Magnitskiy1 PDF

From: Wayne Allensworth <swallen@1scom.
net>
Sent time: 06/11/2016 07:09:18 AM
To: Robert Otto <robertotto25@gmail.com>
Subject: RE: Viktor Ivanov

That’s why I wrote “could be” in that same para—But I should have written something like “supposedly” or “reportedly” in the
first sentence, so I’ll come back to it and qualify the remark. I ‘ve written dozens of times and did again this time that when one
of these things starts—a campaign, a personnel reshuffle, a shakeup—that a lot of reasons that may have had nothing to do
with the initial motive start coming into play as scores are settled, so that’s always something to keep in mind.

From: Robert Otto [mailto:robertotto25@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, June 11, 2016 3:25 AM
To: Wayne Allensworth <swallen@1scom.net>
Subject: Viktor Ivanov

All this stuff about the guys resigning and their ties to Viktor might be true…..but then again might not.

I’ve followed Voronin, for example, for years and the VI connection comes up ONLY after he resigns and
Big Vik has lost and refused another post.

Why didn’t it come up with Russo Chekisto or Magnitskiy or the NDS scams?

All of these leaks about the relationship may just be misdirection and there are other reasons for what’s going
on.

From: Bob <robertotto25@gmail.com>
Sent time: 06/30/2016 05:59:13 PM
To: Peter Reddaway <pbreddaway@gmail.com>
Cc: Wayne Allensworth <swallen@1scom.net>
Subject: Re: Internet Notes 10 June 2016

His Krysha was Murov who could no longer protect him and was ousted several weeks after the arrest.
Sent from my iPad
On Jun 30, 2016, at 6:05 PM, Peter Reddaway <pbreddaway@gmail.com> wrote:
Thanks for this, Wayne.
In the period c. 2004-2010, which I studied for the paper I sent you 3 weeks ago, DM was very
aggressive and was clearly under a St Petersburg krysha, which I think meant, ultimately at least,
Bortnikov. So his arrest in March might be a warning to Bortnikov, although a lot of water may
have flown under the bridge since the period I was studying.
Best,
Peter
On Mon, Jun 13, 2016 at 10:35 AM, Wayne Allensworth <swallen@1scom.net> wrote:
Peter, thanks for this—Mikhalchenko was arrested. It was reported in the notes for 30 March. He has come up in
the 31 March, 26, 27, and 31 May and on 7, 9, and 10 June. I referred back to the notes form 2007 that claimed
Mikhalchenko was involved in Tsepov’s murder. I’ll search again and see if anything turns up earlier than that.
Here’s the bit on MIkhalchenko being taken into custody from 30 March:
Dmitriy Mikhalchenko taken into custody (The FSB vs FSO/Culture Ministry scandal)
See yesterday’s notes…
http://en.news-4-u.ru/basmanny-court-has-arrested-billionaire-mikhalchenko-in-the-case-of-smuggling-of-elite-
alcohol.html
Moscow’s Basmanny court has approved that the head of the holding «Forum» Dmitry Mikhalchenko,
previously questioned in a criminal case of alcohol smuggling, be taken into custody for two months.
Judge Andrey Karpov dismissed the request that the businessman be released on bail of 50 million rubles
according to «Interfax».
Mikhalchenko categorically denied his involvement in smuggling or any plans to hide from the
investigation. The businessman also told the jury about attempts to pressure his business, in particular
the construction of a deep water port Bronka, which has been headed by OOO «Phoenix».
…The Russian billionaire is accused of smuggling alcohol in 2015, creating an organized crime group
that shipped the alcohol from the port of Hamburg under the guise of construction sealant.
…Mikhalchenko was accused of smuggling of alcoholic beverages in an organized group in especially
large quantity (part 3 of article 200.2 of the Criminal Code). His Deputy Boris Chorevski, Deputy
Director of OOO «Logistik Central Northwest», Anatoly Kindzerskaya, and the Director of «South-East
trading company», Ilya Pichko, were also detained.
According to some media reports, Mikhalchenko arrived in Moscow on March 28 and was detained the
next day. According to «Fontanka.ru», the detention took place on Wednesday morning. He was
detained by investigators of the central apparatus of the FSB and was taken to the Investigative
Committee. He was detained for two days...
Mikhalchenko’s name was previously mentioned in connection with a case of multi-million
embezzlement uncovered in the Ministry of Culture….He is the General Director of a management
company, «Forum».
On March 15 and 17, the General Director of CJSC Baltstroy (part of the Forum holding), Dmitry
Sergeev, and Baltstroy’s Alexander Kochenov were taken into custody on order of Moscow’s Lefortovo
court. They are suspects in the case of a multimillion embezzlement of budget funds allocated for the
restoration of a number of cultural heritage sites.
The main suspect in this case is the Deputy Minister of Culture, Gregory Pirumov. On 24 March he was
charged with charged with fraud.

From: Peter Reddaway [mailto:pbreddaway@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, June 11, 2016 5:54 PM
To: Wayne Allensworth <swallen@1scom.net>; Robert Otto <robertotto25@gmail.com>
H
i Wayne and Bob,

This is just a quick note about Tsepov, Sechin, and Mikhalchenko,
whom you've discussed in two recent issues, Wayne, quoting a reader
who I suspect is you, Bob.

Between c. 2004 and 2011 I did a lot of research on these and related
folks, putting the results into a 70 pp paper, which is supposed to be
published soon in an e-journal ("Putin & the Silovik Wars").

What struck me about Mikhalchenko were his extraordinary youth
(about 30 in 2005?), his great personal ambition for wealth and power,
and his skill at cultivating the Leningrad KGB. I don't recall any ties to
Moscow or the likes of Sechin or Zolotov - he was too young.

Also, over the 5-6 years after Tsepov was assassinated, I don't recall
anyone raising the possibility that Mikhalchenko was in any way
involved. Certainly he jumped in aggressively and took over large
chunks of Tsepov's empire, so he could theoretically have had a motive
in this regard. But this was also the opportunistic way you'd simply
expect someone of his character to act.

To conclude, one question - did you mean it when you wrote 2-3 times
that he had recently been arrested, and if so, for what and when?. And
one small factual point: the business co-run by Tsepov and Zolotov was
Baltik-Eskort (not -Eksport).

With thanks once again to both of you for the prodigious amount of
outstanding work that you produce day in and day out,

Yours,

Peter

On Fri, Jun 10, 2016 at 6:29 PM, Wayne Allensworth <swallen@1scom.net> wrote:
Internet Notes 10 June 2016
More changes at FSB (Feoktistov; Mikhalchenko). 1
Mikhalchenko and the Tsepov murder?. 2
More from Rosbalt on the FSB personnel changes. 4
Strelkov’s site: The end is near?. 4
Russia’s “Brain drain”. 6
The Duma vs. Ilya Ponomarev. 7
News aggregators will be regulated. 7
French bank closes Russian diplomats’ accounts. 8
Central Bank lowers key interest rate. 8
More changes at FSB (Feoktistov; Mikhalchenko)
http://www.rosbalt.ru/moscow/2016/06/10/1522030.html
The heads (no names given) of the FSB’s Directorates “P” and “T” have resigned. Those two directorates, along
with “K,” whose head, Viktor Voronin, has also resigned, form the backbone of the FSB’s Economic Security
Service (SEB). Directorate P handles industrial counterintelligence, while T handles transportation, including
Russian Railways and aviation. The head of FSB SEB, Yuri Yakovlev, is supposedly on his way out as well.
Rosbalt’s sources say that the likely successor for Yakovlev at FSB SEB is the FSB’s head of the internal
security directorate (USB) Sergey Korolev. Korolev could be replaced by his deputy, Oleg Feoktistov. The
FSB USB’s Ivan Tkachev is reportedly to take over at Directorate K.
Comment: I wonder whether the people at Directorates P and T were also connected to Viktor Ivanov,
as Voronin and Romodanovskiy were. See yesterday’s notes. True, both were also supposedly linked
to Mikhalchenko, as was Murov, but “clan” lines tend to overlap and the key players all know one
another. It could be that Ivanov’s departure, as I suggested yesterday, was the beginning of the
unravelling of his “clan” network within the special services and in other key areas as well—such as
Larisa Kalanda leaving her posts at Rosneft/Rosneftegaz. Mikhalchenko’s name could be dropped as
a pretext to go after Ivanov’s people.
Feoktistov has come up in these notes before in the material on the GUEBiPK scandal mentioned in
yesterday’s notes. Here’s a bit from the 14 May 2014 notes that mentions him:
[More updates on the GUEBiPK scandal story:
Novaya Gazeta refutes Sugrobov’s (his deputy Kolesnikov, also arrested, has made the same claim) claim he knew nothing
about the “provocations” and did not know the provocateurs used by the GUEBiPK in allegedly setting up and framing a
number of officials. Novaya has information that he at least knew the GUEBiPK agent Sergey Pirozhkov dating back to 2009,
when Pirozhkov worked in the then MVD Department for Economic Security (now the GUEBiPK):
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/inquests/63516.html
In an open letter to Putin, posted on Facebook by his lawyer, Anton Tsetkov, Sugrobov blames his troubles on rivals in the FSB
and SK—he blames the SK for fouling up a number of corruption cases (an implies that they were protecting corrupt officials
and undermining Putin’s anti-corruption campaign). Sugrobov also denies that he is married to Presidential Aide Konstantin
Chuiychenko’s wife’s sister or that he has benefited from Chuiychenko’s patronage (as a number of our sources have reported).
He further claims that FSB General Feoktistov approached him in 2011, urging him to establish relations with one time 1st Deputy
Head of the MVD Economic Security Unit, Khorev (Feoktistov claimed that Khorev, implicated in the tax-rebate schemes that
involved the Tax Service and were connected to the Magnitskiy affair [See, for instance, the 20 March 2012 notes], was set to
become head of a reorganized economic security/anti-corruption unit, the GUEBiPK, and would agree to name Sugrobov his
deputy. But Sugrobov refused to go along; Comment: We had read that part of the struggle involving the GUEBiPK was
between supporters of Khorev and backers of Sugrobov. See the 1 April notes; Novaya Gazeta’s Kanev wrote on the ties
between Feoktistov and Khorev back in 2011: http://www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2011/107/28.html). Sugrobov ends by saying he
is willing to take a polygraph test and calls on Putin to make sure the investigations of the charges against him and his
subordinates are “objective”: http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?
fbid=700657453313675&set=pcb.700658349980252&type=1&theater]
Comment: For any of that to make sense, readers will have to refer back to summation of the
GUEBiPK scandal (up to that point) I included in the 31 March notes. The GUEBiPK’s Sugrobov was
connected by our sources to Mevdedev’s “lawyer/classmates” faction, among them Konstantin
Chuiychenko, mentioned above. Recall this bit from yesterday’s notes:
[This item http://www.moscow-post.com/politics/kto_za_vse_v_otvete21249/
…claims that charges against Voronin have to do with “K’s” involvement in the case against the MVD’s economic security/anti-
corruption unit, the GUEBiPK, a case in which the former head of that unit, Denis Sugrobov, was arrested and still awaits trial on
corruption charges stemming from claims that he and his subordinates fabricated cases against businesses, among other things.
Sugrobov’s deputy, Boris Kolesnikov was also arrested (Comment: And died under strange circumstances while in custody).
The GUEBiPK scandal dealt a serious blow to Medvedev’s entourage—and some say that Voronin’s departure from the FSB
SEB was revenge by some of Medvedev’s people for the GUEBiPK case.
Comment: Russia’s overlapping money laundering channels are vast and involve lots of games—apart from the Magnitskiy
affair, recall the lengthy GUEBiPK scandal, which pointed to a clash between the MVD economic security department
(probably allied with elements in the Prosecutor’s office) and the FSB and its allies in the Investigative Committee. The battle
was said to be over controlling money laundering channels. See the 31 March notes for a rehash of the GUEBiPK affair.]
On Mikhalchenko—recall the bit from yesterday’s notes linking him to the Tsepov murder back in 2004:
[Mikhalchenko and the Tsepov murder?
Comment: I recently covered Putin’s connections to organized crime in St. Petersburg, connections that included Tsepov, in
the 30 March notes. Briefly put, Tsepov was a racketeer and one time all-around fixer and bodyguard for Mayor Sobchak in St.
Petersburg. Tsepov was the co-founder, along with Putin bodyguard Viktor Zolotov, of a St. Petersburg security firm, Baltic
Eksport. Tsepov apparently tried to insinuate himself into the Yukos affair as a mediator—I suspected at the time that this was
the reason he was assassinated. Zolotov attended Tsepov’s funeral. The killing of Tsepov shook up the elite, creating quite a
scandal. I had Sechin and Deripaska, who was also interested in Yukos, as likely suspects in the murder—Tsepov reportedly
tried to pass himself off as Deripaska’s representative. There have been claims that Tsepov, like Litvinenko, was poisoned
with polonium.
This item (http://putinism.wordpress.com/2016/01/29/roma_tsepov/#more-146), an update to an earlier article on Putin and
Tsepov, claims that “FSB agent Dmitriy Mikhachenko” killed Tsepov with polonium-poisoned tea at the St. Petersburg FSB
office. Mikhalchenko subsequently took over Tsepov’s businesses. Zolotov had been Tsepov’s patron, but Mikhalchenko had
the FSB’s Bortnikov as a krysha. Thus, Zolotov and Bortnikov have long been enemies—Nemtsov was killed by Kadyrov and
Zolotov, the investigation conducted under Bortnikov.
An e-mail from the reader who sent this: The article is a bit strange since the recent info is that Mikhalchenko is all mobbed up with the
FSO/Murov and the target of the FSB.
That said, if Mikhalchenko was involved, we have a reason to think there’s enmity between Mikhalchenko and Zolotov (and maybe Murov,
too since he seems to be the Mikhalchenko krysha now) ……..and Zolotov and Bortnikov?
In 2004, when Tsepov was murdered, Bortnikov was out of StP, btw. Up to February 2004 he headed the FSB in StP, but he then went to
head the FSB’s SEB (when he met Voronin?), taking the one time allegedly super influential Zaostrovtsev’s (tri kita) place.
Yuriy Ignashchenkov took Bortnikov’s place in StP and was serving (no pun intended) when Tsepov was poisoned in September.
In short, just how much — if not all — of this stuff a provocation is not clear, but that doesn’t make it less interesting in light of all the other
stuff going on…]
Comment: I included quite a bit of material on Mikhalchenko’s possible involvement in the Tsepov
murder in notes from years past. In the 5 September 2007 notes, for instance, I included material on
Chayka’s campaign against Tambov gangster Vladimir Kumarin—and one item had Kumarin as
possibly being involved in the Tsepov assassination, with he and Sechin using Mikhalchenko as part of
the plan to get rid of Tsepov. Tsepov was connected with all the St. Petersburg siloviky, but his
stronger connections were with the MVD and FSO, Mikhalchenko’s supposedly with the FSB, as in
the item above.
Mikhalchenko took over Tsepov’s niche in St. Petersburg after Tsepov’s death. In those notes, I had
Sechin, Kumarin and their allies in the FSB killing Tsepov because he tried to insinuate himself into
the Yukos affair and represented a roadblock to Kumarin’s friend Mikhalchenko’s ambition to take
over Tsepov’s security business/fixer role in St. Petersburg. I had also suspected Deripaska, who may
have been irritated by Tsepov’s reported overstepping in presenting himself as a Deripaska (without
D’s consent) rep in secret talks on the fate of Yukos—but here’s an important point: Deripaska was
supposedly close at the time to Murov/FSO and Zolotov. And Zolotov was a close friend of Tsepov’s.
So it made sense to at that point have Sechin as the stronger suspect for using his FSB connections
and Mikhalchenko to kill Tsepov.
The problem we have is that more recently—and this is a number of years later, to be sure—our
sources had Murov as Mikhalchenko’s patron and krysha. Things can change, of course—maybe
Mikhalchenko’s FSB connections were to people closer to Patrushev than the man who would succeed
him at FSB, Bortnikov, and a re-alignment took place after a number of changes in the “power block”
and after Mikhalchenko had established himself as Tsepov’s successor. What’s more, we also have
some sources saying that Zolotov drifted apart from his old boss, Murov, and was pleased to replace
him with his own man, Kochnev, as head of the FSO. See, for instance, the notes from 27 May.
I’ve been writing these notes since 2002. The notes from summer 2004 to present are available at the
OSC site for those with access who might be interested in tracing the story back to St. Petersburg in
the 2000s.
More from Rosbalt on the FSB personnel changes
http://www.rosbalt.ru/main/2016/06/10/1522064.html
Relations between the FSB Internal Security Directorate (USB) and the FSB SEB have been strained lately—
and the strain has resulted in scandals and criminal cases. Rosbalt’s sources say it’s the FSB USB’s boss,
Korolev, who will take over at FSB SEB. His deputy, Oleg Feoktistov, will take over at USB, and Ivan
Tkachev of FSB USB will take over Directorate K. When then head of FSB USB, Aleksandr Kupryazhkin, was
promoted to FSB deputy director in 2011, Feoktistov was supposed to be his replacement, but Sergey Korolev,
a comrade of Anatoliy Serdyukov’s, got the nod…Just a couple of years ago, the USB and SEB were friendly
and cooperated in the case against the MVD GUEBiPK, but then the USB turned its attention to the SEB. In
February of last year, USB officers arrested Directorate P’s Igor Korobitsin for demanding a $1 million bribe
from the head of Rosalkogolregulirovanie, Igor Chuyan. At the beginning of this year, the USB implicated
Directorate K’s Vadim Uvarov in an extortion case involving contraband cell phones. The “shadow financial
sector” has reportedly already reacted to the personal shifts at FSB by raising its rate for legalizing large amounts
of illicit cash (“obnalichivanie” or “obnal”) to 15%...
Strelkov’s site: The end is near?
http://novorossia.pro/25yanvarya/2014-erik-lobah-vot-teper-stalo-pohozhe-na-konec.html
<image001.jpg>
One propaganda failure after another, with the starring role going to the failed successor, Medvedev and his
“there’s no money” comment. And it’s not happening without a Peskov-Volodin-Ernst conspiracy. There’s a
campaign against Medvedev, one the majority of the “Kremlin towers” support.
<image002.jpg>
They are certainly not inspiring optimism in anyone…Crimea is no longer helping the thieving regime. And within
the regime, conspiracies abound, as the system is in a stupor…
Comment: Recall that Medvedev was in Crimea and a retired woman complained about low pensions
—Medvedev told her pensions would be indexed when possible, but said “there’s no money.” He told
her to hang in there. See the 25 May notes. His remarks were mocked around the Runet. Putin said
that maybe Medvedev’s comments had been taken out of context:
http://www.newsru.com/russia/28may2016/hold_on.html And that the government was paying more attention to
fulfilling social obligations—anyway, a lot of countries were having problems with pensions…
Russia’s “Brain drain”
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russia-facing-biggest-brain-drain-in-two-
decades/571758.html
Russia is facing its biggest brain drain in the last 20 years, British newspaper The Times reported Friday.
Some 350,000 people left Russia in 2015, ten times more than five years ago. Many are highly trained and looking for
better business opportunities abroad, the newspaper said.
Forty-two percent of senior managers want to emigrate from Russia, a poll by headhunting company Agentstvo
Kontakt revealed Tuesday.
Those wishing to move said that they were motivated by more favorable conditions for developing private businesses,
better prospects of finding investors, and a higher quality of life.
The poll was conducted in May among 467 Russian high-level managers working in local or international companies.

The Duma vs. Ilya Ponomarev
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russian-state-duma-strips-opposition-deputy-ponomarev-
of-his-powers/571816.html
The Russian State Duma voted to strip opposition deputy Ilya Ponomarev of his powers for not fulfilling his duties, the
Vedomosti newspaper reported Friday.
The vote concluded with 413 deputies for and three against, all three coming from the A Just Russia opposition party:
Dmitry Gudkov, Sergei Petrov, and Ponomarev himself, voting in absentia from the United States.
During the proceedings, the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, alleged that
Ponomarev is leading anti-Russian propaganda and acting against the interests of the country.
The A Just Russia party presented the initiative, and concluded that Ponomarev has not come to the Duma in two
years, has not been working with constituents, and has not been communicating with the party. Ponomarev refutes
these claims, Vedomosti reported.
Ponomarev was the only deputy in the Duma who voted against the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. When he
traveled to California soon after, his bank accounts were frozen and he was allegedly prohibited from traveling abroad.
He has not returned to Russia since then, according to The New York Times.
In 2015 the Duma stripped him of parliamentary immunity, charged and arrested him in absentia for the embezzlement
of $750,000 from the state-funded scientific and technological Skolkovo Foundation. Ponomarev had worked with
Skolkovo as a lecturer, and in 2011-12 he managed part of the foundation’s projects while working closely with then-
President Dmitry Medvedev.
News aggregators will be regulated
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russia-state-duma-passes-law-regulating-news-
aggregators/571817.html
Members of the Russian State Duma on Friday approved the third reading of a law regulating the work of news
aggregators, the Slon.ru news website reported. The law received unanimous support, with 319 deputies voting for the
law and none against.
The law holds news aggregators accountable for the dissemination of false information.
The law reduces fines for failing to comply with the orders of the Roskomnadzor media watchdog.
The first offense for legal entities now carries a fine of 600,000 rubles ($9,200), the first for individuals now 100,000
rubles ($1,500).
Leading Russian search engine Yandex was critical of the bill when it was first introduced, saying that its
requirements were excessive and impractical. The law requires aggregators to save the information they disseminate
for six months after publication.
Upon initial introduction in February, an explanatory note accompanying the bill stated the need for stricter regulation
of aggregators, on the basis of their audience reach and ability to influence opinion.
French bank closes Russian diplomats’ accounts
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/french-bank-closes-accounts-of-russian-diplomats/571802.html
French bank Societe Generale began closing the accounts of Russian diplomats in Paris without explanation on
Friday, the state-run RIA Novosti news agency reported.
Employees of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) have also been
affected, RIA Novosti reported, citing an unnamed source within diplomatic circles.
“At this time, while deputies of the National Assembly and the French Senate are voting on lifting the sanctions
against Russia, the French bank Societe Generale, seemingly out of fear from the U.S. side, is closing the accounts
not only of Russian citizens, but Russian diplomats as well,” the unnamed source said, RIA Novosti reported.
The French Foreign Ministry has promised to provide information on the closing of the accounts. Societe Generale
has not yet responded to RIA Novosti with comments regarding the closures.
In June 2015, the French “daughter” bank of Russia-based Vneshtorgbank (VTB) froze the accounts of Russian
companies. The accounts were reopened the following month.
Accounts of people associated with state-owned and operated news agency Rossia Segodnya were also frozen in
June 2015, a move declared illegal by a Paris court in April.
Central Bank lowers key interest rate
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russian-central-bank-lowers-key-interest-rate/571794.html
The Russian Central Bank lowered its key interest rate by 0.5 percentage points to 10.5 percent on Friday, the TASS
state news agency reported. The last time the bank lowered the interest rate was in August 2015.
Following a meeting of the Board of Directors, the bank decided to lower the rate based on recent perceived positive
trends in inflation patterns.
“The Board of Directors notes positive process of inflation stabilization, decline of inflation expectations and inflation
risks amid signs of an approaching phase of growing recovery,” the bank's report said, TASS reported.
The report said the decision was also based on positive GDP trends in Q1 of this year, as well as macroeconomic
indicators in April, which reflect the growing ability of the Russian economy to withstand fluctuations in the price of oil.
With the next meeting of the bank's Board of Directors to take place on July 29, the report mentioned the future of the
rate.
“The Russian Central Bank will consider the possibility of further reduction of the key rate, assessing inflation risks
and compliance of dynamics of inflation deceleration with the target trajectory,” the report said.
The ruble continued to fall following the announcement, but stabilized later in the day after the dollar and euro fell to
64.7 and 73.2 rubles, respectively.

From: Peter Reddaway <pbreddaway@gmail.com>
Sent time: 07/01/2016 03:18:42 PM
To: Bob <robertotto25@gmail.com>
Cc: Wayne Allensworth <swallen@1scom.net>

Thanks, Bob. I only just read this.
Peter
On Thu, Jun 30, 2016 at 8:59 PM, Bob <robertotto25@gmail.com> wrote:
His Krysha was Murov who could no longer protect him and was ousted several weeks after the arrest.
Sent from my iPad
On Jun 30, 2016, at 6:05 PM, Peter Reddaway <pbreddaway@gmail.com> wrote:
In the period c. 2004-2010, which I studied for the paper I sent you 3 weeks ago, DM was very
aggressive and was clearly under a St Petersburg krysha, which I think meant, ultimately at
least, Bortnikov. So his arrest in March might be a warning to Bortnikov, although a lot of water
may have flown under the bridge since the period I was studying.
Best,
Peter
Peter, thanks for this—Mikhalchenko was arrested. It was reported in the notes for 30 March. He has come up
in the 31 March, 26, 27, and 31 May and on 7, 9, and 10 June. I referred back to the notes form 2007 that claimed
Mikhalchenko was involved in Tsepov’s murder. I’ll search again and see if anything turns up earlier than that.
Here’s the bit on MIkhalchenko being taken into custody from 30 March:
http://en.news-4-u.ru/basmanny-court-has-arrested-billionaire-mikhalchenko-in-the-case-of-smuggling-of-elite-
alcohol.html
previously questioned in a criminal case of alcohol smuggling, be taken into custody for two months.
Judge Andrey Karpov dismissed the request that the businessman be released on bail of 50 million
rubles according to «Interfax».
Mikhalchenko categorically denied his involvement in smuggling or any plans to hide from the
investigation. The businessman also told the jury about attempts to pressure his business, in particular
the construction of a deep water port Bronka, which has been headed by OOO «Phoenix».
…The Russian billionaire is accused of smuggling alcohol in 2015, creating an organized crime group
that shipped the alcohol from the port of Hamburg under the guise of construction sealant.
…Mikhalchenko was accused of smuggling of alcoholic beverages in an organized group in especially
large quantity (part 3 of article 200.2 of the Criminal Code). His Deputy Boris Chorevski, Deputy
Director of OOO «Logistik Central Northwest», Anatoly Kindzerskaya, and the Director of «South-East
trading company», Ilya Pichko, were also detained.
According to some media reports, Mikhalchenko arrived in Moscow on March 28 and was detained the
next day. According to «Fontanka.ru», the detention took place on Wednesday morning. He was
detained by investigators of the central apparatus of the FSB and was taken to the Investigative
Committee. He was detained for two days...
Mikhalchenko’s name was previously mentioned in connection with a case of multi-million
embezzlement uncovered in the Ministry of Culture….He is the General Director of a management
company, «Forum».
On March 15 and 17, the General Director of CJSC Baltstroy (part of the Forum holding), Dmitry
Sergeev, and Baltstroy’s Alexander Kochenov were taken into custody on order of Moscow’s Lefortovo
court. They are suspects in the case of a multimillion embezzlement of budget funds allocated for the
restoration of a number of cultural heritage sites.
The main suspect in this case is the Deputy Minister of Culture, Gregory Pirumov. On 24 March he was
charged with charged with fraud.

H
i Wayne and Bob,

This is just a quick note about Tsepov, Sechin, and Mikhalchenko,
whom you've discussed in two recent issues, Wayne, quoting a reader
who I suspect is you, Bob.

Between c. 2004 and 2011 I did a lot of research on these and related
folks, putting the results into a 70 pp paper, which is supposed to be
published soon in an e-journal ("Putin & the Silovik Wars").

What struck me about Mikhalchenko were his extraordinary youth
(about 30 in 2005?), his great personal ambition for wealth and power,
and his skill at cultivating the Leningrad KGB. I don't recall any ties to

Also, over the 5-6 years after Tsepov was assassinated, I don't recall
anyone raising the possibility that Mikhalchenko was in any way
involved. Certainly he jumped in aggressively and took over large
chunks of Tsepov's empire, so he could theoretically have had a motive
in this regard. But this was also the opportunistic way you'd simply
expect someone of his character to act.

To conclude, one question - did you mean it when you wrote 2-3 times
that he had recently been arrested, and if so, for what and when?. And
one small factual point: the business co-run by Tsepov and Zolotov was

With thanks once again to both of you for the prodigious amount of
outstanding work that you produce day in and day out,

Yours,

Peter


The heads (no names given) of the FSB’s Directorates “P” and “T” have resigned. Those two directorates,
along with “K,” whose head, Viktor Voronin, has also resigned, form the backbone of the FSB’s Economic
Security Service (SEB). Directorate P handles industrial counterintelligence, while T handles transportation,
including Russian Railways and aviation. The head of FSB SEB, Yuri Yakovlev, is supposedly on his way out as
well. Rosbalt’s sources say that the likely successor for Yakovlev at FSB SEB is the FSB’s head of the internal
security directorate (USB) Sergey Korolev. Korolev could be replaced by his deputy, Oleg Feoktistov. The
FSB USB’s Ivan Tkachev is reportedly to take over at Directorate K.
Comment: I wonder whether the people at Directorates P and T were also connected to Viktor
Ivanov, as Voronin and Romodanovskiy were. See yesterday’s notes. True, both were also
supposedly linked to Mikhalchenko, as was Murov, but “clan” lines tend to overlap and the key
players all know one another. It could be that Ivanov’s departure, as I suggested yesterday, was the
beginning of the unravelling of his “clan” network within the special services and in other key areas
as well—such as Larisa Kalanda leaving her posts at Rosneft/Rosneftegaz. Mikhalchenko’s name
could be dropped as a pretext to go after Ivanov’s people.
Feoktistov has come up in these notes before in the material on the GUEBiPK scandal mentioned in
yesterday’s notes. Here’s a bit from the 14 May 2014 notes that mentions him:
Novaya Gazeta refutes Sugrobov’s (his deputy Kolesnikov, also arrested, has made the same claim) claim he knew nothing
about the “provocations” and did not know the provocateurs used by the GUEBiPK in allegedly setting up and framing a
number of officials. Novaya has information that he at least knew the GUEBiPK agent Sergey Pirozhkov dating back to 2009,
when Pirozhkov worked in the then MVD Department for Economic Security (now the GUEBiPK):
In an open letter to Putin, posted on Facebook by his lawyer, Anton Tsetkov, Sugrobov blames his troubles on rivals in the
FSB and SK—he blames the SK for fouling up a number of corruption cases (an implies that they were protecting corrupt
officials and undermining Putin’s anti-corruption campaign). Sugrobov also denies that he is married to Presidential Aide
Konstantin Chuiychenko’s wife’s sister or that he has benefited from Chuiychenko’s patronage (as a number of our sources
have reported). He further claims that FSB General Feoktistov approached him in 2011, urging him to establish relations with
one time 1st Deputy Head of the MVD Economic Security Unit, Khorev (Feoktistov claimed that Khorev, implicated in the tax-
rebate schemes that involved the Tax Service and were connected to the Magnitskiy affair [See, for instance, the 20 March
2012 notes], was set to become head of a reorganized economic security/anti-corruption unit, the GUEBiPK, and would agree
to name Sugrobov his deputy. But Sugrobov refused to go along; Comment: We had read that part of the struggle involving
the GUEBiPK was between supporters of Khorev and backers of Sugrobov. See the 1 April notes; Novaya Gazeta’s Kanev
wrote on the ties between Feoktistov and Khorev back in 2011: http://www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2011/107/28.html). Sugrobov
ends by saying he is willing to take a polygraph test and calls on Putin to make sure the investigations of the charges against
him and his subordinates are “objective”: http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?
Comment: For any of that to make sense, readers will have to refer back to summation of the
GUEBiPK scandal (up to that point) I included in the 31 March notes. The GUEBiPK’s Sugrobov
was connected by our sources to Mevdedev’s “lawyer/classmates” faction, among them Konstantin
Chuiychenko, mentioned above. Recall this bit from yesterday’s notes:
…claims that charges against Voronin have to do with “K’s” involvement in the case against the MVD’s economic
security/anti-corruption unit, the GUEBiPK, a case in which the former head of that unit, Denis Sugrobov, was arrested and
still awaits trial on corruption charges stemming from claims that he and his subordinates fabricated cases against businesses,
among other things. Sugrobov’s deputy, Boris Kolesnikov was also arrested (Comment: And died under strange
circumstances while in custody). The GUEBiPK scandal dealt a serious blow to Medvedev’s entourage—and some say that
Voronin’s departure from the FSB SEB was revenge by some of Medvedev’s people for the GUEBiPK case.
Comment: Russia’s overlapping money laundering channels are vast and involve lots of games—apart from the Magnitskiy
(probably allied with elements in the Prosecutor’s office) and the FSB and its allies in the Investigative Committee. The
battle was said to be over controlling money laundering channels. See the 31 March notes for a rehash of the GUEBiPK
affair.]
Comment: I recently covered Putin’s connections to organized crime in St. Petersburg, connections that included Tsepov, in
the 30 March notes. Briefly put, Tsepov was a racketeer and one time all-around fixer and bodyguard for Mayor Sobchak in
St. Petersburg. Tsepov was the co-founder, along with Putin bodyguard Viktor Zolotov, of a St. Petersburg security firm,
Baltic Eksport. Tsepov apparently tried to insinuate himself into the Yukos affair as a mediator—I suspected at the time that
this was the reason he was assassinated. Zolotov attended Tsepov’s funeral. The killing of Tsepov shook up the elite,
creating quite a scandal. I had Sechin and Deripaska, who was also interested in Yukos, as likely suspects in the murder—
Tsepov reportedly tried to pass himself off as Deripaska’s representative. There have been claims that Tsepov, like
Litvinenko, was poisoned with polonium.
Tsepov, claims that “FSB agent Dmitriy Mikhachenko” killed Tsepov with polonium-poisoned tea at the St. Petersburg FSB
office. Mikhalchenko subsequently took over Tsepov’s businesses. Zolotov had been Tsepov’s patron, but Mikhalchenko
had the FSB’s Bortnikov as a krysha. Thus, Zolotov and Bortnikov have long been enemies—Nemtsov was killed by Kadyrov
and Zolotov, the investigation conducted under Bortnikov.
That said, if Mikhalchenko was involved, we have a reason to think there’s enmity between Mikhalchenko and Zolotov (and maybe Murov,
too since he seems to be the Mikhalchenko krysha now) ……..and Zolotov and Bortnikov?
In 2004, when Tsepov was murdered, Bortnikov was out of StP, btw. Up to February 2004 he headed the FSB in StP, but he then went to
head the FSB’s SEB (when he met Voronin?), taking the one time allegedly super influential Zaostrovtsev’s (tri kita) place.
In short, just how much — if not all — of this stuff a provocation is not clear, but that doesn’t make it less interesting in light of all the
other stuff going on…]
Comment: I included quite a bit of material on Mikhalchenko’s possible involvement in the Tsepov
murder in notes from years past. In the 5 September 2007 notes, for instance, I included material on
Chayka’s campaign against Tambov gangster Vladimir Kumarin—and one item had Kumarin as
possibly being involved in the Tsepov assassination, with he and Sechin using Mikhalchenko as part
of the plan to get rid of Tsepov. Tsepov was connected with all the St. Petersburg siloviky, but his
stronger connections were with the MVD and FSO, Mikhalchenko’s supposedly with the FSB, as in
the item above.
Mikhalchenko took over Tsepov’s niche in St. Petersburg after Tsepov’s death. In those notes, I had
Sechin, Kumarin and their allies in the FSB killing Tsepov because he tried to insinuate himself into
the Yukos affair and represented a roadblock to Kumarin’s friend Mikhalchenko’s ambition to take
over Tsepov’s security business/fixer role in St. Petersburg. I had also suspected Deripaska, who
may have been irritated by Tsepov’s reported overstepping in presenting himself as a Deripaska
(without D’s consent) rep in secret talks on the fate of Yukos—but here’s an important point:
Deripaska was supposedly close at the time to Murov/FSO and Zolotov. And Zolotov was a close
friend of Tsepov’s. So it made sense to at that point have Sechin as the stronger suspect for using his
FSB connections and Mikhalchenko to kill Tsepov.
The problem we have is that more recently—and this is a number of years later, to be sure—our
sources had Murov as Mikhalchenko’s patron and krysha. Things can change, of course—maybe
Mikhalchenko’s FSB connections were to people closer to Patrushev than the man who would
succeed him at FSB, Bortnikov, and a re-alignment took place after a number of changes in the
“power block” and after Mikhalchenko had established himself as Tsepov’s successor. What’s more,
we also have some sources saying that Zolotov drifted apart from his old boss, Murov, and was
pleased to replace him with his own man, Kochnev, as head of the FSO. See, for instance, the notes
from 27 May.
I’ve been writing these notes since 2002. The notes from summer 2004 to present are available at
the OSC site for those with access who might be interested in tracing the story back to St. Petersburg
in the 2000s.
Relations between the FSB Internal Security Directorate (USB) and the FSB SEB have been strained lately—
and the strain has resulted in scandals and criminal cases. Rosbalt’s sources say it’s the FSB USB’s boss,
Korolev, who will take over at FSB SEB. His deputy, Oleg Feoktistov, will take over at USB, and Ivan
Tkachev of FSB USB will take over Directorate K. When then head of FSB USB, Aleksandr Kupryazhkin,
was promoted to FSB deputy director in 2011, Feoktistov was supposed to be his replacement, but Sergey
Korolev, a comrade of Anatoliy Serdyukov’s, got the nod…Just a couple of years ago, the USB and SEB were
friendly and cooperated in the case against the MVD GUEBiPK, but then the USB turned its attention to the
SEB. In February of last year, USB officers arrested Directorate P’s Igor Korobitsin for demanding a $1 million
bribe from the head of Rosalkogolregulirovanie, Igor Chuyan. At the beginning of this year, the USB implicated
Directorate K’s Vadim Uvarov in an extortion case involving contraband cell phones. The “shadow financial
sector” has reportedly already reacted to the personal shifts at FSB by raising its rate for legalizing large
amounts of illicit cash (“obnalichivanie” or “obnal”) to 15%...
<image001.jpg>
One propaganda failure after another, with the starring role going to the failed successor, Medvedev and his
“there’s no money” comment. And it’s not happening without a Peskov-Volodin-Ernst conspiracy. There’s a
campaign against Medvedev, one the majority of the “Kremlin towers” support.
<image002.jpg>
They are certainly not inspiring optimism in anyone…Crimea is no longer helping the thieving regime. And within
the regime, conspiracies abound, as the system is in a stupor…
Comment: Recall that Medvedev was in Crimea and a retired woman complained about low pensions
—Medvedev told her pensions would be indexed when possible, but said “there’s no money.” He
told her to hang in there. See the 25 May notes. His remarks were mocked around the Runet. Putin
said that maybe Medvedev’s comments had been taken out of context:
http://www.newsru.com/russia/28may2016/hold_on.html And that the government was paying more attention
to fulfilling social obligations—anyway, a lot of countries were having problems with pensions…
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russia-facing-biggest-brain-drain-in-two-
decades/571758.html
Some 350,000 people left Russia in 2015, ten times more than five years ago. Many are highly trained and looking
for better business opportunities abroad, the newspaper said.
Forty-two percent of senior managers want to emigrate from Russia, a poll by headhunting company Agentstvo
Kontakt revealed Tuesday.
Those wishing to move said that they were motivated by more favorable conditions for developing private businesses,
better prospects of finding investors, and a higher quality of life.
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russian-state-duma-strips-opposition-deputy-
ponomarev-of-his-powers/571816.html
The Russian State Duma voted to strip opposition deputy Ilya Ponomarev of his powers for not fulfilling his duties,
the Vedomosti newspaper reported Friday.
The vote concluded with 413 deputies for and three against, all three coming from the A Just Russia opposition
party: Dmitry Gudkov, Sergei Petrov, and Ponomarev himself, voting in absentia from the United States.
During the proceedings, the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, alleged that
Ponomarev is leading anti-Russian propaganda and acting against the interests of the country.
The A Just Russia party presented the initiative, and concluded that Ponomarev has not come to the Duma in two
years, has not been working with constituents, and has not been communicating with the party. Ponomarev refutes
these claims, Vedomosti reported.
Ponomarev was the only deputy in the Duma who voted against the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. When he
traveled to California soon after, his bank accounts were frozen and he was allegedly prohibited from traveling abroad.
He has not returned to Russia since then, according to The New York Times.
In 2015 the Duma stripped him of parliamentary immunity, charged and arrested him in absentia for the
embezzlement of $750,000 from the state-funded scientific and technological Skolkovo Foundation. Ponomarev had
worked with Skolkovo as a lecturer, and in 2011-12 he managed part of the foundation’s projects while working
closely with then-President Dmitry Medvedev.
Members of the Russian State Duma on Friday approved the third reading of a law regulating the work of news
aggregators, the Slon.ru news website reported. The law received unanimous support, with 319 deputies voting for
the law and none against.
The first offense for legal entities now carries a fine of 600,000 rubles ($9,200), the first for individuals now 100,000
rubles ($1,500).
Leading Russian search engine Yandex was critical of the bill when it was first introduced, saying that its
requirements were excessive and impractical. The law requires aggregators to save the information they disseminate
for six months after publication.
Upon initial introduction in February, an explanatory note accompanying the bill stated the need for stricter regulation
of aggregators, on the basis of their audience reach and ability to influence opinion.
French bank Societe Generale began closing the accounts of Russian diplomats in Paris without explanation on
Friday, the state-run RIA Novosti news agency reported.
Employees of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) have also been
affected, RIA Novosti reported, citing an unnamed source within diplomatic circles.
“At this time, while deputies of the National Assembly and the French Senate are voting on lifting the sanctions
against Russia, the French bank Societe Generale, seemingly out of fear from the U.S. side, is closing the accounts
not only of Russian citizens, but Russian diplomats as well,” the unnamed source said, RIA Novosti reported.
The French Foreign Ministry has promised to provide information on the closing of the accounts. Societe Generale
has not yet responded to RIA Novosti with comments regarding the closures.
In June 2015, the French “daughter” bank of Russia-based Vneshtorgbank (VTB) froze the accounts of Russian
companies. The accounts were reopened the following month.
Accounts of people associated with state-owned and operated news agency Rossia Segodnya were also frozen in
June 2015, a move declared illegal by a Paris court in April.
The Russian Central Bank lowered its key interest rate by 0.5 percentage points to 10.5 percent on Friday, the
TASS state news agency reported. The last time the bank lowered the interest rate was in August 2015.
Following a meeting of the Board of Directors, the bank decided to lower the rate based on recent perceived positive
trends in inflation patterns.
“The Board of Directors notes positive process of inflation stabilization, decline of inflation expectations and inflation
risks amid signs of an approaching phase of growing recovery,” the bank's report said, TASS reported.
The report said the decision was also based on positive GDP trends in Q1 of this year, as well as macroeconomic
indicators in April, which reflect the growing ability of the Russian economy to withstand fluctuations in the price of
oil.
With the next meeting of the bank's Board of Directors to take place on July 29, the report mentioned the future of
the rate.
“The Russian Central Bank will consider the possibility of further reduction of the key rate, assessing inflation risks
and compliance of dynamics of inflation deceleration with the target trajectory,” the report said.
The ruble continued to fall following the announcement, but stabilized later in the day after the dollar and euro fell to
64.7 and 73.2 rubles, respectively.

From: Wayne Allensworth <swallen@1scom.net>
Sent time: 06/18/2016 10:02:27 AM
To: Wayne and Stacy Allensworth <swallen@1scom.net>
Subject: Internet Notes 18 June 2016
Attachments: IN18June16.docx

More on the St. Petersburg Economic Forum (Putin’s speech and Q&A: Russia/NATO/ A new Cold War?; Ukraine/the
Minsk agreements; Syria/Assad/Elections; US presidential elections/Russia-US; The doping scandal/Russian soccer
fans)
Stanovaya on the Economic Forum and foreign business
Solovey on gestures to America
German foreign minister on NATO “warmongering”
fans)
See yesterday’s notes.
I did a brief summary of Putin’s speech and included a link to the Russian in yesterday’s notes. Here are excerpts from an English
version of the speech: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52178
The structural problems accumulated by the global economy still persist, and we have not yet put our economy on the growth trajectory.
Incidentally, current geopolitical tensions are related, to some extent, to economic uncertainty
and the exhausting of the old sources of growth. There is a risk it may increase or even be artificially provoked.
It is our common interest to find a creative and constructive way out of this situation.
The world’s leading economies are looking for sources of growth, and they are looking to capitalise
on the enormous existing and growing potential of digital and industrial technologies, robotics, energy,
biotechnology, medicine and other fields. Discoveries in these areas can lead to true technological revolutions,
to an explosive growth of labour productivity. This is already happening and will happen inevitably; there is
impending restructuring of entire industries, the devaluation of many facilities and assets. This will alter
the demand for skills and competencies, and competition will escalate in both traditional and emerging
markets.
In fact, even today we can see attempts to secure or even monopolise the benefits of next generation
technologies. This, I think, is the motive behind the creation of restricted areas with regulatory barriers
to reduce the cross-flow of breakthrough technologies to other regions of the world with fairly tight control over
cooperation chains for maximum gain from technological advances. We have discussed this with our
colleagues; some say it is possible. I think not. One can control the spread of certain technologies for a while,
but in today's world it would be next to impossible to keep them in a contained area, even a large area. Yet,
these efforts could lead to basic sciences, now open to sharing of knowledge and information through joint
projects, getting closed too, with separation barriers coming up.
…Over 40 states and international organisations have expressed the desire to establish a free trade zone with
the Eurasian Economic Union. Our partners and we think that the EAEU can become one of the centres
of a greater emergent integration area. Among other benefits, we can address ambitious technological
problems within its framework, promote technological progress and attract new members. We discussed this
in Astana quite recently. Now we propose considering the prospects for more extensive Eurasian partnership
involving the EAEU and countries with which we already have close partnership – China, India, Pakistan
and Iran – and certainly our CIS partners, and other interested countries and associations.
…As early as June we, along with our Chinese colleagues, are planning to start official talks on the formation
of comprehensive trade and economic partnership in Eurasia with the participation of the European Union
states and China. I expect that this will become one of the first steps toward the formation of a major Eurasian
partnership. We will certainly resume the discussion of this major project at the Eastern Economic Forum
in Vladivostok in early September. Colleagues, I would like to take this opportunity to invite all of you to take
part in it.
Friends, the project I have just mentioned – the “greater Eurasia” project – is, of course, open for Europe,
and I am convinced that such cooperation may be mutually beneficial. Despite all of the well-known problems
in our relations, the European Union remains Russia’s key trade and economic partner. It is our next-door
neighbour and we are not indifferent to what is happening in the lives of our neighbours, European countries
and the European economy.
The challenge of the technological revolution and structural changes are no less urgent for the EU than
for Russia. I also understand our European partners when they talk about the complicated decisions for Europe
that were made at the talks on the formation of the Trans-Atlantic partnership. Obviously, Europe has a vast
potential and a stake on just one regional association clearly narrows its opportunities. Under
the circumstances, it is difficult for Europe to maintain balance and preserve space for a gainful manoeuvre.
As the recent meetings with representatives of the German and French business circles have showed,
European business is willing and ready to cooperate with this country. Politicians should meet businesses
halfway by displaying wisdom, and a far-sighted and flexible approach. We must return trust to Russian-
European relations and restore the level of our cooperation.
We remember how it all started. Russia did not initiate the current breakdown, disruption, problems
and sanctions. All our actions have been exclusively reciprocal. But we don’t hold a grudge, as they say,
and are ready to meet our European partners halfway. However, this can by no means be a one-way street.
Let me repeat that we are interested in Europeans joining the project for a major Eurasian partnership. In this
context we welcome the initiative of the President of Kazakhstan on holding consultations between
the Eurasian Economic Union and the EU. Yesterday we discussed this issue at the meeting with
the President of the European Commission.
…Russia has managed to resolve the most urgent current problems in the economy. We hope growth will
resume in the near future. We have maintained reserves and substantially reduced capital drain – by five times
compared with the first quarter of 2016. Inflation is going down as well. It has fallen almost in half if we compare
several months in 2014–2015 with the same period in 2015–2016. I believe that it is possible to bring inflation
down to 4–5 percent as early as in the mid-term perspective.
In addition, it is necessary to gradually decrease the budget deficit and the dependence on revenues from
hydrocarbons and other raw materials. This includes cutting our non-oil and gas deficit at least in half
in the next 5 to 7 years.
…The current slowdown is a global trend.
A key factor that predetermines the overall competitiveness of the economy, market dynamics, GDP growth
and higher wages is labor productivity. We need higher labor productivity at large and medium-sized
enterprises: in industry, in the construction and the transport sectors and in agriculture – no less than 5
percent a year. This appears to be a challenging and even unattainable goal, if we look at what is happening
here today. At the same time, the examples of numerous enterprises, as well as of entire manufacturing
sectors, such as the aircraft industry, the chemical industry, pharmaceutics and agriculture, show that this
goal is quite feasible and realistic.
We will develop legislation, tax regulators and technical standards to incentivise companies to raise labour
productivity and introduce labour and energy saving technology. …With the growth of labour productivity,
inefficient employment will inevitably shrink, which means we will need to substantially increase the labour
market’s flexibility, to offer people new opportunities. We will be able to resolve this problem primarily
by creating more jobs at small and medium-sized businesses. The number of people (what I am going to say is
very important) employed at small and medium-sized businesses should grow from today's 18 million
by at least 1.4 million by 2020 and by more than 3 million by 2025. It will be difficult to increase support
for small and medium-sized businesses, and still harder to consistently build a niche for its operation. But it
needs to be done.
… I should add that our import replacement programme is also aimed at manufacturing goods that are
competitive on the global market. And in this sense, I would also like to stress that import replacement is
an important stage for expanding exports in sectors other than raw materials and finding a place for our
companies in global manufacturing and technological alliances – and not in secondary roles, but as strong
and effective partners.
…Friends, we will continue to further liberalise and improve the business climate. I know a great deal has been
said about this at forum events today and yesterday. We will tackle systemic problems, of which we still have
plenty. This includes improving transparency and balancing relations between government agencies
and businesses. These relations should be built on understanding and mutual responsibility, meticulous
observance and compliance with laws and respect for the interests of the state and society,
and the unconditional value of the institution of private property.
It is essential to drastically reduce illegal criminal prosecutions. Furthermore, representatives of security
and law enforcement agencies should be made personally liable for unjustified actions leading
to the destruction of a business enterprise. I believe that this liability can be criminal.
I realize that this is a very sensitive issue. We cannot and should not bind our law enforcement agencies hand
and foot. However, without a doubt, there is a need for balance here, for a firm barrier to any abuses of power.
The leadership of the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Investigative Committee, the Interior Ministry
and the Federal Security Service should continuously monitor the situation on the ground and, if necessary,
take measures to improve legislation.
I ask the working group on law enforcement in entrepreneurial activity, which is headed by Chief of Staff
of the Presidential Executive Office Sergei Ivanov, to focus on these issues as well. I should add that I have
already submitted to parliament a package of draft laws prepared by the working group, designed to humanise
the so-called economic statutes [of the Criminal Code]. That said, it is also important to guarantee businesses
and all citizens the right to fair and impartial defence in court.
The Russian judicial community has done a good deal recently to improve the quality of the court system.
The merging of the Supreme and the Higher Arbitration courts has played a positive role in ensuring
the uniformity of law enforcement. I believe it is necessary to move further toward enhancing the responsibility
of judges and making the judicial process more transparent.
A major role in creating a favorable business environment, without a doubt, belongs to Russian regions. I know
that this was discussed at forum events in the morning, and the results of the annual national investment
climate ratings were announced. I would like to join in congratulating the winners and remind you that these are
Tatarstan and the Belgorod and Kaluga regions. I would also like to note the significant progress made
by the Tula, Vladimir, Tyumen, Kirov, Lipetsk and Orel regions, and the city of Moscow.
What stands out here? Judging by the results, a core group of leaders has already emerged, who are invariably
at the top of rankings. The natural question is: Where are the others? I ask the Government, in conjunction with
business communities, to consider additional mechanisms to reward the best regional administrative teams.
On the other hand, we will take serious measures, including dismissals, with regard to regional leaders who do
not understand that business support is a major resource for regional and national development. I would like
my colleagues in the regions, above all, regional leaders to hear me. We will seriously analyse what is
happening in this sphere in each Russian region and discuss the issue in depth in the autumn.
Ladies and gentlemen, I have already talked about Russia’s participation in cooperative scientific research
projects, in particular with European countries. It is essential to add that we have a core advantages
in physics, mathematics and chemistry. As you know, recently we honoured scientists who won the National
Award, who have made brilliant breakthroughs in biology, genetics and medicine. Russian microbiologists have
developed, for example, an effective vaccine against Ebola. National companies are going to bring an entire line
of unmanned vehicles to the market and are working on energy distribution and storage, and digital sea
navigation systems. We have practically put in place a technological development management system. What
does this entail and what would I like to say in this context?
First. The recently formed Technology Development Agency will help apply current research to real
manufacturing and set up joint ventures with foreign partners.
Second. Another mechanism will be in use starting in 2019. Major manufacturers will be made legally bound
to use the most advanced technologies meeting the highest environmental standards. Hopefully, this will give
a serious boost to industrial modernisation. Many neighbouring countries introduced such requirements long
ago. We have had to put off these changes due to problems in the real economic sectors, but we can’t keep
postponing it any more. Our business colleagues know this and must be prepared.
And finally, third. The National Technology Initiative covers projects of the future based on technologies that will
create fundamentally new markets in a decade or two. I would like to ask the Government to promptly remove
administrative, legislative and other obstacles blocking the development of future markets. It is essential
to back up technological development with financial resources. Therefore, the key task facing the overhauled
Vnesheconombank will be to support long-term projects, attractive projects in this high-tech sector.
We clearly understand that it is people who create and use technologies. Talented researchers, qualified
engineers and workers play a crucial role in making the national economy competitive. Therefore education is
something we should pay particular attention to in the next few years.
…Colleagues, obviously the issues that we are facing call for new approaches toward development
management, and here we are determined to make active use of the project principle. A presidential council
for strategic development and priority projects will be created in the near future. It will be headed by your
humble servant, while the council presidium will be led by Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev.
The council will deal with key projects aimed at effecting structural changes in the economy and the social
sphere, and increasing growth rates. I have spoken about some of these projects today: raising labour
productivity, the business climate, support for small and medium-sized business, and export support, among
others.
…Plenary session moderator, CNN host Fareed Zakaria: Thank you to all three of you: two presidents, one
prime minister, though in Italy, you are allowed to say ”President Renzi“ also. By the format we have agreed
upon, what I will do is we will begin this discussion first with our host president, President Putin, and then I will
widen that conversation to include Prime Minister Renzi and President Nazarbayev. We started a little bit late,
so we will go a little bit longer.
President Putin, let me ask you a very simple question. Since 2014, you have had European Union sanctions
and US sanctions against Russia. NATO has announced just this week that it is going to build up forces
in states that border Russia. Russia has announced its own buildup. Are we settling into a low-grade, lower-
level cold war between the West and Russia?
Vladimir Putin: I do not want to believe that we are moving towards another Cold War, and I am sure
nobody wants this. We certainly do not. There is no need for this. The main logic behind international
relations development is that no matter how dramatic it might seem, it is not the logic of global
confrontation. What is the root of the problem?
I will tell you. I will have to take you back in time. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, we expected overall
prosperity and overall trust. Unfortunately, Russia had to face numerous challenges, speaking in modern terms:
economic, social and domestic policy. We came up against separatism, radicalism, aggression of international
terror, because undoubtedly we were fighting against Al Qaeda militants in the Caucasus, it is an obvious fact,
and there can be no second thoughts about it. But instead of support from our partners in our struggle with
these problems, we sadly came across something different – support for the separatists. We were told, “We do
not accept your separatists at the top political level, only at the technological.”
Very well. We appreciate it. But we also saw information support, financial support and administrative backup.
Later, after we tackled those problems, went through serious hardships, we came to face another thing.
The Soviet Union was no more; the Warsaw Pact had ceased to exist. But for some reason, NATO continues
to expand its infrastructure towards Russia’s borders. It started long before yesterday. Montenegro is becoming
a [NATO] member. Who is threatening Montenegro? You see, our position is being totally ignored.
Another, equally important, or perhaps, the most important issue is the unilateral withdrawal [of the US] from
the ABM Treaty. The ABM Treaty was once concluded between the Soviet Union and the United States
for a good reason. Two regions were allowed to stay – Moscow and the site of US ICBM silos.
The treaty was designed to provide a strategic balance in the world. However, they unilaterally quit the treaty,
saying in a friendly manner, “This is not aimed against you. You want to develop your offensive arms, and we
assume it is not aimed against us.”
You know why they said so? It is simple: nobody expected Russia in the early 2000s, when it was struggling
with its domestic problems, torn apart by internal conflicts, political and economic problems, tortured
by terrorists, to restore its defence sector. Clearly, nobody expected us to be able to maintain our arsenals, let
alone have new strategic weapons. They thought they would build up their missile defence forces unilaterally
while our arsenals would be shrinking.
All of this was done under the pretext of combatting the Iranian nuclear threat. What has become of the Iranian
nuclear threat now? There is none, but the project continues. This is the way it is, step by step, one after
another, and so on.
Then they began to support all kinds of colour revolutions, including the so-called Arab Spring. They fervently
supported it. How many positive takes did we hear on what was going on? What did it lead to? Chaos.
I am not interested in laying blame now. I simply want to say that if this policy of unilateral actions continues
and if steps in the international arena that are very sensitive to the international community are not coordinated
then such consequences are inevitable. Conversely, if we listen to one another and seek out a balance
of interests, this will not happen. Yes, it is a difficult process, the process of reaching agreement, but it is
the only path to acceptable solutions.
I believe that if we ensure such cooperation, there will be no talk of a cold war. After all, since the Arab Spring,
they have already approached our borders. Why did they have to support the coup in Ukraine? I have often
spoken about this. The internal political situation there is complicated and the opposition that is in power now
would most likely have come to power democratically, through elections. That’s it. We would have worked with
them as we had with the government that was in power before President Yanukovych.
But no, they had to proceed with a coup, casualties, unleash bloodshed, a civil war, and scare the Russian-
speaking population of southeastern Ukraine and Crimea. All for the sake of what? And after we had to, simply
had to take measures to protect certain social groups, they began to escalate the situation, ratcheting up
tensions. In my opinion, this is being done, among other things, to justify the existence of the North Atlantic
bloc. They need an external adversary, an external enemy – otherwise why is this organisation necessary
in the first place? There is no Warsaw Pact, no Soviet Union –who is it directed against?
If we continue to act according to this logic, escalating [tensions] and redoubling efforts to scare each other,
then one day it will come to a cold war. Our logic is totally different. It is focused on cooperation and the search
for compromise. (Applause.)
Fareed Zakaria: So let me ask you, Mr President, then what is the way out? Because I saw an interview
of yours that you did with Die Welt, the German newspaper, in which you said, the key problem is that
the Minsk Accords have not been implemented by the Government in Ukraine, by Kiev, the constitutional
reforms. They say on the other side that in Eastern Ukraine, the violence has not come down,
and the separatists are not restraining themselves, and they believe Russia should help. So since neither
side seems to back down, will the sanctions just continue, will this low-grade cold war just continue? What
is the way out?
Vladimir Putin: And it is all about people, no matter what you call them. It is about people trying to protect
their legal rights and interests, who fear repression if these interests are not upheld at the political level.
If we look at the Minsk agreements, there are only a few points, and we discussed them all through the night.
What was the bone of contention? What aspect is of primary importance? And we agreed ultimately that
political solutions that ensure the security of people living in Donbass were the priority.
What are these political solutions? They are laid down in detail in the agreements. Constitutional amendments
that had to be adopted by the end of 2015. But where are they? They are nowhere to be seen. The law
on a special status of these territories, which we call “unrecognized republics”, should have been put into
practice. The law has been passed by the country’s parliament but still hasn’t come into effect. There should
have been an amnesty law. It was passed by the Ukrainian parliament but was never signed by the president, it
has no effect.
What kind of elections are we talking about? What sort of election process can be organised during an anti-
terrorist operation? Do any countries do that? We do not talk about it, but does any other country hold election
campaigns when an anti-terrorist operation is taking place on its territory?
They [elections] have to be cancelled and our work should focus on economic and humanitarian restoration.
Nothing is being done, nothing at all. Postponing these problems over on-going violence on the frontlines is just
an excuse. What is happening in reality is that both sides are accusing each other of opening fire. Why do you
think it is separatists who are shooting? If you ask them, they say, “It is Ukrainian government forces,
the Ukrainian army.”
One side opens fire, the other side responds – that’s what exchanging fire means. Do you think this is a good
enough reason to delay political reforms? On the contrary, political reforms that will constitute the foundation
of a final settlement on security are a pressing priority.
Some things have to be done in parallel. I agree with Mr Poroshenko that the OSCE mission has to be
reinforced to the point of authorizing OSCE observers to carry firearms. Other things can be done to improve
security. But we cannot afford to continue putting off key political decision by citing the lack of security
in the area. That’s it. (Applause.)
Fareed Zakaria: There are so many areas to cover with you, Mr President, so let me go to the Middle
East, where Russia has had a forceful intervention to bolster the Assad regime. President Assad now says
that his goal is to take back every square inch of his territory. Do you believe that the solution in Syria is
that the Assad regime should take back and govern every square inch of Syria?
Vladimir Putin: I think that the problems of Syria, of course, concern primarily the anti-terrorist struggle,
but there is more to it. It goes without saying that the Syrian conflict is rooted in contradictions within
Syrian society, and President Bashar al-Assad understands this very well. The task is not just to expand
control over various territories, although this is very important. The point is to ensure the confidence
of the entire society and trust between different parts of this society, and to establish on this foundation
a modern and efficient government that will be trusted by the country’s entire population. And political
negotiations are the only road to this. We have urged this more than once. President al-Assad also spoke
about this – he accepts this process.
What needs to be done today? It is necessary to join more actively the process of forming the new Constitution
and to conduct, on this basis, future elections, both presidential and parliamentary. When President al-Assad
was in Moscow, we spoke about this with him and he fully agreed with this. Moreover, it is extremely important
to conduct the elections under strict international control, with the participation of the United Nations.
Yesterday we discussed this issue in detail with Mr de Mistura and the UN Secretary-General. They all agree
with this, but we need action. We hope very much that our partners, primarily from the United States, will work
with their allies that support the opposition to encourage constructive cooperation with the Syrian authorities.
What do we mean by this? In general, when I ask my colleagues: “Why are you doing this?” they reply:
“To assert the principles of democracy. President al-Assad’s regime is not democratic and the triumph
of democracy must be ensured.” Fine. “Is democracy everywhere there?” “No, not yet but democracy should
exist in Syria.” “Ok. And how do you make society democratic? Is it only possible to achieve this by force
of arms or simply by force?” “No, this may be done only with the help of democratic institutions
and procedures.” And what are they all about? There is no more democratic way of forming a government than
elections on the basis of fundamental law: a Constitution that is formulated in a clear way, that is transparent
and accepted by the overwhelming majority of society. Pass the Constitution and hold elections on its basis.
What’s bad about this, especially if they are held under international control?
Occasionally we hear that some countries of the region do not fully understand what democracy is. Do we
want to replace one undemocratic regime with another undemocratic one? And if we still want to promote
the principle of democracy let’s do this by democratic means. But considering this is a complicated process
and results will not come tomorrow or the day after tomorrow but will require time, while we still need to do
something today, I agree with the proposals of our partners, primarily our American partners that suggest
(I don’t know, maybe I’m saying too much although, on the other hand, this US proposal is known in the region,
and the negotiators of both sides – the government and the opposition – are familiar with it and I consider it
absolutely acceptable), they suggested considering the possibility of bringing representatives of the opposition
into existing power structures, for instance, the Government. It is necessary to think about what powers this
Government will have.
However, it is important not to go too far. It is necessary to proceed from the current realities and to refrain from
declaring unfeasible, unrealistic goals. Many of our partners are saying that Assad should go. Today they are
saying no, let’s restructure governing institutions in such and such a way, but in practical terms it will also
mean his departure. But this is also unrealistic. Therefore, it is necessary to act carefully, step by step,
gradually winning the confidence of all sides to the conflict.
If this happens, and I think this will happen in any event and the sooner the better, it will be possible to go
further and speak both about subsequent elections and a final settlement. The main point is to prevent
the country’s collapse. And if things continue to go as they are today, collapse will become inevitable. And this
is the worst-case scenario because we cannot assume that after the country’s collapse some quasi-state
formations will co-exist in peace and harmony. No, this will be a destabilising factor for the region and the rest
of the world.
Fareed Zakaria: Let me ask you, Mr President, about another democracy that is having a very different
kind of drama. You made some comments about the American Republican presumptive nominee, Donald
Trump. You called him brilliant, outstanding, talented. These comments were reported around the world.
I was wondering, what in him led you to that judgement, and do you still hold that judgement?
Vladimir Putin: You are well known in our country, you personally. Not only as a host of a major TV
corporation, but also as an intellectual. Why are you distorting everything? The journalist in you is getting
the better of the analyst. Look, what did I say? I said in passing that Trump is a vivid personality. Is he not?
He is. I did not ascribe any other characteristics to him. However, what I definitely note and what
I definitely welcome – and I see nothing wrong about this, just the opposite – is that Mr Trump said that he
is ready for the full-scale restoration of Russian-US relations. What is wrong with that? We all welcome
this! Don’t you?
We never interfere in the internal politics of other countries, especially the United States. However, we will work
with any president that the US people vote for. Although I do not think, by the way, that… Well, they lecture
everyone on how to live and on democracy. Now, do you really think presidential elections there are
democratic? Look, twice in US history a president was elected by a majority of electors, but standing behind
those electors was a smaller number of voters. Is that democracy? And when (sometimes we have debates
with our colleagues; we never accuse anyone of anything, we simply have debates) we are told: “Do not
meddle in our affairs. Mind your own business. This is how we do things,” we feel like saying: “Well then, do
not meddle in our affairs. Why do you? Put your own house in order first.”
But, to reiterate, indeed, this is none of our business although, in my opinion, even prosecutors there chase
international observers away from polling stations during election campaigns. US prosecutors threaten to jail
them. However, these are their own problems; this is how they do things and they like it. America is a great
power, today perhaps the only superpower. We accept this. We want to work with the United States and we
are prepared to. No matter how these elections go, eventually they will take place. There will be a [new] head
of state with extensive powers. There are complicated internal political and economic processes at work
in the United States. The world needs a powerful country like the United States, and we also need it. But we
do not need it to continuously interfere in our affairs, telling us how to live, and preventing Europe from building
a relationship with us.
How are the sanctions that you have mentioned affecting the United States? In no way whatsoever. It could not
care less about these sanctions because the consequences of our actions in response have no impact on it.
They impact Europe but not the United States. Zero effect. However, the Americans are telling their partners:
“Be patient.” Why should they? I do not understand. If they want to, let them.
…We do not lavish praise on anybody. It’s none of our business. As Germans say, “this is not our beer.”
Because when they make their choice, we will work with any president who has received the support
of the American people, in the hope that it will be a person who seeks to develop relations with our country
and help build a more secure world.
Fareed Zakaria: Just to be clear, Mr President, the word ”brilliant“ was in the Interfax translation, I realize
that other translations might say ”bright,“ but I used the official Interfax translation. But let me ask you
about another person you have dealt with a great deal. Mr Trump, you've never met. Hillary Clinton was
Secretary of State. In your very long questions and answers with the Russian people, you made a joke
when somebody asked you about her – you said, I think that the Russia idiom is, the husband and wife is
the same devil. And what it means in the English version is, it's two sides of the same coin. What did you
mean by that, and how did she do as Secretary of State? You dealt with her extensively.
Vladimir Putin: I did not work with her, Lavrov did. Ask him. He is sitting here.
I was not a foreign minister, but Sergei Lavrov was. He will soon tie [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei] Gromyko.
(Addressing Sergei Lavrov.) How long have you been in office?
I worked with Bill Clinton, although for a very short time, and we had a very good relationship. I can even say
that I am grateful to him for certain moments as I was entering the big stage in politics. On several occasions,
he showed signs of attention, respect for me personally, as well as for Russia. I remember this and I am
grateful to him.
About Ms Clinton. Perhaps she has her own view on the development of Russian-US relations. You know, there
is something I would like to draw [your] attention to, which has nothing to do with Russian-US relations or with
national politics. It is related, rather, to personnel policy.
In my experience, I have often seen what happens with people before they take on a certain job and afterward.
Often, you cannot recognise them, because once they reach a new level of responsibility they begin to talk
and think differently, they even look different. We act on the assumption that the sense of responsibility
of the US head of state, the head of the country on which a great deal in the world depends today, that this
sense of responsibility will encourage the newly elected president to cooperate with Russia and, I would like
to repeat, build a more secure world.
Fareed Zakaria: President Putin, let me finally ask you one question about news reports about Russian
athletes. There are now two major investigations that have shown that Russian athletes have engaged
in doping on a massive scale, and that there has been a systematic evasion and doctoring of testing and lab
samples. And I was just wondering what you reaction to these reports is.
Vladimir Putin: I did not understand what kind of programme it is – to tamper with the samples that were
collected for tests? If samples are collected they are immediately transferred to international organisations
for storage and we have nothing to do with them. Samples are collected and taken somewhere,
to Lausanne or wherever, I do not know where, but they are not on Russian territory. They can be
opened, re-checked, and this is what specialists are doing now.
Doping is not only a Russian problem. It is a problem of the entire sports world. If somebody tries to politicise
something in this sphere, I think this is a big mistake, because just like culture, for example, sport cannot be
politicised. These are the bridges that bring people, nations and states closer together. This is the way
to approach it, not try to forge some anti-Russian or anti-whatever policy on this basis.
As for the Russian authorities, I can assure you, we are categorically against all doping for several reasons.
First, as a former amateur athlete, I can tell you, and I think that the overwhelming majority of people will agree
with this: if we know there is doping, it’s not interesting to watch the event; millions of fans lose interest
in the sport.
Second, no less important, and maybe even most important, there is the health of the athletes themselves.
You can’t justify anything that damages health. This is why we have combated and will continue to combat
doping in sport on the national level.
Furthermore, as far as I know, the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Investigative Committee have been
closely looking into all facts reported in the media, among others. Simply, this must not be turned into
a campaign, especially a campaign disparaging sport, including Russian sport.
Next, the third point I would like to make. There is a legal concept that says responsibility can only be
individual. Collective responsibility cannot be imposed on all athletes or athletes of a certain sports federation if
certain individuals have been caught doping. An entire team cannot be held responsible for those who have
committed this violation. I believe that this is an absolutely natural, correct approach.
However, doping is not the only problem today. There are plenty of problems in sport. Euro 2016 is underway.
I believe that less attention is being paid to football than to brawling between fans. This is very sad and I regret
this, but here too we should always proceed from some general criteria. To reiterate, responsibility
for misconduct should be individualised as much as possible and the approach toward perpetrators should be
the same.
Euro 2016 began with a high-profile case: a fight between Russian and British fans. This is absolutely
outrageous. Granted, I do not know how 200 Russian fans were able to pummel several thousand Britons. I do
not understand. But in any case, law enforcement agencies should take the same approach toward all
perpetrators.
This is the way we have organised this work and will continue to combat doping and enforce discipline among
fans. We will work with these fan associations. I very much hope that there are plenty of intelligent, sensible
people among the fans, who really love sport and who understand that violations do nothing to support their
team but, on the contrary, cause damage to the team and to sport. However, a great deal has yet to be done
here, including in conjunction with our [foreign] colleagues.
I would like to stress that there has been absolutely no support and can be absolutely no support for violations
in sport, let alone doping violations, at the state level. We have worked and will continue to work with all
international organisations in this sphere.
<…>
http://slon.ru/posts/69481
This is the first St. Petersburg forum not shunned by Western political elites in a couple of years…Russia wants to show Western
business that there are possibilities for reform…The sanctions have not been removed, the Minsk agreements not fulfilled, but there
has been a certain lowering of tensions…The Kremlin is cautiously rehabilitating the systemic liberals—Kudrin has informal status
as the main reformer, with assistance from Gref…Vlast, not very convincingly, is making noises about improving conditions for
private business… Gestures have been made to ease tensions with the West—Savchenko, for example, was released—there’s a
certain weariness with confrontation…There has been some movement away from the conservative trend domestically—
Pavlenskiy has been released (http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-pavlensky-artist-fined-cultural-site-fsb/27786266.html )...The
message to Western investors is clear—Russia does not want to be North Korea or even Belarus…Russia needs direct investment
and budget problems are pushing vlast toward making a political decision on structural reforms…
The weariness of both Russia and the West with sanctions in the mid-term could at least lead to their weakening. The decline of the
economy has slowed down and some optimists expect growth by the end of the year… The Ukraine crisis could be routinized,
pushed to the back burner in favor of cooperating on combatting terrorism…Putin wants to lower tensions with the Americans…
Yet the arbitrary behavior of courts, “tax terrorism,” corruption, and “nightmaring” businesses have only become worse…Average
investors without special connections are waiting for a sign of vlast’s intensions and of a more transparent economic policy…It’s
doubtful that will happen—and foreign business surely understands that…Foreign investors want to know about concrete
economic development plans, tax policy, about whether Glazyev is taken seriously and whether Kudrin is around just for window
dressing. Are the siloviky taking part in discussions on economic policy temporarily or is they here to stay?
…Putin wants the economy to improve, but without changing anything institutionally…The way to have influence in Russia is
through a relationship with one of Putin’s friends, who often have more influence than ministers. So investors want to know what a
particular person’s access to Putin really is, what kind of influence a person might have on a minister…And investors see a society
that is distrustful, even hateful toward the West, one where opposition political figures are in danger, where one has to be wary of
provocations by competitors…And the Yukos case, the Magnitskiy affair, and the case against the owners and managers of
Domodedovo airport are still very much on the minds of foreign investors…
In Russia, if you move one way, you lose your business, another and you lose your life. If you move just right, you can become a
billionaire…
http://vk.com/id244477574?w=wall244477574_18809/all
Russia’s conciliatory gestures to America are being made for two reasons: One, because it is the Americans blocking European
revisionism regarding Russia; and two, because Moscow is worried about “reputational scandals”—there may be more to come,
provoking a spilt in the Russian elite…
HTTP://WWW.YAHOO.COM/NEWS/GERMANY-SLAMS-NATO-WARMONGERING-RUSSIA-115515814.HTML?REF=GS
German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier has criticised NATO for having a bellicose policy towards Russia, describing it as
"warmongering", the German daily Bild reported.
Steinmeier pointed to the deployment of NATO troops near borders with Russia in the military alliance's Baltic and east European
member states.
"What we should avoid today is inflaming the situation by warmongering and stomping boots," Steinmeier told Bild in an interview to
be published Sunday.
"Anyone who thinks you can increase security in the alliance with symbolic parades of tanks near the eastern borders, is mistaken,"
Germany's top diplomat added.
NATO had announced on Monday that it would deploy four battalions to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland to counter a more
assertive Russia, ahead of a landmark summit in Warsaw next month.
All four countries were once ruled from Moscow and remain deeply suspicious of Russian intentions, especially after Russia's
annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014.
In an interview with Bild on Thursday, NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg said Russia is seeking to create "a zone of influence through
military means".
"We are observing massive militarisation at NATO borders -- in the Arctic, in the Baltic, from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean
Sea," he told the newspaper.
Stoltenberg has stressed that NATO does not seek confrontation with Russia and wants a constructive dialogue but that it would
defend the 28 allies against any threat
Russia bitterly opposes NATO's expansion into its Soviet-era satellites and last month said it would create three new divisions in its
southwest region to meet what it described as a dangerous military build-up along its borders.

Sent time: 06/18/2016 10:02:27 AM

fans)
fans)
I did a brief summary of Putin’s speech and included a link to the Russian in yesterday’s notes. Here are excerpts from an English
version of the speech: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52178
The structural problems accumulated by the global economy still persist, and we have not yet put our economy on the growth trajectory.
Incidentally, current geopolitical tensions are related, to some extent, to economic uncertainty
and the exhausting of the old sources of growth. There is a risk it may increase or even be artificially provoked.
It is our common interest to find a creative and constructive way out of this situation.
The world’s leading economies are looking for sources of growth, and they are looking to capitalise
on the enormous existing and growing potential of digital and industrial technologies, robotics, energy,
biotechnology, medicine and other fields. Discoveries in these areas can lead to true technological revolutions,
to an explosive growth of labour productivity. This is already happening and will happen inevitably; there is
impending restructuring of entire industries, the devaluation of many facilities and assets. This will alter
the demand for skills and competencies, and competition will escalate in both traditional and emerging
markets.
In fact, even today we can see attempts to secure or even monopolise the benefits of next generation
technologies. This, I think, is the motive behind the creation of restricted areas with regulatory barriers
to reduce the cross-flow of breakthrough technologies to other regions of the world with fairly tight control over
cooperation chains for maximum gain from technological advances. We have discussed this with our
colleagues; some say it is possible. I think not. One can control the spread of certain technologies for a while,
but in today's world it would be next to impossible to keep them in a contained area, even a large area. Yet,
these efforts could lead to basic sciences, now open to sharing of knowledge and information through joint
projects, getting closed too, with separation barriers coming up.
…Over 40 states and international organisations have expressed the desire to establish a free trade zone with
the Eurasian Economic Union. Our partners and we think that the EAEU can become one of the centres
of a greater emergent integration area. Among other benefits, we can address ambitious technological
problems within its framework, promote technological progress and attract new members. We discussed this
in Astana quite recently. Now we propose considering the prospects for more extensive Eurasian partnership
involving the EAEU and countries with which we already have close partnership – China, India, Pakistan
and Iran – and certainly our CIS partners, and other interested countries and associations.
…As early as June we, along with our Chinese colleagues, are planning to start official talks on the formation
of comprehensive trade and economic partnership in Eurasia with the participation of the European Union
states and China. I expect that this will become one of the first steps toward the formation of a major Eurasian
partnership. We will certainly resume the discussion of this major project at the Eastern Economic Forum
in Vladivostok in early September. Colleagues, I would like to take this opportunity to invite all of you to take
part in it.
Friends, the project I have just mentioned – the “greater Eurasia” project – is, of course, open for Europe,
and I am convinced that such cooperation may be mutually beneficial. Despite all of the well-known problems
in our relations, the European Union remains Russia’s key trade and economic partner. It is our next-door
neighbour and we are not indifferent to what is happening in the lives of our neighbours, European countries
and the European economy.
The challenge of the technological revolution and structural changes are no less urgent for the EU than
for Russia. I also understand our European partners when they talk about the complicated decisions for Europe
that were made at the talks on the formation of the Trans-Atlantic partnership. Obviously, Europe has a vast
potential and a stake on just one regional association clearly narrows its opportunities. Under
the circumstances, it is difficult for Europe to maintain balance and preserve space for a gainful manoeuvre.
As the recent meetings with representatives of the German and French business circles have showed,
European business is willing and ready to cooperate with this country. Politicians should meet businesses
halfway by displaying wisdom, and a far-sighted and flexible approach. We must return trust to Russian-
European relations and restore the level of our cooperation.
We remember how it all started. Russia did not initiate the current breakdown, disruption, problems
and sanctions. All our actions have been exclusively reciprocal. But we don’t hold a grudge, as they say,
and are ready to meet our European partners halfway. However, this can by no means be a one-way street.
Let me repeat that we are interested in Europeans joining the project for a major Eurasian partnership. In this
context we welcome the initiative of the President of Kazakhstan on holding consultations between
the Eurasian Economic Union and the EU. Yesterday we discussed this issue at the meeting with
the President of the European Commission.
…Russia has managed to resolve the most urgent current problems in the economy. We hope growth will
resume in the near future. We have maintained reserves and substantially reduced capital drain – by five times
compared with the first quarter of 2016. Inflation is going down as well. It has fallen almost in half if we compare
several months in 2014–2015 with the same period in 2015–2016. I believe that it is possible to bring inflation
down to 4–5 percent as early as in the mid-term perspective.
In addition, it is necessary to gradually decrease the budget deficit and the dependence on revenues from
hydrocarbons and other raw materials. This includes cutting our non-oil and gas deficit at least in half
in the next 5 to 7 years.
…The current slowdown is a global trend.
A key factor that predetermines the overall competitiveness of the economy, market dynamics, GDP growth
and higher wages is labor productivity. We need higher labor productivity at large and medium-sized
enterprises: in industry, in the construction and the transport sectors and in agriculture – no less than 5
percent a year. This appears to be a challenging and even unattainable goal, if we look at what is happening
here today. At the same time, the examples of numerous enterprises, as well as of entire manufacturing
sectors, such as the aircraft industry, the chemical industry, pharmaceutics and agriculture, show that this
goal is quite feasible and realistic.
We will develop legislation, tax regulators and technical standards to incentivise companies to raise labour
productivity and introduce labour and energy saving technology. …With the growth of labour productivity,
inefficient employment will inevitably shrink, which means we will need to substantially increase the labour
market’s flexibility, to offer people new opportunities. We will be able to resolve this problem primarily
by creating more jobs at small and medium-sized businesses. The number of people (what I am going to say is
very important) employed at small and medium-sized businesses should grow from today's 18 million
by at least 1.4 million by 2020 and by more than 3 million by 2025. It will be difficult to increase support
for small and medium-sized businesses, and still harder to consistently build a niche for its operation. But it
needs to be done.
… I should add that our import replacement programme is also aimed at manufacturing goods that are
competitive on the global market. And in this sense, I would also like to stress that import replacement is
an important stage for expanding exports in sectors other than raw materials and finding a place for our
companies in global manufacturing and technological alliances – and not in secondary roles, but as strong
and effective partners.
…Friends, we will continue to further liberalise and improve the business climate. I know a great deal has been
said about this at forum events today and yesterday. We will tackle systemic problems, of which we still have
plenty. This includes improving transparency and balancing relations between government agencies
and businesses. These relations should be built on understanding and mutual responsibility, meticulous
observance and compliance with laws and respect for the interests of the state and society,
and the unconditional value of the institution of private property.
It is essential to drastically reduce illegal criminal prosecutions. Furthermore, representatives of security
and law enforcement agencies should be made personally liable for unjustified actions leading
to the destruction of a business enterprise. I believe that this liability can be criminal.
I realize that this is a very sensitive issue. We cannot and should not bind our law enforcement agencies hand
and foot. However, without a doubt, there is a need for balance here, for a firm barrier to any abuses of power.
The leadership of the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Investigative Committee, the Interior Ministry
and the Federal Security Service should continuously monitor the situation on the ground and, if necessary,
take measures to improve legislation.
I ask the working group on law enforcement in entrepreneurial activity, which is headed by Chief of Staff
of the Presidential Executive Office Sergei Ivanov, to focus on these issues as well. I should add that I have
already submitted to parliament a package of draft laws prepared by the working group, designed to humanise
the so-called economic statutes [of the Criminal Code]. That said, it is also important to guarantee businesses
and all citizens the right to fair and impartial defence in court.
The Russian judicial community has done a good deal recently to improve the quality of the court system.
The merging of the Supreme and the Higher Arbitration courts has played a positive role in ensuring
the uniformity of law enforcement. I believe it is necessary to move further toward enhancing the responsibility
of judges and making the judicial process more transparent.
A major role in creating a favorable business environment, without a doubt, belongs to Russian regions. I know
that this was discussed at forum events in the morning, and the results of the annual national investment
climate ratings were announced. I would like to join in congratulating the winners and remind you that these are
Tatarstan and the Belgorod and Kaluga regions. I would also like to note the significant progress made
by the Tula, Vladimir, Tyumen, Kirov, Lipetsk and Orel regions, and the city of Moscow.
What stands out here? Judging by the results, a core group of leaders has already emerged, who are invariably
at the top of rankings. The natural question is: Where are the others? I ask the Government, in conjunction with
business communities, to consider additional mechanisms to reward the best regional administrative teams.
On the other hand, we will take serious measures, including dismissals, with regard to regional leaders who do
not understand that business support is a major resource for regional and national development. I would like
my colleagues in the regions, above all, regional leaders to hear me. We will seriously analyse what is
happening in this sphere in each Russian region and discuss the issue in depth in the autumn.
Ladies and gentlemen, I have already talked about Russia’s participation in cooperative scientific research
projects, in particular with European countries. It is essential to add that we have a core advantages
in physics, mathematics and chemistry. As you know, recently we honoured scientists who won the National
Award, who have made brilliant breakthroughs in biology, genetics and medicine. Russian microbiologists have
developed, for example, an effective vaccine against Ebola. National companies are going to bring an entire line
of unmanned vehicles to the market and are working on energy distribution and storage, and digital sea
navigation systems. We have practically put in place a technological development management system. What
does this entail and what would I like to say in this context?
First. The recently formed Technology Development Agency will help apply current research to real
manufacturing and set up joint ventures with foreign partners.
Second. Another mechanism will be in use starting in 2019. Major manufacturers will be made legally bound
to use the most advanced technologies meeting the highest environmental standards. Hopefully, this will give
a serious boost to industrial modernisation. Many neighbouring countries introduced such requirements long
ago. We have had to put off these changes due to problems in the real economic sectors, but we can’t keep
postponing it any more. Our business colleagues know this and must be prepared.
And finally, third. The National Technology Initiative covers projects of the future based on technologies that will
create fundamentally new markets in a decade or two. I would like to ask the Government to promptly remove
administrative, legislative and other obstacles blocking the development of future markets. It is essential
to back up technological development with financial resources. Therefore, the key task facing the overhauled
Vnesheconombank will be to support long-term projects, attractive projects in this high-tech sector.
We clearly understand that it is people who create and use technologies. Talented researchers, qualified
engineers and workers play a crucial role in making the national economy competitive. Therefore education is
something we should pay particular attention to in the next few years.
…Colleagues, obviously the issues that we are facing call for new approaches toward development
management, and here we are determined to make active use of the project principle. A presidential council
for strategic development and priority projects will be created in the near future. It will be headed by your
humble servant, while the council presidium will be led by Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev.
The council will deal with key projects aimed at effecting structural changes in the economy and the social
sphere, and increasing growth rates. I have spoken about some of these projects today: raising labour
productivity, the business climate, support for small and medium-sized business, and export support, among
others.
…Plenary session moderator, CNN host Fareed Zakaria: Thank you to all three of you: two presidents, one
prime minister, though in Italy, you are allowed to say ”President Renzi“ also. By the format we have agreed
upon, what I will do is we will begin this discussion first with our host president, President Putin, and then I will
widen that conversation to include Prime Minister Renzi and President Nazarbayev. We started a little bit late,
so we will go a little bit longer.
President Putin, let me ask you a very simple question. Since 2014, you have had European Union sanctions
and US sanctions against Russia. NATO has announced just this week that it is going to build up forces
in states that border Russia. Russia has announced its own buildup. Are we settling into a low-grade, lower-
level cold war between the West and Russia?
Vladimir Putin: I do not want to believe that we are moving towards another Cold War, and I am sure
nobody wants this. We certainly do not. There is no need for this. The main logic behind international
relations development is that no matter how dramatic it might seem, it is not the logic of global
confrontation. What is the root of the problem?
I will tell you. I will have to take you back in time. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, we expected overall
prosperity and overall trust. Unfortunately, Russia had to face numerous challenges, speaking in modern terms:
economic, social and domestic policy. We came up against separatism, radicalism, aggression of international
terror, because undoubtedly we were fighting against Al Qaeda militants in the Caucasus, it is an obvious fact,
and there can be no second thoughts about it. But instead of support from our partners in our struggle with
these problems, we sadly came across something different – support for the separatists. We were told, “We do
not accept your separatists at the top political level, only at the technological.”
Very well. We appreciate it. But we also saw information support, financial support and administrative backup.
Later, after we tackled those problems, went through serious hardships, we came to face another thing.
The Soviet Union was no more; the Warsaw Pact had ceased to exist. But for some reason, NATO continues
to expand its infrastructure towards Russia’s borders. It started long before yesterday. Montenegro is becoming
a [NATO] member. Who is threatening Montenegro? You see, our position is being totally ignored.
Another, equally important, or perhaps, the most important issue is the unilateral withdrawal [of the US] from
the ABM Treaty. The ABM Treaty was once concluded between the Soviet Union and the United States
for a good reason. Two regions were allowed to stay – Moscow and the site of US ICBM silos.
The treaty was designed to provide a strategic balance in the world. However, they unilaterally quit the treaty,
saying in a friendly manner, “This is not aimed against you. You want to develop your offensive arms, and we
assume it is not aimed against us.”
You know why they said so? It is simple: nobody expected Russia in the early 2000s, when it was struggling
with its domestic problems, torn apart by internal conflicts, political and economic problems, tortured
by terrorists, to restore its defence sector. Clearly, nobody expected us to be able to maintain our arsenals, let
alone have new strategic weapons. They thought they would build up their missile defence forces unilaterally
while our arsenals would be shrinking.
All of this was done under the pretext of combatting the Iranian nuclear threat. What has become of the Iranian
nuclear threat now? There is none, but the project continues. This is the way it is, step by step, one after
another, and so on.
Then they began to support all kinds of colour revolutions, including the so-called Arab Spring. They fervently
supported it. How many positive takes did we hear on what was going on? What did it lead to? Chaos.
I am not interested in laying blame now. I simply want to say that if this policy of unilateral actions continues
and if steps in the international arena that are very sensitive to the international community are not coordinated
then such consequences are inevitable. Conversely, if we listen to one another and seek out a balance
of interests, this will not happen. Yes, it is a difficult process, the process of reaching agreement, but it is
the only path to acceptable solutions.
I believe that if we ensure such cooperation, there will be no talk of a cold war. After all, since the Arab Spring,
they have already approached our borders. Why did they have to support the coup in Ukraine? I have often
spoken about this. The internal political situation there is complicated and the opposition that is in power now
would most likely have come to power democratically, through elections. That’s it. We would have worked with
them as we had with the government that was in power before President Yanukovych.
But no, they had to proceed with a coup, casualties, unleash bloodshed, a civil war, and scare the Russian-
speaking population of southeastern Ukraine and Crimea. All for the sake of what? And after we had to, simply
had to take measures to protect certain social groups, they began to escalate the situation, ratcheting up
tensions. In my opinion, this is being done, among other things, to justify the existence of the North Atlantic
bloc. They need an external adversary, an external enemy – otherwise why is this organisation necessary
in the first place? There is no Warsaw Pact, no Soviet Union –who is it directed against?
If we continue to act according to this logic, escalating [tensions] and redoubling efforts to scare each other,
then one day it will come to a cold war. Our logic is totally different. It is focused on cooperation and the search
for compromise. (Applause.)
Fareed Zakaria: So let me ask you, Mr President, then what is the way out? Because I saw an interview
of yours that you did with Die Welt, the German newspaper, in which you said, the key problem is that
the Minsk Accords have not been implemented by the Government in Ukraine, by Kiev, the constitutional
reforms. They say on the other side that in Eastern Ukraine, the violence has not come down,
and the separatists are not restraining themselves, and they believe Russia should help. So since neither
side seems to back down, will the sanctions just continue, will this low-grade cold war just continue? What
is the way out?
Vladimir Putin: And it is all about people, no matter what you call them. It is about people trying to protect
their legal rights and interests, who fear repression if these interests are not upheld at the political level.
If we look at the Minsk agreements, there are only a few points, and we discussed them all through the night.
What was the bone of contention? What aspect is of primary importance? And we agreed ultimately that
political solutions that ensure the security of people living in Donbass were the priority.
What are these political solutions? They are laid down in detail in the agreements. Constitutional amendments
that had to be adopted by the end of 2015. But where are they? They are nowhere to be seen. The law
on a special status of these territories, which we call “unrecognized republics”, should have been put into
practice. The law has been passed by the country’s parliament but still hasn’t come into effect. There should
have been an amnesty law. It was passed by the Ukrainian parliament but was never signed by the president, it
has no effect.
What kind of elections are we talking about? What sort of election process can be organised during an anti-
terrorist operation? Do any countries do that? We do not talk about it, but does any other country hold election
campaigns when an anti-terrorist operation is taking place on its territory?
They [elections] have to be cancelled and our work should focus on economic and humanitarian restoration.
Nothing is being done, nothing at all. Postponing these problems over on-going violence on the frontlines is just
an excuse. What is happening in reality is that both sides are accusing each other of opening fire. Why do you
think it is separatists who are shooting? If you ask them, they say, “It is Ukrainian government forces,
the Ukrainian army.”
One side opens fire, the other side responds – that’s what exchanging fire means. Do you think this is a good
enough reason to delay political reforms? On the contrary, political reforms that will constitute the foundation
of a final settlement on security are a pressing priority.
Some things have to be done in parallel. I agree with Mr Poroshenko that the OSCE mission has to be
reinforced to the point of authorizing OSCE observers to carry firearms. Other things can be done to improve
security. But we cannot afford to continue putting off key political decision by citing the lack of security
in the area. That’s it. (Applause.)
Fareed Zakaria: There are so many areas to cover with you, Mr President, so let me go to the Middle
East, where Russia has had a forceful intervention to bolster the Assad regime. President Assad now says
that his goal is to take back every square inch of his territory. Do you believe that the solution in Syria is
that the Assad regime should take back and govern every square inch of Syria?
Vladimir Putin: I think that the problems of Syria, of course, concern primarily the anti-terrorist struggle,
but there is more to it. It goes without saying that the Syrian conflict is rooted in contradictions within
Syrian society, and President Bashar al-Assad understands this very well. The task is not just to expand
control over various territories, although this is very important. The point is to ensure the confidence
of the entire society and trust between different parts of this society, and to establish on this foundation
a modern and efficient government that will be trusted by the country’s entire population. And political
negotiations are the only road to this. We have urged this more than once. President al-Assad also spoke
about this – he accepts this process.
What needs to be done today? It is necessary to join more actively the process of forming the new Constitution
and to conduct, on this basis, future elections, both presidential and parliamentary. When President al-Assad
was in Moscow, we spoke about this with him and he fully agreed with this. Moreover, it is extremely important
to conduct the elections under strict international control, with the participation of the United Nations.
Yesterday we discussed this issue in detail with Mr de Mistura and the UN Secretary-General. They all agree
with this, but we need action. We hope very much that our partners, primarily from the United States, will work
with their allies that support the opposition to encourage constructive cooperation with the Syrian authorities.
What do we mean by this? In general, when I ask my colleagues: “Why are you doing this?” they reply:
“To assert the principles of democracy. President al-Assad’s regime is not democratic and the triumph
of democracy must be ensured.” Fine. “Is democracy everywhere there?” “No, not yet but democracy should
exist in Syria.” “Ok. And how do you make society democratic? Is it only possible to achieve this by force
of arms or simply by force?” “No, this may be done only with the help of democratic institutions
and procedures.” And what are they all about? There is no more democratic way of forming a government than
elections on the basis of fundamental law: a Constitution that is formulated in a clear way, that is transparent
and accepted by the overwhelming majority of society. Pass the Constitution and hold elections on its basis.
What’s bad about this, especially if they are held under international control?
Occasionally we hear that some countries of the region do not fully understand what democracy is. Do we
want to replace one undemocratic regime with another undemocratic one? And if we still want to promote
the principle of democracy let’s do this by democratic means. But considering this is a complicated process
and results will not come tomorrow or the day after tomorrow but will require time, while we still need to do
something today, I agree with the proposals of our partners, primarily our American partners that suggest
(I don’t know, maybe I’m saying too much although, on the other hand, this US proposal is known in the region,
and the negotiators of both sides – the government and the opposition – are familiar with it and I consider it
absolutely acceptable), they suggested considering the possibility of bringing representatives of the opposition
into existing power structures, for instance, the Government. It is necessary to think about what powers this
Government will have.
However, it is important not to go too far. It is necessary to proceed from the current realities and to refrain from
declaring unfeasible, unrealistic goals. Many of our partners are saying that Assad should go. Today they are
saying no, let’s restructure governing institutions in such and such a way, but in practical terms it will also
mean his departure. But this is also unrealistic. Therefore, it is necessary to act carefully, step by step,
gradually winning the confidence of all sides to the conflict.
If this happens, and I think this will happen in any event and the sooner the better, it will be possible to go
further and speak both about subsequent elections and a final settlement. The main point is to prevent
the country’s collapse. And if things continue to go as they are today, collapse will become inevitable. And this
is the worst-case scenario because we cannot assume that after the country’s collapse some quasi-state
formations will co-exist in peace and harmony. No, this will be a destabilising factor for the region and the rest
of the world.
Fareed Zakaria: Let me ask you, Mr President, about another democracy that is having a very different
kind of drama. You made some comments about the American Republican presumptive nominee, Donald
Trump. You called him brilliant, outstanding, talented. These comments were reported around the world.
I was wondering, what in him led you to that judgement, and do you still hold that judgement?
Vladimir Putin: You are well known in our country, you personally. Not only as a host of a major TV
corporation, but also as an intellectual. Why are you distorting everything? The journalist in you is getting
the better of the analyst. Look, what did I say? I said in passing that Trump is a vivid personality. Is he not?
He is. I did not ascribe any other characteristics to him. However, what I definitely note and what
I definitely welcome – and I see nothing wrong about this, just the opposite – is that Mr Trump said that he
is ready for the full-scale restoration of Russian-US relations. What is wrong with that? We all welcome
this! Don’t you?
We never interfere in the internal politics of other countries, especially the United States. However, we will work
with any president that the US people vote for. Although I do not think, by the way, that… Well, they lecture
everyone on how to live and on democracy. Now, do you really think presidential elections there are
democratic? Look, twice in US history a president was elected by a majority of electors, but standing behind
those electors was a smaller number of voters. Is that democracy? And when (sometimes we have debates
with our colleagues; we never accuse anyone of anything, we simply have debates) we are told: “Do not
meddle in our affairs. Mind your own business. This is how we do things,” we feel like saying: “Well then, do
not meddle in our affairs. Why do you? Put your own house in order first.”
But, to reiterate, indeed, this is none of our business although, in my opinion, even prosecutors there chase
international observers away from polling stations during election campaigns. US prosecutors threaten to jail
them. However, these are their own problems; this is how they do things and they like it. America is a great
power, today perhaps the only superpower. We accept this. We want to work with the United States and we
are prepared to. No matter how these elections go, eventually they will take place. There will be a [new] head
of state with extensive powers. There are complicated internal political and economic processes at work
in the United States. The world needs a powerful country like the United States, and we also need it. But we
do not need it to continuously interfere in our affairs, telling us how to live, and preventing Europe from building
a relationship with us.
How are the sanctions that you have mentioned affecting the United States? In no way whatsoever. It could not
care less about these sanctions because the consequences of our actions in response have no impact on it.
They impact Europe but not the United States. Zero effect. However, the Americans are telling their partners:
“Be patient.” Why should they? I do not understand. If they want to, let them.
…We do not lavish praise on anybody. It’s none of our business. As Germans say, “this is not our beer.”
Because when they make their choice, we will work with any president who has received the support
of the American people, in the hope that it will be a person who seeks to develop relations with our country
and help build a more secure world.
Fareed Zakaria: Just to be clear, Mr President, the word ”brilliant“ was in the Interfax translation, I realize
that other translations might say ”bright,“ but I used the official Interfax translation. But let me ask you
about another person you have dealt with a great deal. Mr Trump, you've never met. Hillary Clinton was
Secretary of State. In your very long questions and answers with the Russian people, you made a joke
when somebody asked you about her – you said, I think that the Russia idiom is, the husband and wife is
the same devil. And what it means in the English version is, it's two sides of the same coin. What did you
mean by that, and how did she do as Secretary of State? You dealt with her extensively.
Vladimir Putin: I did not work with her, Lavrov did. Ask him. He is sitting here.
I was not a foreign minister, but Sergei Lavrov was. He will soon tie [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei] Gromyko.
(Addressing Sergei Lavrov.) How long have you been in office?
I worked with Bill Clinton, although for a very short time, and we had a very good relationship. I can even say
that I am grateful to him for certain moments as I was entering the big stage in politics. On several occasions,
he showed signs of attention, respect for me personally, as well as for Russia. I remember this and I am
grateful to him.
About Ms Clinton. Perhaps she has her own view on the development of Russian-US relations. You know, there
is something I would like to draw [your] attention to, which has nothing to do with Russian-US relations or with
national politics. It is related, rather, to personnel policy.
In my experience, I have often seen what happens with people before they take on a certain job and afterward.
Often, you cannot recognise them, because once they reach a new level of responsibility they begin to talk
and think differently, they even look different. We act on the assumption that the sense of responsibility
of the US head of state, the head of the country on which a great deal in the world depends today, that this
sense of responsibility will encourage the newly elected president to cooperate with Russia and, I would like
to repeat, build a more secure world.
Fareed Zakaria: President Putin, let me finally ask you one question about news reports about Russian
athletes. There are now two major investigations that have shown that Russian athletes have engaged
in doping on a massive scale, and that there has been a systematic evasion and doctoring of testing and lab
samples. And I was just wondering what you reaction to these reports is.
Vladimir Putin: I did not understand what kind of programme it is – to tamper with the samples that were
collected for tests? If samples are collected they are immediately transferred to international organisations
for storage and we have nothing to do with them. Samples are collected and taken somewhere,
to Lausanne or wherever, I do not know where, but they are not on Russian territory. They can be
opened, re-checked, and this is what specialists are doing now.
Doping is not only a Russian problem. It is a problem of the entire sports world. If somebody tries to politicise
something in this sphere, I think this is a big mistake, because just like culture, for example, sport cannot be
politicised. These are the bridges that bring people, nations and states closer together. This is the way
to approach it, not try to forge some anti-Russian or anti-whatever policy on this basis.
As for the Russian authorities, I can assure you, we are categorically against all doping for several reasons.
First, as a former amateur athlete, I can tell you, and I think that the overwhelming majority of people will agree
with this: if we know there is doping, it’s not interesting to watch the event; millions of fans lose interest
in the sport.
Second, no less important, and maybe even most important, there is the health of the athletes themselves.
You can’t justify anything that damages health. This is why we have combated and will continue to combat
doping in sport on the national level.
Furthermore, as far as I know, the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Investigative Committee have been
closely looking into all facts reported in the media, among others. Simply, this must not be turned into
a campaign, especially a campaign disparaging sport, including Russian sport.
Next, the third point I would like to make. There is a legal concept that says responsibility can only be
individual. Collective responsibility cannot be imposed on all athletes or athletes of a certain sports federation if
certain individuals have been caught doping. An entire team cannot be held responsible for those who have
committed this violation. I believe that this is an absolutely natural, correct approach.
However, doping is not the only problem today. There are plenty of problems in sport. Euro 2016 is underway.
I believe that less attention is being paid to football than to brawling between fans. This is very sad and I regret
this, but here too we should always proceed from some general criteria. To reiterate, responsibility
for misconduct should be individualised as much as possible and the approach toward perpetrators should be
the same.
Euro 2016 began with a high-profile case: a fight between Russian and British fans. This is absolutely
outrageous. Granted, I do not know how 200 Russian fans were able to pummel several thousand Britons. I do
not understand. But in any case, law enforcement agencies should take the same approach toward all
perpetrators.
This is the way we have organised this work and will continue to combat doping and enforce discipline among
fans. We will work with these fan associations. I very much hope that there are plenty of intelligent, sensible
people among the fans, who really love sport and who understand that violations do nothing to support their
team but, on the contrary, cause damage to the team and to sport. However, a great deal has yet to be done
here, including in conjunction with our [foreign] colleagues.
I would like to stress that there has been absolutely no support and can be absolutely no support for violations
in sport, let alone doping violations, at the state level. We have worked and will continue to work with all
international organisations in this sphere.
<…>
This is the first St. Petersburg forum not shunned by Western political elites in a couple of years…Russia wants to show Western
business that there are possibilities for reform…The sanctions have not been removed, the Minsk agreements not fulfilled, but there
has been a certain lowering of tensions…The Kremlin is cautiously rehabilitating the systemic liberals—Kudrin has informal status
as the main reformer, with assistance from Gref…Vlast, not very convincingly, is making noises about improving conditions for
private business… Gestures have been made to ease tensions with the West—Savchenko, for example, was released—there’s a
certain weariness with confrontation…There has been some movement away from the conservative trend domestically—
Pavlenskiy has been released (http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-pavlensky-artist-fined-cultural-site-fsb/27786266.html )...The
message to Western investors is clear—Russia does not want to be North Korea or even Belarus…Russia needs direct investment
and budget problems are pushing vlast toward making a political decision on structural reforms…
The weariness of both Russia and the West with sanctions in the mid-term could at least lead to their weakening. The decline of the
economy has slowed down and some optimists expect growth by the end of the year… The Ukraine crisis could be routinized,
pushed to the back burner in favor of cooperating on combatting terrorism…Putin wants to lower tensions with the Americans…
Yet the arbitrary behavior of courts, “tax terrorism,” corruption, and “nightmaring” businesses have only become worse…Average
investors without special connections are waiting for a sign of vlast’s intensions and of a more transparent economic policy…It’s
doubtful that will happen—and foreign business surely understands that…Foreign investors want to know about concrete
economic development plans, tax policy, about whether Glazyev is taken seriously and whether Kudrin is around just for window
dressing. Are the siloviky taking part in discussions on economic policy temporarily or is they here to stay?
…Putin wants the economy to improve, but without changing anything institutionally…The way to have influence in Russia is
through a relationship with one of Putin’s friends, who often have more influence than ministers. So investors want to know what a
particular person’s access to Putin really is, what kind of influence a person might have on a minister…And investors see a society
that is distrustful, even hateful toward the West, one where opposition political figures are in danger, where one has to be wary of
provocations by competitors…And the Yukos case, the Magnitskiy affair, and the case against the owners and managers of
Domodedovo airport are still very much on the minds of foreign investors…
In Russia, if you move one way, you lose your business, another and you lose your life. If you move just right, you can become a
billionaire…
http://vk.com/id244477574?w=wall244477574_18809/all
Russia’s conciliatory gestures to America are being made for two reasons: One, because it is the Americans blocking European
revisionism regarding Russia; and two, because Moscow is worried about “reputational scandals”—there may be more to come,
provoking a spilt in the Russian elite…
HTTP://WWW.YAHOO.COM/NEWS/GERMANY-SLAMS-NATO-WARMONGERING-RUSSIA-115515814.HTML?REF=GS
German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier has criticised NATO for having a bellicose policy towards Russia, describing it as
"warmongering", the German daily Bild reported.
Steinmeier pointed to the deployment of NATO troops near borders with Russia in the military alliance's Baltic and east European
member states.
"What we should avoid today is inflaming the situation by warmongering and stomping boots," Steinmeier told Bild in an interview to
be published Sunday.
"Anyone who thinks you can increase security in the alliance with symbolic parades of tanks near the eastern borders, is mistaken,"
Germany's top diplomat added.
NATO had announced on Monday that it would deploy four battalions to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland to counter a more
assertive Russia, ahead of a landmark summit in Warsaw next month.
All four countries were once ruled from Moscow and remain deeply suspicious of Russian intentions, especially after Russia's
annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014.
In an interview with Bild on Thursday, NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg said Russia is seeking to create "a zone of influence through
military means".
"We are observing massive militarisation at NATO borders -- in the Arctic, in the Baltic, from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean
Sea," he told the newspaper.
Stoltenberg has stressed that NATO does not seek confrontation with Russia and wants a constructive dialogue but that it would
defend the 28 allies against any threat
Russia bitterly opposes NATO's expansion into its Soviet-era satellites and last month said it would create three new divisions in its
southwest region to meet what it described as a dangerous military build-up along its borders.

From: Robert Otto <robertotto25@gmail.com>
Sent time: 06/11/2016 01:24:45 AM
Subject: Viktor Ivanov

All this stuff about the guys resigning and their ties to Viktor might be true…..but then again might not.
I’ve followed Voronin, for example, for years and the VI connection comes up ONLY after he resigns and
Big Vik has lost and refused another post.
Why didn’t it come up with Russo Chekisto or Magnitskiy or the NDS scams?
All of these leaks about the relationship may just be misdirection and there are other reasons for what’s going
on.
From: Firestone, Thomas <thomas.firestone@bakermckenzie.com>
Sent time: 06/23/2016 09:01:19 AM
To: Robert Otto <robertotto25@gmail.com>
Subject: RE: Magnitskiy

Interesting. It is possible that he was employed by the firm only in an audit/investigative capacity and did not give legal advice, as he
did not have a legal education. Why not just ask Browder or Jamison ?

Sent: Thursday, June 23, 2016 8:28 AM
To: Firestone, Thomas
Subject: Re: Magnitskiy

Let's try it this way (since I am at work writing from the site):

http://russian-untouchables.com/eng/testimonies/

Page down to the June 8 2008 document. The auditor occupation is specified on the 1st page after the numeral 8.

On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 7:18 AM, Firestone, Thomas <thomas.firestone@bakermckenzie.com> wrote:
The document won’t open. Can you resend ?

Sent: Thursday, June 23, 2016 4:40 AM

See the top of the document for auditor.

On Wed, Jun 22, 2016 at 6:07 PM, Firestone, Thomas <thomas.firestone@bakermckenzie.com> wrote:
Yurist is just a lawyer, i.e., anyone who has a law degree, which is an undergrad degree in Russia. To be an advokat, you have to
pass a special exam and be admitted to an advokatskaya palata. Only advokats can represent defendants in criminal cases and
only advokats have attorney-client privilege. Other than that, there is not much difference. But a yurist is definitely a lawyer and
should be described as such, not as an auditor.
-----Original Message-----
Sent: Wednesday, June 22, 2016 3:41 PM
What's the difference between the 2? yurist and advokat?
> On Jun 22, 2016, at 3:40 PM, Firestone, Thomas <thomas.firestone@bakermckenzie.com> wrote:
>
> Do you have more information about his bio ? As I understand it, he was a lawyer (юрист) but not an адвокат. I have no idea
where the auditor bit comes from.
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
>> On Jun 22, 2016, at 3:37 PM, Robert Otto <robertotto25@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> Hi Tom:
>>
>> A question about his profession and the court system.
>>
>> Browder always calls him a lawyer and, when pressed, notes that Magnitskiy represented Hermitage in court (and has the
documents)
>>
>> The Public oversight commission referred to him as an auditor (appendix 1 of the HRC report) and Kabanaov's NAL claimed
he was a lawyer -Auditor.
>>
>> What's deal on this? Can Auditors go to court? What kinds etc.
>>
>> If you don't know can you point me to something to read?
>>
>> b
>>
>> can you do lunch?
>>
>>
>
>
> This message may contain confidential and privileged information. If it has been sent to you in error, please reply to advise the
sender of the error and then immediately delete this message. Please visit www.bakermckenzie.com/disclaimers for other
important information concerning this message.
>

Sent time: 07/26/2016 11:51:53 PM
To: Robert Otto <OttoRC@state.gov>
BCc: swallen@1scom.net; chris.bort@gmail.com; naterey80@gmail.com; donald.jensen8@gmail.com
Subject: MK on Belyaninov (Korolev as a spotless individual)

Kommersant has the op on Belyaninov as a joint USB FSB // SK But we don’t have a USB FSB head yet.
But
The stuff on Korolov being pure reminded me of this live journal stuff that Kanev mentioned in 2011 (i resent earlier this year).
What angered Feoktistov was Korolev becoming head of USB……...
Говорят, что узнав об этом, Олег Феоктистов пришел в ярость, но руки не опустил и решил действовать по-
старинке, поручив руководителю 6-й службы УСБ Ткачеву срочно найти компромат на Королёва. Коррупции
найти не удалось, и Феоктистов решил остановиться с поисками. С августа 2011 Сергей Королев года
приступил к исполнению своих обязанностей.
Учитывая, что его партнер Андрей Хорев утратил большую часть влияния на экономический блок МВД,
текущая мечта Олега Феоктистова занять должность руководителя Управления ФСБ по г. Москве и Московской
области.
http://www.mk.ru/social/2016/07/26/za-obyskami-u-belyaninova-stoit-bolshoy-peredel-v-fsb.html
За обысками у Бельянинова стоит «большой передел» в ФСБ
«Все чудеснее и чудеснее»: круг неприкасаемых сужается с каждым днем
Вчера в 17:51, просмотров: 91875
Не успели обыватели прийти в себя после арестов руководителей Следственного комитета, как очередная
сногсшибательная новость. ФСБ пришло с обысками в Федеральную таможенную службу. Причем чекисты заглянули
даже в кабинет и в дом к главе ведомства Андрею Бельянинову, который сам в прошлом работал в КГБ СССР. Как
выразился наш источник, близкий к Кремлю: «С каждым днем становится все чудеснее и чудеснее».
А за всеми этими «чудесами», по данным наших источников, стоят кардинальные перестановки в ФСБ, которые
произошли в июле, и на которые мало кто обратил внимание.
Как связаны все последние аресты и обыски между собой и «три главных буквы русского алфавита» (так уже стали
называть ФСБ)?
Первые сообщения об обысках в ФТС появились утром 26 июля. Но в ведомстве от событий сразу отреклись. Начальник
управления по связям с общественностью ФТС Иван Саутин заявил:
-У нас все тихо. А Бельянинов вообще в отпуске.
Вскоре скрывать происходящее уже не было смысла. Тогда появилась версия, что это был не обыск, а изъятие
документов по одному громкому уголовному делу, и проходило оно не в кабинете Бельянинова, а в канцелярии ФТС.
-Таможенная служба никаких официальных комментариев относительно обысков или выемок документов в центральном
аппарате ФТС давать не будет, - заметил Саутин.
- Они могут называть это как угодно, - говорит наш источник в спецслужбах. - Операция проводилась по решению
руководства ФСБ в рамках расследования дел о контрабанде, в том числе контрабанде спиртного, в которой обвиняется
«круглосуточный губернатор Петербурга» миллиардер Михальченко (он был арестован еще весной, находится в
«Лефортово»). Одновременно обыски прошли у экс-советника руководителя ФТС, руководителя группы компаний
«Арсенал» Сергея Лобанова.
Связаться с Бельяниновым так и не удалось, но, по слухам, он весьма раздражен неприятными новостями. В прошлом
актер (помните - «мальчик Юра, Юра Бондаренко» в фильме Евгения Карелова «Дети Дон Кихота»), разведчик (был
сотрудником посольств в ряде стран, в том числе в ГДР, где познакомился с Владимиром Путиным), он считал себя
неуязвимым для правоохранителей.
Три года назад к нему уже приходили с обысками, ничего не нашли и он назвал потом это “несанкционированным
проникновением из-за низкой квалификации правоохранителей».
Спасут ли сейчас Бельянинова знакомства высшего уровня? В верхах поговаривает, что «круг неприкасаемых», к кому
претензий быть не может по определению, сужается с каждым днем. Весной знакомства не спасли бизнесмена
Михальченко. Напомним, что у него нашли контрабандный алкоголь на сумму в 1,6 миллиона. Сейчас у правоохранителй
появились сведения, что к этой контрабанде (и не только спиртного, но и других товаров, в частности мясных изделий)
могли быть причастны должностные лица ФТС.
И все-таки почему именно сейчас? Почему аресты и обыски в последние дни идут одни за другими?
И вот тут стоит обратить внимание на то, что произошло в самом ФСБ, точнее в одном из главных его подразделений -
Службе экономической безопасности (СЭБ) — кстати, в свое время им руководил нынешний глава ФСБ Александр
Бортников.
Итак, в июле ушел на пенсию начальник СЭБ Юрий Яковлев. А еще был уволен начальник управления «К» того же
СЭБ, член санкционного «списка Магнитского» (он занимался расследованием дела погибшего юриста) Виктор Воронин
(He’s not on the magnitskiy list) . Именно к этим двум генералам было больше всего вопросов у самих же чекистов.
- Как бы вам объяснить попроще... В ФСБ много структур, которые друг друга не просто контролируют, но между собой
воют и собирают компромат, - говорит наш источник. - На Яковлева и Воронина его было много. Коллеги перестали им
доверять. Они сами в последнее время почти перестали контролировать ситуацию. А ведь СЭБ отвечает за кредитно-
финансовую сферу, борьбу с контрабандой и т. д. По всем этим направлениям было «проседание».
К примеру, все прекрасно понимали, что огромное количество алкоголя поставляется контрафактно, но знаковых арестов
не было. Или вот все догадывались, что львиная доля одежды, обуви, бытовой техники из Китая поставляется
нелегально. И опять же — никаких задержаний. А ведь про контрабанду не раз за последнее время говорили и в Госдуме,
и в Правительстве. Называли колоссальные суммы (речь о триллионах), которые теряет бюджет.
И вот в июле на должность главы СЭБ был поставлен Сергей Королев. Место руководителя подразделения «К» пока
вакантно, но в ближайшие дни назовут его имя. Кроме того, ожидается, что у УСБ ФСБ тоже будет новый начальник
(прежним был Королев).
- Вот тогда все окончательно станет на свои места, - заметил наш источник. - Пока же можно сказать, что назначение
Королева всех воодушевило. Кристально честный и чистый человек, которого не затронуло профессиональное
выгорание. Он всегда противостоял заигрываниям с преступным миром, в результате которых правоохранители сами
становятся преступниками. Отсюда и аресты в СК. Можно сколько угодно говорить, что это сам СК подчищает ряды, но
в действительности вся операция проведена ФСБ.
ЧТО ПОРАЗИЛО В ДОМЕ БЕЛЬЯНИНОВА
— Интерьер в классическом стиле, как любят в России, — говорит московский дизайнер Искандар КАДЫРОВ. —
Выделяется роскошный английский кабинет, сделанный под заказ. Но это единственное, что стильно. Остальное —
дорого и безвкусно. По принципу «главное — удобство». Скорее всего, для выбора мебели не привлекали дизайнеров, а
это делала супруга. По общей стоимости — около 35 миллионов долларов, не больше. Один только белый рояль стоит
50–70 тысяч евро. А вот оценить большую коллекцию старинных картин даже боюсь. Одно только полотно Айвазовского
(а судя по всему, там оно есть, хотя я могу ошибаться) доходит до $1 млн.
ПО КАКОМУ ДЕЛУ ПРОХОДИТ БЕЛЬЯНИНОВ
Главным управлением по расследованию особо важных дел Следственного комитета Российской Федерации
продолжается расследование уголовного дела, возбужденного по ч. 3 ст. 200.2 УК РФ по факту незаконного
перемещения через таможенную границу Таможенного союза алкогольной продукции в крупном размере и неуплаты
обязательных таможенных платежей. В рамках уголовного дела предъявлено обвинение генеральному директору
холдинговой компании «Форум» Дмитрию Михальченко, заместителю генерального директора холдинговой компании
«Форум» Борису Коревскому, заместителю генерального директора ООО «КонтРейл Логистик Северо-Запад» Анатолию
Киндзерскому и директору ООО «Юго-Восточная торговая компания» Илье Пичко. По уголовному делу проведены
обыски в Федеральной таможенной службе, в том числе в кабинете ее руководителя Андрея Бельянинова, его
заместителей Давыдова и Струкова, а также по месту жительства руководителя ФТС. Кроме того, проведены обыски по
месту жительства и работы президента ООО «Страховая компания Арсеналъ» Сергея Лобанова, который является
учредителем не менее 15 различных фирм, чья деятельность тесно связана с ФТС России.
КТО С КЕМ СВЯЗАН
Согласно данным «Картотеки.ру», гендиректором ООО «Страховая компания Арсеналъ» является некий Анатолий
Сандимиров. «Арсеналъ» в свою очередь является учредителем АО «Единый Таможенный поручитель» и ООО
«Интерлогистика». Эти структуры, оказывающие услуги участникам внешнеэкономической деятельности, организованы
относительно недавно — в 2014 году. Очевидно, что они напрямую связаны с таможенными услугами. При этом Сергей
Лобанов является учредителем компании «Арсеналъ-Капитал», которая в свою очередь учредила ООО «Страховая
компания Арсеналъ».
Читайте материалы «СМИ: главный таможенник РФ написал заявление об отставке»
Сколько стоят предметы антиквариата, собранные в доме Бельянинова
Sent time: 06/30/2016 04:05:03 PM
Cc: Robert Otto <robertotto25@gmail.com>

In the period c. 2004-2010, which I studied for the paper I sent you 3 weeks ago, DM was very aggressive
and was clearly under a St Petersburg krysha, which I think meant, ultimately at least, Bortnikov. So his
arrest in March might be a warning to Bortnikov, although a lot of water may have flown under the bridge
since the period I was studying.
Best,
Peter
Peter, thanks for this—Mikhalchenko was arrested. It was reported in the notes for 30 March. He has come up in the 31
March, 26, 27, and 31 May and on 7, 9, and 10 June. I referred back to the notes form 2007 that claimed Mikhalchenko was
involved in Tsepov’s murder. I’ll search again and see if anything turns up earlier than that. Here’s the bit on MIkhalchenko
being taken into custody from 30 March:
http://en.news-4-u.ru/basmanny-court-has-arrested-billionaire-mikhalchenko-in-the-case-of-smuggling-of-elite-alcohol.html
previously questioned in a criminal case of alcohol smuggling, be taken into custody for two months. Judge Andrey
Karpov dismissed the request that the businessman be released on bail of 50 million rubles according to «Interfax».
Mikhalchenko categorically denied his involvement in smuggling or any plans to hide from the investigation. The
businessman also told the jury about attempts to pressure his business, in particular the construction of a deep water
port Bronka, which has been headed by OOO «Phoenix».
…The Russian billionaire is accused of smuggling alcohol in 2015, creating an organized crime group that shipped
the alcohol from the port of Hamburg under the guise of construction sealant.
…Mikhalchenko was accused of smuggling of alcoholic beverages in an organized group in especially large quantity
(part 3 of article 200.2 of the Criminal Code). His Deputy Boris Chorevski, Deputy Director of OOO «Logistik
Central Northwest», Anatoly Kindzerskaya, and the Director of «South-East trading company», Ilya Pichko, were
also detained.
According to some media reports, Mikhalchenko arrived in Moscow on March 28 and was detained the next day.
According to «Fontanka.ru», the detention took place on Wednesday morning. He was detained by investigators of
the central apparatus of the FSB and was taken to the Investigative Committee. He was detained for two days...
Mikhalchenko’s name was previously mentioned in connection with a case of multi-million embezzlement
uncovered in the Ministry of Culture….He is the General Director of a management company, «Forum».
On March 15 and 17, the General Director of CJSC Baltstroy (part of the Forum holding), Dmitry Sergeev, and
Baltstroy’s Alexander Kochenov were taken into custody on order of Moscow’s Lefortovo court. They are suspects in
the case of a multimillion embezzlement of budget funds allocated for the restoration of a number of cultural
heritage sites.
The main suspect in this case is the Deputy Minister of Culture, Gregory Pirumov. On 24 March he was charged
with charged with fraud.

H
i Wayne and Bob,

This is just a quick note about Tsepov, Sechin, and Mikhalchenko, whom you've
discussed in two recent issues, Wayne, quoting a reader who I suspect is you,
Bob.

Between c. 2004 and 2011 I did a lot of research on these and related folks,
putting the results into a 70 pp paper, which is supposed to be published soon in
an e-journal ("Putin & the Silovik Wars").

What struck me about Mikhalchenko were his extraordinary youth (about 30 in
2005?), his great personal ambition for wealth and power, and his skill at
cultivating the Leningrad KGB. I don't recall any ties to Moscow or the likes of
Sechin or Zolotov - he was too young.

Also, over the 5-6 years after Tsepov was assassinated, I don't recall anyone
raising the possibility that Mikhalchenko was in any way involved. Certainly he
jumped in aggressively and took over large chunks of Tsepov's empire, so he
could theoretically have had a motive in this regard. But this was also the
opportunistic way you'd simply expect someone of his character to act.

To conclude, one question - did you mean it when you wrote 2-3 times that he
had recently been arrested, and if so, for what and when?. And one small factual
point: the business co-run by Tsepov and Zolotov was Baltik-Eskort (not -
Eksport).

With thanks once again to both of you for the prodigious amount of outstanding
work that you produce day in and day out,

Yours,

Peter

The heads (no names given) of the FSB’s Directorates “P” and “T” have resigned. Those two directorates, along with “K,”
whose head, Viktor Voronin, has also resigned, form the backbone of the FSB’s Economic Security Service (SEB).
Directorate P handles industrial counterintelligence, while T handles transportation, including Russian Railways and aviation.
The head of FSB SEB, Yuri Yakovlev, is supposedly on his way out as well. Rosbalt’s sources say that the likely successor
for Yakovlev at FSB SEB is the FSB’s head of the internal security directorate (USB) Sergey Korolev. Korolev could be
replaced by his deputy, Oleg Feoktistov. The FSB USB’s Ivan Tkachev is reportedly to take over at Directorate K.
Comment: I wonder whether the people at Directorates P and T were also connected to Viktor Ivanov, as Voronin
and Romodanovskiy were. See yesterday’s notes. True, both were also supposedly linked to Mikhalchenko, as
was Murov, but “clan” lines tend to overlap and the key players all know one another. It could be that Ivanov’s
departure, as I suggested yesterday, was the beginning of the unravelling of his “clan” network within the special
services and in other key areas as well—such as Larisa Kalanda leaving her posts at Rosneft/Rosneftegaz.
Mikhalchenko’s name could be dropped as a pretext to go after Ivanov’s people.
Feoktistov has come up in these notes before in the material on the GUEBiPK scandal mentioned in yesterday’s
notes. Here’s a bit from the 14 May 2014 notes that mentions him:
Novaya Gazeta refutes Sugrobov’s (his deputy Kolesnikov, also arrested, has made the same claim) claim he knew nothing about the
“provocations” and did not know the provocateurs used by the GUEBiPK in allegedly setting up and framing a number of officials. Novaya
has information that he at least knew the GUEBiPK agent Sergey Pirozhkov dating back to 2009, when Pirozhkov worked in the then MVD
Department for Economic Security (now the GUEBiPK): http://www.novayagazeta.ru/inquests/63516.html
In an open letter to Putin, posted on Facebook by his lawyer, Anton Tsetkov, Sugrobov blames his troubles on rivals in the FSB and SK—he
blames the SK for fouling up a number of corruption cases (an implies that they were protecting corrupt officials and undermining Putin’s anti-
corruption campaign). Sugrobov also denies that he is married to Presidential Aide Konstantin Chuiychenko’s wife’s sister or that he has
benefited from Chuiychenko’s patronage (as a number of our sources have reported). He further claims that FSB General Feoktistov
approached him in 2011, urging him to establish relations with one time 1st Deputy Head of the MVD Economic Security Unit, Khorev
(Feoktistov claimed that Khorev, implicated in the tax-rebate schemes that involved the Tax Service and were connected to the Magnitskiy
affair [See, for instance, the 20 March 2012 notes], was set to become head of a reorganized economic security/anti-corruption unit, the
GUEBiPK, and would agree to name Sugrobov his deputy. But Sugrobov refused to go along; Comment: We had read that part of the
struggle involving the GUEBiPK was between supporters of Khorev and backers of Sugrobov. See the 1 April notes; Novaya Gazeta’s Kanev
wrote on the ties between Feoktistov and Khorev back in 2011: http://www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2011/107/28.html). Sugrobov ends by saying
he is willing to take a polygraph test and calls on Putin to make sure the investigations of the charges against him and his subordinates are
“objective”: http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=700657453313675&set=pcb.700658349980252&type=1&theater]
Comment: For any of that to make sense, readers will have to refer back to summation of the GUEBiPK scandal
(up to that point) I included in the 31 March notes. The GUEBiPK’s Sugrobov was connected by our sources to
Mevdedev’s “lawyer/classmates” faction, among them Konstantin Chuiychenko, mentioned above. Recall this bit
from yesterday’s notes:
…claims that charges against Voronin have to do with “K’s” involvement in the case against the MVD’s economic security/anti-corruption
unit, the GUEBiPK, a case in which the former head of that unit, Denis Sugrobov, was arrested and still awaits trial on corruption charges
stemming from claims that he and his subordinates fabricated cases against businesses, among other things. Sugrobov’s deputy, Boris
Kolesnikov was also arrested (Comment: And died under strange circumstances while in custody). The GUEBiPK scandal dealt a serious
blow to Medvedev’s entourage—and some say that Voronin’s departure from the FSB SEB was revenge by some of Medvedev’s people for the
GUEBiPK case.
Comment: Russia’s overlapping money laundering channels are vast and involve lots of games—apart from the Magnitskiy affair, recall the
lengthy GUEBiPK scandal, which pointed to a clash between the MVD economic security department (probably allied with elements in the
Prosecutor’s office) and the FSB and its allies in the Investigative Committee. The battle was said to be over controlling money laundering
channels. See the 31 March notes for a rehash of the GUEBiPK affair.]
Comment: I recently covered Putin’s connections to organized crime in St. Petersburg, connections that included Tsepov, in the 30 March
notes. Briefly put, Tsepov was a racketeer and one time all-around fixer and bodyguard for Mayor Sobchak in St. Petersburg. Tsepov was the
co-founder, along with Putin bodyguard Viktor Zolotov, of a St. Petersburg security firm, Baltic Eksport. Tsepov apparently tried to insinuate
himself into the Yukos affair as a mediator—I suspected at the time that this was the reason he was assassinated. Zolotov attended Tsepov’s
funeral. The killing of Tsepov shook up the elite, creating quite a scandal. I had Sechin and Deripaska, who was also interested in Yukos, as
likely suspects in the murder—Tsepov reportedly tried to pass himself off as Deripaska’s representative. There have been claims that
Tsepov, like Litvinenko, was poisoned with polonium.
This item (http://putinism.wordpress.com/2016/01/29/roma_tsepov/#more-146), an update to an earlier article on Putin and Tsepov, claims that
“FSB agent Dmitriy Mikhachenko” killed Tsepov with polonium-poisoned tea at the St. Petersburg FSB office. Mikhalchenko subsequently
took over Tsepov’s businesses. Zolotov had been Tsepov’s patron, but Mikhalchenko had the FSB’s Bortnikov as a krysha. Thus, Zolotov
and Bortnikov have long been enemies—Nemtsov was killed by Kadyrov and Zolotov, the investigation conducted under Bortnikov.
An e-mail from the reader who sent this: The article is a bit strange since the recent info is that Mikhalchenko is all mobbed up with the FSO/Murov and
the target of the FSB.
That said, if Mikhalchenko was involved, we have a reason to think there’s enmity between Mikhalchenko and Zolotov (and maybe Murov, too since he
seems to be the Mikhalchenko krysha now) ……..and Zolotov and Bortnikov?
In 2004, when Tsepov was murdered, Bortnikov was out of StP, btw. Up to February 2004 he headed the FSB in StP, but he then went to head the FSB’s
SEB (when he met Voronin?), taking the one time allegedly super influential Zaostrovtsev’s (tri kita) place.
In short, just how much — if not all — of this stuff a provocation is not clear, but that doesn’t make it less interesting in light of all the other stuff going
on…]
Comment: I included quite a bit of material on Mikhalchenko’s possible involvement in the Tsepov murder in notes
from years past. In the 5 September 2007 notes, for instance, I included material on Chayka’s campaign against
Tambov gangster Vladimir Kumarin—and one item had Kumarin as possibly being involved in the Tsepov
assassination, with he and Sechin using Mikhalchenko as part of the plan to get rid of Tsepov. Tsepov was
connected with all the St. Petersburg siloviky, but his stronger connections were with the MVD and FSO,
Mikhalchenko’s supposedly with the FSB, as in the item above.
Mikhalchenko took over Tsepov’s niche in St. Petersburg after Tsepov’s death. In those notes, I had Sechin,
Kumarin and their allies in the FSB killing Tsepov because he tried to insinuate himself into the Yukos affair and
represented a roadblock to Kumarin’s friend Mikhalchenko’s ambition to take over Tsepov’s security
business/fixer role in St. Petersburg. I had also suspected Deripaska, who may have been irritated by Tsepov’s
reported overstepping in presenting himself as a Deripaska (without D’s consent) rep in secret talks on the fate of
Yukos—but here’s an important point: Deripaska was supposedly close at the time to Murov/FSO and Zolotov.
And Zolotov was a close friend of Tsepov’s. So it made sense to at that point have Sechin as the stronger suspect
for using his FSB connections and Mikhalchenko to kill Tsepov.
The problem we have is that more recently—and this is a number of years later, to be sure—our sources had
Murov as Mikhalchenko’s patron and krysha. Things can change, of course—maybe Mikhalchenko’s FSB
connections were to people closer to Patrushev than the man who would succeed him at FSB, Bortnikov, and a re-
alignment took place after a number of changes in the “power block” and after Mikhalchenko had established
himself as Tsepov’s successor. What’s more, we also have some sources saying that Zolotov drifted apart from his
old boss, Murov, and was pleased to replace him with his own man, Kochnev, as head of the FSO. See, for
instance, the notes from 27 May.
I’ve been writing these notes since 2002. The notes from summer 2004 to present are available at the OSC site
for those with access who might be interested in tracing the story back to St. Petersburg in the 2000s.
Relations between the FSB Internal Security Directorate (USB) and the FSB SEB have been strained lately—and the strain
has resulted in scandals and criminal cases. Rosbalt’s sources say it’s the FSB USB’s boss, Korolev, who will take over at
FSB SEB. His deputy, Oleg Feoktistov, will take over at USB, and Ivan Tkachev of FSB USB will take over Directorate K.
When then head of FSB USB, Aleksandr Kupryazhkin, was promoted to FSB deputy director in 2011, Feoktistov was
supposed to be his replacement, but Sergey Korolev, a comrade of Anatoliy Serdyukov’s, got the nod…Just a couple of years
ago, the USB and SEB were friendly and cooperated in the case against the MVD GUEBiPK, but then the USB turned its
attention to the SEB. In February of last year, USB officers arrested Directorate P’s Igor Korobitsin for demanding a $1
million bribe from the head of Rosalkogolregulirovanie, Igor Chuyan. At the beginning of this year, the USB implicated
Directorate K’s Vadim Uvarov in an extortion case involving contraband cell phones. The “shadow financial sector” has
reportedly already reacted to the personal shifts at FSB by raising its rate for legalizing large amounts of illicit cash
(“obnalichivanie” or “obnal”) to 15%...

One propaganda failure after another, with the starring role going to the failed successor, Medvedev and his “there’s no
money” comment. And it’s not happening without a Peskov-Volodin-Ernst conspiracy. There’s a campaign against
Medvedev, one the majority of the “Kremlin towers” support.
They are certainly not inspiring optimism in anyone…Crimea is no longer helping the thieving regime. And within the regime,
conspiracies abound, as the system is in a stupor…
Comment: Recall that Medvedev was in Crimea and a retired woman complained about low pensions—Medvedev
told her pensions would be indexed when possible, but said “there’s no money.” He told her to hang in there. See
the 25 May notes. His remarks were mocked around the Runet. Putin said that maybe Medvedev’s comments had
been taken out of context: http://www.newsru.com/russia/28may2016/hold_on.html And that the government was paying
more attention to fulfilling social obligations—anyway, a lot of countries were having problems with pensions…
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russia-facing-biggest-brain-drain-in-two-decades/571758.html
Some 350,000 people left Russia in 2015, ten times more than five years ago. Many are highly trained and looking for better
business opportunities abroad, the newspaper said.
Forty-two percent of senior managers want to emigrate from Russia, a poll by headhunting company Agentstvo Kontakt revealed
Tuesday.
Those wishing to move said that they were motivated by more favorable conditions for developing private businesses, better
prospects of finding investors, and a higher quality of life.
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russian-state-duma-strips-opposition-deputy-ponomarev-of-his-
powers/571816.html
The Russian State Duma voted to strip opposition deputy Ilya Ponomarev of his powers for not fulfilling his duties, the Vedomosti
newspaper reported Friday.
The vote concluded with 413 deputies for and three against, all three coming from the A Just Russia opposition party: Dmitry
Gudkov, Sergei Petrov, and Ponomarev himself, voting in absentia from the United States.
During the proceedings, the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, alleged that Ponomarev is
leading anti-Russian propaganda and acting against the interests of the country.
The A Just Russia party presented the initiative, and concluded that Ponomarev has not come to the Duma in two years, has not
been working with constituents, and has not been communicating with the party. Ponomarev refutes these claims, Vedomosti
reported.
Ponomarev was the only deputy in the Duma who voted against the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. When he traveled to
California soon after, his bank accounts were frozen and he was allegedly prohibited from traveling abroad. He has not returned to
Russia since then, according to The New York Times.
In 2015 the Duma stripped him of parliamentary immunity, charged and arrested him in absentia for the embezzlement of $750,000
from the state-funded scientific and technological Skolkovo Foundation. Ponomarev had worked with Skolkovo as a lecturer, and in
2011-12 he managed part of the foundation’s projects while working closely with then-President Dmitry Medvedev.
Members of the Russian State Duma on Friday approved the third reading of a law regulating the work of news aggregators, the
Slon.ru news website reported. The law received unanimous support, with 319 deputies voting for the law and none against.
The first offense for legal entities now carries a fine of 600,000 rubles ($9,200), the first for individuals now 100,000 rubles ($1,500).
Leading Russian search engine Yandex was critical of the bill when it was first introduced, saying that its requirements were
excessive and impractical. The law requires aggregators to save the information they disseminate for six months after publication.
Upon initial introduction in February, an explanatory note accompanying the bill stated the need for stricter regulation of
aggregators, on the basis of their audience reach and ability to influence opinion.
French bank Societe Generale began closing the accounts of Russian diplomats in Paris without explanation on Friday, the state-
run RIA Novosti news agency reported.
Employees of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) have also been affected, RIA Novosti
reported, citing an unnamed source within diplomatic circles.
“At this time, while deputies of the National Assembly and the French Senate are voting on lifting the sanctions against Russia, the
French bank Societe Generale, seemingly out of fear from the U.S. side, is closing the accounts not only of Russian citizens, but
Russian diplomats as well,” the unnamed source said, RIA Novosti reported.
The French Foreign Ministry has promised to provide information on the closing of the accounts. Societe Generale has not yet
responded to RIA Novosti with comments regarding the closures.
In June 2015, the French “daughter” bank of Russia-based Vneshtorgbank (VTB) froze the accounts of Russian companies. The
accounts were reopened the following month.
Accounts of people associated with state-owned and operated news agency Rossia Segodnya were also frozen in June 2015, a
move declared illegal by a Paris court in April.
The Russian Central Bank lowered its key interest rate by 0.5 percentage points to 10.5 percent on Friday, the TASS state news
agency reported. The last time the bank lowered the interest rate was in August 2015.
Following a meeting of the Board of Directors, the bank decided to lower the rate based on recent perceived positive trends in
inflation patterns.
“The Board of Directors notes positive process of inflation stabilization, decline of inflation expectations and inflation risks amid
signs of an approaching phase of growing recovery,” the bank's report said, TASS reported.
The report said the decision was also based on positive GDP trends in Q1 of this year, as well as macroeconomic indicators in
April, which reflect the growing ability of the Russian economy to withstand fluctuations in the price of oil.
With the next meeting of the bank's Board of Directors to take place on July 29, the report mentioned the future of the rate.
“The Russian Central Bank will consider the possibility of further reduction of the key rate, assessing inflation risks and compliance
of dynamics of inflation deceleration with the target trajectory,” the report said.
The ruble continued to fall following the announcement, but stabilized later in the day after the dollar and euro fell to 64.7 and 73.2
rubles, respectively.

Sent time: 06/11/2016 03:53:42 PM
To: Wayne Allensworth <swallen@1scom.net>; Robert Otto <robertotto25@gmail.com>

H
i Wayne and Bob,
This is just a quick note about Tsepov, Sechin, and Mikhalchenko, whom you've discussed in two recent
issues, Wayne, quoting a reader who I suspect is you, Bob.
Between c. 2004 and 2011 I did a lot of research on these and related folks, putting the results into a 70 pp
paper, which is supposed to be published soon in an e-journal ("Putin & the Silovik Wars").
What struck me about Mikhalchenko were his extraordinary youth (about 30 in 2005?), his great personal
ambition for wealth and power, and his skill at cultivating the Leningrad KGB. I don't recall any ties to
Also, over the 5-6 years after Tsepov was assassinated, I don't recall anyone raising the possibility that
Mikhalchenko was in any way involved. Certainly he jumped in aggressively and took over large chunks of
Tsepov's empire, so he could theoretically have had a motive in this regard. But this was also the
To conclude, one question - did you mean it when you wrote 2-3 times that he had recently been arrested,
and if so, for what and when?. And one small factual point: the business co-run by Tsepov and Zolotov was
With thanks once again to both of you for the prodigious amount of outstanding work that you produce day
in and day out,
Yours,
Peter
whose head, Viktor Voronin, has also resigned, form the backbone of the FSB’s Economic Security Service (SEB). Directorate
P handles industrial counterintelligence, while T handles transportation, including Russian Railways and aviation. The head of FSB
SEB, Yuri Yakovlev, is supposedly on his way out as well. Rosbalt’s sources say that the likely successor for Yakovlev at FSB
SEB is the FSB’s head of the internal security directorate (USB) Sergey Korolev. Korolev could be replaced by his deputy,
Oleg Feoktistov. The FSB USB’s Ivan Tkachev is reportedly to take over at Directorate K.
and Romodanovskiy were. See yesterday’s notes. True, both were also supposedly linked to Mikhalchenko, as was
Murov, but “clan” lines tend to overlap and the key players all know one another. It could be that Ivanov’s
“provocations” and did not know the provocateurs used by the GUEBiPK in allegedly setting up and framing a number of officials. Novaya has
information that he at least knew the GUEBiPK agent Sergey Pirozhkov dating back to 2009, when Pirozhkov worked in the then MVD Department
for Economic Security (now the GUEBiPK): http://www.novayagazeta.ru/inquests/63516.html
benefited from Chuiychenko’s patronage (as a number of our sources have reported). He further claims that FSB General Feoktistov approached
him in 2011, urging him to establish relations with one time 1st Deputy Head of the MVD Economic Security Unit, Khorev (Feoktistov claimed that
Khorev, implicated in the tax-rebate schemes that involved the Tax Service and were connected to the Magnitskiy affair [See, for instance, the 20
March 2012 notes], was set to become head of a reorganized economic security/anti-corruption unit, the GUEBiPK, and would agree to name
Sugrobov his deputy. But Sugrobov refused to go along; Comment: We had read that part of the struggle involving the GUEBiPK was between
supporters of Khorev and backers of Sugrobov. See the 1 April notes; Novaya Gazeta’s Kanev wrote on the ties between Feoktistov and Khorev
back in 2011: http://www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2011/107/28.html). Sugrobov ends by saying he is willing to take a polygraph test and calls on
Putin to make sure the investigations of the charges against him and his subordinates are “objective”: http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?
Comment: For any of that to make sense, readers will have to refer back to summation of the GUEBiPK scandal (up
to that point) I included in the 31 March notes. The GUEBiPK’s Sugrobov was connected by our sources to
…claims that charges against Voronin have to do with “K’s” involvement in the case against the MVD’s economic security/anti-corruption unit,
the GUEBiPK, a case in which the former head of that unit, Denis Sugrobov, was arrested and still awaits trial on corruption charges stemming
from claims that he and his subordinates fabricated cases against businesses, among other things. Sugrobov’s deputy, Boris Kolesnikov was also
arrested (Comment: And died under strange circumstances while in custody). The GUEBiPK scandal dealt a serious blow to Medvedev’s
entourage—and some say that Voronin’s departure from the FSB SEB was revenge by some of Medvedev’s people for the GUEBiPK case.
likely suspects in the murder—Tsepov reportedly tried to pass himself off as Deripaska’s representative. There have been claims that Tsepov,
like Litvinenko, was poisoned with polonium.
“FSB agent Dmitriy Mikhachenko” killed Tsepov with polonium-poisoned tea at the St. Petersburg FSB office. Mikhalchenko subsequently took
over Tsepov’s businesses. Zolotov had been Tsepov’s patron, but Mikhalchenko had the FSB’s Bortnikov as a krysha. Thus, Zolotov and
Bortnikov have long been enemies—Nemtsov was killed by Kadyrov and Zolotov, the investigation conducted under Bortnikov.
An e-mail from the reader who sent this: The article is a bit strange since the recent info is that Mikhalchenko is all mobbed up with the FSO/Murov and the
target of the FSB.
That said, if Mikhalchenko was involved, we have a reason to think there’s enmity between Mikhalchenko and Zolotov (and maybe Murov, too since he seems
to be the Mikhalchenko krysha now) ……..and Zolotov and Bortnikov?
In 2004, when Tsepov was murdered, Bortnikov was out of StP, btw. Up to February 2004 he headed the FSB in StP, but he then went to head the FSB’s SEB
(when he met Voronin?), taking the one time allegedly super influential Zaostrovtsev’s (tri kita) place.
In short, just how much — if not all — of this stuff a provocation is not clear, but that doesn’t make it less interesting in light of all the other stuff going on…]
assassination, with he and Sechin using Mikhalchenko as part of the plan to get rid of Tsepov. Tsepov was connected
with all the St. Petersburg siloviky, but his stronger connections were with the MVD and FSO, Mikhalchenko’s
supposedly with the FSB, as in the item above.
represented a roadblock to Kumarin’s friend Mikhalchenko’s ambition to take over Tsepov’s security business/fixer
role in St. Petersburg. I had also suspected Deripaska, who may have been irritated by Tsepov’s reported
overstepping in presenting himself as a Deripaska (without D’s consent) rep in secret talks on the fate of Yukos—but
here’s an important point: Deripaska was supposedly close at the time to Murov/FSO and Zolotov. And Zolotov was
a close friend of Tsepov’s. So it made sense to at that point have Sechin as the stronger suspect for using his FSB
connections and Mikhalchenko to kill Tsepov.
The problem we have is that more recently—and this is a number of years later, to be sure—our sources had Murov
as Mikhalchenko’s patron and krysha. Things can change, of course—maybe Mikhalchenko’s FSB connections
were to people closer to Patrushev than the man who would succeed him at FSB, Bortnikov, and a re-alignment took
place after a number of changes in the “power block” and after Mikhalchenko had established himself as Tsepov’s
successor. What’s more, we also have some sources saying that Zolotov drifted apart from his old boss, Murov, and
was pleased to replace him with his own man, Kochnev, as head of the FSO. See, for instance, the notes from 27
May.
I’ve been writing these notes since 2002. The notes from summer 2004 to present are available at the OSC site for
those with access who might be interested in tracing the story back to St. Petersburg in the 2000s.
Relations between the FSB Internal Security Directorate (USB) and the FSB SEB have been strained lately—and the strain has
resulted in scandals and criminal cases. Rosbalt’s sources say it’s the FSB USB’s boss, Korolev, who will take over at FSB
SEB. His deputy, Oleg Feoktistov, will take over at USB, and Ivan Tkachev of FSB USB will take over Directorate K. When
then head of FSB USB, Aleksandr Kupryazhkin, was promoted to FSB deputy director in 2011, Feoktistov was supposed to
be his replacement, but Sergey Korolev, a comrade of Anatoliy Serdyukov’s, got the nod…Just a couple of years ago, the USB
and SEB were friendly and cooperated in the case against the MVD GUEBiPK, but then the USB turned its attention to the
SEB. In February of last year, USB officers arrested Directorate P’s Igor Korobitsin for demanding a $1 million bribe from the
head of Rosalkogolregulirovanie, Igor Chuyan. At the beginning of this year, the USB implicated Directorate K’s Vadim Uvarov
in an extortion case involving contraband cell phones. The “shadow financial sector” has reportedly already reacted to the
personal shifts at FSB by raising its rate for legalizing large amounts of illicit cash (“obnalichivanie” or “obnal”) to 15%...

One propaganda failure after another, with the starring role going to the failed successor, Medvedev and his “there’s no money”
comment. And it’s not happening without a Peskov-Volodin-Ernst conspiracy. There’s a campaign against Medvedev, one the
majority of the “Kremlin towers” support.
the 25 May notes. His remarks were mocked around the Runet. Putin said that maybe Medvedev’s comments had been
taken out of context: http://www.newsru.com/russia/28may2016/hold_on.html And that the government was paying more
attention to fulfilling social obligations—anyway, a lot of countries were having problems with pensions…
Some 350,000 people left Russia in 2015, ten times more than five years ago. Many are highly trained and looking for better business
opportunities abroad, the newspaper said.
Tuesday.
Those wishing to move said that they were motivated by more favorable conditions for developing private businesses, better prospects
of finding investors, and a higher quality of life.
powers/571816.html
The vote concluded with 413 deputies for and three against, all three coming from the A Just Russia opposition party: Dmitry Gudkov,
Sergei Petrov, and Ponomarev himself, voting in absentia from the United States.
During the proceedings, the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, alleged that Ponomarev is leading
anti-Russian propaganda and acting against the interests of the country.
The A Just Russia party presented the initiative, and concluded that Ponomarev has not come to the Duma in two years, has not been
working with constituents, and has not been communicating with the party. Ponomarev refutes these claims, Vedomosti reported.
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russia-state-duma-passes-law-regulating-news-aggregators/571817.html
Leading Russian search engine Yandex was critical of the bill when it was first introduced, saying that its requirements were excessive
and impractical. The law requires aggregators to save the information they disseminate for six months after publication.
Upon initial introduction in February, an explanatory note accompanying the bill stated the need for stricter regulation of aggregators,
on the basis of their audience reach and ability to influence opinion.
French bank Societe Generale began closing the accounts of Russian diplomats in Paris without explanation on Friday, the state-run
RIA Novosti news agency reported.
Accounts of people associated with state-owned and operated news agency Rossia Segodnya were also frozen in June 2015, a move
declared illegal by a Paris court in April.
Following a meeting of the Board of Directors, the bank decided to lower the rate based on recent perceived positive trends in inflation
patterns.
“The Board of Directors notes positive process of inflation stabilization, decline of inflation expectations and inflation risks amid signs
of an approaching phase of growing recovery,” the bank's report said, TASS reported.
The report said the decision was also based on positive GDP trends in Q1 of this year, as well as macroeconomic indicators in April,
which reflect the growing ability of the Russian economy to withstand fluctuations in the price of oil.
“The Russian Central Bank will consider the possibility of further reduction of the key rate, assessing inflation risks and compliance of
dynamics of inflation deceleration with the target trajectory,” the report said.

Sent time: 07/15/2016 03:01:51 PM
Subject: Internet Notes 15 July 2016
Attachments: IN15July16.docx

Internet Notes 15 July 2016
Notes on Notes (A comment on Putin’s neighbors at Valday and a question)
Another arrest by the FSB (Khorev and the arrest of Stanislav Svetlitskiy)
More from Orlova
The FSB arrests Gangster Kalashov
Government announces Rosneft privatization plan
Shoygu claims more than 2000 ISIS militants from Russia killed in Syria
Putin addresses the French president after the Nice attack
Putin meets with Kerry
Strelkov: Putin and his team are determined to surrender

Recall this bit from the 2 June notes:
[http://politcom.ru/21134.html
Aleksey Makarkin says that Murov’s resignation is a victory for Zolotov (they were once apparatus allies, but Zolotov has his own “clientele” these days)—Zolotov was able to replace him with his man Dmitriy
Kochnev, Zolotov’s longtime deputy at the Presidential Security Service who since last year has headed that service. Systemically, we see cadres from that service being placed in important posts—General
Kolpakov as head of the Presidential Affairs Administration, General Mironov is now head of the MVD’s economic crimes unit (Makarkin sees Dyumin moving from deputy defense minister to Tula governor as
something of a demotion—so he is an “exception to the rule”).
There is a tendency to a changing of the generational guard in the higher echelons of vlast. In the early 2000s, when Putin became president, he brought with him a team of people close to him, people he had
worked with in the KGB or in St. Petersburg. For a long time, Putin did not make any changes in his circle—he is a man stable in his sympathies as well as his antipathies. If there was a change, then it was a lateral
move, or accompanied by some form of compensation. But somewhere down the line, Putin began to doubt the effectiveness of these people—Yakunin’s departure from Russian Railways was an indicator. And
Putin saw that a resignation in his close circle was not a catastrophe. The system continued to function normally. So we got a domino effect—Viktor Ivanov lost his FSKN post, Gryzlov his seat as a permanent
Security Council member. Now it’s Murov’s turn.
Comment: On Yakunin, I wondered whether his departure—he subsequently warned others they were not safe—had something to do with a) the crisis, and the ineffectiveness of people who kept coming back
again and again asking for more money, more subsidies. Putin was disturbed by the crisis—and the sense that he was not being repaid with the degree of steadfastness and loyalty he might have expected and b)
Putin’s own view of himself as a man of destiny, one that was evident, I think, before the Ukraine crisis, a sense that he was a man apart, with a special mission. That would tend to make it easier to part with
friends he might see as presenting roadblocks to fulfilling his destiny. In a low trust environment like that in Russia, such moves might cause rumblings among those in his circle who expect a premium from
being “close to the body”—as well as drawing the circle of those most trusted even closer. Like Zolotov.
Makarkin doesn’t like the “clan” description of groups within vlast—he says that vlast is more atomized, with Russian politics comprised of a few dozen major players and their “clienteles” who form
“situational alliances” with one another, and clash as well, with the president presiding over the system’s arbitration—which sounds pretty much like my “vertical axis” of the “clan” system (the “just
business” axis), so I think he’s making a distinction without a difference. On the “horizontal axis” are one’s closest friends and relatives, the people one counts on in a pinch—I think we have an idea of who
some of those people are in Putin’s circle—Zolotov, Roldugin, the Rotenbergs, and the Kovalchuks being examples.
Makarkin is saying that the cadre reserves Putin is drawing on are not so much from the broader FSO as from its Presidential Security Service branch. ]
Comment: In the bit in the 13 July notes on Putin’s neighbors at Valday, as well as neighbors at a St. Petersburg apartment building mentioned in the piece, the only name
that didn’t pop up that I might have expected was Sergey Roldugin. Putin’s closest “in group” appears to be made up of Ozero people, Rossiya Bank people, a few
relatives, and his bodyguards.
One question—how long did Putin drop out of sight this time? I saw him chairing a meeting with the government on the news in the last day or two.
http://mosmonitor.ru/articles/economy/u_vodokanalov_evraziyskogo_potekla_kryisha__kak_stanislav_svetlitskiy_pod_opekoy_generala_mvd_horeva_milliardyi_otkachal
The arrest was on 24 June. It doesn’t say which department/directorate of the FSB made the arrest (it just says the FSB’s “central apparatus”), but the man arrested in Rostov (while on a
plane waiting to take off for Germany) was Stanislav Svetlitskiy, former deputy energy minister, currently head of a company called “Eurasia,” which handles water supply for communal
services in the region. Svetlitskiy is accused of fraud. Svetlitskiy was taken to Moscow and is in Lefortovo (but there is an alternative versiya in which Svetlitskiy and the head of another
company, Dmitriy Puzanov of ABVK-EKHO, are in a pre-trial detention center in Rostov and the investigation is headed by the MVD). The charges include an alleged plan by Svetlitskiy
and Puzanov to bankrupt a certain financial institution (“Narodniy Kredit” bank) and make off with depositors’ money. But some say that the real reasons for his arrest are connections to
certain former, and perhaps current, Moscow siloviky.
The article includes a bit on Svetlitskiy being suspected of money laundering in Switzerland (he tried to blame it all on VEB’s Vladimir Dmitriyev). In Russia, he was one of those accused
in an alleged scheme to steal VEB funds (the case was opened by the MVD, but later dropped)…The article goes on to point out that Svetlitskiy could not have gotten away with so much
for so long without an influential patron—and as it turns out, one of the Eurasia company board members in Andrey Khorev, one of the participants in the Magnitskiy affair and former first
deputy head of MVD Economic Security…Svetlitskiy’s arrest is a sign that Khorev’s influence is waning…
Comment: Khorev was part of an extortion scheme with people involved in the Magnitskiy affair. A former MVD captain who worked under him, Maksim Kaganskiy,
was the middleman in the extortion payment scheme. Khorev did not pass a re-assessment of MVD officers and he and Kaganskiy left the ministry back in 2011. I saw
his departure as related to a clan battle over controlling “markets” for opening/closing cases/extortion/bribery and tax rebate schemes, with Kaganskiy a fixer offering
his—and Khorev’s—services to prospective “clients.” See the 25 January 2012 notes and the 6 October 2011 notes.
Kaganskiy also acted as a fixer and intermediary for the Dubik brothers—Sergey and Nikolay—part of Medvedev’s “lawyers”/ “classmates” faction. See the notes
from 29 March 2012. Khorev came up in the context of the GUEBiPK scandal as well—he was a rival of Denis Sugrobov, who eventually went on to head the reorganized
MVD economic security unit (re-named the Chief Directorate for Economic Security and Anti-Corruption, or GUEBiPK). Feoktistov of the FSB USB, whose name has
come several times recently in connection with arrests made by the FSB, was a Khorev backer against Sugrobov (in the battle over taking charge of MVD economic
security). See the 10 June notes. Feoktistov’s boss at USB, Korolev, was moved to take over as head of FSB Economic Security (SEB) and Feoktistov was said to be in
line to take over the USB (so does the arrest of a Khorev protégé have an impact on that?). The USB seemed to be making a full court press on taking over the SEB, but
then, something happened—from the 6 July notes:
[http://www.novayagazeta.ru/inquests/73735.html
A highly-placed FSB officer tells Novaya that Belykh’s arrest exceeded the bounds of “understood authority”—usually, any moves involving a person appointed by the president have to be cleared by the first
person, but in Belykh’s case even the operational work before the arrest was not cleared ahead of time with the president. Information was gathered under the cover of gathering material on Navalniy. The source
tells Novaya that for months now, a conflict between FSBers, led by Sergey Ivanov, and FSO people who were headed formally and informally by now ex-FSO chief Yevgeniy Murov, has been underway. The
source says that the creation of the National Guard was a victory for the FSO side of the conflict. It’s not the mob that we are afraid of, says the source, but each other (Comment: Shulman said something
similar back in the 27 May notes). And there is a basis for fear—the most serious function granted to the National Guard is the operational-investigative function. There’s no guarantee that the Natsguard will
not use that function to go after FSB personnel posted to ministries, in the regions, and in major banks and enterprises. The FSO also posts its cadres outside service—every governor’s office, for example, has
an FSO officer keeping watch, maybe as head of the governor’s apparatus, or maybe as an aide—or taking over the governor’s post (Comment: That’s a reference to a former FSO man, Dyumin, taking over as
Tula governor).
FSO sources confirm that the FSB clan took the creation of the Natsguard hard. At the same time the Natsguard was being created, there was some lobbying (Comment: Who did the lobbying?) to create a new
Ministry of State Security (MGB) that would include the FSB, the FSO, and the SVR. Murov, however, managed to defend the independence of the FSO. Without the FSO, creating an MGB didn’t make sense. But
the wheels were already turning on creating the Natsguard. The FSB clan could not sit by and watch the FSO grow stronger, so a blow against them was delivered on 16 March when Dmitriy Mikhalchenko was
arrested. The FSB knows full well that Murov was Mikhalchenko’s patron. Murov also supposedly introduced Mikhalchenko to Putin, recommending him as a businessman who generously supported the
president’s initiatives. Mikhalchenko was actually arrested twice—the first time, the officer heading the operation called Murov and Mikhalchenko was subsequently released. He was reprimanded for doing so
and again arrested Mikhalchenko. A few days later, the FSB reported to Putin about the arrest and the role of the FSO clan in Mikhalchenko’s business schemes. Murov’s fate was practically decided on that very
day.
Another FSB victory was the liquidation of the FSKN—Viktor Ivanov was a heavyweight in the FSO clan. The FSB then moved to get rid of FSO-connected people within the FSB apparatus, the most prominent
one being the head of Directorate K of FSB Economic Security (FSB SEB), Viktor Voronin (Comment: There was a bit in the 9 June notes that claimed Voronin was close to Viktor Ivanov. I wondered whether the
fate of Ivanov was having an impact on people connected to him like Larisa Kalanda). Voronin’s departure was followed by much talk of more turnover at FSB. But cadre turnover has been dragged out—some say
that the FSB clan grew nervous and made a fatal mistake by arresting Belykh. Both FSB and FSO sources say that the Kirov FSB overplayed its hand and exceeded its “understood authority” by making the arrest.
First of all, Putin was not informed about the “operational experiment” against Belykh.
It could be that after the Belykh arrest, a number of changes that were in the works at FSB SEB were halted. Ivan Tkachev of the 6t h Directorate of FSB Internal Security (FSB USB) was supposed to take over as
head of Directorate K at FSB SEB, but is now supposedly slated for the 1st deputy spot. The word is that the head of the directorate will be its current 1st deputy chief, Andrey Yegorov. Other changes that have
been talked about won’t happen.]
I attempted to sum up where we were at in the siloviky shakeups in my comments in the 6 July notes:
[Comment: Alright, let’s see if we can make some sense of this…On the MGB story, let’s back up to the notes from 20 June—the material in those notes on forming a new MGB or Ministry for Public Security
(MOB) seemed to point to a strengthening of Zolotov’s position, with the Natsguard being used to purge the old power structures and screen officers for positions in the MGB. The material from Novaya says
that Murov opposed the MGB project and was able to save his FSO, which undercut the MBG/MOB plan. We usually think of Murov and Zolotov as allies, but one of our sources had Zolotov drifting away from
his old boss and setting up shop on his own as National Guard chief (Aleksey Makarkin claimed in the 2 June notes that Murov’s departure was a victory for Zolotov as Murov was replaced by Kochnev, a man
from the service that Zolotov had headed, the Presidential Security Service. One reason I’ve had Zolotov as a big winner, big enough to really upset the balance among the siloviky, is that some of our sources,
Makarkin was one, have said that Putin isn’t using the FSO as a whole for a cadres reserve, he’s using the Zolotov-connected Presidential Security Service for that), so maybe he supported the MGB/MOB
operation.
Nevertheless, Murov is gone—so what kind of clout does he have now that could prevent the merger going forward? It would make sense that if the end game was a MGB/MOB staffed with people screened by
Zolotov that the FSB and Bortnikov would oppose it. While Murov’s leaving may at least have not been opposed by Zolotov, maybe that retirement and the deep-sixing of the MGB/MOB project was compensation
to the FSB for the creation of the Natsguard, which practically all of our sources have seen as a move that weakens the FSB. Of course, that does not mean that Putin isn’t in favor of a purge and vetting of the
power structures, a process that might be supervised by Zolotov. We’ll have to wait and see about that. I suspect it won’t happen—that Putin will hold back. There are plenty of others who might oppose such a
super-concentration of power in the Natsguard and I’ve written that moves meant to prevent a “palace coup” could backfire if there is a perception that one player is getting too strong.
I’ve written on Mikhalchenko’s arrest likely being a sign that Murov was weakened (See the 21 and 31 March notes). Mikhalchenko also turned up in the 30 March and 26, 27, and 31 May and 7, 9, and 10
June notes. A bit in the 9 June notes from Kommersant had Voronin as close to Mikhalchenko (And we saw a claim in those same notes that Romodanovskiy of the now-defunct FMS was a protégé of VIvanov as
well). There was some confusion about Mikhalchenko’s krysha—in the 9 and 10 June notes, I went over a piece claiming that Mikhalchenko was involved in the killing of Roman Tsepov in St. Petersburg
back in 2004. In that scenario, Mikhalchenko was connected to the FSB, while Tsepov was close to the FSO people, especially Zolotov, and the (reportedly) Viktor Ivanov-connected Romodanovskiy, who, like
Zolotov, attended Tsepov’s funeral.
Both Tsepov and Mikhalchenko had a web of connections to various “power” departments. But Tsepov’s ties were strongest with FSO people, apparently. Connections change over time and overlap. Up until
early 2004, Bortnikov was in St. Petersburg—maybe he and Mikhalchenko established a firm relationship, while Mikhalchneko also had some lines out to the FSO people. Could be that a re-alignment of
kryshas took place sometime after Tsepov’s murder and Mikhalchenko’s stepping in to take over Tsepov’s niche in the Northern Capital. Another complicating factor—as mentioned above, Romodanovskiy
went to Tsepov’s funeral. But a bit in the 9 June notes said he was close to Mikhalchenko and could be implicated in the case against him.
On Tkachev—he is from the FSB USB. He was supposed to take over at FSB SEB (See, for instance, the 10 June notes). See my comments above about Orlova’s take on the FSB USB being in Zolotov’s sphere
of influence. Yakovlev, who was said to be a Bortnikov protégé, was reportedly replaced at FSB SEB by Internal Security’s Korolev. Did Korolev in fact get the job? A bit in the 14 June notes claimed that he had
already taken over as head of FSB SEB. That same bit said that Korolev was responsible for the criminal case that cost the FSB SEB’s head of Directorate K, Viktor Voronin, his post, as well as head of FSB
SEB Yakovlev losing his. More changes were supposedly on the way, but Novaya claims they won’t happen. So the maneuvering is continuing. ]
While I’m at it, I’ll back up to a November 2014 summation of the GUEBiPK scandal I included in the 29 March notes:
[Comment: Readers will recall the GUEBiPK scandal, which I followed for some time in these notes. I summarized the scandal up to that point in the 11 November 2014 notes. Recall as well that Kolesnikov
died under highly questionable circumstances while in custody.
From the 11 November 2014 notes:
[Comment: The last update was back on 2 October. Recall that the Investigative Committee (SK) was going to again review the circumstances of Kolesnikov’s death. We learned of dubious operations involving
the MVD’s Main Directorate for Economic Security and Anti-Corruption (GUEBiPK) and VEB. The GUEBiPK scandal appears to have been set off by a clash between MVD economic security on the one hand
(With perhaps some help from some elements in the Prosecutor’s office) and its FSB counterpart (with help from the Investigative Committee—the SK) over controlling money laundering channels. The battle
was kicked off in the summer of 2013 with a series of raids on banks by the MVD. The battle also reportedly has involved allies of former economic security boss Khorev (who was replaced by Denis Sugrobov)
and his close associate Maksim Kaganskiy, seeking revenge against Sugrobov (See the 3 August notes).
Some have cast the scandal as an attack on MVD chief Kolokoltsev and on Putin advisor Yevgeniy Shkolov (Once the scandal broke, it’s quite likely that rival siloviky clans have been using it as a means of
settling scores unrelated to the original battle over money laundering channels). The last we read was that Putin’s former presidential security chief, Zolotov, who had been sent to the MVD and made head of
the Internal Troops, would be elevated to head the ministry (See the notes from 30 October). Meanwhile, a number of cases involving the GUEBiPK have been under review and are unraveling, as “agents” used
by GUEBiPK chief Sugrobov’s people were targeted for framing their victims (the formal accusation in the case is of the GUEBiPK people forming a “criminal community” to carry out their frame ups). Some
investigators in those cases resigned. Sugrobov’s and Kolesnikov’s property was arrested. A number of GUEBiPK people implicated in the criminal case have signed agreements with the investigation and are
cooperating.]

More from Orlova
http://www.the‐american‐interest.com/2016/07/14/the‐fsb‐goes‐after‐an‐american‐company/
In the latest twist in the evolving drama we have been closely following here at TAI, Russian security services came after an American company—Amway—in Moscow. FSB officers, accompanied by Federal
Tax Service agents, searched both Amway’s office in the Russian capital, as well as its warehouses in the surrounding Moscow region, RBC reports, citing a statement from the company.
The searches were conducted by the Economic Security Service of the FSB six days after Vladimir Putin had appointed the new head of the Service. Sergey Kovalev replaced Yury Yakovlev after a harsh fight
between the two departments inside the FSB: Directorate K, a department in the Economic Security Service (SEB), and the 6th Service, a division of the Interior Security Department (USB).
The 6th Service, a secretive department inside the FSB known as the Gestapo for the harsh tactics it employs as an unofficial internal intelligence agency, began its war with Directorate K for control over
the financial sector in Russia around a 12‐18 months ago. (Directorate K is the watchdog responsible for all financial and bank operations in the country.) The 6th Service is said to have both the protection
and the blessing of General Viktor Zolotov, Putin’s long‐time head of security who was recently appointed to lead the newly‐formed National Guard.
The fight has thus far resulted in much collateral damage: at the very least three governors have been arrested, several businesses have been lost, and there have been two major resignations. In May of this
year, the Head of Directorate K, Viktor Voronin, sent in his resignation letter after his subordinate was implicated in a bribery scandal uncovered by an audit initiated by the 6th Service. As RBC notes,
Voronin’s boss at the FSB’s Economic Security Service, Yury Yakovlev, was nudged to resign in June, but he declined to do that. This resulted in a second audit, also initiated by the 6th Service, which finally
made Yakovlev file his resignation papers.
The new head of Directorate K has not yet been appointed. Sources say it will be the current chief of the 6th Service, Ivan Tkachev, the man who brought down General Denis Sugrobov, the head of the
Economical Security and Anticorruption Department of the Interior Ministry, as well as his deputy General Boris Kolesnikov, in 2014. Sugrobov is now in jail awaiting trial, and Kolesnikov fell out of a
window of the Investigative Committee headquarters in Moscow under suspicious circumstances. Comment: So Orlova doesn’t know about the claim that Tkachev was blocked from
taking the Directorate K job.
Yet less than a week after a successful and long‐awaited career transition, Kovalev struck at an American business in Russia. As the Amway’s PR director told the press, the reason for the searches was
never explained to the company. The siloviki only showed a warrant and started taking documents away.
The episode is eerily reminiscent of the what happened in 2007 to Hermitage Capital, William Browder‘s Moscow‐based investment fund. Those raids resulted in a $230 million tax theft, the death of
Hermitage’s lawyer jailed Sergey Magnitsky, and the enactment of the Magnitsky Act by the United States. It doesn’t seem like much of a coincidence that Directorate K was responsible for issuing the legal
findings—that several companies belonging to Hermitage Capital were underpaying their taxes—which triggered the raids.
Founded in 1959, Amway, which is now part of Alticor holdings, manufactures consumer nutrition, beauty and home care products. Amway is ranked No. 30 among the largest privately‐held companies in
the United States by Forbes. Its sales in Russia for 2014 exceeded 18 billion rubles ($270 million).
Earlier in April, the FSB also searched the offices of Oriflame, another foreign cosmetics company operating in Russia. The Federal Tax Service claimed it suspected the Swedish company of tax evasion.
As we have been writing, the shrinking of Russia’s economy, coupled with the significant enlargement of the military and intelligence services led to the siloviki shaking down more and more businesses in
Russia. Foreigners are clearly no longer exempt.
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/the-tale-behind-the-arrest-of-russias-most-notorious-crime-boss/574964.html
Interior MinistryShakro Molodoi
When it opened in July 2015, the Elements Korean restaurant in central Moscow got good reviews — both for food and design. But that's not what the restaurant is famous for.
Two women — the restaurant owner and a designer she hired to renovate and furnish it — disagreed over payment after the designer failed to meet the agreed deadline. As was reported at that time, the restaurant
owner Zhanna Kim refused to pay the designer the 2 million rubles ($30,000) she was owed for designing the restaurant.
What started as a usual financial disagreement led to one of the most notorious armed fights in central Moscow since the 1990s and to the arrest of one of Russia’s most notorious criminals — thief-in-law
Zakhary Kalashov — better known by the pseudonym Shakro Molodoi.
On Dec. 15, 2015, around 20 armed men occupied the beautiful rooms in the Elements restaurant. “Everyone shut up, no one leaves the building until we make a deal,” Zhanna Kim, a trendsetter, a socialite and the
restaurant owner, later recalled in various interviews.
“It was a shakedown,” she said. As was reported later, Fatima Misikova, the designer, had reassigned the debt that Kim still owed her to mobster Andrei Kochuikov, known as The Italian and a high-ranking
member of Shakro’s gang.
What happened later received extensive press coverage. The Italian showed up with a simple message: if the debt is not paid, he would take over the restaurant. Zhanna Kim refused to pay him.
She called the police and her lawyer — retired Interior Ministry Colonel Eduard Budantsev, reportedly connected to law enforcement as well as the Taganskaya crime group and now a lawyer engaged in debt
collection.
Always armed with a Beretta that was personally awarded to him by the interior minister, he arrived quickly with his supporters and demanded that the “unwanted guests” leave at once.
According to the Kommersant newspaper, The Italian told Budantsev, that he was sanctioned to “milk this cow” by Shakro. He then asked if Budantsev had any respect for the law of thieves and, after hearing an
emotional “No,” The Italian ordered his subordinates “to pack the bald one [Budantsev] into the car.”
In the fight that followed outside the restaurant two men were shot dead and several were wounded. According to some reports, Shakro also was at the scene, but his name later disappeared from interior ministry
documents.
YouTube / Instagram / modified by MT
L‐R: Shakro Molodoi, Zhanna Kim and Eduard Budantsev
Half a year later, a Federal Security Service (FSB) squad raided Shakro’s mansion in an upmarket area near Moscow. A video released by the Interior Ministry shows his guards on the ground with their arms on
their heads. The video shows Shakro on a chair in what looks like the kitchen.
“I will not talk in front of the camera, are you kidding me? Don’t make a show out of it. Turn off the camera and we’ll talk,” he says.
“It’s not a show, we need it,” the officer’s voice is heard answering.
The criminal mastermind was later brought to the Moscow Central Investigation Department where he was questioned, the ministry reported.
Shakro will be accused of organizing extortion from the Elements restaurant owner, who had already filed a complaint, according to the Interfax news agency.
Shakro, a well-known Russian mob boss, re-emerged on Russia’s criminal scene in 2014 after serving an 8-year prison term in Spain where he was convicted of money-laundering and masterminding criminal
organizations.
He was also sentenced in absentia to 18 years in prison for murder in Georgia, and Georgia has repeatedly requested that Shakro be extradited, Gazeta.ru reported. After another famous mobster Aslan Usoyan was
killed by a sniper in the center of Moscow in 2013, Shakro has been regarded as a new leader of Russia’s crime world.
“It is personal for Shakro,” his accomplice was quoted as saying by an unnamed source within law enforcement. “He intervened in the conflict between two ladies at his friend’s request. Nobody knew there
would be problems, but in such cases something can always go wrong,” the source told the Moskovsky Komsomolets newspaper.
“Do you consider yourself a thief-in-law?” Shakro is asked in the video. He refuses to answer in front of the camera. But he once answered the same question during a conversation with law enforcement when he
came back to Russia in 2014. “They call me that,” he answered, smiling.
A Rosbalt report has the FSB SEB’s Directorate M making the arrest: http://www.rosbalt.ru/moscow/2016/07/12/1531031.html

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russian-government-presents-rosneft-privatization-guidelines/575305.html
The Russian government has announced the criteria for purchasing private shares of state-owned oil company Rosneft, the Vedomosti business daily reported Friday.
The government is selling 19.5 percent of Rosneft's total shares, and hopes to make at least 700 billion rubles ($11 billion). This is part of Russia's largest privatization scheme since the 1990s,
with the Russian government reluctantly selling assets during a deep economic recession.
Purchasers of Rosneft's private stake will be subject to several requirements. First, any share package purchased must be held for at least three years, to prevent short-term investing.
Second, investors will be required to sign a shareholder's agreement that obliges them to vote in favor of any government member who applies for a seat on Rosneft's board of directors.
Third, an investor is required to be free of debt and with a clean record of corruption. If potential investors hold debt, they must present a plan for debt consolidation.
A preliminary list of candidates for purchase of the shares must be submitted to the government by Sept. 1. The successful privatization of oil assets is not guaranteed, and if the price of crude oil
climbs, analysts say prospects of sale are dim.
The first sale of Russia's new privatization campaign was concluded this week when a 10.9 percent stake in the world's largest diamond miner, Alrosa, was sold for 52.2 billion rubles ($816
million). The shares went for 65 rubles ($1.01) each. See the 11 July notes.
Under President Vladimir Putin, the Russian government's stake in the economy has increased dramatically, to as high as 55 percent in 2015. When asked why the state is looking to sell assets,
Putin replied: “We need the money.”
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/defense-minister-over-2000-islamic-state-militants-from-russia-killed-in-syria/575302.html
More than 2,000 militants who traveled from Russia to join Islamic State were killed by Russian armed forces operating in Syria, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said, the Dozhd news agency
reported Friday.
The targeted terrorists, with 17 warlords among them, were promulgating radical Islam and plotting to bring jihad to Russia, Shoigu said.
With help from the Russian air force, Syrian troops managed to clear more than 12,000 square kilometers and 150 towns from islamist militants. A total of 586 settlements were liberated, which
allowed more than 264,000 refugees to return to their homes, Shoigu said.
According to the defense minister, more military conflicts are likely to erupt in near future, given the current development of events, the Interfax news agency reported.
Crisis situations similar to the one in Syria might be provoked in Central Asia, and Russia “will be forced to adequately respond to potential threats,” Shoigu was quoted as saying by Interfax.
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52522
President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Last night we all heard about another outrageous terrorist attack in France. I understand that the President and many of France’s leaders are too busy now for telephone
conversations. Therefore, I would like to address Mr President publicly.
Dear Francois,
Russia knows terrorism and the threat it creates for us all. Our people have had to deal with similar tragedies many times, and we are deeply distressed at the news. We would like to express our sympathy
and solidarity with the French nation.
The criminal act in Nice that resulted in death and injury, including among Russian citizens, was committed with extreme atrocity and cynicism.
I would like to stress again that only through a united effort can we defeat terrorism.
Mr President, I kindly ask you to pass on my words of most sincere sympathy and support to the victims’ families and friends, and wishes for a speedy recovery to the injured.

President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Mr Secretary, colleagues, let me welcome you to Moscow once again.
I would like to note our mutual efforts to settle conflicts that we consider important and that must be resolved.
My latest conversation with President Obama convinced me that we are sincerely striving not only to maintain and develop our cooperation but also to achieve positive results.
I hope you will report to him – and please send him my best regards – that during our consultations today we also made headway in discussing and resolving the issues we are meeting
to address.
United States Secretary of State John Kerry: Well, Mr President, thank you very much for taking time. I appreciate the opportunity to be able to meet. President Obama sends you his regards. He
thought it was a constructive conversation, and hopefully we will be able to make some genuine progress that is measurable and implementable, and that can make a difference to the course
of events in Syria. So I look forward very much to a serious conversation this evening and again tomorrow with Sergei. We have a lot of work to do.
The President and I both believe, Mr President, that the United States and Russia are in a position to make an enormous difference in the course of events, not just in Syria but obviously
in Ukraine and even in other potential areas of cooperation. And so we are anxious to get to work. We have done a lot of groundwork but we’re not where we need to be yet and we hope to be able
to get there.
So I’m ready to work. I know you are. Let’s go.
Vladimir Putin: President Obama drew my attention to the fact that we helped in the release of one of your citizens. I would like to say that we continue working in this area at your request
and also hope the US side will reciprocate with constructive efforts if need be.

Comment: Strelkov has been going after Putin for a while now, claiming the Kremlin is capable only of half measures—and the Putin crowd only knows how to steal. The
thing to do is for the patriots to wait for the regime to start falling apart and then step in to pick up the pieces. See, for instance, the notes from 3 and 7 June and from 25
May.
More from Strelkov:
http://novorossia.pro/strelkov/2143-igor-strelkov-situaciya-i-perspektivy.html
From the point of view of a patriot there is no positive forecast. Putin and his team are determined to surrender, but the West will never permit Russia an “honorable capitulation.” There is
no sentimentality there; it wants only to destroy the weak and “cut off heads,” especially when these are stupid and cowardly (Comment: The implication here is Putin & Co.). There’s
a crisis in the West; it needs Russia’s resources. It will destabilize Russia. Then the Anglo-Saxons will go after the EU too, but a little later.
Russia’s awkward and indecisive conduct towards Ukraine was a service (knowingly or through incredible stupidity is worthy of debate) to the international oligarchy with the US in the
lead. It created a convenient scarecrow. It missed a chance to create real sovereignty in 2014.
To employ a criminal allegory: the RF has worthless rulers who found a thief in their own garden (Comment: Ukraine I think) and instead of kicking the thief out, made loud noises and
then started whining to the “dear Western partners” about its guns etc. But the Kremlin will not use its guns; it will surrender.
The Kremlin is nothing less than a cowardly bunch of impotent hedonists seeded with Western agents. So instead of a radical change of course (that the situation requires), we have what
we have. This was the mistake of the patriots in 2014—to believe that such a change was possible, a real confrontation with the world hegemon. We thought Putin would understand the
irreversibility of his step. But he didn’t. Strelkov states that he’s ashamed to admit it, but he thought Putin was smarter.
We have a completely ossified bureaucratic-oligarchic regime incapable of reforming itself. It’s in a state of shock by its exclusion from the world community. They can’t imagine anything
else besides it.
But we do have a split: those closest to the West are ready for surrender at any price. On the other hand, there are those who understand that to lose power over the country could lead to
loss of life. But they are powerless on their own. A new nobility incapable of independent action. This is the result of Putin’s personnel policy. In contrast to the surrender crowd, they are
in a real panic, because they remain loyal to Putin.
Comment: Strelkov follows with a real smack at Putin over his appearance—like a little 8 year old schoolboy caught stealing—with the Swiss president in 2014.
What has Putin done subsequently? Stolen pages from the Milosevic playbook, under the guise of making everyone happy. He’s handed over everything to the Ostap Bender of our days,
one Surkov. He’s trying to trade Donbass for Crimea and forgiveness. Under the guise of having leverage over Kiev. The problem is the West will not agree. But Surkov being a member
of the 1s t estate, aka 5th column, has maneuvered Putin into taking responsibility for the Minsk agreements. Obama has his own ideas on this score.
At first the West was dumbfounded because it looked as if Putin had taken an irrevocable step. It expected decisive action, a complete turnabout in domestic and economic policy
including the Oprichnina. But these did not materialize – instead Putin imitated Saddam and Kuwait. This made the West happy. It has plans to deal with this turn of affairs. But faced
with a dead end, the Kremlin tried the Syrian adventure, one that it doesn’t need and one where it can’t succeed. The majority Sunni population and the opposition of all the surrounding
states makes victory impossible. Revealing the stupidity of Putin and his entourage, it went forth thinking the West would forgive all in exchange for the fight against ISIS (he claims he got
this from one well-informed person). When this forgiveness was not forthcoming, Putin backed Assad. The West is seemingly opposed but really OK with this because it enhances the
prospects for overthrowing the Putin regime, its real goal. Putin’s only smart move was the partial withdrawal in March because it was clear the West would not bend on Ukraine and that
he can’t win in Syria. But he really didn’t do it and is now stuck in a swamp.
So what are the results: two hopeless wars, one we can’t win the other we will not win. The Kremlin chickened out and made it a draw. Maybe I will be arrested or killed (but not over
the weekend)?

Sent time: 06/22/2016 12:14:39 PM
Subject: S.L. Magnitskiy

Appendix 1
ОБЩЕСТВЕННАЯ НАБЛЮДАТЕЛЬНАЯ КОМИССИЯ
город Москва
по осуществлению общественного контроля за обеспечением прав человека в местах принудительного содержания
и содействия лицам, находящимся в местах принудительного содержания
Магнитский Сергей Леонидович, 08.04. 1972 года рождения. Гражданин РФ, проживал в г. Москве.
Образование высшее. Женат, двое детей. Место работы: аудитор фирмы «Файерстоун Данкен». Ранее не судим.
Обвинялся по ч.2 ст. 199 УК РФ. Под стражей находился с 24 ноября 2008 года.
Appendix 2
ЗАКЛЮЧЕНИЕ НАЦИОНАЛЬНОГО АНТИКОРРУПЦИОННОГО КОМИТЕТА ПО ИССЛЕДОВАНИЮ
ПРИЧИННО-СЛЕДСТВЕННЫХ СВЯЗЕЙ, ПОВЛЕКШИХ СМЕРТЬ С.Л. МАГНИТСКОГО В СИЗО
С.Л.Магнитский, являвшийся юристом‐аудитором компании Firesone Duncan, которая являлась аудитором фонда
Hermitage, обнаружил незаконную перерегистрацию компаний фонда Hermitage в октябре 2007 года.
Sent time: 07/15/2016 03:01:51 PM
Subject: Internet Notes 15 July 2016
Attachments: IN15July16.docx

Internet Notes 15 July 2016
More from Orlova

Recall this bit from the 2 June notes:
[http://politcom.ru/21134.html
Aleksey Makarkin says that Murov’s resignation is a victory for Zolotov (they were once apparatus allies, but Zolotov has his own “clientele” these days)—Zolotov was able to replace him with his man Dmitriy
Kochnev, Zolotov’s longtime deputy at the Presidential Security Service who since last year has headed that service. Systemically, we see cadres from that service being placed in important posts—General
Kolpakov as head of the Presidential Affairs Administration, General Mironov is now head of the MVD’s economic crimes unit (Makarkin sees Dyumin moving from deputy defense minister to Tula governor as
something of a demotion—so he is an “exception to the rule”).
There is a tendency to a changing of the generational guard in the higher echelons of vlast. In the early 2000s, when Putin became president, he brought with him a team of people close to him, people he had
worked with in the KGB or in St. Petersburg. For a long time, Putin did not make any changes in his circle—he is a man stable in his sympathies as well as his antipathies. If there was a change, then it was a lateral
move, or accompanied by some form of compensation. But somewhere down the line, Putin began to doubt the effectiveness of these people—Yakunin’s departure from Russian Railways was an indicator. And
Putin saw that a resignation in his close circle was not a catastrophe. The system continued to function normally. So we got a domino effect—Viktor Ivanov lost his FSKN post, Gryzlov his seat as a permanent
Security Council member. Now it’s Murov’s turn.
Comment: On Yakunin, I wondered whether his departure—he subsequently warned others they were not safe—had something to do with a) the crisis, and the ineffectiveness of people who kept coming back
again and again asking for more money, more subsidies. Putin was disturbed by the crisis—and the sense that he was not being repaid with the degree of steadfastness and loyalty he might have expected and b)
Putin’s own view of himself as a man of destiny, one that was evident, I think, before the Ukraine crisis, a sense that he was a man apart, with a special mission. That would tend to make it easier to part with
friends he might see as presenting roadblocks to fulfilling his destiny. In a low trust environment like that in Russia, such moves might cause rumblings among those in his circle who expect a premium from
being “close to the body”—as well as drawing the circle of those most trusted even closer. Like Zolotov.
Makarkin doesn’t like the “clan” description of groups within vlast—he says that vlast is more atomized, with Russian politics comprised of a few dozen major players and their “clienteles” who form
“situational alliances” with one another, and clash as well, with the president presiding over the system’s arbitration—which sounds pretty much like my “vertical axis” of the “clan” system (the “just
business” axis), so I think he’s making a distinction without a difference. On the “horizontal axis” are one’s closest friends and relatives, the people one counts on in a pinch—I think we have an idea of who
some of those people are in Putin’s circle—Zolotov, Roldugin, the Rotenbergs, and the Kovalchuks being examples.
Makarkin is saying that the cadre reserves Putin is drawing on are not so much from the broader FSO as from its Presidential Security Service branch. ]
Comment: In the bit in the 13 July notes on Putin’s neighbors at Valday, as well as neighbors at a St. Petersburg apartment building mentioned in the piece, the only name
that didn’t pop up that I might have expected was Sergey Roldugin. Putin’s closest “in group” appears to be made up of Ozero people, Rossiya Bank people, a few
relatives, and his bodyguards.
One question—how long did Putin drop out of sight this time? I saw him chairing a meeting with the government on the news in the last day or two.
http://mosmonitor.ru/articles/economy/u_vodokanalov_evraziyskogo_potekla_kryisha__kak_stanislav_svetlitskiy_pod_opekoy_generala_mvd_horeva_milliardyi_otkachal
The arrest was on 24 June. It doesn’t say which department/directorate of the FSB made the arrest (it just says the FSB’s “central apparatus”), but the man arrested in Rostov (while on a
plane waiting to take off for Germany) was Stanislav Svetlitskiy, former deputy energy minister, currently head of a company called “Eurasia,” which handles water supply for communal
services in the region. Svetlitskiy is accused of fraud. Svetlitskiy was taken to Moscow and is in Lefortovo (but there is an alternative versiya in which Svetlitskiy and the head of another
company, Dmitriy Puzanov of ABVK-EKHO, are in a pre-trial detention center in Rostov and the investigation is headed by the MVD). The charges include an alleged plan by Svetlitskiy
and Puzanov to bankrupt a certain financial institution (“Narodniy Kredit” bank) and make off with depositors’ money. But some say that the real reasons for his arrest are connections to
certain former, and perhaps current, Moscow siloviky.
The article includes a bit on Svetlitskiy being suspected of money laundering in Switzerland (he tried to blame it all on VEB’s Vladimir Dmitriyev). In Russia, he was one of those accused
in an alleged scheme to steal VEB funds (the case was opened by the MVD, but later dropped)…The article goes on to point out that Svetlitskiy could not have gotten away with so much
for so long without an influential patron—and as it turns out, one of the Eurasia company board members in Andrey Khorev, one of the participants in the Magnitskiy affair and former first
deputy head of MVD Economic Security…Svetlitskiy’s arrest is a sign that Khorev’s influence is waning…
Comment: Khorev was part of an extortion scheme with people involved in the Magnitskiy affair. A former MVD captain who worked under him, Maksim Kaganskiy,
was the middleman in the extortion payment scheme. Khorev did not pass a re-assessment of MVD officers and he and Kaganskiy left the ministry back in 2011. I saw
his departure as related to a clan battle over controlling “markets” for opening/closing cases/extortion/bribery and tax rebate schemes, with Kaganskiy a fixer offering
his—and Khorev’s—services to prospective “clients.” See the 25 January 2012 notes and the 6 October 2011 notes.
Kaganskiy also acted as a fixer and intermediary for the Dubik brothers—Sergey and Nikolay—part of Medvedev’s “lawyers”/ “classmates” faction. See the notes
from 29 March 2012. Khorev came up in the context of the GUEBiPK scandal as well—he was a rival of Denis Sugrobov, who eventually went on to head the reorganized
MVD economic security unit (re-named the Chief Directorate for Economic Security and Anti-Corruption, or GUEBiPK). Feoktistov of the FSB USB, whose name has
come several times recently in connection with arrests made by the FSB, was a Khorev backer against Sugrobov (in the battle over taking charge of MVD economic
security). See the 10 June notes. Feoktistov’s boss at USB, Korolev, was moved to take over as head of FSB Economic Security (SEB) and Feoktistov was said to be in
line to take over the USB (so does the arrest of a Khorev protégé have an impact on that?). The USB seemed to be making a full court press on taking over the SEB, but
then, something happened—from the 6 July notes:
[http://www.novayagazeta.ru/inquests/73735.html
A highly-placed FSB officer tells Novaya that Belykh’s arrest exceeded the bounds of “understood authority”—usually, any moves involving a person appointed by the president have to be cleared by the first
person, but in Belykh’s case even the operational work before the arrest was not cleared ahead of time with the president. Information was gathered under the cover of gathering material on Navalniy. The source
tells Novaya that for months now, a conflict between FSBers, led by Sergey Ivanov, and FSO people who were headed formally and informally by now ex-FSO chief Yevgeniy Murov, has been underway. The
source says that the creation of the National Guard was a victory for the FSO side of the conflict. It’s not the mob that we are afraid of, says the source, but each other (Comment: Shulman said something
similar back in the 27 May notes). And there is a basis for fear—the most serious function granted to the National Guard is the operational-investigative function. There’s no guarantee that the Natsguard will
not use that function to go after FSB personnel posted to ministries, in the regions, and in major banks and enterprises. The FSO also posts its cadres outside service—every governor’s office, for example, has
an FSO officer keeping watch, maybe as head of the governor’s apparatus, or maybe as an aide—or taking over the governor’s post (Comment: That’s a reference to a former FSO man, Dyumin, taking over as
Tula governor).
FSO sources confirm that the FSB clan took the creation of the Natsguard hard. At the same time the Natsguard was being created, there was some lobbying (Comment: Who did the lobbying?) to create a new
Ministry of State Security (MGB) that would include the FSB, the FSO, and the SVR. Murov, however, managed to defend the independence of the FSO. Without the FSO, creating an MGB didn’t make sense. But
the wheels were already turning on creating the Natsguard. The FSB clan could not sit by and watch the FSO grow stronger, so a blow against them was delivered on 16 March when Dmitriy Mikhalchenko was
arrested. The FSB knows full well that Murov was Mikhalchenko’s patron. Murov also supposedly introduced Mikhalchenko to Putin, recommending him as a businessman who generously supported the
president’s initiatives. Mikhalchenko was actually arrested twice—the first time, the officer heading the operation called Murov and Mikhalchenko was subsequently released. He was reprimanded for doing so
and again arrested Mikhalchenko. A few days later, the FSB reported to Putin about the arrest and the role of the FSO clan in Mikhalchenko’s business schemes. Murov’s fate was practically decided on that very
day.
Another FSB victory was the liquidation of the FSKN—Viktor Ivanov was a heavyweight in the FSO clan. The FSB then moved to get rid of FSO-connected people within the FSB apparatus, the most prominent
one being the head of Directorate K of FSB Economic Security (FSB SEB), Viktor Voronin (Comment: There was a bit in the 9 June notes that claimed Voronin was close to Viktor Ivanov. I wondered whether the
fate of Ivanov was having an impact on people connected to him like Larisa Kalanda). Voronin’s departure was followed by much talk of more turnover at FSB. But cadre turnover has been dragged out—some say
that the FSB clan grew nervous and made a fatal mistake by arresting Belykh. Both FSB and FSO sources say that the Kirov FSB overplayed its hand and exceeded its “understood authority” by making the arrest.
First of all, Putin was not informed about the “operational experiment” against Belykh.
It could be that after the Belykh arrest, a number of changes that were in the works at FSB SEB were halted. Ivan Tkachev of the 6t h Directorate of FSB Internal Security (FSB USB) was supposed to take over as
head of Directorate K at FSB SEB, but is now supposedly slated for the 1st deputy spot. The word is that the head of the directorate will be its current 1st deputy chief, Andrey Yegorov. Other changes that have
been talked about won’t happen.]
I attempted to sum up where we were at in the siloviky shakeups in my comments in the 6 July notes:
[Comment: Alright, let’s see if we can make some sense of this…On the MGB story, let’s back up to the notes from 20 June—the material in those notes on forming a new MGB or Ministry for Public Security
(MOB) seemed to point to a strengthening of Zolotov’s position, with the Natsguard being used to purge the old power structures and screen officers for positions in the MGB. The material from Novaya says
that Murov opposed the MGB project and was able to save his FSO, which undercut the MBG/MOB plan. We usually think of Murov and Zolotov as allies, but one of our sources had Zolotov drifting away from
his old boss and setting up shop on his own as National Guard chief (Aleksey Makarkin claimed in the 2 June notes that Murov’s departure was a victory for Zolotov as Murov was replaced by Kochnev, a man
from the service that Zolotov had headed, the Presidential Security Service. One reason I’ve had Zolotov as a big winner, big enough to really upset the balance among the siloviky, is that some of our sources,
Makarkin was one, have said that Putin isn’t using the FSO as a whole for a cadres reserve, he’s using the Zolotov-connected Presidential Security Service for that), so maybe he supported the MGB/MOB
operation.
Nevertheless, Murov is gone—so what kind of clout does he have now that could prevent the merger going forward? It would make sense that if the end game was a MGB/MOB staffed with people screened by
Zolotov that the FSB and Bortnikov would oppose it. While Murov’s leaving may at least have not been opposed by Zolotov, maybe that retirement and the deep-sixing of the MGB/MOB project was compensation
to the FSB for the creation of the Natsguard, which practically all of our sources have seen as a move that weakens the FSB. Of course, that does not mean that Putin isn’t in favor of a purge and vetting of the
power structures, a process that might be supervised by Zolotov. We’ll have to wait and see about that. I suspect it won’t happen—that Putin will hold back. There are plenty of others who might oppose such a
super-concentration of power in the Natsguard and I’ve written that moves meant to prevent a “palace coup” could backfire if there is a perception that one player is getting too strong.
I’ve written on Mikhalchenko’s arrest likely being a sign that Murov was weakened (See the 21 and 31 March notes). Mikhalchenko also turned up in the 30 March and 26, 27, and 31 May and 7, 9, and 10
June notes. A bit in the 9 June notes from Kommersant had Voronin as close to Mikhalchenko (And we saw a claim in those same notes that Romodanovskiy of the now-defunct FMS was a protégé of VIvanov as
well). There was some confusion about Mikhalchenko’s krysha—in the 9 and 10 June notes, I went over a piece claiming that Mikhalchenko was involved in the killing of Roman Tsepov in St. Petersburg
back in 2004. In that scenario, Mikhalchenko was connected to the FSB, while Tsepov was close to the FSO people, especially Zolotov, and the (reportedly) Viktor Ivanov-connected Romodanovskiy, who, like
Zolotov, attended Tsepov’s funeral.
Both Tsepov and Mikhalchenko had a web of connections to various “power” departments. But Tsepov’s ties were strongest with FSO people, apparently. Connections change over time and overlap. Up until
early 2004, Bortnikov was in St. Petersburg—maybe he and Mikhalchenko established a firm relationship, while Mikhalchneko also had some lines out to the FSO people. Could be that a re-alignment of
kryshas took place sometime after Tsepov’s murder and Mikhalchenko’s stepping in to take over Tsepov’s niche in the Northern Capital. Another complicating factor—as mentioned above, Romodanovskiy
went to Tsepov’s funeral. But a bit in the 9 June notes said he was close to Mikhalchenko and could be implicated in the case against him.
On Tkachev—he is from the FSB USB. He was supposed to take over at FSB SEB (See, for instance, the 10 June notes). See my comments above about Orlova’s take on the FSB USB being in Zolotov’s sphere
of influence. Yakovlev, who was said to be a Bortnikov protégé, was reportedly replaced at FSB SEB by Internal Security’s Korolev. Did Korolev in fact get the job? A bit in the 14 June notes claimed that he had
already taken over as head of FSB SEB. That same bit said that Korolev was responsible for the criminal case that cost the FSB SEB’s head of Directorate K, Viktor Voronin, his post, as well as head of FSB
SEB Yakovlev losing his. More changes were supposedly on the way, but Novaya claims they won’t happen. So the maneuvering is continuing. ]
While I’m at it, I’ll back up to a November 2014 summation of the GUEBiPK scandal I included in the 29 March notes:
[Comment: Readers will recall the GUEBiPK scandal, which I followed for some time in these notes. I summarized the scandal up to that point in the 11 November 2014 notes. Recall as well that Kolesnikov
died under highly questionable circumstances while in custody.
From the 11 November 2014 notes:
[Comment: The last update was back on 2 October. Recall that the Investigative Committee (SK) was going to again review the circumstances of Kolesnikov’s death. We learned of dubious operations involving
the MVD’s Main Directorate for Economic Security and Anti-Corruption (GUEBiPK) and VEB. The GUEBiPK scandal appears to have been set off by a clash between MVD economic security on the one hand
(With perhaps some help from some elements in the Prosecutor’s office) and its FSB counterpart (with help from the Investigative Committee—the SK) over controlling money laundering channels. The battle
was kicked off in the summer of 2013 with a series of raids on banks by the MVD. The battle also reportedly has involved allies of former economic security boss Khorev (who was replaced by Denis Sugrobov)
and his close associate Maksim Kaganskiy, seeking revenge against Sugrobov (See the 3 August notes).
Some have cast the scandal as an attack on MVD chief Kolokoltsev and on Putin advisor Yevgeniy Shkolov (Once the scandal broke, it’s quite likely that rival siloviky clans have been using it as a means of
settling scores unrelated to the original battle over money laundering channels). The last we read was that Putin’s former presidential security chief, Zolotov, who had been sent to the MVD and made head of
the Internal Troops, would be elevated to head the ministry (See the notes from 30 October). Meanwhile, a number of cases involving the GUEBiPK have been under review and are unraveling, as “agents” used
by GUEBiPK chief Sugrobov’s people were targeted for framing their victims (the formal accusation in the case is of the GUEBiPK people forming a “criminal community” to carry out their frame ups). Some
investigators in those cases resigned. Sugrobov’s and Kolesnikov’s property was arrested. A number of GUEBiPK people implicated in the criminal case have signed agreements with the investigation and are
cooperating.]

More from Orlova
http://www.the‐american‐interest.com/2016/07/14/the‐fsb‐goes‐after‐an‐american‐company/
In the latest twist in the evolving drama we have been closely following here at TAI, Russian security services came after an American company—Amway—in Moscow. FSB officers, accompanied by Federal
Tax Service agents, searched both Amway’s office in the Russian capital, as well as its warehouses in the surrounding Moscow region, RBC reports, citing a statement from the company.
The searches were conducted by the Economic Security Service of the FSB six days after Vladimir Putin had appointed the new head of the Service. Sergey Kovalev replaced Yury Yakovlev after a harsh fight
between the two departments inside the FSB: Directorate K, a department in the Economic Security Service (SEB), and the 6th Service, a division of the Interior Security Department (USB).
The 6th Service, a secretive department inside the FSB known as the Gestapo for the harsh tactics it employs as an unofficial internal intelligence agency, began its war with Directorate K for control over
the financial sector in Russia around a 12‐18 months ago. (Directorate K is the watchdog responsible for all financial and bank operations in the country.) The 6th Service is said to have both the protection
and the blessing of General Viktor Zolotov, Putin’s long‐time head of security who was recently appointed to lead the newly‐formed National Guard.
The fight has thus far resulted in much collateral damage: at the very least three governors have been arrested, several businesses have been lost, and there have been two major resignations. In May of this
year, the Head of Directorate K, Viktor Voronin, sent in his resignation letter after his subordinate was implicated in a bribery scandal uncovered by an audit initiated by the 6th Service. As RBC notes,
Voronin’s boss at the FSB’s Economic Security Service, Yury Yakovlev, was nudged to resign in June, but he declined to do that. This resulted in a second audit, also initiated by the 6th Service, which finally
made Yakovlev file his resignation papers.
The new head of Directorate K has not yet been appointed. Sources say it will be the current chief of the 6th Service, Ivan Tkachev, the man who brought down General Denis Sugrobov, the head of the
Economical Security and Anticorruption Department of the Interior Ministry, as well as his deputy General Boris Kolesnikov, in 2014. Sugrobov is now in jail awaiting trial, and Kolesnikov fell out of a
window of the Investigative Committee headquarters in Moscow under suspicious circumstances. Comment: So Orlova doesn’t know about the claim that Tkachev was blocked from
taking the Directorate K job.
Yet less than a week after a successful and long‐awaited career transition, Kovalev struck at an American business in Russia. As the Amway’s PR director told the press, the reason for the searches was
never explained to the company. The siloviki only showed a warrant and started taking documents away.
The episode is eerily reminiscent of the what happened in 2007 to Hermitage Capital, William Browder‘s Moscow‐based investment fund. Those raids resulted in a $230 million tax theft, the death of
Hermitage’s lawyer jailed Sergey Magnitsky, and the enactment of the Magnitsky Act by the United States. It doesn’t seem like much of a coincidence that Directorate K was responsible for issuing the legal
findings—that several companies belonging to Hermitage Capital were underpaying their taxes—which triggered the raids.
Founded in 1959, Amway, which is now part of Alticor holdings, manufactures consumer nutrition, beauty and home care products. Amway is ranked No. 30 among the largest privately‐held companies in
the United States by Forbes. Its sales in Russia for 2014 exceeded 18 billion rubles ($270 million).
Earlier in April, the FSB also searched the offices of Oriflame, another foreign cosmetics company operating in Russia. The Federal Tax Service claimed it suspected the Swedish company of tax evasion.
As we have been writing, the shrinking of Russia’s economy, coupled with the significant enlargement of the military and intelligence services led to the siloviki shaking down more and more businesses in
Russia. Foreigners are clearly no longer exempt.
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/the-tale-behind-the-arrest-of-russias-most-notorious-crime-boss/574964.html
Interior MinistryShakro Molodoi
When it opened in July 2015, the Elements Korean restaurant in central Moscow got good reviews — both for food and design. But that's not what the restaurant is famous for.
Two women — the restaurant owner and a designer she hired to renovate and furnish it — disagreed over payment after the designer failed to meet the agreed deadline. As was reported at that time, the restaurant
owner Zhanna Kim refused to pay the designer the 2 million rubles ($30,000) she was owed for designing the restaurant.
What started as a usual financial disagreement led to one of the most notorious armed fights in central Moscow since the 1990s and to the arrest of one of Russia’s most notorious criminals — thief-in-law
Zakhary Kalashov — better known by the pseudonym Shakro Molodoi.
On Dec. 15, 2015, around 20 armed men occupied the beautiful rooms in the Elements restaurant. “Everyone shut up, no one leaves the building until we make a deal,” Zhanna Kim, a trendsetter, a socialite and the
restaurant owner, later recalled in various interviews.
“It was a shakedown,” she said. As was reported later, Fatima Misikova, the designer, had reassigned the debt that Kim still owed her to mobster Andrei Kochuikov, known as The Italian and a high-ranking
member of Shakro’s gang.
What happened later received extensive press coverage. The Italian showed up with a simple message: if the debt is not paid, he would take over the restaurant. Zhanna Kim refused to pay him.
She called the police and her lawyer — retired Interior Ministry Colonel Eduard Budantsev, reportedly connected to law enforcement as well as the Taganskaya crime group and now a lawyer engaged in debt
collection.
Always armed with a Beretta that was personally awarded to him by the interior minister, he arrived quickly with his supporters and demanded that the “unwanted guests” leave at once.
According to the Kommersant newspaper, The Italian told Budantsev, that he was sanctioned to “milk this cow” by Shakro. He then asked if Budantsev had any respect for the law of thieves and, after hearing an
emotional “No,” The Italian ordered his subordinates “to pack the bald one [Budantsev] into the car.”
In the fight that followed outside the restaurant two men were shot dead and several were wounded. According to some reports, Shakro also was at the scene, but his name later disappeared from interior ministry
documents.
YouTube / Instagram / modified by MT
L‐R: Shakro Molodoi, Zhanna Kim and Eduard Budantsev
Half a year later, a Federal Security Service (FSB) squad raided Shakro’s mansion in an upmarket area near Moscow. A video released by the Interior Ministry shows his guards on the ground with their arms on
their heads. The video shows Shakro on a chair in what looks like the kitchen.
“I will not talk in front of the camera, are you kidding me? Don’t make a show out of it. Turn off the camera and we’ll talk,” he says.
“It’s not a show, we need it,” the officer’s voice is heard answering.
The criminal mastermind was later brought to the Moscow Central Investigation Department where he was questioned, the ministry reported.
Shakro will be accused of organizing extortion from the Elements restaurant owner, who had already filed a complaint, according to the Interfax news agency.
Shakro, a well-known Russian mob boss, re-emerged on Russia’s criminal scene in 2014 after serving an 8-year prison term in Spain where he was convicted of money-laundering and masterminding criminal
organizations.
He was also sentenced in absentia to 18 years in prison for murder in Georgia, and Georgia has repeatedly requested that Shakro be extradited, Gazeta.ru reported. After another famous mobster Aslan Usoyan was
killed by a sniper in the center of Moscow in 2013, Shakro has been regarded as a new leader of Russia’s crime world.
“It is personal for Shakro,” his accomplice was quoted as saying by an unnamed source within law enforcement. “He intervened in the conflict between two ladies at his friend’s request. Nobody knew there
would be problems, but in such cases something can always go wrong,” the source told the Moskovsky Komsomolets newspaper.
“Do you consider yourself a thief-in-law?” Shakro is asked in the video. He refuses to answer in front of the camera. But he once answered the same question during a conversation with law enforcement when he
came back to Russia in 2014. “They call me that,” he answered, smiling.
A Rosbalt report has the FSB SEB’s Directorate M making the arrest: http://www.rosbalt.ru/moscow/2016/07/12/1531031.html

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russian-government-presents-rosneft-privatization-guidelines/575305.html
The Russian government has announced the criteria for purchasing private shares of state-owned oil company Rosneft, the Vedomosti business daily reported Friday.
The government is selling 19.5 percent of Rosneft's total shares, and hopes to make at least 700 billion rubles ($11 billion). This is part of Russia's largest privatization scheme since the 1990s,
with the Russian government reluctantly selling assets during a deep economic recession.
Purchasers of Rosneft's private stake will be subject to several requirements. First, any share package purchased must be held for at least three years, to prevent short-term investing.
Second, investors will be required to sign a shareholder's agreement that obliges them to vote in favor of any government member who applies for a seat on Rosneft's board of directors.
Third, an investor is required to be free of debt and with a clean record of corruption. If potential investors hold debt, they must present a plan for debt consolidation.
A preliminary list of candidates for purchase of the shares must be submitted to the government by Sept. 1. The successful privatization of oil assets is not guaranteed, and if the price of crude oil
climbs, analysts say prospects of sale are dim.
The first sale of Russia's new privatization campaign was concluded this week when a 10.9 percent stake in the world's largest diamond miner, Alrosa, was sold for 52.2 billion rubles ($816
million). The shares went for 65 rubles ($1.01) each. See the 11 July notes.
Under President Vladimir Putin, the Russian government's stake in the economy has increased dramatically, to as high as 55 percent in 2015. When asked why the state is looking to sell assets,
Putin replied: “We need the money.”
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/defense-minister-over-2000-islamic-state-militants-from-russia-killed-in-syria/575302.html
More than 2,000 militants who traveled from Russia to join Islamic State were killed by Russian armed forces operating in Syria, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said, the Dozhd news agency
reported Friday.
The targeted terrorists, with 17 warlords among them, were promulgating radical Islam and plotting to bring jihad to Russia, Shoigu said.
With help from the Russian air force, Syrian troops managed to clear more than 12,000 square kilometers and 150 towns from islamist militants. A total of 586 settlements were liberated, which
allowed more than 264,000 refugees to return to their homes, Shoigu said.
According to the defense minister, more military conflicts are likely to erupt in near future, given the current development of events, the Interfax news agency reported.
Crisis situations similar to the one in Syria might be provoked in Central Asia, and Russia “will be forced to adequately respond to potential threats,” Shoigu was quoted as saying by Interfax.
President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Last night we all heard about another outrageous terrorist attack in France. I understand that the President and many of France’s leaders are too busy now for telephone
conversations. Therefore, I would like to address Mr President publicly.
Dear Francois,
Russia knows terrorism and the threat it creates for us all. Our people have had to deal with similar tragedies many times, and we are deeply distressed at the news. We would like to express our sympathy
and solidarity with the French nation.
The criminal act in Nice that resulted in death and injury, including among Russian citizens, was committed with extreme atrocity and cynicism.
I would like to stress again that only through a united effort can we defeat terrorism.
Mr President, I kindly ask you to pass on my words of most sincere sympathy and support to the victims’ families and friends, and wishes for a speedy recovery to the injured.

President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Mr Secretary, colleagues, let me welcome you to Moscow once again.
I would like to note our mutual efforts to settle conflicts that we consider important and that must be resolved.
My latest conversation with President Obama convinced me that we are sincerely striving not only to maintain and develop our cooperation but also to achieve positive results.
I hope you will report to him – and please send him my best regards – that during our consultations today we also made headway in discussing and resolving the issues we are meeting
to address.
United States Secretary of State John Kerry: Well, Mr President, thank you very much for taking time. I appreciate the opportunity to be able to meet. President Obama sends you his regards. He
thought it was a constructive conversation, and hopefully we will be able to make some genuine progress that is measurable and implementable, and that can make a difference to the course
of events in Syria. So I look forward very much to a serious conversation this evening and again tomorrow with Sergei. We have a lot of work to do.
The President and I both believe, Mr President, that the United States and Russia are in a position to make an enormous difference in the course of events, not just in Syria but obviously
in Ukraine and even in other potential areas of cooperation. And so we are anxious to get to work. We have done a lot of groundwork but we’re not where we need to be yet and we hope to be able
to get there.
So I’m ready to work. I know you are. Let’s go.
Vladimir Putin: President Obama drew my attention to the fact that we helped in the release of one of your citizens. I would like to say that we continue working in this area at your request
and also hope the US side will reciprocate with constructive efforts if need be.

Comment: Strelkov has been going after Putin for a while now, claiming the Kremlin is capable only of half measures—and the Putin crowd only knows how to steal. The
thing to do is for the patriots to wait for the regime to start falling apart and then step in to pick up the pieces. See, for instance, the notes from 3 and 7 June and from 25
May.
More from Strelkov:
http://novorossia.pro/strelkov/2143-igor-strelkov-situaciya-i-perspektivy.html
From the point of view of a patriot there is no positive forecast. Putin and his team are determined to surrender, but the West will never permit Russia an “honorable capitulation.” There is
no sentimentality there; it wants only to destroy the weak and “cut off heads,” especially when these are stupid and cowardly (Comment: The implication here is Putin & Co.). There’s
a crisis in the West; it needs Russia’s resources. It will destabilize Russia. Then the Anglo-Saxons will go after the EU too, but a little later.
Russia’s awkward and indecisive conduct towards Ukraine was a service (knowingly or through incredible stupidity is worthy of debate) to the international oligarchy with the US in the
lead. It created a convenient scarecrow. It missed a chance to create real sovereignty in 2014.
To employ a criminal allegory: the RF has worthless rulers who found a thief in their own garden (Comment: Ukraine I think) and instead of kicking the thief out, made loud noises and
then started whining to the “dear Western partners” about its guns etc. But the Kremlin will not use its guns; it will surrender.
The Kremlin is nothing less than a cowardly bunch of impotent hedonists seeded with Western agents. So instead of a radical change of course (that the situation requires), we have what
we have. This was the mistake of the patriots in 2014—to believe that such a change was possible, a real confrontation with the world hegemon. We thought Putin would understand the
irreversibility of his step. But he didn’t. Strelkov states that he’s ashamed to admit it, but he thought Putin was smarter.
We have a completely ossified bureaucratic-oligarchic regime incapable of reforming itself. It’s in a state of shock by its exclusion from the world community. They can’t imagine anything
else besides it.
But we do have a split: those closest to the West are ready for surrender at any price. On the other hand, there are those who understand that to lose power over the country could lead to
loss of life. But they are powerless on their own. A new nobility incapable of independent action. This is the result of Putin’s personnel policy. In contrast to the surrender crowd, they are
in a real panic, because they remain loyal to Putin.
Comment: Strelkov follows with a real smack at Putin over his appearance—like a little 8 year old schoolboy caught stealing—with the Swiss president in 2014.
What has Putin done subsequently? Stolen pages from the Milosevic playbook, under the guise of making everyone happy. He’s handed over everything to the Ostap Bender of our days,
one Surkov. He’s trying to trade Donbass for Crimea and forgiveness. Under the guise of having leverage over Kiev. The problem is the West will not agree. But Surkov being a member
of the 1s t estate, aka 5th column, has maneuvered Putin into taking responsibility for the Minsk agreements. Obama has his own ideas on this score.
At first the West was dumbfounded because it looked as if Putin had taken an irrevocable step. It expected decisive action, a complete turnabout in domestic and economic policy
including the Oprichnina. But these did not materialize – instead Putin imitated Saddam and Kuwait. This made the West happy. It has plans to deal with this turn of affairs. But faced
with a dead end, the Kremlin tried the Syrian adventure, one that it doesn’t need and one where it can’t succeed. The majority Sunni population and the opposition of all the surrounding
states makes victory impossible. Revealing the stupidity of Putin and his entourage, it went forth thinking the West would forgive all in exchange for the fight against ISIS (he claims he got
this from one well-informed person). When this forgiveness was not forthcoming, Putin backed Assad. The West is seemingly opposed but really OK with this because it enhances the
prospects for overthrowing the Putin regime, its real goal. Putin’s only smart move was the partial withdrawal in March because it was clear the West would not bend on Ukraine and that
he can’t win in Syria. But he really didn’t do it and is now stuck in a swamp.
So what are the results: two hopeless wars, one we can’t win the other we will not win. The Kremlin chickened out and made it a draw. Maybe I will be arrested or killed (but not over
the weekend)?

Sent time: 06/13/2016 08:01:40 AM
To: Peter Reddaway <pbreddaway@gmail.com>; Robert Otto <robertotto25@gmail.com>
Subject: RE: Internet Notes 10 June 2016

Peter, let me know when your paper is published. It’s like to read it and can reference it in the notes.
H
i Wayne and Bob,

Bob.




Eksport).


Yours,

Peter

P handles industrial counterintelligence, while T handles transportation, including Russian Railways and aviation. The head of
FSB SEB, Yuri Yakovlev, is supposedly on his way out as well. Rosbalt’s sources say that the likely successor for Yakovlev at
FSB SEB is the FSB’s head of the internal security directorate (USB) Sergey Korolev. Korolev could be replaced by his
deputy, Oleg Feoktistov. The FSB USB’s Ivan Tkachev is reportedly to take over at Directorate K.
information that he at least knew the GUEBiPK agent Sergey Pirozhkov dating back to 2009, when Pirozhkov worked in the then MVD
him in 2011, urging him to establish relations with one time 1st Deputy Head of the MVD Economic Security Unit, Khorev (Feoktistov claimed
that Khorev, implicated in the tax-rebate schemes that involved the Tax Service and were connected to the Magnitskiy affair [See, for instance,
the 20 March 2012 notes], was set to become head of a reorganized economic security/anti-corruption unit, the GUEBiPK, and would agree to
name Sugrobov his deputy. But Sugrobov refused to go along; Comment: We had read that part of the struggle involving the GUEBiPK was
between supporters of Khorev and backers of Sugrobov. See the 1 April notes; Novaya Gazeta’s Kanev wrote on the ties between Feoktistov
and Khorev back in 2011: http://www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2011/107/28.html). Sugrobov ends by saying he is willing to take a polygraph test
and calls on Putin to make sure the investigations of the charges against him and his subordinates are “objective”:
http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=700657453313675&set=pcb.700658349980252&type=1&theater]
from claims that he and his subordinates fabricated cases against businesses, among other things. Sugrobov’s deputy, Boris Kolesnikov was
also arrested (Comment: And died under strange circumstances while in custody). The GUEBiPK scandal dealt a serious blow to Medvedev’s
target of the FSB.
overstepping in presenting himself as a Deripaska (without D’s consent) rep in secret talks on the fate of Yukos—
but here’s an important point: Deripaska was supposedly close at the time to Murov/FSO and Zolotov. And Zolotov
was a close friend of Tsepov’s. So it made sense to at that point have Sechin as the stronger suspect for using his
May.

Tuesday.
powers/571816.html
reported.
patterns.

Sent time: 06/04/2016 01:52:12 AM
To: nathaniel reynolds <naterey80@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: The Inimitable Viktor Voronin Goes acc to RBK (see novaya piece sent this morning :)) was close to Viktor Ivanov

It’s also illustrative of the clan/faction/group whatever nature of these alleged institutions, in this case the FSB.
Voronin had it in for Novaya (see below) and it had it in for him. This was evident in the Magnitskiy affair, but not only.
Here’s a passage from one of the great takedowns of the last decade entitled Russo Chekisto, about FSB officer Frolov’s (a deputy at
Voronin’s Directorate K) castle off the coast of Italy
В силу всех этих причин о полковнике Фролове и некоторых его подчиненных сложилось крайне странное мнение. «Новая газета»
опросила с десяток его знакомых и бывших коллег, но поверить в то количество историй с рухнувшими банками и «обнальными»
площадками, в которых упоминалось его имя, все равно трудно. Хотя некоторые из эпизодов уже известны на весь мир и имеют
более или менее объективное подтверждение. Прежде всего это «дело Магнитского» (руководитель Фролова Виктор Воронин —
один из первых в «списке Магнитского»), дело «АМТ Банка» Мухтара Аблязова и другие. Последний из громких эпизодов, в
котором, по словам источников «Новой», в том или ином свете упоминалось имя Дмитрия Фролова, — это задержание группы
«черных банкиров» во главе с Сергеем Магиным. Этой группе, по данным МВД, за несколько лет удалось обналичить и вывести за
рубеж около 36 млрд рублей.
And Yuliya followed up with this
http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/code/1142036-echo/
И еще 2 новости, на которые мало кто обратил внимание, а, мне кажется, они тоже очень важные. Одна – это
напечатанная в «Новой газете» статья про господина Фролова, который, на минуточку, является замом Управления
«К» ФСБ, вот того самого, страшного Управления «К», которое вот... И которого выперли из ФСБ, потому что у него
есть недвижимость за границей, где‐то там на итальянском озере. Ну, там это формальная причина, понятно,
увольнения. Удивительно, что ФСБ подтвердила новость, что господина Фролова уволили. Господина Фролова,
заместителя всемогущего Воронина, человека, про которого ходили слухи, что он курирует вот ту самую систему
грязной отмывки денег (господин Фролов), о которой, помните, еще Игнатьев перед увольнением с поста главы
Центробанка говорил? Встал глава Центробанка и сказал «Вы знаете, у нас есть единая система отмывки денег через
грязные банки по всей России», но не назвал имени человека. И вот через некоторое время, спустя несколько
месяцев после этого, поперли господина Фролова, уволили с какой‐то уничтожающей формулировкой из ФСБ.
Я просто прошу обратить внимание на эту новость по той причине, что у нас очень много там говорят про Пехтина,
что у него недвижимость в Майами, про госпожу Яровую, у которой там сын за границей, и так далее, и так далее. Ну,
ребята, не пропустите. Господин Фролов – это гораздо интереснее и гораздо важнее.
Among the folks who took down Magin? The GUEBiPK gang with Sugrobov at its head which led directly to the scandal of the same
name…………….more at work on Monday.
Also note that when Voronin was at the FSKN, his boss (at least nominally) was Cherkesov and Viktor was a high flying PA official (now
there’s a vertical for ya).
On Jun 3, 2016, at 3:31 PM, nathaniel reynolds <naterey80@gmail.com> wrote:
Thanks, gives a lot of credence to the Novaya piece. The Ivanov connection is interesting too.
2016-06-03 15:11 GMT-04:00 Robert Otto <robertotto25@gmail.com>:
http://www.rbc.ru/politics/03/06/2016/57501d0c9a7947cfd3b27bd0?from=main
Глава управления ФСБ попросился
в отставку после коррупционного
скандала
<754649552785989.jpg>
Руководитель управления «К»
Службы экономической
безопасности ФСБ Виктор
Воронин
Фото: szfo.fskn.gov.ru
Глава управления ФСБ Виктор Воронин, отвечающий за контроль в банковской сфере,
написал заявление об отставке, рассказывают источники РБК. Его называли в числе
возможных кандидатов на пост главы ФСО
Заявление об отставке
Руководитель управления «К» Службы экономической безопасности ФСБ Виктор Воронин написал
рапорт об отставке в связи с уголовным делом, фигурантом которого стал сотрудник его
подразделения, рассказал РБК источник, близкий к спецслужбе. Эту информацию подтвердил
собеседник в ФСБ. По его словам, в ведомстве уже несколько недель обсуждался возможный уход
Воронина, поскольку один из его подчиненных оказался связан со «сложной историей». Также
о возможной отставке Воронина в пятницу сообщила «Новая газета».
В центре общественных связей ФСБ пообещали ответить на запрос РБК, отправленный 2 июня,
в установленный законом срок.
Официально ФСБ не раскрывает свою структуру. Как писала «Новая газета», управление «К»
занимается контрразведывательным обеспечением кредитно-финансовой сферы. К
этому же подразделению было присоединено управление «Н» ФСБ, которое боролось с наркотиками,
контрабандой и организованной преступностью.
Собеседник РБК, близкий к спецслужбе, полагает, что одна из причин, которая вынудила Воронина
написать заявление, состоит в том, что его подчиненный, начальник 7-го отдела Управления «К» СЭБ
ФСБ Вадим Уваров оказался связан с уголовным делом о даче взятки сотруднику таможни
при оформлении грузов компаниями-импортерами в размере 2 млн руб. Обвиняемый — бывший
оперативник в Главном управлении по борьбе с контрабандой ФТС Павел Смолярчук (был задержан
в декабре 2015 года), которого «Фонтанка» называла свояком Уварова. Сам Уваров находится
в статусе свидетеля по этому делу в рамках дела о взятке. В рамках этого же дела ФСБ задержала
в петербургском аэропорту Пулково 20 тонн смартфонов.
В СКР не ответили на просьбу РБК предоставить информацию по этому уголовному делу.
Карьера силовика
В 2010 году «Ведомости» называли Воронина в числе возможных преемников главы ФСО Евгения
Мурова. Тогда Муров сохранил свой пост и ушел в отставку 26 мая 2016 года. Службу возглавил
руководитель службы безопасности президента Дмитрий Кочнев.
В мае 2011 года совладелец «Новой газеты», предприниматель Александр Лебедев направил главе
ФСБ Александру Бортникову открытое письмо, в котором указал, что высокопоставленные
сотрудники ФСБ, включая Воронина, неоднократно называли бизнес Лебедева преступным, а его
намерения — противозаконными. Он также отметил, что некоторые подчиненные Воронина «путают
собственную шерсть с государственной».
Воронин — один из наиболее высокопоставленных российских силовиков, включенных в список
сенатора Бенджамина Кардина, на основе которого был составлен «список Магнитского». В списке
Кардина отмечается, что Воронин был инициатором уголовного преследования сотрудников фонда
Hermitage Capital. Дело было заведено через месяц после того, как юристы заявили о причастности
МВД к хищению бюджетных средств в размере 5,4 млрд руб.
В 2012 году США приняли «закон Магнитского», предусматривающий персональные санкции
против лиц, которых США считают причастными к гибели юриста и аудитора фирмы Firestone Duncan
Сергея Магнитского, сотрудничавшего с фондом Hermitage Capital Уильяма Браудера. В итоговый
«список Магнитского» Воронин не был включен.
В конце 2014 года Воронин вошел в специальную рабочую группу по мониторингу ситуации
на валютном рынке во главе с первым вице-премьером Игорем Шуваловым. В ее состав также были
включены представители Минфина, Минэкономики, ФНС, Росфинмониторинга и ЦБ.
Собеседник РБК в ФСБ рассказывает, что Воронин был близок к бывшему главе ФСКН Виктору
Иванову. В 2004 году Воронин был непосредственным подчиненным Иванова и возглавлял управление
ФСКН по Северо-Западному федеральному округу. В апреле 2016 года ФСКН была ликвидирована
как самостоятельная структура и переведена в подчинение МВД. Иванову не нашлось места в новом
управлении.
Свой пост Воронин мог покинуть еще в 2010 году, писал «Росбалт». По данным издания, отставка
обсуждалась в связи с несколькими крупными уголовными делами, например, о поставке
контрабандной одежды из Китая в воинскую часть ФСБ в Подмосковье и о контрабандных товарах
на Черкизовском рынке, попадавших в Россию через Балтийскую таможню.
Sent time: 06/10/2016 03:29:51 PM


Mikhalchenko and the Tsepov murder?

The heads (no names given) of the FSB’s Directorates “P” and “T” have resigned. Those two directorates, along with “K,” whose
head, Viktor Voronin, has also resigned, form the backbone of the FSB’s Economic Security Service (SEB). Directorate P handles
industrial counterintelligence, while T handles transportation, including Russian Railways and aviation. The head of FSB SEB, Yuri
Yakovlev, is supposedly on his way out as well. Rosbalt’s sources say that the likely successor for Yakovlev at FSB SEB is the
FSB’s head of the internal security directorate (USB) Sergey Korolev. Korolev could be replaced by his deputy, Oleg
Feoktistov. The FSB USB’s Ivan Tkachev is reportedly to take over at Directorate K.
Comment: I wonder whether the people at Directorates P and T were also connected to Viktor Ivanov, as Voronin and
Romodanovskiy were. See yesterday’s notes. True, both were also supposedly linked to Mikhalchenko, as was
Murov, but “clan” lines tend to overlap and the key players all know one another. It could be that Ivanov’s departure,
as I suggested yesterday, was the beginning of the unravelling of his “clan” network within the special services and in
other key areas as well—such as Larisa Kalanda leaving her posts at Rosneft/Rosneftegaz. Mikhalchenko’s name
could be dropped as a pretext to go after Ivanov’s people.
information that he at least knew the GUEBiPK agent Sergey Pirozhkov dating back to 2009, when Pirozhkov worked in the then MVD Department
for Economic Security (now the GUEBiPK): http://www.novayagazeta.ru/inquests/63516.html
corruption campaign). Sugrobov also denies that he is married to Presidential Aide Konstantin Chuiychenko’s wife’s sister or that he has benefited
from Chuiychenko’s patronage (as a number of our sources have reported). He further claims that FSB General Feoktistov approached him in 2011,
urging him to establish relations with one time 1st Deputy Head of the MVD Economic Security Unit, Khorev (Feoktistov claimed that Khorev,
implicated in the tax-rebate schemes that involved the Tax Service and were connected to the Magnitskiy affair [See, for instance, the 20 March 2012
notes], was set to become head of a reorganized economic security/anti-corruption unit, the GUEBiPK, and would agree to name Sugrobov his
deputy. But Sugrobov refused to go along; Comment: We had read that part of the struggle involving the GUEBiPK was between supporters of
Khorev and backers of Sugrobov. See the 1 April notes; Novaya Gazeta’s Kanev wrote on the ties between Feoktistov and Khorev back in 2011:
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2011/107/28.html). Sugrobov ends by saying he is willing to take a polygraph test and calls on Putin to make sure
the investigations of the charges against him and his subordinates are “objective”: http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?
Comment: For any of that to make sense, readers will have to refer back to summation of the GUEBiPK scandal (up
to that point) I included in the 31 March notes. The GUEBiPK’s Sugrobov was connected by our sources to
…claims that charges against Voronin have to do with “K’s” involvement in the case against the MVD’s economic security/anti-corruption unit, the
GUEBiPK, a case in which the former head of that unit, Denis Sugrobov, was arrested and still awaits trial on corruption charges stemming from
claims that he and his subordinates fabricated cases against businesses, among other things. Sugrobov’s deputy, Boris Kolesnikov was also
arrested (Comment: And died under strange circumstances while in custody). The GUEBiPK scandal dealt a serious blow to Medvedev’s
Comment: I recently covered Putin’s connections to organized crime in St. Petersburg, connections that included Tsepov, in the 30 March notes.
Briefly put, Tsepov was a racketeer and one time all-around fixer and bodyguard for Mayor Sobchak in St. Petersburg. Tsepov was the co-
founder, along with Putin bodyguard Viktor Zolotov, of a St. Petersburg security firm, Baltic Eksport. Tsepov apparently tried to insinuate
This item (http://putinism.wordpress.com/2016/01/29/roma_tsepov/#more-146), an update to an earlier article on Putin and Tsepov, claims that “FSB
agent Dmitriy Mikhachenko” killed Tsepov with polonium-poisoned tea at the St. Petersburg FSB office. Mikhalchenko subsequently took over
Tsepov’s businesses. Zolotov had been Tsepov’s patron, but Mikhalchenko had the FSB’s Bortnikov as a krysha. Thus, Zolotov and Bortnikov
have long been enemies—Nemtsov was killed by Kadyrov and Zolotov, the investigation conducted under Bortnikov.
target of the FSB.
That said, if Mikhalchenko was involved, we have a reason to think there’s enmity between Mikhalchenko and Zolotov (and maybe Murov, too since he seems to
be the Mikhalchenko krysha now) ……..and Zolotov and Bortnikov?
assassination, with he and Sechin using Mikhalchenko as part of the plan to get rid of Tsepov. Tsepov was connected
with all the St. Petersburg siloviky, but his stronger connections were with the MVD and FSO, Mikhalchenko’s
supposedly with the FSB, as in the item above.
Mikhalchenko took over Tsepov’s niche in St. Petersburg after Tsepov’s death. In those notes, I had Sechin, Kumarin
and their allies in the FSB killing Tsepov because he tried to insinuate himself into the Yukos affair and represented a
roadblock to Kumarin’s friend Mikhalchenko’s ambition to take over Tsepov’s security business/fixer role in St.
Petersburg. I had also suspected Deripaska, who may have been irritated by Tsepov’s reported overstepping in
presenting himself as a Deripaska (without D’s consent) rep in secret talks on the fate of Yukos—but here’s an
important point: Deripaska was supposedly close at the time to Murov/FSO and Zolotov. And Zolotov was a close
friend of Tsepov’s. So it made sense to at that point have Sechin as the stronger suspect for using his FSB
connections and Mikhalchenko to kill Tsepov.
as Mikhalchenko’s patron and krysha. Things can change, of course—maybe Mikhalchenko’s FSB connections were
to people closer to Patrushev than the man who would succeed him at FSB, Bortnikov, and a re-alignment took place
after a number of changes in the “power block” and after Mikhalchenko had established himself as Tsepov’s
was pleased to replace him with his own man, Kochnev, as head of the FSO. See, for instance, the notes from 27 May.
resulted in scandals and criminal cases. Rosbalt’s sources say it’s the FSB USB’s boss, Korolev, who will take over at FSB SEB.
His deputy, Oleg Feoktistov, will take over at USB, and Ivan Tkachev of FSB USB will take over Directorate K. When then head
of FSB USB, Aleksandr Kupryazhkin, was promoted to FSB deputy director in 2011, Feoktistov was supposed to be his
replacement, but Sergey Korolev, a comrade of Anatoliy Serdyukov’s, got the nod…Just a couple of years ago, the USB and
SEB were friendly and cooperated in the case against the MVD GUEBiPK, but then the USB turned its attention to the SEB. In
February of last year, USB officers arrested Directorate P’s Igor Korobitsin for demanding a $1 million bribe from the head of
Rosalkogolregulirovanie, Igor Chuyan. At the beginning of this year, the USB implicated Directorate K’s Vadim Uvarov in an
extortion case involving contraband cell phones. The “shadow financial sector” has reportedly already reacted to the personal
shifts at FSB by raising its rate for legalizing large amounts of illicit cash (“obnalichivanie” or “obnal”) to 15%...
Comment: Recall that Medvedev was in Crimea and a retired woman complained about low pensions—Medvedev told
her pensions would be indexed when possible, but said “there’s no money.” He told her to hang in there. See the 25
May notes. His remarks were mocked around the Runet. Putin said that maybe Medvedev’s comments had been taken out
of context: http://www.newsru.com/russia/28may2016/hold_on.html And that the government was paying more attention to
fulfilling social obligations—anyway, a lot of countries were having problems with pensions…
Tuesday.
Those wishing to move said that they were motivated by more favorable conditions for developing private businesses, better prospects of
finding investors, and a higher quality of life.
powers/571816.html
The A Just Russia party presented the initiative, and concluded that Ponomarev has not come to the Duma in two years, has not been
working with constituents, and has not been communicating with the party. Ponomarev refutes these claims, Vedomosti reported.
In 2015 the Duma stripped him of parliamentary immunity, charged and arrested him in absentia for the embezzlement of $750,000 from
the state-funded scientific and technological Skolkovo Foundation. Ponomarev had worked with Skolkovo as a lecturer, and in 2011-12
he managed part of the foundation’s projects while working closely with then-President Dmitry Medvedev.
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russia-state-duma-passes-law-regulating-news-aggregators/571817.html
Members of the Russian State Duma on Friday approved the third reading of a law regulating the work of news aggregators, the Slon.ru
news website reported. The law received unanimous support, with 319 deputies voting for the law and none against.
Leading Russian search engine Yandex was critical of the bill when it was first introduced, saying that its requirements were excessive
and impractical. The law requires aggregators to save the information they disseminate for six months after publication.
Upon initial introduction in February, an explanatory note accompanying the bill stated the need for stricter regulation of aggregators, on
the basis of their audience reach and ability to influence opinion.

patterns.
“The Board of Directors notes positive process of inflation stabilization, decline of inflation expectations and inflation risks amid signs of
an approaching phase of growing recovery,” the bank's report said, TASS reported.

Sent time: 06/13/2016 07:35:01 AM
To: Peter Reddaway <pbreddaway@gmail.com>; Robert Otto <robertotto25@gmail.com>
Subject: RE: Internet Notes 10 June 2016

Peter, thanks for this—Mikhalchenko was arrested. It was reported in the notes for 30 March. He has come up in the 31 March,
26, 27, and 31 May and on 7, 9, and 10 June. I referred back to the notes form 2007 that claimed Mikhalchenko was involved in
Tsepov’s murder. I’ll search again and see if anything turns up earlier than that. Here’s the bit on MIkhalchenko being taken
into custody from 30 March:
http://en.news-4-u.ru/basmanny-court-has-arrested-billionaire-mikhalchenko-in-the-case-of-smuggling-of-elite-alcohol.html
previously questioned in a criminal case of alcohol smuggling, be taken into custody for two months. Judge Andrey
Karpov dismissed the request that the businessman be released on bail of 50 million rubles according to «Interfax».
Mikhalchenko categorically denied his involvement in smuggling or any plans to hide from the investigation. The
businessman also told the jury about attempts to pressure his business, in particular the construction of a deep water
port Bronka, which has been headed by OOO «Phoenix».
…The Russian billionaire is accused of smuggling alcohol in 2015, creating an organized crime group that shipped the
alcohol from the port of Hamburg under the guise of construction sealant.
…Mikhalchenko was accused of smuggling of alcoholic beverages in an organized group in especially large quantity
(part 3 of article 200.2 of the Criminal Code). His Deputy Boris Chorevski, Deputy Director of OOO «Logistik Central
Northwest», Anatoly Kindzerskaya, and the Director of «South-East trading company», Ilya Pichko, were also
detained.
According to some media reports, Mikhalchenko arrived in Moscow on March 28 and was detained the next day.
According to «Fontanka.ru», the detention took place on Wednesday morning. He was detained by investigators of
the central apparatus of the FSB and was taken to the Investigative Committee. He was detained for two days...
Mikhalchenko’s name was previously mentioned in connection with a case of multi-million embezzlement uncovered
in the Ministry of Culture….He is the General Director of a management company, «Forum».
On March 15 and 17, the General Director of CJSC Baltstroy (part of the Forum holding), Dmitry Sergeev, and
Baltstroy’s Alexander Kochenov were taken into custody on order of Moscow’s Lefortovo court. They are suspects in
the case of a multimillion embezzlement of budget funds allocated for the restoration of a number of cultural heritage
sites.
The main suspect in this case is the Deputy Minister of Culture, Gregory Pirumov. On 24 March he was charged
with charged with fraud.

H
i Wayne and Bob,

Bob.




Eksport).


Yours,

Peter

P handles industrial counterintelligence, while T handles transportation, including Russian Railways and aviation. The head of
FSB SEB, Yuri Yakovlev, is supposedly on his way out as well. Rosbalt’s sources say that the likely successor for Yakovlev at
FSB SEB is the FSB’s head of the internal security directorate (USB) Sergey Korolev. Korolev could be replaced by his
deputy, Oleg Feoktistov. The FSB USB’s Ivan Tkachev is reportedly to take over at Directorate K.
information that he at least knew the GUEBiPK agent Sergey Pirozhkov dating back to 2009, when Pirozhkov worked in the then MVD
him in 2011, urging him to establish relations with one time 1st Deputy Head of the MVD Economic Security Unit, Khorev (Feoktistov claimed
that Khorev, implicated in the tax-rebate schemes that involved the Tax Service and were connected to the Magnitskiy affair [See, for instance,
the 20 March 2012 notes], was set to become head of a reorganized economic security/anti-corruption unit, the GUEBiPK, and would agree to
name Sugrobov his deputy. But Sugrobov refused to go along; Comment: We had read that part of the struggle involving the GUEBiPK was
between supporters of Khorev and backers of Sugrobov. See the 1 April notes; Novaya Gazeta’s Kanev wrote on the ties between Feoktistov
and Khorev back in 2011: http://www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2011/107/28.html). Sugrobov ends by saying he is willing to take a polygraph test
and calls on Putin to make sure the investigations of the charges against him and his subordinates are “objective”:
http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=700657453313675&set=pcb.700658349980252&type=1&theater]
from claims that he and his subordinates fabricated cases against businesses, among other things. Sugrobov’s deputy, Boris Kolesnikov was
also arrested (Comment: And died under strange circumstances while in custody). The GUEBiPK scandal dealt a serious blow to Medvedev’s
target of the FSB.
overstepping in presenting himself as a Deripaska (without D’s consent) rep in secret talks on the fate of Yukos—
but here’s an important point: Deripaska was supposedly close at the time to Murov/FSO and Zolotov. And Zolotov
was a close friend of Tsepov’s. So it made sense to at that point have Sechin as the stronger suspect for using his
May.

Tuesday.
powers/571816.html
reported.
patterns.

Sent time: 06/09/2016 03:59:08 PM

More on Yakovlev/Voronin/Romondanovskiy
Zolotov’s victory (Murov/Kochnev)
FSB will look into employee debt, foreign marriages
A problem with “dual use” alcohol-based products

More on Yakovlev/Voronin/Romondanovskiy
See the notes from 7 and 8 June.
First, following up on this bit from yesterday’s notes:
[http://www.rbc.ru/politics/08/06/2016/5756984b9a7947574d1f5b40?from=main
Putin intends to replace Yuri Yakovlev as head of the FSB’s Economic Security Service (SEB)—Yakovlev will retire, according to RBC’s sources.
Peskov says that “thus far” he doesn’t know anything about it. Former FSB Major General Aleksandr Mikhailov says that the SEB is one of the
key components of the FSB. FSB boss Aleksandr Bortnikov preceded Yakovlev at FSB SEB, serving there in 2004-2008. Yakovlev’s departure could
be connected with the resignation of the head of the SEB’s Department K, Viktor Voronin. Voronin’s departure was supposedly connected to a
criminal case involving contraband. One of Voronin’s subordinates, Vadim Uvarov, was implicated in the case, which involved payoffs by importers
to a Customs official. The Customs official who is suspected of taking bribes is Pavel Smolyarchuk, a relative of Uvarov’s.]
On 6 June Novaya Gazeta said that Voronin was on his way out: http://www.novayagazeta.ru/inquests/73329.html
Novaya looks back at the last month as a “conveyer” of corruption cases pursued by the MVD and FSB, starting with the Culture
Ministry scandal. Those implicated include Deputy Minister Pirumov, the MinKult’s Boris Mazo and Boris Tsagarayev, as well as
contractor/businessman Dmitriy Mikhalchenko, also implicated in a customs/smuggling case (they say there is a battle underway for
controlling the NW Customs office). Mikhalchenko is reportedly a protégé of now former head of the FSO, Yevgeniy Murov.
Another associate of Murov’s, Kremlin restoration expert Yevgeniy Prigozhin, has also been arrested (On the Culture Ministry
scandal and Mikhalchenko/Murov, see the notes from 21 and 29 March. See also the 26 and 27 May notes).
An advisor to the head of Rospybolovstvo, Yuri Khokholov, is suspected of “selling” the post of rector of the Kamchatka State
Technical University for $5 million. He was targeted by the FSB’s Directorate K (Comment: Part of the FSB’s Economic
Security Service/SEB as we read in yesterday’s notes).
The Mayor of Vladivostik, Igor Pushkarev, and the director of a road construction enterprise, Andrey Lushhikov, have also been
arrested by the FSB—this time, the Internal Security Directorate or Sixth Service (See the 2 and 7 June notes).
Meanwhile, the MVD has arrested the head of Rosreestor for the NW Moscow Okrug, taken into custody just as he received a
$350,000 bribe for registering certain real estate holdings. Experience shows that this is likely just the beginning. The MVD-FSB
jointly carried out an operation that detained two former heads of military industry enterprises, Murad Safin and Ruslan
Suleiymanov, on fraud charges.
Some have explained the wave of corruption cases as being typical for an election year—but that’s usually in a presidential, not a
parliamentary election year. Changes in the power structures (at the FSB’s economic security unit, for instance) could have
something to do with the anti-corruption “conveyer.” Another factor—the liquidation of the FSKN, the departures of Viktor
Ivanov and Murov. Maybe those events led to a re-division of the influence market.
According to Novaya’s sources, a proverka has been underway at FSB SEB and an important SEB unit, Directorate K, which
handles cases involving the credit/financial system. Novaya says that the head of Directorate K, Viktor Voronin, has resigned—he
is one of the most influential and non-public of the siloviky. So the ramped up anti-corruption campaign could be related to a
struggle to succeed Voronin. “K” is a key department in the FSB, handling the banking system, taking part in operational matters
related to money laundering and the shifting of money offshore. There are rumors going around that the leadership of the FSB
SEB could go as well. So with a struggle underway to take Voronin’s spot, the anti-corruption cases enumerated above may be a
chance for those aspiring to take his place to show their skills, auditioning for the job. Recent power ministry shakeups have
perhaps opened up possibilities for those who wanted to pursue certain cases, but had not been given the go ahead prior to the
shakeups.
Comment: As noted previously (See the 31 May notes, for example), I think Murov’s departure was related to the
FSB vs FSO struggle that goes back a ways, particularly flaring up after the Nemtsov murder. Mikhalchenko’s arrest
indicated that Murov was weakened. The creation of the Natsguard and Zolotov’s rise needed to be “balanced”—
true, Zolotov may have welcomed the departure of his old boss Murov, as he intended to replace him with his man
Kochnev, but the FSB was probably hoping to place its own candidate. Other factors include Putin’s distrust of the
siloviky in general, fears of a “palace coup,” and the always present elite fear of a popular “bunt”—so Putin draws
those closest to him even closer (Zolotov, for example, with people from his FSO/Presidential Security Service days
being placed in important posts. And we’ve read that Zolotov may be eyeing posts at the FSB and the SK. See the 2
and 6 June notes, which also included a bit on Putin doing some “balancing” by disbanding the FSKN and the
Migration Service and shifting their functions to the MVD, which had lost the Internal Troops to the Natsguard. And
Kolokoltsev did get something out of Zolotov’s leaving the MVD for the Natsguard—Zolotov had long been rumored
to be a possible replacement for Kolokoltsev as minister. See the 31 May notes).
As far as the present anti-corruption arrests—they are likely partly related to the FSB-FSO power struggle, partly
probably the FSB and MVD trying to reassert themselves. There’s probably some score settling going on at the mid-
level of the power bureaucracy, and once these campaigns get started, the peripheral motives tend to obscure and
confuse the initial reasons the campaign was kicked off. It could very well be that some are auditioning for Voronin’s
job, for instance.
More: As noted here many time previously, a system that is inefficient and dysfunctional in its day-today operations
occasionally needs “manual control” or an anti-corruption campaign to keep the wheels turning. Corruption at a
certain, manageable level probably helps keeps the system working, however inefficiently, but if the bribes get too big,
the corrupt officials too blatant, then the machine’s gears can grind to a halt. An anti-corruption campaign becomes
necessary to rein in the worst abuses and shore up the state’s legitimacy. I think such a campaign had been going on
previous to this latest round of arrests.
More on Voronin…RBC says that Voronin was close to Viktor Ivanov:
http://www.rbc.ru/politics/03/06/2016/57501d0c9a7947cfd3b27bd0?from=main
Back in 2010, Voronin was mentioned as a possible replacement for Murov at FSO…Voronin was a candidate for inclusion on
the US “Magnitskiy list” as an initiator of the case against Hermitage Capital, but did not make the final cut…An FSB source says
that Voronin was close to Viktor Ivanov—in 2004, Voronin headed the NW Federal Okrug FSKN…
Comment: I think it’s worth replaying this bit from the 2 June notes one more time:
[Zolotov’s victory (Murov/Kochnev)
http://politcom.ru/21134.html
Aleksey Makarkin says that Murov’s resignation is a victory for Zolotov (they were once apparatus allies, but Zolotov has his own “clientele”
these days)—Zolotov was able to replace him with his man Dmitriy Kochnev, Zolotov’s longtime deputy at the Presidential Security Service who
since last year has headed that service. Systemically, we see cadres from that service being placed in important posts—General Kolpakov as head
of the Presidential Affairs Administration, General Mironov is now head of the MVD’s economic crimes unit (Makarkin sees Dyumin moving from
deputy defense minister to Tula governor as something of a demotion—so he is an “exception to the rule”).
There is a tendency to a changing of the generational guard in the higher echelons of vlast. In the early 2000s, when Putin became president, he
brought with him a team of people close to him, people he had worked with in the KGB or in St. Petersburg. For a long time, Putin did not make any
changes in his circle—he is a man stable in his sympathies as well as his antipathies. If there was a change, then it was a lateral move, or
accompanied by some form of compensation. But somewhere down the line, Putin began to doubt the effectiveness of these people—Yakunin’s
departure from Russian Railways was an indicator. And Putin saw that a resignation in his close circle was not a catastrophe. The system continued
to function normally. So we got a domino effect—Viktor Ivanov lost his FSKN post, Gryzlov his seat as a permanent Security Council member. Now
it’s Murov’s turn.
Comment: On Yakunin, I wondered whether his departure—he subsequently warned others they were not safe—had something to do with a) the
crisis, and the ineffectiveness of people who kept coming back again and again asking for more money, more subsidies. Putin was disturbed by
the crisis—and the sense that he was not being repaid with the degree of steadfastness and loyalty he might have expected and b) Putin’s own view
of himself as a man of destiny, one that was evident, I think, before the Ukraine crisis, a sense that he was a man apart, with a special mission.
That would tend to make it easier to part with friends he might see as presenting roadblocks to fulfilling his destiny. In a low trust environment
like that in Russia, such moves might cause rumblings among those in his circle who expect a premium from being “close to the body”—as well
as drawing the circle of those most trusted even closer. Like Zolotov.
Makarkin doesn’t like the “clan” description of groups within vlast—he says that vlast is more atomized, with Russian politics comprised of a
few dozen major players and their “clienteles” who form “situational alliances” with one another, and clash as well, with the president presiding
over the system’s arbitration—which sounds pretty much like my “vertical axis” of the “clan” system (the “just business” axis), so I think he’s
making a distinction without a difference. On the “horizontal axis” are one’s closest friends and relatives, the people one counts on in a pinch—I
think we have an idea of who some of those people are in Putin’s circle—Zolotov, Raldugin, the Rotenbergs, and the Kovalchuks being examples.
Makarkin is saying that the cadre reserves Putin is drawing on are not so much from the broader FSO as from its Presidential Security Service
branch. ]
Viktor Ivanov’s departure may have had an impact on the fate of Larisa Kalanda, who recently left her important
posts at Rosneft and Rosneftegaz, as well. See the 27 May and 6 June notes.
More on Voronin: http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3005894
The case against the SEB Directorate K’s Uvarov (mentioned above) was handled by the FSB’s Internal Security unit…
Kommersant says that Voronin was also supposedly close to recently arrested businessman Dmitriy Mikhalchenko…
This item http://www.moscow-post.com/politics/kto_za_vse_v_otvete21249/
…claims that charges against Voronin have to do with “K’s” involvement in the case against the MVD’s economic security/anti-
corruption unit, the GUEBiPK, a case in which the former head of that unit, Denis Sugrobov, was arrested and still awaits trial on
corruption charges stemming from claims that he and his subordinates fabricated cases against businesses, among other things.
Sugrobov’s deputy, Boris Kolesnikov was also arrested (Comment: And died under strange circumstances while in
custody). The GUEBiPK scandal dealt a serious blow to Medvedev’s entourage—and some say that Voronin’s departure from
the FSB SEB was revenge by some of Medvedev’s people for the GUEBiPK case.
Comment: Russia’s overlapping money laundering channels are vast and involve lots of games—apart from the
Magnitskiy affair, recall the lengthy GUEBiPK scandal, which pointed to a clash between the MVD economic security
department (probably allied with elements in the Prosecutor’s office) and the FSB and its allies in the Investigative
Committee. The battle was said to be over controlling money laundering channels. See the 31 March notes for a
rehash of the GUEBiPK affair.
More on Romodanovosky…
I ran this item in the 7 June notes…
[See yesterday’s notes and the notes from 27 and 31 May.
http://www.newtimes.ru/articles/detail/111570
Some say that former head of the Federal Migration Service (FMS) Konstantin Romodanovskiy fled the country—that’s why he was not at the
meeting at which Putin announced that the FSKN and the FMS would be under the MVD. Rumors followed that Romodanovskiy was connected to
the arrested businessman Dmitriy Mikhalchenko. The MVD Public Communications Department says it does not know where he is. New Times
couldn’t find him at his residence in Moscow Oblast, though it’s interesting that one of his neighbors there, Remigiyus Penkauskas, was sentenced
to nine years back in 2013 for being connected to a drug trafficking ring. The investigation was conducted by the FSKN. A security guard at the
complex where Romodanovskiy’s residence is located says that three months ago, Romodanovskiy’s son and family were constantly visiting him,
but he has not seen any of them for a while… ]
That was not the full item—a reader sent the complete article…Romodanovskiy started his career as a pathologist at the Moscow
morgue…He went to a KGB Academy in Minsk and joined the 5th Directorate, which targeted dissenters…After the fall of the
USSR, Romodanovskiy worked for the FSB Internal Security Department, then in the analogous MVD department starting in
2011 (the piece maintains that Romodanovskiy was part of the “intrigues” that eventually resulted in then MVD chief Vladimir
Rushaylo losing that post)…In the 2000s, Romodanovskiy took part in the MVD’s internal anti-corruption campaign against
“werewolves in shoulder boards” and was called the “conscience of the militia.” His patron was Viktor Ivanov, who was at the
time working as deputy head of the Presidential Administration…He was also said to be quite well acquainted with Roman Tsepov
(See below). When Tsepov was assassinated in 2004, both Zolotov and Romodanovskiy attended the funeral.
In 2005, Romodanovskiy was made head of the Federal Migration Service (FMS), and subsequently his rank was elevated to that
of a minister. The FMS was frequently named in bribery scandals…In 2012, the Ivanov-Romodanovskiy tandem took part in the
struggle for the MVD minister’s post when Nurgaliyev was on his way out (Comment: I assume the aim was to install
Romodanovskiy as minister, though that’s not clear). But Kolokoltsev, reportedly backed by Medvedev, Gazprom, and
Severstal, eventually won out…There were rumors in March that Romodanovskiy would be implicated in the contraband alcohol
case against Dmitriy Mikhalchenko. Mikhalchenko was supposedly involved in passing documentation to Central Asian “Guest
workers”—shortly thereafter, the FMS was liquidated, its duties transferred to the MVD…
Eventually, New Times was able to contact Romodanovskiy by phone. He says he is at his residence and has not fled the country.
He was not at the meeting with Putin (in which VVP announced the liquidation of the FMS and the FSKN) because he was ill—he
already knew, anyway…
Comment: I recently covered Putin’s connections to organized crime in St. Petersburg, connections that included
Tsepov, in the 30 March notes. Briefly put, Tsepov was a racketeer and one time all-around fixer and bodyguard for
Mayor Sobchak in St. Petersburg. Tsepov was the co-founder, along with Putin bodyguard Viktor Zolotov, of a St.
Petersburg security firm, Baltic Eksport. Tsepov apparently tried to insinuate himself into the Yukos affair as a
mediator—I suspected at the time that this was the reason he was assassinated. Zolotov attended Tsepov’s funeral.
The killing of Tsepov shook up the elite, creating quite a scandal. I had Sechin and Deripaska, who was also interested
in Yukos, as likely suspects in the murder—Tsepov reportedly tried to pass himself off as Deripaska’s representative.
There have been claims that Tsepov, like Litvinenko, was poisoned with polonium.
Tsepov, claims that “FSB agent Dmitriy Mikhachenko” killed Tsepov with polonium-poisoned tea at the St. Petersburg FSB office.
Mikhalchenko subsequently took over Tsepov’s businesses. Zolotov had been Tsepov’s patron, but Mikhalchenko had the
FSB’s Bortnikov as a krysha. Thus, Zolotov and Bortnikov have long been enemies—Nemtsov was killed by Kadyrov and
Zolotov, the investigation conducted under Bortnikov.
That said, if Mikhalchenko was involved, we have a reason to think there’s enmity between Mikhalchenko and Zolotov (and maybe
Murov, too since he seems to be the Mikhalchenko krysha now) ……..and Zolotov and Bortnikov?
In 2004, when Tsepov was murdered, Bortnikov was out of StP, btw. Up to February 2004 he headed the FSB in StP, but he then went
to head the FSB’s SEB (when he met Voronin?), taking the one time allegedly super influential Zaostrovtsev’s (tri kita) place.
In short, just how much — if not all — of this stuff a provocation is not clear, but that doesn’t make it less interesting in light of all the
other stuff going on…
FSB will look into employee debt, foreign marriages
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russian-security-service-to-examine-employee-debt-foreign-
marriages/571698.html
Russian citizens seeking to join the Federal Security Service (FSB) will have to disclose overdue debt and any marriages to foreigners
within their family, the independent television channel Dozhd reported Thursday.
The FSB is seeking to curb foreign interference in its operations and within its network.
“Recently, foreign intelligence services have strengthened their operations through penetration of the FSB in Russia. This increases
corruption and risks for employees,” Dozhd reported, citing an explanatory note accompanying the measures.
According to the order, all FSB candidates will be required to make known any marriages within close family to foreigners, stateless
persons or Russian citizens living abroad.
In addition, those hoping to enter into service will now be required to disclose any debt exceeding 500,000 rubles ($7,800) if the debt is
not paid within three months. An explanation will be required by the FSB.
The change protects employees from foreign recruitment in the event that the FSB goes bankrupt. By requiring candidates to supply
their personal information, the FSB aims to prevent such information from being made public, Dozhd reported.
The new order is in agreement with a law passed in October 2015, which declared that anyone unable to pay debt exceeding 500,000
rubles within three months can declare bankruptcy.
A problem with “dual use” alcohol-based products
Comment: A reminder that this kind of thing is still a major problem.
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russian-officials-fight-perfume-boozers/571679.html
Officials in northwest Russia's republic of Komi are discussing a federal ban on large bottles of cologne in an attempt to stop residents
drinking the perfume as a cheap alternative to vodka, the Flash Nord news outlet reported Thursday.
The authors of the initiative propose that bottles of perfume be reduced in size from 50 ml to 10 ml to ensure that cologne remains more
expensive than traditional spirits.
The measures are intended to prevent residents from drinking the fragrances for their high alcohol content. “Dual-use” alcohol-based
products — perfume, medicine, cleaning products — are the most common cause of poisoning in the area, Flash Nord reported.
The republic has a high level of alcoholism, with alcohol abuse significantly impacting local mortality rates. The numbers of deaths
caused by chronic alcoholism stands above the national average in 10 of the region's towns, according to Russian consumer rights
watchdog Rospotrebnadzor, Flash Nord reported. Komi ministers also discussed taking additional measures to ensure that that alcohol
content in perfume and other dual-use products does not exceed legal limits.

Sent time: 06/01/2016 11:53:10 PM
Subject: Navalnyy on Vice Mayor Liksutov's Link to the Magnitskiy Affair

http://navalny.com/p/4892/
Вице-мэр Ликсутов оказался замешан в хищениях по "делу Магнитского".
Ну и адский же клубок. Надеюсь, когда-нибудь «дело Магнитского» станет основанием для грандиозного трибунала, там вся мафия повязана — от виолончелиста-миллиардера Ролдугина
до, как выясняется, любимца ФБК Максима Ликсутова.
Газета «Зюдойче цайтунг», та самая, с которой началось «Панамское досье» (оно у них, собственно, и хранится) опубликовала новое расследование.
Они выяснили, что компания Ликсутова тоже получила долю от тех 5,4 миллиардов рублей, похищенных из бюджета убийцами Сергея Магнитского.
Долю пока нашли небольшую — 336 тысяч долларов, но тем не менее.
http://panamapapers.sueddeutsc...
Материал в Зюдойче на немецком. Русского или английского перевода пока не вижу, но вот пересказ сути на русском:
1 июня 2016 года — По данным расследования «Панамского досье», проведенного журналистами немецкой газеты «Зюддойче цайтунг», компания заместителя мэра
Москвы Максима Ликсутова получила около 336 тысяч долларов от оффшорной фирмы, использовавшейся для отмывания 5,4 миллиардов рублей, похищенных из
российского бюджета — преступления, раскрытого Сергеем Магнитским.По данным газеты, в 2012 году эстонская компания «Трансгруп Инвест»,
cовладельцем которой на тот момент являлся заместитель московского мэра Максим Ликсутов, получила 336 тысяч 153 доллара США от компании «Зибар
Менеджмент», участвовавшей в схеме отмывания похищенных у россиян 5,4 миллиардов рублей.Фирма «Зибар Менеджмент» была зарегистрирована на Британских
Виргинских островах и связана с Дмитрием Клюевым, включенным в американский санкционный список за его роль в деле Магнитского. Компанию «Зибар
Менеджмент» возглавлял номинальный директор, а администратором выступала находящаяся в России фирма «Гудвин менеджмент».
Компания «Трансгруп Инвест» была впоследствии перерегистрирована на супругу Максима Ликсутова, с которой он вскоре развелся.
Максим Ликсутов отвечает в мэрии Москвы за вопросы транспорта и развития дорожно-транспортной инфраструктуры. В рейтинге богатейших бизнесменов России
по версии журнала Forbes за 2013 год вице-мэр Москвы Ликсутов занял 157-е место с капиталом в 650 млн долларов США.
http://lawandorderinrussia.org...
Надеюсь, отвратного жулика Ликсутова включат в санкционные списки — лишат возможности ездить в Монако к своей яхте.
Ну и, конечно, публикация SZ — ещё одно подтверждение правоты ФБК. Мы долгие годы последовательно, с документами доказывали, что Ликсутов — один из крупнейших чиновников-
коррупционеров.
Мы продолжим заниматься этим и будем требовать привлечения Ликсутова к уголовной ответственности.
Sent time: 06/01/2016 11:50:39 PM
To: Kyle Parker <kyle@kyleparker.net>
Subject: Navalnyy Links Vice Mayor Liksutov to the Magnitskiy Affair

http://navalny.com/p/4892/
Вице-мэр Ликсутов оказался замешан в хищениях по "делу Магнитского".
Ну и адский же клубок. Надеюсь, когда-нибудь «дело Магнитского» станет основанием для грандиозного трибунала, там вся мафия повязана — от виолончелиста-
миллиардера Ролдугина до, как выясняется, любимца ФБК Максима Ликсутова.
Газета «Зюдойче цайтунг», та самая, с которой началось «Панамское досье» (оно у них, собственно, и хранится) опубликовала новое расследование.
Они выяснили, что компания Ликсутова тоже получила долю от тех 5,4 миллиардов рублей, похищенных из бюджета убийцами Сергея Магнитского.
Долю пока нашли небольшую — 336 тысяч долларов, но тем не менее.
http://panamapapers.sueddeutsc...
Материал в Зюдойче на немецком. Русского или английского перевода пока не вижу, но вот пересказ сути на русском:
1 июня 2016 года — По данным расследования «Панамского досье», проведенного журналистами немецкой газеты «Зюддойче цайтунг», компания
заместителя мэра Москвы Максима Ликсутова получила около 336 тысяч долларов от оффшорной фирмы, использовавшейся для отмывания 5,4
миллиардов рублей, похищенных из российского бюджета — преступления, раскрытого Сергеем Магнитским.По данным газеты, в 2012 году
эстонская компания «Трансгруп Инвест»,
cовладельцем которой на тот момент являлся заместитель московского мэра Максим Ликсутов, получила 336 тысяч 153 доллара США от компании
«Зибар Менеджмент», участвовавшей в схеме отмывания похищенных у россиян 5,4 миллиардов рублей.Фирма «Зибар Менеджмент» была
зарегистрирована на Британских Виргинских островах и связана с Дмитрием Клюевым, включенным в американский санкционный список за его роль в
деле Магнитского. Компанию «Зибар Менеджмент» возглавлял номинальный директор, а администратором выступала находящаяся в России фирма
«Гудвин менеджмент».
Компания «Трансгруп Инвест» была впоследствии перерегистрирована на супругу Максима Ликсутова, с которой он вскоре развелся.
Максим Ликсутов отвечает в мэрии Москвы за вопросы транспорта и развития дорожно-транспортной инфраструктуры. В рейтинге богатейших
бизнесменов России по версии журнала Forbes за 2013 год вице-мэр Москвы Ликсутов занял 157-е место с капиталом в 650 млн долларов США.
http://lawandorderinrussia.org...
Надеюсь, отвратного жулика Ликсутова включат в санкционные списки — лишат возможности ездить в Монако к своей яхте.
Ну и, конечно, публикация SZ — ещё одно подтверждение правоты ФБК. Мы долгие годы последовательно, с документами доказывали, что Ликсутов — один из
крупнейших чиновников-коррупционеров.
Мы продолжим заниматься этим и будем требовать привлечения Ликсутова к уголовной ответственности.
Sent time: 06/02/2016 01:02:51 PM

Venediktov explains why the Albats program disappeared from Ekho Moskvy
6,000 workers on a “work-to-rule” strike at Evraz
Moscow Deputy Mayor Liksutov and the Magnitskiy affair
Milov on privatizing Rosneft (The Chinese may be the only option…)
Russia’s “pivot” to China
Vladivostok mayor detained (Charged with channeling budget funds to firms owned by his relatives)
Oleg Navalniy petitions for parole

Venediktov explains why the Albats program disappeared from Ekho Moskvy
http://www.mk.ru/social/2016/05/25/ya-v-beshenstve-venediktov-obyasnil-ischeznovenie-peredachi-albac-s-ekha.html
Venediktov has confirmed an earlier report by Open Russia that the disappearance of Yevgenia Albats’ program from Ekho
Moskvy was because of “censorship limits”—Venediktov says he will try and get her back on the air in June (the report is dated
25 May)…Albats says that she was offered a new contract with a clause on her not asking any questions or raising any themes
that had not been approved by Echo Moskvy General Director Yekaterina Pavlova. Another clause requires her not to violate
“generally recognized moral norms”…Venediktov says the contract steps on his toes as Chief Editor—it’s his job to determine
editorial policy. The argument over the Albats contract is reminiscent of the firing of journalist Aleksandr Plyushchev by Pavlova
(because of a tweet about the head of Kremlin Administration Sergey Ivanov)—Venediktov said it was his job to hire and fire.
Plyushchev was reinstated. New Times, a magazine headed by Albats, regularly carries reports on official corruption…
Comment: The Plyushchev affair pitted the late Mikhail Lesin, in his capacity as head of Gazprom Media, against
Venediktov. See the notes from 7, 9, 10, 12, and 16 November 2014. The tweets that caused the stir were about the
drowning death of Ivanov’s son.
Here’s a piece that sums up the story: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/firing-of-ekho-moskvy-reporter-
prompts-speculation-over-fate-of-editor-in-chief/510788.html
6,000 workers on a “work-to-rule” strike at Evraz
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/massive-strike-at-russian-factory-of-abramovichs-evraz/571240.html
Six thousand workers have gone on strike at a plant of the Evraz steel and mining company, partly owned by Roman Abramovich.
Staff at the ore mining and processing plant in the Sverdlovsk region town of Kachkanar are protesting a new bonus system, the RBC
news outlet reported Thursday.
Strike leaders claim the changes reduce their wages by 7,000 to 15,000 rubles ($100 to $220) a month. The average salary at the plant
is 47,000 rubles ($700) a month.
Workers are holding a work-to-rule strike, where those taking part are encouraged to strictly follow all industry rules and guidelines to
the point where it hampers production.
Trade union leader Anatoly Pyankov said that production could be reduced by 50 percent as a result of the action, RBC reported.

http://politcom.ru/21134.html
Aleksey Makarkin says that Murov’s resignation is a victory for Zolotov (they were once apparatus allies, but Zolotov has his own
“clientele” these days)—Zolotov was able to replace him with his man Dmitriy Kochnev, Zolotov’s longtime deputy at the
Presidential Security Service who since last year has headed that service. Systemically, we see cadres from that service being
placed in important posts—General Kolpakov as head of the Presidential Affairs Administration, General Mironov is now head of
the MVD’s economic crimes unit (Makarkin sees Dyumin moving from deputy defense minister to Tula governor as something of
a demotion—so he is an “exception to the rule”).
There is a tendency to a changing of the generational guard in the higher echelons of vlast. In the early 2000s, when Putin became
president, he brought with him a team of people close to him, people he had worked with in the KGB or in St. Petersburg. For a
long time, Putin did not make any changes in his circle—he is a man stable in his sympathies as well as his antipathies. If there was
a change, then it was a lateral move, or accompanied by some form of compensation. But somewhere down the line, Putin began
to doubt the effectiveness of these people—Yakunin’s departure from Russian Railways was an indicator. And Putin saw that a
resignation in his close circle was not a catastrophe. The system continued to function normally. So we got a domino effect—
Viktor Ivanov lost his FSKN post, Gryzlov his seat as a permanent Security Council member. Now it’s Murov’s turn.
Comment: On Yakunin, I wondered whether his departure—he subsequently warned others they were not safe—had
something to do with a) the crisis, and the ineffectiveness of people who kept coming back again and again asking for
more money, more subsidies. Putin was disturbed by the crisis—and the sense that he was not being repaid with the
degree of steadfastness and loyalty he might have expected and b) Putin’s own view of himself as a man of destiny,
one that was evident, I think, before the Ukraine crisis, a sense that he was a man apart, with a special mission. That
would tend to make it easier to part with friends he might see as presenting roadblocks to fulfilling his destiny. In a
low trust environment like that in Russia, such moves might cause rumblings among those in his circle who expect a
premium from being “close to the body”—as well as drawing the circle of those most trusted even closer. Like
Zolotov.
Makarkin doesn’t like the “clan” description of groups within vlast—he says that vlast is more atomized, with
Russian politics comprised of a few dozen major players and their “clienteles” who form “situational alliances” with
one another, and clash as well, with the president presiding over the system’s arbitration—which sounds pretty much
like my “vertical axis” of the “clan” system (the “just business” axis), so I think he’s making a distinction without a
difference. On the “horizontal axis” are one’s closest friends and relatives, the people one counts on in a pinch—I
think we have an idea of who some of those people are in Putin’s circle—Zolotov, Raldugin, the Rotenbergs, and the
Kovalchuks being examples.
Makarkin is saying that the cadre reserves Putin is drawing on are not so much from the broader FSO as from its
Presidential Security Service branch.
From the 31 May notes:
[More from Agentura.ru’s Andrey Soldatov: http://www.svoboda.mobi/a/27761289.html
Comment: Soldatov reminds us that when we say there is an “FSB vs. FSO” battle, it’s important to remember that were not necessarily talking
about a full-scale clash of institutions, but, rather, a battle of clans within those organizations. As noted above, FSO people have been moving into
other institutions like the MVD, but they may not have or develop any institutional loyalty to a new organization—it’s more likely they will work
for the interests of their “clan,” the focal point of which may be somewhere outside their formal organization. I use the shorthand “FSB vs.
FSO” and generally think of the Investigative Committee (SK) as being the FSB’s ally against Chayka and the MVD, for instance, but, again,
these institutions are actually hives of clans, and the informal arrangements are stronger than the institutional ones. So that’s an important
point that we should not lose sight of. Zolotov, for instance, was in the MVD, commanding the Internal Troops, but by all accounts kept his ties to
his old FSO comrades and was closer to Kadyrov than to Kolokoltsev, who saw Zolotov as a threat to his position.
Soldatov also says that Putin is using the FSO as a “cadres reserve”—Putin has lost his old contacts with the St. Petersburg FSB from which he
drew cadres in the past. In the 90’s, heads of special services were often people who had created those post-Soviet organizations and had more
reason to count on the loyalty of their cadres—today, Bastrykin is the only power structure chief leading an organization that he has headed from
its inception…Putin could be more sure of the special services when he was drawing on people from St. Petersburg—today he is not so sure of
their loyalty and the main problem has been who would he use for replacements in those organizations. Putin has leaned on the FSO for cadres,
something Soldatov calls a “desperate step.” Why? Because Putin can trust only those people right there with him, his security detail, something
reminiscent of what happens in small dictatorships, but can’t work in a huge country like Russia. It’s a complex problem—Putin is surrounded by
people who are siloviky and those people are always in a defensive stance, always “answering for threats”—they live in a world of threats. That
suggests Putin and his circle have few strategic plans, there are only tactical decisions (Comment: A point supported by Belkovskiy—and made in
these notes many times)… ]
More on Kochnev…
Kochnev’s wife, Marina Medvedeva, is a manager at Sibur, Russia’s largest petrochemical company, and is doing quite well for
herself: http://www.rbc.ru/politics/01/06/2016/574bf6229a7947712fb6fc6d Neither Medvedeva nor the FSO Press Service
would answer RBC’s questions, but an FSB source backs up the story, which had appeared in Fontanka on 26 May…She’s a
lawyer specializing in the international oil business. She previously worked at TNK and TNK/BP. She’s worked at Sibur since
2008 and owns real estate and two houses in Moscow Oblast. Among spouses of siloviky, Medvedeva is surpassed in income
only by the wife of the MVD’s Aleksandr Savenkov…Since 4 April of this year, Medvedeva has also been the general director of
Olefininvest, which owns 73% of Sibur. Olefininvest is controlled by structures belonging to Leonid Mikhelson, founder of
Novatek. Among Sibur’s co-owners are Gennadiy Timchenko and reported Putin son-on-law Kirill Shamalov.

Sobesednik (1 June, article by Oleg Roldugin; the article is not at the site, but identified as a Sobesednik piece at this site:
http://www.oilru.com/news/517883 ; The article is reproduced here as well: http://rosinvest.com/novosti/1263600 ) notes that
Murov departed from his post the day after Sobesednik published a piece on his wife owning a mansion in an exclusive part of
Moscow Oblast (http://sobesednik.ru/rassledovanie/20160526-pered-uvolneniem-glava-fso-murov-zavladel-nedvizhimostyu-na
). He didn’t put that residence in a property declaration and then had the property signed over to his son…On Kochnev—his
daughter Yulia (by his first wife, Tatyana Kochneva) works for a bank (SMP Bank) controlled by the Rotenberg brothers, Arkadiy
and Boris…Kochnev’s current wife (though Sobesednik has not been able to definitely establish whether she is actually his wife;
she has a child of her own), Marina Medvedeva, heads Olefininvest—Sibur shares held in Cyprus were transferred to that
company as a consequence of “de-offshorization.” Timchenko and Shamalov are said to be among the prominent business figures
behind Olefinivest…Two years ago, Medvedeva won the “Director of the Year” award and in 2004 was awarded a US State
Department grant to go to the US on a job training program…
Comment: The Sobesednik piece claims that Kochnev at one time worked at the MVD, which is not in his official bio.
See the 27 May notes.
Here’s another Sobesednik piece saying that Yulia Kochneva works at the Rotenbergs’ bank:
http://sobesednik.ru/rassledovanie/20160602-doch-novogo-glavy-fso-ushla-k-rotenbergam?utm=important
We get this picture of mother and daughter as well:
Moscow Deputy Mayor Liksutov and the Magnitskiy affair
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/moscow-deputy-mayor-allegedly-linked-to-magnitsky-case/571184.html
German newspaper Süddeutschen Zeitung has linked Moscow's deputy Mayor Maxim Liksutov to the Magnitsky case in an ongoing
investigation, the Meduza news website reported Wednesday.
The joint investigation by Süddeutschen Zeitung and Swiss company Sonntagszeitung is looking into leaked information from the so-
called Panama papers. The scandal has revealed the offshore holdings of more than a hundred of politicians and officials around the
world.
Company Zibar Management transferred more than $336,000 to the account of Estonian firm Transgroup Invest in 2012, Süddeutschen
Zeitung reported. A 50 percent share of Transgroup Invest belonged to Liksutov at the time.
Zibar Management was claimed to be one of the entities involved in the 5.4 billion ruble ($81 million) theft from the Russian government
budget by head of Hermitage Capital William Browder.
The crime was investigated by a Moscow lawyer Sergei Magnitsky, who worked for Hermitage Capital Management. Magnitsky died in a
Russian jail in 2009 after being unable to access medical treatment, claim human rights activists and Magnitsky's lawyers.
The incident resulted in the U.S. introducing the Magnitsky Act, which bans certain Russians involved in human rights violations from
entering the U.S. The list currently includes 39 individuals, RIA Novosti reported.
Liksutov did not reply to the request for comment from the newspaper.
Milov on privatizing Rosneft (The Chinese may be the only option…)
http://echo.msk.ru/blog/milov/1775482-echo/
The state wants to sell a 19.5% stake—that leaves the state 50%+1 share—right now, 69.5% belongs to Rosneftegaz, with
Rosimushchestvo holding one share. But is this a real privatization we are talking about? Not really. The government wants to get
some money for a stake that will leave the state in control of Rosneft. BP owns a similar stake in Rosneft (19.75%) and has two
directors on the company’s board, but has no influence on decision making or representatives in the company’s executive bodies.
In Russian corporate culture, the rule is if you hold a controlling stake, then you are the company’s owner—very seldom do
minority shareholders have any influence over a company’s management. It was Browder’s efforts to press for minority
shareholder influence at Gazprom that got him into trouble. And how did that turn out for him? Those who aspire to the 19.5%
stake in Rosneft know very well about that. So selling that stake will not change anything in Rosneft’s management…
Vlast has a problem with Rosneft—Western investors do not want to invest billions in Rosneft because of sanctions and other
problems Rosneft has (more on that below). The Chinese might buy the stake, but they have made it clear that if so, they will have
influence in the company’s management.
So the state wants money to help close some budget holes, but a few hundred billion rubles won’t save the situation and systemic
problems require more drastic measures—shrinking the state’s share of the economy, de-monopolizing the economy, easing
tensions with the outside world. Privatization in the oil sector is necessary as well—but to get there, you’d have to divide Rosneft
into several companies and privatize them. Today, Rosneft extracts more than 35% of Russia’s oil. So selling a piece of a state
controlled company while maintaining state management doesn’t do anything for changing the economy structurally. Selling to the
Chinese would mean selling one state stake to another state-held company—China’s CNPC. What Russia needs is a competitive
situation among privately held companies, so it would make sense to ban selling stakes to other (foreign) state-held companies.
Rosneft has some problems—non-transparent management, a recent spate of cadre shakeups (See the 27 May notes), falling
production levels, and debt—true, the debt burden is not what it was, but that was dealt with by receiving a record level advance
from the Chinese for future oil deliveries (around $35 billion), meaning that Rosneft must deliver oil for free to China for some
time. The money from the advance has already been spent on the debt accumulated for Rosneft’s purchase of TNK/BP and
Sechin’s other escapades. Debts remain, and falling extraction at oil fields that are being used up will require a lot of investment to
keep production levels up and there’s no money for it. Combine that with low oil prices and Rosneft has some major issues to deal
with.
All things considered, selling the 19.5% stake in Rosneft to the Chinese in exchange for guarantees of access to management is the
only available option. If the Russians manage to sell the Chinese the idea of billions in exchange for just a couple of seats on the
board, then that would be a success for Putin. But the Chinese are tough and effective negotiators.
Russia’s “pivot” to China
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/why-russias-pivot-to-china-was-all-talk-and-little-action/571193.html
Chinese officials have visited Russia, the Russian government has announced plans to increase trade volume with China by $200 billion
in the next few years and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has expressed interest in increasing its stake in Russian
oil giant Rosneft.
So, is Russia pivoting to China or not? This question took on ideological importance when, early in the Ukrainian crisis, the Kremlin
stepped up its propaganda, touting China as an alternative to Moscow's partnership with Europe.
Even the most critical take on Russian-Chinese relations must acknowledge that the relative share of Russia's trade with China has
tripled since the start of the 21st century, and has increased significantly even in absolute terms. China is Russia's largest trading
partner after the European Union. Russia has launched major oil and gas projects with China and already competes with Saudi Arabia
as one of Beijing's leading oil suppliers.
At the same time, hopes that Russian-Chinese relations would gain new momentum have not panned out. Russian propaganda's
insistence that Moscow was pivoting to Asia only resulted in disappointment when no breakthroughs actually occurred. (The gas
contract that Moscow signed with Beijing in 2014 was the result of many years of effort and can hardly be considered a result of that
pivot.)
In fact, Russia's negotiations with China on major economic projects continue just as slowly and with just as much exhausting
and nerve-racking maneuvering as ever. Under such circumstances, any such project requires at least five to seven years of preparation
before it moves into the implementation phase.
This approach is justified to some degree. Major state-owned Chinese companies such as CNPC are essentially a direct extension
of the Chinese state bureaucracy. Any future disagreements will very likely shift to the political level, as happened in 2011 when
Transneft and Rosneft clashed with CNPC over tariffs for pumping oil through the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean pipeline.
In other words, any purely economic dispute over, say, the terms in a contract can become extremely serious and have an impact
on national security. That is why Russian leaders in the post-Soviet period have always advocated an extremely cautious, skeptical
approach when closing major deals with China in strategically important areas. That approach began to change slowly only a few years
prior to the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis.
Russia had a good opportunity to change that cautious approach to an open door policy in the second half of 2014, when the country's
economic prospects looked dismal due to falling oil prices and Western sanctions. It was a time of near panic.
Back then, Moscow was ready to agree to just about anything. Frightened leaders were even prepared to take drastic measures
to attract Chinese investment and lending. They were poised to make irreversible decisions that would have, at the least, given China
a strong presence in Russia, and at most, allowed it to dominate the Russian fuel and energy sector for decades.
But the Chinese were too slow to react. By mid-2015, the Russian authorities understood that no apocalypse was imminent. Russian
government economists now expect economic growth to resume in late 2016, early 2017. Skeptics, however, expect continued
stagnation or a sluggish recession, but even they do not predict a radical upheaval.
Thus, despite the fact that the Ukrainian crisis spurred closer bilateral relations with China, especially in industry, no real qualitative
changes have taken place.
President Vladimir Putin's visit to China in June will probably result in a raft of important intergovernmental agreements to, for example,
create wide-body aircraft, construct a high-speed railway between Moscow and Kazan and further develop cooperation on oil and gas.
However, no serious changes in Russian-Chinese relations are likely — at least not this year.
There are several reasons for this. First, both the Russian and Chinese ruling elite are split over fundamental issues. The Russian elite
have yet to reach a consensus on economic and foreign policy. The Chinese elite are locked in an ongoing debate over future relations
with the United States and the possibility of adopting a more assertive foreign policy befitting a superpower.
Second, and more importantly, they both are in a state of uncertainty concerning the outcome of the next U.S. presidential election.
Regardless of the outcome, it will lead to major changes in U.S. foreign policy. Those changes might influence the U.S. approach to the
Trans-Pacific Partnership, relations with Russia and alliances with countries in the Asia-Pacific region.
Therefore, Russian-Chinese relations might stand on the verge of major changes, but they are unlikely to occur earlier than next year.
Vladivostok mayor detained (Charged with channeling budget funds to firms owned by his relatives)
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russias-vladivostok-mayor-charged-with-misusing-more-than-23m-in-
funds/571136.html
The mayor of Russia's far eastern city of Vladivostok is to face charges of misusing public funds to the sum of more than 160 million
rubles ($2.3 million), the Interfax news agency reported Wednesday.
Igor Pushkaryov is accused of abusing his authority to mastermind a large-scale trade deal between the local government and building
supply company Vostokcement, headed by his close relatives.
The overpriced building materials bought from Vostokcement with government money gave Pushkaryov 45 million rubles ($670,000) of
pure profit, said Russian Investigative Committee representative Vladimir Markin.
Pushkaryov was detained on Wednesday and charged with abuse of power and bribery, RIA Novosti reported, citing an unidentified
source within the Russian Investigative Committee.
The mayor's press-service denied media reports of Pushkaryov's detention, maintaining that the mayor was still at work, the Interfax
news agency reported earlier on Wednesday.
Oleg Navalniy petitions for parole
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/brother-of-russian-oppositioner-navalny-files-petition-for-parole/571239.html
Oleg Navalny — the brother of opposition leader Alexei Navalny — has filed a petition for parole, the Interfax news agency reported
Thursday. He is currently serving a 3 ½ year prison sentence.
The petition will be considered on June 27, Navalny's lawyer Kirill Polozov said. However, Polozov said that he thinks it is unlikely that
parole will be granted.
Navalny has unpaid penalties and the administration of the prison colony has given him an unfavorable report.
On Dec. 30, 2014 Oleg Navalny and his brother were found guilty of fraud and laundering funds of the French cosmetics firm Yves
Rocher. Alexei Navalny a received three-year suspended sentence.
Navalny filed a complaint with the European Court of Human Rights, but no decision has been taken by the court yet, the Meduza news
website reported.

Sent time: 06/01/2016 10:33:05 PM
BCc: OttoRC@state.gov
Subject: More on Navalnyy Troubles over Karpov (magnitskiy)

http://www.newsru.com/russia/01jun2016/navalny.html
Алексея Навального допросили, досмотрели и
обыскали по делу о клевете на полицейского
Основателя Фонда борьбы с коррупцией (ФБК) оппозиционера Алексея Навального в среду, 1 июня, допросили в
Следственном комитете по уголовному делу о клевете на бывшего следователя МВД Павла Карпова, включенного
Европарламентом в санкционный "список Магнитского". После допроса и личного досмотра оперуполномоченные
центра "Э" (по противодействию экстремизму) провели обыск дома у оппозиционера. Об этом сообщается в Twitter
его адвоката Вадима Кобзева.
"Пришел на допрос по делу о клевете на полностью неуиноуного полицейского Карпова. Уже больше года на
допросах не был. Прям ностальгия", - написал в Twitter Алексей Навальный. ("Неуиноуный" - это аллюзия на
интернет-мем, восходящий к миниатюре Comedy Club о "начальнике милиции всего Прикавказья и всего Махачкалы",
который отпустил на свободу преступника Рафика и доказывал в программе "Криминальная Россия", что он "ни у чем
не виноват".)
Его адвокат добавил, что "после допроса Навального решили провести его личный обыск". Сотрудники
правоохранительных органов, по их словам, искали "оборудование, предметы, документы и иные средства
совершения преступления".
"Попросили задрать штанины и снять обувь, в карманах и ботинках ничего не нашли. В результате личного обыска
Навального у него обнаружили только паспорт на имя Навального", - рассказал защитник в своем Twitter.
Навальный на своем сайте описал досмотр так: "Адвоката (Ольгу) Михайлову из кабинета прогнали - на личном
обыске могут быть только лица одного пола - вывернули карманы, похлопали по спине, заставили снять ботинки и
постучать ими об пол". Также оппозиционер отметил в своем Twitter, что при обыске из квартиры забрали все
компьютеры, телефоны, флэшки и Wi-Fi роутер.
Пресс-секретарь Навального Кира Ярмыш сообщила "Эху Москвы", что личным досмотром правоохранители не
ограничились и обыскали дом оппозиционера. Вадим Кобзев выложил в Twitter фотографии обыска, который
проводят оперуполномоченные центра по борьбе с экстремизмом.
У @navalny начинается обыск
— Вадим Кобзев (@advokatkobzev) 7:26 AM - 1 Jun 2016
Оперуполномоченные Центра по борьбе с экстремизмом роятся в прихожей
— Вадим Кобзев (@advokatkobzev) 7:30 AM - 1 Jun 2016
Адвокат Вадим Кобзев в Twitter описывал обыск в режиме реального времени: "Роются в прихожей", "обыскивают
детскую", "обнаружен телефон в чехле в виде ежика. Что делать? - Изымаем".
Алексей Навальный пытается шутить с оперуполномоченными. "На кухне Навальных обнаружен тульский пряник
большого размера. Алексей добровольно сообщает, что внутри могут быть спрятаны рация и акваланг", - написал
защитник.
Около 17:00 часов пресс-секретарь Навального Кира Ярмыш сообщила "Интерфаксу", что обыск завершился. По ее
словам, были изъяты "все найденные в квартире компьютеры, телефоны, флешки и жесткие диски". Кроме того,
Ярмыш подтвердила, что полицейские забрали телефон, принадлежащий дочери Навального.
"Для чего нужен обыск по делу о клевете - даже не представляю, ведь дело возбуждено "из-за записей в блоге
Навального". Наверное, его и ищут - блог Навального. Сомнений у меня никаких нет - это все приветы ФБК и лично
мне от Юрия Яковлевича Чайки. Ну, значит, все правильно делаем", - прокомментировал действия оперативников сам
Алексей Навальный.
Он отметил, что это третий обыск у него на квартире: "Все они были в июне. Это, наверное, традиция такая -
поздравляют с днем рождения, а в этот раз даже с юбилеем". 4 июня 2016 года Навальному исполнится 40 лет.
Во вторник, 31 мая, главный редактор радиостанции "Эхо Москвы" Алексей Венедиктов сообщил, что на "Эхо"
пришли полицейские, чтобы допросить главного редактора сайта Виталия Рувинского о размещении на сайте блога
Навального в связи с тем же уголовным делом.
После допроса стало известно, что следователей интересовало, мог ли Навальный размещать в блоге материалы без
ведома редакции. "Боюсь, что Навального подозревают, что он сам разместил блоги на "Эхе", видимо, взломав
сервер", - добавил Венедиктов в своем Twitter сегодня.
По мнению Виталия Рувинского, правоохранители могли интересоваться публикациями с сайта "Эха", где упоминался
Павел Карпов, в частности записью от 19 мая, где Навальный со ссылкой на выписки из реестров рассказал о том,
каким имуществом могли владеть Карпов и его супруга.
31 мая в прямом эфире телеканала "Дождь" Навальный, уже получивший вызов на допрос, дал следующий прогноз
исхода этого дела: "Меня осудят по этому делу, я получу еще одно уголовное наказание, в этом нет сомнений.
Прогноз у меня точно такой же, как по остальным моим уголовным делам. Их возбуждают не для того, чтобы меня
могли оправдать, а для того, чтобы еще раз осудить и препятствовать моей деятельности, в том числе участию в
выборах".
Дело по частям 2 и 5 статьи 128.1 УК РФ ("Клевета") против Алексея Навального было возбуждено по заявлению
Павла Карпова отделом МВД по району Марьино. Поводом стали пять упоминаний Карпова в видеороликах под
названием Russian untouchables ("Неприкасаемые россияне"), в которых говорится о причастности Карпова к гибели
сотрудника фонда Hermitage Capital Сергея Магнитского в 2009 году.
Сергей Магнитский, арестованный по обвинению в уклонении от уплаты налогов, умер в московском СИЗО 16
ноября 2009 года. Его коллеги Уильям Браудер и глава Firestone Джемисон Файерстоун заявили, что Магнитского
арестовали после того, как тот вскрыл коррупционные схемы, к которым оказались причастны некоторые чиновники
и сотрудники МВД, в том числе Павел Карпов.
Карпов заявляет, что доказал свою непричастность к смерти Сергея Магнитского, в частности, 4 июня 2015 года
Мосгорсуд постановил взыскать с фонда Hermitage Capital, Браудера и Файерстоуна восемь миллионов рублей в
пользу Карпова по его иску о защите чести и достоинства. Ранее он подал иск о защите чести и достоинства в
Мещанский суд Москвы, и тот присудил ему 100 тысяч рублей. Ранее аналогичный иск бывшего следователя был
отклонен в Лондоне.
Ссылки по теме:
Фигурант "списка Магнитского" сообщил о возбуждении уголовного дела против Навального
// NEWSru.com // В России // 19 мая 2016 г.
Венедиктов сообщил о визите полицейских в редакцию "Эхо Москвы"
Следователь по делу Магнитского из "касты неприкасаемых" отсудил 8 миллионов у Hermitage Capital
// NEWSru.com // В России // 4 июня 2015 г.
Каталог NEWSru.com:
Информационные интернет-ресурсы
Досье NEWSru.com:
Партии и политики // Общество // Навальный, Алексей
Sent time: 05/19/2016 12:43:52 PM
Subject: GP Wants US Aid in Probe of Browder's Gazprom Shares (magnitskiy)

http://www.newsru.com/russia/19may2016/browder.html
Генпрокуратура РФ попросит США проверить
сделки компаний, в которых фигурирует
Браудер
Генеральная прокуратура РФ направит запрос в США с просьбой проверить сделки с участием международной
группы, в которую входил основатель фонда Hermitage Capital Уильям Браудер. По версии следствия, в период с 1997
по 2005 год компания незаконно приобрела не менее 200 миллионов акций "Газпрома", уклонилась от уплаты налогов
и обанкротила ряд компаний. Ущерб оценили как минимум в 1 млрд рублей, говорится на сайте ведомства.
Как заявил представитель Генеральной прокуратуры РФ Александр Куренной, с 1997 по 2005 год инвестиционный
фонд Ziff Brothers Investments, являющийся налоговым резидентом США, через сеть более мелких офшорных
компаний переводил средства специально открытым российским компаниям, которые скупали акции "Газпрома" на
Санкт-Петербургской и Московской торговых площадках в нарушение указа президента РФ "О порядке обращения
акций РАО "Газпром".
Всего было куплено как минимум 200 млн акций Газпрома, которые в 2006 году перевели кипрской Giggs enterprises
limited. Полученную прибыль вывели в другое юридическое лицо под видом дивидендов. Средства затем поступили
компаниям, управляемым фондом братьев Зифф. Российский бюджет при этом, как утверждается, недополучил 1
млрд рублей в качестве налогов.
По версии следствия, руководила всем этим международная группа, в которую входили братья Зифф, Уильям
Браудер, Джемисон Файерстоун и другие лица.
Теперь следователи готовят обращение в США с просьбой проверить указанные сделки на соответствие
американскому финансовому и налоговому законодательству, а также предоставить необходимые сведения о схеме
вывода российских активов для завершения расследования и передачи дела в суд, сообщил представитель
российской прокуратуры.
Отметим, что 11 июля 2013 года Тверской суд Москвы заочно приговорил Уильяма Браудера к девяти годам
заключения по делу о неуплате налогов на сумму более 522 млн рублей путем фальсификации налоговых деклараций
и незаконного использования льгот, предназначенных для инвалидов. Через две недели после этого Россия объявила
Браудера в международный розыск.
Бастрыкин поручил проверить информацию о причастности Уильяма Браудера к убийству Магнитского
// NEWSru.com // В России // 14 апреля 2016 г.
Мать Магнитского обвинила генпрокурора Чайку во лжи и укрывательстве преступников
// NEWSru.com // В России // 22 декабря 2015 г.
Экс-следователь МВД из "списка Магнитского" увеличил сумму иска к сотрудникам Hermitage Capital
// NEWSru.com // В России // 11 февраля 2015 г.
На волне "Виргиликс" бывший шеф Магнитского обвинил ФСБ в покровительстве офшорной коррупции
Мосгорсуд оставил в силе заочный приговор главе Hermitage Capital
// NEWSru.com // В России // 31 января 2014 г.
Прокуратура России // Обращение // США
Sent time: 05/17/2016 11:36:23 AM
Subject: Karpov vs Navalnyy (magnitskiy)

http://www.newsru.com/russia/17may2016/karpov.html
Против Навального завели уголовное дело по
заявлению бывшего следователя по делу
Магнитского
Бывший сотрудник полиции Павел Карпов, ранее включенный Европарламентом в санкционный "список
Магнитского", обратился в МВД с заявлением в отношении основателя Фонда борьбы с коррупцией Алексея
Навального. В итоге по сообщению Карпова в отношении оппозиционера возбудили уголовное дело о
распространении порочащей информации, передает РБК.
Официально о расследовании против Навального пока не сообщается. "Речь идет о четырех видеороликах Russian
untouchables ("Неприкасаемые россияне"), которые распространял Уильям Браудер в рамках своей кампании в
отношении меня", - пояснил журналистам Карпов.
Он напомнил, что в 2015 году Мещанский суд Москвы признал данную информацию несоответствующей
действительности. Несмотря на это, Навальный продолжил в конце 2015 года и в апреле того же года распространять
на своем сайте и на сайте "Эха Москвы" статьи со изображениями этих роликов и ссылками на них, подчеркнул
бывший следователь.
"Кроме того, в одной из статей он написал, что приложил много усилий для распространения этих роликов. Как
юрист он отдает отчет своим действиям", - добавил Карпов.
В разговоре с журналистами портала Life.ru Карпов признал, что пока не получил уведомления о возбуждении
уголовного дела. "Однако я могу сказать, что действительно подавал заявление. В четырех роликах, размещенных в
интернете, меня обвиняют в совершении тяжких и особо тяжких преступлений, в том числе и в убийстве Сергея
Магнитского. Решением суда было установлено, что эта информация недействительна", - прокомментировал Карпов.
Напомним, 14 апреля глава Следственного комитета Александр Бастрыкин, получив обращение Павла Карпова,
поручил проверить информацию о возможной причастности основателя фонда Hermitage Capital Уильяма Браудера и
неустановленного сотрудника секретной разведывательной службы Великобритании МИ-6 к убийству юриста
Hermitage Capital Сергея Магнитского в 2009 году.
Павел Карпов, который был включен Европарламентом в санкционный "список Магнитского", тогда отметил, что в
фильме политического обозревателя ВГТРК Евгения Попова "Эффект Браудера", показанном 13 апреля на телеканале
"Россия-1", содержалась "информация о состоявшемся в сентябре 2009 года разговоре между сотрудником МИ-6 и
Уильямом Браудером о проведении антироссийской информационной кампании и плане убийства Сергея
Магнитского, завуалированного под неоказание медицинской помощи и врачебную ошибку".
Отправив обращение Бастрыкину, Карпов заявил: "Я доказал в судах Великобритании и России свою непричастность
к смерти Сергея Магнитского. Теперь очередь за Браудером, которому я рекомендую найти хороших адвокатов, так
как его ожидают большие проблемы на территории России и за ее пределами".
"У меня есть все основания полагать, что сценарий убийства Сергея Магнитского, предложенный Уильяму Браудеру
неустановленным сотрудником секретной службы МИ-6, к моему большому сожалению, был успешно реализован", -
отметил Карпов.
Напомним, сотрудник фонда Hermitage Capital, партнер британской юридической фирмы Firestone Duncan Ltd. Сергей
Магнитский умер в московском СИЗО 16 ноября 2009 года. Он был арестован по обвинению в уклонении от уплаты
налогов. Коллеги Магнитского Браудер и глава Firestone Джемисон Файерстоун заявили, что Магнитского арестовали
после того, как тот вскрыл коррупционные схемы, к которым оказались причастны некоторые чиновники и
сотрудники МВД, в том числе Павел Карпов.
Принимавший участие в расследовании одного из уголовных дел, связанных с Hermitage Capital, Карпов добивался
через суд в России и Великобритании прекращения распространения недостоверной информации. Он требовал
взыскать с Браудера, Файерстоуна и компании Hermitage Capital компенсацию за клевету.
4 июня 2015 года Мосгорсуд постановил взыскать с фонда Hermitage Capital, Браудера и Файерстоуна восемь
миллионов рублей в пользу Карпова по его иску о защите чести и достоинства.
11 июля 2013 года Тверской суд Москвы заочно приговорил Уильяма Браудера к девяти годам заключения по делу о
неуплате налогов на сумму более 522 млн рублей путем фальсификации налоговых деклараций и незаконного
использования льгот, предназначенных для инвалидов. В этом же преступлении суд признал виновным и покойного
Магнитского. Через две недели после этого Россия объявила Браудера в международный розыск.
Браудер рассказал об отмытых в Великобритании 30 млн долларов из "дела Магнитского"
// NEWSru.com // В мире // 4 мая 2016 г.
Следователь из "списка Магнитского" потребовал завести дело на Браудера после сюжета ВГТРК о
Навальном
Sent time: 05/19/2016 12:29:10 PM
Subject: More Karpov vs Navalnyy (magnitskiy)

http://www.newsru.com/russia/19may2016/karpov.html
Фигурант "списка Магнитского" сообщил о
возбуждении уголовного дела против
Навального
Бывший сотрудник полиции Павел Карпов, ранее включенный Европарламентом в санкционный "список
Магнитского", подавший на этой неделе заявление в отношении основателя Фонда борьбы с коррупцией Алексея
Навального, сообщил о возбуждении уголовного дела против оппозиционера по статье "Клевета", передает агентство
"Интерфакс".
"По ранее поданному мной заявлению отдел МВД по району Марьино возбудил в отношении Навального уголовное
дело по частям 2 и 5 статьи 128.1 УК РФ ("Клевета"). Теперь у Алексея Анатольевича будет прекрасная возможность
предоставить все имеющиеся, как он утверждает, доказательства моей причастности к совершению преступлений.
Уильяму Браудеру это доказать не удалось", - заявил Карпов.
Журналисты напоминают, что статья 128.1 УК РФ предусматривает наказание в виде штрафа в размере до 5 млн
рублей либо обязательных работ на срок до 480 часов. В настоящий момент официального подтверждения о
возбуждении уголовного дела против Навального не поступало.
Тем временем на появившуюся информацию отреагировал сам оппозиционер, опубликовал в своем блоге запись под
названием "Мой социальный лифт: скоро стану уже четырежды судимым рецидивистом". "Сам я, об уголовном деле,
проверке и вообще всем узнаю только из СМИ. Меня никто никуда не вызывал, не уведомлял, не опрашивал. Как
обычно впрочем", - объяснил Навальный.
В своем блоге он также разместил один из роликов, ставших причиной подачи заявления Карповым. "Действительно.
Это должно быть довольно неприятно, когда тебе напоминают, что ты майор милиции с зарплатой (на момент службы)
в 533 доллара США, но согласно данным из реестров: у тебя в семье появляется квартира в элитном жилом
комплексе; появляются такие "характерные" для семей полицейских машины как Мерседесы и Порши; еще земельные
участки и еще машины", - пишет Навальный, указывая на собственность Карпова.
"Как объяснить происхождение этих средств? Не получается. А раз поймали, но объяснить не получается, то надо
бегать и требовать возбуждения уголовных дел против тех, кто не боится распространять правду. Ну ничего, в стране
где за правду сажают и список судимостей может быть хорошим перечнем заслуг", - добавляет оппозиционер.
В минувший вторник, 17 мая, в разговоре с журналистами Карпов пояснил, что поводом для подачи заявления, в
частности, стали четыре видеоролика под названием Russian untouchables ("Неприкасаемые россияне"). Эти
материалы, по его словам, "распространял Уильям Браудер в рамках своей кампании" в отношении него.
Тогда Карпов напомнил, что в 2015 году Мещанский суд Москвы признал данную информацию несоответствующей
действительности. Несмотря на это, Навальный продолжил в конце 2015 года и в апреле того же года распространять
на своем сайте и на сайте "Эха Москвы" статьи с изображениями этих роликов и ссылками на них, подчеркнул
бывший следователь.
14 апреля глава Следственного комитета Александр Бастрыкин, получив обращение Павла Карпова, поручил
проверить информацию о возможной причастности основателя фонда Hermitage Capital Уильяма Браудера и
неустановленного сотрудника секретной разведывательной службы Великобритании МИ-6 к убийству юриста
Hermitage Capital Сергея Магнитского в 2009 году.
Павел Карпов, который был включен Европарламентом в санкционный "список Магнитского", тогда отметил, что в
фильме политического обозревателя ВГТРК Евгения Попова "Эффект Браудера", показанном 13 апреля на телеканале
"Россия-1", содержалась "информация о состоявшемся в сентябре 2009 года разговоре между сотрудником МИ-6 и
Уильямом Браудером о проведении антироссийской информационной кампании и плане убийства Сергея
Магнитского, завуалированного под неоказание медицинской помощи и врачебную ошибку".
Отправив обращение Бастрыкину, Карпов заявил: "Я доказал в судах Великобритании и России свою непричастность
к смерти Сергея Магнитского. Теперь очередь за Браудером, которому я рекомендую найти хороших адвокатов, так
как его ожидают большие проблемы на территории России и за ее пределами".
"У меня есть все основания полагать, что сценарий убийства Сергея Магнитского, предложенный Уильяму Браудеру
неустановленным сотрудником секретной службы МИ-6, к моему большому сожалению, был успешно реализован", -
отметил Карпов.
Напомним, сотрудник фонда Hermitage Capital, партнер британской юридической фирмы Firestone Duncan Ltd. Сергей
Магнитский умер в московском СИЗО 16 ноября 2009 года. Он был арестован по обвинению в уклонении от уплаты
налогов. Коллеги Магнитского Браудер и глава Firestone Джемисон Файерстоун заявили, что Магнитского арестовали
после того, как тот вскрыл коррупционные схемы, к которым оказались причастны некоторые чиновники и
сотрудники МВД, в том числе Павел Карпов.
использования льгот, предназначенных для инвалидов. В этом же преступлении суд признал виновным и покойного
Магнитского. Через две недели после этого Россия объявила Браудера в международный розыск.
Против Навального завели уголовное дело по заявлению бывшего следователя по делу Магнитского
Браудер рассказал об отмытых в Великобритании 30 млн долларов из "дела Магнитского"
// NEWSru.com // В мире // 4 мая 2016 г.
Навальном
Sent time: 05/02/2016 12:14:32 AM
Subject: TsPK: May 9 prep, Vostochnyy/Rogozin, Magnitskiy/Roldugin, Navalnyy's maneuvers

http://cpkr.ru/ru/analytics/25-aprelya-1-maya-navalnyy-vyhodit-iz-igry
25 апреля – 1 мая: Навальный выходит из игры
Развал Демократической коалиции, начало неформального конкурса на пост Генерального прокурора РФ,
ответ внутриполитического блока Кремля на критику праймериз, эскалация негативной информационной
кампании против КПРФ стали главными событиями недели во внутренней политике.
Неделя завершилась празднованием 1 Мая, в ходе которого политические партии смогли протестировать готовность и
потенциал своего актива в преддверии парламентских выборов. Кульминацией майских праздников станет
патриотическая мобилизации власти в День Победы, которая, как предполагается, должна превысить масштаб
прошлогодних мероприятий. Так, в 2015 году в акции «Бессмертный полк» в Москве приняло участие более
полумиллиона человек, включая президента России Владимира Путина. В этом году 9 Мая находится в списке
основных приоритетов для Кремля. На фоне укороченной предвыборной кампании праздник, по сути, является
последней календарной датой, когда власть имеет возможность не только подчеркнуть единство и энтузиазм нации, но
и наглядно продемонстрировать свое подавляющее доминирование в политическом поле и консолидацию граждан
вокруг своей повестки.
Большое внимание в конце недели привлекла ситуация вокруг космодрома «Восточный». После первого неудачного
пуска ракеты и выговора Дмитрию Рогозину со стороны президента Путина в лояльных СМИ началась кампания
против профильного вице-премьера. Однако в итоге Кремль не дал отмашку на развитие информационной атаки.
Участие главы государства в форуме Общероссийского народного фронта в Йошкар-Оле носило проходной характер
и не оказало значительного влияния на динамику информационной повестки. Путин вновь актуализировал тему
внешнего врага, предупредив о росте угрозы со стороны Запада по мере приближения к парламентским и
президентским выборам. Получила продолжение на неделе и кампания, направленная на разрушение репутации
российской власти. СМИ опубликовали очередную порцию «компромата», на этот раз связывающего Сергея
Ролдугина с делом Магнитского.
Опросы общественного мнения показывают, что власть недооценивает внимание к офшорному скандалу со стороны
населения. Согласно данным, представленным «Левада-Центром», в общей сложности 43% граждан слышали о
«панамском скандале», а 40% считают, что представленная информация бросает тень на президента Путина. 51%
опрошенных согласны с тем, что глава государства в той или иной степени несет ответственность за злоупотребление
властью в стране и за масштабы коррупции и финансовых злоупотреблений в высших эшелонах власти. Продолжает
показывать негативную динамику и рейтинг премьер-министра Дмитрия Медведева. На неделе рекордные за два года
32% респондентов заявили, что оценивают работу правительства плохо (данные ФОМ).
Центральным событием недели стало прекращение существования Демократической коалиции. После
провала попыток Навального и его сторонников пересмотреть условия формирования коалиции на базе ПАРНАС,
выход из союза с Касьяновым оставался единственным оптимальным решением для главы ФБК. Напротив,
сохранение Демократической коалиции любой ценой сулило неформальному лидеру оппозиции исключительно
политические проигрыши. Несмотря на то, что Навальный не имеет права баллотироваться в Думу, власть записала бы
провал ПАРНАС в сентябре на его счет. Лояльные СМИ постарались бы представить результат демократов как конец
политической карьеры Навального, который потерял поддержку даже среди либералов. В результате оппозиционер
рисковал растерять на думской кампании весь свой политический капитал и создать прочную ассоциацию себя с
Касьяновым и его уничтоженной репутацией.
Отказ Навального от формата коалиции расширяет для него и его союзников пространство выбора. Он может вернуть
себе выгодную позицию над кампанией, которая с высокой степенью вероятности закончится крахом для либералов, и
сосредоточить ресурсы на расследованиях в отношении правящей элиты, которые наносят серьезный урон репутации
российской власти. От развала коалиции больше всего выигрывает «Яблоко» и Григорий Явлинский, которое
становятся безальтернативным выбором для либералов в 2016 и в 2018 годах. Прекращение существования коалиции
может реанимировать переговоры о формировании единого списка либералов на базе «Яблока», но уже без
Касьянова и при условии признания всеми участниками соглашения президентских амбиций Явлинского. Даже если
такое соглашение не будет достигнуто, не исключено, что отдельные участники коалиции смогут договориться с
«Яблоком» напрямую. Однако следует учитывать, что Яблоко» рискует оказаться в центре масштабной негативной
кампании власти, которая нуждается в образе внутреннего врага. Это может отпугнуть от партии остатки
региональных элит, готовых к сотрудничеству с «лояльным» Кремлю Явлинским и обнулить ее шансы на получение
утешительных мандатов по мажоритарной системе.
Содержание
КОНФЛИКТЫ НЕДЕЛИ
Демократическая коалиция прекращает существование
КАМПАНИИ НЕДЕЛИ
Начало конкурса на пост Генпрокурора
Кремль защищает праймериз
Кремль против КПРФ
СОБЫТИЯ НЕДЕЛИ
ПОБЕДИТЕЛИ И ПРОИГРАВШИЕ НЕДЕЛИ
СОБЫТИЯ НАСТУПАЮЩЕЙ НЕДЕЛИ
Полная версия еженедельного мониторинга "Анализ политической повестки недели" доступна по подписке.
Фото: Артем Коротаев /ТАСС
__________
Читайте также:
18 – 24 апреля: Кремль уступает оппозиции
11 – 17 апреля: Праймериз не оправдывают ожиданий
4 – 10 апреля: Путин меняет баланс сил
Sent time: 05/01/2016 11:24:24 PM
Subject: magnitskiy
Attachments: magnitsky001.pdf

Sent time: 05/01/2016 09:44:48 AM
To: John Williams <willijp1@yahoo.com>
Subject: the fried document

It’s quite a frustrating read. No doubt these aren’t good guys (see the official bios on the WIRE site).
But the info below is ‘sketchy' to put it mildly (does your son use that term)? It all prompts more questions.
But also keep in mind they are buds with Toria. She explained it to me as “a Jewish thing” whatever that may mean.
What follows is keyed to the points in the document you sent
1) If he has documents, he should share them. The Novoselov role on the Putin case is in the public domain. Even appears in the Who Is
Mr Putin film, explaining the rationale for the barter deals (man has guts).
2) it uses Gunvor: okay so what? Gunvor is a legit trading operation - we’d need more (evidence it engaged in kickbacks, for example)
3) Check with Kelly. In light of the decline in oil prices the deal doesn’t look that good, but I don’t know whether that was really the case
at the time of the sale.
I remember Milov criticized it based on its increase of the state share in the oil industry, but I don’t recall his complaining about the price
per se. There was a concern about where the money would come from, but that’s different. We do have stuff that Putin in retrospect is
not happy about the deal.
As for Letter One avoiding sanctions etc. Pure nonsense. Neither guy is sanctioned. Putin wanted them to invest the profit from the sale
in Russia, but they’ve ignored him (Letter One is an example). They do invest in Ukraine too (a small gas company, but it’s not clear that
it’s in line with Gazprom’s desires)
4) The semi mythical Kroll document(s): Kroll’s role on the party money etc. has been greatly exaggerated….by Kroll. At one time, Anne
saw it and concluded it wasn’t much. If what’s alleged here is true, it’s probably from open sources. Even left the government post in
December 1992, btw.
5) The Volcker report was always a bit weird. I remember Voloshin’s name was in it. When Peter R asked me about it I said something
along the lines that, while corrupt, I doubted Voloshin was stupid. Ditto Alfa Echo - I don’t rule its participation out, but I’d want more.
It’s official US policy to support Bushehr.
6) See 3 above. It’s not clear that Aven/Fridman’s investments in Ukraine are in line with Kremlin policy. Alfa is a bank; banks issue loans.
So what’s the big deal with its loans to UVZ? It’s a loss making enterprise and Alfa has threatened bankruptcy proceedings over non-
payment. I fail t see how that’s at the Kremlin request.
7) I know nothing about Karimova’s ties to Alfa. She has them to Usmanov. And it’s Usmanov and Shvidler (Abramovich) who allegedly
bribed Shuvalov, not Alfa (#8).
8) A search in Integrum on “magnitskiy” and “al’fa” gets five hits. Not a one is about Alfa laundering Magnitskiy money, let alone a
central role. Why repeat something so easily checkable. Was it some sort of Alfa subsidiary? If so, name it. See above on Shuvalov -
some of the money may have went through Alfa, but that’s not what went public. (tidbit: one of the folks exposing Shuvalov is
Natalya Pelevin that same who shared Kasyanov’s bed and chatted about an anti-Navalnyy front)
9) this is the way the country works.
10) A very serious allegation that requires investigation. He should provide more i.e. what does shared premises mean? We have former
Alfa fellows working in the building.
11) Yes it does.
12) FSB sanctions? - before this Olesha guy, we probably should put Viktor Voronin on the sanctions list for his role IN the Magnitskiy
affair. That said, if he has documents, I’d be interested in seeing them.
Sent time: 05/02/2016 03:25:09 PM
Subject: Internet Notes 2 May 2016
Attachments: IN2May16.docx

Internet Notes 2 May 2016
Note on notes (Zolotov and the Security Council)
Latynina circles back to the Independent Oil Company, VTB, Sechin, Khudaiynatov (Another “violinist”?;
Shumkov/Lesin and “the pool”)
Solovey on the intended audience for the “information attacks”
Stanovaya on kompromat about Putin (Putin is more vulnerable than he seems…but Western mass media is not the threat;
Open Russia has more on Putin’s ties to organized crime; Spain puts Deputy FSKN Director Aulov on a wanted list)
Strelkov: No murder charges?
Land to be given away in the Far East

Note on notes (Zolotov and the Security Council)
First we read that with the creation of the National Guard, Zolotov was to be elevated to the status of permanent Security Council
member. Gryzlov was to be taken off the council. Then we read that Putin had issued an order reversing the earlier decision, with
Zolotov designated an ordinary SovBez member (See the 12 April notes). But he’s still listed as a permanent member:
http://www.kremlin.ru/structure/security-council/members
Latynina circles back to the Independent Oil Company, VTB, Sechin, Khudaiynatov (Another “violinist”?;
Shumkov/Lesin and “the pool”)
From the 22 February notes:
[On Sechin, Khudaiynatov, and a $4 billion credit, Latynina refers to a post by Maksim Blant: http://mblant.livejournal.com/669.html
Eduard Khudaiynatov was general director of Rosneft when Sechin was vice premier. Khudaiynatov was Sechin’s shadow. When Sechin came back
to Rosneft, Khudaiynatov created the Independent Oil and Gas Company (NNK) and NNK began to accumulate assets and licenses, many of them
rather small assets. The main asset acquisition was Musa Bazhayev’s Alliance group. The transaction was made in 2014, when Russia was already
under sanctions, and the assumed value of the deal was $4 billion. But where did Khudaiynatov, who had always been a hired manager, not a
business owner, get the money? And Sechin had been consolidating oil assets in Rosneft—then his own former right hand makes such an
acquisition.
Blant tells the story: Rosneft deposited $4 billion in VTB, while simultaneously NNK was given a $4 billion credit. Making a bank deposit that
instantly becomes a credit is a common money-laundering method in Russia. Where did Rosneft get the $4 billion? Latynina thinks it was sales to
China. Latynina also believes the sale price was jacked up—and part of the transaction was Khudaiynatov getting a kickback for making the deal
on Rosneft’s behalf. Comment: I’m not sure I follow all this—is the deposit to credit transaction illegal? How is it money laundering? Anyway,
Latynina says that with all Rosneft’s financial troubles, Sechin wanted VTB to give its money back and VTB is not playing along. I don’t
understand that bit of the story at all—hadn’t NNK acquired the company on Rosneft’s behalf? That’s what Latynina is claiming here. Blant
referred to protocols from a Rosneft board meeting showing that the transaction was at a loss for Rosneft (Comment: OK, so the price was too high
—to account for the kickback—Latynina also says that the terms of the deposit-to-loan deal were a loser for Rosneft. So when she said Rosneft
wanted its money back, maybe it wanted back the loss on the deposit-to-loan transaction). Latynina goes on to imply that she thinks Sechin has
been using NNK to go after oil assets for a while—like Bashneft. NNK made Sistema an offer, not Rosneft, on the asset. And Sistema’s
Yevtushenkov wound up under house arrest (See, for instance, the 30 October 2014 notes)…So, regarding the NNK purchase of Alliance group,
Rosneft was financing the purchase (at a loss) while demanding money from the National Welfare Fund…]
Comment: So it appeared that a Rosneft that was under sanctions was using NNK, not under sanctions, as a vehicle
for making acquisitions—but there was that money laundering part that I wondered about. In her program last week,
Latynina asked whether NNK was the equivalent of Roldugin’s offshore—another “violinist” being used to launder
money acquired by dubious means. The acquisition, claimed Latynina, whose terms were not good for Rosneft, was
really a put up deal designed to funnel and legalize shady money. The transaction fee—a kickback—was paid to
Khudaiynatov as part of the laundering deal:
http://echo.msk.ru/programs/code/1752700-echo/ Latynina says the deposit-to-credit transaction is a common cover for money
laundering…She adds that she thinks the approval for the deal (NNK purchasing Bazhayev’s Alliance group) went all the way up
to Putin—at the time, everyone figured oil prices would go up, but they didn’t…But there’s something else—there’s a connection
between the deal and the late Dmitriy Shumkov (See the notes from 8 and 10 December 2015 and 5 and 11 January). Latynina
says that’s why she came back to the story, though there was also Khudaiynatov’s purchase of a villa in Porotfino (for 25 Million
Euro) in 2015, after Putin told everybody not to buy any property abroad. The Roldugin offshore was shut down in 2014—after
Crimea. By 2012, it became clear that the Americans were taking a negative attitude to such offshores—so they were no longer
safe and Putin gave the order on no foreign property. But Khudaiynatov bought his villa in 2015.
She gets back to Shumkov—he was close to Bazhayev, and was a sometime business partner of his. He was making big
investments, was involved in big deals in Moscow when he reportedly committed suicide. Where did he get the money for those
deals? Latynina thinks he got the money from the “strange” NNK/Bazhayev deal. Later, he supposedly committed suicide—was
he desperate because he had been caught siphoning money off from the deal? Was he killed because he was stealing? (Comment:
She doesn’t tell us why she believes Shumkov stole money from the NNS/Bazhayev deal). Latynina says the Shumkov
story reminds her of Lesin—also found dead, but in Washington, a death she says was most likely an unfortunate incident related to
Lesin’s extravagant habits. But Lesin lost his post after a deal that was similar to the deal Khudaiynatov made. In the Lesin case,
there was Kovalchuk’s Gazprom Media. Prof Media was purchased for Gazprom Media at a price of $600 million. The word
was that the sale price was above market value. Lesin had been loudly bragging about that. And the “violinist” affair let us know
that 20% of Video International belonged to that violinist with a Stradivarius. So maybe the Lesin story wasn’t about the
Kovalchuks (Comment: One versiya explaining Lesin’s death was that he was killed partly because he owed Kovalchuk
money. One of the Panama Papers offshores was connected to Lesin).
Latynina again circles back to Shumkov—she goes on about “the pool” (“basseiyn”). The pool is a second, informal budget, a
personal part of the treasury. It existed semi-unofficially and they say that it provides the salaries for highly-placed officials. But it
was mainly for emergency expenditures, like Crimea. Latynina says she thinks that it became apparent that the pool did not have
has much money in it as was thought, and those that had their hands on the taps that fed the pool had their own streams. If the pool
was leaking like a sieve, well, that could lead to some interesting re-distributions of authority in the elite. We already have the well-
known story of Yakunin’s resignation, after it came to light that his son had acquired citizenship in the UK. There was the
interesting story of VEB’s bankruptcy—how much did VEB hand over for the purchase of Sibuglement in 2014? $1.8 billion?
Wasn’t that a lot for that company? Uralvagonzavod bought the Zarechniy mine, the Russian Coal Holding—together, that was 45
billion. Did that reflect their real value? Latynina ends by saying she thinks there will be more stories of the “leaky pool” and that
Shumkov will not be the only victim…
Comment: “The pool,” as Latynina casts this story, may also be something like an “obshak,” a mafia organization’s
slush fund. She’s implying here that both Lesin and Shumkov abused the pool and that others have as well, leading to
some shakeups and maybe some murders. She is also saying that the NNK transaction and some others were money
laundering operations held, apparently, on behalf of the pool and some who had access to it, such as Roldugin.
Let’s backup and see what dots we can connect…In the 8 December 2015 notes, we read that there was a kompromat
war underway and that Shumkov’s death might be associated with it. One of Shumkov’s patrons was an assistant of
Chayka’s, Aleksandr Zvyagintsev, who was dismissed following the scandal over kompromat on Chayka’s son (See
the 11 January notes). Recently, there have been numerous kompromat dumps on elites, a number of them involving
foreign property. In December, around the same time as the kompromat attacks on Chayka, there were stories in the
notes on Putin’s links to organized crime (See the 29 and 31 December 2015 notes). In November and December, we
saw stories on “Tikhonova” and her alleged husband, Shamalov (See, for instance, the 10 and 11 November 2015
notes and the notes from 21 December). There was an item in the 8 February notes linking Chayka’s son to
Shumkov.
Recall that Navalniy was behind a call for a check up on Yakunin and his operations at Russian Railways and that
Millennium Bank was linked to RR. RR and Artyom Chayka owned shares in the bank, which had its license revoked
(See the 8 February notes). Chayka claimed Browder and Navalniy were behind the dumps against him (See the 14
December 2015 notes; back in the 21 December 2015 notes, Yabloko’s Sergey Mitrokhin said that Navalniy’s attacks
on Chayka were “ordered”; This spring, Browder and Navalniy were attacked by Rossiya TV as foreign agents. See
the 11 April notes)—so we circled back to the Magnitskiy affair. Then Roldugin and the Panama Papers came along
(4 April)—and Roldugin’s offshore was subsequently tied to the Magnitskiy affair as a money laundering platform for
the cash stolen in that case (27 and 28 April). The Nekrasov film appeared to be another reply to the kompromat
dumps that related back to the Magnitskiy affair (27 April).
In the 4 April notes, I suggested that the attacks on Kasyanov were connected to the previous kompromat on Russian
elites, especially the Panama Papers. My comments:
[Looks like the Kremlin anticipated the media reaction to the Panama papers and sought to soften the impact by showing that the opposition was
dirty, too. And, as I wrote last week, I think Khodorkovskiy, some elites in Russia, and people associated with them are probably a major source—
or at least a major distributor—of dirt like the Baevskiy material we saw last week (See the 31 April and 1 March notes), so there’s a bit of
retaliation going on. The Kremlin is showing that it can play that game as well. I doubt the illicit liaison in the Kasyanov video will shock anybody,
nor will the corruption mentioned by Kasyanov, but that’s not the point.]
Baevskiy was an associate of the Rotenbergs who had handled apartment purchases for “Putin’s women,” including
Tikhonova and Kabayeva (See the notes from 31 March and 1 April).
Solovey commented on these “information attacks” on Russian vlast and their likely intended audience in the 1 April
notes:
[Solovey on the intended audience for the “information attacks”
http://vk.com/id244477574?w=wall244477574_16316%2Fall
…The talk about “information attacks” follows classic theory—“vaccinate” the public, that is, warn them that enemies intend slander. The
question is, just who is being vaccinated? The Russian public? They’ll brush off foreign exposés. They won’t surprise anyone, or open anyone’s
eyes, or, and this is the main thing, change anyone’s attitude to vlast. These exposés are aimed primarily at the Western elite. They are indifferent
to the warnings of Russian officials…
Comment: I think he’s right about the target audience for the kompromat dumps, which don’t really tell us anything new. I think Khodorkovskiy
and some Russian elites who would like it if there was not another Putin term are intending to help prevent any talk of lifting sanctions at this
time, hoping for increased pressure on Putin. Maybe some of the elite are willing to endure more pain now for the prospect of Putin’s leaving the
Kremlin in 2018. Belkovskiy, who I think has been working for Khodorkovskiy, has been seeming to (sometimes) say that an exit that would not
put him in danger is still possible for Putin. Pavlovskiy said that earlier this week (See the 30 March notes). Khodorkovskiy has been a little
different, saying that those not implicated in crimes have no reason to fear a change in regime. When kompromat wars are going on, though, it
can get a little blurry—maybe others might toss out some dirt on rivals, too. There may be more than one source for the material and more than
one motivation.]
But Stanovaya thought that the cumulative impact of the kompromat might be relevant in the long run—and could turn
Putin’s base against him. From the 31 March notes:
[Stanovaya on kompromat about Putin (Putin is more vulnerable than he seems…but Western mass media is not the threat; Open Russia has
more on Putin’s ties to organized crime; Spain puts Deputy FSKN Director Aulov on a wanted list)
Stanovaya wonders whether Putin should be worried about the “information attacks” Peskov has mentioned…Right now, all the criticisms aimed at
Putin are coming from channels that have an axe to grind—the non-systemic opposition and the West. But when the criticism comes from, say, the
protesting long-haul truckers, then that changes the picture quite a bit. When the “fifth column” in the eyes of vlast becomes the narod, then a
revolution is underway…Putin less and less seems to believe that his rating could fall as a consequence of his own mistakes. It’s not hard to see
that Putin isn’t just satisfied with the results of his rule, he is proud of them. And it will be hard for him to believe in the reality of popular
disappointment when it manifests itself…Vlast also does not understand that “Krym nash” in the eyes of the general public means what it says—
NASH--not Krym Putina or Krym Rotenberga, but Krym nash, that is, Putin is seen only as the instrument of re-establishing historical justice.
Crimea should have been Russian with or without Putin.
Putin is more vulnerable than it seems. But the main sources of a threat are not Navalniy or Western mass media. The threat to Putin will appear
when the accusations are coming from his own electorate…Anti-Putin information will be replenished, expecting consumers and it is they who will
raise the question of justice, unless GKChP-2 intervenes… ]
To recap and formulate a picture of what’s going on…With elections approaching and an economic crisis underway,
Putin’s enemies (Khodorkovskiy, and perhaps people in the Russian elite discontented with the way things have gone)
are stepping up the kompromat attacks. The Magnitskiy affair and the Panama papers point to massive money
laundering and asset transfer operations done on the behalf of high level players, with trusted figures like Roldugin
acting as operators of the mechanisms involved. The money launderers may both try and create “clean” money for
“the pool” and legitimize funds that have wound up there from operations like the tax rebate schemes connected to the
Magnitskiy affair. Putin is not involved in this directly or in any hands-on way. The launderers/acquisition operatives
may try and clean up money for lower level players like the MVD and Tax Service people involved in the Magnitskiy
affair. They are rewarded for their efforts with kickbacks or shares in companies like Video International or Rosneft.
“The pool” could operate, at least partly, like a mafia obshak—key players kick in funds that are available for major
asset acquisitions and use “the pool” as a deposit for money that needs to be laundered.
Some of the players have abused their access to “the pool”—maybe Lesin, maybe Yakunin. Perhaps Shumkov was
mixed up in operations that cost the pool too much and angered key pool members. At the time of Yakunin’s ouster—
and especially after his warning to other elites—I thought that we were seeing signs of friction in the inner elite at a
time of diminishing resources, a smaller corruption pie, and tensions over the results of sanctions (See the 13 January
notes, for instance). So I repeat that there may be more than one ultimate source of kompromat on Putin and other
players—I could see an angry Yakunin maybe retaliating with dirt he surely knows about.
Navalniy and Browder are players in their own right, as well as channels for transmitting kompromat. I think Navalniy
is still with us and not in prison because he gets at least “situational” cover from whichever Kremlin “tower” might be
using him at a given moment. He is associated with anti-Putin forces, but he probably gets some help from people in
the elite—maybe Alfa Group people—who are also thinking that it’s time for a change (See the notes from 11
January; 17 May 2015; 29 December 2014; and 6 November 2014).
Another way to think of the pool is a place where players lower down the corruption food chain may kick in a piece of
the action for their superiors. Questions: How does all this operate in practice? Who all is a part of what must be an
intricate network of interlocking channels for money laundering and asset transactions in a system that has access to
the pool? Who accounts for the money in the pool and where it may end up? I doubt that every pool-connected
transaction is coordinated with other players—there is probably a high degree of independent operation within the
network, with not all of those involved aware of all the others. The network that has access to the pool and includes
elaborate money laundering channels and avenues for asset transactions probably arose spontaneously out of a few
deals and grew from there, working out its own mode of activity and ground rules. The people who pulled off the scam
in the Magnitskiy case were operating on their own, though they were connected to people higher up the food chain in
various ways, and then they tapped into the channels that were linked to Roldugin and the pool. But how are the
details worked out and who does the planning and organization? We are only hearing about a very small part of what
goes on in the guts of what must be an elaborate informal machine that no one player probably knows inside and out.
Russia’s overlapping money laundering channels are vast and involve lots of games—apart from the Magnitskiy
(probably allied with elements in the Prosecutor’s office) and the FSB and its allies in the Investigative Committee.
The battle was said to be over controlling money laundering channels—see the 31 March notes.
To wind this up, Putin sees the Khodorkovskiy-Kasyanov-Navalniy-Browder types as a united front in the West’s war
against him. He is aware of frictions in the elite and of the possibility of protests that could play into the hands of his
enemies or dissatisfied Russian elites who might be looking for an alternative. One such alternative could be Sergey
Shoygu (See the 8 April notes, for instance). So VVP creates the National Guard under trusted bodyguard Zolotov as
his personal palace guard.
Latynina carried on in this past weekend’s program: http://echo.msk.ru/programs/code/1756772-echo/
Why couldn’t Russian vlast uncover the people responsible for the scam in the Magnitskiy affair? It wasn’t because they were so
highly placed. It was because they were using the same money laundering “washing machine” that some completely different
people were also using—including Roldugin. It wasn’t that Roldugin was involved in the Magnitskiy affair—it’s that he and the
others used the same “washing machine” …
Latynina also takes some time to discredit Oleg Lure, who testified in an American court in the case involving Denis Katsyv and a
money laundering case linked to the Magnitskiy affair—she has Lure basically repeating a lot of the claims made by Nekrasov in
his film about Magnitsky (cited above). Lure claims Browder hired Navalniy. She points out that Lure was in jail for defrauding
Senator Slutsker—and she also notes that Lure has claimed that he saw documents indicating that Navalniy was a spy (the same
documents shown on NTV’s attack piece against Navalniy and Browder).
Strelkov: No murder charges?
From the 25 April notes:
[Strelkov’s post on the murder charges: http://m.vk.com/wall347260249_2127
Strelkov says that two men who identified themselves as police officers had visited his mother’s residence and told her that he was being charged
for two murders in St. Petersburg—they wanted to know whether she had seen her son around the time of the killings… So what were they up to?
What are they trying to show me?, asks Strelkov. Surkov and company should not bother—organizing these kinds of vile actions won’t work with
me. They won’t stop me from doing what I have to do—I’m ready for anything they can throw at me…]
http://m.vk.com/wall347260249_3529
About the criminal charges supposedly made against me—maybe there is a case and maybe not. So far I have no official word on
that. There’s supposed to be a public meeting on Suvorov Square on 2 May, but nobody will be there—how many people will
think a meeting in honor of fallen countrymen is more important than shashlik on a holiday?
Land to be given away in the Far East
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russians-given-free-land-in-countrys-far-east/567729.html
President Vladimir Putin has approved a law giving Russian citizens free plots of land in the country's Far East, the Interfax news
agency reported Monday.
All citizens will be entitled to apply for up to hectare of land in the Kamchatka, Primorye, Khabarovsk, Amur, Magadan and Sakhalin
regions, the republic of Sakha, or the Jewish and Chukotka autonomous districts.
The land can be used for any lawful purpose but can only be rented, sold, or given away after an initial five-year waiting period, according
to the bill.
The program is one of a number of initiatives aimed at boosting the economy in Russia's Far East, including the construction of the new
Vostochny cosmodrome. A recent deal also saw a number of Chinese companies set on relocating to the area.

Sent time: 04/29/2016 01:36:23 PM
Subject: Internet Notes 29 April 2016
Attachments: IN29April16.docx

Internet Notes 29 April 2016
More from Rosbalt on the Nemtsov murder investigation (Khatayev)
European TV channel holds up airing Nekrasov’s film on Magnitskiy
Kashin on the Magnitskiy affair/Roldugin connection
Zolotov and Kudrin: What’s the Kremlin up to?
Novaya Gazeta on the end of the democratic coalition
A crisis in the Russian opposition? (Kasyanov)
Belkovskiy on Navalniy/Yashin vs. Kasyanov
Consumer confidence at a low point
NOD activists attack participants at “Memorial” event
Lavrov on Russia’s aiming for self sufficiency
More from Rosbalt on the Nemtsov murder investigation (Khatayev)
The Investigative Committee (SK) is looking for a Chechen MVD officer, Aslambek Khatayev, who visited the apartment in Moscow where Ruslan Geremeyev was staying and met with other suspects in Moscow hotels…Khatayev was in Moscow on assignment as part of a
security detail for Chechen officials (Comment: Which is what we heard about some of the other suspects), though it is not clear who the official or officials were. Investigators believe Khatayev left Moscow for Chechnya…Investigators now say that all of the suspects
were involved in debt collecting—they received half of recovered debts. When the debt collectors encountered a debt owed by someone with connections, they called in Geremeyev as their “heavy artillery” …Comment: Recall the item we saw back in the 19 February
notes on the brutal tactics employed by debt collectors and complaints against them.
Here’s more:
http://www.interpretermag.com/russia-update-april-27-2016/
Attorneys Vadim Prokhorov and Olga Mikhailova who represents the interests of Zhanna Nemtsova, daughter of slain opposition leader Boris Nemtsov say several more individuals were involved in Nemtsov's murder who have not been indicted, RBC.ru reports.
The attorneys submitted a statement today to Nikolai Tutevich, the senior special cases investigator assigned to Nemtsov's case. Nemtsov was assassinated February 27, 2015 and the case has not yet come to trial, although four suspects are in custody on charges of perpetrating or
assisting in the murder.
The statement references case files that indicate that Russia's Investigative Committee believes that Ruslan Geremeyev, an officer of the Sever Battalion within the Interior Ministry Internal Tropos in Chechnya, organized the murder, along with his brother Artur. These troops were recently
reorganized into the National Guard, and some have speculated that this restructuring was meant to rein in armed forces that had come to be regarded as "the personal army" of Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov.
According to the Russian registry of businesses, Artur Geremeyev is the owner of one of the apartments that figures in the case, no. 46 Veyernaya Street. (For our complete analysis of the suspects' movements and locations, see here; see also our translation of Novaya Gazeta's "How
Boris Nemtsov Was Murdered."
The attorneys' petition also mentions Alibek Delimkhanov, commander of the Sovet Battalion and relative of the powerful Chechen State Duma member Adam Delimkhanov, as well as two others not previously mentioned: Aslanbek Khatayev, an officer of the Chechen Interior Ministry and
Shamkhan Tazabayev -- a person with this name holds a post as deputy director of the Lenin District Center for Public Social Services in Chechnya). Finally, Suleyman Geremeyev, a powerful Chechen senator related to Ruslan Geremeyev, and Vakha Geremekhev, head of the District
Department of Interior Affairs [the police] for Shelkovsky District in Chechnya are indicated in the statement as well. The attorneys have repeatedly asked for Suleyman and Vakha Geremeyev to be interrogated. Investigators have refused.
RBC sites sources that say investigators did try to issue charges in absentia against Ruslan Geremeyev, but both times Aleksandr Bastrykin, head of the Investigative Committee, turned down the request, saying there was insufficient evidence.
Novaya Gazeta obtained a screenshot of a surveillance camera at the President Hotel in Moscow, where Chechen assassins with contracts are said to gather, showing Ruslan Geremeyevl, who reportedly fled Russia but may have returned now, and a suspect who is already in custody,
Tamerlan Eskerkhanov.
RBC is currently seeking clarification from the Investigative Committee.
As RBC reported earlier, in January, Tutevich decided to separate out from the main murder case the case of the supposed organizers of the assassination, Ruslan Geremeyev and his driver, Ruslan Mukhudinov, along with six others not named who were said to propose to Zaur Dadayev, a
Sever officer designated as the main perpetrator, to kill Nemtsov for 15 million rubles (about $229,000).
The Nemtsov family attorneys have called for keeping the cases together because otherwise it is not clear why the perpetrators had a motivation to kill Nemtsov. As their statement indictates (translation by The Interpreter):
"From the materials of the criminal case it follows that the investigation avoided a proper investigation of Nemtsov's murder, and did not establish the motives for his murder which guided the organizers. Moreover, a decisions was artificially and unlawfully made by the investigation to end
the preliminary investigation on the main, so-called "parent case."
The attorneys believe the investigators should have kept the cases united and pursued the leads more vigorously instead of closing a case that points to powerful individuals in the entourage of Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov.
Basically, to pin the organization of the murder on an officer's driver in a separate case that won't be tried (because he has fled abroad), then only focusing on the immediate facts of the perpetration of the murder -- as they have done with so many cases involving public critics before -- the
Investigative Committee is indicating once again that it can't take on Kadyrov.
Thus speculation that the National Guard reorganization has "reined in" Kadyrov may not have merit unless the Kremlin believes it can control Kadyrov going forward by closing the book on his past crimes.
-- Catherine A. Fitzpatrick
European TV channel holds up airing Nekrasov’s film on Magnitskiy
http://www.rferl.mobi/a/magnitsky-film-on-hold-european-tv-channel-arte/27704772.html
BRUSSELS -- A European television channel will not air a controversial new documentary next week on Sergei Magnitsky, the lawyer who helped uncover a massive tax fraud case in Russia and later died in a Russian jail, as previously planned.
Claude-Anne Savin, a spokeswoman for ARTE European, said the Franco-German channel is reviewing the film in response to complaints about its accuracy to "make sure the film is clean."
Despite the cancellation of the May 3 airing of the film, titled The Magnitsky Act -- Behind The Scenes, Savin said the channel still might air it "in a few weeks."
ARTE pulled the promotional tease for the film from its website.
Lawyer Sergei Magnitsky
The film, which was shot by Russian documentary filmmaker Andrei Nekrasov, was scheduled to premiere at the European Parliament on April 27. That showing was canceled following complaints from Magnitsky's relatives and former colleagues. German parliamentarian Marieluise Beck also complained that
footage of her staff was used without permission.
Magnitsky blew the whistle on a $230 million tax-fraud scheme and died in 2009 while being held on fraud charges in a Moscow pretrial detention facility. His family and friends say that, prior to his death, he was beaten, tortured, and denied medical care.
William Browder, a U.S.-born British investor who employed Magnitsky and has led the international campaign to hold Moscow accountable for his death, says he sent ARTE a list of "factual errors" in the film and warned them they would be legally accountable for knowingly broadcasting false statements.
"It is one thing to have free speech, but it is another thing to try to manipulate and to use lies, innuendo, and fabrications to make a point which isn't true," Browder told RFE/RL. "That's why there are libel laws out there to protect people from this type of thing."
William Browder
"The movie is just a collection of lies and fabrications, which desecrates the memory of Sergei Magnitsky and changes the whole story of how he died," Browder added.
Browder’s campaign on behalf of Magnitsky resulted in the U.S. Congress passing a law in 2012 sanctioning several Russian officials for their alleged involvement in the lawyer’s death. The law deeply angered Moscow.
Nekrasov has produced several films highly critical of Russian President Vladimir Putin. He was a friend of former Russian Federal Security Service officer Aleksandr Litvinenko, who was killed by a radioactive substance in London in 2006. His 2007 documentary about that case premiered at the Cannes Film
Festival and was shown in Moscow at the Sakharov Center human rights organization.
His 2010 film, Russian Lessons, about the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, exposed falsifications and manipulations undertaken by Russian state television in covering events before, during, and after that conflict.
But his Magnitsky film is decidedly different. Nekrasov wrote an April 27 blog post that the film changed his "consciousness…and, probably, my life."
The film asserts that Magnitsky was not beaten while in police custody and that he did not make any specific allegations against individuals in his testimony to Russian authorities, Nekrasov writes.
In an interview with RFE/RL on April 27, Nekrasov said he began the film with the intention of telling the story of how Magnitsky uncovered the tax fraud and was killed in order to silence him.
This sequence of events has been thoroughly documented by Browder and others -- including, in part, by the Kremlin's own human rights council.
Nekrasov, however, says that making the film changed his mind.
"I didn't abandon that narrative easily because I was ideologically very close to Browder," he said. "I was also a regime critic, honestly, on a lot of counts. But if we are not telling the truth, then it makes it easier for the bad guys to carry on doing their bad things."
The aborted April 27 screening at the European Parliament was organized by Finnish lawmaker Heidi Hautala, a member of the Green Party. Rebecca Harms, president of the Greens at the European Parliament, wrote on Twitter that the planned screening was "not an event of the Greens" group in the legislative
chamber.
Hautala, like Nekrasov, has a long record of defending human rights and of criticizing Russia. She was a sponsor of the original 2010 European Parliament resolution calling for EU member states to impose sanctions against Russian officials involved in the Magnitsky case, similar to the U.S. sanctions.
According to Finnish media, she has also been romantically linked to Nekrasov. She told the EU Observer website on April 27 that "we are close friends; I've known him [for] many years."
"It is very important to verify the facts and listen to different parties," she said in an interview with RFE/RL. "I'm very interested to see what the consequences of the film of Andrei Nekrasov will be when they will be openly discussed, openly available, when one day there will be no harassment against the
screening of this film."
Another organizer of the canceled Brussels premiere was Russian lawyer Natalya Veselnitskaya. She is a defense lawyer for Russian businessman Denis Katsyv, (See the 28 April notes) who is the target of a U.S. federal civil forfeiture case in New York concerning alleged money laundering linked to the Magnitsky
case.
In November, a U.S. federal prosecutor submitted a letter to the judge in the case saying that Veselnitskaya, Katsyv, and others involved in the action racked up more than $50,000 in expenses on the U.S. government’s dime during a four-day deposition in New York.
The costs included a two-night stay at the Plaza Hotel "in a $995/night room for Natalia Veselnitskaya, who was not deposed and did not even attend the depositions in person, for the weekend after the depositions had concluded," U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara wrote in the letter.
"Ms. Veselnitskaya appears to have stayed at a less expensive hotel during the depositions, but moved to the Plaza after the depositions concluded and only after the Court orally stated that the Government would be responsible for reimbursing Defendants' expenses," Bharara added.
German lawmaker Elmar Brok, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the European Parliament, told RFE/RL the effort to show the film at the parliament was "a wrong idea."
"This is a piece of propaganda that should not be part of our parliamentary work," he said.
He added that he is "looking into" the matter of whether ARTE should have been involved in the project. The channel relies on "financial support from the European Union," according to the channel's website, with the goal to "produce television programs which…are…conducive to promoting understanding and
cooperation between Europe's nations."
Petras Austrevicius, a Lithuanian member of the European Parliament who also serves on the Foreign Affairs Committee, told RFE/RL that the push to screen the film for the chamber was one of several moves "by the Russian authorities" in order "to weaken Western confidence in its policy line" and secure a
review of EU sanctions against Russia later this year.
"And I expect more and more actions like this in the months to come," Austrevicius added. "And probably in a very creative way."
Kashin on the Magnitskiy affair/Roldugin connection
http://rus2web.ru/mneniya/gotovyi-li-myi-poverit-novoj-versii-ubijstva-magnitskog.html
…Are we ready to believe that the money stolen in the Magnitskiy affair wound up in “Putin’s purse”? Take it a step further—are we ready to believe that the money was stolen by Putin? That’s a question right up there in importance with, say, the question “are we ready to
believe that the FSB carried out the 1999 apartment bombings?” …In situations like this in the past, Russian public opinion has sided with Putin—just try and find a respectable critic of vlast who is willing to, for instance, say that Putin blew up the apartments. Ekho Moskvy, for
instance, maintains a presumption of innocence for Putin…The answer to the question about the Magnitskiy affair money and Putin will be given by people like Sobchak and Venediktov…A better question is are we ready to believe those who will defend Putin?
Zolotov and Kudrin: What’s the Kremlin up to?
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/the-kremlin-entrenching-itself?
mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiWldZME0yWTNNVFpqWmpjMiIsInQiOiJ2bUVUTWg2UnhEd0FcL0RaZkJWdERvaStuWnpKREwrZzBpNVl4SlwvS3RDaFlJQjI2djU0UFlyMGt3WGFXQlhXcXowQ1czTklqaXQ1K2d1NHB5YkFFcDY2aFV0MldpZ0FCdExoR2VZdEM1aVJzPSJ9
The Kremlin Is Entrenching Itself
By Maxim Trudolyubov…
Traditional opposition in Russia, negligibly small and weak, is no longer a target of the Kremlin’s designs. Putin is now dealing with challenges that are invisible to the naked eye. The year 2017 will mark the centennial of the Russian Revolution; an occasion too symbolic to ignore. The year 2018 will see
presidential elections, and Putin will announce whether or not he will try to remain in the Kremlin for yet another term.
Two major political projects, both launched in April and both involving men close to Vladimir Putin, may help us understand the Kremlin’s thinking about its future. One project has to do with domestic security; the other is about strategic policy planning. Both were long in the making and are the Kremlin’s
responses to mounting economic and political pressures.
The first project is Putin’s decision, announced in early April, to create a new security agency, the National Guard of Russia. Putin chose Viktor Zolotov, the long-time head of the president’s personal security unit who served as Commander of the Russian Interior Troops for the past two years, to lead the new
force. The Interior Troops, Interior Aviation, OMON (riot police), SOBR (the Russian equivalent of SWAT force), a security corporation formerly run by the Interior Ministry, the weapons licensing department of the Interior Ministry – all of these structures, numbering up to 400,000 members (roughly 200,000 of
them professional military service personnel) have now become part of the National Guard remit.
The bodyguard-in-chief, Zolotov, has thus been elevated to a Security Tsar of Russia. All weapon-wielding forces, with the exception of the Federal Guard Service tasked with protecting top officials, and FSB’s small special forces, will now report to Zolotov, who will in turn report directly to Putin. Through the
weapon licensing service he will also have effective control over all private military and security firms in Russia.
A new “corps of gendarmes” is being created at the expense of the Interior Ministry. Two former security agencies, a drug enforcement administration and an immigration agency are being cut in size and put under the command of the Interior Minister. Grom, a special force for anti-drug special operations, will also
likely move from the Interior to the National Guard. The Special Corps of Gendarmes security police that existed in Russia in the 19t h and early 20t h centuries, may be seen as a precursor to the newly created force. It also may be compared to the French gendarmerie or the Italian carabinieri rather than the U.S.
National Guard, which is a reserve military force. No visible domestic threats seem to warrant such a massive security centralization in Russia.
The second telling decision is that of giving Alexei Kudrin, who served as Finance Minister for 11 years and was also the first Deputy Prime Minister, a leading role in the drafting of a future reform program. Just like Zolotov, Kudrin worked with Putin for a long time. Both Kudrin and Putin moved from St.
Petersburg to Moscow in 1996 at the invitation of Anatoly Chubais, then Boris Yeltsin’s chief of staff. Kudrin will now chair the Center for Strategic Research, a think tank once close to the Kremlin.
Kudrin is treading carefully. He advocates institutional reform, placing judiciary and law enforcement reforms at the forefront of his agenda, but stops short of calling the current system accountable for mismanagement and corruption. He even let slip the word perestroika, a taboo in the Kremlin, but only in
passing. This is comfortable politics for the Kremlin, as well as for most pro-modernization forces within Russian society. Little seemed to preclude Putin from elevating Kudrin to the role of a “reform tsar” but the president decided not to. Kudrin’s new position feels underwhelming.
Kudrin was forced to leave the government in 2011 after a public row with Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev over military spending. In 2012, Kudrin created the Committee of Civic Initiatives, an NGO with a mission to help society influence government decisions. Between 2012 and 2016, Kudrin retained his
influence with the Kremlin while acquiring respect as a civil society player. He sponsored a number of research projects and policy proposals that were met with much interest on both sides of the Kremlin walls. A draft of the Interior Ministry reform that Kudrin sponsored and presented in 2013 was based on an in-
depth study of Russian police, conducted originally by the European University in St. Petersburg. No trace of these proposals is found in the reforms that created the National Guard.
A similar fate might await the effort that Kudrin is expected to lead at the Center for Strategic Research. Three major reform-drafting projects were undertaken under Putin and none of them ever became a binding document. In contrast to Zolotov, Kudrin has not been given any authority, only vague promises.
“[Kudrin] was invited to draft an economic program that has no official status or funding,” the political analyst Kirill Rogov wrote in a Moscow Times op-ed. “He was offered undefined powers on the president’s Economic Council, a strange and practically non-functioning body that Putin has not consulted even
once throughout 18 months of economic crisis.”
Even the semi-independent role that Kudrin was playing between 2011 and 2016 seems to have become too fraught from the Kremlin viewpoint. Putin clearly prefers to have Kudrin in a more dependent position that would symbolize the Kremlin’s control of the reformist discourse. Putin will own whatever Kudrin’s
team produces, and will be free to use it or to shelve it. What Kudrin will no longer be able to do in his new capacity is more important than what he might have done as “Strategist-in-Chief.” The appointment of Kudrin is a defensive move, rather than a policy planning initiative.
Both creating a Russian gendarmerie and placing Kudrin at the drawing board of a hypothetical reform plan, are forward-looking measures. They are not meant for just one electoral season, which is a parliamentary election coming later this year. The National Guard is unlikely to be fully operational by September,
and Kudrin’s main goal is post-2018 Russia (2018 is the year of a presidential election). These are measures of entrenchment and seem to be aimed at making things clearer between the ruling group and all other groups, including elites and the broader society.
Putin is addressing issues that have not become apparent yet, and is trying to anticipate problems emanating from previously loyal quarters. He has just created a super-strongman to deal with all security strongmen who might go rogue. He has just appointed a reformer-designate to make sure no one would be
able to team up with Alexei Kudrin for policy projects alternative to those of the Kremlin.
Novaya Gazeta on the end of the democratic coalition
[A crisis in the Russian opposition? (Kasyanov)
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/crisis‐in‐russian‐opposition‐as‐two‐withdraw‐from‐election‐primaries/565739.html
Two of Russia’s leading opposition politicians announced Wednesday 13 April their withdrawal from election primaries being organised by the PARNAS democratic coalition.
Ivan Zhdanov. Head of Law at Alexey Navalny's Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK) and Ilya Yashin, PARNAS political party deputy chairman, announced they would not be standing within the space of 24 hours.
Their reaction comes after PARNAS leader, Mikhail Kasyanov, announced his refusal to withdraw from the list of proposed candidates, despite recent involvement in a well-publicised scandal.
Kasyanov was the only politician to be included on the list of potential candidates since last December when the coalition was formed.
“I think that Kasyanov's position destroys voters' trust and scraps us from the ability to be an effective opposition coalition,” Yashin said.
Zhdanov's cited similar reasons to Yashin, but added that he was too busy with other political projects.
“The list would have been much more respectable if its leader was elected at primaries. Openness is the core value of the opposition,” Zhdanov told The Moscow Times. He stressed that the withdrawal was his personal decision and that he hadn't heard of anybody else planning to quit their candidacy.
The decision to give Kasyanov the privilege of heading the list of candidates had been controversial. The coalition was criticised for being non-democratic and for giving the Kremlin a chance to concentrate anti-opposition smears on a single figure.
That chance was used when state-controlled television channel NTV aired grainy video footage of Mikhail Kasyanov and a colleague, Natalia Pelevina, in bed together. They are heard criticizing their opposition colleagues.
“Given such circumstances, we would be answering idiotic questions about who slept with whom and who called someone names in bed throughout the course of the whole [State Duma election] campaign,” Yashin explained.
Kasyanov told KommersantFM radio that he saw no problems with Yashin's choice. “It's his decision and he has the right for any decision and it's his opinion,” he said.
Unlike Yashin, Zhdanov has said that his decision had nothing to do with the publication of the film. The lawyer believe that PARNAS still have good chances at the parliamentary elections, “because there's no alternative”.
“Democratic coalition members now have to choose between bad and worse,” the political expert Alexey Makarkin told The Moscow Times.
Makarkin believes the film scandal will push opposition members away from Kasyanov. He also said that voter activity at the primaries appeared to be low, and that cancelling them could be an option.
At the same time, Makarkin also believes that the scandal will not result in any dramatic changes: PARNAS will survive, and Yashin will probably enter the electoral campaign in a single-member district.
“The situation in general is a plus to everyone, not a minus,” Grigory Melkonyants, co-chair of Golos, an independent elections monitor, told The Moscow Times. “It is good when such things pass before the election campaign. When it starts, nothing will distract them. It seems like they [the opposition]are at
a stage when they need to clarify the relationship”. ]
[Belkovskiy on Navalniy/Yashin vs. Kasyanov
http://echo.msk.ru/programs/beseda/1747696-echo/
Kasyanov says he plans on keeping the first spot on the PARNAS party list for himself, scandal or no scandal, and regardless of the results of the primaries. So Yashin has refused to take part in the party primaries. Belkovskiy: what we are seeing shows the contradictions and conflicts within the non-systemic
opposition. But this won’t mean the total collapse of the democratic coalition—it’s of too much value to people like Kasyanov and Navalniy. Yashin represents Navalniy’s team, which wants to seize control of the opposition and take charge of it—and there is a reason they think that way. A certain part of
PARNAS’s assets, regional structures, consider Navalniy their leader more than Kasyanov and view Navalniy as having better political prospects. The struggle for power between Kasyanov and Navalniy is certainly damaging to the non-systemic opposition and could cause a split at a time the opposition needs
to consolidate…We understand that the Kremlin will likely not allow a large majority of opposition candidates into the Duma and under such conditions, consolidation becomes even more important. There’s also a battle going on for the political-moral legacy of Boris Nemtsov. A lot of PARNAS activists still
consider him as a more authoritative figure than Kasyanov. If Navalniy and Yashin can convince activists that they represent Nemtsov’s legacy better than Kasyanov, then that would be a trump card in the struggle over the party.
Belkovskiy says he agrees that Navalniy has better prospects as a leader than Kasyanov, but morally he supports Kasyanov—one can’t use Kremlin provocations as a basis for infighting in the opposition…]
Novaya Gazeta (http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/72887.html) reports that Navalniy’s Progress Party and Vladimir Milov’s Democratic Choice party have announced their withdrawal from a coalition with Kasyanov’s PARNAS. The parties could not reach agreement
on procedures for the primaries, on forming a party list, or on whether Kasyanov should have the #1 spot on the party electoral list. Apart from that, Kasyanov has been accused of failing to finance preparations for the elections…Electorally, this signifies collapse. Without
Navalniy and his people, PARNAS doesn’t even have a theoretical chance of breaking the 5% barrier in the Duma election. But it’s even worse for Navalniy and company and their unregistered party, which can’t take part in elections without collecting signatures…It follows that
Navalniy will likely soon declare that the elections are a sham and the opposition should boycott them…What this all means is that Navalniy’s team is not ready to take part in politics. It’s high point was the Moscow mayor’s election in 2013…We can only hope that Yabloko,
which is trying to form its own coalition, does not repeat the mistakes of PARNAS…Leonid Volkov of the Progress Party says he would be surprised if PARNAS garners 1% of the vote in September…Lyubov Sobol, also of the Progress Party, says that even though her party
has withdrawn from the coalition, candidates can still run for individual mandates and she will run in a Moscow district…Democratic Choice’s Milov says the main argument was about Kasyanov as #1 on the party list without having to take part in primaries. Kasyanov was
named party chairman because of a desire to hold the coalition together, but he has not been fulfilling his obligations as leader—but he (Kasyanov) could still come around and change his mind about cooperation….Democratic Choice candidates can still compete for single
mandate districts…
Consumer confidence at a low point
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russian-consumer-confidence-falls-to-historic-lows/567532.html
Consumer confidence in Russia fell to 63 points in the first quarter of this year on Nielsen's Consumer Confidence Index, the lowest level since records began in 2005, the Kommersant newspaper reported Friday.
In the same period last year, the index stood at 72 points, the newspaper reported.
According to Nielsen, a record low number of people now have any extra money after covering basic needs and bills.
At the same time, the share of Russians forced to slash their spending rose to 76 percent in the first quarter of the year.
Fifty-nine percent of Russian citizens now have to abstain from entertainment expenses and 61 percent put off the purchase of new clothes. Fifty-two percent of Russians switched to cheaper food products, according to data from Nielsen.
As Russia continues to experience economic recession, the real wages of Russians shrank 9.5 percent in 2015. This year, the trend continued with 3.9 percent in real wages year-on -year in the first quarter of 2016, according to the Rosstat state statistics service.
“The continuing decline in real incomes means that Russians' consumer activity will remain low in the near future,” Dilyara Ibragimova, an associate professor at the Higher School of Economics' sociology department, told the newspaper.
Deputy Prime Minister Olga Golodets said Friday that Russia has been hit by a consumer crisis. Fifty-one percent of purchased items in February were food products while the consumption of certain types of light industry has fallen by 20 percent, according to Golodets.
NOD activists attack participants at “Memorial” event
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/human-rights-event-attacked-in-moscow/567472.html
Guests at an event organized by Russia's leading human rights group Memorial have been attacked by nationalist activists, the organization's executive director told the Moscow Times Thursday.
Participants at the award ceremony for high-school students were pelted with disinfectant and ammonia, said executive director Yelena Zhemkova.
"Memorial was holding a very important event at Dom Kino in central Moscow, but the guests and the participants were attacked by a group of aggressive protesters who threw green disinfectant and ammonia at them as they tried to enter the building," Zhemkova said.
The protests in front of the Dom Kino building were organized by the People's Liberation Front nationalist movement (NOD), local media sources reported.
Roughly 20 NOD activists congregated outside Dom Kino, holding banners reading "we don't need alternative history," and shouting "fascists."
Among those attacked was acclaimed Russian novelist Lyudmila Ulitskaya. The writer, who headed the jury at the competition, was sprayed in the face with green disinfectant.
A number of international guests were also present, including the German ambassador to Russia Rüdiger von Fritsch, the Novaya Gazeta newspaper reported. The activists also attacked the representative from the similar school's history contest in Norway.
The NOD's youth wing coordinator Maria Katasonova denied the attack on Ulitskaya in the interview with the Govorit Moskva radio station "We don't know who sprayed Ulitskaya," she said. "I only saw her turn around and she was already covered in green disinfectant.
The high-school competition, "A person in the history: Russia in the XX century" is an annual event by Memorial. Students from around the country are encouraged to research local history by studying historical archives, interviewing witnesses and examining newspapers and other
sources.
Winning students are then invited to Moscow where they attend a number of places and events organized by Memorial. The culmination of their Moscow program is the awards ceremony.
Police arriving on the scene said that the protest was a one-man picket and took no action.
"Usually, even it's a real one-man protest, the police will come and puts everybody in the back of a van. This time nothing happened, even though our college had an eye injury," Zhemkova said.
The executive director said that although there had been previously protests carried out during previous Memorial events, it was the first time counter-activists had been so aggressive.
There was a picket had been carried out in front of the Sakharov Center where Memorial held an exhibition dedicated to the first Chechen war last month, but no one had been attacked, she said.
Contact the author at a.bazenkova@imedia.ru. Follow the author on Twitter at @a_bazenkova.
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/kremlin-calls-attack-on-human-rights-event-hooliganism/567490.html
The Kremlin's spokesman Dmitry Peskov has called an attack on a human rights event by nationalist activists “hooliganism,” the TASS news agency reported Friday.
“It is hooliganism, it is a disgrace,” Peskov said. “Those, who hide behind the St. George ribbon, discredit it.” He stressed that it was “absolutely unacceptable,” Peskov was quoted as saying by TASS.
On Thursday, activists from the Pro-Kremlin People's Liberation Front nationalist movement (NOD) attacked the award ceremony for high-school students who had participated in a history contest, organized by the prominent human rights group Memorial.
The NOD activists gathered in front of the Dom Kino, where the Memorial ceremony was being held, shouting insults and spraying green disinfectant and ammonia at the event attendees as they tried to enter the building.
Among those attacked were the competition participants, organizers, foreign and Russian guests and acclaimed Russian writer Lyudmila Ulitskaya, the head of the competition's jury.
According to representatives of Memorial, when police arrived at the scene, they failed to take any action against the NOD activists.
Later on Thursday, Moscow police announced that one of the attackers had been detained, the Interfax news agency reported. He has been charged with petty hooliganism and may face up to 15 days in prison.
Comment: Recall the item we saw in the 25 April notes on “dynamic” and “hermetic” authoritarian regimes—and the Kremlin being uncomfortable with any spontaneous actions, even by groups that are pro-vlast.
Lavrov on Russia’s aiming for self sufficiency
Lavrov also had some comments on NATO and Sweden, NATO and Russia…
http://www.rt.com/news/341378-lavrov-sweden-nato-russia/
NATO expansion to the East enables the alliance to deploy forces next to Russia’s borders and then accuse Moscow of “carrying out dangerous maneuvers” near the alliance’s bases, the Russian foreign minister told a Swedish media outlet.
“This is a mean‐spirited attempt to turn the issue on its ears,” Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov told Sweden’s Dagens Nyheter daily.
“NATO military infrastructure is inching closer and closer to Russia’s borders. But when Russia takes action to ensure its security, we are told that Russia is engaging in dangerous manoeuvres near NATO borders. In fact, NATO borders are getting closer to Russia, not the opposite,” the Russian FM
pointed out.
Speaking about NATO as the EU’s principal military alliance, Lavrov said its existence is an “objective reality” and therefore Moscow is ready for dialogue.
NATO deployments of AMD bases and troops near Russian borders have already violated the basic 1997 NATO‐Russia Founding Act, the foreign minister noted. Today, NATO is different from what it used to be and Russia pays no attention to its soothing words, but instead reacts to
the alliance’s military potential massed near Russia’s borders, Lavrov added.
Russia is not interested in neutral Sweden entering NATO, yet “If Sweden decides to join NATO, we (Russians) won’t think that it intends to attack Russia,” Lavrov said. However, he also mentioned that alliance infrastructure in Sweden would definitely arouse a reaction from the Russian
military.
Every state is free to choose its self‐defense strategy in consideration of its national interests, and it’s better to ask the people before making this decision, according to the Russian foreign minister.
“The answer [why NATO needs new member states] is simple ‐ NATO seeks to cover as much geopolitical space as possible and surround the countries that somehow disagree with NATO, such as, for example, Russia and Serbia."
Self‐reliance is Russia’s strategic course now
Russian foreign policy is subject to change because sanctions against Moscow have made business as usual “absolutely impossible.” Russia will have to rely on its own resources first and foremost, the minister told the Dagens Nyheter daily.
“From now on we have to look to ourselves. We have everything we need for that. We are a self‐sufficient country,” Sergey Lavrov said, adding that Russians are prepared to work hard to avoid having to buy anything abroad.
“This is a strategic course. It has nothing to do with self‐isolation,” Lavrov said. He expressed hope that “when and if”Western partners opt to revert to “normal behavior,” this would only mean additional opportunity for development and cooperation. “But in basic things we’re going to paddle
our own canoe.”
The EU will mature and come to an “equitable respectful dialogue without ultimatums,” Lavrov said, expressing hope that the ongoing situation in Russia‐EU relations won’t last long, because the European Union and Russia are not capable of competing in the modern world on their own.
“We’re destined to live and cooperate together,” the Russian foreign minister stated.
Lavrov added that Moscow will speak with other European capitals as “equal partners and defy any ideas prescribed by the EU to be taken for granted.”
He went on to say that not everyone in Europe is happy with the outcome of the anti‐Russian sanctions, and it is no secret Brussels will have to discuss the issue.
“Let’s hope that common sense prevails,” Lavrov said, noting that the “European Union, of course, will head in the direction that Germany wishes to go.”
Sergey Lavrov reiterated that Russia would rely on generating internal resources to avoid being dependent on Europe, which is currently putting politics ahead of economic expediency.

Sent time: 04/27/2016 03:12:18 PM

Natalya Zubarevich: Russia has reserves of sustainability
Andrey Nekrasov’s Magnitskiy film
Links between Roldugin’s offshore and the Magnitskiy case
Natalya Zubarevich: Russia has reserves of sustainability
http://newtimes.ru/articles/detail/110033
An interview with economist Zubarevich, who has shown up in these notes before*…
NT: Do you have a sense of impending catastrophe?
Z: No. As a matter of fact, travelling around the country only strengthens my sense of the unlikely sustainability of the system. That
comes from the rational behavior of people. In a crisis, they try and minimize their risks on a personal level. They aren’t interested
in politics. They adapt. The inertia of the system plus that tendency are the two legs the system can stand on for a long time.
NT: How many donor regions are there in Russia? How much does the periphery depend on Moscow?
Z: Regions with a Gross Regional Product higher than average number about 9-13. But that doesn’t mean they don’t get anything
from the center.
NT: OK, how many rich regions are there?
Z: Going by tax contributions—taxes from extracting natural resources and value added taxes—Khanty-Mansiysk (contributes
27%-28% of the federal budget draw from those taxes), Yamal-Nenets (10%) and Moscow (14%--that’s from value-added
taxes). Moscow has a lot of people and there’s a lot of consumption. Pay rates are higher in Moscow, so there is a high
contribution of income taxes. St. Petersburg, too. So you can say that four regions account for 55%-60% of budget income.
In 2015, the federal budget deficit was R2 trillion rubles. That was the first year for a deficit. Did the crisis cause the deficit? No,
spending did. Spending on pensions—more pensioners, fewer contributors—and defense spending, which accounted for 28% of
the budget. Budget income has decreased by 5%. Add another 12% for national security and there’s a third of the budget.
Creating the National Guard won’t raise the deficit—they government will just redistribute funds.
NT: So vlast is behaving more wisely than the leadership of the USSR?
Z: Yes. One more factor for sustainability is that administration is more qualified and that lowers risks. I’m not talking about foreign
policy, of course, only the economy.
NT: And the Soviet leadership sold off gold and currency reserves…
Z: And the current leadership isn’t. With elections coming up, vlast will maintain reserves—smart people go into an election with
money…The regions are behaving rationally. In 2015, regional budget income grew by 6%, expenditures only by 1%. They began
cutting—51 regions cut spending on communal serves, 48 cut spending on education. They cut social programs least of all. They
didn’t cut benefits to the population (these are separate from pensions, pensions are a federal matter). In September there will be
21 elections of regional leaders—who would cut benefits in an elections year? This year only 20 regions made cuts in health care,
16 in social spending. Cuts can be made, but gradually, with precision, cuts to smaller groups of the population. They can make it
more complicated for people to enter the social benefits system, things like that. Take Yaroslavl as an example—you separate off
people suffering from rare diseases whose medicines cost millions and cease buying the medicine. These groups of relatively few
sick people can’t make a big fuss—it’s cynical, but it works…Another way to makes cuts is to not index benefits—at 13%
inflation, that’s an effective way to economize…There are lots of ways to make cuts without sparking protests…Kransodar wasn’t
so careful, cutting transportation privileges for pensioners and people took to the streets. So privileges were reinstated.
Vladimir Oblast has a budget surplus. So does Moscow, which also made cuts in education, health care and culture. Why make
cuts with a surplus? Well, there are lots of incomplete infrastructure projects and there’s no guarantee of raising pay rates again as
the crisis deepens…Leningrad Oblast and St. Petersburg have budget surpluses, as do Khanty-Mansiysk, Tyumen Oblast,
Sakhalin, Chukotka. Sevastopol is in positive numbers, though Crimea is running a deficit…Budget deficits were actually slightly
lower in 2015 than in 2013. In 2013, there was no sense that cuts had to be made…The total of regional budget deficits is R370
billion. In 2014, that was R440 billion. In 2013, R640 billion. 2015’s (regional) budget deficits weren’t extreme, more like
typical. The deficits were created by Putin’s May edicts, by the order to raise pay rates….Every region is different, methods for
coping are different—that diversity is another factor in favor of stability. Each region comes up with its way and that lowers risks
overall.
NT: What about the increase in the number of poor Russians?
Z: There has been an increase—three million more poor people. That’s an increase from 10.5% to 13.6%. Someone is poor if
they have an income lower than the minimum. But that does not mean inequality is increasing. The rule is that economic growth
increases inequality. A bigger piece of a growing economic pie goes to the richer parts of the population. Inequality grew in the
1990s and 2000s…
The “shadow economy” has grown, but it grew before the crisis. The number of people employed in major or mid-sized
enterprises has decreased from 41 to 33 million. Business shed itself of ineffective personnel. Where did they go? 10-14 million
went to smaller enterprises. The rest went to the “gray zone”—earlier that was about 17 million, now it’s just under 20 million.
NT: Has the crisis peaked?
Z: The first peak was in December of 2014, as incomes and pay decreased. The second was in February-May of last year as
industry declined. Then the “new normal” set in: there was a stabilization at the low level and it has continued. Russia isn’t in the
graveyard, just slowly moving that way…
There are two key electoral groups—pensioners and budget workers. As a rule, the budget workers don’t get social benefits. The
pensioners don’t depend on the regional budgets. The people who suffer the most from the crisis are families with children. The
level of child poverty in Russia is 1.5X higher than general poverty.
NT: What do you mean by “child poverty”?
Z: If the Russian population is divided by age group, we see that when the average poverty rate for the whole population was
11%-12%, the poverty rate for children was 17%, 18%, or 19%. And child benefits are at a level of R200, R300, or
R400/month! If you have two parents both working at low paying jobs, then they cannot support the second child. Until not long
ago, the birth of a second child was the path to poverty.
NT: The state has to understand just how important children are to it…
Z: No, it’s not ready to understand. The state had an understanding of that importance when the economy was growing and it had
a need for more workers. Now, we in a rather drawn out crisis. For the period up until the 2018 presidential election, the
demographic issue will be closed. The context won’t make that theme a winner, so we won’t be hearing about it.
NT: How will the crisis have an impact on the prospects for political protests? We know that political activity is in the major cities.
Z: In the very biggest cities.
NT: And to take part in political activity, you have to have time and money…
Z: Of course.
NT: So protests took place in 2011—people earned money and could allow themselves taking part in politics.
Z: Agreed. People went beyond routine existence, they had a broader horizon for thinking about what they desired…
NT: So what’s going on in the big cities now?
Z: There are several channels that lower the likelihood of protests. First, the outflow from the country of the more competitive,
educated, qualified people. Not children or students, but people in their 30s, people who have a shot at a position in the West. We
are losing human capital and that lowers the resources for protests. Second—if you lose your job, then you adapt. You find
another job at lower pay. It doesn’t help one’s self confidence, but it doesn’t mean you are ready for protests. You ether fall into a
depression or try to find ways to earn more. Third: you withdraw. You take up a hobby, focus inwardly. This is a very Soviet
response. Fourth—forget about everything and drink.
*From the 8 March notes, a bit from another article on Zubarevich’s views on the crisis:
[Unemployment has increased, but has not reached catastrophic levels. There have been small doses of personnel cuts. Of course, there are lot of
hours being cut and “administrative leave” orders are being declared…As far as vlast is concerned, people are not protesting, there are not a lot of
people being fired, people are still working. True, for less money, but still working…
What lies ahead?
Regions with non-completive industries will decline even further. Others will adapt—there won’t be a collapse, but, rather, a fading economy,
stagnation. Where will the bottom be? No one knows. The crisis is hitting the major cities the strongest—those cities have service economies and
the state has no mechanisms for helping them…
There isn’t any protest movement because for Russians there is no linear connection between economic dynamics and their social-cultural
perceptions. People adapt to tough conditions and adjust their budgets. Zubarevich ends by saying that for her, the worst risk in such adaptation
is further degradation… ]

Andrey Nekrasov’s Magnitskiy film
http://lawandorderinrussia.org/2016/magnitsky-family-blasts-the-green-party-in-the-european-parliament-for-hosting-
premiere-of-a-false-and-offensive-film-about-sergei-magnitsky-by-andrei-nekrasov/
Magnitsky Family Blasts the Green Party in the European Parliament for Hosting Premiere of a False and Offensive Film about Sergei Mag-
nitsky by Andrei Nekrasov

27 April 2016 – The widow and mother of Sergei Magnitsky have written to the Green/EFA faction in the European Parliament (see their letter)
protesting the premiere of a new false, offensive and defamatory film by Russian filmmaker Andrei Nekrasov about their murdered husband and
son. The premiere will take place this afternoon at 5:30 pm at the European Parliament.

The premiere is sponsored at the European Parliament by the Greens/EFA Group, and hosted by Heidi Hautala, Finnish MEP, Vice President of
the Green/EFA Group, who was reported in the Finnish press to be filmmaker Andrei Nekrasov’s girlfriend.

The Magnitsky family expressed their indignation in the letter about this new attempt to blacken Sergei Magnitsky’s name. They view this film as
promoting the interests of those who Sergei Magnitsky exposed and who are afraid of the truth he had uncovered.

“This film has been made in the interest of those who are scared of the truth uncovered by Sergei Magnitsky, - said Sergei Magnitsky’s mother
and widow. - “By this letter the family of Sergei Magnitsky state their highly negative reaction to this film and protest against unconscionable
attempts to blacken Sergei Magnitsky’s name. We are categorically against public viewing of the Andrei Nekrasov’s film, against its distribution
in any form.”

The letter from the Magnitsky family states that the film contains false information and lies about Sergei Magnitsky. They are categorically against
any showing or distribution of this film, including and especially at the European Parliament.

“We believe that the film by Andrei Nekrasov, based on his inventions, and not on documents and facts, is degrading to the dignity of Sergei
Magnitsky, degrading to the deceased, who cannot defend himself,” says the letter from the Magnitsky family.

The film by Andrei Nekrasov and producer Torstein Grude of Piraya Films (Norway) is designed to perpetuate a Russian government disinforma-
tion campaign about the Magnitsky case for a Western audience. The film claims that Sergei Magnitsky was not beaten in custody, was not
a lawyer, did not testify against Russian officials, did not investigate the US$230 million fraud, but instead committed it himself.
These false claims are con t ra d icted by numer o us doc u m ents. In par t ic u l ar, the claim that he wasn’t beaten is refuted by the pho t os of his
injuries from the state autopsy; his death certificate stating he had a suspected cerebrial cranial injury; certificates from the detention center
where he died recording the application of rubber batons; the Russian state forensic opinion finding that Sergei Magnitsky’s injuries were con-
sistent with blunt force trauma.
Magnitsky’s profession as a lawyer is demonstrated by his role in representing his multiple clients in court, providing them legal advice, and his
own testimony identifying himself as a lawyer.

The fact that Sergei Magnitsky’s testified against police officers is proven by his testimony from 5 June 2008 in which he described the theft of
Hermitage’s companies and fraudulent claims against them, mentioning police officer Kuznetsov 14 times and police officer Karpov 13 times,
his 7 October 2008 testimony in which he confirmed his 5 June 2008 testimony and testified that the same group who stole Hermitage’s com-
panies stoleUS$230 mln from the Russian budget.

The claim that Sergei Magnitsky stole US$230 mln is refuted by the discovery of the illicit proceeds from the fraud on accounts connected to the
Russian officials and members of their families; the joint travel of the criminals and Russian government officials involved in the fraud; the fact
that Magnitsky helped Hermitage report the crime three weeks before the criminals applied for the fraudulent tax refund, and the fact that the
same criminal organisation did similar crimes before and after.

The false and defamatory allegations about Sergei Magnitsky that Nekrasov tries to make have been refuted in the past by independent interna-
tional institutions including the Council of Europe, the EU Parliament, the USState Department and many others who have studied the case in
detail. Fur t her m ore, the alle g a t ions in the film are also con t ra d icted by the Russ i an government’s own evi d ence, court records, and expert
conclusions.

In Sergei Magnitsky’s own hand-written statement, 4 days before his death, on 12 November 2009, he wrote:

“By now it has been a year that I am being held hostage in prison in the interests of the persons, who are interested to ensure that those actually
guilty in the theft of 5.4 billion rubles [US$230 million] from the budget will never be brought to justice. … Investigator Silchenko does not want to
identify the other persons, who made this fraud possible. He wants the lawyers of the Hermitage Fund, who pursued and continue to pursue
attempts for this case be investigated, be forced to emigrate from their country, in which criminal cases were fabricated against them on phony
grounds, or like me be detained in custody.

My detention in custody has absolutely nothing in common with the purpose of criminal justice, which I referred to earlier. It has nothing in com-
mon with the legal purpose of restraint listed in Article 97 of the Russian Criminal Procedural Code, but this is a punishment to which I have
been subjected for merely defending the interests of my client and, ultimately, the interests of the Government, because should my client’s inter-
ests be realized, should the law enforcement agencies stop obstructing the interests of my client and instead assisted them, then the theft of 5.4
billion rubles from the state would not be possible. The actual purpose of my criminal prosecution and my detention in custody are in conflict
with the law.”

The mother of Sergei Magnitsky has previously written to the producer of the film, but received no reply.

Nekrasov has defended the film:
http://fakeoff.org/politics/cheloveka-zhalko-no-vsyo-ostalnoe-lozh
Nekrasov says that he wanted to make a film about contemporary Russia, about a man who was not a dissident against a
backdrop of the astronomical increase in value of the oil and gas sector and against a background of corruption. He thought of the
main figure in the film as no idealist, but when it came time for him to choose between good and neutrality, he chose good and died
a hero–but it wasn’t so, as I found out while making the film, says Nekrasov…
Magnitskiy accused two MVD officers, Karpov and Kuznetsov, of stealing budget funds to the tune of $230 million…It became
clear that the whole Magnitskiy-as-hero story was based on a lie, a story that was used as an alibi for Magnitskiy’s colleagues…
Nekrasov then deconstructs the Magnitskiy story by making claims like this one: Magnitskiy and his colleagues supposedly warned
the Prosecutor’s office and the Investigative Committee for three weeks that an illegal tax rebate scheme was in the works, but
another versiya is that they complained about the theft of companies (Comment: As a reminder, Magnitskiy reported that
officials, including officials in the tax service, were operating a scam for receiving tax rebates. Part of the Magnitskiy
affair was a story that MVD officers raided companies Magnitskiy represented and seized official documents and
other items that they could then use to “steal” those companies)—there was a complaint made about attempts to steal
money from those companies, but Browder himself told me those companies didn’t have any money (Comment: I recall that
Magnitskiy was supposed to have registered a number of shell companies—I think those were the entities that were
“stolen”)…Nekrasov goes on to bash Browder and says he regrets having called a couple of the people on the “Magnitskiy list”
“scoundrels”…
Links between Roldugin’s offshore and the Magnitskiy case
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/reports-claim-putin-ally-roldugins-offshore-tied-to-magnitsky-
case/567431.html
Banking records obtained from the Panama Papers show links between cellist Sergei Roldugin, a close ally of Russia's President
Vladimir Putin, and the case of Sergei Magnitsky, a Russian lawyer who died of mistreatment in prison in 2009, according to the
website of the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP).
The Magnitsky case involved the theft of $230 million from the Russian Treasury. The crime was uncovered in 2007 by Magnitsky, a
Russian lawyer who was working for Hermitage Capital Management, then the biggest foreign investor in Russia. Magnitsky was
arrested in 2008 by the same police officers whom he accused of covering up the fraud.
In February 2008, the money vanished into a chain of phantom companies and about two million eventually ended up with Delco
Networks SA, a British Virgin Islands corporation.
Two months later, Sergei Roldugin made a deal with the same offshore company. Delco purchased 70,000 shares in Rosneft — Russia's
state oil company — from Roldugin, sending his company $800,000 in May 2008. The contract, OCCRP said, was buried in the
Panama Papers, which have disclosed details of doing business in offshore tax havens for clients who want to hide their identities.
OCCRP said on its website that “Delco and its associated companies were likely part of a large offshore money laundering network …
set up by organized crime and involving companies and bank accounts in Russia, Moldova, Britain, Latvia and offshore tax havens that
was used by the Russian government and numerous crime gangs to steal or launder money, evade taxes and pay bribes.”
A graphic on the Roldugin connection to the Magnitskiy case posted on Open Russia:
http://s2.openrussia.org/redactor/o/f3/29/f32967e22cf1.png

From: David Kramer <David.J.Kramer@asu.edu>
Sent time: 04/27/2016 03:10:57 PM
Subject: RE: Nekrasov Film Cancelled

Maybe. Spoke with Dan Fried about it – he spoke with the reporter, though the reporter hasn’t yet called me.
From: Bob [mailto:robertotto25@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, April 27, 2016 6:10 PM
To: David Kramer <David.J.Kramer@asu.edu>
Subject: Re: Nekrasov Film Cancelled
The NBC investigation seems more serious. Safe trip.
Sent from my iPad
On Apr 27, 2016, at 3:05 PM, David Kramer <David.J.Kramer@asu.edu> wrote:
Interesting, hadn’t heard anything.
Off to Vienna in a few hours, back Saturday. See you Sunday at 8:15.
Subject: Nekrasov Film Cancelled
http://www.newsru.com/world/27apr2016/magnitskiy.html
В Европарламенте со скандалом отменили премьеру фильма о Сергее
Магнитском
В Европарламенте разгорелся скандал вокруг внезапной отмены премьерного показа фильма-
расследования российского режиссера Андрея Некрасова о юристе фонда Hermitage Capital Сергее
Магнитском. Ранее против показа выступили родственники убитого в 2009 году в СИЗО юриста,
назвав картину лживой. При этом сам Некрасов заявил, что за внезапным запретом стоит Билл
Браудер, передает EU Observer.
По словам режиссера, в ходе съемок он пришел к выводу, что Магнитский "не был убит". "Более того,
он не вел расследования против российских офицеров полиции и не выдвигал обвинений в их адрес",
- отметил Некрасов. Он добавил, что не исключает подачи иска против Браудера за обвинения в
"фальсификации доказательств".
"Для отмены показа Билл Браудер направил письма телеканалам, которые поддерживали съемки этого
фильма. Он обвинил меня лично в фальсификации доказательств и фактов. Это очень серьезное
обвинение, и не исключаю возможность судебных действий против господина Браудера", - сказал
Некрасов (цитата по ТАСС).
Одна из организаторов показа Наталья Весельницкая пояснила журналистам, что фильм Некрасова
обвинили в пророссийской пропаганде. По ее данным, организаторы получили письмо от Браудера с
угрозами. Дело в том, что фильм, который должен был быть показан сегодня, демонстрирует другую
сторону истории, которая отличается от версии Браудера, представленной им западной аудитории", -
сказала Весельницкая.
"Тот факт, что фильм был так легко снят с организованного в Европарламенте премьерного показа,
показывает, что здесь право на свободу слова предоставляется только одной стороне", - подчеркнула
она.
Депутат Европарламента Хайди Хаутала, в свою очередь, в разговоре с агентством подтвердила факт
давления со стороны Браудера для отмены показа фильма, назвав это давление "внезапным и
сильным". "Со вчерашнего дня ряд писем начали приходить мне и моим коллегам от адвокатов,
связанных с господином Браудером. Да, это правда", - признала она.
Very interesting. The Nekrasov/Hautula Magnitsky black PR attack event at the Europarliament abruptly cancelled
http://t.co/sHtOW6jcpv
— Bill Browder (@Billbrowder) April 27, 2016
Ранее мать и вдова юриста Сергея Магнитского выразили протест против намеченной на вечер 27
апреля в Европейском парламенте премьеры фильма о нем. В письме, адресованном фракции "Зеленые
- Европейский свободный альянс", организовавшей показ, близкие Магнитского признали, что
недавно они получили возможность предварительно посмотреть фильм, который произвел на них
гнетущее впечатление. "Мы все глубоко возмущены и одновременно испытываем чувство
брезгливости", - говорится в послании, которое цитирует "Радио Свобода".
Родственники Магнитского называют фильм лживым и отмечают, что, как и другие подобные фильмы
в России, он был снят с целью очернить его имя и постараться оправдать лиц, которые причастны к
его смерти. "Любая часть фильма, любой отрывок, где автор пытается оболгать Магнитского, легко
опровергается огромным количеством оригинальных документов, свидетельствами очевидцев,
выводами независимых комиссий…" - подчеркивается в письме.
Показ фильма Некрасова "Закон Магнитского - За кулисами" был запланирован в Европарламенте за
несколько дней до телевизионной премьеры на канале ARTE. Некрасов, известный критической
позицией в отношение российских властей, начал работать над фильмом о Магнитском при поддержке
крупнейших европейских кинематографических организаций и СМИ, в том числе франко-германской
ARTE, норвежских NRK и NFI, финской YLE и других, отмечает агентство РИА "Новости".
Напомним, сотрудник фонда Hermitage Capital, партнер британской юридической фирмы Firestone
Duncan Ltd. Сергей Магнитский умер в московском СИЗО 16 ноября 2009 года. Он был арестован по
обвинению в уклонении от уплаты налогов. Коллеги Магнитского Браудер и глава Firestone Джемисон
Файерстоун заявили, что Магнитского арестовали после того, как тот вскрыл коррупционные схемы, к
которым оказались причастны некоторые чиновники и сотрудники МВД, в том числе Павел Карпов.
Принимавший участие в расследовании одного из уголовных дел, связанных с Hermitage Capital,
Карпов добивался через суд в России и Великобритании прекращения распространения
недостоверной информации. Он требовал взыскать с Браудера, Файерстоуна и компании Hermitage
Capital компенсацию за клевету.
4 июня 2015 года Мосгорсуд постановил взыскать с фонда Hermitage Capital, Браудера и Файерстоуна
восемь миллионов рублей в пользу Карпова по его иску о защите чести и достоинства.
11 июля 2013 года Тверской суд Москвы заочно приговорил Уильяма Браудера к девяти годам
заключения по делу о неуплате налогов на сумму более 522 млн рублей путем фальсификации
налоговых деклараций и незаконного использования льгот, предназначенных для инвалидов. В этом
же преступлении суд признал виновным и покойного Магнитского. Через две недели после этого
Россия объявила Браудера в международный розыск.
В "Панамских документах" нашли связь между Ролдугиным и "делом Магнитского"
Бастрыкин поручил проверить информацию о причастности Уильяма Браудера к убийству
Следователь из "списка Магнитского" потребовал завести дело на Браудера после сюжета
ВГТРК о Навальном
Власти РФ запретили въезд пяти бывшим чиновникам США в ответ на расширение "списка
Магнитского"
"Список Магнитского" расширили не из-за ситуации на Украине, объяснили в США
// NEWSru.com // В мире // 2 февраля 2016 г.
Европа // Европейский Союз // Парламент
Sent from my iPad
From: David Kramer <David.J.Kramer@asu.edu>
Sent time: 04/27/2016 03:05:13 PM
Subject: RE: Nekrasov Film Cancelled

В Европарламенте со скандалом отменили премьеру фильма о Сергее Магнитском
В Европарламенте разгорелся скандал вокруг внезапной отмены премьерного показа фильма-расследования
российского режиссера Андрея Некрасова о юристе фонда Hermitage Capital Сергее Магнитском. Ранее против
показа выступили родственники убитого в 2009 году в СИЗО юриста, назвав картину лживой. При этом сам
Некрасов заявил, что за внезапным запретом стоит Билл Браудер, передает EU Observer.
По словам режиссера, в ходе съемок он пришел к выводу, что Магнитский "не был убит". "Более того, он не вел
расследования против российских офицеров полиции и не выдвигал обвинений в их адрес", - отметил Некрасов.
Он добавил, что не исключает подачи иска против Браудера за обвинения в "фальсификации доказательств".
"Для отмены показа Билл Браудер направил письма телеканалам, которые поддерживали съемки этого фильма. Он
обвинил меня лично в фальсификации доказательств и фактов. Это очень серьезное обвинение, и не исключаю
возможность судебных действий против господина Браудера", - сказал Некрасов (цитата по ТАСС).
Одна из организаторов показа Наталья Весельницкая пояснила журналистам, что фильм Некрасова обвинили в
пророссийской пропаганде. По ее данным, организаторы получили письмо от Браудера с угрозами. Дело в том,
что фильм, который должен был быть показан сегодня, демонстрирует другую сторону истории, которая
отличается от версии Браудера, представленной им западной аудитории", - сказала Весельницкая.
"Тот факт, что фильм был так легко снят с организованного в Европарламенте премьерного показа, показывает, что
здесь право на свободу слова предоставляется только одной стороне", - подчеркнула она.
Депутат Европарламента Хайди Хаутала, в свою очередь, в разговоре с агентством подтвердила факт давления со
стороны Браудера для отмены показа фильма, назвав это давление "внезапным и сильным". "Со вчерашнего дня
ряд писем начали приходить мне и моим коллегам от адвокатов, связанных с господином Браудером. Да, это
правда", - признала она.
Ранее мать и вдова юриста Сергея Магнитского выразили протест против намеченной на вечер 27 апреля в
Европейском парламенте премьеры фильма о нем. В письме, адресованном фракции "Зеленые - Европейский
свободный альянс", организовавшей показ, близкие Магнитского признали, что недавно они получили
возможность предварительно посмотреть фильм, который произвел на них гнетущее впечатление. "Мы все
глубоко возмущены и одновременно испытываем чувство брезгливости", - говорится в послании, которое
цитирует "Радио Свобода".
Родственники Магнитского называют фильм лживым и отмечают, что, как и другие подобные фильмы в России,
он был снят с целью очернить его имя и постараться оправдать лиц, которые причастны к его смерти. "Любая
часть фильма, любой отрывок, где автор пытается оболгать Магнитского, легко опровергается огромным
количеством оригинальных документов, свидетельствами очевидцев, выводами независимых комиссий…" -
подчеркивается в письме.
Показ фильма Некрасова "Закон Магнитского - За кулисами" был запланирован в Европарламенте за несколько
дней до телевизионной премьеры на канале ARTE. Некрасов, известный критической позицией в отношение
российских властей, начал работать над фильмом о Магнитском при поддержке крупнейших европейских
кинематографических организаций и СМИ, в том числе франко-германской ARTE, норвежских NRK и NFI,
финской YLE и других, отмечает агентство РИА "Новости".
Напомним, сотрудник фонда Hermitage Capital, партнер британской юридической фирмы Firestone Duncan Ltd.
Сергей Магнитский умер в московском СИЗО 16 ноября 2009 года. Он был арестован по обвинению в уклонении
от уплаты налогов. Коллеги Магнитского Браудер и глава Firestone Джемисон Файерстоун заявили, что
Магнитского арестовали после того, как тот вскрыл коррупционные схемы, к которым оказались причастны
некоторые чиновники и сотрудники МВД, в том числе Павел Карпов.
использования льгот, предназначенных для инвалидов. В этом же преступлении суд признал виновным и
покойного Магнитского. Через две недели после этого Россия объявила Браудера в международный розыск.
Навальном
Власти РФ запретили въезд пяти бывшим чиновникам США в ответ на расширение "списка Магнитского"
Sent from my iPad
Sent time: 04/28/2016 03:19:59 PM

Recapping the Magnitskiy case and related issues
Latynina on why Chayka said Browder was behind the FBK investigation
Rossiya TV on Navlaniy’s “Secret correspondence”
Latynina comments on the Magnitskiy scandal (Latynina points to Serdyukov in the Magnitskiy affair)
Levada polls Russians on the Panama Papers
Levada polls on the National Guard
Stanovaya: Five reasons there won’t be any reforms
Another launch delay at Vostochniy Cosmodrome (Putin reprimands Rogozin)

Recapping the Magnitskiy case and related issues
See yesterday’s notes for the new twist—that Roldugin’s offshore was used to launder funds embezzled by state officials, the
embezzlement pointed out by Sergey Magnitskiy. More recently, kompromat released by Navalniy’s Anti-corruption Foundation
implicating Chayka’s son (See the 7 December 2015 notes) in corruption prompted Chayka to claim that Browder was behind the
material.
From the 18 December 2015 notes:
[Latynina on why Chayka said Browder was behind the FBK investigation
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/columns/71189.html
It’s because a US federal prosecutor has brought suit against a Russian businessman, Denis Katsyv, in a New York court. Katsyv’s accounts and
real estate holdings in the US have been frozen—his name is on the “Magnitskiy list” of Russians, officials and others, Magnitisky claimed were
making off with state funds under the guise of tax rebates. Magnitskiy, of course, was charged with that crime himself and died in a Russian jail.
Katsyv has been connected to a number of key figures in the Magnitskiy affair, including Dmitriy Klyuyev and former head of Russian Tax
Inspectorate 28, Olga Stepanova (Comment: From what I gather, Katsyev was laundering the funds siphoned off by the group involved in the tax
rebate scam, shifting the money to overseas accounts and buying assets). But it appears that Chayka’s office will argue that it was Browder and his
group—which included Magnitskiy—who made off with state funds, then accused Russian officials of that. ]
Chayka’s claims brought the Magnitskiy affair back into focus. This month, Dmitriy Kiselyov’s program took aim at Browder and
Navalniy. From the 11 April notes:
[Rossiya TV on Navlaniy’s “Secret correspondence”

Comment: The first attack was on Kasyanov. Now it’s Navalniy’s turn. The aim is what Belkovskiy mentioned—prevent a “color revolution” and
foreign interference in the elections, control the political process…
http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=2741466#
From Dmitriy Kiselev’s program…It’s about Navalniy (described as a “corrupt recidivist”) e-mailing (and apparently in Skype conversations with)
another Kremlin enemy, William Browder (a “swindler” who “inspired the Magnitskiy list”), with VGTRK’s Yevgeniy Popov describing the “secret
correspondence” as revealing channels between the Russian opposition and the US and UK. Former Berezovsky security man Sergey Solokolov
(Comment: I’m not sure where he comes into this story—as an informant on goings on in the UK?) says the correspondence was picked up off of
servers set up by the CIA and the MI6 as a channel for their agents (“Freedom”—Navalniy and “Soloman”—Browder) for plotting the overthrow of
the Russian constitutional system (Operation “Drozh” or “Tremor”)…The special operation “Drozh” dates back to 1986 and then-CIA Director
William Casey, who planned the overthrow of the system in the USSR and Eastern Europe. Part of the plan was to gain control over financial flows
and assets.
Former MVD investigator Pavel Karpov (Comment: He was involved in the Magnitskiy affair) says that Browder and Navalniy work parallel to one
another, as well as together…They first made contact in 2006, when Browder was already banned from entering Russia and Navalniy was a young
Yabloko activist. Browder wanted Navalniy to help him with “greenmail projects”—Navalniy was initially skeptical. Browder told Navalniy he would
be a “hero of the minority shareholders” and would accumulate “reputational capital”…Eventually Navalniy agreed and Browder suggested he
start with VTB. Browder’s target list included Gazprom, Rosneft, Sberbank, Lukoil and Surgutneftegaz. But Navalniy needed money, so Browder
got him in contact with banker Vladimir Ashurkov (Comment: I think Ashukrov, who at one time worked for Alfa, was a channel for Alfa money to
the non-systemic opposition. I think Alfa supported the “protest wave” in 2011-2012; See the notes from 11 January; 17 May 2015; 29
December 2014; and 6 November 2014 for more on Ashurkov). The report reproduces correspondence it claims was from an MI6 controller who
channeled R100 million to Navalniy and company.
When Magnitskiy (portrayed here as engaging in fraud himself) was arrested, Browder asked for Navalniy’s help. Navalniy suggested that they
play up Magnitskiy’s suffering, something Russians would respond to. But the Western controller (MI6 “Agent Belt”) was unhappy—the story
wasn’t generating enough interest, so the best thing to do was use connections to see to it that medical aid to Magnitskiy was cut off. Then
Magnitskiy died. Sergey Kurginyan chimes in to say that the person most interested in seeing Magnitskiy dead was Browder. Browder
subsequently began his campaign to get the US to set up a “Magnitskiy list”—Navalniy conducted the information campaign in Russia.
Another Browder-Navalniy project was the information attack on Prosecutor General Chayka, beginning with the allegedly illegal businesses of his
son (See, for instance, the 7 December 2016 notes; Comment: Recall that Chayka blamed Browder for the kompromat)—this followed
investigators searching the offices of Browder’s firms on Cyprus.
Navalniy has posted on the story: http://navalny.com/p/4819/
So supposedly a leak of information from the CIA identifies me as “Agent Freedom”—Kiselyov and his writers made up the dialogue…Who did
they consult as “experts”? The former head of Berezovskiy’s security service and Pavel Karpov, implicated in Magnitskiy’s death, that’s who.
Karpov has defended Chayka as well. It’s all a fantasy…
Here’s more: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/navalny-to-sue-media-holding-vgtrk-over-browder-link-accusations/565407.html
According to Alexey Kovalyov, former employee of the state-run RIA Novosti news agency that is now headed by the TV anchor
Kiselyov, editors of the agency received instructions on Monday not to cover the story due to it "probably being fake.” Kovalyov cited the
email sent to the editors that was shown to him by one of the employees.

Comment: I would not be surprised that Navalniy was in contact with Browder and others—he gets support from somewhere, I think in the past, at
least from Alfa, but Vesti Nedeli just made up the “Agent Belt” stuff.
Navalniy wants a criminal case opened and says he is ready to sue: http://newsru.com/russia/10Apr2016/freedom.html
British journalist Shaun Walker noticed how many errors there were in the English of the supposed MI6 handlers:
Rus TV running whole programme on @navalny recruitment by MI6, featuring "leaked" emails full of article mistakes.
— Shaun Walker (@shaunwalker7) 11:43 - 10 апреля 2016 ]
Yesterday, Aleksey Nekrasov showed a film in the Euro parliament that supported claims by Magnitskiy’s detractors.
Comment: Here’s some material from the 8 August 2011 notes that helps fill out the picture—I’ve had to re-edit it to
keep from going off on the various related threads of the story, but I think it will be helpful to those not familiar with
the Magnitskiy affair. I used different fonts then and the style was a bit different, but I think it holds up:
[Latynina comments on the Magnitskiy scandal (Latynina points to Serdyukov in the Magnitskiy affair)

http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/code/799758-echo/
As Latynina relates the Magnitskiy case, Hermitage Capital’s Browder, a green mailer, naturally attracted the attention of law enforcement when
he pressured state companies, blackmailing the state (Though the blackmail did improve accounting is state companies in some instances). His
offices were raided and the documentation needed to trade the shares of three firms associated with Browder’s company was taken. (The three
companies—Parfenen, Makhaon, and Riland themselves were shells used strictly for trading Russian shares) These documents wound up in the
hands of a criminal named Markelov, who figured in one of the cases (kidnapping/murder) of an investigator whose name would come up in the
Magnitskiy affair, Kuznetsov. Markelov arranged for a court to declare that these firms were suffering operational losses. These firms then
approached Tax Inspectorate #28, headed by Olga Stepanova, whose husband owned property in Dubai, among other things…So Stepanova
signed the documents authorizing a tax rebate to these companies of $5.4 billion. The money was placed in certain banks, the main one being
the Universal Savings Bank that belongs to a certain Klyuyev, who had figured in a case involving the theft of company shares in a deal with
Metallinvest. Latynina believes that Klyuyev was the main organizer of the affair. But she also thinks that all of the figures she named were
connected in some way with Renessans Kapital. Klyuyev used to work there…[Comment: What Latynina seems to be saying is that the
swindlers used connections in Renessans Kapital to pull off their operation and that the RK management was simply indifferent to the affair
since it was not their money that was being stolen. That does not seem credible to me—if it was involved in something like this, Renessans
would want a kickback…] Heritage knew what was up and had already lodged a complaint in October ’07. [Comment: What I’ve never quite
understood was what was going on with the three companies—according to Latynina’s version of the story, the law enforcement people who
eventually prosecuted Magnitskiy raided Browder’s office, obtained documents that effectively gave them control of those companies, I think,
and then they used those companies as Latynina described above. Didn’t Heritage know that the documents—whatever they were, exactly—
were gone and that they could be used in such a way? Is that how they caught on to the tax scheme?...] The transactions and actual theft did
not take place until December—and the thieves knew that Heritage had lodged a complaint. But they could call on gigantic administrative
resources and were very confident.
Meanwhile, the three companies used for the theft transactions were re-sold to a certain Rimma Starova, born in Chita in 1938. [Comment: OK,
so she’s a front, a cover] Why? Because Browder had already said he was robbed, that $250 million had been stolen from the budget. Starova
then says he had bought the companies and that she found out that they had been used to steal, not $250 million, but $5.4 billion and that she
wanted an investigation. And the investigation determined that Browder had stolen the money. The investigation covered for Tax Inspector
Stepanova and charged Browder and Magnitskiy. In August of ’08, two men went a to a DHL office in London and sent off a package (to a
lawyer named Khayretdinov) containing all the original documentation on the companies used in the tax fraud scam, and when it got to Russia,
there was a raid on the lawyer’s office and the documents were confiscated. [Comment: I don’t quite understand the lawyer’s role, but this was
evidently a set up by the crooked law enforcement officers to claim they had evidence of Browder/Magnitskiy scamming the tax refunds] So
the assets being put to use in this operation include, if not foreign intelligence itself, at least some of its resources. All of this took place before
the arrest of Magnitskiy.
It was obvious that the investigators and Stepanova were being protected by someone. Who? Browder has said that “ministers” are behind
this. We know that Stepanova worked in the tax service when the head of that was the current Defense Minister, Serdyukov. And she went to
work at Rosoboronpostavka when Serdyukov went over the defense ministry. Vlast is out to protect these people—Surkov got in on the act when
he threatened an end to reset if the “Magnitskiy list” was adopted. ]
In August of 2013, the Investigative Committee declared that it could find no evidence that Stepanova had committed any crimes:
http://grani.ru/Events/Crime/m.220977.html
Then there was the story of a wealthy Russian living in London who may have been poisoned—from the 20 May 2015 notes:
[Russian millionaire Alexander Perepilichny may have been poisoned (Magnitskiy)
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/521757.html
WikicommonsThe alleged fraud scheme had initially been exposed by lawyer Sergei Magnitsky, who died in a Moscow detention center in 2009.
Deceased Russian millionaire Alexander Perepilichny may have been poisoned by extracts from a rare and deadly plant, evidence suggests, casting
doubt on the initial theory that the businessman died of natural causes near his British home, The Independent reported Monday.
Perepilichny died suddenly while out for a jog in November 2012 near his home in Weybridge, in Britain's Surrey County. He was 44 years old.
Initially, he was believed to have died of natural causes, such as a heart attack, the BBC reported in March 2013. But as more evidence began
trickling in, police determined a full investigation should be carried out, according to the BBC.
Perepilichny dropped dead shortly before he had been set to deliver evidence against Russian officials in a $230 million fraud case, the BBC
reported. The alleged fraud scheme had initially been exposed by lawyer Sergei Magnitsky, who died in a Moscow detention center in 2009.
The BBC reported that it had seen court documents attesting that Perepilichny relocated to Britain from Russia in 2009 because he feared for his
life.
Initially, toxicology testing led Surrey police to conclude that the death had not been suspicious, but more recent testing, the results of which were
revealed at a pre-inquest hearing, called that initial conclusion into question, The Independent reported.
The more recent tests produced evidence that Perepilichny may have swallowed Gelsemium, a poisonous plant nicknamed "heartbreak grass,"
The Independent reported, referring to the plant as "a known tool of assassins from Russia and China, where the most toxic version of the shrub —
Gelsemium elegans — grows on remote hillsides."
According to the report, the most recent high-profile assassination carried out with Gelsemium was in 2011, when Chinese billionaire Huang Guang
died after eating cat stew believed to have been laced with the toxic substance.
"This is a really unusual case where there is cause for very serious concern," Dijen Basu, a lawyer for Surrey Police, was quoted by The
Independent as saying in the court. "We have a suspect substance in the stomach."
An inquest into Perepilichny 's death was set to get under way on Monday, but has been delayed until September to provide time for further
testing, The Independent reported.
More: http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/may/19/poisoned-russian-whistleblower-was-fatalistic-over-death-
threats?CMP=share_btn_tw
A Russian whistleblower took all reasonable precautions in the months leading up to his death, but was nonetheless “fatalistic” about threats to kill
him from powerful enemies in Moscow, a friend has said.
Alexander Perepilichnyy collapsed and died in November 2012 outside his luxury home in Weybridge, Surrey, after he had been out jogging. Surrey
police insisted there were no suspicious circumstances surrounding his death. But a pre-inquest hearing heard on Monday that traces of a rare and
deadly plant poison had been found in his stomach.
The poison – from one of five possible varieties of the lethal gelsemium plant – is the weapon of choice for Chinese and Russian assassins, the
hearing was told. A plant expert at the Royal Botanic Gardens in Kew, south-west London, Prof Monique Simmonds, will carry out further blood
tests. Her initial findings suggest that Perepilichnyy ingested poison.
Alexander Perepilichnyy, who came forward after the death in custody of Magnitsky. Photograph: Screen grab
Perepilichnyy’s friend – who declined to be named – said on Tuesday: “He was a very nice chap. He was bright. He seemed rational. He tried to be
cautious but was definitely quite fatalistic about the threats against him.” The friend met Perepilichnyy on five occasions after he fled in 2010 from
Moscow to the UK with his wife and their two children. The Perepilichnyys kept a low-profile, rarely mingling with the large community of Russians
in London. They lived in the high-security St George’s Hill estate in Weybridge.
Perepilichnyy was instrumental in exposing a massive alleged money-laundering ring involving the Russian mafia and the Russian state. He
provided details of an alleged $230m (£148m) fraud carried out by senior Russian tax officials. The money was allegedly stolen from taxes paid by
Hermitage Capital, a hedge fund run by the US-born financier Bill Browder.
The friend met Perepilichnyy in a series of London bars and restaurants in connection with the investigation into the Hermitage fraud allegations.
His evidence led Swiss prosecutors to freeze a bank account containing $11m and belonging to the family of a prominent Russian government
official. Perepilichnyy decided to come forward after the arrest, torture and death in custody of Sergei Magnitsky, Hermitage’s lawyer in Moscow.
“Typically he drank water or tea. The photos of him are pretty accurate, though when I saw him he was a bit skinnier,” the friend said. He added that
in 2011-12 Peripilichnyy had mentioned that the situation in Russia had become dangerous for him and that he was receiving threats. Their last
meeting took place shortly before the whistleblower’s sudden death on 5 November 2012. He was 44 and had previously been healthy.
Peripilichnyy’s widow, Nataliya, is still believed to be in the UK. She has not spoken publicly about her husband’s death and a barrister represented
her at Monday’s hearing at Woking coroner’s court. Shortly before his death Perepilichnyy is understood to have taken out a substantial life
insurance policy. The insurer is believed to have commissioned the independent toxicology reports from Kew.
Simmonds found traces of an ion linked to the gelsemium plant, the most toxic of which is Gelsemium elegans. Similar traces were not found in
blood samples. The expert will now retest blood and urine samples – applying different techniques – as well as a sample taken from the spleen.
Perepilichnyy’s last meal may be the key to the case. In 2011 a Chinese billionaire, Long Liyuan, died after eating a dish of cat-meat stew believed to
have been laced with the poison. That particular variety of the plant grows only in Asia.
Browder, a notable critic of Vladimir Putin, has also been bitterly critical of Surrey police’s investigation. Browder said he informed the police
repeatedly about the threats made against Perepilichnyy in the run-up to his death. Despite this, detectives failed to carry out toxicology tests until
three weeks afterwards. In 2013 Surrey police ruled out third-party involvement and referred the death to the Surrey coroner.
Detectives will now cooperate with the coroner while “additional work” and “clarification” takes place, ahead of an inquest on 21 September, Surrey
police said on Monday. They declined to say whether they are treating Perepilichnyy’s death as murder. The coroner, Richard Travers, has
designated three interested parties: the police, the victim’s family and the unnamed insurer.
Last week Browder sent a lengthy letter to Travers setting out his suspicions that the whistleblower had been murdered. Perepilichnyy was
involved in the murky world of semi-legal Russian cash and money-laundering, and many of his associates always felt the death could be
suspicious, even if initial tests appeared to yield little evidence.
The backstory behind the death of Magnitsky in prison is one of the darkest episodes in recent Russian history, with authorities refusing to
investigate any of the fraud allegations despite substantial evidence.
Magnitsky uncovered major fraud in 2008 after being retained by Hermitage Capital to investigate what had happened to companies that were
illegally seized from the fund. Hermitage had been built up by Browder, a naturalised Briton, into the largest investment vehicle in Russia before it
fell victim to the fraud.
The lawyer accused a number of Russian officials as being behind the scheme, including Olga Stepanova, a senior tax official, and her husband
Vladlen Stepanov. Stepanova authorised a huge tax rebate to a company shortly after it had been seized from Hermitage, and in the aftermath both
she and her husband appeared to purchase property in Dubai.
Magnitsky was jailed by the same officials he was investigating, and died in prison after receiving no treatment for a medical condition. Instead of
prosecuting those responsible, Russian officials put the dead lawyer himself on trial, in a surreal case in which the defendant’s cage remained
empty.
Browder, who was in London after being declared by the Russian government a “threat to national security” and barred entry, was also put on trial.
The businessman, who had previously been a predatory capitalist and a cheerleader of Vladimir Putin, became one of the regime’s harshest critics,
determined to avenge Magnitsky’s death and lobbying for sanctions against Russia.
Hermitage has suggested that the officials worked with crime world figures as part of an overarching mafia structure. Based on Hermitage’s
documents, a number of the people involved in the case, such as Stepanova, were put on the so-called “Magnitsky List” and banned from
travelling to the US and European Union. Russia was so infuriated with the Magnitsky list that it banned the adoption of Russian orphans by US
parents in response, as well as drawing up its own list of “anti-Russian” western politicians, who have been barred from entering Russia.
Exactly what Perepilichnyy’s status was in the scheme, as well as how he became a whistleblower, remains somewhat unclear.
According to friends Perepilichnny – whom they knew as Sanek – had a flair for finance. A brilliant maths and physics student, he graduated in
1991 from the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology. He got his first break selling computers and bought himself a black Mercedes. One
friend said that he moved in a world full of all kinds of sharks, though he himself was honest and observed the law.
It is believed that Perepilichny was involved in offering semi-legal financial services to fellow businessmen, legalising money of dubious
provenance for various clients including corrupt officials. He lost a huge amount of money during the financial crisis and fled to London in January
2010, where he lived a low-profile life with his family in a secure compound.
At some point, he passed a number of documents to Hermitage Capital that implicated several officials Hermitage was already tracking in the
expropriation of $230m from the Russian budget. Hermitage passed the papers to Swiss police, sparking a major investigation.
Perepilichnyy’s documents implicated tax official Stepanova and Stepanov in the fraud. In his only ever interview, Stepanov told a Russian
newspaper in 2011 that Perepilichny was a “physics and maths genius who had started financial activities” but had subsequently gone missing.
Russian court documents from a case the same year say Perepilichnyy was outside the country “because he fears for his life”.
Andrey Pavlov, a lawyer who was close to Stepanov, said in 2012 that Perepilichnyy had wanted to make peace with Stepanov before his death.
Pavlov claimed that Perepilichnyy told him during a meeting in a cafe at Heathrow airport that he wanted a rapprochement with Stepanov and
others in Russia. Having handed over documents to the Swiss prosecutors, Pavlov claimed, Perepilichnyy had accidentally implicated himself and
seen most of his own funds frozen.
Whether he was a whistleblower who had gone to police after his conscience got the better of him, or a corrupt financier who had ratted on his
associates after he fell into financial ruin, there is no doubt that Perepilichnyy had powerful enemies. ]
Navalniy went over the connections between the embezzlement reported by Magnitskiy and the Roldugin offshore, then wondered
how the story could possibly make sense: http://navalny.com/p/4845/
If, as Moscow claims, Browder and Magnitskiy embezzled the money, what kind of sense does it make for them to shift the money
to Roldugin? No—the thieves who stole the money used some of it to buy apartments in Moscow and Dubai and shifted part of
the money to Roldugin’s (Putin’s best friend) offshore—that would give them complete immunity and a guarantee of security.
Levada polls Russians on the Panama Papers
http://www.levada.ru/2016/04/27/rassledovanie-o-panamskih-offshorah/
The poll was taken on 22-25 April…Have you heard about the Panama scandal and if so, does it interest you? Yes, I’ve heard of
it and it’s interesting to me—14%...I’ve heard of it, but am not interested—29%...I haven’t heard anything about it—56%...Hard
to say—2%...
Was it unexpected/not unexpected for you to learn that friends of the president had used offshores (from among those who had
heard of the scandal—as are most of the remaining responses to other questions)? Unexpected—30%...Not unexpected—
53%...Hard to answer—18%
Does this information cast a shadow on the president or does it not touch on him personally? It casts a shadow on Putin—
40%...It does not touch on him personally—47%...Hard to answer—13%
What was the aim of publishing the material? A struggle for transparency in the global financial system—12%...A struggle against
business and political figures hiding their income and avoiding taxes—26%...To discredit politicians from various countries—
18%...To discredit Vladimir Putin personally—34%...Hard to answer—10%...
What should Russia do about the information on Russians taking money offshore? Conduct an investigation—48%...Legally limit
or ban Russian citizens from sending money offshore—39%...Other—2%...Don’t do anything—9%...Hard to answer—9%...
Will there be any consequences in Russia after the publication of the material on offshoring? A decline in trust of the country’s
leadership—16%...High profile resignations in the country’s leadership—15%...Vlast will adopt tough measures against its critics,
journalists, and opposition figures in order to head off discussion of the material—14%...Other—2%...There will not be any
consequences—37%...Hard to answer—18%...
This is a question for all respondents…Officials have to file income/property statements in April. Do you think that they usually
declare all of their property and income or only part of it? All of it—5% (last year, this was 15%)…Most of it—14% (8% last
year)…A lesser part of it—40% (40%)…A very small part—29% (26%)…Hard to answer—12% (12%)
(All respondents) Do you think Putin bears responsibility for high level corruption and financial abuses, as his opponents say he
does? Yes—26% (37% in May of last year)…To a significant degree—33% (43%)…Only partly—25% (14%)…He does not
bear responsibility—9% (3%)…Hard to answer—7% (3%)…
(All respondents) Do you think Putin is guilty of the abuses his opponents accuse him of? Undoubtedly—14% (7% in July of last
year; 16% in April of 2012)…Probably, but I don’t really know much about it—37% (29%; 32%)…Even if true, it’s more
important the country began to live better under Putin—18% (31%; 25%)…I don’t believe that Putin has abused his power—
17% (22%; 11%)…Hard to answer—14% (12%; 16%)
Levada polls on the National Guard
http://www.levada.ru/2016/04/28/sozdanie-natsionalnoj-gvardii-rf/
Why was the National Guard created? For a more effective struggle with the terrorist threat—24%...To deal with possible mass
disorders connected with the economic crisis and falling living standards—18%...To deal with possible mass disorders connected
with the hostile, anti-Russian activities of the West—15%...Because of the corruption and ineffectiveness of the MVD and Internal
Troops—12%...In connection with possible mass protests during and after the 2018 presidential election—6%…It was created
for Putin’s former bodyguard Zolotov—VVP does not trust the current power structures—6%...Hard to answer—19%
Stanovaya: Five reasons there won’t be any reforms
Kudrin has returned to work in an official capacity—but there are no real grounds for optimism regarding reforms. Vlast will not
allow any. Why? First—Putin believes that the economic and political system has been formed and is operating pretty well—there
may be some small matters to fix, but Putin’s “everything is fine” attitude is the biggest obstacle to reforms…
Second—a lack of strategic planning or thinking on the part of vlast, which is reactive in nature. Its focus on foreign policy means
that each time there is an external challenge, it’s time for mobilization and repression. Any change is seen as a possible basis for
destabilization. Thus, vlast prefers “gray” technocrats to liberal strategists. Anyway, liberal strategist Kudrin isn’t so much making a
return to vlast as he is getting close to vlast. But even getting close to vlast has a tendency to change strategists into technocrats—
Kudrin used to say that the economy could not be developed without structural reforms, but he is already growing more
cautious…
Third—the logic of a besieged fortress: that the West is hostile and wishes to see Russia destroyed has become axiomatic in vlast.
And liberal reforms are seen as “Western”—making any reformer suspect, at least, a Western agent at most. Reforms are seen as
risky and destabilizing—and perhaps a Western plot…
Fourth—reforms without politics: there’s an eternal argument among liberals about whether to begin reforms with political or
administrative changes. The non-systemic opposition says that first there should be political reforms, then administrative; Kudrin
says they should be conducted simultaneously; Gref and Chubays think administrative reforms can be carried out under the current
conditions and democracy will follow…But for Putin, changes in the political sphere have already gone far and state administration
isn’t doing so badly. So it’s a mistake that liberals in vlast mean administrative reforms will take place…
Fifth—“true democracy”: there’s a myth that Puitn isn’t afraid of his rating falling and is even prepared for that. But the truth is
different. Take the issue of raising the pension age. When a decision can have an impact on the interests of millions of people,
cause associations with the 90s, cause a feeling of injustice, and undermine the people’s love for the president, Putin yields.
Socially panful reforms are unavoidable as part of market transformations—Putin is terribly afraid of breaking his contract,
however frayed at the edges, with the narod…
So why was Kudrin called in? Oil prices are going back up a bit, the ruble has strengthened, the elections are under control, the
war in Ukraine has been “frozen,” and Putin has been rehabilitated regarding Syria. So vlast needs a post-war agenda. Bastrykin
has stated his (see the 18 and 19 April notes). Kudrin and Gref have spoken. Putin sees the proposals of the systemic liberals as
appropriate. But is the formulation of an agenda an administrative or political project? Is a dialogue for the elections or a plan for
action outside of the context of the elections? Is Putin preparing for elections or for reforms? Sure, there will be long term program
that results from the “reformist itch”—but it will inevitably wind up on Putin’s desk and stay there as Putin embarks on another
war…
Comment: Maybe bringing back Kudrin is what I said it was—a “balancing” move since the siloviky have gained so
much ground during the war in Ukraine, then Syria, and a gesture to the West, indicating Putin wants to talk, not
fight. As Zubarevich noted yesterday, some ideas the liberals have backed, like making some budget cuts (she was
mostly talking about at the regional level, but “optimization” is one theme that’s come up in discussions of the reforms
of the “power block”), are being cautiously implemented. But that doesn’t mean there will be structural reforms.

Another launch delay at Vostochniy Cosmodrome (Putin reprimands Rogozin)
http://arstechnica.com/science/2016/04/russian-leadership-reportedly-not-amused-by-latest-launch-delay/
On Wednesday morning, Russian President Vladimir Putin and the country's senior space official, Deputy Prime Minister
Dmitry Rogozin, were on hand to see the inaugural launch from the new Vostochny Cosmodrome, located in the far east of
Russia. They had to be disappointed after a technical glitch with the rocket delayed the launch for one day.
Based upon an unnamed source, the Russian TASS agency reported that the delay came after the rocket's automated
launch system "identified a glitch in one of the instruments of the control system responsible for starting and stopping the
engines, for the separation of rocket stages, and for the direction of flight." The delay was not due to a problem with the new
launch infrastructure, accordingto reports.
FURTHER READING
It is not clear how Putin took the delay, but he will apparently remain at Vostochny for 24 hours to see the launch of
the Soyuz-2.1a rocket on Thursday (10:01pm ET Wednesday). However, a displeased-looking Rogozinapparently "hastily
withdrew" from a launch observation deck after the cancellation and did not respond to questions from reporters.
Russian space officials are eager to move forward with the launch. Putin has considered the modern, $3 billion facility one of
his signature projects, yet it has been beset by hunger strikes, claims of unpaid workers, and other challenges. A year ago,
Russia’s Prosecutor General reported that $126 million had been stolen during construction. Additionally, a man driving a
diamond-encrusted Mercedes was arrested after embezzling $75,000 from the project.
The delays have not really hampered the robust Russian commercial space program, however, as the country can also
launch some of its rockets from facilities in Kazakhstan, the Plesetsk Cosmodrome north of Moscow, and the Guiana Space
Center in South America. However Russia's space agency wants to wind down its reliance on the historic Baikonur
Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan, as it has had to lease those facilities since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
The launch took place today: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-space-vostochny-idUSKCN0XO1R8
Russia launched its first rocket from a new cosmodrome on Thursday, a day after a technical glitch forced a
postponement of the event in a sign of continuing crisis in the nation's space industry.
An unmanned Soyuz-2.1A rocket, carrying three satellites, roared into a clear blue sky from the launchpad at Vostochny cosmodrome
in the remote Amur Region near China's border at 0501 Moscow time (0201 GMT), state television showed.
The satellites separated from the rocket's third stage about nine minutes into the flight and headed for their designated orbits, Russian
news agencies quoted officials from the space agency Roscosmos as saying.
The launch was called off less than two minutes before lift-off on Wednesday, upsetting President Vladimir Putin. He had flown
thousands of kilometers to watch what Russian media and officials called a historic event.
"I want to congratulate you. There is something to be proud of," Putin told cosmodrome workers and Roscosmos officials after watching
Thursday's launch at Vostochny, Russian media reported.
"The equipment overreached itself a little bit yesterday," he said. "In principle, we could have held the launch yesterday, but the
equipment overdid its job and stopped the launch. This is a normal thing."
His remarks contrasted with his tough words after Wednesday's aborted launch, when he criticized Roscosmos and government officials
for the large number of technical problems in the space industry, saying that "there should be an appropriate reaction".
Putin reprimanded Roscosmos head Igor Komarov and Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, who is in charge of space and military
industries, Russian news agencies quoted Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov as saying.

Sent time: 04/27/2016 03:00:24 PM
BCc: ottorc@state.gov

Магнитском. Ранее против показа выступили родственники убитого в 2009 году в СИЗО юриста, назвав
картину лживой. При этом сам Некрасов заявил, что за внезапным запретом стоит Билл Браудер, передает
EU Observer.
По словам режиссера, в ходе съемок он пришел к выводу, что Магнитский "не был убит". "Более того, он не
вел расследования против российских офицеров полиции и не выдвигал обвинений в их адрес", - отметил
Некрасов. Он добавил, что не исключает подачи иска против Браудера за обвинения в "фальсификации
доказательств".
показывает, что здесь право на свободу слова предоставляется только одной стороне", - подчеркнула она.
давления со стороны Браудера для отмены показа фильма, назвав это давление "внезапным и сильным".
"Со вчерашнего дня ряд писем начали приходить мне и моим коллегам от адвокатов, связанных с
господином Браудером. Да, это правда", - признала она.
Ранее мать и вдова юриста Сергея Магнитского выразили протест против намеченной на вечер 27 апреля
в Европейском парламенте премьеры фильма о нем. В письме, адресованном фракции "Зеленые -
Европейский свободный альянс", организовавшей показ, близкие Магнитского признали, что недавно они
получили возможность предварительно посмотреть фильм, который произвел на них гнетущее
впечатление. "Мы все глубоко возмущены и одновременно испытываем чувство брезгливости", - говорится
в послании, которое цитирует "Радио Свобода".
Родственники Магнитского называют фильм лживым и отмечают, что, как и другие подобные фильмы в
России, он был снят с целью очернить его имя и постараться оправдать лиц, которые причастны к его
смерти. "Любая часть фильма, любой отрывок, где автор пытается оболгать Магнитского, легко
опровергается огромным количеством оригинальных документов, свидетельствами очевидцев, выводами
независимых комиссий…" - подчеркивается в письме.
несколько дней до телевизионной премьеры на канале ARTE. Некрасов, известный критической позицией
в отношение российских властей, начал работать над фильмом о Магнитском при поддержке крупнейших
европейских кинематографических организаций и СМИ, в том числе франко-германской ARTE,
норвежских NRK и NFI, финской YLE и других, отмечает агентство РИА "Новости".
Напомним, сотрудник фонда Hermitage Capital, партнер британской юридической фирмы Firestone Duncan
Ltd. Сергей Магнитский умер в московском СИЗО 16 ноября 2009 года. Он был арестован по обвинению в
уклонении от уплаты налогов. Коллеги Магнитского Браудер и глава Firestone Джемисон Файерстоун
заявили, что Магнитского арестовали после того, как тот вскрыл коррупционные схемы, к которым
оказались причастны некоторые чиновники и сотрудники МВД, в том числе Павел Карпов.
Принимавший участие в расследовании одного из уголовных дел, связанных с Hermitage Capital, Карпов
добивался через суд в России и Великобритании прекращения распространения недостоверной
информации. Он требовал взыскать с Браудера, Файерстоуна и компании Hermitage Capital компенсацию за
клевету.
11 июля 2013 года Тверской суд Москвы заочно приговорил Уильяма Браудера к девяти годам заключения
по делу о неуплате налогов на сумму более 522 млн рублей путем фальсификации налоговых деклараций и
незаконного использования льгот, предназначенных для инвалидов. В этом же преступлении суд признал
виновным и покойного Магнитского. Через две недели после этого Россия объявила Браудера в
международный розыск.
Навальном
Sent from my iPad
Sent time: 04/27/2016 03:09:42 PM
Subject: Re: Nekrasov Film Cancelled

The NBC investigation seems more serious. Safe trip.
Sent from my iPad
On Apr 27, 2016, at 3:05 PM, David Kramer <David.J.Kramer@asu.edu> wrote:
Магнитском. Ранее против показа выступили родственники убитого в 2009 году в СИЗО юриста,
назвав картину лживой. При этом сам Некрасов заявил, что за внезапным запретом стоит Билл
Браудер, передает EU Observer.
По словам режиссера, в ходе съемок он пришел к выводу, что Магнитский "не был убит". "Более того,
он не вел расследования против российских офицеров полиции и не выдвигал обвинений в их адрес",
- отметил Некрасов. Он добавил, что не исключает подачи иска против Браудера за обвинения в
"фальсификации доказательств".
показывает, что здесь право на свободу слова предоставляется только одной стороне", - подчеркнула
она.
давления со стороны Браудера для отмены показа фильма, назвав это давление "внезапным и
сильным". "Со вчерашнего дня ряд писем начали приходить мне и моим коллегам от адвокатов,
связанных с господином Браудером. Да, это правда", - признала она.
Ранее мать и вдова юриста Сергея Магнитского выразили протест против намеченной на вечер 27
апреля в Европейском парламенте премьеры фильма о нем. В письме, адресованном фракции "Зеленые
- Европейский свободный альянс", организовавшей показ, близкие Магнитского признали, что
недавно они получили возможность предварительно посмотреть фильм, который произвел на них
гнетущее впечатление. "Мы все глубоко возмущены и одновременно испытываем чувство
брезгливости", - говорится в послании, которое цитирует "Радио Свобода".
Родственники Магнитского называют фильм лживым и отмечают, что, как и другие подобные фильмы
в России, он был снят с целью очернить его имя и постараться оправдать лиц, которые причастны к
его смерти. "Любая часть фильма, любой отрывок, где автор пытается оболгать Магнитского, легко
опровергается огромным количеством оригинальных документов, свидетельствами очевидцев,
выводами независимых комиссий…" - подчеркивается в письме.
несколько дней до телевизионной премьеры на канале ARTE. Некрасов, известный критической
позицией в отношение российских властей, начал работать над фильмом о Магнитском при поддержке
крупнейших европейских кинематографических организаций и СМИ, в том числе франко-германской
ARTE, норвежских NRK и NFI, финской YLE и других, отмечает агентствоРИА "Новости".
Напомним, сотрудник фонда Hermitage Capital, партнер британской юридической фирмы Firestone
Duncan Ltd. Сергей Магнитский умер в московском СИЗО 16 ноября 2009 года. Он был арестован по
обвинению в уклонении от уплаты налогов. Коллеги Магнитского Браудер и глава Firestone Джемисон
Файерстоун заявили, что Магнитского арестовали после того, как тот вскрыл коррупционные схемы, к
которым оказались причастны некоторые чиновники и сотрудники МВД, в том числе Павел Карпов.
Принимавший участие в расследовании одного из уголовных дел, связанных с Hermitage Capital,
Карпов добивался через суд в России и Великобритании прекращения распространения
недостоверной информации. Он требовал взыскать с Браудера, Файерстоуна и компании Hermitage
Capital компенсацию за клевету.
11 июля 2013 года Тверской суд Москвы заочно приговорил Уильяма Браудера к девяти годам
заключения по делу о неуплате налогов на сумму более 522 млн рублей путем фальсификации
налоговых деклараций и незаконного использования льгот, предназначенных для инвалидов. В этом
же преступлении суд признал виновным и покойного Магнитского. Через две недели после этого
Россия объявила Браудера в международный розыск.
Следователь из "списка Магнитского" потребовал завести дело на Браудера после сюжета
ВГТРК о Навальном
Sent from my iPad
Sent time: 04/27/2016 08:45:04 AM
Subject: Re: Follow up

Just look at the slides I sent and the rebuttal to each of the assertions. If that's all there is........and the seals are not mentioned.
Sent from my iPad
On Apr 27, 2016, at 8:42 AM, John Williams <willijp1@yahoo.com> wrote:
I haven't been able to find a link to the film.
On Wednesday, April 27, 2016 11:24 AM, Bob <robertotto25@gmail.com> wrote:
The Nekrasov film is so incompetent........
I could do a better job of discrediting the 'official' line
http://globalvoices.org/2013/03/12/propaganda-mystery-in-russias-browder-magnitsky-case/
I helped Kevin write the above. If what's alleged is true about the seals, all the regime has to is call in
independent experts and verify it.
It's among the reasons why Magnitskiy calling Fillip Alekseyevich only is important. And Magnitskiy
did admit there were duplicate seals.
Sent from my iPad
You may be right about the Browder PR machine; lots of e-mails going around on this
stuff...Nate has quickly gotten on top of the issue.
Chayka certainly qualifies in the category of "incoherent jerks."
I sent Nate the slides I sent you.
I apologize for the sloppy note yesterday. What I meant was that I wasn't following the
Magnitskiy case in late 2007 thru his death in November 2009. So I have no recollection of
what was said in public at that time. Rather, I read all the stuff made public after
Magnitskiy's murder. That will teach me to write while drinking beer.
I reread the June testimony this morning. It triggered a memory. besides my note on the
meeting with Browder, I also wrote up a note on the different case numbers assigned to the
issues involved that included some thoughts on thatJune document. It all goes to when
exactly the Browder crew knew about the theft of the funds. There's a reference in that
document to a certain Fillip Alekseyevich, just a 1st name and patronymic, no last name.
He worked at tax authority 28. Magnitskiy never does this with anyone else; it sticks out
like a sore thumb. I always wondered whether this was some type of signal to the
investigators that he knew precisely what was up. But it's only speculation.
Meanwhile, I am beginning to feel we are all just a part of the Browder PR machine. When I
wrote the note on the meeting with him, I ended with The Untouchables. Here I will just
quote from the Man Who Shot Liberty Valence: when the legend becomes fact, print the
legend.
On a much happier note, speaking of incoherent jerks, try this:
http://www.newsru.com/russia/27apr2016/4aikapanam.html
Or this
http://www.newsru.com/russia/27apr2016/patrushev.html
Sent from my iPad
From: Williams, John P <WilliamsJP@state.gov>
Sent time: 04/27/2016 09:30:37 AM
To: Robert Otto (robertotto25@gmail.com) <robertotto25@gmail.com>
Subject: FW: Magnitsky case

Just fyi…

From: Fried, Daniel
To: Williams, John P; Flaherty, Daniel R; Ciaccia, Sarah J; Otto, Robert; Curry, Dennis L; Reynolds, Nathaniel L; Hollas, Richard J
Subject: RE: Magnitsky case

Expect you are right. I think we should examine the movie and the NBC allegations if these emerge (and Browder’s rebuttal)
using original source material, i.e., I don’t want us accepting anything Browder says at face value. Trust or not, and verify.

From: Williams, John P
To: Flaherty, Daniel R; Fried, Daniel; Ciaccia, Sarah J; Otto, Robert; Curry, Dennis L; Reynolds, Nathaniel L; Hollas, Richard J

The Nekrasov film, by the way, appears to be full of easily rebuttable accusations, a real hack job. No doubt the purpose,
though, is to obfuscate and perhaps draw attention away from other embarrassing revelations, including the Panama Papers.

To: Flaherty, Daniel R; Fried, Daniel; Marcos, Miliette; Ciaccia, Sarah J; Otto, Robert; Curry, Dennis L; Reynolds, Nathaniel L; Hollas,
Richard J

The talking points look accurate from our point of view, with the caveat that much of the information comes from Browder’s
website. The quotations appear accurate including those from Magnitsky’s written testimony.

From: Flaherty, Daniel R
Sent: Wednesday, April 27, 2016 11:02 AM
To: Fried, Daniel; Marcos, Miliette; Williams, John P; Ciaccia, Sarah J; Otto, Robert; Curry, Dennis L; Reynolds, Nathaniel L; Hollas,
Richard J
Cc: Flaherty, Daniel R
Subject: Magnitsky case

Ambassador Fried: INR says Russia’s Investigative Committee (headed by Bastrykin) dropped the investigation into
Magnitskiy’s death in 2013, a couple of years after Russia’s Presidential Human Rights Council concluded Magnitskiy had been
beaten while in prison.

INR colleagues: Please see the ask below.

John: reporter’s name is Ken Dilanian.

From: Marcos, Miliette
To: Flaherty, Daniel R
Subject: FW: Following up - Magnitsky

Hi Dan,

Dan asked if INR could verify the TPs put together by Kyle Parker below. Let me know if you have any questions.

Thanks,
M

Miliette Marcos
D/CSP
Telephone: + 202.736.7118

From: Bartlett, Sean (Foreign Relations) [http://redirect.state.sbu/?url=mailto:Sean_Bartlett@foreign.senate.gov]
Sent: Tuesday, April 26, 2016 9:56 AM
Cc: Daniel Calingaert <Calingaert@FreedomHouse.org>
Subject: Following up ‐ Magnitsky

Hi David,
Thanks for taking my call just now. The reporter from NBC, Ken Dilanian, has your phone number and I told him you were free
after lunchtime today. Daniel, he also has your email address and knows you’re in Kiev.
Below are what I think extremely helpful bullets that Kyle Parker put together that go through the allegations the reporter laid
out in his initial note. Hopefully these are helpful to you both as well.
Best,
Sean
‐‐‐
Sean Bartlett
Communications Director, Democratic Staff
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Phone: 202.224.4651
Email: Sean_Bartlett@foreign.senate.gov

“Magnitsky was not a lawyer, as Browder calls him”

Magnitsky was indeed a lawyer, who represented the Hermitage Fund and many other clients in court. We have viewed court
documents evidencing this.

Furthermore, in Sergei Magnitsky's testimony to Russia’s Investigative Committee on 5 June 2008, he confirmed his profession
as a lawyer: “Based on my professional activity I provide advisory services on matters of Russian law.”

Finally, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin said at a press conference on December 20, 2012: “Mister Magnitsky, it is known,
was not some rights defender, he did not fight for human rights. He was Mister Browder’s lawyer.”

Just to be clear, Magnitsky was not a barrister, and therefore could not represent clients in criminal court, but did represent
clients in civil court.

“there is no evidence he was beaten in prison”

There is overwhelming evidence that Sergei Magnitsky was beaten in prison.

Photographs of his beaten body were available to us, which show physical evidence of him having been beaten.

We reviewed the detention center protocol, which reports that Magnitsky was beaten with rubber batons by guards on the
evening of November 16, 2009—the night he died.

In July 2011, Russia’s Presidential Human Rights Council referred to the beating of Magnitsky and his injuries in their report:
“As a result, Magnitsky was completely deprived of medical care before his death. In addition, there is reasonable
suspicion to believe that the death was triggered by beating Magnitsky: later his relatives recorded smashed knuckles
and bruises on his body.”

Magnitsky's Death Certificate refers to a cerebral cranial injury.

The forensic postmortem conducted by Russian state experts refers to injuries on Magnitsky's body consistent with the use of
rubber batons.

“it’s clear from police and court records that he wasn’t detained because he blew the whistle on an alleged fraud scheme”

The documents that we have show that Sergei Magnitsky was arrested by subordinates of Russian police officer Artem
Kuznetsov whom he had implicated after testifying against Kuznetsov for involvement in the fraud against his client Hermitage
and the Russian state.

On June 5, 2008, Magnitsky gave a sworn statement to Russia’s Investigative Committee in which he specifically named
Russian police officer Artem Kuznetsov and Russian investigator Pavel Karpov.

On October 7, 2008, Sergei Magnitsky made an additional sworn statement to Russia’s Investigative Committee in which he
described the theft of 5.4 billion rubles (~230 million U.S. dollars) of Russian tax revenue by the same group he had described
in his initial testimony of June 5, 2008 about the fraud against his client.

On November 21, 2008, officer Kuznetsov was assigned to detain Magnitsky.

On November 24, 2008, Kuznetsov’s subordinates arrested Magnitsky.

On October 14, 2009, Magnitsky gave further testimony to Russia’s Interior Ministry, in which he reiterated his previous
testimony naming Kuznetsov and other police officers stating his belief they were complicit in the fraud against his client and in
the theft of 5.4 billion rubles of state funds.

“He was detained over tax evasion by Browder’s companies”

The tax evasion charge was a pretext used for detaining Sergei Magnitsky after his testimonies implicating government
officials. This is referenced in the U.S. Department of State’s 2009 County Reports on Human Rights Practices, which states,
“After Magnitsky gave testimony in court in 2008 against Kuznetsov and Karpov, officials charged and arrested him on tax
evasion charges that many observers believed were fabricated.”

“In fact, there are credible allegations in court documents that Browder and his associates are suspects in the fraud – and
that Browder concocted the whistleblower story to cover that up.”

The U.S. Department of Justice rejects this position in the government's filing with the 2nd Circuit Appeals Court about this
case:

“…for the avoidance of doubt, Baker & Hostetler’s accusations are false. Hermitage is a victim—not a perpetrator—
of the Russian Treasury Fraud… In any event, there is no question here that the [US Government] complaint alleges
Hermitage is a victim of the Russian Treasury Fraud.26 That fraud resulted in, among other things: a law
enforcement raid on the offices of Hermitage and its law firm (A. 312-13 (Compl. ¶¶ 24- 25)); the theft of three
Hermitage Fund corporations (A. 313-14 (Compl. ¶¶ 26-28)); the fraudulent imposition of hundreds of millions of
dollars of fictitious liabilities upon them (A. 314-17 (Compl. ¶¶ 29-37)); the use of these stolen companies to
perpetrate a theft from Russian taxpayers (A. 317-20 (Compl. ¶¶ 38-45)); the need for extensive legal action to
remediate the fraud (A. 322-23 (Compl. ¶¶ 55-56, 59)); and the institution of retaliatory criminal proceedings against
Hermitage agents who reported the fraud (A. 323-25, 327 (Compl. ¶¶ 58, 61-68, 72))… Indeed, Baker & Hostetler
itself, in connection with its prior representation of Hermitage, has explicitly recognized that Hermitage is a victim of
the Russian Treasury Fraud.” “Case 16-132, Document 118, 02/16/2016.”

“All the supposedly independent reports about this in the media and, for example, by the Council of Europe, got their key
information from Browder or from people who trace back to Browder”

Of course, we have communicated with the victims, which include Sergei Magnitsky’s family, Bill Browder, and other
representatives of Hermitage. We also communicated with representatives of the Government of Russia and the European
Union.

The Magnitsky Act is the culmination of exhaustive investigation including open source and classified materials, public debate,
and political negotiations spanning two Congresses.

As for the Council of Europe report, the Rapporteur described their information gathering in the following manner:

“In order to allow the Russian authorities to give me their official views on the different aspects of the case, I
went to Moscow first, between 13 and 16 February 2013. Next, from 25 to 27 April, I travelled to London in
order to meet both the competent British authorities and Sergei Magnitsky’s former client, Bill Browder.
Already on 7 January, I met with the Swiss Prosecutor General and his Deputy and, on 29 and 30 April, with the
competent Cypriot authorities. Finally, on 20 and 21 May 2013, I returned to Moscow in order to hear the
Russian authorities’ response to the issues raised by all the other interlocutors since my first visit.”

As for the Russian filmmaker you mention, I assume you mean Andrei Nekrasov. If so, Nekrasov may have been a Putin critic at one
time, but his recent track record suggests a possible change of heart. In or about 2010, Nekrasov made a film on Belarus, which was
pro-Lukashenko. While Lukashenko isn’t Putin, he is certainly a kindred spirit and it’s unusual for someone associated with Russia’s
democratic opposition to flatter another regional dictator.

I hope this background is helpful and, if you decide to run the story, the following quote may be attributed to Senator Cardin,

"Attempts to defame Sergei Magnitsky are as old as the crime he uncovered. One need only look to the posthumous
prosecution and conviction of Magnitsky to understand the lengths Putin's violent kleptocracy is willing to go to keep its
crimes hidden from the Russian people. Sergei Magnitsky may be gone, but his legacy of courageous patriotism remains an
inspiration to those in Russia, and around the world, who work for a better future. And I am proud to stand with them."

From: John Williams <willijp1@yahoo.com>
Sent time: 04/27/2016 08:42:54 AM

I haven't been able to find a link to the film.
I helped Kevin write the above. If what's alleged is true about the seals, all the regime has to is call in independent
experts and verify it.
It's among the reasons why Magnitskiy calling Fillip Alekseyevich only is important. And Magnitskiy did admit
there were duplicate seals.
Sent from my iPad
You may be right about the Browder PR machine; lots of e-mails going around on this stuff...Nate has
quickly gotten on top of the issue.
I apologize for the sloppy note yesterday. What I meant was that I wasn't following the Magnitskiy case
in late 2007 thru his death in November 2009. So I have no recollection of what was said in public at
that time. Rather, I read all the stuff made public after Magnitskiy's murder. That will teach me to write
while drinking beer.
I reread the June testimony this morning. It triggered a memory. besides my note on the meeting with
Browder, I also wrote up a note on the different case numbers assigned to the issues involved that
included some thoughts on thatJune document. It all goes to when exactly the Browder crew knew
about the theft of the funds. There's a reference in that document to a certain Fillip Alekseyevich, just a
1st name and patronymic, no last name. He worked at tax authority 28. Magnitskiy never does this
with anyone else; it sticks out like a sore thumb. I always wondered whether this was some type of
signal to the investigators that he knew precisely what was up. But it's only speculation.
Meanwhile, I am beginning to feel we are all just a part of the Browder PR machine. When I wrote the
note on the meeting with him, I ended with The Untouchables. Here I will just quote from the Man Who
Shot Liberty Valence: when the legend becomes fact, print the legend.
Or this
Sent from my iPad
Sent time: 04/27/2016 08:35:48 AM
To: Reynolds, Nathaniel L <ReynoldsNL@state.gov>
Cc: Williams, John P <WilliamsJP@state.gov>; Otto, Robert <OttoRC@state.gov>; Curry, Dennis L <CurryDL@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Trending Today in Russian Social Media

Stepanova worked at Tax Authority 28, not 29 as Navalnyy has it.
The agent freedom nonsense came from inside Russia; KISELEV aired only a small part of it. Nekrasov, whose previous films
were on the Litvinenko murder and the 1999 bombings, is no (obvious) regime tool like Popov.
Meanwhile, after the Chayka film, Chayka himself went on about Browder killing Magnitskiy, it self a distinct echo of a Zavtra
piece in 2011
http://zavtra.ru/content/view/2011-08-1621/
It has to be read to be believed and the Zavtra crowd asks some sharp questions at the end. Did Browder know Stepanova at
28, for example?
Sent from my iPad
On Apr 27, 2016, at 6:40 AM, Reynolds, Nathaniel L <ReynoldsNL@state.gov> wrote:
Yes, and maybe explains Browder’s appearance in the “agent freedom” piece from Kiselev, which was followed by
Bastrykin’s decision to open a “check” on Browder’s link to Magnitsky’s murder.
There’s also a new documentary from a Russian filmmaker that claims to uncover lies in Browder’s version of what
happened in the Magnitsky case. It was shown in the European Parliament today. I have to think that was well in the
works before the Panama papers.
To: Otto, Robert; Reynolds, Nathaniel L; Curry, Dennis L
Cc: Robert Otto (robertotto25@gmail.com)
Subject: FW: Trending Today in Russian Social Media
Maybe this has some connection to the NBC reporter’s investigation…
From: Hagengruber, Mathew L
Subject: Trending Today in Russian Social Media
Trending Today in Russian Social Media

1. Magnitsky money in Roldugin’s accounts
2. Extra credit
1. More Panama Papers fallout – this time it’s Magnitsky and Roldugin: It’s a
complicated paper trail to follow, but it appears that an offshore company owned by Putin
friend and cellist Sergei Roldugin received money tied to the Sergei Magnitsky tax evasion
case. This OCCRP article lays it all out in great detail. Liberal/independent media outlets
quickly picked up on this story and it was a big topic on social media last night and into today.
The unanimous conclusion among social media influencers: Putin himself wound up with the
money from the Hermitage Capital/Magnitsky case.

(Journalist and prolific social media commenter Oleg Kashin)
Wow wow wow wow
Headline: Money stolen from Hermitage Capital was found in “Putin’s best friend’s” offshore.
<image001.jpg>
(Mikhail Khodorkovsky)
Monstrous information. Real mafia? OCCRP: in Roldugin’s offshores was the money Magnitsky was looking for.
<image002.jpg>
(Investigative journalist Roman Dobrokhotov)
You’ve misunderstood. Roldugin sold a rare cello to Magnitsky. The money he got was given to children! No, not to
Putin's children, just ordinary children.
<image003.jpg>
(Opposition Duma Deputy Dmitry Gudkov)
In the story with Roldugin, the stolen tax money by Browder’s firms and Magnitsky's death, there is one point that
you should understand. It was the murder of Magnitsky that became the first sign of the current crisis of power. It
was the first high-profile scandal about the Russian elite. When they were looting Yukos, trying to cover it up with the
court and the law. Here it was just fraud and a murder. Therefore, from the first crime they increased the sanctions
against the Russian officials. Therefore, after the murder of Magnitsky, they forced the Duma into submission,
dragging the law of scoundrels. This was the beginning and the international isolation, the first experience of "anti-
sanctions.” That’s why for propaganda and kleptocrats Browder became a new Trotsky, the number one enemy.
That’s how the benefit of petty criminals caused irreparable harm to the country.
<image004.jpg>
(Anti-corruption activist Alexey Navalny)
Read, we’re explaining the sensational continuation of the "Panama dossier" investigation http://navalny.com/p/4845/
From Navalny’s blog: “Let me remind you the main plot of Magnitsky case: The employees of the 29th tax agency
hustled the scheme with the alleged overtax return on income tax and VAT. They provided forged documents and
with their help "returned" billions from the budget. Several companies, stolen during police raids in the Hermitage fund
(you cannot put billions into shell companies), were used in these schemes. Sergei Magnitsky was the auditor of these
companies, he detected the illegal "return" scheme, after which he was arrested and tortured to death in prison. And it
was absolutely unclear why they’re defending these women from the tax agency? They bought villas in Dubai and
houses on Rublevka so openly… Now it is clear why. The tax schemes by Stepanova were feeding another very
famous Vladimir. Today came up the continuation of the story of "Putin's purse" cellist Roldugin… It was the
"Magnitsky case" figures who transferred the money in "Putin's purse". And it was not just the same people but the
same money. Almost one million dollars out of the stolen 230 million was paid to the company, 100% owned by
Putin's best friend.
<image005.jpg>
How Olga Stepanova was filling Vladimir Putin’s purse http://navalny.com/p/4845/
<image006.jpg>
(Cartoonist Sergey Elkinmanaged to connect the Panama Papers to the new season of Game of Thrones)
Cartoon text: Game of Cellos: new season.
User comment: “Roldugin’s washing machine: your money loves this music”
<image007.jpg>

===============
2. Extra credit

Ruscpr (“Russian Pravda”) Facebook community posted a video of aging female volunteers from the United
Russia political party getting rudimentary martial arts training, supposedly in preparation for the “Unified Voting Day.”
The video has mesmerized RuNet, scoring 2,300 shares and over 200,000 views.
<image008.jpg>
Blogger Rustem Adagamov and others shared a photo showing a food collection for people living in
villages.
First, these (expletives) crush food with bulldozers and then begin to collect "products for the villages."
<image009.jpg>
Both pro- and anti-Kremlin voices have taken note of the hunger strike of Savik Shuster, a Canadian-
Ukrainian journalist who is under investigation in Kyiv on what he calls trumped up political charges.
(Pro-Kremlin political activist Filip Maslovskiy)
Shuster suddenly realized the criminal nature of the junta regime, not because of the murder of his colleague Buzina,
but because of the loss of the job as a shepherd of svidomits [a negative, post-Soviet nickname for Ukrainians
used by pro-Kremlin trolls]
<image010.jpg>
And another tweet from him:
Schuster should not be offended – he just got a kick from the children of those who, without batting an eye 70 years
ago, would’ve gutted him for being a journalist named “Savik.”
<image011.jpg>

Web programmers have discovered that the quasi-pro-Kremlin media outlet Gazeta.ru blocks searches on
its site for any of its many articles related to the 2001 Kursk submarine tragedy.
(Former Lenta.ru new media producer Igor Belkin)
They’ve even modified their robots.txt file, real pros!)
<image012.jpg>
<image013.jpg>
LifeNews and other state-run media outlets reported on the “successful” launch of a rocket at the new
Vostochny Cosmodrome, a Russian space center intended to reduce Russia’s dependence on launching
from Kazakhstan. Except the launch wasn’t “successful” at all; it was cancelled at the last minute. Being
who they are, LifeNews never bothered to take down their article, but added a short correction at the end.
(The Stopfake propaganda debunking page)
“Typical Lifenews” section
<image014.jpg>
Russian media outlets yesterday quoted an anonymous Swiss source who said that American officials had
told Western countries to avoid the upcoming economic forum in St. Petersburg.
(VK publik “NOVOROSS - DONETSK, Yet to Come!”)
[American expletives] are banning "free" Europeans from visiting Russia
<image015.jpg>
Journalist Leonid Ragozin and others shared a popular video about what happens to people who speak
Russian in Lviv, Ukraine [spoiler: the old Lviv babushka shoots the Russian speaker on the spot, and neo-
Nazi nationalists run through the video]
I was actually asked by a couple of people in Moscow what is the situation with the Russian language in Lviv. Here it
is – all the truth! J
<image016.jpg>
“Trending Today” is a quick daily roundup of the hot topics on Russian social media and is produced by
the Press Office at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.
This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

Sent time: 04/27/2016 08:23:58 AM

I helped Kevin write the above. If what's alleged is true about the seals, all the regime has to is call in independent experts and
verify it.
It's among the reasons why Magnitskiy calling Fillip Alekseyevich only is important. And Magnitskiy did admit there were
duplicate seals.
Sent from my iPad
You may be right about the Browder PR machine; lots of e-mails going around on this stuff...Nate has
quickly gotten on top of the issue.
I apologize for the sloppy note yesterday. What I meant was that I wasn't following the Magnitskiy case
in late 2007 thru his death in November 2009. So I have no recollection of what was said in public at
that time. Rather, I read all the stuff made public after Magnitskiy's murder. That will teach me to write
while drinking beer.
I reread the June testimony this morning. It triggered a memory. besides my note on the meeting with
Browder, I also wrote up a note on the different case numbers assigned to the issues involved that
included some thoughts on thatJune document. It all goes to when exactly the Browder crew knew
about the theft of the funds. There's a reference in that document to a certain Fillip Alekseyevich, just a
1st name and patronymic, no last name. He worked at tax authority 28. Magnitskiy never does this
with anyone else; it sticks out like a sore thumb. I always wondered whether this was some type of
signal to the investigators that he knew precisely what was up. But it's only speculation.
Meanwhile, I am beginning to feel we are all just a part of the Browder PR machine. When I wrote the
note on the meeting with him, I ended with The Untouchables. Here I will just quote from the Man Who
Shot Liberty Valence: when the legend becomes fact, print the legend.
Or this
Sent from my iPad
From: John Williams <willijp1@yahoo.com>
Sent time: 04/27/2016 07:55:07 AM

You may be right about the Browder PR machine; lots of e-mails going around on this stuff...Nate has quickly
gotten on top of the issue.
I apologize for the sloppy note yesterday. What I meant was that I wasn't following the Magnitskiy case in late 2007
thru his death in November 2009. So I have no recollection of what was said in public at that time. Rather, I read all
the stuff made public after Magnitskiy's murder. That will teach me to write while drinking beer.
I reread the June testimony this morning. It triggered a memory. besides my note on the meeting with Browder, I
also wrote up a note on the different case numbers assigned to the issues involved that included some thoughts on
thatJune document. It all goes to when exactly the Browder crew knew about the theft of the funds. There's a
reference in that document to a certain Fillip Alekseyevich, just a 1st name and patronymic, no last name. He
worked at tax authority 28. Magnitskiy never does this with anyone else; it sticks out like a sore thumb. I always
wondered whether this was some type of signal to the investigators that he knew precisely what was up. But it's
only speculation.
Meanwhile, I am beginning to feel we are all just a part of the Browder PR machine. When I wrote the note on the
meeting with him, I ended with The Untouchables. Here I will just quote from the Man Who Shot Liberty Valence:
when the legend becomes fact, print the legend.
Or this
Sent from my iPad
Sent time: 04/27/2016 06:25:44 AM
To: John P Williams <willijp1@yahoo.com>
Subject: Follow up

I apologize for the sloppy note yesterday. What I meant was that I wasn't following the Magnitskiy
case in late 2007 thru his death in November 2009. So I have no recollection of what was said in
public at that time. Rather, I read all the stuff made public after Magnitskiy's murder. That wi
ll teach me to write while drinking beer.
I reread the June testimony this morning. It triggered a memory. besides my note on the meeting
with Browder, I also wrote up a note on the different case numbers assigned to the issues involved
that included some thoughts on thatJune document. It all goes to when exactly the Browder crew k
new about the theft of the funds. There's a reference in that document to a certain Fillip Alekse
yevich, just a 1st name and patronymic, no last name. He worked at tax authority 28. Magnitskiy
never does this with anyone else; it sticks out like a sore thumb. I always wondered whether this
was some type of signal to the investigators that he knew precisely what was up. But it's only s
peculation.
Meanwhile, I am beginning to feel we are all just a part of the Browder PR machine. When I wrote
the note on the meeting with him, I ended with The Untouchables. Here I will just quote from the
Man Who Shot Liberty Valence: when the legend becomes fact, print the legend.
Or this
Sent from my iPad
Sent time: 04/26/2016 04:09:12 PM
To: John P. Williams <willijp1@yahoo.com>

I do wonder what the story is with him. Neither the Litvinenko nor 1999 flics comport with a regime tool. Did it get to him
somehow or is he just acting in good faith?
Sent from my iPad
On Apr 26, 2016, at 3:12 PM, John P. Williams <willijp1@yahoo.com> wrote:
Right.
Sent from my iPhone
On Apr 26, 2016, at 6:10 PM, Bob <robertotto25@gmail.com> wrote:
Yes, but Nekrasov is no Kiselev.
Sent from my iPad
Will tell Kelly.
Did not go to David's.
Interesting to note recent linking of Browder with Navalniy and then this inquiry...the old
"why now" question.
Sent from my iPhone
Does Kelly know you will be out?
Did you go to David's?
As for the chronology, Hermitage filed complaints about the theft of the firms
as early as February 2008.
Public statements, however, would not be in my memory bank. When
Browder et al went public is a topic you'd need nexus Lexus to accomplish.
I only started following this matter closely after his death, which is when
Browder made all this stuff public
Sent from my iPad
On Apr 26, 2016, at 2:45 PM, John P. Williams <willijp1@yahoo.com>
wrote:
Yeah I know...this may still be around on your return. I will be
out Monday by the way.
Sent from my iPhone
On Apr 26, 2016, at 5:42 PM, Bob
<robertotto25@gmail.com> wrote:
Um, huh? What difference does that make?
The actual theft occurs on December 24, 2007.
That's the day the tax authority 28 authorized the
rebate to the firms illegally reregistered.
Magnitskiy. knew about the illegal re registration
of the three companies that applied for the rebate
at least as of June 2008. He doesn't mention any
theft of budget funds in the June testimony, though.
That comes in October 2008 - 4th page 2nd full
para that I already sent.
The site claims that Magnitskiy discovered the
theft only in July 2008 and Hermitage filed
complaints that same month: see the documents at
the bottom of the page.
http://russian-untouchables.com/eng/230m-theft-
from-budget/
At any rate, Browder may well have gone public
before the October testimony, but he claims he got
the info from Magnitskiy.
Am I missing something?
Good thing I didn't file a leave slip.
Sent from my iPad
On Apr 26, 2016, at 1:53 PM, John Williams
<willijp1@yahoo.com> wrote:
Part of this "reporter's"
argument is that Magnitsky only
mentioned the $230 million tax
evasion scheme after Browder
raised it publicly. Do you know
whether that's true? (passing on
this question from elsewhere)
On Tuesday, April 26, 2016 10:32 AM,
Bob <robertotto25@gmail.com> wrote:
Karpov and Kuznetsov are
mentioned in the June testimony
multiple times and Magniskiy
refers back to it in the October
document.
As for embellishment, I have a
theory/hypothesis that's best left
for a face to face chat.
That said, most of what we know
does come Browder
supplemented with stuff from
novaya. There's no doubt that
the individuals involved were are
a part of a corrupt network.
Sent from my iPad
On Apr 26, 2016, at 7:19 AM,
John Williams
Yeah, I think there's
no doubt Browder
has embellished
along the way, which
may come back to
haunt him.
On Tuesday, April 26,
2016 10:14 AM, Bob
<robertotto25@gmail.com>
wrote:
On the other
hand.....when Karpov
sued Browder in UK,
the judge threw the
case out of court.
Browder touts this.
But the judge also
stated that Browder
had no evidence that
Karpov was involved
in Magnitskiy's
torture and murder.
I don't have my files
here, but I do have
the complete verdict
at home
Sent from my iPad
On Apr 26, 2016, at
7:10 AM, John
Williams
<willijp1@yahoo.com>
wrote:
Thanks.
On
Tuesday,
April 26,
2016 9:58
AM, Bob
wrote:
http://russian-
untouchables.com/eng/testimonies/
His
testimonies.
See the
October
2008,
4th
page,
2nd full
para.
Sent
from my
iPad
From: John P. Williams <willijp1@yahoo.com>
Sent time: 04/26/2016 03:12:24 PM

Right.
Sent from my iPhone
Sent from my iPad
Will tell Kelly.
Interesting to note recent linking of Browder with Navalniy and then this inquiry...the old "why now"
question.
Sent from my iPhone
As for the chronology, Hermitage filed complaints about the theft of the firms as early as
February 2008.
Public statements, however, would not be in my memory bank. When Browder et al went
public is a topic you'd need nexus Lexus to accomplish. I only started following this matter
closely after his death, which is when Browder made all this stuff public
Sent from my iPad
Yeah I know...this may still be around on your return. I will be out Monday
by the way.
Sent from my iPhone
The actual theft occurs on December 24, 2007. That's the day
the tax authority 28 authorized the rebate to the firms illegally
reregistered.
Magnitskiy. knew about the illegal re registration of the three
companies that applied for the rebate at least as of June 2008.
He doesn't mention any theft of budget funds in the June
testimony, though.
That comes in October 2008 - 4th page 2nd full para that I
already sent.
The site claims that Magnitskiy discovered the theft only in July
2008 and Hermitage filed complaints that same month: see the
documents at the bottom of the page.
http://russian-untouchables.com/eng/230m-theft-from-budget/
At any rate, Browder may well have gone public before the
October testimony, but he claims he got the info from
Magnitskiy.
Sent from my iPad
On Apr 26, 2016, at 1:53 PM, John Williams
Part of this "reporter's" argument is that
Magnitsky only mentioned the $230 million
tax evasion scheme after Browder raised it
publicly. Do you know whether that's true?
(passing on this question from elsewhere)
On Tuesday, April 26, 2016 10:32 AM, Bob
Karpov and Kuznetsov are mentioned in the
June testimony multiple times and
Magniskiy refers back to it in the October
document.
As for embellishment, I have a
theory/hypothesis that's best left for a face to
face chat.
That said, most of what we know does
come Browder supplemented with stuff from
novaya. There's no doubt that the
individuals involved were are a part of a
corrupt network.
Sent from my iPad
On Apr 26, 2016, at 7:19 AM, John Williams
Yeah, I think there's no doubt
Browder has embellished along
the way, which may come back
to haunt him.
On the other hand.....when
Karpov sued Browder in UK, the
judge threw the case out of
court. Browder touts this. But
the judge also stated that
Browder had no evidence that
Karpov was involved in
Magnitskiy's torture and murder.
I don't have my files here, but I
do have the complete verdict at
home
Sent from my iPad
On Apr 26, 2016, at 7:10 AM,
John Williams
Thanks.
On Tuesday, April 26,
2016 9:58 AM, Bob
wrote:
http://russian-
His testimonies.
See the October
2008, 4th page, 2nd
full para.
Sent from my iPad
Sent time: 04/26/2016 03:10:58 PM
To: John P. Williams <willijp1@yahoo.com>

Sent from my iPad
Will tell Kelly.
Interesting to note recent linking of Browder with Navalniy and then this inquiry...the old "why now" question.
Sent from my iPhone
As for the chronology, Hermitage filed complaints about the theft of the firms as early as February
2008.
Public statements, however, would not be in my memory bank. When Browder et al went public is a
topic you'd need nexus Lexus to accomplish. I only started following this matter closely after his death,
which is when Browder made all this stuff public
Sent from my iPad
Yeah I know...this may still be around on your return. I will be out Monday by the way.
Sent from my iPhone
The actual theft occurs on December 24, 2007. That's the day the tax
authority 28 authorized the rebate to the firms illegally reregistered.
Magnitskiy. knew about the illegal re registration of the three companies that
applied for the rebate at least as of June 2008. He doesn't mention any theft
of budget funds in the June testimony, though.
That comes in October 2008 - 4th page 2nd full para that I already sent.
The site claims that Magnitskiy discovered the theft only in July 2008 and
Hermitage filed complaints that same month: see the documents at the bottom
of the page.
At any rate, Browder may well have gone public before the October
testimony, but he claims he got the info from Magnitskiy.
Sent from my iPad
On Apr 26, 2016, at 1:53 PM, John Williams <willijp1@yahoo.com> wrote:
Part of this "reporter's" argument is that Magnitsky only
mentioned the $230 million tax evasion scheme after
Browder raised it publicly. Do you know whether that's
true? (passing on this question from elsewhere)
Karpov and Kuznetsov are mentioned in the June
testimony multiple times and Magniskiy refers back to it
in the October document.
As for embellishment, I have a theory/hypothesis that's
best left for a face to face chat.
That said, most of what we know does come Browder
supplemented with stuff from novaya. There's no doubt
that the individuals involved were are a part of a corrupt
network.
Sent from my iPad
Yeah, I think there's no doubt Browder has
embellished along the way, which may come
back to haunt him.
On the other hand.....when Karpov sued
Browder in UK, the judge threw the case out
of court. Browder touts this. But the judge
also stated that Browder had no evidence
that Karpov was involved in Magnitskiy's
torture and murder.
I don't have my files here, but I do have the
complete verdict at home
Sent from my iPad
Thanks.
http://russian-
His testimonies. See the
October 2008, 4th page, 2nd full
para.
Sent from my iPad
From: John P. Williams <willijp1@yahoo.com>
Sent time: 04/26/2016 03:08:55 PM

Will tell Kelly.
Interesting to note recent linking of Browder with Navalniy and then this inquiry...the old "why now" question.
Sent from my iPhone
As for the chronology, Hermitage filed complaints about the theft of the firms as early as February 2008.
Public statements, however, would not be in my memory bank. When Browder et al went public is a topic you'd
need nexus Lexus to accomplish. I only started following this matter closely after his death, which is when Browder
made all this stuff public
Sent from my iPad
Yeah I know...this may still be around on your return. I will be out Monday by the way.
Sent from my iPhone
The actual theft occurs on December 24, 2007. That's the day the tax authority 28
authorized the rebate to the firms illegally reregistered.
Magnitskiy. knew about the illegal re registration of the three companies that applied for
the rebate at least as of June 2008. He doesn't mention any theft of budget funds in the
June testimony, though.
That comes in October 2008 - 4th page 2nd full para that I already sent.
The site claims that Magnitskiy discovered the theft only in July 2008 and Hermitage filed
complaints that same month: see the documents at the bottom of the page.
At any rate, Browder may well have gone public before the October testimony, but he
claims he got the info from Magnitskiy.
Sent from my iPad
On Apr 26, 2016, at 1:53 PM, John Williams <willijp1@yahoo.com> wrote:
Part of this "reporter's" argument is that Magnitsky only mentioned
the $230 million tax evasion scheme after Browder raised it
publicly. Do you know whether that's true? (passing on this
question from elsewhere)
On Tuesday, April 26, 2016 10:32 AM, Bob <robertotto25@gmail.com> wrote:
Karpov and Kuznetsov are mentioned in the June testimony multiple
times and Magniskiy refers back to it in the October document.
As for embellishment, I have a theory/hypothesis that's best left for a
face to face chat.
That said, most of what we know does come Browder
supplemented with stuff from novaya. There's no doubt that the
individuals involved were are a part of a corrupt network.
Sent from my iPad
On Apr 26, 2016, at 7:19 AM, John Williams <willijp1@yahoo.com>
wrote:
Yeah, I think there's no doubt Browder has embellished
along the way, which may come back to haunt him.
On the other hand.....when Karpov sued Browder in UK,
the judge threw the case out of court. Browder touts
this. But the judge also stated that Browder had no
evidence that Karpov was involved in Magnitskiy's
torture and murder.
I don't have my files here, but I do have the complete
verdict at home
Sent from my iPad
Thanks.
http://russian-
His testimonies. See the October 2008, 4th
page, 2nd full para.
Sent from my iPad

Magnitskiy1 PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Magnitskiy1 PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

From: Wayne Allensworth <swallen@1scom.

You might also like