Legal Technique and

Logic (1:00-3:00 S)

Case Digest
(Chapter 2)

Submitted to:
Judge Juvenal N. Bella

Submitted by:
Molina, Darwin Vergel V.
Case No.1 Ordillo v. COMELEC G.R. No. 93054 December 4, 1990
Facts:
On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao,
Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to
Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous
Region." Results of the plebiscite showed that the creation of the Region was approved only in
the Ifugao Province.
Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No. 2259 stating
that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of the votes
cast only in the province of Ifugao. On the same date, the Secretary of Justice issued a
memorandum for the President reiterating the COMELEC resolution and provided:
". . . [A]nd considering the proviso in Sec. 13(A) that only the provinces and city voting
favorably shall be included in the CAR, the province of Ifugao being the only province which voted
favorably — then, alone, legally and validly constitutes the CAR." (Rollo, p. 7)
As a result of this, on March 8, 1990, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6861 setting the
elections in the Cordillera Autonomous Region of Ifugao on the first Monday of March 1991.
On March 9, 1990, the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the non-
ratification of the Organic Act for the Region. The COMELEC merely noted said petition. On March
30, 1990, the President issued Administrative Order No. 160 declaring among others that the
Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly and all the offices created under
Executive Order No. 220 were abolished in view of the ratification of the Organic Act.-
The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only
one province as the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be
composed of more than one constituent unit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the
creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute such
Region.
RULING:
No. The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous
Region.
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution that:
"Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordillera consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing common
and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines."
The keywords — provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that
"region" is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term "region" used in its ordinary
sense means two or more provinces. This is supported by the fact that the thirteen (13) regions
into which the Philippines is divided for administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous
provinces. (Integrated Reorganization Plan (1972), which was made as part of the law of the land
by P.D. No. 1; P.D. No. 742) Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a region, it must join
other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas. It joins other units because of their
common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and other
relevant characteristics. The Constitutional requirements are not present in this case.-
Aside from the 1987 Constitution, a reading of the provisions of Republic Act No. 6766
strengthens the petitioner's position that the Region cannot be constituted from only one province.
Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of the Statute provide that the Cordillera Autonomous Region
is to be administered by the Cordillera government consisting of the Regional Government and
local government units. It further provides that:
"SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary
for the proper governance and development of all provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangay
or ili within the Autonomous Region . . ."
Case No.2
Province of North Cotobato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace
Panel on Ancestral Domain G.R. No. 183591 October 14, 2008
Facts:
Towards the end of 1999 up to early 2000, the MILF attacked a number of municipalities
in Central Mindanao and, in March 2000, it took control of the town hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte. In response, then President Joseph Estrada declared and carried out an "all-out-war"
against the MILF.
When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office, the military offensive against
the MILF was suspended and the government sought a resumption of the peace talks. President
Arroyo asked the Government of Malaysia through Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to help
convince the MILF to return to the negotiating table, the MILF convened its Central Committee to
seriously discuss
In 2005, several exploratory talks were held between the parties in Kuala Lumpur,
eventually leading to the crafting of the draft MOA-AD in its final form. On August 5, 2008, the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of
their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement
on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001
in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize,
however, for upon motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the
scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the
GRP from signing the same.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel
respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD
including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the
disclosure of the contents of the MOAAD and the holding of a public consultation thereon.
Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.
Issue:
 Whether or not respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public
consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and later initialed the MOA-
AD?
Ruling:
Yes. The Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion
when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3,
Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD
was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a
whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross
evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined. The right of access to
public documents, as enshrined in both the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution, has been
recognized as a self-executory constitutional right.
At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify the
exercise of the people's right to be consulted on relevant matters relating to the peace agenda.
One, E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both
national and local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of
the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant
information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned
sectors of society.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national
offices to conduct consultations before any project or program critical to the environment and
human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people
residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that
unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which
could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of
inhabitants from their total environment.
Three, Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for
clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among
other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does no grant the Executive Department
or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by
mere agreement or compromise.
Case No.3
Animas v. Minister of National Defense G.R. No. L-51747 December 29, 1986
Facts:
Diosdado Yanson was a political leader of Ernesto Montilla, candidate for Mayor of
Pulupandan, Negros Occidental in the November 11, 1971 local elections. The petitioners were
charged for murder in connection with the alleged killing of Yanson on the eve of the November
11 elections. The accused were arrested almost a year later, on September 21, 1972 after martial
law was proclaimed. It was only in 1974 that a "summary preliminary investigation" was conducted
by a PC captain belonging to the Judge Advocate General Service. Originally, 18 men were to be
charged with murder, qualified by superior strength, night time, use of motor vehicle, and
treachery. The list of 18 accused was later trimmed to 14.
The petitioners were recommended for prosecution before the Military Tribunal,
considering that one of them, petitioner Sgt. Rodolfo Animas is a military personnel. Thereafter,
the Judge Advocate General filed the corresponding charge sheet, but he modified the crime
charged from "Murder" to "Violation of Section 878 of the Revised Administrative Code" in
Relation to Section 2692 of the same Code and Presidential Decree No. 9, "Illegal Possession of
Firearms with Murder."
On February 16, 1978, the Minister of National Defense referred the case to the Military
Tribunal’s Branch of the Judge Advocate General’s Office (JAGO) which in turn assigned the
same to respondent Military Commission No. 27. Sometime in 1977, the petitioners were released
even as the Provincial Fiscal commenced to investigate the murder charge. However, a warrant
of arrest was issued on June 8, 1978, resulting in the re-arrest of 14 accused including the
petitioners.
On November 25, 1978, with two of the accused agreeing to become witnesses for the
State, twelve accused including the petitioners were arraigned. They pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged. However, when the case was called for trial on June 25, 1979, the title of the
charge sheet was amended on motion of the prosecution by the addition of the phrase "Violation
of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code." There was, however, no amendment of the body of
the charge sheet.Before trial could proceed, the respondent Minister of National Defense ordered
on June 30, 1979, the transfer of the case to the civil courts. Before the order could be
implemented, it was superseded by the respondent Minister’s 1st Indorsement dated August 22,
1979, directing immediate implementation of the hand-written marginal instructions dated August
14, 1979 of the President enfaced on the letter of Nelly Yanson, the wife of the deceased-victim,
dated July 23, 1979 which reads: "In order to calm the fears of injustice by the aggrieved party, I
order the Military Commission to retain jurisdiction of the case and not to transfer it to the civil
court."
Issue:
 Whether or not the Military Commission No. 27 has jurisdiction over the present case
where both civilians and military personnel were involved in the same offense.
Ruling:
NO. The Military Commission No. 27 has no jurisdiction over the present case where both
civilians and military personnel were involved in the same offense.
P.D. No. 1822 provided that members of the armed forces charged with offenses related
to the performance of their duties shall continue to be exclusively tried and punished by
court martial. This decree is dated January 16, 1981 or one day before the issuance of
Proclamation No. 2045. Hardly was the ink on P.D. No. 1822 dry, when an amendatory
decree, P.D. No. 1822-A, also dated January 16, 1981 was issued.
When civilian and military accused are segregated and tried for the same offense in two
separate tribunals, the witnesses would be presented twice and would testify two times on exactly
the same incident, with all the concomitant mischief such a procedure entails. This is not to
mention the ever present possibility of the military tribunal and the civil court coming up with
diametrically opposing decisions on the same facts and issues. The P. D. also mandates that any
waiver is for the civilian to submit himself to the military tribunal and not for the armed forces
member to opt for a civilian trial.
Inspite or because of the ambiguous nature of the decrees insofar as civilian takeover of
jurisdiction was concerned and notwithstanding the shilly-shallying and vacillation characteristic
of its implementation, this Court relied on the enunciated policy of normalization in upholding the
primacy of civil courts. This policy meant that as many cases as possible involving civilians being
tried by military tribunals as could be transferred to civil courts should be turned over immediately.
In case of doubt, the presumption was in favor of civil courts always trying civilian accused.
Case No.4
Re: COA Opinion on Computation of Appraised Value of Properties Purchased by
Supreme Court Justices A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC July 31, 2012
FACTS:
In the June 8, 2010 Opinion issued by the Legal Services Sector, Office of the General
Counsel of the Commission on Audit (COA), which found that an underpayment amounting to
P221,021.50 resulted when five (5) retired Supreme Court justices purchased from the Supreme
Court the personal properties assigned to them during their incumbency in the Court.
The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property Division of the Supreme
Court of the wrong formula in computing the appraisal value of the purchased vehicles. According
to the COA, the Property Division erroneously appraised the subject motor vehicles by applying
Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution No. 35 dated April 23, 1997 and
its guidelines, in compliance with the Resolution of the Court En Banc dated March 23, 2004 in
A.M. No. 03-12-01, when it should have applied the formula found in COA Memorandum No. 98-
569-A4 dated August 5, 1998.
In her Memorandum dated August 10, 2010, Atty. Candelaria recommended that the Court
advise the COA to respect the in-house computation based on the CFAG formula, noting that this
was the first time that the COA questioned the authority of the Court in using CFAG Joint
Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines in the appraisal and disposal of government property since
these were issued in 1997. And that more importantly, the Constitution itself grants the Judiciary
fiscal autonomy in the handling of its budget and resources.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the Division of the Supreme Court should conform to the Opinion issued
by COA’s in June 8, 2010.
RULING:
NO. The COA's authority to conduct post-audit examinations on constitutional bodies
granted fiscal autonomy is provided under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. This
authority, however, must be read not only in light of the Court's fiscal autonomy, but also in relation
with the constitutional provisions on judicial independence and the existing jurisprudence and
Court rulings on these matters.
No less than the Constitution provides a number of safeguards to ensure that judicial
independence is protected and maintained. The Constitution mandates that the judiciary shall
enjoy fiscal autonomy, and grants the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts
and judicial personnel. Jurisprudence has characterized administrative supervision as exclusive,
noting that only the Supreme Court can oversee the judges and court personnel's compliance
with all laws, rules and regulations. No other branch of government may intrude into this power,
without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
One of the most important aspects of judicial independence is the constitutional grant of
fiscal autonomy.
Under the guarantees of the Judiciary’s fiscal autonomy and its independence, the Chief
Justice and the Court En Banc determine and decide the who, what, where, when and how of the
privileges and benefits they extend to justices, judges, court officials and court personnel within
the parameters of the Court’s granted power; they determine the terms, conditions and restrictions
of the grant as grantor.
The use of the formula provided in CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 is a part of the Court’s
exercise of its discretionary authority to determine the manner the granted retirement privileges
and benefits can be availed of. Any kind of interference on how these retirement privileges and
benefits are exercised and availed of, not only violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of
the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief Justice
and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the Judiciary’s own affairs.
The in-house computation of the appraisal value made by the Property Division, Office of
`Administrative Services, of the properties purchased by the retired Chief Justice and Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court, based on CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 dated April 23, 1997, as
directed under the Court Resolution dated March 23, 2004 in A.M. No. 03-12 -01, is CONFIRMED
to be legal and valid.
Case No. 5 Radiowaelth vs. Agregado G.R. No. L-3066 May 22, 1950
FACTS:
The Supreme Court purchased (1) Webster Teletalk Model 206 MA and six (6) Webster
Telephone Speakers, amounting to P585, including installation, labor and materials. The
purchase was certified by the Clerk of Court and was of urgent character and necessary to public
service. C. L. Dacanay, Chairman of the Property Requisition Committee appointed by the
President, disapproved the purchase and installation under EO No. 302 and EO No. 298.
Radiowealth, Inc., the vendor of the equipment and its accessories, took the matter up with the
Auditor General with the request that the payments be approved. The Auditor General withheld
his signature, citing the same orders, EO No. 302 and EO No. 298, and commented on it, saying:
“there is no evidence to show that the requirements of the law and/or regulations aforecited had
been complied with.” Radiowealth submitted a petition for review.
ISSUE:

 Whether the Auditor General’s decision to withhold his countersignature on purchases

made by the court is valid.
RULING:
1. The distribution of powers is a fundamental maxim of constitutional law and essential to
the separation of the three branches of government, separation which, though incomplete,
is one of the chief characteristics of our Constitution. The Supreme Court is independent
of executive or legislative control as the Executive and the Congress are of the judiciary.
2. The Judiciary’s independence is not confined only to matters related to the exercise of
judicial functions. The Court cited the case Province of Tarlac, etc. vs. Gale (26 Phil., 338)
which ruled that the prerogatives of the courts granted in the Constitution include not only
the powers to adjudicate causes but all things that are reasonably necessary for the
administration of justice, free from encroachment by neither the Executive nor the
Legislative.
3. Sections 2041-2044 of the Revised Administrative Court (EO 298) speak of departments,
bureaus, and offices. They do not speak of the legislature or the Supreme Court, and it is
our understanding that they were not intended to embrace either of these branches of the
government. "Departments" in these sections mean the several divisions among which
are distributed the functions and duties devolving upon the Chief Executive. The Supreme
Court is neither a department, a bureau nor an office within the meaning of the said
sections.
4. Auditor General may not question the court's expenditures except when they are, in the
words of the organic law, "irregular, unnecessary, excessive and extravagant." The
Auditor General's ruling under review does not criticize the expenditure in question on any
of the above purchase and installation of a teletalk and telehome speakers in the offices
of the Chief Justice and of the clerk of court has been explained in the clerk's statement;
the cost of the equipment and labor has been certified to be the lowest obtainable on the
market, and there is appropriation from which the items may lawfully be paid for.
Case No. 6 Marcos vs. Manglapus G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989
FACTS:
Three years after being ousted from the position of President and being exiled to Hawaii,
the dictator Ferdinand Marcos on his deathbed wished to return to the Philippines to die. However,
Cory Aquino, as the President, barred his return based on the consideration that his return will
further threaten the stability of the government already unstable. Marcos and his family filed a
petition for mandamus and prohibition asking the Courts to order the respondents to issue travel
documents to Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation
of the President’s decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President
may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess in jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to
the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar
their status.
RULING:
1. Although the Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the
president, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of
“executive power.”Corollarily, the powers of the president cannot be said to be limited only
to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is
more than the sum of specific powers enumerated. Whatever power inherent in the
government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.
2. The President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote
their welfare and advance the national interest. Allowing the Marcoses to return would
only worsen the unstable situation of the country. Their return poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare. The petition of the Marcoses cannot be considered in the
light solely of the constitutional provisions granting liberty of abode and the right to travel.
3. The instability of the country because of the various insurgencies lends itself as factual
bases for the President’s conclusion that the return of the Marcoses would only exacerbate
the problems. The President did not act arbitrarily in barring the Marcoses from returning
to the country, and therefore she did not act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess in jurisdiction.
Case No. 6 Republic of the Philippines vs. Bayao G.R. NO. 179492 June 05, 2013
FACTS:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45. This Petition prays for
the reversal and setting aside of the Court of Appeals' (1) Resolution dated March 21, 2007 that
dismissed the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 filed by petitioner for failure to resort to a Motion
for Reconsideration of the assailed trial court Order dated October 9, 2006 and (2) Resolution
dated August 16, 2007 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
EO 304 was passed designating Koronadal City as the regional center and seat of
SOCCSKSARGEN Region.2 It provides that all departments, bureaus, and offices of the national
government in the SOCCSKSARGEN Region shall transfer their regional seat of operations to
Koronadal City. A memorandum was issued by DA Undersec for Operations Edmund J. Sana
directing Officer-in- Charge and Regional Executive Director of DA-RFU XII Abusama M. Alid to
transfer their regional offices to Koronadal City.
The private respondents addressed a memorandum to DA Sec. Arthur Yap opposing the
transfer and the alleging that former president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo made a pronouncement
during one of her visits in Cotabato City that the regional seat of Region 12 shall remain in
Cotabato City. Respondents justified their appeal saying that a building was constructed in
Cotabato City that can accommodate the whole staff of DA- RFU XII. On the other hand, there is
no building yet in Koronadal City where rent is very expensive.10 Moreover, if the regional office
remains in Cotabato City, the government need not spend over P7,200,000.00 as dislocation pay
as well as other expenses for equipment hauling and construction.Finally, respondents alleged
that the proposed third floor of the ATI Building in Tantangan has a sub-standard foundation and
will not be issued a certificate of occupancy by the City Engineering Office of Koronadal City as
per information from an auditor.
Even so, the OIC ordered the transfer to be carried out. The respondents filed a petition
for injunction and was granted by the court.
ISSUE:
Whether the issuance by the RTC of a preliminary injunction against the transfer of the
DA Regional Office to Koronadal City violates the separation of powers between the executive
department and the judiciary as to the wisdom behind the transfer
RULING:
1. This Court has held that while the power to merge administrative regions is not provided
for expressly in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the
President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local
governments according to the Constitution and the Local Government Code. In
Chiongbian v. Orbos, the court held that the power of the President to reorganize
administrative regions carries with it the power to determine the regional center.
2. The transfer of the regional center of the SOCCSKSARGEN region to Koronadal City is
an executive function. The judiciary cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the
acts of the executive. When the trial court issued its October 9, 2006 Order granting
preliminary injunction on the transfer of the regional center to Koronadal City when such
transfer was mandated by E.O. No. 304, the lower court did precisely that.
3. The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great government
branches has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in concerns falling within its own
constitutionally allocated sphere. The judiciary as Justice Laurel emphatically asserted
"will neither direct nor restrain executive [or legislative] action x x x."
4. Finally, a verbal pronouncement to the effect that E.O. No. 304 is suspended should not
have been given weight. An executive order is valid when it is not contrary to the law or
Constitution.
Case No. 8 Belgica vs. Executive Secretary G.R No. 208566 November 19, 2013
Facts:
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922.
Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the
Congress. It underwent several legal designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest
“Priority Development Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated
in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA). The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide
for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet members may request for the realignment of
funds into their department provided that the request for realignment is approved or concurred by
the legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel- The president does have his own source of fund albeit not
included in the GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a)
the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project – this has been around since 1976, and
(b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR – this has been
around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy- in July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy,
exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated by
Janet Lim Napoles which helps lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus
NGO’s (non-government organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are
being used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to “ghost” projects.
Issues:
 Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel laws are
unconstitutional for violating the constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers, (b)
checks and balances, (d) accountability, (e) political dynasties, (f) local autonomy.

Ruling:
a) The separation of powers between the Executive and the Legislative Departments has
been violated. The post-enactment measures including project identification, fund release,
and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence,
allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of
budget execution, which belongs to the executive department.
Any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in
the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers
and is thus unconstitutional. Respondents also failed to prove that the role of the
legislators is only recommendatory in nature. They even admitted that the identification
of the legislator constitutes a mandatory requirement before the PDAF can be tapped as
a funding source.

b) Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective
allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators
who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is
passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. This kind of
lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation
of a ―budget within a budget which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment
and consequently impairs the President‘s power of item veto. In fact, even without its post-
enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain
constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum
appropriation. This is because the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and
purposes of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily
indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the President‘s power of item veto.
The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation
of the budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested observers when
scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law. The
conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-
enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves
participate. The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment
authority and/or the individual legislator‘s control of his PDAF per se would allow him to
perpetuate himself in office. The use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter
which must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.
Case No. 9 National Electrification Administration v. COA, G.R. 143481, February 15, 2002

Facts:

Congress passed a Joint Resolution No. 01 urging the President to revise the existing
compensation and position classification system in the Government. Approved by then President
Ramos, Joint Resolution No. 01 adjusted the salary schedule of all officials and employees of the
government, and that the new salary schedule shall be implemented within four years beginning
in 1994. The president then issued EO 389, which directs the payment of the fourth and final
salary increases in two tranches, in January 1, 1997 and in November 1, 1997. The DBM issued
Implementing Guidelines under NBC No. 458 of 1997, reiterating the schedule of payments in EO
389.

In January 1997, National Electrification Administration, a GOCC, did not implement the
salary increases in accordance with the schedule of payment specified in EO 389 and NBC No.
458. Instead, NEA implemented in one lump sum beginning January 1, 1997. Otherwise stated,
NEA accelerated the implementation of the salary increase by paying the second tranche starting
January 1, 1997 instead of November 1, 1997. The COA issued a Notice of Suspension requiring
the submission of the legal basis for the full implementation of the new salary schedule. The NEA
failed to submit the basis for its advance implementation.Thus, the Commissions resident auditor
issued on May 14 and 27, 1998, Notices of Disallowance.

Issue:

Whether or not NEA’s accelerated implementation is in accordance with law.

Ruling:

The Court ruled that NEAs accelerated implementation is not in accordance with law. The
Memorandum, which allows full implementation of the salary increases not earlier than November
1, 1996, does not automatically accelerate the staggered salary increases for 1997. It specifically
provides that accelerated implementation can be availed of by GOCCs and GFIs x x x only upon
prior approval of the DBM. Evidently, in order to avail of the benefits of accelerated
implementation, NEA must secure the approval of the DBM by complying with the terms and
conditions prescribed by the Memorandum. NEA failed to do this. Absent any authority or approval
from the DBM or the President authorizing NEA to accelerate implementation of the last phase of
the salary increase, NEAs accelerated payment is without legal basis. Under our system of
government all executive departments, bureaus and offices are under the control of the President.
This case would not have arisen had NEA complied in good faith with the directives and orders
of the President.
Case No. 10 PNB v. Bitulok Sawmill Inc. G.R. L-24177-85 June 29, 1968

Facts:

The Philippine Lumber Distributing Agency, Inc. was organized upon the initiative and
insistence of the late President Manuel Roxas. He promised and agreed to finance the agency by
making the Government invest P9.00 by way of counterpart for every peso that the members
would invest therein. Accordingly, Roxas instructed the Hon. Emilio Abello, then Executive
Secretary and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine National Bank, for the latter to
grant said agency an overdraft in the original sum of P250,000.00 which was later increased to
P350,000.00, payable on or before April 30, 1958, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum, and
secured by the chattel mortgages on the stock of lumber of said agency. The Government did not
invest the P9.00 for every peso coming from defendant lumber producers. The loan extended to
the Philippine Lumber Distributing Agency by the Philippine National Bank was not paid. PNB
sought the recovery from defendant the balance of their stock subscriptions. Though the
defendants plead that they would not have subscribed to the capital stock of the Philippine Lumber
Distributing Agency were it not for the assurance of the then President of that it would back it up
by investing P9.00 for every peso.

Issue:

 Whether or not the non-compliance with a plain statutory command, considering the plea
that defendants would "not have subscribed to the capital stock were it not for the
assurance of the President, a condition which was not fulfilled, such commitment not
having been complied with, be justified.

Ruling:

No. It would be unwarranted to ascribe to the late President Roxas the view that the
payment of the stock subscriptions, as thus required by law, could be condoned in the event that
the counterpart fund to be invested by the Government would not be available. Even if such were
the case, however, and such a promise were in fact made, to further the laudable purpose to
which the proposed corporation would be devoted and the possibility that the lumber producers
would lose money in the process, still the plain and specific wording of the applicable legal
provision as interpreted by this Court must be controlling. It is a well-settled principle that with all
the vast powers lodged in the Executive, he is still devoid of the prerogative of suspending the
operation of any statute or any of its terms.
Case No. 11Adolfo v. Court of First Instance of Zambales G.R. No. L-30650 July 31, 1970

Facts:

Albert L. Merchant was charged for a crime, which was committed outside a base, or more
particularly in Barrio Manggahan, Subic, Zambales. Although a citizen of the United States, he is
a civilian employee or component of the U. S. Naval Base at Subic Bay, and not a member of the
armed forces of the US within the purview of the US-PH Military Base Agreement. Petitioner
asserted that Merchant should be in custody of a commanding officer pursuant to the MBA. That
in all cases over which the Philippines exercises jurisdiction the custody of the accused, pending
trial and final judgment, shall be entrusted without delay to the commanding officer of the nearest
base, who shall acknowledge in writing that such accused has been delivered to him for custody
pending trial. In addition, even if the right of custody of a commanding officer over the person of
an accused civilian component of the base is not prescribed by the original Base Agreement,
nonetheless such a right is now provided for in paragraph 5 of the Agreed Official Minutes of the
Agreement entered into between the Philippines and the United States on August 10, 1965. The
exchange of notes on August 10, 1965 is commonly known as the Mendez-Blair Agreement.

Issue:

 Whether or not the Mendez-Blair Agreement validly modify or amend the provisions of
the Military Bases Agreement.

Ruling:

The Court ruled that since the power to make treaties is lodged under our Constitution
with the President with the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate, the power to amend these
treaties must similarly be vested in those organs of the government. After all, an amendment to a
statute produces one law, usually the statute as amended. In pari materia is the observation that
only Congress, with its legislative power, can make laws and alter or repeal them. The Chief
Executive, with all his vast powers, cannot suspend the operation of a statute; a fortiori, he cannot
exercise the greater power to amend or to revoke a statute. Therefore, as applied to this case,
the making of the treaty having been undertaken under the joint auspices of the President and
the Senate, its amendment or revision must similarly be undertaken by both agencies of the State
as directed by the Constitution. The August 10, 1965 notes to the US - PH Military Bases
Agreement of 1947, not having been ratified yet by the Senate, remain as mere proposals.
Case No. 12 Tuason v. Register of Deeds G.R. No. 70484 January 29, 1988

Facts:

Spouses Tuason bought in 1965 from Carmel Farms Inc. a piece of land in Caloocan City
by virtue of which they were issued a title in their names and they took possession of their
property. In 1973, President Marcos, exercising martial law powers, issued PD 293 cancelling the
certificates of titles of Carmel Farms, which had earlier purchased from the Government the land
it had subsequently subdivided into several lots for sale to the public. The PD 293 made the
finding that Carmel had failed to complete payment of the price of the lands, and declare the lands
covered to be open for disposition and sale to members of the Malacañang Association Inc., the
present bona fide occupants thereof. On the strength of this Presidential decree, the Register of
Deeds of Caloocan City caused the inscription on the Tuasons’ title, that their certificate of title is
declared invalid and null and void ab initio.

Issue:

 Whether or not the President has the power to cancel Torrens Title.

Ruling:

The Decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function. Since he was
never vested with judicial power - such power, being vested in the SC and such inferior courts as
may be established by law - the judicial acts done by him were under the circumstances alien to
his office as chief executive. He made a determination of facts, and applied the law to those facts,
declaring what the legal rights of the parties were in the premises. These acts essentially
constitute a judicial function, or an exercise of jurisdiction — which is the power and authority to
hear or try and decide or determine a cause.
Case No. 13 Macabago Vs Comelec G.R. No.152163 November 18, 2002
FACTS:
Petitioner Sabdullah T. Macabago was proclaimed Municipal Mayor of Saguiran, Lanao
del Sur. Petitioner had a lead of 198 votes over respondent Jamael M. Salacop. Respondent filed
a petition against petitioner and the proclaimed vice mayor for the alleged fact that there was a
massive substitution of voters, rampant irregularities in voting procedures in some precincts and
the failure of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) to comply with Sections 28 and 29 of Comelec
Resolution No. 3743 and Section 193 of the Omnibus Election Code, thus rendering the election
process in those precincts a mockery and the proclamation of the winning candidates a nullity. In
support of his petition, private respondent appended thereto photocopies of random Voters
Registration Records (VRRs) evidencing the fraud and that allegedly permeated the electoral
process, as well as affidavits tending to prove that serious irregularities were committed in the
conduct of the elections in the subject precincts. The petitioner denied the material and averred
that it is a pre-proclamation controversy. The COMELEC En Banc took cognizance of the petition
and issued an order directing the Election Officer of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur to bring to and
produce before the COMELEC Office in Manila the original VRRs of the questioned precincts for
technical examination. After its examination, comparing the original copies of the VRRs with the
voter’s signatures and fingerprints, the COMELEC concluded that there was convincing proof of
massive fraud in the conduct of the elections in the four precincts thus declaring failure of election.
ISSUE:

 Whether or not COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or committed a grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the petition
of private respondent and in issuing the assailed order.
RULING:
Yes. Before the COMELEC can grant a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of
election, the concurrence of two conditions must be established, namely: (a) no voting has taken
place in the precincts concerned on the date fixed by law or, even if there was voting, the election
nevertheless resulted in a failure to elect; (b) the votes cast would affect the result of the election.
The Court declared in Ricardo Canicosa vs. Commission on Elections, et al., that there are only
three instances where a failure of election may be declared, namely: x x x (a) the election in any
polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud, or other analogous causes; (b) the election in any polling place had been suspended before
the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud, or other analogous causes; (c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission
of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to
elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes. In sum
then, the grounds alleged by private respondent in his petition before the COMELEC are those
for a regular election protest and are not proper in a pre-proclamation controversy nor is such
petition one for annulment of the elections or for a declaration of failure of elections in the
municipality of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur. The COMELEC should have ordered the dismissal of
the petition instead of issuing the assailed order. The COMELEC thus committed a grave abuse
of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the same. The error is
correctible by the special civil action for certiorari.
Case No. 14 David Lu Vs Paterno Lu Ym, Sr. G.R. No. 153690 February 15, 2011
FACTS:
Petitioner David Lu filed a case against respondents Paterno LU YM, Sr., Ludo and LuYm
Development Corporation (LLDC), et. al for Declaration of Nullity of Share Issue, Receivership
and Dissolution claiming that the respondents, being members of the Board of Directors, caused
the issuance of unsubscribed and unissued shares at less that par value. The RTC ruled in favor
of the petitioner by annulling the subscription and ordering the dissolution and asset liquidation of
LLDC.
In G.R. No. 157381 wherein Lu Ym father and sons challenged the appellate court’s
resolution restraining the trial court from proceeding with their motion to lift the receivership order
which was filed during the pendency of G.R. No. 153690, the Court, by Decision of August 26,
2008 resolved that the issue was mooted by the amendment of the complaint and by the trial
court’s decision on the merits.
The respondents moved to reconsider the decision that the complaint filed by the petitioner
was incapable of pecuniary estimation. The respondents pointed out that the case filed by the
petitioner contains the alleged real value of the shares, based on underlying real estate values
worth P1,087,055,105.

The Court, in a turnaround resolution on August 4, 2009, reconsidered its position on the matter
of docket fees. It resolved that it was indeed capable of pecuniary estimation and that the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for David Lu, et al.’s failure to pay the correct
docket fees, hence, all interlocutory matters and incidents subject of the present petitions must
consequently be denied.
ISSUE:

 Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the action filed by the petitioner.
RULING:
No. The trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the action filed by the petitioner. A court
acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon payment of the prescribed fees. Hence, without
payment of the correct docket fees, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition filed
by David, et. al.
Case No. 15 Land Bank Of The Philippines Vs Federico Suntay G.R. No. 188376
December 14, 2011.
FACTS:
In Land Bank v. Suntay (G.R. No. 157903), the Court has declared that the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to determine just compensation under Republic Act No. 6657
(Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, or CARL) pertains to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) as a
Special Agrarian Court; that any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) and to convert the original
jurisdiction of the RTC into appellate jurisdiction is void for being contrary to the CARL; and that
what DARAB adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a preliminary manner the
reasonable compensation to be paid to the landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate power
to decide this question. Bearing this pronouncement in mind, the court granted the petition for
review on certiorari and reverse the decision promulgated on June 5, 2009 by the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 106104 entitled Land Bank of the Philippines v. Hon. Conchita C. Mina ̃ s,
Regional Agrarian Adjudicator of Region IV, and Federico Suntay, as represented by his
Assignee, Josefina Lubrica, dismissing the petition for certiorari of Land Bank of the Philippines
(Land Bank) on the ground of its being moot and academic.
ISSUE:

 Whether or not RARAD Casabar's orders dated December 15, 2008 and December 18,
2008 rendered Land Bank's petition for certiorari moot and academic.

RULING:
To the extent that it nullified and recalled RARAD Mina ̃ s' October 30, 2008 order, RARAD
Casabar's December 15, 2008 order seemingly mooted Land Bank's petition for certiorari
(whereby Land Bank contended that RARAD Miñas, through her order dated October 30, 2008,
could not disregard or invalidate the decision promulgated on October 11, 2007 in G.R. No.
157903, and that the monies, funds, shares of stocks, and accounts of Land Bank, which did not
form part of the Agrarian Reform Fund (ARF), could not be levied upon, garnished, or transferred
to Lubrica in satisfaction of RARAD Miñas' January 24, 2000 decision). At first glance, indeed,
RARAD Casabar's December 15, 2008 order seemingly rendered the reliefs prayed for by the
petition for certiorari unnecessary and moot. An issue is said to become moot and academic when
it ceases to present a justiciable controversy, so that a declaration on the issue would be of no
practical use or value. However, the application of the moot-and-academic principle is subject to
several exceptions already recognized in this jurisdiction.
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court has declared that the moot-and-academic
principle is not a magical formula that automatically dissuades courts from resolving cases,
because they will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if they find that: (a) There is a
grave violation of the Constitution; (b) The situation is of exceptional character, and paramount
public interest is involved; (a)The constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the Bench, the Bar, and the public; or (b) A case is capable of repetition yet
evading review. In Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines
Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP), the Court has come to consider a voluntary cessation
by the defendant or the doer of the activity complained of as another exception to the moot-and-
academic principle. The exception of voluntary cessation of the activity without assuring the
nonrecurrence of the violation squarely covers this case. Hence, the CA's dismissal of CAG.R.
SP No. 106104 on the ground of mootness must be undone. Yet another reason why the Court
should still resolve derives from the fact that the supervening RARAD Casabar's recall order did
not at all resolve and terminate the controversy between the parties. We further discern that the
parties have heretofore acted to advance their respective interests and claims against each other
by relying on seemingly conflicting pronouncements made in DARAB v. Lubrica (G.R. No.
159145) and Land Bank v. Suntay (G.R. No. 157903).
Case No. 16 Visayas Geothermal Power Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
G.R. No. 197525 June 4, 2014
Facts:
Petitioner Visayas Geothermal Power Company (VGPC) is a limited partnership duly
organized and existing under Philippine Laws. It is principally engaged in the business of power
generation through geothermal energy and the sale of generated power to the Philippine National
Oil Company (PNOC), pursuant to the Energy Conversion Agreement.
VGPC filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) its Original VAT Returns for the first
to fourth quarters of taxable year 2005 on April 25, 2005, July 25, 2005, October 25, 2005 and
and January 20, 2006.
On December 6, 2006, it filed an administrative claim for refund for the amount of
₱14,160,807.95 with the BIR on the ground that it was entitled to recover excess and unutilized
input VAT payments for the four quarters of taxable year 2005, pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9136, which treated sales of generated power subject to VAT to a zero percent (0%) rate
starting June 26, 2001.
On January 3, 2007, VGPC filed its judicial claim via a petition for review with the CTA
praying for a refund or the issuance of a tax credit certificate in the amount of ₱14,160,807.95,
covering the four quarters of taxable year 2005.
The CTA Second Division partially granted the petition, which respondent was ordered to
refund or, in the alternative, to issue a tax credit certificate in favor of petitioner the reduced
amount of ₱7,699,366.37 representing unutilized input VAT paid on domestic purchases of non-
capital goods and services, services rendered by non-residents, and importations of non-capital
goods for the first to fourth quarters of taxable year 2005.
The CTA Second Division found that only the amount of ₱7,699,366.37 was duly
substantiated by the required evidence. As to the timeliness of the filing of the judicial claim, the
Court ruled that following the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) v. Mirant Pagbilao
Corporation (Mirant), both the administrative and judicial claims were filed within the two-year
prescriptive period provided in Section 112(A) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997
(NIRC), the reckoning point of the period being the close of the taxable quarter when the sales
were made.
Issue:

 Whether the petitioner’s judicial claim for refund was prematurely filed.
Ruling:
No. The general rule is that the 120+30 day period is mandatory and jurisdictional from
the effectivity of the 1997 NIRC on January 1, 1998 up to present. As an exception, judicial claims
filed from December 10, 2003, in view of the BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, to October 6, 2010, when
it was reversed by the Supreme Court in Aichion Case, need not wait for the exhaustion of the
120-day period.
In the case at bar, VGPC filed its administrative claim with the CIR on December 6, 2006
and later, its judicial claim with the CTA on January 3, 2007. The judicial claim was clearly filed
within the period of exception and was, therefore, not premature and should not have been
dismissed by the CTA En Banc.
Case No. 17 Cabuay Jr. vs. Malvar GR No. 123780 September 24, 2002

Facts:
In 1936, Hermogenes Lopez filed his homestead application docketed as Homestead
application No. 138612 for the land in Barrio De La Paz, Antipolo City that he inherited from his
father, Fermin Lopez, upon knowing that the said application was not acted upon. Hermogenes
continued to occupy the land until he transferred his rights to Ambrosio Aguilar. Records show
though that the said land was registered in the name of Fernando Gorospe under Original
Certificate of Title 537. Gorospe, in turn, sold the land to spouses Salvador and Rosario De Tagle.
Tagle sold the land to Antonio Zuzuarregui Sr., who issued TCT 7357. When Antonio died, the
property was adjudicated to his widow, Beatriz. Beatriz Zuzuarregui sold the land to Eduardo
Santos.
Lopez filed a complaint for annulment of Oct 537. However this was dismissed on the
complaint that Lopez was not the real party-in-interest since he sold the property to Aguilar.
Aguilar was then prompted to file similar action against the defendants. The courts rendered
judgment in favor of Aguilar, declaring him the true and lawful owner of the land.
Lopez heirs on July, 16, 1984 filed a complaint of cancellation of the deed of sale between
Hermogenes and Aguilar over the land, alleging that Hemrogenes was “insufficiently educated”
when he made the sale. Court rendered its decision declaring void an initio the Lopez-Aguilar
deed of sale and restoring the Lopez heirs’ possession. Adia heris filed a separate action for
partial quashal of the writ of execution with application for preliminary injuction against the Lopez
heirs’. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Adia heirs then filed filed a protest with the
Land Management Bureau hoping that the property be titled to their names. LMB disregarded the
final decision of SC and ordered the reconstruction of the homestead application of Adia. Lopez
heirs together with Dr. Potenciano Malvar, who bought a portion of the land, filed a motion for the
issuance of an alias writ of execution of the decision. This caused Col. Pedro Cabuay Jr. to file
with the SC petition for clarification as to the validity and forceful effect the final and executoy but
conflicting decisions. Malvar then filed a motion for reconsideration with alternative prayer for
referral to the court en banc.
Issue:
Who lawfully owns the subject property, between the Lopez heirs and Adia heirs?
Ruling:
The weight of evidence and jurisprudence shows that the Lopez heirs are the lawful owners
of the land in controversy. The First Division, through Justice Emilio A. Gancayco, recognizes the
right of ownership of Hermogenes Lopez over the property by reason of his continuous
possession since 1920 and his full compliance with the requirements by the Public Land Act for
the issuance of a homestead patent. Hermogenes Lopez complied with the requirements of the
Public Land Act.
In the early part of 1936, Hermogenes Lopez went to the Bureau of Lands and inquired about
his father’s homestead application. He was informed that said application was still unacted upon
and was advised to apply in his own name. He complied and his application was docketed as
homestead application No. 138612. Subsequently, he was able to prove compliance with the
requirements of the Public Land Act and, as a matter of course, the land was surveyed by a
government surveyor and on 7 February 1939 the resulting plan H-138612 was approved by the
Director of Lands. The latter thereafter ordered the issuance of the corresponding patent in the
name of Hermogenes Lopez (page 33, Rollo). He has been in actual and continuous possession
thereof and was recognized as its owner until he transferred his rights to Ambrosio Aguilar, private
respondent herein, on 31 July 195.
With the ruling of this Court in G.R. No. 90380 that Hermogenes Lopez is the lawful owner,
LMB Director Abelardo Palad should have refrained from adjudicating the property to the Adia
heirs since it ceased to be of the public domain and beyond his authority to dispose of.
To be more precise, the property became the private property of Hermogenes Lopez as early
as 1950, or after the lapse of 30 years of continued possession by Hermogenes and his father
Fermin Lopez that began in 1920. This is so because jurisprudence consistently declares that the
mere lapse of the statutory period of 30 years of open, continuous and exclusive possession of
disposable public land automatically transforms the same into private property and vests title on
the possessor.
Case No. 18 Villagracia vs. Fifth Shari’a District Court G.R No. 18832, April 23, 2014
Facts:
On February 15, 1996 Roldan E. Mala purchased a 300-square meterparcel of land
located in Poblacion, Parang, Maguindanao from one Ceres Canete. A TCT no. 15633 covering
the parcel of land was issued in Roldan’s name. At the time of the purchase, Vivencio B.
Villagracia occupied parcel of land. By 2002, Vivencio secured a Katibayan ng Original na Titulo
Blg P-60192 issued by the Land Registration Authority allegedly covering the same parcel of land.
It was only on October 30, 2006 when Roldan had the parcel of land surveyed, found out that
Vivencio occupied the said parcel of land. Failing to settle with Vivencio at the Barangay level,
Roldan filed an action to recover possession of the parcel land with respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court. In its decision dated June 11, 2008 respondent ruled that Roldan, as registered
owner, had the better right to possess the parcel of land. It ordered Vivencio to vacate the
property, turn it over Roldan, and pay damages as well as Attorney’s fees. A notice of writ of
execution was sent to Vivencio giving him 30 days from receipt of the notice to comply with the
decision. Meanwhile, Vivencio, filed a petition from relief from judgement with a prayer for
issuance of writ of preliminary injunction. He cited Article 155, paragraph 2 of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines and argued that Shari’a District Courts may only hear civil
actions and proceedings if both parties are Muslims. Considering that he is a Christian, hence the
respondent had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of Roldan’s Action for recovery of possession
of a parcel of land. However, respondent denied Vivecio’s petition for relief from judgement for
lack of merit. Hence this petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Shari’a District Court has jurisdiction over a real action where one of the
parties is not a Muslim
2. Whether or not proceedeings before respondent Shari’a District Court were valid since the
latter acquired jurisdiction over the person of Vivencio
Ruling:

1. When ownership is acquired over a particular property, the owner has the right to possess
and enjoy it.If the owner is dispossessed of his or her property, he or she has a right of
action to recover its possession from the dispossessor. When the property involved is
real, such as land, the action to recover it is a real action;otherwise, the action is a personal
action.In such actions, the parties involved must be Muslims for Shari’a District Courts to
validly take cognizance of them.

In this case, the allegations in Roldan’s petition for recovery of possession did not state
that Vivencio is a Muslim. When Vivencio stated in his petition for relief from judgment that
he is not a Muslim, Roldan did not dispute this claim. When it became apparent that
Vivencio is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court should have motu proprio
dismissed the case. Under Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, if it appears that the
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action based on the pleadings or
the evidence on record, the court shall dismiss the claim.

2. Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no authority under the law to decide Roldan’s
action because not all of the parties involved in the action are Muslims. Thus, it had no
jurisdiction over Roldan’s action for recovery of possession. Under Article 175 of the
Muslim Code, customary contracts are construed in accordance with Muslim law.Hence,
Shari’a District Courts apply Muslim law when resolving real actions arising from
customary contracts. In real actions not arising from contracts customary to Muslims, there
is no reason for Shari’a District Courts to apply Muslim law. In such real actions, Shari’a
District Courts will necessarily apply the laws of general application, which in this case is
the Civil Code of the Philippines, regardless of the court taking cognizance of the action.
This is the reason why the original jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts over real actions
not arising from customary contracts is concurrent with that of regular courts.
Case No. 19 Tomawis vs Balindong GR No. 182434 March 5, 2010

Facts:
Respondents Amma A. Pumbaya, Jaliliah A. Mangompia, and Ramila A. Musor, filed with
the Shari’a District Courts (SDCs) an action for quieting a title of a parcel of land in Banggolo,
Marawi City against petitioner Sultan Jerry Tomawis. Respondents allege that they are the
absolute owners of the land, being the legal heirs of Acraman Radia. Tomawis debunked the
sisters’ claims and raised a motion to dismiss SDCs lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case. As argued that, the regular civil court have jurisdiction over the said case and not the
SDC.
Issue:
 Whether or not the Shari’a District Courts has jurisdiction over the action for quieting the
title of a parcel of land.
Ruling:
Petitioners claim has no basis. The allegations, as well as the relief sought by private
respondents, the elimination of the cloud of doubts on the title of ownership on the subject land,
are within the SDCs jurisdiction to grant. PD 1083 created the Shari’a Courts, classified as
regular courts, in which Art 143 of PD 1083 vests in certain cases exclusive original
jurisdiction over certain causes of action. Subsequently BP 129, later amended by RA
7691, took effect which vests the RTC or the MTC exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil
actions that involve the title or possession of real property. BP 129 was enacted to
reorganize only existing civil courts and is a law of general application to the judiciary. In
contrast, PD 1083 is a special law that only applies to Sharia courts.
It was held that a general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in pari
materia and should be read together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect to
both. In the instant case, it applies the principle generalia specialibus non derogant. A general law
does not nullify a special law. The general law will yield to the special law in the specific and
particular subject embraced in the latter. BP 129 and PD 1083 must be read and construed
together, then by taking PD 1083 as an exception to the general law to reconcile the two laws.
This is so since the legislature has not made any express repeal or modification of PD 1083, and
it is well-settled that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. Implied repeals will not be
declared unless the intent of the legislators is manifest. Laws are assumed to be passed only
after careful deliberation and with knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, and it follows that
the legislature did not intend to interfere with or abrogate a former law relating to the same subject
matter
SDC has exclusive original jurisdiction over all actions arising from contracts customary
to Muslims to the exclusion of the RTCs, as the exception under PD 1083, while both courts have
concurrent original jurisdiction over all other personal actions.
Case No. 20 Kabigting vs Acting Director of Prisons GR No. L-1554 October 30, 1962

Facts:

Petitioner Jose Kabigting for the third time filed a petition for Habeas Corpus. Since
January 5, 1938 he has been serving prison terms by virtue of final judgments of conviction in
nineteen criminal cases. His first two petitions were denied. On his third petition for Habeas
Corpus, petitioner alleges that he had overserved the total period of his prison terms. Respondent
Director of Prisons opposed this petition. On April 23, 1959 the court a quo rendered its decision
and held that petitioner had already served more than the maximum period of his prison terms
and consequently ordered the Director of Prisons to release him from custody "unless held on
charges other than those mentioned and covered in this Proceeding”. The Solicitor General,
representing the Director of Prisons, filed a notice of appeal from the decision and an urgent
motion for the re-arrest of petitioner. The Court of First Instance of Rizal Judge Felix Domingo
presiding, gave due course to the appeal and ordered petitioner's re-arrest, but allowed him to
post a bail bond in the amount of P5,000.00 for his temporary liberty pending appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent's appeal has been properly taken, considering first the time
element and secondly the fact that petitioner had already been released, which release, he now
contends, rendered the decision appealed from final and executor.

Ruling:

Yes, the respondent’s appeal was properly taken. The respondent, thru the office of the
Solicitor General, received a copy of the decision at 12:25 in the afternoon of Saturday, April 25,
1959, and since the next day, being Sunday, was not be included in the computation of the 24-
hour period, the appeal interposed by respondent at 9:45 in the morning of the following Monday,
April 271959, was timely.

With respect to the release of the petitioner, which was carried out by the Superintendent
of the Bureau of Prisons in Manila, in whose office petitioner was then detailed, there can be no
doubt that the same was premature and contrary to law, for according to section 20 of Rule 41,"a
judgment remanding the person detained to the custody of the officer or person detaining him
shall not be stayed by appeal (but) a judgment releasing the person detained shall not be effective
until the officer or person detaining has been given opportunity to appeal; (and) an appeal taken
by such officer or person shall stay the order of release unless the person detained shall furnish
a satisfactory bond in an amount fixed by the court or judge rendering the judgment."
Case No. 21 Bagabuyo v. COMELEC GR No. 176970 December 8, 2008
FACTS:
On October 10, 2006, Cagayan de Oro’s then Congressman Constantino G. Jaraula filed
House Bill House Bill No. 5859: An Act Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone Legislative
District of the City of Cagayan De Oro. This law eventually became Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9371.
For the election of May 2007, CDO’s voters would be classified as belonging to either the first or
the second district, depending on their place of residence. On March 13, 2007, COMELEC
promulgated Resolution No. 7837 implementing R.A. 9371. On March 27, 2007, Petitioner
Bagabuyo filed a petition against the COMELEC asking for the nullification of R.A. 9371 and
Resolution No. 7837. Bagabuyo argued that the COMELEC cannot implement said law
without providing for the rules, regulations and guidelines for the conduct of a plebiscite
which is indispensible for the division of a local governmental unit.
ISSUE:

 WON R.A. No. 9371 merely provides for the legislative reapportionment of Cagayan de
Oro City, or does it involve the division and conversion of a local government unit
RULING:
Yes, it provides only for legislative reapportionment. Legislative apportionment, as defined by
Black’s Law Dictionary, is the allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the
population of a State, county or other subdivision to equalize population and voting power among
districts. Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or change in the legislative
districts brought about by changes in the population and mandated by the constitutional
requirement of equality of representation.
Under both Sec. 5, Article VI and Section 10 , Article X of the 1987 Constitution, the
Legislature is entitled to (1) make an apportionment and reapportionment of legislative districts
and (2) create, divide, merge, abolish local government units and alter boundaries of local
governments, respectively. However, the distinction between Sec. 5, Article VI and Section 10 is
on the requirement of a plebiscite. The LATTER requires a plebiscite while the FORMER does
not.
Legislative districts are mere political units. They have no legal personality that can be
created or dissolved and have no capacity to act. They merely delineate the areas occupied by
the people who will choose a representative in their national affairs. Thus, a plebiscite is not
required.
Local government units, on the other hand, are political and corporate units. They are an
instrument of the state in carrying the functions of the government and an agency of the
community in the administration of local affairs. In light of said roles, the Constitution saw it fit to
expressly to secure the consent of the people through a plebiscite. However, in the case at bar,
R.A. 9371 increases the legislative district of Cagayan de Oro through legislative
reapportionment. Thus, Cagayan de Oro’s territory remains completely whole and intact; there is
only an addition of another legislative district.
Case No. 22 Hicoblino M. Catly (Deceased), Substituted By His Wife, Lourdes A. Catly Vs.
William Navarro, Et. Al., And Ayala Land, Inc. GR No. 167239 May 5, 2010
FACTS:
Respondents Navarro, et. al. filed a Complaint against Las Piñas Ventures, Inc., was
substituted by Ayala Land Inc. (ALI) because of merger, for annulment of TCT No. T-5332 and
recovery of possession with damages. Respondents were represented by petitioner Atty. Catly,
now deceased and substituted in this case by his wife, Lourdes Catly. Later on, Respondents
Navarro, et.al., and ALI executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), expressing their desire
toward an amicable settlement. Petitioner later on filed a Manifestation and Motion alleging that
should there be an amicable settlement of the case, his attorney’s fees should be awarded in full
as stipulation in the Contract for Legal and Other Valuable Services. Hence, petitioner,
respondents Navarro et. al., and ALI executed an Amendatory Agreement incorporating the
provision that, in addition to the ten million attorney’s fees as previously agreed upon, petitioner
would also be entitled to the amount of twenty million pesos as additional attorney’s fees.
ISSUE:

 Whether or not the attorney’s fees are reasonable.

RULING:
According to the SC, the high standards of the legal profession as prescribed by law and the
Canons of Professional Ethics regulate if not limit the lawyer’s freedom in fixing his professional
fees. The moment he takes his oath, ready to undertake his duties first, as a practitioner in the
exercise of his profession, and second, as an officer of the court in the administration of justice,
the lawyer submits himself to the authority of the court. It becomes axiomatic therefore, that
power to determine the reasonableness or the unconscionable character of attorney's fees
stipulated by the parties is a matter falling within the regulatory prerogative of the courts. And this
Court has consistently ruled that even with the presence of an agreement between the parties,
the court may nevertheless reduce attorney's fees though fixed in the contract when the amount
thereof appears to be unconscionable or unreasonable. For the law recognizes the validity of
stipulations included in documents such as negotiable instruments and mortgages with respect
to attorney's fees in th eform of penalty provided that they are not unreasonable or
unconscionable.
The principle of quantum meruit (as much as he deserves) may be a basis for determining
the reasonable amount of attorney’s fees. Quantum meruit is a device to prevent undue
enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain benefit without
paying for it. It is applicable even if there was a formal written contract for attorney’s fees as long
as the agreed fee was found by the court to be unconscionable. In fixing a reasonable
compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit, factors such
as the time spent, and extent of services rendered; novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
importance of the subject matter; skill demanded; probability of losing other employment as a
result of acceptance of the preferred case; customary charges for similar services; amount
involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client; certainty of compensation;
character of employment; and professional standing of the lawyer, may be considered. Indubitably
entwined with a lawyer’s duty to charge only reasonable fee is the power of the Court to reduce
the amount of attorney’s fees if the same is excessive and unconscionable in relation to Sec. 24,
Rule 138 of the Rules. Attorney’s fees are unconscionable if they affront ones sense of justice,
decency or unreasonableness.
The case is remanded to the trial court which shall forthwith conduct hearings with dispatch
to resolve the issue of the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees, on quantum meruit basis.
Case No. 23 G.R. No. 183409 June 18, 2010

CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC. (CREBA), petitioner,

vs
THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, Respondent.

FACTS:
Oct 1997, Sec of DAR issued DAR A.O.1-02 entitled Omnibus Rules and Procedures
Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non Agricultural Uses. The said AO embraced all
private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced and all
untitled agricultural lands and agricultural lands reclassified by LGU into non-agricultural uses
after 15 June 1988. March 1999, Sec DAR issued Revised Rules and Regulations on Conversion
of Agricultural Lands to Non Agricultural Uses, it covers the following: (1) those to be converted
to residential, commercial, industrial, institutional and other non-agricultural purposes; (2) those
to be devoted to another type of agricultural activity such as livestock, poultry, and fishpond ─ the
effect of which is to exempt the land from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
coverage; (3) those to be converted to non-agricultural use other than that previously authorized;
and (4) those reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses on
or after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 pursuant to Section 20 of
Republic Act No. 7160 and other pertinent laws and regulations, and are to be converted to such
uses. The 2 earlier AOs was further amended by an AO issued Feb 2002 - 2002 Comprehensive
Rules on Land Use Conversion; covers all applications for conversion from agricultural to non-
agricultural uses or to another agricultural use.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the DAR secretary acted in excess of his jurisdiction and gravely abused his
discretion by issuing and enforcing [dar ao no. 01-02, as amended] which seek to regulate
reclassified lands.
2. Whether memorandum no. 88 is a valid exercise of police power.
RULING:
1. NO. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform does not fall within the ambit of a tribunal, board,
or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The issuance and enforcement by
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform of the questioned DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, an
d Memorandum No. 88 were done in the exercise of his quasi-legislative and administrati
ve functions and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In issuing the aforesaid admini
strative issuances, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform never made any adjudication of righ
ts of the parties. As such, it can never be said that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform had
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing
and enforcing DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88 for he never e
xercised any judicial or quasi-judicial functions but merely his quasi-legislative and admin
istrative functions.

2. YES. It bears emphasis that said Memorandum No. 88 was issued upon the instruction o
f the President in order to address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands fo
r real estate development because of the worsening rice shortage in the country at that ti
me. Such measure was made in order to ensure that there are enough agricultural lands
in which rice cultivation and production may be carried into. The issuance of said Memor
andum No. 88 was made pursuant to the general welfare of the public, thus, it cannot be
argued that it was made without any basis.
Case No. 24 National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms, Inc. v. Energy
Regulatory Commission and Manila Electric Company, G.R. No. 190795, July 6, 2011
Facts:
The Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) used to apply the Return on Rate Base
(RORB) method to determine the proper amount a distribution utility (DU) may charge for the
services it provides. The RORB scheme had been the method for computing allowable electricity
charges in the Philippines for decades, before the onset of the EPIRA. Section 43(f) of the EPIRA
allows the ERC to shift from the RORB methodology to alternative forms of internationally
accepted rate-setting methodology, subject to multiple conditions. The ERC, through a series of
resolutions, adopted the Performance-Based Regulation (PBR) method to set the allowable rates
DUs may charge their customers. Meralco, a DU, applied for an increase of its distribution rate
under the PBR scheme on 7 August 2009. Petitioners NASECORE, FOLVA, FOVA, and Engineer
Robert F. Mallillin (Mallillin) all filed their own Petitions for Intervention to oppose the application
of Meralco.
On 13 November 2009, FOLVA failed to appear despite due notice. Likewise, on 19
November 2009, petitioners NASECORE, FOVA, and FOLVA all failed to appear despite due
notice. NASECORE had sent a letter requesting that it be excused from the said hearing. The
latter objected to this request by virtue of the ERC’s Rules of Practice and Procedure. ERC ruled
that the absence of NASECORE and FOVA was deemed a waiver of their right to cross-examine
Meralco’s first witness. On 26 November 2009 hearing, NASECORE and FOLVA again failed to
attend the hearing despite due notice.
Issue:

 Whether or not petitioners’ right to due process of law was violated when the ERC issued
its Order before the expiration of the period granted to petitioners to file their comment.
Ruling:
Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is
granted, there is no denial of due process. It must not be overlooked that prior to the issuance of
the assailed Decision, petitioners were given several opportunities to attend the hearings and to
present all their pleadings and evidence in the MAP2010 case. Petitioners voluntarily failed to
appear in most of those hearings.
The opportunity granted by the ERC of, technically, allowing petitioners to finally be able
to file their comment in the case, resolves the procedural irregularity previously inflicted upon
petitioners.
We find that there has been no denial of due process and that any irregularity in the
premature issuance of the assailed Decision has been remedied by the ERC through its Order
which gave petitioners the right to participate in the hearing of the MR filed by Mallillin.
Case No. 25 Ocampo vs. Abando G.R No. 16830 February 11, 2014
FACTS:
On 26 August 2006, a mass grave was discovered by elements of the 43rd Infantry
Brigade of the Philippine Army at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte.1The
mass grave contained skeletal remains of 67 individuals believed to be victims of "Operation
Venereal Disease" (Operation VD) launched by members of the Communist Party of the
Philippines/New Peoples Army/National Democratic Front of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) to
purge their ranks of suspected military informers.
On 6 March 2007, Judge Abando issued an Order finding probable cause "in the
commission by all mentioned accused of the crime charged." He ordered the issuance of warrants
of arrest against them with no recommended bail for their temporary liberty. On 16 March 2007,
petitioner Ocampo filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the 6 March 2007 Order of Judge Abando and the
Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero.The petition prayed for the unconditional release of petitioner
Ocampo from PNP custody, as well as the issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain the conduct of further proceedings during the pendency of the
petition. Petitioner Ocampo argued that a case for rebellion against him and 44 others (including
petitioners Echanis and Baylosisand Ladlad) was then pending before the RTC Makati, Branch
150 (RTC Makati).Putting forward the political offense doctrine, petitioner Ocampo argues that
common crimes, such as murder in this case, are already absorbed by the crime of rebellion when
committed as a necessary means, in connection with and in furtherance of rebellion. Judge
Abando issued an Order denying the motion.
ISSUES:
1. Were petitioners denied due process during preliminary investigation and in the issuance
of the warrant of arrest?
2. Should the murder charges against petitioners be dismissed under the political offense
doctrine?
RULING:
Petitioners were accorded due process during preliminary investigation and in the
issuance of the warrants of arrest. A preliminary investigation is "not a casual affair." It is
conducted to protect the innocent from the embarrassment, expense and anxiety of a public trial.
While the right to have a preliminary investigation before trial is statutory rather than constitutional,
it is a substantive right and a component of due process in the administration of criminal justice.
In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right to due process of law entails the
opportunity to be heard. It serves to accord an opportunity for the presentation of the respondent's
side with regard to the accusation. Afterwards, the investigating officer shall decide whether the
allegations and defenses lead to a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed, and that it
was the respondent who committed it. Otherwise, the investigating officer is bound to dismiss the
complaint. "The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit
evidence in support of one's defense." What is proscribed is lack of opportunity to be heard. Thus,
one who has been afforded a chance to present one's own side of the story cannot claim denial
of due process
Under the political offense doctrine, "common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a
political offense, are divested of their character as "common" offenses and assume the political
complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be
punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the
imposition of a graver penalty."
Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the crime of
rebellion.Thus, when a killing is committed in furtherance of rebellion, the killing is not homicide
or murder. Rather, the killing assumes the political complexion of rebellion as its mere ingredient
and must be prosecuted and punished as rebellion alone.But when the political offense doctrine
is asserted as a defense in the trial court, it becomes crucial for the court to determine whether
the act of killing was done in furtherance of a political end, and for the political motive of the act
to be conclusively demonstrated.
Case No. 26 Lim v. Executive Secretary G.R. No. 151445 April 11, 2002
FACTS:
Beginning 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States started arriving in
Mindanao, to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in “Balikatan 02-1”. In theory,
they are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral
defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951.

On Feb. 2002, Lim filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, praying that respondents
be restrained from proceeding with the so-called “Balikatan 02-1”, and that after due notice and
hearing, judgment be rendered issuing a permanent writ of injuction and/or prohibition against the
deployment of US troops in Basilan and Mindanao for being illegal and in violation of the
Constitution. They were subsequently joined by SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA,
both party-list organizations, who filed a petition-in-intervention. Lim and Ersando filed suits in
their capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers. SANLAKAS and PARTIDO on the other hand,
claimed that certain members of their organization are residents of Zamboanga and Sulu, and
hence will be directly affected by the operations being conducted in Mindanao.

The petitioners alleged that “Balikatan-02-1” is not covered by the Mutual Defense Treaty
(MDT) between the Philippines and the United States. Petitioners posited that the MDT only
provides mutual military assistance in accordance with the “constitutional processes” of each
country only in the case of an armed attack by an external aggressor, meaning a third country,
against one of them. They further argued that it cannot be said that the Abu Sayyaf in Basilan
constitutes an external aggressor to warrant US military assistance in accordance with MDT of
1951. Another contention was that the VFA of 1999 does not authorize American soldiers to
engage in combat operations in Philippine territory.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the “Balikatan-02-1” inconsistent with the Philippine Constitution?
RULING:
Petition is dismissed. The VFA itself permits US personnel to engage on an impermanent
basis, in “activities”, the exact meaning of which is left undefined. The sole encumbrance placed
on its definition is couched in the negative, in that the US personnel “must abstain from any activity
inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political activity.”

The MDT is the core of the defense relationship between the Philippines and the US and
it is the VFA which gives continued relevance to it. Moreover, it is the VFA that gave legitimacy to
the current Balikatan exercise. The constitution leaves us no doubt that US Forces are prohibited
from engaging war on Philippine territory. This limitation is explicitly provided for in the Terms of
Reference of the Balikatan exercise. The issues that were raised by the petitioners was only
based on fear of future violation of the Terms of Reference.

Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It is
only logical to assume that “Balikatan 02-1” – a mutual anti-terrorism advising, assisting, and
training exercise falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of the
agreement. Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the
conclusion that combat-related activities – as opposed to combat itself – such as the one subject
of the instant petition, are indeed authorized.
Case No. 27 Elma V. Presidential Commission On Good Government
G.R. No. 155996 June 27, 2012
FACTS:
There were several letters showing that there exists agreement between PCGG and
respondent Jacobi entitling the latter of incentive percentage for efforts in recovering ill-gotten
wealth of the Marcoses. Respondent Jacobi filed before the Sandiganbayan thru his counsel Atty.
Reyes, a petition for mandamus, prohibition and certiorari (with prayer for injunction) against
PCGG for allegedly re-hiring two “trojan horse” consultants preventing the enforcement of claims
against the Marcoses. Another similar thrust was filed before the Ombudsman against PCGG in
violation of R.A. No. 3019, with a later manifestation of withdrawing a letter because Jacobi is
allegedly part of said letter. PCGG claimed that said that the letter is a falsified document there
being nothing on their records that such ever existed. PCGG through Chairman Elma filed before
the DOJ criminal complaint under Art.171 par.2 and Art. 172 pars.1 and 3 of RPC against
respondents. No summons were issued to respondents. DOJ found no probable cause on the
complaint and the case was dismissed.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to question the DOJ’s
determination of probable cause.
2. Whether the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion.
RULING:
1. On the first issue, no. The respondents are mistaken in their claim that petition for review
under Rule 43 is the proper remedy. By weighing the evidence submitted by the parties in
a preliminary investigation and by making an independent assessment thereof, an
investigating prosecutor is, to that extent, performing functions of a quasi-judicial nature
in the conduct of a preliminary investigation. However, since he does not make a
determination of the rights of any party in the proceeding, or pronounce the respondent’s
guilt or innocence (thus limiting his action to the determination of probable cause to file an
information in court), an investigating prosecutor’s function still lacks the element of
adjudication essential to an appeal under Rule 43. As an extraordinary remedy, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court does not require that summons be issued to the respondent; the
service upon him of an order to file its Comment or Memorandum is sufficient. But it is
required that this be filed before the Court of Appeals and not directly to SC under the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts. SC’s original jurisdiction may be allowed only if there are
special and important reasons clearly and specifically set out in the petition or where
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling
for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.

2. No. The ruling on Jacobi’s second MR and on Atty. Reyes’ first MR cannot be appreciated
as grave abuse of discretion. While it seemingly violated established rules of procedure,
it provided ample justification therefore the avoidance of possibility of two conflicting
rulings on two motions treating of the same inseparable subject matter. The existence of
several letters and reports made by the respondents to the PCGG, shows that the PCGG
was at least aware of the respondents’ efforts to assist in the recovery efforts of the
government, in general, and of the PCGG, in particular. Therefore, forging a letter that
would simply be evidence of an implied agreement for those services hardly makes any
sense. Considering the inapplicability of the presumption of authorship and the dearth of
evidence to support the allegation of conspiracy, much less of evidence directly imputing
the forgery of the De Guzman letter to Jacobi, SC found no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the DOJ in absolving respondent Jacobi.
Case No. 28 SPOUSES CHUA v. ANG G.R. No. 156164 September 4, 2009

FACTS:

On February 11, 1999, the petitioners (as buyers) and Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. (FEPI,
as developers) executed a Contract to Sell a condominium unit. Despite the lapse of three (3)
years, FEPI failed to construct and deliver the contracted condominium unit to the petitioners. As
a result, the petitioners filed on September 3, 2002 a Complaint-Affidavit before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Pasig City accusing the private respondents, as officers and directors of FEPI,
of violating P.D. No. 957, specifically its Sections 17 and 20, in relation with Section 39.
The petitioners alleged that the private respondents did not construct and failed to deliver
the contracted condominium unit to them and did not register the Contract to Sell with the Register
of Deeds. Of the seven (7) private respondents, only private respondent Alice Odchique-Bondoc
filed a Counter-Affidavit.5 She countered that the City Prosecutor has no jurisdiction over the case
since it falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB). Chua vs. Ang, 598 SCRA 229, G.R. No. 156164 September 4, 2009. The petitioners
argue that jurisdiction to entertain criminal complaints is lodged with the city prosecutor and that
the jurisdiction of the HLURB under P.D. No. 957 is limited to the enforcement of contractual
rights, not the investigation of criminal complaints. Chua vs. Ang, 598 SCRA 229, G.R. No.
156164 September 4, 2009.
In their Comment, the private respondents submit that the petition should be dismissed
outright because the petitioners failed to avail of other remedies provided by law, such as (a) the
filing of a motion for reconsideration with the City Prosecutor of Pasig City, (b) the filing of a
petition for review with the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ), (c) the filing of a motion
for reconsideration of any judgment rendered by the DOJ, or (d) the filing of an appeal or a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA); that even if certiorari is a proper remedy, the petition
was filed in violation of the hierarchy of courts; and that even on the merits, the petition must fail
since the public respondents correctly dismissed the complaint as a reasonable interpretation of
P.D. No. 957 which requires a prior determination by the HLURB that a corporation violated P.D.
No. 957 before criminal charges may be filed against its corporate officers.
In their Reply, the petitioners reiterate that the public respondents abdicated their authority
to conduct a preliminary investigation and to indict the private respondents for criminal violations
of P.D. No. 957 when they dismissed the criminal complaint for being premature.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the petitioners are fied their criminal complaint in the right jurisdiction of
the HLURB and with the city prosecutor
RULING:
Petition was found meritorious. At the outset, we note that the petitioners indeed filed the
present petition for certiorari without prior recourse to other available remedies provided by law
and the observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts. Nonetheless, the rules on prior recourse to
these available remedies are not without exceptions, nor is the observance of the judicial
hierarchy of courts an inflexible rule; the peculiarity, uniqueness and unusual character of the
factual and circumstantial settings of a case may allow the flexible application of these established
legal principles to achieve fair and speedy dispensation of justice.
In the present case, the petitioners have expressly chosen to pursue the criminal
prosecution as their remedy but the prosecutor dismissed their complaint. The prosecutor’s
dismissal for prematurity was apparently on the view that an administrative finding of violation
must first be obtained before recourse can be made to criminal prosecution. The need for a final
administrative determination in unfair labor practice cases, however, is a matter expressly
required by law. Where the law is silent on this matter, as in this case, the fundamental principle—
that administrative cases are independent from criminal actions—fully applies, subject only to the
rules on forum shopping under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. In the present case, forum
shopping is not even a matter for consideration since the petitioners have chosen to pursue only
one remedy—criminal prosecution. Thus, we see no bar to their immediate recourse to criminal
prosecution by filing the appropriate complaint before the prosecutor’s office.
Case No. 29 G.R. No. 175910 July 30, 2009
Atty. Rogelio E. Sarsaba VS Fe Vda. De Te, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, Faustino
Castañeda

Facts:

On February 14, 1995, a Decision was rendered by NLRC finding Patricio Sereno to have
been illegally dismissed and ordering Teodoro Gasing to pay him his monetary claims. After the
Writ of Execution was returned unsatisfied, Labor Arbiter Newton R. Sancho issued an Alias Writ
of Execution on June 10, 1996, directing Fulgencio R. Lavarez, Sheriff II of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), to satisfy the judgment award. On July 23, 1996, Lavarez,
accompanied by Sereno and his counsel, petitioner Atty. Rogelio E. Sarsaba, levied a Fuso Truck,
which at that time was in the possession of Gasing. On July 30, 1996, the truck was sold at public
auction, with Sereno appearing as the highest bidder. Meanwhile, respondent Fe Vda. de Te,
represented by her attorney-in-fact, Faustino Castañeda, filed with the RTC, a Complaint for
recovery of motor vehicle, damages with prayer for the delivery of the truck.

Issues:

 W/N the RTC should have dismissed the complaint against all the defendants and that the
same should be filed against petitioner’s estate, since Sereno died before summons was
served on him.
 W/N respondent's attorney-in-fact, Faustino Castañeda, be discharged as he has no more
legal personality to sue on behalf of Fe Vda. de Te, who passed away on April 12, 2005,
during the pendency of the case before the RTC

Ruling:

 The Court ruled that only the case against Patricio Sereno will be dismissed and the same
may be filed as a claim against the estate of Patricio Sereno, but the case with respect to
the three (3) other accused will proceed. As correctly pointed by defendants, the
Honorable Court has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of Patricio Sereno since
there was indeed no valid service of summons insofar as Patricio Sereno is concerned.
Patricio Sereno died before the summons, together with a copy of the complaint and its
annexes, could be served upon him. However, the failure to effect service of summons
unto Patricio Sereno, one of the defendants herein does not render the action
DISMISSIBLE, considering that the three (3) other defendants, namely, Atty. Rogelio E.
Sarsaba, Fulgencio Lavares and the NLRC, were validly served with summons and the
case with respect to the answering defendants may still proceed independently.

 The Court ruled that Faustino Castañeda has legal personality to sue in behalf of the
plantiff. While it may be true as alleged by defendants that with the death of Plaintiff, Fe
Vda. de Te, the Special Power of Attorney she executed empowering the Attorney-in-fact,
Faustino Castañeda to sue in her behalf has been rendered functus officio, however, this
Court believes that the Attorney-in-fact had not lost his personality to prosecute this case.
It bears stressing that when this case was initiated/filed by the Attorney-in-fact, the plaintiff
was still very much alive. Records reveal that the Attorney-in-fact has testified long before
in behalf of the said plaintiff and more particularly during the state when the plaintiff was
vehemently opposing the dismissal of the complainant. Subsequently thereto, he even
offered documentary evidence in support of the complaint, and this court admitted the
same. When this case was initiated, jurisdiction was vested upon this Court to try and hear
the same to the end. Well-settled is the rule to the point of being elementary that once
jurisdiction is acquired by this Court, it attaches until the case is decided.
Case No. 30 G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

The Diocese of Bacolod, represented by the most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra and the
Bishop himself in his personal capacity

VS

COMELEC and the Election Officer of Bacolod City, Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon

Facts:

On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound
housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′)
by ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view.
The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health
Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case.
This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH)
Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral
candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354,
otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by
petitioners as comprising “Team Patay” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay”.
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate.
Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names of candidates for the 2013 elections,
but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that
election.

Issues:

1. W/N the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a political question,
hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s power of review.
2. W/N the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-neutral regulation.
3. W/N the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.

Ruling:

1. The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence or
modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted upon by this court through the
expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution. The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the
act of a constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right.
Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the
manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the
fundamental right to expression.
2. Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on the subject matter
of the utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls
merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech. The
Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content is
not easily divorced from the size of its medium. Content-based regulation bears a heavy
presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the clear and present danger rule as
measure.
3. The Court ruled in the negative. The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by
petitioners are not binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the
Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its
members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of
candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with
political consequences and not religious speech.
Case No. 31 G.R. No. 169461 September 2, 2013

First Gas Power Corporation

VS

Republic of the Philippines, Represented by the Office of the Solicitor General

Facts:

Through a Petition dated April 17, 1998 filed before the RTC, petitioner sought for the
original registration of two parcels of land situated at Brgy. Sta. Rita, Batangas City. No oppositor
appeared during the said hearing except Prosecutor Amelia Panganiban who appeared in behalf
of the Office of the Solicitor General (respondent). Consequently, the RTC issued the
corresponding Order of Special Default and the reception of evidence was delegated to the
Branch Clerk of Court. For land registration purposes, the subject lots were both investigated and
inspected separately by Special Land Investigators of DENR CENRO of Batangas City. Based on
their findings, the subject lots are within the alienable and disposable zone under project no. 13,
lc map no. 718 issued on March 16, 1928. It is stated that the subject lots are not portion of/nor
identical to any approved isolated survey. During the reception of evidence, the government,
through respondent, was given the opportunity to examine the authenticity of the documents
presented by petitioner in support of its application for land registration as well as cross-examine
the latter’s witnesses. Without any objection from the former, all exhibits offered by petitioner were
admitted by the RTC. Meanwhile, respondent did not present any evidence to contradict
petitioner’s application.

Issue:

 W/N the CA erred in annulling and setting aside the RTC Decision and Amended Order
as well as the final decree of registration issued in favor of petitioner over the subject lots.

Ruling:

The petition is bereft of merit. It is a long-standing rule that an applicant who seeks to have
a land registered in his name has the burden of proving that he is its owner in fee simple, even
though there is no opposition thereto.

Records disclose that petitioner itself manifested during the proceedings before the RTC
that there subsists a decision in a previous cadastral case, i.e., Cad. Case No. 37, which covers
the same lots it applied for registration. Petitioner even posits in the present petition that it was
apprised of the existence of the foregoing decision even before the rendition of the RTC Decision
and Amended Order through the LRA Report dated as early as November 24, 1998 which, as
above-quoted, states that the subject lots "were previously applied for registration of title in the
[c]adastral proceedings and were both decided under [Cad. Case No. 37, GLRO Record No.
1969, and are subject to the following annotation x x x: ‘Lots 1298 (45-1) [and] 1315 (61-1) Pte.
Nueva doc.’" Since it had been duly notified of an existing decision which binds over the subject
lots, it was incumbent upon petitioner to prove that the said decision would not affect its claimed
status as owner of the subject lots in fee simple.

To note, the fact that the RTC did not order petitioner to address the matter or that it did
not properly determine the effects of the existing decision to petitioner’s application does not
justify the latter’s entitlement to have the subject lots registered in its name. Neither can the
recommendation of the LRA to have the case set aside be perceived as an ample justification for
the RTC’s dispositions since this action is precluded by the doctrine of judicial stability as will be
discussed below. These missteps just magnify the patent and gross errors of the RTC in these
proceedings.
Case No. 32 G.R. No. 175303 April 11, 2012

Pacific Ace Finance Ltd. (Pafin) VS Eiji Yanagisawa

Facts:

Respondent Eiji Yanagisawa (Eiji), a Japanese national, and Evelyn F. Castañeda

(Evelyn), a Filipina, contracted marriage on July 12, 1989 in the City Hall of Manila. On August
23, 1995, Evelyn purchased a townhouse unit located at Bo. Sto. Niño, Parañaque, Metro Manila.
The Registry of Deeds for Parañaque issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 99791 to
"Evelyn P. Castañeda, Filipino, married to Ejie Yanagisawa, Japanese citizen [,] both of legal
age."

In 1996, Eiji filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Evelyn on
the ground of bigamy (nullity of marriage case). During the pendency of the case, Eiji asked that
Evelyn be enjoined from disposing or encumbering all of the properties registered in her name.
At the hearing on the said motion, Evelyn and her lawyer voluntarily undertook not to dispose of
the properties registered in her name during the pendency of the case, thus rendering Eiji’s
application and motion moot.

Sometime in March 1997, Evelyn obtained a loan of ₱500,000.00 from petitioner Pacific
Ace Finance Ltd. (PAFIN). To secure the loan, Evelyn executed on August 25, 1998 a real estate
mortgage (REM) in favor of PAFIN over the Parañaque townhouse unit. The instrument was
submitted to the Register of Deeds of Parañaque City for annotation on the same date. At the
time of the mortgage, Eiji’s appeal in the nullity of marriage case was pending before the CA. The
Makati RTC had dissolved Eiji and Evelyn’s marriage, and had ordered the liquidation of their
registered properties, including the Parañaque townhouse unit, with its proceeds to be divided
between the parties. The Decision of the Makati RTC did not lift or dissolve its October 2, 1996
Order on Evelyn’s commitment not to dispose of or encumber the properties registered in her
name.

Issue:

 W/N Parañaque RTC can rule on the issue of ownership, even as the same issue was
already ruled upon by the Makati RTC and is pending appeal in the CA.

Ruling:

The Court ruled in the negative. The issue of ownership and liquidation of properties
acquired during the cohabitation of Eiji and Evelyn has been submitted for the resolution of the
Makati RTC, and is pending appeal before the CA. The doctrine of judicial stability or non-
interference dictates that the assumption by the Makati RTC over the issue operates as an
"insurmountable barrier" to the subsequent assumption by the Parañaque RTC. By insisting on
ruling on the same issue, the Parañaque RTC effectively interfered with the Makati RTC’s
resolution of the issue and created the possibility of conflicting decisions.

Petitioner maintains that it was imperative for the Parañaque RTC to rule on the ownership
issue because it was essential for the determination of the validity of the REM. The Court
disagrees. A review of the complaint shows that Eiji did not claim ownership of the Parañaque
townhouse unit or his right to consent to the REM as his bases for seeking its annulment. Instead,
Eiji invoked his right to rely on Evelyn’s commitment not to dispose of or encumber the property
(as confirmed in the October 2, 1996 Order of the Makati RTC), and the annotation of the said
commitment on TCT No. 99791. It was Evelyn and PAFIN that raised Eiji’s incapacity to own real
property as their defense to the suit. They maintained that Eiji, as an alien incapacitated to own
real estate in the Philippines, need not consent to the REM contract for its validity. But this
argument is beside the point and is not a proper defense to the right asserted by Eiji. This defense
does not negate Eiji’s right to rely on the October 2, 1996 Order of the Makati RTC and to hold
third persons, who deal with the registered property, to the annotations entered on the title.
Case No. 33 Cabili v. Balindog A.M. No. RJT-10-2225 September 6, 2011

Facts:
Civil Case No. 06-2954 is an action for damages in Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC
against the Mindanao State University (MSU), et al., arising from a vehicular accident that caused
the death of Jesus Ledesma and physical injuries to several others. On November 29, 1997, the
Iligan City RTC rendered a Decision, holding the MSU liable for damages amounting to
P2,726,189.90. The CA affirmed the Iligan City RTC decision and upon lapse of finality, on
January 19, 2009, Entry of Judgment was made. On March 10, 2009, the Iligan City RTC issued
a writ of execution. The MSU, however, failed to comply with the writ; thus, on March 24, 2009,
Sheriff Gerard Peter Gaje served a Notice of Garnishment on the MSUs depository bank, the
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), Marawi City Branch.
The OSG opposed the motion for execution. The Iligan City RTC denied the opposition in
its March 31, 2009 Order. The MSU responded to the denial by filing on April 1, 2009 a petition
with the Marawi City RTC, for prohibition and mandamus with an application for the issuance of
a TRO and/or preliminary injunction against the LBP and Sheriff Gaje. The petition of MSU was
raffled to the RTC, Marawi City, Branch 8, presided by respondent Judge. After hearing, the
respondent Judge issued a TRO restraining Sheriff Gaje from garnishing P2,726,189.90 from
MSUs LBP-Marawi City Branch account.
On May 8, 2009, complainant Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili, counsel of the private plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 06-2954, filed the complaint charging the respondent Judge with Gross Ignorance
of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority, Abuse of Discretion, and/or Grave Misconduct Prejudicial
to the Interest of the Judicial Service for interfering with the order of a co-equal court, Branch 6 of
the Iligan City RTC, by issuing the TRO to enjoin Sheriff Gaje from garnishing P2,726,189.90 from
MSUs LBP-Marawi City Branch account.
Issue:

 Whether or not Judge Balindog of RTC Branch 8 acted with gross ignorance of the law
when he issued the TRO
Ruling:
The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of
a co-equal court is an elementary principle in the administration of justice: no court can interfere
by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the
power to grant the relief sought by the injunction. The rationale for the rule is founded on the
concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment
therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its
execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of
ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment.
In the present case, the respondent Judge clearly ignored the principle of judicial stability
by issuing a TRO to temporarily restrain Sheriff Gaje from enforcing the writ of execution issued
by a co-equal court, Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC, and from pursuing the garnishment of the
amount of P2,726,189.90 from MSUs account with the LBP, Marawi City Branch.
Case No. 34 The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee v. Pimentel Jr.
G.R. No. 136760 July 28, 2003

Facts:
This case had its aegis when the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee conducted an inquiry
into the alleged mismanagement of the funds and investment of the Armed Forces Retirement
and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS). During the public hearings by the Blue Ribbon
Committee, it appeared that the AFP-RSBS purchased a lot from Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano worth
P10,500 per square meter. However, the deed of sale filed with the Register of Deeds indicated
that the purchase price of the lot was only P3,000 per square meter. The Committee caused the
service of a subpoena to Atty. Flaviano, directing him to appear and testify before it. Respondent
refused to appear and filed a petition for prohibition and preliminary injunction with prayer for
temporary restraining order with the RTC of General Santos City. The trial court issued a TRO
directing the committee to cease and desist from proceeding with the inquiry. The Committee filed
a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a valid cause of action.
The Trial Court denied the motion to dismiss. Hence, this petition for certiorari alleging that Judge
Majaducon committed grave abuse of discretion and acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
Issue:

 Whether or not respondent Judge Jose Majaducon committed grave abuse of discretion
when he dismissed the petition for prohibition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction.
Ruling:
The assailed resolution of respondent Judge Majaducon was issued without legal basis.
The principle of separation of powers essentially means that legislation belongs to Congress,
execution to the Executive, and settlement of legal controversies to the Judiciary. Each is
prevented from invading the domain of the others. When the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
served subpoena on respondent Flaviano to appear and testify before it in connection with its
investigation of the alleged misuse and mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds, it did so
pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly provided in Article
6, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution:
The Senate of the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
Hence, the RTC of General Santos City, or any court for that matter, had no authority to
prohibit the Committee from requiring respondentt appear and testify before it.
Case No. 35 G.R. No. L-37878 November 25, 1932
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. PASAY TRANSPORTATION COMPANY,
INC., ET AL.,
Facts:
Act No. 1446 was passed. Section 11 of the Act provides: "Whenever any franchise or
right of way is granted to any other person or corporation, now or hereafter in existence, over
portions of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein, the terms on which said other person or
corporation shall use such right of way, and the compensation to be paid to the grantee herein by
such other person or corporation for said use, shall be fixed by the members of the Supreme
Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final."
Pursuant to said Act, Meralco filed a petition requesting the members of the Supreme
Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which certain transportation
companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the Manila Electric Company and the
compensation to be paid to the Manila Electric Company by such transportation companies.
Copies of the petition were directed to be sent to transportation companies affected by the
petition. Opposition was entered to the petition by a number of public utility operators.
Issue:
Whether or not the members of the Supreme Court sit as arbitrators and fix the terms and
compensation as is asked of them in this case?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power
in our government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme
Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction
usurpations by any other department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own
sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it. The Supreme Court
and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust
or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions.
Section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a
democratic government constitutionally established, and that it would be improper and illegal for
the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of
whom shall be final, to act on the petition of the Manila Electric Company.
Case No. 36 FERNANDO LOPEZ vs. GERARDO ROXAS and PET
G.R. No. L-25716 July 28, 1966

FACTS:
Petitioner Fernando Lopez and respondent Gerardo Roxas were candidates for the
position of Vice-President of the Philippines in the general elections held on November 9,
1965. Petitioner Fernando was later proclaimed to the latter office with 3,531,550 votes, or a
plurality of 26,724 votes over his closest opponent, respondent Gerardo M. Roxas, in whose favor
3,504,826 votes had been tallied, according to said resolution. On January 5, 1966, respondent
filed, with the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, Election Protest No. 2, contesting the election of
petitioner herein as Vice-President of the Philippines, upon the ground that it was not he, but said
respondent, who had obtained the largest number of votes for said office. Petitioner Lopez
instituted in the Supreme Court the present original action, for prohibition with preliminary
injunction, against respondent Roxas, to prevent the Presidential Electoral Tribunal from hearing
and deciding the aforementioned election contest, upon the ground that Republic Act No. 1793,
creating said Tribunal, is "unconstitutional," and that, "all proceedings taken by it are a nullity
on the grounds that it was not provided in the constitution. He even furthered that it rendered
unconstitutional since the members of the tribunal are the Supreme Court justices; Congress
created another court within the SC a violation of the constitution.
ISSUE:
 WON RA 1793 is unconstitutional on the ground that election protest for president and
vice president is not provided in the constitution and that its enactment created a new
court within the SC.
RULING:
NO. Instead of indicating that Congress may not enact Republic Act No. 1793, the
aforementioned provision of the Constitution, establishing said Electoral Tribunals for Members
of Congress only, proves the exact opposite, namely: that the Constitution intended to vest
Congress with discretion to determine by law whether or not the election of a president-elect or
that of a vice-president-elect may be contested and, if Congress should decide in the
affirmative, which court of justice shall have jurisdiction to hear the contest. Republic Act No. 1793
has not created a new or separate court. It has merely conferred upon the Supreme Court
the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. Indeed, the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals and courts of first instance, are vested with original jurisdiction, as well as with appellate
jurisdiction, in consequence of which they are booth trial courts and appellate courts, without
detracting from the fact that there is only one Supreme Court, one Court of Appeals,
and one court of first instance, clothed with authority to discharged said dual functions.So, the
PET is not inferior to the SC , it is the same Court although the functions peculiar to said Tribunal
are more limited in scope than those of the SC in the exercise of its ordinary functions. Hence,
the enactment of RA no. 1793 does not entail an assumption by Congress of the power of
appointment vested by the Constitution in the President. It merely connotes the imposition of an
additional duties upon the Members of the SC.
Wherefore, the petition herein is hereby dismissed and the writs therein prayed for denied
accordingly. The aforesaid motion is, moreover, denied. With costs against the petitioner.
Case No. 37 Vera v. Avelino G.R. L-543 August 31, 1946
Facts:
Pursuant to a constitutional provision, (section 4, Article X), the Commission on Elections
submitted, last May, to the President and the Congress of the Philippines, its report on the national
elections held the preceding month, and, among other things, stated that, by reason of certain
specified acts of terrorism and violence in the Provinces of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and
Tarlac, the voting in said region did not reflect the true and free expression of the popular will.
When the Senate convened on May 25, 1946, it proceeded with the selection of its officers.
Thereafter, in the course of the session, a resolution was approved referring to the report and
ordering that, pending the termination of the protest lodged against their election, the herein
petitioners, Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero who had been included among
the sixteen candidates for senator receiving the highest number of votes, proclaimed by the
Commission on Elections shall not be sworn, nor seated, as members of that chamber.
Petitioners immediately instituted this action against their colleagues responsible for the
resolution. They pray for an order annulling it, and compelling respondents to permit them to
occupy their seats, and to exercise their senatorial prerogatives. In their pleadings, respondents
traverse the jurisdiction of this Court, and assert the validity of the Pendatun Resolution.
Issues:

 Whether or not the Court had jurisdiction over the case

 Whether or not the Senate has exceeded its powers
 Whether or not it was respondents’ legally inescapable duty to permit petitioners to take t
heir seats
 Whether or not respondents can be called to account for their votes regarding the assaile
d resolution

Ruling:
The Court has no jurisdiction over the case. Granting that the postponement of the
administration of the oath amounts to suspension of the petitioners from their office, and
conceding arguendo that such suspension is beyond the power of the respondents, who in effect
are and acted as the Philippine Senate, (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83, 88), this petition
should be denied. As was explained in the Alejandrino case, we could not order one branch, of
the Legislature to reinstate a member thereof. To do so would be to establish judicial
predominance, and to upset the classic pattern of checks and balances wisely woven into our
institutional setup.
The Senate did not exceed its powers. independently of constitutional or statutory grant,
the Senate has, under parliamentary practice, the power to inquire into the credentials of any
member and the letter's right to participate in its deliberations.
It may also be approached in the viewpoint of the Senate exercising its powers under Art
. VI, Sec.10 (3) of the 1935 Constitution to set its own rules for its proceedings, and it exercises t
his power to promulgate orders to maintain its prestige and dignity. It could be said to have done
this in this case in order to make sure that these Senators really were elected properly.
Section 12 of Commonwealth Act 725 provides that those who are elected are to come t
o Manila and assume office, but it does not imply that the House could not deny admission in the
case of disqualification.
The Constitution provides, under Art. VI, Sec. 15, that Senators and Congressmen canno
t be questioned in any other place for any speech or debate made in Congress. Therefore, the C
ourt cannot question or permit respondents to question the votes made regarding the resolution
before it.
Case No. 38 Electromat Manufacturing and Recording Corporation v. Lagunzad,
G.R. No. 172699 July 27, 2011

Facts:

The private respondent Nagkakaisang Samahan ng Manggagawa ng Electromat-Wasto (

union), a charter affiliate of the Workers Advocates for Struggle, Transformation and Organizatio
n (WASTO), applied for registration with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR). The BLR thereaft
er issued the union a Certification of Creation of Local Chapter (equivalent to the certificate of re
gistration of an independent union), pursuant to Department Order No. (D.O.) 40-03.

On October 1, 2003, the petitioner Electromat Manufacturing and Recording Corporation

(company) filed a petition for cancellation of the unions registration certificate, for the unions failu
re to comply with Article 234 of the Labor Code. On November 27, 2003, Acting Director Ciriaco
A. Lagunzad of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)-National Capital Region dism
issed the petition. In the appeal by the company, BLR Director Hans Leo J. Cacdac affirmed the
dismissal.

The company thereafter sought relief from the CA through a petition for certiorari, conten
ding that the BLR committed grave abuse of discretion. It posited that the BLR should have strict
ly adhered to the union registration requirements under the Labor Code, instead of relying on D.
O. 40-03 which it considered as an invalid amendment of the law since it reduced the requireme
nts under Article 234 of the Labor Code. It maintained that the BLR should not have granted the
unions registration through the issuance of a Certification of Creation of Local Chapter since the
union submitted only the Charter Certificate issued to it by WASTO. The CA Tenth Division ismis
sed the petition and affirmed the assailed BLR ruling. The company moved for reconsideration b
ut the same was denied by the CA.
Issues:

 Whether or not D.O. 40-03 is a valid exercise of the rule-making power of the DOLE.
Ruling:
Petition is denied for lack of merit. D.O. 40-03 is a valid exercise of the rule-making powe
r of the DOLE. The Court said that by force of law, the local or chapter of a labor federation or na
tional union becomes a legitimate labor organization upon compliance with Section 3, Rule II, Bo
ok V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code, the only requirement being the submission of th
e charter certificate to the BLR.
The local union in the present case has more than satisfied the requirements the petition
er complains about; specifically, the union has submitted: (1) copies of the ratified CBL; (2) the m
inutes of the CBLs adoption and ratification; (3) the minutes of the organizational meetings; (4) t
he names and addresses of the union officers; (5) the list of union members; (6) the list of rank-a
nd-file employees in the company; (7) a certification of non-existence of a CBA in the company; (
8) the resolution of affiliation with WASTO and the latters acceptance; and (9) their Charter Certi
ficate. These submissions were properly verified as required by the rules.
In sum, the petitioner has no factual basis for questioning the union’s registration, as eve
n the requirements for registration as an independent local have been substantially complied wit
h.
Case No. 39 Ricardo Valmonte v. Feliciano Belmonte G.R. No. 74930 February 13, 1989

Facts:
The controversy arose when petitioner Valmonte, representing himself as a lawyer, a me
mber of the media and a plain citizen, wrote respondent Belmonte, Government Service and Ins
urance System (GSIS) General Manager, a letter requesting to be furnished with the list of name
s of the opposition members of the Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan o
f P2 million each on guarranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos.
Meynardo A. Trio, Deputy General Counsel of GSIS, replied to the letter of petitioner stat
ing that in his opinion, a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borr
ow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this conf
identiality; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so or
dered by the courts, as a violation of this confidentiality may mar the image of the GSIS as a rep
utable financial institution.
On June 26 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the GSIS Deputy Gene
ral Counsel, petitioner Valmonte joined by the other petitioners, filed the instant suit.
Issues:

 Whether or not mandamus lies to compel respondent to perform the acts sought by petiti
oners to be done, in pursuance of their right to information.
 Whether or not petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans gran
ted by the GSIS.
Ruling:
Petition is hereby granted and respondent General Manager of the Government Service I
nsurance System is ordered to allow petitioners access to documents and records evidencing lo
ans granted to Members of the former Batasang Pambansa. Before mandamus may issue, it mu
st be clear that the information sought is of "public interest" or "public concern", and is not exem
pted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee (Legaspi v. Civil Service Commiss
ion). A second requisite must be met before the right to information may be enforced through ma
ndamus proceedings, viz. that the information sought must not be among those excluded by law
.
Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as
regards the documents subject of this petition. His position is apparently based merely on consid
erations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues.
In sum, the pubic nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by t
he alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern
.
Case No. 40 The Pagpalain Haulers Inc. v. Trajano G.R. No. 133215, July 15, 1999

Facts:
On May 14, 1997, respondent Integrated Labor Organization-Pagpalain Haulers Workers
Union (hereafter referred to as ILO-PHILS), in a bid to represent the rank-and-file drivers and he
lpers of petitioner Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. (hereafter referred to as Pagpalain), filed a petition for
certification election with the Department of Labor and Employment. ILO-PHILS attached to the
petition copies of its charter certificate, its constitution and by-laws, its books of account, and a li
st of its officers and their addresses.
On July 10, 1997, Pagpalain filed a motion to dismiss the petition, alleging that ILO-PHIL
S was not a legitimate labor organization due to its failure to comply with the requirements for re
gistration under the Labor Code. Specifically, it claimed that the books of account submitted by I
LO-PHILS were not verified under oath by its treasurer and attested to by its president, a require
d by Rule II, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.
In a reply dated August 4, 1997, ILO-PHILS dismissed Pagpalains claims, saying that De
partment Order No. 9, Series of 1997 had dispensed with the requirement that a local or chapter
of a national union submit books of account in order to be registered with the Department of Lab
or and Employment.
Finding in favor of ILO-PHILS, the Med-Arbiter, on August 27, 1997, ordered the holding
of certification elections among the rank-and-file of Pagpalain Haulers. Pagpalain promptly appe
aled the decision to the Secretary of Labor and Employment. The Secretary issued a resolution
dismissing petitioner’s appeal on February 27, 1998.
Aggrieved by said resolution, Pagpalain now comes to this Court for relief claiming that t
he Secretary of Labor acted without jurisdiction in issuing the questioned resolution.
Issues:

 Whether or not respondent union is a legitimate union even if their books of account wer
e not verified under oath by its treasurer and attested to by its president.
Ruling:
Petition is dismissed for lack of merit and the resolution of the Secretary of Labor dated F
ebruary 27, 1998 affirmed. Pagpalains contentions are without merit.The Labor Code does not r
equire the submission of books of account in order for a labor organization to be registered as a
legitimate labor organization.
Since the Department Order No. 9 has done away with the submission of books of accou
nt as a requisite for registration, Pagpalain’s only recourse is to have said order declared null an
d void.
Pagpalain has failed to show that Department Order No. 9 is contrary to the law or the C
onstitution.
Department Order No. 9 only dispenses with books of account as a requirement for registrati
on of a local or chapter of a national union or federation. As provided by Article 241 (h) and (j), a
labor organization must still maintain books of account, but it need not submit the same as a req
uirement for registration. Given the foregoing disquisition, The Court finds no cogent reason to d
eclare Department Order No. 9 null and void, as well as to reverse the assailed resolution of the
Secretary of Labor.
Case No. 41 People v. Veneracion G.R. Nos. 119987-88 October 12, 1995.
Facts:
On August 2, 1994, the cadaver of a young girl, later identified as Angel Alquiza wrapped
in a sack and yellow table cloth tied with a nylon cord with both feet and left hand protruding from
it was seen floating along Del Pan St. Binondo, Manila. On the basis of sworn statements of
witnesses, booking sheets, arrest reports and the necropsy report of the victim, Abundio
Lagunday, and Henry Lagarto, of Tondo, Manila were later charged with the crime of Rape with
Homicide, docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-138071. Subsequently thereafter, Ernesto Cordero,
Rolando Manlangit, , Richard Baltazar, and Catalino Yaon, of Tondo, Manila were accused of the
same crime of Rape with Homicide, docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-138071.
The two criminal cases were consolidated and all the accused pleaded “Not Guilty”.
Abundio Lagunday who was already dead, was dropped from the Information. The trial court
rendered a decision finding the defendants Lagarto and Cordero guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced both accused with the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with all the accessories provided for by law. Disagreeing with the sentence imposed,
the City Prosecutor of Manila, filed a Motion for Reconsideration, praying that the Decision be
"modified in that the penalty of death be imposed" against respondents Lagarto and Cordero, in
place of the original penalty.
Issue:
 Whether or not death be imposed instead of reclusion perpetua
Ruling:
The law plainly and unequivocably provides that "when by reason or on the occasion of
rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death." The provision leaves no room for the
exercise of discretion on the part of the trial judge to impose a penalty under the circumstances
described, other than a sentence of death. The trial judge's misgivings in imposing the death
sentence because of his religious convictions. The Rules of Court mandates that after an
adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose "the proper penalty and civil liability provided for by
the law on the accused." This is not a case of a magistrate ignorant of the law. If judges, under
the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries
within which they are required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes
meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary
powers by those acting under its authority. This is a case in which a judge, fully aware of the
appropriate provisions of the law, refuses to impose a penalty to which he disagrees. In so doing,
respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to a lack of jurisdiction in imposing the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua where the law
clearly imposes the penalty of Death.
Case No. 42 Resins, Inc. v. Auditor General of the Philippines
G.R. No. L-17888 October 29, 1986.
Facts:
Petitioner seeks a refund from respondent Central Bank on the claim that it was exempt
from the margin fee under Republic Act No. 2609 for the importation of urea and formaldehyde,
as separate units, used for the production of synthetic glue of which it was a manufacturer. Urea
formaldehyde is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from 'urea' and
'formaldehyde', as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resins known as
'urea formaldehyde'. Congress intended to exempt 'urea' and 'formaldehyde' separately as
essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called 'urea fomaldehyde' not
the latter as a finished product. Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill which uses the
term 'urea formaldehyde' instead of 'urea and formaldehyde' is conclusive upon the courts as
regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President.
Issue:
 Whether or not Resin’s contention is with merit
Ruling:
It has been the constant and uniform holding that exemption from taxation is not favored
and is never presumed, so that if granted it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer.
Certainly, whatever may be said of the statutory language found in Republic Act 2609, it would
be going too far to assert that there was such a clear and manifest intention of legislative will as
to compel such a refund. In the same way that the Auditor General, which is intended to implement
the constitutional mandate that no money can be paid out of the treasury except in the pursuance
of appropriation made by law, must carefully see to it that there is in fact such statutory enactment,
no refund, which likewise represents a diminution of public funds in the treasury, should be
allowed unless the law clearly so provides. The Auditor General would be sadly remiss in the
discharge of his responsibility under the Constitution if, having the statute before him, he allows
such a refund when, under the terms thereof, it cannot be done.
Case No. 43 Barrera v. Barrera G.R. No. L-31589 July 31, 1970.
Facts:
Respondent Judge Alfredo Catolico of the Court of First Instance of Cavite was cited for
contempt in accusing that the court had delegated its Clerk a power which is applicable only to
Chief Justice. When this case was set for hearing, the presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Cavite, the Hon. Judge Jose B. Jimenez, was appointed as District Judge for the Court
of First Instance of Manila, and on said date, he did not hold court session. This case was left
pending, and it was reset for hearing however the case was not again heard because the new
Presiding Judge did not arrive due to bad weather.
The counsel for the plaintiff in Barrera v. Barrera, a civil case requested that the Court,
presided over by the Hon. Judge Alfredo Catolico be authorized to continue with the hearing of
the case pursuant to Section 3, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court. When the judge assumed his duties,
he found no written authority by the Honorable Chief Justice of the Supreme Court extended to
this branch for it to be able to continue trying the case. Rule 22 on the subject of adjournments
and postponements, the Court can only apply its clear and express provisions; and that upon the
lapse of three months from the first day of trial on the merits, the trial judge lost control of the
same, and may not continue trying the same for the only thing possible to be done is to dismiss
the case.
Issue:
 Whether or not the refusal by respondent Judge to apply the law as interpreted by the
Highest Tribunal lead him to his contempt
Ruling:
Under the said rule, not even the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court could validly, legally
and morally extend power to the trial Judge to reacquire control of the case tantamount to
reacquiring jurisdiction of the subject matter when the said written authority is extended far beyond
the three months limit in the said Rule 22 of the Rules of Court. Reiterated by the Hon. Tribunal
that when it comes to time or period in order that it could be extended, the petition for extension
should be filed before its expiration or there is nothing that could be extended.
The respondent judge was further reprimanded not for his opinions but in his allegation
that the clerk of court was permitted to exercise an authority which applicable only to the chief
Justice. Judges are not expected to be wholly in agreement with every decision of this Tribunal.
Nor are they required to keep locked up within their breasts their own views on such matters. The
misdeed of respondent Judge is compounded by such an accusation apparently arising from his
adamantine conviction that a doctrine of this Court that fails to meet his approval need not be
applied. No inferior court judge, to repeat, can be permitted to arrogate unto himself such a
prerogative at war with everything that the rule of law stands for. There is only one Supreme Court
from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings. The rulings, then he has no other
alternative than to place himself in the position that he could properly avoid the duty of having to
render judgment on the case concerned and he has only one legal way to do that.
Case No. 44 Macalintal v. COMELEC G.R. No. 157013 July 10, 2003.
Facts:
Romulo B. Macalintal filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition as a taxpayer and as a
lawyer. He seeks for a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and
material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public funds are properly
and lawfully used and appropriated.
He speculates that Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters, who
are immigrants or permanent residents in other countries, by their mere act of executing an
affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violates the residency requirement
in Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution. The petitioner further argues that Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution does not allow provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition
to be qualified to vote in a political exercise; that the legislature should not be allowed to
circumvent the requirement of the Constitution on the right of suffrage by providing a condition
thereon which in effect amends or alters the aforesaid residence requirement to qualify a Filipino
abroad to vote. He claims that the right of suffrage should not be granted to anyone who, on the
date of the election, does not possess the qualifications provided for by Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution.
Issue:
 Whether or not RA 9189 unconstitutional
Ruling:
Contrary to petitioner’s claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the Constitution, Congress
enacted the law prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting in compliance with the
constitutional mandate. Such mandate expressly requires that Congress provide a system of
absentee voting that necessarily presupposes that the "qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad"
is not physically present in the country. The provisions of Sections 5(d) and 11 are components
of the system of overseas absentee voting established by R.A. No. 9189. The qualified Filipino
abroad who executed the affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines. He
is presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this country. His having
become an immigrant or permanent resident of his host country does not necessarily imply an
abandonment of his intention to return to his domicile of origin, the Philippines. Therefore, under
the law, he must be given the opportunity to express that he has not actually abandoned his
domicile in the Philippines by executing the affidavit required by Sections 5(d) and 8(c) of the law.
The petition was partly granted. Some portions of R.A. No. 9189 are declared void for being
unconstitutional.
Case No. 45 Angara v. Electoral Commission G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936
FACTS:
Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted
for the position of member of the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas province.
On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect
of the National Assembly for garnering the most number of votes. He then took his oath of office
on November 15th. On December 3rd, National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8 which
declared with finality the victory of Angara. On December 8, Ynsua filed before the Electoral
Commission a motion of protest against the election of Angara, that he be declared elected
member of the National Assembly. Electoral Commission passed a resolution in December 9th
as the last day for the filing of the protests against the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly. On December 20, Angara filed before the Electoral
Commission a motion to dismiss the protest that the protest in question was filed out of the
prescribed period. The Electoral Commission denied Angara's petition.
Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral
Commission taking further cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended that the Constitution
confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the said Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of
contested elections to the Nat'l Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to
hear the case.
ISSUE:

 Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the controversy;
 Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
RULING:
The Supreme Court declared that it has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission.
Separation of powers granted by the Constitution through separate articles for each branch, but
the check and balances maintain coordination among the branches. When there are conflicts
between the boundaries of power and functions of each branch, the Judiciary has the power to
review and resolve these conflicts through Judicial Review.
Electoral Commission acted within its jurisdiction since it is recognized as an independent
quasi-judicial body, which is not an inferior tribunal, or corporation, board, or person, and is
granted the power to be the sole judge of all contest relating to the election, returns, qualifications
of members of National Assembly. The present constitution granted the Electoral Commission
with all the powers exercised by the legislature relating to the said function of Electoral
Commission, and this includes the regulation of the rules and procedures of election protests. The
confirmation of National Assembly of its members is not required and does not limit the Electoral
Commission of its power to fix dates for election protest, or else this would undermine the power
and functions of the Electoral Commission.
Case No. 46 Jose Alejandrino VS. Manuel L. Quezon et al.

GR No 22041 September 11, 1924

FACTS:

The Philippine Senate composed of respondent Senators, including Senate President

Manuel L. Quezon, issued a resolution depriving petitioner, Senator Jose Alejandrino Senator for
the Twelfth District, of all the prerogatives, privileges and emoluments of his office for the period
of one year from the first of January 1924, having found the petitioner guilty of disorderly conduct
and flagrant violation of the privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted Vince de
Vera, Senator for the Sixth District, on the occasion of certain phrases being uttered by the latter
in the course of the debate regarding the credentials of Senator Alejandrino.

Alejandrino filed mandamus and injunction against respondent Senate President Manuel
Quezon from executing the said resolution and to declare the said resolution null and void.

Respondents, through the Attorney General, objects, claiming the Supreme Court has no
jurisdiction therein.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to annul the Resolution made by the
Philippine Senate against Senator Alejandrino.

RULING:

The Supreme Court declared that neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch thereof
can be directly controlled in the exercise of their legislative powers by any judicial process. The
court accordingly lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition and the demurrer must be sustained.

The power to control is the power to abrogate and the power to abrogate is the power to
usurp. Each department may, nevertheless, indirectly restrain the others. It is peculiarly the duty
of the judiciary to say what the law is, to enforce the Constitution, and to decide whether the
proper constitutional sphere of a department has been transcended. The courts must determine
the validity of legislative enactments as well as the legality of all private and official acts. To this
extent, do the courts restrain the other departments.
Case No. 47 BENGZON VS. DRILON G.R. 103524 April 15, 1992
FACTS:
Petitioners are retired justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are
currently receiving pensions under RA 910 amended by RA 1792, Sec 3-A says that “in case
salary is increased or decreased, such increase or decrease will be deemed the retirement
pension”. Identical retirement benefits given to Constitutional Commissions by virtue of RA 1568
amended by RA 3595. Same given to AFP by virtue of PD 758. President Marcos issued a decree
repealing section 3-A of RA 1797 which authorized the adjustment of the pension of retired
justices and officers and enlisted members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. PD 1638 was
issued giving armed forces pensions automatic readjustment, while that of the retired justices was
not.

Realizing the unfairness, Congress passes a HB No.16297 and Senate Bill 790, that
sought to readjust Justices pension automatically as those of the armed forces. But Pres. Aquino
vetoed the bill saying that it is against the Compensation and Position Classification Act.

Justices filed a petition claiming that the PD 644 pegging the pension to prevailing salaries
is invalid because it did not receive proper publication. It follows that RA 1797 was still in effect
and HB 16297 was superfluous because it tried to restore benefits which were never taken away
validly. The veto of HB 16297 did not also produce any effect. Lower Court granted it.

Recognizing the court’s grant of their petition, Congress included in the General
Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 1992 certain appropriations for the Judiciary intended for the
payment of the adjusted pension rates due the retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court
of Appeals. President Aquino at that time, however, vetoed the pensions of the retired justices of
the judiciary.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not the veto of the President of certain provisions in the GAA of FY 1992
relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices is constitutional or
valid.

RULING:

No. The Supreme Court declared that the act of the Executive in vetoing the particular
provisions is an exercise of a constitutionally vested power. But even as the Constitution grants
the power, it also provides limitations to its exercise. The Executive must veto a bill in its entirety
or not at all. He or she is, therefore, compelled to approve into law the entire bill, including its
undesirable parts. It is for this reason that the Constitution has wisely provided the “item veto
power” to avoid inexpedient riders from being attached to an indispensable appropriation or
revenue measure. What was done by the President was the vetoing of a provision and not an
item.

Congress passed a law providing for retirement pensions to retired Justices of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals which was amended by RA 1797. Thus, Congress
included in the General Appropriations Act of 1992, provisions identifying funds and savings which
may be used to pay the adjusted pensions pursuant to the Supreme Court Resolution. As long as
retirement laws remain in the statute book, there is an existing obligation on the part of the
government to pay the adjusted pension rate pursuant to RA 1797. Thus, the President has no
power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to repeal existing
laws. The President’s power is merely to execute the laws as passed by Congress.
Case 48 BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Zamora

G.R. No. 138570 October 10, 2000

FACTS: On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a military
bases agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine
territory by the US military personnel. To further strengthen their defense and security
relationship, the Philippines and the US entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951.
Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory,
armed forces, public vessels and aircraft. In 1991, with the expiration of RP-US Military Bases
Agreement, the periodic military exercises between the two countries were held in abeyance.
However, the defense and security relationship continued pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty.
On July 18, 1997 RP and US exchanged notes and discussed, among other things, the possible
elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). Negotiations by both panels on VFA led to a
consolidated draft text and a series of conferences. Eventually, President Fidel V. Ramos
approved the VFA.

On October 5, 1998 President Joseph E. Estrada ratified the VFA thru respondent
Secretary of Foreign Affairs. On October 6, 1998, the President, acting thru Executive Secretary
Zamora officially transmitted to the Senate, the Instrument of Ratification, letter of the President
and the VFA for approval. It was approved by the Senate by a 2/3 vote of its members. On June
1, 1999, the VFA officially entered into force after an exchange of notes between Secretary Siazon
and US Ambassador Hubbard. The VFA provides for the mechanism for regulating the
circumstances and conditions under which US Armed Forces and defense personnel may be
present in the Philippines. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition, assailing the
constitutionality of the VFA and imputing grave abuse of discretion to respondents in ratifying the
agreement.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not the Visiting Forces Agreement is unconstitutional.

RULING:

The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the
Senate on treaties or international agreements. The first cited provision applies to any form of
treaties and international agreements in general with a wide variety of subject matter. All treaties
and international agreements entered into by the Philippines, regardless of subject matter,
coverage or particular designation requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and
effective.

In contrast, the second cited provision applies to treaties which involve presence of foreign
military bases, troops and facilities in the Philippines. Both constitutional provisions share some
common ground. The fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Sec. 21 Art.
VII, and that Senate extended its concurrence under the same provision is immaterial.
Undoubtedly, Sec. 25 Art. XVIII which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military
bases and troops should apply in the instant case. Hence, for VFA to be constitutional it must
sufficiently meet the following requisites: a) it must be under a treaty; b) the treaty must be duly
concurred in by the Senate, and when so required by Congress, ratified by a majority of votes
cast by the people in a national referendum; and c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting
State.

There is no dispute in the presence of the first two requisites. The third requisite implies
that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. Moreover, it
is inconsequential whether the US treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under
international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. They are equally binding
obligations upon nations. Therefore, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the
constitution. The court also finds that there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
executive department as to their power to ratify the VFA. Petition is dismissed.
Case 49 Manalo vs. Sistoza G.R. No. 107369 August 11, 1999
Facts:
On December 13, 1990, former President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Republic Act
6975, creating the Department of Interior and Local Government. The said Act states that the
PNP Chief, Chief Superintendent and Director General shall be appointed by the President
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Pursuant thereto, Pres. Aquino,
through Executive Secretary Franklin S. Drilon, promoted 15 police officers to permanent
positions in the Philippine National Police with the rank of Chief Superintendent to Director. The
said police officers took their oath of office and assumed their respective positions. Thereafter,
the Department of Budget and Management, under the then Secretary Salvador M. Enriquez III,
authorized disbursements for their salaries and other emoluments.
Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition to assail the legality of subject appointments and
disbursements made therefor. He contends that: (1) RA 6975 requires confirmation of the
appointments of officers from the rank of senior superintendent and higher by the CA; (2) The
PNP is akin to the Armed Forces where the Constitution specifically requires confirmation by the
CA, and (3) Respondent Secretary in allowing and/or effecting disbursements in favor of
respondent officers despite the unconstitutionality and illegality of their appointments is acting
without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the appointment PNP officers need CA confirmation
2. Whether or not Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 are constitutional
Ruling:
1. Under Section 16, Article VII, of the Constitution, there are four groups of officers of the
government to be appointed by the President: First, the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments
are vested in him in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the President may
be authorized by law to appoint; Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the
Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group require the
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The appointments of respondent
officers who are not within the first category, need not be confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments. As held in the case of Tarrosa vs. Singson, Congress cannot by law
expand the power of confirmation of the Commission on Appointments and require
confirmation of appointments of other government officials not mentioned in the first
sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
2. Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 which empower the Commission on
Appointments to confirm the appointments of public officials whose appointments are not
required by the Constitution to be confirmed are unconstitutional. The rest of Republic Act
6975 stands. It is well-settled that when provisions of law declared void are severable
from the main statute and the removal of the unconstitutional provisions would not affect
the validity and enforceability of the other provisions, the statute remains valid without its
voided sections.
Case No. 50 Mercado vs. Board of Election Supervisors G.R. No. 109713 April 6, 1995
FACTS:
Petitioner Jose M. Mercado was proclaimed winner in the 4 December 1992 election for
chairman of the SK of Barangay Mabalor, Ibaan, Batangas. The proclamation was made by the
Board of Election Tellers (BET), acting as the Board of Canvassers, on the basis of its tally which
showed Mercado winning by one vote (49 to 48) over his rival, private respondent Crisanto P.
Pangilinan.
Mercado's victory was, however, short-lived. Immediately after Mercado's proclamation
as the winner by the BET, Pangilinan filed a formal protest with the BES questioning the results
of the election. He alleged that the BET Chairman, drinking gin and Coke during the counting,
had invalidated some votes without consulting the other board members. The BES ordered the
reopening of the ballot box and the recount of the votes for SK Chairman. The recount reversed
the earlier tally to 51 to 49 in favor of Pangilinan, who was thereupon proclaimed the duly elected
SK Chairman by the BES, which issued for that purpose its own Certificate of Canvass and
Proclamation.
ISSUES:
1. The legality and constitutionality of Section 24, Resolution No. 2499 of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) creating, for purposes of the elections in the Sangguniang
Kabataan (SK), the Boards of Election Supervisors (BES) and making it the final arbiter of
all election protests;
2. The jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts over contests involving Sangguniang Kabataan
elections.
RULING:
In the light of the foregoing, it is indisputable that contests involving elections of SK (formerly KB)
officials do not fall within Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code and paragraph 2, Section 2,
Article IX-C of the Constitution and that no law in effect prior to the ratification of the Constitution
had made the SK chairman an elective barangay official. His being an ex-officio member of the
sangguniang barangay does not make him one for the law specifically provides who are its
elective members, viz., the punong barangay and the seven regular Sangguniang Barangay
members who are elected at large by those who are qualified to exercise the right of suffrage
under Article V of the Constitution and who are duly registered voters of the barangay.
The Court recognizes the consequences of the quasi-judicial acts performed by the BES
pursuant to Section 24 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2499 under the operative fact doctrine; thus,
we hold that the Regional Trial Court is competent to review the decision of the BES in election
controversies within its level. As correctly stated by the petitioner, it is a basic principle in
administrative law that the absence of a provision for the review of an administrative action does
not preclude recourse to the courts.
It is generally understood that as to administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial or
legislative power there is an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies
on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute. The
purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect
substantial rights of parties affected by its decisions. It is part of the system of checks and
balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust
adjudications.The Court further holds that there was no need for the petitioner to exhaust
administrative remedies; firstly, because Section 24 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2499 did not
provide for recourse to a higher administrative body; and secondly, the petitioner's cause falls
within the exception to the rule in that his petition in Civil Case No. 3565, aside from raising pure
questions of law and jurisdiction, also alleges deprivation of due process.
Case No. 51 BIRAOGO VS. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION
G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010

FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC)
dated July 30, 2010. The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under
the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption
committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has been
described as an "independent collegial body," it is essentially an entity within the Office of
the President Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad
hoc body is one.
To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative body under
Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-
judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes
between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and
corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite
people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot
determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in
our courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or
sanctions.
ISSUES:

 Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
This Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view
of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill
of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It
requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.
Equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass
the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. The classification will be
regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights
conferred and obligations imposed. Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of
the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out
the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration
only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated
constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating
differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and
selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification. The PTC must
not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to
investigate all past administrations. The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the
nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights
determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution
should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.
Case No. 52 DE CASTRO VS. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
G.R. No. 191002 March 17, 2010

FACTS:
The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs
seven days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010. Under Section 4(1), in
relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department)
of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within
two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the
process of filling up the position of Chief Justice. Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC
“automatically considered” for the position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate
Justices of the Court. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters dated
January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because
the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in
the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days
from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers
intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily
expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII
(Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers
also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s power to
appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from “political vicissitudes”
and its “insulation from political pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the
establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme
Court Justice.
ISSUE:

 Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno
upon his retirement.
RULING:
The prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a
vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary. Had the framers intended
to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous
ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit
in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification
was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the
President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they
affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to
appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies
only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the
statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and
Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments.
Case No. 53 A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC October 12, 2010

In the matter of the charges of plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del
Castillo
FACTS:
In the landmark decision of Vinuya vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
162230, promulgated last April 28, 2010, the Supreme Court DISMISSED the petition filed by a
group of Filipino “comfort women” during the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines. The
Court, speaking through Justice Mariano C. del Castillo, held that the petition seeking to compel
the Executive Department to espouse the petitioners’ claims for official apology and other forms
of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice and other international
tribunals has NO MERIT because: (1) the prerogative to determine whether to espouse
petitioners’ claims against Japan belongs exclusively to the Executive Department; and (2)
the Philippines is not under any international obligation to espouse the petitioners’ claims.
Discontented with the foregoing decision, the petitioners in Vinuya filed a motion for
reconsideration. Subsequently, they also filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration, this time
accusing the Justice Del Castillo of plagiarizing (copying without attribution) and twisting
passages from three foreign legal articles to support the Court’s position in the Vinuya decision:
(1) A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Professors Evan J. Criddle; (2) Breaking the Silence:
Rape as an International Crime by Mark Ellis; and (3) Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in
International Law by Professor Christian J. Tams
The Court then referred the charges against Justice Del Castillo to its Committee on
Ethics and Ethical Standards, chaired by Chief Justice Renato Corona, for investigation and
recommendation. After the proceedings before it, the Committee submitted its findings and
recommendations to the Court en banc, which then treated and decided the controversy as an
administrative matter.
ISSUES:
1. Did Justice Del Castillo, in writing the opinion for the Court in the Vinuya case, plagiarize
the published works of authors Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis?
2. Did Justice Del Castillo twist the works of these authors to make it appear that such works
supported the Court’s position in the Vinuya decision?

RULING:
1. No, Justice Del Castillo, in writing the opinion for the Court in the Vinuya case, did NOT
plagiarize the published works of authors Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis. At its most
basic, plagiarism means the theft of another person’s language, thoughts, or ideas. To
plagiarize, as it is commonly understood according to Webster, is “to take (ideas, writings,
etc.) from (another) and pass them off as one’s own.” The passing off of the work of
another as one’s own is thus an indispensable element of plagiarism. It was notable
that neither Justice Del Castillo nor his researcher had a motive or reason for omitting
attribution for the lifted passages to Criddle-Descent or to Ellis.
2. NO, Justice Del Castillo did NOT twist the works of authors Tams, Criddle-Descent, and
Ellis to make it appear that such works supported the Court’s position in
the Vinuya decision. To twist means “to distort or pervert the meaning of.” For example,
if one lifts the lyrics of the National Anthem, uses it in his work, and declares that Jose
Palma who wrote it “did not love his country,” then there is “twisting” or misrepresentation
of what the anthem’s lyrics said. Here, nothing in the Vinuya decision said or implied that,
based on the lifted passages, authors Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis supported the
Court’s conclusion that the Philippines is not under any obligation in international law to
espouse Vinuya et al.’s claims.
Case No. 54 VINUYA vs. SEC. ROMULO G.R. No. 162230 April 28, 2010

FACTS:
Petitioners narrate that during the Second World War; the Japanese army attacked
villages and systematically raped the women as part of the destruction of the village. As a result
of the actions of their Japanese tormentors, the petitioners have spent their lives in misery, having
endured physical injuries, pain and disability, and mental emotional suffering. Petitioners claim
that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA and
OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers
who ordered the establishment of the “comfort women stations in the Philippines. However, said
officials declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims for
compensation have already been fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance with the Peace Treaty
between the Philippines and Japan. Petitioners also argued that the comfort women system
constituted a crime against humanity, sexual slavery, and torture. They alleged that the prohibition
against these international crimes is jus cogens norms from which no derogation is possible, as
such, the Philippine government is in breach of its legal obligation not to afford impunity for crimes
against humanity.
ISSUE:

 Whether the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing
petitioner’s claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan

RULING
No. The question whether the government should espouse claims of its nationals against
a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably
committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the
Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause would be inimical to our
country’s foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating
serious implications for stability in this region. For the Court to overturn the Executive Departments
determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch
to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally committed. In the international
sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim within the
international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring
a claim on the individual’s behalf. Even then, it is not the individual’s rights that are being asserted,
but rather, the states own rights. The State, therefore, is the sole judge to decide whether its
protection will be granted, to what extent it is granted, and when will it cease.
The Court fully agrees that rape, sexual slavery, torture, and sexual violence are morally
reprehensible as well as legally prohibited under contemporary international law. However, it does not
automatically imply that the Philippines is under a non-derogable obligation to prosecute
international crimes. Absent the consent of the states, an applicable treaty regime, or a directive
by the Security Council, there is no non-derogable duty to institute proceedings against
Japan. Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis.
Even if we sidestep the question of whether jus cogens norms existed in 1951, petitioners have not
deigned to show that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the
time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is
an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.
Case No. 55 Gutierrez vs. House of Representatives Committee on Justice
G.R. No. 193459 February 15, 2011
FACTS:
July 22, 2010: 4 days before the 15th Congress opened its first session, private
respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim and spouses Pestaño (Baraquel group) filed
an impeachment complaint against Gutierrez upon endorsement of Party-List Representatives
Walden Bello and Arlene Bag-ao and a few days later, HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the complaint
to House Speaker Belmonte who then, on August 2, directed the Committee on Rules to include
it in the Order of Business
August 3, 2010: private respondents Renato Reyes Jr., Mother Mary John Mananzan,
Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed the
second impeachment complaint against Gutierrez endorsed by Representatives Colmenares,
Casiño, Mariano, Ilagan, Tinio and De Jesus. HOR provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure
on Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th Congress and HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the complaint
to House Speaker Belmonte who then, on August 9, directed the Committee on Rules to include
it in the Order of Business.
August 11, 2010: HOR simultaneously referred the two complaints to the House
Committee on Justice (HCOJ) and after hearing the committee found both complaints sufficient
in form. September 2, 2010: The Rules of Procedure of Impeachment Proceedings of the
15th Congress was published. After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 7, 2010 found the
two complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public
trust, sufficient in substance. Petitioner filed petitions for certiorari and prohibition challenging
Resolutions of September 1 and 7 alleging that she was denied due process and that these
violated the one-year bar rule on initiating impeachment proceedings
ISSUE:

 Whether or not the HR Committee on Justice violated the one-year bar provision when it
issued the Resolution.

RULING:
No. Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution provides that, no impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.
The act of initiating the complaint means the filing of the impeachment complaint and the referral
by the House Plenary to the Committee on Justice. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one
year period. Therefore, the one-year period ban is reckoned not from the filing of the first
complaint, but on the date it is referred to the House Committee on Justice. Hence, in this case,
the HR Committee did not violate the one-year bar provision of the Constitution when it accepted
the second impeachment complaint after the first impeachment complaint was filed.
Also, it was held that the HR committee did not abuse its discretion in finding the
complaints sufficient in form in substance. The Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the
constitutional requirements and providing that there must be a verified complaint or resolution,
and that the substance requirement is met if there is a recital of facts constituting the offense
charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee.
Case No. 56 League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 176951 June 28, 2011

FACTS:

These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the League
of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas, assailing the
constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws, each converting the municipality covered thereby into a
component city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws.

During the 11th Congress, 57 bills seeking the conversion of municipalities into
component cities were filed before the House of Representatives. However, Congress acted only
on 33 bills. It did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12 th
Congress, R.A. No. 9009 became effective revising Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
It increased the income requirement to qualify for conversion into a city from P20 million annual
income to P100 million locally-generated income. In the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24
municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. Each of the
cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting the particular municipality from the 100
million income requirement imposed by R.A. No. 9009.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate Article 10, sections 6 and 10 and the equal protection
clause of the Constitution

RULING:

The Court maintained that the said Cityhood Laws do not violate Article 10, sections 6 and
10 and the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Congress clearly intended that the local
government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of R.A. No.
9009. The apprehensions of the then Senate President with respect to the considerable disparity
between the income requirement of P20 million under the Local Government Code (LGC) prior to
its amendment, and the P100 million under the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 9009 were
definitively articulated in his interpellation of Senator Pimentel during the deliberations on Senate
Bill No. 2157.

Moreover, the court reiterated that, “We should not ever lose sight of the fact that the 16
cities covered by the Cityhood Laws not only had conversion bills pending during the
11th Congress, but have also complied with the requirements of the LGC prescribed prior to its
amendment by R.A. No. 9009. Congress undeniably gave these cities all the considerations that
justice and fair play demanded. Hence, this Court should do no less by stamping its imprimatur to
the clear and unmistakable legislative intent and by duly recognizing the certain collective wisdom
of Congress
CASE NO. 57 AQUINO VS. COMELEC G.R. No. 120265 September 18, 1995
FACTS:
Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative for the Second District of Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly
registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy. Cembo,
Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the residence
qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution,
should be for a period not less than 1 year immediately preceding the elections.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for
congressman as mandated by Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution
RULING:
In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second
District of Makati City, he must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of
choice.
Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated not only that he
was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same
for 52 years immediately preceding that elections. At that time, his certificate indicated that he
was also a registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as
the birthplace of his parents. What stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile
of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995
elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.
The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a
condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract may be indicative of petitioner’s
intention to reside in Makati City, it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove
abandonment of one’s original domicile.
Petitioner’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare
assertion which is hardly supported by the facts. To successfully effect a change of domicile,
petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin
should be deemed to continue.
Case No. 58 BITONIO, JR. vs. COA G.R. No. 147392 March 12, 2004.
FACTS:
Petitioner Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr. was appointed Director IV of the Bureau of
Labor Relations in the Department of Labor and Employment and acted as representative of the
Secretary of Labor to the PEZA, the petitioner was receiving a per diem for every board meeting
he attended during the years 1995 to 1997.Petitioner filed for the annulment of the Decision of
the COA denying the petitioner’s motion for the reconsideration of the COA Notice of
Disallowances involving the per diems the petitioner received from the Philippine Economic Zone
Authority (PEZA).“Members of the Board shall receive a per diem of not less than the amount
equivalent to the representation and transportation allowances of the members of the Board
and/or as may be determined by the Department of Budget and Management: Provided, however,
That the per diem collected per month does not exceed the equivalent of four (4) meetings. ”the
COA disallowed the payment of per diems to the petitioner and thus issued the following:(a) Notice
of Disallowance No. 98-008-101 (95) dated July 31, 1998 for the total sum of P24,500 covering
the period of July-December 1995;(b) Notice of Disallowance No. 98-003-101 (96) also dated July
31, 1998 for a total amount of P100,000 covering the period of January 1996 to January 1997;(c)
Notice of Disallowance No. 98-017-101 (97) dated October 9, 1998 for the total amount of
P210,000 covering the period of February 1997 to January 1998.The reason of the disallowance
was stated in the Notices, “Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants holding other offices
in addition to their primary office and to receive compensation therefore was declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled emoluments from the Board Meetings he attended.
RULING:
No. Secretary of Labor is prohibited from receiving compensation for his additional office
or employment, such prohibition likewise applies to the petitioner who sat in the Board only in
behalf of the Secretary of Labor.
Case No. 59 SECRETARY OF JUSTICE vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ
GR No. 139465 January 18, 2000

FACTS:
The Department of Justice (DOJ) received from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez (Jimenez) to the United States.
Jimenez was found guilty by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida of the following
crimes: (1) Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States; (2) Attempt to evade or
defeat tax; (3) Fraud by wire, radio, or television; (4) False statement or entries; and (5) Election
contributions in name of another. Jimenez requested copies of the official extradition request from
the U. S. Government, as well as all documents and papers submitted in order to comment. He
also further asked that the proceedings be suspended in the meantime while his request is
pending. Consequently, such requests were denied. Petitioner reasoned that the request made
by Jimenez is premature, pending the evaluation of the DOJ of the validity of the extradition
request.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not private respondent should be afforded due process of law

2. Whether or not private respondent is entitled to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the
Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty

RULING:
1. Due process is comprised of two components: (a) substantive due process which requires
the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty,
or property; and (b) procedural due process which consists of the two basic rights of notice
and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent
tribunal. The notice and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be
dispensed with and shelved aside. Private respondent shall not be exempted from
exercising such right.
2. In the case at bar, the two laws of the land (municipal and national laws) are not pitted
against each other. There is no occasion to choose which of the two should be upheld.
Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as implemented
by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic due process rights of a prospective
extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. From the procedures earlier
abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and during the judicial determination
of the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the
prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the law is silent as to these rights.
Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also manifests this silence. Petitioner
interprets this silence as unavailability of these rights. Consequently, he describes the
evaluation procedure as an "ex parte technical assessment" of the sufficiency of the
extradition request and the supporting documents. This will not hold since in the absence
of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the basic
twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the
implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from
a prospective extraditee.
Case No. 60 Free Telephone Workers Union Vs.The Honorable Minister Of Labor And
Employment, The National Labor Relations Commission, And The Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company GR No. L-58184 October 20, 1981
FACTS:
The Article of the Labor Code regarding strikes have been amended. It now reads as "In
labor disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national
interest, such as may occur in but not limited to public utilities, companies engaged in the
generation or distribution of energy, banks, hospitals, and those within export processing zones,
the Minister of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or
certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification
shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout. If one
has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out
employees shall immediately return to work and the employers shall immediately resume
operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the
strike or lockout. The Minister may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure
compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same."
Subsequently, there was a notice of strike with the Ministry of Labor for unfair labor
practices. Several conciliation meetings called by the Ministry followed, with petitioner manifesting
its willingness to have a revised Code of Conduct that would be fair to all concerned but with a
plea that in the meanwhile the Code of Conduct being imposed be suspended; a position that
failed to meet the approval of private respondent. Petitioner further alleges that the said Code of
Conduct resulted to an indefinite preventive suspension which is apparently the principal cause
of the labor dispute.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the said amendment to the Labor Code is unconstitutional
RULING:
The allegation that there is undue delegation of legislative powers cannot stand the test
of scrutiny. The Constitution is not to be regarded as denying the legislature the necessary
resources of flexibility and practicability. To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be
a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters principle
and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to
repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and
specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative
command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out.
Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above
guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express
or implied. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied
from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. Therefore, insofar as the said law
empowers the Minister of Labor to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes causing or likely to
cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest and thereafter decide it or certify
the same the National Labor Relations Commission is not, on its face unconstitutional for being
violative of the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative power. The arbiter however is called upon
to take due care that in the decisions to be reached, there is no violation of "the rights of workers
to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of
work. Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Case No. 61 United BF Homeowner’s Association v. BF Homes, Inc.
G.R. No. 124873 July 14, 1999
FACTS:
United BF Homeowners Association, Inc.(UBFHAI) is the sole representative of all
homeowners of BF Homes while BF Homes, Inc (BFHI) is the owner- developer of the subdivision.
Due to financial difficulties, BFHI was placed under receivership by SEC for 10 years under Atty.
Orendain for 10 years. Atty. Florencio B. Orendain took over management of respondent BFHI.
Preliminary to the rehabilitation, Atty. Orendain entered into an agreement with the two major
homeowners' associations, the BF Parañaque Homeowners Association, Inc. (BFPHAI) and the
Confederation of BF Homeowners Association, Inc. (CBFHAI), for the creation of a single,
representative homeowners' association and the setting up of an integrated security program that
would cover the eight (8) entry and exit points to and from the subdivision. Subsequently, this
tripartite agreement was reduced into a memorandum of agreement, and was amended. Pursuant
to these agreements, petitioner UBFHAI was created and registered with the Home Insurance
and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC), and recognized as the sole representative of all the
homeowners' association inside the subdivision. Respondent BFHI, through its receiver, turned
over to petitioner UBFHAI the administration and operation of the subdivision's clubhouse and a
strip of open space respectively.
ISSUE:

 Whether or not HIGC has jurisdiction and authority to hear the case as provided for in
section 1(b) rule II of HIGC’s rules of procedure.
RULING:
HIGC has no jurisdiction to hear the case. Originally, administrative supervision was
vested by law with the SEC but pursuant to PD902-A, this function was delegated to the HIGC.
As stated in PD92-A, HIGC was given the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
homeowner’s disputes arising out of the following intra-corporate relations: 1. Between and
among members of the association; 2.Between any and/or all of them and the association of
which they are member; and 3.In so far as it concerns its right to exist as a corporate entity,
between the association and the state. When HIGC adopted its revised rules of procedure in the
hearing of homeowners’ disputes, it added the phrase “between the association and the
state/general public or other entity.” The HIGC went beyond the authority provided by the law
when it promulgated the revised rules of procedure. There was a clear attempt to unduly expand
the provisions of Presidential Decree 902-A.
The inclusion of the phrase “GENERAL PUBLIC OR OTHER ENTITY” is a matter which
HIGC cannot legally do. The rule-making power of a public administrative body is a delegated
legislative power, which it may not use either to abridge the authority given it by Congress or the
Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond the scope intended. The rule-making power must be
confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings to carry into effect the law as it has
been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to
embrace matters not covered by the statute." If a discrepancy occurs between the basic law and
an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails.
Moreover, where the legislature has delegated to an executive or administrative officers
and boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of
administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the
authority-granting statute, do not represent a valid exercise of the rule-making power but
constitute an attempt by an administrative body to legislate. "A statutory grant of powers should
not be extended by implication beyond what may be necessary for their just and reasonable
execution.
Case No. 62 DAR v. Sutton G.R. No. 162070 October 19, 2005
FACTS:
Respondents inherited a land in Masbate which has been exclusively devoted to cow and
calf breeding, the respondents made a voluntary offer to sell their land to DAR to avail of certain
incentives under the law. When CARP took effect, it included to its coverage farms used for raising
livestock, poultry and swine.
Since, SC en banc declared lands devoted to poultry and livestock not included in the
definition of agricultural land in Luz Farms Case, respondents filed with DAR a formal request to
withdraw their offer to sell saying that their land is exempted from the coverage of CARL.
In 1995, DAR partially granted the application of the respondents for exemption applying
the retention limits (1hectare: 1head of animal) with such, some portion of respondent's land were
exempted, some portion were segregated and placed under Compulsory Acquisition.
Respondents moved for reconsideration saying that the entire portion of the land must be
exempted because it was solely devoted to cattle-raising, their motion was denied.
They filed a notice of appeal with the Office of the President assailing the constitutionality
of CARL and pushing their application for exemption. The President affirmed the order of DAR.
On appeal, CA declared the DAR Administrative Order (retention limits) null and void, favoring
the respondents.
ISSUE:

 Whether DAR A.O prescribing a maximum retention limit for owners of lands devoted to
livestock raising constitutional.
RULING:
We find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O.
sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and
prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987
Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted
to livestock, swine and poultry- raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock,
swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of agriculture
or agricultural activity. The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree
farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment in this
enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities,
drainage, waterers and blowers, feed mill with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and
generators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment
like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deep wells, elevated
water tanks, pump houses, sprayers, and other technological appurtenances.
Lands devoted to raising of livestock, poultry and swine have been classified as industrial,
not agricultural, lands and thus exempt from agrarian reform. Petitioner DAR argues that, in
issuing the impugned A.O., it was seeking to address the reports it has received that some
unscrupulous landowners have been converting their agricultural lands to livestock farms to avoid
their coverage by the agrarian reform. Again, we find neither merit nor logic in this contention.
The undesirable scenario which petitioner seeks to prevent with the issuance of the A.O. clearly
does not apply in this case. Respondent’s family acquired their landholdings as early as 1948.
They have long been in the business of breeding cattle in Masbate which is popularly known as
the cattle-breeding capital of the Philippines. Petitioner DAR does not dispute this fact. Indeed,
there is no evidence on record that respondents have just recently engaged in or converted to the
business of breeding cattle after the enactment of the CARL that may lead one to suspect that
respondents intended to evade its coverage. It must be stressed that what the CARL prohibits is
the conversion of agricultural lands for non-agricultural purposes after the effectivity of the CARL.
There has been no change of business interest in the case of respondents.
Case No. 63 DAVID VS. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO G.R. No. 171396 May 3 2006
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of
emergency. On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017David, et al.
assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress;
(2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and
(3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly.
They alleged “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police
operatives pursuant to PP 1017. During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the
issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5 have factual basis, and contended that the intent of the
Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of
calling out the armed forces. The petitioners did not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor
General.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are constitutional.
RULING:
President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status
or condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II of
the Revised Administration Code. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless,
without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In
declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s
extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with public
interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such
Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless. To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial
Law. It is merely an exercise of President Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed forces
to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President
Arroyo the authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the province
of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “the legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives.” To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of
emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national
emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public
utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional
circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point
out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the
President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17,
Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.
As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the
PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is “necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence.” Considering that “acts of terrorism”
have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is
declared unconstitutional.
Case No. 64 BANDA VS ERMITA GR NO. 166620 APRIL 20, 2010
FACTS:
The petitioners filed this action as a class suit on their own behalf and on behalf of
all their co-employees at the National Printing Office. They challenge the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 378 issued by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
which amended Sec. 6 of Executive Order No. 285, removing the exclusive jurisdiction
of the NPO over the printing services requirements of government agencies and
instrumentalities. They perceive it as a threat to their security of tenure as employees
of the NPO contending that it is beyond the executive powers of Pres. Arroyo to amend or
repeal EO No. 285 issued by former Pres. Aquino when the latter still exercised legislative powers
and that EO No. 378 violates petitioners’ security of tenure because it paves the way for the gradual
abolition of the NPO.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not it is beyond the executive powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal
Executive Order No. 285 issued by former President Aquino when the latter still exercised
legislative powers; and
2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 378 violates petitioners' security of tenure, because
it paves the way for the gradual abolition of the NPO.
Ruling:
It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power to reorganize
the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with the President's constitutionally
granted power of control over executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation of the
legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes.
Pertinent to the case at bar, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 quoted above
authorizes the President (a) to restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President
Proper, including the immediate Offices, the President Special Assistants/Advisers System and
the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or
transferring functions from one unit to another, and (b) to transfer functions or offices from the
Office of the President to any other Department or Agency in the Executive Branch, and vice
versa.
In the case at bar, there was neither an abolition of the NPO nor a removal of any of its
functions to be transferred to another agency. Under the assailed Executive Order No. 378, the
NPO remains the main printing arm of the government for all kinds of government forms and...
publications but in the interest of greater economy and encouraging efficiency and profitability, it
must now compete with the private sector for certain government printing jobs, with the exception
of election paraphernalia which remains the exclusive responsibility of the NPO together with the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, as the Commission on Elections may determine. At most, there was
a mere alteration of the main function of the NPO by limiting the exclusivity of its printing
responsibility to election forms
In the present instance, involving neither abolition nor transfer of offices, the assailed
action is a mere reorganization under the general provisions of the law consisting mainly of
streamlining the NTA in the interest of simplicity, economy and efficiency. It is an act well within
the authority of the President motivated and carried out, according to the findings of the appellate
court, in good faith, a factual assessment that this Court could only but accept.
Clearly, Executive Order No. 102 is well within the constitutional power of the President to issue.
The President did not usurp any legislative prerogative in issuing Executive Order No. 102. It is
an exercise of the President's constitutional power of control over the executive department,
supported by the provisions of the Administrative Code, recognized by other statutes, and
consistently affirmed by this Court. The issuance of Executive Order No. 378 by President Arroyo
is an exercise of a delegated legislative power granted by the aforementioned Section 31, Chapter
10, Title III, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987, which provides for the continuing authority
of the President to reorganize the Office of the President, "in order to achieve simplicity, economy
and efficiency."
Case No. 65 In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of
Camilo L. Sabio G.R. No. 174340 October 17, 2006
Facts:
Pursuant to Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution which grants the Senate or the
House of Representatives or any of its respective committees power to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure, Senator
Miriam Defensor Santiago on February 20, 2006, introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No.
455 (Senate Res. No. 455). This Resolution directed an inquiry in aid of legislation on the
anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation
(POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT
Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective
Board of Directors.
Subsequently, the Senate required Chairman Sabio and PCGG
Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Nicasio Conti, Tereso Javier and Narciso Nario, herein
petitioners, to appear in the public hearing and testify on what they know relative to the matters
specified in Senate Res. No. 455.
Despite invitation by the Senate, PGCC Comissioner and Chairmans declined to appear
before the former. They then submitted to the Senate their Compliance and Explanation where
they invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 ( installed on February 28, 1986 by former President
Corazon C. Aquino) which provides: No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to
testify or produce evidence in any judicial legislative or administrative proceeding concerning
matters within its official cognizance.
Respondents’ contention, on the other hand, is that Section 4(b)of the executive order in
question has been repealed by the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is repealed by the 1987 Constitution.
Ruling:
Yes. The Courts in Senate v. Ermita categorically ruled that the power of inquiry is broad
enough to cover officials of the executive branch; the operation of government, being a legitimate
subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation and that the power of inquiry is co-
extensive with the power to legislate.
The Court ruled that Section 4(b) is directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21. Section
4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress power of inquiry. This cannot be
countenanced. There is no provision in the Constitution granting such exemption. The Congress’
power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of
existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends to government
agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to
regulate or even abolish. PCGG belongs to this class.
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress,
in the absence of any constitutional basis.
Also,the Constitution is the highest law of the land. It is the basic and paramount law to
which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the
land, must defer. No act shall be valid, however noble its intentions, if it conflicts with the
Constitution. Consequently, the Court has no recourse but to declare Section 4(b) of E.O. No.
1 repealed by the 1987 Constitution.
Case No. 66 Lina v. Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna
G.R. No. 129093 August 30, 2001

Facts:
On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He then
requested Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor's permit to open the
lotto outlet. This was denied on the ground of an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 issued on September 18, 1995.
The ordinance prohibited “illegal gambling” especially lotto in the said province.
Subsequently, respondent Calvento filed a complaint with the RTC which prayed for an
order requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto R Cataquiz to issue a business permit for the
operation of a lotto outlet; and an order annulling or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508,
T. 1995.
On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Paño, promulgated his
decision enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg.
508, T. 1995. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was subsequently denied.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners contend that the assailed resolution is a valid policy declaration of its vehement
objection to the operation of lotto and all forms of gambling. It is likewise a valid exercise of the
provincial government's police power under the General Welfare Clause of Republic Act 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.
For his part, respondent Calvento argues that the questioned resolution is, in effect, a
curtailment of the power of the state since in this case the national legislature itself had already
declared lotto as legal and permitted its operations around the country.

Issue:
Whether Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna and
the denial of a mayor's permit based thereon are valid.

Ruling:
The ordinance merely states the "objection" of the council to the said game. It is but a
mere policy statement on the part of the local council, which is not self-executing. Nor could it
serve as a valid ground to prohibit the operation of the lotto system in the province of Laguna.
Moreover, as a policy statement in exercise of freedom to contrary views as that of the
national government does not mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that
go against laws duly enacted by Congress.
The game of lotto is a game of chance duly authorized by the national government through
an Act of Congress. Republic Act 1169, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 42, is the law which
grants a franchise to the PCSO and allows it to operate the lotteries. What the national legislature
expressly allows by law, such as lotto, a provincial board may not disallow by ordinance or
resolution. This is because municipal governments are only agents of the national government
and local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred upon them by Congress
as the national lawmaking body. Accordingly, the delegate cannot be superior to the principal or
exercise powers higher than those of the latter.
Case No. 67 Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp. G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994

Facts:
In 1992, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end,
it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., one of the herein
private respondents. The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was
swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353 which prohibited the
issuance of business permit and cancelled existing business permit to any establishment for the
using and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation of casino.
Additionally, on January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93, an ordinance
prohibiting the operation of casino and providing penalty for violation thereof.

Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals. On March 31, 1993, the Court
of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their
enforcement. Reconsideration of this decision was denied on July 13, 1993. Hence, this petition
for review.

Issue:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 3355 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City are valid.

Ruling:
No, the Ordinances are not valid. One of the tests for an ordinance to be valid is that it
must not contravene the Constitution or any statute. The reason for this is because municipal
corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the
legislature. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by
Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate then cannot be superior to the principal
or exercise powers higher than those of the latter.
The ordinances in question contravene P.D. 1869, which authorized casino gambling, and
the public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising the power
conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. P.D. 1869 has the status of a statute
that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance.
Thus, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact
Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance
No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos.
Case No. 68 Solicitor General v. MMDA G.R. NO. 102782 December 11, 1991
Facts:
In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District v. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, G.R.
No. 91023, promulgated on July 13, 1990,the Court held that the confiscation of the license plates
of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the
Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605. It was there also observed that even the confiscation
of driver's licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed
by the decree to be imposed by the Commission.
Subsequently, several complaints were lodged to the Court alleging that their driver's
license was confiscated by traffic enforcers upon alleged violations of traffic rules.
It has been called to Court’s attention the enactment by the Metropolitan Manila Authority
of Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, providing that it, thru the Traffic Operations Center, is
authorized to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/unattended/abandoned motor
vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila.Such provision appears
to be in conflict with the decision of the Court in the case mentioned earlier. The Authority however
argued that the decision itself said that the confiscation of license plates was invalid in the
absence of a valid law or ordinance, which was why Ordinance No. 11 was enacted.
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, expressed the view that the ordinance was null
and void as an invalid exercise of legislative power because it violated existing law, specifically
PD 1605, which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the
confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila.

Issue:
Whether or not the ordinance is an invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power hence,
null and void.

Ruling:
The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such
measures. However, on the issue of whether such delegated power has been validly exercised,
the Court ruled in the negative.
A municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit
but may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 7) must be general and consistent with
public policy.
A careful study of the Gonong decision shows that the measures under consideration do
not pass the first criterion because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD
1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's
licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. In fact, its provisions prohibit the
imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila.
The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains
itself. Local political subdivisions are mere agents vested with what is called the power of
subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot
contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the case at bar, the enactments
in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the
force and effect of a statute.
Case No. 69 Balacuit vs. CFI of Agusan del Norte 163 SCRA 182 June 30, 1988
Facts:
Petitioners are managers of the Maya and Dalisay Theaters, the Crown Theater, and the
Diamond Theater. Aggrieved by the effect of Ordinance No. 640, petitioners attack the validity
and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 on the grounds that it is ultra vires and an invalid
exercise of police power.

Ordinance No. 640 penalizes any person, group of persons, entity, or corporation
engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions,
games, contests, or other performances to require children between seven (7) and twelve (12)
years of age to pay full payment for admission tickets intended for adults but should charge only
one-half of the value of the said tickets.

Issue:
W/N Ordinance No. 640 is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
Yes. To invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest of
the public generally requires an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.
The Court agrees with the petitioners that the ordinance is not justified by any necessity
for the public interest. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and
welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means.
The ordinance does not provide a safeguard against this undesirable practice and as such,
the respondent City of Butuan now suggests that birth certificates be exhibited by movie house
patrons to prove the age of children. This is, however, not at all practicable. We can see that the
ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressive upon the business of petitioners.
Moreover, there is no discernible relation between the ordinance and the promotion of public
health, safety, morals and the general welfare.
Nonetheless, as to the question of the subject ordinance being a valid exercise of police
power, the same must be resolved in the negative. While it is true that a business may be
regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the
regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to
an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or
calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the
exercise of police power.
Case No. 70 Fernando vs. St. Scholastica's College 693 SCRA 141 March 12, 2013
Facts:
Respondent SSC is the owner of four (4) parcels of land. The property is enclosed by a
tall concrete perimeter fence built some thirty (30) years ago. Abutting the fence along the West
Drive are buildings, facilities, and other improvements.
The petitioners are the officials of the City Government of Marikina. On September 30,
1994, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Marikina City enacted Ordinance No. 192, entitled
"Regulating the Construction of Fences and Walls in the Municipality of Marikina."
On April 2, 2000, the City Government of Marikina sent a letter to the respondents ordering
them to demolish and replace the fence of their Marikina property to make it 80% see-thru, and,
at the same time, to move it back about six (6) meters to provide parking space for vehicles to
park.
Issue:
WN Ordinance No. 192, imposing a five-meter setback a valid exercise of police power?
Ruling:
No. To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment
of an ordinance and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, two tests have been
used by the Court―the rational relationship test and the strict scrutiny test. The Court has often
applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges. Using the rational
basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate
governmental interest. Under intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively examined
and the availability of less restrictive measures is considered. Applying strict scrutiny, the focus
is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the
absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest. Even without going to a discussion
of the strict scrutiny test, Ordinance No. 192, series of 1994 must be struck down for not being
reasonably necessary to accomplish the City’s purpose. More importantly, it is oppressive of
private rights.
Regarding the beautification purpose of the setback requirement, it has long been settled
that the State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the
beneficial use of their property solely to preserve or enhance the aesthetic appearance of the
community. The Court, thus, finds Section 5 to be unreasonable and oppressive as it will
substantially divest the respondents of the beneficial use of their property solely for aesthetic
purposes. Accordingly, Section 5 of Ordinance No. 192 is invalid.
Compelling the respondents to construct their fence in accordance with the assailed
ordinance is, thus, a clear encroachment on their right to property, which necessarily includes
their right to decide how best to protect their property. It also appears that requiring the exposure
of their property via a see-thru fence is violative of their right to privacy, considering that the
residence of the Benedictine nuns is also located within the property.
Case No. 71 Tañada vs. Angara 272 SCRA 18 May 02, 1997
Facts:
Petitioners believe that the ratification of the Philippines to World Trade Organization will
be detrimental to the growth of our National Economy and against to the “Filipino First” policy.
The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the
reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides
new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more
investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as
viewed by the signatory Senators, a “free market” espoused by WTO.
Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the provisions of our constitution, since
the said Agreement is an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because it meant
that Congress could not pass legislation that would be good for national interest and general
welfare if such legislation would not conform to the WTO Agreement.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the petition present a justiciable controversy.
2. Whether the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
contravene the provisions of Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, all of the
1987 Philippine Constitution.
Ruling:
1. Justiciable. In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it
contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where
an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. “The
question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to
assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld.” Once a “controversy as to the
application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in
the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional
mandate to decide.”
2. No. All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favour of Filipino goods,
services, labour and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business
exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits
protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that
are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy.
It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the
Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of
foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either.
In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on
foreign competition that is unfair.
The WTO reliance on “most favored nation,” “national treatment,” and “trade without
discrimination” cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of
equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade
policy based on “equality and reciprocity,” the fundamental law encourages industries that
are “competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby demonstrating a clear
policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual
development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets.
Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to
compete internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and
managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper
against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.
Case No. 72 M. H. Wylie vs. Rarang 209 SCRA 357 May 28, 1992
Facts:
M. H. Wylie was the assistant administrative officer while petitioner Capt. James Williams
was the commanding officer of the U. S. Naval Base Olongapo City. Private respondent Aurora I.
Rarang was an employee in the office of the Provost Marshal assigned as merchandise control
guard.
M. H. Wylie, supervised the publication of the "Plan of the Day" (POD) which was
published daily by the US Naval Base station. On February 3, 1978, the POD made a publication,
under the "NAVSTA ACTION LINE INQUIRY" which mentioned a certain person named “Auring”
who is described as a disgrace to her division and to the Office of the Provost Marshal.
The private respondent was the only one who was named "Auring" in the Office of the
Provost Marshal. The private respondent then commenced an action for damages against M. H.
Wylie, Capt. James Williams and the U. S. Naval Base. She alleged that the article constituted
false, injurious, and malicious defamation and libel tending to impeach her honesty, virtue and
reputation exposing her to public hatred, contempt and ridicule.
Issue:
Whether or not the officials of the United States Naval Base are immune from suit.
Ruling:

No. The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts
claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra
vires or where there is showing of bad faith.

It is to be noted, however, that the petitioners were sued in their personal capacities for
their alleged tortious acts in publishing a libellous article.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code prescribes a civil liability for damages caused by a person's
act or omission constituting fault or negligence, to wit:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

"Fault" or "negligence" in this Article covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also
acts criminal in character, whether intentional or voluntary or negligent."

Indeed the imputation of theft contained in the POD dated February 3, 1978 is a
defamation against the character and reputation of the private respondent. Petitioner Wylie
himself admitted that the Office of the Provost Marshal explicitly recommended the deletion of the
name Auring if the article were published. The petitioners, however, were negligent because
under their direction they issued the publication without deleting the name "Auring." Such act or
omission is ultra vires and cannot be part of official duty. It was a tortious act which ridiculed the
private respondent. As a result of the petitioners' act, the private respondent, according to the
record, suffered besmirched reputation, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation,
specially so, since the article was baseless and false. The petitioners, alone, in their personal
capacities are liable for the damages they caused the private respondent.
Case No. 73 Deutsche Bank Ag Manila Branch v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
G.R. No. 188550 August 19, 2013
Facts:
Pursuant to the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, the petitioner remitted to the
respondent the amount of Php. 67,688,553.51, representing 15% of the Branch Profit Remittance
Tax (BPRT) on its Regular Banking Unit (RBU) net income remitted to the Deutsche Bank of
Germany for 2002 and prior taxable years.
Believing that they made an overpayment of the BPRT, the petitioner filed with the BIR
Large Taxpayers Assessment and Investigation Division an administrative claim for refund or a
tax credit representing the alleged excess BPRT paid. The petitioner also requested from the
International Tax Affairs Division (ITAD) for a confirmation of its entitlement to a preferential tax
rate of 10% under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty.
CTA denied the petition for review, reiterating its claim for refund or tax credit certificate
representing the alleged excess BPRT paid on the ground that the application for tax treaty relief
was not filed with the ITAD prior to the payment of BPRT, thereby violating the 15-day period
mandated under Sec. III (2) of the Revenue Memorandum Order No. 1-2000. Also, the CTA relied
on an en bank decision that before the benefits of a tax treaty may be extended to a foreign
corporation; the latter should invoke the provisions of the tax treaty and prove that they indeed
apply to the corporation.
Issue:
Whether or not the failure to strictly comply with the provisions of RMO No. 1-2000 will
deprive persons or corporations the benefit of a tax treaty.
Ruling:
No. The Constitution provides for the adherence to the general principles of international
law as part of the land (Art. II, Sec. 2). Every treaty is binding upon the parties, and obligations
must be performed (Art. 26, Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties). There is nothing in RMO
No. 1-2000 indicating a deprivation of entitlement to a tax treaty for failure to comply with the 15-
day period. The denial of availment of tax relief for the failure to apply within the prescribed period
would impair the value of the tax treaty. Also, the obligation to comply with the tax treaty must
take precedence over the objective of RMO No. 1-2000 because the non-compliance with tax
treaties would have negative implications on international affairs and would discourage foreign
investments.
Case No. 74 Bayan Muna v. Romulo G.R. No. 159618 February 1, 2011
Facts:
In 2000, the RP, through Charge d’Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute
which, by its terms, is “subject to ratification, acceptance or approval” by the signatory states.
In 2003, via Exchange of Notes with the US government, the RP, represented by then DFA
Secretary Ople, finalized a non-surrender agreement which aimed to protect certain persons of
the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in
international tribunals.
Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying the
Agreement and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without
force and effect.
Issue:
1. Did respondents abuse their discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
concluding the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement in contravention of the Rome Statute?
2. Is the agreement valid, binding and effective without the concurrence by at least 2/3 of all
the members of the Senate?
Ruling:
The Agreement does not contravene or undermine, nor does it differ from, the Rome
Statute. Far from going against each other, one complements the other. As a matter of fact, the
principle of complementarity underpins the creation of the ICC. According to Art. 1 of the Statute,
the jurisdiction of the ICC is to “be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions [of the
signatory states].” the Rome Statute expressly recognizes the primary jurisdiction of states, like
the RP, over serious crimes committed within their respective borders, the complementary
jurisdiction of the ICC coming into play only when the signatory states are unwilling or unable to
prosecute.
Also, under international law, there is a considerable difference between a State-Party
and a signatory to a treaty. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a signatory state
is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty. The
Philippines is only a signatory to the Rome Statute and not a State-Party for lack of ratification by
the Senate. Thus, it is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose
of the Rome Statute. Any argument obliging the Philippines to follow any provision in the treaty
would be premature. And even assuming that the Philippines is a State-Party, the Rome Statute
still recognizes the primacy of international agreements entered into between States, even when
one of the States is not a State-Party to the Rome Statute.
The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of
subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days
of our history, we have entered executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and
consular relations, most favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection,
postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of these has never
been seriously questioned by our courts.
Executive agreements may be validly entered into without such concurrence. As the
President wields vast powers and influence, her conduct in the external affairs of the nation is, as
Bayan would put it, “executive altogether.” The right of the President to enter into or ratify binding
executive agreements has been confirmed by long practice.
Case No. 75 Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Sandiganbayan, Major General
Josephus Q. Ramas and Elizabeth Dimaano, respondents. G.R. No. 104768. July 21, 2003
Facts:
Pursuant to Executive No. 1, creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) issued by then President Corazon Aquino, PCGG was tasked to recover all ill-gotten
wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates
and close associates. EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power (a) to conduct investigation as
may be necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the purposes of this order and the power
(h) to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this
order. Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-
Graft Board (AFP Board) tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices
by AFP personnel, whether in the active service or retired. Based on its mandate, the AFP Board
investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major General Josephus
Q. Ramas (Ramas). The AFP Board recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be
prosecuted and tried for violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and RA 1379, as amended, otherwise known as The Act for the Forfeiture
of Unlawfully Acquired Property. Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture
under Republic Act No. 1379 (RA No. 1379) against Ramas. The Court held in Migrino that the
PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers by reason of mere
position held without a showing that they are subordinates of former President Marcos.
Issue:

 Whether the PCGG has the jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing of a forfeiture
petition against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379
Ruling:
NO. The PCGG created the AFP Board to investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt
practices of AFP personnel, whether in the active service or retired. The PCGG tasked the AFP
Board to make the necessary recommendations to appropriate government agencies on the
action to be taken based on its findings. The PCGG gave this task to the AFP Board pursuant to
the PCGGs power under Section 3 of EO No. 1 to conduct investigation as may be necessary in
order to accomplish and to carry out the purposes of this order. EO No. 1 gave the PCGG specific
responsibilities.
The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained wealth and
corrupt practices of AFP personnel who fall under either of the two categories mentioned in
Section 2 of EO No. 1. These are: (1) AFP personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth
during the administration of former President Marcos by being the latters immediate family,
relative, subordinate or close associate, taking undue advantage of their public office or using
their powers, influence x x x; or (2) AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft and corruption
provided the President assigns their cases to the PCGG.
Petitioner, however, does not claim that the President assigned Ramas case to the
PCGG. Therefore, Ramas case should fall under the first category of AFP personnel before the
PCGG could exercise its jurisdiction over him. However, we hold that Ramas was not a
subordinate of former President Marcos in the sense contemplated under EO No. 1 and its
amendments.
Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a subordinate as
this term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed close association
with former President Marcos. Migrino discussed this issue in this wise:
Ramas position alone as Commanding General of the Philippine Army with the rank of
Major General does not suffice to make him a subordinate of former President Marcos for
purposes of EO No. 1 and its amendments. The PCGG has to provide a prima facie showing that
Ramas was a close associate of former President Marcos, in the same manner that business
associates, dummies, agents or nominees of former President Marcos were close to him. Such
close association is manifested either by Ramas complicity with former President Marcos in the
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by the deposed President or by former President Marcos
acquiescence in Ramas own accumulation of ill-gotten wealth if any.
Case No. 76 DR. LAMPA I. PANDI and DR. JARMILA B. MACACUA, petitioners, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, and DR. AMER A. SABER, respondents. | G.R. No. 116850. April 11,
2002

Facts:

On August 9, 1993, Macacua, in her capacity as Regional Director and as Secretary of

the Department of Health of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao ("DOH" and "ARMM",
respectively, for brevity), issued a Memorandum designating Pandi, who was then DOH-ARMM
Assistant Regional Secretary, as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. In the
same Memorandum, Macacua detailed Dr. Mamasao Sani ("Sani" for brevity), then the provincial
health officer of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur, to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office in Cotabato
City. On September 15, 1993, Lanao del Sur Provincial Governor Mahid M. Mutilan issued Office
Order No. 07 designating Saber also as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. On
August 12, 1993, Sani filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Sur, Branch
10, Marawi City challenging the August 9, 1993 Memorandum transferring him to the DOH-ARMM
Regional Office in Cotabato City, alleging that he is the holder of a permanent appointment as
provincial health officer of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. On the other hand, Saber filed with
the Court of Appeals a petition for quo warranto with prayer for preliminary injunction, claiming
that he is the lawfully designated Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the application of the law to the designation of Saber

2. Whether or not the application of the law to the appointment and transfer of Sani
3. Whether or not the application of the law to the designation of Pandi

Ruling:

1. Lanao del Sur Provincial Governor Mahid M. Mutilan designated Saber as Officer-in-
Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur, on September 15, 1993. On this date the
provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur was still a national government official paid
entirely from national funds. The provincial health officer was still appointed by the national
Secretary of Health to a region and not to a province. The Secretary of Health exercised
supervision and control over the provincial health officer. The Secretary of Health was also
the official authorized by law to assign the provincial health officer to any province within
the region. Indisputably, on September 15, 1993, Provincial Governor Mutilan had no
power to designate Saber as Officer-in-Charge of IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur.
Consequently, the designation of Saber as such Officer-in-Charge is void.
2. However, on November 6, 1993, Macacua issued another Memorandum reiterating Sani’s
detail or assignment to the Regional Office in Cotabato City. This second Memorandum
was issued after the issuance of Executive Order No. 133 which expressly transferred
"supervision and control over all functions and activities of the Regional Department of
Health" to "the Head of the Regional Department of Health." In Gen. Renato de Villa vs.
City of Bacolod, this Court ruled that the power of administrative control encompasses the
power to transfer personnel who under the law may be reassigned to other stations. The
second detail or assignment of Sani to the Regional Office in Cotabato, issued on
November 6, 1993, is within the authority of Macacua as Regional Secretary of Health.
Thus, the second detail of Sani is valid.
3. As Regional Secretary of Health, Macacua was, as of November 6, 1993, the official
vested by law to exercise supervision and control over all provincial health offices in the
ARMM. The Regional Secretary, by virtue of Executive Order No. 133, assumed the
administrative powers and functions of the Secretary of Health of the National Government
with respect to provincial health offices within the ARMM. The official exercising
supervision and control over an office has the administrative authority to designate, in the
interest of public service, an Officer-in-Charge if the office becomes vacant. Macacua,
therefore, had the authority on November 6, 1993 to designate an Officer-in-Charge in the
provincial health office of Lanao del Sur pending the appointment of the permanent
provincial health officer. After the effectivity of the ARMM Local Code, the Regional
Secretary of Health lost the authority to make such a designation.