Thesis - Final Hardbound - Whole Document PDF

ADVOCACY COALITION FRAMEWORK OF POLICY CHANGE AND POLICY-
ORIENTED LEARNING IN R.A. 9700: A DISCOURSE ON HOW POLICY BELIEFS

OF ADVOCACY COALITIONS AND EXTERNAL EVENTS SHAPED THE
PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT’S DECISION TO EXTEND AND REFORM THE
COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION
JOHN VINCENT C. PIMENTEL

071905
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
MASTER OF ARTS IN POLITICAL ECONOMY
WITH SPECIALIZATION IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT
IPE 5000
THESIS FOR IPE
SUBMITTED TO
DR. MAY ZULEIKA SALAO, THESIS COORDINATOR

DR. NICK ALVIAR, INTERNAL READER
DR. ROLANDO DY, EXTERNAL READER
INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
UNIVERSITY OF ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

DECLARATION
The undersigned declared that the Thesis entitled
ADVOCACY COALITION FRAMEWORK OF POLICY CHANGE AND POLICY-

ORIENTED LEARNING IN R.A. 9700: A DISCOURSE ON HOW POLICY BELIEFS
OF ADVOCACY COALITIONS AND EXTERNAL EVENTS SHAPED THE
PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT’S DECISION TO EXTEND AND REFORM THE
COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION
is an authentic record of an original research work carried out by the author under the
supervision of (name of thesis adviser) and has not been presented for any other degree of
diploma earlier.
____________________
John Vincent C. Pimentel
Master of Arts in Political Economy
Political Economy Program
Political Economy Program

University of Asia and the Pacific
July 24, 2017
APPROVAL SHEET
The thesis attached hereto, entitled, “Advocacy Coalition Framework Of Policy Change And
Policy-Oriented Learning In R.A. 9700: A Discourse On How Policy Beliefs Of Advocacy

Coalitions And External Events Shaped The Philippine Government’s Decision To Extend
And Reform The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program Implementation”, an authentic
record of an original work carried out by John Vincent C. Pimentel under my supervision and
guidance during the period from SY 2016-2017 in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts in Political Economy with a Specialization in International

Relations and Development under the supervision of the Political Economy Program of the
School of Law and Governance of the University of Asia and the Pacific, is hereby approved.
The work presented in this thesis has not been submitted for any degree or diploma earlier.
May Zuleika Q. Salao, Ph.D.

Thesis Coordinator
The thesis, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts in Political
Economy with Specialization in International Relations and Development under the Political
Economy Program of the School of Law and Governance of the University of Asia and the
Pacific, has been defended before and examined by the following panel members:
Rolando T. Dy, Ph.D. Nicomedes B. Alviar, Ph.D.

External Reader Internal Reader
The thesis, after having been examined and approved by the members of the defense panel, is
hereby accepted.
Atty. Delia S. Tantuico Atty. Joaquin E. San Diego

Program Director Dean
Political Economy School of Law and Governance
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This thesis will not be possible without the support of the following:
My parents, Hon. Johnny and Rosalinda Pimentel, for the unwavering patience,
understanding, and moral and financial support;
My thesis advisers Dr. Nanette Dungo, Dr. Abigail de Leon, and Dr. May Salao for their
tough yet continuous guidance and direction, especially in times of confusion and waning
interest in my chosen field of research;
My esteemed professors in Political Economy for instilling the value of excellence, diligence,
discipline, and strength amidst adversity in the course of my undergraduate and graduate
studies;
The administrative assistants of the Institute of Political Economy, Ms. Brederi Dunca and
Ms. Myra Labayne, who have both been very helpful and considerate in our submission of
papers and requirements;
My classmates and friends in Political Economy (Francine Turo, Abraham Guiyab, Mary
Frances Lozada, Veronica Cruz, Karen Caballero, Ellah Din, Jemima Landong, Luke
Magsila, Ramon Cabrera, David Rosario, and Justin Akia, among others) for their sympathy
over our common experiences and their incessant encouragement in times of doubt on
continuing my Masters Programs;
My college best friend Jessica Advento for her patience, understanding, and provision of
various assistance in the course of finishing my thesis proposal;
My High School best friends and barkadas, BFFs and The Cutes (Camille Adle, Bryan
Gilbuena, Rhyan Dasalla, Mae Ceniza, Kristel Jarabelo, Krystelle Quimpo, Nigel de Castro,
Bernard Rageth, Bullet Lagon, Khryss Pude, Francis Libron, Marc Claudio, Jason Botoy,
Lorenzo Rivero, Renz Manansala, Jericho Calzo, Philogene Negapatan, among others) for
showing incessant motivation whenever I’m close to giving up and providing me with happy
and unforgettable diversions and distractions whenever I feel burnt out in the process of
finishing my thesis;
My life partner John Herrera for continuing to inspire me to dream bigger and motivating me
to never conform to mediocrity;
And John’s best friend, Jinggay Serag, for patiently sitting in my mock defense and
providing a critical recommendation that I believe secured the passage of my final defense.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................1-17

Background of the Study .............................................................................. 1-7
Research Questions ...................................................................................... 7-8
Objectives of the Study ................................................................................ 8-9
Definition of Terms .................................................................................... 9-15
Significance of the Study ......................................................................... 15-16
Scope and Limitations .............................................................................. 16-17
CHAPTER II: REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL

FRAMEWORK ............................................................................18-66
A. CARP’s Flaws: Empirical Findings .................................................... 19-24
B. Theoretical Perspectives on CARP’s Flaws ........................................ 25-43
C. Summary of Strengths and Weaknesses and Research Gap ................ 43-44
D. Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) as the Appropriate Framework ....
..................................................................................................... 44-66
Figure 2.1. Conceptual Diagram of the Advocacy Coalition Framework
by Paul Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1994 ed.) .................................... 53
Figure 2.2. Conceptual Diagram of the ACF’s Main Thesis ................. 61
Figure 2.3. Operational Diagram: ACF (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith,
1994) as applied to the case of (CARPER) law (R.A. 9700) ................ 66

CHAPTER III: HISTORY OF LAND REFORM IN THE PHILIPPINES.......67-87
CHAPTER IV: POLICY SUBSYSTEM, ADVOCACY COALITIONS AND

THEIR POLICY BELIEFS, AND POLICY BROKERS .......88-147
A. Policy Subsystem ................................................................................ 88-90
B. Advocacy Coalitions ............................................................................ 90-96
C. Policy Beliefs ..................................................................................... 96-144
D. Policy Brokers ................................................................................. 145-147
CHAPTER V: CARPER: AN EXAMPLE OF POLICY CHANGE THROUGH

POLICY-ORIENTED LEARNING .......................................148-272
A. Indicators of Policy Change in the Case of CARPER ..................... 148-161
B. Test Cases on Policy Change through Policy-Oriented Learning
.............................................................................................................. 162-272
CHAPTER VI: THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL SHOCKS ON THE DECISION TO

ENACT CARPER ....................................................................273-287
CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................288-292

APPENDICES...........................................................................293-316
BIBLIOGRAPHY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This thesis explains the policy change process of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP). CARP was instituted by the Corazon Aquino administration as a policy
tool to rectify unequal land ownership and alleviate poverty among farmers through a
comprehensive re-distribution of all agricultural lands. Decades of CARP implementation,
however, failed to achieve its social objectives until the 14th Congress (2007-2010) extended
CARP with substantial reforms thereby producing the CARP Extension and Reforms
(CARPER) law. Utilizing Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s Advocacy Coalition Framework
(ACF) and deductive content analysis of statements of participants in the congressional
deliberations on CARPER, the study finds that both (1) policy-oriented learning or learning
from past implementation and the (2) consideration of select external factors compelled the
decision of the 14th Congress legislators to extend and reform CARP through CARPER.
These four policy core issues were on (1) coverage, (2) security of land transfer process, (3)
support services, and (4) the role of DAR and implementing agencies. Deliberations on these
four issues show that conflicting policy beliefs compelled competing coalitions to engage in
intense but constructive debates that led to clarifications and eventually compromises. Such
compromises were enabled by the multi-level nature of policy beliefs and by the presence of
policy brokers’ intent in diffusing tension between competing coalitions and finding workable
solutions to policy problems. These compromises became the amendment provisions
incorporated in CARPER. Meanwhile, external factors considered by the 14th Congress
legislators included the following: (1) the constitutional mandate to pursue social justice
through CARP and this provided a constant institutional pressure to continue and improve it;
(2) the unchanging or minimally improving socioeconomic conditions of CARP beneficiaries
that served to justify continued demand for CARP extension as a social justice and welfare
program, (3) government administrations that were open to reform. By describing the
process through which the agreement to continue and improve CARP through CARPER was
forged, and identifying the factors external and internal to such process, this thesis clarifies
policy change in agrarian reform that may provide guidance to future policymaking in this
policy area.
ADVOCACY COALITION FRAMEWORK 1
Chapter I
Introduction
Background of the Study
The study offers an explanation as to how, despite its flaws and highly contentious
nature, Republic Act 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) as a
government program was continued and reformed through its second extension program RA
9700, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program Externsion with Reforms (CARPER). In
particular, the study discovers that both feedback learning (i.e. policy-oriented learning) and
the consideration of select major external stimuli (i.e. external shocks) influenced the
decision of the House of Representatives to continue and introduce substantial policy
changes to CARP as embodied in the provisional amendments in CARPER. This finding
challenges the traditional notion that the legislature is dominated by landed interests and that
the historical enmity between landowners and landless farmers prevents any constructive
agreement on improving a government program of national importance such as CARP. Given
this, the study contributes to a greater understanding of the characteristics and evolution of
CARP as a state policy.
Existing literature proposes three theoretical perspectives (government-market
interaction, colonial history, and weak state theory) to explain CARP’s perceived flawed
character and failures. The first claims that the intervention of the Philippine government
through CARP distorted the agricultural market. The second argues that agrarian reform
laws, including CARP, adopted conflicting or barely reconcilable dual principles that
originate from sociopolitical considerations during the Spanish and American colonial
periods. The third claims that CARP’s defective quality is due to a weak state susceptible to
interests contrary to the objectives of CARP as a government program. None of the
perspectives prove solely sufficient in explaining the factors that led to the decision of
Congress to continue and change CARP amidst these flaws. Therefore, this literature gap
merited a renewed scholastic discussion of the land reform legislation process as reflected in
the case of R.A. 9700’s deliberations, so that a more nuanced understanding of issues in
Philippine agrarian reform may be pursued. Given CARP’s importance in developing a
viable rural economy and reducing rural poverty, it is therefore imperative to re-evaluate
through a perspective based on coalition dynamics and policy-oriented learning (i.e.
Advocacy Coalition Framework), how the Philippine Congress as a state institution arrived at
synergy between historically conflicting classes sufficient to enable the extension of CARP
through CARPER.
The choice of this research problem is further justified by statistics relating to
agriculture. In the 2007 Annual Poverty Income Statistics (APIS) of the National Statistics
Office (NSO), 163,822 (around 36.7%) of 446,600 families who acquired lands under CARP
still belonged to the bottom 30% of the country’s population or are still living below the
poverty line. In 2008, the year the first CARP extension ends and before the second
extension law (i.e. R.A. 9700) was passed, this percentage decreased to 30% (NSO, 2008).
Although it decreased, 30 per cent is still a significant number considering CARP’s existence
for over three decades. These numbers are especially significant when contrasted with the
national profile of poverty in country. In 2012, 80% of the poor inhabit the countryside as
small farmers and agricultural laborers1 (NSO, 2012a). While 67.8 % of unpaid family
workers thrive in agriculture (NSO, 2012b), 44%—the largest portion—of the

1
Of the country’s total labor force of about 37.7 million, agriculture comprises the second largest sector with
32.3 % of persons employed. Among the major occupation groups, farmers, forestry workers, and fishermen are
also the second largest group: 14.4 % in 2102 (NSO, 2012c).
underemployed are working in the agricultural sector (NSO, 2012c). By contrast, only 3.6%,
the smallest occupation group, comprise employers in family-operated-and-owned farms or
business in 2012 (NSO, 2012b). These numbers concretize the magnitude of the problem that
CARP as a policy tool of the Philippine government aims to rectify.
Indeed, CARP was intended as a social justice program with the primary goals of
addressing the problems of continuing socioeconomic inequality and pervasive rural poverty
brought about by inequitable distribution of land (Cornista, 1990; Ledesma 1976; Putzel,
1992). Inspired by the successful land-to-the tiller programs partly credited for the economic
successes of Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, and, to a certain extent, China (Dorner &
Thiesunhusen, 1990; Harkin, 1976; Ledesma, 1976; Lee, 2013; Kim, 2012; Putzel, 1992),
CARP is a culmination of efforts by past Presidential administrations to implement a series
of land reform programs to achieve this desired consequence of economic development.
Instituted through Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 by the 8th Congress, it was touted as a
centerpiece program of the late former President Corazon Aquino and a landmark policy that
promised to redress inequitable land ownership and uplift the socioeconomic conditions of
the poor farmer by implementing a comprehensive re-distribution of all agricultural lands
regardless of size and kind (Putzel, 1992). However, decades of CARP implementation
appeared to fail in achieving the program’s objective of significantly improving the welfare
of its poor farmer beneficiaries (Almeda-Martin, 1999; Elvinia, 2011; Fabella, 2014). Indeed,
a review of related literature finds CARP to be generally a flawed program, if not considered
a relative failure (Almeda-Martin, 1999; Cornista, 1990; Elvinia, 2011; Fabella, 2014; Putzel,
1992). In the policymaking arena, this observation of CARP being flawed is recognized to be
true. But the question remains whether this is enough reason to dissolve the CARP entirely.
For years, a debate has been ongoing between stakeholders participating in the Agrarian
Reform cause. In the 14th Congress, anti-AR and Anti-CARP groups such as landowners
have been generally criticizing its flaws and have called for discontinuing the program while
pro-AR blocs are one in justifying the continuation of the agrarian reform cause because of
the need to correct them. Nevertheless, the pro-AR blocs differ in the specific policy
instruments to use. While most prefer to continue and modify CARP, others such as the
Bayan Muna Coalition think CARP is no longer appropriate and must be replaced with a
totally new law. In the end, the CARP was extended for the second time and this time
substantially reformed. Although the program was first extended under former President
Fidel V. Ramos, such extension merely augmented funding and extended program
implementation for ten more years until 2008 since it first expired in 1998. It was not until
the presidency of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo when CARP was extended until 2014 that a
heavily reformed policy that affected the stakes of both affluent landowners and its poor
farmer beneficiaries was in place.
The perceived failure of CARP to redress land inequality, eradicate rural poverty, and
spur a new class of propertied and entrepreneurial farmers appears to drive continued
demand for CARP. In 2006, another DAR-commissioned study by the German Technical
Cooperation (GTZ) recommended four options based on previous impact assessment reports
for the Philippine Government to consider in implementing CARP: (1) business as usual; (2)
sprint to the line; (3) Hercules; and (4) the clean break (Arlanzae et. al, 2006). All these four
scenarios either hinted on DAR abdicating their land distribution functions or recommended
continuation of CARP on reduced government support or were based on the premise that the
DAR had already distributed 85% of land distribution targets, a figure that is greatly
contested by agrarian reform advocates (Flores-Obanil, 2010). Expectedly, the study stirred
controversy after being presented in a round of national and regional consultations, and have
pushed advocates, who upon noticing how the attending DAR personnel appeared keen in
supporting the idea of leaving their land distribution duties, decided to coalesce. As Flores-
Obanil (2010), a participant in the consultations, recounts, the initial coalition called
“CARPER coalition” expanded to include more organizations to emerge as the “Reform
CARP Movement” (RCM). Akbayan Party List Rep. Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel explained
that this name change became necessary to distinguish those who were campaigning for a
‘mere extension’ of CARP from those pushing for CARP extension with necessary reforms
in the entire agrarian reform system (Flores-Obanil, 2010; TCM 11-21-2007). Flores-Obanil,
an official RCM member herself, relays how as a more unified unit the RCM was effective in
establishing tighter working relations with both the Agrarian Reform Committees of both
Houses to fast-track the legislative campaign, ensure closer monitoring of HB 4077 (i.e.
consolidated bill for R.A. 9700), and provide technical assistance or scientific data to
championing legislators to use in defending the provisions of the template bill. In this way,
the DAR-GTZ study provided a strong impetus to the agrarian community community to
ignite debates on CARP’s second extension, i.e. beyond the initial deadline of June 2008 set
by R.A. 8532 (Flores-Obanil, 2010).
The ratification of R.A. 9700, known as CARP with Extension Reforms (CARPER),
has important implications for the country’s agrarian reform policy. At the onset, it
challenges the traditional notion of landowning elites remaining influential or
overwhelmingly dominant in LR legislation, because the passage of CARPER suggests a
changing composition and orientation of the Philippine Congress, whose majority opinion
appears to favor redistributive land reform this time. Technically, it seems to underline the
impact of scientific studies in the actions and decisions of policy stakeholders. More
importantly, as a policy reform CARPER highlights the extent to which factors in the
external environment is significant in effecting changes in important state policies such as
agrarian reform.
The extension and reform of CARP through CARPER begs a couple of important
questions. Is the Philippine government’s decision to extend CARP implementation for a
second time a reflection of the state’s genuine commitment to the principle of social justice
and equity that are enshrined in the Constitution? Or is this CARP extension merely
obligatory compliance by the Philippine state to the constitutional mandate of land reform
that it apparently struggles to accomplish? Was this commitment reflected in the
administration of former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo? Were there other external
factors that convinced legislators at the Lower House of the 14th Congress to extend and
reform the CARP law? While the multitude of actors appear to converge into two main
(polarized) positions—the liberal or pro-distribution (farmers) coalition and the conservative
or anti-distribution (landowners) camp—R.A.9700 debates show that the emergence of more
stakeholders joining the legislative deliberations brings in diverse policy issues and beliefs,
thereby widening the parameters of debate and requiring a framework comprehensive enough
to accommodate the increasing diversity of policy positions and systematic enough to
identify clearly the process by which these varied positions are harmonized toward a
common goal of upholding the welfare of CARP beneficiaries. In other words, is the
extension of the program an indicator of policy-oriented learning or more fundamentally,
changes in the policy beliefs of competing coalitions on land reform?

To answer these questions, the study employs the Advocacy Coalition Framework
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1994), a framework widely used by social scientists around the
world to explain the process through which concrete and substantial changes in important
government policies occur. This framework is chosen as it allows the interaction of
competing advocacy groups or coalitions with significant differences in policy beliefs and
explains the phenomenon of constructive policy brokerage. The framework also considers
variables both external to and internal within the policy subsystem being studied, thus
contributing to a holistic and comprehensive analysis of policy change within such
subsystem.
This framework is complemented by the archival research and content analysis of
statements of policymakers and stakeholders participating in Congressional deliberations
leading to the ratification of the CARPER law (RA 9700). The proponents of the Advocacy
Coalition Framework, Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith (1994) themselves explicitly
recommends content analysis as an appropriate research method to operationalize the said
framework.
Given all these, the rest of Chapter I enumerates the following: 1) specific Research
Questions the study aims to answer, 2) the Research Objectives, 3) Definition of Terms
important to note in the data analysis, and 4) the Significance of the Study, and 5) important
Scope and Limitations.
Research Questions
To reiterate, the study seeks to answer the following questions:
General Question
How did factors within and outside the agrarian reform policy subsystem lead to the
policy change of extending and reforming CARP through R.A. 9700?

Specific Questions
1) How did the competing policy beliefs of advocacy coalitions shape the Philippine
House of Representative’s decision to extend CARP through R.A. 9700?
2) Given the contentious nature of CARP debates, were there policy brokers that
mediated agreements or working compromises between competing advocacy
coalitions, which enabled the decision to extend CARP through R.A. 9700? Who
were these and how did they help in arriving at those workable compromises?
3) Was the decision to extend CARP a result of policy-oriented learning in light of
new information from past CARP implementation? If so, how did policy-oriented
learning alter, strengthen, or weaken the policy beliefs of advocacy coalition
members on the issue of deciding to extend CARP through R.A. 9700?
4) Were there external shocks or events to the Agrarian Reform sector that became
relevant considerations in the Philippine House of Representatives’ decision to
extend CARP through R.A. 9700? If so, which one/s provided the greatest
stimulus for the CARP extension (changes in socioeconomic and political
conditions, changes in public opinion, changes in systematic governing coalition,
other policy decisions outside the land reform policy subsystem)?
Objectives of the Study
Pursuant to these, the study aims to achieve following objectives:
1) To arrive at a renewed understanding of the agrarian reform issues in the
Philippines by presenting a reorganization of CARP debates through a framework
that operationalizes the dynamics of competing advocacy coalitions and their
policy beliefs
2) To examine how the contentious type of political dynamics of policy actors and
stakeholders shape or facilitate compromises in a government institution tasked to
make a decision on an important national policy such as CARP
3) To determine to what extent both external factors and new, scientific information
and internal feedback from previous policy implementation effots affect the
decision of policy actors to continue an important national policy such as CARP
4) To demonstrate how the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) can be an
appropriate guide in the conduct of debates or in organizing the dialectics on the
decision to extend CARP
Definition of Terms
Term Conceptual Operational Indicators

Definition Definition
Policy “a set of actors Ranges from In the study, the policy subsystem is
subsystem who are traditional notions the land reform sector. The profile or
involved in of 'iron triangles’ description is denoted by the range
dealing with a (administrative of Speakers in the debates
policy agencies, participating in the legislative
problem” legislative deliberations:
(Sabatier, committees, and
1988, p. 138) interest groups at a -Legislator,
single level of -Landowner,
government) to Beneficiary,
various -Expert,
government levels -CSO (NGO, PO),
-Both Landowner & Legislator,
active in policy
-Both Beneficiary & Legislator,
formulation and
-Both Legislator & CSO,
implementation,
-Others
journalists,
researchers, policy
analysts, and other
public and private

organizations who
play important
roles in the
generation,
dissemination, and
evaluation of
policy ideas
(Sabatier &
Jenkins-Smith,
1994)
Advocacy A group of Demonstrated by Represented by the explicit policy

coalitions “People from unified policy stand/proclamation or the general
a variety of stand of Policy Position professed by the
positions participants in speakers:
(elected and legislative
agency deliberations; and - For extension and fund
augmentation (either with or withour
officials, as such may be reforms)
interest group implicit as sharing - Not For Extension
leaders, a common policy > For Totally New Law
researchers) stand (Binag, > Simply Not For Extension
who share a 2010) or explicit
particular as coalitions
belief system - protesting on the
i.e. a set of streets with
basic values, formally registered
causal and media-
assumptions, recognized names
and problem
perceptions -
and who show
a non-trivial
degree of
coordinated
activity over
time”
(Sabatier,
1988, p. 139)
Policy brokers “a third group A traditional Represented by those

of actors function of some
whose elected officials - Neutral in deliberations of
principal (particularly chief contestable issues or who display
concern is to executives) and, in impartiality in the deliberation
find some some European process and
reasonable countries of high - who strive to facilitate agreement
compromise civil servants such on or display openness to workable
that will as those in the compromises that aim to resolve
reduce intense courts, 'blue conflicting policy positions
tension among ribbon (Sabatier, 1988)
coalitions with commissions', etc. - who are willing to clarify
contentious issues
conflicting (Sabatier, 1988).
strategies” Sabatier (1988)
(Sabatier, notes however that
1988, p. 133) the distinction
or “…keeping between 'advocate'
the level of and 'broker' is a
political continuum, for
conflict within many brokers will
acceptable have some policy
limits and bent, while others
reaching some may show some
‘reasonable’ serious concern
solution to the with preserving
problem” the system.
(Sabatier,
1988, p. 141)
Policy beliefs “Set of basic Delineated by a Indicated by the discussion of

values, causal tripartite structure: (explicit mention/implicit reference)
assumptions, the following three tiers of belief
and problem (i) a Deep systems (and their subcategories) and
(Normative)
perceptions” Core of their frequency of occurrence in
(Sabatier & fundamental legislative deliberations:
Jenkins-Smith, normative and
1994, p. 139) ontological (i) values expressed under Deep
axioms which (Normative) Core:
which
individuals define a
-Social Justice
rely on as person's -Socioeconomic Equity/Equality

primary underlying -Gender Equality
heuristic for personal
philosophy; (ii) issues listed under Near (Policy)
political
(ii) a Near Core (See Annex A.8)
decision- (Policy) Core
making of basic (iii)details enumerated in Secondary
(“Advocacy strategies and Aspects: (See Annex A.8)
Coalition policy
Framework positions for
Overview,” in achieving
Deep Core
WOPPR,
beliefs; and
2012) (iii)Secondary
Aspects
comprising a
multitude of
instrumental
decisions and
information
searches
necessary to
implement the
Policy Core
(Sabatier, 1988;
Sabatier &
Jenkins-Smith,
1994)
Policy Change Changes in the Changes in Policy change in this study is the
core attributes governmental decision to extend and reform CARP
of a programs as a through R.A. 9700 (otherwise known
governmental product of both as CARPER)
program or
policy (i) external
shocks/
decision perturbations
(ii) policy-oriented
learning within
policy
subsystems
(Sabatier, 1988, p.
133; Sabatier &
Jenkins-Smith,
1994, p. 182)
Two Types:
(i) Major policy

change is
defined as
changes or
alterations in
the policy core
beliefs of
coalitions and
(ii) Minor policy
change as
changes/alterati
ons in the
secondary
aspects of a
coalition’s
beliefs
(“Advocacy
Coalition
Framework
Overview,”
2012, para. 5)
Policy- “relatively Indicated by “…a The two conditions are further
oriented enduring productive operationalized by the ff. indicators:
learning alterations of analytical debate
thought or between members (1) the presence of intermediate level
of informed conflict:
behavioral of different
intentions advocacy (a) citation of a point of conflict or
which result coalitions…[where disagreement usually phrased in a
from ]one or both question form which starts a
experience and coalitions are led discussion that leads to
which are to alter Policy
concerned Core aspects of (b) a clarification or some form of
with the their belief system enlightenment
attainment (or or at least very
(c) recognition of a
revision) of important
flaw/defects/imperfections that raise
policy Secondary Aspects
issue as to the necessity of reforming
objectives” as a result of an
the law
(Sabatier, observed dialogue
1988, p. 133; rather than a (d) recognition of (c) which raise the
Sabatier & change in external
Jenkins-Smith, conditions” need to evaluate the performance

1994, p. 182) (Sabatier, 1988, p. (i.e. success/failure) of a law in order
155); to
Thus, indicated by (e) improve the law or manifestation

two conditions of intent to improve the law
(Sabatier, 1988):
(f) in the process of this conflict,
(1) the presence of heavy emphasis is placed on the need
intermediate level for scientific information/ empirical
of informed (reliable) studies
conflict between
(2) existence of a professional forum:
the two coalitions.
This requires: a) (a) recognition of Congress as an
each has the avenue for representation and
technical inclusion of opinion or the need to
resources to for wider consultation
engage in such a
debate; and that b) (b) insistence/intent to
the conflict be observe/preserve/uphold democratic
between secondary procedures (i.e. voting, quorom,
aspects of one submission of documents, invites to
belief system and hearings,
core elements of
the other or,
alternatively,
between important
secondary aspects
of the two belief
3-minute rule) that define Congress
systems.
as a democratic institution
(2) existence of a
(c) adherence to or enforcement of
forum which is: a)
mild or non-offensive language, as
prestigious enough
clearest indication of
to force
professionanorms of debates or
professionals from
engaging in dialogues, esp. between
different coalitions
opponents with high tension
to participate and
b) dominated by *Practically demonstrated by the
professional alteration/modification of certain
norms. policy beliefs by coalition members
Manifested in participating in the debates, out of

various forms: (i) recognizing the accurate assessment
improving one's of the situation in light of new
understanding of scientific information, research
the state of findings/facts, or other forms of
variables defined technical evaluations
as important by
one's belief system
or, secondarily, by
competing belief
systems; (ii)
refining one's
understanding of
logical and causal
relationships
internal to a belief
system; (iii)
identifying and
responding to
challenges to one's
belief system
(Sabatier, 1988)
External Factors Refers to the four Indicated by the following:

shocks/ external to a Dynamic
perturbations policy External Events: (i) Are socioeconmic conditions
such as poverty incidence or low
subsystem that household income among
can vary (i) Change in
Socioeconomi landless farmers cited as
substantially c conditions justification for continuing
over the and (distributing lands under)
course of a technology, CARP? If so, how frequent is
few years or a (ii) Change in this citation?
Public (ii) Is the perception of the public on
decade and
Opinion, CARP considered in the
that constitute deliberations on the decision to
(iii)Change in
one of the discontinue/continue CARP? If
Systemic
principal Governing so, how much weight does
dynamic Coalitions, public perception on CARP put
elements (iv) Other policy on the decision to dis/continue
affecting subsystem CARP?
decisions (iii)Are presidential administrations
policy change
(Sabatier, 1988; or is agency leadership seen as a
by altering the
constraints and Sabatier & factor that enables/disables

opportunities Jenkins-Smith, policy change (i.e. reform)? If
confronting 1994) so, is the current/incumbent
administration seen as an
subsystem
enabler in the policy decision to
actors continue CARP? Alternatively,
(Sabatier, are past administrations regarded
1988; Sabatier to have contributed to
& Jenkins- better/worse CARP
Smith, 1994) implementation?
(iv) Are there other policy issues/
laws that affect the priority of
lawmakers in allocating
budgetary and other government
resources to CARP
implementation?
Significance of the Study
Given the historical importance of CARP in fulfilling the social justice mandate of
the Philippine state, this study may be beneficial as follows:
o Theoretically, the study will be able to contribute to the existing body of literature and
research on the applications of the Advocacy Coalition Framework in different policy
subsystems by providing a case study of the land reform policy sector in the Philippines
o For the academe, the study may contribute to a better understanding of the role of
scientific information, belief systems, and coalition formation in effecting policy change
in a highly politically contested important policy subsystem such as the agrarian reform
sector.
o For other political economy students, this study provides a guide on how the political
dynamics of a highly contested policy issue or sector such as the agrarian reform sector
can be presented in a clear, systematic and organized manner through the Advocacy
Coalition Framework, Critical Discourse Analysis and Deductive Content Analysis,

which are all deemed appropriate qualitative research tools that aid in achieving the
objective of the study.
o For policymakers (Congress) and policy implementers (DAR and other CARP
implementing agencies), it may provide useful insights into the agrarian issue, which may
assist and guide their efforts in improving mechanisms for CARP implementation,
criteria for evaluation, and strategies for future legislation initiatives on AR.
Scope and Limitations
Given the allotted time frame for the study and the expansive nature of the subject
matter (i.e. agrarian reform), the study deliberately sets the following parameters.
o Although ACF requires a timescale of one decade (10 years), the research only focused
on Congressional deliberations from 2007 to 2009, since these already contain explicit
evaluations of the implementation of the first CARP extension in the past 10 years. Given
that AR in the country has spanned for more three decades now, it is assumed that the
Philippine political system is more open to reforms in the AR sector.
o Although the ACF states that the decentralized nature of government needs to be
accounted, it may not be necessary to probe into the specifics of subnational political
dynamics in this study, as it only focuses on the extension of CARL, essentially a
national law mostly deliberated at the national level.
o The study will not examine the policy impacts of R.A. 9700 but rather its rationale,
causes, and motivations.

Chapter II
Review of Related Literature and Theoretical Framework
A review of existing literature on CARP suggests that the program is characterized as
flawed because of four major reasons, among others. First, CARP has allegedly exacerbated,
instead of improving, agricultural productivity of CARP farms. (APPC, 2007; Gordoncillo et.
al, 2007). Second, CARP’s impact on raising incomes has been disputed or unclear (Fabella,
2014; Gordoncilla et. al, 2007; Reyes, 2002; Tecson, 2009). Third, CARP does not have
adequate and proper mechanisms for government support services as exemplified by the lack
of credit access by CARP beneficiaries (APPC, 2007; Arlanza et. al, 2006). Fourth, the actual
rate of re-distributing CARP lands was dismal or below expectations (APPC, 2007; Borras,
2001; DARa, n.d.; DAR, 2000; Vanzi, 1997).
Three schools of thought offer explanation to this flawed character of CARP: 1)
government-market interaction, 2) colonial history, and 3) weak state theory. The first argues
that government has staged ineffective or inadequate intervention in the agricultural market
by failing to provide the right incentives to convince landowners to subject their lands to re-
distribution and encourage farmer beneficiaries to be productive (Adriano and Quisumbing,
1990; Almeda-Martin, 1999; APPC, 2007; Balisacan, 1990; Estrella, 1974). The second
argues that CARP’s failure can be attributed to the colonial legacy of the Spanish and US
occupational governments which precluded any genuine efforts towards agrarian reform
(Almeda-Martin, 1999; Elvinia, 2011). The third suggests the Philippine state is so weak in
balancing countervailing sociopolitical pressure that it can only enact haphazard measures on
agrarian reform (e.g. Putzel, 1992; Wurfel, 1954). Although each school of thought
contributes important insights to the evolution and characteristics of CARP as a government

program, these paradigms by themselves are unable to fully explain the ironies contained in
the ambivalent provisions of CARP.
Given this, this chapter is subdivided into four parts. The first discusses the empirical
findings on the flaws of CARP. The second explains each of the three perspectives on these
flaws. The third provides a summary of weaknesses and strengths of each perspective and
concludes with the research gap. The fourth then proposes and extensively discusses an
appropriate conceptual and operational framework, the Advocacy Coalition Framework
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1994), to answer the research problem.
A. CARP’s Flaws: Empirical Findings
Empirical studies assess that CARP as a social justice program is flawed generally.
These studies suggest the following flaws:
A.1 Declining Productivity
CARP has worsened, instead of improving, agricultural productivity of CARP farms.
A meso-level assessment of one ARC barangay and a non-ARC barangay reveals generally
decreasing crop yield over a six-year study period from 2000 to 2006 (Gordoncillo et. al,
2007). For instance, a substantial yield decline ranging from 31 to 33% was reported by
beneficiaries in both ARC and non-ARC barangays. On the other hand, a macro assessment
of CARP’s impact on agricultural productivity failed to reveal any productivity changes
directly attributable to CARP thus far. Thus, the study observes that after twenty years of
CARP, productivity growth in agriculture has been below expectations while poverty still
plagues rural areas. Low by regional standards, total agricultural factor productivity has
grown only 0.13% per year during 1980-1998, compared to 0.87% per year in Thailand and
1.49% in Indonesia (APPC, 2007). Respondents from these ARCs identified lack of capital
as the main cause of this decline in crop production (Gordoncillo et. al, 2007).
A.2. Contested Income Improvement among ARBs
With these problems in productivity, experts lack consensus on the welfare
improvement impacts of CARP as studies show disputed results on the income-raising
benefit of CARP. On one hand, many AR advocates still believe that agrarian reform in itself
has the potential to improve the welfare of impoverished farmers. A study by the Philippine
Institute of Development Studies or PIDS (Reyes, 2002) indicates improvements in about
1,800 households surveyed. First, Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries (ARBs) tend, on average,
to have a higher per capita income than non-ARBs (P98,653 vs. P76,159); (ii) ARBs have, as
a group, lower poverty incidence than non-ARBs (45% vs. 56%); (iii) all else equal, being an
ARB lowers—and statistically significantly so—the likelihood of the household being above
the poverty line; (iv) all else equal, being an ARB significantly raises the per capita income
of the household; and (v) the poverty incidence declined among ARBs from 1990 to 2000,
while it rose among non-ARBs in the same period. The paper concludes that land reform has
produced significant improvements on the lives of the beneficiaries.
On the other hand, three studies show data that dispute these claims:
One, a closer examination by Fabella (2014) of the PIDS study (Reyes, 2002), shows
that: (i) 49% of the ARBs are from the Central Luzon, Southern Tagalog and Cagayan Valley
areas, while only 21% of the non-ARBs come from the same regions. By contrast, only 36%
of the ARBs come from Visayas and Mindanao, while 56% of the non-ARBs come from
there. Since the first three regions constitute the most affluent in the Philippines and poverty
incidence is highest in the last two, the average income and poverty incidence comparison
may be inaccurate, since the reduction in poverty among ARBs may be reflecting the poverty
reduction in the central Luzon region, which was significantly faster due to concentration of
support services in agrarian reform communities therein.
Second, an earlier survey in 2006 of 1,301 farm workers from six major agricultural
sectors done by Centro Saka, Inc. (Tecson, 2009) reveals that most farmers (85-95% of 1,500
surveyed) across major agricultural sectors (rice, corn, sugarcane, coconut, banana, rubber)
remain the poorest as they receive low wages, lack regular employment, lack access to health
services and social security, have poor occupational safety and health conditions, are largely
unorganized, and receive little or no support from the government. The study further
discovered that rice, corn, and coconut farmers claimed to have received payment in other
forms, by either percentage of harvest (rice), or a per hectare (coconut), or per sack basis
(corn and coconut). Banana and rubber plantation farmers2 on the other hand reported as of
2006 average annual incomes well above the set poverty threshold3 for each plantation. The
study credits the relatively higher income of some farmers, particularly in rubber, to the fact
that 93.5% of the workers were already awarded lands under CARP and hence gained the
benefits of being owner-workers (Tecson, 2009). This is corroborated by the fact that fewer
respondents in the banana, corn, and rubber sectors reported earning income from other
sources of livelihood, thereby suggesting that farmers in these sectors depended solely and
sufficiently on awarded CARP lands (Tecson, 2009).
Third, a meso-level assessment of one ARC barangay and one non-ARC barangay

2
PhP59,989.41 for banana and PhP69,404.35 for rubber (Tecson, 2009)
3
PhP15,042.00 for banana and PhP11,980.00 for rubber (Tecson, 2009)
from 2000 to 2006 also shows inconsistent findings. In the ARC barangay, the incomes of
beneficiaries were greater than those of the non-beneficiaries and the difference continued to
increase (25% in 2000 to 34% in 2006)(Gordoncilla et. al, 2007). However, in the non-ARC
barangay, the income-raising benefit of CARP appears irrelevant as the income difference
between non- beneficiaries in fact decreased (36% in 2000 to 2% in 2006), suggesting that
the ability to raise incomes is not dependent on owning lands through CARP (Gordoncilla et.
al, 2007).
A.3. Inadequate Government Support Services: Lack of Credit Access
Critics attribute this problem on productivity and income generation under CARP to
inadequate government support services, as demonstrated particularly by the lack of reliable
credit access. A DAR-commissioned study discovers most beneficiaries turn to informal
transactions or arrangements for their credit needs (APPC, 2007). The most common of
which are the prenda and arriendo4. Rightly so, sales (up to 30% of CLOA holders) have
been reported in major ARC provinces like Camarines Sur, with prices reportedly reaching
up to P120,000/ha (as in Kitaotao, Bukidnon) depending on the location5. While it is difficult
to ascertain the legality of these sales, given the stringent requirements for legal sales, it is
likely that some or even most of such transactions are done underground6 (APPC, 2007). In
fact, a separate in-house study by DAR (as cited in Arlanza et. al, 2006) of about 2,752

4
The first is a land pawning arrangement similar to sangla, where a landowner incurs a debt in return for
cultivation and usufruct rights, while the second is a leaseback arrangement, where beneficiaries leases out the
awarded land for a fixed cash payment (usually at the beginning of a cropping season), over a specified duration
(three years or less). While the arriendo has mostly produced positive consequences in raising CARP farm
productivity, the prenda is prone to abuse as pawners are allowed to pile up debt to several times the original
amount, to the point that the property can no longer be redeemed— effectively leading to an informal sale
(APPC, 2007).
5
E.g. proximity to the road commands a premium (APPC, 2007)
6
One common tactic is that the buyer simply holds onto the title document until the ten-year period has lapsed,
upon which the legal transfer process is initiated. For a detailed report, see the study by APPC (2007).
CLOA holders in 23 provinces from Luzon to Mindanao shows that 17% of the respondents
made transactions with their properties. 80% of the transaction cases were either for outright
transfer or mortgaging while the remaining 20% were involved in other deals such as transfer
of rights, leasing and other arrangements. These reports of sales and mortgaging suggest the
post-CARP situation of beneficiaries is considerably different from pre-CARP. At least for
many rice and corn farmers, before CARP, they were on gross revenue share contracts with
the original landowners that did not involve consumption credit or working capital finance
from the original landowners (APPC, 2007). For plantation workers prior to CARP, many
were able to obtain salary loans for consumption purposes, particularly medicines and health
care, and working capital was financed by the plantations (APPC, 2007). But with CARP,
this all changed. In other words, the trade-off to owning land is that beneficiaries as new
owner-cultivators now face much greater financial requirements. However, the institutional
environment of the agricultural credit market could help mitigate these farm costs.
A.4. Below-Expectations or Dismal Rate of CARP Lands Re-distribution
Besides the issue of support services, the actual rate of re-distributing CARP lands
did not conform to expectations of stakeholders. Despite CARP’s ambitious targets, DAR’s
accomplishments alone as an implementing agency in re-distributing covered lands were
dismal. Under Corazon Aquino (1987 to 1992), the DAR only redistributed 848,518
hectares7 or a little over 19% of the total 4.42 million hectares (Borras, 2001; DARa, n.d.).
Under Ramos (1992-1998), although DAR more than doubled the output at 1,900,035
hectares (43% of DAR’s total target), a closer look reveals that achievements centered on the
less contentious land components and acquisition modes: i) 33% in government-owned lands,

7
Reyes (2002) provides a close estimate of 898,420 recipients receiving their land titles or free patents.
ii) another 33% through VOS and VLT, iii) only 6% through compulsory acquisition, and iv)
7.5% in rice and corn lands (Borras, 2001). This statistics did not include yet public lands
distributed by DENR. Hence, in 1997, a year before the deadline, only 57% of total lands for
distribution (by both DAR and DENR) had been awarded, leaving more than 3.4 million
hectares to be distributed and prompting the 10th Congress to extend the CARP for another
10 years (DAR, 2000). Upon extension, DAR under Estrada’s short-lived presidency (1998-
2001) had to tackle the most difficult private estates in coconut lands, sugar haciendas, and
deferred commercial plantations, a task Estrada promised (Vanzi, 1997) but failed to deliver
with a meagre 222,907 hectares (5%) of total lands distributed, leaving a balance of 2 million
hectares for distribution (Borras, 2001; DAR, 2000). Even with this low number, less
contentious acquisition modes were employed, with VOS, VLT, and government-owned
lands jointly accounting for 70% of distributed lands while compulsory acquisition of private
agricultural lands only accounting for about 25%. Under Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo8 (2001-
2010), incomplete or unavailable information prevents any systematic assessment of CARP’s
performance. Nonetheless, a study commissioned by DAR to assess the impact of CARP in
2007 showed that as of end of December 2006, overall accomplishment in land distribution
was still at 3.8 million hectares or 86% of the DAR’s target of 4.4 million hectares (APPC,
2007).

8
The former president’s official website (“Initiatives: Land Distribution,” n.d.) claims impressive achievements
in CARP in terms of land transfer (53% within just one administrative period), support services (9 irrigation
facilities servicing 2,593 hectares, scholarships, etc.), agricultural infrastructures (55 187-meter long farm-to-
market roads, 12 1,216-meter long farm-to-market bridges, 2 post-harvest facilities with 7 units), and agrarian
justice delivery (34,182 legal cases resolved).
B. Theoretical Perspectives on CARP’s Flaws
To reiterate, existing literature suggests three perspectives in explaining the flaws of
CARP: government-market interaction, colonial history, and state theory (Almeda-Martin,
1999). These perspectives are explained more fully in the succeeding sections.
B.1. Government-Market Interaction (Political Economy) in CARP
The first argues that government has staged an ineffective or inadequate intervention
in the agricultural market by failing to provide the right incentives to convince landowners to
subject their lands to re-distribution and encourage farmer beneficiaries to be productive
through CARP. This argument frames the agrarian reform problem within the context of
excessive government intervention and analyzing the supply and demand of political
pressures for LR as determinants of program success or failure. That is, studies under this
school of though offer a market analysis on the relative inability of agrarian reform programs
in the Philippines, including CARP, to correct the lopsided development between urban
centers and rural areas.
This theory is best exemplified by certain provisions in CARP that mandated
inappropriate government intervention in the agricultural market. One of which is a provision
in the CARP law that restricts collateralizing awarded farmlands (§ 35 and 73 of RA 6657).
Banks in agricultural lending (other than Land Bank of the Philippines) require collateral.
However, the Certificate of Landownership Award (CLOA) held by CARP beneficiaries is
typically not accepted as collateral for at least three reasons. First, Section 27 of CARL
prohibits the transfer of CLOAs for ten years after issuance, preventing foreclosure within
that period. Second, although foreclosure is made possible by Section 71 of CARL after ten
years, the bank’s claim would only be secondary owing to the Land Bank’s lien on the
CLOA and banks avoid accumulating agricultural land above their retention limit set by
Section 6 of CARL, as they would then be subject to land acquisition and distribution. This
leaves the Land Bank as the only major financial institution lending to beneficiaries.
However, Land Bank data shows rather inconsistent lending activities for small farmers and
fishers with fluctuations that peaked in the late 1980s and 20059, but for the most declined in
mid-90s and early 2000s a brief dip in 2000-2001 (APPC, 2007). Land Bank lending has also
not outpaced inflation over time, so in real terms, lending has been generally on the
downtrend since the late 1990s (APPC, 2007). A study cites all these restrictions as the
primary contributor for this problem in lack of access to credit (APPC, 2007). This political
market argument implies that with minimal government assistance, landowners and peasants
will arrive at an optimal LR agreement. If government provides the right incentives, by
removing the restrictions on CARP land as land owners for instance, landowners would be
induced to cooperate with land redistribution whil peasants would be encouraged to become
more efficient producers (Almeda-Martin, 1999).
This confluence of restrictions on collateralizing CARP lands reflects a weak linkage
between the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors in the Philippines at the macro level.
This weak linkage is partly evidenced by a skewed distribution of income directly related to
unequal land distribution, has resulted into a geographically and sectorally lopsided pattern
of national economic growth, where employment opportunities (in terms of income and
vocational training) and infrastructure development is limited to urban centers. Indeed, this
vital rural-urban link and its real consequences on development was already foreshadowed by

9
Lending reached nearly P17 billion, channeled through 1,075 cooperatives and 422 rural financial institutions,
serving 322,000 clients (APPC, 2007)
the Marcos’s Administration’s Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Secretary Conrado
Estrella (1974) who, by equating AR to freedom10, warned that failure in distributing farm
tillers’ just share of land produce will tend to discourage farmers to increase production,
resulting in under-utilized farms, lower national agricultural output, and migration to cities
due to very low income. Such exodus to urban centers in turn imposes added burdens to
over-loaded public utilities and gives birth to slum areas and urban congestion (Estrella,
1974). Effective land reform is supposedly a mechanism that can rectify this lacking link
between agricultural development and industrialization (Elvinia, 2011).
This implies that an optimal LR program addresses the existing conditions of the
political market in the Philippines by limiting government discretion over LR transactions
and by ensuring the dual goals of efficiency and equity are balanced through simple, uniform,
and transparent regulations (Adriano and Quisumbing, 1990). Relatedly, an expert posits that
the nature of past LR programs was possibly the best form that could be expected from the
“political market” prevalent at that time (Balisacan, 1990). Previous reforms did not effect
substantive structural changes because the effective demand for agrarian reform by farmers is
lower than expected due to high costs of organization and hence low investments in political

10
Estrella (1974) argues that true AR liberates farmers by pursuing the fundamental objective “to achieve a
dignified existence for the small famers free from pernicious institutional restraints and practices” (p. 5)—a
conceptual evolution shared by latter Philippine scholars (e.g. Espiritu, 1995; Putzel, 1992). Moreover, Estrella
(1974) finds that the most crippling obstacle to LR is the farmer’s mindset per se, as LR involves unlearning
“traditional beliefs, obsolete habits and groundless fears” (p. 5). Indeed, he illustrates how collaborative
interaction between stakeholders facilitates LR, from rural banks extending credit to LR beneficiaries, to LGUs
being conduits for farmers’ pleas, the military assisting de-radicalized rebels in farming, and landowners driving
industrialization with their high-degree educational background and entrepreneurial skills. To this end, Putzel
(1992) incorporates a social dimension by defining AR as not only the physical redistribution of land, but a
transformation in rural relations” (p. 3). He asserts that. Therefore, landownership through AR incentivizes
agricultural productivity, promotes self-sufficiency among farmers, and indirectly contributes to political
stability by preventing agrarian unrest (Estrella, 1974; Almeda-Martin, 1999). LR is thus a redistribution of
rights over land and land use, which can ultimately determine income and political empowerment (Almeda-
Martin, 1999).
influence (Balisacan, 1990). The higher the level of land distribution, the higher the degree of
opposition by landed elites, an opposition that will certainly add to the cost of demanding
agrarian reform by the group of tenant farmers (Balisacan, 1990).
The strength of this perspective lies in its ability to provide a correspondence to the
tangible impact of certain provisions of CARP to concrete welfare indicators used to justify
the continued implementation of CARP. However, studies under this school of thought do
not contain substantial analysis of the kind and historical background of institutions that
formalized CARP, which provides insights to why and how CARP was molded as a policy.
B.2. Colonial History of Philippine Agrarian Reform Laws
The second perspective argues that CARP adopted the colonial legacy of the dual
principle of just compensation and property rights inherited from the land reform law during
the Spanish and American colonial periods, which are difficult to accomplish fully. This
theory is derived from the assumption that agrarian reform programs are in fact reactions to
historical milestones born out of decisive changes in a society. Studies classified under this
school propose that the role of agrarian reform as both a consequence and instigator of these
defining moments in a society’s history is no less clearly demonstrated in the de-colonization
process of postcolonial states.
In Asia, the impact of colonial history on the outcome of AR programs was clearly
seen in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan (Dorner and Thiesenhusen, 1990; Ledesma, 1976).
In Japan, although the dispossession of the daimyo (warlord) in the 1870s Meiji
Restoration enabled easier targeting of smaller village landlords who remained influential
during the second stage of Japan’s LR from 1947-49 (Ledesma, 1976), the support of the
United States Alliance for Progress was critical in enabling a successful LR implementation,
not only locally but in Taiwan and South Korea as well (Dorner & Thiesenhusen, 1990;
Leones & Moreno, 2012; Putzel, 1992). At that time, the US Alliance had to implement LR
in order to prevent agrarian unrest and the communist-led revolutions in nearby China and
Russia to succeed in Japan, which at that time was a strategic US base partner in Asia Pacific
(Leones & Moreno, 2012).
Although South Korea11 and Taiwan12 individually implemented a series of policies
tailor-fitted to their respective development circumstances, their common history of Japanese
colonization and occupational governments benefited them in Firstly garnering public
support for AR and accessing technological innovations that boosted agricultural
productivity. The two countries’ mutual lack of sympathy for their Japanese colonizers
facilitated an easy land transfer process by lessening resistance in redistributing former
Japanese-owned lands (Dorner and Thiesenhusen, 1990). Secondly, both countries were
under outside influences at the time of reform, a factor that provided greater political
incentives for reform, as Taiwan’s Kuomintang government, determined to prove its
legitimacy and autonomy, endeavored to avoid repeating the initially failed AR of
mainland’s Communist party that expelled it while the American occupation forces,
determined to foil the spread of Communism, strove to dissuade South Koreans from

11
For South Korea, a wider range of socioeconomic structural transformations included 1) reorganizing the
agricultural sector through existing rural institutions versus radical sectoral reorganization and allowance of
tenancy not as a basis for social relationship, but a device for flexible farm operation, 2) destroying the rural
elites without creating a new class of rich peasants, and empowering farmers through 3) the refusal of tenants to
pay rents to landlords, and 4) sustaining agricultural produce post-LR for eight years with minimal government
expenditure (Dorner & Thiesenhusen, 1990).
12
For Taiwan, these were: 1) the 3-stage progression involving the 37.5% farm rent reduction in 1949, the sale
of public lands, and the Land-to-the-Tiller Act of 1953 that set maximum retention limit of 3 hectares of paddy
land; 2) the pegging of landlord compensation to commodity prices, which avoided inflation; and 3) the
integration of LR in the rural reconstruction aimed to uplift small farmer’s welfare (Ledesma, 1976).
succumbing to the prevailing Marxist ideology of the North. In both cases, industrialization
was not regarded as mutually exclusive to agriculture, so that LR served as a way to achieve
industrial growth and urbanization not at the expense of agricultural productivity, thereby
sustaining the benefits of LR.
In the Philippines, historical accounts of land reform programs show that the
transformation of the Philippine economy under the Spanish and American colonial periods
precluded any genuine efforts towards land reform but instead developed a system of
property and power relations in the country which consequently bred present income
inequality and poverty (Elvinia, 2011). This system is manifested in the dual principles of the
US colonial land reform policy on general entitlements for peasants and heightened due
process for landowners caused continued failure of Philippine agrarian reform by inherently
undermining the goals of efficient redistribution of property rights through agrarian reform.
The pressure to not ignore agrarian unrest due to poverty and unequal land distribution in
order to legitimately establish colonial authority caused US colonial land reform policy to
become overly ambitious in attempting to balance both benevolent intentions and the desire
to make the Philippines a profitable colony (Almeda-Martin, 1999). While public land
entitlements to landless peasants served as an incentive to stimulate the economy through
independent small-scale farming and to eventually balance the skewed class structure
seriously threatening political stability, US colonial authorities were committed to protect
prior claims to property by reassuring landowners and corporations that existing private
property rights would remain valid under the new colonial legal framework, to both facilitate
a smooth economic transition and build from the commercial economy already in place.
These dual principles were evident in the (1) Public Land Act (PLA) of 1902, the (2) Friar
Lands Act (FLA) of 1903, and the (3) Rice Share Tenancy Act (RSTA) of 1933 (Almeda-
Martin, 1999; Espiritu & Yoingco, 1995; Wurfel, 1954). These principles have also been
incorporated in four land reform programs enacted in postward independence: the (1)
Agricultural Tenancy Act (ATA) of 1954 under President Ramon Magsaysay; the (2)
Agricultural Land Reform Code (ALRC) of 1963 under President Diosdado Macapagal; (3)
Presidential Decree 27 (PD 27) under the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos in 1972; and the
(4) Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1989 under President Corazon Aquino.
Each law had tried to implement a more progressive LR scheme than the last, but each effort
repeatedly encountered numerous problems, because US colonial land reform policy remains
the primary strategy of implementing administrations (Almeda-Martin, 1999).
In particular, CARL, the enabling law of CARP, contains a number of legal loopholes
that allowed landowners to evade coverage (Almeda-Martin, 1999; Cornista, 1990). First,
landowners would receive just compensation, a provision that delayed distribution by
allowing landowners to dispute the amount of compensation in slow and congested agrarian
courts. Second, the four-phased redistribution process created four categories of peasant
beneficiaries who would technically acquire land depending upon the type and size of land
subject to redistribution. This extended time requirement provided landlords ample
opportunity to once again break-up their estates and stall land reform, and coupled with the
administrative procedures relating to land acquisition, transfer, and just compensation, served
as transaction costs for the peasant beneficiary. Third, CARP included alternatives to
physical land redistribution such as stock-sharing options and leasehold arrangements.
Finally, the fact that President C. Aquino belonged to a family of wealthy landowners whose
own estates were subjected to a controversial case of land redistribution 13 meant her
administration was forced to implement CARP under the same colonial policy strategy of
providing general land entitlements and lengthy processes that ensured landowners' rights to
challenge confiscation of their property and that rightly stalled reform (Almeda-Martin,
1999). In this way, the political and economic history inevitably predetermined the failure of
modern agrarian reform in the Philippines. Thus, the only effective way the Philippines can
break out of these neocolonial influences, according to this school of thought, is through an
effective assertion of state sovereignty in national programs such as CARP (Elvinia, 2011).
This historical approach offers a compelling explanation behind the flawed qualities of
CARP as a government program by exactly pinpointing the exact historical events,
circumstances, and turning points that define agrarian reform laws. Yet, the perspective is to
a certain extent deterministic in that it does not contain a substantial analysis on or does not
necessarily offer a mechanism to explain how individual state agents can effect changes in
the policy of CARP.
B.3. Weak State Theory
The weakness of the historical approach is addressed by the third perspective, which
suggests that the Philippine state is weak in balancing countervailing sociopolitical pressure
as it can only enact haphazard measures on agrarian reform as demonstrated by CARP (e.g.
Putzel, 1992; Wurfel, 1954). That is, the third perspective theorizes that the dual principles
adopted by CARP came to be precisely because Philippine state institutions are weak in
insulating itself from interests that are counterproductive to the benevolent objectives of

13
For an extensive discussion of the Cojuangcos’ Hacienda Luisita, please see Putzel (1992).
CARP. This theory is based on the assumption that state institutions are not monolithic
organizations insulated from other societal actors with their own agenda, interests, and
influences and state policy is a product of negotiated agenda, interests, and influences.
State weakness can be better understood in relation to state autonomy. Defined as
“the ability of those who control the state apparatus to use it for ends other than, and
particularly contrary to, those of the dominant class” (Hamilton, 1988, p. 23), state autonomy
is indicated by the extent and kind of policy reform a country or political unit enacts. For
instance, state autonomy manifested in Mexico’s 1910 revolution that destroyed pre-existing
state apparatus to install the reformist administration of General Lazaro Cardenas, who from
1934 to 1940 carried out an AR that expropriated huge estates to peasants on a massive scale,
establishing collective farms on commercial agricultural estates while effectively eliminating
the power of traditional landowning elites (Hamilton, 1982). Cardenas’ acceleration of LR as
a key structural reform that enabled Mexico’s recovery from the Great Depression of 1930s
and is credited for Mexico’s widely praised economic growth in the next thirty years
(Hamilton, 1982, U.S Library of Congress, n.d.). In China, on the other hand, the Communist
state played a central role in determining the trajectory of AR albeit an agrarian revolution
fermenting subsequent massive land redistribution. Mao’s Communist government
implemented a gradual reform process characterized by (1) deliberate adjustment of
agricultural commodity prices and a phased collectivization14 schemes formalized under an
agrarian reform law aimed at developing among peasants a sociopolitical consciousness
compatible with the Communist institution to effectively prevent the rise of an independent

14
Later on, this collective approach would be applied to the more successful Production Responsibility System
(PRC) in which collective ownership of rural land was firmly maintained but arable land was contracted out to
household units through a legal contract called bao gan dao hu, which ordinarily stipulated an agreed quota of
staple crop production for sale to the state while permitting the household to sell above-quota/surplus
production (Dorner & Thiesenhusen, 1990).
class of wealthy peasants (Dorner and Thiesenhusen, 1990; Ledesma, 1976). Altogether,
these institutional innovations led to a substantial increase in farm labor productivity and
farm income, as it incentivized production by directly relating farm income to individual
effort and performance (Dorner & Thiesenhusen, 1990). Notwithstanding the adverse short-
term consequences15 of these reforms, these cases of agrarian reform show how the state
plays a central role in accomplishing the goals of agrarian reform.
However, in most countries, the traditional stronghold of elites over state and society
limits the extent of such autonomy (Hamilton, 1988; Migdal, 1988). This is evident in mostly
developing countries with what Migdal (1988) calls Strong Society, Weak State dynamics. In
weak states, the web-like characteristic of society frustrates compliance of strong, powerful
social actors with state rules by engendering the creation of social norms different from or
not centralized within the state, creating an environment of conflict, where social control is
constantly contested between state institutions and these powerful social forces (Migdal,
1988). These so-called local strongmen (e.g. chiefs, landlords, etc.) enjoy public legitimacy
and support by providing for the population’s needs and demand for social services (i.e.
strategies of survival) and hence are able to capture state institutions and resources, which
frequently impede the capacity of state leaders to implement national policies. For this
reason, Migdal (1988) refers to local strongmen as power brokers or patrons. Thus, surveying
agrarian reform laws of developing states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America from the late

15
In China, for instance, state intervention accompanied with it constraints to further growth in farm
production, as the system resulted in regional disparities at first with landholdings in many instances becoming
too small and fragmented while rural cadres assigned in input rationing and pricing grains sold to government
were reported to commit corrupt practices. Also, it was not always orderly and peaceful, as land acquisition was
confiscatory and often brutal in character, with the official press condemning ‘unrestrained violence’ that
resulted to 400,000 to 800,000 deaths (Dorner & Thiesenhusen, 1990). Although China’s case exhibits the
typical trade off in prioritizing greater equity over greater efficiency (Kung, 2007), at least in the interim.
19th to the 20th century, Migdal (1988) illustrates how strength or weakness16 of states vis-à-
vis society determined the ability of states to implement national laws. In societies with more
than 90% of the population in agriculture, state leaders drafting new land laws frequently
discovered their policies failed to establish a more centralized control of states over targeted
territories but instead, ironically fostered growth in power among landlords hostile to state
centralization and to the national goal of effecting socioeconomic equality in rural sectors
(Migdal, 1988).
Migdal’s (1988) observation mirrors an early historical survey of agrarian reforms
programs in Latin American that suggests agrarian reform emerges as an issue that
effectively opens dialogue for social change but one tainted with suspect political motives
during sociopolitical upheavals (Chaney, 1976). For instance, as an electoral campaign
slogan, AR is an effective strategy in garnering votes of the rural masses, as much as it is an
effective counterinsurgency measure only rhetorically considered to pacify rural unrest
(Harkin, 1976, Ledesma, 1976), as demonstrated by elections in Guatemala in 1945, Bolivia
in 1952, Peru in 1962, and Chile in 1964 (Chaney, 1970). This acute political consideration
renders agrarian reform programs as a haphazardly executed program that more often than
not fails to redress socioeconomic inequity and alleviate rural poverty.
Indeed, in these conditions of state weakness and stronger societal forces, three
conditions of state-society dynamics emerge to facilitate a successful AR program (Chaney,
1970). First, contrary to conventional notions of a truly revolutionary measure, a successful
AR program does not transfer all power, property, and status to beneficiaries, but instead

16
Based on four capabilities of the state to: 1) regulate social interactions, 2) extract and 3) appropriate
resources to the citizenry, and 4) penetrate society (REAP)(Putzel, 1992)
recognizes the peasant’s deference in not completely abolishing the hacienda system, an
institution that is “…an essential part of their cultural horizon [i.e. traditions]” [emphasis
added](Chaney, 1970, p. 9), while pursuing political stability conducive for state
prioritization of agricultural modernization and industrialization. Secondly, a successful AR
must be rapid, massive and irreversible, as how Mexico, Bolivia and Cuba’s were (Chaney,
1970). Thirdly, Chaney reiterates Huntington’s rejection of the notion that land tenure
changes depend upon either “reform from above” or “reform from below,” arguing instead
that ARs that successfully alter political and economic structure materialize out of both rapid
centralization of power in reform-minded elites and sustained peasant mobilization or
effective grassroots political organization, as exemplified in Venezuela where an AR law in
1948 passed through a Congress dominated by Accion Democratica, Venezuela’s largest
peasant organization. Thus, “Agrarian reform is never purely an economic and technical
issue. It also involves political procedures and bargaining in getting reform legislation
enacted or decreed, as well as in implementing and enforcing it” (Chaney, 1976, p. 1). This
political bargaining is illustrated by a study on how Guatemala’s oligarchy captured public
decision-making processes to keep provisions on AR ironically out of the Agrarian Situation
section of the 1996 Peace Accord that resolved the Guatemalan civil war (Stine, 2011).
This Weak State-Strong Society dynamics is cited by most early scholastic
assessments of Philippine agrarian reform programs as the cause of flaws, if not failures, of
agrarian reform in the Philippines (Almeda-Martin, 1999; Putzel, 1992; Wurfel 1988). Under
this view, the power of government is measured according to immunity or vulnerability to
political pressures. As such, a weak state is understood as neither committed to, nor capable
of implementing an effective agrarian reform program because the government is vulnerable

to the influence of vested interests (Almeda-Martin, 1999; Putzel, 1992; Wurfel, 1988). From
the postwar presidency of Quirino until the presidency of Corazon Aquino, this state
weakness is seen as the permeation of landed interests in state policymaking bodies through
the election of wealthy and well-connected landowning legislators, a factor that has thwarted
a truly radical and transformative agrarian reform (Putzel, 1992; Wurfel, 1983; Wurfel,
1988).
The common pattern across postwar presidencies is that the changing composition of
the elite class in each administration has determined the policy direction of the state on
agrarian reform (Wurfel, 1983). During the Roxas Administration, the state was closely
linked to the landed elites of Central Luzon. Hence, its response to the rising Huk Rebellion
was traditional force, thus instigating mobilization of the peasantry by the leftists (Wurfel,
1983). His Vice-President and successor Elpidio Quirino was closely tied to the landowners
of the Philippines’ “ricebowl,” so he saw the advantage of pacifying the rebels through a
cease-fire; granted amnesty to the Huks; and seated NPA leader Luis Taruc in Congress
(Wurfel, 1983). But the distrust was too high, leading to sabotage of cease-fire and
resumption of the guerilla movement (Wurfel, 1983). So, he attempted some reform
measures except land redistribution, whose liberal version proposed by Robert Hardie was
vehemently opposed in Congress (Wurfel, 1983; Putzel, 1992). Magsaysay’s Administration
brought in younger state leaders, with reformists attitude dedicated to solving the underlying
problems causing agrarian unrest (Wurfel, 1983; Putzel, 1992). However, land reform was
put forth at this time in an attenuated version. On the other hand, Garcia saw the resurgence
of old-fashioned politicking, given the relative peace of Philippine society that time (Wurfel,
1983). Macapagal, although growing up a poor boy, had coopted with landed elites in
Pampanga. With Marcos’ ascent to power, little interest was shown in land reform even as
landed elites lost influence while the peasant organization enlarged and became more
politically skilled, directly putting pressures on Congress for these reforms (Wurfel, 1983).
In these programs, the lack of follow-through is partly explained by the emergence of
“conciliary elites,” who proclaim to support while lacking genuine commitment to agrarian
reform and even attempt to circumvent the law17 (Wurfel, 1983). Accordingly, concentration
of power is not compatible with freedom of organization, which is based on the assumption
that various interests in society have a right to share in the decision-making process of the
state (Wurfel, 1983). Consistent with the central state-local strongmen dynamics, the
irresolute nature of Philippine land reform is due in great part to the increasing difference in
interests between central state elites and local political elites (Migdal, 1988; Wurfel, 1983).
While landed interests relatively declined in the former, it is still strong in the latter
considering that even in local state bureaucracies, civil servants are either relatives of or
recommended by local elites (Wurfel, 1983). In short, the failure to implement land reform
was due to the gap between central policy and local practice, which again could not be
corrected by the central state given its limited autonomy vis-à-vis elite power.
This central state-local strongmen dynamics was shown in the highly contentious
deliberations of CARP’s enabling law. The dominance of landowner interests over agrarian
reform policy was overtly displayed when amidst ideological rifts in fundamental aspects of
agrarian reform such as the definition of comprehensive agrarian reform and the nature of
property rights, many provisions in the landowner bill version were gradually incorporated

17
Wurfel (1983) attributes this to ritualism or the belief that appearance is reality and that to make a declaration
is to create a condition.
into the supposedly more progressive AR committee bill. Thus, the law included sections
allowing landowner compensation based on landowners’ declaration of market value, last
phase of distributing private lands in a ten-year period of implementation, and alternatives to
physical distribution such as leaseholding, shareholding or stock distribution options
(Cornista, 1990, p. 4; Putzel, 1992; § 31, R.A. 6657). In the end, the CARP law was “watered
down” (Balisacan, 1990; Cornista, 1990; Putzel, 1992), to the point that the AR Committee
chair and principal author of the CARP law, along with 14 co-sponsors, resigned from the
committee in protest and Akbayan (n.d.) would later denounce CARP as a last-minute
response to the so-called Mendiola Bridge Massacre 18 and a mere counterinsurgency
instrument19 (Putzel, 1992). Expectedly, a landowner and presidential relative took over bill
sponsorship (Balisacan, 1990; Putzel, 1992).
Yet, this outcome was not surprising given that the 8th Congress was composed of
many members from large landowning families, with 141 of 204 representatives20 registering
ownership of agricultural and residential land valued at P293.7 million (Putzel, 1992). While
the President herself belonged to a landed political clan, whose large sugar lands have been
subject of a nationwide controversy given her family’s implementation of the corporate
stock-sharing alternative over physical redistribution, she faced immense pressure from the

18
On January 22, 1987, six months before the first Committee hearing for CARL, a bloody protest occurred
outside Malacañang, which killed 19 unarmed peasants, after police and a contingent of marines opened fire to
15,000 members of Kilusang Mambubukid ng Pilipinas (Putzel, 1992)
19
“Agrarian Reform has been used primarily as an instrument to crush insurgency particularly in the
countryside, rather than as an instrument to make life better for all peasants”[emphasis added](p. 3).
20
Among which, two relatives of President C. Aquino emerged among the wealthiest, with the President’s
sister-in-law, Teresa Aquino-Oreta, declaring P17.2 million, and her brother, Jose Cojuangco, Jr., 6.4 million
worth of real estate. In the Agrarian Reform Committee alone, Putzel (1992) records that of the 31 members
who signed up, 18 were scions of traditional political clans, seven were relatives of those clans, and only six
were new and relatively unattached to these clans. One of the six unattached was Bonifacio Gillego, an ex-
military intelligence official assigned as the Agrarian Reform Committee chair. Jose Cojuangco, on the other
hand, was regarded as the leader who joined the early Committee meetings but kept a low profile, leaving the
public debate to sugar and rubber planter Hortensia Starke and sugar planter Romeo Guanzon, who both hail
from sugarland-rich Negros Occidental (Putzel, 1992).
leftist movement that toppled the Marcos dictatorship and yet that continues to capitalize on
the growing discontent among poor farmers who feel CARP had not yet delivered its promise
(Putzel, 1992). Thus, owing to political pressure from both farmers and landowners, C.
Aquino ratified CARP despite its “compromised” quality (Putzel, 1992). Indeed, various civil
society organizations questioned the authenticity and commitment of President Corazon
Aquino to implement CARP fully, given her ties to a landed political clan whose agricultural
estate, the infamous Hacienda Luisita21, spans more than 14,000 hectares (Putzel, 1992).
Based on this, “Aquino’s emphasis on the ‘twin goals’ of productivity and ‘dispersal of
ownership’ foreshadowed the corporate stock-sharing plan that would later be introduced to
help families like the Cojuangcos maintain control of their agribusiness operations” (Putzel,
1992, p. 185). When prodded on the issue of her family’s Hacienda Luisita, Aquino
unequivocally affirmed her commitment to agrarian reform:
You will probably ask me: Will I also apply it to my family’s Hacienda Luisita? My answer is yes;
although sugar land is not covered by the land reform law, I shall sit down with my family to explore
how the twin goals of maximum productivity and dispersal of ownership and benefits can be
exemplified for the rest of the nation in Hacienda Luisita [emphasis & italics added](Putzel, 1992, p.
185)
This effectively makes Corazon Aquino the first landlord to evade CARP on such a grand
scale, thus creating a deeply negative atmosphere for the agrarian reform cause (Borras,
2001).
Several conclusions on state weakness in Philippine agrarian reform can be derived
from these accounts. Firstly, a weak state may be as much a consequence of inter-agency
conflicts as it is of societal intrusion although one may partly cause the other (Wurfel, 1991).

21
For an exhaustive history of how Corazon Aquino’s clan, the Cojuangcos-Aquinos, acquired their 14-
thousand estate, see Putzel (1992).
Secondly, a state may also be weakened by too many competing demands from targeted
beneficiaries or even NGOs (Wurfel, 1991). Thirdly, under present circumstances, however,
a weak state or permeable bureaucracy may not be entirely bad for agrarian reform, as such
permits the entry of better informed and organized NGOs or POs that provide desirable
pressure and critical checks to implementation of state policies. In fact, the assignment of
NGO head Ernest Garilao as DAR Secretary has resulted into an episodic progress in CARP
by instituting several successful reforms, including the Voluntary Offer to Sell22 (VOS)
provision of CARP, an option that gives landowners the option to voluntary put up their land
for government acquisition, which, albeit was marred with controversy 23 initially, was
credited as instrumental in fast-tracking distribution during the Ramos presidency (Borras,
2001; Putzel, 1992). This phenomenon is called the “Bibingka strategy” (Borras, 2001) as
this success requires state reformists from above and social mobilizations from below as the
condition for a more effective agrarian reform (Chaney, 1970). Fourthly, levels of state
capacity may be specific to policy and certainly may change over time. Even though central
agencies are most likely identical in various provincial branches, they may respond
differently to different societal pressures. That is, state (as represented by the bureaucracy)
and society (as represented by pressures from social actors, NGOs or landowners) may be
mutually transforming and empowering (Migdal, 1988; Wurfel, 1991). Lastly, the intensity

22
Preceded by the Voluntary to Land Transfer (VLT) option, which enables landowners to sell directly their
lands to farm beneficiaries (FBs) and personally collect amortizations from tenant beneficiaries, this was an
unpopular option but compared to VLT. However, compared to VLTs, it was less prone to abusive landlord-
tenant relationship so DAR promulgated it to fast-track distribution but the surge of VOS requests bottlenecking
in DAR offices proved problematic for CARP implementation as it entailed long, arduous, and toxic
negotiations on valuation of landowners’ properties (Wurfel, 1993). For an further discussions of the VOS,
please see “Land Reform” for the Elite: “Voluntary offers to sell” under C.A.R.P (Wurfel, 1993).
23
More trouble came in 1989 when some participants of CARP’s voluntary sale arrangement for landowners
were caught overpricing land sales to the government with the approval and assistance of Department of
Agrarian Reform officials (Almeda-Martin, 1999; Putzel, 1992).
of economic elite opposition to CARP seems to be a function of the degree of economic
security of the landowner (Wurfel, 1991). For instance, those who depend entirely on the
farm are generally going to be more hostile to CARP than those with diverse interests and
sources of income. Among elected officials (Congressmen and their national or local
intermediaries), most feel “left out” of CARP activities while others are either strong
proponents of such or safely in the neutral side, critiquing and supporting it at the same time
(Wurfel, 1991). In any case, administrative or elective elites who try to use components of
the CARP process for personal gain will only weaken it further (Wurfel, 1991). Among
socio-economic elites, the responses of landlords differ from an initially extreme call to arms
such as that espoused by 1987 House AR committee member and rubber plantation owner
Congresswoman Cortesia Starke (Putzel, 1992) to an eventual acceptance of the inevitable
implementation after gaining exposure to provisions of various AR laws (Wurfel, 1991). This
shift in perception is what is called the “Counter-elites,” those who originally oppose CARP
but recognize its benefits and have expressed intentions of coordinating with DAR (Wurfel,
1991). Rightly so, one creative recommendation is having a strong secretary maintain some
autonomy by multiplying his patrons in Congress instead of fixating on just one (Wurfel,
1993).
The Weak State theory provides a compelling explanation on how the dual principles
first articulated by the historical approach are institutionalized in agrarian reform laws,
particularly CARP. Nevertheless, the Weak State-Strong Society thesis possesses some
shortcomings as well. Theoretically, it does not accurately describe the entire reality of state-
society dynamics in the Philippines because its emphasis on the contrasting roles of state
leaders, who use modern bureaucratic mechanisms to pursue state goals, and powerful
strongmen, who employ patrimonial structures and mass mobilization in the local level,
overlooks the fact that state leaders may be strongmen themselves, entrenched in a complex
network of patron-client relations (Wurfel, 1991). Methodologically, although the theory
permits possibilities or prospects for policy change, it does not contain a specific
complementary and practical framework that illustrates a detailed description of the process
through which such policy changes are produced.
C. Summary of Strengths and Weaknesses and Research Gap
C.1. Summary of Strengths and Weaknesses
Although each school of thought contributes important insights to the evolution and
characteristic of CARP as a government program, these paradigms by themselves are unable
to fully explain the inconsistencies contained in the ambivalent provisions of CARP. The
analysis of market-government interaction is devoid of historical context and is unable to
explain why economic and political institutions active in CARP behave in such manner. The
historical approach provides this institutional context by re-tracing the events and societal
circumstances that define these defective agrarian reform laws but the approach still lacks the
mechanism to explain how these defective provisions specifically emerged or were enacted.
The view of the Philippine Government as a weak state institution appears to offer an
acceptable explanation to how the benevolent intentions of agrarian reform laws are
frustrated or undermined by self-serving interests of landowners who have ties with the
ruling elites or powerful leaders in government. Nonetheless, the theory per se does not
possess a framework that elucidates on the exact process through which changes in agrarian
reform laws can occur. Besides these shortcoming, only a few scholars (e.g. Putzel, 1992;
Wurfel, 1954) examined the configuration of AR laws by describing the process in which
different or opposing stakeholders with different and often times conflicting agendas engage
in contentious debates to deliberate and enact these AR laws. These few scholars critiqued
the dynamics of policy actors involved in legislating AR programs in the country and
asserted that the very structure of the law provide fundamental reasons why AR initiatives by
different administrations have been flawed, if not frustrated. Yet, no similar study has been
done on CARPER. Thus, the limitation of existing literature on CARPER necessitates studies
to disaggregate state institutions primarily involved in the formulation of AR laws and to
elucidate on the formulation process of the latest CARP extension and reform law.
C.2. Research Gap: The Need for Policy Process Framework for CARPER
Given this, a policy process framework that analyzes interaction of advocacy
coalitions is necessary to explain the complexities in Philippine Congress that enabled it to
extend and reform CARP. In describing the political dynamics of policy actors involved in
the decision to extend and reform CARP, the proposed study intends to build from the state
theory perspective in deconstructing how differences in holding social and economic power
within a so-called weak state institution such as the House of Representative is manifested in
deliberating an important policy change.
D. Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) as the Appropriate Frameworks
D.1. Background: the ACF vis-à-vis other Policy Process Frameworks
Beginning in the late I96os and early I970s, many policy scholars adopted a stages
heuristic to public policy derived from the work of Harold Lasswell, David Easton and others
(as cited in deLeon and deLeon, 2002). Briefly, it breaks the policy process into distinct sub-
processes. According to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1994), among the most authoritative
statements of the textbook model are Jones' (I977) An Introduction to the Study of Public
Policy, Anderson's (I979), Public Policy-Making, and Peter's (I986) American Public Policy.
All these works distinguish the stages of problem identification or agenda setting, policy
formulation and adoption, policy implementation, and policy evaluation and reformulation.
They likewise also place these stages within a broader political environment of federalism,
political institutions, public opinion, political culture, and other constraints. Given this,
scholars working within the stages heuristic have certainly made important contributions
over the past two decades. The concept of a process of policymaking operating across the
various institutions of government has provided an alternative to the institutional approach of
traditional political science. By shifting attention to the process aspect, the stages model has
encouraged analysis of phenomena that transcend any institution. In addition, the stages
heuristic has permitted useful analysis of questions that were less readily perceived within
the institutionalist framework. Perhaps the most important of these has been its focus on
policy outcomes. Traditional institutional approaches tended to stop at the output of that
particular institution—be it a law, a court decision or an administrative agency rule—without
specific attention to the ultimate outcome or impact of the policy (Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith, 1994). Finally, the stages model has provided a useful conceptual disaggregation of
the complex and varied policy process into manageable segments, particularly regarding
agenda setting (e.g. Cobb et al, 1976; Kingdon, 1984; Nelson, 1984) and policy
implementation (e.g., Pressman and Wildavsky, I973; Barrett and Fudge, I98I; Mazmanian
and Sabatier, I989).

Despite its contributions, however, the stages heuristic has serious limitations for
policy scholarship (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1994). First, the stages model is not really a
causal model as it lacks an identifiable force or forces that can drive the policy process from
one stage to another and generate activity within specific stages. The literatures on each stage
shows very little integration with each other in terms of the major actors involved or the
causal factors which drive the process along. And because it fails to specify the linkages, and
influences that form the essential core of theoretical models, the approach also does not
provide a clear basis for empirical hypothesis-testing across stages or within multiple stages.
The means for confirmation, alteration or elaboration of the model are lacking, except within
a specific stage.
Insofar as the stages heuristic posits a sequence of steps starting with agenda-setting
and then passing through policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation, it is often
descriptively inaccurate proponents often acknowledge deviations from the sequential stages,
in practice (see, e.g. Jones, 1977 as cited in Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1994). Empirical
studies (cited by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1994) suggests that deviations may be quite
frequent: evaluations of existing programs often affect agenda setting, and policy making
occurs as bureaucrats attempt to implement vague legislation.
More importantly, the stages heuristic suffers from a built-in legalistic, top-down
focus as it draws attention to a specific cycle of problem identification, policy decision, and
implementation that focuses on the intentions of legislators and the fate of a particular policy
initiative. Such a top-down view results in a tendency to neglect other important players (e.g.,
street-level bureaucrats), restricts the view of 'policy' to a specific piece of legislation, and
may be entirely inapplicable when 'policy' stems from a multitude of overlapping directives
and actors, none dominant (Sabatier, I986). Furthermore, focus on the policy cycle as the
temporal unit of analysis is often inappropriate. Policy evolution usually involves multiple,
interacting cycles initiated by actors at different levels of government, as various
formulations of problems and solutions are conceived, partially tested, and reformulated by a
range of competing policy elites against a background of change in exogenous events and
related policy issue areas (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1994).
These and other problems with the stages heuristic have encouraged the development
of other conceptualizations of the policy process (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith,
1994). Two major alternative schools of thought consist of an institutional rational choice
tradition (see Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1994 for works) and another in comparative public
policy, generally operating within a conceptual framework articulated by Hofferbert (as cited
in Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1994). Among these, the study selects the alternative theory
referred to as the Advocacy Coalition Framework as the proper framework for the study.
As a widely used policy process framework, Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith’s
Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) grew out of the authors’ longstanding interest to
understand the role of technical information in the “incredibly complex process of policy
change over periods of one or several decades” (Sabatier, 1988, p. 1). Accordingly, Sabatier
and Jenkins-Smith (1994) found the predominant Stage Heuristic model lacking in clearly
explaining the causes of policy change because it was (1) descriptively inaccurate, with
proponents acknowledging deviations from the sequential stages of problem identification,
agenda-setting, policy formulation, implementation, evaluation; (2) a ‘legalistic, top-down’
approach narrowly focused on the legislator’s intentions and “the fate of a particular policy
initiative” and hence negligent to the interconnections of other factors (e.g. important
players, other pieces of legislation); and (3) lacking a clear basis for empirical hypothesis-
testing, given its lack of identifiable forces that drive the policy process from one stage to
another (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1994: 177). Unsatisfied with this and the deterministic
attribute of demographers to changing social and macroeconomic conditions (e.g. population
migrations, critical elections, macroeconomic fluctuations in unemployment and inflation),
Sabatier elaborated Heclo’s idea of policy change as “a product of both (1) and (2) the
strategic interaction of people within a policy community involving both competition for
power and efforts to develop more knowledgeable means of addressing the policy problem”
(Sabatier, 1988: 2). Therefore, the ACF was Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s attempt to (1)
synthesize ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approaches and to (2) translate Heclo's basic insight
into a reasonably clear conceptual framework of policy change over time.
D.2. Applications of ACF
First introduced as a symposium issue of Policy Sciences (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith,
1988) and later revised by the authors after soliciting six case studies (Sabatier & Jenkins-
Smith, 1994), the ACF has been applied and refined in policy cases tackling significant social
issues and diverse geopolitical settings24, most notably in Asia Pacific and Europe. This
diversity in applications provides studies using similar methods to the proposed study such as
Berggren’s (1998) study of land use in Sweden, Wolsink’s (2003) assessment of land
planning in The Netherlands, and Villamor’s (2006) survey of forest policy in the Philippines
and recently Binag’s (2010) evaluation of policy-oriented learning in the Automated Election
System movement in the country. The last two case studies, among others, rightly

24
For an updated, comprehensive list, see
http://www.ucdenver.edu/academics/colleges/SPA/BuechnerInstitute/Centers/WOPPR/ACF/Pages/AdvocacyC
oalitionApplications.aspx.
demonstrate the viability or operability of the ACF mechanisms in a Philippine policy
subsystem.
D.3. Criticisms and Counterarguments of ACF
Despite this, the ACF has some criticisms. Most notable is the potential bias of the
ACF toward pluralistic political systems (Kübler; Eberg in “Advocacy Coalition Framework
Overview,” 2012), which tends to limit the applicability of the framework in geopolitical
settings different from that of US. As response to this, the framework has been revised
(Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1994) to suit the contingencies of political systems different from
and outside of the USA, most notably the realities of European governance (Sabatier &
Weible, 2007). In order to ease the application of the ACF outside US, a new category of
variables was developed, known as “long-term coalition opportunity structures (LTCOS),”
which refer to relatively enduring features of a polity that affect the resrouces and constraints
of subsysem actors or advocacy coalitions (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). LTCOS are identified
by two variables: (1) degree of consesnus needed for major policy change, which refer to
norms or requirements of a political system to reach consensus before deciding to change
policy; and (2) openness of political system to policy change, which are indicated by (a) the
number of decisionmaking venues that any major policy proposal must go through and (b)
the accessibility of each venue (Sabatier & Weible, 2007).
However, the LTCOS variable is not relevant to this study because Firstly, the
Congressional body formally only requires majorities (either 2/3rd or simple majority) and
not a consensus to decide on a major policy change proposal. Secondly, the Philippine
political system effectively limits formal discussion or consideration of amendment bills to

CARP to Congress and hence the criteria on the number of decisionmaking venues is also
irrelevant.
Other recent additions to the ACF include two more paths to policy change: (1)
internal subsystem events and negotiated agreements (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). Compared
with external events, internal events occur within the subsystem and are expected to highlight
failures in current subsystem practices, e.g. oil spills crisis that causes stricter controls in the
oil industry. Building from the alternate dispute resolution literature, negotiated agreements
involving two or more coalitions builds from previous ACF work on the conditions
facilitating cross-coalition learning (Jenkins-Smith, 1990) where “professional forums”
provide an institutional setting that allows coalitions to safely negotiate, agree, and
implement agreements. Sabatier and Weible (2007) identify nine conditions affecting the
likelihood of policy change through negotiated agreement: a hurting stalemate, effective
leadership, consensus- based decision rules, diverse funding, duration of process and
commitment of members, a focus on empirical issues, an emphasis on building trust, and lack
of alternative venues. These two also do not pertain to this study as, no major crisis within
CARP subsystem with a magnitude akin to an oil crisis has occurred in the proximate time
before the decision to extend and reform CARP.
D.4. Justification for Using the ACF
Given this, the ACF meets the requirements of a viable causal theory stipulated by
Lave and March (as cited in Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1994). Firstly, it has two primary
forces of causal change; (a) the beliefs of coalition members and (b) exogenous shocks to the
subsystem. Secondly, it is testable or falsifiable. In fact, several of the proposed hypotheses
have had to be revised as a result of the new cases. Thirdly, it is relatively parsimonious and
fertile, i.e. it produces a relatively large number of interesting predictions per assumption
(although this is certainly subject to contention). Fourthly, it may produce some surprising
results. Lastly, as Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1994) describes, the ACF has “the potential
for contributing to a better world by helping policy activists understand a very complex
process and by showing how individuals with solid information can make a difference over
time” (p. 137).
Indeed, the ACF’s model of the individual is well suited to shed light on the decision
to extend and reform CARP amidst a decade-long decades-long policy conflict in the sector,
as highlighted by the tumultuous history of AR legislation in the country. At the onset, the
initial extension of 10 years granted by R.A. 8532, that has already lapsed rightly fits the first
premise of ACF of a decade-long timeframe. More substantially, the ACF is apt to illustrate
the intense level of coalition formation as evidenced by the more pronounced coordinated
activities of different coalitions formed by various CSOs, POs, and NGOs that bound
together to push for the extension and major revision of CARP (Flores-Obanil, 2010). In
other words, the legislative battles and social debates coloring its history has rendered
Philippine AR a distinct policy subsystem, complete with a diverse set of actors with their
accompanying stories of injustices, privileges, failures, successes in Philippine society. Most
importantly, the fact that the efforts galvanizing the legislation of the CARP extension
through 9700 was triggered by a study conducted by a foreign think tank (Flores-Obanil,
2010) fits perfectly with ACF’s emphasis on the centrality of technical and scientific
information in triggering major policy change.

D.5. Assumptions of the ACF
Given this, the ACF is based on four basic premises. First, understanding the process
of policy change requires a time perspective of a decade or more to allow ‘policy-oriented
learning’. Secondly, focusing on 'policy subsystems,' defined as “a set of actors who are
involved in dealing with a policy problem” (Sabatier, 1988, p. 138), is the most useful
aggregate unit of analysis. Its conceptualization stems from the enormous pressure of
specialization needed to make sense of the increasing complexity of modern society, the
expansion of governmental problems and the technical nature of policy problems (Sabatier,
1988). Thirdly, a policy subsystem includes actors from all levels of government, given the
substantial discretion of implementing officials in deciding how national policy is translated
into diverse localities. Fourthly, public policies and programs can be conceived as concrete
translations of beliefs that are successfully argued, as they involve value priorities, causal
relationships, perceptions of the magnitude of societal problems, and perceptions of policy
instruments and implicit theories about how to achieve policy objectives (Sabatier, 1988;
Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1994).

D.6. Theoretical Framework of the ACF
Figure 2.1. Conceptual Diagram of the Advocacy Coalition Framework by Paul

Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1994 ed.)
D.6.a.1
RELATIVELY STABLE POLICY SUBSYSTEM

PARAMETERS
Coalition A: Coalition B:
1. Basic attributes of a problem Policy
a. Beliefs a. Beliefs
area or good Brokers
b. Resources b. Resources
2. Basic attributes of
distribution of natural
resources SHORT-TERM
3. Fundamental sociocultural
values and social structure
D.6.a.
4. Basic constitutional structure CONSTRAINTS
AND Strategy Strategy
RESOURCES re. guidance re. guidance

OF instruments instruments
SUBSYSTEM
ACTORS
EXTERNAL (SYSTEM) (Policy-Oriented Learning) Decisions by Sovereigns
EVENTS
Feedback
1. Changes in socioeconomic
and political conditions
2. Changes in public opinion Governmental Programs
3. Changes in systemic
governing coalition
4. Policy decisions and impacts
from other subsystems
D.6.a.3 Policy Output
D.6.a.4
Policy Impacts
D.6.a. Variables of the ACF
D.6.a.1. The Role of External Factors
Policy-making in any political system or policy subsystem is constrained by a variety
of social, legal, and resource features of the society of which it is a part (Sabatier, 1988).
Hence, on the left side are two sets of exogeneous variables—the one fairly stable, the other
more dynamic—that affect the constraints and opportunities of policy subsystem actors.
Fairly stable parameters are factors that are relatively unchanging over several
decades and are grouped into 4 categories. (1) Basic attributes of the policy problem or
public good define the parameters distinguishing the qualities of the policy problem, topic, or
public good in question. For instance, goods that give rise to common pool problems that
markets cannot deal efficiently (e.g. ocean fisheries) become issues that warrant
governmental regulation or public policy (Ostrom as cited in Sabatier, 1988). The presence
of quantitative measurements to ascertain performance gaps also determine the basic
attributes of the policy problem and the degree of policy-oriented learning that takes place.
(2) The distribution of natural resources provides the material basis for how the policy
problem emerged and evolved. (3) Fundamental sociocultural values and social structures
provides the social context stimulating demand for policy issues and in which power and
competition over dominion of policy are being played. Lastly, constitutional mandates
provide (4) the basic institutional and legal structure in which the policy problem is
legitimately addressed or solutions to it are formally formulated (Sabatier, 1988). As
products of history, these factors are slow to change and less able to account for policy
change, unless drastic events such as constitutional amendments occur (Sabatier, 1988).
While the difficulty of changing them discourages policy actors from using them as basis for
strategizing behavior, they can nevertheless limit the range of feasible and acceptable policy
options (Sabatier, 1988).
On the other hand, more dynamic external factors surround a policy subsystem.
These factors are more susceptible to significant fluctuations over the course of a few years
(Sabatier, 1988). These include: (1) socio-economic conditions or system-wide conditions
such as employment, inflation, and other macroeconomic indicators, which affect a

subsystem on a wholesale scale either by clarifying causal assumptions of present policies or
by altering policy opinion; (2) public opinion that refers to the general sentiment or political
support of the public toward the policy in question, providing the necessary constituency in
pushing for policy change; (3) changes in systemic governing coalitions or changes in
leadership in political or administrative offices that bring changes in management styles and
principles and in manner of policy implementation; and (4) other policy decisions (i.e.
decisions from other policy subsystem) that may also determine the direction and substance
of policy change by affecting priority setting and resource allotment among government
programs. These dynamic external events constitute a principal source of policy change by
altering constraints and opportunities of subsystem actors. They also present a continuous
challenge to subsystem actors in learning to anticipate and respond to contingencies in a
manner consistent with their policy beliefs. They become sources of frustrations when
coalitions working for years to gain an advantage over their competitors suddenly find their
plans disrupted by external events over which they have little control (Sabatier, 1988). In
most cases, dynamic external events are interrelated (Sabatier, 1988).
D.6.a.2 Advocacy Coalitions and their Policy Beliefs
Within the subsystem, policy actors aggregate into “a number of advocacy coalitions
composed of people from various organizations who share a set of normative and causal
beliefs and who often act in concert” (Sabatier, 1988, p. 133; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith,
1994, p. 180) and “…who show a non-trivial degree of coordinated activity over time”
(Sabatier, 1988, p. 139). Advocacy coalitions are formed because policy actors strive to
translate their beliefs into actual policy before their opponents can. That is, if their opponents
pool resources under a common position, actors without allies are greatly disadvantaged, so
they seek alliance with people who embrace similar policy core beliefs engaging in
substantial coordination over time and sharing resources and developing complementary
strategies, in order to be successful. In the process coalition members will tend to resist
information suggesting their basic beliefs are invalid or unattainable, and they will use formal
policy analyses primarily to corroborate those beliefs (or attack their opponents'). Sabatier
and Jenkins-Smith (1994) call this tendency the devil shift. Consequently, the fear of losing
to opponents and the tendency to not underestimate the opponents’ resources, power, and
hostility reinforces alliance among coalitions, rendering policy beliefs to be stable and quite
resistant to change (Sabatier & Weible, 2007) (Hypothesis 1 of Appendix A. 1. Hypotheses
Concerning Advocacy Coalition). In this sense, the ACF rejects the view that coalitions are
primarily motivated by short-term self-interests and that 'coalitions of convenience' of highly
varying composition tends to dominate policy-making.
Hence, it is shared policy beliefs that provide the principal 'glue' of politics, which
bind advocacy coalitions (Sabatier, 1988). Defined as the “set of basic values, causal
assumptions, and problem perceptions” (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1994, p. 139), policy
beliefs are what policy actors and coalitions rely on as primary heuristic for political
decision-making (“Advocacy Coalition Framework Overview,” in WOPPR, 2012). Given
their complexity, policy beliefs are organized into a belief system of a hierarchical, tri-partite
structure, with higher levels constraining more specific ones (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith,
1994). At the highest or broadest level, the 'deep core' of the shared belief system includes
basic ontological and normative beliefs, such as the perceived nature of humans or the
relative valuation of individual freedom or social equality, which universally operate across
all policy domains (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1994). At the next level are
'policy core' beliefs that represent a coalition's basic normative commitments and causal
perceptions in an entire policy subsystem. They include fundamental value priorities, such as
the relative importance of economic development versus environmental protection; basic
perceptions concerning the general seriousness of the problem and its principal causes; and
strategies for realizing core values within subsystem, such as the appropriate division of
authority between governments and markets, the level of government best suited to deal with
the problem, and the basic policy instruments to be used. Finally, the secondary aspects of a
coalition's belief system within a specific policy domain comprise a large set of narrower
beliefs and minor, specific details concerning the seriousness of the problem or the relative
importance of various causal factors in specific locales, policy preferences regarding
desirable regulations or budgetary allocations, the design of specific institutions, and the
evaluations of various actors' performance (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1994).
In general, deep core beliefs are very resistant to change—essentially akin to a
religious conversion. A coalition's policy core beliefs are somewhat less rigid or more
susceptible to changes than deep core. While several are almost exclusively normative and
thus very difficult to modify, most involve empirical elements which may change over a
period of time with the gradual accumulation of evidence, as in Weiss's enlightenment
function (as cited in Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1994). Beliefs in secondary
aspects are assumed to be more readily adjusted in light of new data, experience, or changing
strategic considerations.
While belief systems determine the direction in which an advocacy coalition tends to
steer governmental programs into, its ability to do so will be critically dependent upon
resources, which range from material resources such as money and number of supporters to
intangible assets such as legal authority, among others (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier & Weible,
2007) (see Annex A.5 for more details).
To further policy objectives, coalitions adopt at any time one or more strategies
embodying one or more institutional innovations. Advocacy coalitions may revise their
beliefs or alter their strategy based on perceptions of the adequacy of governmental
decisions, the resultant impacts, and new information on external events dynamics and
internal subsystem movements. Such may involve seeking major institutional revisions at the
collective choice level, more minor revisions at the operational level, or even going outside
the subsystem to demand changes in the dominant electoral governing coalition at the
systematic level to re-configure strategic priority and political support of policy issues or
proposed policy changes (Sabatier, 1988).
Conflicting strategies and beliefs from various coalitions are normally mediated by a
third group of actors called 'policy brokers,' whose principal concern is to find some
reasonable compromise that reduces intense conflict and who plays the part of “…keeping
the level of political conflict within acceptable limits and reaching some ‘reasonable’
solution to the problem” (Sabatier, 1988, p. 141). The ACF thus maintains that the distinction
between 'advocate' and 'broker' is a continuum for many brokers will have some policy bent,
while others may show some serious concern with preserving the system (Sabatier, 1988).
This is more true for agencies with a clearly defined mission grounded on a statutory
mandate and reinforced by the professional affiliation of agency personnel (Sabatier &
Jenkins-Smith, 1994). For Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1994) then, high civil servants
embody this dual role of policy brokers and policy advocates.

D.6.a.3 The Role of Policy-Oriented Learning
Given the stability of policy beliefs and the resistance of advocacy coalitions to
accept their opponents’ views at face value, coalition members undertake extensive research,
in order to identify findings useful in debunking their opponents’ arguments or responding to
challenges to their own belief system. In most subsystems, impacts of a policy take time to
manifest in clear and measurable form. Consequently, the process of altering policy beliefs
takes years as it takes that much time to gather data to correct the erroneous arguments of a
coalition and accept the logic and practicability of their rival’s—hence the first assumption to
consider a decade-long time span in understanding policy implementation and enabling
‘policy-oriented learning.’ Once useful information is gathered, coalition members use this to
refine their understanding of Firstly the internal logical and causal relationships of their
belief system and Secondly those of their competing belief systems, in order to better achieve
their objective of changing policies. Usually, coalitions gather information through feedback
of previous policy implementation. Given this, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1994) defines
policy-oriented learning as the “relatively enduring alterations of thought or behavioral
intentions which result from experience and which are concerned with the attainment (or
revision) of policy objectives” (Heclo as cited in Sabatier, 1988, p. 182). Operationally,
policy-oriented learning is manifested in “…a productive analytical debate between members
of different advocacy coalitions…[where] one or both coalitions are led to alter Policy Core
aspects of their belief system or at least very important Secondary Aspects as a result of an
observed dialogue rather than a change in external conditions” (Sabatier, 1988, p. 155). In
short, policy-oriented learning is demonstrated practically by the modification of certain
policy beliefs by coalition members participating in the debates, out of recognizing the
accurate assessment of the situation in light of new scientific information, research findings
and facts, or other forms of technical evaluations (i.e. enlightenment function of scientific
information). Thus, policy-oriented learning is premised on the fact that policy change is
possible even with the mere consideration of new and enlightening scientific information
(Sabatier, 1988).
Here, the interaction of competing stakeholder advocacy coalitions is a focal point of
analysis. That is, although policy-oriented learning is essentially a cognitive activity, it is
indicated further by two conditions: (1) the presence of intermediate level of informed
conflict between two coalitions that (a) possess the technical resources to engage in a debate
and whose (b) conflict lies between secondary aspects of one belief system and core elements
of the other or between important secondary aspects of both their belief systems and the (2)
existence of a forum which is (a) prestigious enough to force professionals from different
coalitions to participate and (b) dominated by professional norms.
Then again, such learning comprises only one of the forces affecting policy change
over time. In addition, there is a real world that changes, which in turn influences the
perception of policy actors and advocacy coalitions on the policy problem (Sabatier, 1988).
That is, although policy-oriented learning occurs mostly within the internal feedback loops of
the policy subsystem (see Fig. 2.1), it is reinforced by perceptions of the external
environment (i.e. dynamic external events) and of increased knowledge of the state of the
policy problem (see Fig. 2.1). The integration of this knowledge with basic values and causal
assumptions comprising the core beliefs of advocacy coalitions is the focus of policy-
oriented learning.
D.6.a.4 Policy Change through Policy-Oriented Learning or External Events
Therefore, according to the ACF, policy change, the end goal of advocacy coalitions,
occurs through two paths (Fig. 3.2): accumulated (1) policy-oriented learning and the impact
of (2) external shocks. More exactly, the ACF argues that while policy-oriented learning is an
important aspect of policy change and can often alter ‘Secondary Aspects’ (i.e. minor policy
change) of a coalition's belief system, changes in the core aspects of a policy (i.e. major
policy change) usually result from perturbations in non-cognitive factors external to the
policy subsystem (i.e. real world changes), which the ACF classifies in two ways: (1) fairly
stable parameters and more dynamic (2) system-wide external events (Sabatier, 1989). Yet,
these two paths are not entirely mutually exclusive as external events can again reinforce the
perception of the policy problem and affect policy-oriented learning to a certain degree. Once
an agreement is reached by opposing coalitions, policy change comes in the form of a set of
one or more government programs as the policy output, whose impacts on the policy
subsystem are used as feedback to subsequent assessments of the policy in question.
Figure 2.2. Conceptual Diagram of the ACF’s Main Thesis
EXTERNAL
EVENTS
ADVOCACY POLICY
COALITION CHANGE
w/ POLICY
BELIEFS
POLICY-
ORIENTED
LEARNING
D.7. Operational Framework: the ACF to Explain CARPER
Operationalized, this dual path of policy change through external events and/or policy-
oriented learning is considered in looking at both external events (particularly dynamic
external events) and policy-oriented learning as possible paths that resulted into the policy
change of extending and reforming CARP (Figure 2.3).
D.7.a. External Events
Box 1. Were there external shocks or events within the Agrarian Reform sector that became relevant
considerations in the Philippine House of Representatives’ decision to extend CARP through R.A. 9700? If so,
which one/s provided the greatest stimulus for the CARP extension (changes in socioeconomic and political
conditions, changes in public opinion, changes in systematic governing coalition, other policy decisions outside
the land reform policy subsystem)?

The study through ACF aim s to assess if four of the dynamic external events or factors
earlier discussed were relevant consideration in the decision to extend and reform CARP
through CARPER. In the case of agrarian reform, the following external shocks may be
worth considering. Externally, continued demand for CARP appears to be driven by its
failure to uplift significantly the socioeconomic conditions of AR beneficiaries, as partially
evidenced by prevailing high poverty incidence among them, the unchanging concentration
of land to a privileged few, and the alarming decline in agricultural productivity (Fabella,
2014). This perception appears to materialize in news media coverage that articulate public
opinion on CARPER as acutely shown by protests of disgruntled farmer beneficiaries calling
for sustained and reformed CARP.
Philippine AR history also suggests that changes in leadership (government coalition)
tends to determine the pace and degree of policy change in CARP implementation. It is hence
valid to examine if President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo did the same.

Other policy decisions of other policy subsystems may have also affected CARL’s
inclusion in the legislative priorities of the Arroyo administration, especially in terms of
budget allocation and research effort.
D.7.b. Policy-Oriented Learning
Box 2. Was the decision to extend CARP a result of policy-oriented learning in light of new information from
past CARP implementation? If so, how did policy-oriented learning alter, strengthen, or weaken the policy
beliefs of advocacy coalition members on the issue of deciding to extend CARP through R.A. 9700?
Yet, the most likely impetus of the decision to extend and reform CARP seems to be
policy-oriented learning within the Philippine AR policy subsystem. That is, the decision to
extend CARP stems from the learning and refinement of understanding by advocacy
coalitions of the true state of affairs of CARP policy based on previous years of CARP
implementation, specifically of the first CARP law, RA 6657, and the second extension law,
RA 8532, which merely augments funding for CARP and extends the implementation of the
first CARP law for ten more years. In this study, policy-oriented learning is specifically
indicated by how the debates proceed. It is assumed as competing coalitions, mainly
polarized into pro-land distribution farmer beneficiaries and anti-land distribution
landowners, engage in debates, they undergo a process of clarifying conflicting beliefs. In
the process of clarification, these coalitions utilize scientific studies or empirically rigorous
evaluations of CARP implementation (e.g. DAR-commissioned GTZ study) to justify and
bolster their arguments. Hence, the variable of policy-oriented learning is further
operationalized in relation to the discussion on conflicting policy beliefs of competing
advocacy coalitions (see Box 3).
D.7.c. Advocacy Coalitions and their Competing Policy Beliefs

Box 3. How did the competing policy beliefs of advocacy coalitions shape the Philippine House of
Representative’s decision to extend CARP through R.A. 9700?
Both coalitions are documented to have employed various strategies and resources—
ranging from extensive lobbying to media harnessing (Flores-Obanil, 2010)—to achieve their
goal of extending CARP or not. Although the two coalitions disagreed with major
components of CARP, they were still able to arrive at a mutual policy decision to extend and
CARP. This paradox of passing a mutual decision amidst differences is explained by the
multi-layered nature of policy beliefs and the presence of policy brokers who mediate
differences between pro- and anti-CARP extension coalitions. The complex relationship of
various levels of beliefs bind opposing positions of coalitions by allowing agreement on
fundamental aspects of a policy such as generic or humanistic ideals (e.g. social justice).
D.7.d. The Role of Policy Brokers
Box 4. Given the contentious nature of CARP debates, were there policy brokers that mediated agreements or
working compromises between competing advocacy coalitions, which enabled the decision to extend CARP
through R.A. 9700? Who were these and how did they help in arriving at those workable compromises?
Policy brokers, on the other hand, usually come in the guise of Congressional
Committee Chairs and agency administrators, who display objectivity and openness for
suggestions to improve CARP implementation despite their clearly defined mission or
mandate to continue the land distribution component of CARP. Individual legislators,
regardless of their orientation, also assisted in finding workable compromises between the
two coalitions (TCM 11-27-2007). These individual legislators epitomize the continuum
between ‘advocate’ and ‘broker’.

Altogether, this is how policy-oriented learning enables policy change through the
refinement of understanding of a policy through conflict of and consequent clarification of
policy beliefs. In all this, the DAR-GTZ study is a form of scientific feedback that served as
“The Trigger” (Flores-Obanil, 2010) stimulating an intermediate level of conflict between
two opposing coalitions, which in the process of coming to a resolution resulted to
clarification of scientific/empirical data on the results/impacts of previous CARP
implementation and refinement of the accurate understanding of policy beliefs on CARP. On
the other hand, Congressional committee meetings, plenary sessions, and periods of
interpellation served as the forum for the participation of pertinent professionals and
academic experts such as agrarian lawyers and agricultural economists while Congressional
deliberations per se in these meetings becomes clear manifestations of an intermediate level
of conflict among informed policy stakeholders whose polarized positions mobilized a
productive exchange of scientific information, which fostered solidarity within advocacy
coalitions and ultimately led to two coalitions correcting their arguments and refining their
understanding of CARP.
In the end, these compromises and the consideration of compelling external factors
influence two coalitions come to a decision to extend and reform CARP and are reflected in
certain amendments of the new law, which is basically the policy output at the operational
level in the form of actual amendment provisions ratified in the CARP with Extension
Reforms (CARPER) law (R.A. 9700).

Figure 2.3.
Operational Diagram: ACF (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1994) as applied to the case of (CARPER) law (R.A. 9700)
Box 1
POLICY SUBSYSTEM EXTERNAL (SYSTEM) POLICY SUBSYSTEM Timeline
(Old) EVENTS (New) 2007
a. Changes in socio-economic
conditions: poverty
Policy Impacts: incidence, low income & (Pro-Extension) Coalition:
Box 4
(Anti-Extension) Coalition:
Implementation productivity among ARBs Reform CARP Movement Landowners & allies
Problems of RA b. Changes in public opinion: 1. Beliefs: Policy Brokers:
1. Beliefs:
8532 and RA 6657 public support reflected in a. Deep Normative Core 1. Agrarian Reform
a. Deep Normative Core
publicized protests and b. Near Policy Core Committee Chair
b. Near Policy Core
similar news c. Secondary Aspects 2. DAR Secretary
c. Secondary Aspects
c. Changes in systemic 2. Resources: 3. Others
2. Resources:
governing coalitions: GMA Financial, information, Financial, information, Box 3
orders fast-tracking of CARP authority, leadership, etc. authority, leadership,
d. Policy decisions of other
policy subsystems:
priority/landmark laws
competing w/ CARP over
national budget & other state Strategy Strategy
resources, e.g. AES Law, Lobbying w/ Congress, Highlighting CARP failure,
Box 2 Climate Change Act, Media Harnessing, Public Unjust Compensation,
Cheaper Medicines Act, etc. Protests, etc. Lower Prod. post-CARP
etc.
POLICY-ORIENTED
LEARNING
• DAR-GTZ study as feedback
output from implementation of Government Decision: Extending and Reforming CARP
R.A. 8532 and 6657 that triggered
conflict that force opposing
coalitions to form and engage in an
contested yet productive exchange
of scientific information Government Program: CARP Extension w/ Reforms (CARPER)
• Congressional committee meetings
and plenary sessions as forum
where professionals participate and
congressional debates and the
Policy Output: Specific Amendments to R.A. 6657/8532 through R.A. 9700
compromises reached reflecting
learning
2009
Chapter III
History of Land Reform in the Philippines
Before presenting the findings of the study, it may be useful to provide a
historical background or chronological development of the many land reform programs in
the Philippines that culminated in CARP.
The Philippines has a long history of land reforms. Yet, after decades of different
land reform programs, the policy goals of reducing poverty among landless peasants
through dispersing the unequal distribution of lands remains to be seen. Critics of
Philippine land reform programs point to this long agrarian history for answers to explain
the relative failures of past and present land reform programs (Almeda-Martin, 1999).
U.S. Colonial Land Reform Policies
When the United States acquired the Philippines in 1898, it joined the ranks of
European empires as a new colonial power but its rise to international power status also
generated new problems in formulating colonial policy (Almeda-Martin, 1999).
According to Almeda-Martin (1999), land reform is arguably the most pertinent example
of the dilemma that challenged US colonial authorities:
One of the most important and serious questions which is to come before the United States
Authorities in adjusting affairs in the Philippines, is that of the land. Opinions differ very materially
as to the subject, and it will probably take not only action by Congress, but some litigation to fully
settle the questions involved. That there are thousands of acres of most excellent land to be obtained
for agricultural purposes is not questioned. That it can be easily obtained and at a fair rental is not
feared, the underlying question is the real title (Cruz as cited in Almeda-Martin, 1999, p. 187).
The United States understood that land reform was critical to political stability and
economic development of the islands. After all, the Philippine Independence Revolution
against Spain originated as a peasant movement. Hence, agrarian unrest due to poverty
and unequal distribution of land could not be ignored if colonial authority was to be
legitimately established.
In effect, such pressures for land reform caused US colonial policy to become
over ambitious, attempting to balance both benevolent intentions and the desire to make
the Philippines a profitable colony. On one hand, public land grants provided landless
peasants an opportunity to become independent small-scale farmers and aimed to
stimulate the rural economy by using land ownership as an incentive for farm
productivity, a strategy seen to balance the skewed class structure that seriously
threatened political stability. On the other hand, colonial authorities were committed to
preserving the existing structure of private property rights, and reassured landowners that
private property rights would remain valid under the new colonial legal framework to
both build from the commercial economy already in place and facilitate a smooth
economic transition (Almeda-Martin, 1999).
These dual principles are evident in the Public Land Act (PLA) of 1902, the Friar
Lands Act (FLA) of 1903, and the Rice Share tenancy Act (RSTA) of 1933. The PLA
required prospective beneficiaries to undergo a lengthy, costly process of land
registration and court litigations (land surveying, notice, and a five-year waiting period,
before acquiring title to the land) and permitted individuals and corporations to lease a
maximum of 1,024 hectares of public land for up to twenty-five years, renewable a
second time, while the FLA required roughly 60,000 tenant beneficiaries who had been
tilling since the Spanish colonial period to pay the purchase price of the land plus interest,
forcing beneficiaries to sell lands to American and Filipino businessmen who perpetuated
plantation agriculture. On the other hand, the RSTA regulated landlord-tenant
relationship rather than focusing on distributing land and required share contracts to be
written in the vernacular language, provided for 50-50 share crop arrangements, set an
interest ceiling of ten per cent per annum on loans, and prohibited arbitrary dismissal of
tenants (Almeda-Martin, 1995; Espiritu & Yoingco, 1995) yet only provided for one-year
rental terms, and gave landowner-dominated municipal councils the dicretion to
implement the regulations, allowing landowners the legal means to evade coverage
(Almeda-Martin, 1999; Wurfel, 1954).
All three laws not only provided for land entitlements but also included
substantial safeguards to protect prior property claims of private individuals and
corporations. Procedures such as land surveyance and notice requirements did not aid
peasant beneficiaries, but instead facilitated a process whereby landowners and others of
the educated and propertied class could acquire more land and challenge peasant
beneficiaries through legal contestations of homestead applications. As a result, land
reform during the American colonial period failed because potential beneficiaries were
not able to secure land entitlements against landowners who effectively utilized land
reform laws' procedures not only to prevent expropriation of their land, but also to
increase their landholdings (Almeda-Martin, 1999).
Post-War Land Reform Laws
Since independence from the United States in 1946, the Philippines has
implemented four land reform programs: Republic Act 1400 or the Agricultural Tenancy
Act (ATA) of 1954 under President Ramon Magsaysay; Republic Act 3844 or the
Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963 under President Diosdado Macapagal;
Presidential Decree 27 (PD 27) under Ferdinand Marcos in 1972; and Republic Act 6657
or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) law of 1987 under President
Corazon Aquino.
The ATA mandated the redistribution of public lands and the expropriation of
private lands exceeding 300 hectares and corporate lands exceeding 600 hectares of
contiguous area. It provided institutional support through credit facilities and the creation
of agrarian justice mechanisms such as the Tenancy Commission and the Court of
Agrarian Relations, which prohibited unjustified ejectment of tenants and settled
problems arising from tenancy, and the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation
Administration25 (NARRA), which expedited free distribution of public agricultural lands
to landless tenants (DAR, n.d.; Espiritu & Yoingco, 1995). With this, the ATA was
considered the Magna Carta of Tenants and labeled the “Land to the Landless” program
(Espirtu & Yoingco, 1995; Putzel, 1992) and was initially successful in attracting
farmers-turned-rebels to a peaceful life by giving them home lots and farms (Espiritu &
Yoingco).
However, the high land retention restriction limited coverage to less than two
percent of the nation's agricultural land as only a few land holdings were over 300
contiguous hectares while landowners evaded redistribution by simply breaking up their
lands into smaller units (Almeda-Martin, 1999; Putzel, 1992). The law also required a
majority of tenants in a covered private estate to first petition the government to subject
the estate to expropriation, adding organizational cost to beneficiaries. Most of all, the
ATA is criticized as a mere counterinsurgency response to the national threat of large-
scale peasant unrest posed by the HUKBALAHAP, an agrarian based peasant resistance

25
Through R.A. 1160 or the NARRA Law of 1955, NARRA replaced Land Settlement Development Corporation (LASEDECO) in
carrying out this mandate of expediting land distribution (Espiritu & Yoingco, 1995)
against the Japanese WWII occupation 26 (Almeda-Martin, 1999). Politically, while
landowning legislators supported the concept of land entitlements in order to satiate
demands from their consitutuencies, they deliberately created heightened protections to
prevent expropriation of their lands (Espirttu & Yoingco, 1995), utilizing the same
principles of US colonial land reform in a number of ways: (1) preserving their property
rights by integrating procedural barriers that put the burden of land reform on peasant
initiation (e.g. tenant petitions for expropriation of private land they tilled); (2) creating
legal loopholes that would exempt most landed estates (e.g. land retention of 300
contiguous hectares); and (3) failing to vote for adequate funding of the program, which
limited optimized achievements (Almeda-Martin, 1999; Espiritu & Yoingco, 1995). For
its part, the NARRA lacked implementing modalities that implementers would usually
resort to costly, unsure improvisation (Espiritu & Yoingco, 1995).
The second to the last, ALRC of 1963, intended to transform tenant farmers into
landowners by abolishing shared tenancy and instituting leasehold system with the
guarantee of tenure and even the possibility of eventual ownership (Almeda-Martin,
1999). It lowered the retention limit from 300 to 75 hectares, institutionalized a judicial
system of agrarian cases, provided marketing support and incorporated credit extension to
farmer beneficiaries. The law's fundamental objective was to establish owner-
cultivatorship with economic family-sized farms as the basis of Philippine agriculture and
subsequently to divert landlord capital in agriculture to industrial development. However,
the ALRC exempted coverage of plantation crops, which were deemed too important as
export earners that time.

26
Espiritu and Yoingco (1995) reported that the ATA involved 22 settlement projects benefiting 8,800 Huk families in NARRA
settlements in Palawan and in some parts of Mindanao.
However, little progress in land distribution was made under this program because
its implementation mostly focused on creating institutions27, specifically rural credit
agencies and agrarian courts, which created additional procedures, and ultimately
detracted from the program’s objective of transforming tenants into tenured leaseholders
or owners. Five years after ALRC’s enactment, only 15 percent of the targeted
beneficiaries became lease holders, while 3.4 percent of these leasehold arrangements
were officially registered (Almeda-Martin, 1999).
The ALRC laid the foundation for the implementation of P.D. 27 by adopting the
land-to-the tiller principle. P.D. 27 was enacted as a policy response to the increasing rate
of tenancy in the rice and corn lands, which had reached 60 percent by 1972 (Harkin,
1976). Unlike previous land reform laws, P.D. 27 radically ordered the emancipation of
all tenants on rice and corn lands through directly transferring land ownership (Putzel,
1992). P.D. 27 required that all tenants whose landlords owned more than seven hectares
were to be sold the land they tilled at two and a half times the average annual production,
with a fifteen-year payment plan through the Land Bank. While landlords were
compensated through payment of 10 percent in cash and 90 percent in Land Bank bonds,
the tenant beneficiary received a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) once final payment
was made to the Land Bank (Almeda-Martin, 1999).
Despite the radical policy design of land reform under P.D. 27, the decree retained
institutional encumbrances seen in previous land reform laws. Peasant beneficiaries under
PD 27 still faced difficulty in securing their land entitlements. For one, tenants were
obligated to pay rents to their landowners until land valuation and landowner

27
Specifically, the ALRC of 1963 created a special agency called the Land Authority headed by a Governor (under the control and
supervision of the President) to carry out the law’s basic objectives (Almeda-Martin, 1999).

compensation were completed. Secondly, they were required to show proof of
membership in a village level association and current cultivation of the land in question,
before obtaining his or her CLT. Thirdly, the law permitted landowners to negotiate the
land price directly with tenants. This latter provision further complicated the land transfer
process. Fourthly, once a beneficiary received a CLT, he was also treated as the owner of
the land and therefore obligated to pay for real property taxes on the land. With all these
substantial costs in the transfer of title, the law did not completely sever the legal
relationship between landlord and tenant. In effect, the implementation of P.D. 27 was
slow and inconsistent that by 1985, one report estimates that only 3% of target
beneficiaries actually received land titles, while other more optimistic estimates place the
figure between 13% and 19% (Almeda-Martin, 1999). Thus, even under Marcos land
reform was implemented under a dual policy strategy of land entitlements to peasants and
procedural safeguards for landowners.
These land reform laws have each tried to implement a more progressive land
reform scheme than the last, but each effort has repeatedly encountered numerous
obstructions in implementation because the US colonial land reform policy remains the
primary strategy employed by each administration (Almeda-Martin, 1999). Just as the
PLA, FLA and RSTA operated under a policy based on irreconcilable principles, each
land reform law has functioned under similar dual principles of general entitlements to
landless peasants and favorable due process for landowners. Each new government's
attempt to balance those political-economic interests is evident in land reform laws that
purport to redistribute private and public land with extensive and costly procedures that
reassure the landowner will undergo smooth transitions and receive just compensation.
These earlier forms of agrarian reform were heavily based on the narrow concept
that redistributing big landed estates owned by a few rich, non-cultivating landowners to
many non-owning, cultivating farmers28 will eventually rectify the skewed distribution of
wealth and contribute to the development of the national economy (Almeda-Martin,
1999; Dorner & Thiesenhusen, 1990; Estrella, 1974; Putzel, 1992). However, the
documented failures of these programs are historical proof that mere land redistribution is
insufficient, as it arises from a simplistic understanding of private property, without
addressing the greater question of investment necessary to increase productivity (Harkin,
1976). Such necessitated a broader concept of agrarian reform29 that involves not only
land transfer but also structural, institutional transformations and provision of essential
support services30 (Elvinia, 2011), in which government plays a significant role (Leones
and Moreno, 2012).
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988
This necessity prompted the government of President Aquino to renew
government commitment to land reform. Aquino herself made explicit policy
pronouncements before and after her election that a social justice program like CARP
will be the centerpiece of her administration‘s social legislative agenda and urged the
drafters of the 1987 Constitution to include a provision on social justice that would
institute a comprehensive agrarian reform law covering “all agricultural lands for ‘just
distribution’” (Putzel, 1992; § 21, Art. II; § 4, Art. XIII, Philippine 1987 Constitution).

28
In this set-up, LR is defined as "the reorganization of land holding arrangements, in terms of tenureship
and ownership” (Almeda-Martin, 1999, p. 181).
29
Leong (as cited in Leones & Morena, 2012) defines as “an integrated measure designed to eliminate
obstacles to economic and social development arising out of the defects in the agrarian structure” (p. 3)
30
Cohen (as cited in Elvinia, 2011) specifies to include measures of raising land productivity, institutional
credit, tenancy and wage relations, cooperatives establishment, R&D, human capital investment,
industrialization, trade and price policies, population control, and infrastructure construction.
With this, President Aquino and her administration elevated the pursuit of land reform
and a comprehensive redistributive social justice program to the level of a constitutional
right for the Filipino farmer, whose fundamental principles were grounded on the
successful land-to-the-tiller model earlier applied in Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea
(Putzel, 1992; Harkin, 1976).
Given this, the 8th Congress enacted the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL) (R.A. 6657) of 1989, which mandated a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) that has highly complex implementing mechanisms and ambitious
targets (Borras, 2001; Putzel, 1992). CARP intended to cover 10.3 million hectares of all
the 11.28 million hectares31 of private and public farmlands regardless of agricultural
products and productivity levels and targeted about 5 million rural poor households
(about 80% of the peasant population) as beneficiaries of at most 3 hectares of lands. A
series of policy decisions to exempt certain areas 32 , including aquaculture farms
(fishponds and prawn farms), reduced the scope to about 8.2 million hectares. 4.42
million of which were to be distributed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
and 3.72 million (public lands) by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
in a span of 10 years and in four phases33. Landowners were promised just compensation

31
Different sources offer different estimates of acreage, ranging from 9.725 million ha to 12 million. The
figure of 11.28 million ha is from FAOSTAT Agricultural Data (Borras, 2001). R.A. 7881 of 1995 was
also enacted to exempt existing fishponds and prawn farms from CARP coverage or allow conversion of
awarded CARP lands into fishponds and prawn farms whenever economically feasible as determined by
DAR. With a ‘data clean-up’ campaign in 1996, the coverage was reduced to 8.064 million ha (Borras,
2001; Putzel, 1992).
32
E.g. military reserves, penal colonies, public parks, forestry, public schools, etc. See Section 10 of R.A.
6657 for the complete list.
33
(1) rice and corn lands under P.D. 27, all idle or abandoned lands, all private lands voluntarily offered by
the owners for agrarian reform, all lands foreclosed by government financial institutions, all lands acquired
by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG); (2) all alienable and disposable public
agricultural lands; (3) landholdings above 24 hectares up to fifty (50) hectares; and (4) landholdings from
the retention limit up to twenty-four (24) hectares (Sec. 7 of Chap. II of R.A. 6657).
from beneficiaries, in the form of 25 to 35% cash downpayment (depending on
landholding size) and government bonds34 . The government subsidizes the gap. By
default, private agricultural lands were re-distributed through compulsory acquisition
(CA), whether or not the landlord cooperates with the program. To incentivize landowner
cooperation, however, CARP offers alternative land transfer arrangements: (1) the
Voluntary-Offer-to-Sell (VOS) by landowners, which increases the cash portion of
landlords' compensation by 5 per cent (with a corresponding 5 per cent reduction in
bonds); (2) the Voluntary Land Transfer (VLT), which allows direct land transfer to
peasants under terms mutually agreed between peasants and landlords; (3) the Stock
Distribution Option, which exempts corporate farms from redistribution through
corporate stock sharing with peasant beneficiaries; and in certain conditions approved by
the DAR, (4) leaseback arrangement, which allows beneficiaries to lease out awarded
lands to an investor.
Still, CARP failed to achieve its ambitious targets within the prescribed time.
DAR’s accomplishments alone were dismal. Under Corazon Aquino (1987 to 1992), the
DAR only redistributed 848,518 hectares35 or a little over 19% of the total 4.42 million
hectares (Borras, 2001; DARa, n.d.). Under Ramos (1992-1998), although DAR more
than doubled the output at 1,900,035 hectares (43% of DAR’s total target), a closer look
reveals that achievements centered on the less contentious land components and
acquisition modes: i) 33% in government-owned lands, ii) another 33% through VOS and
VLT, iii) only 6% through compulsory acquisition, and iv) 7.5% in rice and corn lands

34
Mainly in the form of stock shares in government-owned or –controlled corporations, LBP preferred
shares, physical assets and other qualified investments in accordance with the guidelines set by the
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council. See Section 18 of Chapter VI of R.A. 6657 for an exhaustive list.
35
Reyes (2002) provides a close estimate of 898,420 recipients receiving their land titles or free patents.
(Borras, 2001). This statistic did not include public lands distributed by DENR. Hence, in
1997, a year before the deadline, only 57% of total lands for distribution (by both DAR
and DENR) had been awarded, leaving more than 3.4 million hectares to be distributed
and prompting the 10th Congress to extend the CARP for another 10 years (DAR, 2000).
Upon extension, DAR under Estrada’s short-lived presidency (1998-2001) had to tackle
the most difficult private estates in coconut lands, sugar haciendas, and deferred
commercial plantations, a task Estrada promised (Vanzi, 1997) but failed to deliver with
a meagre 222,907 hectares (5%) of total lands distributed, leaving a balance of 2 million
hectares for distribution (Borras, 2001; DAR, 2000). Even with this low number, less
contentious acquisition modes were employed, with VOS, VLT, and government-owned
lands jointly accounting for 70% of distributed lands while compulsory acquisition of
private agricultural lands only accounting for about 25%. Under Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo36 (2001-2010), incomplete or unavailable information prevents any systematic
assessment of CARP’s performance. Nonetheless, a study commissioned by DAR to
assess the impact of CARP in 2007 showed that as of end of December 2006, overall
accomplishment in land distribution was still at 3.8 million hectares or 86% of the DAR’s
target of 4.4 million hectares (APPC, 2007).
Like many programs before it, CARP’s dismal performance across presidencies
can be attributed to its adoption of the dual policy of property rights assurance to
beneficiaries and due process for landowners, a difficult task that Almeda-Martin (1999)

36
The former president’s official website (“Initiatives: Land Distribution,” n.d.) claims impressive
achievements in CARP in terms of land transfer (53% within just one administrative period), support
services (9 irrigation facilities servicing 2,593 hectares, scholarships, etc.), agricultural infrastructures (55
187-meter long farm-to-market roads, 12 1,216-meter long farm-to-market bridges, 2 post-harvest facilities
with 7 units), and agrarian justice delivery (34,182 legal cases resolved).
argues would cause high probability of failure. This duality is evident in an earlier
analysis of the CARP law by Cornista (1990), which indicates ambivalence on how to
achieve social justice through CARP. While the strong demand for social justice
necessitated a comprehensive program that covers all agricultural lands (private and
public) regardless of crops and tenure of farmers, the strong influence of powerful
landholders over decision-making mechanisms of the state prompted the inclusion of
alternatives to physical redistribution “…such as production or profit-sharing, labor
administration and the distribution of shares of stocks” (Cornista, 1990, p. 4; § 31, R.A.
6657) and other physical land transfer arrangements such as the VLT37 (§ 20, R.A. 6657)
and VOS (§ 19, R.A. 6657) that intended to lessen landlord resistance but eventually
allowed evasion by landowners from CARP coverage. Such ambivalence in the law
(and the program) principally reflects the weakness of the state in balancing
countervailing sociopolitical pressures to implement an agrarian reform program that
produces optimal outcomes.
On one hand, Corazon Aquino’s presidency was threatened by several coup
attempts and hence faced heightened pressure to use CARP as a tool to quell peasant
agitation by conferring lands to farmers who constitute most of the growing insurgency
movement in the countryside (Putzel, 1992). Putzel (1992) suggests that no other agrarian
unrest most proximately demonstrates the counterinsurgency element of CARP than
media allegations that its enabling law, i.e. CARL, was a last-minute response to the

37
For one, VOS has proven to be less voluntary in practice than its name might suggest, and acquisition
under this mode has not always been easy. Despite the promise of mutual agreements, VLT transactions are
the most contentious element in the official data on CARP, as allegations of landlords conniving with DAR
officials and/or ‘beneficiaries’ to fake redistribution pervaded (Borras, 2001). Although the absence of
empirical data showing the extent of genuine and faked redistributions under VLT make this hard to prove,
this negative perception did not facilitate expedition of CARP redistribution (Borras, 2001).
‘Mendiola Bridge Massacre,’ a bloody protest six months before the first Committee
hearing for CARL, which left 19 unarmed peasants killed after the police and a
contingent of marines opened fire to 15,000 members of Kilusang Magbubukid ng
Pilipinas on January 22, 1987. This observation is later supported by the leftist group
Akbayan’s (n.d.) in their assessment of CARP and the entire Philippine agrarian reform
sector: “Agrarian Reform has been used primarily as an instrument to crush insurgency
particularly in the countryside, rather than as an instrument to make life better for all
peasants”[emphasis added](p. 3).
On the other hand, dominant landowner interests permeated the 8th Congress. The
House of Representatives alone was composed of many members from large landowning
families, with 141 of 204 representatives registering ownership of agricultural and
residential lands valued at P293.7 million (Putzel, 1992). Two relatives of President
Corazon Aquino emerged among the wealthiest, with the President’s sister-in-law, Teresa
Aquino-Oreta, declaring P17.2 million, and her brother, Jose Cojuangco, Jr., 6.4 million
worth of real estate. Of the 31 the Agrarian Reform Committee members, 18 came from
traditional political clans, seven were relatives of those clans, and only six were new and
relatively unattached to these clans (Putzel, 1992). One of the unattached was Bonifacio
Gillego, an ex-military official elected as the Agrarian Reform Committee chair. Jose
Cojuangco, on the other hand, was regarded as the leader who joined the early Committee
meetings but kept a low profile, leaving the public debate to sugar and rubber planter
Hortensia Starke.
With this profile, an intense confrontation during the House of Representatives
debates was expected and clearly demonstrated the ideological rifts between the pro-
peasant redistributive liberal and the landowner-dominated conservative approaches to
fundamental aspects of agrarian reform such as the definition of a genuine comprehensive
agrarian reform, the nature of property rights, and the mode of redistribution, among
others. For instance, Starke challenged Gillego’s definition of ‘comprehensive agrarian
reform,’
Agrarian...refers to anything that has to do with agriculture, and as you know agriculture also refers
not only to land, but also to the labor that works on the land and to the machinery…and to all the other
inputs…that go into production… So it is not necessarily referring to privately owned
lands…[reform] when it refers to the farmer, it means to improve his economic status, while
‘comprehensive’ refers not only or necessarily to all lands, but to all components: marketing,
organization, infrastructure, irrigation, and credit facilities[emphasis added](Putzel, 1992, p. 265).
Gillego rose to the challenge,
If we use the term ’agrarian’… [we] refer to a relationship and that relationship is not between man
and land…[If] I am tilling this land that I do not own, I relate myself in a real sense not to the land that
I till, but to you, my landowner…[I]n our relationship there is [a] situation that is pregnant with
opportunities for abuse and exploitation...[T]he state comes in and corrects this unjust relationship.
[emphasis added](Putzel, 1992, p. 265)
Then Gillego went on, “you added an adjective like comprehensive…What has been
the…nature of reforms in the past? Limited…” (Putzel, 1992, p. 265). So given the
context of past failed reforms, Gillego pertained to ‘comprehensive’ as covering both
public and private lands, regardless of tenurial arrangement “beyond rice and corn... and
all permanent crops” (Putzel, 1992, p. 265). Gillego then defined ‘reform’ “as a social or
political concept…[that] would include institutional reform. And the institution involved
here is ownership of property, and in the ownership of property there can only be one
relationship. If the property is land, you either owned the land or I work on the land
which you owned” [emphasis added](Putzel, 1992, p. 265-66). But later, Rep. Pablo
Garcia countered with a conservative defense of private property, attacking “worn out
and discredited slogans…such as ‘land for the landless’…Is there freedom when you can
be compelled against your will to part with land which you have earned out of your
honest toil, tears, sweat and blood?” and even appealing to natural law, “If your land is a
gift of God…then only God not Congress, can take it away from you against your will”
(Putzel, 1992, p. 266).
These contestations continued in the following months until many of the
provisions in the landowner bill were gradually incorporated. In late September 1987,
Gillego and his colleagues made one crucial concession to the landowners to enlarge the
retention limit to 5 hectares plus seven hectares for each legitimate heir. On March 23,
1988, amendments were introduced one after the other, which included allowing
compensation based on landowners’ declaration of market value, putting off the
distribution of private lands until the latter end of a ten-period timeline, and finally
permitting a retention limit of seven hectares for the owner plus three hectares for ‘each’
legal heir. In the end, the consolidated CARP bill was “watered down” (Balisacan, 1990;
Cornista, 1990; Putzel, 1992), prompting Akbayan (n.d.) to state that “Agrarian Reform
laws have been crafted as ‘compromise’ rather than as ‘reform’” (p. 3). Gillego and 14 of
the 22 sponsors of HB 400 resigned from the Committee in protest, saying that Congress
was sending “a signal to the people… that we are the bastion of conservatism at a time
when radical reforms are needed” (Putzel, 1992, p. 268). Another representative
commented in corroboration, “This is Land to the landed and not land to the landless
tiller” (Putzel, 1992, p. 268). Francisco S. Sumulong, landowner and presidential relative,
took over bill sponsorship (Balisacan, 1990; Putzel, 1992). Consequently, when the final
bill was passed on April 21, 1988 with 112 votes in favor and 47 against, it “was
immediately condemned by peasant organizations around the country” (Putzel, 1992, p.
268).
Indeed, various civil society organizations questioned the authenticity and
commitment of President Corazon Aquino to implement CARP fully, given her ties to a
landed political clan whose agricultural estate, the infamous Hacienda Luisita38, spans
more than 14,000 hectares (Putzel, 1992). As Putzel (1992) analyzes, “Aquino’s
emphasis on the ‘twin goals’ of productivity and ‘dispersal of ownership’ foreshadowed
the corporate stock-sharing plan that would later be introduced to help families like the
Cojuangcos maintain control of their agribusiness operations” (Putzel, 1992, p. 185).
When prodded on the issue of her family’s Hacienda Luisita, Aquino unequivocally
affirmed her commitment to agrarian reform:
You will probably ask me: Will I also apply it to my family’s Hacienda Luisita? My answer is
yes; although sugar land is not covered by the land reform law, I shall sit down with my family
to explore how the twin goals of maximum productivity and dispersal of ownership and benefits
can be exemplified for the rest of the nation in Hacienda Luisita [emphasis & italics
added](Putzel, 1992, p. 185)
For Borras (2001), this effectively makes Corazon Aquino the first landlord to evade
CARP on such a grand scale, thus creating a deeply negative atmosphere for the agrarian
reform cause.
Another blatant manifestation of state weakness and dual policy in CARP is the
problematic land valuation method used to calculate just compensation to landowners (§
17, 18, & 26). The mechanism used a multi-factor formula that lacked a systematic and
reliable database prone to manipulation of land sales data and over-valuation (Cornista,
1990). In fact, DAR’s problematic land valuation method was highlighted when the Land
Bank of the Philippines exposed the overvaluation of the 1,888-hectare Garchitorena
Estate in Camarines Sur in connivance with some mid-level DAR officials (Putzel, 1992).

38
For an exhaustive history of how Corazon Aquino’s clan, the Cojuangcos-Aquinos, acquired their 14-
thousand estate, see Putzel (1992).
In these public scandals, the degree of state weakness or strength appears to be
shaped by the administration in place. Indeed, an assessment by Borras (2001) of the
state-society interaction in CARP from Presidents Corazon Aquino to Joseph Estrada
shows that administrative changes have significant effects on the capacity of state
institutions to accomplish the objectives of CARP.
During Corazon Aquino’s presidency, the economy was performing poorly while
political conditions were highly unstable. The DAR failed to gather momentum with
frequent changes in leadership, having four different Secretaries as a consequence of
corruption scandals (Putzel, 1991; Borras, 2001). Worse, the organization with the
strongest clout in terms of a mobilizable base, the national-democratic front (CPP-NDF-
NPA), remained staunchly opposed to CARP and unwilling to engage the state (Borras,
2001).
Under Ramos, CARP gained momentum and achieved modest success because of
better administrative decisions. First, the administration regained political stability and
stimulated the national economy. Second, Ramos appointed NGO leader Ernesto Garilao
as DAR Secretary. Garilao brought in NGO activists to occupy key DAR positions. This
infused a reformist orientation that overcame special interests and root out corruption in
the bureau through tighter supervision and stricter law enforcement. Third, Garilao's
DAR carried out widespread and sustained re-training and re-tooling of employees and
officials, and succeeded in reviving the confidence of the foreign donor community in
CARP. For example, Garilao instituted a constant formula for valuating lands, thus
catalyzing the clearing of VOS backlogs (Borras, 2001). Fourth, Ramos and Garilao
adopted the concept of Agrarian Reform Communities (ARC), a clustering approach that
served as the key to optimizing CARP’s impact through integrating government support
services with rural development efforts. Lastly, Garilao recognized the importance of
working closely with autonomous peasant organizations and NGOs, rather than the
traditional state co-opted groups. This became possible when after the 1992 collapse of
the National-Democratic Front (CPP-NDF-NPA) social movements, the bulk of its cadres
abandoned their outright opposition to CARP and decided to engage the state (Borras,
2001). Given this, Ramos was encouraged to ensure the gains of CARP by urging
legislators to extend CARP through R.A. 8532, which (1) extended CARP until 2008, (2)
allocated an additional funding of not more than P50 billion, and (3) provided for yearly
appropriations of not less than P3 billion from the General Appropriations Act (Borras,
2001).
However, Estrada’s short-lived presidency overturned these gains. As national
political stability and public confidence were not strong points of the Estrada
administration and later led to the ouster of Estrada, the Office of the President also
appeared weak in resisting pressures from its elite supporters either to exempt their lands
from expropriation or approve non-distributive arrangements. An example of this was the
special deal with Marcos crony and Estrada ally Eduardo `Danding' Cojuangco for his
4,000-hectare estate in Negros Occidental (Borras, 2001). Furthermore, the pro-CARP
civil society organizations were divided on how to relate with then DAR Secretary
Horacio Morales and the Estrada administration in general. The problems that developed
in the relationship weakened the pro-reform state-society alliance that enabled sporadic
success under Ramos (Borras, 2001).

When Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo acceded the presidency, introduced the Kapit
Bisig sa Kahirapan Agrarian Reform Zones (KARZONEs), a framework of delivering
support services that builds on the ARC clustering strategy pioneered under the Ramos
administration (DAR, 2013). With this, GMA’s administration reports that in 2002,
through foreign assistance, DAR had completed 9 irrigation facilities servicing 2,593
hectares, 55 farm-to-market roads with a total length of 187 kilometers, 12 farm-to-
market bridges with total length of 1,216 linear meters, and 2 post-harvest facilities with
7 units (“Initiatives: Land Distribution,” n.d.). In terms of land transfer, although no
isolated assessment on the period of GMA’s CARP was made systematically, a study
commissioned by DAR to assess the impact of CARP in 2007 showed that as of end of
December 2006, overall accomplishment in land distribution was still at 3.8 million
hectares or 86% of the DAR’s target of 4.4 million hectares (APPC, 2007). In terms of
agrarian justice delivery, DAR (2013) credits GMA’s administration in reducing agrarian
case congestion by introducing a quota system to compel adjudicators to work faster on
agrarian cases and train farmers into paralegals. In fact, GMA’s own website boasts that
in 2002 alone, the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) handled 28,935 cases in 2002 and
solved 15,919 cases, or 74 percent of the target 21,489 cases (“Initiatives: Land
Distribution,” n.d.).
GMA also made structural reforms through executive issuances. On September
27, 2004, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, signed Executive Order No. 364, which
renamed the Department of Agrarian Reform to Department of Land Reform. The E.O.
also broadened the scope of the Department, making it responsible for all land reform in
the country and placed the Philippine Commission on Urban Poor (PCUP) under its
supervision and control (DAR, 2013). Recognition of the ownership of ancestral domain
by indigenous peoples also became the responsibility of this new department, under the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)(DAR, 2013). On August 23, 2005,
President Macapagal Arroyo signed Executive Order No. 456 which renamed the
Department of Land Reform back to Department of Agrarian Reform, because according
to the EO, "the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law goes beyond just land reform but
includes the totality of all factors and support services designed to lift the economic status
of the beneficiaries" (DAR, 2013, par. 4). Then on June 27, 2008, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo has certified House Bill 4077 urgent. The bill’s principal sponsor and
veteran proponent of CARP Albay First District Representative Edcel Lagman
commended the presidential certification of the bill as urgent, saying this would give an
"unequivocal signal" to the members of the House of Representative, more particularly
those allied with the majority coalition, that its immediate passage has the firm support of
the President herself (Dalangin-Fernandez and Ager, 2008). According to Lagman, "A
presidential certification will discourage, if not foreclose, long-winding and repetitive
interpellations and recurring questions of quorum coming from the members of the
majority coalition, which delay the passage of the bill" (Dalangin-Fernandez and Ager,
2008, par. 7). A year after the bill was certified urgent, GMA approved the CARP
extension and reforms (CARPER) law that extends and significantly reform CARP fro 5
more years. CARPER law has 5 significant changes: 1) extension of the land acquisition
and distribution for five more years until 2014, 2) declaring the CLOA or EP of CARP
beneficiaries as indefeasible a year after its award, 3) increasing the fund allocation for
support services from 25% to 40%, 4) gender responsive support services, and 5) creation
of a joint Congressional Oversight Committee to monitor the progress of extended CARP
implementation (Albay First District Representative Edcel Lagman, Plenary Deliberation,
23-Apr-2008).
To date, DAR (2015) reports that it has distributed a total of 4.718 million
hectares of land benefitting 2.783 million agrarian reform beneficiaries. This amounts to
88% of the target scope for DAR. Consequently, this leaves DAR with an outstanding
balance of 625,432 (12% of target) to distribute. In terms of support services, 2,210 ARC
and special ARCs have been launched covering 9,698 nationwide as of December 31,
2015 (DAR, 2015). This allowed DAR to assist 6,601 farmers’ organizations/
associations/ cooperatives through 519,728 ARB-members who serve as conduit for
support services and development. PhP14 billion of credit and microfinance were also
provided to 1.1 million ARBs for the implementation of 361,042 crop production,
marketing, livelihood and agri-based projects (DAR, 2015).
Given this, it would be worthwhile to see how this long history of agrarian reform
in the Philippines is factored in the 14th Congress deliberations that led to the passage of
the CARP extension and reform laws.

Chapter IV
Policy Subsystem, Advocacy Coalitions and their Policy Beliefs, and Policy Brokers
A. Policy Subsystem
As Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1994) posits as the second assumption, focusing
on policy subsystems is the most useful aggregate unit in analyzing policy change (i.e. 2nd
assumption). Defined as “a set of actors who are involved in dealing with a policy
problem” (Sabatier, 1988, p. 138), the idea of policy subsystem helps in simplifying or
making sense of the increasing complexity of modern society, the expansion of
governmental problems and the technical nature of policy problems (Sabatier, 1988). In
this case, the agrarian reform program of the Philippines has evolved to become a distinct
policy sector whose operations have generated policy problems whose solutions lie in the
discussion or assessment of technical components of the program.
Table 4.1. Profile of Stakeholder Participants in Congressional Deliberations
LGU leader (Mayor,

Both beneficiary &
Both landowner &

Expert (Academe)
Both legislator &
Both legislator &

NGO/CSO/PO
NGO/CSO/PO
CSO/NGO/PO
NG/CSO/PO
implementor
Government
Bureaucrat/
Beneficiary
Landowner
landowner
Governor)
Legislator
Total
1134 430 13 69 71 100 15 162 206 50 5 13
100% 47% 1% 7% 8% 11% 2% 18% 22% 5% 1% 1%
For the longest time, the policy discourse on agrarian reform has historically been
defined by a bipolaristic divide between those who own lands and those who till it
(Harkin, 1976; Putzel, 1992). However, the study finds that the political landscape
undergirding CARP has gradually evolved to include the participation of a wider
spectrum of policy actors.
This inclusivity is demonstrated by the relatively diverse profile of speakers
participating in Congressional deliberations, as shown in the table above. Out of the 922
sets of relevant statements coded and analyzed, 11 types of speakers were identified as
participants of the Congressional deliberations and more than a thousand instances of
participation from these speakers were counted. Almost half are ‘purely’ legislators,
without any clear linkage to landowners or association with elected party lists or NGOs
and civil society organizations. The second majority is the group of representatives from
partylists that by law are mandated to cater to the needs of the marginalized, including the
rural poor. The third most active group (i.e. more instances of participation in
discussions) is composed of legislators that appear to lobby for landowner’s interests.
The last group with the greater representation in the deliberations is the various NGOs,
people’s organizations, and various civil society organizations.
From these four most active types of speakers or participants, two noteworthy
observations can be drawn. First, the marginally greater number of instances of
participation from partylists representatives advocating for the welfare of the
beneficiaries of CARP and the other marginalized rural poor over that of the legislative
allies of landowners demonstrates how the pro-CARP extension and reform agenda
dominated the discussions over the various expressions of resistance from landowners
during the Congressional deliberations. Second, the large percentage of participation of
‘pure’ legislators hints at a sufficient number or comfortable level of presence of policy
brokers able to mediate between conflicting interests or beliefs of landowners and their
allies on one hand and CARP beneficiaries and their advocates on the other. Although it
is not the intention of the study to make any statistical correlation, these findings have
one important implication: they illustrate, if not partly explain, how the changing political
landscape within the agrarian reform policy subsystem facilitated substantial changes in
CARP as a state policy. The weakening traditional dominance or hold of landed interests
in Congress relative to the deliberations of the first CARP law, RA 6657, where landed
interests dominated the 8th Congress (Putzel, 1992), the increasing strength of pro-CARP
forces, and the emergence of neutral forces able to balance private interests in view of the
common good jointly enabled the policy change agenda of extending and reforming
CARP amidst the known longstanding resistance of landowners or forces resistant to
policy change.
B. Advocacy Coalitions
As Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1994) discover through years of research as the
third assumption on policy change, a policy subsystem includes actors from all levels of
government, especially given the substantial discretion of implementing officials in
deciding how national policy is translated into diverse localities (i.e. 3rd assumption).
As in any controversial policy issue, the discussions on the second extension of
CARP can be characterized by the apparent contestation between the pro- and anti-
coalitions. These coalitions are formed as policy actors strive to succeed in translating
their beliefs into actual policy before their opponents can (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith,
1994). Hence, in this study, it is assumed that agrarian reform advocates and opponents
sought alliance with people who embrace similar policy core beliefs, engaged in
substantial coordination over time, shared resources and developed complementary
strategies, in order to achieve their agenda of policy change.
Yet, as earlier mentioned, the diametrically opposed positions of agrarian reform
advocates and opponents operate along a complex structure of policy beliefs. In this
study, this complexity is demonstrated by the emergence of three major coalitions that
display considerable clout in the direction, form, and content of Congressional
deliberations on the CARP extension and reforms and eventually the law output itself.
The first is fundamentally pro-CARP extension and reforms. The last two are pro-AR but
are opposed to the particular proposed bill by the first (i.e. agree that CARP as a social
justice program is justified but disagree with how it should be implemented).
B.1. Coalition A: The Reform CARP Movement
Those in favor of it continue to justify the extension of CARP by extolling the
age-old virtues of social justice and right to property enshrined in the Constitution and the
declaration of principles of policies of the first CARP Law (RA 665s7). Organizations
representing this policy position have collaborated into a single major coalition called the
Reform CARP Movement or the RCM. This movement has been championed by a
prominent left-wing figure Anakbayan Representative Ana Theresia “Risa” (as she is
widely known) Hontiveros-Baraquel, now a Senator, and a known social reformer and
agrarian reform proponent Albay First District representative Edcel Lagman. Its
organization is quite explicit and diverse, consisting of left-wing advocacy groups,
grassroots organizations and moderate social reformers, as Hontiveros stated in her
sponsorship speech during the opening session for the introduction of CARP extension
bills on November 21, 2007:
Higit tatlumpong grup po ang nasa loob ng (more than 30 groups comprise the) Reform CARP
Movement. At kaya umabot kami sa ganitong (And that’s why we have reached this) bill na
mayroon sa isang simpleng presentasyong siyam na element (with a simple set of 9 elements, i.e.
proposals) (Akbayan Partylist Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Committee Hearing 21-Nov-2007).
According to Menchioe Flores-Obanil, a coordinator of the RCM and a participant in the
Congressional hearings, the coalition is composed of broad spectrum of local and
national farmers organizations, non-government organizations, and individual land
reform advocates: AMKB, KABAPA, MAKABAYAN-PILIPINAS, PAKISAMA,
PARAGOS- PILIPINAS, PKSK, Samahang Magsasaka ng 53 Ektarya ng Macabud;
NGOs – AJFI, CARET, CSI, FOCUS, KAISAHAN, MODE, PASCRES, PDI, PEACE
FOUNDATION, PLCPD, PRRM, RWC-CSI, SALIGAN; Coalitions – AR-NOW!,
KILOS AR, PARRDS, PESANtech, PKKK; Partylist-AKBAYAN and AMIN (Flores-
Obanil, 2010). These groups formally coalesced into a single coalition after learning
about the DAR-GTZ study launched by the DAR in 2006, which suggested as one of its
recommendations the possibility of abandoning the mandate of finishing the land
acquisition and redistribution of remaining CARP lands (Flores-Obanil, 2010). In her
sponsorship speech on November 21, 2007, Hontiveros refers to the wide range of policy
actors/advocacy groups involved in the movement: “…Hindi lang Akbayan kundi
pangunahin sa Reform CARP Movement na marami ay nakaupo dito sa ating mesa
kasama yung mga nakatayo sa likod na mula pa sa Baha Talibuyag sa Batangas at mula
pa sa Canlubang sa Laguna (includes not only Akbayan but among those in the Reform
CARP Movement are seated in our desks including those standing at the back from
Talibuyag, Batangas and Canlubang, Laguna.).” The policy stances of the RCM are
encapsulated in the House Bill No. 1257 authored by Hontiveros and adopted as the
template bill for the consolidated bill House Bill No. 4077 that the House Committee on
Agrarian Reform endorsed later on.
In the Congressional deliberations, the coalition is empirically represented by
various permutations or options for extending and reforming CARP: 1) for Extension and
Fund Augmentation, 2) For Extension and Reforms (e.g. HB 1257), and 3) Extend then
Reform.
B.2. Coalition B: Landowners and Allies
Expectedly, the opposition consists of policy actors mainly concerned with the
failures and disruptive effect of CARP on agricultural productivity. These concerns were
voiced out by legislators representing the interests of landowners and agro-industrial
enterprises. The most notable of which are Cebu Third District Representative Pablo
Garcia, Negros Occidental Third District Representative Pryde Henry Teves, and later on,
Cavite Third District Representative Jesus Crispin Remulla. These solons hail from well-
known landed families (Sidel, 1999). Unlike the RCM, opponents of the second CARP
extension are not formally organized but are unified by their implicit, common opposition
to the continuation of CARP. The landowner bloc, however, did not have a single
consolidated bill representing their stand on policy issues involving CARP. Rather, their
opposition is mostly reflected in their vocal opposition and provocative cross-
examination/interpellation of legislative measures proposed by the pro-CARP extension
blocs. The lack of organization of the landowner bloc is partly manifested as well by the
fact that some landowning legislators voted for the CARP extension law (e.g. Cebu 3rd
District Representative Pablo Garcia and Cavite Third District Representative Jesus
Crispin Remulla) while others expectedly voted against (e.g. Pangasinan 5th District
Representative Marco Cojuangco) the law.
Members of this coalition tend to represent differing forms of reluctance to extend
CARP: 1) outright opposition to CARP extension, 2) a conditional agreement to CARP
extension with specific reservations, and 3) an explicit call to reform CARP before
extension.
B.3. Coalition C: Bayan Muna Coalition
Yet, although classic illustrations of debates on AR suggest a strictly bipolaristic
structure, that is a straightforward opposition between landowners and pro-CARP farmer
beneficiaries, the Congressional hearings for the second CARP extension (i.e. RA9700)
reveal a third coalition. Even within the so-called pro-land reform bloc, there is division
between those who agree that the CARP law must reformed and continued (i.e. Anak
Pawis bloc of Risa Hontiveros) and those who think that CARP must be replaced
altogether by a new law. This divergent stance is proffered by party list legislators Bayan
Muna Representative Teddy Casiño and Gabriela Representative Lisa Maza argue that
CARP as originally instituted through RA 6657 is an inauthentic social justice program
incapable of achieving equity in land ownership and failing to—if not only selectively or
sporadically—reduce incidence of poverty among farmer beneficiaries. This rift in policy
stance is mainly articulated by the explicit support manifested by NGOs coalescing
around specific bill proposals. For the Bayan Muna Coalition, the RCM’s H.B. 1257 as
proposed by Hontiveros insufficiently encompasses the kinds of policy reforms that will
adequately resolve and address concerns of continuing CARP. Hence, the group rallied
support around H.B. 3059 (i.e. Genuine AR Bill), which the group beliefs embodies the
real aspirations of farmer beneficiaries toward a genuine and wholly reformed CARP.
Conversely, Bayan Muna coalition members tend to question the RCM’s bill (HB 4077)
proposal.
The stand of Bayan Muna Coalition members were evolving as the Congressional
deliberations progressed. Nonetheless, theirs is mainly characterized by reservations in
two forms: either 1) conditional opposition to CARP extension depending on the
satisfactory response by RCM bill proponents during interpellations by the Bayan Muna
Coalition, 2) an explicit call to CARP reform before deciding on its extension, or later on,
3) outright opposition to RCM-sponsored bill HB 1257 and strong endorsement of a bill
proposing a totally new CARP law, i.e. HB 3059.
In the study, these coalitions are concretely differentiated and partly indicated by
the position taken by their members (as shown in the table below).
Table 4.2. Stakeholder Participant’s Position on CARP Extension and/or Reforms

For Total Reform/New Law
For Extension and Reforms
Conditional For Extension,

Not For Extension & Fund
Compensation, subject to
Neutral/Unsure/Unclear
For Extension & Fund
certain consideration)
(e.g. only when Fund
Reform then Extend

Extend then Reform
Augmented for
(e.g. HB 1257)
(e.g. HB 3059)
Augmentation
Augmentation
Total
1056 181 306 43 8 174 228 40 76
100% 17% 29% 4% 1% 16% 22% 4% 7%
The study finds that out of 922 sets of congressional statements sampled, more than a
thousand instances indicate a policy stand or position taken by members of the three
coalitions. Of these, eight kinds of policy positions on the issue of extending and/or
reforming CARP were identified. The RCM coalition is identified with a position
supportive of 1) extending CARP and increasing funds, 2) both extending and reforming
CARP, and 3) extending CARP first before reforming. The landowners’ bloc and the
Bayan Muna supporters typically support 1) the outright opposition to CARP extension,
2) CARP reforms first before extension, 3) proposals of a wholly new CARP law, or 4)
conditional agreement to CARP extension subject to certain guarantees. Data suggests
that the passage of the CARP Extension with Reforms Bill is partly explained by the
greater presence of stakeholders supportive of CARP extension with reforms, a position
spearheaded by the RCM. That is, the number of instances stakeholders support CARP
extension and reform of CARP, as espoused by the RCM through its sponsored bill HB
1257, exceeds the frequency of support for other policy positions taken by the other two
coalitions, the landowners and the Bayan Muna Coalition. The next chapter shows this
finding will be relevant in describing how CARP extension and reforms were eventually
passed in the House of Representatives.
C. Policy Beliefs
As Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1994) also warrant as a fourth assumption, public
policies/programs can be seen as concrete translations of beliefs that are successfully
argued or defended as they reflect priorities on universal values of policy actors, their
perceptions of the magnitude of societal problems and the policy instruments and implicit
theories about how to achieve their policy objectives.
Given this, these coalitions are differentiated further by their policy beliefs, as
articulated by their respective members during Congressional deliberations. Defined as
the “set of basic values, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions” (Sabatier &
Jenkins-Smith, 1994, p. 139), policy beliefs are what policy actors and coalitions rely on
as primary basis for political decision-making (“Advocacy Coalition Framework
Overview,” in WOPPR, 2012). Hence, it is shared policy beliefs that bind advocacy
coalitions (Sabatier, 1988). Despite their complexity, policy beliefs can be organized into
a system with a hierarchical, tri-partite structure, with higher levels or deeper ideals being
reflected by more specific ones (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1994).
In the 14th Congress, discussions on the CARP Extension revolved around seven
normative core and fourteen policy core issues.
C.1. Normative Core Beliefs
Table 4.3. Frequency of Reference to Normative Core Ideals

application of the law)
to life, to subsistence,
responsibility of state
Human Rights (Right

(Socioeconomic and
Economic Justice or
Power or sovereign
Inequity/Inequality
Exercise of Police
Good/General or
Public Welfare
No Deep Core
Social Justice
Discussion
Common
Rights
Total
etc.)
1212 211 423 24 190 21 123 16
100% 17% 35% 2% 16% 2% 10% 1%
According to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1994), normative core beliefs are
fundamental normative and ontological axioms, which define a person's underlying
personal philosophy. Congressional deliberations on the CARP extension and reforms

revolved around seven normative beliefs. As expected, social justice emerges to be the
most discussed among these seven, followed by public welfare. This shows either
CARP’s continuing relevance as a policy instrument to achieve social justice and public
welfare. Additionally, this statistics also suggest that social justice and improvement of
the welfare of CARP beneficiaries continues to be ideals that CARP either failed to
achieve or legislators feel it should continue to pursue. The latter sentiment appears to be
the case as supported by the fact that the exercise of policing powers by the state or is the
third most discussed normative concept.
On Social Justice. The identity of CARP as a state policy is almost synonymous
to social justice. The explicit provision in the 1987 Constitution mandating the institution
of CARP as a social justice program reverberated across the Congressional halls and
throughout the committee hearings and plenary debates. Nevertheless, differences in the
interpretation—and even definition—of social justice and how this universal concept
should be translated into concrete policy terms could be observed among coalitions
during Congressional debates. These differences are seen in discussions of the more
concrete policy core beliefs on the extent of land coverage, phasing of types of lands
covered, preferred modes of distribution, and, related to this, the manner of ensuring
security in the land transfer process.
Coalition A. For RCM members, CARP’s legitimacy as a social justice mandate
could only be justified through the unequivocal and unambiguous granting of secure
property rights to landless tillers and through the continued pursuit of rectifying the
socioeconomic inequality between the rural poor and other more progressive parts of the
country. Rightly so, RCM proponents define social justice as rectifying the inequitable
ownership of lands to bridge the income gap between the rich and the poor. In effect,
RCM members strongly believe that CARP’s social justice mandate could only be truly
achieved through actual, physical redistribution and irrevocable ownership of lands to
and by the landless farmers. This normative belief could be inferred from RCM
champions like Anakbayan Partylist Representative Risa Hontiveros and veteran agrarian
reform advocate and Albay First District Representative Lagman who persistently
advocate for continuing and accelerating the land acquisition and redistribution
component of CARP:
Beyond issues of economics, however, what we must always keep in mind, Mr. Speaker, my dear
colleagues, is that the agrarian reform program is a social justice program. It seeks to right the
long-perpetuated wrong where vast landholdings have, for so many generations, been owned
and controlled by a few who benefit from the land, who benefit from the hard work of
ordinary farmers and farmworkers, who often are under exploitative circumstances. It seeks
not just to give to the tiller ownership of the land they till but also to restore to them the dignity,
honor, and respect which befit them as true owners of the land. After all, we know that for the
farmer, the land is more than just soil and minerals and a place to plant crops--it is the meaning of
their existence, inextricably linked to and an essential part of their humanity [emphasis
added](Anakbayan Partylist Representative Ana Theresia "Risa" Hontiveros-Baraquel, Plenary
Deliberations 30-Apr-2008).
Mr. Speaker, at the onset, land reform based on land to the tiller concept and consequent ownership
of the principal means or production is a social justice measure. The transfer of ownership was
meant to erase the feudal system, free the tenant, and later on agricultural workers, from the bondage
of inequity and landlessness, and provide the beneficiaries with the necessary means, physical and
spiritual, especially of the element of hope and dignity, that thru [sic] ownership, he will become a
productive member of society and cut the umbilical cord of dependency based on a patron-client
relationship. Thus, land acquisition and distribution was meant, among others, to bridge the gap
between the rich and the poor and to actualize the right to property of every citizen. As a social
justice principle in a democratic state, property ownership is indeed a core element of free
enterprise or laissez faire and carries with it, recognition that land ownership equates to efficiency
and thus economic productivity [emphasis added](Nueva Ecija First District Representative Eduardo
Joson, Plenary Deliberations 30-Apr-2008).
For both legislators, the pursuit of social justice through CARP has deeper implications
on upholding the human dignity of farmer beneficiaries.

Coalition B. Despite preconceived notions/suspicions of landowner’s full
resistance to land reform, representatives of landowners acknowledge the importance of
CARP as a redistributive social justice program that would contribute to resolving
prevalent problems on socioeconomic inequities and lopsided rural-urban development.
However, they tend to question the manner in which CARP is being implemented as a
social justice program. In particular, they tend to question the compulsory nature
employed by DAR in acquiring and redistributing private agricultural properties. This
contention was first raised by Cebu Third District Representative Pablo Garcia at the
opening committee hearing on November 21, 2007:
In this country, one of the rights, human rights of a person is… under the Bill of Rights, no person
shall be deprived of his… life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the law. The law protects the landowner but that is
disregarded by DAR and LRA. At one time, Secretary Garilao issued a Memorandum to all RDs,
Provincial Officers not anymore to issue a CLOA because of the decision of the Supreme Court in
Association of Small Land Owners versus secretary of DAR. Do not issue CLOAs until there is
proof that the owners have fully paid. But this has also been disregarded [emphasis added](Cebu 3rd
District Representative Pablo Garcia, Committee Hearing 21-Nov-2007).
In both instances, landowning legislators alluded to the guaranteeing the right to due
process as an important facet of social justice that should be afforded to landowners
under CARP. More exactly, social justice for landowners means justly or properly
compensating the lands that they earned (whether legitimately or not) and that the
government seized for redistribution.
Coalition C. Like the RCM, Bayan Muna coalition members believe that actual,
physical land transfer defines the core of CARP as a redistributive social justice program.
In effect, they similarly define social justice as granting and securing proper rights of
farmer beneficiaries over awarded lands. However, its authenticity as a social justice
program is undermined by both (1) the exemptions granted by the law that limits land
coverage and (2) the explicit inclusion of non-distributive schemes/alternatives to
physical redistribution such as stock-sharing schemes, labor administration, leasehold
arrangements, and other alternative arrangements that allow for an abusive and exploitive
relationship between landlords and landless tillers. Bayan Muna Partylist Representative
Satur Ocampo articulates this policy belief at a public hearing on CARP:
Noong simulan po ang (When the) Agrarian Reform Law (started) noong (in) 1988, nakita roon sa
statistics (show that nine thousand families) na siyam na libo limang daang pamilya, 9,500 families
composing the … land … of the country owned twenty percent or two million eight hundred twenty
thousand hectares of agricultural lands. Ganoon. So 'yung ganoong nare-reflect on a lesser level doon
sa mas maliliit at 'yun ang tinangkang buwagin sa pamamagitan ng CARP pero magpa-hanggang
ngayon pa ang sina... batay din sa statistics na nakukuha ng independent studies at ng government ay
hindi ... hindi ito nagawa. Ang (So this reflects on those who have little and those are what CARP
intends to break down but until now, based on statistics of independent studies and the government,
have failed to do. Ang (The) CARP inherited the skewed concept of social justice and added its own
array of measures further protecting the landed interest through the affirment non-distributive
forms of land tenure. Dahil po 'yung lahat ng mga programa ay impluwensiyado (influenced) ng
pananaw na igalang ang karapatan sa pag-aari ng lupa, 'yung layunin na maibigay sa bumubungkal ng
lupa 'yung lupang sinasaka niya ay hindi natupad bunga ng mga probisyon (provision) ng mahirap, na
just compensation computation, 'yung exclusion or exemption ng maraming lupain at saka 'yung iba't-
ibang anyo ng retention limit. (Because of all programs are influenced by the concept of respecting
property rights, the intention to give landless tillers the land they till has not been fulfilled due to
provisions on the complex just compensation computation, the exclusion or exemption of numerous
lands and the different forms of retention limit.) At pumasok sa CARP 'yung iba pang eksemsiyon
(exemption), 'yung non-distributive kung tawagin tulad nung mga stock distribution option at iba pa
(Exemptions were also granted by CARP, the so-called stock distribution option and other non-
distributive arrangement.) [emphasis added][translation by author](Bayan Muna Partylist
Representative Satur Ocampo, Public Hearing 06-Mar-2008).
Like members of the RCM, Bayan Muna Coalition members also feel that CARP has a
more profound role as a state instrument that dispenses social justice and ultimately
uphold human dignity. Thus, Anakpawis Partylist Representative and veteran land reform
advocate Rafael Mariano exhaustively explains during a public hearing on March 7,
2008:
... Kailangang maituwid...(We need to rectify)…we have to rectify social injustices na napakalaon
na na dinaranas ng mga magsasaka (that farmers have longed suffered from). Kailangang palayain
natin ang mga magsasaka sa iba't-ibang anyo ng pagsasamantala (We need to free farmers from
different faces of exploitation). Tawag namin diyan, pagsasamantalang feudal at mala-feudal, (We
call that feudal or qausi-feudal abuse) at dahil siya ang pangunahing produktibong puwersa, kung
mapapalaya po natin ang magsasaka, may purchasing power siya, siya po ang magtitiyak ng
malakas at papalawak na merkado mismo ng ating bansa (and because he is the first point of
production, if we free the farmers, he will have greater purchasing power that can help ensure and
expand market growth in the country). Kung may purchasing power siya, so ibig sabihin, mabibili
niya ang mga pangangailangan niya lalung-lalo na 'yung pagpapaunlad pang lalo ng produksiyon
natin sa agrikultura (if he has purchasing power, he will be able to buy the needed inputs to boost
agricultural production), and we have to treat our Philippine agriculture as the very foundation of
our national economy with the industrial sector as the leading factor. Hindi po tayo uunlad, wala
tayong tunay na magiging pag-unlad kung walang tunay na reporma sa lupa at pambansang
industrilisasyon (We will not develop, we will not have genuine development if we don’t have
genuine land reform and nationwide industrialization) [translation by author](Anakpawis Party List
Representative Rafael V. Mariano and National President of Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas
Rafael Mariano).
In addition, Bayan Muna Partylist Teodoro Casiño states the following at the opening
House Agrarian Reform Committee hearing on November 21, 2007:
The real measure of any agrarian reform is not only increased productivity, increased income, but
more importantly, yung nagpapalaya po natin ang ating magsasaka sa pagkitil nila, pagkadena sa
kanila sa lupa at sa mapagsamantalang relasyon ng may-ari ng lupa at ng magsasaka sa
mapagsamantalang relasyon ng nagpapautang o mga usurer, 'yung mga trader, 'yung mga
negosyante. Yun ang gusto nating wasakin (the emancipation of our farmers from the
constraints, the bondage of soil and the exploitive relations between the landowner and land tiller,
the abuses of lenders or usurers, those traders, those businessmen. That’s what we want to
destroy)[emphasis added][translation by author](Bayan Muna Partylist Representative Teodoro
Casiño, Comiittee Hearing 21-Nov-2007).
On Public Welfare/General Well-Being/Common Good. The association of
social justice through CARP raises another important ideal that coalitions debate heavily
on. In the Congressional deliberations, this is commonly yet interchangeably referred to
as public welfare or general well-being of the farmers and the entire Filipino people. In
particular, this ideal comes to fore when the right of CARP stakeholders, both
landowners and beneficiaries, to receive adequate support is discussed. This concern for
public welfare under CARP is aptly expressed by Association of Philippine Electric
Cooperatives (APEC) Partylist Representative Edgar Valdez, who appear to be neutral or
non-aligned with any of the coalitions:

This afternoon we shall discuss positions and alternatives to come up with a sound legislation that is
aimed at responding to the improvement of the lives of the general population in the field of agrarian
reform. In the end, therefore, we have to make a final assessment and draw a decision to come up
with a piece of legislation that shall advance the interest and promote the general welfare of the
people (APEC Partylist Representative Edgar L. Valdez, Committee Hearing 5-Dec-2007).
This concern for public/general welfare improvement of CARP beneficiaries is manifested in
discussions of more specific policy core issues on continuing funds for delivering support
services to beneficiaries for increasing productivity and rural poverty alleviation.
Coalition A. Members of the RCM continue see the improvement of the
beneficiaries’ welfare not only as a policy goal but also as a justification for extending
the CARP. Given this, it was common for RCM champions to cite studies empirically
showing the welfare benefits of CARP:
And all of the studies would show, distinguished Gentleman that the quality of life of the
beneficiaries had increased. Even on the non-monetary aspect, with respect to the non-monetary
indicators of welfare, like strong house materials, and better educational attainment of family
members, households of agrarian reform beneficiaries showed better performance than non-
agrarian reform beneficiaries. So, this is the beneficial effect of the program which cannot be
debunked by general statements, because these are empirical studies supported by documentation
and researches (Albay 1st District Representative Edcel Lagman, Plenary Deliberations 04-Jun-
2008).
Coalition B. Legislative allies of landowners also see welfare improvement of
beneficiaries as the most compelling rationale for CARP. However, they use the
shortcomings of CARP in this aspect instead to justify not or re-evaluate extending the
land acquisition and distribution of CARP. Hence, Cavite Third District Representative
Jesus Crispin “Boying” Remulla suggested at a plenary deliberation postponing the
enactment of another CARP extension law:
Madam Speaker, is there anything which stops Congress from passing a new law after it has
expired-- a better thought of law? Because we can still allocate money for support services to make
all of the lands productive to say that we have corrected all the flaws. That is my point, Madam
Speaker. Let us first perfect, let us first look at how it works because this is sheer madness. We will
pour in money to acquire lands while the others are not being used. I'd rather that we use the
P100B for support services, Madam Speaker, make it succeed and when it's successful, pass
another land reform law and acquire the other land, Madam Speaker. Wouldn't that be a better
alternative? At least, everything becomes productive, all the ARCs will be like the one we have in
Magallanes, Cavite [emphasis added](Cavite Third District Representative Jesus Crispin “Boying”
Remulla, Plenary Deliberations 21-May-2008).
Coalition C. Members of the Bayan Muna Coalition adopts a similar position to
that of the landowners in calling for taking more time and consultations to re-evaluate/re-
consider plans to merely extend CARP and reform it more wholly. Consistent with their
belief that the current CARP law and the RCM’s proposed HB 1257 do not embody
genuine agrarian reform, members of the coalition such as Gabriela Partylist
Representative Luzviminda Ilagan endorse their sponsored bill HB 4077, which they
believe can better improve the welfare of CARP beneficiaries:
Madam speaker, Honorable Sponsor, these provisions are all supposed to be embodied in House Bill
No. 3059. We propose a bill--we came up with a bill which unfortunately was not heard in this
august Body; and we would like to make this manifestation that, that should have been a very
important piece of legislation but it was not given a chance to be heard in this hall. That proposal
would have distributed thousands of hectares of lands to farmer-occupants who will have full control
of the same. It would have addressed the concerns of those in Mindanao, of farmers, who have
become workers, farmers who used to own lands, albeit small, but who are now reduced to being
paid workers in these big companies, mere workers whose income is not able to give them the
quality of life that they deserve. So, I believe that the extension of a law which has failed to address
the problems of Mindanao would therefore push them further into difficult circumstances (Gabriela
Partylist Representative Luzviminda Ilagan, Plenary Deliberations 04-Jun-2008).
On Economic Justice. Given the ideological rift among coalitions on the
interpretation of social justice, some actors raise an anti-thesis to balance what opponents
of the CARP extension would regard as an almost obsessive pursuit of social justice.
Economic Justice, as first defined by a member of the RCM, fundamentally means
providing all citizens the opportunity to improve his/her economic status. In the context
of CARP, economic justice means not only rectifying the inequitable ownership of lands
through redistribution of lands to landless, poor farmers but also making sure these
redistributed lands stay true to their original purpose of agricultural production.
Coalition A. Nueva Ecija First District Representative Eduardo Joson, a member

of the RCM, elaborates on the concept of economic justice, which is essentially social
justice anchored on productivity and economic progress:
Ngunit sa pagkakataong ito, hindi lamang (This time, however, it is not only about) social justice
kundi (but also) economic justice ang ating sundan at tupdin (that we should pursue and achieve). In
other words, Mr. Speaker, from social justice to economic justice, an economic justice is the new
tenet, to uplift the plight of our farmers and landless. In other words, land ownership and economic
productivity must go hand-in-hand. We cannot sacrifice one for the other. And what do I mean
by economic justice, Mr. Speaker? Simply put it, it means progress for all (kaunlaran para sa
lahat); it means providing for every citizen the opportunity to improve his standard of living; it
means affording him a decent job or opportunity to do business and laying down the economic
infrastructure so that jobs, businesses and investments will prosper too and for the benefit of all
citizens. Economic justice presupposes a vision by government and the political will to achieve this
vision by a change in policies to focus on the means and/or resources to create, establish, maintain
or improve on the said economic infrastructure to spur or pump prime agricultural productivity
especially for the disadvantaged sectors of our country (Nueva Ecija 1st District Representative
Eduardo Joson, Plenary Deliberations 30-Apr-2008).
Coalition B. Despite not formally coining it, landowners use this concept of
economic justice to justify their policy belief or agenda on CARP. This was evident in
the way Cavite Third District Jesus Crispin Remulla questioned the economic
soundness of redistributing productive lands on account of many unproductive
awarded lands and idle, unsupported CARP beneficiaries.:
Madam Speaker, because I have noticed a pattern, several things that I have seen. Many of the
CLOA have been sold. None of children of the farmers want to farm anymore and when you
award the land, it would just wait forever until it is sold again after ten years. How do we solve
this problem of productivity of the land? If the land is already productive and you divide it now
and parcel it out, will it not disturb our agricultural productivity, the way it is going right now?
(Plenary Deliberations, 14-May-2008).
Coalition C. In an earlier deliberation, Rep. Crispin Beltran, a member of the
Bayan Muna Coalition, alludes to the economic injustice done to farmers by the defective
implementation of CARP:
Ayun po ang (That is a) specific and still very…kailangan pag-usapan pa ng mahaba-haba at

matino na pag-uusap, hindi iyung reconfiscation ng mga may-ari ng lupa, in the form of pautang,
utang na hindi mababayaran. …magsasaka iyung pinautang sa kanila sapagkat nalulugi iyung mga
magsasaka... ([we] need to discuss this lengthily and properly, not just (allow) reconfiscation by
landowners who lend money to farmers who will never be able to repay because they are selling at a
loss)… better for them to abandon their lands and seek a livelihood in the cities or elsewhere in the
world. Kaya ganoon ang nangyayari, abandonado ang ating (That’s why this is happening: our land
reform is abandoned) land reform. That is why ang presyo ng bigas ngayon ay doble na kaysa
noong isang buwan (the price of rice has doubled since last month) and there is a crisis (Rep.
Crispin B. Beltran, Plenary Deliberations 23-04-2008).
In all these statements, economic justice is alluded to when discussing funding
support services to increased productivity.
On Exercise of Police Power, Sovereignty of the State, and Nationalism.
Congressional discussions on the provision of public goods in the form of continued
support services delivery touches on the capacity of the state to impose its sovereignty
and exercise its policing powers and functions. Such ideological discussion typically
begins with questions on the credibility of the DAR and implementing agencies as an
implementer, adjudicator, mediator (in disputes), and documenter (of program
progress/status). Thus, at the opening committee hearing on November 21, 2007, the
Chair of the House Committee on Agrarian Reform Apayao Lone District Representative
Elias Bulut, Jr. states the importance of state performance in CARP:
Given the favorable policy environment and support of the program, the overall land acquisition and
distribution should be sped up and completed in due time. Friends, ladies and gentlemen, we are
now on the last quarter of the year 2007. This only leaves us with very little time to put our facts
together in order to legislate for CARP extension. Most importantly, the sincerity of the program's
implementors is very vital to render a positive CARP scenario (House Agrarian Reform Committee
Chair and Apayo Lone District Representative Elias Bulut, Jr., Committee Hearing 21-Nov-2007).
Coalition A. RCM Champion and Anakbayan Partylist Representative Risa
Hontiveros explicitly asserts the need for the state to tighten CARP implementation when
she responded to a criticism by known landowning Cebu legislator Pablo Garcia against
the allegedly “compulsory” manner of transferring titles of landownership from
landowners to landless farmers:
Lastly, for this afternoon, Mr. Chairman, on P.D. 1125 what the good gentleman from Cebu was
referring to should be deal to cover regular transactions involving lands for the landowners's copy of
the certificate of title. It must be surrendered before it can be cancelled but CARP is not an ordinary
transaction but an exercise of the police power of the State. If we follow the procedure explained by
the good gentleman from Cebu then it would be very easy to defeat our very own program by the
mere existence of refusal by the landowners to surrender their copy of the certificate of title
(Anakbayan Partylist Representative Ana Theresia "Risa" Hontiveros-Baraquel, Committee Hearing
21-Nov-2007).
Coalition B. Landowners and their Congressional allies are also provocative in
questioning the commitment of the state to exercise such police powers. An apt example
is Cavite Third District Representative Jesus Crispin Remulla who at a deliberation
questioned the commitment of implementers of CARP over the past decades of the
program’s existence:
Yes, Madam Speaker, I laud the Gentleman for the sincerity by which he states the facts of the
proposed bill, but the question really is, we are trying to continue a program, which we don't know,
which we have no real assessment report throughout the country on how successful it has been to the
farmer-beneficiary. Twenty years have gone by, enough time has been given, so many secretaries, so
many President have gone by and yet after 20 years, it seems to be that the inefficiency is quite
alarming because we have to extend it for another five years. Don't you think that the problem is the
implementing agency also? Cavite Third District Representative Jesus Crispin “Boying” Remulla,
Plenary Deliberations 14-May-2008).
Coalition C. Like the RCM, Bayan Muna Coalition members also take
cognizance of the importance of state commitment in CARP. The difference is their
advocates elevate state commitment to the extreme by proposing a land acquisition and
distribution process whose costs are fully subsumed by the state:
Kung merong mga bahagi ng mga may-ari ng lupa ngayon na hinihingi ng just compensation,
sagutin ng gobyerno hindi nang tatangap ng lupa. May mekanismo pong ibinibigay or ititindig
tungkol dito. (If there are some landowners now who are asking for just compensation, government
should pay. There is an existing mechanism for this.) [translation by author](Rep. Ocampo, Plenary
Deliberation 23-Apr-2008).
Ngayon po, ang positive na provision doon na sinabi na ni Ka Satur, ay iyung isa na free
distribution, ito ay hinahati sa lima na specific...(Now, there is a positive provision to what Rep.
Satur said, which is free distribution [of lands], subdivided into five specific…una, (first) the state
must master the political will to finally confront the fundamental problem of our society. Ito ay
tungkol sa social justice na napakahabang panahon ang mga magsasaka natin ay biktima ng social
injustice at ito ay iyung fundamental na probisyon, nasa constitution. (This pertains to social justice
that have long evaded our farmers who were victims of social injustice and this is a fundamental
provision in the constitution.) This is a social justice program. Anakpawis Partylist Representative
Crispin B. Beltran, Plenary Deliberation 23-Apr-2008).
On Equality (Socioeconomic and Gender). Related to the issue of social justice
is the longstanding issue of equality. The important ideal/concept was at the center of
Congressional deliberations on CARP. In fact, the Chair of the House Agrarian Reform
Committee and Apayao Lone District Representative Elias Bulut, Jr. cited it as the main
culprit of rural poverty and other pervasive rural problems that CARP aims to address
during the opening hearing of the 14th Congress on CARP:
The litany of inequities of facing the Filipino farmers is almost endless. These inequities are the
reasons why our farmers are poor. These inequities are the reasons why we in Congress have finally
woken up to the fact that genuine agrarian reform is not mere land distribution to rectify or spewed a
land ownership system that has been pestering for decades (House Agrarian Reform Committee
Chair and Apayao Lone District Representative Elias Bulut, Jr.).
Coalition A. RCM coalition members are more proactive in dealing with
inequality in the context of CARP. This directness was shown during the first committee
hearing for sponsorship of bills on November 21, 2007 when RCM champion and
Anakpawis Risa Hontiveros proposed reforms to recognize equal rights of all
beneficiaries, especially of female beneficiaries:
Eight--ito mahalaga sa mga kababaihang nayong sa (this is important among the female community
within the) Reform CARP Movement at sa buong kilusan para sa Repormang Panakahan (and the
entire agricultural reform movement)--recognition of women as program beneficiaries and
mandating gender responsive support services… Ninth, or last but not the least, Mr. Chairman,
recognition of the rights of all other qualified beneficiaries and their legal standing in cases
involving their land (Anakpawis Partylist Representative Ana Theresia "Risa" Hontiveros-Baraquel,
Committee Hearing 21-Nov-2007).
At the same hearing, COOP-NATCO Partylist Representative Guillermo Cua, a co-
sponsor of the RCM bill, also reiterated the call for equal rights of women in CARP:
We need also to empower the women as equal beneficiaries of land reform. We need also to
address the controversies of the non-distributive CARP schemes like the stock distribution option,
the joint venture agreement and the leaseback agreement. All these things need also to be reviewed
[emphasis added](COOP-NATCO Partylist Representative Guillermo Cua, Committee Hearing 21-
Nov-2007).
Coalition B. Landowners appear not as vocal as the RCM coalition members in
discussing the issue of equality. Nonetheless, landowning legislators such as Cavite Third
District Representative Jesus Crispin “Boying” Remulla, tend to challenge the application
of equality in CARP by contesting CARP’s bias against landowners. Remulla implied
this through a brief but provocative question at a plenary deliberation:
When you say social justice, does it mean only for the poor or for everybody in the country?
[emphasis added](Cavite Third District Representative Jesus Crispin “Boying” Remulla, Plenary
Deliberations, 21-May-2008).
Coalition C. Like landowners, members of the Bayan Muna Coalition also
challenge the inconsistent application of the CARP law. Frank Ribo, National President
of the Alliance for Rural Concerns Partylist, pointed out this inconsistency and called for
unequivocally equal implementation of CARP at the second committee hearing:
The law is for all or none at all. It is not right that some landholdings should be covered while
others should go scot-free. It is not just that some landless tillers should acquire landownership or
become secure in their land tenure and benefit from support services under the program while others
may have to wait forever [emphasis added](Frank Roy Ribo, National President, Alliance for Rural
Concerns Partylist, Committee Hearing 05-Dec-2007).
On Human Rights. Land reform is a disruptive process involving acquiring and
redistributing private property. In the process, resistance would be a natural reaction from
those who own lands. With this, tension arises between landowners and landless farmers
who fill deprived of their right to property. Eventually, the entire process can turn violent.
Indeed, historical accounts of land reform in the Philippines show a number of agrarian
revolts every now and then (Espiritu and Yoingco, 1995). CARP as a land reform
program is not exempted from agrarian violence. Hence, the issue of deaths related to
CARP and human lives being taken in the fight to claim awarded lands have become an
important issue that is no longer negligible. This long history of agrarian unrest was cited
by a land reform advocate during the second committee hearing on December 5, 2007:
Just to remind that agrarain reform is a historical consensus that is borne out of history, old
aspirations and struggles which reaches [sic] heights in the anti-dictatorship struggles of 1972 to
'86. To discard agrarian reform by refusing to extend CARP with reforms is to betray this historical
consensus that has been forged as a social contract through the Philippine Constitution of 1987. To
dismantle agrarian reform is to grossly ignore the call of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace
in 1997 made by Pope John Paul... John II for an equitable, efficient, and effective land reform and
the universal declaration of human rights which provides for the basic human rights to means
of subsistence. To do so is turning back on the millions of peasants still hungry for land and justice.
To do so is to abandon the path of social justice, peace and humane development for all (Ricardo
Reyes, Representative, Kilusan Para sa Pagsusulong ng Reformang Agrario, Kilos-AR, Committee
Hearing 5-Dec-2007).
Coalition A. Members or allies of the RCM were quite open in sharing
experiences of agrarian violence and abuses against CARP beneficiaries and farmers in
general. Thus, Danny Cacho, a representative of Associates for Rural Development,
shares his experience at a public hearing:
Marami rin kaming karanasan ng harassment, ng patayan at mga pagbawi ng mga CLOA at EP,
ngunit naniniwala kami doon sa tinatawag na lakas ng magbubukid. Kung mayroong lakas ng
magbubukid at dapat labanan, 'yong mga ganitong anti na magsasakang patakaran at anti na
magsasakang gawa ng iba't ibang mga tao, maaari tayong magtagumpay. (We have also
experienced many instances of harassment, extra-judicial killing and confiscation of CLOA and EP,
but we still believe in the strengthe of the farmer. If farmers remain strong and there are things we
need to fight off, we can overcome these anti-farmer policies devised by others.)[translation by
author](Danny Cacho, Representative of Associates for Rural Development, Inc. [ACORD], La
Union, Public Hearing 06-Mar-2008).
Cacho’s sentiments are shared by many other farmers and land reform advocate who
participated in the Congressional hearings on the CARP extension and reforms.
Coalition B. Landowners and their Congressional representatives on the other
hand attempt to divert the blame/cause of agrarian unrest from the resistance of
landowners to the overall faulty implementation of CARP and lack of support for the
farmer beneficiary. This line of reasoning was evident in the statement made by
Pangasinan Fifth District Representative Marcos Cojuangco at a plenary deliberation,
pointing the blame on extra-judicial killing of farmers to expoitive and violent lenders:
Mr. Speaker, the answer I would give to that question is because when you reform land and you
move away the owner, the original owner, from that land, you are also removing the working capital
that makes that land productive. Of course, if the owner is no longer benefitting from that land, then
that capital is no longer available and the recepient farmer has now to raise that capital on his own,
aside from having the obligation to pay his obligations to Land Bank included, would risk to lend
money to farmer beneficiaries because they are a bad credit risk. And so, farmer[s] recipients are left
to their own devices, they end up going to informal lending institutions like the 5-6 and we all know
that the 5-6, if they are not paid, will not go through legalities to collect what is due them. They will
beat up people, they will even kill people to collect their debts. Are we not forcing these
recipients into a more desperate situtation by giving them land knowing that they do not have
enough capital to run it at a level that could provide them with a decent return, Madam Speaker, Mr.
Sponsor? Pangasinan 5th District Representative Marcos Cojuangco, Plenary Deliberation 04-Jun-
2008).
Coalition C. Like the RCM, members and allies of the Bayan Muna Coalition
were also willing to share their respective experiences of violence and abuses. At a public
hearing, Medy Gonzales, a member of the Piglas-Quezon or United Peasants of Quezon,
a supporter of the sponsored-bill of the Bayan Muna coalition, recounts with less censure
the harassment against and killing of farmer beneficiaries:
Nang sila po ay lumaban sa ilalim ng kanilang binuong mga tunay na farmers' organization o
people's organization, sila po ay inakusahang mga NPA at pagkatapos nito anim po sa kanila ay
pinatay at tatlo pa ho … tatlo sa kanila hanggang sa ngayon ay nakabilanggo sa ilalim .. sa Quezon
Provincial Jail at kinasuhan ng qualified theft dahil patuloy nilang binubungkal at nilulukad ang
kanilang mga niyugan. ... ay sinasang-ayunan at isinusulong ang pagsasabatas sa House Bill 3059
(Applause) at tinatawag na Genuine Agrarian Reform Bill dahil naniniwala po ang mga magsasaka
sa Bondoc Peninsula at sa buong lalawigan ng Quezon na sa ilalim lamang ng Genuine Agrarian
Reform Bill makakamtan nila ang kanilang mga lupa. (When they [farmers] fought under the true
farmers’ organization or people’s organization that they built, they were accused of being members
of the NPA [New People’s Army, i.e. leftist rebel group] and afterwards, six of them were killed
and… three of them are imprisoned until now in the Quezon Provincial Jail and were charged with
qualified theft because they continued to till their coconut farms…we support and endorse the
enactment of House Bill 3059, the Genuine Agrarian Reform Bill because the farmers in Bondoc
Peninsula and the rest of the Quezon province believe that only under a Genuine Agrarian Reform
Bill will be able to claim their lands.)[translation by author](Medy Gonzales, Member, Piglas-
Quezon or United Peasants of Quezon, Public Hearing 03-06-2008).
C.2. Policy Core Beliefs
Table 4.4. Frequency of References to Policy Core Beliefs
Security of ARB Installation & Ownership Transfer
Productivity/Viability (of ARBs or awarded lands)
Role of DAR bureaucracy & other implementing
Agrarian Justice Delivery/ Court/ Adjudication/

Rural Development & Industrialization
Technical Support Services (or lack of)
Coverage (Scope and Retention Limit)

Poverty Reduction & Alleviation
agencies (e.g.DENR, LBP, PCGG)
No Discussion on Policy Core

Mode of Distribution
Phasing/Priorities
Funds (or lack of)
Time (or lack of)
Arbitration
Total
1680 101 151 214 54 75 212 38 128 261 118 197 54 13
100% 6% 9% 13% 3% 4% 13% 2% 8% 16% 7% 12% 3% 1%
As defined by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1994), policy core beliefs are basically
translations of the normative core in more concrete concepts. More exactly, policy core
beliefs refer to basic strategies and policy positions for achieving normative core beliefs.
This relationship is supported by the fact that of the almost 2,000 instances different
policy core beliefs were cited, the mode of distribution and security of the land transfer
process, concrete manifestations of social justice, are also the top two most discussed
policy core issues, followed by support services and role of DAR and implementing
agencies. The last two policy core issues also reflect the next two most discussed
normative core issues on public welfare/general well-being and exercise of state police
power, respectively. In short, the study finds that discussions on the policy core issues are
consistent with discussions on the normative core.
On Time. The most apparent issue is time. For the most part, time is discussed in
the context of CARP program extension. This intention was encapsulated in the opening
speech of the House Committee on Agrarian Reform Chair Representative Elias Bulut, Jr.
during the first committee hearing on November 21, 2007:
Under the 14th Congress, we aim to continue to work for improvement of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law. Principal in our Agenda is to reconsideration of legislation measures that
seek to provide reasonable period of time for the extension of CARP and allocation of sufficient
funds for its implementation (Committee Hearing, 21-11-2007).
Coalition A. For the RCM, this issue of time pertains to a more specific task of
enacting a law to extend CARP before the program officially expires. Hence, for CARP
extension proponents/champions, this means heeding the urgency to expedite passing a
piece of legislation to extend CARP. Hence, Albay Congressman Edcel Lagman states,
I would like to impress that what is about to expire next year is not the entire program. It is only the
component on land acquisition and distribution, which is the heart or core of the Agrarian Reform
Program. I based this statement on Section 5 of Republic Act 6657, the original copy of which reads,
"The distribution of lands covered by this Act shall be implemented immediately and completely within
the ten years from the effectivity thereof.
So, what was subjected to an expiry date was land acquisition and distribution. This was the one
extended under Republic Act 8532 and this is the one, which we are seeking to extend again, but for a
limited period of only five years… So, it is of critical immediacy that we enact a law extending the land
acquisition and distribution component of the CARP. This is indeed of critical immediacy… (Albay 1st
District Representative Edcel Lagman, Committee Hearing 21-Nov-2007).
This urgency is further reflected in the fact that Lagman’s bill espouses a greatly
simplified version with much less drastic reforms or provision amendments:
So, the bill I had introduced, this is the first bill filed towards this objective, House Bill No. 328 is
very simple. It has three components. One, extension of the land decision and distribution
component of the program for at least five years from 2008; two, the appropriation of one hundred
billion for the program; and, three, increasing the support services component from 25% to 40%.
Because it is support services that we are able, that we should be able to sustain the program after
land acquisition and distribution is effected (Albay 1st District Representative Edcel Lagman,
Committee Hearing 21-Nov-2007).

For Lagman, this simplification provides an expedient strategy to accelerate the process
of passing an extension law by attempting to avoid cumbersome interpellation or
questions.
Other members of the RCM justified the need for more time in implementing
CARP by alluding to the complex nature of the CARP reform process. Representative
Junie Cua, one of the co-sponsors of the CARP Extension Bill, explains,
The process of addressing agrarian problem is a tedious process; is a program that cannot be completed
in a short period of time. Experiences from our neighboring nations have shown this to be fact. The
agrarian reform program of Taiwan, of Korea took decades to finish. I remember that one of the studies
show that in these two nations alone, it took them more than 35 years to complete the program--to
distribute land to the landless and improve the viability of the beneficiaries as a way of poverty
alleviation (Quirino Lone District Representative Junie Cua, Committee Hearing 21-Nov-2007).
In specific terms, sponsoring members of the RCM propose various length of
extension. Some RCM members/proponents like COOP-NATCO Partylist Representative
Guillermo Cua suggest extending CARP for another ten years. The chief executive the
Department of Agrarian Reform Secretary Nasser Pangandaman himself explicitly
advocates for the same length of extension, citing the enormous task of redistributing the
remaining inventory of CARP lands:
As I've Said, We Are Already Pressed For Time. For This Reason, We Support The Most Simplified
Version Of The CARP Implementation. Your Honors, For The Period, We, In The Department Of
Agrarian Reform, Advocate For An Extension Of Ten (10) Years Or Until 2018 To Allow The
Completion Of The Remaining Combined Land Acquistiion And Distribution Balance Of The
Department Of Agrarian Reform And Department Of Environment And Natural Resources Of
Around One Point Six (1.6) Million Hectares Of Agricultural Land For The Next Six (6) Years And
To Devote The Remaining Years To Program Beneficiaries Development Particularly The Last Two
(2) Years For The Mainstreaming And Sustainability Mechanisms (DAR Secretary Nasser
Pangandaman, Committee Hearing 21-Nov-2007).
Some other RCM champions such as Hontiveros suggested a shorter and
supposedly more reasonable period of extension of five to seven years while other group
members such as IDEALS, a non-government organization that extends free legal aid to
CARP beneficiaries, and Alliance for Rural Concerns Partylist, argue for a more flexible
extension period on the basis of technicality:
We believe though that the legislative stand on the period for extension is required not primarily for
the continuation of the program per se as it is quite settled and the period for program
implementation state in R.A. 6657, as amended by R.A. 8532, is merely directory (Atty. Maribel
Arias, Director for Legal Affairs, IDEALS, Inc., Committee Hearing 21-Nov-2007).
The Constitution does not set a deadline for accomplishing agrarian reform after which it may no
longer be implemented, nor does R.A. 6657, as amended by R.A. 8532, neither should any law. The
10-year time frames mentioned in R.A. 6657 and R.A. 8532 were intended to speed up
implementation and not to limit it, and to set a timetable for guaranteed program funding and not to
starve it of funds should more be needed to accomplish program goals (Frank Roy Ribo, National
President, Alliance for Rural Concerns Partylist, Committee Hearing 21-Nov-2007).
On the other hand, both the other two coalitions see the issue of time in a different
light.
Coalition B. For landowning legislators such as Cebu Third District
Representative Pablo Garcia, time was not explicitly mentioned as an issue. However,
any discussion relating to deadlines by landowning legislators like Garcia hinged on a
more drastic proposal to recommit the bill for further scrutiny and study. Garcia made
this request on May 19, 2009 a year after the first round of interpellations were
conducted:
I am moving for a recommitment of this bill to the committee because of a fundamental objection.
Mr. Speaker, this House Bill No. 4077 was filed way back in 2008. It was presented for deliberation
on the floor also sometime [sic] in the middle of 2008. This bill is for the extension of the land
acquisition and distribution component of Republic Act No. 6657 which was due to expire on
December 31, 2008 (Cebu 3rd District Representative Pablo Garcia, COMMITTEE HEARING 19-
May-2009).
Coalition C. For representatives of the Bayan Muna coalition, time is not the
issue but the defective CARP law whose provisions allow for certain violations to occur.
This argument was made by Representative Teddy Casiño in one of his interpellations:
Again, my problem, distinguished Sponsor, is that the mere extension of this law will not solve the
problem. The problem in many studies that have been made and in my own critical studies, the
problem is not the length of time that has been allotted to the program. As I said, this is the longest
running land reform program in the world. Ang problema po dito hindi panahon. Kahit i-extend
nating ng limang taon, kahit i-extend natin ng sampung taon, kahit i-extend natin ng 20 taon, ang
problema hindi sa oras. Ang problema nandoon mismo sa batas, nando'n mismo sa definition kung
ano ba 'yung repormang agraryo, nando'n mismo sa definition of what is agricultural land, nando'n
sa napakaraming butas ng batas na nagagawa ng landowner na higit pang pangsamantalahan ang
mga magsasaka.
Hence, another Bayan Muna Partylist Representative Satur Ocampo appeals for more
time to study/examine the proposals to extend CARP in view of the greater need to
reform the original CARP law (RA 6657). They argue that the urgency arising from the
looming deadline or expiration of CARP should not supersede the more important task of
re-evaluating the institutional design of CARP and rectifying its gaps, defects, or
loopholes through more drastic measures. Hence, these two coalitions call for more time
to hold more consultations and study how CARP can be improved.
On Funding. A concomitant issue to the expiration of CARP is funding. In fact,
coalitions sought clarification on whether funding for CARP also ceases alongside the
expiration or the deadline of the program on December 31, 2008. Notwithstanding this
point of clarification, all coalitions agree that adequate funding is necessary for the
successful implementation of CARP and its prospective extension. Yet, differences
among the three coalitions still emerge on how the state should allocate funds for CARP
in case it would be extended.
Coalition A. For RCM champion Hontiveros, funding CARP has greater
fundamental importance than a mere technical detail of a program extension law. Its non-
continuation is equivalent to Constitutional violation. Thus, at a plenary deliberation she
states,
To discontinue funding for CARP would be tantamount to an abandonment of the constitutional

mandate to pursue agrarian reform. It will be a great disservice to around 700,000 potential farmer-
beneficiaries still awaiting award for their land, as well as to another on million farmers who will
lose the chance to enter into leasehold arrangements in retention areas (Anakbayan Partylist
Representative Ana Theresia "Risa" Hontiveros-Baraquel, Plenary Deliberations 30-Apr-2008).
During her sponsorship, Hontiveros suggest devoting bulk of the funds to accelerating the
acquisition and distribution of remaining CARP lands while the rest is allotted for
provision of necessary support services that were previously lacking such as reliable and
secure access to credit and capital, construction of more farm-to-market roads, irrigation,
and other agricultural infrastructure. All of which are expected to increase farm
productivity:
So, yung unang panawagan ng (the first recommendation of) House Bill 1257--sufficient funding
for an accelerated land acquisition and distribution to be completed… and continuous support
service delivery even after LAD completion with such funding to be appropriated automatically as
3.8% of the GAA… So, di ba ayaw nating nag-automatic appropriation dahil marami isa atin ayaw
para sa pagbayad lang ng utang (is it not we don’t want automatic appropriation, as most of us do
not want to pay debts). Sinasabi naman po ng (We are saying) Reform CARP Movement, mag-
automatic appropriation na lang tayo para sa lahat para masunod na natin sa wakas ang utos ng
Konstitusyon [translation added by author](instead for all so we can finally comply with the mandate
of the Constitution)(Committee Hearing 21-Nov-2007).
Within implementing agencies such as DAR, which is by virtue of its pro-extension
stance is somehow affiliated with the RCM, continuous funding is a fundamental component of
the program. As expressed by Secretary Pangandaman, its expiration is a matter of urgency:
According to Republic Act 8532, the funding support for land acquisition and distribution will end
in 2008. Hence, the need for an amendment to extend the fund support for the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program. With barely a year ago, we no longer have the luxury of time, Your
Honors. This is why we earnestly request our honorable Legislators to sustain the gains of the
program by supporting the passage of the CARP extension Bill before it's too late. As to the
budget, an estimate of around One Hundred Sixty-Two Billion Pesos (P162,000,000,000.00) is
necessary to enable the Department of Agrarian Reform and the other CARP implementing agencies
to complete its land acquisition and distribution program, its program beneficiaries development,
and agrarian justice deliverables [emphasis added]( DAR Sec. Nasser Pangandaman, Committee
Hearing 21-Nov-2007).
A DAR undersecretary further specifies the sources of funding to continue support services:
Sa ngayon kami po ay masasabi rin po namin na hindi lamang po kami umaasa sa ating pondo
nasyonal, kung di din po sa ating mga foreign-assisted projects para po kami makapagbigay ng mga
kaukulang imprastraktura sa iba't-ibang lugar ng ating mga magsasaka, tulad po halimbawa ng mga
farm-to-market roads, mga tulay, mga irrigation systems, water systems, health services, education.
Name it, we have it all (Ms. Rosalina Bistoyong. Undersecretary for Support Services and National
Commision on Indigenous Peoples {NCIP} Concerns, Department of Agrarian Reform {DAR}

Committee Hearing 6- Mar-2008).
Some NGO members of the RCM like IDEALS raise the need for a legislative measure
to continue CARP funding:
Now on… IDEALS also agree doon sa mga (with) proposals recommending additional funding for
support services and establishment of more ARCs because of the positive impact of this model as
reflected in the latest studies that I mentioned. And we also endorse the creation of an Oversight
Committee on CARP implementation, a joint executive-legislative. We have other matters to state
but we will reserve this for the next hearing because this would deal with some reform measures
about... that are being suggested by one of the proponents… at this point in time because of the
continuing mandate this Congress must provide for CARP. Atty. Maribel Arias (Director, Legal,
IDEALS, Inc., Committee Hearing 21-Nov-2007).
Coalition B. On the other hand, landowners feel that funds are better spent on
paying fully the just compensation of lands already awarded promised to them instead of
acquiring new lands for redistribution:
Our recommendations. If we, if this Body will really allocate 100 billion, one allocation of 50 billion
to the Land Bank to pay in full land already acquired, I'm talking of 1972 but not yet paid, and to
purchase all voluntary offer of sale paying for the full entitled at the municipal valuation of land.
Thousands of landowners will accept the offer and it would estimate the problem to be determining
just compensation which has been the cases of many these years.
The second recommendation is to allocate the second 50 billion to the provincial government for
them to determine the support services that they know is needed to improve agriculture in their
areas. Who would know better than the local government what is needed, and this will not solve the
long neglected need for support services (Silverio J. Belenguer, Small Landowner Representative
from Bicol, Committee Hearing 05-Dec-2007).
Coalition C. For their part, the Bayan Muna Coalition expresses regret on how the
failure of the CARP to achieve its main policy objective of raising the incomes and farm
productivity of CARP beneficiaries reflects the wasteful disbursement of the previous
Agrarian Reform Fund for the past 20 years. This sentiment was expressed by Bayan
Muna Representative Teddy Casiño:
My apprehension, Madam Speaker, is that we will be spending P100 billion for this extension, that
is P20 billion a year, and the fact that what should have been a ten-year program was extended
another ten years, is now being extended to another five years, and if we add the original agrarian
reform programs during the Macos period, during the Macapagal period, then this would be a world
record in the length of an agrarian reform program. And, yet it appears that we have not really made
any significant impact on the lives and the kind of structural oppression that is housing hounding our
farmers, especially our landless farmers. So, my apprehension is that we might be throwing good
money after bad money, and after 20 years. I think it is about time that we really change or repair the
fundamental laws, the congenital defects as mentioned by the distinguished Sponsor in the law itself,
the very defects of the have made this the longest running Agrarian Reform Program, probably the
most expensive Agrarian Reform Program, with the least results. In any case, Madam Speaker, I
understand from the title that this bill is going to institute necessary reforms, so I would like to walk
through some of what I think are the major loopholes of the existing law and see if the bill that we
are discussing addresses these necessary reforms that are supposedly being met as indicated in the
title (Bayan Muna Partylist Representative Teddy Casiño, COMMITTEE HEARING 03-June-
2008).
On Support Services. A persistent problem comprising most of the funding issue
is the lack of sufficient support services in past CARP implementation. All coalitions
recognize this problem to be almost universal among CARP beneficiaries in that most, if
not all, legislators and stakeholders participating in committee hearings cite it as the
cause of failure in CARP. Hence, all coalitions agree that fund allocation for support
services should be increased, given the complexity and wide variety of support services
needed to ensure and increase farm productivity. However, they diverge in their proposed
manner of delivering support services considering other equally important components of
CARP such as land acquisition and distribution and agrarian justice delivery.
Coalition A. For RCM champions, the importance of sustaining funding for support
services is almost a given. Hence, Hontiveros stated the following:
Moreover, this will lead to a substantial decrease in the already poor delivery of support services to
existing beneficiaries, effectively undermining the gains that have already been made by the
program (Anakbayan Partylist Representative Ana Theresia "Risa" Hontiveros-Baraquel, Plenary
Deliberations 30-Apr-2008).
This statement was further supported by Lagman, who at later plenary deliberations briefly stated
the specific proposal of the RCM to increase fund allocation for support services in order to
address the greater problem of defaulting or financial insecurity among CARP beneficiaries:
…and moreover, Mr. Chairman, that there are other alternatives to Section 4, liberalize terms on
agriculture credit facilities is already answered by the increase in the support services from 25
percent to 40 percent, you could even increase to 50 percent. Because it should be government with
your support the agrarian reform beneficiaries not have their lands collateralized and at the end of
the day they will lose their lands because they are not able to pay the mortgage (Albay 1st District
Representative Edcel Lagman, Plenary Deliberations 23-Apr-2008).
The bill increases the funding percentage of support services from the current 25% to 40% of CARP
funds to cover expenditure and cost of rural credit, production requirements, post-harvest facilities
and marketing needs of agrarian reform beneficiaries (ARBs). Thirty percent of the appropriation for
support services shall be earmarked for rural credit (Albay 1st District Representative Edcel Lagman,
Plenary Deliberations 23-Apr-2008).
Another RCM bill co-sponsor, Ilocos Sur First District Representative Ronald Singson, more
clearly articulates the problem of insufficient support services:
A stark problem in the program implementation is the utter lack of support services and credit.
Technology and support services were needed to make the farmer beneficiaries successful in their new
endeavor as landowners. No government loans were available to them. Borrowed at interest rates of
24.7%, the Land Bank of the Philippines which was supposed to do... to primarily service agricultural
sector was transformed into a universal bank with 16% of its portfolio dedicated to commercial and
industrial business. DAR admits that about 3 million of the 4 million farmer beneficiaries nationwide
did not receive any support services… Among the salient features include the following: Continue
CARP for at least 5 years in order to distribute the remaining 1.2 million hectares but budgetary
allocations must address all the concerns of lack of support services and organization efficiency. Hence,
50% of the budget must be for the provision of support services including credit support, market
linkages and agricultural infrastructure and other facilities [emphasis added](Ilocos Sur 1st District
Representative Ronald Singson, Committee Hearing 21-Nov-2007).
Coalition B. Affected landowners are more vocal and straightforward in
attributing CARP failure to the lack of support services, which causes decreased
productivity of farmers yet increases their vulnerability to exploitive lending:
As far as land distribution is concerned, no question about success. But if we are to determine on
whether or not they... this distribution alleviated poverty, has increased the productivity, has
encouraged landowners to invest in the rural areas, it has not succeeded. It is a failure. But we
cannot completely blame the farmer-beneficiaries for the following reasons: Number one, there has
been a lack of support services. Number two, there is no direct loan, there is no credit that is
given to the farmer-beneficiaries. He is on his own. How can he produce a crop? He has to go to a
[sic] five-six lenders. (Mr. Eduard F. Hernandez, PARC Landowner Representative, Committee
Hearing 05-Dec-2007).
This precariousness of insufficient support services was also raised by then presidential
relative and well-known landowning legislator Iggy Arroyo, who suggested concentrating
resources on support services:
Also it is in my experience, if I may say so, we have our land DOS in Negros Occidental, and after… in
fact, Congresswoman mentioned also that there should be a law that they cannot lease to a corporation
or whatever. What happened in that part, in that area, was that the beneficiaries immediately they leased
out their land to somebody else, I would rather not mention the name, they came back to me after six
months asking me for just, but I told them how can I give you just when I don't own the farm anymore?
So, that is a problem, which I would like to address, you know, CARP law. Maybe we should
concentrate on support services. And I believe during my talks with the DAR Secretary that there is a
gap on support services. Maybe we can make support services higher (Negros Occidental 5th District
Representative Iggy Arroyo, Committee Hearing 21-Nov-2007).
Other minor recommendations from landowners include allocating more money to LGUs
that implement support services on the ground:
The second recommendation is to allocate the second 50 billion to the provincial government for
them to determine the support services that they know is needed to improve agriculture in their
areas. Who would know better than the local government what is needed, and this will not solve the
long neglected need for support services. (Silverio J. Belenguer, Small Landowner Representative
from Bicol, Committee Hearing 05-Dec-2007).
Coalition C. The Bayan Muna Coalition also echoes this concern for threats/risks
associated with the absence of support services in CARP farm activities, albeit in clearer
and bolder language:
Nakita po natin ang (We have seen the) failure ng (of) CARP na ipinasa sa magbubukid, ang
pagbabayad (that passed the burden of payment to the farmers). Hindi naman binigyan ng (They
were not even given) support services, suporta ng gobyerno (government support), at sa ilalim ng
ating (and under the) new liberal globalization, tinanggalan pa iyong sabsido sa (subsidies on)
fertilizers (were removed) at iba pang tulong (and other forms of support), lalong nahirapan,
nagtulak na either i-give up nila, iyong kanilang lupa, ibenta nila o mabawi sa pamamagitan ng
mekanismo mismo ng repormang agraryo (which gave farmers a harder time and forced them to
either give up their lands, sell them or allow their lands to be confiscated through the mechanisms of
agrarian reform, i.e. CARP). Napaka walang katarungan po ng mga mekanismo ng implementation
ng CARP (CARP has such an unjust implementing mechanism.)(Bayan Muna Partylist
Representative Satur Ocampo, Plenary Deliberations 23-Apr-2008).
On Productivity. As earlier noted, the lack of support services is attributed as the
main cause of CARP failure. This failure is almost equally defined by declining or zero
productivity in CARP farms. Hence, during the opening session for the introduction of
CARP extension bills on November 21, 2007, House Agrarian Reform Committee Chair
Elias Bulut explains the link between social justice and economic productivity and
highlights the need for government support to increase productivity:
Ill-equipped, desirable, our Filipino farmers can hardly hurdle day-to-day demands of their survival.
Yet, we place squarely on their shoulders responsibility of feeding the entire nation. The litany of
inequities of facing the Filipino farmers is almost endless. These inequities are the reasons why our
farmers are poor. These inequities are the reasons why we in Congress have finally woken up to the
fact that genuine agrarian reform is not mere land distribution to rectify or spewed a land ownership
system that has been pestering for decades. Rather, true agrarian reform means empowering the
Filipino farmers to become a more efficient producer. Thus, bringing him into economic mainstream
of the free market. For all the perceived limitations, I sincerely hope that CARP remains a landmark
program. It should be progressive and courageous, and hopefully, alter the Philippine agrarian
landscape and ultimately set a new phase for agricultural productivity (House Agrarian Reform
Committee Chair Rep. Elias Bulut, Jr., Committee Hearing 21-Nov-2007).
The relationship between adequate support services and assured, if not increased,
productivity reverberates as a common theme on the issue of productivity among all
coalitions.
Coalition A. For RCM champions, productivity can only be ensured with
continued CARP funding and consequently sustained support services. Anakbayan
Partylist Representative Risa Hontiveros poignantly illuminates on the economic
importance of making CARP lands productive:
To end CARP funding now would, in effect, end the simple but noble dream of the Filipino farmer
to own the land that he or she tills and make the land productive. This would comprise not only the
livelihood of the farmers themselves, but the very future of the entire Filipino nation as our
economic, if not physical survival is inextricably linked with the success of our agricultural sector
[emphasis added](Anakbayan Partylist Representative Ana Theresia "Risa" Hontiveros-Baraquel,
Plenary Deliberations 30-Apr-2008).
Other members of the RCM even device their own terminology to explain the
fundamental relationship between funding support services and productivity. Besides the
term ‘economic justice’ earlier cited and used by Nueva Ecija First District
Representative Eduardo Joson, COOP-NATCO Partylist Representative Guillermo Cua
uses the term ‘enterprising the land’ and ‘entrepreneuring the agrarian reform
beneficiaries’ to pertain to the task of making CARP-awarded lands productive through
government support services:
There has been a lot of studies kini sa Agrarian Reform which shows that CARP has a positive
impact on the lives of the farmers-beneficiaries, including ang mga pamilya o ang mga communities.
In fact, I'd like to all enumerate kay kini sa this was a study that was done by the U.P.L.B.
Foundation and the Asian Pacific Policy Center which shows that the beneficiaries are mainly
improvements in tenure...tenurial status, better economic and physical welfare for Agrarian Reform
Beneficiaries, lowered and improving incident of poverty among Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries,
better education sa mga ARBs na mga anak, higher inputs and investment on their lands by ARBs,
more optimistic perceptions on the economic future, and a general positive benefits from the support
services, infrastructure development and capacity-building programs of the ARC approach. This was
the result of the 35 years of implementation of CARP. And so, although nakita nato na inspite of
that, there could be some problems, dili man siguro tanan nga...tanan mga programa, perpekto gid
siya, pero at least, doon na tayo makita na the advantages of Agrarian Reform Program to the
beneficiaries is better kaysa kung wala nga tagaan gyud ug yuta tapos ang gi-additional na lima ka-
tuig mau na siya siguro gamitun para sa what we call program beneficiaries development. Or I may
want to...sa ako I... I... we termed it as enterprising the land and entrepreneuring the agrarian reform
beneficiaries. So dapat kutob diha sa...so additional five years, although DAR would say ang
programa gitawag nila ug Program Beneficiaries Development, pero ako if I were to decide on a
program I would say enterprising the land and entrepreneuring the agrarian reform beneficiaries
(COOP-NATCO Partylist Representative Rep. Guillermo P. Cua, Public Hearing 07-Mar-2008).
Coalition B. As expected, landowners are straightforward in their resentment
against insufficient support services and its effect on productivity. For example,
Pangasinan Fifth District Representative Marcos Cojuangco, relative of former President
Corazon Aquino and a member of the big landowning clan Cojuangcos, cited a study
claiming that insufficient support services, especially credit, has led to declining
productivity:
Madam Speaker, I have here a copy of World Bank study, "Philippine Agriculture Public
Expenditure Review." And the claims, as mentioned by the Sponsor, are debunked by the study and
so with the study of the GTE [sic] which claims that productivity has definitely gone down
because of lack of investment, lack of working capital, lack of access to credit by even Land
Bank. Land Bank itself is not willing to give its own recipients crop loans because they know they
cannot collect (Pangasinan 5th District Representative Marcos Cojuangco, Plenary Deliberations 04-
Jun-2008).
Other landowning legislators such as Pangasinan Fifth District Representative Marcos Cojuangco
belabor to explain how the previous arrangements between landowners and farmers that CARP
disrupts contribute to decreasing productivity in the agricultural sector:

Madam Speaker, Your Honor, so are the studies that conclude otherwise, and I suppose there will
always be two sides to the coin. But, maybe to relate to what I know in my district, in my
conversations with farmers, farmer beneficiaries and tenants who have not received their own land
in the case of tenants who have not received their own land, there are two sharing schemes, 50-50
sharing scheme, if the landowner and the tenant will both put in working capital into the venture.
And so, the tenant has a partner to share the risk if something bad happens to the crop, he does not
lose it completely. Usually, there is no owner representative during the harvest, so whatever the
tenant reports, most of the time, the landowner just accepts. And so, I think it is a very soft
arrangement. On the other hand, there are also arrangements, 70-30 arrangements where the tenant
gets 70%, the landowner gets 30%, and the tenant puts up all the capital. Again, when it comes time
to harvest, usually, the landowner takes the word of the tenant. These have been relationships that
have been going on for decades, and when I ask these people, "Do you want your land to be
reformed? Do you want to receive your land?" Firstly, the complaint is, "it is too small, what I will
get is too small to make it viable." Secondly, the complaint is "I will lose the capital that the
landowner is sharing with me, so I have to raise more capital." And then, on the landowner's side,
the complaint is, "Five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten hectares na lang ho. Hindi lang ho naman ganoon
kalaki, hahatiin pa. Hindi na makaka-afford bumili ng traktora, hindi na makaka-afford bumili ng
water pump, hirap sa working capital." So we can see that it will drive down productivity, and
with the crises that are about to face the country [emphasis added](Pangasinan 5th District
Representative Marcos Cojuangco, Plenary Deliberations 04-Jun-2008).
Other landowners such as Cebu Third District Representative Garcia argued that
the issue on productivity hinges on the more specific disruptive effect of CARP on
economies of scale required by certain crop industries to thrive. Productivity in this case
is associated with the mode of distribution. In this line of reasoning, landowner-allied
legislators such as Cebu Third District Representative argue that physical land transfer
and parceling out of large plantations can cause entire industries to collapse. In effect,
landowners tend to appreciate the value of non-distributive schemes such as labor
administration or the controversial corporate stock-sharing. In a committee hearing,
Garcia demonstrates his arguments through the example of sugarcane plantations in
Cuba:
For example, we have a sugar industry. How many million people are dependent on the sugar
industry? And it is one of the major industries of the country. Now, they are operating, especially in
the Visayas, Negros, their sugar farms under labor administration and that is not unlawful. That is
not unlawful, it is allowed by law. So, if you will have to parcel out into one hectare. two
hectares all the sugarlands, what will happen to the sugar industry? It will collapse. What will
happen to the sugar centrals, the billions of pesos invested in the sugar centrals?
In Cuba, when Fidel Castro took over, there was very strong pressure from the descamisados, the
shirtless, the peasants, for Castro to subdivide the sugarlands in Negros. And he said, I am not
stupid. If I divide a 1,000-hectare hacienda into one or two hectares, parcel them out, the
farmers will not plant sugarcane because sugarcane is one-year crop and so they will plant
four crops, so the sugar industry in Cuba will collapse, and sugar is the number one industry of
Cuba. In fact, Cuba was the number on producer of sugar in the world. Now, I think, it is overtaken
by Brazil. So we have to look at this, we have to look at the bigger picture. And here our... Republic
Act 6657 encourages the landowners... Here, "the state shall be guided..." this is the declaration of
principles, "the state shall be guided by the principles that land has a social function and land
ownership has a social responsibility. Owners of agricultural lands, all agricultural lands, have the
obligation to cultivate directly or pro-labor administration, the lands they owned and thereby make
the land productive. Republic Act 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Land Reform [sic] [emphasis
added](Cebu 3rd District Representative Pablo Garcia, Committee Hearing 05-Dec-2007).
Other landowners cite a more specific type of support service as the critic success factor
in farm productivity. Hence, Eduardo F. Hernandez, a landowner representative in the
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, an oversight council, explains the relationship of
credit access to productivity during a committee meeting:
Okay, in any event, I will just conclude by saying that there are mer [sic]… very major issues, very
major problems before agriculture in our country can succeed. In the Senate, Senator Osmena, when
he was proposing a bill to allow credit to emancipation patents, stated and reveal that investment in
Philippine agriculture is the lowest in Asian countries, the lowest in the Asian countries.
Productivity in rice is also the lowest among the 8 Asian countries. We produce only 2.5 tons per
hectare against Korea's 6 tons and so forth and so on. And to produce sugar, you need at least 50
thousand per hectare, to produce rice, you need at least 10 thousand to 15 thousand per hectare. How
can they produce if you will not give them credit? Landbank talks of credit to the cooperatives but it
never trickles down really to the ultimate farmer. The sugar industry was doubled because of credit
direct to the farmers in the Quedan system (Eduard F. Hernandez, PARC Landowner
Representative, Committee Hearing 05-Dec-2007).
Coalition C. For the Bayan Muna coalition, the question on productivity is
colored by ideological undertones, such as the stereotypical resistance/critique of left
wing organizations to globalization. Bayan Muna Partylist Representative Satur Ocampo
best encapsulates this critique when in a public hearing on CARP, he cited CARP as the
main culprit of disrupting farm productivity alongside government policy on focusing on
export crops for increased global trade:

Sa aming pag-aaralan (Based on our analysis) ang CARP, as it is, undermines our agriculture and
small farmers and reinforce the destructive impact of globalization and liberalization. CARP has
caused the further fragmentation of our farm units na… which makes our small farmers... small
farmers even smaller and more economically vulnerable to the onslaught of foreign agricultural
products wrought by full liberalization (Bayan Muna Partylist Representative Satur S. Ocampo,
Public Hearing 06-Mar-2008).
Gabriela Partylist Representative Lisa Maza also raised the issue of productivity in the context of
criticizing export-oriented agri-businesses that endanger food sufficiency or security:
Another concern, Madam Speaker, Your Honor, is its agri-business in relation to food security and
food sufficiency, because we know, and it follows again from our experience, that if we concentrate
on production for export, food sufficiency is imperiled. This is what we are experiencing now with
the food crisis as manifested by high prices of food stuff including rice, Your Honor. (Gabriela
Partylist Representative Liza Maza, Plenary Deliberations 27-May-2008).
As no statistics was cited to demonstrate this disruption in productivity, it appears that
Maza’s argument is also underpinned by a conventional, formulaic ideological reproach
to haciendas or large-scale agricultural enterprises.
On Rural Development and Industrialization. Discussions on the issue of
productivity in relation to CARP is almost always done in view of the larger the picture
of developing the agricultural economy through rural development initiatives and
industrialization efforts. COOP-NATCO Partylist Representative Guillermo Cua brief
introduction during the opening session of the House Agrarian Reform Committee
exemplifies this: “I believe that the Agrarian Reform Program is a social justice program,
and if you wanted to have peace and development especially in the rural communities,
we need to have this Agrarian Reform Program [emphasis added](Committee Hearing
21-Nov-2007).” Cua expounds on this at a later public hearing on CARP:
… Agrarian Reform Committee members, gilantaw namo ang (we see the) Agrarian Reform
Program na usa ka (as a) social justice or growth for equity programs. Ug nanong gipasabot namo
nga (And we say it is a) growth with equity programs kay nakita namo na kung mahimo, kung may
balansa sa atong ekonomiya dinhi sa Pilipinas kay nakita nato, na kung tan-awon nato, ang
pinakama... maayong na... na sitwasyon sa...sa kalim...katilimban dinhi sa Pilipinas, na-a sa mga
(because we see that if it is possible to have a balanced economy in the Philippines as we see that if
we look closer, better living conditions can be seen in) highly urbanized areas where you can see a
lot of big and successful businesses. Pero pag-abot didto sa (But in) rural o sa (in the) countryside,
kulang ang mga negosyo ug ang (businesses and) industrialization (are lacking) na makatabang unta
(which could supposedly help) labi kay diha sa (especially in the) countryside ug sa (and) rural
areas, diha man ang daghan mga kabus ug mga (where most of the) marginalized sector (can be
found). Ug nanong... busa importante diha ang (And that is why) small and medium enterprises (are
important) ug nakita nako na ang (and I see that) agrarian reform communities enterprises labi ana
ang mga kooperatiba usa ka importante na (especially the cooperatives which are important) small
and medium en...enterprises that will be the...the engine of growth and development in the rural
economy and the countryside. Ug nakita sad nato na kining (And I also see that this) Agrarian
Reform, isa ka (is one) strategy for poverty and reduction, food security ug (and) job creations
especially in the countryside and in the rural areas. So kung baga, nakikita nato usad nga (in other
words, I see that)… if we really wanted to have a sound sustainable and ru…rural development in
the…and Philippine industrialization, the backbone for such a sustainable development on
Philippine industrialization is going to be Philippine agriculture. And what is very important,
ang importante dinhi (what’s important here), is maestablisar ang (to establish) owners-
cultivatorship of economic-sized farm as the basis for Philippine agriculture (COOP-NATCO
Partylist Representative Guillermo P. Cua, Public Hearing 07-Mar-2008).
Coalition A. For RCM proponents, rural development and industrialization can be
attained specifically through the strategy of developing Agrarian Reform Communities
(ARC), which are essentially a cluster of CARP beneficiary communities. Thus, pro-
CARP Extension bill proponent Albay First District Representative Edcel Lagman would
promote the positive impact of the ARC strategy by juxtaposing income indicators of
ARCs and non-ARC areas and crediting the relative success of CARP to the successful
installation of ARCs:
Well, there are various assessments of the success or failure of the program. But empirical studies
would show that the program has succeeded but not the way it is expected to succeed. Because these
studies would show that agrarian reform beneficiaries would have better productivity and the
incidence of poverty in agrarian reform communities would be lower compared to non-agrarian
reform communities (Albay 1st District Representative Edcel Lagman, Plenary Deliberations 28-
May-2009).
This promotion of the ARC strategy is further reinforced by legislators such as Antique
Lone District Representative Exequiel Javier who shares the positive experience of ARCs
in his district:
Your Honor, I am for the extension of the acquisition of lands because I'm also for the extension of
the support services. My province is one of the beneficiaries of the support services of CARP and in
fact, we have so many barangays which have been the beneficiaries of CARP under its foreign-
assisted project--programs. I think, in my district, CARP has irrigated--has funded the irrigation of
about 1,600 hectares. And it has built farm-to-market roads of about 34 kilometers, Your Honor. So,
with the help of CARP, in fact, our province is now a net exporter of rice, aside from--our province,
Your Honor, is only 17% lowland and 83% upland, and only 15,000 hectares are irrigated. So, with
the CARP, it helped us produce more rice, more agricultural products like corn, and it helped the
income of farmers, small farmers in my district, Your Honor. And that is why I am standing up to
express my support for the extension of the CARP. And in my province, we still have proposed
agrarian reform communities program, and we are looking forward to that. At least, during the
time that we passed that legislation on land reform, for foreign assisted projects, I think the CARP
has extended about P170 million in assistance to my district. So, we are worried that if the anchor of
the CARP, which is the extension of the acquisition and distribution of lands, would be terminated,
because Congress failed to act on time, then the future support services for my district would also be
terminated. So, Your Honor, because during the debates we only concentrated on the legality of the
extension. I think no speaker had stoop up to speak on the performance of the CARP since we
enacted that piece of legislation on land reform. So, Your Honor, with that, I would like to again
thank you for honoring me, for allowing me to interpellate you and to express my support for the
extension of the CARP (Antique Lone District Representative Exequiel Javier, Plenary
Deliberations 03-Jun-2008).
Coalition B. Landowners appears silent on the aspect of rural development and
industrialization in CARP. In this sense, their silence seems to imply their agreement that
CARP can be a vehicle for rural development and industrialization. Although the first
CARP law (RA 6657 of 1988) explicitly mandates (Sec. 2) giving incentives to
landowners to venture into industries using the just compensation money paid by the
beneficiaries, questions remain on the feasibility or financial viability of the ARC
strategy, as expressed by Cavite Third District Representative Jesus Crispin Remulla.
Although ‘Boying’ (as he is known) Remulla has not explicitly identified himself with
the landowner bloc, he is a son of a well-known landowning provincial warlord or
‘strongman’ whose postwar political career and story was documented by a renowned
comparative political economy professor John T. Sidel (1999):
Yes, Madam Speaker, I laud the Sponsor in his effort to really justify the extension; and I have seen
some ARC's succeed, Madam Speaker. In my province, although we are an exception to the general
rule as a state of sponsoring himself, there's one ARC in a most remote barangay--most remote town
in Magallanes beside Batangas, which was very successful. But the government spent for irrigation,
for all the roads, for all the seeds, practically giving everything to the program. Practically, the
government spend more than one million per hectare in that area. Do we have one million per
hectare for this program when we acquire so many more hectares and all the lands that we have
acquire [sic] already? Because the way I estimate it, Madam Speaker, if we want this program to
succeed, we need P100.00--actually, more than P100.00 per square meter in input to be able to make
the program succeed. Do we have that money? Is 100 billion enough? Where will we get the money
later on? How about the on-going lands that had been acquired and are in limbo where the farmers
are not moving. Do we have the money to make it succeed? (Cavite 3rd District Representative Jesus
Crispin Remulla, Plenary Deliberations 21-May-2008).
Coalition C. While acknowledging its positive impact on CARP implementation,
members of the Bayan Muna bloc also questioned the feasibility of the ARC strategy.
Partylists Representatives Lisa Maza (from Gabriela) and Satur Ocampo (from Bayan
Muna) comprehensively expressed this concern. Maza even goes as far as claiming that
the focus of ARCs on establishing agri-businesses has adversely impacted the
improvement of the farmers’ quality of life:
Now I would like to go now to my last point. According to President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's plan,
vision and policy direction from 2005 to 2010, there will be a paradigm shift from Agrarian Reform
Community to what they call Agrarian Reform Connectivity. And that is connecting the different ARCs
that are near to each other, and also connecting ARCs to non-ARCs. And that this Agrarian Reform
Connectivity will focus agri-business development. According to this plan also, because of the tight
budgetary situation of the national government, much of the envisioned support services and
developmental inputs in the Agrarian Reform Connectivity will be delivered through the
implementation of foreign-assisted projects. Would the good Sponsor expound on this concept and
visions, since it is the opinion of this Representation that we cannot talk of CARP extension now
without putting such land reform program within a context. And this policy context is that the Agrarian
Reform Connectivity, meaning the model Agrarian Reform Development, is focused on agri-business,
and that it will be financed through foreign loans. How would the good Sponsor expound on this? Is this
the correct path to economic development, even agricultural development for that matter?
Madam Speaker, Your Honor, it's just that when I read this, this program, this plan and vision of this
government, I cannot help but examine CARP extension within this policy context. And immediately,
the cause for concern are three things.
One is the stress on agri-business. In the law, when they conceptualized the agrarian reform community,
agri-business is one of the focus of the agrarian reform community already. And we have 19 years of
CARP implementation with the ARC. And the agri-business aspect has not contributed to the
development of farmers. And as a matter of fact, rural poverty has even increased in recent years.
Madam Speaker, Your Honor (Gabriela Partylist Representative Lisa Maza, PLENARY
DELIBERATIONS 27-May-2008).
Ocampo, for his part, requested for empirical evidence supporting the proposal to target
establishing three ARCs per legislative district annually.

Yes, I note that in Section 3 of the bill under deliberation, there is a requirement of a minimum of
three (3) agrarian reform communities that shall be established, shall be established by the
Department of Agrarian Reform in each legislative district with a predominantly agricultural
population. Is this realizable? Has there been any study that would show that this is feasible to have
three (3) agrarian reform communities in a single district in a year? (Bayan Muna Partylist
On Poverty Incidence. One of the clearest indication of rural development and
improvement of the agricultural economy is increased incomes of CARP beneficiaries
and consequently reduced poverty incidence among their communities. House Committee
on Agrarian Reform Chair and Apayao Lone District Representative Elias Bulut, Jr.
conveys this conceptual relationship through a poignant sponsorship speech during the
first committee hearing on November 21, 2007:
Hopefully, everyone will be able to rally around and contribute in the understanding of the present
state of CARP, and provide a rejoinder in the issues of CARP Extension. Indeed, how land is used
and how largely benefit from its fruits are issues that have dominated the economics of our
country, and since the middle of the 18th Century, every previous Philippine administration
has laid claim to the fact that agriculture is the backbone of our economy. Ironically, however,
it is this predominantly agricultural economy which has spawned pervasive poverty in the
country today. The Philippine poverty is by and large a rural problem with distinctively agrarian
roots (House Agrarian Reform Committee Chair and Apayao Lone District Representative Elias
Bulut, Jr., Committee Hearing 21-Nov-2007).
Coalition A. While RCM members are aware of CARP’s relative failure to
achieve fully its policy goal of reducing poverty in the countryside, they choose to focus
on the positive potential and highlight success stories of CARP contributing to poverty
alleviation and improving the quality of life among CARP beneficiaries. This policy
belief was clearly evident in the RCM champion Hontiveros’ defense of CARP during a
plenary deliberation on April 30, 2008:
Second, some claim that CARP is a total failure, not worthy of extension. Those who oppose
agrarian reform either call for the junkng of CARP altogether, or the delay in its further
implementation pending a review of the program, Mr. Speaker and my dear colleagues, this is far
from unqualified fact. Various comprehensive studies have established empirical data that CARP,
where it was properly and successfully implemented, has contributed to alleviating poverty,
establishing peace in the countryside, and the improved quality of life for agrarian reform
beneficiaries. This is a fact, Mr. Speaker, that our farmer-friends in the Reform CARP Movement,
a broad coalition of more than 30 national and local farmer's organization and the NGO's, some of
whom are in the gallery today, are more than willing to attest to. [emphasis added](Anakbayan
Partylist Representative Ana Theresia "Risa" Hontiveros-Baraquel, Plenary Deliberations 30-Apr-
2008).
Coalition B. Given the failures of CARP to achieve its objective of reducing or
alleviating rural poverty, landowners and their Congressional representatives such as
Pangasinan Fifth District Representative Cojuangco feel that CARP’s focus on the
landless poor farmers are excessive and unfair to other sectors of the poor. In a way, such
a belief appears to be an attempt to justify diverting policy focus on the real
socioeconomic issues that CARP intends to address or an excuse to justify not devoting
policy resources to reforming and extending CARP. Cojuangco verbalized this
sentiments at a plenary deliberation on June 4, 2008:
Madam Speaker, I feel for the agrarian reform beneficiaries and agrarian reform candidates, but I do
not feel it is also fair to the other sectors of poor [sic] in our society that there is only sector of poor
being recognized as in need in the country. And, from what I know about spending, every peso you
spend one project on is another peso that you forgo [sic] for another project, or another socially
responsible expenditure (Pangasinan Fifth District Representative Marcos Cojuangco, Plenary
Deliberation 04-Jun-2008).
Coalition C. For Bayan Muna Coalition champions, the correlation between
landlessness and rural poverty is commensensical and quite straightforward. Hence,
Frank Ribo, National President of the Alliance for Rural Concerns Partylist, suggested at
a committee hearing that in CARP lands yet to be distributed, poverty incidence,
demands for agrarian reform, and agrarian revolts are high.
We believe that there are still more than two (2) million hectares of agricultural lands, private and
public, that are yet to be distributed to around 1.8 million landless tillers and farmworkers. These
areas are considered most contentious and resistances to CARP are very strong. It is also in these
areas where we would find the poor farmers, farmworkers, tillers and demands for agrarian
reform and agrarian revolts are high, Mr. Frank Roy Ribo (National President, Alliance for Rural
Concerns Partylist, Committee Hearing 05-Dec-2007).
This correlation between rural poverty and unrest and landlessness is more clearly
articulated by Bayan Muna Partylist Representative Satur Ocampo at a plenary

deliberation on April 23, 2008:
Ang kahirapan talamak sa kanayunan dahil sa kawalan ng pag-aari o kontrol ng mga magbubukid
sa mga lupain (Poverty is rampant in the countryside because farmers lack ownership or control of
farm lands). Tila po medyo komplikado po, mas komplikado kesa CARP iyong aming panukalang
batas na mahirap kong isa-isahin, nguni't ang diwa nito ay maibigay sa mga kinauukulang mga
magbubukid ang lupang sinasaka o maaari nilang sakahin ng libre, hindi pagbabayad sa kanila
(Although our proposed reforms, which are difficult to itemize, are more complicated than CARP,
but the essence is to give to qualified farmers the lands they till or they may till for free, without
requiring them to pay any form of just compensation [translation by author](Bayan Muna Partylist
Coverage. A core policy issue that emerges out of the Congressional
deliberations on the CARP extension is CARP’s original scope and retention limits (land
hectarage). In the first place, the original CARP law (RA 6657) is vague in not containing
any explicit directive or specific provision on the total hectares of lands to re-distribute.
The problem not only lies with the ambiguity of the law on the actual land hectares to
distribute but also with the law’s expansive and comprehensive criteria of coverage.
Section 4 of RA 6657 provides that
The Comprehensive Agrarian reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement
and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation
No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for
agriculture.
Later on, this comprehensive coverage would incite certain agricultural sectors to request
exemptions that were granted by the government through a Supreme Court ruling and a
subsequent amendment law. (This exemption will be discussed in detail in the next
chapter). Retained throughout CARP’s history of implementation, the exemptions
sparked controversy and divided different agrarian reform advocacy groups. This division
manifested in the discussions among coalitions during the 14th Congress deliberations on
the CARP extension and reforms.
Coalition A. For RCM proponents who recommend the continuation of CARP,

retaining the original scope/inventory of CARP lands to redistribute is a fair and befitting
policy direction, especially given that CARP is a social justice program that has yet to
resolve the longstanding struggle of farmers for unequivocal landownership. This policy
belief was evident in the statement by RCM member and proponent COOP-NATCO
Partylist Representative Guillermo Cua during the opening session of the House
Committee on Agrarian Reform on November 21, 2007. Citing a famous case of the
Bukidnon Mapalad Farmers, he said the following:
Today, the Bukidnon Mapalad Farmers had a walk for justice and this has been their struggle for
many, many years and they are on their way from Bukidnon. They pass visayas and maybe in Luzon
anytime wihtin the month of December. This is just one of the 1.5 million landless farmers which...
which also has 2 million lands that need to be distributed which would have... which would cost
about 100 to 150 billion pesos (COOP-NATCO Partylist Representative Guillermo Cua, Committee
Coalition B. Landowners and their allies cautions that while the State is mandated
to undertake distribution of all agricultural lands, the distribution process must take into
account more important considerations of productivity and social justice for both
landowners and beneficiaries through the assurance of just compensation. Cebu Third
District Representative Pablo Garcia alludes to this at a plenary deliberation on May 27,
2008:
Now listen very carefully to the next sentence: To this end, to this end, the State shall encourage and
undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands subject to such priorities and retention limits
as the Congress may prescribe taking into account ecological, developmental and equity
considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation (Cebu 3rd District Representative
Pablo Garcia Plenary Deliberations 27-May-2008).
Coalition C. Those who push for a totally new CARP law in the Bayan Muna
coalition appear to be on the same side as the RCM in demanding for universal coverage
by CARP of all agricultural lands, as originally envisioned/mandated by the first CARP
law.
We believe that there are still more than two (2) million hectares of agricultural lands, private and
public, that are yet to be distributed to around 1.8 million landless tillers and farmworkers. These
areas are considered most contentious and resistances to CARP are very strong. It is also in these
areas where we would find the poor farmers, farmworkers, tillers and demands for agrarian reform
and agrarian revolts are high. The law is for all or none at all. It is not right that some landholdings
should be covered while others should go scot-free. It is not just that some landless tillers should
acquire landownership or become suecrue in their land tenure and benefit from support services
under the program while others may have to wait forever (Frank Roy Ribo, National President,
Alliance for Rural Concerns Partylist, Committee Hearing 05-Dec-2007).
At a public hearing on March 6, 2008, Bayan Muna Partylist Representative Satur
Ocampo more clearly state Bayan Muna’s proposal of redistributing lands free of cost:
Hindi doon sa paiba-ibang (not based on inconsistent) definition of what is agricultural land kundi
paano ang gamit, ito ay tinatamnan (but boils down to how it’s being used is) for agricultural
production purposes. Kaya rerepasuhin lahat ng mga na-reclassify na mga lands (That’s why we
need to revoke all re-classified lands). 'Yong mga lupang nasa (those) estates, 'yong mga (those)
modern commercial production, 'yong mga nasasaklaw ng mga dayuhan sasaklawin pong lahat 'yan
(those covered by foreign companies will all be covered). At doon sa mga... sa pamamahaging 'yan,
ang sentrong ideya dito ay 'yong libreng pamamahagi sa benificiaries (And in the transfer process,
the central idea is free distribution to beneficiaries). (Applause)[translation by author](Bayan Muna
Partylist Representative Satur Ocampo, Public Hearing 03-06-2008).
Phasing. Besides the extent of CARP coverage, the order of priorities of coverage
is also another contentious issue that divide coalitions.
Coalition A. RCM proponents such as Anakbayan Representative Hontiveros
believes that after two decades of implementation, the program has already covered the
‘easier’ lands and should now focus on redistributing the more contentious private
agricultural lands that make up the bulk of remaining CARP lands inventory.
Before you recognize the next resource person, just to put something on record the comment on one
of the points made by the good Chairman, in fact, one of the facts being disputed is what is the
nature of the land to be covered by land acquisition and distribution. And I respectfully disagree,
Mr. Chairman, that the remaining lands to be covered are the inaccessible ones in the mountains and
in the less-accessible islands. In fact, Mr. Chairman, it is the knowledge of the agrarian reform
advocates around the table that those lands still to be covered and which make up the large part of
the more than one million hectares left to be covered are the large part private agricultural
lands. Just to put that on the table, Mr. Chairman. Thank you [emphasis added](Anakbayan Partylist
Representative Ana Theresia Hontiveros-Baraquel, Committee Hearing 05-Dec-2007).
Coalition B. As expected, landowners diverge from the RCM proposal by arguing
that state resources are better expended if the government concentrates on public lands
that are easier to dispose. Further citing the inability of the State to provide just
compensation to private landowners, Negros Occidental Fifth District Representative and
presidential relative Iggy Arroyo made the following proposal during the opening session
of the House Committee on Agrarian Reform on November 21, 2007:
Secondly, on land acquisition: why not concentrate also on government land and spend money in
building farm to market roads to go to those lands. After all the government has so much land. Let us
concentrate on our government lands so that at least… our problem is that landowners are not being
paid right now by the government. So, if the government will sell their own land let the government
collect from its own. So, that is my only point that I would like to make, Your Honor. (Negros
Occidental 5th District Representative Iggy Arroyo, Committee Hearing 21-Nov-2007).
Coalition C. Like the RCM, Bayan Muna Coalition members also questioned the
DAR’s commitment and priorities in redistributing private agricultural lands, which are
the more contentious lands. Anakpawis Partylist Representative Rafael Mariano
confronted DAR during a plenary deliberation on May 19, 2009:
Madam Speaker, distinguished Sponsor, 20 taon na pa itong nasasabning batas, itong

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, at sa 20 taon ng pagpapatupad na ito, ay sinasabi po ng
Department of Agrarian Reform ay meron nang mga humigit-kumulang 2.1 million hectares of
private agricultural lands ang na-acquire na at naipamahagi na sa mga intended farmer beneficiaries.
Tama po ba iyong ganoong claim o accomplishment report ng Department of Agrarian Reform?
(Anakpawis Partylist Representative Rafael Mariano, Plenary Deliberations 19-May-2009).
On Mode of Distribution. The manner of distributing agricultural land defines
the core of CARP as a land reform program. Yet, it has become one of the most
contentious issues even during the deliberation behind the first CARP law in 1988
(Putzel, 1992). This contentious nature appears to be carried over to the 14th Congress
deliberations on the modes of CARP distribution. The wide range of distribution modes
permitted by CARP was alluded to by House Agrarian Reform Committee Chair
Representative Elias Bulut Jr. who at the opening committee hearing on November 21,
2007 defines genuine agrarian reform as not limited by land distribution but by an overall
approach to empower Filipino farmers:
Ill-equipped, desirable, our Filipino farmers can hardly hurdle day-to-day demands of their survival.
Yet, we place squarely on their shoulders responsibility of feeding the entire nation. The litany of
inequities of facing the Filipino farmers is almost endless. These inequities are the reasons why our
farmers are poor. These inequities are the reasons why we in Congress have finally woken up to
the fact that genuine agrarian reform is not mere land distribution to rectify or spewed a land
ownership system that has been pestering for decades. Rather, true agrarian reform means
empowering the Filipino farmers to become a more efficient producer. Thus, bringing him into
economic mainstream of the free market. For all the perceived limitations, I sincerely hope that
CARP remains a landmark program. It should be progressive and courageous, and hopefully, alter
the Philippine agrarian landscape and ultimately set a new phase for agricultural productivity
[emphasis added](House Committee on Agrarian Reform Chair Representative Elias Bulut, Jr.).
Coalition A. RCM champions continued to argue that actual, physical land
transfer lies at the core definition of a true land reform program. Hence, at the opening
session of the House Committee on Agrarian Reform on November 21, 2007,
Representative Lagman, a long-time land reform advocate and CARP extension bill
proponent, explains,
I would like to impress that what is about to expire next year is not the entire program. It is only the
component on land acquisition and distribution, which is the heart or core of the Agrarian Reform
Program. I based this statement on Section 5 of Republic Act 6657, the original copy of which reads,
"The distribution of lands covered by this Act shall be implemented immediately and completely within
the ten years from the effectivity thereof. So, what was subjected to an expiry date was land acquisition
and distribution. This was the one extended under Republic Act 8532 and this is the one, which we are
seeking to extend again, but for a limited period of only five years [emphasis added](Albay First
District Representative Edcel Lagman, Committee Hearing 21-Nov-2007).
Lagman is supported by fellow proponents of CARP extension and reforms, Anakbayan
Partylist Representative Risa Hontiveros and Quirino Lone District Representative Junie
Cua, who at the opening session on November 21, 2007 both value the importance and
necessity of physical land acquisition and distribution in CARP:
Mr. Chairman, the program has been extended for twenty years already. But as we see, the program has
yet to be completed. While substantial gains have been achieved by the department, the remaining lands
that remain to be distributed are lands that are problematic. This is expected because they are
problematic. Non-extension of the program of land acquisition would deal a very serious blow on the
social justice program of this government where perception will be that those high and mighty are
beyond the reach of law. (Quirino Lone District Representative Junie Cua, Committee Meeting 21-11-
2007)
Bakit (Why) accelerating the completion of the land acquisition and distribution component of
CARP. Accelerating dahil gaya ng sinabi na rin ni (because like what) Congressman Cua (has said),
halos dalawang dekada na ito at maging tayo masyado ng mabagal sa pagsunod sa utos ng
Konstitusyon at nga maga sunod-sunod na batas tungkol sa repormang agraryo (this has been going
on for almost two decades and even we find it too slow in complying with the Constitution and other
agrarian reform laws). Bakit mahalaga yung (Why is) land acquisition and distribution (important)?
Alam na ng lahat dito sa kuwarto ito yung una, pinakaimportante at mahalagang... unang hakbang
para tumungo talaga sa repormang agraryo at kaunlaran sa kanayunan (All of us in this hall knows
that this is the most important… first step towards a true agrarian reform and national progress)
(Anakbayan Partylist Representative Ana Theresia Hontiveros-Baraquel, Committee Meeting 21-11-
2007).
Coalition B. By contrast, landowners and their congressional allies argue that
agrarian reform is not only limited to actual, physical land transfer but includes other
non-physical alternative arrangements. Cebu Congressman Pablo Garcia consistently and
strongly argues for this more methodologically inclusive definition of agrarian reform in
House Agrarian Reform Committee hearings:
With all due respect, Mr. Secretary, Agrarian Reform is not all land acquisition and distribution. And
may I invite your attention to Section 3-(a) of Republic Act 6657, the definition of the term "agrarian
reform." It says that agrarian reform means not only the physical distribution of lands, regardless of
crops or fruits produced, to farmers and regular farm workers but also to include all other alternative...
all other arrangements alternative to physical distribution of lands such as production or profit-sharing,
labor administration or shares of stocks. This is also agrarian reform, a system of farming known as
labor administration (Cebu 3rd District Representative Pablo Garcia, Committee Meeting 21-11-2007).
I think that all along, we have thought or even believe that agrarian reform is only a matter of
acquisition and distribution of lands, it is not so, and it is in the law. How does the law, Republic Act
6657 define agrarian reform? We will follow the law. Okay. Section 3 of the law is definition of
terms. Definition Agrarian reform means the redistribution of lands regardless of crops or fruits
produced to farmers and regular farm workers who are landless irrespective of tenurial arrangement.
Now, here is the phrase, "to include the totality of factors and support services and all other
arrangements alternative to physical distribution of lands such as production or profit
sharing, labor administration, and the distribution of shares of stock which will allow
beneficiaries to receive a just share of the fruits thereof." The problem is we are focused on
land distribution, land distribution. Agrarian reform is not only a matter of parceling out
lands; it is also for productivity [emphasis added](Cebu 3rd District Representative Pablo Garcia,
Committee Hearing 05-Dec-2007).
Coalition C. Members of the Bayan Muna coalition echoes the same belief of the RCM
that actual, physical land distribution is the truest definition of agrarian reform. Unlike the RCM
coalition, however, the Bayan Muna coalition members are more vocal in their opposition
towards controversial non-distributive schemes that they believe landowners use to circumvent
the mandate of CARP. Bayan Muna Partylist Representative Casiño briefly yet boldly states this
policy belief at a plenary deliberation:
In the alternative modes of compliance, a point well threshed out by our distinguished colleague
from Cebu [Pablo Garcia], there is nothing, again, that would prevent landowners from escaping
actual physical distribution of land. They can still enter into stock distribution options, can still
enter into leasehold, can still enter into joint ventures which would save them or make them go
around the actual physical distribution of land [emphasis added](Bayan Muna Partylist
Representative Teodoro Casiño, Plenary Deliberations 03-Jun-2008).
On Security of Installation of ARB ownership. A major issue that besets past
CARP implementation is the continuing cases of violations, exploitation, and abuses
against CARP beneficiaries. In certain instances, these maltreatment leads to extra-
judicial deaths and criminal violence. Policy actors are divided on whether this is a
product of empowerment that the comprehensive nature of the CARP law has conferred
on the farmers, which emboldens them to risk their lives, or of the institutional gaps that
allow landowners to manipulate CARP mechanisms to circumvent the physical
distribution mandate of CARP. In any case, there is that common impression that the
CARP law is defective or weak and all coalitions seem to agree that it needs to be
strengthened through reforms. The Chair of the House Agrarian Reform Committee
himself, Apayao Lone District Representative Elias Bulut, Jr., raised the seriousness of
the CARP problem during the first committee hearing on November 21, 2007:
Due to the seriousness of the matters at hand, the lives of the CARP stakeholders and their families
the Committee had taken keen interest look into the matter; take action on the same depending on
the outcome of our discussions (House Agrarian Reform Committee Chair Representative Elias
Bulut, Jr., Committee Meeting 21-11-2007)
The difficulty in guaranteeing security in the installation of ARBs into their awarded
lands is partly caused by the complex nature of the CARP land transfer process. That is,
with many aspects in the procedure to consider, it is easy to pinpoint problems with the
process. Consequently, different coalitions find different solutions to guaranteeing
security in the land transfer process.
Coalition A. For RCM proponents, security in the land transfer process can only
be achieved through irreversible, continuous possess of awarded lands. However, they
acknowledge that this state has not been achieved by CARP in the past two decades of its
implementation. That is why in the opening committee hearing for bill sponsorship on
November 21, 2007, RCM champion and Anakbayan Partylist Representative Hontiveros
briefly states this policy belief:
Sixth, equating installation to the actual, physical, peaceful and continuous possession of awarded
land, we, the government ensuring security and success (Anakbayan Partylist Representative Rep.
Ana Theresia Hontiveros-Baraquel, Committee Hearing 21-Nov-2007).
Moreover, the RCM champions also raised issue with cases of maliciously
nullifying CLOAs. Hence, Hontiveros proposed through HB 4077 a protection clause
rendering the CLOA indefeasible/irrevocable for a year upon receipt by the farmer
beneficiary, as will be discuss further in the next chapter:
Fourth, categorical declaration, the CLOAs, and other titles issued under any Agrarian Reform
Program shall be indfeasible one year form registration to avoid the delaying tactics by landowners.
So ung pong mga malalaking panginoong maylupa na pinakahumaharang sa pagpapatupdad ng
CARP sa paggamit ng mga legal technicalities at sila and pangunahing gumagawa ng karahasang
agraryo laban sa mga farmer beneficiaries nais tugunan nitong pagtaguyod ng mga CLOA, mga
titulo indefeasible after a certain period, reasonable period (Anakbayan Partylist Representatives
Ana Theresia "Risa" Hontiveros-Baraquel, Committee Hearing 21-Nov-2007).
Coalition B. On the contrary, landowners and their Congressional allies challenge
the RCM’s belief that security of the ARB installation process can only be achieved
through unequivocal physical land transfer, citing the many cases of CARP beneficiaries
who sell their awarded lands after being unable to make them productive. They argue that
security of the land transfer process for CARP beneficiaries can better be guaranteed/
safeguarded through a non-physical mode of distribution based on actual cases of land
selling/conversion and reversal of ownership while security for landowners can only be
granted by the proper and full payment of just compensation. This policy stance could be
inferred from the question Cebu Third District Representative Pablo Garcia directly
raised during a plenary deliberation on CARP on June 4, 2008:
Madam Speaker, the Sponsor stated that there were many studies but there are also many studies
that were done on the efficacy of land reform. And so, I believe that the issue of its efficacy, at best,
is unresolved and is a matter for further debate and consideration among Members of this House so
that they could come up with a more logical and informed decision. I would like to cite the study
done by the German-based institute, independent institute called the GTZ, which states that 26
percent of farmer beneficiaries nationwide sold their lands. Sixty-six percent of the agrarian reform
beneficiaries have not been given support services. The LandBank [sic] of the Philippines has not
given any crop loan to agrarian reform beneficiaries because many of them cannot even pay their
amortization on the purchase price of the land and neither was there enough funds to pay the
landowners. Mr. Sponsor, are these statements true? [emphasis added](Cebu Third District
Representative Pablo Garcia, Plenary Deliberations, 04-Jun-2008)
Coalition C. Members of the Bayan Muna coalition appear to mediate between
the two opposing beliefs of the RCM and landowner coalition by criticizing the entire
land transfer process that does not seem to guarantee secure property
rights/landownership to farmers and at the same time pay the full compensation to
landowners. In effect, the Bayan Muna coalition alludes to the inability of CARP to
assure secure property rights and just compensation, two components of social justice.
The complexity of the coalition’s policy stance is summarized in Bayan Muna Partylist
Representative Satur Ocampo’s statement at a public hearing for CARP on March 6,
2008:
Sa halip na 'yong farmer sa ilalim ng CARP ay nahihirapan na mabayaran 'yong lupa kaya maraming
pagkakataon hindi nila nakumpleto at nabawi sa kanila (Instead, farmers under CARP are struggling to
pay the awarded lands that’s why they could not complete the process and these lands are taken from
them)… it is the sovereign responsibility ng estado na ibalik sa kanila 'yong lupa, tulungan silang
paunlarin ang kanilang produksiyong (of the state to return the lands, help them boost their production)
through services. At 'yong mga mawawalan naman ng lupa, kung makatwiran ang kanilang pag-
acquire ng lupa, ay babayaran sila (Those whose lands were redistributed, if the acquisition process is
just, should be paid) under the principle of just compensation sa isang (through a) formula na may iba-
ibang aspeto rin (that takes into account different aspects). Pero 'yong mga ano naman 'yong tinatawag
na nakuha sa masamang paraan, mayroong provision dito na konpiskasyon... Social justice ang
namumuong principle dito (For those so-called lands acquired through unjust ways, there are provisions
on confiscation… Social justice remains the ruling principle here). Pangunahing (Primarily,) social
justice sa maliliit (for the small ones), pagkilala sa karapatan naman nung mga nag-acquire ng lupa na
(recognizing the rights of those who acquired the lands that are) well intended at legally and justly
(Bayan Muna Partylist Representative Satur Ocampo, Public Hearing 03-06-2008).
On Role of DAR and other implementing agencies. The criticism of the Bayan
Muna Coalition of the entire land transfer process of CARP leads to a larger question on
the credibility of the Department of Agrarian Reform and other implementing agencies to
achieve the policy goals of rectifying the skewed/inequitable ownership of lands in the
country, reducing poverty incidence among farmer beneficiaries, and developing the
agricultural sector through incentivizing productivity. This call for exacting
accountability and greater commitment from the DAR and implementing agencies was
eloquently made by the House Committee on Agrarian Reform Chair and Apayao Lone
District Representative Elias Bulut, Jr. during the opening hearing on November 21,
2007:
Most importantly, the sincerity of the program's implementors is very vital to render a positive
CARP scenario. The DAR has a bureaucracy that should show dedication to provide the
stakeholders with honest service and deliberate efforts to properly implement the program in
order to gain attention among the public and private sectors. Thus, paving the way to the influx of
tremendous support for the continuity of the program when Congress will have to seek proofs from
analysts to advocate to arbiter and even referee. But choices have to be made, wisdom of choices.
This is the challenge that confronts us all today… [emphasis added](House Committee on Agrarian
Reform Chair and Apayao Lone District Representative Elias Bulut, Jr., 21-Nov-2007).
Coalitions as well had similar calls for improved implementation but their line of
questioning or angle of accusations or allegations differ.
Coalition A. For the RCM, the DAR and other implementing agencies are clearly
responsible for the implementation problems that hinder CARP from achieving its policy
goals. Nonetheless, RCM champions such as Hontiveros acknowledge that these

implementation problems somehow instigate creative solutions from DAR and the rest of
the implementing agencies. At the opening session on November 21, 2007, she explains:
Third, resolution of implementation problems, such as issues on retention limits, standing crops and
installation of farmer beneficiaries. Sana magka-interest dito ang DAR dahil lagi silang nasa gitna
(We hope DAR takes interest in this because they are always in the middle). Itong mga
implementation problems, minsan nagiging bahagi ng problema, minsan naman, may mga kaso din
na nakakatulong talaga (These implementation problems, sometimes they become part of the
problem; other times, there are cases where in they inspire solutions). Gusto po namin lagyan ng
policy framework para sa pag-resolve nitong (We want to put a policy framework to resolve)
implementation problems [translation by author](Anakbayan Partylist Representative Ana Theresia
"Risa" Hontiveros-Baraquel, Committee Meeting 21-11-2007).
Coalition B. Landowners are more vocal and clearer in their accusations against
the questionable ways of implementing agencies. At the same opening session, Cebu
Third District Representative Pablo Garcia questions the legal basis and Constitutional
mandate of the compulsory acquisition of CARP lands by the DAR and in effect, implies
a constitutional violation by the DAR:
For example, this compulsory acquisition by the DAR, there is no legal or constitutional basis for
this. Under the Constitution and under the law, if the owner of the property does not want to sell his
land, then the government must institute expropriation proceedings under Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court. Not like now, when the DAR will forcibly, and even with the assistance of the military and
the police, install beneficiaries, at least beneficiaries, into the land (Cebu 3rd District Representative
Pablo Garcia, Committee Hearing 21-Nov-2007)
Coalition C. Like RCM advocates, members and allies of the Bayan Muna
coalition are also straightforward in ascribing the responsibility and burden of CARP
performance on to the DAR and implementing agencies. Frank Ribo, National President
of the Alliance for Rural Concerns Partylist, puts forth this policy stand at the second
committee hearing on December 5, 2007:
The present Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or R.A. 6657, promulgated in June 1988, may
not be the ideal law that we would have wished to have. Republic Act 6657 is even considered as a
compromise law that has accommodated clashing interest during the 8th Congress. And it will be the
performance and ableness [sic] of CARP implementers, particularly the Department of
Agrarian Reform and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, that would
spell failure or success of this piece of social justice legislation [emphasis added](Frank Roy
Ribo, National President, Alliance for Rural Concerns Partylist, Committee Hearing 05-Dec-2007)
On Agrarian Justice Delivery. Given the legal defects or procedural loopholes
of CARP, one implementation problem that commonly affects DAR and other
implementing agencies, landowners, and CARP beneficiaries is the swift judicial
resolution or credible adjudication of landownership disputes.
Coalition A. Members of the RCM coalitions are forthright in their complaints
about delays in the delivery of agrarian justice. At the second committee hearing on
November 21, 2007, Ricardo Reyes, a representative of the RCM member group Kilos-
AR, candidly describes the snail pace in resolving agrarian-related disputes.
Tapos ang sinabi nuong araw easy cases first, hard cases later. At katunayan yun pong mga, ano
tinatawag natin dito, yung mga problematic cases which amount to one millione hectares na walang
paliwanag, 'no, hanggang ngayon yung mga previous administrations ng DAR ay nabura na lang
duon sa target, 'no (Ricardo Reyes, Representative, Kilusan Para sa Pagsusulong ng Reformang
Agrario, Kilos-AR, Committee Hearing 05-Dec-2007).
Statements such as abovementioned had impelled RCM champions such as
Anakbayan Representative Risa Hontiveros, one of the main sponsors of the
consolidated CARP extension and reforms bill, to propose reform measures to
strengthen the Adjudication Board of DAR.
Coalition B. Delays in the expropriation of CARP lands through agrarian courts
effectively benefit the landowners by preventing landless farmer beneficiaries to take
legal hold of the awarded lands. However, landowners also find the slow justice system
as a source of insecurity in the CARP land transfer process, especially on the matter of
just compensation. Pangasinan Fifth District Representative and well-known landowning
legislator Marcos Cojuangco questioned the causes of delay in resolving agrarian cases
during the plenary debates on June 4, 2008:
In the expropriation of lands for land reform, I would like to compare it to the expropriation of lands
for right-of-way on our public highways. When we expropriate lands for public highways, and I
have experienced this personally because of the widening of the national highway in Urdaneta City,
napakadugo ho. The DPWH has to deposit the amount of money with the court before filing
expropriation. Only then can the DPWH enter and possess the land. Guaranteed payment must be
made first. In the case of land reform, expropriation of land for land reform, 10% cash is given and
then 10-year bonds for 90% of the balance. But yet there are reports that there are some landowners
that are not paid or are delayed in payment. Could I ask the Sponsor what forms of delays are these?
(Pangasinan 5th District Representative Marcos Cojuangco, Plenary Deliberations 04-Jun-2008).
Coalition C. Members of the Bayan Muna Coalition also attribute the delay in the
disposition of agrarian cases to the congestion caused by thousands of lawsuits involving
CARP’s faulty design of just compensation, a critical aspect that determines the speed of
the land transfer process. Thus, at a public hearing for CARP held on March 7, 2008,
Bayan Muna Partylist Representative Teodoro Casiño cited the correlation between a
complicated just compensation scheme and a slow pace of agrarian justice delivery, two
problematic yet fundamental components of CARP:
Almost 50,000 cases ang nasa (are lodged in) DAR at DARAB kasi marami sa mga magsasaka hindi
kayang bayaran, kahit na 30 years, hindi nila kayang bayaran yung lupa (because many among farmers
are unable to pay, even after 30 years, they could not pay. So, ang nangyayari, (what happens is) six
point seventy...six million ang na-distribute pero ang tanong, ilan dito 'yung bumalik sa mga landowner
(are distributed, but the question is how many of these were returned to landowners?) [translation by
author](Bayan Partylist Representative Teodoro Casiño, Public Hearing March 7, 2008)
These differences in policy beliefs have compelled the three coalitions to engage in
rigorous and often heated debates, which contributed to a constructive clarification on
longstanding divisive policy core issues and eventually led to a refinement of coalition members’
understanding of the state of CARP implementation and more importantly to agreements on
amending important provisions on the original CARP law (RA 6657). These debates showcase
how conflict in policy beliefs serves as an impetus to, if not an avenue for, learning from past
implementation or what Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1994) refer to as policy-oriented learning.

D. Policy Brokers
As Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1994) hypothesize, substantial differences in
several fundamental normative and policy core beliefs of advocacy coalitions are
mediated by a third group of actors not necessarily aligned with coalitions and whose
principal concern of finding some reasonable compromise that will reduce intense tension
among coalitions with conflicting strategies and beliefs. Their participation in
Congressional deliberations is instrumental in facilitating constructive debates that lead to
policy changes on CARP as reflected in CARPER. Congressional deliberations In the
14th Congress deliberations on CARP extension, all coalitions appear to have their own
policy brokers. For the Reform CARP Movement, these came in the guise of Albay 1st
District Representative Edcel Lagman, a known veteran in the land reform movement,
and Anakbayan Partylist Representative Risa Hontiveros. Both are co-sponsors of the bill
endorsed by the House Agrarian Reform Committee, HB 4077. For the landowner
coalition, Negros Oriental Third District Representative Pryde Henry Teves appears more
open to compromises and constructive suggestions. For the Bayan Muna Coalition, most
of the champions are open to dialogue. However, the one most engaged appears to be
Bayan Muna Partylist Representative Teodoro Casiño. All these brokers are identified
with the three major coalitions involved in the deliberations on the issue of CARP
extension and reforms. As such, they embody what Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith qualify as
“continuum” in the distinction between 'advocate' and 'broker', for most, if not all, of
them exhibit some policy bent, while others (especially landowning policy brokers) show
some serious concern with preserving the system. Nonetheless, there are also others who
do not show clear affiliations or association with any coalition. An example is

Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC) Partylist Representative who in a
statement given at the second committee hearing on December 5, 2007, attempted to
dissipate the tensions between pro- and anti-CARP extension camps:
And it is precisely for this purpose that we are, the Committee, is conducting a wide spectrum of
surveys on what we should do in the light of all these circumstances. You know, I would like… as a
lawyer, as a Member of Congress, I know, I don't… I know that laws have to be improved, there are
no perfect lawas, but the Chair would appreciate it probably, especially the other resource person, if
we can simmer down, you know. Kami ho ay nandito para tumulong sa problema, iyong... para
masakit lang konti iyong sinasabi po ng ating mga obispo no ano... (We are here to help solve the
problem…that… what the bishops are saying are somehow hurtful)…but this is what I felt, you
know. So, I hope that we would like to assure everybody, we are here to get conglomeration of all
the ideas to produce a wonderful piece of legislation that we can be all truly proud of as having
passed in the 14th Congress...
So, we would like to advise the Comsec to also get as many inputs as we can all over the country
from wide groups that represent the interest not only of the farmers but also of the landowners kasi
the landowners are equally entitled to the right in the same manner that the farmers will have the
rigth as we discuss this bill along the way [emphasis added](APEC Partylist Representative Edgar
Valdez, Committee Hearing 05-Dec-2007).
Like Representative Valdez, the aforementioned legislator display a number of specific
behavior indicators to qualify them as policy brokers. These include: (1) exhibiting
objectivity in evaluations, (2) openness to suggestions, (3) willingness to clarify, and (4)
willingness to compromise.
Table 4.5. Frequency of Observed Instances of Policy Brokering
Total Frequency of Exhibiting Openness to Willingness to Willingness to

Instances of Policy objectivity suggestions/correct clarify Compromise
Brokering ions
210 3 112 64
55
N/A 1% 26% 53% 30%
It is important to note that the frequency of observation of each behavioral
indicator does not necessarily equate to the total number of times policy brokering was
observed. This is so because in any instance of policy brokering, more than type of
specific indicator can be observed at the same time. Given this, it is interesting to note
that the most apparent manifestation of policy brokering is the willingness of policy
brokers to clarify certain issues and arrive at workable compromises. This finding is
important as it strongly suggests that this kind of policy brokering enabled legislators to
constructively agree and move forward in deciding to extend and substantially reform
CARP despite their opposing policy beliefs.
Given these elements of a policy subsystem, the next chapter explains how
advocacy coalitions on CARPER, the expression of their policy beliefs and the presence
of policy brokers have altogether enabled policy-oriented learning that leads to
substantial policy changes on the original CARP law. Yet, given the breadth and
complexity of policy issues on CARP, the next chapter will only discuss the most
relevant and most conflicted CARP policy core issues whose deliberations and
Congressional debates have resulted into concrete legislative amendments to the original
CARP (RA 6657) as incorporated in the latest CARP extension and reform law (RA
9700).
Chapter V
CARPER: An Example of Policy Change Through Policy-Oriented Learning
According Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1988 and 1994), policy change occurs
through a dual path of external perturbations outside and/or policy-oriented learning
within a policy subsystem. For the most part, government policies that undergo change
only after several decades are usually motivated by the latter, although certain external
shocks or events/circumstances provides a trigger that inspire/cause substantive policy
changes. This chapter specifically focuses on how policy-oriented learning as manifested
in clarification of conflicted policy core beliefs led to changes in the original CARP
policy as reflected in CARPER, the latest CARP extension and reform law.
A. Indicators of Policy Change in the Case of CARPER
Policy change is possible even with the consideration of new and enlightening
scientific information drawn from re-examining the existing policy (Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith, 1994). This occurs when policy actors decide to act from the accumulated learning
of past implementation or what Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1994) call policy-oriented
learning. Defined as the “relatively enduring alterations of thought or behavioral
intentions which result from experience and which are concerned with the attainment (or
revision) of policy objectives,” policy-oriented learning is demonstrated practically by
the modification of certain policy beliefs by coalition members participating in the
debates, out of recognizing the accurate assessment of the situation in light of new
scientific information, research findings/facts, or other forms of technical evaluations.
Given this, policy-oriented learning is manifested by two indicators: 1) the presence of
intermediate conflict that leads to refinement of understanding of pertinent policy issues

and 2) the presence of a professional forum where such constructive debates transpire.
Table 5.1. Frequency of Observations of Policy-Oriented Learning
Total Instances of Observations presence of conflicts (i.e. debates) Presence of Congress as a

of Policy-Oriented Learning that lead to professional forum (i.e.
clarifications/enlightenment committee wants to hear your
voice/opinion, we are here to
listen)
651 454 131
N/A 70% 20%
Note: The two indicators do not add up to the total frequency of observations of policy-oriented learning for a sampled statement can
contain indications of both the presence of conflicts and professional forum. These two sub-indicators are not mutually exclusive.
Of 922 sets of statements sampled, 651 reflect various extents of policy-oriented
learning. Most of these statements show conflicts between opposing coalitions on
fundamental ideas and competing policy beliefs. A few of these also demonstrate
professional norms that facilitated workable compromises over what could be contentious
exchanges.
A.1. Intermediate Conflict
The first indicator is further signified by more specific sub-indicators: (a) citation
of a point of conflict or disagreement usually phrased in a question form that starts a
discussion that leads to a clarification or some form of enlightenment, (b) recognition of a
flaw/defects/imperfections that raise (c) need for scientific information/ empirical
(reliable) studies and (d) the need to evaluate the performance (i.e. success/failure) of a
law in order to (e) manifestation of intent to improve the law. Among these indicators,
confrontation or contestations on a policy core issue comprises the most frequent
instances when policy-oriented learning is showcased (see Table 6.7). This is followed by
statements that indicate recognition of implementation problems or loopholes of the law,

which coalition members criticize and intend to correct. The last two most pronounced
indication of policy-oriented learning are found in statements that place heavy emphasis
on the role of scientific information or explicitly call for the need for accurate
data/statistics or empirical studies and statements that evaluate CARP performance as a
success or failure.
Table 5.2. Frequency of Observations of Indicators of Presence of Intermediate

Conflict
Need for/Heavy Emphasis
Performance/Success/Fail
presence of conflicts (i.e.
Law/Admission of faults
Intention to improve on
Instances of observing
information/Empirical
Problems/Loopholes,
debates) that lead to
implementation)
ure or Feedback
Implementation
Recognition of
enlightenment
Defects of the
clarifications/
Evaluation of
of Scientific
Mechanism
the law (or

Conflicts
Studies
454 417 328 169 169 117
N/A 92% 72% 37% 37% 26%
A.1.a. Conflict and Clarification.
A perfect example of an interpellation showcasing intermediate level of conflict
and misunderstanding that led to a useful clarification is the contention raised by Cebu
Third District Representative and known ally of landowners Pablo Garcia, who argued
that the Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 (RA 3844) is the truer and more
comprehensive basis of the Philippine agrarian reform programs than the CARP law (RA
6657):
I think the entire, you know, misunderstanding conflict here is that we focus our attention to
Republic Act 6657, the so-called Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. No! There is another law,
Republic Act 3844, the Agrarian Land Reform Code of 1963. Mr. Tadeo is very familiar with this,
and this law, Republic Act 3844 is more comprehensive than 6657. Republic Act 6657 contains only
about seventy-eight (78) Sections. Republic Act 3844 contains more than three hundred sixty (360)
Sections. In fact, your very office, the Department of Agrarian Reform was created under that law;
the Charter of the Land Bank is under that law and yet we are so focused to 6657 that we overlooked
the fact that there is another more comprehensive law. And that is why the attention of the DAR is
focused mainly on physical... in acquisition and distribution of lands (Committee Hearing, 21-Nov-
2007).
This argument incited many clarifications from RCM champions and CARPER bill
sponsors Edcel Lagman and Risa Hontiveros, and Constitutional Commissioner Jimmy
Tadeo himself that RA 3844 is not the true basis and is not as comprehensive as RA
6657. This clarification will be discussed in detail in the succeeding chapter on data
analysis.
A.1.b. Recognition of flaws/defects
The house deliberations on CARP extension and reforms in the 14th Congress are
full of admissions from both anti- and pro-CARP legislators that CARP is an important
yet flawed social justice program that needs improvement. One of the bluntest admissions
was done by no other than the RCM champion and principal sponsor of the House
CARPER bill himself Edcel Lagman who at a latter deliberation said, “Now, we are also
aware that there are certain loopholes in the program; there are some problems afflciting
the program. But the biggest loophole, the biggest problem is if we fail to extend
seasonably the land [distribution]” [emphasis added](Plenary Deliberation, 23-Apr-
2008). More admissions, either subtle and implicit or voluntary and explicit, will be
discussed in the data analysis chapter.
A.1.c. Need for Scientific Information
As Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1994) explains through their Advocacy Coalition
Framework theory, contentious debates and instances of misunderstanding between

members/policymakers from competing coalitions typically require hard data or rigorous
statistics to strengthen or foolproof their arguments. It is the same in the 14th Congress
house deliberations on CARPER. A perfect example is shown in the discussion of the
controversial cases of conversions, mortgaging, or selling of CARP lands, practices
supposedly prohibited by the original CARP law (RA 6657). To argue for their case,
legislators and farmer organization representatives from competing or opposing
coalitions utilize disputed facts. Naturally, those who support CARP cite lower cases of
land conversion, mortgaging, or selling while those who oppose it provide higher
numbers. This discrepancy in facts is further discussed in the next chapter on data
analysis.
A.1.d. Evaluation of CARP performance
Most often than not, empirical studies and statistics are used by legislators,
policymakers, and members of participating coalitions to evaluate the accuracy of claims,
soundness of logic, and the credibility of arguments used in deliberations. This is
precisely what occurred in the 14th Congress house deliberations on CARP. Landowners
and the pro-AR but anti-CARP (i.e. Bayan Muna) coalition tend to assess CARP as a
failure or question claims of its successes:
Yes, I have no qualms about that because twenty years have gone by and the program has been
implemented. Unfortunately, fortunately or unfortunately, there seems to be a failure because we are
extending the law. Don't you think that by extending the law, it means the law was a failure?
[emphasis added](Cavite Third District Representative Jesus Crispin Remulla, Plenary Deliberation,
26-May-2008)
Following your statement about loopholes and imperfections, the Gentleman adduced that despite
the flawed implementation, the CARL has been a major instrument that seeks to correct the highly-
skewed [sic] distribution of landownership in the country which principally contribute to the
persistence of poverty in the countryside, and second, hinders sustainable rural development. I take
very close attention to the fact that you used a "a major instrument that seeks to correct the highly-
skewed [sic] distribution of landownership." But it is not a catergorical statement that it has
succeeded to that. Am I correct in that observation? (Bayan Muna Partylist Representative Satur
Ocampo, Plenary Deliberation 30-Apr-2008).
On the other hand, CARP supporters and proponents of its extension tend to downplay
this assessment, focusing instead on certain successes of CARP:
agrarian reform either call for the junking of CARP altogether, or the delay in its further
from unqualified fact. Various comprehensive studies have stablished empirical data that CARP,
beneficiaries. This is a fact, Mr. Speaker, that our farmer-friends in the Reform CARP Movement, a
broad coalition of more than 30 national and local farmer's organization and the NGO's, some of
whom are in the gallery today, are more than willing to attest to.Akbayan Partylist Representative
Ana Theresia "Risa" Hontiveros-Baraquel, Plenary Deliberation 30-Apr-2008)
More specific evaluations of CARP in the context of major, specific policy core issues
will be discussed in the data analysis chapter.
A.1.e. Intent to improve the law
Following admissions of defects/loopholes and evaluations of CARP
performance, legislators typically state their policy stand. In this case, those supportive of
CARP usually express intention to improve on the defects of the original CARP law
through general statements or specific proposals. This is apparent especially among
policy brokers or legislators who seek to reduce tension in deliberations and reach
workable comprises. Lagman’s statement at a plenary deliberation exemplifies this
behavioral tendency:
Distinguished Gentleman from Cavite, as I have said earlier, there are so many imperfections in
the program and some agrarian reforms beneficiaries are not perfect. So, some of them, most
probably, mortgaged or sold to enterprising businessmen or former landlords or landlords, the land
they have acquired under the program. But, most probably, in order to solve this temptation to
alienate or encumber these precious farmlands is to increase the support services coming from
the government so that production, post-harvest facilities, marketing activities could be funded
from these support services including rural credit. So, this bill would include a component of
increasing the support services from the present 25% to 40%. In that way, we would be able to really
support the agrarian reform beneficiary in terms of varied aspects of support services [emphasis
added](Plenary Deliberation, 14-May-2008).
A.2. Professional norms
As warranted by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1994), policy-oriented learning may
be facilitated by a forum governed by professional norms that are conducive for
diplomatic exchanges of ideas and even civil confrontation on significant policy issues.
In the case of house deliberations on CARP extension and reforms, the different stages of
Congressional deliberations from the committee hearings to public hearings, plenary
debates, and finally the Bicameral Conference Committee all serve as this avenue where
contentious policy core issues are resolved and amendment proposals are evaluated and
consequently approved or rejected. Given this, the second indicator is manifested by the
(a) recognition of Congress as an avenue for representation and inclusion of opinion or
the need to for wider consultation, (b) adherence to democratic procedures of Congress
and (c) enforcement of mild or non-offensive language, as clearest indication of
professional norms of debates or engaging in dialogues, especially between opponents
with high tension. Among these indicators, the acknowledgment of Congress as a
democratic and inclusive institution that allows wider representation of CARP
stakeholders and their pleas comprise most of statements that showcase the facilitative
role of professional norms to policy-oriented learning. This is followed by statements
showing how legislators uphold democratic interaction by upholding or maintaining
institutional procedures or traditions embedded or established in the legislative branch.
The last but most conspicuously important indicator of the presence of professional
norms is the enforcement of rules that compel participants to respect divergent opinions.
These indicators are typically shown in the statements of policy brokers who mediate
between opponents during heated debates or facilitate compromises between competing
coalitions.
Table 5.3. Frequency of Observations of Indicators of Presence of Professional

Forum
Recognition of Congress
observe/preserve/uphold
inclusiveness of opinion
presence of professional
democratic procedures
Instances of observing
Respecting opinion
Insistence/intent to
representation and
as an avenue for
norms
454 104 40 14
N/A 23% 9% 3%
A.2.a. Congress as an Avenue for Representation
According to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, policy-oriented learning is most likely
to occur when there exists a forum which is prestigious enough to force professionals
from different coalitions to participate and hence are dominated by professional norms.
The House of Representatives is the Lower Chamber of the legislative branch of the
Philippine Government. Like any other parliamentary bodies, this is seen as one of the
highest representative bodies whose members are by law or tradition expected to serve as
the conduit or channel for the plight of the governed, i.e. constituents. In this case, the
constituents are CARPER beneficiaries and landowners affected by CARP. Hence, the
House of Representatives has the default obligation to serve as that representative body
where these policy actors/stakeholders can voice out their concerns. Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith (1994) finds in their decades of research on policy change that the more open a
policymaking body such as the House of Representatives is to expert/scientific

assessments of policies, the more likely policy learning takes place and ultimately policy
change occurs. In the study, the inclusiveness of Congressional deliberations is at least
shown by the extent, reach, and number of public hearings or consultative meetings held
by the 14th Congress, which accommodated a variety of speakers/participants (presented
in the previous chapter). Six hearings were held by the House Committee on Agrarian
Reform to gather the different perspectives and positions of policy actors on CARP
before submitting a consolidated bill for interpellation to the entire House of
Representatives. Out of the six hearings held by the House Committee on Agrarian
Reform, over a hundred stakeholder participants hail from different non-government and
civil society organizations. The openness of Congress as a democratic institution is also
shown/suggested by the fact that two of these hearings were done in public venues: one
in a gym in Davao City to accommodate views from stakeholders in Mindanao and the
other in North Luzon to gather the sentiments and views of stakeholders in the Rice Bowl
region and other agriculturally rich regions of Luzon. For legislators and policymakers
themselves, the number of hearings proportionally reflective of the openness or
inclusiveness of Congress as a democratic institution:
You referred to that fact that the discussion of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform underwent a
democratic process. And by that I assume the marathon public hearings and the committee and the
committee meetings alone, which also has been done here and the floor deliberations, including the
debates and the voting on issues (Bayan Muna Partylist Representative, Satur Ocampo, Plenary
Deliberation, 30-Apr-2008).
The openness and inclusiveness of Congress as an avenue for dialogue on
CARPER was further discussed as an issue when legislators disagreed on whether to
conduct more hearings. Landowners and other stakeholders who oppose CARP or
skeptical of its continuation insisted on conducting more hearings on grounds that the
number of new and uninformed Congressmen has increased since the 8th Congress that
enacted the first CARP law:
Yes, I appreciate the information that there were public hearings conducted in the 13th Congress.
However, we are the 14th Congress. Most of us were not in the 14th Congress. The records will show
that there are more than 100, 110 neophyte Congressmen or returning Congressmen from 1987 to
1992. So that to give us an opportunity to ehar all sides of the issue, I believe that we need to
conduct public hearing in these areas which the Committee will later on decide. If, there is a saying
which says, if Mohammad cannot go to the mountain, then the mountain must go to Mohammad
(Committee Hearing, 05-Dec-2007).
On the other hand, members of the RCM coalition who participated in initiatives
to pass a CARP extension law in the previous Congresses argue that the House of
Representatives has cumulatively gathered enough information to decide on the extension
of CARP:
Precisely, Mr. Chairman, the mountain are coming to Mohammad. They are outside the gates of
Congress. And I respect the point raised by the good Gentleman from Cebu. Certainly more than a
hundred is a significant proportion of our numbers, we colleagues in the lower House. And I'm not
trying to be mathematical alone, kasi kung (because if) mathematical lang (only), eh, di mas
maramin iyong higit... isang daan at limampu na hindi (then more than 150 are not) first termers.
But I respect that each Member of the House brings a particular experience and wisdom to our
processes (Akbayan Representative Ana Theresia "Risa" Hontiveros-Baraquel, 5-Dec-2007)
In instances when accusations of one coalition on the unfair representation in Congress
becomes highly tense among competing coalitions, more neutral parties (i.e. policy
brokers) either made the same appeal for more expansive consultations to
accommodate more views and evaluations on CARP or assure the other stakeholders
that sufficient time has been allotted for hearings:
We would like to advise the Comsec to also get as many inputs as we can all over the country from
wide groups that represent the interest not only of the farmers but also of the landowners kasi
(because) the landowners are equally entitled to the right in the same manner that the farmers will
have the right as we discuss this bill along the way (Rep Edgar Valdez, Committee Hearing, 05-Dec-
2007).
Well, Your Honor, there are always alternative proposals if the distinguished Gentleman from
Bayan Muna would recall my sponsorship speech, I said that some farmer organizations 20 years
ago were pushing for an alternative CARP, different from House Bill No. 400. And now, the
distinguished Gentleman and some of his colleagues in Bayan Muna are pushing for another
alternative CARP which they have denominated as the genuine CARP. But we have conducted a
process. The Committee on Agrarian Reform went to different regions and in all of these public
meetings, there was unanimity in the endorsement of the extension bill. In the committee itself this
was also approved and the committee decided that the bill of Bayan Muna and the other reform
measures will have to be considered at a separate setting so that we will first give priority to a
simple extension bill (Albay 1st District Edcel Lagman, Plenary Deliberation 30-Apr-2008).
Thus, among the three indicators, the explicit and common acknowledgment of
legislators and coalition representatives that Congress as a democratic institution that
needs to maintain or improve its inclusiveness of different perspectives on CARP
strongly suggests that the policy issues of CARP, especially those left unresolved after
twenty years or so of implementation, have matured to the point that all stakeholders
could no longer accept the status quo. Given this, advocacy coalitions display the
willingness or intent to reform the program, starting with the so-called defective
provisions of the law. This transient unity among competing coalitions to finally change
the state of CARP implementation was shown at one plenary deliberation where Bayan
Muna Partylist Representative Crispin Beltran from the Bayan Muna Coalition and
Negros Occidental Sixth District Representative Ignacio “Iggy” Arroyo agreed to extend
the period and locations of conducting hearings. Beltran poignantly cited the peaceful
protest of the Sumilao farmers who marched 1,700 miles from Bukidnon to Metro Manila
to illustrate the need to hold public hearings outside Congress while Arroyo repeated
Beltran’s call to “…go to all the places that will be affected like Sumilao, Negros
Occidental, Bukidnon, Batangas… and let us listen to everyone concerned to enact a
good, strong law so that our people will benefit” (Plenary Deliberation 30-Apr-2008).
A.2.b. Institutional Procedures
These procedures refer to processes, rules, protocols, customs, or traditions
implemented in parliaments for the sake of establishing an orderly conduct of business.
These procedures complement the first indicator in that they are specific codes of
behavior to establish a fair and systematic process of decisionmaking for large
policymaking bodies such as the House of Representatives. In the study, these refer to the
procedures on voting, submitting policy papers and important documents, extending
invites to hearings, and observing the 3-minute speech rule to allow all participating
stakeholders to express their views, insights, perspectives, and evaluations of CARP.
Compliance to these institutional rules/procedures are customarily enforced by presiding
officers such as the House Agrarian Reform Committee Chair Lone District of Apayao
Representative Elias Bulut:
Before we recognize other members to respond, there are some guests here, resource speakers on this
meeting, I would like to give them a chance also to exchange views with regards to this discussions, but
the Chair would like to remind the resource speakers to limit to three minutes because it is already
four o'clock and I am giving you three minutes to enlighten us also. The members who were not able to
air their sentiments, we would like you to submit your position paper to the Committee [emphasis
added](Committee Hearing, 21-Nov-2007).
The importance of observing institutional protocols extends to implications on the
inclusiveness and openness of the House of Representatives. This was highlighted when a
landowner representative and a known landowner-allied Congressman raised issue with
an observation that Congressional invites to hearings seem to evade landowners. The
landowner representative suggested inviting a variety of landowner organizations to
separate hearings:
In all of these consultations and meetings, whether in Manila or in the provinces, never has [sic] the
landowners been invited separately, not even the DAR. And I'm a part of DAR because I'm a
member of the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council.
What I'm suggesting, Mr. Chairman, is that you call for a separate meeting with the
landowners as well. Perhaps, you can enlighten them. But if we will consider them as the enemy,
how can you get more lands? But that is.. You know, we have been invited one time, only one time,
given one day notice in a meeting in the province about three Congresses ago. Very few showed up
because they were afraid to be lynched. That is the reality. The landowners are so few, so many are
the desirous farmer beneficiaries [emphasis added](Eduard Hernandez, PARC Landowner
Representative, 5-Dec-2007).
A similar call was made by a presidential relative and political scion from a known
landed clan Negros Occidental Sixth District Representative Iggy Arroyo during the
opening session of the House Committee on Agrarian Reform on November 21, 2007:
First of all, I would like to commend the authors for wanting to extend the CARP law and inasmuch as
I agree with the authors, maybe the extension, if there is going to be an extension, we should have
more due consultation with the different NGOs. And in fact, I noticed there is only one landowner
representative here, you know.
The landowners are composed of different organizations and the bigger ones, like, I'm talking about
the CONFED, and all the other organizations. Maybe we should consult and contact some hearings
and find out what they want. And I also agree with Congressman Beltran that, maybe that, I think if I
am right, he mentioned that we would have a review on this, 'no, more review so that we can draft a
better and more feasible agrarian reform law (Committee Hearing, 21-Nov-2007),
A.2.c. Respecting Opinions
Other rules pertain to prohibitions that are not necessarily formally established but
are nonetheless enforced with the intention to preserve the civility or diplomacy or
institutional environment/atmosphere conducive for deliberating on contentious issues. In
the study, a clear example of this is the reminder given by House Agrarian Reform
Committee Chair Elias Bulut to Jimmy Tadeo, the Constitutional Commissioner who use
mild or non-offensive language in expressing views or issuing clarifications:
With due indulgence, Ka Jimmy, gamitin lang ho natin yung magandang lingguahe para ho hindi
naman nakakahiya sa miyembro ng Kumite
Let’s use mild language so it won’t be offensive to the members of the Committee [translation by
author](Committee Hearing, 21-Nov-2007).
Another example is the appeal made by Pangasinan First District Representative Arthur
Celeste to fellow legislators and other advocacy coalition members participating in the
deliberations to respect opinions, however different they may be:
Ang ating mga opinion may kontra may hindi, hihingin na lang po ng inyong lingkod, ng Komite na
i-respeto na lang po sana natin ang bawat opinion ng mga nandirito ngayon
Our opinion have opponents and supporters, Yours Truly and the Committee request that we respect
the respective opinions of those who are here today.[translation by author](Public Hearing 07-Mar-
2008)
Although prohibitions on offensive language is the norm seldom mentioned
explicitly in the statements of participating legislators, it may still be the clearest
indication of professional norms of debates or engaging in dialogues, especially between

opponents with high tension. This indicator operationalizes the definition of policy
brokers as “a third group of actors, whose principal concern is to find some reasonable
compromise which will reduce intense conflict” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1994, p.
182). In fact, this prohibition/norm became useful or was put to good use when Jimmy
Tadeo clarified the rights of landless tillers to qualify as legitimate beneficiaries of CARP
lands regardless of location, that is, regardless if the tiller is tilling the land being
awarded or another CARP land. Desperate to defend his name that was cited in vain by
the landowning legislator Pablo Garcia, Tadeo started using strong language that
prompted House Agrarian Reform Committee Chair Bulut to remind him to use mild and
diplomatic language. With such reminder, Tadeo was able to explain objectively and
properly that farmworkers other than the tiller of the land being distributed are also
qualified/legitimate beneficiaries. Such clarification in turn aided in enacting a policy
change of clarifying the order of priority among different types of farm workers as
qualified CARP land beneficiaries. In other words, this so-called informal norm serves a
facilitative function/purpose, specifically in permitting policy-oriented learning to
transpire amidst a tense/contentious environment/atmosphere.
Overall, these two indicators of policy-oriented learning and their sub-indicators
are not discrete but are rather interrelated. So, in the analysis (in the succeeding section)
of interaction among conflicting policy beliefs, these indicators may be presented in a
continuous flow and each policy belief/issue segment may include a discussion of, not all
but, one or more of these indicators.

B. Test Cases on Policy Change through Policy-Oriented Learning
As data shows, these two indicators and sub-indicators of policy-oriented learning
were manifested clearly in the four most discussed and conflicted policy core issues on
CARP: 1) Coverage, 2) Security of Installation of ARBs/Land Transfer Process, 3)
Support Services, and 4) Role of DAR and other Implementing Agencies. The concrete
amendments to the original CARP law provisions (RA 6657) as reflected in the CARPER
law (RA9700) on these four policy core issues on CARP and the deliberations behind
them offer the most compelling evidence of policy change through policy-oriented
learning.
In the first place, the fact that the first extension merely extends CARP and
augments its funding and concrete changes to provisions on original CARP law (RA
6657) took place in the second extension law (i.e. RA 9700 or the CARPER law)
operationalizes the first assumption of Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1994) that it takes 20
years or so for policy change to occur as it takes that long for policy-oriented learning to
accumulate and produce such policy change. As such, the CARPER law—and the
provisional amendments therein—provides the most appropriate test case for the
Advocacy Coalition Framework. Conversely, the Advocacy Coalition Framework offers
the most suitable theoretical tool to explain the policy changes on CARP as incorporated
in the CARPER law.
Moreover, the passage of R.A. 9700 or otherwise known as the CARP Extension
with Reforms (CARPER) law also operationalizes another hypothesis of Sabatier and
Jenkins-Smith (1994) that policy change can be facilitated by the complex multi-level
structure of policy beliefs. On the normative core aspect, all coalitions appear to agree
that social justice is an important yet elusive ideal or a common good that the State
should continue to pursue for the well-being of its citizens/beneficiaries. More
importantly, all of the coalitions apparently and explicitly recognize the shortcomings of
CARP as a social justice program and this failure precisely justifies the continued
demand for extending and reforming, or at least re-examining CARP. As the Chair of the
House of Agrarian Reform Committee Elias Bulut, Jr. puts it,
According to the data gathered by various groups, it is clear that CARP is not fully completed and
the continuation of the program will attain its unfinished goals in accordance with the
Constitution, it is our responsibility to promote Comprehensive Rural Development and Agrarian
Reform. This is the very reason why the Committee on Agrarian Reform have considered the
CARP extension bills as our priority agenda in the 14th Congress. Considered as a social justice
and poverty alleviation program, CARP was hailed as a centerpiece agenda for development and
still continuous to be a potent instrument towards rural growth. Hence it is vital and significant to
study and assess its impact, with that we can examine and formulate recommendations if the
program needs to be extended for a year more [emphasis added](House Agrarian Reform Committee
Chair and Apayao Lone District Rep. Elias C. Bulut, Jr., Public Hearing 07-Mar-2008).
For the RCM, HB 4077 (i.e. consolidated template bill of RA 9700) sponsor Edcel
Lagman aptly encapsulates this admission of CARP’s faulty implementation and in one
of the many plenary deliberations:
Well, there is no perfect law, Madam Speaker, distinguished Gentleman. It is a truism that we do
not pass here in Congress perfect laws. That is why no law is irrepealable because it is subject to
amendments, modifications, or even scrapping. But the mere fact that its implementation is
not perfect, does not detract from the constitutional mandate that we will have to undertake
an agrarian reform program and we will have to distribute justify all agricultural lands. That
is the mandate of the Constitution and we will have to bow to that mandate [emphasis added](Albay
1st District Representative Edcel Lagman, Plenary Deliberations 14-May-2008).
Even the Congressional allies of landowners or the landowner bloc acknowledges
the reality of continuing demand for CARP pending the achievement of its social justice
mandate:
…The bills filed are for the extension of the funding because CARP will always be with us for
as long as the Constitution is with us. It is mandated in Section 4 of Article XIII of the
Constitution, the state shall by law undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of the
farmers and regular farm workers who are landless to own directly or indirectly or collectively the
lands they till, and so, the other farm workers to receive a just share of the fruits of the land
[emphasis added](Cebu Third District Representative Pablo Garcia, Plenary Deliberations 23-Apr-
2008).
Eduardo Hernandez, a landowner representative at the Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council (PARC), provides a specific diagnosis of the failure of CARP to accomplish the
constitutional mandate of social justice:
Whether or not PARC should be extended will depend on whether or not it has accomplished in the past
34 years or 38 years the purposes that is stated in the law itself as well as in the Constitution. The
Constitution as well as the 6657 states that there are 3 basic purposes of the CARP Law--number one,
alleviation of poverty; number two, increase in productivity; and number three, encourage landowner
investment in the rural areas. If the purpose of land reform is solely the distribution of land, if that is the
only purpose of land reform, then certainly, it has succeeded magnificently because to date, the
Agrarian Reform Department has already distributed more than 6.5 million hectares to more than 4
million farmer-beneficiaries. As far as land distribution is concerned, no question about success. But if
we are to determine on whether or not they... this distribution alleviated poverty, has increased the
productivity, has encouraged landowners to invest in the rural areas, it has not succeeded. It is a failure.
But we cannot completely blame the farmer-beneficiaries for the following reasons: Number one,
there has been a lack of support services. Number two, there is no direct loan, there is no credit that
is given to the farmer-beneficiaries. He is on his own. How can he produce a crop? He has to go to a
[sic] five-six lenders. [emphasis added](Mr. Eduardo F. Hernandez (PARC Landowner Representative,
Committ Hearing 05-Dec-2007).
The Bayan Muna coalition also heeds the criticisms on the failures of CARP as a social
justice program but, unlike the other two coalitions, uses this observation to argue for establishing
a different or new agrarian reform law:
Yes, I asked that because the main argument of the farmers' organizations that are rejecting the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, as it has been so crafted and implemented, is that
is has failed to achieve its purpose. And so we may disagree--the Gentleman and I may disagree on
how to look at the situation but there is a reading of those who are proposing an alternative law
that all past agrarian reforms have failed because they were designed, not, as was pointed out,
a social justice program, but more so as a program to protect the property rights of feudal
landowners through provisions on just compensation, exclusion, exemption and retention and
I think these are the crux or the criticism of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law--that
the CARP unfortunately inherited this skewed concept of social justice and other array of measures
that further protected the landed interest and deferred the distribution to landless tenants as
envisioned or provided in the Constitution. Is that right? (Bayan Muna Partylist Representative Satur
Ocampo, Plenary Deliberations, 30-Apr-2008)
Anyway, ang…kami…'yung mga authors po ng House Bill 3059 ang tingin namin, walang problema na
kailangan talaga ng ating bansa ng land reform. Lahat nag-agree diyan. Kailangan magkaroon ng
reporma sa lupa pero ang tingin namin, 'yung kasalukuyang batas, eh, hindi sapat. In fact, 'yung
kasalukuyang batas, depektibo, at 'yung kasalukuyang batas, maraming nagsasabi, isa itong peke na
batas sa repormang agraryo at kailangan itong baguhin, kailangan palitan totally. Dahil ano ba 'yung
land reform? Kung i-summarize natin ang definition, ito 'yung pag-distribute ng lupa para ang lupa ay
mapunta sa pag-a-ari at kontrol ng mga magsasaka para gawin niyang produktibo at umangat ang
kanyang buhay. Ibig sabihin, ang esensiya, ang puso ng repormang agraryo, ibigay mo 'yung lupa sa
mga magsasaka para siya ay maging may-ari ng lupa at siya ay may kontrol ng lupa. So, iba pa 'yung
ikaw may-ari, iba pa 'yung ikaw ang may kontrol kase sa experience natin ngayon, maraming mga lupa
nasa pag-aari ng magsasaka pero ang kontrol nasa buyer, sa trader. Ang kontrol nasa kumpanya na
nagko-kontrata. Ang kontrol nasa mga biyahero. Ang kontrol mas...nasa mga usorero. So, 'pag sinabi
nating pag-a-ari at kontrol, ito dapat pareho ay kasama na makuha ng mga magsasaka, na sa tingin
namin, to a large extent, 'yung kasulukuyang batas, nakatali sa distribusyon
Anyway, we, the authors of House Bill 3059, agree that the country needs land reform. Everyone
agrees to that. We need land reform but we think the current law is insufficient. In fact, the
current law is defective and many say it is an inauthentic law on agrarian reform and it needs to
be revised or replaced totally. Because what defines land reform? If we summarize the definition, it
refers to distribution of the ownership and control of land to farmers in order for farmers to make the
land productive and use them to improve his lot. Meaning, the essence, the heart of agrarian reform is
distributing land ownership and control to farmers. It’s different when you own the land and when you
have control over it, as current experience shows, many lands are owned by farmers but the control rests
on the buyer, trader. The control lies with the contracting company. The control is with the marketers.
The contro is… with the lender. So when we say ownership and control, this should be both given to the
farmers. We think, to a large extent, the current law is tied only to distribution. [Translation by
author](Bayan Muna Partylist Representative Teodoro A Casiño, Public Hearing 07-Mar-2008).
Casiño’s statement aptly captures how the complexity of the policy belief structure
enabled CARP stakeholders from divergent coalitions or views to agree to consider the
probability of extending and reforming CARP. This consideration starts with re-
examining and re-evaluating the state of CARP implementation. Hence, notwithstanding
the divergent stands of coalitions on the issue of CARP extension, the failure of CARP to
fulfill the Constitutional mandate of dispensing social justice and effecting welfare
improvement of its beneficiaries becomes the binding factor that compelled all
stakeholders to coalesce into groups with the same policy beliefs and forced these
coalitions to place renewed attention and effort to re-examine the state of CARP
implementation by participating in a democratic forum (i.e. Congressional hearings)
where their members engaged in a contentious yet constructive dialogue that tested the
soundness of their respective policy beliefs, clarify the differences between them, refine
their fundamental understanding of policy issues, and eventually or when necessary,

reconfigure and amend their policy beliefs in light of newer and more accurate scientific
information. This intensive process of debating on policy beliefs precisely led coalitions
to come to a state of clarification and refinement of understanding that facilitated the
decision to extend and substantially reform CARP.
The 14 policy core issues earlier presented became the battleground for these
opposing coalitions and their competing beliefs. Yet, only a few emerge as fundamentally
critical to warrant concrete amendments in the CARP law. Their relative importance is
partly reflected in the exact provisions amended by the second CARP Extension law, i.e.
RA 9700. These amendments reflect the mutual intention, concerted efforts, and lengthy
debates as well of legislators from opposing advocacy coalitions to improve the law in
concrete terms, as shown in the discussion of the following four test cases on CARP
policy changes.
B.1. Coverage
One of the most obvious changes in policy is coverage. As earlier discussed, the
comprehensive coverage of CARP has generated initial opposition, particularly from
aquaculture/prawn farms and livestock farms. In fact, this opposition escalated into a
Supreme Court case whose ruling laid the foundation for a subsequent CARP amendment
law that exempted livestock, poultry, and fishery. Years after the exemption was granted
favorably by a Supreme Court decision and instituted formally through an amendment
law to RA 6657 (R.A. 7881), the same sentiment could still be heard from the same
constituent organization of fishermen:
Ang Pamalakaya Pilipinas ay isang pambansang organisasyon ng mga malilitt na mangingisda at

ito ay may 43 pang probinsiyang balangay at may 7 rehiyon sa Luzon, Visayas, at Mindanao.
(The National Federation of Fisherfolk Organizations of the Philippines is a national organization of
small fishermen and covers 43 provinces and 7 regions in Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao)
Ang Pamalakaya ay naninindigan na tumututol sa ano pa mang plano ng pagpapalawig pa ng isang

huwad at maka-panginoong may lupa at hindi maka-magsasaka at maka-mangingisda na
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. (The Organization stand by our opposition to any plans
of extending an inauthentic, landowner-leaning, and anti-farmer and –fisherfolk Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program.)
Sa katanuyan po sa loob nga halos dalawampung taon ng implemenstasyon ng Comprehensive

Agrarian Reform Program ay nananatili sa pito sa bawat sampung mga magsasaka ang walang
lupa. At higit sa lahat ay dagdag diyan yung sa bahagi, ano, ng mga mangingisda ay talagang
walang pakinabang sa isang bugos na Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program na ito. Dahil
unang-una, nuong 1990 and Supreme Court decision duon sa Luz Farm versus DAR ay exempted
yung mga tulad ng aquaculture farm at saka iba't iba pang mga commercial farm dito sa
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. At dagdag pa dito noong 1997 ay yung panibago na
Republic Act 7881 na tuluyan ng in-exempt sa ilallim ng Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
ang mga prawn farm at iba pang aquaculture at iba pang mga pang commercial na mga kagamitan
ng mga lupa at pangisdaan dito sa ating bansa (In fact, in the twenty years of implementing the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, 7 out of 10 farmers remain landless. Besides this, the
fisherfolk have not benefitted from such a fake Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Because
in the first place, in 1990, the Supreme Court decided on the Luz Farm versus DAR case to exempt
lands such as aquaculture farm and other commercial farm under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program. In addition, in 1997, a new law Republic Act 7881 formally exempted the prawn
farm, other aquaculture [farm], and other commercial farms in the country from the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program) Mr. Fernando Hicap (Representative, Pamalakaya Pilipinas)
However, members of the Bayan Muna coalition—and later on, the RCM—raised
concerns that such exemption has reduced the scope of CARP as originally envisioned.
Thus, data gathered show that almost all policy actors/stakeholders participating in
discussions on CARP coverage commonly believe that provisions on CARP coverage
must be reformed. Although the issue of coverage only constitutes a meager portion of
the entire 14th Congressional deliberations on CARP, almost half of statements relating to
coverage issues tackled varioius forms of exemptions that served as avenues for
circumventing CARP coverage. Of the total frequence of observations of the policy issue
on coverage (shown in the table 7.1. below), almost all explicitly called for or implied the
need to review current CARP coverage that apparently granted many exemptions prone
to abuse and circumvention of the CARP mandate. Rightly so, this clamor was reflected
in the many CARP law sections that were amended.

Table 5.4. Frequency of Observations of Policy Core Issue on Coverage
Coconut
(scope, retention limits,

military bases, public
Prawn Farms, schools,
Need to review/re-visit
Plantations,
Need to retain current

lands
current CARP coverage

and
CARP coverage (scope

on
Lands, Banana and
ARBs, and exemptions)
and retention limits)

Coverage (Scope
Retention Limit)
purpose areas)
(Sugarlands,
Exemption
productive
Rubber
128 59 118 14
100% 46% 92% 11%
Hence, during various stages of the Congressional deliberations, Bayan Muna
coalition champions were outspoken in reciting cases of evasion or circumvention of
CARP coverage were candidly raised and stating proposals to re-include these
exemptions in the coverage. One of these outspoken champions is Bayan Muna Partylist
Representative Satur Ocampo:
And then noong pumasok may… hindi pa naman nangangalahati doon sa walong … sampung
taon ng implementasyon (implementation), nagkaroon ng mga amendatory bills. In-exempt 'yung
mga lupang tinatamnan. 'Yung definition po ng agricultural land na naging limitado, 'yung lahat
ng hindi tinatamnan ng anumang matitigas, bigas ahh ... palay, mais, o mga vegeta... o prutas ay
exempted. Ganoon din po, na-exempt 'yung mga sa livestock, 'yung sa mga palaisdaan, etcetera.
So kung ... sa mahabang panahon kumitid ng kumitid 'yung kabuuang lupa na naku-cover ng
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program kung kaya 'yung pakay na talagang buwagin 'yung
concentration na hindi nakamit (And then when…half way through the implementation,
amendatory bills were enacted. Productive agricultural lands were exempted. The definition of
agricultural lands were limited, those not planted with rice, wheat, corn or vegetables… or fruits
are exempted. All the same, livestock was exempted, those fisheries, etcetera. So if… in the long
run, the entire land covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program got narrower and
narrower so that the goal of dissipating the concentration [of lands] was not achieved…[translation
by author][emphasis added](Bayan Muna Partylist Rep. Satur Ocampo, Public Hearing 06-Mar-
2008).
In the same hearing, Ocampo relates the question of coverage to the question of
appropriate length of the extension period, arguing that reduced coverage of CARP
means lesser number of years of extension:

Eh, eto nga po'y malaon ko ng tanong sa DAR noon pong mga budget hearings sa committee level
at saka sa plenary session. Kung marami ng lupa ang sadyang naitakas, naiiwas, sa...sa...sa...
(inaudible) o saklaw ng CARP bago pa mag-took effect ito at habang pinatutupad, in 10 or in
extended 10 years ay maraming naiiwas, be like the commercial farms, nabanggit na po ni
Congressman Teddy Casiño, hindi ba ang natural kung kumitid pa, lumiit pa 'yung saklaw dahil sa
napakaraming exemptions, exclusion, at maraming kung anu-anong mga alternative arrangement,
hindi ba natural na dapat umikli ang period of implementation? Hindi...hindi dapat humaba pero
ang sagot po diyan ng Department of Agrarian Reform ho natin, malakas ang resistance ng mga
landlords (I have long wanted to ask the DAR during the budget hearings at the committee level
and in the plenary session. If many lands were already exempted from the coverage of CARP
before it took effect and while it is being implementation, in 10 or in extended 10 years, be like the
commercial farms, which Congressman Teddy Casiño has already mentioned, wouldn’t it be
natural that if the coverage narrowed down because of many exemptions, exclusion, and various
alternative arrangement, the period of implementation should also be shortened? That it should
not… should not be prolonged but DAR responded by saying, landlord resistance is
strong.)[translation by author](Bayan Muna Partylist Rep. Satur Ocampo, Public Hearing 06-Mar-
2008).
Yet, one of the more complete and detailed explanations on the reduction of coverage
was given by Ocampo’s fellow Bayan Muna Partylist Representative Teddy Casiño at a
public hearing immediately following the first:
Ang tingin namin, ang sinabi kanina ni Congressman Cua, ang problema wala sa magsasaka. Totoo
'yan. Tingin namin ang problema wala sa magsasaka, ang problema sa batas. ... Iyung kasalukuyang
batas, limited ang coverage ng lupa. Kasi 'pag sinabing agricultural land, maraming klaseng lupa pero
sa kasalukuyang batas, exempted ang swine livestock, poultry, fish pond, prawn pond, lahat ng lupa na
classified as residential, commercial, industrial, kahit tinataniman, kahit alam natin na may mga saging
diyan na may mga puno ng mangga pero dahil sa munisipyo, nakasulat residential, hindi na puwedeng
pumailalim sa Agrarian Reform, so nali-limit 'yung coverage. Tapos, may option pa na i-convert o i-
reclassify 'yung lupa kaya ho marami sa mga lupa na dapat kasama sa programa, because of this
provision, na-exempted na. Kaya noong 1988, ang original target for distribution was 10.3 million
hectares, pagdating ng 1995, seven point eight million hectares na lang kase maraming na-exempt sa
programa. Kaya may isang study, sabi nila, 43 percent lang ng agricultural land ang nag-qualify sa
reform program. Iyung iba, 'yung 60...ay, 'yung 70...ay 'yung 50...seven percent exempted because of
these exemptions. Tapos ang problema pa, exempted na nga 'yung maraming lupa, meron pang
retention limit na malaki. So, 'yung lot owner may five hectare, bawat anak, may three hectares. Tapos
nung in-implement 'yung batas, doon sa batas mismo may three months para...noong 1988, para i-
dispose 'yung mga lupa, so marami rin ang nakalusot at hindi na-cover ng programa. Ang...ang mas
masama pa diyan, merong tinatawag na Alternative Distribution Scheme. Tulad ng nasabi ko kanina,
'yung isang essential ng Agrarian Reform, 'yung lupa ay ibigay mo, physically, sa mga magsasaka but
because of this Alternative Distribution Scheme, magbigay ka lang ng kapirasong papel sa magsasaka,
covered na 'yang ng Agrarian Reform Program like 'yung Stock Distribution Option. Iyung mga
magsasaka sa Hacienda Luisita, ang alam nila, may-ari sila ng hacienda pero sila ay mga magsasaka,
mga sakada, na napakababa ng suweldo pero supposedly sa papel, sila ay may-ari ng kanilang lupa.
We think, what Congressman Cua said earlier that the problem lies not with the farmers is true. We
think the problem is not with the farmers, but with the law… the current [CARP] law. Land
coverage is limited. Agricultural land means different types of land but with the current law, swine
livestock, poultry, fish pond, prawn pond, all lands classified as residential, commercial, industrial,
are exempted; even those lands already planted with crops, even if we know that a banana shrub and a
mango tree are planted in it but because of the municipality, the land will no longer be covered by
Agrarian Reform, so the coverage becomes limited. In addition, there is an option to convert or re-
classify lands. That’s why there are many lands supposedly covered by the program that are
already exempted because of this provision. Alas, the original target of 10.3 million in 1988 was
reduced to 7.8 million hectares because of many exemptions. Hence, a study stated that only 43 percent
of agricultural lands qualified for CARP. The other 60…er 70…50…seven percent exempted because
of these exemptions. To add to the problem of exemptions, retention limit is high, so that the original
landowner has five hectares and his heirs have three hectares each. And when the law was implemented,
it contained a provision that allowed landowners to dispose of their lands for three months, so many
lands circumvented coverage. What’s worse is the so-called Alternative Distribution Scheme. As I
mentioned earlier, the essence of Agrarian Reform is to give the lands physically to the farmers but
because of this Alternative Distribution Scheme handing out a piece of paper to farmers suffices to
cover them under the Agrarian Reform Program as in the Stock Distribution Option. Those farmers in
Hacienda Luisita know that they own the hacienda then again they are farmers, seasonal farmworkers,
with really low wages but supposedly on paper, they are the owners of their lands [emphasis
added][translation by author](Bayan Muna Partylist Representative Teodoro A Casiño, Public Hearing
07-Mar-2008).
On the other hand, some member organizations of the RCM coalition exposed cases of
so-called shrewd land title grabbing, agrarian violence, and even extra-judicial killings of
farmers as a testament to the extreme negative impact of exemptions from CARP
coverage. With strong language, Ricardo Reyes of Kilos-AR repudiated critics of CARP,
claiming that legally mandated CARP exemptions are the very cause of CARP’s failure:
Ito pong sinabi nung kasama namin sa (This is what our fellow from the) Task Force Mapalad ang
isang dahilan, maghahabol at magpapatibay ng mga exemptions mula sa (granted by the) CARP
Law at every turn in its nearly 20 years of history, outrightly resisting its implementation katulad ng
mga (like the) landowners ng Negros. Sayang at wala sila rito (Too bad they are not here) because
we are ready to list down all the details about this and employing armed goons and other violent
means against peasant claimants all throughout the country, killing corps of peasants. Yong
pong sa (With) Kilos-AR (alone) aabot ng (reaches) 42 ang patay (casualties). Hundreds (were) an
na-detained at nasugatan (and wounded), and whole communites, Quezon, Nueva Ecija, Negros
Occidental, Davao, Iloilo, Tarlac and other parts of the country, Bicol as well where there are mass
movements's movements or dislocations of women, children, and the elderly as a result of
harassments by landowners. Ngayon sasabihin nila eh (Now they say it’s failure), eh bakit hindi nga
magiging (why wouldn’t it become a failure, (when there are) may exemptions, merong pagbabara
ng (there are obstructions to) implementation, 'no, at merong mga (there are) detention at pagpatay
(and killings), pagkatapos sasabihin dito sa harapan namin (then they will tell us it’s a), failure."
(Ricardo Reyes, Representative, Kilusan Para sa Pagsusulong ng Reformang Agrario, Kilos-AR, )
While exposés like this abounded in the hearings, RCM coalition champions mostly
responsible for the House consolidated CARPER bill (HB 4077), did not explicitly call
for reviewing and re-instating these exemptions. Nonetheless, they acknowledged the
need to reform the land acquisition and distribution procedure to accelerate the
distribution of remaining lands covered by CARP:
We want to emphasize, however, that a mere extension will not be sufficient. And we have ssen that
in the past two decades, the Department of Agrarian Reform of our government had been given the
opportunity to implement and complete the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. So it is not
just because of the lack of material time for implementation of the program, it is more because there
had been obstacles in the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. So we
are pushing for the extension of the program with significant reforms that will address the obstacles
that we had experience in the past. The remaining more than one million hectares of agricultural
land [sic] that have not yet been distributed under the program are the most difficult in terms of
acquisition and distribution. And, therefore, a mere extension of the law, of the funding support will
not be sufficient if we will not be addressing the obstacles that had prevented the coverage, the
distribution of this remaining one million, more than one milion hectares of land holding. So we are
pushing, Your Honor, for the extension but with signficiant reforms that will accelerate the
completion, specifically the land acquisition ad distribution component of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program [emphasis added](Marlon Manuel, Representative, Sentro ng
Alternatibong Lingap Panlega, SALIGAN, 05-Dec-2007).
The difference in policy belief between the RCM and the Bayan Muna coalitions on the
issue of exemptions were highlighted at the plenary debate between RCM champion
Lagman and Bayan Muna coalition member Gabriela Partylist Representative Lisa Maza.
Maza advocated for Bayan Muna’s policy belief of universal CARP coverage, that is, re-
including lands previously exempted, while Lagman initially expressed reservations on
such a proposal but eventually conceded to reviewing CARP coverage:
Rep. Maza: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, it is not only the public lands but also the commercial
livestock or lands used for commercial livestock, for poultry, for swine raising, also lands
devoted to aquaculture like fishponds and prawn farms which are excluded from CARP. Does
the Sponsor know how many farmers would have benefited if these lands that are exempted or
excluded would be covered by CARP?
Rep. Lagman: Distinguished Lady, you would recall that under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law, the program covered these lands devoted to poultry, swine raising and the allied production
which are not from the growth of the land. That is precisely covered. However, the Supreme Court,
in Luz Farms vs. Secretary of DAR, 192 SCRA 51, one of the first cases which challenged the
program, brought before the Supreme Court, said that these lands devoted to livestock and poultry
industry is not within the legitimate coverage of agrarian reform. So, we will have to bow to that
Supreme Court decision and the Supreme Court quoted-- no less than the Supreme Court in the--was
quoted by the Supreme Court with respect to its definition of agricultural lands.
Rep. Maza: But that was the recent decision, but before that, there were executive orders and other
laws enacted that provided for exemption and exclusion and
Rep. Lagman: Well…
Rep. Maza: …that precisely defeated the very purpose of the distribution of wealth if there were too
many exemptions and exclusions and therefore, concentrating resources and ownership of resources
to a few.
Rep. Lagman: Yeah. The previous exemptions which antedated the CARL were precisely being
corrected by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program by covering livestock and poultry
industry, among others, which will have to be covered immediately after the ten-year period. But,
unfortunately, the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional that particular provision of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. But...
Rep. Maza: Are you saying…
Rep. Lagman: I agree with the distinguished Lady that we will have to revisit these exempted
lands because some of them can now be covered by program. That is why, after we have
extended the LAD, we are going to immediately work on reforms which would include the inclusion
of hitherto exempted lands [emphasis added](Plenary Deliberations 27-May-2008).
So despite initial reservations, it was advocates from the RCM who proposed to re-
incorporate these exemptions in the definition of a farmer and an agricultural activity and
defended such proposals from questions by landowners. So at the Bicameral Conference
Committee Meeting on June 9, 2009, Sorsogon First District Representative Salvador
Escudero, III proposed to re-instate livestock, fisheries, poultry or fish into the CARP’s
definition of a farmer and what accounts for an agricultural activity. Escudero reasoned
that in the same vein that the definition of a farmer should be broadened to acknowledge
the role of rural women farmers, the variety of agriculture should also be captured
formally through a concrete re-definition of what qualifies as an agricultural activity. At
this point, well-known landowner Pablo Garcia informs the Bicameral body that a
Supreme Court decision currently in force effectively prevents this from happening. In
defense, RCM champion and House CARPER bill sponsor Albay First District
Representative Lagman clarifies that increasing the breadth of activities does not
effectively increase the coverage and re-instate the exemptions.
Sorsogon 1st Rep. Salvador Escudero III: May I just make an observation? I requested TWG to
perfect the amendments. We defined farmer as being a crop-farmer only… No consistency. We
defined rural women including crop-farmers and food-processing. So, the definition for rural women
is broader than the farmer. The farmer's definition should be like agriculture. Agriculture is anything
coming from land except marijuana, coming from the seas except piranha, and it includes livestock
raising. Let's have a consistent definition. But I find it strange, maybe it reflects the power of
women, rural women is defined in much broader perspective than the farmer. Let’s have a consistent
definition I asked the TWG to do it, they did not, I'll define it for them…Because the problem of
Philippine Agriculture, we define agriculture as if it's only rice and corn, ang kitid ng (our)
definition natin (is too narrow). Kung gusto nating sumikat, 'yung tunay na definition ng agriculture
(if we want to progress, [use] the true definition of agriculture). It should be as broad as possible,
that's why I said the definition of rural women is much broader than the definition of farmer. There
should be consistency and the TWG can do it… Because the correct definition, Mr. Chairman,
Agriculture is production, processing and marketing. It is the whole gamut. [emphasis
added](Bicameral Conference Committee, 09-Jun-2009).
Rep. Garcia: In that connection, may I inform our colleagues and Senators that in the case of Luz
Farms versus DAR, certain sections of the CARP Law were declared unconstitutional? Livestock is
not included in the law because the… in the case of livestock, poultry, the land is not a very
substantial component, so...I don't have the copy of the decision but certain sections of the...of
Republic Act 6657 were declared unconstitutional and so Luz Farms was (inaudible) from...
Rep. Lagman: I don't think we are abrogating or abandoning the decision of the Supreme Court in the
Luz Farms, which is limited to saying that agricultural lands devoted to livestock and poultry are not
covered by the Agrarian Reform Program, but that does not prevent us from making a definition of a
farmer...which should include activities involving livestock, poultry, fisheries, etcetera. We are just
defining a farmer. We are not, in anyway, changing the coverage of the program, as constructed by the
Supreme Court in Luz Farms.
Rep. Garcia: I have no objection to that because, anyway, the Supreme Court was basing its decision
on Section 4 of Article 13, that the Agrarian Reform Program is founded on the right of the farmers
and regular farm worker who are landless to own the lands they till, so it refers to crops.
Rep. Lagman: We are just defining the coverage of the program. And moreover, with respect to
fisheries, under the original law, there is a… this is a special concern because the fisher folk is more
impoverished generally compared to the farmer. And that is a special concern. Just like rural women,
is... are included in the special conerns under the original law.
Advocacy Coalition Framework Analysis. In this exchange, two observations
relating to policy-oriented learning can be drawn. First, any proposal that tend to
challenge the policy belief/agenda/interest of the opposing coalition would incite a
confrontation that would lead to a clarification that eventually offers compromises.

Secondly, the role of policy brokers in this process of clarification and eventual
compromise could not be understated as in the case of Lagman who upon the point of
clarification by Garcia, used a language that somehow pacified the interests of
landowners against increasing CARP coverage but still pushed the policy belief of RCM
proponents to somehow re-instate the same coverage exemptions at least in the definition
of the farmer and the qualification of agricultural activities. Hence, through the process
and dynamics of policy-oriented learning, the following amendments were enacted to re-
instate the much controversial coverage exemptions:
Table 5.5. CARP Provisional Amendments: Definitions of Farmer and

Agricultural Activity
POLICY ORIGINAL PROVISION RESOLUTION: PROVISION

ISSUE AMENDMENT
(RA 6675)
(RA 9700)
Exemptions of Sec. 3 on Definitions Sec. 3 on Definitions

certain types of
agricultural
lands in (b) Agriculture, Agricultural Enterprise (b) Agriculture, Agricultural Enterprise or
coverage or Agricultural Activity means the Agricultural Activity means the cultivation
cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit
growing of fruit trees, including the trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish,
harvesting of such farm products, and including the harvesting of such farm
other farm activities and practices products, and other farm activities and
performed by a farmer in conjunction practices performed by a farmer in
with such farming operations done by conjunction with such farming operations
persons whether natural or juridical. done by persons whether natural or juridical.
(f) Farmer refers to a natural person (f) Farmer refers to a natural person whose
whose primary livelihood is cultivation primary livelihood is cultivation of land or
of land or the production of agricultural the production of agricultural crops,
crops, either by himself, or primarily livestock and/or fisheries either by himself,
with the assistance of his immediate or primarily with the assistance of his
farm household, whether the land is immediate farm household, whether the land
owned by him, or by another person is owned by him, or by another person under
under a leasehold or share tenancy a leasehold or share tenancy agreement or
agreement or arrangement with the arrangement with the owner thereof.
owner thereof.
Given the lack of clarity of the exact coverage of CARP and the lack of
confidence/credibility of the DAR in their inventory, other Bayan Muna bloc members
such as Rafael Mariano, also known as “Ka Paeng,” offered his own specific calculations
of what he thought is the real balance of private agricultural lands to be distributed, which
he believes is greater than what the DAR is reporting:
Madam Speaker, distinguished Sponsor, kaya ko lamang po nabanggit iyon, at mahalaga po kasi
iyong datos na iyon at laman noong census na iyon dahil, (the only reason I mentioned that, and that
data is quite important as it contained a census), assuming na malinis iyong datos o (that the data is
clean or the) accomplishment report ng (of the) DAR na mayroon nang (that there are) 2.1 million
hectares of private agricultural lands ang naipamahagi sa mga (that were distributed to) farmer-
beneficiaries ng (of) CARP for the last 20 years, ibig pong sabihin noon, kung mayroon pong
(meaning to say, if there are) 8.7 million hectares ng (of) private agricultural lands as of 1988,
lalabas po na mayroon pang mahigit mga limang milyong ektarya ng (this leaves us with more than
five million hectares of) private agricultural lands ang hindi nagagalaw, at kung ibabase naman po
nating doon sa isang datos na census din ng gubyerno na may (that were not covered, and if we base
it on another census that) 8.9 million hectares of private agricultural lands, ibawas nating iyong (and
deduct the) 2.1 million hectares, lalabas may mahigit pang (we are left with) seven million hectares
of private agricultural lands (ANAKPAWIS Party List and Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas,
(KMP) National President Rafael Mariano, Public Hearing 07-Mar-2008).
At the bicameral committee hearing to reconcile differences between the House and
Senate consolidated CARPER bills Rizal, First District Representative Michael John R.
Duavit also raised the issue of insufficient coverage as evidenced by the decreasing
average of land hectares distributed to each CARP beneficiary:
May I just offer some information also… the Body? Over the last twenty years there have been… as
high as 0.9 to 1.9 hectares for each beneficiary. The reason for this is… depending on the number of
beneficiaries for that year. If DAR had identified few beneficiaries then they could go on an average
as high as 2.2 or 2.4 hectares which means that it has been flexbile over time. What it points to is
that so far wala pang nagyayaring sobra po laging kulang (nothing has happened yet; it [coverage]
is always lacking)[emphasis added][translation by author](Rizal 1st District Representative Michael
John Duavit, Bicameral Conference Committee 09-Jun-2009).
With this acknowledgment of insufficient coverage, participants of the Bicameral
Conference Committee from different coalitions agreed to adopt a policy declaration that
highlights this policy reality:

Table 5.6. CARP Provisional Amendment: Declaration of Principles and Policies

on Insufficient CARP Lands
POLICY ORIGINAL RESOLUTION: PROVISION AMENDMENT

ISSUE PROVISION
(RA 6657) (RA 9700)
Insufficient No provision Sec. 2 Declaration of Principles and Policies is hereby
CARP lands amended to include the following provision:
The state recognizes that there is not enough agricultural land

to be divided and distributed to each farmer and regular
farmworker so that each one can own his/her economic-size
family farm. This being the case, a meaningful agrarian reform
program to uplift the lives and economic status of the farmer
and his/her children can only be achieved through
simultaneous industrialization aimed at developing a self-
reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos.
All these policy belief statements are explicit recognition of a problem in the actual
extent of land coverage, which is a fundamental component of CARP implementation.
Consequently, these policy belief statements converge to a single point: the lack of
accuracy of and the need to clarify the actual target of scope of CARP lands. The
recognition or admission of the problem seems to trigger a learning process that compels
legislators with differing, competing policy beliefs to sit down and engage in a debate
that will eventually leads to substantial policy change. As Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith
(1994) explains, this is the essence of policy-oriented learning.
In addition, several of these policy statements recognizes that this problem on
lack of transparency has existed for more than a decade, which according to Sabatier and
Jenkins-Smith (1988 and 1994) is the average time for policy-oriented or adequate
learning to occur before significant policy reform or change occurs.

Consequently, these factors have compelled the legislators to agree to establish a
mechanism to exact greater transparency and fix the problem of lack in accuracy of
CARP lands. The controversy over the real land coverage of CARP hinges on the
capacity of DAR as the main implementing agency. Thus, given the lack of accuracy in
the target scope of lands to be covered by CARP and the lack of credibility of DAR’s
documentation/inventory, both pro- and anti-CARP extension blocs argued for
institutionalizing a mechanism to exact greater transparency and better monitoring of
accomplishing CARP coverage targets. The first question was raised by Cebu Third
District Representative Pablo Garcia, who during the opening session of the House
Committee on Agrarian Reform on November 21, 2007, confronts DAR Secretary Nasser
Pangandaman on the responsibility/accountability of DAR in implementing land
distribution and monitoring the running balance of lands inventory actually under CARP
coverage:
Rep. Garcia: Yes, Mr. Secretary, I have heard you say that there are still about 1 million hectares to
be acquired and distributed. Would this include the sugar lands in Negros, in Iloilo, in Bukidnon, in
Davao, the sugar… the banana plantations in Davao, Cotabato, the rubber plantations in Mindanao,
the pineapple plantations, Mr. Secretary?
Sec. Pangandaman: Your Honor, you know, when I assumed office as the Secretary of the
Department more than two years ago one of the directives that I have issued was for the inventory of
these LADs to be acquired and to be distributed. And as presented earlier, we still have a balance of
around 1.6 million hectares; 1.07 hectares will be acquired and to be distributed by our department
in the next ten years... in the next six years after une 2008 and the remaining more than 500,000
hectares will be for the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to distribute. Now, we
have an inventory of these lands, Mr. Chairman, Your Honors, and we'll be submitting the list of
these landholdings, Mr. Chairman, Your Honors, soonest.
Rep. Garcia: Did you mean to say that until now the department does not have any idea where these
remaining 1. something million hectares are located?
Secretary Pangandaman: No, we have. We have. As I have mentioned earlier, Your Honor, we have
the list of these landholdings to be acquired and to be distributed.
Rep. Garcia: And now you can perhaps answer my question. Do these remaining 1. something
million hectares include the sugar-producing lands in Negros, in Iloilo, or Panay, Bukidnon, Davao,
even Leyte. Would this include or exclude?
Sec. Pangandaman: This includes the lands that you have mentioned, Your Honor.
Rep. Garcia: Now, what will happen to the sugar industry if these sugar lands now producing sugar
not only for domestic consumption but also for export, what will happen if this will be parcelized
into one or two hectares under your program? And the farmers to whom... or the beneficiaries will
no longer plant sugar cane because sugar cane is a one-year crop, they woul rather plant fruit crops.
So what will happen to our sugar centrals? What will happen to our sugar industry? Will you not be
throwing out of jobs the four or five million people depending on the sugar industry? (Committee
Meeting 21-11-2007)
The second exchange on the issue of transparency of DAR over actual CARP coverage
was raised by pro-extension coalition members, specifically Representative Duavit, who
have raised the lack of a national land use act and hence the need for better and more
comprehensive land zoning in the country to identify clearly agricultural lands at the
bicameral conference committee on June 9, 2009. The legislators felt that this
comprehensive land inventory system provides an institutional answer to questions on the
transparency of DAR as an implementor and documentor of lands for acquisition and
redistribution. They also feel it must be properly coordinated with the LGU functions on
disposing lands.
The proposal for a comprehensive land inventory system was first raised at a
plenary deliberation on May 29, 2009, when after a year of requesting an inventory of
CARP lands, Duavit felt dismayed with the failure of DAR to produce a complete
accounting of the beginning number and geographical mapping of lands to be covered by
CARP and the running balance of lands actually redistributed in the course of CARP’s
implementation. Consequently, Duavit proposed an amendment provision
institutionalizing this land use plan to address the issue of ambiguous CARP coverage
targets:
At least, there is the admission that the beginning inventories really did not exist, at least, not in
the form that is expected of a program like this. So, I will not belabor the point. But, that leads us to
say what have we--basically what have we established until this point? From the prior interpellation,
Your Honor, is that there really is no comprehensive inventory system put in place. What was used
as a system dependent on aggregated historical information at the beginning of this program, Your
Honor. And that there really is a need for proper inventory system, should this program continue. So
the question might be, what would be considered proper? I think, what we can consider a proper
inventory is one where we can actually see the totality of the land being covered. And that as they
are distributed, we can check them off the list, so we can really track the success of the program. So,
as such, as I have an amendment proposed, Your Honor.
In 1998, one of our colleagues, Joey Solis, was the head of NAMRIA, and he proposed a bill to this
Congress, in fact, it passed it in this House, that was for a national mapping of the country. And this
was sometime back, and technology has advanced, and now, there is a bill calling for a national land
use plan. It was discussed last night by the Honorable Cerilles. My first amendment that I will propose
later on, is for the institution of a comprehensive inventory system in consonance with a national land-
use plan for the purpose of properly identifying and classifying farmlands. The data shall be used for
the acquisition and distribution of classified farmlands. If this is going to be acceptable from the
sponsoring committee, when the time comes, personally, we can move on already away from this
issue (Plenary Deliberations 29-May-2009).
The proposal was favorably accepted or received by a fellow RCM proponent Albay First
District Representative Edcel Lagman, who promised support at the proper time:
Rep. Lagman: Your Honor, the sponsoring committee confirms, that at the proper time when this is
introduced, it will be accepted by the committee.
Rep. Duavit: Thank you very much…
Rep. Lagman: As a matter of fact, it would form part of the committee amendments, Your Honor
(Plenary Deliberations, 29-May-2009).
Indeed, Lagman presented this proposal as a sponsored committee amendment at the
second reading on June 3, 2009 and was carried over to the Bicameral Conference
Committee six days after. The original proposal was stated as follows:
A comprehensive inventory system in consonance with a national land use plan shall be undertaken by
the DAR for the purpose of properly identifying and classifying farmlands upon the availability of the
inventory data shall be used as one of the prerequisites for determining the acquisition and distribution
of classified farmlands (Bicameral Conference Committee, 09-jun-2009).
However, the phrasing changed as a product of two concerns. First, Manila City Fifth
District Representative Amado Bagatsing raised the need to coordinate the land zoning
functions of LGUs as provided in the LGU Code of 1991:

Yes. I just like to highlight that, in accordance with the Local Government Code, because the
CARP Law was done in 1988 and the Local Government Code, as the father here, Senator Pimentel,
was in '92, so we just want to make sure that the powers of the local government will always be
respected. Because like zoning and reclassification of land, it has always been an inherent power of
the LGUs even prior to the passage of the Local Government Code [emphasis added](Manila City
5th District Representative Amado Bagatsing).
This amendment generated an intermediate exchange of competing ideas on the extent of
LGU power vis-à-vis a national policy like CARP. It first caught attention of the LGU
Code’s principal author Senator Aquilino “Nene” Pimentel who clarified that despite the
extended power of LGUs to administer land zoning and reclassification, this power was
not meant to override the more important policy goals of CARP as a social justice
program. This interpretation was corroborated by RCM champion and Akbayan Partylist
Representative Risa Hontivero. Citing a Supreme Court ruling allowing the Province of
Camarines Sur to re-classify lands without the approval of DAR, landowner legislator
Cebu Third District Representative Pablo Garcia qualified this interpretation but later
conceded by citing a conditional clause in the LGU Code appraising the primacy of
CARP over LGUs in determining land zoning and reclassification. This long exchange is
summarized by the following exhange:
Rep. Garcia: For the record, I'd like to point out that there is a decision of the Supreme Court on the
power of the local government to reclassify lands and which is now found in Section 20 of the Local
Government Code. In that case of Provicne of Camarines sur vs. the Court of Appeals, the supreme
Court said that... it nullifies the... Wherefore, the petitino is granted... because the Province of
Camarines Sur wanted to expropriate certain parcels of land, agricultural lands, and it was opposed
by the DAR. And the decision of the Supreme Court was to affirm the decision of... was to nullify
the decision of the court, of the lower court, and sustained the decision of the lower court
authorizing the Province of Camarines Sure to take possession of private respondents' property,
orders the trial court suspend the expropriate proceedings and requires the Province of Camarines
Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify private
respondents' property from agricultural to non-agricultural. This ruling of the Supreme Court was re-
affirmed in that case of Fortich vs. Coronoa in that Sumilao case becuase the Municipality of
SUmilao reclassified certain agricultural lands to non-agricultural purposes, and it was affirmed by
the Supreme Court.
Rep. Hontiveros: Just a brief addition to what my colleague in the House Contingent said. Yes,
indeed, there are safeguards in this very Section 20. And also, just to make It of record, Mr.
Chairman, what many here know better than me, Section 20 itself provides that the right of the
LGUs to classify or reclassify is not allowed for lands already covered under CARP. And if there
should be any amendments to that, those would more properly be amendments to the Local
Government Code and not to our bill strengthening the CARP.
Sen. Pimentel: Yeah, just this point that the cases cited by Congressman Garcia are indeed in our
statute books. But I'd like to posit a nivew tha the powers of local government can never put to
naught a social thrust policy defined in the Constitution. Although… it is true I was on e of the
crafters of the Local Government Code, I believe that in matters of social legislation, such as the one
we are crafting, local government powers must stand by the side when the implementation of such a
law is being proposed. But, in any event, the suggestion of Congressman Bagatsing might need the
approval of this Chamber. That's up to us to decide. I'm just putting that as an issue, Mr. President,
Mr. Chairman.
Rep. Garcia: Mr. Chairman, under Section 20 of the Local Government Code, it provides at the end
that this "Section does not in any way amend, modify or repeal the Republic Act Number 6657". It
is there in Section 20 of the Local Government Code (Bicameral Conference Committee 09-Jun-
2009).
The second concern was raised by the amendment’s own proponent Representative
Duavit. Duavit proposed to delete the phrase “upon the availability of the inventory” in
order to discourage complacency in the agency in accelerating the completion of the
comprehensive land inventory. Hearing this, Senator Gordon expressed the need to
replace this clause with another language that will pressure the DAR to expedite the
inventory process of CARP lands. To this end, Senator Pia Cayetano, another member of
the Bicameral Conference Committee, suggested specifying a timeline. The productive
exchange occurred as follows:
Rep. Duavit: Well, the reason this was proposed, Your Honor, is precisely because of our
common problem between… with the House and the Senate with the lack of imperical [sic]
data. This inventory system we feel is critical for the success of the program and especially with
regards to implementation. With this law we also have... we are also creating our Joint Oversight
Committee and without having an inventory as a checklist there is really nothing that the
Committee will be able to do. So the reason I aproposed this amendment is to make sure that this
actually... that we will be able to do our functions and make sure that, being mission critical, that
the inventory is in place. With… if we are going to put "Upon the availability of the inventory"
this will…this may be an opening for the DAR not to actually work on it or to take their time.
And for the next five years both the House and the Senate, who are accountable to the people
because we will be spending about a 150 billion of their money, will have nothing to go on. So this
is... the removal is proposes to give more urgency to the DAR to actually institute the inventory.
Sen. Gordon: Mr. Chairman, we are on the same wavelength but, upon the explanation of
Congressman Duvait, I will agree as long as this is on record because my worry is if we take out
the "Upon the availability", the DAR might take advantage of that by saying "well, wala
kami, wala kaming inventory"(well, we don’t have, we don’t have an inventory). They aren't
gonna move because the provision talks about the duty of DAR to create an inventory and I think
"upon the availabiity" are marching orders on DAR on how important that availability must be. So
I think this is bad craftmanship, if I... with all due respect. If the intention is to tell DAR you must
create an inventory, then we must give a deadline to DAR, di ba? Dapat may deadline iyong DAR,
hindi iyong (not tose) silent sa (about the) availability or upon the availability because I think we
are on the same wavelength with Secretary Duavit. Pag tinanggal mo naman iyan, walang
deadline, di ba? (if we remove that, we don’t have a deadline, do we?
Sen. Cayetano: I just want to… I have been listening ot the discussion and I think the simple
solution is just to put a timeline. I support the statemetn of Senator Gordon on the responsibility of
DAR because, otherwise, there is also no pressure, there is absolutely... I mean, I am not aware if
there is something elese in the Bill. But without a timeline, I think it will be left hanging at the
discretion of the department that has not really been reliable when it comes to producing
data [emphasis added][translation by author](Bicameral Conference Committee 09-Jun-2009).
The language used in these policy statements imply a strong sense of
suspicion and distrust in the capacity of DAR as an implementing agency and such
tone alludes to a certain degree of learning on the degree of responsibility and
reliability of DAR. Hence, this learning is further manifested in the very amendment
provision proposed and agreed to by the various coalition members at the Bicameral
Conference Committee on June 9, 2009. Moreover, the reason Duavit stated for his
proposal regarding the need for better empirical data refers to the importance of
scientific information in making a more enlightened, better informed decision.
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1994) considers this need for scientific information as a
critical component of the policy-oriented learning process. Therefore, this
demonstrates that the following amendment on instituting a comprehensive inventory
system is indeed a product of policy-oriented learning:

Table 5.7. CARP Provisional Amendment: Comprehensive CARP Land

Inventory
POLICY ISSUE ORIGINAL RESOLUTION: PROVISION AMENDMENT

PROVISION
(RA 9700)
(RA
6657)
A comprehensive, reliable No provision
land inventory system for Section 4 of Chapter II on Coverage is hereby amended to
greater transparency in include the following provision:
identifying CARP lands
A comprehensive inventory system in consonance with
acquired and re-distributed
the national land use plan shall be instituted by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), in accordance
with the Local Government Code, for the purpose of
properly identifying and classifying farmlands within one
(1) year from effectivity of this Act, without prejudice to
the implementation of the land acquisition and
distribution.
Advocacy Coalition Framework Analysis. In these exchanges, the concept of
devil shift (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1994) can be observed in instances wherein the
representative of landowners used the failure and lack of credibility of the implementing
agency over the land transfer process to justify his own policy agenda or policy belief. In
this case, landowners and their allies in Congress argue that certain lands must be
exempted from CARP’s comprehensive coverage to ensure the survival of an entire
agricultural crop sector/industry. Although on the surface, such an appeal can be
perceived as a malicious maneuver to avoid inclusion in CARP coverage, this concern
will be heeded later on at the Bicameral Conference Committee, where House and Senate
members would deliberate and ultimately approve an amendment provision to address
this concern.
Besides clarity of actual coverage, the productivity of farms in relation to

coverage was another major concern that was mostly expressed by landed legislators who
participated in Congressional deliberations to guard their land interests. One of the most
provocative questions was raised by Cavite Third District Representative Jesus Crispin
Remulla who, despite claiming to have peasant roots, is documented to hail from a clan
of landed strongmen (Sidel, 1999). Remulla started a debate on productivity by first
asking the House CARPER bill sponsor Representative Lagman to evaluate the
performance of DAR in all aspects of the program for the past twenty years. A veteran
CARP advocate, Lagman deferred a detailed assessment but calmly provided his personal
objective evaluation:
Rep. Remulla: So in the twenty years, Madam Speaker, that the CARP has been implemented by the
government, how would you grade it? As a success, a failure? On a scale of one to ten, how has
been the performance of the department regarding the distribution, the support service, the
productivity and the improvement of the lives of our Filipino farmer?
Rep. Lagman: Well, candidly, Madam Speaker, distinguished Gentleman, I am not in a position to
make that grading or assessment but I could refer the distinguished Gentleman to empirical studies
which would show as a bottom line assessment that the agrarian reform program has been
successful. Of course, there are also other positions saying that the agrarian reform program has
been a failure, but it all depends on the perspective where you come from and whether you are
assessing it as a social justice measure or a production efficiency or enhancement measure (Plenary
Deliberations 14-May-2008).
Remulla was unconvinced of the assessment, however, and pressed on to examine what
he reckoned were the real causes of failures of CARP amidst Lagman’s assessment that
CARP was successful:
Rep. Remulla: Yes, Madam Speaker, I laud the Gentleman for the intent behind the law but the question
still remains unanswered on whether or not the program has been a success. Twenty years have gone by
and so much money has been spent by government so far and yet, the Gentleman refuses to say on
whether or not it has been a success or a failure. That is the question I'm asking. Is it a success or a
failure?
Rep. Lagman: Well, personally, I would assess that the program has been a success considering the
number of agrarian reform benefciaires which have been benefited and also because it is principally a
social justice legislation.
Rep. Remulla: So, principally, Madam Speaker, the Gentleman considers the program a success but
it has its shortcomings. Is that the way I understand the way that it is answered?
Rep. Lagman: Yes, Your Honor. From the very start, this Sponsor admitted that the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law is not a perfect law, that the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program is not
a perfect program, that the implementation of the program by the DAR and allied agencies is less
than perfect, and we have agrarian reform beneficiaries who are likewise not perfect.
Rep. Remulla: What is the reason then, Madam Speaker, that after 20 years, 20 long years, all the
money spent, all these grants given by the government, that until now we have not finished with the
program? The law that we passed in 1988, the first law, mandated that acquisition be done within 20
years but until now it has not been finished. Will this be a guaranty [sic] then that if we extend the
program, that in five years' time it will be finished, everybody will be paid, all the farmers will have
support services and agriculture will become more productive in this country?
Rep. Lagman: There are a number of reasons and variables why the success we were expecting
during the 8th Congress did not materialize as we wanted it to be, although, I would say, that it was
still successful but not as as successful as expected.
Firstly, there was this Garchitorena controversy or the Garchitorena scam which actually derailed
the program but it was a blessing in disguise because we were able to expose it and the valuation
procedures have been tightened.
Number two, there was this regodon of secretaries of the program. I think one of the agencies which
have so many changes in the stewardship of the department would be in the Department of Agrarian
Reform; and
Thirdly, most probably, the ten-year period imposed by the 8th Congress was very ambitious. Most
probably, it was not realistic to really complete the Land Acquisition and Distribution Program. And
also, of course, as expected, there would be that resistance from landowners (Plenary Deliberations
14-May-2008).
Despite the explanation of Lagman, Remulla continued to challenge the entire land
acquisition and redistribution process of CARP, highlighting the historical incapacity and
questioning the credibility of DAR as an implementing agency in completing the task:
So there are so many reasons why this program had been delayed. But, is there a guaranty [sic] that
after we extend it for five years, the program will be complete? Well, the guaranty [sic] really
would be with respect to funding support, with respect to extension of support service, with respect
to least resistance from the landowners and also the efficiency of the implementing agency, the DAR
and the allied government agencies [emphasis added](Cavite 3rd District Representative Jesus
Crispin Remulla, Plenary Deliberatinos 14-May-2008).
Specifically, Remulla proceeded to question the viability of the physical mode of land
acquisition and redistribution in view of the need to consider productivity. For him,
parceling out productive lands may not be the wisest or most effective strategy as it
adversely impacts agricultural productivity:

CLOA have been sold. None of children of the farmers want to farm anymore and when you award
the land, it would just wait forever until it is sold again after ten years. How do we solve this
problem of productivity of the land? If the land is already productive and you divide it now
and parcel it out, will it not disturb our agricultural productivity, the way it is going right
now? [emphasis added](Cavite 3rd District Representative Jesus Crispin Remulla, Plenary
Deliberatinos 14-May-2008).
In response, Lagman recognized the issue and assured Remulla that his concerns on
productivity would be addressed by the proposed substantial increase of funding for
support services.
Distinguished Gentleman from Cavite, as I have said earlier, there are so many imperfections in the
program and some agrarian reforms beneficiaries are not perfect. So, some of them, most probably,
mortgaged or sold to enterprising businessmen or former landlords or landlords, the land they have
acquired under the program. But, most probably, in order to solve this temptation to alienate or
encumber these precious farmlands is to increase the support services coming from the government so
that production, post-harvest facilities, marketing activities could be funded from these support services
including rural credit. So, this bill would include a component of increasing the support services from
the present 25% to 40%. In that way, we would be able to really support the agrarian reform beneficiary
in terms of varied aspects of support services (Albay First District Representative Edcel Lagman,
Plenary Deliberations 14-May-2008).
Despite this, Remulla remain unfazed, saw Lagman’s response as a diversionary tactic,
and continued to suggest that DAR and other implementing agencies were the cause of
CARP’s failure:
farmer-beneficiary. Twenty years have gone by, enough time has been given, so many secretaries,
so many President have gone by and yet after 20 years, it seems to be that the inefficiency is quite
alarming because we have to extend it for another five years. Don't you think that the problem is the
implementing agency also? (Cavite 3rd District Representative Jesus Crispin Remulla, Plenary
After a lengthy and persistent interpellation, Remulla’s policy agenda as a landowning
legislator finally surfaced when at the following plenary deliberation, he concluded with
a proposal to exempt productive lands from CARP coverage:
I agree, Madam Speaker, regarding that statement that Cavite may be an exception to the general
rule. Then, is it not perhaps better if we look at all the productive lands and unproductive lands and
say, "Let us distribute all the unproductive lands and the productive lands, let them be,
because, at least, they are producing food for the country. [sic]?" Do we have to make a general
rule that will affect everybody? Let us say somebody has six hectares right now, tilling the soil.
Does he have to give away one hectare and disturb his life and make it more miserable when he is
already productive, than to go to the unproductive areas and distribute the land in the unproductive
areas? [emphasis added](Cavite Representative Remulla, Plenary Deliberations 26-May-2008).
Other legislators identified as having landed interests reinforced this concern. At a
plenary debate, Henry Pryde Teves, the Third District Representative of Negros Oriental,
a province with vast sugarlands, argued that CARP must balance productivity
considerations and granting ownership rights to landless farmers, especially if excessive
focus on physical land transfer would undermine productivity and in the long run
aggravate poverty conditions in the countryside instead of alleviating it. Effectively,
Teves alluded to a balance between the deeper, underlying ideals of economic justice and
social justice:
Madam Speaker, I have asked enough but I will ask more later on. I just would like to express one
more last. If we have to lose our exports or put our productivity at risk for the sake of the few
farmers whom we have to accommodate, then I don't think we are going on the right track.
We should keep a balance on productivity and giving of social justice to these farmers. Giving
land or dividing land and giving it to them is not what what we aim for. After all, what we aim is to
make their lives better than what it is today. And in doing this, we must speak with realistic figures.
We must know how much we have because we cannot give what we do not have (Negros Oriental
3rd District Representative Henry Pryde Teves, Plenary Deliberations 27-May-2009).
In an attempt to reach a compromise, RCM member and Rizal First District
Representative Michael John Duavit, the amendment’s own proponent, adopted a
proposal that takes into account productivity without abandoning the mandate of
redistributing actual productive lands. Hence, at the plenary deliberation before the final
reading of the CARPER bill, Duavit suggested an amendment provision instituting a
more flexible retention limit and land size that considers crop and soil type, weather
patterns, and other variables critical for the successful production of the CARP
beneficiary, which Lagman, as the CARPER bill sponsor, accepted as a committee
amendment:
Rep. Duavit: Also, what we have found or established from the last round of interpellations, is that
the method of distribution used a formula that--to put it kindly, was not very good, you know. In my
notes, I used stronger words. But let us just say that the formula being, if for example, there is 100
hectares, and that there are 100 claimants or applicants, this was to be divided equally between the
applicants, so they will get one hectare each. Kung dumami man ang humihingi at nag-a-apply, 200
na, kalahating ektarya na lang. And this is also regardless of crop type and other pertinent things.
This Representation feels that the distribution of the land should be commensurate to what is
actually required by the probable beneficiary, and that the distribution be done on a scheme wherein-
-wherein, for example, if your crop is cacao, which family really could survivie on maybe, 3,000
square meters, then fine, we can give that. But if the crop is, for example, rice, and 3,000 square
meters cannot feed that family, I think, we should give the proper amount. So, what I am saying is,
we cannot have a formula that is ""one size fits all."" Does the Sponsor agree?"
Rep. Lagman: Yes, Your Honor, we do agree.
Rep. Duavit: So, another amendment, that will be introduced, Your Honor, is that the distribution
size of the land shall be based on the following weights: crop type, soil type, weather patterns,
and other pertinent variables, deemed critical for the success of the beneficiaries post
distribution. When the time comes, I hope this will be acceptable, Your Honor.
Rep. Lagman: Yes, Your Honor, we are going to favorably consider at the proper time, the proposed
amendment which is consistent with the previous amendment [emphasis added](Plenary
Given these exhaustive deliberations, the amendment proposal faced minimal opposition
in the finalization of the CARPER law at the June 9, 2009 Bicameral Conference
Committee. The only legislator who raised an issue was Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr.,
who was concerned with the practicality of the provision given the magnitude and variety
of lands/crop types that the DAR needs to study before it can fully and judiciously
distribute the right type and sizes of CARP lands to each beneficiary—a concern that
Duavit, the amendment’s own proponent, adequately answered:
Sen. Gordon: Yes, with due respect. Nahihirapan lang ako kung papaano ito ma-i-implement
because if the distribution will have to depend on assessment muna, weather patterns, variable
factors deemed critical for the success of the beneficiaries, who is to determine whether these factors
are critical? Is it the DAR or... hindi ba kaya ito ay matters for agriculturalists to determine, not for
DAR people to assess?
Rep. Duavit: Yes. Actually, I think this is in… very much consnance with the earlier Senate
proposed provision where we said within six months they are to come up with a study. All of these
are also readily available from the DA, Mr. Senator, Mr. Chairman. So, again, maybe it will require
some inter-agency cooperation, but I do not see any problem with that as long as the Secretary is
actually... (Bicameral Conference Committee, 09-Jun-2009).
With this provision, members of the Bicameral Conference Committee proceeded to adopt a
related provision also raised by Duavit, which binds the DAR to this huge task of determining the
right crop type and land size to each beneficiary:
We are now on page 7, line 6, Section 4, There shall be incorporated after Section 6 of Republic Act
No. 6657, as amened, new sections to read as follows:
"Section 6-a. review of limits of land size. Within one year from the effectivity of this Act, the
Department of Agrarian Reform shall conduct to a comprehensive study on the land size
appropriate for each type of crop and shall submit the same to Congress for a possible review of
limits of land sizes provided in this Act." (Senate Committee on Agrarian Reform
CommitteeSecretary Xerxes Nitafan, Bicameral Conference Committee 09-Jun-2009).
The participating legislators, Nueva Ecija 4th District Rep. Rodolfo W. Antonino, all
agreed to establish a timeline and adopt a stronger and clearer language to elicit urgency
from DAR to conduct the study. The approval was quick:
Rep. Antonino: May I suggest that rather than say "shall conduct and complete", shall we just say
shall complete. Shall submit. Shall complete. So the observation of Congressman Duavit is taken
into account…Our intention is that upon effectivity of this Act, they shall conduct a study right
away and shall complete it within one yar.
Rep. Duavit: Point of information. That all this data is available from the Department of Agriculture.
So with a little bit of inter-agency cooperation, I think they can do it in less than a year, infact.
Rep. Escudero: Can we shorten the period from one year to six months? Because the truth to tell,
this is available readily.
Chairperson Honasan: Any objection to six months? No objection? Salamat po. Secretary, you may
proceed (Bicameral Conference Committee, 09-Jun-2009).
Table 5.8. CARP Provisional Amendment: Productivity-Sensitive Retention

Limit
POLICY ORIGINAL PROVISION RESOLUTION: PROVISION AMENDMENT

ISSUE (RA 9700)
(RA 6657)
Retention Section 25. Award Ceiling to SEC. 10. Beneficiaries shall be awarded an area not
Limit Beneficiaries. Beneficiaries shall exceeding three (3) hectares, which may cover a
Disrupting be awarded an area not exceeding contiguous tract of land or several parcels of land
Productivity three (3) hectares, which may cumulated up to the prescribed award limits. The
cover a contiguous tract of land or determination of the size of the land for distribution
several parcels of land cumulated shall consider crop type, soil type, weather patterns
up to the prescribed award limits. and other pertinent variables or factors, which are
deemed critical for the success of the beneficiaries.
No provision
There shall be incorporated after Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, new sections
to read as follows:
6B. Review of Limits of Land Size. – Within six (6)

months from the effectivity of this Act, the DAR
shall submit a comprehensive study on the land size
appropriate for each type of crop to Congress for a
possible review of limits of land sizes provided in
this Act.
Advocacy Coalition Framework Analysis. The amendments abovementioned are
undeniable products of policy-oriented learning in many ways. First, the repetitive
mention of two decades of implementation heeds a fundamental assumption of the
Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1994) that it takes at least a
decade before serious consideration of prospects for policy change are taken by policy
actors. Second, the insistence of Remulla demonstrates the stable nature of policy beliefs
and the tendency of policy actors to defend their policy beliefs to the hilt. Third, the
lengthy deliberations on the issue of coverage in the context of productivity also show an
intermediate level of conflicting/competing policy beliefs and ideas. Fourth, Lagman’s
explicit admission that CARP is not a perfect program and his consequent assurance
through an amendment proposal to an opponent or a non-believer of the CARP agenda
shows a tangible instance of policy-oriented learning in that after admitting a
shortcoming, Lagman proceeds to addressing a past problem through a concrete change
in a core policy that fellow legislator Duavit regarded as a critical success factor. Fifth,
the fact that Duavit proposed an amendment provision that pacified previously
opposing/competing camps based on the interpellation between Remulla and Lagman

indicated a certain degree of tangible policy-oriented learning, such that the conflict have
led to a more rigorous evaluation of CARP as a state policy that eventually led to
consideration of policy change in the form of an amendment provision heeding Remulla’s
concern for productivity. Lastly, the relatively quick approval process of the proposal
regarding DAR’s submission of the comprehensive study on determining the right land
size and crop type reflect the magnitude of policymakers’ unanimous distrust in DAR’s
capacity as implementor of CARP and such distrust seems to be borne out of a common
recognition of and learning from DAR’s historical failure to accomplish its policy goals.
B.2. Security of Installation of ARBs/Land Transfer
The deliberations on DAR’s credibility as both a documentor and implementer of
CARP and concerns of productivity touched on the policy issue of exemption.
Subsequently, legislators proceeded to discussing the various ramifications of
maintaining exemptions to CARP coverage. The issue of lands circumventing actual
redistribution has been a major bane in the twenty years of CARP implementation. Yet,
the question on exemptions is not only an issue of coverage but also has inevitable
consequence on guaranteeing security for the overall process of installing ARBs onto
their awarded lands. Legislators appear to heed this interrelation when the substantial
amendments were incorporated into the following: (1) exceptions to the retention limits,
(2) the scope, (3) priorities, (4) award ceilings to the ARBs.
The most vocal opposition to the current practice on exemptions from CARP coverage is
the champions and members of the Bayan Muna coalition. This opposition was clearly shown at a
plenary deliberation on May 27, 2008, when Gabriela Partylist Representative and Bayan Muna
coalition champion Lisa Maza incited RCM champion and CARPER bill sponsor Edcel Lagman
to review the exemption of public domains from CARP coverage:
Rep. Maza: Now to my next point, Madam Speaker, Your Honor, do you agree with me that public
lands that are being tilled by farmers for over a long time should finally be given to them?
Rep. Lagman: Yes, I fully agree with that proposition, distinguished Lady.
Rep. Maza: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, because there are public lands which are not being used
by government but which are exempted under CARP. Like for example, parks, some areas that are
declared forest areas, but as a matter of fact, farmers have been tilling these lands and they are
agricultural lands. And based on the principle of land to the tiller, as one of the main features of
CARP, these farmers tilling these lands should be awarded. But this law, the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law, allows for too many exemptions and exclusion.
Rep. Maza: Let me just cite several. In the Central Mindanao University, there are 400 hectares of
land being tilled by 800 farmers and up to this time, the Central Mindanao University is not using
this land. The farmers have made this land productive and yet, this land cannot be awarded or given
to the farmers just because they are part of the university and cannot be converted.
Rep. Maza: Another example is some parts of the 74,000 hectares of land in Fort Magsaysay, in
Nueva Ecija, which is not being used by the military and which is actually being farmed by the
farmers in that area. Another example is the 33,000 hectares of land in Panay which is part of the
ancestral land of the Tumandoc indigenous peoples and they were occupied by the 3rd infantry
Division of the Philippine Army. And now, the Tumandocs are being removed from their land and
their traditional ancestral land that they had been tilling for ages. So, what is your take on this?
Rep. Lagman: I agree with the distinguished Lady that there are certain exempted lands under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program which we should revisit and possibly cover under the
program. That is precisely the reason why we are extending the the program on land acquisition and
distribution so that we could cover these hitherto exempted lands, otherwise, if we don't extend the
program, how can we cover these lands which the distinguished Lady Has enumerated? But we do
not live by farmlands alone. If the land is forestal, if the land is a sanctuary, if the land is a park, then
there is good reason for these lands to be exempted (Plenary Deliberation 27-May-2008).
It can be inferred from this exchange that both the RCM and the Bayan Muna coalitions
evaluated exemptions to CARP coverage in view of the benevolent intention to improve
the lot of the farmer beneficiaries. These members/advocates of both coalitions believe
that this altruistic intent could only be achieved through conferring the CARP
beneficiaries the irrevocable right to land ownership that the 1987 Constitution and the
CARP law has bequeathed. Accordingly, this right could only be safeguarded if adequate
security in the landownership transfer process is guaranteed. In fact, data presented in the
previous chapter suggests that the issue of security in the process of transferring
landownership to ARBs is the top most policy concern of both CARP proponents and
opponents (Table 6.4) and almost all instances when this issue is counted explicitly or
implicitly call for reforms to improve the security of the entire CARP land transfer
process.
Table 5.9. Frequency of Observations of Security of ARB Installation and

Ownership Transfer as a Policy Core Issue of CARP
Security of ARB Installation & Ownership Transfer Need to Secure ARB Installation & Ownership Transfer
261 254
100% 97%
Rightly so, this concern of security of the land transfer process was shown during the
Bicameral Committee Conference on June 9, 2009, when participating legislators from
all coalitions agreed to incorporate an amendment to the provision (see Table 7.7) on
CARP scope that prevents the redistribution of agricultural lands that are well within the
retention limit of 5 hectares that the CARP law grants. This was to ensure that CARP
beneficiaries who already own lands within the legally specified land hectare limits
would not be subjected to re-distribution. This concern for the security of land ownership
of CARP beneficiaries was further demonstrated when at the same Bicameral Committee
Conference, legislators agreed to include a provision on the section on exceptions to
retention limits a conditional clause ensuring that such exception to retention limits will
not be maliciously used to circumvent CARP coverage (see Table 7.7). This benevolent
intention of providing greater security to the CARP land transfer process is demonstrated
in the following exchange:

Sen. Pimentel: I simply would like to inquire whether or not we are endorsing the idea that lands
already, for example, distributed to land tillers or farmers under the spirit… of the Agrarian Reform
Law may be acquired for these purposes. Because if that is the idea then we are, by this Act,
compelling the return to landlessness of the people who have been previously granted the
rights under the Agrarian Reform Law. Of course there is the provision subject to just
compensation, I would suppose, but the whole idea here is that without any qualification it would
mean that local government units can ride roughshod over the intent of the Agrarian Reform
Law by allowing the expropriation of those lands. I recognize the power, incidentally, the power
to expropriate, but probably we should compel them to provide a suitable replacement for the land
that is being tilled by the farmer-tiller to whom such land previously awarded to him or her would
now be subjected to expropriation. It's a rough idea, I know, Mr. Chairman, but these are by
concerns here.
Rep. Montemayor: The other aspect to this issue is if an area has not yet been acquired by the DAR
for transfer for the Agrarian Reform beneficiaries of the program would no longer have any land to
speak of and they would not enjoy also the just compensation that would be given to the new
landowner. So, that the other aspect to this issue, Mr. Chairman… My concern here is that as far
as I can recall the entitlement of the farmer would be displaced by an exprorpriation
proceeding would probably be only the disturbance compensation. I think it is so many times
the harvest in a given year. However, if before the expropriation takes place the land per component
has arleady been implemented, then the farmer would stand to benefit from any payment for funding
LGU concerns. So, that way, we achieve both the public purpose of setting up the... whatever it is, a
plaza and so on. But the farmer would also be given enough leeway to adjust to a situation where he
ill no longer be working on the land. I think the amendment should be before the expropriation takes
place, the LAD should already have been completed in favor of the qualified agrarian reform
beneficiary [emphasis added](Bicameral Conference Committee, 09-Jun-2009).
Advocacy Coalition Framework Analysis. The statement of Alyansa ng
Bayanihan ng Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at Mangingisda (ABA formerly known
as ABA-AKO) Partylist Representative Leonardo Montemayor explicitly recognizing the
ARBs as the beneficiary of the policy change is a manifestation of a certain degree of
learning from the past failure of CARP as a social justice program to secure the transfer
of landownership to the farmers. This is consistent with Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s
hypothesis that policy change can transpire out of cumulative learning from past
implementation of decades-long policy such as CARP. This policy-oriented learning is
manifested in the inclusion of the phrases “Provided, That lands subject to CARP shall
first undergo the land acquisition and distribution process of the program” and “Provided,
further, That when these lands have been subjected to expropriation, the agrarian reform
beneficiaries therein shall be paid just compensation” (Table 7.7).
Table 5.10. CARP Provisional Amendment: Exceptions to the Retention Limits
POLICY ISSUE ORIGINAL PROVISION (RA RESOLUTION: PROVISION

6657) AMENDMENT (RA 9700)
Retention Section 4 on Scope. The Section 4 on Scope on Coverage is hereby

Limits/Exceptions Comprehensive Agrarian reform Law amended to include the following
of 1988 shall cover, regardless of amendments:
tenurial arrangement and commodity
produced, all public and private
agricultural lands as provided in The Comprehensive Agrarian reform Law of
Proclamation No. 131 and Executive 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial
Order No. 229, including other lands arrangement and commodity produced, all
of the public domain suitable for public and private agricultural lands as
agriculture. provided in Proclamation No. 131 and
Executive Order No. 229, including other
lands of the public domain suitable for
agriculture: Provided, That landholdings of
landowners with a total area of five (5)
hectares and below shall not be covered for
acquisition and distribution to qualified
beneficiaries.
No provision
Section 6 of RA 6657 on Retention Limits is
hereby amended to include a section
following:
6-A. Exception to Retention Limits.

Provincial, city and municipal government
units acquiring private agricultural lands by
expropriation or other modes of acquisition
to be used for actual, direct and exclusive
public purposes, such as roads and bridges,
public markets, school sites, resettlement
sites, local government facilities, public
parks and barangay plazas or squares,
consistent with the approved local
comprehensive land use plan, shall not be
subject to the five (5)-hectare retention limit
under this Section and Sections 70 and 73(a)
of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended:
Provided, That lands subject to CARP shall
first undergo the land acquisition and
distribution process of the program:
Provided, further, That when these lands

have been subjected to expropriation, the
agrarian reform beneficiaries therein shall be
paid just compensation.
No provision SEC. 10. Section 25 of RA 6657 on ward

Ceiling to Beneficiaries is hereby amended
to include the following: For purposes of this
Act, a landless beneficiary is one who owns
less than three (3) hectares of agricultural
land.
In general, the land awarded to a farmer-

beneficiary should be in the form of an
individual title, covering one (1) contiguous
tract or several parcels of land cumulated to
a maximum of three (3) hectares.
However, for the landowners, security of landownership of CARP beneficiaries
could be better guaranteed if a more clearcut set of criteria/qualifications for selecting
ARBs would be implemented. Consequently, landowners persistently sought to clarify
and limit the type of qualified beneficiaries, arguing that the DAR appears to violate their
constitutional rights to property by arbitrarily assigning beneficiaries who they said are
unqualified and unwilling to own and cultivate CARP lands. For them, such a practice
not only violates constitutional rights but also disrupts productivity of farms and
ultimately decimates the viability of the agricultural economy as a whole. This accusation
of a Constitutional violation from landowning legislators generated conflicts between
coalitions on fundamental components of CARP. The conflict was first instigated by
Cebu Third District Representative Pablo Garcia, who at the first House Agrarian Reform
Committee hearing contested the mandatory nature of the rights of CARP beneficiaries to
own lands:
And another thing, under the Constitution, the right to own land is not compulsory. It is a right
that can be waived. You are a farmer, you have cold relations with your landowner; or you are a
farm worker, you do not want to own the land, can you waive your right to own the land? Yes.
And the will protect you. In fact, and I think Mr. Tadeo here can also bear this out, that in the
debates in the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Ople wanted this right to be compulsory
just like the right to receive a minimum wage. But according to the Committee, we are not giving
the land. The farmer has still an obligation to pay; therefore, you cannot force him to accept the
land if he does not want to own the land.
Garcia’s argument that the landownership rights of CARP beneficiaries are waivable
incited a rigorous debate that demonstrated the diametrically opposed policy beliefs of
primarily the RCM and landowner coalitions. The first to respond to this statement was
RCM champion and CARPER bill sponsor Edcel Lagman. A veteran in the agrarian
reform advocacy, Lagman first reminded Garcia and the entire House plenary that
Garcia’s refutation was already answered twenty years ago and then proceeded to rebut
Garcia by citing a section in the law that allows other kinds of farmworkers to qualify as
legitimate beneficiaries:
Many of the issues raised by the distinguished Gentleman from Cebu would be a resurrection of the
debates we had more than… almost twenty (20) years ago… The qualified beneficiary is not
limited to the tiller of the land subject to acquistion. Because in the absence or refusal of the
tiller of the land, there are other qualified beneficiaries enumerated by the law. And let us now
go to Section 22, who are the qualified beneficiaries? And the qualified beneficiaries are not limited
to the actual tillers of the land. So, in this point again, Mr. Chairman, I think, we should be able to
clarify this point. There are other parts I would like to clarify but most probably, that will have to
come later [emphasis added](Albay 1st District Representative Edcel Lagman, Committee Hearing
21-Nov-2007).
Despite this clarification, Garcia insisted on his arguments and quickly proceeded to
knitpick on the specific provisions of the section. This time, he also cited the discussion
of the Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution where the social justice mandate of
CARP is enshrined.
May I immediately respond? Because Section 22 is referred to. I have here a copy of Section 22,
where the landless residents of the same barangay or in the absence thereof, landless residents of
the same municipality. This is the Section which the DARAB or the DAR is relying upon to
designate beneficiaries other than tillers. But please read in full Section 22. Now, these other
beneficiaries must be tillers because they are in the order of priorities. Number 1, agricultural
leases or share tenants, they are tillers; regular farm workers, they are tillers; but regular farm
worker means permanent farm workers. Other farm workers, they are tillers. Actual tillers or
occupants of public lands os that even in public lands you cannot give these lands to the tillers,
under Section 22. Then, if collective beneficiaries or cooperative of the above. And the last, others
directly working in the land. So, the first paragraph of Section 22, other beneficiaries are qualified
by the rest of the paragraph. So, this is a land to the tiller program and Mr. Tadeo here, next time, I
will bring a copy of the records of the Constitutional Commission because Commissioner Tadeo
figured very prominently in the records. It's a land to the tiller program. Under the Constitution...
(interrupted)
That state shall by law undertake an agrarian reform program found it [sic] on the right of the farmer
and regular farm workers who are landless to own directly or collectively the lands they till. And as to
the other farm workers to receive their just share of the fruits thereof. So, if [sic] if you are not a tiller,
and even tillers, they must be permanent, if it is farm worker, permanent farm worker. That's why
Commissioner Rodrigo during that proceedings in that exchange or interchange of comments, and
reactions between Commissioner Tadeo and Commissioner Rodrigo, pointed out what about those who
will only gather the coconuts, pick the coconuts from the tree. They are not enttitled to own lands,
according to Commissioner Tadeo, because they are not tillers. [emphasis added] (Rep. Pablo
Garcia
Lagman responded immediately to clarify Garcia’s interpretation of the CARP law and
the Constitution. Lagman agreed with Garcia that CARP beneficiaries must be tillers but
the law allows other land tillers to qualify as owners of lands that they are not actually
tilling. This, he explained, is allowed to ensure that lands covered under CARP will still
be redistributed and occupied.
I take issue with the distinguished Gentleman from Cebu with respect to his statement that others
who are not the actual tillers of the land are placed as beneficiaries. But I agree that all
beneficiaries should be tillers of the land, but they do not need to be necessarily the actual
tillers of the land subject to acquisition. Because Section 22 mentioned other qualified
beneficiaries. Of course, they should be tillers, they cannot be merchants. They cannot be
professional, but they should be farmer tillers but not necessarily the actual tillers of the land
subject to acquistion. Because in the absence of the actual tillers of the land subject to acquistion.
Because in the absence of the actual tillers of the land subject to acquisition, there are other
beneficiaries who whould be granted the right to till the land. Rep. Edcel Lagman
Just the same, Garcia continued to contest the absolute or compulsory character of the
CARP land redistribution process in succeeding hearings, expressing reservations on the
seeming arbitrary nature of installing another CARP beneficiary if the first targeted
beneficiary hesitates to own the land:

And another thing, another thing, this right to own land is waivable. You cannot force a farmer or
a farm worker to own a land. They can waive it. This is clear from the records of the Constitutional
Commission. But as… as implemented, here is a farmer he says, "You do not want to own the
land, we will replace you." So I think, before we proceed, before we proceed to extend, let us first
define the legal parameters of the law because we want to implement it in accordance with the
Constitution and in accordance with the Agrarian Reform Law, Republic Act 6657 Rep. (Cebu 3rd
District Representative Pablo Garcia Committee Hearing 5-12-2007).
So, for landowners, the problem rests on the greater question of willingness of CARP
beneficiaries to commit to making the awarded lands productive at whatever cost. Thus,
congressional allies of landowners sought to clearly specify the rights and responsibilities
of farmer beneficiaries in order to (1) pacify resistance of affected landowners who feel
that a substantial number of beneficiaries are not qualified or lack the commitment to
make CARP lands productive and (2) provide safeguards for qualified beneficiaries who
are powerless to the abuses and violative manipulations of landowners and DAR agents.
These concerns were adequately articulated by Cavite Third District Representative Jesus
Crispin Remulla from the prominent landowning clan Remullas (Sidel, 1999):
Yes, because my father came from peasant roots, my grandfather was a rice tiller. He was a tenant in
a piece of land. He was given a residential area afterwards, after he stopped tilling the land and of
course, that place is now highly urbanized like in Cavite. Now, how do we make sure that when
we award land to the beneficiary, that the beneficiary would be there to till the land? Can we
not come up with punitive clauses like, if the land remains idle, it would be taken away from
them and give it to others or at least, to make sure that productivity goes on, that a slight decrease in
productivity or maybe, a stop in productivity or in the use of land would disqualify the farmer,
because we are now talking about extending a law which you admitted to be imported [emphasis
added](Cavite 3rd District Rep. Jesus Crispin Remulla, Plenary Deliberations 14-May-2008).
Throughout the deliberations, Garcia persisted to fight for his policy beliefs on the rights
of beneficiaries. In the Bicameral Conference Committee, the final stage to reconcile
differences between the Senate and House approved CARPER bills, he maintained that
the right of CARP beneficiaries to own lands is waivable, a stand opposed by the
Bicameral Conference Committee Chair Honasan. When Garcia cited a provision
allowing farmer beneficiaries to “refuse to exercise their rights or waive their rights,”
Honasan explained that the framers of the 1987 Constitution mandating CARP opposed
the idea of waivers for beneficiaries for it could open doors to circumvention of the
CARP redistribution mandate by landlords. Thus, he cited the following:
Congressman Garcia, we refer to, as basis, to records of the Constitutional Commission…
“Mr. Nolledo: I would like to make a few remarks on the statement of the Committee that the
rights under the land reform program are subject to a waiver…I join Commissioner Ople in his
opinion that the Members of the Committee, in making that statement, are threading on dangerous
grounds…If we adopt the general rule that the rights under the land reform program of the
government are subject to waiver, then we will open the avenue towards circumvention
thereof by the landlords in many subtle ways. So I will agree to the statement of the Committee
that we cannot compel a tenant to assume obligations or to avail of the benefits afforded by
the land reform program. If that statement is given a restrictive meaning because if the tenant
does not avail of the benefits and rights under the land reform program, then he will forfeit
his right and his share…and his share should accrue to other beneficiaries of land reform…”
[emphasis added](Senate Agrarian Reform Committee Chair Gregorio Honasan, Bicameral
Conference Committee 09-Jun-2009).
Upon hearing this, Garcia immediately disagreed, insisting that the stand of the
Constitutional Commission is that the right of the beneficiaries to own lands is waivable.
He explained further that the obligation to own lands and the other accompanying
financial liabilities such as land taxes could not be imposed on the beneficiary. Garcia
supposedly argued in the context of protecting the welfare of the beneficiaries, explaining
that RA 3844, the predecessor of the CARP law RA 6657, guarantees that if the tenant
waives his landownership rights, s/he must not be ejected from the land. This apparent
concern for the welfare of the beneficiary is craftily articulated in Garcia’s concluding
rhetorical question:
So it will be unfair. You are working there. You have relations with your landowner, good relations.
The landowner is getting only one-fourth of the land…of the produce and you are asked to own the
land, is it? I will not because I cannot cultivate the land myself without the landowner. So will
you drive him out of the land? (Cebu 3rd District Representative Pablo Garcia, Bicameral
Conference Committee 09-Jun-2009).
Garcia further exalted the value of non-physical arrangements of land redistribution in
terms of evading the disruption of farm productivity and more importantly, supposedly
guaranteeing security of tenure for farmers/tenants. This policy belief was clearly
explained by the following statement of Garcia:
The trouble is the mindset of the DAR, when they talk of agrarian reform is always physical
distribution…which is hurting our economy, fragmentizing our land. There are… we have
distributed 7 million hectares to almost 5 million beneficiaries. What is the average size of the farm of
a beneficiary? One point four (1.4) hectares. How much will 1.4 hectares produce? In their study—
and that is alreay a very generous study—one hectare will produce 2.5 cavans of rice. Make it three,
so two plantings, six. Six plants at fifteen thousand, that’s ninety thousand. Reduce the cost. We are
actually… if we fragmentize the land if we do not resort to industrialization and modernize
farming, we will become a nation of marginalized and subsistent farming. That is why farm
labor is lawful. It is not correct to say that you have to redistribute all of these lands [emphasis
added](Cebu 3rd District Representative Pablo Garcia, Bicameral Conference Committee 09-Jun-
2009).
At this point, RCM champion Risa Hontiveros warned against the explicit inclusion of
waivers of ownership rights and the restrictions on the qualification for alternative
beneficiaries in cases of such waivers by original beneficiaries. Believing both provisions
might lead to eventual failure of to fulfill its constitutional mandate of social justice,
Hontiveros appealed for the immediate resolution of this legal gap in the CARP law. To
this end, Lagman, another RCM champion, proposed a compromise agreeable to the
opposing parties (RCM and landowners):
Lagman: So that we don’t have to delve into this contentious issue on waiver and the
consequence of waiver is complete forfeiture, most probably we will just eliminate or delete from
lines 12 to 18 from the word unless to beneficiaries and go direct to the point after what we have
already approved…The subsequent sentence would read, “Only when these beneficiaries have all
received three hectares each shall the remaining protion of the landholding, if any, be
redistributed to the other beneficiaries under Section 22, subpar. (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g).
Period. Wala nang iba. Wala nang iba. Is that amenable to you, Pabling?
Garcia: Yes.
[emphasis added](Bicameral Conference Committee 09-Jun-2009).
Hence, after a long ardous debate, the Bicameral Conference Committee agreed to the
following amendment provision on qualified beneficiaries.

Table 5.11. CARP Provisional Amendment: Qualified Beneficiaries
POLICY ISSUE ORIGINAL RESOLUTION: PROVISION AMENDMENT

PROVISION
(RA 6657)
ARB No provision SEC. 8. Section 22. There shall be incorporated after Section 22
Qualifications/ of RA 6657 on Qualified Beneficiaries, as amended, a new
Eligibility to own section to read as follows:
CARP lands
SEC. 22-A. Order of Priority.- A landholding of a landowner
shall be distributed first to qualified beneficiaries under Section
22, subparagraphs (a) and (b) of that same landholding up to a
maximum of three (3) hectares on each. Only when these
beneficiaries have all received three (3) hectares each, shall the
remaining portion of the landholding, if any, be distributed to
other beneficiaries under Section 22, subparagraphs (c), (d), (e),
(f), and (g)
Advocacy Coalition Framework Analysis. This particular amendment provision
on the qualification of beneficiaries is a perfect example of policy change that was
facilitated by the presence of a policy broker. Lagman’s opening sentence “so we don’t
have to delve into…the contentious issue on waiver” demonstrates Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith’s (1994) characterization of policy brokers as policy actors whose “principal
concern is to find some reasonable compromise that will reduce intense tension among
coalitions with conflicting strategies” (Sabatier, 1988, p. 133). Moreover, Lagman’s
proposal is a tangible measure of another characteristic of a policy broker in “keeping the
level of political conflict within acceptable limits and reaching some ‘reasonable’
solution to the problem” (Sabatier, 1988, p. 141). Furthermore, this finding
operationalizes what Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1994) that to a certain extent the
CARPER law is a product of policy-oriented learning in that the amendment provision
(to Sec. 22 on ARB qualification) was first instigated by (1) the presence of intermediate
level of informed conflict between the two coalitions: the RCM and landowners. The
debate/exchange between champions or representative of both coalitions further shows
that the 1) two coalitions each has the technical resources to engage in such a debate as
evidenced by the the citation of legal mandates and Constitutional Commission
proceedings/records and that b) the conflict occurred at the level of secondary aspects
(i.e. specific details) of the two coalition’s belief systems. The latter is important to
consider as Lagman’s proposal was agreeable given that it was an amendment of
statutory nature and not necessarily of deep policy core implications. These two factors
are what Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s framework (1994) cite as the condition for policy
change through policy-oriented. Thus, this particular amendment and the process to
which opposing coalitions diverged and eventually agreed to a workable solution
highlights that the CARPER law appears to have been a product of policy change through
policy-oriented learning.
But then again, for RCM champions, the locus of insecurity lies in the weak
guarantees or lack of safeguards that make patents and certificates of landownership
susceptible to nullification. This should be the focus of any CARP reform on fool
proofing such certificates of land transfer. Hence, in section 24 on the process of
awarding lands to CARP beneficiaries, RCM champions peddled heavily to incorporate
an amendment to the CARP law that renders the land titles of CARP beneficiaries as
indefeasible, i.e. cannot be lost, annulled, or overturned. According to Akbayan Partylist
Representative and a known RCM champion Risa Hontiveros, this provision on
indefeasibility would provide an irrefutable, undeniable, irrevocable, and unequivocal
testament or certification of land ownership by CARP beneficiaries. In the first House

Agrarian Reform committee hearing, she explains the rationale behind this amendment:
Fourth, categorical declaration, the CLOAs, and other titles issued under any Agrarian Reform
Program shall be indefeasible one year form registration to avoid the delaying tactics by landowners.
So ung pong mga malalaking panginoong maylupa na pinakahumaharang sa pagpapatupdad ng
CARP sa paggamit ng mga legal technicalities at sila and pangunahing gumagawa ng karahasang
agraryo laban sa mga farmer beneficiaries nais tugunan nitong pagtaguyod ng mga CLOA, mga
titulo indefeasible after a certain period, reasonable period (Akbayan Partylist Representative Ana
Theresia "Risa" Hontiveros-Baraquel, Committee Hearing 21-Nov-2007).
Representatives of RCM coalition member organizations corroborated Hontiveros’
proposal by sharing and using their experiences in unjust cancellation of CLOAs or
awarded land titles as justification for CARP extension and reforms:
…mga kaseguruhan ng mga magsasaka tungkol po…usapin po dito sa mga EP/CLOA. Linalaman
po kasi ng batas, partikular (particular) po 'yung House Bill 1257 na kung saan nililinaw po dito sa
provision na ito 'yung suporta (support), kasuportahan (support), kaseguruhan ng mga magsasaka
na nagmamay-ari ng EP/CLOA.
…security of farmers regarding…the matter on EP/CLOA. The extension law proposal

provides, particularly the House Bill 1257, support and security to farmer who holds EPs/CLOAs.
[translation by author][emphasis added](Manuel Rosario. Member, Pambansang Katipunan ng mga
Samahan sa Kanayunan, Public Hearing 06-Mar-2008).
Kangina sinasabi rin po 'yung bigay-bawi ng CLOA. Ito rin po ay aming tinututukan doon sa
ginawa namin sa 1257. Ang sabi po namin doon tigilan na ang bigay-bawi. Pag ibinigay, ibinigay.
Wala na pong bawian. At kung makakalipas po ang isang taon at walang magku-question nung
titulo niyo, hindi na po pupuwededng kuwestiyunin (question) ng kahit na sino. 'Yan po ang
sinasabi namin doon indefeasibility of CLOA na clause
The confiscation of the CLOA was mentioned a while ago. We are focused on this with our work
on [HB] 1257. We proposed through the bill to end this ambiguous granting and revocation. When
it’s given, it’s given. No more confiscation. And when a year passes without anyone questioning
your claim/title, the title should no longer be question by anyone. That is what we mean by the
clause on the indefeasibility of CLOA [translation by author][emphasis added](Elvie Baladlad.
Representative, Panlalawigang Koalisyon ng mga Kababaihan sa Kanayunan, Public Hearing 06-
Mar-2008).
Member organizations of the Bayan Muna Coalition also shared exposés on the many
instances of revocation of awarded CARP land titles. However, unlike the RCM
representatives, these organizations use their examples/experience as justification for the
non-extension of CARP:
Sa Sorsogon po pinapasok po ang mga beneficiary ng CARP doon sa Hacienda Berenguer nagkaroon
pa po ng dramatic entrance kasama ang regional director ng DAR, ngunit pag-alis din ng regional
director ng DAR, sinugod ng mga armadong mga security guard ang hacienda 'yong mga magbubukid,
pinagpapalo. Hanggang sa kasalukuyan nandodoon pa rin sila; walang lupa. May mga nakakaso,
thirty-seven (37) ang may kaso at ngayon dalawa pa ang nasa kulungan. Iyan po ang kalagayan sa
Bicol Region. Kaya 'yon pong pagpapatuloy sa repormang agraryo suportado po kami. Mariin po
naming sinusuportahan 'yong agrarian reform pero hindi po 'yong CARP. Sinusuportahan po namin
'yong House Bill 3059
In Sorsogon, CARP beneficiaries are raided in Hacienda Berenguer. The regional director of DAR had
a dramatic entrance, but when the director left, the beneficiaries were attacked by armed security guards
of the hacienda. Until now, the CARP beneficiaries remain landless. Some were sued, 37 of them have
cases while two were incarcerated. That is the situation in the Bicol Region. That is why we support
continuing the agrarian reform but not CARP. We support House Bill 3059. (Tino Jerus, OIC
Chairman, Barangay Agrarian Reform Council, Bicol Region, 06-Mar-2008).
The many exposés of revocation of CLOAs served as strong evidence and impetus for
such an agreement to be reached even between two historically diametrically opposed
coalitions that during the Bicameral Conference Committee, the clause on indefeasibility
of CARP was quickly approved without question at all or any long
deliberation/contestation:
Table 5.12. CARP Provisional Amendment: Indefeasibility of CLOAs and Rights

of CARP Beneficiaries
POLICY ORIGINAL PROVISION (RA 6657) RESOLUTION: PROVISION

ISSUE AMENDMENT (RA 9700)
ARB Section 24. Award to Beneficiaries. The SEC. 9. Section 24 OF RA 6657 on Award
Qualifications rights and responsibilities of the to Beneficiaries is hereby amended to
and Conditional beneficiary shall commence from the include the following:
Rights time the DAR makes an award of the
land to him, which award shall be The rights and responsibilities of the
completed within one hundred eighty beneficiary shall commence from their
(180) days from the time the DAR takes receipt of a duly registered emancipation
actual possession of the land. Ownership patent or certificate of landownership award
of the beneficiary shall be evidenced by a (CLOA) and their actual actual physical
Certificate of Land Ownership Award, possession of the awarded land. Such award
which shall contain the restrictions and shall be completed in not more than one
conditions provided for in this Act, and hundred eighty (180) days from date of
shall be recorded in the Register of Deeds registration of the title in in the name of the
concerned and annotated on the Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That
Certificate of Title. the emancipation patents, the certificates of
land ownership award, and other titles
issued under any agrarian reform program
shall be indefeasible and imprescriptible
after one (1) year from its registration with
the Office of the Registry of Deeds, subject
to conditions, limitations, and qualifications
of this Act, the property registration decree,
and other pertinent laws. The emancipation
patents or the certificate of land ownership
award being titles brought under operation
of the torrens system, are conferred with the
same indefeasiblity and security afforded to
all titles under the said system, as provided
for by Presidential Decree No. 1529, as
amended by Republic Act No. 6732.
Identified and qualified agrarian reform

beneficiaries, based on Section 22 of
Republic Act No. 6657, as amended shall
have usufructuary rights over the awarded
land as soon as the DAR takes possession
of such land, and such right shall not be
diminished even pending the awarding of
the emancipation patent or the certificate of
land ownership award.
Advocacy Coalition Framework Analysis. Perhaps both coalitions agreed to
reform this important component of CARP as both CARP beneficiaries and landowners
are parties to the land transfer process and are hence commonly affected by the issue on
the defeasibility or improper cancellation of land titles. After all, the issue on cancellation
of land titles is not exclusive to CARP beneficiaires. Landowners also complained how
their own landownership titles are transferred to the beneficiaries even without full
compensation. Thus, the speed at which this decision is reached suggests that a certain
degree of learning from past implementation problems materialized. More importantly,
the fact that both coalitions overcame differences in this particular instance is a tangible
deviation from the archetypal or historical enmity/hostility between pro-land reform
coalition and landowners. Such deviation qualifies as a behavioral alteration that is
consistent with Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s definition of policy-oriented learning as
“relatively enduring alterations of thought or behavioral intentions which result from
experience and which are concerned with the attainment (or revision) of policy
objectives” (Sabatier, 1988, p. 133; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1994, p. 182).
Then again, this convergence is limited as expected. The common experience of
injustice of land title cancellation that both CARP beneficiaries and landowners share that
facilitated the agreement of the indefeasibility of CLOAs becomes the very avenue for
the true divergence of beliefs between the two coalitions to be highlighted. When
landowning Cebu Third District Representative Pablo Garcia described the so-called
illegal practice of DAR to cancel unsurrendered Owner’s duplicate title, he accused DAR
of harmful prejudice/bias against landowners, citing the normative principles of equal
protection of law:
Also another illegal practice of the DAR, this issuance of CLOAs under the Land Registration Law,
Act 496 as amended by that decreee, Presidential Decree, I think, 1125, you cannot cancel the title of
the landowner without surrendering the Owner's Duplicate Certficiate of Title, that is in the law
and that has not been amended until now. But what happened? Now, if the landowner does not
surrender or present his Owner's Duplicate Certificate of Title in case there is a process, there is a
petition in court informing the owner to surrender his certificate of title in order that the original can be
cancelled. But what happened? In Cebu, in Negros and possibly other places, the owners still hold their
Duplicate Certificate of Title but the original in the office of the Register of Deeds has already been
cancelled. That is clearly patently illegal. But there is, I think and I should, I believe the Land
Registration Authority should also be informed that what they are doing because of their MOA is
against the law [emphasis added](Cebu 3rd District Representative Pablo Garcia, Committee Hearing,
21-Nov-2007).
shall be deprived of his… life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the law. The law protects the landowner but that is disregarded
by DAR and LRA. At one time, Secretary Garilao issued a Memorandum to all RDs, Provincial
Officers not anymore to issue a CLOA because of the decision fo the Supreme Court in Association
of Small Land Owners versus secretary of DAR. Do not issue CLOAs until there is proof that the
owners have fully paid. But this has also been disregarded [emphasis added](Cebu 3rd District
Representative Pablo Garcia, Committee Hearing 21-Nov-2007).
RCM champion and sponsor of House CARPER bill (1257) Akbayan Partylist
Representative Risa Hontiveros come to the defense of DAR, clarifying that CARP is
not an ordinary transaction that does not depend or wait for the voluntary concession
of landowners but a mandatory social justice program:
Lastly, for this afternoon, Mr. Chairman, on P.D. 1125 what the good gentleman from Cebu was
referring to should be deal to cover regular transactions involving lands for the landowners's copy of
the certificate of title. It must be surrendered before it can be cancelled but CARP is not an ordinary
transaction but an exercise of the police power of the State. If we follow the procedure explained
by the good gentleman from Cebu then it would be very easy to defeat our very own program
by the mere existence of refusal by the landowners to surrender their copy of the certificate of
title [emphasis added](Akbayan Partylist Representative Ana Theresia "Risa" Hontiveros-Baraquel,
Committee Meeting 21-Nov-2007).
The degree of conflict was further demonstrated when Garcia did not concede but
insisted that his policy belief has a legal basis:
Mr. Chairman, a quick response. Republic Act 3844 in the records of the Constitution Commission
upon the queries by the members notably Commissioner Davide, Commissioner Maambong asking
the chairman whether the passage of another law, Republic Act 3844 will still be enforce [sic] and
the answer, the loud answer is yes.
In fact, Commissioner Tadeo quoted portions of the Republic Act 3844. And regarding the
Presidential Decree No. 946 that is also included, it is not repealed in Republic Act 6657. And as
to the procedure even during the darkest days of Martial Law, even during the darkest days of
Martial Law, in the exercise by the government of the right of imminent domain, Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court or expropriation was resorted to. There was no single instance when land even under
the Land Reform Program was forcibly acquired under compulsoy acquisition by the DAR it was
always through expropriation proceedings (Cebu 3rd District Representative Pablo Garcia).
Immediately, RCM champion and Albay First District Representative Edcel Lagman
clarified and asserted that R.A. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988 repeals all other laws including RA 3844 that Garcia kept on citing, which will now
be suppletory. This repealing power is warranted by Section 75 of R.A. 6657. At a later
deliberation, Lagman even countered Garcia’s arguments by reverse accusation:
We are not, in any way, endorsing a confiscatory mode to deprive just compensation to the
landowners. That is never the intention and that is not the state of the law at the moment. If there are
problems with respect to land compensation, it is because landowners have controverted the
valuation made by the DAR and the Landbank, so much so that they refused to receive payment,
pending resolution of the cases they have filed before the judicial forum (Albay 1st District
Representative Edcel Lagman, Plenary Deliberations 19-May-2009).
This conflict continued until the Bicameral Conference Committee where Garcia raised
again the issue of unsettled just compensation vis-à-vis the process of transferring land
titles. Garcia cited a Supreme Court ruling and a Land Registration Authority (LRA)
administrative circular stipulating that complete transfer of land title can only happen
upon full payment of the compensation to respective landowners. This citation was
readily contested by Hontiveros who reminded Garcia and the rest of the committee that
“even before the issuance of an emancipation patent or CLOA to the agrarian reform
beneficiary…the title transfers to the republic” (Bicameral Conference Committee, 09-
Jun-2009, p. 128). Hontiveros further explained that “when there is an issuance of RP
title under the Torrens system, in effect, there is a cancellation of the landowners title
even while the farmer beneficiary is stil paying amortizations on the land awarded to him
or her. So there cannot be two titles to one piece of land, to one piece of property”
(Bicameral Conference Committee, 09-Jun-2009, p. 128). Yet again, Garcia insisted that
the Supreme Court ruling holds. At this point, Lagman mediated by first consulting with
the DAR official the current practice of DAR on the matter of landowners’ compensation
and subsequently providing a workable compromise that pacified the rest of the
committee members. The DAR official clarified that “before a title is cancelled in favor
of the Republic of the Philippines, the Land Bank issues a…certificate of payment,
a…COD. The landowners is presumed to have been paid…cash portion and bonds
equivalent to the total value of the landholding beind covered” (Bicameral Conference
Committee, 09-Jun-2009). Hearing this, the committee deliberated on the technicalities
until Lagman himself suggested a provision that the rest agreed to. Thus, Lagman
proposed to add the following paragraph on Section 24 on Award to Beneficiaries:
It is the ministerial duty of the Register of Deeds to register the title of the land in the name of the
Republic after the Land Bank of the Philippines has certified that the landowner has been fully paid
his compensation in cash, as well as in bond. And also to register the CLOAs issued to the
beneficiaries (Bicameral Conference Committee, 09-Jun-2009)
Garcia finally agreed to this but added a clause as “provided as confirmed by the owner”
and so the final provision read as how it is enacted in the CARPER law (see Table 5.13).
Table 5.13. CARP Provisional Amendment: Just Compensation and Cancellation of the
Title of Landowners
ORIGINAL
RESOLUTION: PROVISION AMENDMENT
POLICY ISSUE PROVISION
(RA 9700)
(RA 6657)
Just Compensation No provision Section 24. Award to Beneficiaries is hereby amended to include the
and Cancellation of following provision:
Landowners’ Title
It is the ministerial duty of the Office of the Register of Deeds to register
the title of the land in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, after the
Land Bank of the Philippines has certified the necessary deposit in the
name of the landowner constituting full payment in cash or in bond with
due notice to the landowner and the registration of the certificate of land
ownership award issued to the beneficiaries, and to cancel previous titles
pertaining thereto.
Advocacy Coalition Framework Analysis. This amendment yet again
demonstrates the Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1994) in
four ways. First, it operationalizes Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s theory (1994) that
competing or conflicting beliefs and the ensuing tension and debates lead to a beneficial
clarification that eventually leads to substantial policy reform or what the Advocacy
Coalition Framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1994) refers to as policy change.
Secondly, the deliberations on the process of cancelling landowners’ titles heeds the
relative failure by the DAR/pertinent government agencies (Register of Deeds and LRA)
to properly coordinate the cancellation procedure. This provisional response is evidenced
yet again that a certain extent of policy-oriented learning transpired among supposedly
competing coalitions. Thirdly, the deliberations behind the amendment also show that
policy-oriented learning and clarification was possible because the conflict was at what
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1994) calls a secondary aspect (i.e. specific policy details)
level that could be more easily resolved through re-phrasing or linguistic modifications.
Fourthly and more importantly, the deliberations on this particular provision highlights
the important role of policy brokers in reducing the tension between competing coalitions
through the pursuit of workable compromises or solutions to conflicting policy beliefs or
strategies (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1994).
Although the abovementioned provision provided better security and order in the
transfer of land titles per se, further 14th Congressional deliberations show that it was
insufficient in addressing the longstanding and crosscutting issue of just compensation.
That is, after 20 years of CARP implementation, it remains a problem that adversely
impacted the security of the land transfer process for both landowners and farmer
beneficiaries. While the Constitution clearly provides for this in part to grant equal justice
for all, i.e. for both those lands are taken away (landowners) and those who are given
lands (landless farmer beneficiaries), discussions at the House Agrarian Reform
Committee and plenary deliberations show that it has been an elusive principle that
CARP has failed to exercise. Such a failure was demonstrated by furthers statements
from all three coalitions involved in the House of Representatives deliberations.
At a plenary deliberation, Bulacan Second District Representative Pedro Pancho,
a supporter of the amenbmdent bill sponsored by the RCM coalition, recommended
prioritizing the delivery of government support to CARP beneficiaries to aid them in
settling the just compensation to landowners:
I am sorry to tell, Mr. Chairman, but I am happy to say that, all the bills are very good for the
extenstion of distribution of lands. Pero may isang pagkakamali po tayo rito, eh, kahit itanong po
natin sa magsasaka, kailangan unahin po natin kung ibibigay na sa kanila, kumita sila sa
pagbubungkal...kumita po ba kayo sa pagbubungkal ng inyung lupa? So, sa makatuwid nabayaran
po natin lahat ng lupa? Pag hindi po kayo nakabayad, ibig sahihin po hindi tayo kumita sa
pagbubungkal ng lupa. Kailangan isama po natin dito… sapagkat kung kikita po ang magsasaka sa
pagbubungkal ng lupa (But we have one mistake. Even if we ask the farmers, we need to prioritize
helping the farmers to earn from farming…[we should ask them] did you earn from your land? In
other words, were they able to fully pay the land? If not, it means the farmers are not earning
from tilling their lands) there is not [sic] need of billion financing to support the farmers for
paying their obligations [translation by author][emphasis added](Bulacan 2nd District
Representative Pedro M. Pancho, Plenary Deliberations 23-Apr-2008).
Again, just compensation remains elusive given the inability of farmers to pay on time or
the state to guarantee full compensation. For landowners, this is a source of insecurity.
For CARP beneficiaries, the complex payment scheme and the lack of credit support
disables them to settle full compensation to landowners. As a consequence, agrarian cases
ensue and increase in number, as beneficiaries default and questions on the real
ownership of beneficiaries arises, thereby undermining the security of the entire
landownership transfer process. Given this, actual landowners at different committee

hearings and plenary deliberation opined on this issue of just compensation/inability of
beneficiaries and/or the state to fully compensate.
So what is wrong? That is wrong at all? Why should we be afraid to meet with the landowners?
They have the source of the land to whom you... for distribution. Maybe, they have also their
concerns. So many of these landowners have not been paid. It is so easy to say, take all the lands
and give it all. If that is the desire, just confiscate all lands, commercial, industrial, urban, including
houses, finish. But we are not going to do that. We are only talking of agricultural lands…
… Number four, the landowners have not been properly paid. According to the German study
with the DAR, the average price paid for the rice lands was only about P8,000.00 to P10,000.00.
And for the rest of the other lands, other agricultural lands, the average price was only P50,000.00.
that is payable for ten years, 25% cash and they receive funds. How do you expect the landowner to
invest in industries, in packaging, in processing in the countryside which is the secret of why
Vietnam has succeeded, Vietnam who came after us? They succeeded because they invested in
packaging and processing and they are exporting it. So the Thailand and the rest [emphasis
added](Mr. Eduardo F. Hernandez, Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, Landowner
Representative, Committee Hearing 05-Dec-2007).
For Bayan Muna coalition champions such as Bayan Muna Partylist
Representatives Teddy Casiño and Satur Ocampo, the problem on just compensation lies
more specifically on the complex payment scheme that CARP beneficiaries could not
afford. Casiño explained that after paying amortizations for 30 years with an annual
interest of 6%, the CARP beneficiary becomes in his words a slave of the bank and no
longer of the landowner. This hefty payment scheme, according to him, is the reason why
many beneficiaries go on default and get their titles or patents cancelled and why DAR’s
quasi-judicial body is congested with almost 50,000 cases of contested cancellations
(Public Hearing, 07-Mar-2008). Given this, Ocampo at a separate hearing recommends
that considering the difficulty beneficiaries encounter with the payment scheme, “it is the
sovereign responsibility” of the state to return the cancelled titles to beneficiaries and
help them increase production through better support services. Ocampo also suggested
that in cases where land was acquired through legal and just means, just compensation
should be given under a more conscientious formula that takes into account many factors.
Otherwise, Ocampo asserts that the social justice principle must be upheld if lands were
previously acquired through malicious and exploitive means (Public Hearing, 06-Mar-
2008).
In view of these statements, a proposal was considered to lessen the amount of
just compensation. The proposal was raised by RCM champion Lagman at the Bicameral
Conference Committee. Lagman cited the proposal of reducing the amount of
compensation from 100% to 70% of zonal value, which was incorporated in the approved
Senate Bill version and suggested but not adopted in the final House bill version:
There are similar proposals in the House, which were not incorporated because they were not finally
proposed during the period of amendments or committee amendments. But I recall that in the case of
Congressman Villafuerte, he was willing to provide for 70% of the zonal valuation. That is my
recollection... I don’t know whether the companies would agree that instead of a one hundred
percent (100%) zonal valuation, it should be 30% of the zonal…70% of the zonal valuation.
Because, anyway, the zonal valuations are revised very regularly by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
Just, just a suggestion. I’m just trying to relate to this meeting the idea of the Honorable Villafuerte
(Bicamerla Conference Committee, 09-Jun-2009).
Garcia raised a point of information, citing a Supreme Court ruling that maintained
“the valuation for the dermination of the valuation made by DAR is only preliminary
because the fixing of just compensation is a judicial question” (Bicameral Conference
Committee, 09-Jun-2009, p. 112). This is the reason, Garcia recalled, why the first
CARP law (RA 6657) provides for special agrarian reform courts whose jurisdiction is
to cover cases involving the fixing of just compensation. Lagman heeded this legalistic
reminder and agreed to add this condition in the final provision, arguing that “ there is
no harm in providing that it should be 70% of the zonal valuation because, anyway,
the court will have to make the final determination” (Bicameral Conference
Committee, 09-Jun-2009, p. 112). With this agreement, the Bicameral Conference
Committee proceeded to adopt the final version as stated (in the table below):
Table 5.14. CARP Provisional Amendment: Amount and Affordability of Just

Compensation to Landowners
RESOLUTION: PROVISION
POLICY ISSUE ORIGINAL PROVISION (RA 6657)
AMENDMENT (RA 9700)
Amount and Section 17 on Just Compensation. In Section 17 of RA 6657 on Just
Affordability of determining just compensation, the cost Compensation is hereby amended: In
Just of acquisition of the land, the current determining just compensation, the cost of
Compensation to value of like properties, its nature, actual acquisition of the land, the current value
Landowners use and income, the sworn valuation by of like properties, its nature, actual use
the owner, the tax declarations, and the and income, the formula by the DAR shall
assessment made by government be considered, sworn valuation by the
assessors shall be considered. The social owner, the tax declarations, the
and economic benefits contributed by the assessment made by government
farmers and the farmworkers and by the assessors, and seventy percent (70%) of
Government to the property as well as the zonal valuation of the Bureau of
the non-payment of taxes or loans Internal Revenue (BIR), translated into a
secured from any government financing basic formula by the DAR shall be
institution on the said land shall be considered, subject to the final decision of
considered as additional factors to the proper court. The social and economic
determine its valuation. benefits contributed by the farmers and
the farmworkers and by the Government
to the property as well as the non-payment
of taxes or loans secured from any
government financing institution on the
said land shall be considered as additional
factors to determine its valuation.
Advocacy Coalition Framework Analysis. This amendment is again consistent
with the tenets of the ACF (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1994) in two ways. First, it is a
product of policy-oriented learning by being the final output of intense discussions on the
problems from past implementation of CARP. Second, the role of policy brokers is yet
again important in allowing for significant policy change. Albay First District
Representative Lagman in the entire course of Congressional deliberations has proven to
fit the role perfectly.
Another noteworthy policy change to address the issue of affordability of just
compensation was adopted to the benefit of beneficiaries (see Table 12 below).

Table 5.15. CARP Provisional Amendment: Affordability of Just Compensation

for CARP Beneficiaries
POLICY RESOLUTION: PROVISION AMENDMENT

ORIGINAL PROVISION (RA 6657)
ISSUE (RA 9700)
Inability or Section 26. Payment by Beneficiaries. Lands
affordability of awarded pursuant to this Act shall be paid for SEC. 11. Section 26 of RA 6657 on Payment by
Payment to by the beneficiaries to the LBP in thirty (30) Beneficiaries is hereby amended:
Beneficiaries annual amortizations at six percent (6%)
interest per annum. The payments for the first Lands awarded pursuant to this Act shall be paid
three (3) years after the award may be at for by the beneficiaries to the LBP in thirty (30)
reduced amounts as established by the PARC: annual amortizations at six percent (6%) interest
Provided, That the first five (5) annual per annum. The annual amortization shall start
payments may not be more than five percent one (1) year from the date of the certificate of
(5%) of the value of the annual gross land ownership award registration. However, if
production as established by the DAR. Should the occupancy took place after the certificate of
the scheduled annual payments after the fifth land ownership registration, the amortization shall
year exceed ten percent (10%) of the annual start one (1) year from actual occupancy. The
gross production and the failure to produce payments for the first three (3) years after the
accordingly is not due to the beneficiary's award shall be at reduced amounts as established
fault, the LBP may reduce the interest rate or by the PARC: Provided, That the first five (5)
reduce the principal obligation to make the annual payments may not be more than five
repayment affordable. percent (5%) of the value of the annual gross
production as established by the DAR. Should the
scheduled annual payments after the fifth (5th)
year exceed ten percent (10%) of the annual gross
production and the failure to produce accordingly
is not due to the beneficiary's fault, the LBP shall
reduce the interest rate and/or reduce the principal
obligation to make the repayment affordable.
It is equally important to note that the provision abovementioned was approved
without question. At the Bicameral Conference Committee, no objection was raised. Yet
again, the speed and ease of its approval is a testament to the extent of policy-oriented
learning that occurred among coalitions after lengthy deliberations that shed light on the
severity of the practical problem of the amount and the timeline in settling just
compensation to landowners.
Related to the issue of just compensation is the prevalence of land selling,
mortgaging, re-classification, and conversion, which both experts and stakeholders see as
another stumbling block to the proper or smooth transfer of lands to the CARP
beneficiaries. Indeed, the lengthy deliberations at the House of Representatives
demonstrate the seriousness of the policy issue.
The problem on land conversion is quite prevalent that all three coalitions raised
issue with it all throughout the Congressional deliberations on the CARPER law. At the
second House Agrarian Reform Committee hearing, Rene Peñas, a member of the
Sumilao Farmers who marched from Bukidnon all the way to Metro Manila, shares the
experience of his group in being displaced because of a contested case of land conversion
by the incumbent owner of the lands they are fighting for:
Isa lang po 'yung position namin. Kahit ganito maraming butas ang batas na Agrarian Reform Law
ngunit kami ay naniniwala na kailangan pa rin to ng mga magsasaka na walang lupa sa Pilipinas.
Dahil kung wala po tayong batas at walang programang sinusunod lalo na tayong magkakagulu-
gulo dahil wala tayong batas na sinusundan at programa. Bagamat ngunit ganyan siya, marami
siyang butas, ngunit nananawagan pa rin kami na i-extend ang repormang agraryo ngunit with
reform. Kung ano mang ang mga butas at kakulangan sa batas na iyan ay dapat iyon ang pag-
uusapan sa Kongreso. Pa'no sila mapunang ang mga kakulangan ng batas na iyan. Dahil sa ngayon
kahit twenty years na ang pakikipaglaban ng Sumilao Farmers sa kanyang karapatan sa lupa, mula
sa hunger strike hanggang ngayon sa paglalakad mula Bukidnon hanggang Maynila kung saan
tinatag namin ang halos 1,600 kilometers ngunit naniniwala kami na ang aming ginagawa ay isang
protestang mapayapa at mapaabot sa ating gobyerno ang mga hinaing ng Sumilao Farmers. Kaya
naniniwala rin kami na mayron rin mga rules diyan sa batas na pinaninindigan namin na hanggang
ngayon ay naniniwala kami na kung ang DAR mismo ay tingnan lamang ang merito ng kaso na ito
at petition ng Sumilao Farmers kami ay naniniwala na mapapasa amin pa rin ang lupa na iyan, ang
144 hectares…Maliwanag naman at malinaw sa ating DARAB Administrative Order No. 1, series
of 2002 na kapag naaprubahan na ang conversion ay dapat tapusin mo sa loob na limang taon at
lalong pinatibay ng Memorandum Circular No. 20, series of 2004 na kapag nabenta ang lupa sa
isang tao, obligado po siyang sunding kung ano po ang nakasulat sa inaplayan na conversion.
Maliwanag din na sinasabi ng Memorandum Circular na iyan na dapat kung may violation dapat i-
revoke ang application for conversion at mag-issue ng notice of coverage. Kahit ganyan man,
pinaglaban pa rin namin na matino ang repormang agraryo with reform. Maraming salamat po
We only have one position. Although the [Comprehensive] Agrarian Reform Law is full of
loopholes, we still believe it is necessary for landless farmers in the Philippines. Because without a
law, we won’t have a program to follow and we will experience more disorder because there is not
law and program to follow. Although it has many loopholes, we still call for the extension of
agrarian reform albeit with reform. Whatever loopholes and shortcomings the law has should be
discuss in Congress…how can those shortcomings be addressed. Because now after tweny years of
fighting by Sumilao Farmers for their rights to own land, from hunger strike to marching from
Bukidnon to Manila where we chartered almost 1,600 kilometers, we still believe that what we are
doing is a peaceful protest that we hope the government would heed the plea of Sumilao Farmers.
We also believe that there are rules in the law that we staunchly believe if DAR will only see the
merits of the case and petition of Sumilao Farmers, we believe will grant us that land, the 144
hectares… It’s clear in the DARAB Administrative Order No. 1, series of 2002 that if the
conversion is approved, it should be finished within five years and this is reinforced by
Memorandum Circular No. 20, series of 2004 that if the land is sold to a person, the person is
obligated to follow whatever instructions are written on the conversion application. That
Memorandun Circular also clearly says that if a violation is incurred, the application for
conversion should be revoked and a notice of coverage should be issued. Nevertheless, we
continue to fight properly for the agrarian reform… with reform. Thank you very much [translation
by author][emphasis added](Rene Peñas, Member, Sumilao Farmers, Committee Hearing 05-Dec-
2007).
This statement highlights the technical nature of land conversion. In fact, this technical
character reverberates across the lengthy deliberations on land conversion, selling, or
mortgaging. In fact, at a plenary deliberation (plenary deliberations, 26-May-2008),
Negros Oriental Third District Representative Henry Pryde Teves cited a study by the
Center for Peasant Education Services, which finds that in Souther Tagalo and Central
Luzon, three out of five beneficiaries have sold their rights or mortgaged them. To
confirm this, Teves requested more accurate statistics on land selling/mortgaging. As a
sponsor of the consolidated CARPER bill, Lagman responded by directing the request to
DAR. Hearing this, Teves explained that the rationale for his request is to ensure that
before undergoing a full-blown distribution again, lands would not be abandoned so they
are made productive and tax paying. Lagman acknowledged this concern and assured
Teves that such is also the reason behind the RCM coalition proposal to increase fund
allocation for support services from 25% to 40%.
Other landowning legislators, on the other hand, were more provocative in
expressing their concern for the phenomenon of land selling/mortgaging/conversion.
At the last few plenary deliberations, Cavite Third District Representative Jesus
Crispin Remulla, from the known landed Remulla clan (Sidel, 1999) implies that the
prevalence of land selling is an indicator of failure, particularly of the negative impact

of CARP’s land redistribution process to farm productivity:
CLOA have been sold. None of children of the farmers want to farm anymore and when you
award the land, it would just wait forever until it is sold again after ten years. How do we solve
this problem of productivity of the land? If the land is already productive and you divide it now
and parcel it out, will it not disturb our agricultural productivity, the way it is going right now
[emphasis added](Plenary Deliberations, 26-May-2008).
Hearing this question on productivity, Lagman concedes that CARP is not a perfect
program in as much as its beneficiaries are not perfect. Still, Lagman answers
Remulla’s questions by reiterating the proposal to increase the support services from
25% to 40% to properly support beneficiaries and maintain farm viability:
Distinguished Gentleman from Cavite, as I have said earlier, there are so many imperfections in
the program and some agrarian reforms beneficiaries are not perfect. So, some of them, most
probably, mortgaged or sold to enterprising businessmen or former landlords or landlords, the land
they have acquired under the program. But, most probably, in order to solve this temptation to
alienate or encumber these precious farmlands is to increase the support services coming from
the government so that production, post-harvest facilities, marketing activities could be funded from
these support services including rural credit. So, this bill would include a component of increasing
the support services from the present 25% to 40%. In that way, we would be able to really support
the agrarian reform beneficiary in terms of varied aspects of support services [emphasis
added](Plenary Deliberations, 26-May-2008).
Remulla, however, remained unconvinced and insisted on the proper and a more in-depth
assessment of how successful CARP has been in supporting the farmer beneficiary.
Citing the 20 years of CARP implementation, he places the blame on the implementing
agency, i.e. DAR, which he thought is inefficient:
farmer-beneficiary. Twenty years have gone by, enough time has been given, so many
secretaries, so many President have gone by and yet after 20 years, it seems to be that the
inefficiency is quite alarming because we have to extend it for another five years. Don't you
think that the problem is the implementing agency also? [emphasis added](Plenary
At this point, Lagman agrees to Remulla that there is a greater need to exact
accountability on the progress of CARP from DAR and other implementing agencies.
Hearing this acknowledgment, Remulla shares that his father hails from peasant roots (i.e.
was with land) and proceeds to suggest punishments to or disqualification of beneficiaries
if awarded lands are left idle:
Yes, because my father came from peasant roots, my grandfather was a rice tiller. He was a tenant in
a piece of land. He was given a residential area afterwards, after he stopped tilling the land and of
course, that place is now highly urbanized like in Cavite. Now, how do we make sure that when we
award land to the beneficiary, that the beneficiary would be there to till the land? Can we not come
up with punitive clauses like, if the land remains idle, it would be taken away from them and
give it to others or at least, to make sure that productivity goes on, that a slight decrease in
productivity or maybe, a stop in productivity or in the use of land would disqualify the farmer,
because we are now talking about extending a law which you admitted to be imported (Plenary
Seemingly concerned with this proposal, Lagman cautions that even if CARP is not a
perfect law, these imperfections should not detract the Philippine Government from
pursuing a constitutional mandate to dispense social justice through program like
CARP. For Lagman, this Constitutional mandate is above any implementation
problem:
Well, there is no perfect law, Madam Speaker, distinguished Gentleman. It is a truism that we do not
pass here in Congress perfect laws. That is why no law is irrepealable because it is subject to
amendments, modifications, or even scrapping. But the mere fact that its implementation is not
perfect, does not detract from the constitutional mandate that we we will have to undertake an
agrarian reform program and we will have to distribute justify all agricultural lands. That is
the mandate of the Constitution and we will have to bow to that mandate. (Plenary
Deliberations, 26-May-2008)
In this particular exchange, the concession or acknowledgment of Lagman of CARP’s
implementation problems and failures in itself is an indicator of policy-oriented
learning. It may well be the first tangible step towards a significant policy change.
At later deliberations, Lagman was more straightforward in responding to
challenges and contestations from other competing coalitions. Such was shown during
the interpellations by Bayan Muna Partylist Teddy Casiño and Representative Lisa
Maza from the Gabriela Partylist, a member organization of the Bayan Muna coalition.
When Casiño raised the non-existence of a provision that “would prevent the future
conversion of agricultural lands to escape land reform or for whatever purposes that
this may serve,” Lagman admitted there is none but answered sufficiently that “there is
already Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which delimits what
agricultural lands could be converted to non-agricultural uses” (Plenary Deliberations,
03-Jun-2008). Lagman then agrees to discuss a policy mechanism to make sure that
makes “conversion not only as a moratorium but as a permanent policy” and to “revisit
the Local Government Code with respect to the authority of local government units to
rezone agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses” (Plenary Deliberations, 03-Jun-
2008).
Maza, on the other hand, was more forthright on attributing the cancellation of
CLOAs and EPs on massive land conversion. Subsequently, she belabors to enumerate
many documented cases:
Let me cite two examples. In a farming community in Rizal, 998 EP holders have been tilling the
land since Marcos' time, since during the time of Marcos land reform and they have fully paid their
amortization, which means that the land is supposed to be theirs already. But the EP, they are
threatened with EP cancellation and they are tilling 1,644 hectares of land. Why are they threatened
of EP cancellation? It is because the alleged owners were saying that there was a proclamation
converting the farmland into a town site.
Another very much projected case is the case of the farmers in Hacienda Look in Nasugbu. There
are about 3,000 hectares families of farmers and fisherfolks in hacienda, in that hacienda, and they
were affected by the conversion of 650 hectares of land. The land was converted under a presidential
proclamation declaring the land as commercial, industrial and eco-tourism site, using the DOJ
Opinion No. 44 and Section 20 of the Local Government Code.
Again, the DAR itself, from the information that they handed to us during the committee meetings,
in the DAR briefing on CARP and the accomplishments of CARP, it says there that of the 4,359
applications for land-use conversion, the majority, the overwhelming majority, 3,990, covering
49,079 hectares were approved and only 300, a measly 369 applications were denied. And this is
according to the DAR data which I would even question, because there seems to be a variance with
the data of the National Statistics Office and PhilRice (?). The NSO data says that there are already
about 827,000 hectares of lands converted to other uses since the late 1970s, while PhilRice data
said, that agricultural lands were converted at a rate of 9,000 hectares per year, which translates to
180,000 hectares. Whereas DAR was saying that from the CARP implementation in 1988, there was
only a conversion of over 40,000 or about 49,079 as of June 2007 (Plenary Deliberation, 27-May-
2008).
With this, Maza criticizes the lack of clear figures on how many CARP lands have been
actually converted. Lagman at this point agrees with Maza but informs Maza and the
plenary body that DAR is not the only authority to grant conversion permits. Local
governments are also allowed by law to do the same. Lagman further cited to a
Department of Justice opinion that validates the legimitacy of lands reclassified prior to
the enactment of the first CARP law (RA 6657). Lagman nonetheless agrees to revisit the
issue only after his sponsored consolidated CARPER bill is enacted. He further argues
that this problem on land conversion justifies all the more the need to extend land
acquisition and distribution component of CARP in order to replenish these lands which
had been covered so that we could intensify food production, [sic] we could intensify the
tenets of social justice in the countryside” (Plenary Deliberations, 27-May-2008). Maza,
however, contests this, claiming that land conversion intensified during the
implementation of CARP. In response, Lagman repeats his proposed strategy of first
expediting the approval of the CARP extension law first, next adopting policy changes to
prevent the conversion of CARP lands, specifically irrigable lands, and finally amending
the Local Government Code that grants the autonomous rights to LGUs to reclassify
irrigable and irrigated lands (Plenary Deliberation, 27-May-2008). Yet, when Maza askef
further if such proposals will be incorporated in Lagman’s sponsored CARPER bill, the
latter clarified that these will not be included. Instead, Lagman maintains his proposed
strategy of reforming an extended program (Plenary Deliberation, 27-May-2008).
Later at the Bicameral Conference Committee, another known landowning
legislator Cebu Third District Representative Pablo Garcia raised a question on the issue
of fairness of restricting land selling by beneficiaries. Citing a case of land selling where
somehow a farmer was offered millions, Garcia challenged the merit of the restriction by
illustrating through a question that such offers received by CARP beneficiaries provide
enough incentives to abandon farm work, thus contributing to declining farm productivity
or idleness. Although Garcia explicitly disclaimed he is not objecting to the retaining the
provision restricting land selling as stipulated by the first CARP law (RA 6657), his line
of questioning somehow suggests that he represents the landowner’s stance to remove
such restrictions:
I am not objecting but I am going to tell a story told to me by Secretary Garilao (i.e. DAR secretary
under President Ramos). This is about the restrictions of the CLOA.
A farmer in Laguna, an old farmer, 65 years old, got his CLOA already for two hectares of land. His
sons, there were three of them, would not want to work on the farm. And so, he did not have any
help working on the land, and so he approached the MARO that “Ca I sell the land? I cannot work
on the land anymore. My children are not willing to work on the farm.” But the MARO told him,
“Well, that’s illegal. That’s against the law. You can only give it to your children.” But my children
do not want to work on the land. By the way, how much were you offered for your two hectares of
land, rice land in Laguna? Eight (8) million pesos. This was relayed to Secretary by his MRO, “He’s
a farmer,” he said “I need the money. I’m getting old. I’m offered eight million for two hectares.” So
in such a situation, would be helping the farmer by telling him not to sell, or just look the other way?
According to Secretary Garilao, the farmer succeeded in selling the land and he lived happily ever
after gt(Bicameral Conference Committee, 09-Jun-2009).
Garcia then proceeded to cite statistics to prove that “the mistake of our Program is when
we prohibit further transaction on the land after the award” (Bicameral Conference
Committee, 09-Jun-2009, p. 159). Hence, he enumerated the following:
Now, the record of the DAR shows that 43% as of 2006, that was three years ago, of the
beneficiaries in Nueva Ecija sold or mortgaged their lands. Fifty-three percent (54%) in Laguna. In
Negros, it was 47%. In Quezon, it was about 20%.
I have here the report of the JDC-DAR(?) [sic]. Earlier studies established that despite the
restrictions imposed by the legal statutes on land market transactions, mortgaging and selling of land
and property rights have become common practice. An in-house study within DAR, 1994, surveyed
about 2,752 EP holders in 23 provinces from Luzon to Mindanao. The research showed that 17% of
the respondents made transaction of their properties. Eighty (80%) of the transaction cases were
either for outright transfer or mortgaging. The remaining 20% involved other deal such as transfer of
rights, leasing, or other arrangements (Bicameral Conference Committee, 09-Jun-2009).
With strong language and sarcasm, Lagman replied that the MARO gave the wrong
advice to Secretary Garilao:
I think Secretary Garilao should have chastised his MARO for giving a wrong advice. He should
have told the aging farmer beneficiary that he should take advantage of Section 65 of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law on conversion and once he is able to make that conversion,
then subsequently sell the land, instead of violating the law, by selling the land because that is a
violation really [emphasis added](Bicameral Conference Committee, 09-Jun-2009).
At this point, Senator Pimentel intervened to lessen the controversy by clarifying that
“there is no oppression or undue imposition on a beneficiary who agrees that he will
become a beneficiary under the terms of the law” (Bicameral Conference Committee, 09-
Jun-2009). In other words, the mere presence of a waiver to land rights by beneficiaries
presupposes that if the beneficiary chooses to own a parcel of CARP land, he is not being
forced to own it at his own expense. With this the following provision on further
clarifying the transferability of awarded lands was approved with minimal objection:
Table 5.16. CARP Provisional Amendment: Transferability of Awarded Lands
ORIGINAL
(RA 9700)
(RA 6657)
Problem on land No provision SEC. 12. Section 27 of RA 6657 on Transferability of
conversion/selling Awarded Lands is hereby amended to include the following:
The title of the land awarded under the agrarian reform

program must indicate that it is an emancipation patent or a
certificate of land ownership award and the subsequent
transfer must also indicate that it is an emancipation patent or a
certificate of landownership award.
Advocacy Coalition Framework Analysis. The discussions on land
conversion/selling/mortgaging and the legal transfer of awarded lands demonstrates
policy-oriented learning in many ways. First, the lengthy deliberations that showcased the
tension between competing coalitions underlines the process on how the presence of
intermediate conflict leads to beneficial clarification on a policy issue, which in turn leads
to significant policy issues. Second, the concrete use of statistics to support competing
arguments by opposing coalitions is consistent with the theoretical assumption of the
ACF (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1994) that advocacy coalitions employ scientific
information to reinforce the merits of their arguments. In particular, even though the
exchange of legislators from competing coalitions on data and statistics on land
conversion did not result to the removal of restrictions on land conversion from the
CARP law to the CARPER law, it nonetheless demonstrates one hypothesis of the
Advocacy Coalition Framework that “even when the accumulation of technical
information does not change the views of the opposing coalition, it can have important
impacts on policy, at least in the short term, by altering the views of policy brokers or
other important government officials” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1994, pp. 192-193).
Thirdly, the presence of policy brokers like Lagman (and to on some occasions, Pimentel)
are again critical in mitigating tension, providing clarification to an otherwise thorny
policy issue, and ultimately to reaching workable solutions that different coalitions can
agree on. Fourthly, the explicit mention of 20 years of CARP implementation and its
ramifications as discussed in the Congressional deliberations also accurately
operationalizes another important assumption of Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s ACF
(1994) that substantial policy changes transpires after a decade or so as policy-oriented
learning typically that much time to accumulate.
The issue of non-recognition of women’s rights was first raised by the National
Federation of Peasant Women, a member of the Bayan Muna coalition that endorsed a
new and totally reformed CARP law at the second House Agrarian Reform Committee
hearing:
Napakarami na ng mga kinansela na mga EPs at CLOAs at hindi rin naman talaga napaunlad ang
kabuhayan ng nakararaming mga magsasaka lalong lalo na ang mga kababaihan. Natanong ba
ninyo kung ano ang kabuhayan ng mga kababaihan at kung paano ang papel nila doon sa
produksiyon. Ang produksiyon na kung saan ang mga kababaihan ay kalahok sa pagsasaka pero
hindi naman lubos na nare-recognize. Nabigyan man sila ng CLOA ngunit papaano nga ba? Paano
panghahawakan ng mga kababaihan itong mga CLOAs na ito at mga Emancipation Patent na ito.
Kung susumahin nating iyong mga kaso ng lupa sa Hacienda Luisita, Central Mindanao University,
Hacienda Sta. Isabel at San Antonio sa Isabela, Hacienda Looc, Lungsod Silangan sa Montalban,
libo-libong mga kababaihan ang apektado at mababawian ng CLOA at Emancipation Patent at
mapapalayas sa kanilang mga lupang matagal na simula pa ng kanilang mga ninuno ay kanilang
pinaghirapan. Pawis at dugo ang puhunoan ng mga magsasaka at napakalaking kasalanan ng
CARP ang pagbawi sa mga magsasaka ng kanilang mga CLOAs at EPs. At masasabi namin, sa
bagong batas ang kailangan natin talaga ay iyong tunay na maglilingkod sa interest ng mga
magsasaka at ng mga kababaihang mga magsasaka. Huwag nating kalimutan iyong papel ng mga
kababaihan.
So many EPs and CLOAs have been cancelled and the lives of many farmers, especially women,
have not improved. Have you asked what livelihood women have taken and what role they play in
[farm] production. The production where women take part in farming but are not well recognized.
They were give CLOAs but how? How will women claim these CLOAs and this Emancipation
Patent. If we look at cases in Hacienda Luisita, Central Mindanao University, thousands of women
are affected and are being deprived of CLOA and Emancipation Paten and are expelled from their
lands that they have long toiled since the time of their ancestors. Farmers have invested sewat and
blood and CARP commits a big mistake in confiscating their CLOAs and EPs. And we say, a new
law is really needed which will genuinely serve the interest of the farmers and female farmers. Let’s
not forget the role of the women. [emphasis added][translation by author](Ms. Zenaida Soriano
(Vice-President, Amihan, National Federation of Peasant Women, Committee Hearing, 05-Dec-
2007).
The representative went on to share the grotesque realities of female farmers making ends
meet:
Kaya ang masasabi namin, marami sa mga kababaihan ang mga nagpakatulong, naglalabada, kung
ano-ano ang hinahanap na hanap-buhay dahil hindi nakakatugon iyong kanilang kinikita doon sa
bukid. At upang mabayaran din ang mga CLOA at mga programa na ito ay talagang ang mga
kababaihan ay nagpakahirap ng husto. May mga anak ang ilang mga kasama natin na nag GRO
upang makatulong sa pagbabayad diyan sa CLOA na yan, pero pagkatapos nito, naka-pending at
kakanselahin. Kaya napakasaklap ng kalagayan ng nakararaming mga mamamayan sa kanayunan
at ito ang dapat ninyong alamin ng husto.
That’s why we say, many women have become domestic helpers, doing laundry, and looking for
whatever kind of employment because their farm income cannot sustain them. And so they can pay
the CLOA and in this program, women really suffer a lot. Some have children who become GROs
to help pay for the CLOA, but after that, it is still pending or gets cancelled. That’s why the fate
of most citizens are very tragic and you should know very well. [translation by author](Ms. Zenaida
Soriano, Vice-President, Amihan, National Federation of Peasant Women, Committee Hearing, 12-
Dec-2007).
Nonetheless, there are other women’s organization that participated in the deliberations,
which showed support for RCM’s consolidated CARPER bill (no. 1257):
Okay. Kanina ko pa nadidinig eh na 'yong batas bulok, ibasura. Pero tignan muna natin sigurong
maigi. 'Yon bang batas ang may deperensiya o 'yon nag-i-implementa? Siguro huwag nating
pagsamahin iyong implementors at iyong batas. May kakulangan ang batas at 'yan ang tinugunan
nung Reform CARP Movement na nagbalangkas sa loob ng isang taon para mabuo ang House Bill
1257. Marami kaming sinagutan dito na mga kakulangan ng batas. Unang-una, sinabi na nung mga
kasamahan ko kanina iyon tungkol sa karapatan ng kababaihan na maipangalan sa kanya ang titulo
ng lupa kung siya o ang kanyang karapatan has been vested o naitatag na o naistablisa na. Hindi po
pwedeng puro kalalakihan nakapangalan ang CLOA. 'Yon itinulak po 'yan ng Pambansang
Koalisyon ng Kababaihan sa Kanayunan.
I have been hearing since a while ago that the law is defective, that it should be thrown away. But
let us examine closely first: is the law defective or the one implementing it? Perhaps we must
not mistake the implementors with the law. The law has shortcomings and that’s what the
Reform CARP movement focused on when it framed House Bill 1257 within a year. We have
addressed many shortcomings of the law. Firstly, my colleagues have mentioned a while ago the
rights of women to have the land titles named after them or their rights to be established. Men
should not have exlusive entitlement to CLOAs. That’s what the National Coalition of Rural
Women. [emphasis added][translation by author](Mr. Elvie Baladlad. Representative,
Panlalawigang Koalisyon ng mga Kababaihan sa Kanayunan, Public Hearing 06-Mar-2008).
Gabriela Partylist Representative Lisa Maza, on the other hand, tackled the more problem
of land conversion and cancellation encountered by women in Rizal:
The example that I cited earlier about the community in Rizal--the farming community in Rizal
where hundreds, I think 200 women are farming, is an example of the effect of land conversion on
women farmers. And this is the conrete problem of peasant women on the ground, that their
emancipation patents and CLOAs are being cancelled. And so, I just do not know how this gender
provision would address concretely the the problem of women peasants on the ground (Plenary
Maza further criticized the consolidated CARPER bill sponsored by the RCM, which
does not contain any concrete provision to recognize the rights of women under CARP:
Well, regarding my next point on the gender provision of the substitute bill, it contains statements of
principles, recognizing gender equality and the right of women to till the land and to access services.
But I also noticed that there are no concrete provisions. And I'm afraid that when this good or
beautiful statements are tested on the ground, this will be of little value to the women farmers Rep.
Maza (Plenary Deliberations 27-May-2008).
So at despite initial questions from mostly male members of the Bicameral Conference
Committee on June 9, 2009, these provisions were ultimately approved:

Table 5.17. CARP Provisional Amendment: Equal Recognition of Female CARP

beneficiaries
ORIGINAL
POLICY ISSUE PROVISION RESOLUTION: PROVISION AMENDMENT (RA 9700)
(RA 6657)
Gender equality: equal No provision Section 2 of RA 6657 on Declaration of Principles and Policies is hereby amended to
recognition of rights include the following:
for female CARP
beneficiaries The State shall recognize and enforce, consistent with existing laws the rights of rural
women to own and control land, taking into consideration the substantive equality
between men and women as qualified beneficiaries, to receive a just share of the fruits
thereof, and to be represented in advisory or appropriate decision-making bodies.
These rights shall be independent of their male relatives and of their civil status.
No provision Section 3 of RA 6657 on Definitions is hereby amended to include the following:
(l) Rural women refer to women who are engaged directly or indirectly in farming
and/or fishing as their source of livelihood, whether paid or unpaid, regular or
seasonal, or in food preparation, managing the household, caring for the children, and
other similar activities.
The rationale behind this approval was best explained by Senator Pia Cayetano, the
author of the Philippine Magna Carta for Women:
Yes. If I may, I would be very happy to elaborate on that ano. Historically, in many countries,
including the Philippines, women’s right [sic] have always been secondary to their husband’s
right. And, therefore, this sentence merely states that women have rights separate from the
existence of their husbands, so they can be recongized as a farmer even though their husband
is not a farmer. In the Philippines I guess a century or so ago, a woman could not own a
property. It is owned… her rights are attached to her husband’s rights. So all this is saying is
even if she didn’t have a husband she can own property, she can avail of the provisions of CARP.
And again, we emphasize, it is consisten with the Family Code and existing laws so that we are not
creating anything new or, whay do you call this, conflicting… [emphasis added](Bicameral
Conference Committee, 09-Jun-2009).
Yet again, the statements above on gender quality suggest that despite differences
in the policy instrument employed or endorsed by competing coalitions (HB 3059 by the
Bayan Muna Coalition and HB 1257 by the RCM), all of them are bound by the unifying
and universal ideal of attaining gender equality in CARP. That is, the multi-level nature
of policy beliefs seems to be the factor that facilitated the approval of the amendment
provisions amidst differences between coalitions. This reality is consistent with the
hypothesis of the ACF (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1994) that policy change is possible
because of the multi-dimensional character of policy beliefs. Moreover, such a change in
policy transpired perhaps because it touches on the fundamental question or normative

core principle of gender equality, a principle whose importance is not justified by the
number of times it has been discussed in Congress. Rather, what explains its relatively
lesser frequency in Congressional deliberations is the fact that the need for this policy
reform is self-evident that legislators and participating coalition members already
understands it is a necessary policy reform that should be enacted in the CARP extension
and reform law.
Gender equality is a crosscutting policy issue in CARP that the recognition of
women’s role in CARP includes a broader concern for the welfare of female
beneficiaries. This breadth of concern is concretely reflected in an amendment provision
explicitly guaranteeing an equal provision of support services to female CARP
beneficiaries (see Table 5.17 below):
Table 5.17. CARP Provisional Amendment: Equal Recognition of Female CARP

beneficiaries
ISSUE PROVISION (RA (RA 9700)
6657)
Gender No provision Section 37 of RA 6657 on Support Services for Beneficiaries is hereby amended to include the
equality in following:
support The PARC shall likewise adopt, implement, and monitor policies and programs to ensure the
services fundamental equality of women and men in the agrarian reform program as well as respect for
the human rights, social protection, and decent working conditions of both paid and unpaid
men and women farmer-beneficiaries.
SEC. 37-A. Equal Support Services for Rural Women. - Support services shall be extended
equally to women and men agrarian reform beneficiaries.
The PARC shall ensure that these support services, as provided for in this Act, integrate the
specific needs and well-being of women farmer- beneficiaries taking into account the specific
requirements of female family members of farmer- beneficiaries.
The PARC shall also ensure that rural women will be able to participate in all community
activities. To this effect, rural women are entitled to self-organization in order to obtain equal
access to economic opportunities and to have access to agricultural credit and loans, marketing
facilities and technology, and other support services, and equal treatment in land reform and
resettlement schemes.
The DAR shall establish and maintain a women's desk, which will be primarily responsible for
formulating and implementing programs and activities related to the protection and promotion
of women's rights, as well as providing an avenue where women can register their complaints
and grievances principally related t o their rural activities.
These particular provisions on gender equality in CARP support services did not undergo
any lengthy deliberation or intense contestation. This fact is corroborated by the
significantly low frequency of citation in discussions at the House of Representatives (see
Table 7.16 below). Like the provision on equal recognition of women in CLOAs, the
speed at which the amendment provision above is approved reflects the agreement of
supposedly competing coalitions that gender equality is a fundamental right or principle
that CARP as a social justice should uphold in all aspects.
Table 5.18. Frequency of Observations of Equal Provision of Support Services to

Women
Support Services Gender sensitive/responsive
214 30
100% 14%
More than the issue of gender equality, the inadequacy of support services has
historically been cited by many studies as a major problem that contributed to the decline
in productivity, consequently to the propensity of CARP beneficiaries to abandon
farming, and eventually surrender their land rights by selling or mortgaging their awarded
lands. In fact, the prominence of the problem is partly reflected by the fact that of the
total relevant statements pertaining to support services, the issue on increasing the funds
for support services is one of top four policy concerns on support services (see Table
7.17).
Table 5.19. Frequency of Observations of Secondary Aspects of the Policy Core

Issue on Support Services
Support Services Increased Levels Credit or Capital Agricultural ARC Cluster Strategy/Community-
Access Infrastructure Based Support Services
(e.g. farm-to-
market roads,
post-harvest
facilities,
irrigation)
214 30 71 39 42
100% 14% 33% 18% 20%
B.3. Support Services
House deliberations show that the proposals to increase funds are based on the
perceived need to improve support services. In fact, analyzed data indicates that various
proposals for fund allocation for support services figure most prominently in discussions
on CARP funding.
Table 5.20. Frequency of Observations of Secondary Aspects of the Policy Core

Issue on Funding
Funding Various Proposals for Source 100 to 150 billion
Support Services allotment
151 48 41 26
100% 32% 27% 17%
Proposals to increase funding for support services was first raised by RCM
champion and House CARPER bill sponsor Edcel Lagman who at the first House
Agrarian Reform Committee hearing suggested increasing the allotment for support
services from the current 25% (as mandated by the first CARP law) to 40%, “Because it
is support services that we are able, that we should be able to sustain the program after
land acquisition and distribution is effected” (Committee Hearing 21-Nov-2007). Lagman

later argued that redistributing lands, especially those unproductive, to beneficiaries,
without augmenting “support services to a higher percentage or level” would only make
their lives more miserable (Plenary Deliberation, 14-May-2008). The more concrete
measure, however, for an increase in funding was first suggested by Rep. Guillermo Cua,
a co-sponsor of RCM’s endorsed CARPER bill (1257). At the first hearing, Cua
poignantly cited the peaceful march by the Bukidnon Mapalad Farmers who constitute
1.5 million landless farmers expecting to receive the 2 million lands yet to be distributed,
which would cost 100 to 150 billion pesos (Committee Hearing 21-Nov-2007).
Yet, surprisingly, questions on the sufficiency of the amount of funding came
from landowning legislators. Using a hypothetical case of a beneficiary whose heirs do
not wish to till the land, Cavite Third District Representative Jesus Crispin Remulla
questioned the proposal to extend the land acquisition and redistribution component of
CARP on the grounds of uncertainty in sustaining farm productivity due to hereditary
succession problems.
What happens when, let's say, Madam Speaker, we award five hectares to Mang Pandoy and Mang
Pandoy is 55 years old. Mang Pandoy has six children, all grown up. Not one wants to be farmer
[sic]. What happens then to that land? What happens then to the family? By hereditary
succession, non-farmers will inherit the land. Isn't supposed to be land, land not only for the
landless but land for the farmer? Isn't that the more important thing that the land is farmed
and not just distributed?[emphasis added] Plenary Deliberation, 21-May-2008)
In response, Lagman assured Remulla that the proposal for CARP extension is
justified by the continued demand or clamor by farmers for such extension. Hearing this,
Remulla explained that his intention is to rationalize the priorities in funding allocation
that for him appears insufficient and is better channeled more to support services:
Definitely, nobody wants to go against his own interest. This Representation, madam Speaker, only
wants to scrutinize the fact that we are passing a P100B law, a minimum of P100B for the law and
yet, the 20-year program is not really expiring in the sense of land acquisition but is in need of
support services already which has not even been done. So, how do we put the house in order, so
to speak, Madam Speaker? Do we first acquire, bahala na ang (let this be) in support services? Let's
pay consultants so that they will help us. What is the order by which we will do this? Because as for
the past 20 years, one-half of the farmers or maybe one out of two farmers does not pay landowners,
P18B have not been given out which would be P18B divided by P4.00 per square meter would be
how many hectares? That is so much land not being paid right now which have become
unproductive [translation by author][emphasis added](Plenary Deliberation, 21-May-2008).
A similar line of questioning was done by landowning legislator and Negros
Oriental Third District Representative Henry Pryde Teves. Teves scrutinized the specifics
of the 40 billion of 100 billion pesos allocation for support services and warned against
the expensive minimum cost of farm inputs that would assure successful farm production:
Madam Speaker, I will go to figures. If we insist on individual farmers--I was not given a figure on
how much will go to bridges and roads from the support services of P40 billion--but, let's just say
that one-half of this went to roads and bridges and the other half would go to farm inputs. P20
billion divided by the present--as of now, out of the 6.8 million farmers that have already been given
lands, 30% have had their share of farm inputs given by our Agrarian Reform Department, the rest
of the 70% have not yet received any and have to receive, so that we will be out of 40 billion
hectares--plus the current two million hectares, that is six million hectares that we have to take
care of it. If we have a P20 billion budget for farm inputs, for six million hectares, that will be
P3,000 per hectare that we will put as farm inputs.
In the success stories, the production cost for one hectare in sugarcane or pineapple should be
P35,000. But, I am sure I can lower it down to P15,000 with modern organic agriculture. But if you
will only give P3,000, for sure this will fail, because if it will be individual and not partnership with
businesses, then we will have to take care of the farm inputs that the farmers will put in. What will
they do with P3,000? One bag of corn seeds is even P4,500 [emphasis added](Plenary Deliberation,
27-May-2008).
Lagman immediately clarified that support services are not limited to farm inputs only
but consist of a wide spectrum of activities that help reduce the production costs of CARP
beneficiaries:
Your Honor, the support services will not be limited to farm inputs. There are other components
of the support services, wich, in the mathematics of the distinguished Gentleman, is not inputted.
You have the farm-to-market roads. How many thousand kilometers of farm-to-markets roads
have already been put in place because of support services which would benefit the agrarian reform
beneficiaries? How many post-harvest facilities had been conveyed to farm, to agrarian reform
beneficiaries to benefit them? And, rural credit is being intensified.
Lagman further argued that due to the nature of scarce government resources, the
government should not provide or subsidize all the necessary production costs so as not
to encourage counterproductive dependence by the CARP beneficiaries but instead
encourage their autonomy and productivity:
Because, you do not give everything to the agrarian reform beneficiaries because that will not
be encouraging self-reliance. But, government would have to initiate, government would have to
start the support services. But, the agrarian reform beneficiaries would have to augment
whatever the government would be able to grant them. So, we are not just talking about only the
government giving the support. Otherwise, this will be pure doleout which should not be a program
of government [emphasis added](Plenary Deliberation, 27-May-2008)
However, Teves was quick to use this argument to imply the need to increase the funding
of CARP. Teves proposed a specific amount that would guarantee productivity and
suggested as providing crop insurance as a failsafe for CARP beneficiaries:
That is the reason, Madam Speaker, that we have to fund them the right amount. I was proposing
P15,000 per hectare. That is good for one season. While giving them the P15,000 for one season, let
us enroll them in our crop insurance program so that if in that season they fail, they still have a
chance to make it one more time. But if they fail again, that is a problem. But for sure, for two
tries, with real farmers who know how to till their lands, they can do it P15,000 per hectare, enrolled
in the PCIC, so that they can have one more chance, but not P3,000 per hectare. Not P3,000 per
hectare. They will never make it [emphasis edd](Plenary Deliberation, 27-May-2008).
This lengthy and rigorous interpellation of Lagman by Teves was repeated at a
later plenary deliberation. Teves again challenged the sufficiency of the initially proposed
CARP fund of P100 billion. Using conservative estimates, Teves calculated that the total
land acquisition cost exceeds the proposed CARP fund:
Madam Speaker, if the balance of two million hectares that we need in order to accommodate
those landless farmers can be acquired from the current vacant lands that we already acquired, and
whose beneficiaries have already been disqualified, we would be serving at least 200 billion that is
needed to acquire those lands basing on the current pricing of plantation lands that were acquired in
the last few years. For private lands, for example, at 1.3 million hectares, put it at a conservative
estimate of P150,000, which is the price last 1997 or 1996, that would account to P195 billion.
Where will you get the money? [emphasis added](Plenary Deliberation, 26-May-2008).
Acknowledging the soundness of this argument, Lagman suggested increasing the CARP
fund by adopting the same proposal of the Senate at 149 billion pesos. Still, Teves
remained unconvinced and pessimistic of the sufficiency of the fund allocation for
CARP, continuing to cite calculations to prove the inadequacy of Lagman’s fund

proposal:
Madam Speaker, that P100 billion is--40% of that would go to support services. Only 60% would
be used to acquire land, not to mention the salaries that we have to pay the current bloated
bureaucracy of the Department of Agrarian Reform. We can never get this money and that is only a
conservative estimate of P150,000. P150,000 was less than the amount compared to what was paid
in Lapay, Bayauan, in 1997 or 1998. The lands there was at P160,000.00 per hectare, and that was
63 kilometers away from the nearest highway. The latest land that was bought in Pulo plantation
was P400,000.00 per hectare. With a conservative estimate, It would only be P200,000.00 per
hectare. At 1.3 million hectares, that is P260 billion. Where we will get the money? [emphasis
To allay concerns, Lagman further clarified that the concern for sufficiency will be
addressed by the payment scheme specified by the first CARP law (RA 6657), which is a
combination of cash payment and investment in bonds:
Your Honor, these estimates would be cash payments. But under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law, the agricultural lands subject to acquisition and distribution are not acquired by
immediate cash payments. There is a percentage in cash, the rest are payable in bonds, and this
would be redeemable at staggered periods. So, the computation should be based on the existing
provisions of the law, not on a cash payment basis [emphasis added](Plenary Deliberation, 26-May-
2008).
Despite this, Teves continued with his calculations to prove the insufficiency of the total
fund allocation for CARP. This time, he zeroed in on the fund allocation for support
services:
Considering if payment for the acquiring of lands is not on a cash basis, definitely, with support
services, it would be on a cash basis. At 6.8 million hectares, that was currently--that was already
distributed, putting it at only P15,000.00 per hectare to make farming productive. I am a farmer, I
am sure P15,000.00 is conservative, but it is the least that you need in order to make you
survive one season and hope for success. At 6.8 million hectares times P15,000.00, that is already
P102 billion. That is even more than P100 billion that we'll appropriate for all support services, and
acquisition and distribution plus salaries [emphasis added](Plenary Deliberation, 26-May-2008).
Lagman provided further clarification again, stating that with the proposed addition of 40
million pesos in funding for support services that was originally at 25 billion, the total
allocation would increase to 65 billion. This leaves 35 million for other important
components of CARP such as the delivery of agrarian justice (courts) and the daily
operations of the DAR. For Lagman, this makes the total funds for CARP adequate. But
then, Teves questioned this again, asking how these allotments were derived. Lagman
responded that this is the scheme provided by the first CARP law. Teves continued to not
recognize this explanation, continuing to challenge the sustainability of the proposed fund
allocation for CARP:
That is impossible. This would account to already P100 billion. Then, this would be only 666,000
hectares. If we will price it at P150,000 per hectares, this would only be 666,000 hectares. If we
would price it at P200,000 per hectare, this would be much lower, and we must remember, these are
plantation lands that we are talking about. According to the World Bank, the last are plantation
lands, the prime lands. I do not think--I would think this amount is very, very small. If we force
the issue, how will we sustain the support services? We divide the pie even smaller? [emphasis
Sounding a bit annoyed, Lagman said “that is the computation given to me” and proposed
to “task the department to make a recomputation of their figures,” but conceded the
suggestion of Teves that “if amount is necessary to fund the compensation package, then
we will have to increase the funding support” [emphasis added](Plenary Deliberation,
26-May-2008). Hearing this, Teves finally stopped the interpellation and explained his
insistence on his proposal to increase funding for CARP support services:
That would be appropriate, Madam Speaker. They should base their targets on realistic amounts
that we can harness, based on the resources that this country has. If you keep on getting--if you keep
on making targets that are too high, and divide the pie even smaller, then this would still be bound to
failure. At P40 billion support services, P40 billion, you divide that by the current 6.8 million
hectares, how much will you get? That would be so small and the support services is not input itself,
not just fertilizer and seeds but including roads, bridges and the like, and the rest. Ano ang itatanim
ng ating farmers kung wala tayong pera? (What will our farmers plant if they do not have enough
money?) I think if we would really have a genuine agrarian reform bill, we should base our targets
on how much resources we can put in the next five years, Madam Speaker [emphasis added](Plenary
Deliberation, 26-May-2008).
At later deliberations, some other landowning legislators such as Pangasinan Fifth
District Representative Marcos Cojuangco even suggested a more radical to allot 100%
of the CARP budget to support services.
Madam Speaker, in closing, I would just like to recap most of the points that I have made today, the
most important one being that every peso appropriated for a given task is a peso forgone [sic] by
another task. And there are so many crises and challenges facing the country today; we have the
energy crisis; the looming food crisis; the fertilizer crisis; which directly impacts the ability of
our farmers and agricultural reform beneficiaries to produce, and if they can produce, to win
back the confidence that they have lost from society to be suppliers of the nation's food. If we
could bring back that confidence, Madam Speaker, Your Honor, I believe that we could lower the
propensity of government to import rice and we could increase the propensity of government to take
more risks on our farmers and allocate more funds for our farmers knowing that the money will
come back on higher yields. And so, I really believe that the moneys that are allocated in this bill
for acquisition should all 100% be allocated to support the existing ARCs and ARBs (Plenary
Deliberation, 04-Jun-2008).
Given this strong demand for increased funding for support services, it did not come as a
surprise that the following provision (Table 7.19) on augmenting the total funding for
CARP did not encounter any objections, except minor adjustments on the actual amount.
Hence, during the Bicameral Conference Committee, where both chambers of the 14th
Congress finalized and approved the CARPER law (RA 9700), when the Senate Agrarian
Reform Committee Secretary Xerxes Nitafan mentioned that 147 billion pesos will be
allocated for the total CARP fund, Lagman merely reminded the committee that House
members have agreed to increase and round off the amount to 150 billion pesos.
Table 5.21. CARP Provisional Amendments: Increase in Funds
POLICY ORIGINAL PROVISION (RA 6657) RESOLUTION: PROVISION AMENDMENT

ISSUE (RA 9700)
Lack of The initial amount needed to implement this Act for the period Section 63. Funding Source is hereby amended
funds of ten (10) years upon approval hereof shall be funded from the as follows: The amount needed to further
Agrarian Reform Fund created under Sections 20 and 21 of implement the CARP as provided in this Act, until
Executive Order No. 229. June 30, 2014, upon expiration of funding under
Republic Act No. 8532 and other pertinent laws,
SECTION 20. Agrarian Reform Fund. — As provided in shall be funded from the Agrarian Reform Fund and
Proclamation No. 131 dated July 22, 1987, a special fund is other funding sources in the amount of at least One
created, known as The Agrarian Reform Fund, an initial amount hundred fifty billion pesos (P150,000,000,000.00).
of FIFTY BILLION PESOS (P50 billion) to cover the estimated
cost of the CARP from 1987 to 1992 which shall be sourced
from the receipts of the sale of the assets of the Asset
Privatization Trust (APT) and receipts of sale of ill-gotten
wealth recovered through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government and such other sources as government may deem
appropriate. The amount collected and accruing to this special
fund shall be considered automatically appropriated for the
purpose authorized in this Order.
SECTION21. SupplementalAppropriations. — The amount of

TWO BILLION SEVEN HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (P2.7
billion) is hereby appropriated to cover the supplemental
requirements of the CARP for 1987, to be sourced from the
receipts of the sale of ill-gotten wealth recovered through the
Presidential Commission on Good Government and the
proceeds from the sale of assets by the APT. The amount
collected from these sources shall accrue to The Agrarian
Reform Fund and shall likewise be considered automatically
appropriated for the purpose authorized in this Order.
The proposal (see Table 7.20) to increase the percentage of fund allocation for
support services from 25% under the old law (RA 6657) to 40% (RA 9700) also faced
minimal deliberation. RCM champion and Albay First District Representative Edcel
Lagman first introduced the proposal at the opening committee hearing and repeatedly
suggested it at later deliberations. Notwithstanding the question by landowning
Representative Teves, the proposal did not receive any substantial criticism all
throughout the plenary deliberations until it underwent a final evaluation at the Bicameral
Conference Committee. The interpellations by different Bicam members revolved around
not on the actual percentage but on the capacity and presence of a concrete plans to
improve the execution of support services delivery, especially in light of CARP lands
already awarded but sold and considering the the tight timeline of extension (i.e. 5 years).
Thus, a contest between the statistics of competing coalitions ensued.
Table 5.22. CARP Provisional Amendments: Increase in Funds
POLICY ORIGINAL PROVISION (RA 6657) RESOLUTION: PROVISION

ISSUE AMENDMENT
(RA 9700)
Lack of In order to cover the expenses and cost of Section 36 .Funding for Support Services is
support support services, at least twenty-five percent hereby amended: In order to cover the
services (25%) of all appropriations for agrarian reform expenses and cost of support services, at
shall be immediately set aside and made least forty percent (40%) of all
available for this purpose. In addition, the appropriations for agrarian reform during
DAR shall be authorized to package proposals the five-year extension period shall be
and receive grants, aid and other forms of immediately set aside and made available
financial assistance from any source. for this purpose.
Along with another legislator, Cebu Third District Representative Pablo Garcia
cited the DAR-commissioned GTZ study that shows almost half (46%) of awarded lands
have already been sold or mortgaged (Bicameral Conference Committee, 09-Jun-2009).
When Bicameral Conference Committee Chair Gringo Honasan verified this with a DAR
representative, the participating DAR representative explained that “it is very difficult to
identiy lands illegally sold because the fact that they are illegally sold… the sale would
be under the table” (Bicameral Conference Committee, 09-Jun-2009, p. 164). The only
cases DAR knows are those farmers “seeking clearance from the department itself…who
signified their inetnion to sell and asked the approval of DAR… And if the qualifications
are met, they are given approval” (Bicameral Conference Committee, 09-Jun-2009, p.
164). When Garcia heard and challenged this explanation, another RCM champion
Akbayan Partylist Representative Risa Hontiveros came to his defense by citing a study
(Tecson, 2009) showing only 6% of awarded were sold (illegally) and two other studies
showing that 70% to 75% of CARP beneficiariesstill possess their awarded lands
(Bicameral Conference Committee, 09-Jun-2009). Another RCM advocate, Rizal First
District Representative Michael John Duavit, reminded the Bicam participants of DAR’s
admission of a lack of inventory system. At this point, Nueva Ecija Fourth District
Representative Rodolfo Antonino suggested incorporating some language to ensure
DAR’s commitment to pursue an integrated land acquisition and distribution of support
services. Lagman agreed to this proposal until the DAR representative gave assurance
that Antonino’s concern has already been addressed by an existing provision “That a
complementary support services delivery strategy for existing agrarian reform
beneficiaries that are not in barangays within the ARCs shall be adopted by the DAR”
(Bicameral Conference Committee, 09-Jun-2009, p. 169). Hence, the proposal to include
increase the specific percentage of fund allocation for support services was only
conditional clause was only approved with the inclusion of this conditional clause
adopting the ARC strategy in the final CARPER law (RA 9700).
Advocacy Coalition Framework Analysis. To a certain extent, the consensus
reached among all competing coalitions to increase the fund allocation for support
services delivery is in itself an indicator of policy-oriented learning. Specifically, the
agreement implies that after more than two decades of CARP implementation, competing
coalitions have commonly acknowledged and established that the lack of support services
to CARP beneficiaries is an undeniable problem that have partly caused the relative
failures of CARP. As such, the proposal to increase the percentage of funds allocated for
this component of CARP is a testament to coalitions’ mutual aspiration to improve on
this shortcoming of CARP. This is a clear demontration of Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s
concept of policy-oriented learning as “…a productive analytical debate between

members of different advocacy coalitions…[where] one or both coalitions are led to alter
Policy Core aspects of their belief system or at least very important Secondary Aspects as
a result of an observed dialogue rather than a change in external conditions” (Sabatier,
1988, p. 155). This learning from past CARP implementation is even more pronounced
with the proposed conditional clause to adopt a strategy that proved successful, i.e. the
ARC clustering method of support service delivery.
Table 5.23. CARP Provisional Amendments: ARC Clustering as a Strategy of

Support Services Delivery

ISSUE PROVISION (RA 9700)
(RA 6657)
Strategy of Section 2 of RA 6657 on Declaration of Principles and Policies is hereby
Support No provision amended to incorporate the following statement:
Services
Delivery As much as practicable, the implementation of the program shall be
community-based to assure, among others, that the farmers shall have greater
control of farmgate prices, and easier access to credit.
Sec. 13 hereby amends Sec. 36. Funding for Support Services:
Provided, further, That for the next five years, as far as practicable, a minimum
of two (2) Agrarian Reform Communities (ARCs) shall be established by the
DAR, in coordination with the local government units, non-governmental
organizations, community-based cooperatives and people’s organizations in
each legislative district with a predominant agricultural population: Provided,
furthermore, That the areas in which the ARCs are to be established are shall
have been substantially covered under the provisions of this Act and other
agrarian reform laws: Provided, finally, That a complementary support services
delivery strategy for existing agrarian reform beneficiaries that are not in
barangays within the ARCs shall be adopted by the DAR.
For this purpose, an Agrarian Reform Community is composed and managed by

agrarian reform beneficiaries who shall be willing to organize and to undertake
the integrated development of an area and/or their organizations/cooperatives.
In each community, the DAR, together with the agencies and organizations
abovementioned, shall identify the farmers’ association, cooperative, or their
respective federations approved by the farmers-beneficiaries that shall take the
lead in the agricultural development of the area. In addition, the DAR, in close
coordination with the congressional oversight committee created herein, with
due notice to the representative of the legislative district prior to
implementation shall be authorized to package proposals and receive grants, aid
and other forms of financial assistance from any source.
As presented in the previous chapter, all coalitions agree that the lack of support
services forms part of the major reason for CARP’s failure. Yet, all coalitions seem to
acknowledge the positive impact of Agrarian Reform Communities, a clustering
approach in consolidating support services to CARP beneficiaries. This unanimous
agreement is shown by the fact that Representative Duavit’s proposed amendment to
incorporate a provision under the Statement of Policies and Principle appreciating the
ARC strategy was accepted without objection both in the 3rd reading of the House of
Representatives and at the Bicameral Committee. At a hearing to incorporate individual
and committee amendments to the consolidated bill HB 4077, Duavit’s proposal to
include this declarative provision on adopting the ARC strategy was met with a positive
response from the bill’s sponsor Albay First District Representative Lagman:
Rep. Duavit: Yes. And I guess the last amendment that I will be introducing later on is that, all
distribution regardless of implementation--and by that I mean even those that receive the land
directly ore [sic] even kung makasuwerte man sila at talagang tumugma ang laki ng lupa doon sa
crop type nila, etc. that--regardless of the implementation, all of these must still be community based
and that we have a strong push in the bill for the program to be community based. And this is really
just to assure that the farmers will have greater control of the gate prices, Your Honor, and as well as
to facilitate easier credit by now being able to implement risk management measure by virtue of
their being confederated into a larger body, Your Honor.
Rep. Lagman: Yes, Your Honor, at the proper time, we are going to favorably accept the amendment
(Plenary Deliberations 29-May-2009).
In a way, Lagman’s role as a policy broker being open to suggestions facilitated the
statement of policy change proposed by Duavit. This was even more shown during the
final reading of the bill on June 3, 2009:
Rep. Lagman: in Section 1 of House Bill No. 4077, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6657 is hereby
amended to read as follows: After the third paragraph of the original law, provide for the following
paragraph which shall be the fourth paragraph: AS MUCH AS PRACTICABLE THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAM SHALL BE COMMUNITY-BASED TO ASSURE,
AMONG OTHERS, THAT THE FARMERS SHALL HAVE GREATER CONTROL OF
FARMGATE PRICES, AND EASIER ACCESS TO CREDIT. We would like to acknowledge that
this amendment was proposed by the distinguished Gentleman from Rizal, the Honorable Duavit,
which we have accepted and included as part of the committee amendments. I move that we approve
the same, Madam Speaker.
DEPUTY SPEAKER Villarosa: Is there any objection? Hearing none, same is approved.
Lagman was also the one who proposed the adoption of the same provision at the
Bicameral Committee Conference on June 9, 2009 to reconcile differences between
the Senate and House versions of the CARP extension and reform bills:
Rep. Lagman: We propose to adopt the Senate verions with the modification that we adopt the
House version with respect to the implementation of the program shall be community-based to
assure farmers greater control of farm-gate prices and easier access to credit.
CHAIRPERSON HONASAN: Are there any objections? Hearing none, let me approve this.
The appreciation of the ARC strategy first employed by President Ramos under
the administration of DAR Sec. Ernesto Garilao came about as an acknowledgment of
assessments highlighting the ARC as one of the factors that gave CARP relative success.
Perhaps, what made this appreciation more convincing was the presence of a more
objective evaluation of the ARC method from impartial academics who cited the
contributions of the ARC to CARP’s relative success:
Now, we look at variables per capita income, per capita expenditure, net farm income and also on
poverty incidence. And our findings suggest that ownership of the land is really a very significant
predictor of all these. So those who own the lands significantly have higher incomes per capita and
they have lower poverty incidence. And then among those who already own their lands, again, it
makes a lot of significant impact if they are in an ARC. In fact, if one is residing in an ARC, and
he owns the land, then there is no difference between an ARB and a non-ARB, which is again as
expected because we know that the support services of the ARC is really community-based
And then the next data that we looked at is the census of agriculture. One was conducted in 1991
also by the NSO and then another in 2002 by the NSO. Then we looked more closely into this ARC
strategy and what we found out there is that if we look at community investments in the ARC, then
there was really a significantly higher investments in the ARC than in the non-ARCs. But we
wanted to look more closely into this and what we did was to compare the ARCs strategy in terms of
the benefits and the costs with your regular agricultural development programs and we are talking
about the programs of the Department of Agriculture and the LGUs. Of course, we took out the
budget of the Fisheries, the budget for research because this will have no overarching impact.
Now, what we found out there is that one, both of them have positive net present values. Meaning
that their benefits outweigh the costs. But if you compare the net present values of the ARC
strategy and the regular agricultural development programs, then we find out that, again, it is
significantly higher. The ARC strategies is [sic] significantly higher. And this again supports our
initial hypothesis that for a development strategy to be very effective, you need to have broad
base distribution of assets to begin with (Rosemarie Edillon, Executive Director, Asia Pacific
Policy Center, Committee Hearing 05-Dec-2007).
Still, the ARC strategy like any other policy issue was questioned by members of the
landowners’ bloc and the Bayan Muna Coalition on separate occasions, but their
questions pertained only to the sustainability of ARC targets and does not substantially
attack the rationality, soundness or legitimacy of the concept.
Rep. Remulla: Yes, Madam Speaker, I laud the Sponsor in his effort to really justify the extension; and
I have seen some ARC's succeed, Madam Speaker. In my province, although we are an exception to the
general rule as a state of sponsoring himself, there's one ARC in a most remote barangay--most remote
town in Magallanes beside Batangas, which was very successful. But the government spent for
irrigation, for all the roads, for all the seeds, practically giving everything to the program. Practically,
the government spend more than one million per hectare in that area. Do we have one million per
hectare for this program when we acquire so many more hectares and all the lands that we have acquire
[sic] already? Because the way I estimate it, Madam Speaker, if we want this program to succeed, we
need P100.00--actually, more than P100.00 per square meter in input to be able to make the program
succeed. Do we have that money? Is 100 billion enough? Where will we get the money later on? How
about the on-going lands that had been acquired and are in limbo where the farmers are not moving. Do
we have the money to make it succeed? (Plenary Deliberation, 21-May-2008).
Rep. Ocampo: Yes, I note that in Section 3 of the bill under deliberation, there is a requirement of a
minimum of three (3) agrarian reform communities that shall be established, shall be established by
the Department of Agrarian Reform in each legislative district with a predominantly agricultural
population. Is this realizable? Has there been any study that would show that this is feasible to have
three (3) agrarian reform communities in a single district in a year? (Plenary Deliberation, 30-Apr-
2008).
In effect, the proposal to institute a target for creating ARCs during the CARP extension
did not encounter major objection at the Bicameral Conference Committee (09-Jun-
2009), where the Senate and House CARPER bill provisions were finalized. The only
concern raised by Nueva Ecija Fourth District Representative and Bicam member
Rodolfo Antonino was the need to establish more ARCs that he considers a “clustering
[method that is] very good in terms of being able to provide support services” [emphasis
added](Bicameral Conference Committee, 09-Jun-2009, p. 170).
Advocacy Coalition Framework Analysis. In two ways, the conditional clause
adopting a minimum number of ARCs to be created in the course of CARP’s five-year

extension is another proof of policy-oriented learning transpiring among advocacy
coalition members participating in the CARPER law deliberations (RA 9700). Firstly, the
academic assessment (abovementioned) supporting proposals to formally acknowledge
the ARC strategy as a CARP policy is a consistent finding exemplifying what Sabatier
and Jenkins-Smith (1994) refer to as the important role of scientific information in the
consideration/deliberations of policy change. According to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith
(1994), scientific information possess an “enlightening function” in that data gathered
over the course of program implementation enable coalition members to have a more
accurate assessment of the state of policy implementation, to refine the understanding of
a policy issue, and eventually modify policy beliefs by correcting the erroneous
arguments of a coalition or accepting the logic and practicability of a competing
coalition’s belief. In this case, the objective academic evaluation provided by the Asia
Pacific Policy Center exemplifies this instrumental role of scientific information.
Secondly and more importantly, policy-oriented learning is yet again demonstrated in
their intention to improve the delivery of support services to CARP beneficiaries, all
coalitions agree that the clustering strategy of establishing ARCs, first employed by
President Ramos under the administration of then DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao, has
spurred momentous/episodic success in support services delivery. Legislators from all
coalitions appeared to converge in adopting this successful strategy and refining it
through provisional amendments as stated above.

Table 5.24. CARP Provisional Amendments: Increase in Fund Allocation for

Agricultural Credit
ORIGINAL
POLICY
PROVISION RESOLUTION: PROVISION AMENDMENT (RA 9700)
ISSUE
(RA 6657)
Lack of No provision SEC. 14. Sec. 37 of RA 6657 on Support Services to the
secure and Beneficiaries is hereby amended as follows:
reliable credit
access, in Support Services for the Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries. The State
shall adopt the integrated policy of support services delivery to
particular
agrarian reform beneficiaries. To this end, the DAR, the
Department of Finance, and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)
shall institute reforms to liberalize access to credit by agrarian
reform beneficiaries. The PARC shall ensure that support services
to farmer-beneficiaries are provided, such as:
(b) Socialized terms on agricultural credit facilities

Thirty percent (30%) of all appropriations for support services
referred to in Section 36 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended,
shall immediately set aside and made available for agricultural
credit facilities: Provided, That one-third (1/3) of this segregrated
appropriation shall be specifically allocated for subsidies to support
the initial capitalization for agricultural production to new agrarian
reform beneficiaries upon the awarding of the emancipation patent
or the certificate of land ownership award and the remaining two-
thirds (2/3) shall be allocated to provide access to socialized credit
to existing agrarian reform beneficiaries, including the
leaseholders: Provided, further, the LBP and other concerned
government financial institutions, accredited savings and credit
cooperatives, financial service cooperatives and accredited
cooperative banks shall provide the delivery system for
disbursement of the above financial assistance to individual
agrarian reform beneficiaries, holders of collective titles and
cooperatives.
"For this purpose, all financing institutions may accept as collateral

for loans the purchase orders, marketing agreements or expected
harvests: Provided, That loans obtained shall be used in the
improvement or development of the farm holding of the agrarian
reform beneficiary or the establishment of facilities which shall
enhance production or marketing of agricultural products of
increase farm income therefrom: Provided, further, That of the
remaining seventy percent (70%) for the support services, fifteen
percent (15%) shall be earmarked for farm inputs as requested by
the duly accredited agrarian reform beneficiaries' organizations,
such as, but not limited to: (1) seeds, seedlings and/or planting
materials; (2) organic fertilizers; (3) pesticides; (4) herbicides; and
(5) farm animals, implements/'machineries; and five percent (5%)
for seminars, trainings and the like to help empower agrarian
reform beneficiaries.
Besides the actual amount of support services fund, much of the discussion on
support services centered on the lack of access by CARP beneficiaries to reliable and
secure credit (see Table 7.17). Indeed, various studies identifies lack of access to credit or
insufficient capital under CARP as a practical problem that generated negative
consequences on farm productivity and incited contentious social issues (APPC, 2007;
Arlanza et. al, 2006; Gordoncillo et. al, 2007;). This finding is further corroborated by the
fact that the institutional choice and design of credit facility for CARP underwent a
lengthy ardous deliberation at the House of Representatives.
The issue of credit access was first raised by RCM member and Lone District of
Quirino Representative Junie Cua at the first committee hearing. Cua used the need for
better credit as justification for urging his fellow legislators to approval the CARP
extension immediately.
Chairman, I agree completely with the statement that the extension of this program is a matter of
immediacy, a matter of urgency. And so, I seek the support of all of our Members for the extension
of this program. This bill seeks not only to extend the life of the program but seeks as well to
provide the necessary funding for an extension without support is not going to work. And this
humble representation feels very strongly that there is a need to improve the viability of farmer
beneficiaries, especially in the area of access to credit. And this... the bill that this humble
representation has included this component in the proposed legislation [emphasis added](Committee
Hearing, 21-Nov-2007).
In the same hearing, another RCM champion and Akbayan Partylist Representative Risa
Hontiveros stated that strengthening “credit and support services, including collateral-free
loans and capability-building projects to farmer beneficiaries” is the second priority of
the RCM’s CARPER bill proposal (Committee Hearing, 21-Nov-2007). Then DAR
Secretary Nasser Pangandaman himself acknowledged that the provision of credit “is
deemed crucial to the development of agri-business and enhancement of farmers
productivity leading to rural development and industrialization...” and “…will surely
address the perpetual problem of the availability of loans or credit in the countryside and
accelerate the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform program” (Committee Hearing, 21-Nov-
2007). Even representatives of both farmers and landowners commonly acknowledged on
separate committee hearings that CARP has somehow failed in providing adequate credit
support to its beneficiaries:
…itanong nating ngayon sa CARP. Meron ba dun na credit assistance? Ito po. Meron kayong batas
na ginawa dito pero hindi naman niyo pinatitibay. Ito po, (Let’s ask this about CARP: is there credit
assistance? A law was made for this but it lacks reinforcement.) An Act to provide farmers broad
access to agricultural credit and provide a mechanism thereof and for other purposes. Farming is a
business. You need capital to be productive, efficient and competitive. Sa ilalim ng CARP, wala
hong agency na magpapautang sa min. Alam niyan ng Land Bank through cooperative. Pero bagsak
ang kooperatiba. Saan kami mangungutang? Usurer ang binabagsakan namin kaya nakalublob
kami sa kumunoy ng kahirapan, na siyang kailangang ituwid (Under CARP, no agency is willing
to grant us loans. Land Bank knows that through cooperative, but when cooperatives fail,
where do we borrow money? We go to usurers that plunge us to even greater poverty, which
should be rectified.) [translation by author][emphasis added](Mr. Jaime Tadeo (Farmer
Representative, Presidential Agrarian Reform Council/ Consitutional Commissioner, Committee
Whether or not PARC should be extended will depend on whether or not it has accomplished
in the past 34 years or 38 years the purposes that is stated in the law itself as well as in the
Constitution. The Constitution as well as the 6657 states that there are 3 basic purposes of the
CARP Law--number one, alleviation of poverty; number two, increase in productivity; and number
three, encourage landowner investment in the rural areas. If the purpose of land reform is solely the
distribution of land, if that is the only purpose of land reform, then certainly, it has succeeded
magnificently because to date, the Agrarian Reform Department has already distributed more than
6.5 million hectares to more than 4 million farmer-beneficiaries. As far as land distribution is
concerned, no question about success. But if we are to determine on whether or not they... this
distribution alleviated poverty, has increased the productivity, has encouraged landowners to
invest in the rural areas, it has not succeeded. It is a failure. But we cannot completely blame
the farmer-beneficiaries for the following reasons: Number one, there has been a lack of
support services. Number two, there is no direct loan, there is no credit that is given to the
farmer-beneficiaries. He is on his own. How can he produce a crop? He has to go to a [sic] five-
six lenders (Eduardo F. Hernandez, PARC Landowner Representative, Committee Hearing 05-Dec-
2007).
Another known landowning legislator Pangasinan Fifth District Representative Marcos
Cojuangco even illustrates that the importance of credit access extends to life and death:
Mr. Speaker, the answer I would give to that question is because when you reform land and you
move away the owner, the original owner, from that land, you are also removing the working capital
that makes that land productive. Of course, if the owner is no longer benefitting from that land, then
that capital is no longer available and the recepient farmer has now to raise that capital on his own,
aside from having the obligation to pay his obligations to Land Bank included, would risk to lend
money to farmer beneficiaries because they are a bad credit risk. And so, farmer[s] recipients are left
to their own devices, they end up going to informal lending institutions like the 5-6 and we all know
that the 5-6, if they are not paid, will not go through legalities to collect what is due them. They will
beat up people, they will even kill people to collect their debts. Are we not forcing these recipients
into a more desperate situtation by giving them land knowing that they do not have enough capital to
run it at a level that could provide them with a decent return, Madam Speaker, Mr. Sponsor? Plenary
Deliberation, 04-Jun-2008)
This mutual recognition by historically diametrically opposed coalitions establishes the
critical importance of credit as a policy core issue or its irrefutable necessity as a factor in
CARP’ success. This meant legislators would undergo lengthy deliberations to
completely sort out the specific details of its program design and implementation.
Cagayan de Oro City Second District Representative and RCM coalition member Rufus
Rodriguez was the first Congressman to acknowledge explicitly the contentious nature of
credit access in CARP. At a single plenary deliberation, his strong statement urging his
fellow legislators to be decisive about how credit as a type of CARP support service
should be dispensed generated an extensive series of interpellations:
…Mr. Chairman, I agree that credit facilities land collateral is a contentious issue for so long.
Let us finish that contentious issue today. Let us decide what to do. It is a very important
component of reform that we have credit facilities. We cannot delay that. After all, if we
approve this in the committee, the plenary in the ultimate wisdom will decide whether farm will be
collateral or not. And so it is with regret that I could not accept the amendment. And I would go to
the motion of the comment of Congressman Junie Cua that his be harmonized, the two proposals,
and that we approve of this now, and has been distributed a product of a long planning and hearings
and therefore, I move that we call the previous question, Mr. Chairman [emphasis added](Plenary
Deliberation, 23-Apr-2008).
At the same hearing, legislators pondered on two types of credit services being offered by
sponsors and co-sponsors of the House consolidated bill (HB 4077). RCM champion and
Akbayan Partylist Representative Risa Hontiveros suggested allotting 30 percent of all
fund allocation for support services with certain conditions while another RCM advocate
and lone district of Quirino Representative Junie Cua proposed to liberalize credit access
by permitting CARP beneficiaries to use their land as collateral, an idea that clearly
divided the three coalitions and that a number of agrarian experts regard as a major
constraint to credit access for CARP beneficiaries (APPC, 2007; Fabella, 2014;
Gordoncillo et. al, 2007 to name a few). Both the RCM and the Bayan Muna coalitions
opposed Cua’s proposal because of its conterversial consequence of allowing probable
abusive and exploitive land mortgaging practices while experts argue that restrictions on
collateralizing CARP lands makes it highly risky for banks to lend money due to lack of
guarantees especially in highly probable cases of defaulting (APPC, 2007; Fabella, 2014;
Gordoncillo et. al, 2007). Lagman articulated this concern at the same hearing house
representatives deliberated on these two proposals:
If it is assumed that credit facilities will have to be collateralized, then there is no other way to have
that collateralized except to mortgage the landholding, and I am of the very serious concern
that once you do that, you're going to have the CARP program end with respect to the
particular beneficiary who will fail, and eventually fail to redeem the mortgage [emphasis
added](Plenary Deliberation, 23-Apr-2008).
With this pronounced opposition to allowing collateralization of CARP lands, several
legislators such as Quezon City Third District Representative Matias Defensor attempted
to broker by proposing to harmonize both proposals. However, Sorsogon First District
Representative Salvador Escudero and Palawan Second District Representative Abraham
Kahlil Mitra suggested to break the stalemate/resolve the dilemma through a referendum
or a legislative vote as Escudero sees them as mutually exclusive options that “cannot be
married” (Plenary Deliberations 23-Apr-2008). Mitra consulted with the DAR then
represented by Secretary Nasser Pangandaman, who gave a rather ambiguous stand on
the issue of collateralizing CARP lands. Given this ambiguity, the attending legislators
decided to vote on the proposals and the outcome favored Hontiveros’ proposal to allot
30 percent share of all funds for support services. Even before the result of the votes was
announced, Hontiveros already lauded the lengthy and cumbersome process of
deliberating on the two proposals, expressing joy at the fact that the vote underwent a
long and arduous process that is, albeit unfinished and imperfect but “at the very least it
represents an attempt to consolidate the efforts and the victories, modest, however, they
may be of the rural sectors that's far” (Plenary Deliberation, 23-Apr-2008) and shows that
the Committee has “done in good faith with no intention of wittingly or unwittingly,
fooling the rural sectors who have done most” (Plenary Deliberation, 23-Apr-2008) to
draft and pushed for the enactment of the consolidated bill. For his part, Cua conceded
but asked if the decision can be appealed through a motion for reconsideration, which
according to House Agrarian Committee Chair Elias Bulut is no longer possible.
Consequently, this lengthy deliberation in a single hearing meant the legislators
were able to thresh out the specifics of what was supposedly a highly contentious policy
core issue on credit access and so the approve proposal no longer encountered major
objections until the Bicameral Conference Committee. At the Bicam, the only question
raised was the explicit inclusion of the phrase “leaseholders” which Senator Pimentel
argued may “contravene in the provisions of the Agrarian Reform Law in the sense that if
the leasehold agreements, for example, will entitle the landowner to retain more than
what is authorized by the Agrarian Reform Law” (Bicameral Conference Committee, 09-
Jun-2009). With the assurance given by Lagman, however, Pimentel conceded and the
proposal of Hontiveros (see Table 7.23) was approved swiftly.
Advocacy Coalition Framework Analysis. The provision on socialized credit
and increasing the percentage share of credit support to CARP beneficiaries demonstrates
policy-oriented learning in many ways. First, the fact that landowners relieves farmer
beneficiaries of the culpability in the failure of CARP to make awarded lands productive
reflects an alteration “of thought or behavioral intentions which result from experience,
which is an indicator of policy-oriented learning according to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith
(1994). Moreover, this mutual recognition of insufficient credit as a policy problem in
CARP is reflective of a refinement or improvement of one’s understanding of the state of
policy variables forming policy beliefs, a process that Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1988;
1994) regard as another indicator of policy-oriented learning. Their mutual attribution to
insufficient credit as the cause of CARP failure establishes insufficient credit as a policy
issue/problem that has become pervasive among all stakeholders after twenty years.
Thirdly, the fact that competing coalitions commonly agree that insufficient capital is an
undeniable problem at the policy core level is consistent with the hypothesis of Sabatier
and Jenkins-Smith (1994) that the multi-dimensional/level nature of policy beliefs
facilitates/permits policy change by allowing agreement at a certain level regardless of
differences and disagreements on another level. Fourthly, the use of legislators of
referendum as an institutional mechanism to resolve a possible gridlock in
decisionmaking operationalizes Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s (1988; 1994) hypothesis
that policy change through policy-oriented learning is possible or can be facilitated
through the existence of a forum governed by professional norms. In this case, the
committee hearing served as this facilitative forum while the referendum functioned as a
professional norm.
Similar to amendment provisions relating to the policy core issue of security of
land transfer or installation of ARBs, the amendment provisions on support services
earlier discussed and incorporated in the final CARPER law reflect the major secondary
aspects (i.e. specific policy details) that constitute the top most concerns of all coalitions.
As shown in the frequency data (shown on Table 7.18), data gathered consistently show
that the most discussed secondary aspects (i.e. specific issues) of support services are the
ones that would be most likely reformed or experience policy change. According to
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s Advocacy Coalition Framework (1994), this is so as
lengthy and cumbersome debates indicate a presence of intermediate conflict between
competing coalitions with contradicting beliefs, which facilitate policy change by
allowing participating coalitions to clarify and refine their respective views or
understanding of policy issues through discussions of scientific data, intensive analysis of
policy problems, and most importantly, learning from mistakes of past policy
implementation. Moreover, these amendments were possible because there appears to be
an overwhelming consensus among traditionally clashing coalitions to improve the state
of support services under CARP. Data gathered on the frequency of discussing support
services (see Table 5.25) as a policy core issue of CARP proves the presence of this
consensus by showing that 97 percent of statements on support services either explicity
call for or strongly implies continuing or improving the state of support services delivery
under CARP.
Table 5.25. Frequency of Observations of Support Services as a Policy Core Issue

of CARP
Technical Support Services Need to Improve or Increase Support Services
214 208
100% 97%

B.4. Role of DAR and Implementing Agencies
An important observation to note regarding the amendments to the original CARP
law provisions is that the conditional clauses mostly pertain to the capacity of the DAR as
the main implementing agencies. This partly reflects the recognition that much of
CARP’s problem is ineffective implementation as much as it is defective or problematic
legislation. Data gathered on the frequency supports this observation:
Table 5.26. Frequency of Observations of Role of DAR and Implementing

Agencies as Policy Core Issue of CARP
implementing agencies (e.g.DENR, LBP,
authenticity/ Capacity/ Competency
Oversight/Monitoring Committee
Interagency coordination (DBM,
(and its deviation from mandate,
of DAR and other implementing
Role of DAR bureaucracy & other
Corruption in the bureaucracy/

susceptibility to influence, and
Political Will/Commitment/
Liability/Accountability of
susceptible to influence
implementing agencies
DAR as implementer
effectiveness)
Land Bank
DOF, etc.)
agencies
PCGG)
197 23 15 10 12
70 22 20
100% 36% 11% 10%

12% 8% 5% 6%
This learning culminated in a separate and new provision (see Table 7.25) that establishes
a Congressional Oversight Committee to exact greater transparency and put constructive
pressure to accelerate CARP’s delayed implementation.
Table 5.27. CARP Provisional Amendments: Congressional Oversight for

Improved Implementation
ORIGINAL
(RA 9700)
(RA 6657)
Greater oversight to No provision Section 26 of the new CARP law adopts a new provision
exact accountability creating a Congressional Oversight Committee.
and transparency from
DAR and A Congressional Oversight Committee on Agrarian Reform
implementing agencies (COCAR) is hereby created to oversee and monitor the
implementation of this Act. It shall be composed of the
Chairpersons of the Committee on Agrarian Reform of both
Houses of Congress, three (3) Members of the House of
Representatives, and three (3) Members of the Senate of the
Philippines, to be designated respectively by the Speaker of
the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate
of the Philippines.
The Chairpersons of the Committees on Agrarian Reform of

the House of Representatives and of the Senate of the
Philippines shall be the Chairpersons of the COCAR. The
Members shall receive no compensation; however, traveling
and other necessary expenses shall be allowed.
In order to carry out the objectives of this Act, the COCAR

shall be provided with the necessary appropriations for its
operation. An initial amount of Twenty-five million pesos
(P25,000,000.00) is hereby appropriated for the COCAR for
the first year of its operation and the same amount shall be
appropriated every year thereafter.
The term of the COCAR shall end six (6) months after the
expiration of the extended period of five (5) years.
Functions of the No provision Sec. 27. Powers and Functions of the COCAR. The COCAR
COCAR shall have the following powers and functions:
(a) Prescribe and adopt guidelines which shall govern its

work;
(b) Hold hearings and consultations, receive testimonies
and reports pertinent to its specified concerns;
(c) Secure from any department, bureau, office or
instrumentality of the government such
assistance as may be needed, including technical
information, preparation and production of
reports and submission of recommendations or
plans as it may require, particularly a yearly
report of the record or performance of each
agrarian reform beneficiary as provided under
Section 22 of Republic Act No. 6657, as
amended;
(d) Secure from the DAR or the LBP information on the
amount of just compensation determined to be
paid or which has been paid to any landowner;
(e) Secure from the DAR or the LBP quarterly reports
on the disbursement of funds for the agrarian
reform program;
(f) Oversee and monitor, in such a manner as it may
deem necessary, the actual implementation of
the program and projects by the DAR;
(g) Summon by subpoena any public or private citizen to
testify before it, or require by subpoena duces
tecumto produce before it such records, reports,
or other documents as may be necessary in the
performance of its functions;
(h) Engage the services of resource persons from the
public and private sectors as well as civil society
including the various agrarian reform groups or
organizations in the different regions of the
country as may be needed;
(i) Approve the budget for the work of the Committee
and all disbursements therefrom, including
compensation of all personnel;

(j) Organize its staff and hire and appoint such
employees and personnel whether temporary,
contractual or on constancy subject to applicable
rules; and
(k) Exercise all the powers necessary and incidental to
attain the purposes for which it is created.
Periodic reporting No provision
Sec. 28. Periodic Reports. The COCAR shall submit to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President
of the Senate of the Philippines periodic reports on its
findings and recommendations on actions to be undertaken by
both Houses of Congress, the DAR, and the PARC.
House Agrarian Reform Committee Chair Elias Bulut first raised the need to improve the
role of DAR and other implementing agencies in his introduction at the opening
committee hearing:
Given the favorable policy environment and support of the program, the overall land acquisition and
distribution should be sped up and completed in due time. Friends, ladies and gentlemen, we are
now on the last quarter of the year 2007. This only leaves us with very little time to put our facts
together in order to legislate for CARP extension. Most importantly, the sincerity of the
program's implementors is very vital to render a positive CARP scenario. The DAR has a
bureaucracy that should show dedication to provide the stakeholders with honest service and
deliberate efforts to properly implement the program in order to gain attention among the public and
private sectors. Thus, paving the way to the influx of tremendous support for the continuity of the
porgram when Congress will have to seek proofs from analysts to advocate to arbiter and even
referee [emphasis added](Committee Hearing, 21-Nov-2007).
As the hearings proceeded, members of the three coalitions identified the problem with
DAR more specifically. According to Ilocos Sur First District Representative Ronald
Singson, a supporter of the RCM-sponsored CARP extension and reform bill, the
problem of DAR lies with its excessive focus on land redistribution and its consequent
negligence of providing adequate support services to CARP beneficiaries. He further
pointed to DAR’s bloated structure as the cause of the department’s inefficiencies:
As for the DAR, it has concentrated mainly on the land redistribution without considering the
viability and the provision of support services to farmer beneficiaries. Despite the shortage, the
implementation of CARP has been characterized by misplaced priorities, misallocation of resources.
For instance, 60% of DAR's total fund disbursements goes [sic] to salaries of department's
employees. A very bloated bureaucracy, DAR has over... has 15,000 officials and employees. An
efficient organization must observe the ratio between personnel and operating costs at sixty-
for...forty-sixy, respectively [emphasis added](Committee Hearing 21-Nov-2007).
COOP-NATCCO Partylist Representative Guillermo Cua, another co-sponsor of the
RCM-endorsed CARP extension bill, stressed the need “to maybe strengthen DAR also
as a regulatory body for Agrarian Reform communities if you wanted to build viable
Agrarian Reform communities (Committee Hearing 21-Nov-2007).” The sentiments of
farmers, on the other hand, were accurately expressed by Nestor Eugenio from the
Kaakbay Federation of Farmers, who in Filipino, illustrated DAR’s shortcoming in
extending support services to all CARP beneficiaries on the ground:
Maliban po doon, sa usapin po ng burokrasya (bureaucracy), 'yung pagpapatupad po natin ng mga

policy, 'yung mga nakasaad po doon sa CARP o 'yung ating mga trabaho bilang mga empleyado
(employee) ng DAR ay hindi po tumutugon doon sa dapat na trinatrabaho po natin o 'yung tama at
angkop na pamamahagi ng lupa. Bakit ko po sinasabi 'yan? Sapagkat naparaming lupa po ang hindi
pa nako-cover. Ayon po doon sa sinabi ng DAR, mayroon pong more or less 1.3 million hectares na
hindi pa distributed at isa nga po diyan 'yung lupain po ng mga Cojuangco, ng mga Arroyo
Besides that, the issue on bureaucracy, the implementation of policy, those provided in the CARP
[law] or our work as employees of DAR does not correspond to what we are supposed to focus
on… the right and proper way of redistributing lands. Why do I say so? Because many lands
remain to be covered. And regarding what DAR said, there still remains more or less 1.3 million
hectares to be distributed and one of those lands is owned by the Cojuangcos, the
Arroyos…[translation by author][emphasis added](Committee Hearing, 21-Nov-2007).
On the other hand, Cebu Second District Representative Pablo Garcia, a known ally of
landowners (Putzel, 1992), was more straightforward in criticizing DAR’s
implementation of CARP. At the opening committee hearing, Garcia cited several
allegations of DAR’s so-called abusive practices. First, Garcia argued that DAR’s
inclusion of temporary farmworkers as CARP beneficiaries is a discretionary practice
that seems violative of the Constitution because according to the framers of the
Constitution, notably the farmer representative Jaime Tadeo, these are unqualified as
beneficiaries and hence are not entitled to own CARP lands:

And also, who are entitled to own land? Well, farmer, that means tenant or lessee, farm worker. They
must be regular farm worker. The temporary--and this was stretched by Mr. Tadeo during the
deliberation at the Constitutional Commission--temporary workers on the farm are not entitled to
own land. They are entitled to own... ah, to receive a just share of the fruit. Herein lies all this
conflict because of the interpretation of the law and its implementation by the DAR [emphasis
added] (Committee Hearing, 21-Nov-2007).
Second, Garcia also claimed that DAR’s compulsory acquisition and redistribution of
private lands lacks legal and constitutional basis for “Under the Constitution and under
the law, if the owner of the property does not want to sell his land, then the government
must institute expropriation proceedings under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court…Not like
now, when the DAR will forcibly, and even with the assistance of the military and the
police, install beneficiaries, at least beneficiaries, into the land” (Committee Hearing, 21-
Nov-2007). Garcia elaborated that CARP’s preceeding law, RA 3844, provides an
expropriation process that requires a claimant farmer beneficiary to file a petition first so
courts can proceed on determining his/her eligibility before any claim of ownership can
be granted. Third, Garcia also reproached the inability of CARP to guarantee just
compensation, citing a case in the City of Kanlaon, where “more than 50% have
already… only beneficiaries have already disposed of their lands” and only 18% of
beneficiaries supposedly have paid their loan amortizations to Land Bank (Committee
Hearing, 21-Nov-2007). Fourth, Garcia exposed a case of unpaid taxes by CARP
beneficiaries in the cities and municipalities of Negros Occidental, whose “league passed
a resolution complaining that the beneficiaries no longer paid their taxes which amount
now to more than 3 billion pesos,” (Committee Hearing, 21-Nov-2007) a piece of
information verified by then DAR Secretary Nasser Pangandaman himself. Lastly, Garcia
cited another supposedly illegal practice by DAR of cancelling a landowner’s title
without due notice:

Also another illegal practice of the DAR, this issuance of CLOAs under the Land Registration Law,
Act 496 as amended by that decree, Presidential Decree, I think, 1125, you cannot cancel the title of
the landowner without surrendering the Owner's Duplicate Certificate of Title, that is in the law and
that has not been amended until now. But what happened? Now, if the landowner does not surrender
or present his Owner's Duplicate Certificate of Title in case there is a process, there is a petition in
court informing the owner to surrender his certificate of title in order that the original can be
cancelled. But what happened? In Cebu, in Negros and possibly other places, the owners still hold
their Duplicate Certificate of Title but the original in the office of the Register of Deeds has already
been cancelled. That is clearly patently illegal. But there is, I think and I should, I believe the Land
Registration Authority should also be informed that what they are doing because of their MOA is
against the law (Committee Hearing, 21-Nov-2007).
For Garcia, this practice violates the Constitutional rights of landowners to due process of law:
shall be deprived of his… life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the law. The law protects the landowner but that is disregarded by
DAR and LRA. At one time, Secretary Garilao issued a Memorandum to all RDs, Provincial Officers
not anymore to issue a CLOA because of the decision fo the Supreme Court in Association of Small
Land Owners versus secretary of DAR. Do not issue CLOAs until there is proof that the owners have
fully paid. But this has also been disregarded.
Rightly so, at the second hearing, a representative of small landowners in Bicol
suggested to discuss the termination of DAR in a concise statement that clearly
encapsulates the continuing distrust or disappointment of landowners with the DAR:
Finally, it is time, 34 years, to bring DAR to end. We are ready to participate in any forum to
discuss points of both proposals. We also urge all legislators to secure a copy of the shocking GTS
[sic] report to familiarize yourself with the facts or do you approve the continuation of the existence
of the DAR [emphasis added](Silverio J. Belenguer, Small Landowner Representative from Bicol,
Committee Hearing, 05-Dec-2007).
However, Albay First District Representative Edcel Lagman, an RCM
coalition champion and principal sponsor of the consolidated House CARP extension
and reform bill, repudiated all these allegations, saying that “many of the issues raised
by the distinguished Gentleman from Cebu would be a resurrection of the debates we
had more than… almost twenty (20) years ago” (Committee Hearing 21-Nov-2007).
First, Lagman refuted Garcia’s accusation on the illegality of DAR’s compulsory
acquisition as according to him, “The Comprehensive Agrarian Law authorizes

compulsory acquisition under Section 16, but then there are two (2) modes, Mr.
Chairman, of acquisition. One, is compulsory under Section 16; and voluntary Land
Transfer under Section 20” (Committee Hearing 21-Nov-2007). Second, Lagman also
clarified that certain kinds of temporary workers are permitted by law to own lands as
CARP beneficiaries for “the qualified beneficiary is not limited to the tiller of the land
subject to acquistion. Because in the absence or refusal of the tiller of the land, there
are other qualified beneficiaries enumerated by the law… not limited to the actual
tillers of the land” (Committee Hearing, 21-Nov-2007).
Still, Garcia insisted that “these other beneficiaries must be tillers because they
are in the order of priorities” as provided in Section 22 of the original law (RA 6657)
and because “It's a land to the tiller program” (Committee Hearing, 21-Nov-2007).
Jaime Tadeo, the Constitutional Commissioner referred to by Garcia, himself
unequivocally negated Garcia. Incensed with anger, Tadeo corrected the inaccuracies
or in Filipino “kasinungalingan” (i.e. literal translation: ‘lies’) Garcia apparently
committed upon levying accusations of illegal practices against DAR. First, Tadeo
clarified that the RA 3844 cited by Garcia is not comprehensive, as it does not
authorize land acquisition and redistribution but only covers emancipation farmers
under leasehold arrangements. Hence, the law, Tadeo explained, should not be used as
basis for implementing CARP. Tadeo confided that RA 3844 was intended to be not
comprehensive to allow landowners to retain large landholdings. Second, Tadeo
explained that the Constitution is a byproduct of a numbers game. Despite initially
instituting the right of farmers to own land as a primacy right, such right was relegated
to a basic right as the rest of the 48 Constitutional Commissioners voted against it and
included a provision on non-distributive schemes such as the stock sharing agreement
to allow then President Aquino, a part landowner of Hacienda Luisita, one of the
biggest land estates in the country, to retain her family’s landownership. Tadeo
concluded his rebuttal by taking “issue with the distinguished Gentleman from Cebu
with respect to his statement that others who are not the actual tillers of the land are
placed as beneficiaries. But I agree that all beneficiaries should be tillers of the land,
but they do not need to be necessarily the actual tillers of the land subject to
acquisition. Because Section 22 mentioned other qualified beneficiaries. Of course,
they should be tillers, they cannot be merchants. They cannot be professional, but they
should be farmer tillers but not necessarily the actual tillers of the land subject to
acquisition. Because in the absence of the actual tillers of the land subject to
acquisition, there are other beneficiaries who whould be granted the right to till the
land” (Committee Hearing, 21-Nov-2007). With this firsthand response from Tadeo,
the tense interpellation by Garcia ended but the discussions on the need to improve the
role of DAR and other implementing agencies continued given the many controversies
and implementation issues experienced by various stakeholders and members of all
three coalitions.
On one hand, earlier deliberations on CARP extension centered on the
commitment and political will of DAR and other pertinent implementing agencies to
accomplish CARP’s policy goals. Legislators demanded assurance or guarantees from
DAR representatives who were constantly probed—sometimes dramatically—yet who
were quick to reiterate their dedication in finally fulfilling the mandate of CARP. An
apt example could be witnessed during the opening committee hearing, where
Sorsogon First District Representative Salvador Escudero III dramatically asked then
DAR Secretary Nasser Pangandaman to pledge an oath to his “Allah” that the ten-year
extension period DAR was requesting would be sufficient:
Rep. Escudero: Fifty plus ten years, you are not yet retireable by then. Are you willing to call Allah,
that Allah, give me only ten years after ten years I will not ask anything from you, I can join you. Are
you willing to say that?
Sec. Pangandaman: I will, i will, Your Honor (Committee Hearing, 21-Nov-2007).
Other officials of DAR and other implementing agencies followed suit in reiterating this
commitment. Gerundio Madueño, a DAR undersecretary, went as far as promising to
provide solutions to all the issues against implementing agencies raised with him:
…ngayon na natutuwa po kami sa inyong suporta at ipagpapatuloy po namin ang…ang ating

serbisyo sa Department of Agrarian Reform at sa atin pong mga kasamang agencies, 'yung atin pong
tinatawag na CARP Implementing Agencies. So, ito pong support ninyo sa aming ay dadalhin pon
amin sa ating management, kay Secretary NAsser Pangadaman para po maituwid ang lahat ng
inyong issues. Gusto po naming masagot...masagot at mapagbigyan ng solusyon lahat ng inyong
hinaing at tingin ko naman po ay with...within the...the power of the DAR right now, tingin ko naman
po ay meron tayong solusyon sa lahat ng issues na inyong sinabi ngayong hapon
Now, we are glad for your support and we will continue the services of the Department of Agrarian
Reform and those accompanying implementing agencies, those what we call CARP Implementing
Agencies. So, we will convey your support to our management, to Secretary Nasser
Pangandaman so we could rectify all your issues. We intend to address and provide solutions to all
you pleas and we think that within the power of the DAR right now, we think we have solutions to
all the issues you’ve raised this afternoon [translation by author][emphasis added[(Gerundio
Madueño, Undersecretary, Department of Agrarian Reform, Public Hearing 07-Mar-2008).
Camilo Sabio, then Chairperson of the Presidential Commission on Good Government, a
government agency whose proceeds, collections, or confiscations from successful
resolution of corruption cases contribute to CARP’s Agrarian Reform Fund, also restated
his commitment to the agrarian reform cause. Sabio recounted his personal history of
involvement in drafting the first Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657):
Your Honor, this is the commitment of the Commission and it is also my personal commitment.
This is not an idle commitment, Your Honors, please, because my entire professional life, the first
20 years of my life were spent as Chief Counsel of the Federation of Free Farmers. And then in
1986, when Cory took over, I was counsel together with the Secretary of Justice of the Cabinet
Action Committee and the Inter-Agency Task Force on Agrarian Reform, composed of the
member of the Cabinet and we drafted the CARP, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Porgram
composed of the Executive Order, Your Honor, which was issued by the President together with the
Proclamation. Now, in 1987, I was already in the House of Representatives, I was invited by
Speaker Mitra and Your Honor as then Deputy Secretary General of the House of Representatives. I
mobilized research, the Legislative Council and the Bill Drafting Divisions of the House to draft...
help draft the first Agrarian Reform Law, CARL (Committee Hearing, 05-Dec-2007).
Despite these assurances, legislators continued to question the credibility of DAR.
Palawan Second District Representative Abraham Kahlil Mitra verbalized this skepticism
precisely when he ask these two questions:
1) What happened to the land acquisition? Has the DAR not really performed the way it should
perform?
2) Who controls the Agrarian Reform Fund, is it transparent? Has it been laid to everyone? Has it
been transparent?
There was no question asked about transparency although one or two probably would…my
implication, want a stronger law that would also protect not only the interest of the farmer
beneficiaries but also of the landless, more so in the matter of compensation and the matter of the
usage of the funds that they get for their lands... [emphasis added](Plenary Deliberation, 23-Apr-
2008).
This distrust was further evident during the interpellation by Mitra of DAR Secretary
Nasser Pangandaman. Mitra justified his insistence on the two questions abovementioned
with an expressed intent to improve the CARP law and/or its flawed implementation:
Mr. Chairman, that's why I've been asking that question because, if ever we're going to extend
CARP, we want to extend it the right way. We learned from lessons from the past why it has
not met targets. So in the meantime, Mr. Chairman, please allow me to... please relay through you
my question to the secretary. Bakit po nade-delay ang mga land acquisition ninyo? Ano po ba ang
mga hinaharap na problema? Ano po ba ang sa tingin ninyo ang mga dapat ilagay ninyo dito sa
batas para gumanda ang agrarian reform natin?
Why does your land acquisition get delayed? What problems do you face? What do you think should
we include in the law to improve our agrarian reform? [translation by author][emphasis
added](Plenary Deliberation, 23-Apr-2008).
In response, Secretary Pangandaman alleges that the reason for this impasse in land
acquisition and redistribution is the delayed release of funds by Congress in early 2000s,
a fact that Mitra questioned or disputed. Mitra argued that Congress cannot be faulted for
the delay because first, the Agrarian Reform Fund is included in the annual budget of the
Philippine Government; second, any budget proposal typically originates from the
concerned executive agency, in this case, the DAR; third, Congress merely approves and
deliberates on it; and hence, fourth, Congress is not in charge of the disbursement/fund
release but the Department of Budget and Management and the Land Bank of the
Philippines. Mentioning the presence of the Appropriations (Budgeting) Committee
Chairman in-charge then, Mitra asked further for the specific years when this budget was
not released. The Secretary estimated it to be between 2002 and 2004, but disclaimed that
several other factors also contributed to the delay in DAR’s land acquisition and
redistribution process. Among these is the reconstitution of lost, burned, or damaged
titles. Pangandaman, nonetheless, gave assurance that despite these delays, DAR has been
able to acquire and re-distribute more than 130,000 hectares of land a year and “in the
course of the delay of program,” has been “able to discover… more lands to be acquired
and distributed,” thus increasing the total lands for acquisition and redistribution from
4.29 million hectares to 5.3 million hectares (Plenary Deliberation, 23-Apr-2008).
As the hearings and deliberations progressed, stakeholders became more
emboldened to expose cases or allegations of corrupt practices, if not, at least implied
questionable discretionary practices by DAR in collusion with landowners. Some are
subtle implications such as the following:
…Pero di naman sa lahat… may mga personalidad naman… na talagang sumusuporta sa mga
landowner. Ang stand lang ho namin simple lang i-extend ang CARP then may reporma. I-cancel
natin iyong mga probisyon sa CARP na nakapagbigay ng mga paraan na makapagmanipula iyong
mga landowner kaakibat ang mga personalidad sa DAR. Iyan lang ho.
…But not all… there are personalities… who actually support landowners. Our stand is simple:
extend CARP but with reform. Let’s cancel those provisions in CARP that allows landowners to
manipulate along with personalities in DAR. That’s all. [translation by author][emphasis
added](Faustino Revilleza, Representative, Crescent Incorporated, North Cotabato, Public Hearing

07-Mar-2008).
Others such as the following participant are more blatant in their accusations or
exposition of facts about collusion/corruption:
…The other day nagkaroon kami ng mobilization sa Medialdea farmers petitioning the Medialdea
estate. Itong estate na ito ay kahawig sa problema ng Sumilao kasi iyong si Mr. Medialdea at saka
iyong si Quisumbing ay magkasama doon sa Supreme Court noon. Itong lupain na ito ay nasalang
na sa DAR pero parang na-pull out iyong mga dokumento at saka nawala doon sa listahan ng DAR
dito sa Davao del Sur so hanggang ngayon kami ay nag-struggle pa rin 'no.
The other day we had a mobilization in Medialdea farmers petitioning the Medialdea estae. This
estate resembles the problem in Sumilao because Mr. Medialdea and that Quisumbing are colleagues
in the Supreme Court before. This land was already covered by the DAR but suddenly, its
documents were pulled out and the land was removed from the inventory/list of the DAR here in
Davao del Sur so until now, we continue to struggle.
We are supporting CARP not only for its extension but it's perpetual extension of the program
because CARP is a social justice program of the government. The government responded to
revolutionary situation during the martial law. Has the situation changed? Has the revolutionary
situation in the rural areas changed? Parang wala di ba mayroon pa ring...maraming social injustice
countryside natin 'no; nagpatuloy pa rin iyong ano iyong poverty, iyong rural poverty. I think the
program should be co-terminus with social justice and with poverty in the countryside. Iyon lang po
maraming salamat [translation by author][emphasis added](Mr. Silverio Cardona. Representative,
Balay Dabaw Sur Incorporated/Provincial Agrarian Reform Coordinating Committee, Davao del
Sur, Public Hearing 07-Mar-2008).
Regardless of the tone or manner, all these exposés highlight the problem of transparency
and credibility of DAR and other implementing agencies.
In fact, data gathered shows that the bulk of questions revolved around the
capacity of DAR in its multiple functions as an implementing agency. At separate
hearings, two members of the Bayan Muna coalition questioned the transparency of
private land inventory as suggested by the accomplishment report presented by the DAR
and effectively questioned the latter’s competency in documentation. For instance,
Gabriela Partylist Representative Liza Maza questioned DAR’s statistics on land
conversion by presenting two other sources that indicate more cases than DAR reported:
Again, the DAR itself, from the information that they handed to us during the committee meetings,
in the DAR briefing on CARP and the accomplishments of CARP, it says there that of the 4,359
applications for land-use conversion, the majority, the overwhelming majority, 3,990, covering
49,079 hectares were approved and only 300, a measly 369 applications were denied. And this is
according to the DAR data, which I would even question, because there seems to be a variance
with the data of the National Statistics Office and PhilRice (?). The NSO data says that there are
already about 827,000 hectares of lands converted to other uses since the late 1970s, while
PhilRice data said, that agricultural lands were converted at a rate of 9,000 hectares per year,
which translates to 180,000 hectares. Whereas DAR was saying that from the CARP
implementation in 1988, there was only a conversion of over 40,000 or about 49,079 as of June 2007
(Plenary Deliberation, 27-May-2008).
At another hearing, Rizal First District Representative Michael John Duavit, a supporter
of the RCM-sponsored House Bill CARPER version, questioned the changing scope of
DAR’s coverage of CARP lands and the fact that despite claiming to distribute millions
of hectares, the completion rate decreased substantially over the years:
The reason I'm asking, Your Honor, is because…I will show you what was given to us and the base,
from the period of 1988 even, which suggests that DAR actually continued the scope that was set
during the revolutionary government of Madam Cory Aquino and used that as the base, up until
1997, Your Honor. And that before the next extension, Madam Speaker, before it was, another
almost 200,000 hectares was added in the scope. This dovetails also, Your Honor, with the DOJ
decision from around the time that an extension was not necessary by law, necessary by law, for as
long as the scope was to remain the same. Apparently, because there was a change in scope, Your
Honor, the law for extension happened in 1998. The reason I cite this also, Your Honor, is
according again to the speech of Secretary Pangandaman, in 2005, where we were at almost
84% completion and then in the latest report, we were down to 77% completion, Your Honor.
May I ask how, despite adding beneficiaries and giving away the land, bumaba pa po ang
accomplishment? [emphasis added](Plenary Deliberation, 04-Jun-2008).
In other cases, legislators such as Pryde Henry Teves, Representative of the sugarland
province of Negros Oriental, relayed the complaints of landowners regarding the
exclusive jurisdiction of DAR over agrarian-related cases and their questions on DAR’s
current capacity—or incapacity—to resolve landownership disputes:
For the last 20 years, this has been the setup and until now, a lot of landowners are complaining that
it was not fair to them. Why don't we give the other alternative a try? Why don't we give it to the
regular courts or a court directly under the judicial system to erase all doubts because it's just right
that Executive, Legislative and Judiciary are separate and are co-equal bodies. Why don't we try it
that way? (Plenary Deliberation, 26-May-2009)
In these interrogations, Land Bank of the Philippines, next to DAR, also received
most of the criticisms notably on their inability to collect payments and their
unwillingness to loan capital or offer agricultural credit as consistent with their original
mandate. The first criticism was levied by RCM supporter Ilocos Sur First District
Representative Ronald Singson at the opening hearing. Singson blasted LBP’s exorbitant
rates and the bank’s misplaced priorities in commercial and industrial business, which is
a diversion from its original mandate of providing credit to farmers:
A stark problem in the program implementation is the utter lack of support services and credit.
Technology and support services were needed to make the farmer beneficiaries successful in their
new endeavor as landowners. No government loans were available to them. Borrowed at interest
rates of 24.7%, the Land Bank of the Philippines which was supposed to do... to primarily service
agricultural sector was transformed into a universal bank with 16% of its portfolio dedicated to
commercial and industrial business (Committee Hearing, 21-Nov-2007).
At a later hearing, Palawan Second District Representative Abraham Kahlil Mitra
provides a more explicit evaluation:
There should be a proper substitute and there have been complaints on that, about Land Bank not
doing its job. I think the records of the DAR will show how many millions are still unpaid to the
landowners up to now. Some have entered into lease contracts already, simply because they have not
been paid [emphasis added](Plenary Deliberation, 23-Apr-2008)
Another interpellation by Pangasinan Fifth District Representative and known landed
legislator Marcos Cojuangco incited a series of fairly tense interrogation on the efficacy
of Land Bank of the Philippines as part implementor, which Lagman, the author of the
CARPER law, addressed:
Madam Speaker, the Sponsor stated that there were many studies but there are also many studies that
were done on the efficacy of land reform. And so, I believe that the issue of its efficacy, at best, is
unresolved and is a matter for further debate and consideration among Members of this House
so that they could come up with a more logical and informed decision. I would like to cite the
study done by the German-based institute, independent institute called the GTZ which states that 26
percent of farmer beneficiaries nationwide sold their lands. Sixty-six percent of the agrarian
reform beneficiaries have not been given support services. The LandBank [sic] of the
Philippines has not given any crop loan to agrarian reform beneficiaries because many of them
cannot even pay their amortization on the purchase price of the land and neither was there enough
funds to pay the landowners. Mr. Sponsor, are these statements true? [emphasis added](Plenary
Deliberation, 04-Jun-2008)
Cojuangco went on further to criticize what he seems to consider Land Bank’s lax
policies on defaulting CARP beneficiaries:
But, Madam Speaker, Your Honor, wasn't that the feature of the law made so if the farmer defaulted-
-and I would like to say at this point that the terms that allow Land Bank to take back the land
are very, very liberal, more liberal than I have ever seen in any business or banking
transaction. They are allowed to default for three years in a row, Madam Speaker, distinguished
Sponsor. And the purpose of getting the land back from them, if they cannot perform, is also to give
the land, to redistribute the land to another recipient. Is that not correct, distinguished Sponsor?
[emphasis added](Plenary Deliberation, 04-Jun-2008)
Lagman, an RCM champion and the principal author and sponsor of the consolidated
House CARPER bill, confirmed this practice but clarified that “it is not to liken the
program to a business or banking transaction because it is a social justice provision”
(Plenary Deliberation, 04-Jun-2008). Cojuangco agreed that “the purppose of the Land
Bank is not make money, [but] it is to assist these farmers in paying off their obligation”
but subtly suggested through a question “that if Land Bank were to properly take back
those lands which have not been paid properly and redistribute it to those recipients who
still in your opinion, need to receive land, that there might not be a need to acquire
anymore land?” (Plenary Deliberation, 04-Jun-2008). Lagman disagreed, explaining that
“because the mandate of the Constitution is to distribute justly all agricultural lands… As
long as there are still remaining agricultural lands and remaining expectant beneficiaries,
then we would have to discharge that mandate” (Plenary Deliberation, 04-Jun-2008).
Given this, one of the five major reforms introduced by the CARPER extension
and reforms bills is the creation of a Congressional Oversight Committee to monitor the
progress and exact accountability in cases of questionable practices or demand expedition
of the implementation. At times, when pressed during heated debates, Lagman frequently
cited this amendment proposal to address concerns about past shortcomings of CARP:
Malaki ho ang pag-asa namin na mapapatupad ang (We have high hopes that the) Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Porgram (will be implemented) on the extended basis sapagkat… Magkakaroon
tayo ng (because we will have) statutory authorization at mayroon ding pondo at mayroong (and
funds and) increased support services at sana nga mayroong (and we hope there will be the) political
will to effectively implement the program kaya't gumawa tayo ng (that’s why we created an)
Oversight Committee upang matutukan ang (that will focus on the) Department of Agrarian Reform
sa (in its) implementation ng programa (of the program), partikular iyong (particularly the) LAD
[Land Acquisition and Distribution] during the extended period.
Unang-una ho iyong retention limits ay susog lamang sa Saligang Batas at pangalawa, kailangang
gawin ng DAR na sa simula't simula pa ma-identify na mabuti at specifically iyong lands retained by
the landowners or their offsprings upang huwag nang mangyari ang mga sitwasyon na binabayaran
na ng agrarian reform beneficiary at mababawi pa sa kanila at ilalagay sa leasehold arrangement
sapagkat iyon pala iyong lupang na-identify ng landowner as their retained lands. Palagay ko iyan ay
isang kakulangan ng departamento na hindi agad-agad na-identify iyong mga lupain na subject to
the retention rights of landowners. Kailangan hindi na mangyayari iyan at that could be part of the
powers and authority of the Oversight Committee
Firstly, retention limits are lodged only in the Constitution and Secondly, DAR needs to at the very
beginning identify properly and specifically thos lands retained by the landowners or their offsprings
in order to avoid situations wherein lands already being paid by agrarian reform beneficiaries would
be confiscated and placed under leasehold arrangement because again those are lands already
identified by landowners as their retained lands. I think that is one shortcoming of the department,
that they do not identify right away those lands subject to the retention right of landowners.
This needs to be avoided and that could be part of the powers and authority of the Oversight
Committee [translation by author][emphasis added](Plenary Deliberation, 19-May-2009).
Let me just amend my answer, Your Honor. The projection is based on 52% based on compulsory
acquisition and voluntary offer to sell which would be compensalbe by Landbank through
appropriations from the government, and the balance would be voluntary land transfer. But we will
have to look at this very well because studies will show that the VOS and the VLT have been
flawed. And that's why we are establishing a Congressional Oversight Committee to look very
intensely on all of the processes being undertaken by the Department of Agrarian Reform
[emphasis added](Plenary Deliberation, 26-May-2009)
At the Bicameral Conference Committee to reconcile differences between the Senate and
House versions and finalize provisions in the CARPER law, the amendment proposal to
establish a Congressional Oversight Committee appeared to garner a consensus. The only
objections faced by the proposal pertained to issue of adequate representation in the
membership of the committee. When the number of members was placed under a vote,
RCM champion and a co-sponsor or the House CARPER bill version, raised a concern
that the number of allowed members of the committee might be unable to adequately
represent the whole gamut of agrarian reform groups. So she proposed to “reconsider that
because it might be possible to have a reasonable and manageable number of
representatives from agrarian reform groups to join the Congressional Overisght
Committee… for example, three members form various AR groups, one each from
Luzon, Visaya, Mindanao…” (Bicameral Conference Committee, 09-Jun-2009, p. 286).
Alyansa ng Bayanihan ng Magsasaka, manggagawang Bukid at Mangingisda Partylist
Representative Leonardo Montemayor also argued for increasing the size of the
committee membership considering the huge budget of CARP and the expansive scope of
the program and to enlist “all the help we can get in terms of being able to monitor more
closely the work of DAR” (Bicameral Conference Committee, 09-Jun-2009). However,
Lagman assured Hontiveros and Montemayor of the sufficiency of the proposed
membership size because “as far as the House Membersa re concerned, we represent all
sector in our district, including agrarian reform groups or organization. And with respect
to the Senate, they have a nationwide representation….” Lagman further warned against
the tendency of big oversight committee to become ineffective as when meetings are
scheduled, “you see the same people attending and many do not really attend” (Bicameral
Conference Committee, 09-Jun-2009, p. 286). Hence, Lagman concluded that increasing
current proposal of having 8 members in the committee is not necessary because it is
already a “ functional group” that “will ensure to have the various agrarian reform
groups/organizations in the different regions of the country represented” (Bicameral
Conference Committee, pp. 286-287). With this rebuttal, the committee approved the
amendment proposal with no changes at all even with the specific powers and functions
of the committee. Lagman, however, suggested including a provision that explicitly

delimits the powers and functions of the COCAR 6 months after the expiration of the 5-
year extension (Bicameral Conference Committee, 09-Jun-2009).
Advocacy Coalition Framework Analysis. Unlike the three previous policy core
issues analyzed, the creation of a Congressional Oversight Committee is the starkest
manifestation of policy-oriented learning. First, the fact that no provision of this kind was
included in the original CARP law (RA 6657) implies that policymakers at the onset did
not foresee or anticipate implementation problems to occur and accumulate/escalate over
the years to a level that would warrant a monitoring body. This observation is reinforced
by the statements of Mitra that explicitly signify a recognition if not admission of
learning from past implementation: “if ever we're going to extend CARP, we want to
extend it the right way. We learned from lessons from the past why it has not met
targets” (Plenary Deliberation, 23-Apr-2008). The first statement implies that legislators
tangibly or concretely complies with learning by expressing an intention to improve the
law and/or its implementation, if not correct past faults or errors. The second statement
consistently conforms to Sabatier’s definition of policy-oriented learning as an alteration
or modification of thoughts or behavioral intentions as “a result from experience and
which are concerned with the attainment (or revision) of policy objective” (Sabatier,
1988, p. 133; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1994, p. 182). Moreover, the demands made by
Marcos on a more accurate statistics on Land Bank’s collections and operations, Maza’s
comparative analysis of different statistics on land conversion versus that of DAR’s, and
Duavit’s suspicion on the decreasing completion report on DAR’s land acquisition and
redistribution all amount to what Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s (1994) refer to as the
important role of scientific information in the decision of coalition members to approve

or reject critical policy changes. These various demands by legislators imply that data
gathered through empirically rigorous means play an important in informing the
decisions of policymakers on critical policy changes. Hence, scientific information has
what Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1994) call an enlightening function.

Chapter VI
The Role of External Shocks on the Decision to Enact CARPER
As Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1994) explain, factors external to a policy
subsystem provide relevant inputs to the policy decisions of advocacy coalitions
members. To a certain extent, these factors constrain or delimit the opportunities and
resources of coalitions and more importantly influences the perception of policy
actors/advocacy coalitions on the policy problem in question.
Table. 6.1. Frequency of Observed Citation of External Shocks to Total Number

of Relevant Statements
Total Number of Relevant Statements Coded Total Frequency of Observed Citation of External Shocks
922 290
100% 17%
The study finds that almost 20 percent of the 922 sets of statements extracted and
coded contain explicit references to external shocks. Most of these statements pertain to
an administration, presidency, or executive leadership or what Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith (1994) termed as systemic governing coalition. This is followed by references or
explicit mention of other policy decisions in the form of republic acts, executive orders,
court decisions, and other policies that are separate from CARP but affect CARP in one
way or another. Socioeconomic conditions are the third most discussed external factor
while the constitutional mandate of CARP and public opinion on the program are the two
least cited external factors. The ones with the greater potential to drive policy change are
the four more dynamic external factors enumerated in the table (6.10 below).
Table. 6.2. Frequency of Observed Citation of External Shocks to Total Number

of Relevant Statements
Total Frequency of Fairly Stable Dynamic External Factors
Observed Citation of Parameters
External Shocks
Constitutional Socioeconomic Public Systemic Other
Mandate Conditions Opinion Governing Policy
Coalition Decisions
290 50 68 27 112 77
100% 17% 23% 9% 39% 27%
A. Constitutional Mandate
Constitutional mandates are one of the four fairly stable parameters that are
relatively unchanging over several decades. These provide (4) the basic institutional and
legal structure in which the policy problem is legitimately addressed or solutions to it are
formally formulated (Sabatier, 1988). Rightly so, representatives of advocacy coalitions
participating in the deliberations at the House of Representatives see the constitutional
mandate of CARP as a fixed institutional imperative that can only change when and if the
Philippine Constitution is changed. As such, the constitutional mandate of CARP
provides a constant basis for the continuation of the program until its policy objectives
are fully realized:
We would like to remind everybody, our Honorable Congressmen, as well as officials from the
Department of Agrarian Reform and everybody concerned, that the Philippine Constitution of 1987
is our social contract, which is the result of a long struggle against the dictatorship, and the main
contents of which includes agrarian reform. And that is the reason why agrarian reform is a mandate
of the Philippine Constitution to promote social justice and human rights, Article 13, and to serve
the purposes of national development and full employment with industrialization as its linchpin
under Article 13 of the Philippine Constitution.
Kaya't ang tingin po natin hindi pupuwedeng matanggal ang (That is why we cannot remove the)
Agrarian Reform Law. It is inscribed in our Constitution. And if Congress will refuse to enact a new
agrarian reform law, it will be a blatant and patent violation of our Constitution by a major branch of
government.
Congress is bound to continue agrarian reform because that is our constitutional mandate (Ricardo
Reyes, Representative, Kilusan Para sa Pagsusulong ng Reformang Agrario, Kilos-AR, Committee
Hearing 05-Dec-2007)
Indeed, Sabatier (1988) warrants that factors such as constitutional mandates are slow to
change and less able to account for policy change, unless drastic events such as
constitutional amendments occur. While the difficulty of changing them discourages
policy actors from using them as basis for strategizing behavior, they can nevertheless
limit the range of feasible and acceptable policy options (Sabatier, 1988).
In the course of the House deliberations on CARPER, the Constitutional mandate
of CARP continues to serve as the default justification for the extension and reform of
CARP. Despite of different perspectives, all coalitions agree that the failure of the State
to fulfill the goals of CARP is tantamount to a failure in complying with this mandate.
Again, House Agrarian Reform Committee Chair Elias Bulut continued to reiterate the
need to comply with this mandate even in brief statements: “In accordance with the
Constitution, it is our responsibility to promote comprehensive rural development and
agrarian reform. This is the very reason why we have considered the CARP Extension
Bills as our priority agenda for the 14th Congress (Plenary Deliberations 23-Apr-2008).
Although data suggest that the frequency of citation of the constitutional mandate is a
lesser concern than other more dynamic external forces, the very nature or absolute
character of the constitution provided a stronger or more irrefutable basis/justification for
agreeing to extend CARP and significantly reform it.

Moreover, although the proponents of the ACF, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith
(1994), opted to exclude fairly stable parameters as major sources of policy change on the
grounds that these are less prone to changes and hence do not constitute major sources of
changes, they nonetheless provide stability in the demand for policy reforms/change. In
other words, these external factors can still serve as the driving force that pushed policy
change to occur.
Precisely, in this study, that seems to be the case. As members of the pro-land
reform coalitions, especially the Reform CARP Movement headed by Rep. Hontiveros,
argue, the relative inability, if not outright failure, of CARP as a state policy tool to uplift
the quality of life among farmer beneficiaries means that the Constitutional Mandate for
an effective Agrarian Reform Program has not been fulfilled yet. That is, for policy
stakeholders who favor CARP extension (with reforms), CARP must be continued until
the time rural poverty that remains high among these beneficiaries are eradicated or
substantially alleviated and grievances abounding in Congress hearings are satisfactorily
addressed. Both coalitions, landowner and pro-CARP extension farmer beneficiaries’
bloc, agree that the Constitutional Mandate of implementing an effective and genuine
social justice program is wanting, specifically that is, CARP in its incumbent form does
not entirely embody that Constitutional aspiration. But both camps, however, diverge in
their interpretation, with the landowners’ bloc highlighting the inability of the Philippine
state to grant just compensation and the farmer beneficiaries claiming various abuses and
machinations to depriving them of incontestable land ownership. Nevertheless, the
Constitutional Mandate is an external factor, a fairly stable parameter, which binds all
these competing coalitions into a contentious yet productive analytical debate. Indeed, the
presence of a constitutional mandate for CARP that enshrines the ideal and intent of
dispensing social justice means that advocacy coalitions have a common deep normative
core that binds competing coalitions with conflicting policy beliefs. This finding is
consistent with the tenet of the Advocacy Coalition Framework that policy change in a
highly contentious policy subsystem is still possible because of the multi-level nature of
policy beliefs (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1994).
B. Socioeconomic Conditions
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1994) define socioeconomic conditions as system-
wide conditions that affect a policy subsystem. In the study, this refers to macroeconomic
indicators that characterize the state of welfare development of CARP beneficiaries. In
fact, most of statements that explicitly refer to socioeconomic conditions pertain to the
improvement of the quality of life of ARBs (Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries) or their
income. According to House Agrarian Reform Committee Chair Elias Bulut, this is in
fact one of the policy goals of CARP:
The ultimate goals of the Bills are synonymous in the sense that all the measures offered to increase
the agrarian reform fund to see to it that needs are met for program completion. In the end, improve
the quality of lives to address the problem of landlessness and rural poverty. Our effort will be
centered on the formulation of meaningful legislation that will respond to the improvement of
the lives of general population in the field of agrarian reform [emphasis added](Committee
Hearing, 21-Nov-2007).
During the deliberations, socioeconomic conditions were usually cited as supporting
arguments to justify the policy agenda of different competing coalitions.
As the third most cited dynamic external factor, socioeconomic conditions
provide greater credibility in the arguments given during the House deliberations on
CARPER. All coalitions seem to refer to argue either the extension or non-extension
of CARP. Pro-CARP coalition use the unchanging socioeconomic conditions as

justification to continue CARP while anti-CARP coalitions, i.e. landowners and the
Bayan Muna Coalition, justify its termination precisely because unchanging
socioeconomic indicators imply that CARP appears to fail in achieving its policy
objective of improving the welfare of its beneficiaries or at least in raising their
incomes. For instance, both Hontiveros and Lagman come to the defense of CARPER
by citing studies showing the quality of life of beneficiaries have increased. Hence, in
two separate deliberations, the two champions of the RCM coalition argue against
claims that CARP is a total failure:
agrarian reform either call for the junking of CARP altogether, or the delay in its further
from unqualified fact. Various comprehensive studies have established empirical data that CARP,
beneficiaries. This is a fact, Mr. Speaker, that our farmer-friends in the Reform CARP Movement, a
broad coalition of more than 30 national and local farmer's organization and the NGO's, some of
whom are in the gallery today, are more than willing to attest to (Akbayan Partylist Representative
Ana Theresia "Risa" Hontiveros-Baraquel, Plenary Deliberation 30-Apr-2008).
And all of the studies would show, distinguished Gentleman that the quality of life of the beneficiaries
had increased. Even on the non-monetary aspect, with respect to the non-monetary indicators of
welfare, like strong house materials, and better educational attainment of family members, households
of agrarian reform beneficiaries showed better performance than non-agrarian reform beneficiaries. So,
this is the beneficial effect of the program which cannot be debunked by general statements, because
these are empirical studies supported by documentation and researches (Albay First District
Represenative Edcel Lagman, Plenary Deliberation, 4-Jun-2008).
On the other hand, members of other coalitions who are either against CARP outright or
maintain reservations on extending it continue to question the soundness of extending it
by refuting CARP’s progress in improving the socioeconomic conditions of its
beneficiaries. This was shown when Cavite Third District Representative Jesus Crispin
Remulla asked how Lagman, an RCM coalition champion and principal sponsor of
CARPER, assess CARP’s performance after twenty years of implementation:
So in the twenty years, Madam Speaker, that the CARP has been implemented by the government,
how would you grade it? As a success, a failure? On a scale of one to ten, how has been the
performance of the department regarding the distribution, the support service, the productivity and
the improvement of the lives of our Filipino farmer? (Plenary Deliberation, 14-May-2008)
Lagman responded with a mixed evaluation, admitting shortcomings of the program
while highlighting its sporadic successes in certain components such as the distribution of
millions of hectares of CARP land. Then again, Remulla appeared unconvinced and
continued to question the wisdom in extending CARP given its failures and the admission
of even principal sponsors of such relative failure:
“What is the reason then, Madam Speaker, that after 20 years, 20 long years, all the money spent,
all these grants given by the government, that until now we have not finished with the program? The
law that we passed in 1988, the first law, mandated that acquisition be done within 20 years but until
now it has not been finished. Will this be a guaranty [sic] then that if we extend the program, that in
five years' time it will be finished, everybody will be paid, all the farmers will have support services
and agriculture will become more productive in this country? ” (Plenary Deliberation, 14-May-
2008).
In this manner, the citation of socioeconomic conditions in the arguments of competing
coalitions strongly suggests that such external factors are relevant in the decisionmaking
process of the 14th. More particularly, this observation is consistent with the hypothesis of
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1994) that external factors influences the perception of
advocacy coalition members of the policy problem. Indeed, references to socioeconomic
conditions complement the articulated demand of legislators for scientific information to
enable a more accurate assessment of CARP’s performance or implementation.
C. Public Opinion
As a highly controversial policy, it may be expected that the consideration of
public opinion, or the general sentiment or political support of the public toward it would
be most relevant. However, data suggests that relative to other external factors, this may
not be the case. Possible explanations for this include the fact that CARP at this point in
time have been in existence for 20 years or so, the public might have already been
saturated with many news of problems and scandals surrounding CARP that public
attention or its novelty as a news item in the media probably have waned over the years.
Nevertheless, the House deliberations on CARPER still contain statements that heed the
concern for public opinion. Most of these allude to concerns of some Congressmen for
the image of Congress as a democratic institution where constituents and CARP
stakeholders can approach and voice out their quandaries. This concern is aptly captured
in the concise statement of Rizal First District Representative Michael John Duavit about
the need for accurate data to aid in making a prudent decision on a heavily important state
policy as CARP: “And since we are all members of Congress and responsible to the State
as for the disposition of its wealth. I think this is data that we need in order to make the
decision when the time to vote on this measure comes, Your Honor” (Plenary
Deliberation, 4-Jun-2008). Other statements point to news headlines that incite concern
among legislators on the assessment of the general public on CARP:
And that leads me to my last clarificatory point, Your Honor. There appeared in the Inquirer
newspaper today--and if I may read the headline--"Negros farmers' group says CARP was a failure."
And if I may read a pertinent portion--"While he admitted", referring to the president of the agrarian
reform beneficiaries, this is in Manlapa, Negros Occidental, "While he admitted that CARP
succeeded in terms of land distribution, he said it was a failure in terms of poverty alleviation. 'Now
there's talk to extend CARP for another five years. How can DAR accomplish in five years what it
failed to do in 20 years? CARP extension is tenable only if it focuses on support services for us."
What can you say about this, Your Honor? (Trade Union Congress of the Philippines Partylist
Representative Raymond Democrito Mendoza, Plenary Deliberation 28-May-2009).
D. Systemic Governing Coalitions
According to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1994), changes in leadership in
political and/or administrative offices that bring changes in management styles and
principles and in manner of policy implementation. Hence, changes in the governing
coalitions may provide one of the most potent stimuli for policy change. In the case of the
Philippines, presidencies change every six years while local government posts are open
for election every three years. It is thus reasonable to expect policy changes to transpire
in this institutional structure.
Rightly so, the deliberations at the House of Representatives abound with
references to presidential administrations or administrative leadership that instigated
change on land reform policy. Expectedly, the most cited administration is that of
President Corazon Aquino, whose legislature enacted the first CARP law, touted as a
landmark law and a centerpiece in the Aquino administration’s economic development
plan. An apt example of these citations can be found in Lone District of Quirino
Representative Junie Cua, a proponent of CARP extension and co-sponsor of the
consolidated House bill version of CARPER:
I distinctly recall that during the 8th Congress, during the presidency of President Cory Aquino, her
centerpiece program was the agrarian reform program.
I recall as well that during those days one of the serious concerns and problems of the nation was
social justice. I remember that inequality of distribution of land was likened to a social volcano
waiting to erupt. In the light of distribution of that environment, with the support and certification by
then President Cory Aquino, passed the landmark Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. The
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law intended to make more equal the distribution of land as well
as improving the viability of agrarian reform beneficiaries (Committee Hearing, 21-Nov-2007).
The next most cited administrations is the autocratic regime of Ferdinand Marcos, who
converted leaseholders of rice and corn lands to owners through Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 27, also known as Operation Land Transfer. Reference to the Marcos years vary from
a plain reference to PD 27 or an analysis of the significance of his dictatorship over the
cause of agrarian reform in the country. The latter is quite apparent in a statement given
by a representative of a member farmers organization of the RCM coalition, the major
coalition sponsoring CARPER:
Just to remind that agrarian reform is a historical consensus that is borne out of history, old
aspirations and struggles which reaches [sic] heights in the anti-dictatorship struggles of 1972 to
'86. To discard agrarian reform by refusing to extend CARP with reforms is to betray this
historical consensus that has been forged as a social contract through the Philippine
Constitution of 1987…To do so is turning back on the millions of peasants still hungry for land and
justice. To do so is to abandon the path of social justice, peace and humane development for all
[emphasis added](Ricardo Reyes, Representative, Kilusan Para sa Pagsusulong ng Reformang
Agrario, Kilos-AR, Committee Hearing, 5-Dec-2007).
The next most cited administration is that of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo who
is seen as instrumental in pushing the enactment of the CARPER law with her
certification of the bill as urgent. The acknowledgment of the role of GMA’s
certification in accelerating the enactment of the CARPER law can be seen in a
statement by Akbayan Partylist Representative Risa Hontiveros, who is a champion of
the RCM coalition and a co-sponsor of the House CARPER bill. Hontiveros argued at
a plenary deliberation that the certification of urgency issued by GMA should signal to
the House of Representative to avoid any delaying tactics:
Ngayon, lalo na na-certify as urgent na nga ang bill na ito, hindi na dapat issue ang quorum. Dapat
lahat tayo ay nandirito, nagtratrabaho, nagpupuyat kung kailangan dahil 'yan ang ating
sinumpaang trabaho
Now, especially that the bill is certified urgent, [the presence of] quorum should no longer be an
issue. We should be here working overtime if necessary because that is our sworn obligation
[translation by author](Akbayan Partylist Representative Ana Theresia "Risa" Hontiveros-Baraquel,
Plenary Deliberation, 02-Jun-2008).
Another aspect of the systemic governing coalition that is worth noting the study is the
allusion to the composition of Congress since the inception of the CARP law all
throughout its implementation to date. A member organization of the Bayan Muna
Coalition, a pro-AR but anti-CARP bloc, explains the significance and implications of
the profile/composition of Congressional membership on program design and
execution:
Ang Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas sumsaklaw ng labing-limang regional chapters, 65

provincial chapters nationwide. Mahigpit na tinututulan ng Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas ang
ekstensyon ng CARP dahil ito ay isang kontra-magsasaka at maka-panginoong maylupang program
at batas ng gobyerno. Naglalaman ito ng mga provisyong umaayon sa maka-uring interes ng mga
panginoong may-lupa para iiwas o itakas sa pmamamahagi ang malalawak na lupain na

kinokontrol nila. Nagkakait ang CARP sa malaunang kahilingan at karapatan ng mga sang...
magbubukid na magkaroon ng sariling lupa. Bakit po? No'ng 8th Congress, 61% ng mga member
ng Kongreso, 61% ay mga panginoong may lupa. sa 12th Congress, 29% ng mga miyembro ng
Kongreso ay involved sa real estate at saka 37% ay may kontrol sa agricultural land. So sa ganitong
kalagayan, hindi renesolba ang kahirapan ng mga mamamayang Pilipino at ng mga magsasakang
Pilipino. Bakit? 'Yung kontrol ng panginoong may lupa sa malalawak na lupain, hindi directly na
napunta sa mga magbubukid.
The Peasant Movement of the Philippines covers 15 regional chapters, 65 provincial chapters
nationwide. The Peasant Movement of the Philippines strictly opposes the extension of CARP
because this is an anti-farmers and pro-landlord program and law of the government. It contains
provisions that serve the interest of the landlords to avoid the distribution of large estate that they
control. The CARP deprives the latter pleas and rights of farmer to own lands. How come? In the
8th Congress, 61% of the members of Congress, 61% are landlords. In the 12th Congress, 29%
of the members of Congress are involved in real estate [development] and 37% have control
over agricultural land. So with this circumstances, rural povery among Filipino citizens and
Filipino farmers remain unsolved. Why?...[Because the] control of landlord over huge estates are not
directly transferred to the farmers [translation by author][emphasis added](Willy Marbellam, Deputy
Secretary General for Internal Affairs, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas).
These findings suggest that presidential administrations (and their DAR leaders)
are seen by advocacy coalition members/CARP stakeholders as a significant factor that
enables or disables policy change (i.e. reform). As CARP history shows, the performance
of CARP fluctuated across presidencies, suggesting that different policies or governance-
related circumstances affect to a certain extent the success or failure of CARP
implementation. Indeed, under President Ramos, CARP experienced episodic success in
terms of accelerated land distribution and improved support services delivery with the
introduction of the ARC clustering strategy (Borras, 2001). It is equally worthy to note
that it is during the Ramos presidency when the CARP law was first extended with
augmented funds but without policy changes at all. According to Borras (2001), these
milestones in CARP can be credited to the reformist mindset or orientation of both
President Ramos and his DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao. Garilao brought in NGO
activists to occupy key DAR positions. This infused a reformist orientation that overcame
special interests and root out corruption in the bureau through tighter supervision and
stricter law enforcement (Borras, 2001). He carried out widespread and sustained re-
training and re-tooling of employees and officials, and succeeded in reviving the
confidence of the foreign donor community in CARP. For example, Garilao instituted a
constant formula for valuating lands, thus catalyzing the clearing of VOS backlogs
(Borras, 2001). In fact, the ARC strategy as a legacy of DAR Under Ramos and Garilao
received fair appreciation from advocacy coalition members, mostly from the pro-CARP
RCM coalition. An example is the statement given by Guillermo Cua, one of the
proponents of CARPER and a co-sponsor of the CARPER bill:
I learned that there is an independent study on the implementation of the Agrarian Reform
Communities and may be [sic] would be very helpful for the Members of this Committee
because it also expresses some success factors in the implementation of agrarian reform. In
fact, as a Cooperative Sector Representative in Congress, we have a lot of agrarian reform
cooperatives that are very successful and they are even going into business for importation and
exportation also. So, I think these are models that we need to study and look also. So, may we ask
the Department Secretary to give a copy of the independent study to the Members of this Committee
[emphasis added](Committee Hearing, 21-Nov-2007).
Another more objective assessment of the positive impact of the ARC strategy is given
by an academic invited to present findings at the second committee hearing:
Now, we look at variables per capita income, per capita expenditure, net farm income and also on
poverty incidence. And our findings suggest that ownership of the land is really a very significant
predictor of all these. So those who own the lands signficantly have higher incomes per capita and
they have lower poverty incidence. And then among those who already own their lands, again, it
makes a lot of significant impact if they are in an ARC. In fact, if one is residing in an ARC, and he
owns the land, then there is no difference between an ARB and a non-ARB, which is again as
expected because we know that the support services of the ARC is really community-based… if you
compare the net present values of the ARC strategy and the regular agricultural development
programs, then we find out that, again, it is significantly higher. The ARC strategies is significantly
higher. And this again supports our initial hypotheis that for a development strategy to be very
effective, you need to have broad base distribution of assets to begin with (Rosemarie Edillon
Executive Director, Asia Pacific Policy Center, Committee Hearing 5-Dec-2007).
Although there is no explicit mention of then name of President Ramos or Secretary
Garilao, the fact that their ARC strategy innovation is positively evaluated is a testament
to the posterity of their policy reforms. Consequently, this demonstrates to an extent how
systemic governing coalitions can be significant considerations in the process of
deliberating on policy change.
In the case of CARPER, CARP history shows as well that GMA adopted Ramos’
ARC strategy under a different nomenclature (see Chapter 5 on History of CARP) and
most importantly, certified urgent the CARPER bill proposed and endorsed by the RCM
coalition being spearheaded by Lagman and Hontiveros. The certification of urgency of
the bill alone puts a de facto pressure on the 14th Congress to accelerate the deliberations
and enactment of the CARP extension and reforms law. This institutional push is made
manifest in the statement of RCM coalition champion and House CARPER bill co-
sponsor Risa Hontiveros, which argued that the issuance of the certification of urgency
by the President meant that any requirement of a quorum in making a decision on the
approval of CARPER must not undermine the commitment of Congress to see through
the passage of the CARPER bill:
Ang ikinadidismaya namin, Ginang Speaker, ay ang kawalan ng political will sa pagtutulak ng
panukalang batas an ito. Napabalita kahapon na ise-certify as urgent ng Malacañang ang bill na ito,
subalit hindi pa rin sasapat ang ganitong hakbang para mapasa agad ang panukalang bill na ito
bago pa man matapos ang LAD sa June 10
What we are disappointed, Madam Speaker, is the lack of political will to push this bill forward. We
have heard yesterday that Malacañang will certify this bill urgent, but this step is still not enough to
expedite the passage of this bill before the LAD expires on June 10 [emphasis added][translation by
author](Plenary Deliberation, 02-Jun-2008).
This statement is substantially suggests that the consideration of an administrative
leadership, especially one supportive of policy reform, has considerable weight on the
decision to extend and reform CARP.
Other Policy Decisions
According to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1994), other state policies may also
determine the direction and substance of policy change by affecting priority setting and
resource allotment among government programs. In the study, most of statements
containing citations of other policy decisions refer to either agrarian reform laws
preceding the CARP law (RA 6657) such as the RA 3844 or the Agricultural Tenancy
Act of 1954, PD 27 under Marcos, and Supreme Court rulings on the exemptions on
CARP coverage. In fact, discussions on preceding laws centered mostly on RA 3844
which Cebu Second District Representative and known allies of landowners Pablo Garcia
often use to contest the comprehensive scope of the CARP law (RA 6657). This
contestation is further discussed in the next chapter on data analysis. On the other hand,
the decision of the Philippine Government to accede to membership in the World Trade
Organization and enforce its mandate on free trade policies is either heavily criticized by
anti-CARP Bayan Muna Coalition or recognized by landowners as a market constraint
that needs to be accounted for in crafting a CARP extension and reform law:
Sa aming pag-aaralan ang [Based on our assessment of] CARP, as it is, undermines our agriculture
and small farmers and reinforce the destructive impact of globalization and liberalization.
CARP has caused the further fragmentation of our farm units na… which makes our small farmers...
small farmers even smaller and more economically vulnerable to the onslaught of foreign
agricultural products wrought by full liberalization [translation by author][emphasis
added](Bayan Muna Partylist Representative Satur Ocampo, Public Hearing 03-Mar-2008).
Number three, we have the free trade, the WTO. There is a great issue, a major issue on whether
or not a family size farm--one hectare, two hectare--can compete with the foreign-funded developed
farms in the world which are even subsidized. We cannot compete [emphasis added](Eduardo
Hernandez, PARC Landowner Representative, 5-Dec-2007).
As the second most cited dynamic external factor, other policies relate to CARP
in various ways. Specifically, other policies may serve as valuable inputs in fixing or
organizing the specific details or what Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1994) calls secondary
aspects of a proposed policy change. A perfect example is the concern raised by Manila
City District Rep. Amado Bagatsing on the role of the LGU Code of 1991 on the powers
of LGUs to determine land zoning, use, and reclassification during the time the
legislators deliberated on a proposal to require DAR to create and monitor a land
inventory system for transparency purposes. In this case, the dilemma or predicament is
technical in nature and does not necessarily pertain to higher, deeper ideals such as social
justice. Nevertheless, clarifications raised on this helped legislators refine the proposed
amendment to CARPER law, clarified the priorities of the state regarding national laws
vis-à-vis local laws, and hence avoided questions of the legal nature. Another proof that
other policy decisions amount to a significant consideration in the 14th Congress
decisionmaking process on CARPER law is the instance Pablo Garcia contested the
supremacy of RA 6657 as the comprehensive legal basis for any Philippine land reform
program to date. As shown in the analysis above, the contestation eventually led to a
heated confrontation that provided the benefit of clarifying Garcia’s misconceptions and
provided greater credibility on the part of the CARPER bill sponsors and supporters (i.e.
Lagman, Hontiveros, and Tadeo) to move forward the process of passing the CARPER
law. Given these examples, other policy decisions in the case of the CARPER law
deliberations might not have the same weight as systemic governing coalitions but have
considerable relevance or weight on the decision to extend and reform CARP.
Based on these findings, it appears that external factors were relevant
considerations of coalition members or policy actors in making the decision to extend and
reform CARP or not. In particular, data suggest that four of the five external factors
presented offered the most relevant considerations in the decision to extend and reform
CARP: 1) Constitutional Mandate, 2) Systemic Governing Coalition, 3) Socioeconomic
Conditions, and 4) Other Policy Decisions.

Chapter VII
Conclusions and Recommendations
In conclusion, the study finds that both policy-oriented learning and the
consideration of select external factors.
Box 2. Was the decision to extend CARP a result of policy-oriented learning in light of new
information from past CARP implementation? If so, how did policy-oriented learning alter, strengthen,
or weaken the policy beliefs of advocacy coalition members on the issue of deciding to extend CARP
through R.A. 9700?
Consistent with the Advocacy Coalition Framework of Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith (1994), House deliberations on the decision to extend and reform CARP shows
that a substantial degree of learning from past implementation (i.e. policy-oriented
learning) occurred among members of supposedly competing coalitions. This learning is
most notably reflected in the amended provisions of the original CARP, which were
included in the final CARPER law, and is further evidenced by altered behavior and
modifications of policy beliefs of these competing coalition members. This alterations
and modifications were demonstrated during debates that showcased the clash of policy
beliefs among competing coalitions and the process through which the difference
between this policy beliefs are resolved or attenuated. This process is exhibited through
the following specific indicators: (a) citation of a point of conflict or disagreement
usually phrased in a question form which starts a discussion that leads to a clarification or
some form of enlightenment, (b) recognition of a flaw/defects/imperfections that raise
issue as to the necessity of reforming the law, which raise (c) the need for scientific
information/ empirical (reliable) studies to (d) evaluate the performance (i.e.
success/failure) of a law in order to (e) improve the law or manifestation of intent to
improve the law. These indicators of policy-oriented learning were present in the
deliberations that led to a number of specific amendment provisions on the policy core
issues of (1) coverage, (2) security of land transfer process, (3) support services, and
(4) the role of DAR and implementing agencies.
Box 3. How did the competing policy beliefs of advocacy coalitions shape the Philippine House of
Representative’s decision to extend CARP through R.A. 9700?
These three policy core issues are the most contentious policy aspects of CARP,
which most often divides competing advocacy coalitions. Indeed, data shows that these
four policy core issues either exhibit the most conspicuous changes in provisions or have
the highest number of frequency of being cited, suggesting that legislators and advocacy
coalition members take longer time to deliberate on them. Given their contentious nature,
data analysis also suggests that what facilitated the resolution of these differences is the
multi-level nature of policy beliefs. That is, the ACF’s tri-partite structure of a belief
system appropriately demonstrates how an intermediate level of conflict among coalitions
and their beliefs allows conditions for policy-oriented learning. Although both coalitions
converge on certain deep core normative beliefs or values (i.e. normative core) that bind
their opposing positions and precisely permits the passage of the bill extending CARP
into law despite their differences, both diverge on the exact means (i.e. policy core) to
realize these deep core beliefs/values. Although the landowner coalition (anti-AR, anti-
CARP), the RCM (pro-AR, pro-CARP), and the Bayan Muna Coalition (pro-AR, anti-
CARP) agree that agrarian reform is an important policy tool to dispense social justice
and achieve socioeconomic equality (normative cores) and alleviate rural poverty, these
coalitions disagree on the concrete policy mechanisms to implement such ideological
values. For instance, on establishing security of land transfer, the RCM coalition argue
that indefeasibility of land titles will provide greater security of installation of CARP
beneficiaries onto their awarded lands. Landowners and their Congressional allies, on the
other hand, argue that true security lies in the deferment of cancelling landowners’ title
until full just compensation is granted to them. The Bayan Muna coalition provides a
middle ground by agreeing with the RCM on the indefeasibility of awarded land titles but
argue that just compensation scheme should either be simplified in order to be affordable
to paying beneficiaries or be subsumed entirely by the state. Thus, the competing policy
beliefs of advocacy coalitions somehow pushed/compelled both coalitions to act on the
status quo that CARP, as a landmark law/a state policy, has established. The differences
in beliefs have instigated members of opposing coalitions to engage in intense, heated,
yet productive debates that at the end of the day resulted in the clarification of previously
unresolved issues surrounding CARP, refinement of the understanding of concepts and
activities that define CARP as a state program, and concrete revision of mechanisms or
manner of implementing CARP through specific law amendments.
Box 4. Given the contentious nature of CARP debates, were there policy brokers that mediated
agreements or working compromises between competing advocacy coalitions, which enabled the
decision to extend CARP through R.A. 9700? Who were these and how did they help in arriving at
In this learning process, Congress served as a professional forum facilitating
policy-oriented learning, where tension between competing coalitions with opposing
beliefs is mitigated through (1) adherence to the view of Congress as a democratic
institution, open to and inclusive of divergent views, (2) enforcing institutional
procedures that allow for this democratic dialogue to occur, and (3) prohibitions that
uphold mutual respect of diverging opinion (as exemplified in the use of mild or non-
offensive language). These rules are typically enforced by policy brokers or a inviduals
who seek to reduce the tension between competing coalitions by working on

compromises and solutions to differences in policy beliefs. Hence, policy-oriented
learning is also made possible by the existence of policy brokers who display neutrality in
resolving divergent policy stances and openness to suggestions or workable
compromises. Their role in the final passage of significant policy changes in CARP
cannot be underestimated. Foremost policy brokers include House Agrarian Reform
Committee Chair Elias Bulut and the principal sponsor and RCM coalition champion
himself Edcel Lagman.
Box 1. Were there external shocks or events within the Agrarian Reform sector that became relevant
considerations in the Philippine House of Representatives’ decision to extend CARP through R.A. 9700?
If so, which one/s provided the greatest stimulus for the CARP extension (changes in socioeconomic
and political conditions, changes in public opinion, changes in systematic governing coalition, other
policy decisions outside the land reform policy subsystem)?

Data also suggest an abundance of compelling evidence that the decision to
extend and reform CARP through CARPER would be influenced or motivated as well by
external forces that provide a constant impetus or source of social demand for the
continued implementation of CARP. A major force is the Constitutional mandate for a
social justice program through CARP. Although the ACF states that constitutional
mandates rarely account for dynamic changes in longstanding policies, the Philippine
Constitution of 1987 in this case served as a constant reminder that provided a stable
demand and pressure point to continue and reform CARP policy. The pursuit/fulfillment
of this mandate also appears to be affected/determined/hinges on the commitment and
openness to reforms by governing coalition/leadership (i.e. presidency and
administrative head) tasked to implement CARP. The demand for continuing CARP also
appears to be reinforced by the unchanging bad socioeconomic conditions of or the
persistence of poverty incidence among CARP beneficiaries—an irony that the failure
becomes the justification. Other policy decisions, notably past AR laws that affect how
specific provisions of the CARPER law should be organized, are also relevant
considerations that governing coalitions take into account in deciding whether to extend
and reform CARP or not. One other major policy decision that deserve being mentioned
is the decision of the Philippines to participate in the globalized, free trade regime,
which some coalition members argue constrained agricultural
productivity/competitiveness. Such policy decision is recommended for further research.
In conclusion, forces both internal and external to the CARP policy subsystem
were at play in the decision of the government to extend and reform CARP. This shows
that policy changes occur when external forces provide policy actors with the motivation
to examine past laws and engage in productive debates that will test and most likely
change their policy beliefs through a process of cumulative learning. Such is the case
with R.A. 9700 or the CARPER Extension Law.
Recommendation/s
With an attempt to provide a comprehensive explanation for the decision to
extend and reform CARP, the study would also like to offer some policy
recommendations. Although much of the implementation problems have been addressed
by the amendments of critical provisions of the original CARP law, the ultimate success
of the program rests on the conscientious/religious or better actual implementation. That
is, the role of government cannot be understated as government is the implementor of
various types of support services. As such, this study recommends further examination or
evaluation of the implementation of CARPER, which by law was supposed to expire in
2014. Furthermore, insights and lessons gained in deconstructing the process of
legislating reforms in CARP policy may serve as valuable input to the likelihood of
another CARP extension given current discussions in the 16th and 17th Congress.
APPENDICES
A. 1. Research Methodology
Given the study’s focus on political dynamics, the research warrants a qualitative
method to examine variables (see Table 4.1. below).
Table 4.1. Summary Guide for Data Gathering and Analysis
Variables Data Needed Method of Method of Analysis

Collection
Policy Beliefs Congressional deliberations: Archival Research, Deductive and Partial Indusctive
1) Technical Committee Key-informant/In- Content Analysis (under the Critical
Minutes (TCM), depth Interviews Discourse Analysis technique)
2) Technical Secretariat to
the Presidency (TSP),
3) Joint Committee
Bicameral Legislature
(Bicam),
4) Bill Sponsorships and
Amendments,
5) Vote list, and
6) similar documents of the
CARPER law
deliberations
Policy- Congressional Archival Research, Textual Comparison of Bills and
Oriented deliberations, Key-informant/In- Final Provisions of the Law and
Learning Bills depth Interviews Partial Inducitve Content Analysis
External Congressional Archival Research, Deducitve Content Analysis
Shocks deliberations (above), Key-informant/In-
News Articles depth Interviews
Variables and Data Needed
To describe how policy beliefs, as influenced by external events and policy-
oriented learning, shaped the decision by the legislature to extend and reform CARP
through the CARPER law (R.A. 9700), the study both identified the differences in
provisions between the original CARP law (R.A. 6657) and the CARPER law and
examined policy statements during the deliberations of the CARPER law, which reflect
differences in the policy beliefs of the opposing advocacy coalitions. These statements
are contained in transcripts of legislative debates in the House of Representatives

Agrarian Reform Committee Meetings minutes, plenary sessions/periods of interpellation
or obtained through in-depth interviews of key-informants or policy actors present in
these Congressional sessions.
Method of Collection
Archival Research 39 . These legislative transcripts were collected from the
National Legislative Archives of the House of Representatives in the form of: 1) House
Committee deliberations, where stakeholders are consulted and a consolidated bill is
produced for the approval of the entire representative body; 2) plenary deliberations,
where specific provisions of the bill amendments are subjected to a period of
interpellation or questioning; 3) Joint Committee Bicameral Legislature (Bicam), where
the approved bill versions of the Senate and the Lower House are reconciled; 4) Bill
Sponsorships and Amendments; 5) Vote list; and 6) similar documents of the CARPER
law deliberations. In total, the whole length of the records spanned 1,600 pages and
covers the period of November 21, 2007 up to July 29, 2009 (see Table below for a list of
legislative documents to analyze).
TYPE OF MEETING MINUTES NO. OF PERIOD

MEETINGS COVERED
House Committee (on Agrarian Reform) Deliberations November 21,
6 meetings 2007 – April
30, 2007
Plenary Deliberations May 14, 2008
14 meetings – June 01,
2009
Approval on Second Reading and Third Reading June 03, 2009
Bicameral Conference Committee Meeting June 09, 2009
Conference Committee Reports and Approval of HB No. 8118 and SB July 29, 2009
No. 1946

39
Defined in the social sciences as the locating, evaluating, and systematic interpretation and analysis of
sources found in archives (Corti, 2010)
Key-Informant and In-Depth Interview. Interviews will be done to triangulate
or support data obtained from Congressional deliberations. Agrarian Committee officers
during the CARPER law deliberations, CARP-amendment bills proponents, pro-CARP
extension coalition members, and other policy actors (key-informants) present during the
Congressional deliberations are interviewed in-depth to further examine the policy beliefs
of advocacy coalitions and other factors (see proposed list of interviewees below). Given
the high number of possible respondents (e.g. the Agrarian Committee [AC] of the 13th
Congress had 40 members), the researcher will select policy actors40 with the highest
leadership mandates (i.e. Chair) and outspoken co-authors and opponents (i.e. exposed in
media) to the CARPER law.
Table 4.2. Proposed List of Interview Respondents (Key-informant and In-Depth)
Name Position Relevance

Elias C. Lone District of Apayao Rep., Principal Sponsor & Author of R.A. 9700; noted
Bulut Jr. Agrarian Committee Chairman, 14th policy broker
Congress
Edcel C. 1st District of Albay Rep., 14th Principal Sponsor & Co-author of R.A. 9700
Lagman Congress
Eduardo N. Nueva Ecija 1st District Rep., 14th Principal Sponsor & Co-author of R.A. 9700
Joson Congress
Ana Theresia Former AKBAYAN Party List Rep., Principal Sponsor & Co-author of R.A. 9700;
“Risa” 14th Congress claims to represent the RCM coalition
Hontiveros-
Baraquel
Junie E. Cua Lone District of Quirino Rep., 14th Co-author of R.A. 9700
Congress
Ronald V. 1st District of Ilocos Sur Rep., 14th Co-author of R.A. 9700
Singson Congress
Nasser DAR Secretary (2007-2010) DAR Secretary during CARL deliberations; noted
Pangandaman policy broker
Pablo P. 1st District of Cebu Rep., 14th outspoken opposition to extension of CARP;
Garcia Congress landowner-legislator
Mon Castro Land Bank of the Philippines representative at the
TCMs

40
Yet, as the study is historical, some noted informants are unreachable for various reasons so the
researcher also relies on referrals of other informants and thus executes a snowball sampling method as
well (Atkinson & Flint, 2004).
Jimmy Tadeo 1987 Constitution Commission Part of Commission who included Art. XII
delegate; Presidential Agrarian mandating a comprehensive agrarian reform;
Reform Council (PARC) farmer & present at TCMs
landowner sector rep.
Rafael “Ka Kilusang Manggagawa ng Pilipinas; Claims to represent ARBs
Paeng” party list rep. (?)
Mariano
Menchie Coordinator, Land Tenure Sector, Stakeholder speaker at TCMs/ public hearings
Flores-Obanil Centro Saka
Teodoro Bayan Muna Party List Rep. Co-author of H.B. 3059, party list bill input for
“Teddy” R.A. 9700
Casiño
Cathy Agrarian Justice Foundation (AJF) Stakeholder speaker at TCMs/ public hearings
Navarro
Bernie Lim AR NOW Stakeholder speaker at TCMs/ public hearings
Atty. Mabel Director, Initiative for Dialogue and Stakeholder speaker at TCMs/ public hearings
Arias Empowerment through Alternative
Legal Services, Inc. (IDEALS)
Dr. Linda University of the Philippines, Los Representative from the academe
Penalba Baños (UPLB)
Silverio AMIC Representative of landowners at the TCMs
Berenguer
Roy Mahinay Spokesperson, Kilusang Para sa Stakeholder speaker at TCMs/ public hearings
Tunay na Repormang Agraryo
(PRA)
Crispin Anak Pawis Party List Rep. Co-author of H.B. 3059, party list bill input for
Beltran R.A. 9700
Atty. Jobert SENTRA (spell out) Stakeholder speaker at TCMs/ public hearings
Pahilga
Victor Former DAR Chief Planning Advocate of redistributive agrarian reform; former
Gerardo J. Services; and well-known Agrarian DAR Chief Planning Services; former member of
Bulatao Reform expert the Presidential Commission on Government
Reorganization, a Survey Team for government
departments, and participant in Cabinet Action
Committee and the Inter-Agency Task Force on
Agrarian Reform (IATFR), tasked to consolidate
draft inputs from farmer sectors, during Aquino’s
administration
Florencio Former Department of Budget and Agrarian Reform Committee member of the 8th
“Butch” Management (DBM) Secretary Congress and ally of Hon. Bonifacio Gillego,
Abad principal author of House Bill 400, upon which
most of CARL content is based on
Dr. Bernardo Center for Research and regarded as the Business Community
Villegas Communications (CRC), Founder representative (i.e. productivity-sharing side or
more conservative-resounding agrarian reform
side; and foremost drafter of EO 229)
Dr. Rolando Center for Research and Presented various models for Agricultural systems
Dy Communication (CRC), Senior in the first recorded TCM on (specify date)
Economist
Interview questions are indexed from newspaper articles, scholastic works (e.g.
Putzel, 1992), and NGO/DAR publications (e.g. Flores-Obanil, 2010); are semi-
structured to accommodate relevant circumstantial findings or information; and focus on
the role of scientific information, coalition beliefs and resources on policy-oriented
learning in the AR policy subsystem, activities indicating coalition formation, and
external factors plausibly affecting the decision to extend CARP (i.e. policy change). For
reference, an interview questionnaire is appended (see Table 4.3 below).
Table 4.3. Sample Interview Questions (Participant in the 14th Congressional

Hearings on CARPER law)
1. How do you describe your experience in participating in these deliberations?
2. What groups were you up against as a participant in the deliberations of
CARPER?
3. How do you evaluate the committee leadership in these deliberations?
4. How do you characterize the public hearings/forum/consultations/ conducted by
the committee?
5. How do you assess past CARP implementation?
6. What significant events at that time occurred that were relevant to consider?
7. Why do you think CARP should have been extended or not?

Method of Analysis
Deductive Content Analysis (under Critical Discourse Analysis). Statements
of advocacy coalition members recorded in the meeting minutes and obtained from
interviews will be subjected to content analysis under the Critical Discourse Analysis
(CDA) technique. CDA is utilized as it primarily studies how social and political
domination is reproduced through speech and hence sees a text as a product of
negotiations born out of differences in holding power rather than a work of one person
(Dillon, 2012; Scheufele, 2008; Wodak, 2005). Thus, CDA is appropriate in
deconstructing the text of the CARPER law deliberations in order to show how the
structure of power/domination among competing advocacy coalitions determines how
they strive to further their policy beliefs by using every means at their disposal to
articulate, argue, negotiate, and ultimately influence the discussions to arrive at a
compromise that would facilitate the final agreement to extend and reform CARP
implementation.
Operationally, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1994) themselves explicitly suggest
using content analysis41 to analyse the belief system of advocacy coalitions:
Given the rather technical nature of many Secondary Aspects and the focus on changes in beliefs over
a decade or more, content analyses of government documents (e.g. legislative and administrative
hearings) and interest group publications probably offer the best prospects for systematic empirical
work on changes in elite beliefs. [emphasis added](p. 147)
In analysing the data, the researcher intends to use deductive content analysis, a
type of content analysis for studies already populated by sufficient pre-existing
knowledge (i.e. theories, models, mind maps and literature reviews) and hence whose

41
First used as a method for analysing hymns, newspaper, magazine, articles, advertisements and political
speeches in the 19th century, content analysis has evolved to develop diverse uses in different fields (Elo &
Kyngäs, 2008)
objective is theory testing42 (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008), in this case to test whether ACF’s
dual path to policy change offers an explanation to the decision to extend CARP.
Deductive content analysis typically involves three phases: preparation, data
organization and reporting (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008). Preparation involves immersion in the
data by reading through the CARP deliberations and interview transcripts several times in
order to make sense of the whole data43. At this stage, the researcher maps out the range
of themes, issues, and topics reflected in the data.
The researcher then organizes the data by selecting/extracting significant
legislative statements based on their relevance to concepts/variables in the ACF and
noting salient words within those statements, using the research objectives/questions as
guide or criteria (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008). The researcher uses whole interviews and
complete legislative statements large enough to be considered as a whole and small
enough to be kept in mind as a unit of context or meaning during the analysis process44
(Elo & Kyngäs, 2008). Selected statements are encoded into a table with four columns: 1)
the congressional document reference, 2) the statement number, 3) the actual statement;
and 4) space for remarks/earlier annotations, which eventually help define the themes
related to the research questions/variables under scrutiny (see Table 4.4. for sample).

42
Sabatier (1988) corroborates this in the following suggestion:
Given that the basic strategy of the framework is to use the structure of belief systems to predict
changes in beliefs and attempted changes in policy over time, that structure must be stipulated a priori
if the argument to come in Hypotheses 2 and 3 is to be falsifiable. The unsettled nature of the field
makes this a risky undertaking…[but nevertheless] on the assumption that clarity - even if wrong-
begets clarity and eventually improved understanding of a phenomenon, the framework proposes the
structure of elite belief systems ….[emphasis added](p. 144)
43
This is pursuant to the methodological assumption that no theoretical insight can spring forth from the
data without the researcher becoming completely familiar with them (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008)
44
This is done in conformity to the admonition of content analysis experts (as cited in Elo & Kyngäs, 2008)
that an analysis unit that is too narrow (e.g. one word) may result in fragmentation and the recommendation
by GAO (in Elo & Kyngäs, 2008) to practically manage the humungous document to be analysed.
Table 4.4. Sample Matrix for Coded Significant Statements
Document No. Speaker Statement Remarks
TCM 21- 1 Legislato Hopefully, everyone will be able to rally Appears to connote
11-2007 r around and contribute in the understanding of inclusion/
(Chairma the present state of CARP. Indeed, how land inclusiveness in
n Bulut) is used and who largely benefit from its fruits negotiations (?),
are issues that have dominated the economics suggesting
of our country, and since the middle of the neutrality and
18th Century, every previous Philippine willingness to learn
administration has laid claim to the fact that about new
agriculture is the backbone of our economy. information on
Ironically however, it is this predominantly status of CARP,
agricultural economy which has spawned policy-oriented
pervasive poverty in the country today. The learning (?); also
Philippine poverty is by and large a rural cited
problem with distinctively agrarian roots socioeconomic
conditions (i.e.
poverty) as
justification for
discussing bills to
extend
CARP=External
Events,
Socioeconomic
conditions?
This entire process will be replicated in one whole document45 and undergoes the
process of indexing major recurring themes, alternately collapsing details with similar
meaning into workable categories and constructing new ones in the process as new ideas
not previously covered by pre-established categories arise. Afterwards, the researcher
lists the major themes extracted from the remarks and then proceeds to develop an
appropriate mix of structured (Table 4.5.) and unconstrained (Table 4.6.) matrices of
analysis.

45
In particular the 140-page minutes of the first 14th Congress Agrarian Committee Meeting held on
November 21, 2007
For the External Shocks variable, the researcher deemed it practical to use
ACF’s own pre-established concepts and clearly defined variables as the thematic
framework (in the manner shown in Table 4.5.). Hence, the four types of External shocks
(changes in socioeconomic and political conditions, changes in public opinion,
changes in systemic governing coalition, and other policy decisions) are used as
categories for a structured matrix that would be used to identify whether a policy
statement suggests external shocks were significant considerations in the decision to
extend and reform CARP 46 . The same type of structured matrices are applied to
describing the policy subsystem (as defined by the diversity of Speakers) and advocacy
coalition formation (as manifested in Speaker’s Position/Policy Stand).
Table 4.5. Thematic Matrices-Constrained
Corresponding Number External Shocks
1 Changes in Socioeconomic conditions
2 Changes in Public Opinion
3 Changes in systematic governing coalition
4 Other policy decisions from other policy subsystem
5 N/A
On the other hand, partial inductive methods were used in deriving an
unconstrained matrix (see Table 4.6.) from the data per se (i.e. legislative transcripts) to
create categories to operationalize the ACF’s concept of policy belief system (as denoted
by Beliefs/Issues), policy change, and policy-oriented learning. The unconstrained type

46
In this case, the thematic framework used in the study is mostly derived from a priori concepts clearly
defined by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1994) in their Advocacy Coalition Framework and hence the term
‘category’ is used.
more aptly accounted for the specifics of these more endogenous variables as its lack of
fixed, pre-defined conceptual parameters provides greater flexibility47 in accommodating
adjustments to possible new ideas/insights related to the concepts, variables, or
hypotheses being tested. Consequently, it is unavoidable to create subcategories to
capture the nuances of concepts and ideas, since the variables under this matrix type are
endogenous. This multi-layered approach to categorization is especially suited to
accurately illustrate ACF’s three-tiered belief systems (Deep Normative Core, Near
Policy Core, Secondary Aspects).
Once the categorization matrices are completely constructed, coding begins with
applying the categories to each significant statement of sampled documents. The
frequency of observations of each category is tallied and totalled. The sum of each
category’s tally is then divided by either the total sample of coded significant statements
or the total frequency of observations of a particular category to obtain the percentage
share of subcategories to its overarching category (e.g. % share of Time to the variable of
Policy Core). The derived %ages are then ranked from the highest to the lowest value to
demonstrate which among the variables were most considered in the decision to change
policy based on order of importance, relevance, and dominance of categories48. Results

47
Nevertheless, this stage of content analysis requires caution, intense introspection, and astute discernment
in deciding which ideas/insights qualify as viable categories, given that categories must be conceptually
and empirically grounded (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008). Hence, Kyngäs and Vanhanen (as cited in Elo & Kyngäs,
2008) state that the success of content analysis depends on the researcher’s ability to condense data into
categories simplified enough to describe the phenomenon in a systematic, understandable manner yet broad
enough to capture the gamut of meanings in a reliable manner.
48
It is important to note that in coding the significant statements, the statements themselves may contain
more than one category, as the categories devised are distinct yet still interrelated and hence not absolutely
mutually exclusive. So for some categories, especially for the belief systems that comprise the core variable
of the study, the tally may exceed the total number of coded significant statements. Therefore, for
categories with only one level of subcategories (i.e. External Shocks, Policy Change, Speaker’s
Position), the tally is divided by the total number of significant statements while categories with multiple
levels of subcategories, the tally of each category is divided not by the total sample of coded significant
will also be compared to published related literature or cross-checked with news articles
to see whether external events play a role or served as valid consideration for the decision
to extend and reform CARP.
In reporting the findings, the resulting percentages of observations are
substantiated by described contents of the categories, i.e. the meanings of the categories.
In other words, the occurrence of categories and subcategories in the textual data are
counted, charted, and discussed with quotations from significant statements to
demonstrate more clearly the link between the data and the theoretical variables
examined. Citations are pursuant to recommendations of Patton and Sandelowski (in Elo
& Kyngäs, 2008) to show readers the origin and type of original data categories
formulated, thus increasing the trustworthiness of the research findings49.

statements but by the total number of occurrences for that category level (refer to Chapter 5 for an
example).
49
To ensure internal validity of content analysis, the researcher reviewed the content analysis code matrices
at least three times to remove redundancies and streamline overlapping themes. As reinforcement, step-by-
step consultations were also done with a seasoned adviser at every stage of content analysis, a process
consistent with Elo and Kyngäs’ (2008) recommendation of using a panel of experts to support concept
production, content validation or resolution of coding issues. To facilitate transferability, the researcher
gives a clear description of the context, selection and characteristics of participants, data collection and
process of analysis. According to Graneheim and Lundman (as cited in Elo & Kyngäs, 2008), this
demonstration is needed to enable someone else to follow the procedures of the inquiry.
Table 4.6. Thematic Matrices-Unconstrained (Endogenous Variables)
Policy Beliefs Speaker’s Position/

Policy Change Speaker
Policy Stand
(Deep) Normative
(Near) Policy Core Secondar Aspects
Core
Social Justice Modes of Distribution Land Acquisition & Need to review/improve Legislator
Distribution (LAD) LAD
Gender Equality Need to Landowner
continue/accelerate
LAD
Compulsory Acquisition ARBs (i.e. Beneficiary)
Voluntary Land Bureaucrat/Gov’t
Transfer Official
Voluntary Offer to Sell NGO/CSO/PO
Non-distributive Need to retain non- Expert (Academic)
Schemes (SDO, distributive schemes
Leaseback Agreement,
etc.)
Need to revoke/review Both legislator &
non-distributive landowner
schemes
Security of ARB Indefeasibility of Need to secure ARB Both legislator &
Installation/Land CLOA/EP installation/land transfer beneficiary (ARB)
Transfer process
Hereditary Both legislator &
Succession/Continuity NGO/CSO/PO
of Landownership
Collective CLOAs Both landowner &
NGO/CSO/PO
Cancellation/Reversal Both beneficiary (ARB)
of CLOAs & NGO/CSO/PO
Land expulsion LGU leader
Policy Beliefs
(Deep) Normative Policy Change
Core
Social Justice Security of ARB Installation/Land Land mortgaging/ conversion/ selling Need to secure ARB installation/land
Transfer transfer process
Gender Equality CARP lands as collateral
Just Compensation Scheme
Unpaid landowners
Captive Credit Access
ARB qualifications
ARB willingness to own lands
Ability of ARBs to pay taxes
Landowner resistance
Landowner abuse/extra-judicial killings/ agrarian
violence against ARBs
Policy Beliefs
(Deep) Policy Change
Normative Core
Social Justice Coverage (Scope and Private Agricultural Lands (PAL) Need to retain current CARP coverage (scope and
Retention Limit) retention limits)
Public Alienable Lands Need to review/re-visit current CARP coverage (scope,
retention limits, ARBs, and exemptions)
Accomplishment of original scope or remaining land
inventory
Breadth of scope: comprehensive or targeted

Exemptions (sugarlands, coconut lands, plantations,
prawn farms, public spaces, etc.)
Economies of scale
Prohibitions against land conversion
Coverage/Scope of ARBs
Original retention limit
Landowner abuse/extra-judicial killings/ agrarian
violence against ARBs
Policy Beliefs
Core
Human Rights Agrarian Justice Strengthening DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) Need to Improve Agrarian Justice
Delivery Delivery
Right to Due Process of DAR’s exlusive jurisdiction over CARP cases
Law
Decongestion of cases in CARP: system of aging cases, prioritization of
high-impact cases
Target adjudication
Target legal assistance
Compliance to SC rulings and other court rulings
Legal function of CLOAs
Criminalization of ARBs
Landlord-dominated composition of civil courts
Policy Beliefs
(Near) Policy Policy Change
(Deep) Normative Core Secondar Aspects
Core
Public Welfare/ General Well-Being/ Common Funds (or lack of) automatic allocation Need to continue or augment
Good funding
100 Billion (to 150 billion) Need to improve funding allocation
3.8% of GAA
More funding for LAD

More funding for Support Services
100% for support services
75% for support services
50% support services, 50% LAD
Outstanding payables to unpaid
landowners
Policy Beliefs
Policy Change
(Deep) Normative Core (Near) Policy Core Secondar Aspects
Sovereign Responsibility of Role of DAR Bureaucracy & Political Will/Commitment/ authenticity/ Capacity/ Need to Improve DAR bureaucracy &
the State/ Exercise of Polic Other Implementing Competency of DAR and other implementing other implementing agencies or continue
Power Agencies agencies their services
Accountability or
Corruption in the bureaucracy/ susceptible to
influence
DAR as implementor
DAR as regulator
DAR as mediator
DAR as adjudicator
DAR as documentor
Structural reorganization of DAR
Extension of DAR
Equal application of DAR policy
Policy framework
Register of deeds
Presidential Commission on Good Government
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council
Land Bank
BIR
New agency altogether
Recognition of women in DAR service
Inter-agency coordination/oversight monitoring
committee
Policy Beliefs
Core
Economic Justice Productivity issues Enterprising the land Need to Improve Viability/Productivity
Causes of decline: excessive fragmentation, economies

of scale considerations, succession problems
Production costs
Crop type
Sufficiency of retention limits
Increased levels
Appropriate farm technology
Food security
Rural Development & ARC Clustering Strategy Need for Rural Development &
Industrialization Industrialization
Role of women in rural development
CARP as corrective tool to ensure rural agri. Economy
as foundation for national economic growth
Landowner re-investing in industrialization
Policy Beliefs
Policy Change
Public Welfare/ General Well-Being/ Common Technical Support Adequacy Need to Improve Technical Support
Good Services Services
Increased levels
Loans and Credit Access
Savings Program
Crops Insurance
Market Linkage and Price
Support
Education
Social Services
Rural/Agricultural Infrastructure
Policy Beliefs
Policy Change
Inequality/Equity Poverty CARP awarded lands as source of income or non-
awarding/ownership of lands=poverty
CARP lands farming as privileged business
poverty as caused by unequal land ownership
Poverty as a mindset (e.g. not a hindrance to progress)
Alternative livelihood
Poverty worsened after CARP
Poverty reduced after CARP
Inclusion of women helps reduce poverty
A. 2. Typology of Coalition Opportunity Structures classifying

governments (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p. 201)
Openness of Political System Degree of Consensus Needed for Major Policy Change
High Medium Low
High Pluralist Pluralist
Medium Recent Corporatist Westminster
Low Traditional Corporatist Authoritarian Executive
A. 3. Structure of belief systems of policy elites* (Sabatier, 1988, p. 145)
Deep (normative) core Near (policy) core Secondary aspects
Defining Fundamental normative and Fundamental policy Instrumental decisions and

characteristics ontological axioms positions concerning the information searches
basic strategies for necessary to implement
achieving normative policy core
axioms of deep core
Scope Part of basic personal Applies to policy area of Specific to

philosophy; Applies to all interest (and perhaps a few policy/subsystem of
policy areas. more) interest
Susceptibility Very difficult; akin to Difficult, but can occur if Moderately easy; this is
to change religious conversion experience reveals serious the topic of most
anomalies administrative and even
legislative policy-making
Illustrative 1) The nature of man 1) Proper scope of 1) Most decisions

components i) Inherently evil vs. governmental vs. concerning
socially redeemable market activity administrative rules,
ii) Part of nature vs. 2) Proper distribution of budgetary allocations,
dominion over nature authority among disposition of cases,
iii) Narrow egoists vs. various units (e.g. statutory
contractarians levels) of government interpretation, and
2) Relative priority of 3) Identification of social even statutory revision
various ultimate values: groups whose social 2) Information
freedom, security, welfare is crucial concerning program
power, knowledge, 4) Orientation on performance, the
health, love, beauty, etc. substantive policy seriousness of
3) Basic criteria of conflicts, e.g. problems, etc.
distributive justice: environmental
Whose welfare counts? protection vs.

Relative weights of self, economic development
primary groups, all 5) Magnitude of
people, future perceived threats to
generations, non-human those values
beings, etc. 6) Basic choices
concerning policy
instruments, e.g.
coercion vs.
inducements vs.
persuasion
7) Desirability of
participation by various
segments of society:
i) Public vs. elite
participation
ii) Experts vs. elected
officials
8) Ability of society to
solve problems in this
policy area:
i) Zero-sum competition
vs. potential for mutual
accommodation
ii) Technological
optimism vs.
pessimism
*The policy core and secondary aspects apply to governmental programs
A.4. List/Categories of Coalition Resources
i. Formal legal authority to make policy decisions. The ACF views actor in
positions of legal authority as potential members of advocacy coalitions. This includes
many agency officials, legislators, and some judges. As Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith
observe (in Sabatier & Weible, 2007), one of the most important features of a dominant
coalition is that it has more of its members in positions of formal authority than do
minority coalitions. So, it is a major resource to the coalition. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith
further observe (in ibid.) that major strategies for coalitions include placing allies in
positions of legal authority through elections or political appointments, as well as
launching lobbying campaigns to sway officials with legal authority.

ii. Public opinion. Opinion polls showing support for a coalition’s policy
positions are also a major resource for policy participants. This is so as a supportive
public is more likely to elect coalition supporters to legislative and other positions of
legal authority and the help sway the decisions of elected officials. Indeed, as Sabatier
and Jenkins-Smith affirm (in ibid.), a typical strategy for advocacy coalitions is to spend
a lot of time trying to garner public support. Given this, external perturbations that trigger
changes in opinion (as earlier cited under External Dynamic Events) is indeed a
significant factor determining a coalition’s success in enacting policy changes.
iii. Information. Information regarding the causes and severity of problems
and the cost-benefit analysis of policy alternatives is an important resource for a
coalition. Unless there is a “hurting stalemate”, the ACF assumes that information is a
resource utilized by policy participants to win political battles against opponents.
Stakeholders often spin or even distort information to bolster their argument. So,
accurate, credible information is vital to strategically solidify coalition membership,
argue against an opponent’s policy views, convince decision-making sovereigns to
support your proposals, and sway public opinion. This is one of the reasons why the ACF
emphasizes the role of researchers within coalitions (Sabatier & Weible, 2007).
iv. Mobilizable troops. Policy elites often use members of the attentive public
sympathetic to their beliefs to engage in various political activities including public
demonstrations and electoral and fund-raising campaigns. Coalitions with minimal
financial resources often rely very heavily upon mobilizable troops as an inexpensive
resource (ibid.).
v. Financial resources. Money can be used to purchase other resources. A
coalition with ample financial resources can fund research and organize think tanks to
produce information, launch media campaigns to earn public support and advertise policy
positions, and even fund candidates to gain inside access to legislators and political
appointees (ibid.).
vi. Skillful leadership. Studies on policy entrepreneurs (as cited in Sabatier &
Weible, 2007) demonstrate how skillful leaders of coalitions can attract followers,
supporters, and sponsors with their vision and efficient management of resources. Public
policy research also shows how despite the fact that policy changes are driven by
antecedents that dispose a political system to change (i.e. external shocks), skillful
entrepreneurs are needed to bring about actual policy changes (Sabatier & Weible, 2007).
Certainly, the type and availability of resources vary across policy contexts and
localities. Hence, it is highly precarious, if not empirically unjust, and in Sabatier and
Weible’s (2007) own words, ‘extraordinarily difficult’ (p. 203) to use absolute, fixed
aggregate categories to identify them. So greater caution and flexibility must be exercised
in accounting for coalition resources used in policy subsystems.

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ADVOCACY COALITION FRAMEWORK OF POLICY CHANGE AND POLICY-

ORIENTED LEARNING IN R.A. 9700: A DISCOURSE ON HOW POLICY BELIEFS

JOHN VINCENT C. PIMENTEL

DR. MAY ZULEIKA SALAO, THESIS COORDINATOR

INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

UNIVERSITY OF ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

The undersigned declared that the Thesis entitled

ADVOCACY COALITION FRAMEWORK OF POLICY CHANGE AND POLICY-

Political Economy Program

Policy-Oriented Learning In R.A. 9700: A Discourse On How Policy Beliefs Of Advocacy

And Reform The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program Implementation”, an authentic

the degree of Master of Arts in Political Economy with a Specialization in International

May Zuleika Q. Salao, Ph.D.

Rolando T. Dy, Ph.D. Nicomedes B. Alviar, Ph.D.

Atty. Delia S. Tantuico Atty. Joaquin E. San Diego

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................1-17

CHAPTER II: REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL

CHAPTER IV: POLICY SUBSYSTEM, ADVOCACY COALITIONS AND

CHAPTER V: CARPER: AN EXAMPLE OF POLICY CHANGE THROUGH

CHAPTER VI: THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL SHOCKS ON THE DECISION TO

CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................288-292

decision of the House of Representatives to continue and introduce substantial policy

changes to CARP as embodied in the provisional amendments in CARPER. This finding

agreement on improving a government program of national importance such as CARP. Given

CARP as a state policy.

Existing literature proposes three theoretical perspectives (government-market

interests contrary to the objectives of CARP as a government program. None of the

Philippine agrarian reform may be pursued. Given CARP’s importance in developing a

through a perspective based on coalition dynamics and policy-oriented learning (i.e.

The choice of this research problem is further justified by statistics relating to

workers thrive in agriculture (NSO, 2012b), 44%—the largest portion—of the

the smallest occupation group, comprise employers in family-operated-and-owned farms or

CARP as a policy tool of the Philippine government aims to rectify.

CARP is a culmination of efforts by past Presidential administrations to implement a series

of land reform programs to achieve this desired consequence of economic development.

the poor farmer by implementing a comprehensive re-distribution of all agricultural lands

farmer beneficiaries was in place.

“CARPER coalition” expanded to include more organizations to emerge as the “Reform

by R.A. 8532 (Flores-Obanil, 2010).

challenges the traditional notion of landowning elites remaining influential or

overwhelmingly dominant in LR legislation, because the passage of CARPER suggests a

external environment is significant in effecting changes in important state policies such as

questions. Is the Philippine government’s decision to extend CARP implementation for a

that it apparently struggles to accomplish? Was this commitment reflected in the

(polarized) positions—the liberal or pro-distribution (farmers) coalition and the conservative

or anti-distribution (landowners) camp—R.A.9700 debates show that the emergence of more

to accommodate the increasing diversity of policy positions and systematic enough to

extension of the program an indicator of policy-oriented learning or more fundamentally,

changes in the policy beliefs of competing coalitions on land reform?

government policies occur. This framework is chosen as it allows the interaction of

contributing to a holistic and comprehensive analysis of policy change within such

This framework is complemented by the archival research and content analysis of

statements of policymakers and stakeholders participating in Congressional deliberations

recommends content analysis as an appropriate research method to operationalize the said

Scope and Limitations.

To reiterate, the study seeks to answer the following questions:

policy change of extending and reforming CARP through R.A. 9700?

House of Representative’s decision to extend CARP through R.A. 9700?

mediated agreements or working compromises between competing advocacy

3) Was the decision to extend CARP a result of policy-oriented learning in light of

learning alter, strengthen, or weaken the policy beliefs of advocacy coalition

members on the issue of deciding to extend CARP through R.A. 9700?

relevant considerations in the Philippine House of Representatives’ decision to