“The Aristotelian Causes and Law in Aquinas”

STEP - St. Thomas Education Project

Law and Liberty: Ethics and Politics for the XXI Century
Universitat Internacional de Catalunya, Barcelona, September 20-25,
2005
Friday, September 23, 9:30am
Robert A. Gahl, Jr.
Pontifical University of the Holy Cross
(Provisional Draft 20050921)

1. Introduction

The Aristotelian doctrine of the four causes—material, formal, efficient, and

final undoubtedly influenced the structure and content of St. Thomas Aquinas’
thought. Indeed, many commentators have found fruitful application of the
Aristotelian causes as a sort of prism for analyzing Thomistic texts. Nonetheless, only
a few authors have examined Aquinas’ definition of law in Question 90 by comparing
its four elements to the four causes.1 With this lecture, my primary objective is to
offer an interpretation of the Thomistic definition of natural law through the lens of
the Aristotelian causes and to delineate some of the implications of my interpretation
of his definition of law for his natural law theory.

But in this paper, I am motivated by more than the erudite, academic task of
gathering and analyzing commentaries in order to propose my own gloss of Aquinas’s
words. My aim is much more ambitious, perhaps too ambitious for this short lecture.
My more ambitious aim is twofold. First, to show that by applying a careful analysis
of the four causes, as present in Question 90 in Aquinas’ discussion of law in general,
to his doctrine of natural law, a careful balance may be maintained between the three
principal aspects, or foci, of natural law: namely, the anthropic, the epistemic, and the
theonomic.2 And second, to show that such a careful reading of the four causes in the
Treatise on Law can help to recover the extremely delicate balance in Aquinas’ natural
law theory between the natural exigencies of the law and the necessity of divine aid to
fulfill those exigencies. That is, to recover the balance between nature and grace
within the Treatise on Law.

In recent years, renewed interest in Aquinas’ theory of natural law has lead to
controversy, and at times even polemic, among groups of scholars who consider
themselves students of Aquinas and who would like natural law to play a more
prominent role in the political process of legislation and legal interpretation.3 Much of
1
See Thomas Pegs, Commentaire français littéral de la Somme Théologique de Saint Thomas
D’Aquin, vol. IX, “La loi et la grace”, Paris, Pierre Téqui / Toulouse, Édouard Privat, 1914, pp. 19-20.
La somma teologica: Traduzione e commento, ed. Italian Dominicans, PP. Domenicani (Firenze) S.
Domenico, Casa Editrice Adriano Salani, Roma, 1949, vol. XII, pp. 40-41.
2
For an historical treatment of the foci of natural law and of difficulty maintaining their balance, see
Russell Hittinger, The First Grace: Rediscovering Natural Law in a Post-Christian World, Wilmington,
ISI Books, 2003, especially pp. 4-8.
3
See, for example, John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights; Aquinas. Moral, Political and Legal
Theory, New York, Oxford University Press, 1998; Grisez, "The First Principle of Practical Reason: A
Commentary on the Summa Theologiae, 1-2, Question 94, Article 2," Natural Law Forum, 10 (1965),

1
this debate among Thomists today is based upon deep differences regarding the legal
requirements and the naturalness of natural law. To state it more bluntly, today’s
debate concerns to what extent natural law is law and to what extent it is natural. Or,
using more technical terms, the debated differences regard how natural law is
promulgated, how that promulgation is understood by its subjects and, probably even
more complex, the issue of how human nature determines the content and requires the
fulfillment of natural law. With a balanced reading of the three foci of natural law, I
will propose an integration of the four elements of Aquinas’s definition by offering an
integration of the natural, rational, and divine dimensions or foci along with an
explanation of the promulgation of natural law.

2. Aristotle on the Four Causes

The locus classicus for Aristotle’s doctrine on the four causes is the Physics,
Book II, Section 3, where Aristotle analyzes change from the general perspective of
the principles of why and how things come to be. In his ingenious effort to devise a
complete account of the principles of change, he offers four explanations or kinds of
causes.4 First, he considers the material cause as “that out of which a thing comes to
be and which persists, … e.g. the bronze of the statue, the silver of the bowl.” Second,
he considers the formal cause as “the form or the archetype, i.e. the definition of the
essence, and its genera.” Third he considers the efficient cause as “the primary source
of the change or rest; e.g. the man who deliberated is a cause, the father is cause of the
child, and generally what makes of what is made and what changes of what is
changed.” Fourth and finally, he considers the final cause as the “end or 'that for the
sake of which' a thing is done, e.g. health is the cause of walking about.” Finally,
Aristotle concludes by stating: “this then perhaps exhausts the number of ways in
which the term 'cause' is used.”5

When speaking of the four causes in Book II of the Physics, Aristotle often uses
the illuminating example of the artistic crafting of a statue. While Aristotle speaks of
a bronze statue forged from a mold, I find even more expressive of Aristotle’s
proposal the example of a sculptor carving a statue from a block of marble, for
instance, Michelangelo sculpting the statue of Moses recently restored and currently

pp. 168-201; Janet Smith, Humanae Vitae: A Generation Later, Washington, Catholic University of
America Press, 1992; McInerny, Ethica Thomistica, 2nd ed., Washington, Catholic University of
America Press, 1997; Robert George, "A Defense of the New Classical Natural Law Theory,"
American Journal of Jurisprudence, 41 (1996) pp. zz-zz; MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which
Rationality?, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1988; John Rist, Real Ethics zzz; Russell
Hittinger, A Critique of the New Natural Law Theory, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press,
1987; Benedict Ashley, "What Is the End of the Human Person? The Vision of God and Integral
Human Fulfillment," Moral Truth and Moral Tradition. Essays in Honor of Peter Geach and Elizabeth
Anscombe, ed. Luke Gormally, Dublin, Four Courts Press, 1994, pp. 68-96; Fulvio di Blasi, God and
Natural Law, South Bend, St. Augustine Press, zzz; Anthony Lisska, Aquinas’ Theory of Natural Law:
An Analytic Reconstruction, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996; Pamela Hall, Narrative and Natural Law: An
Interpretation of Thomistic Ethics, Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1994; Stephen Louis
Brock, The Legal Character of Natural Law According to St. Thomas Aquinas, dissertation, Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1988; Martin Rhonheimer, Natural Law and Practical Reason: A
Thomistic View of Moral Autonomy, New York, Fordham University Press, 2000.
4
Aristotle's notion of cause is more robust than that understood in common parlance today. Aristotle's
undersanding of cause also encompasses the notion of an explanatory account, responsible for change
or something's coming into being.
5
(194b24-195a3) translated by R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye.

2
on display in the Church of St. Peter in Chains, close to Rome’s Coliseum. For this
example, the material cause is the marble. The formal cause is the form that was first
in the mind of Michelangelo, then on the paper with which he first represented the
design by means of a pencil drawing, and now very physically present in the three-
dimensional shape of the marble itself. An analysis of the efficient causality that
brought about the statue is more complex, especially if a further distinction is added
to the analysis. Certainly Michelangelo was the principal efficient cause. Without him
we would not have the statue known today as Moses. And yet, it seems that there
were other efficient causes. His assistants helped in some of the more bulky carving
of the marble. Michelangelo and his assistants used tools, mostly hammer and chisel.
These tools are instrumental efficient causes, distinct from the principal efficient
cause. Surely Michelangelo could have made such a masterpiece with just about any
decent hammer and chisel. But without Michelangelo there would be no such statue.
The final cause of Moses is more difficult to determine than the efficient cause
because the final cause of human actions is shaped by subjective intentionality,
usually hidden from the perspective of third-person observation. Michelangelo
probably sculpted Moses for a myriad of purposes and motivations: to obtain payment
from Pope Julius II, in hopes of completing the funeral monument, to demonstrate his
own mastery as a sculptor capable of making stone express righteous fury, out of
personal respect and devotion for Moses and his role in salvation history, and, we
should hope, ultimately out of love for God.

Aristotle explains how the four causes account for the multiple features of
change by returning to the example of a bronze statue.

“All things are called causes in many ways, it follows that there are several
causes of the same thing (not merely accidentally), e.g. both the art of the
sculptor and the bronze are causes of the statue. These are causes of the statue
qua statue, not in virtue of anything else that it may be—only not in the same
way, the one being the material cause, the other the cause whence the motion
comes.”6

The sculptor is cause and the bronze is cause and both are causes of the statue
insofar as it is a statue. Any understanding of the statue as such requires taking them
both into account. And yet they are causes in different ways. Their explicative power
for giving an account of why and how the statue came about are diverse. The sculptor
is the efficient cause, “the cause whence the motion comes” and the bronze the
material cause. Despite the discoveries of modern physics, when combined with
modern philosophical empiricism and positivism, it has lead to an impoverishment of
the ability to understand motion, change, and the natural explanation of what things
are and how they come about. The modern mind tends to think of causality as merely
efficient, "the cause whence the motion comes", and has special difficulty fathoming
the formal and final causes.

Aristotle continues his discussion of causality to offer another consideration that

is helpful for the study of Aquinas’ natural law theory. Aristotle considers causes from
the perspective of the relationship between that which causes and that which is
caused. That is, he considers active and passive causality and their relationship to
intentionality in human action. For Aristotle, the effect is already in the cause insofar
6
195a4-8.

3
as the cause has the active capacity to bring about the effect or is naturally inclined
towards bringing it about.

“Some things cause each other reciprocally, e.g. hard work causes fitness and
vice versa, but again not in the same way, but the one as end, the other as the
principle of motion.”7

Hard work and exercise, in moderation of course, naturally lead to physical

fitness, such that the one causes the other. The first is cause. The second is caused.
And yet some work, for instance in their gardens, in order to become fit and therefore
fitness may be a cause for the activity that leads to fitness. Not only is fitness passive,
insofar as it is caused by work and exercise, it may also be an active cause in the
acting subject's motivation. Not only is fitness brought about by the activity, it may
also be a reason for the activity in the first place. While taking into account the bi-
directional relationship between cause and effect, Aristotle asserts that some things
cause each other reciprocally, the one as end, the other as principle of motion, the one
as final cause the other as the efficient cause. To return to our example located at St.
Peter in Chains, the beauty of Moses was caused by Michelangelo’s masterful
sculpting. But the beauty of Moses also motivated Michelangelo, and thereby caused
him, to sculpt. The beauty of the statue is at once passive and active as an explanation
for the action that brought about the marble masterpiece. Only by considering all four
causes can a full account of causes and effects be obtained.

As a further consequence of the reciprocity of causes in their active-passive

relationship, Aristotle considers that to explain motion, in certain circumstances, we
must also take into account the absence of a cause that is somehow common, proper,
or simply expected. The absence of a proper cause, some agent that should be present
and is normally present, can cause something, like a ship wreck to occur.

“Further the same thing is the cause of contrary results. For that which by its
presence brings about one result is sometimes blamed for bringing about the
contrary by its absence. Thus we ascribe the wreck of a ship to the absence of
the pilot whose presence was the cause of its safety.” 8

The pilot’s proper task is to bring the ship safely into port. In his absence, or perhaps
simply in the absence of his proper skill, in the case of an incompetent or drunken
pilot, the ship is wrecked upon the surf. The pilot’s failure to perform as a pilot should
has caused the wreck of the ship.

Aristotle’s proposal for material, formal, efficient, and final causality are
important presuppositions for a full understanding of Aquinas’ definition of law. And,
as I will propose, Aristotle’s doctrine of reciprocal causality and causality by absence
or omission can also aid achieving a deep analysis of Aquinas’ theory of natural law.

3. Analysis of Aquinas’ Definition of Law in General

Question 90, the first question of the Treatise on Law, contains four articles that
introduce the four constitutive elements of Aquinas’ definition of law. First, law is an
7
195a8-10.
8
195a10-14.

4
ordering of reason. Second, law is for the sake of the common good. Third, law is
legislated by the competent authority, that is, the one who has care of the community.
And fourth, law is promulgated. These four constitutive elements of law correspond
to the four articles of question 90. The body of the fourth article concludes with a
summary of the entire question with a formal definition of law. “And so from the four
traits that have been mentioned, we can put together a definition of law: Law is (a) an
ordinance (ordinatio) of reason, (b) for the common good, (c) made by one who is in
charge of the community, and (d) promulgated.”9

Since definitions are causal characterizations of specific differences and

Aquinas offers four such characterizations, the Aristotelian-Thomistic reader should
ask whether, and if so, how, these four elements correspond to the four Aristotelian
causes. In their very fine commentary on the Summa Theologiae, the Italian
Dominicans assert in a footnote that this text constitutes a “complete definition of
law” and then they refer to Thomas Pègues’ literal commentary of the Summa, written
in 1914, where he proposes an analysis of this definition through the prism of the four
causes.10 It is surprising that the Italian Dominicans do not accurately follow the
words of Pègues and that neither the Italian Dominicans nor Pègues mention Aristotle
or the material cause. Both list four causes. The Italians speak of the formal, the final,
the efficient, and, in fourth place, that which “renders the law present and
operative.”11 Whereas Pègues speaks of the formal, final, efficient, and, in fourth
place, the sine qua non, as the necessary components of a complete definition, such as
that offered here by Aquinas. By labeling the fourth cause sine qua non, Pègues
emphasizes that the fourth element of Aquinas’ definition, the promulgation of the
law, is a requirement for the law to have legal force. Although promulgation is not the
specific form of law, it is, nonetheless, a requirement for a law to be a law.

Some Aristotelian-Thomistic readers may be distracted or even confused by the

analyses of the Italian Dominicans and the French Dominican Pègues on account of
their having obscured the material cause in such a way that one might think that all
these Dominicans identify the material cause of the law with its promulgation. But
such an interpretation would lead to a confused understanding of Aquinas’ definition
of law due to an overly literalist reading. Just because there are four components to
his definition does not necessarily mean that the four exactly coincide with the four
causes. [Let me explain.] Indeed, the four components of law listed in the definition
do not perfectly coincide, or line-up, with the four, classic Aristotelian causes. Only

9
Summa Theologiae (ST), I-II, 90, a. 4: “Et sic ex quatuor praedictis potest colligi definitio legis, quae
nihil est aliud quam quaedam rationis ordinatio ad bonum commune ab eo qui curam communitatis
habet, promulgata.” English trans. by Alfred J. Freddoso, STEP – St. Thomas Education Project,
http://www.thomasinternational.org/projects/step/treatiseonlaw/delege090_4.htm, accessed on
September 18, 2005.
10
Thomas Pègues, Commentaire français littéral de la Somme Théologique de Saint Thomas D’Aquin,
vol. IX, “La loi et la grace”, Paris, Pierre Téqui / Toulouse, Édouard Privat, 1914, pp. 19-20.
11
La somma teologica: Traduzione e commento, ed. Italian Dominicans, PP. Domenicani (Firenze) S.
Domenico, Casa Editrice Adriano Salani, Roma, 1949, vol. XII, pp. 40-41. The quote is my own
translation from the Italian: “la rende presente e operante.” The full frase of which is: “La causa
formale (ordinazione della ragione) costituisce la legge; la causa finale (bene comune) dà la bontà o il
valore della legge; la causa efficiente (autorità) ne costituisce l’autenticità; infine la promulgazione la
fa attualmente esistere, la rende presente e operante, con l’applicarla ai sudditi.” (I am surprised to find
that this phrase, presented as a quote from Pègues, seems to be more of a paraphrase of the second half
of his p. 19 rather than a literal translation from the French.)

5
the first three line up with the Aristotelian causes. The first three in Question 90
match up with the last three of the Aristotelian list: formal, efficient, and final,
although in Aquinas the final precedes the efficient. But the material cause is absent
from the main topics of the four articles that make up the Question.

A more careful, deeper, and more Aristotelian reading of Question 90 is needed

to map out the components in Aquinas’ definition with the four Aristotelian causes.
Clearly, the ordering of reason is the formal cause and essential component of the law,
the constitutive element central to the definition. The common good is the final
cause. The competent authority is the efficient cause of the law. The authority makes
the law by legislating. What, then, of promulgation, the topic of the fourth article,
where should it be placed among the four causes? Here I part company with the
Italian Dominicans and with Pègues. To map the articles to the causes, I would
suggest an additional distinction, already mentioned in my analysis of the example of
the sculptor of the statue and his chisel. The ruling authority is the principle efficient
cause who makes the law be law. But legislation cannot take place only within the
legislator. Even in the case of the eternal law, several Persons are involved.12 The
lawgiver makes the law by means of promulgation. As Pègues comments,
promulgation is required for the law to have legal force. The lawgiver causes the law
to have force by means of its promulgation just as the sculptor shapes the block of
marble by means of the instruments of hammer and chisel. Promulgation, therefore, is
the instrumental efficient cause. It is the instrument used by the promulgator to make
the law known, whether by written decree or, in the case of the natural law (and the
new law), by writing on the human heart.

If promulgation is not the material cause but, rather, the instrumental efficient
cause, the problem remains of determining the material cause of law. On my reading
of the Treatise, Aquinas does not offer us an explicit explanation with an entire article
dedicated to the subject, only a quick pointer within the very definition. In many
cases, the material cause is the most evident. Regarding law, the material cause was
not in dispute. And yet, I think that by making explicit the material cause a solution to
current debates regarding the three foci can be clarified. The material cause is the
body of people, the community, or the subjects of the law that are formed by the order
of reason expressed by the law. The people are shaped and ordered towards their
perfection, the common good, by the practical understanding expressed by the law.
Thus, Question 90 does include all of the four causes but with the additional, although
implicit, distinction between the principal and the instrumental efficient causes. To
see that the subjects of the law constitute its material cause helps illuminate the
formal cause of the law, because the form takes shape in the matter. It is the
community who are directed by the law. The people embody the law. Perhaps the
Thomist can rightly conclude that in the English Common Law tradition, custom is
law insofar as it is embodied by the traditional practice of the people rather than
positively expressed by a legislative decree.13

12
For a fascinating defense, especially for its Christological implications, of the legal character of
eternal law, see ST, I-II, q. 91, a. 1, ad 2.
13
Consequently, I very much concur with David Lorenzo's sketch of the relationship between natural
law and MacIntyre's theory of practice. See: David Lorenzo Izquierdo, "The Relation Between Practice
and Law," papered delivered on September 20, 2005 at the Conference Law and Liberty: Ethics and
Politics for the XXI Century, Universitat Internacional de Catalunya, Barcelona.

6
4. The Four Causes and the Natural Law

Since according to the very definition of law, every law must be (1) an order of
reason, (2) for the common good, (3) mandated by the competent authority, and (4)
properly promulgated, (5) that shapes a people by ordering them towards their
perfection, then, of course, the natural law must also include these five elements, the
four Aristotelian categories of causality and promulgation as the necessary, sine qua
non, instrumental efficient cause of law. In Question 91, article 2, Aquinas offers a
succinct definition of natural law. It is the rational creature’s participation in the
eternal law.14 Natural law is an order of reason that directs human beings to their
common good. Natural law is commanded by the competent authority, who rules over
and cares for the entire community of the human family. Of course, only God has
such competence to rule over and care for all human beings, of all races and
languages, from all continents, and from the beginning to the end of history. Natural
law is promulgated by the human’s rational participation in the divine light.

The material cause of natural law is the community of all human beings. The
formal cause is the order of reason. The final cause is the common good. The
principal efficient cause is the Divine Legislator. The instrumental efficient cause,
natural law’s promulgation, is human nature, insofar as the natural light of reason is
capable of participating in the eternal law by grasping the practical principles
contained in natural inclinations. The practical knowledge that makes up the content
of natural law “is something constituted by reason, even as a proposition is a certain
work of reason.”15 In fact, all "law is a certain dictate of practical reason."16 This
practical knowledge is at once from God, discovered by natural human understanding,
and inherent to the natural inclinations common to all humans. It is theonomic,
epistemic, and anthropic. It is God’s law, naturally known by humans, and contained
within our nature. As a participation in the eternal law, natural law is, of course,
metaphysically distinct from the eternal law. The exigencies of natural law are eternal
since they were always present in God's mind. And yet, as a law of nature, natural law
came to be in time with the creation of Adam.

Some contemporary scholars have stressed one of the foci at the expense of the
others. Most common today, especially among the influential proponents of the so-
called “new classical natural law theory,” is an emphasis on the epistemic focus of
natural law at the expense of the anthropic and theonomic.17 Perhaps reacting against
14
ST, I-II, q. 91, a. 2: “Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine: quasi lumen rationis
naturalis, quo discernimus quid sit bonum et malum quod pertinet ad naturalem legem, nihil aliud sit
quam impressio divini luminis in nobis. Unde patet quod lex naturalis nihil aliud est quam participatio
legis aeternae in rationali creatura.”
15
ST, I-II, q. 94, a. 1: “lex naturalis est aliquid per rationem constitutum: sicut etiam propositio est
quoddam opus rationis.”
16
ST, I-II, q. 91 a. 3: "lex est quoddam dictamen practicae rationis."
17
For an especially striking example, see John Finnis, “Natural Law,” Oxford Companion to
Philosophy (Ted Honderich, Oxford University Press, 1995). “natural law. Moral standards which, on
a long-dominant but now disfavoured type of account of morality, political philosophy, and law, can
justify and guide political authority, make legal rules rationally binding, and shape concept formation
in even descriptive social theory.
The sounder versions (e.g. of Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas) consider morality ‘natural’
precisely because reasonable (in an understanding neither consequentialist nor Kantian). Likewise,
contemporary versions plead not guilty of the ‘is-ought’ fallacy: natural law’s first (not yet specifically
moral) principles identify basic reasons for action, basic human goods which are-to-be (ought to be)

7
this emphasis with its under-appreciation of the divine and natural character of natural
law, Russell Hittinger has argued for a recovery of the theological context of natural
law theory by claiming that natural law is principally in God, as Promulgator, and
only secondarily in the human being.18 In fact, in a footnote to his The First Grace:
Rediscovering the Natural Law in a Post-Christian World, Hittinger asserts that
natural law, as discussed in Question 94 as in the creature, is merely the “ratio
materialis” of the natural law.19 If Hittinger were right, natural law would be formally
identitical with the eternal law. But natural law is, by its very definition, the (properly)
human participation in the eternal law. Of course, as all created forms, it is understood
by God and yet its form is, properly speaking, in nature. It is promulgated by God, it
is in human nature, and it is a work of reason. All three foci must be kept in proper
balance in order to maintain the full depth of Aquinas’ entire theory.

Especially since Kant, modern philosophy has viewed nature and reason as
antagonists. But for Aquinas, human reason is not only part of human nature but the
proper part, the part that is specific to us as rational animals. Nature requires us to be
reasonable and to act reasonably. For the human being, to act according to nature is
not to act instinctively or spontaneously, but rather rationally and freely, with self-
dominion.20 So, if natural law is a work of reason, is it in nature only insofar as reason
is the natural faculty whereby we come to know? Or, is natural law also in the lower
potencies that we share with the other animals? To answer this question in Thomistic
terms, one should turn to the concepts of measure, measured, and even active
measuring.

Of course, only God, and his eternal law is entirely without external measure.
Moreover, he eternally measures all with his wisdom, providence, and legislation.
While explaining the rational, or epistemic, character of natural law, Aquinas
specifies that reason is the rule and the measure of human acts. The acts are ruled and
meaured by human reason that participates in the light of God.21 But is natural law

instantiated through choice. Practical knowledge of these presupposes, but is not deduced from, an ‘is’
knowledge of possibilities; full ‘is’ knowledge of human nature is partly dependent on, not premiss for,
practical (‘is-to-be’) understanding of the flourishing (including moral reasonableness) of human
individuals and communities.”
18
For an appreciative critique of Hittinger’s The First Grace, see my: “Grace or Nature First? A
Commentary on Russell Hittinger's The First Grace. Rediscovering the Natural Law in a Post-
Christian World”, in Ethics Without God, ed. Fulvio di Blasi, South Bend, St. Augustine Press,
forthcoming.
19
Russell Hittinger, The First Grace: Rediscovering Natural Law in a Post-Christian World,
Wilmington, ISI Books, 2003, p. 286, note 17: “But in q. 94 he [Aquinas] is not defining the natural
law; the ratio formalis—what it is, and what makes it law—is discussed in qq. 91 and 93. Question 94
takes up the ratio materialis: natural law as an effect in the creature.”
20
See Stephen L. Brock, “Natural Inclination and the Intelligibility of the Good in Thomistic Natural
Law,” forthcoming in Nova et Vetera. It would be hard to overestimate the importance of rational self-
dominion in the Prima Secundae. The Prologue is itself an eloquent and programmatic expression of
intent for the entire work. “Quia, sicut Damascenus dicit, homo factus ad imaginem Dei dicitur,
secundum quod per imaginem significatur intellectuale et arbitrio liberum et per se potestativum;
postquam praedictum est de exemplari, scilicet de Deo, et de his quae processerunt ex divina potestate
secundum eius voluntatem; restat ut consideremus de imagine, idest de homine, secundum quod et ipse
est suorum operum principium, quasi liberum arbitrium habens et suorum operum potestatem.”
21
ST, I-II q. 90 a. 1: "Respondeo dicendum quod lex quaedam regula est et mensura actuum, secundum
quam inducitur aliquis ad agendum, vel ab agendo retrahitur, dicitur enim lex a ligando, quia obligat ad
agendum. Regula autem et mensura humanorum actuum est ratio, quae est primum principium actuum
humanorum, ut ex praedictis patet, rationis enim est ordinare ad finem, qui est primum principium in

8
only in reason or is it also somehow in the other powers or faculties of nature? Is it
correct to speak of inclinations as being at once natural and as somehow constituting
the law? While explaining the multiplicity of precepts within the natural law, in
Question 94, Article 2, Aquinas answers the question regarding the legal character of
natural inclinations by considering the relationship between the legal force of right
reason and the natural inclinations, for instance to conserve one's own life, to
procreate, to make friends, to make intellectual progress through new discoveries of
understanding, and so on. In order to explain the relationship between the legal force
of the dictates of right reason and the natural law in natural inclinations, Aquinas
returns to the analogy of the rule and the measure to express how even the
concupiscible and the irascible appetites can be law. Insofar as any inclination
whatsoever is ruled ("regulatur") by reason, that inclination pertains to the natural law
and, he concludes, "may be reduced to the one, first precept".22 Therefore, the natural
powers and faculties are law insofar as they are ruled and measured by right reason.23
That is, insofar as they participate in human reason, which is, of course, in its turn, a
participation in the divine reason of the eternal law.24 Moreover, as Stephen Brock has
convincingly argued, the "natural inclinations" mentioned by Aquinas in Question 94
Article 2 are rational inclinations, consequent upon the cognitive understanding of the
goods as ends of human perfection.25 In summary, there is no tension whatsoever
between the three foci.

By carefully analyzing Aquinas' definition of natural law through the

illuminating prism of the four Aristotelian causes, rather than being at odds among
one another, the three foci of the natural law complement one another, rather than
substract. Natural law is at once from God and his practical understanding of creation,
a work of human reason, and natural inclination. The three elements cooperate
between one another in building the fullness of natural law. And this full appreciation
for Aquinas' natural law theory is needed in order to understand its integration within
the entire Treatise, and, in particular, to understand the proper relation between the
natural law, the old law of Moses, and the new law of grace.

5. A Christocentric Proposal for Situating the Natural Law within the Treatise on
Law

The application of the Aristotelian causes to natural law theory can lead to a
agendis, secundum philosophum. In unoquoque autem genere id quod est principium, est mensura et
regula illius generis, sicut unitas in genere numeri, et motus primus in genere motuum. Unde
relinquitur quod lex sit aliquid pertinens ad rationem." See also q. 91, a. 2
22
ST, I-II , q. 94, a. 2, ad 2: "Ad secundum dicendum quod omnes inclinationes quarumcumque
partium humanae naturae, puta concupiscibilis et irascibilis, secundum quod regulantur ratione,
pertinent ad legem naturalem, et reducuntur ad unum primum praeceptum, ut dictum est. Et secundum
hoc, sunt multa praecepta legis naturae in seipsis, quae tamen communicant in una radice."
23
See, for example: ST, I-II, q. 94 a. 4 ad 3: "sicut ratio in homine dominatur et imperat aliis potentiis,
ita oportet quod omnes inclinationes naturales ad alias potentias pertinentes ordinentur secundum
rationem. Unde hoc est apud omnes communiter rectum, ut secundum rationem dirigantur omnes
hominum inclinationes."
24
ST, I-II , q. 91, a. 6: "respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, lex essentialiter invenitur in
regulante et mensurante, participative autem in eo quod mensuratur et regulatur; ita quod omnis
inclinatio vel ordinatio quae invenitur in his quae subiecta sunt legi, participative dicitur lex, ut ex
supradictis patet."
25
See Stephen L. Brock, “Natural Inclination and the Intelligibility of the Good in Thomistic Natural
Law,” forthcoming in Nova et Vetera.

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further discovery related to the integration of natural law with the other kinds of law
discussed in the Treatise. First of all, the entire Treatise must be interpreted in light of
the previous questions, including the immediately preceding question. The last article
of the last question of the Treatise on Sin, the one that immediately precedes the
Treatise on Law, Prima Secundae, Question 89, Article 6, considers the first moral act
committed by a non-baptized person. Aquinas' discussion of the phenomenology of
the first free act clarifies that nature requires the human to act for an end greater than
himself, but that we are all born with a deep disorientation towards self-destructive
selfishness. The rectification of this disorientation that infects all the descendants of
Adam and Eve requires the assistance of divine aid. Consequently, nature and nature's
law are inadequate for the task of pursuing human perfection and fulfillment. Divine
positive law, expressed in the law of Moses and the Sermon on the Mount, is needed
along with the new law of grace whereby God assists the human being to overcome
his original disorientation and persistently pursue the highest good which is nothing
more than the end of human nature. One way of offering a philosophical account of
the integration of the various kinds of law is through the hermeneutic instrument of
narrative and, in particular, through the interpretative lens of the genre of divine
comedy.26

But this is not the time to develop a full analysis of the implications of the
natural law for narrative theory and its genre of divine comedy. Rather, prior to
concluding [my lecture, which I hope has already been controversial], I would like to
offer a brief sketch of a proposal for the Christological implications of my analysis of
Aquinas' natural law theory through the prism of the four Aristotelian causes. Aquinas
developed his most mature and systematic account of natural law within the Summa
Theologiae, a work of theology that includes in the Secunda Pars an analysis of how
the human being can gain redemption, with the aid of Jesus Christ, and achieve his
end of communion with God. Jesus Christ is both God and man, "perfectus Deus
perfectus homo"27. The virtuous man who perfectly fulfills the natural law is Jesus
Christ. He is a model for its human perfection. Moreover, according to the Thomistic
theology of grace, systematically developed right after that of law at the end of the
Prima Secundae, any human who succeeds in complying with the exigencies of the
natural law does so only insofar as he satisfies the following four requirements. 1) He
is a son of God, sanctified by the justification won by Jesus Christ, 2) insofar as he
resembles Jesus Christ in his action, 3) insofar as he is assisted by the grace won by
Jesus Christ, and 4) insofar as he achieves union with Jesus Christ. Therefore, the
human who fulfills the natural law is 1) configured by the grace of Christ into a son of
God, 2) imitates Christ's example, 3) is interiorly moved by the life of Christ, and 4)
achieves union with Christ. Or, in the terms of Aristotelian causality, the material
cause of the fulfillment of the natural law is the human being configured in Christ.
The formal exemplar cause of the fulfillment of natural law is Christ. the efficient
cause of the fulfillment is the grace of Christ that moves the human being to act in
accord with the law. And, finally, the end of the fulfillment of natural law is
identification with Christ. In fact, all those who fulfill the demands of the natural law
in their lives are rewarded with the beatific vision, perfect union with Christ in his
humanity and divinity.
26
See my "From the Virtue of a Fragile Good to a Narrative Account of Natural Law," in International
Philosophical Quarterly, 37, 4 (1997): 459-474; and "Etica narrativa e conoscenza di Dio," in Dio e il
senso dell'esistenza umana, ed. Luís Romera, Roma, Armando, 1999, pp. 189-202.
27
Athanasian Creed.

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 Aquinas proposes a daring account of natural law within the context of the
divine law and redemption in Christ. To read the whole Treatise on Law without
sliding into either the Pelagian claim that nature's demands can be met without grace
or the conflation of the gratuitous aid of sanctifying grace with the capabilities of
human nature it is necessary to consider the relationship between the natural law and
the new law. One way of sorting out the apparent entanglements among these diverse
laws, in our existential situation as descendants of Adam and Eve is to apply the four
causes to an analysis of Aquinas' definition of law in general, his theory of natural
law, and, finally, the need for redemption in Christ in order to fulfill the requirements
of natural law.

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