This is primarily because the BOL mandates the creation of new government
departments and offices in the BARMM.

The regional parliament will still work with the national government. The latter will also still
retain powers over national matters such as foreign affairs and a national military and police. –
Rappler.com

ARMM youth favor Bangsamoro

Organic Law: survey
Patrick Quintos, ABS-CBN News
Posted at Dec 06 2018 05:24 PM | Updated as of Dec 07 2018 01:47 PM

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President Duterte poses for a photo with legislators and negotiators in the peace process with the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front, as well as top officials from the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
Philippine National Police during the presentation of the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL) to the MILF at
Malacañan Palace on August 7, 2018. ABS-CBN News file photo

But many young people in Sulu, Tawi-Tawi are hesitant of BOL

MANILA - Majority of youth voters in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) are
in favor of the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL), a peace advocacy group's survey showed.

The International Alert survey found 89.4 percent of its 614 respondents aged 18-35 said they will
vote yes in next year's plebiscite for the law that will establish a new autonomous Bangsamoro
region.

Only 2.5 percent of the respondents said they will vote against the Bangsamoro law, while 8.1
percent said they were unsure, the survey, held from October 29 to November 19, showed.

"This is significant considering that the youth comprises 57 percent of the ARMM voters," said
Nikki de la Rosa, International Alert's manager for the Philippines.

"Data seems to suggest that getting more youth to vote will add to the base of the support for the
BOL," De La Rosa added, citing high familiarity with the Bangsamoro law among those in this
young age group.

The survey showed 83.5 percent of the respondents were familiar with the issues and impact of the
Bangsamoro Organic Law, 15 percent were unfamiliar at all, while 1.5 percent didn't answer.

The same ARMM areas will still be part of the new Bangsamoro region, while Cotabato City, Isabela
City, 6 Lanao del Norte towns and 39 North Cotabato provinces may opt to be included.

The Bangsamoro Organic Law promises fair sharing of resources, a block grant from the national
government, and an overall stronger autonomy in Muslim Mindanao.

Mainland vs island votes

Many youth voters in the island provinces of Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-tawi, however, showed
hesitation in supporting the Bangsamoro Organic Law, according to the survey.

In Sulu, 17.5 percent of the respondents said they will not vote for the BOL, 72.5 percent said they
were unsure, while only 10 percent said they will vote yes.

In Tawi-Tawi, 43.5 percent of the youth were unsure of their stand on the BOL, 10.3 percent said
they will vote against the law, while 46.2 percent said they will vote yes, the survey showed.

Meanwhile, 36.4 percent of the respondents in Basilan said they were unsure of the BOL, 22.7
percent said they are not in favor of it, while 40.9 percent said they will vote for it.

"The reason behind that has always been the perception that the BOL is a law that was crafted by our
brotherhood in the mainland," said Francisco "Pancho" Lara Jr., International Alert senior adviser.

Lara added that this may be the reason behind why Sulu Governor Abdusakur Tan II filed a petition
against the BOL before the Supreme Court.
  Sulu asks SC to void Bangsamoro Organic Law, stop plebiscite

Despite hesitation in these islands, 58.8 percent of respondents from Isabela City in Basilan said they
are in favor of the BOL, 32.4 percent were unsure, while 8.8 percent were against it.

Moro youth 'managing expectations' from BOL

The survey also showed that respondents want the BOL to address the issues of poverty, terrorism,
corruption, rebellion, and crime.

But most of the respondents said they were not too hopeful that the BOL will address violent
extremism, said Lara, as most of them backed the law for the the job opportunities it may bring.

"They don't agree that this will remove violent extremism. They don't agree that this will remove
corruption. The reason why they're supporting this is because it will create jobs," he said.

"It is clear in the data that the youth are quite knowledgeable. They will vote according to their
understanding of the BOL. They are managing their expectation as well," De La Rosa added.

De La Rosa said BOL advocates may have to focus next on promoting the benefits of the law to non-
Muslims because most of them are not inclined to back the law, according to their survey.

Lara said they will hold another survey in the first week of January 2019, 2 weeks before the
plebiscite, to see whether or not the trend will remain the same.

What is the Regional

Development Council
The Regional Development Council (RDC) is the highest planning and policy-making
body in the region. It serves as the counterpart of the National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) Board at the sub-national level. It is the primary
institution that coordinates and sets the direction of all economic and social
development efforts in the region. It also serves as a forum where local efforts can be
related and integrated with regional and national development activities.

The creation of the RDC answers the need for a single planning body whose main
concern is the overall socio-economic development of the region. This was an offshoot
of the implementation of the Integrated Reorganization Plan of 1972 which divided the
country into administrative regions.

Regional development planning is necessary to address the uneven economic and

social development in the country. This stems from the recognition that growth and
advancement over the years remain unevenly distributed and that progress has been
concentrated in a few regions.

In recent years, local autonomy has brought to the fore the need to empower local chief
executives and officials in spearheading development in their respective jurisdictions.
This strengthens and complements the vital role of the RDC in coordinating local
initiatives that could further accelerate the socio-economic development of the region.

What RDC Does

Based on Section 4 of Executive Order 325, the following shall be the functions of the
Regional Development Council (RDC):

a. Coordinate the preparation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of short and

long-term regional development plans and investment programs, regional physical
framework plan and special development plans, including the formulation of policy
recommendations;

b. Integrate approved development plans of provinces and cities, line agencies, state
universities and colleges, government owned and controlled corporations and special
development authorities in the region into the regional development plan;

c. Review, prioritize, and endorse to the national government the annual and multi-year
sectoral investment programs of the region for funding and implementation;

d. Review and endorse to the national government the annual budgets of agency
regional offices, state colleges and universities and special development authorities;

e. Promote and direct the inflow and allocation of private investments in the region to
support regional development objectives, policies and strategies;

f. Review and endorse national plans, programs and projects proposed for
implementation in the regions;

g. As required by the Investment Coordinating Committee (ICC), review and endorse

projects of national government agencies that have impact on the region and projects of
LGUs in the region requiring national government financial exposure which may come in
the form of guarantees, national government budget appropriations or subsidies, among
others;

h. Initiate and coordinate the development, funding and implementation of regional and
special development projects such as those involving several agencies or LGUs;

i. Coordinate the monitoring and evaluation of development projects undertaken by

government agencies, local government units, state colleges and universities,
government-owned and/or – controlled corporations and special development
authorities in the region; and

j. Perform other related functions and activities as may be necessary to promote and
sustain the socio-economic development of the regions.

The RDC undertakes the following functions as provided for in Executive Order No. 325 (as amended):

1 Coordinate the preparation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of short- and long-term
regional development plans and investment programs, regional physical framework plan and special
development plans

2 Formulate policy recommendations

3 Integrate approved development plans of provinces and cities, line agencies, state universities
and colleges, government owned and/or controlled corporations and special development authorities in
the region into the regional development plan

4 Review, prioritize, and endorse to the national government the annual and multi-year
investment programs of the regional line agencies for funding and implementation

5 Review and endorse to the national government the annual budgets of agency regional offices,
state colleges and universities, and special development authorities

6 Promote and direct the inflow and allocation of private investments in the region to support
regional development objectives, policies, and strategies

7 Review and endorse national plans, programs and projects proposed for implementation in the
regions

8 As required by the Investment Coordinating Committee (ICC) of the NEDA Board, review and
endorse projects of national government agencies and local government units that have impact on the
region and projects of LGUs in the region requiring national government financial exposure which may
come in the form of guarantees, national government budget appropriations or subsidies, among others

9 Initiate and coordinate the development, funding and implementation of regional and special
development projects such as those involving several agencies or local government units

10 Coordinate the monitoring and evaluation of development projects undertaken by government

agencies, LGUs, state colleges and universities, government-owned and/or controlled corporations and
special development authorities in the region

11 Perform other related functions and activities as may be necessary to promote and sustain the
socio-economic development of the region
The RDC assists its LGU members, when so requested, in the preparation of local development plans,
local investment programs, and in the preparation of program/project proposals for possible official
development assistance.

Among the important responsibilities of the RDC are, but not limited to, the following:

1 Approve the Regional Development Plan, the Regional Physical Framework Plan and the
Regional Development Investment Program

2 Ensure the consistency of the local development plans and investment programs with the
region’s development directions and priorities, through coordination with the Provincial and City
Development Councils

3 Submit an annual assessment of plan implementation and an integrated report on the

performance of the region’s economy

4 Identify and prescribe uniform systems, standards, methods and institutional arrangements in
the preparation of plans, investment programs, monitoring reports, socio-economic profiles and other
undertakings among its members

5 Accept donations, contributions, grants, bequests or gifts in cash or in kind from any source in
support of the Council’s activities or as a contribution to the undertaking of a development program,
project, or activity

6 Advocate and promote ideals and values which are consistent and contributory to the
development goals of the region

What are RDC’s Committees

Executive Committee

Act on matters that require immediate attention for and on behalf of the RDC when it is not in
session. The Executive Committee shall comprise one fourth of the total membership of the
fully-constituted Council, the membership to be determined by the Council, provided that
all sectoral committee chairmen created under Section 7 of this Executive Order,
shall automatically become members of the Executive Committee. The Chairman, Co-
Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Secretary of the RDC shall also serve as the officers of the
Executive Committee.
Development Administration Committee

Functions

 In coordination with sectoral committees concerned, monitor, review and

evaluate implementation of all programs and projects in the area of development
administration in the region and identify implementation gaps and act on these
directly or through a recommendation to the RDC;
 Review and recommend to the RDC, agency regional budget proposals of
agencies particularly those concerned with development administration;
 Coordinate the formulation, evaluation, approval of medium-term and annual
socio-economic development plans and investment programs of agencies
concerned with development administration;
 Propose policies, guidelines, systems and programs and projects designed for
effective government and management services;
 Create subcommittees and task forces, as it may be necessary to carry out its
objectives;
 Prepare and submit annual accomplishment reports
Economic Development Committee

Functions

 Review and endorse to the Council programs/ projects of Regional Line Agencies
and LGUs requiring funding support from the national government
 Integrate and harmonize the programs and projects of local government units
and sector line agencies into the Regional Development Plan
 Advice the Council on issues, gaps and milestones in the implementation of
programs, projects and activities in the sector as identified in the Regional
Development Plan
 Advice the Council on sector-related actions to be undertaken in order to
accelerate the economic development in the region
 Perform other related functions as may be assigned by the Council
Infrastructure Development Committee

Functions

 Review and endorse programs/projects of national government agencies and

local government units in the region to the Council requiring national government
financial exposure which may come in the form of guarantees, national
government budget appropriations or subsidies, among others
 Undertake the formulation and prioritization of development plans and investment
programs for the infrastructure development sector
  Conduct review of investment programs and budget proposals submitted by the
regional line agencies to ensure consistency with the priority thrusts of the region
 Coordinate the implementation of activities/programs/projects related to the
infrastructure development sector and involving several line agencies and local
government units
 Identify pertinent development issues/concerns and recommend actions where
appropriate including provision of technical assistance when requested
 Monitor and evaluate the implementation of sectoral development plans and
investment programs and assess the performance of the infrastructure
development sector
 Perform other related functions as may be assigned by the Council
Social Development Committee
 Review and endorse programs/projects of national government agencies and
local government units in the region to the Council requiring national government
financial exposure which may come in the form of guarantees, national
government budget appropriations or subsidies, among others
 Integrate sector information and statistics in the preparation of the annual
regional development report
 Assist the Council in the translation of national development goals and policies
into specific regional sector objectives
 Integrate sector plans and programs of local government units into regional
sector plans and programs and coordinate all sector planning and programming
activities of sector line agencies in the region
 Perform other related functions as may be assigned by the Council
Advisory Committee
To further strengthen the coordinative and consultative mechanism in the regions, there is
hereby created an Advisory Committee to advise, assist and support the Council in discharging
its functions. It shall be composed of the members of the House of Representatives
representing the provinces and districts of the region who shall signify their intention to become
members thereof in writing, and members of the Council’s
Executive Committee. The Chairman, Co-Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Secretary of the
Council shall also serve as the officers of the Advisory Committee. The Committee may meet as
often as necessary but not less than once a semester.
Special Committees

 Regional Land Use Committee

 Agusan River Basin Task Force
 Regional Geographic Information System Network
 Gender and Development Coordinating Committee
 Multi-Sectoral Forest Protection Committee
 Regional Statistical Coordination Committee
 Regional Project Monitoring Committee
Administrative Decentralization is the transfer of responsibility for the planning, financing and
managing of certain public functions from the central government and its agencies to field units
of government agencies.
Territorial integrity is the principle under international law that prohibits states from the use of
force against the "territorial integrity or political independence" of another state.

Types of decentralisation
There are four main types of decentralisation: political, administrative, fiscal, and market decentralisation.
1. Political decentralisation
Political decentralisation aims to give citizens or their elected representatives more power in public decision-
making. Its goal is to introduce more participatory forms of governance by giving citizens, or their
representatives, more influence in the formulation and implementation of health policies and plans.
Political decentralisation often requires constitutional law reform as well as changes to other laws.
2. Administrative decentralisation
Administrative decentralisation involves redistributing authority, responsibility and financial resources for
providing public services from the national government to local units of government agencies, sub national
government or semi-autonomous public authorities or corporation.
There are three major forms of administrative decentralisation: deconcentration, delegation, and devolution.
Each form raises different legal issues.
Deconcentration involves redistributing decision making authority and financial and management
responsibilities among different levels of a national government. For example, it may involve shifting
responsibilities from government officials working in the head office of a health ministry, to ministry staff
working in regions, provinces or districts. Deconcentration does not usually involve any changes to existing
laws. Though in some countries, changes to who may exercise a legal power have to follow a specific legal
procedure.
Delegation involves a national government transferring responsibility for decision-making and administration of
public functions to semi-autonomous public sector organizations such as hospital corporations. These
organizations usually have separate legal status and have a great deal of discretion and autonomy around
management decision-making.
Delegation usually involves extensive legal changes including passing laws to establish the new public sector
organizations and specify their duties, powers, accountabilities and relationship to national government. It also
may involve introducing new regulatory controls. This is because independent decision making may generate a
need for state regulation to ensure that decisions made by autonomous bodies are made in line with
government’s broader health policy objectives.
Devolution is where national governments devolve functions to sub national government.
In a devolved system, sub national governments often have clear and legally recognized geographical boundaries
over which they exercise authority and within which they perform these functions.
Devolution may involve constitutional law reform as we as law reform to formalise the devolution of powers,
roles and accountabilities.
3. Fiscal decentralisation
Financial responsibility is a core component of decentralisation. If sub national governments and private
organizations are to carry out decentralised functions effectively, they must have an adequate level of revenues
either raised locally or transferred from the national government– as well as the authority to make decisions
about expenditure.
Law changes are likely be required to give effect to the fiscal devolution, to authorise the transfer of revenue and
to authorise local decision making and revenue raising.
 4. Market decentralisation
Market decentralisation involves shifting responsibility for health functions from the public to the private sector
including businesses and non-government organizations.
Market decentralisation may involve constitutional law reform as well as the passage of new laws to:
 allow the private sector to perform functions that had previously been performed by government; and
 to regulate the performance of those functions.
Working on decentralisation - the importance of legal and institutional reform
Key legal and institutional issues for countries working on health system decentralisation include:
 Settling the objectives of the decentralisation process. The objectives of the process and the context in which it
will take place, are the key factors for designing and implementing appropriate legal and institutional
frameworks to implement decentralisation.
 Ensuring that relevant laws are amended to specify the core functions, roles and responsibilities necessary for the
effective operation of a decentralised health system and to support the relevant health policy objectives of
government.
 Identifying existing laws and regulations that regulate the health system, including those that affect it indirectly,
such as civil service laws and local government laws. These laws need to be assessed and modified as necessary
to implement the desired decentralisation reforms.
 Ensuring that appropriate institutional arrangements for the process are in place, including the assignment of
functions, responsibilities and resources necessary for the effective operation of the desired decentralised system.
 Ensuring that appropriate accountability obligations, mechanisms and process are introduced consistent with the
roles and responsibilities of the various organisations which form part of the decentralised system. This may
include introducing specific legal requirements to facilitate the participation of local communities in decision
making.
 Determining the sequencing for the making of necessary law changes; estimating the time and resources needed
for implementing each step and the phases of the transition to the new system.