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Long March PDF
Long March PDF
Generalissimo Chiang
Background Kai-shek encircled the
Communists in Jiangxi in
1934.
The Red Army in 1934
Although the literal translation of the Chinese Cháng Zhēng is "Long March", official publications of the People's Republic of China
refer to it as "The Long March of the Red Army" (Chinese traditional: 紅軍長征, Chinese simplified: 红军长征, pinyin: Hóngjūn
Chángzhēng). The Long March most commonly refers to the transfer of the main group of the First (or Central) Red Army, which
included the leaders of the Communist Party of China, from Yudu in the province of Jiangxi to Yan'an in Shaanxi. In this sense, the
Long March lasted from October 16, 1934 to October 19, 1935. In a broader view, the Long March included two other forces
retreating under pressure from the Kuomintang: the Second Red Army and the Fourth Red Army. The retreat of all the Red Armies
was not complete until October 22, 1935, when the three forces linked up in Shaanxi.
The divisions of the "Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army" (中國工農紅軍) were named according to historical circumstances,
not by chronological order. Indeed, early Communist units would often form by defection from existing Kuomintang forces, and they
kept their original designations. By the time of the Long March, numerous small units had been organized into three unified groups:
the First Red Army (紅一方面軍/红一方面军/Hóng Yī Fāngmiàn Jūn), the Second Red Army (紅二方面軍/红二方面军/Hóng Èr
Fāngmiàn Jūn), and the Fourth Red Army (紅四方面軍/红四方面军/Hóng Sì Fāngmiàn Jūn).[2] Some translations refer to these
same units as the "First Front Red Army," "Second Front Red Army," and "Fourth Front Red Army" to distinguish them from earlier
organizational divisions.
The First Red Army formed from the First, Third and Fifth Army Groups in southern Jiangxi under the command of Bo Gu and Otto
Braun. When several smaller units formed the Fourth Red Army under Zhang Guotao in the Sichuan-Shaanxi border area, no
standard nomenclature of the armies of the Communist Party existed; moreover, during the Chinese Civil War, central control of
separate Communist-controlled enclaves within China was limited. After the organization of these first two main forces, the Second
Red Army formed in eastern Guizhou by unifying the Second and Sixth Army Groups under He Long and Xiao Ke. In this case, a
"Third Red Army" was led by He Long, who established his base area in the Hunan-Hubei border. The defeat of his forces in 1932
led to a merge in October 1934 with the 6th Army Corps, led by Xiao Ke, to form the Second Red Army. These three armies would
maintain their historical designation as the First, Second and Fourth Red Armies until Communist military forces were nominally
integrated into the National Revolutionary Army, forming the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, during the Second
Sino-Japanese War from 1937 to 1945.
Civil War
The Communist Party of China (CCP) was founded in 1921 by Chen Duxiu with Soviet support. The CCP initially collaborated with
the Chinese Nationalist Party or Kuomintang (KMT), founded by the revolutionary republican Sun Yat-sen. However, after the
unexpected death of Sun in March 1925, a power struggle within the KMT led to the shift in the party's authority to Chiang Kai-shek,
whose Northern Expedition forces succeeded in wresting control of large areas of China from local warlords and establishing a
unified government inNanjing in April 1927. Unlike other nationalist leaders, like Wang Jingwei, Chiang was opposed to the idea of
continued collaboration with the Communist Party. The initial period of cooperation to unify China and end the unequal treaties
broke up in April 1927 when Chiang Kai-shek struck out against the Communists. Unsuccessful urban insurrections (in Nanchang,
Wuhan and Guangzhou) and the suppression of the Communist Party in Shanghai and other cities drove many party supporters to
rural strongholds such as the Jiangxi Soviet, which was organized by Mao Zedong. By 1928, deserters and defecting Kuomintang
army units, supplemented by peasants from the Communist rural soviets, formed the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. The
ideological confrontation between the CCP and the KMT soon evolved into the first phase of the Chinese Civilar.
W
After the establishment of the Jiangxi Soviet, Mao's status within the Party declined. In 1930, Mao claimed a need to eliminate
alleged KMT spies and Anti-Bolsheviks operating inside the Jiangxi Soviet and began an ideological campaign featuring torture and
guilt by association, in order to eliminate his enemies. The campaign continued until the end of 1931, killing approximately 70,000
people and reducing the size of the Red Army from 40,000 to less than 10,000. The de facto leader of the party at the time, Zhou
Enlai, originally supported Mao's purges as necessary to eliminate KMT spies. After Zhou arrived in Jiangxi in December 1931, he
criticized Mao's campaigns for being directed more against anti-Maoists than legitimate threats to the Party, for the campaign's
general senselessness, and for the widespread use of torture to extract confessions. During 1932, following Zhou's efforts to end
[4]
Mao's ideological persecutions, the campaigns gradually subsided.
In December, of 1931 Zhou replacedMao Zedong as Secretary of the First Front Army and political commissar of the Red Army. Liu
Bocheng, Lin Biao and Peng Dehuai all criticized Mao's tactics at the August 1932 Ningdu Conference.[5] The most senior leaders to
support Mao in 1932 were Zhou Enlai, who had become disillusioned with the strategic leadership of other senior leaders in the Party
,
and Mao's old comrade, Zhu De. Zhou's support was not enough, and Mao was demoted to being a figurehead in the Soviet
, during the Long March.[6]
government, until he regained his position later
Chiang's fifth campaign was much more difficult to contain. In September 1933, theNational Revolutionary Armyunder Chiang Kai-
shek eventually completely encircled Jiangxi, with the advice and tactical assistance of his German adviser, Hans von Seeckt.[8] A
fortified perimeter was established by Chiang's forces, and Jiangxi was besieged in an attempt to destroy the Communist forces
trapped within. In July 1934, the leaders of the Party, dominated by the "Twenty-Eight Bolsheviks", a militant group formed in
Moscow by Wang Ming and Bo Gu, forced Mao from the Politburo of the Communist Party in Ruijin and placed him briefly under
house arrest. Mao was replaced byZhou Enlai as leader of the military commission.[9]
Chiang's strategy of slowly constructing a series of interlinking blockhouses (resembling medieval castles) was successful, and
Chiang's army was able to capture several major Communist strongholds within months. Between January and March 1934, the
Nationalists advanced slowly. Bo and Braun continued to employ orthodox military tactics, resulting in a series of Kuomintang
advances and heavy Communist casualties. In October 1934 KMT troops won a decisive battle and drove deep into the heart of the
Central Soviet Area. When Ruijin became exposed to KMT attack, Party leaders faced the choice of either remaining and perishing
[10]
or of abandoning the base area and attempting to break through the enemy encirclement.
In August 1934, with the Red Army depleted by the prolonged conflict, a spy, Mo Xiong, who had been placed by Zhou Enlai in the
KMT army headquarters in Nanchang, brought news that Chiang Kai-shek was preparing a major offensive against the Communist
capital, Ruijin. The Communist leadership decided on a strategic retreat to regroup with other Communist units, and to avoid
annihilation. The original plan was to link up with the Second Red Army commanded by He Long, thought to be in Hubei to the west
and north. Communications between divided groups of the Red Army had been disrupted by the Kuomintang campaign. During the
planning to evacuate Jiangxi, the First Red Army was unaware that these other Communist forces were also retreating westward.
The first movements to screen the retreat were undertaken by forces led by Fang Zhimin, breaking through Kuomintang lines in June
1934. Although Fang Zhimin's troops were soon destroyed, these movements surprised the Kuomintang, who were numerically
superior to the Communists at the time and did not expect an attack on their fortified perimeter
.
The early troop movements were actually a diversion to allow the retreat of more important leaders from Jiangxi. On October 16,
1934, a force of about 130,000 soldiers and civilians under Bo Gu and Otto Braun attacked the line of Kuomintang positions near
Yudu. More than 86,000 troops, 11,000 administrative personnel and thousands of civilian porters actually completed the breakout;
the remainder, largely wounded or ill soldiers, continued to fight a delaying action after the main force had left, and then dispersed
into the countryside.[12] Several prominent members of the Chinese Soviet who remained behind were captured and executed by the
Kuomintang after the fall of Ruijin in November 1934, includingQu Qiubai and the youngest brother of Mao Zedong,Mao Zetan.
The withdrawal began in early October 1934. Zhou's intelligence agents were successful in identifying a large section of Chiang's
blockhouse lines that were manned by troops under General Chen Jitang, a Guangdong warlord who Zhou identified as being likely
to prefer preserving the strength of his troops over fighting. Zhou sent Pan Hannian to negotiate for safe passage with General Chen,
who subsequently allowed the Red Army to pass through the territory that he controlled without fighting.[13] The Red army
successfully crossed theXinfeng River and marched through the province of Guangdong and into Hunan before encountering the last
of Chiang's fortifications at theXiang River.
After passing through three of the four blockhouse fortifications needed to escape Chiang's encirclement, the Red Army was finally
intercepted by regular Nationalist troops, and suffered heavy casualties. Of the 86,000 Communists who attempted to break out of
Jiangxi with the First Red Army, only 36,000 successfully escaped. Due to the low morale within the Red Army at the time, it is not
possible to know what proportion of these losses were due to military casualties, and which proportion were due to desertion. The
conditions of the Red Army's forced withdrawal demoralized some Communist leaders (particularly Bo Gu and Otto Braun), but
Zhou remained calm and retained his command.[13] Most Communist losses occurred over only two days of heavy fighting, from
November 30 to December 1, 1934.
A meeting at Tongdao, close to the border of Hunan and Guizhou, was convened to discuss the direction of the Red Army on
December 12, 1934. Zhou endorsed Mao's proposal, encouraging other leaders to overrule the objections of Bo and Braun. Another
dispute of the direction of the Red Army occurred soon after, once the Red Army reached Liping, in the mountains of southeast
Guizhou. Braun believed that they should travel to eastern Guizhou, but Mao wanted to go to western Guizhou, where he expected
KMT forces to be lighter and which borders Sichuan, and to establish a base area there. In a meeting to decide the army's direction,
Zhou sided with Mao, making Braun "fly into a rage because he was overruled in the debate." At the meeting it was decided that the
Red Army would travel towardsZunyi, in western Guizhou.[14]
On January 1, 1935, the Red Army reached the Wu River. Bo and Braun again insisted the Red Army move back to western Hunan to
join other Communist troops in the area, but their prestige had considerably declined by that point, and their suggestion was rejected.
Even Zhou had become impatient, and proposed a new rule which was put into effect immediately: that all military plans had to be
submitted to the Politburo for approval. The movement passed, clearly depriving Braun of the right to direct military affairs. On
January 15 the Red Army captured Zunyi, the second largest city in Guizhou. As Mao had predicted, the city was weakly defended,
and was too far from Nationalist forces to be under immediate threat of attack.[14] By the time the Red Army occupied Zunyi, it was
highly depleted, and counted little more than 10,000 men.[15] Zhou used the peace afforded in Zunyi to call an enlarged Politburo
[14]
meeting, in order to examine the causes of the Communists' repeated defeats.
After Zhang, Mao gave a speech in which he analyzed the poor tactics and strategies of the two leaders. With Zhou's explicit backing,
Mao won over the meeting. Seventeen of the meeting's twenty participants (the exceptions being Bo, Braun, and He Kequan) argued
in his favor.[16]
Of the three leaders who had controlled the Party before the Zunyi Conference, only Zhou Enlai's political career survived. Zhou was
held partially responsible for the Red Army's defeat, but was retained at the top level of Party leadership because of his differences
with Bo and Braun at Ningdu, his successful tactics in defeating Chiang's fourth Encirclement Campaign, and his resolute support of
Mao.[16] Although the failed leadership of Bo Gu and Otto Braun was denounced, Mao was not able to win the support of a sufficient
[17]
number of Party leaders to gain outright power at the conference.
A major shift in the Party's leadership occurred two months later, in March 1935. Mao was passed over for the position of General
Secretary by Zhang Wentian, but gained enough influence to be elected one of three members of Military Affairs Commission. The
other two members were Zhou Enlai, who retained his position as Director of the Commission, and Wang Jiaxiang, whose support
Mao had enlisted earlier,.[17] Within this group, Zhou was empowered to make the final decisions on military matters, while Ma
o was
Zhou's assistant. Wang was in charge of Party affairs.[16]
In February 1935, Mao's wife, He Zizhen, gave birth to a daughter. Because of the harsh conditions, the infant was left with a local
family[19] (Two Europeans retracing the Long March route in 2003 met a woman in rural Yunnan province said by local officials to
be Mao and He Zizhen's long-lost daughter[20] ).
The Communist forces were harassed by both the Kuomintang and local warlords. To
avoid a fatal confrontation, Zhou and Mao maneuvered the Red army south and west,
through Guizhou, Sichuan, and Yunnan, feigning attacks on Guiyang and Kunming to
disguise their movements. The First Red Army crossed the Yangtze (the section of
Jinsha River) on May 9, 1935, finally escaping determined pursuit, but still had to deal
with dangerous mountain passes at heights of up to 4,000 meters, rough climatic
conditions, shortages of food, clothing, and equipment, and tribes of local ethnic groups
The Luding Bridge hostile to Chinese encroachment.[21] The Red Army had to capture river crossings
defended by warlords and Nationalist troops. The most famous was Luding Bridge,
extolled in official history as an heroic triumph, although many historians now believe
that the difficulty of the battle was exaggerated orthat the incident was fabricated for propaganda purposes.
Communist forces on the Long March clashed against Kham rebels in the 1934 Khamba Rebellion, who were fleeing from Tibetan
government forces.[23]
These changes had no long-term significance because Zhang and Mao disagreed with the direction of the army. Zhang insisted on
going southwest, while Mao insisted on going northwards, towards Shaanxi. No agreement was reached, and the two armies
eventually split, each going their separate ways.[21]
Zhang Guotao's Fourth Red Army took a different route than Mao, travelling south, then west, and finally north through China. On
the way Zhang's forces were largely destroyed by the forces of Chiang Kai-shek and his Chinese Muslim allies, the Ma clique. The
remnants of Zhang's forces later rejoined elements of the Second Red Army before eventually linking up with Mao's forces in
Shaanxi.[24]
On November 19, 1935, the Second Red Army set out on its own Long
March. He Long's force was driven further west than the First Red Army, all the way to Lijiang in Yunnan province, then across the
Jade Dragon Snow Mountain massif and through the Tibetan highlands of western Sichuan. He Long and Xiao Ke were married to
sisters who also accompanied the army. He Long's wife, Jian Xianren, carried the baby daughter she had given birth to three weeks
before the retreat began. Jian Xianfo gave birth to a son in the desolate swamps of northern Sichuan.[26] Forces of the Second Army
detained two European missionaries,Rudolf Bosshardt and Arnolis Hayman, for 16 months.[27] Bosshardt later related his account of
[28]
the details of daily life on the Long March in a book.
Union of the three armies
Mao's First Red Army traversed several swamps and was attacked by Muslim Hui Ma Clique forces under Generals Ma Bufang and
Ma Buqing.[24] Finally, in October 1935, Mao's army reached Shaanxi province and joined with local Communist forces there, led by
Liu Zhidan, Gao Gang, and Xu Haidong, who had already established a Soviet base in northern Shaanxi.[29] The remnants of Zhang's
Fourth Red Army eventually rejoined Mao in Shaanxi, but with his army destroyed, Zhang, even as a founding member of the CPC,
was never able to challenge Mao's authority.[24] After an expedition of almost a year, the Second Red Army reached Bao'an
(Shaanxi) on October 22, 1935, known in China as the "union of the three armies", and the end of the Long March.
All along the way, the Communist Army confiscated property and weapons from local warlords and landlords, while recruiting
peasants and the poor. Nevertheless, only some 8,000 troops under Mao's command, the First Front Army, ultimately made it to the
final destination of Yan'an in 1935. Of these, less than 7,000 were among the original 100,000 soldiers who had started the march. A
variety of factors contributed to the losses including fatigue, hunger and cold, sickness, desertion, and military casualties. During the
[30]
retreat, membership in the party fell from 300,000 to around 40,000.
Aftermath
The greatest strategic retreat in military history turned Mao into a living legend.
— Roderick MacFarquhar, Mao Tse Tung: China's Peasant Emperor, A&E Biography, 2005[31]
While costly, the Long March gave the Communist Party of China (CCP)
the isolation it needed, allowing its army to recuperate and rebuild in the
north of China. It also was vital in helping the CCP to gain a positive
reputation among the peasants due to the determination and dedication of
the surviving participants of the Long March. Mao wrote in 1935:
In addition, policies ordered by Mao for all soldiers to follow, the Eight Points of Attention, instructed the army to avoid harm to or
disrespect for the peasants, in spite of the desperate need for food and supplies. This policy won support for the Communists among
the rural peasants.[33]
Hostilities ceased while the Nationalists and Chinese Communists formed a nominal alliance during the Second Sino-Japanese War
from 1937 until 1945. During these years, the Chinese Communist Party persevered and strengthened its influence. The Red Army
fought a disciplined and organized guerilla campaign[34] against superior Japanese forces, allowing it to gain experience. Following
the end of World War II, the resurgent Communist Eighth Route Army, later called the People's Liberation Army, returned to drive
the Kuomintang out of Mainland China to the island of Taiwan. Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949,
the Long March has been glorified as an example of the Communist Party's strength and resilience. The Long March solidified Mao's
status as the undisputed leader of the CPC. Other participants in the March also went on to become prominent party leaders,
including Zhu De, Lin Biao, Liu Shaoqi, Dong Biwu, Ye Jianying, Li Xiannian, Yang Shangkun, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping.
The Chinese government produced a movie in 2006,My Long March,[35][36] relating personal experiences of a fictional participant in
the Long March.
Historical controversies
The Long March is surrounded by conflicting accounts of what occurred. Some critics and researchers call the earlier accounts
myths, but find that they are difficult to prove or disprove because the Chinese government prevents independent historians from
exploring the topic. The few who were able to perform research recently struggle with the fact that many years have gone by since
[37]
the march took place. Many of the survivors are no longer alive or able to accurately recall events.
Length
In 2003, controversy arose about the distance covered by Mao's First Front Army in the Long March.[38] The figure of 25,000 li
(12,500 kilometres or about 8,000 miles[1]) was Mao's estimate, quoted by his biographer Edgar Snow in Red Star Over China,
published not long after the end of the Long March in 1938. In 2003, two British researchers, Ed Jocelyn and Andrew McEwen,[33]
retraced the route in 384 days,[26][33] and in their 2006 book "The Long March" estimated the March actually covered about
6,000 km (3,700 miles). Jocelyn and McEwen conclude in their book that "Mao and his followers twisted the tale of the Long March
for their own ends. Mao's role was mythologized to the point where ... it seemed he had single-handedly saved the Red Army and
defeated Chiang Kai-shek". Mao exaggerated, perhaps even doubled, the length of the march, they believe.[39] Chinese media dispute
their report: "The 25,000 li of the Red Army's Long March are a historic fact and not open to doubt."[40] However, even at the time
was closer to 18,000 li (9,375 km).[41]
that Edgar Snow's account was written, there were estimates that the distance traveled
Luding Bridge
Well, that's the way it's presented in our propaganda. We needed that to express the fighting spirit of our forces. In
fact, it was a very easy military operation. There wasn't really much to it. The other side were just some troops of the
warlord who were armed with old muskets and it really wasn't that much of a feat, but we felt we had to dramatize it.
— Deng Xiaoping, Quote according to Zbigniew Brzezinski, 2005[42]
The Battle of Luding Bridge has been portrayed as a glorious and heroic moment in Chinese Communist history, analogous to the
Texan Battle of the Alamo. The official account of the battle depicts exhausted and depleted Communist forces in a desperate
situation, where they must fight across a bridge that is guarded by the numerically superior forces of Chiang Kai-shek and his warlord
allies. The Communists send a small volunteer force that braves a hail of gunfire to climb across the bridge on underlying chains and
assault the enemy positions on the other side, hence securing the bridgehead for the rest of the army to cross.
However, there is evidence that differs from the official account of the battle. This suggests that much of the fighting was dramatized,
by Communist leaders, for propaganda purposes. Authors Andrew McEwen and Ed Jocelyn who retraced the route of the Long
March, interviewing survivors along the way, said that a woman in her early 80s recalled that local people led the way across the
bridge and were all shot and killed.[43] Author Sun Shuyun quotes a witness who said that there was a small enemy force on the other
[44]
side armed with guns that could "only fire a few metres". They panicked and fled.
Use as propaganda
The writer Sun Shuyun writes that generations of Chinese have been taught a glorious account of the Long March in order to justify
Mao's Revolution: "If you find it hard", they were told:
think of the Long March; if you feel tired, think of our revolutionary forebears. The message has been drilled into us
so that we can accomplish any goal set before us by the party because nothing compares in difficulty with what they
did. Decades after the historical one, we have been spurred on to ever more Long Marches – to industrialize China, to
feed the largest population in the world, to catch up with the West, to reform the socialist economy, to send men into
space, to engage with the 21st century.[45]
October 2006 marked the 70th anniversary of the end of the Long March. Dozens of newly released, government approved books
were displayed in bookstores, with the intention of showing the heroic actions and drama of the Long March. Chinese television
presented "a feast of Long March-themed entertainment, including a 20-part drama series, documentaries, and even a song-and-dance
extravaganza."[46]
Commentators in the West more often focus on aspects of the Long March rarely portrayed by Chinese propaganda, such as the Red
Army recruiting local people through kidnapping and blackmail.[47] Sun Shuyun interviewed a man who said he was barely into his
teens when he was forced to join the Red Army. This veteran only joined the Red Army because his father was arrested by the
Communists and would not be released until the man agreed to join the army. The man later thought of deserting, but stayed on
because he feared being caught and executed.[37] In order to escape starvation, the Red Army often stole food from villagers in the
remote locations it traveled through.[47]
See also
History of China
History of the Republic of China
History of the People's Republic of China
List of Battles of Chinese Civil War
Military of the People's Republic of China
Military of the Republic of China
National Revolutionary Army
People's Liberation Army
Warlord Era
Whampoa Military Academy
References
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14/content_554037.htm)Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20081212212710/http://english.pladaily .com.cn/site2/
special-reports/2006-08/14/content_554037.htm)December 12, 2008, at theWayback Machine. Retrieved 2007-02-
17
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17. Kampen, Thomas (2000).Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and the Evolution of the Chinese Communist Leadership
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2006. ISBN 962-996-280-2. Retrieved March 12, 2011.p.61 (https://books.google.com/books?id=NztlWQeXf2IC&pri
ntsec=frontcover&dq=zhou+enlai&hl=en&ei=wBkuTdKyB4H_8AaJucigAQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum
=2&ved=0CCsQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false)
22. Hsiao-ting Lin (2010). Modern China's ethnic frontiers: a journey to the west(https://books.google.com/books?id=rsL
QdBUgyMUC&pg=PA52&dq=force+of+about+300+soldiers+was+organized+and+augmented+by+recruiting+local+K
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force%20of%20about%20300%20soldiers%20was%20organized%20and%20augmented%20by%20recruiting%20lo
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history of Asia (illustrated ed.). Taylor & Francis. p. 52. ISBN 0-415-58264-4. Retrieved 2011-12-27. "A force of about
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aintenance/uploaded_pics/TheKarmaofTibet.pdf) (PDF) on September 23, 2015. Retrieved April 24, 2014.
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25. Wiles, Sue (2015). "Li Zhen".In Lee, Lily Xiao Hong; Stefanowska, A. D.; Ho, Clara Wing-chung.Biographical
Dictionary of Chinese Women: The Qing Period 1644-1911 . Oxford: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-7656-0798-0.
26. China Daily (November 23, 2003):Stepping into history (http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-11/23/content_2
83948.htm) (Retrieved November 23, 2006)
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en.asp?TextID=83&page=3) Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20070928070929/http://www
.newlongmarch2.co
m/DisplayNews_en.asp?TextID=83&page=3) September 28, 2007, at theWayback Machine. Retrieved 2007-03-15
28. Bosshardt, Rudolf A. (1936).The Restraining Hand: Captivity for Christ in China
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2006. ISBN 962-996-280-2. Retrieved March 12, 2011.p.62 (https://books.google.com/books?id=NztlWQeXf2IC&pri
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ps://web.archive.org/web/20081212212710/http://english.pladaily .com.cn/site2/special-reports/2006-08/14/content_5
54037.htm) December 12, 2008, at theWayback Machine. (Retrieved November 25, 2006)
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34. *Griffith, Samuel B. (translator) (2005). On Guerrilla Warfare by Mao Tse-tung (1937). Dover Books on History. p. 94.
ISBN 0-486-44376-0.
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Further reading
Chang, Jung & Halliday, Jon (2005). Mao: The Unknown Story. Alfred A. Knopf. pp. 814 pages.ISBN 0-679-42271-
4.
Griffith, Samuel B. (translator) (2005). Yu Chi Chan (On Guerrilla Warfare) by Mao Tse-tung (1937). Dover Books on
History. pp. 128 pages. ISBN 0-486-44376-0.
Jocelyn, Ed & McEwen, Andrew (March 2006).The Long March. Constable and Robinson. pp. 320 pages.ISBN 1-
84529-255-3.
Kampen, Thomas (2000).Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and the Evolution of the Chinese Communist Leadership . Nordic
Institute of Asian Studies. pp. 66–83.ISBN 87-87062-76-3.
King, Dean (2010). Unbound: A True Story of War, Love, and Survival. Little, Brown and Company. pp. 432 pages.
ISBN 978-0-316-16708-6.
Bosshardt, Rudolf Alfred (1975).The Guiding hand: Captivity and Answered Prayer in China . Hodder and Stoughton.
pp. 192 pages. ISBN 978-0340175453.
Salisbury, Harrison Evans (1985).The Long March : The Untold Story. Harper & Row, New York. pp. 419 pages.
ISBN 0-06-039044-1.
Shuyun, Sun (2008). The Long March: The True History of Communist China's Founding Myth. Anchor. p. 304.
ISBN 0-307-27831-X.
Snow, Edgar (1968). Red Star Over China (Revised ed.). Grove Press. pp. 534 pages.ISBN 0-8021-5093-4.
Whitson, William W. (1973). The Chinese High Command : A History of Communist Military Politics 1927–71 .
Praeger. ISBN 0-333-15053-8.
Wilson, Dick (1971). The Long March 1935: The Epic of Chinese Communism's Survival . Penguin Press. pp. 283
pages. ISBN 0-14-006113-4.
Yang, Benjamin (1990).From Revolution to Politics: Chinese Communists on the Long March . Westview Press.
pp. 240 pages. ISBN 0-8133-7672-6.
Young, Helen Prager (2000). Choosing Revolution: Chinese Women Soldiers on the Long March.University of
Illinois Press, pp. 282 pages.ISBN 978-0-252-07456-1
External links
General Information
Key events of the Long March– Account of the Long March by theChina Daily
Retracing Mao's Long March– Report on the modern expeditions by Jocelyn & McEwen along the Long March
routes
The Myth of the 'Turning-Point': Towards a New Understanding of the Long March– Article from 'Bochumer
Jahrbuch zur Ostasienforschung' (2001)
Map of primary route – Locations of the First Front Army route with dates
Long March routes of the Communist armies– Routes of the First, Second and Fourth Front Armies
Site of the Zunyi Conference– Photo and description of the building in which the landmark 1935 politburo meeting
was held
Luding Bridge – Chinese propaganda posters depicting the battle for Luding Bridge
Commemorations
The Long March: 70 Years On – Official Chinese website marking the 70thAnniversary of Long March
"Marking the 70th anniversary of the victory of the Red Army's Long March"
– PLA Daily (Peoples Liberation Army
newspaper) web portal
Art on a Long March – A contemporary art exhibition presented for the public at sites along the route of Mao's Long
March.
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