73. DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO., INC. VS.

THE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 93262

FACTS:
The Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. filed a collection suit against Queensland
Hotel and Teodorico Adarna with an ex parte application for a writ of preliminary
attachment. On 3 May 1989, the trial court issued an Order of Attachment, and the
corresponding Writ of Attachment on 11 May 1989. On 12 May 1989, the
summons, a copy of the complaint, and the writ of attachment was served upon
Queensland and Adarna. Queensland and Adarna filed a motion to discharge the
attachment on the ground that at the time the Order of Attachment and Writ of
Attachment were issued, the trial court has yet to acquire jurisdiction over the
cause of action and over the persons of the defendants.

ISSUE:
Whether the writ of preliminary attachment was validly issued.

HELD:
Yes. A writ of preliminary attachment may be issued before the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.

DOCTRINE:
The court may validly issue a writ of preliminary injunction prior to the acquisition
of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. There is an appreciable period of
time between the commencement of the action (takes place upon the filing of an
initiatory pleading) and the service of summons to the defendant. In the meanwhile,
there are a number of actions which the plaintiff or the court may validly take,
including the application for and grant of the provisional remedy of preliminary
attachment. There is nothing in the law which prohibits the court from granting the
remedy prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. In
fact, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court allows the granting of a writ of preliminary
injunction at the commencement of the suit.

74. THOMAS YANG VS. THE HONORABLE MARCELINO R. VALDEZ

G.R. NO. 73317

FACTS:
On 4 January 1985, respondent spouses Ricardo and Milagros Morante brought
an action in the Regional Trial Court of GeneralSantos City against petitioner
Thomas Yang and Manuel Yaphockun, to recover possession of two (2) Isuzu
cargo trucks. The Morante spouses alleged that they had actual use and
possession of the two cargo trucks, having acquired them during the period from
1982 to 1984. The trucks were, however, registered in the name of petitioner
Thomas Yang who was the Treasurer in the Morante spouses’ business of buying
and selling corn. The Morante spouses further alleged that they were deprived of
possession of the vehicles in the morning of January 3, 1985, when petitioner Yang
had the vehicles taken from where they were parked in front of the Coca-Cola Plant
in General Santos City, to the warehouse of Manuel Yaphockun and there they
were thereafter held. Despite repeated demands, the complaint alleged, petitioner
Yang refused to release the trucks to the spouses. To obtain immediate
possession of the Isuzu trucks, the spouses applied for a writ of replevin and put
up a replevin bond of P560,000.00 executed by respondent Milagros Morante and
Atty. Bayani Calonzo.
On January 7, 1985, the respondent judge issued an order of seizure directing the
Provincial Sheriff of South Cotabato to take immediate possession and custody of
the vehicles involved. The Sheriff carried out the order. On January 10, 1985,
defendant Manuel Yaphockun filed a motion seeking repossession of the cargo
trucks, and posted a replevin counter-bond of P560,000.00 executed by himself
and one Narciso Mirabueno. The respondent judge promptly required the
respondent spouses to comment on the counterbond proffered. Yang moved, on
January 21, 1985, for an extension of fifteen days within which to file an answer to
the complaint for replevin. Four days later, petitioner put up a counter-bond in the
amount of P560,000.00 which counter-bond was, however, rejected by the
respondent judge for having been filed out of time.
Yang now argues before us that, firstly, respondent judge had committed a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in approving the
replevin bond of respondent spouses.
ISSUE:
Whether the judge had committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in rejecting Yang’s counter-bond.
HELD:
No, the judge did not commit a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
DOCTRINE:
Under Section 5 of Rule 60, petitioner may "at any time before the delivery of the
property to the plaintiff" require the return of the property; in Section 6, he may do
so, "within five (5) days after the taking of the property by the officer". Both these
periods are mandatory in character. Thus, a lower court which approves a counter-
bond filed beyond the statutory periods, acts in excess of its jurisdiction.
75. AQUINO ET AL VS. QUIAZON
G.R. NO. 201248
FACTS:
On December 16, 2005, a complaint for Annulment and Quieting of Title was filed
before the RTC-Branch 59 by the petitioners, alleged as the heirs of the late Epifanio
Makam and Severina Bautista, who acquired a house and lot situated in Magalang,
Pampanga, consisting of 557 square meters, by virtue of a Deed of Sale; that since
then, they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, adverse,
and notorious possession for more than a hundred years, constructing houses and
paying real estate taxes on the property. Sometime in June 2005, they received
various demand letters from the respondents, claiming ownership over the subject
property and demanding that they vacate the same. The Register of Deeds (ROD) of
San Fernando, Pampanga thereafter confirmed that the property had been titled in the
name of respondents and declared that the said title was invalid, ineffective, voidable
or unenforceable. The petitioners claim that they were the true owners of the said
property. Hence, they prayed that the title be cancelled, and a new title be issued in
their favor. In their answer, respondents asserted that they were the absolute owners
of the subject and denied the allegations in the complaint and proffered affirmative
defenses with counterclaims. The RTC dismissed petitioners' complaint. Anent
petitioners' argument that only the complaint may be considered in determining the
sufficiency of the cause of action, the RTC ruled that under Section 2 in relation to
Section 6, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, a preliminary hearing on the affirmative
defense in the answer might be had at the discretion of the court, during which the
parties could present their arguments and their evidence. CA likewise dismissed
petitioners' appeal. It explained that under Section 6, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, a
court is allowed to conduct a preliminary hearing, motu proprio, on the defendant's
affirmative defenses, including the ground of "lack of cause of action or failure to state
a cause of action." The rule speaks of affirmative defenses that are grounds for a
motion to dismiss. Indubitably, lack of cause of action or failure to state a cause of
action, being one of the grounds for a motion to dismiss, is included thereby. To rule
otherwise would render nugatory the provision of Section 6, Rule 16 and would make
the holding of a preliminary hearing a plain exercise in futility.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in affirming the dismissal of petitioners' complaint on the ground
of lack of cause of action or failure to state a cause of action.

HELD:
The Court notes that respondents' arguments made no assertion that the complaint
failed to state a cause of action.
DOCTRINE:
The familiar test for determining whether a complaint did or did not state a cause of
action against the defendants is whether or not, admitting hypothetically the truth of
the allegations of fact made in the complaint, a judge may validly grant the relief
demanded in the complaint. It is error for the court to take cognizance of external facts
or hold preliminary hearings to determine their existence. If the allegation in a
complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint may be maintained, the same
should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by the
defendants.