International Relations and Diplomacy (ISSN 2328-2134) Volume 6, Number 4,2018

International Relations
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Volume 6, Number 4, April 2018 (Serial Number 55)
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Editorial Board Members of International Relations and Diplomacy:

★Abdel-Hady (Qatar University, Qatar); Poland);
★Abosede Omowumi Bababtunde (National Open ★Martha Mutisi (African Centre for the Constructive
University of Nigeria, Nigeria); Resolution of Disputes, South Africa);
★Adriana Lukaszewicz (University of Warsaw, Poland); ★Menderes Koyuncu (Univercity of Yuzuncu Yil-Van,
★Ahmed Y. Zohny (Coppin State University, USA) Turkey);
★Alessandro Vagnini (Sapienza University of Rome, ★Myroslava Antonovych (University of Kyiv-Mohyla
Rome); Academy, Ukraine);
★Ali Bilgiç (Bilkent University, Turkey); ★Nazreen Shaik-Peremanov (University of Cambridge,
★András Mérei (University of Pécs, Hungary); UK);
★Anna Rosario D. Malindog (Ateneo De Manila University, ★Nermin Allam (University of Alberta, Edmonton,
Philippines); Canada);
★Basia Spalek (Kingston University, UK); ★Nadejda Komendantova (International Institute for
★Beata Przybylska-Maszner (Adam Mickiewicz University, Applied Systems Analysis, Austria);
Poland); ★Ngozi C. Kamalu (Fayetteville State University, USA);
★Brian Leonard Hocking (University of London, UK); ★Niklas Eklund (Umeå University, Sweden);
★Caner Bakir (Koç University, Turkey); ★Phua Chao Rong, Charles (Lee Kuan Yew School of
★Chandra Lal Pandey (University of Waikato, New Public Policy, Singapore);
Zealand); ★Peter A. Mattsson (Swedish Defense College, Sweden);
★Constanze Bauer (Western Institute of Technology of ★Peter Simon Sapaty (National Academy of Sciences of
Taranaki, New Zealand); Ukraine, Ukraine);
★Christian Henrich-Franke (Universität Siegen, Germany); ★Raymond LAU (The University of Queensland,
★Christos Kourtelis (King’s College London, UK); Australia);
★David J. Plazek (Johnson State College, USA); ★Raphael Cohen Almagor (The University of Hull, UK);
★Dimitris Tsarouhas (Bilkent University, Turkey); ★Satoru Nagao (Gakushuin University, Japan);
★Fatima Sadiqi (International Institute for Languages and ★Sanjay Singh (Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law
Cultures, Morocco); University, India);
★Ghadah AlMurshidi (Michigan State University, USA); ★Shkumbin Misini (Public University, Kosovo);
★Giuseppe Caforio (Torino University, Italy); ★Sotiris Serbos (Democritus University of Thrace,Greece);
★Guseletov Boris (Just World Institute, Russia); ★Stéphanie A. H. Bélanger (Royal Military College of
★Hanako Koyama (The University of Morioka, Japan); Canada, Canada);
★Kyeonghi Baek (State University of New York, USA); ★Timothy J. White (Xavier University, Ireland);
★John Opute (London South Bank University, UK); ★Tumanyan David (Yerevan State University, Armenia);
★Léonie Maes (Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium); ★Zahid Latif (University of Peshawar, Pakistan);
★Lomarsh Roopnarine (Jackson State University, USA); ★Valentina Vardabasso (Pantheon-Sorbonne University,
★Marius-Costel ESI (Stefan Cel Mare University of France);
Suceava, Romania); ★Xhaho Armela (Vitrina University, Albania);
★Marek Rewizorski (Koszalin University of Technology, ★Yi-wei WANG (Renmin University of China, China).
The Editors wish to express their warm thanks to the people who have generously contributed to the
process of the peer review of articles submitted to International Relations and Diplomacy.
International Relations
and Diplomacy
Volume 6, Number 4, April 2018 (Serial Number 55)
Contents
Nigeria-US Relations
History and Evolution of Nigeria-US Military, Security, and Political Relations 209
Dapo Thomas
Good Governance
Good Governance and Growth in Emerging Countries. A Critical Review 231

Rachid Mira
Albanian National Movement
Great Powers and Albanian National Movement (1878-1914) 239

Petr Akhmedovich Iskenderov
Bureaucracy
Bureaucracy: Max Weber’s Concept and Its Application to Pakistan 251

Irfan Ahmed Shaikh, Arshad Islam, Bashir Ahmed Jatoi
Sino-Indian Relations
Analysis on the Consular Dimension of Sino-Indian Relations 263

XIA Li-ping
International Relations and Diplomacy, April 2018, Vol. 6, No. 4, 209-230
doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2018.04.001
D DAVID PUBLISHING
History and Evolution of Nigeria-US Military, Security, and

Political Relations
Dapo Thomas
Lagos State University, Lagos, Nigeria
This paper examines the dynamics, the politics, and the significance of the security relationship between Nigeria
and the United States. Both countries, operating at different levels of military strengths, consider and regard
themselves as partners who should establish some form of cooperation for defence purposes. Though the United
States enjoys massive military capability advantage over Nigeria, the relationship between the two of them was
meant to assist Nigeria, the weak partner, or better still, the client state, to overcome the challenge of its defence
policies, and to reinforce its military infrastructure. This will be in the areas of training, technology, equipment,
professional orientation, and political management. However, there seems to be lack of trust between the two of
them with Nigeria becoming too sensitive and concerned about its defence infrastructural deficits, and the
possibility of the United States exploiting this to its own advantage. Such worrisome suspicions are capable of
tinkering with the objectives of the security arrangements between the two of them. In this kind of suspect
friendship where one partner has transformed into a protector state, it became difficult for defence pacts and
agreements to achieve the desired objectives. Hence, the regular collapse of such pacts and lack of definitive
defence policy actions between the two countries. The findings showed that every attempt by the United States to
help stabilize Nigeria’s political system and environment was seen by Nigeria as an unwarranted intervention and
meddlesomeness capable of destroying the fragility of its polity as it almost did during the June 12 crisis of 1993.
Keywords: security relationship, client state, protector state, defence infrastructural deficit, defence pacts,
unwarranted interventions
Introduction
One of the issues raised in this chapter is the extent to which the partnership between Nigeria and the US
can take care of Nigeria’s own national security interests, most especially in the restructuring and reorientation
of the Nigerian armed forces. The main focus of this chapter is Nigeria’s future, which hinges on the extent to
which it can transform its security sector into a professional, affordable, and accountable sector, and also, the
extent to which effective and enduring civil oversight over the activities of the armed forces can be maintained
in the future.
The Nigerian defence policy has been designed around a proper understanding of the national interests and
objectives of the state. This affords us a proper perspective of the mission or goals which the country’s policies
are designed to achieve (Bassey & Dokubo, 2011).
At the time, Nigeria was still basking in the euphoria of her newly discovered power brought about by the
Dapo Thomas, Ph.D., Department of History and International Studies, Faculty of Arts, Lagos State University, Lagos, Nigeria.
210 NIGERIA-US MILITARY, SECURITY, AND POLITICAL RELATIONS
tremendous increase in resources from petroleum, the Adedeji Foreign Policy Review Panel, in its report of 29
June, 1976 stated the main objectives of Nigeria’s foreign policy as:
(a) The defence of our sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity;
(b) The creation of the necessary political and economic conditions in Africa and the rest of the world
which will facilitate the defence of the independence and territorial integrity of all African states, while at the
same time, fostering national self-reliance and rapid economic development;
(c) The promotion of equality and self-reliance in Africa and the rest of the developing world; the
promotion of justice and respect for human dignity of the blackman, and the defence and promotion of world
peace. (Wright, 2018).
However, the mission and goals achievable influence and are themselves influenced by the political,
military, economic, social, psychological, and technical inputs from regional and international sphere.
In other words, the path of influence is dual and the choice of policies will depend on which of the
directions of influence is strongest at a particular time.
Considering the dynamics of events in Africa, it is in Nigeria’s interest to influence the course of events in
the whole of Africa and to be the dominant power on the African continent. To achieve this, Nigeria would
need to mobilize all its political, economic, military, and technological resources. However, because the level
of inputs which are mobilizable to achieve stated national objectives and interests are not readily achievable, it
is forced to redefine the scope of and restate her national objectives in order to bring them to an operational
reality. Nigerian’s foreign policy objectives clearly emphasise the defence of the country’s sovereignty,
independence and territorial integrity. Consequently, there was massive infusion of resources from petroleum
which is the major strategic economic resource of the country into the defence project. But the moment the
nation’s economy nosedived as a result of many years of misrule and economic mismanagement which caused
some instability in the polity, it became difficult to achieve this objective.
South Africa’s Leadership Threat

This systematic reduction in the defence budget affected the zeal to aggressively pursue the country’s
defence objective. But the major and obvious implication for the country was that Nigeria’s leadership role in
Africa became threatened with South Africa positioning itself strategically for Africa’s leadership. Besides, the
emergence of Nelson Mandela as the president of the country and the successful integration of formerly
implacable adversaries into a cohesive national defence establishment endeared many countries including the
United States to South Africa. Also, the existence of a sound economy and a strong state as well as the lengthy
negotiated settlement created a framework within which Security Sector Transformation (SST) had little choice
but to succeed (Luckham & Hutchful, 2010).
There were four key elements to the successful South African transition. First, it entailed the integration of
eight formerly warring armed formations into a cohesive national defence force―a process that was completed
in 2003. Second, it witnessed the creation of powerful parliamentary defence, policing, and intelligence
committees whose role was not only confined to legislative oversight but also included active involvement in
the process of formulating defence policy.
Two major transformational initiatives emerged in the South African defence arena during 2003: The
acquisition of the first equipment items with which the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) will
execute its task in the coming decades; and the initiation of a transformation process within the country’s
NIGERIA-US MILITARY, SECURITY, AND POLITICAL RELATIONS 211
sizeable reserve force, which held many lessons for other African defence establishments (Batchelor, Dunne, &
Lamb, 2002).
In November 1998, the South African Parliament and the Cabinet approved a Strategic Defence Package
(SDP) based on recommendations presented to and approved by both bodies in October. The contract for the
package was signed in 1999 at a total cost of 30.3 billion rand ($4.8 billion) spread over a 12-year period
starting from fiscal year 2000-2001. The SDP provided for the purchase of four corvettes from a German
frigate consortium, three submarines from the German corporation Ferrostaal, 28 Gripen fighters from a British
Aero-space (BAE) system/Saab consortium, 24 Hawk jet trainers from BAE, and 30 Agusta A-109 light utility
helicopters from the Halian company Agusta.
Moreover, South Africa is blessed with a strong infrastructure, a sound currency, and vast natural
resources. These assets make its economy larger and more vital than any other on the continent including that
of Nigeria. Since South Africa was no longer considered an international pariah, it worked to develop robust
trade and financial links around the region and the globe. A hub for these connections, South Africa could
stimulate growth throughout the southern cone of Africa.
Inspired by this discovery of a possible strategic partner within the African continent and the desire to
control the sea-lanes around the Cape of Good Hope in the case of widespread trouble in the Middle East, the
US decided to consolidate its strategic interests in Africa using South Africa as a dependable partner. The US
was, however, in a dilemma which revolved around the relative merits of anti-communism and anti-racism as
the guiding themes of US-South African relations. As the inevitable process of African independence continued
to gather, support for South Africa by the US risked not only the alienation of future black government on the
African continent, but also would offer the Soviet Union an opportunity to brand the US as an opponent of
decolonization. Yet, in the charged Cold War atmosphere of the late 1940s to the 1970s, the imperatives of
anti-communism and containment of the Soviet Union clearly outweighed any misgivings over the racial
policies of the Afrikaner government. Besides, because South Africa was the United States’ largest trading
partner in Africa and with vast economic potentials, its fate would affect American trading and financial
interests in that country. Consequently, American policy toward South Africa reflects its importance as a
pivotal state. This was a serious threat to Nigeria’s “big-brother” status in Africa.
Nigeria’s Non-aligned Posturing

The close relationship established between Nigeria and the United States after Jimmy Carter’s election as
president in January 1977 was in many respect symptomatic of a more comprehensive evolution of Nigeria’s
status in the international system. Unlike the arguments of some authors, the Nigerian Civil War which ended
in January 1970, weakened the ideological, cultural, economic, and financial links which existed between
Nigeria and the Western countries in the early 1960s with Nigeria becoming a non-aligned nation rather than
becoming pro-West. The substantial military aid which the then Soviet Union and some East European
countries gave to Nigeria during the 30-month conflict provoked a new orientation in Nigeria’s foreign policy.
Indeed, during the 1970s, Nigeria acquired a limited yet real capacity to negotiate and redefine the forms of its
incorporation into the international capitalist system. This capacity was due (1) to the size of the country’s
internal market; (2) to the federation’s oil resources and revenue; and (3) to the government’s increasing control
and authority over Nigerian society.
From January 1978 onwards, Nigeria’s membership of the Security Council favoured its assertive role as a
privileged interlocutor of Western countries and especially of the Carter administration, which remained
concerned that Nigeria should adopt an attitude of neutrality, if not of support, towards important US moves in
Southern Africa. Significantly, it was while visiting Nigeria in April 1978 that Jimmy Carter announced that
the Western countries’ five-nation contact group on Namibia intended to get in touch again with South Africa
and table new propositions for a solution to the Namibian problem. Thus, in August 1978, secret discussions
were held in Lusaka between Joshua Nkomo and Ian Smith with a Nigerian umpire: the former foreign Minister
Joseph Garba (Williams, 2009). Yet, no serious disruption of US-Nigerian relations occurred; although in 1979,
the Nigerian Embassy in Washington made it known, on two occasions that Nigeria might consider the
adoption of an “appropriate response” were the US to lift economic sanctions against Rhodesia. In actual fact,
such declarations were directed not so much at the American presidency or administration as towards Nigeria’s
public opinion and the US Congress.
Defence and Strategic Cooperation

In Nigeria, rapprochement with the US provoked accusations of subservience to American interests in
Africa from the press and in academic and trade union circles. However, federal government representatives in
reply pointed to the overall positive role of the new American stance in Southern Africa. As early as February
1977, the federal government officials were quoted as saying that it was necessary for the US to intervene in the
Rhodesian issue since Britain had failed to solve it. Three years later, President Shehu Shagari justified
US-Nigerian relations in a similar fashion when he told the American Vice President, Walter Mondale on the
latter’s visit to Nigeria, that after Zimbabwe’s independence Namibia and South Africa “must be free if the
friendship between Nigeria and the United States is to thrive”.
The political misunderstanding and disagreement notwithstanding, Nigeria and United States have
demonstrated enough political will to reinforce the relations between the two countries through effective and
active military cooperation and strategic partnership. In strategic studies, defence and security cooperation are
designed as a broad plan of joint action between a client state and the protector state on the training of military
personnel, arms transfer, and classified security assistance. For the protector state, military cooperation is a
variant of the officially accepted means of penetration and intervention in the military regime of the client state.
In bilateral military cooperation, a client state is the weak and needy partner. It is in need of an external
assurance of strength and protection in support of a clearly defined military programme. The goals include
(Timberman, 2016):
(a) Boosting the military strength of a country by way of arms supplies and to qualitatively improve
training and orientation strategy, tactics, and operational art;
(b) Boosting the defence and security image of a country in international politics and in the strategic game.
(c) Introduction of greater military discipline in the client state;
These are some of the externally oriented goals of strategic military cooperation on the part of the client or
weak partner. It is also not ruled out that military cooperation may be a prelude to a military pact or a defence
agreement. The often ignored aspect of military cooperation is the possibility of intervention of the protector,
the strong military partner, in the internal affairs of a client state to safeguard or install a leadership of its
interest in a threatening crisis situation. By every strategic measurement, the weak partner is the disadvantaged.
The protector state is strategically at an advantage not only by arms supplies and other military services, but
also through opportunities for espionage activities.
For the protector or strong military partner, the willingness to enter into military cooperation with a client
state arises from a number of strategic and tactical goals and aspirations. These include:
(1) Projection of power from a position of strength;
(2) Expansion of the sphere of military and strategic influence;
(3) Access to the resources of the client state;
(4) Usage of the client state as a military base to exercise influence in the sub-region or region;
(5) Usage of the client state to attract neighbouring states for expanded military cooperation;
(6) Promotion of some classified political and economic goals.
The Defence Pacts

Specifically, Nigeria’s strategic partnership with protector states began immediately after independence in
1960. As soon as Nigeria attained political independence, it entered into the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact. It
was simply a defence pact between Nigeria and the former colonial power. In Britain’s thinking, Nigeria had
the potential to lead Africa and be a mouthpiece of the West and Britain in Africa. For Britain, a defence pact
with Nigeria was not contingent upon the fear of stronger neighbours. Rather it was designed to:
(a) Secure British access to Nigeria;
(b) Be a part of training and developing the Nigeria Military force;
(c) Strengthen its influence in West Africa sub-region which has been dominated by Franco-phone states
with “formalized” defence pacts with France;
(d) Assist Nigeria to nurture and mature an enduring democratic nation.
The fundamental purpose or reasons for initiating and venturing into the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact are
still very contentious and debatable, but suffice it to say that Nigeria conceived it as an image booster. Nigeria,
rather erroneously, also perceived the defence pact as an additional military element to project its ambition of
leadership in Africa from a position of strength rather than weakness. Erroneously in the sense that it is difficult
to ascertain the readiness and willingness of Britain to commit its military personnel and equipment to the
political ambition of a particular country at the expense of its relations with other strategic and important
partners, like Libya and South Africa.
As an infant nation, Nigeria was inexperienced about contradictions in the inherited, structurally
dependent political economy. The politicians and leaders were rather quite optimistic about the lifespan of
Nigerian democracy. They did not perceive their weak West African neighbours as threats. To some people,
there was no internalized strategic thinking that the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact could be of a value in foiling
military coups. But there are others who believe that our politicians were, in fact, very smart strategic thinkers
who have already factored in this reality before agreeing to the pact.
The confusion and controversy generated by the defence pact particularly among the elite and the
intelligentsia necessitated its abrogation in 1961. As Nowa A. Omogui bserved:
Looking back, whether the Anglo-Nigerian pact of 1960 would have changed Nigeria’s political stability will never
be known. But it cannot escape attention that the sympathies of the middle ranking army officers, who struck on January
15, 1966 were with the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA)―political soulmates of those who opposed the
Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact of 1960 (Akpuru-Aja, 2003).
Significantly, however, it should be noted that the relationship between a protector state and a client state
through a defence pact may or may not prevent a coup. To some extent, it may or may not necessarily imply
loss of sovereignty. In military strategy, a defence pact is a positive sum game. Though a defence pact ought to
be about partnership, the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact, however, lacked this standard as there was an obvious
systematic advantage for Britain.
For decades, the United States has treated Africa as a basket case. Following the end of the Cold War, the
US began to focus more sharply on the economic, strategic, and military matters in Africa. The visit of US
President Bill Clinton to Nigeria in August 2000 had many significant dimensions. The Federal Government of
Nigeria admitted entering into military cooperation with the US and President Olusegun Obasanjo was alleged
to have signed Nigeria-US military cooperation with President Bill Clinton. Part of the inspiration for this
cooperation appeared to have come from a kite flown once in the National Assembly that the nascent
democracy of Nigeria should enter into a defence pact or military cooperation with a power that would defend
the democracy of Nigeria in the event of a military coup. In contrast, many Nigerians, including strategists,
defence analysts, and former foreign ministers have opposed the help of any foreign power to defend Nigerian
democracy. In any case, defending democracy is more about good governance than anything else. In spite of
the opposition against a foreign defence pact or military cooperation, the president has signed the military
cooperation agreement for the following reasons:
(a) Providing training to some battalions of the Nigerian Army;
(b) Providing eight patrol vessels for the Nigerian Army to police the oil producing areas;
(c) Meeting broad objectives of protecting oil installations in the Niger Delta;
(d) Training the Nigerian Army for Peacekeeping operations.
Consequently, both countries immediately began to explore their renewed rapprochement. A group of
US-based consultants visited Nigeria sometime in August 1999 to meet with the Nigerian military authorities
on areas of cooperation and assistance to the government. The eight-man team led by retired Major General
Bruce Moore of the US Army was from a private military consultancy, Military Professional Resource
Incorporation. According to Gen. Moore, the objective of the team was to hold preliminary discussions on
training and exchange programmes. It was also part of the efforts to offer training programmes to the country’s
military personnel so as to strengthen them in coping with the challenges of a democratic government. This
exchange programme would stimulate cooperation and collaboration between the two countries and further
enhance professionalism and ensure that the military subordinate themselves to civil authorities.
Though the then Commandant of the National War College, Rear Admiral Gabriel Shiyanbade explained
that the visit was to enable the College and the Nigerian Armed Forces reach an agreement for a package of
programmes and assistance that would benefit the country, the objective was obviously more than mere
programme packaging. He then went on to list the areas where the War College would need assistance. These
include teaching aid, war-game facilities as well as improvement in its acquisition of books for its library and
research projects.
In a very weak defence of the pact, the Minister of Defence, Lt. Gen. Theophilus Danjuma explained that
Nigeria was seeking suitable places for the training and re-training of the members of its armed forces. “We are
going to reorganize the armed forces and ensure professionalism, so that they will subordinate themselves to
civil authorities”, he stressed.
But this was just an integral part of the major plan to forge a very strong partnership with the US. For
instance, the US began the training of three battalions sometime in September 2001. This was officially
confirmed as one of the ways to establish a working agreement between the military and the civil authorities in
order to consolidate Nigeria’s democracy.
In another record boost to military ties between Nigeria and the US, a bilateral naval proficiency training
was also organized. It was tagged “Joint-Combined Exchange Training”. The training programme was designed
to bring the naval personnel of both countries together for the purpose of building an understanding and help
improve military ties between the two countries. The main purpose of the programme was to ensure that both
nations not only keep their own military skills current but also to develop inter-cultural skills.
The training of three battalions was also aimed at enhancing their professionalism and equipping them
with modern weapons. According to the US Ambassador, Mr. Howard Jeter, the objective of the training was to
show the commitment of the US in assisting Nigeria in building a very strong base for its armed forces and to
extend the hand of friendship to the armed forces by restoring the capacity and pride of Nigeria’s military
institutions. He affirmed:
Domestically, the Nigerian armed forces are turning in the same new direction as the nation―a fundamental
democratic and political transition that, I assure you, will make this country greater, more prosperous and more stable in
the future. The Nigerian armed forces will win the respect of the Nigerian people as corruption ends, as the standards of
training and professionalism increase, as leadership takes on a democratic spirit, as the (military) bases and installations
are recognized as good neighbours in the community they serve and as people see soldiers, sailors, and airmen engaged in
useful tasks. Internationally, your troops are a vital force for peace and stability in Africa. Nigerians should know it, Africa
should know it and the world should know it. But it will fall to you to tell these stories of honour, achievement and
success.
The Nigerian military was urged to build a bridge of understanding with the Nigerian people through the
media. The belief was that once this bridge is secure, the military will be well on their way to regaining the
confidence and admiration of the Nigerian people who are interested in a military they can be proud of.
The US military assistance was not limited to just training programs and exchange of ideas, the United
States also gave financial aid to Nigeria. In one of such moves, President George W. Bush signed some
memoranda clearing the way for US military aid to Nigeria and some other countries. While signing the
memoranda, Bush declared that supplying these countries with defence equipment and services will strengthen
the security of the United States and promote world peace. In the case of Nigeria, it was said that “an
unforeseen emergency exists that requires immediate military assistance. He, therefore, directed that some $4
million in excess of Defence Department equipment and military training services be provided to Nigeria.
The Controversial “Emergency” US Military Assistance

This particular assistance generated some furore because the Nigerian military authorities claimed that the
package was unsolicited and the failure of President Bush to state the nature of the “emergency situation” that
was in the memorandum did not help matter. There was no specific explanation on what the emergency
situation could be and no US public officer was willing to expatiate. But the American president was expected
by law to explain the circumstances to his country’s Congress which seems to be the only way such
emergencies could be known. It was also not certain whether such information would be made public even after
the US president had explained the circumstances to the Congress. The package was titled: “Determination to
authorise the furnishing of emergency military assistance to the government of Nigeria”. It reads: “Pursuant to
the authority vested in me by section 506(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 22 U.S.C.
2318(a)(1) (the “Act”), I hereby determine that:
 An unforeseen emergency exists that requires immediate military assistance to the government of Nigeria;
 The emergency requirement cannot be met under the authority of the Arms Export Control Act or any
other law except section 506(a) of the Act. I therefore direct the draw-down of defence articles and defence
services from the Department of Defence, and military education and training, of an aggregate value not to
exceed $4 million, to provide assistance to the government of Nigeria.
 The Secretary of State is authorized and directed to report this determination to the Congress and to
arrange for its publication in the Federal Register.
The reaction of one of the top military brass who begged for anonymity was both cynical and humorous.
According to him,
I believe if such aid is coming to any of the services, we ought to be aware of it. As of now I am not aware of it. I do
not have details of anything pertaining to that. Is it part of the MPRI (Military Professional Resources Incorporated)? Is it
for the modernization of the bomb disposal units or for training slots for Nigerian officers in the United States? Nobody
knows for now.
He added:
I believe when it is presented formally, we will get all the details you need ... If they are giving us the money, I think
it is good news for us. We can do with any extra cash to really professionalise our military, reactivate our platforms and
retain our military on modern military-civil relations.
Military Cooperation and National Interest

Like defence pacts, military cooperation is also a crucial issue in strategic policy and its implementation
must be defined and understood. The hallmark of military cooperation is national interest. That military
cooperation is not the same thing as a military pact does not make it a less serious strategic issue. The only fear
was whether Nigeria knew the full implications of the Nigeria-US Military Cooperation Agreement. No doubt,
the US has a well-developed strategic doctrine, defence policy, military force, and security consciousness.
In defence and strategic analysis, what Nigeria has presently is a political rather than a professional army
especially the officer corps. The popular belief is that the rank and file seem more dedicated to both their nation
and their responsibilities. More so, the lack of a clear national vision puts Nigeria at a disadvantaged position in
benefiting from military relations with the US Nigeria is the largest market for the US in Africa. The US may
pursue its oil and other economic interests through military cooperation. There are other disturbing issues as
well. These include:
(a) The process leading to the military cooperation;
(b) Gaps in area of military cooperation;
(c) Legal aspects of military cooperation;
(d) Aspects of military training;
(e) Prevention of coup d’etats.
Military cooperation is goal-specific and the objectives are normally spelt out clearly. On the part of
Nigeria, the openly known objectives of the military cooperation with the US are:
 Train and re-train the military force;
 Protect the nascent democracy against military incursions;

 Provide patrol vessels for the Nigerian military (navy) to police the oil producing areas;
 To protect oil installations in the “Niger Delta”;
 Train and re-train the Nigerian military for peace-keeping operations.
However, it overlooks what a military cooperation/partnership should fulfill in the protection of porous
borders of Nigeria against frequent external threats, subversion, sabotage, and aggression. For Nigeria, one
advantage of the present military link with the US is that it boosts the country’s strategic image internationally
because US is certainly the World’s Super Power.
Reservations that have been articulated on Nigeria-US military cooperation are principally about:
 Processes and procedures which involve the legislative power of the National Assembly, and in-puts from
Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs, among others;
 Clarity over Nigeria’s national interests including what use Nigeria would make of US troops in domestic
and external relations;
 Nigeria’s limitations in US external military relations;
 Limiting conditions which Nigeria would need to have in building military cooperation with other
countries.
In a systematic attack on the Nigerian government for building any kind of military partnership with US,
Omoruyi queried the basis for this initiative. His major worry was that the Nigerian political leadership was
going into a kind of partnership which they did not seem to understand. Another worrisome aspect of the whole
deal was the methodology of its introduction as the government was not willing to carry the people along. He
asked:
Is this US military pact within the national interest of Nigeria? Whither Nigerian Armed Forces? What is happening
to the Training And Doctrine (TRADOC) of the Nigerian Army? What is our Defence Policy? If Defence Policy means
identifying who are Nigeria’s enemies, one would then ask a pertinent question, who Are Nigeria’s enemies? Is the US to
tell us who our enemies are? What are the terms of the new “Defence Pact” between the US and Nigeria? What are the
domestic implications of the military pact? These and other questions are the kind of issues, which the National Assembly
should have been inquiring into. Nigeria since 1966 has always solicited for military assistance from a position of strength
throughout her history before the period of Obasanjo. Why should that be changing now? The new US involvement in the
military organization of Nigeria has many issues that should be discussed. This is a fundamental change of foreign policy.
Shouldn’t the Nigerian people know about this? I think they should.
The US does not seem to understand the domestic import of her decision to offer training to a selected unit
of the armed forces. No one in the US understands the political orientation of the Nigerian Army. What about
its poor human rights records! It would appear that the US trainers are under the erroneous impression that they
could deal with the political orientation. The political orientation of the Nigerian armed forces has both
attitudinal and environmental components. The US cannot change any of them; they are too fundamental for
the US to understand. They cannot therefore be dealt with within the US quest for her national security interests.
Domestically, Nigerians do not seem to understand the full implications of the US military involvement in
Nigeria except that the US was sending some military officers to train some Nigerian soldiers.
There is no doubt in the minds of Nigerians that Nigeria ceased to have a professional army since 1966
especially after the civil war. What Nigeria has had since 1966 is a political army with a regional political
agenda. No Nigerian government, civilian, or military, since the end of the civil war has been able to resolve
the ratio of the defence budget to the national budget. Up till now, no one knows how many men and officers
are in the Nigerian armed forces. No one knows the ratio of spending on personnel and on equipment. Nigeria
does not know what a professional army is.
According to Omoruyi the fear was that the US trainers are just rehashing the programme drawn up from
the US experiences in the Balkans. The programme of retraining ought to have the depoliticisation of the
orientation of the armed forces (Omoruyi, 2001).
According to a research finding from the Centre for Democratic Studies, it was discovered that the
Nigerian soldiers conceived of their career as extending to political posts, like military governors and
administrators of states, and parastatals and commanders in peacekeeping assignments. They see political posts
as avenues for moving from Majors to Generals without any evidence of training. They would rather want to be
political generals and become millionaires and billionaires and front men for foreign companies. They do not
attach importance to upward mobilization through training or through professional assignment. They undertake
professional assignment, like “peace-keeping” because it has foreign exchange component to it.
He explained further:
What the Nigerian armed forces need is not just training. There is an urgent need for a fundamental restructuring of
the armed forces to make the so-called Nigerian military representative of the Nigerian ethnic nationalities. The US should
not be made to just assemble battalions and offer them training unless we know the composition. This is not the job of the
US trainers. It is a fundamental issue which is at the root of the survival of the federal system. The US still has not told
Nigerians its track records with respect to how to convert a political army into a peacekeeper on the one hand and a
professional army on the other. The re-training of some soldiers in the use of American equipment is a recipe for another
problem. What happens to the other officers who would not have the benefit of such training from the US Marines? The
implication is that we may be having two types of armed forces and if we are not careful and of course, the two-army plan
has a potentiality for internal crises within the armed forces.
However, this position differs greatly from that of the National Assembly which believed that a defence
pact with the US would not only safeguard democracy in the country but would also assist Nigeria in getting
regular and adequate military assistance in form of better training and orientation towards making the military
perform only its constitutional role of defending the territorial integrity of the country. The initiative was
applauded and was even described as a bold and progressive initiative towards check-mating ambitious military
officers who may want to stage a coup d’etats. It was seen as a move that would help defend, sustain, and make
democracy a permanent system of government. Another major reason why the National Assembly was in
support of the idea was that other African countries would emulate Nigeria by entering into similar defence
pacts. Fundamentally, however, this seems not to make any sense.
Condemning the pact and its sponsors, Prof. Tam David-West, in a seminal article published by This Day,
described the pact as not only ridiculous but also very scandalous. He wrote:
It is also amazingly simple on the part of the Senators, not to realize that the envisaged military pact (or pacts) could
be double-edged sword. For instance, these foreign countries can now contractually “invade” the country with their
sophisticated Security officers (operatives) who would be strategically placed to decide or dictate which Nigerian
government is worth defending. In short, they could turn out to be subversive agents. This could be a second or another
brand of colonialism; and with great probability of being even more pernicious.
Perhaps, the attack was justified because even from the framing of the motion, it shows that the sponsors
lacked the details of the implications of their action. The text of the motion read:
In view of the fact that democratic governance in Nigeria has been rather unstable and vulnerable to military
incursions, and considering the fact that there has been eight coup d’etats in Nigeria since independence in 1960, and also
the need to uphold, protect, maintain and treasure democratic principles, values and structures in Nigeria, the Senate do
hereby direct that the government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria should immediately commence negotiation and sign a
military pact with the United States of America and any other democratic European nation for the protection of democracy
in Nigeria.
The motion was sponsored by the following senators: Adolphus Wabara, Gbenga Ogunniya, Adeseye
Ogunlewe, Vin Obasi Osulor, David Gbua Brigidi, Femi Okurounmu, Afolabi Olabintan, and Ayo Oni.
According to Prof. Emmanuel Akanki, Dean Faculty of Law, University of Lagos, you cannot have a
tyrannical government and expect a defence pact to help you. In his words,
If a society is not happy with the way things are done, there is the tendency that it may rebel. And once you have
entered into a military pact, you are saying and telling the whole world that you cannot protect yourself. What is important
is training our minds to do the right thing. If the people leading us are respected by the people because of their good
conduct, no military will ever dream of taking over the reins of government.
Military partnership may contribute to protecting and preserving national sovereignty. It has to be a matter
of legislation by the states involved and should not originate or end in the perceptions of two presidents.
Military partnership between Nigeria and US is no longer an issue of doubt or debate in academic and defence
circles. Since 2001, both the Nigerian and American governments have issued political statements admitting
military cooperation/partnership but not a military pact. In spite of misgivings on due process, military
cooperation existed between the two countries.
Two developments are important. The first has to do with the impact of the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks on the US. Perhaps, the military cooperation with Nigeria became very dear to the US in “fighting”
terrorism globally. And, cooperation is needed with states which harbour terrorists in Islamic communities. If a
state is suspect in the eyes of the US, it invites trouble. The Nigerian leadership, however, has tried quite hard
to dissociate itself from harbouring terrorists of any sort.
The other even relates to the US suspension of military cooperation with Nigeria. On March 20, 2003, the
Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs made a public announcement, which linked withdrawal of military aid as
due to Nigeria’s opposition to the US-led war on Iraq. Since then, US-Nigeria military relations have created
strains in both the political and the defence establishments.
Decertification Conflict
The issues of security and military partnership are not the only areas where Nigeria and US seem to have a
cordial understanding or relationship. Even this cannot be described as a perfect arrangement or agreement.
Like any other relationships, there are bounds to be some imperfections which may be provoked by
mismanagement of certain matters between the two friends. These disagreements, differences, and disputations
may border on matters of principles, national interest, and outright or flagrant violation of some fundamental
laws of either of the two countries by one of them.
One of such cases which many considered as a political action against Nigeria in order to whip it into line
when there was a complete derailment of all programmes aimed at achieving a smooth transition in its political
arrangement, was the ban or suspension of flights from Nigeria into the US.
The US government through the American Aviation authorities stopped all flights from and to Nigeria to
“maintain and administer effective security measures” at the nation’s premier airport.
But there was an immediate reaction from the government of Nigeria which saw it as being “motivated by
personal and political considerations and certainly not aviation problems”.
The reason given by the US authorities was described as “malicious and false”. The American government
had stated that the killing of four people by armed robbers at the premier airport was an indication of a total
breakdown in the security network of the airports. As at the time, the action was taken, only the Nigeria
Airways and the American Trans Air were operating flights from Nigeria to New York and vice versa. As
stated above, the action was taken at a time of strained relationship between the American government and the
Nigerian military leaders over the political impasse. The ban or suspension was therefore seen by aviation and
diplomatic experts/watchers as one of the harsh measures lined up by Washington to press the military to hand
over to a civilian administration.
But the American Department of Transportation which issued the cancellation of Flight Services noted
that the decision was taken after complaints by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on October 8, 1992,
about the security lapses at the Murtala Muhammed International Airport and several meetings with the
Nigerian aviation authorities. The directive, issued by the Department of Transportation and signed by Mr.
Federico Pena, its secretary, said that the department was discontinuing the authority of air carrier to operate
between the United States and Lagos Airport. He added:
Specifically, I am adding a condition to the permit held by Nigeria Airways Limited so as to prohibit it from operating
from Lagos Airport and the United States, and I am adding a condition to all US air courier certificates and exemptions so
as to preclude these air carriers from operation into Lagos Airport.
With this position, Nigeria was decertified, with the implication that the country could no longer enjoy any
unfettered assistance from the US government, and by extension its allies. This stalemate became protracted
until the first week of July 1999 when President Bill Clinton sent a six-man delegation to Nigeria to see if all
the conditions for lifting the ban had been met. Some of the conditions included installation of more modern
navigational aids at the airports across the country, streamlining of security operatives stationed at the airports
and the installation of modern screening and communication gadgets which increased facilitation of the airports.
This means that the Nigerian government was required to introduce a quick baggage claim system. Each one
should also operate a computerized check-in and check-out system.
The Nigerian government through its Information and Culture Secretary, Uche Chukwumerije stated
That all scheduled flights have been conducting their operations without any hitch ... Nigeria Airways flight from
New York, British Airways and other flights operated. Cameroun, Egypt and other flights have come and departed. Indeed,
West European airlines which in any case carry the bulk of the international passengers, have absolute no problems with
our airports. Only the US sees the imaginary danger in our airports.
However, the Nigerian government succumbed to the demands of the US government by improving the
standards of the country’s airport and aviation facilities. This position was informed by the adamant stance of
the US which deliberately decided to ignore the introduction of political considerations by the Nigerian
government. Having satisfied that all its conditions and demands for the lifting of the suspension had been met,
the United States government lifted air ban on Nigeria on the 22nd of December 1999. The US Transportation
Secretary, Rodney Slater announced the decision saying the Murtala International Airport (MMA) in Lagos
“now maintains and carries out effective security measures”. The American Embassy also issued a statement in
this regard: “... The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) assessed the airport’s security procedures and
found that they now meet international security standards”.
US and the June 12 Election Annulment

The ban on flights to and from Nigeria almost caused a kind of diplomatic rift between the two countries
but it never had the kind of impact that could threaten a complete showdown, like the one experienced during
the Babangida transition programmes. The United States, which is the major promoter of democratic
governance all over the world descended heavily on Gen. Babangida and his government for tinkering with the
transition programmes, truncating electoral exercises, transforming from military to civilian leadership, and
gross violation and abuse of human rights. The Babangida administration enjoyed tremendous support from the
United States until the annulment of the June 12, 1993 elections believed to have been won by the late
Bashorun M. K. O. Abiola. While the entire nation was thrown into a state of pandemonium and anarchy, the
United States recalled all her citizens and also engaged the civil society in constructive dialogue on how to
resolve the stalemate. It was thought that the US was going to use force in forcing the military leadership into
relinquishing power without further delay. The Nigerian government in return accused the US of interfering in
its internal affairs. Gen. Ibrahim Babangida had warned that the Nigerian government would take necessary
action against any interest groups that sought to interfere in the country’s internal affairs. In an obvious
reference to the US role, Babangida stated:
The Presidential election was not an exercise imposed by the United Nations or the wishes of some global policemen
of democracy ... I hereby state unequivocally that my administration will not tolerate “foreign meddlers” who are
interfering in our internal affairs and undermining our sovereignty.
The US had all along been critical of the Babangida transition programme. The process began with the
coming into power of General Babangida in August 1985. Ab initio, the military president announced that the
programme “would be a gradual process through which members of the political class could proceed with
political learning, institutional adjustment, and re-orientation of their political culture”. Launching what he
called “Search for a new political order” in 1987, Babangida set up a 17-member Political Bureau with the task
of reflecting on Nigeria’s past political failures so that it could propose a new political blueprint for the country,
including the framework for the transition process.
When the removal of ban on party politics was announced, close to 88 political associations emerged, with
13 ultimately submitting applications. In spite of ranking by the National Electoral Commission (NEC),
according to six criteria and referring the top six contenders to the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC), the
Federal Military Government refused to register the two leading contenders which were the People’s Solidarity
Party and the Nigerian National Congress (NNC).
In a broadcast, the president repudiated all the political associations, and instead announced and declared
two political parties into existence by military fiat. The two parties were the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and
the National Republican Convention (NRC), one “a little to the left” and the other “a little to the right”.
The long drawn transition programme of General Babangida which began in August 1985, reached its
climax on June 12, 1993, with the presidential election. Unlike the previous elections in Nigeria, this election
was unique because it was the most internationalized with a total of 3,000 observers taking part in the exercise
nationwide. Out of this figure, 135 observers were foreigners.
Secondly, the election was a watershed that symbolized two transitions: The first, from the military to the
civilians after 10 years of continuous military rule; and the second, from the North to the South in terms of
“locale” of power from Northern hegemony to Southern elite in Nigeria’s body politik. After all the
preparations for the election, on 10th June 1993, a case was brought before Justice Bassey Ikpeme by an
unregistered Association for Better Nigeria (ABN) restraining the National Electoral Commission (NEC) from
holding the election; the judge ruled that the election be deferred until the substantive suit is determined.
It was, however impossible for NEC to defer an election which was less than 48 hours away because of the
possible political crisis that might follow. Justifying the wisdom in NEC’s decision to hold the election, a top
government functionary was reported to have stated inter alia: “definitely we are going ahead with the election.
It was very embarrassing for us. We respect the judiciary but the political turmoil that would arise from the
cancellation of the election would be considerable”. He was shocked that such a monumental case was assigned
to Ikpeme who was appointed a judge only in December 1992. The judge started two months ago and the ABN
suit was her first major case. It is on record that the late night court ruling of Ikpeme, issued only two days
before the vote, prompted mass confusion about the election.
With the stalemate, the leader of ABN, Chief Arthur Nzeribe, called for the cancellation of the election on
the ground that “the so-called election was a fraud, a flop, illegal, unconstitutional, undemocratic, and absurd”.
This claim was proved wrong by the repentant Director of Organisation of the ABN, Mr. Abimbola Davies,
who retorted that “the Association (ABN) has no other mandate than to plan and work out how the incumbent
military President, General Babangida would remain in power for at least two more years”.
On June 23rd, 1993, Babangida’s government broke its silence when it suspended the NEC and annulled
the election results. Justifying the annulment of the election General Babangida disclosed that: “There were
authenticated reports of election malpractices against party agents, officials of NEC and voters ... There were
proofs of manipulations, offer and acceptance of money and other forms of inducements”.
According to him, evidence available to government put the total amount of money spent by the
presidential candidates at over 2.1 billion Naira.
To consolidate the government’s action on the annulment, three new decrees were hurriedly promulgated
ousting the jurisdiction of the courts to entertain any case on the June 12 presidential election. They included
Decree 39, 1993, which repealed the Presidential Election (Basic Constitutional and Transitional Provisions),
Decree 13 of 1993, Decree 40 of 1993, which amended The Transition to civil rule political programme and
Decree 19 of 1993. The third one is Decree 41 of 1993 which completely annulled any proceedings pending
over the June 12 presidential election.
It was the spontaneous reaction from the civil society that made Gen. Babangida to “step aside” leaving all
and sundry to believe that he had no intention to relinquish power. An Interim National Government, headed by
Chief Ernest Shonekan took over from him after a prolonged crisis.
On November 17, 1993, a Lagos High Court, in a law suit instituted by the assumed winner of the June 12,
1993 presidential election, Chief M. K. O. Abiola made a declaration that the Interim National Government
(ING), which was hurriedly put in place by Gen. Babangida’s administration was illegal. Thereupon Gen. Sani
Abacha staged a coup d’etat, dissolving all the existing democratic structures retained by the ING and once
again returned the country to a full blown military dictatorship. This provoked the intervention of the United
States of America through various political and diplomatic actions.
The Clinton administration came up with a proclamation against all those who were active participants in
the political crisis in Nigeria. The US president’s proclamation stated that the sanction would affect
“immigrants and non-immigrants of certain Nigerian nationals who formulate, implement, or benefit from
policies that impede Nigeria’s transition to democracy and the immediate families of such persons”. The US
president derived the powers of the proclamation and the portion of it which he has vested in the Secretary of
State from Section 121(F) of the US Immigration and Nationality Act.
The Act states that:
Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be
detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he may deem necessary,
suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or non-immigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any
restriction he may deem to be appropriate.
In Defence of Their Countries

In an apparent show of power, the US took this action to show that it was not ready to be insulted by a
“small nation”, like Nigeria. The Nigerian government had on June 21, 1993 reacted angrily to a statement
issued by the United States Information Agency (USIA) and signed by the Director of the Agency, Mr. Michael
O’Brien to the effect that the United States was not going to accept any further postponement of the election.
This was after the Abuja High Court had restrained NEC from going on with the election.
The Nigerian government described the statement as a threat to the country’s sovereignty, direct
interference in the internal affairs of the country and gave the US government 72 hours ultimatum within which
to withdraw the Director of the Agency, Michael O’Brien and also directed the Centre for Democratic Studies
(CDS) to withdraw the accreditation issued to eight Americans who were to monitor the presidential election.
Though no country worth its name can afford to toy with its sovereignty and independence neither would
it allow unsolicited interference in its affairs, the US is known for its strict adherence to the principle of
democracy and the self-appointed defender of democracy all over the world. The US therefore viewed the
recall order on O’Brien as an act of insolence by the Nigerian government hence its decision to issue a
proclamation against all those who participated in both the Babangida and Abacha administrations.
Given the sole super-power status and the self-appointed role of the US as the watchdog of the world, its
intervention in nations’ affairs especially in political matters has almost gone without questioning. This, it has
been able to achieve through its ability to manipulate the world through vital institutions, such as the United
Nations.
Politically, the US as the self-appointed defender of world democracy has never hidden its displeasure
toward “undemocratic” governments. The US may not be the oldest democracy in the world; it has, however,
over 200 years experience in that system of government. While it may also be true that the Babangida
government never came under direct attack by the US, signals that Washington was not happy with his
administration manifested in the body language of Vice President, Mr. Dan Quayle who came visiting in
September 1991.
The government’s earlier shifting of the hand-over dates coupled with the ban on US wheat in 1991, have
not helped matters in the relationship between Nigeria and US. Although, President Babangida was privileged
to visit the US during the face-off to address the General Assembly of the United Nations, he did so only in his
capacity as the chairman of OAU. His moves to use the opportunity to visit the White House were rejected by
State Department officials.
One man who stood out during this impasse between the two countries was the American Ambassador to
Nigeria, Walter Carrington. He impacted forcefully on the turbulence that characterized Nigeria’s domestic
politics in his capacity as the representative of the world’s most powerful nation on earth. The military
government would describe the impact of Carrington as negative but the pro-democracy activists saw him as a
crusader for a better Nigeria. Between these two divergent spectrums of perception was a man committed to the
ideals of his home country’s foreign policy. As ambassador, he was the repository of American values and
views. It is in consonance with the policy directives from Washington that he acts and if he confronted military
rule and human rights abuses in this country, he merely holds aloft the flag of democracy and constitutional
rights which the American political system fiercely embodies.
According to Carrington: “It is extremely important for the United States to remain engaged in a way that
lets the people of Nigeria know that we support their longing for a return to democratic nation”.
Buttressing this position further, an American Professor of International relations, Max Hilaire noted that
when Ambassador Carrington first arrived in Nigeria, he was not treated well in that many Nigerians felt that
the US was down-grading its relationship with Nigeria by sending a black person to Nigeria instead of a white
person.
Delivering a lecture on “American Foreign Policy and Crisis Management”, under the auspices of the
African Centre for Democratic Governance (AFRIGOV), Prof. Hilaire declared:
… my own impression is that it is probably even better to have a black ambassador who can identify with some of the
problems in Nigeria, somebody who can identify with its (Nigerian) history. There is a common linkage between US and
other parts of Africa. And ambassador Carrington has a long history of relationship with the people of Nigeria. He was
here in the 1960s. He has been here many times thereafter. To him, it was a climax of his career to serve in Nigeria…. I
think part of the problems that Carrington had, the reason why the relationship went sour or became troubled was that there
was a number of issues that happened during Carrington’s tenure that would have led to the prolonged healing period.
Under the Obasanjo administration, three events would have caused a very serious diplomatic rift between
the two countries. But while two were well managed, the third one caused a major disagreement between them.
The first issue was about an intelligence report prepared for the National Intelligence Council of the United
States which predicted that Nigeria may break up. The report stated that the break-up could be as a result of the
leaders insisting on a union, against the people’s wish. It further states that the break-up of Nigeria would be
one of the most important occurrences that would accelerate decline in Africa.
But the government played the issue down by narrowing it down to blackmail. A statement issued by the
government explained:
If our detractors cannot see our far-reaching reforms, our fight against waste and corruption, the new culture of
produce and service delivery that is gradually emerging, the political reforms including the on-going National Political
Reform Conference as well as the sacrifices our people are making to ensure economic progress and democratic
consolidation, as indicators of progress and a radical departure from the past, then they must have dubious or diabolical
benchmarks for measuring efforts at ensuring oneness, unity, stability, indivisibility, prosperity, development and growth
of our dear country.
But the reaction of the government was somehow hasty and unnecessary because after a thorough
examination of the report, it was discovered that the report which was put on the internet had warned in the
opening words that:
The views expressed are those of the individuals and do not represent official US intelligence or policy positions. The
National Intelligence Council routinely sponsors such unclassified conferences with outside experts to gain knowledge and
insight to sharpen the level of debate on critical issues.
To even the most patriotic Nigerian, this possibility is neither fanciful nor far-fetched. Indeed, we came
close to break up in 1966/1967 and again in 1993 and we have been struggling with centrifugal tendencies since
1999. A Nigerian commentator writing on the intelligence reports stated that:
... I disagree with the conferees attribution of junior officers coup as a possible source of that collapse, but then that is
their opinion. In my view, Sharia, the Niger-Delta and autonomy demands from the Igbo, Yoruba and Ijaw if pushed to
their logical conclusion are more realistic indicators that Nigerian cannot yet be taken for granted.
But then such a downside risk elevates Nigeria to the status of a strategic nation in the eyes of US and
global policy makers, especially when combined with Nigeria’s position as a major source of US and global oil
supply. In simple language, this simply means that the world has a stake in the survival and indeed the
prosperity of Nigeria. Nigeria can now begin to leverage this strategic stakes to make our case for debt relief,
military and intelligence support, aid, Foreign Direct Investment, and greater international engagement with
and in Nigeria.
The second event which was almost assuming an explosive direction was nipped in the bud by the
National Assembly. It was the celebrated or orchestrated Third Term Project of President Olusegun Obasanjo.
Though it never got to the level of diplomatic crisis between the two countries, the United States was able to
pass the message to the Nigerian government that it was not in support of any self-seeking project that would
disrupt the democratic process in Nigeria. Much as it was not its business on who rules Nigeria, it was its
responsibility to ensure that democratic process in any country at all, is not disrupted.
Hence, the project was terminated abruptly by the National Assembly which organized open sessions that
were televised by both local and international media. Through these sessions, debates, and contributions by
members of the National Assembly were conducted and the general consensus was that there would not be any
third term for the President no matter how well his administration had performed.
The American government lauded the decision and stated that the country would now face the issue of
governance which was relegated to the background because of the full attention given to the Third Term
project.
The Enemy Between: Managing the Taylor Saga

The third event was the most volatile and critical of all. It almost led to serious diplomatic crisis between
Nigeria and the US. It was the Charles Taylor saga. Charles Taylor was part of dictator Samuel Doe’s
government in 1980 before being exiled to the United States. In the United States, he was jailed for allegedly
stealing $900,000 in Liberian government funds only to escape from a Massachusetts prison, along with some
petty criminals, in 1985 after a year in captivity. In 1989, he returned to West Africa and launched a revolt from
the Ivory Coast against Doe, an ethnic Krahn who had taken power in a military coup. Taylor’s campaign
turned into an ethnic conflict with seven factions fighting for control of the country and its
resources―particularly iron ore, timber, and rubber.
Taylor’s forces included children, who usually dressed in costumes and blond wigs. Often under the
influence of drugs, they were noted for their brutality. An estimated 200,000 people were killed in that phase of
the war, and more than one million were forced from their homes. The United Nations, United States, and
African States mediated a peace of sorts in 1996. Taylor’s faction emerged from the fighting as the dominant
force, and when special elections were held in 1997, he and his National Patriotic Party won an overwhelming
victory.
But despite the landmark support given to Taylor both by the local people and the international community,
his government was still not popular because it was characterized by all sorts of atrocities, such as killing,
raping, maiming, corruption, and genocidal activities. However, under the aegis of an ECOWAS brokered
agreement in July 6, 2003, the Liberian leader, Charles Taylor accepted an offer of asylum from President
Olusegun Obasanjo, and on August 11, 2003, he stepped down as President, handed over power to the Vice
President, Moses Blah and came to Nigeria. Subsequently, Taylor was indicted for crimes against humanity by
the Special Court for Sierra Leone. In dramatic twist of events, the United States then offered $2 million cash
reward for the capture of Taylor.
It could be recalled that Taylor intervened in the brutal civil war in Sierra Leone in support of the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF), which claimed up to 250,000 lives between 1989 and 2003. But beyond
this dour statistics and controversy surrounding Taylor’s relocation to Nigeria, was the role of Olusegun
Obasanjo. In one of his numerous visits to the US, Obasanjo stoutly defended Nigeria’s extension of political
asylum to the former Liberian president. According to Obasanjo, Taylor’s exile to Nigeria helped end
bloodshed in Liberia. His words:
General Collin Powel and I worked together to prevent a bloodbath in Liberia. We put our heads together and decided
that Charles Taylor must be eased out because if we failed to ease him out, he would dig in there and there would have
been a tremendous destruction of lives and property. We were mindful of our duty and responsibility to humanity, the
people of Liberia and West Africa.
As a way of getting the Nigerian government to yield to the American pressure, the US government
offered to waive all debts Nigeria owes it, in exchange for the handing over of Taylor to the UN-backed special
War Crimes Court in Sierra Leone. According to a statement issued by a White House spokesman Scott
McClellan, US government’s offer was made in Washington D.C. during a meeting between the US President
George Bush and his Nigerian counterpart Olusegun Obasanjo.
All the talk about debt forgiveness was seen as an American carrot by the National Assembly which took a
hardline stance towards the country’s unflattering larger debt scenario. The national legislators have in a
populist move been pushing for debt repudiation in defiance of whatever position the Paris Club and others
were saying.
When it seemed this was not having the desired impact on the Nigerian government, the US made a
categorical statement that the release of Taylor to the War Crime Court was going to be tied to Nigeria’s
request for a UN seat. The US government made it known that its support for a UN seat for Nigeria was not
going to come cheap except it handed over Charles Taylor to face war crime charges before the special
UN-backed War Crime Court in Sierra Leone. This put the Nigerian government in a dilemma since it was very
desperate to secure UN seat to boost its international image.
The Nigerian government, again refused to hand over Taylor to the US. This was inspite of the
preponderance of both local and international opinions which were clearly not in favour of the Nigerian
government position.
African and international civil society groups were formed to ensure Nigeria’s surrender of Charles Taylor
to the Special Court in Sierra Leone. Taylor was accused of 17 counts of war crimes and crimes against
humanity, against the people of Sierra Leone by the special court. The crimes include killings, mutilations, rape,
and other forms of sexual violence, sexual slavery, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, abduction, and the
use of forced labour by Sierra Leonean armed opposition groups.
The Mano River Union which consists of Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea, issued a communiqué which
agreed to call for a review of Taylor’s temporary stay in Nigeria.
The Communiqué read as follows: “Nigeria is swimming against the tide of international justice. It is in
the country’s best interest to review its position so as not to be isolated by other nations ...” In addition, the
European Parliament came up with a resolution to condemn Nigeria’s continued refusal to hand over Charles
Taylor. During a visit to West Africa, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour called for
Taylor to appear for trial at the Special Court for Sierra Leone and for African leaders to urge President
Olusegun Obasanjo to hand over Taylor.
At the local level, there was massive opposition against the Federal Government position. For instance,
Nigeria Coalition on International Criminal Court issued a 14-day ultimatum to the Federal Government within
which to either extradite Charles Taylor to the Special Court in Sierra Leone or start a legal action against him.
The group threatened that failure on the part of government to heed this warning would leave the Coalition with
no other option but to launch a national and global campaign to bring Taylor to justice.
The leader of the Coalition, Mr. Ameen Ayodele said the Coalition would at the expiration of the 14-day
ultimatum embark on joint programme of popular mobilization, rallies, and processions beginning from
Calabar to make Nigeria hot and unsafe for Taylor.
Understandably, the Nigerian media stoutly and vehemently opposed the granting of asylum to Taylor
considering his indictment in the death of two Nigerian journalists, Tayo Awotusin and Krees Imodibie while
on official assignment in Liberia.
Chairman, Centre for Free Speech, Mr. Richard Akinola said:
I feel embarrassed that Obasanjo can say he will not hand over Taylor to the UN tribunal despite the atrocities he has
committed. It is an insult on us as journalists that after killing our colleagues and other Nigerians, he did not even have the
courtesy to apologise. It is a slap in the face.
Another journalist, Andy Ike Ezeani observed that from whichever dimension one viewed it, Taylor
coming to Nigeria was wrong. According to him, there were better ways through which Nigeria could achieve
peace in that country without granting him asylum. Granting him asylum, he said, was wrong because it sent
the wrong signals to the international community about Nigeria.
Though the editorial comment of the Daily Champion on the issue posited that Nigeria’s initial opposition
to the granting of asylum to Charles Taylor was based on ennobling moral values, there was no legal platform
on which the asylum could also be justified. Traditionally, territorial asylum is the protection granted by a state
to a foreign citizen against his own state; and designed primarily for the protection of those accused of political
offences, excluding common criminals at the municipal level and those who committed crimes against
humanity at the international level. The hollowness of asylum derives from the philosophical fact that in
ancient times, it designated a place of refuge or protection from which a person could not be removed forcibly
without sacrilege―places like the temples, altars, and in the Christian Church.
Thus, it is inconceivable how such a hallowed or sacred institution like asylum can be used to shelter
persons who have violated or sponsored the violation of humanity, as Charles Taylor was alleged to have done.
The symbolic sacredness of the institution of asylum, therefore, explains the exclusion of criminals from its
ambience. What this suggests is that the Nigerian president may not have considered the philosophical
contradiction in saying that with respect to Taylor’s asylum in Nigeria, his government would not entertain any
request, “not by any organization or country for showing this humanitarian gesture”.
International law is clear that although every state has a plenary right, acting in sovereignty, to grant
territorial asylum, there are some restrictions. These restrictions exist at the municipal sphere if the asylum
seeker is a common criminal, especially when involved in acts that constitute a deliberate crime against life,
among others.
The Taylor saga, however, came to a dramatic end when Charles Taylor made an abortive attempt to
escape from the country. His eventual arrest and his sudden deportation to Liberia to face war crime charges in
Sierra Leone captures vividly the character of the relations between Nigeria and the United States. At the time
of Taylor’s escape from his asylum residence in Calabar, the Nigerian leader, Olusegun Obasanjo was visiting
his US counterpart, President George Bush on what was officially regarded as “matters relating to security in
West African sub-region in particular and Africa in general”. Though it was also speculated in both local and
international media that President Obasanjo was making subtle case for his failed “Third Term Agenda” by
imploring the US to show some understanding in this respect, the official position was that this never formed
part of the discussion between the two leaders.
The haste, dispatch, and seriousness with which the Nigerian government handled the matter were a
sufficient proof of the determination of the US to hold the Nigerian government and its leadership responsible
for Taylor’s escape. President Obasanjo was reported to have been embarrassed by this development. The US
reaction was captured in a statement made by the US Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice while appearing
before the Senate. She said: “... if it is true that Charles Taylor escaped indeed, there would be serious
consequences”. To avoid “these serious consequences”, President Obasanjo ordered all security agencies to
ensure the immediate arrest of Charles Taylor as well as his deportation back to his country, Liberia.
But Charles Taylor attributed the treatment he received from Olusegun Obsanjo to high level politics
during his testimony before the Special Court in The Hague that tried him for War crimes. He explained that
since he was not imprisoned in Nigeria, the issue of escape never arose. It was his contention that he was only a
victim of power play. He stated:
When you are dealing with the level of power play that I saw during that particular period, it is amazing … Obasanjo
knew that I was traveling, where I was going to, and when. He informed me that he was on his way to the United States to
meet with George Bush. But throughout the three years in Nigeria, Obasanjo had constantly reminded me that Nigeria was
under tremendous pressure to turn me over, and he had said he could not do that… you know as I sit here I am still
perplexed. I can’t claim to understand all of the intrigues that happened to me. I would probably want to find out from him,
“why in the hell did you do this?” now, why my dear friend told the world that I was escaping, I swear may be one day he
will come and tell these judges and the world.
Obama’s Visit to Africa

Nigeria’s leadership claim in Africa is being challenged by Ghana’s growing image that is fast spreading
not only beyond the Sub-Saharan Africa but also across the globe. Of late, Ghana has become a model for good
governance in Africa conducting very peaceful transition elections where the incumbent political party lost the
presidency to the opposition. Though the first results ended in a stalemate, the way and manner elections were
conducted in the stalemated zones without the eruption of violence and the transparency of the conduct of the
elections, as well as the acceptance of the election results by the defeated parties without recourse to tortuous
and tedious legal contestations, singled out Ghana as a very unique African country with important values to
promote.
When in July 2009, US President Obama was to make his first trip to Africa, it was therefore not shocking
when he chose to visit Ghana instead of Nigeria, United States’ largest trading partner in Africa. Explaining the
choice of Ghana over Nigeria and other African countries,
Obama stated in an interview with allAfrica.com:
Well part of the reason is because Ghana has now undergone a couple of successful elections in which power was
transferred peacefully even in a very close election. We are trying to lift up successful models of good governance in
Africa. And so, by traveling to Ghana, we hope to highlight the effective governance they have put in place.
Though the Nigerian government in its usual pretentious attitude seemed not to be bothered about this, it
was obvious from the attitude of its officials that Ghana’s choice was very instructive to Nigeria’s ebbing
reputation as an influential nation in Africa.
Defending Obama’s position in a piece titled: “Obama’s Choice”, Wole Soyinka lampooned the
government of Umar Yar’Adua for its inaction and wondered how the government expected Barak Obama to
visit a country that was politically unstable and on the fringe of crisis. He was of the opinion that the Nigerian
state had degenerated to a level that no reasonable and responsible leader of Obama’s personality would find it
attractive to visit.
Though Obama’s visit was only a one-day affair, he was convinced, with what he saw in the country, that
Ghana was becoming a fast growing industrial nation in Africa with strong infrastructural base and conducive
business environment. The American president would surely reflect on these positive business indicators and
explore the possibility of relieving Nigeria of some business overload. In an age when survival of nations is
dependent on strong economic base, the US could not be oblivious of the fact that it would be in its interest to
strengthen economic ties with its partners and ignoring a nation, like Ghana, at this crucial moment and at this
stage of its development would be unwise.
Ghana’s prospering economic fortunes and industrial growth are pointers to the stress the relations
between Nigeria and the United States are undergoing. These situations would not allow Nigeria any rigid
posturing in its relations with the United States. Whatever gave Nigeria that character for that hard stance over
the MPLA issue in Angola had been negated by contemporary developments. The democratization of South
Africa’s polity; the termination of apartheid rule; the anathemisation of military rule in Africa, and in Ghana in
particular, which now allows room for massive economic development have presented options and alternatives
to the United States on issues of trade.
Besides, the discovery of oil in Ghana in 2008 and its determined efforts to begin exploration in 2010 as
well as Ghana’s present aggressive drive for industrial development should be a wake-up call to Nigeria and its
policy makers that truly, “David is on the trail of Goliath”.
Conclusion
The complex nature and dimensions of the US-Nigeria military and political relations as they relate to
strategic cooperation between the armed forces of the two countries and effective management of certain
political disagreements especially on democratization and democracy as well as the Charles Taylor saga capture
the inequality in the countries’ stature and status. But despite the imbalance between the two countries, Nigeria,
which is obviously the smaller partner, has on many occasions, demonstrated its capacity to resist US
meddlesomeness even if such resistance has been very feeble and to some extent, inconsequential. But the fact
that US retaliatory actions to Nigeria’s stance have not gone beyond the diplomatic level, indicates the
existence of mutual respect.
References
Akpuru-Aja, A. (2003). The state and the military: Perspectives on Nigeria-USA military cooperation. Strategic Analysis, 27(2),
250-262.
Bassey, C. O., & Dokubo, C. Q. (2011). Defence policy of Nigeria: Capability and context. Retrieved from
https://www.authorhouse.com/bookstore/bookdetail.aspx?bookid=SKU-000415852
Batchelor, P., Dunne, P., & Lamb, G. (2002). The demand for military spending in South Africa. Journal of Peace Research,
39(3), 339-354.
Luckham, R., & Hutchful, E. (2010). Democratic and war-to-peace transitions and security sector transformation in Africa. A.
Bryden and ‘F. Olanisakin Security Sector Transformation in Africa Geneva: Centre for the Democratic Control of the
Armed Forces.
Omoruyi, O. (2001). The Nigerian-US Military Pact, fine prints recipe for danger. Whither National Assembly.
Timberman, D. G. (2016). A Changeless Land: Continuity and Change in Philippine Politics: Continuity and Change in
Philippine Politics: Routledge.
Williams, P. D. (2009). The Peace and Security Council of the African Union: evaluating an embryonic international institution.
The Journal of Modern African Studies, 47(4), 603-626.
Wright, S. (2018). African foreign policies. London: Routledge.
doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2018.04.002
D DAVID PUBLISHING
Good Governance and Growth in Emerging Countries:

A Critical Review
Rachid Mira
University Paris 13, CEPN laboratory, Paris, France
Numbers of economists of development consider that good governance, defined as the quality management and
orientation of development policies has a positive influence on economic performance. The question is what
content the literature gives to the concept of governance. According to the World Bank, good governance is
evaluated by the implementation capacity of governance principles of a country, providing a framework for market
development and economic growth. Empirical studies tested the relationship between good governance in the sense
of “market-enhancing governance” (stimulus institutions market) and showed a positive relationship between good
governance and economic growth. However, a good governance policy needs for developing countries to achieve
minimum economic growth and political reforms in order to reach a level of development similar to that of
industrialized countries. We focus on good governance definition made by the World Bank and criticism
formulated by Mushtaq Khan, who reconstructed the notion of Governance Capabilities, taking into account the
capacity of states to drive structural change in institutional, political, economic, and social fields, in order to ensure
long-term economic growth. Our goal is to use a new concept of governance in order to build a new political
economy approach more suitable for emerging countries.
Keywords: states failures, good governance, economic growth, development policy
Introduction
Good governance is defined by a set of institutions managed by government in order drive economic
policies. Empirical studies made by World Bank (Kaufman, Kraay, & Zoido-Lobaton, 1999; Kaufman, Kraay,
& Zoido-Lobaton, 2005) showed that good governance has got a positive effect on economic growth and
enhance market development for emerging countries.
Can good governance explain economic performance? Or according to the thesis of Mushtaq Khan (2000;
2004), reforms of economic structures and government capabilities are the first step to improve economic
performance of developing countries, and in a second step to allow economic growth to enhance good
governance.
The first thesis (market enhancing governance) defended by neo-institutionalist authors (Kaufman et al.,
1999; Kaufman et al., 2005; Knack & Keefer, 1995; 1997) considered the state as a sovereign role as welfare
state. Economically, the proper functioning of markets is correlated to the proper functioning of institutions
through efficient practice of State Governance, what is commonly called “good governance”. Therefore,
underdevelopment and low economic growth performance of countries could be explained by a “state failure”
Rachid Mira, Ph.D., University Paris 13, CEPN laboratory, Paris, France.
232 GOOD GOVERNANCE AND GROWTH IN EMERGING COUNTRIES
and the components of good governance with the increase in corruption, instability of property rights, market
distortions, and lack of democracy.
The second thesis (growth enhancing governance) developed in particular by Mushtaq Khan (1995; 2004;
2005; 2007) and partly by Dany Rodrik (1995; 1998), and Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2002), concerned
the ability of the state to implement social change and a voluntary policy of economic development: The
transition of developing countries towards a capitalist system comparable to that of developed countries, cannot
operate without the establishment of efficient institutions in relation with distribution of political power in these
countries. Conversely, those countries would face a state failure, as a result of a mismatch between institutions
and economic policy for development.
Our research consists first to present some results of an empirical model (Hammadache & Mira, 2013)
based on a panel of developing countries chosen by region (MENA, Latin America, and Asia) and due to their
natural resource endowment. The aim is to check if growth rate may or may not be correlated with good
governance indicators as defined by the World Bank. The goal is to lead in a second time an analysis of
criticism made by Mushtaq Khan on the definition of governance, the causes of state failure and barriers to
economic development. Our contribution is to discuss the concept of good governance and the failure of states
taking into account the level of development and governance capacity, based on a structure and distribution of
political power that evolves in time and may or may not be positive for growth. The assumption we make here
is that the so-called good governance policies are relevant if countries reach an adequate level of economic and
social development that enables institutions of good governance to boost growth.
Good Governance, State Failure, and Economic Growth: The State of the Debate
Approach Neo-institutional Economists’ Institutions Called Good Governance Positively Affect
Economic Growth
Institutions are all formal rules (legal, economic, and political) and informal rules (social, behavioural
norms, and conventions) that structure social life. According to Douglass North (1990), a distinction was made
between formal and informal institutions.
Good governance in the definition of the World Bank is the capacity of management and institutional
reforms conducted by state policy, that improve coordination and delivery of effective public services,
accountability of political actors, and individual citizens in the driving of development policies. Good
governance therefore connects adequate political institutions and practices to allow development. Several
econometric studies (Kaufman et al., 1999; Kaufman et al., 2005) tested the relationship between good
governance in the sense of “market-enhancing governance” (stimulus institutions contract): A positive
relationship has been obtained between good governance and economic growth. Then, implementation of good
governance policies can promote economic development and ensure convergence towards level of developed
economies.
Indicators of good governance according to the World Bank: Presentation and interpretation. The
World Bank (Kaufmann et al., 1999; 2005) built composite indicators summarized under six headings:
 “Voice and accountability”: which measures tendencies of political process, civil liberties, political rights,
and independence of the media. The responsibility is that of citizens who participate in political life through
elections, public decisions.
 “Political instability and violence”: which measures the perception of a possible destabilization of the
GOOD GOVERNANCE AND GROWTH IN EMERGING COUNTRIES 233
political regime through elections or violence.

 “Government effectiveness”: which measures the perception of the quality of public service or public
administration. This index assesses the perception of the government’s credibility through the trust given to its
administration.
 “Rule of law”: measures the perception of citizens of the rules that structure society and the degree of
compliance with these rules. The indicator measures the perception of the efficiency and fairness of the judicial
system and respect for contracts and agreements tied.
 “Quality control”: measures perceptions which are favourable or not for market economy, including
anti-liberal interventionist policies, such as price controls, imports and exports, and the banking system. This
index allows us to appreciate the business climate for foreign investors, for example.
 “Control of corruption”: measures perceptions of the use of public power in the pursuit of private gain.
These indicators are rated on a scale as appropriate -2.5 to +2.5 or on a scale from 0 to 100. The lowest
indicator is considered as the least favourable and above the most favourable.
The purpose of the construction of these indicators is to measure the evolution of good governance by
country and implement a policy to improve these indices in order to ensure that improving good governance
could reduce the failure of state. Indeed, in the first argument, the state perceived in its functions as a public
services provider, is right but seems to be narrow if it assumes to reflect the ability of the state to carry out
economic development policies and policy changes and social. The role of the state is certainly to create a set of
institutions that constitute the “rules of the game” (North, 1990), which offer people incentives and
opportunities, so that social coordination operates. The institutions included in the indices of the World Bank
include security of property rights through the “rule of law” indicator for example. Nevertheless, the
improvement of this indicator needs to take into account the notion of “enforcement” (North, 1990) considered
as efficiency or a certain degree of enforcement. The state must be equipped with skills so that it has capacity in
binding rules it has issued. Hence, the construction of institutional indicators would include measuring the
degree of respect, quality, and efficiency of the rules.
Institutions and evolution of institutions developed by North (1990) had influenced the definition of
indicators of the World Bank. It is interesting that North diagnosed failure in development of economies of the
Third World, because of their institutional weakness, which causes historical stagnation and contemporary
underdevelopment in the Third World. Specifically, Douglass North highlighted the arguments of insecure
property rights, legal rules ambiguity and uncertainty in the behaviour of agents of the economies of the Third
World. From this, institutional diagnosis could have emerged the first thesis which put in relation failure of
states and “bad governance” of states that could not provide an institutional framework conducive to growth
and economic performance.
Empirical Results of the Work of the World Bank
Daniel Kaufmann et al. (2005) developed a set of six composite indicators covering nearly 190 measures
perception of governance and agglomerate the collection of data from 17 institutions, out of 170 countries. The
Kaufmann studies have to correlate the quality of governance with the per capita income in all the countries
studied. Thus, their econometric studies show a positive relationship between income per capita growth rates
and improvement of components each indicator of good governance.
Daniel Kaufmann concluded with the following assumptions:
 Better governance has a significantly positive effect on per capita income.

 An improvement in income leads to better governance.
 Other factors affect the increase in income and wealth of countries and are also associated with better
governance.
Considering Daniel Kaufmann as the relationship between governance and income levels and GDP growth,
rate operates in an opposite direction, and then, it is surprising that in the short term high income levels produce
only weak governance.
In another paper, Daniel Kaufmann and Aart Kraay (2003), entitled “Growth without governance”,
analyse the causality between growth in per capita income and governance, leading them to analyse growth of
per capita income over the long-term, particularly the last two centuries, and do not reveal big differences
between countries. The gap in per capita income that we know today makes industrial and technological
revolutions that have allowed the accumulation of physical and human capital and achieve a level of wealth and
income per head of the current developed countries that distinguish developing countries that have not
experienced the same social transformations.
Referring to the work of Robert Hall and Charles Jones (1999) and Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and
James Robinson (2001), companied that have high income levels today have experienced in the last two
centuries of the very rapid rate of economic growth. Their economic performance can be interpreted by deep
historical differences in the quality of their institutions. This work has focused on developing countries that had
a colonial history and show a strong relationship between initial institutional quality and growth in the long run.
In general, thesis is that Daniel Kaufmann consideration of reverse causality, from income levels of
governance, is as plausible as countries with high incomes can financially take the implementation of good
policy governance improving government effectiveness, rule of law, and control of corruption.
But is the relationship between growth in per capita income and governance always positive? Daniel
Kaufmann and Aart Kraay (2003) indicated that no, the sign of the positive or negative causality depends on
the implementation of a proactive policy of states that build a set of efficient institutions and forward
improvement the so-called good governance. Daniel Kaufmann’s thesis is that causality could not be positively
mechanically without considering the political will and the existence of feedback mechanisms (feedback loops)
between per capita income and governance, to create a “virtuous circle” good governance and national wealth.
Thus, the thesis of improving per capita income and waiting a mechanical improvement of governance is
challenged by Daniel Kaufmann. He followed in a certain way thesis developed by Mushtaq Khan (since 1995)
of the role of political factor in economic growth: In effect, Mushtaq Khan developed the concept of “political
settlement” and “patron-client networks” combined with his analysis of the “rent-seeking”, explaining that
good governance can only occur if one overcomes the symptoms of “state failure”. The state can improve its
governance and makes economic reforms for growth, if the elites forming the coalition have a coincidence of
interests between growth strategy and their proper rent seeking. Daniel Kaufmann developed a similar thesis
explaining the existence of “feedback” in the negative relationship between per capita income and governance,
which are caused by the phenomenon of predation of state, defined as the illegal or improper influence of the
state represented by its elites forming interest groups, on the construction of laws, policies, and rules, which can
lead to poor governance. Thus, per capita income can increase without improved governance, when the latter
does not converge with the interests of the elite.
Mushtaq Khan’s Criticism and Theoretical Alternative

As we saw earlier, economists oppose two theses on the role of institutions in the definition and
establishment of good governance: the so-called theory of “market enhancing governance” which attributes to
the state strictly sovereign functions of justice, police, and compliance with market rules. The state would be
the actor who would establish and strengthen the institutional rules, so that the market can operate more
efficiently by ensuring the exchange contracts, private property, establishing incentives, and binding rules for
the market.
Mushtaq Khan’s criticism on relationship between good governance and growth. Several
econometric studies of Daniel Kaufmann et al. (1999), Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer (1995; 1997), Robert
Barro (1996), Hall and Jones (1999) showed that the variables of good governance, such as control of
corruption, stability of property rights or democracy are closely correlated with variables such as GDP growth
rate per capita, investment or human capital development. These empirical tests seek to support the first view
already cited the relationship between market enhancing governance and economic performance of the
countries implementing it. The purpose of these studies is to show that improved indices of “good governance”
have positive effects on economic growth and provide long-term convergence with the so-called developed
countries.
Among the precautions taken by Mushtaq Khan to interpret the results of this literature, the question of
temporality is questioned: Indeed, if we want to test the effect of good governance mechanisms on economic
growth, it should be taken a reference period of these institutional indicators, in order to study the effects on
economic growth for example a decade or two decades later (data collected by Stephen Knack and IRIS began
in 1984 and data collected by Daniel Kaufmann and the World Bank began in 1996). Thus, the authors took the
choice to study relationship between good governance at the end of the period of economic growth which
began in 1984 for Stephen Knack’s data or in 1996 for Daniel Kaufmann’s data. In effect, economic growth
period studied is the consequence of political and institutional capabilities developed since the 1950’s and
1950’s in Asian countries for example. Good governance indicators of the 80s and 90s are thus not correlated to
economic growth which results in the same period. There is a gap period to take into account when considering
effect of good governance on economic growth; otherwise there is a methodological bias. So this means,
according to Mushtaq Khan, that the actual relationship studied and not assumed by authors is that of the effect
of economic growth on good governance. However, the dependent variable chosen is that of economic growth!
The second problem is to take into account a threshold effect in the step reached by countries in their economic
growth: Underdeveloped countries could make efficient good governance policies only after a period of
learning in state capabilities and after reaching a level of development, so that enhancing good governance
indicators could generate better economic growth rates.
Other theoretical difficulties highlighted by Mushtaq Khan. The series must select low and high
economic growth to allow detection of the possible correlation between good governance and growth. However,
most so-called emerging Asian countries which have successfully developed their economy have experienced
strong growth rates from the 1960s through 1980s. However, statistical series of good governance indicators
start at best for Stephen Knack in 1984 and the worst for Daniel Kaufmann in 1996. If we assume a strong
relationship between good governance and economic growth for these rapidly developing countries, we have a
lack of institutional indicators in their early historic period of economic takeoff. The significance of the
correlation cannot be shown as posteriori with indicators of “good governance” for a more recent period of
economic growth.
Figure 1. Interpreting the evidence on governance and development (Source: M. Khan, State failure in developing
countries and strategies of institutional Reforms, SOAS, 2004).
Furthermore, the number of years’ observed in order to make a robust econometric test is not sufficient to
explain the performance in terms of economic growth for emerging countries of the Asian region in particular
and enable better understanding of the institutional mechanisms for their economic success.
Another major obstacle is that the levels of the indicators of good governance, although available over the
recent period only, do not show a significant difference between fast-growing countries and countries with slow
growth. In other words, good governance of fast developing countries does not differ significantly from that of
low developing countries. Although we can establish a significant correlation between good governance and
economic growth, the level of fast-growing countries indicators do not converge to the so-called developed
countries.
Here is an illustration of non-disparity in the results of good governance among countries in slow and
rapid development indices obtained during the panel econometric studies of IRIS and the World Bank:
The empirical results of Stephen Knack and Daniel Kaufmann reveal a strong correlation between good
governance and GDP growth rate per capita, without convincing that the level of institutional indicators of fast
developing countries can converge with that of developed countries. We can therefore conclude that the
enhancing of good governance cannot be a guarantee of GDP per capita growth and vice versa; the GDP per
capita growth can allow improving governance without guaranteeing that its level may converge with that of
developed countries. So, it must be inferred that other factors may explain at once the growth of GDP per capita
and the improvement of good governance indicators.
Conclusion
The analysis above is a contribution to the debate on institutional conditions for economic take off in
developing countries. The argument of the neo-institutional economists is that improving indicators of good
governance is a necessary condition for creating the institutional conditions of lowering transaction costs and
thus a competitive market is conducive to increasing the efficiency in the allocation of resources and the pace
of economic growth. However, this thesis supported by econometric work of Daniel Kaufmann and Stephen
Knack was criticized by Mushtaq Khan especially since the good governance of fast-growing developing
countries indicators are not significantly different from those of low-growth countries. The thesis of economic
catch-up in developing countries by improving good governance index is weakened by this.
The thesis is more efficient when it comes to carry out economic reforms and improve governance indices
and to improve the operation of an existing market economy as in the specific case of developed countries.
Nevertheless, this occults in developing countries, structural and institutional conditions in creation of a market
economy and a capitalist economic system which implies a major social transformation and the emerging of
formal and informal institutional framework. In this issue, the role of the state is crucial in order to drive
economic development: State must acquire skills to orient capital into economic sectors with high added value
and increase productivity. Khan developed for this purpose the concept of “political settlement” that is stable
and consistent relationship between the distribution of political power, an institutional framework and
economic growth in a country. Instead of “good governance” as a condition for economic growth, Khan
replaces it by the notion of governance seen as redistribution of power to a stable political coalition whose
interests coincide with those of the reform and restructuring of the economy, sources of growth and economic
and human development.
So, economic growth and takeoff in developing countries can not only be explained by good governance
indicators as given by institutional authors. Taking into account the complexity of the issues, including search
and economic rent seeking in the relations between political power and coalitions functioning of the economy
requires to develop a broader analysis of the concept of good governance to better understand the role of
political and institutional factor in economic development.
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doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2018.04.003
D DAVID PUBLISHING
Great Powers and Albanian National Movement (1878-1914)
Petr Akhmedovich Iskenderov

Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia
The history of the Albanian national movement is closely connected with two key factors: internal development in
the Albanian-populated areas in the Balkans as well as politics of the Great Powers. Berlin Congress of 1878 totally
neglected interests of the Albanians. Subsequently, Treaty of Berlin became the starting point for creation of the
Albanian League of Prizren (1878-1881) as well as future development of the Albanian national movement. Russia
as well as other Great Powers played a controversial role in that context.
Keywords: Russia, Balkan Peninsula, Balkan Wars, World War I, Albania, Kosovo
The history of the Albanian national movement is closely connected with two key factors: internal
development in the Albanian-populated areas in the Balkans as well as politics of the Great Powers. The
Congress of Berlin 1878 totally neglected interests of the Albanians. As a result, the League of Prizren was
established as the mean to promote the goals of the Albanian national movement. That League confronted with
some Balkan states and Great Powers. But at the same time, it created the first program of Albanian national
unification.
By that time, serious unsettled disputes among the Great Powers themselves affected discussions
concerning the present and the future of Albania—first of all, contradictions between Vienna and Saint
Petersburg. The secret Reichstadt agreement between Russia and Austria-Hungary, concluded on 8 July, 1876
following the meeting of the Russian Emperor Alexander II and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince A. M.
Gorchakov with their Austrian colleagues Franz Joseph and D. Andrássy in the Reichstadt castle in Bohemia,
was made in such a way that the Russian and Austrian records differed just in relation to Albania. According to
Andrássy’s record, Albania had to become an autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire as Bulgaria and
Rumelia. In the Russian version, the mention of Albania was absent (1952).
Another secret Russo-Austrian Convention signed on 15 January, 1877 in Budapest as well as
supplementary Convention signed on 18 March of the same year, but dated 15th of January, also had not
clarified the situation with Albania (1952).
Those documents only mentioned “expected results of the upcoming war” (Potemkina, 1945, p. 38).
What was typical—at the time, as Russian diplomats and international negotiations and agreements
generally were not paid necessary attention to the Albanian problem, was that the Russian public opinion
showed increasing interest in Albanian stories. Among others, well-known assessment of the issues under
consideration in February 1878 was made by then young journalist V. I. Nemirovich-Danchenko: “We have
somehow resolved the issue of the Bulgarians, but for a change it was put forward a number of new ones,
Petr Akhmedovich Iskenderov, M.A., senior researcher, Institute of Slavic Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences,
Moscow, editor-in-chief of Russian history journal “Voprosy Istorii”, Russia.
240 GREAT POWERS AND ALBANIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT (1878-1914)
among which not the last place should be given to Albanian issue” (1992, p. 170).
In the context of growing disillusionment with the provisions of the Great Powers, the Albanian national
movement began to push forward the idea of Albanian League designed to promote the unification of all
Albanian lands into a single autonomous entity, but also to prevent the expansion plans of the Great Powers and
especially of the Balkan States. On the latter point, the views of the Albanians, in principle, were consistent
with the interests of the Turkish government (which sought to exploit the Albanian movement in the interests of
preserving the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire), as well as with the foreign policy strategy of some
of the Great Powers, primarily Britain and Austria-Hungary. Both Powers insisted on the need for revision of
the San Stefano agreement and planned to use the discontent of the Albanians as a lever of pressure on Russia.
It should be stressed that the weakness and inconsistency of the decisions of the Berlin Congress, in turn,
were a consequence of attempts to draw in the Balkans balanced picture—including the definition of
boundaries. The Balkans is one of the classic regions of the world where borders drawn on the basis of ethnic
principle cannot solve the ethnic problems, but only establish new “time bombs”. After all, these ethnic
boundaries are very often arbitrary. They do not take into account ethnic “overlapping”, complex process of
ethno-genesis and exist the nations divided by internal and external natural, political, economic, ethnic, and
religious boundaries and other lines.
From this point of view, the Congress of Berlin was an example of artificial and conscious “Balkanization
from above” when from one Bulgaria two Bulgarian states were made and their boundaries were artificially
narrowed at the expense of Macedonian land; when Serbian ethnicity was divided to three parts, when
national-state integration aspirations of the Albanians were not taken into account at all.
Political and military activities of Albanian League of Prizren were one of the results of Great Powers’
controversial attitude towards the Balkans. First meeting of that League took place in Prizren (Kosovo) on June
10, 1878—just three days before the opening of Congress of Berlin.
Among delegates gathered in the Prizren Albanian feudal lords, leaders of powerful local clans and
representatives of the Muslim clergy were dominated. They came from Kosovo, Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia and
Hercegovina, Macedonia and Sancak of Novi Pazar. Turkish officials also attended the meeting. Participants
adopted a program written in Turkish language and entitled “Kararname” (“Book of decisions”). It included
such key position as “unconditional loyalty to Turkish Sultan”, “fight until the last drop of blood against any
annexation of the Albanian territories”, “the unification of all Albanian-populated territories in one province,
managed by Turkish Governor-General”, “granting the Albanian language official status and the introduction of
a national army under the supreme command of a Turkish officer” (Reuter, 1982, p. 18).
At the same time, delegates of League of Prizren sent a special memorandum to the participants of the
Congress of Berlin, as well as to the Turkish government and diplomatic representatives of the Great Powers in
Istanbul. They drew Europe’s attention to the above-mentioned provisions. Memorandum addressed to Britain
Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli declared: “We are not and we do not want to be Turks, but at the same time
we will fight against those who want to turn us into Slavs or Austrians or Greeks; we want to be Albanians”
(Skendi, 1967, p. 45).
Delegation of the Albanian League led by Abdyl Frasheri left Prizren for Berlin. In addition, petitions
contained the requirements of the League were distributed in London, Paris, and Berlin.
However, representatives of the Albanian national movement failed to participate in the work of the
European forum along with representatives of their Balkan neighbors and even to include Albanian problem
GREAT POWERS AND ALBANIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT (1878-1914) 241
into the agenda for discussions. The Great Powers have denied the very existence of the Albanian nation.
German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck declared that “the Albanian nation does not exist” and European
diplomats continued to consider the territory with Albanian population only as a geographical pattern and as an
element for mutual territorial exchanges by other Balkan states (Castellan, 1980, p. 10).
As a result of above-mentioned attitudes, approaches, and speculations, the Great Powers made in the
Balkans a mosaic of independent, self-contained, occupied and other states, territories, provinces, and regions.
Simultaneously—in the best traditions of geopolitics—they took care of keeping intact the “holy of
holies”—the transport routes. The main water artery—the Danube—was declared neutral and free to shipping.
The passages of warships through the Black Sea Straits were still forbidden, and even passed on to Russia port
of Batum has received the status of Porto Franco (free shopping haven) and was to be used exclusively by
merchant ships.
Congress of Berlin also became a starting point for growing American interests in the Balkans. Initially
US policy in the Balkans “to some extent proceeded from similar assumptions and principles associated with
‘Splendid Isolation’ of Great Britain” (Iskenderov, 2017, p. 116).
However, by the beginning of the World War I, the Balkan direction in American foreign policy began to
acquire self-importance.
After Congress of Berlin Balkan, countries had to use all their efforts in the field of economic
development of acquired territories. They had to overcome financial-economic impact of the three-year
international crisis, to find solutions for accumulated political issues and new inter-state disputes. Serbian
government called that “consolidation of military conquest”. But those problems still are not solved even today.
On the other hand, activities of the League of Prizren shortly got an anti-Ottoman trend. The opposition
between the committees of the Albanian League and Turkish authorities has reached much tension in Prizren,
Debar, Djakova, and Lum, where it sometimes took an armed character. Russian General Consul in
Thessaloniki M. K. Ulyanov reported that the Albanian authorities—in particular, in Debar—are actually
carried out judicial and police functions:
The members of the League strictly pursue the robbery and murder, often sentencing offenders to death or the burning
of houses and property, whereas the Turkish government in their provinces in no way can stop the robbery and ensure the
lives of innocent villagers. (1992, p. 184)
A number of Russian diplomats in their reports not only informed Saint Petersburg about the current
political and military situation in the areas of the activity of League of Prizren, but also analyzed the historical
and ideological roots of the Albanian national movement. So, the Russian Consul in Prizren I. S. Yastrebov
(who was one of Russia’s leading experts on Albanian affairs) expressed the widespread view of the Russian
foreign policy circles, that Albanian League was largely a creation of the authorities of Istanbul. However, he
pointed out that the League was created at the suggestion and on the basis of the development of one of the
ideologists of the Albanian movement Pashko Vasa, who was at that time advisor to the Kosovo Vali.
According to the Russian diplomat, Pashko Vasa himself borrowed this idea from a prominent figure in the
Paris Commune of 1871 General Gustave Paul Cluseret who visited the regions of European Turkey. Yastrebov
even called supporters of League of Prizren “Communards”, although the direct analogies still looked doubtful
because of the deep differences in socio-economic and socio-political conditions in France and in the Albanian
lands (1992).
Second period of the Albanian national movement development was closely connected with the Albanian
uprisings 1908-1912 resulted in the proclamation of independence on November 28, 1912 in Vlora. During that
period, Austria-Hungary and several other Great Powers—to a very significant extent Italy—already paid
particular attention to Albanian matters—but refused to support independence of Albania.
First All-Albanian Congress in Bitoli in November 1908 was a first very important sign of “restart” of the
Albanian national movement after crushing League of Prizren by Ottoman Empire. Delegates from Albania,
Italy, Egypt, Bulgaria, Romania, and the USA took place in that forum. Its importance in the context of the
Albanian national movement was described by Russian Consul to Bitoli P. Kal:
Congress’ main goal was not even to create Albanian alphabetic system, but in the first place to unify all the
Albanians. That wish repeated in all speeches of the participants without exceptions during open-door sessions. The same
wish was in no doubts one of the main themes of the secret sessions of the Congress. (Smirnova, 2003, p. 41)
By the summer of 1909, one should note first military actions of the Albanians against the new regime of
the “Young Turks”. In the spring of the following year, such actions turned into a massive armed rebellion of
the Albanians of the Kosovo vilayet. It was provoked by the military action by Turkish regular army led by
Turgut Sevket Pasha and the introduction of siege throughout the territory of Albania in the late summer. Head
of the Russian Vice-Consulate in Prizren S. P. Razumovsky pointed out in his diplomatic report dated 4 May,
1910 that “the Albanian movement, which began because of the failure of the introduction of a city tax not in
time, bought recently purely fundamental nature of the struggle against the ‘Young Turks’” (Archive, d. 2082).
Position of the Turkish authorities was complicated by a very important factor. That factor was mentioned
in a thorough article in the Russian newspaper “Novoye vremya” (“New Times”) of May 30, 1910 under the
title “The Value of the Albanian Movement”. The author of the article stressed that the territorial boundaries of
the Albanian question covered in one way or another all the provinces of European Turkey, and the area of the
uprising even could easily expand, drawing into its orbit many of the Albanian tribes both Catholic and
Muslim.
On the other hand, the Great Powers, especially Austria-Hungary and Italy, formally entered into a single
military-political bloc, actively strengthened their economic positions in Albania, and gave this region an
increasingly important place in their separate foreign policy plans. Italy began to value the Albanian direction
as an independent and promising since the beginning of the 1880s (since the occupation of Tunisia by France in
1881, when Italy not only lost hopes to acquire it or get come compensation, but also understood her diplomatic
isolation and a certain “inferiority” of her status as a Great Power). At that time, the problem of the place of
Italy in the system of international relations in Europe and her strategic role in the Mediterranean has become
particularly relevant for the Italian leadership. The basic meaning and content of the struggle between two
Powers for economic and political control over Albania was quite clearly noted in 1904 by Italian Minister of
Foreign Affairs T. Tittoni:
Albania itself has no importance whatsoever, all of its special significance lies in the harbours and coast, the
possession of which for Austria and Italy is equivalent to the unrestricted domination on the Adriatic Sea. However,
Austria will not allow this to Italy, and Italy will not allow this to Austria, and if one Power strives for it, another one will
resist it by all her forces. (Arsh, Senkevich, & Smirnova, 1965, p. 125)
That Italian view was directly resonated with the opinion of the Tittoni’s Austro-Hungarian colleague A.
Goluchowski, who said: “Austria has no interest to this province [Albania], but cannot let the capture of her by
other Power. The Adriatic Sea should remain free” (Archive, d. 2081).
The degree of the Austro-Italian contradictions around Albania was periodically increased, and world
media seriously considered even the possibility of military conflict between them. For example, American
newspaper The Deseret Evening News (Salt Lake City) published in December of 1910 the article under the
catchy title “Are Austria and Italy on the Brink of War?”. The article stressed that “Austria thinks of the March
on Salonika, and Italy—about the capture of Albania”.
Balkan leaders also tried to use Albanian national movement in their own interests. In the first place, one
should note the role of Montenegrin King Nicholas. His closest associates have developed a far-reaching
program of action for the transition of Albanian tribes under the jurisdiction of Montenegro. War Minister of
Montenegro M. Martinović openly admitted in his interview with the Russian military agent in Cetinje N. M.
Potapov that “attitudes of the Great Powers concerning the desirability of speedy updates of Turkey and of the
consolidation of her new political system do not coincide with current views and thoughts of Montenegro”. He
did not rule out the possibility that as long as Turkey does not get stronger, the principality “will try to make a
mess in the Balkans, in order to reward herself by parts of Albania and Old Serbia [Kosovo] for the loss of hope
for acquiring Bosnia and Hercegovina” (Archive, d. 2082).
Russia was also guided in her Balkan as well as Albanian policy by own geopolitical interests. It
considered Serbia and Montenegro as traditional allies in the Balkans and therefore treated the Albanian
national movement primarily as a threat to the stability of the overall situation on the Peninsula and to the
security and territorial integrity of the Slavic States. Pan-Slav intentions also played a significant role—not only
in the Balkans. One of the leaders of the Slovenian national movement within Austria-Hungary Janko Lavrin
was a staunch supporter of Russia and the idea of creation a broad Slavic Union—at least in cultural and
national sense.
The language spoken by 2/3 of all Slavs, understood from the Balkans to the Arctic Ocean, from Austria and
Germany to the borders of China, the language that gave the world one of the best literature, more than anyone has the
right to become a language of mutual relations of the Slavs. (1908, pp. 43-45)
But at the same time, Saint Petersburg condemned the expansionist ambitions of the Montenegrin
leadership, which could lead to a sharp worsening of relations and even military conflict between Montenegro
and Turkey as well as to the collective intervention of the Great Powers. Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs A.
P. Izvolsky in a secret telegram to Russian Chargé d’Affaires at Cetinje on May 13, 1910 stressed the need to
give Montenegrin King Nicholas urgent advice to abandon his plans towards Albania and “to stop any action”
in that direction (Archive, d. 2082).
In this context, it is important to stress that Russian diplomats took an active part in fierce discussions
about ethnic roots of the Albanians. Some of them traced Serbian roots of Albanians. Among them, Russian
delegate to the International Control Commission in Albania (1913-1914) A. M. Petryaev was one of the most
prominent Russian experts on Albania (Iskenderov, 2018).
He underlined that Albanians lived in Kosovo and Macedonia “in the vast majority of cases should be
considered as “Turkish Slavs” and “Albanized Slavs”. “Albanian people never played a political role, but under
the Turkish domination becomes a force that comes out of their field, expanding its borders to absorb another
nation, which is the glorious historical past”, wrote Petryaev about Serbs and Albanians in 1912 (Archive, d.
5296).
Russian Consul to Prizren I. S. Yastrebov also saw the transition of the Kosovo Serbs into Islam an
important factor in creating the Albanian ethnos (Archive, V-А2).
However, the point of view of the Serbian roots of a considerable part of the Albanian ethnic group was
strongly opposed by some other Russian diplomats in the early twentieth century. Russian Consul to Mitrovica
Tuholka in the comprehensive report dated 1915 stated that the Albanians “undoubtedly have the Aryan origin.
Apparently they have lived for a long time in the mountains on the Western side of the Balkan Peninsula”.
However, he also recognized the process of “Albanization” of Serbs (Archive, d. 5338).
Another important factor for Russian politics in the Balkans since the Congress of Berlin 1878 was the
opposition to the creation of one dominant state in the Balkan region. In that context, one should agree with
Russian diplomatic representative to Montenegro N. A. Obnorsky who was totally against the very existence of
powerful Balkan states. In February 1913, he prepared a diplomatic report entitled “Russia and the Balkan
Problem”. Obnorsky described two possibilities in the Balkans. First option was creation of unique state of
Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro under the “patronage” of Russia. That option would be contrary to Russian
interests because it can cause problems in multi-ethnic and multi-confessional Russian Empire, stressed
Obnorsky. Second option was that weak Balkan states still preserved their contradictions between each other
but also functioned under Russian “patronage”. Such option would be better for Russia, according to
above-mentioned diplomat. Obnorsky thought collapse of the “status quo” in the Balkans dangerous, because
“Greater Bulgaria” or “Greater Serbia” would be Russia’s regional rivals.
Obnorsky’s points of view were challenged by Russian Vice-Consul in Vlora and representative to the
International Control Commission in Albania A. M. Petryaev—who supported creation of united Yugoslav
state including Serbian areas of Austria-Hungary. Such a state could be populated by 14 million people and
possessed Adriatic Sea harbors (Archive, d. 61).
One should agree that among the Great Powers, Russia for a long time was a supporter of integrity of
Ottoman Empire. As The New York Herald rightly wrote on July 12, 1878, Russian emperor Nicholas I in the
1850s “stated clearly his own opinions of the condition of the Ottoman Empire and of the necessity the Great
Powers were under of providing against the event of its actual collapse”.
Meanwhile understanding of Albanian issues in the international community had risen to a new level in
1911. First of all, that was connected with the fact that a new Albanian revolt broke out in March, had a wider
scope, and by the summer of that year spread throughout Albania. Russian envoy to Serbia N. G. Hartwig noted
that new uprising “apparently organized by experienced hand and directed with unusual tactical sequence”; in
addition, “despite the significant concentration of government troops in fighting the Turks met serious
difficulties with the Albanians” (Archive, d. 2084).
The leaders of the Albanian national movement succeed in establishing sustainable contacts with different
social and political circles and movements in other states, in particular in Italy, Bulgaria, and Montenegro.
On June 23, 1911, Albanian members of the local committee in Podgorica published a memorandum
called “The Red Book”, which was the first holistic program of struggle for a broad territorial-administrative
and economic autonomy of the Albanian lands. It was conveyed to the Turkish leadership and the governments
of leading European powers.
Serbian Consul in Pristina M. Rakić pointed out in his report on July 24, 1911 that “the most significant
hallmark of today’s motion is the desire for autonomy” (Rakić, 1985, p. 270).
At the same time, according to Serbian Consul, such factor objectively contributes to the escalation of
Serbo-Albanian relations in these areas, as the Serbs living there were forced to sit on the fence and largely
neutral stance so as not to give rise to any repressive measures in relation to them from the Albanians as well as
from Turkish authorities. According to his observations, a considerable part of the Serbs directly opposed the
aspirations and demands of the Albanians (Rakić, 1985).
At the same time, Montenegrin support for the Albanians with arms, money, and volunteers became more
active. That led to serious complications of the Montenegro-Turkish relations as well as overall situation in the
Balkans. The Great Powers in that period had already anticipated the discussion of the Albanian question at the
international level.
Temporarily Manager of Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs A. A. Neratov wrote on July 27, 1911 to
Russian Ambassador in Istanbul about his conversation with diplomatic representative of Austria-Hungary to
Russia Count Turn. That report ended with the following conclusion: “The problem of solving Albanian crisis
belonged to the internal affairs of Turkey should not be excluded from the program of the upcoming
[international] discussions, since it would be acceptable for Turkey” (Archive, d. 2084).
The Balkan States also began to take into account events in Albania in the context of their foreign policy
courses. An ambivalent attitude to them in Greece was determined by numerous circumstances. Russian Chargé
d’Affaires in Greece Tatishchev pointed out in his report dated July 28, 1911: “Any inner turmoil in the
Ottoman Empire is found by the Greeks with a sense of fun. This however is understandable because these
troubles serve as evidence of the precariousness of the ‘Young Turks’ regime hated by the Greeks” (Archive, d.
2084).
On the other hand, the deterioration of the relations between Turkey and Montenegro due to the uprising in
Albania could threaten the global political course of the Greek government, designed to maintain the existing
situation in the Balkans, at least until re-organization of the Greek army started under the leadership of English
and French instructors. Finally, almost decisive importance for Greece had the aggravation of the situation in
areas of Southern Albania (Northern Epirus according to Greek terminology) claimed by Athens. The rise of
the Albanian national movement in these areas could prevent the implementation of those expansionistic plans.
Therefore, as Tatishchev reported, the Greek ruling circles and public opinion preferred “to continue the current
domination of the Turks in Epirus, rather than the seizure of that region by Albanian propaganda” (Archive, d.
2084).
Russian diplomatic representatives in the Balkans recognized the rise of the Albanian factor. Vice-Consul
in Vlora A. M. Petryaev wrote to Saint Petersburg in 1912, that “Albanian nation never played political role
actually get force under Ottoman rule and go out of its area and expand its boundaries” (Archive, d. 5296).
At the same time, Russia understood that interests of the Albanian national movement and those of Turkey
became more and more contradicted. In Russian archive one should find very interesting appeal issued in
February 1912 by Albanian leaders of Malessia (North Albania) and received in Russian Vice-Consulate in
Shkoder. They accused the Turks and blamed her for the failure of promises and “abdicated responsibility for
the unrest if their requirements would not be fulfilled immediately” (Archive, d. 2084).
In 1913 during so-called “Scutari Crisis”, Russia firstly tried to support Montenegrin claims towards the
city of Shkoder (Scutari) but finally decided to act together with other Great Powers with the goal to avoid
military conflict and even European war.
In July 1912, correspondent for the Saint Petersburg newspaper “Rech” (Speech) V. Viktorov (who had an
objective and professional knowledge about Albania and Albanians) visited the headquarters of one of the
leaders of the Albanian uprising, Riza Bey and had a long conversation with him and some other leaders
including Bajram Curri and Hasan Bey. Riza Bey said to Viktorov:
We are fighting for the natural rights for great Albanian nation. We are not rebels. We want peace ruling all over the
Ottoman Empire. We wish our Sultan to live in harmony with Russia, because we only know two great nations: our people
and the Russian people… Our current struggle is only the first stage. We demand special rights for the four vilayets: that of
Shkoder, Ioannina, Bitoli, and Kosovo. As for the fifth—that of Thessaloniki—we have not yet come to certain
conclusions. The Albanians live in that vilayet too. The entire Albanian people with us are in this fight. It is a fight against
bullying of [“Young Turks”] Committee over our just and legitimate demands. (Archive, d. 2084)
However, finally Albanian question raised from internal to international level in late 1912, when a new
upsurge of the liberation struggle of the Albanian people led to the proclamation of the independence of this
country on November 28, 1912. On 17 December of the same year, the conference of diplomatic
representatives of the Great Powers in London began a comprehensive discussion of Albanian matters.
The next day after the declaration of independence was adopted Ismail Qemali sent telegrams to Foreign
Ministers of leading European countries and Turkey, in which he informed them about decisions made in Vlora
and asked to recognize Albanian independence and protect Albanians “from any infringements of their national
rights and territory from the dismemberment”. The document said that
The Albanians are included in the Family of Nations of Eastern Europe and proud of the fact that they are an ancient
people. They pursue only one goal: to live in peace with all the Balkan States and become a stabilizing basis in the region.
(Smirnova, 2003, p. 56)
Ismail Qemali also sent telegrams to the countries of the anti-Turkish Balkan Union. They contained the
requirement to cease hostilities and withdraw troops from Albanian territory.
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia S. D. Sazonov promptly informed Russian diplomatic
representatives in Belgrade, Sofia, Paris, London, Vienna, and Berlin about the decisions made in Vlora. He
stressed the particular importance for Serbia in this difficult situation to observe the caution in the Albanian
question and in the first place to abandon plans of joining the coastal areas of Central Albania: “The Serbs
should not put us before necessity to renounce publicly solidarity with them supporting what we believe is
unnecessary” (Smirnova, 2003, p. 56).
However, from practical point of view, the Great Powers ignored the appeal of All-Albanian Congress in
Vlora. The only available answer came from the Turkish government, but that was negative. Moreover, on
December 3th, the Greek fleet attacked Vlora. But both Austria-Hungary and Italy had warned Athens against
the capture of the port—thus demonstrating further evidence of the complex interplay of interests of Great
Powers and the Balkan countries of Albania (Vickers, 1995).
After long discussions, the meeting of Ambassadors of the Great Powers in London rejected Turkey’s
plans to keep Albania as her province. On the other hand, they also refused to recognize Albania as an
independent state—which was consistent with the plans of Austria-Hungary and Italy prepared a joint project
(Puto, 1988).
According to the decision on the legal status of Albania accepted on July 29, 1913 at the London
international forum, it was proclaimed “a sovereign, neutral and hereditary Principality under the protectorate
of the Great powers”. This protectorate was to carry out a special commission composed of seven
members—six from the Great Powers and one from Albania, which was assigned the duty to disband the
existing authorities, to develop the country’s “Organic Statute” and organize an international corps of
gendarmes (Castellan, 1980, p. 23).
Albania herself became a place of struggle between various internal military and political group—but one
should agree that religious factor did not play a dominant role. That situation had a lot in common with actual
processes across the world. As Russian researcher M. A. Sapronova truly noted,
Coming to power of the Islamists is not identical to the creation of an Islamic state, that shows the political process in
the Arab world after 2011. Their victory often leads to erosion of the very idea of Islamism, demonstrates the instability of
Islamic political structures. While in the specific political situation, the greatest success achieved by those militant
religious organizations does not care about ideological nuances. (Sapronova, 2015, p. 37)
That was characteristic for Albania on the eve of World War I to a very significant extent.
The main struggle at the London meetings in 1912-1913 took place on the issue of the borders of Albania.
Serbia presented its own map. It demanded inclusion into the enlarged borders of the Serbian state Decani,
Djakovica, Prizren, Ohrid, and Debar. Montenegro claimed Shkoder, San Giovanni di Medua, and Lesh.
On October 21 of 1912, the Montenegrin troops began shelling the mountain Tarabos with the ultimate
goal to capture the heavily fortified fortress of Shkoder.
Germany strongly condemned the policy of Montenegro. England, France, and Austria-Hungary
threatened to take military action against Serbia and Montenegro and against Russia, if that will support them.
The acuteness of the discussions about the fate of Shkoder was demonstrated by well-known statement of one
of the participants in the London meeting of the ambassadors of the Great Powers, the Austrian diplomat M.
Mensdorf likening them to “buying a carpet at the Istanbul Bazaar” (Puto, 1982, p. 163).
Russia also put a tough diplomatic impact on Montenegro at the final stage of discussions. As a result,
Montenegrin army left occupied fortress of Shkoder. British historian Kenneth Morrison rightly wrote that as a
result of the Balkan Wars 1912-1913, “Montenegro’s military power had been significantly eroded, and it was
increasingly uncertain who in diplomatic circles it could trust. What is more, domestic opposition remained”
(Morrison, 2009, p. 35).
Serbia also for a long time refused to fulfill obligations made by the Great Powers and withdraw her army
from Albanian territory. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia A. A. Neratov declared in Belgrade that
he had been speaking to Italian Chargé d’Affaires in Russia, which stressed the solidarity of Italy with
Austria-Hungary concerning the continuance in force of the decisions of the London Conference. He and also
diplomatic representative of the Austro-Hungarian Empire accused Serbian Prime-Minister Nikola Pasić of
insincerity, citing his statements about the undesirability for Serbia to be considered with the decisions of the
Conference made at the meeting with members of his party. In this regard, Neratov instructed head of the
Russian diplomatic mission in Belgrade to state categorically to the Serbian government that “it cannot count
on the sympathy of Russia resisting already accepted decisions” (Archive, d. 531).
Russian Chargé d’Affaires in Belgrade has also received a secret telegram to the Russian Ambassador in
Paris, A. P. Izvolsky with the “urgent councils” transferred to Serbian representative in France M. Vesnić by
Russian and French Foreign Ministers S. D. Sazonov and S. Pichon to comply with the requirements of the
Powers of the Triple Alliance. Immediately after that, he contacted head of the Serbian government
encouraging him to seek some other way to protect Serbia from Albanian incursions, without occupying
“strategic points” on the Albanian territory. Pasic understood well the indication of the Russian representative
and promised to discuss the matter with the Army chief R. Putnik. But before Pasic managed to report this
conversation to the other members of the Serbian leadership, Chargé d’Affaires of Austria-Hungary in Belgrade
presented on 18 October the ultimatum of his government, in which Serbia was proposed within eight days to
clear Albanian territory, under the threat of making by Austria-Hungary more decisive action in case of
unsatisfactory response (Archive, d. 530).
Following this, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary, L. Berchtold invited Serbian envoy in
Vienna and categorically told him that the Habsburg Monarchy would take decisive action against Serbia “in
the case of abandonment of at least one Serbian soldier outside borders specified by the Conference” (Archive,
d. 531).
The ultimatum caused great excitement in Serbia. A number of members of the government called for a
categorical rejection of the demands of Austria-Hungary. But at the end, more moderate position of the head of
government prevailed over. Visiting the Russian mission immediately after the meeting of the Council of
Ministers, Nikola Pasić said that his Cabinet decided to withdraw Serbian garrisons from Albania as a result not
of the threats by the Habsburg Monarchy, but only of the benevolent advice by Russia. Pasic added that the
garrisons will be transferred to the Serbian side of the border line and placed in such a way that at the first
appearance of armed groups from the Albanian side the latter could be subjected to a massive attack by the
Serbian forces. At the same time, Prime minister said that his government had decided in the near future to
appeal to European powers for speed establishment in Albania of international police and gendarmerie—which
are an essential guarantee of peace on the Serbo-Albanian border (Archive, d. 530).
According to the notice, the Serbian Supreme military commanded, at ten o’clock in the morning of
October 25, 1913—24 hours before deadline fixed by the Austrian ultimatum—the Serbian troops had left
Albanian territory (Archive, d. 530).
In this context, it is quite interesting to compare military power of Austria-Hungary and Serbia. On the eve
World War I, the number of personnel of the Serbian army in time of peace amounted to 52,000 people (as for
Montenegro—2,000 people), in the case of a military threat that numbers could arise up to 247,000 people in
Serbia and 60,000 in Montenegro. The number of pre-war army at the disposal of Austria-Hungary amounted to
478,000 people. In the case of start of military operations, Vienna could account on 1,421,250 people
(Zayonchkovskiy, 1938).
At the end, a compromise around the borders of the new European state was achieved. Albania secured
Shkoder. On the other hand, vast territories with a majority of Albanian population, including Kosovo and
plateau Dukagjin with the cities of Prizren, Debar, Pec, and Djakovica were transferred to Serbia, as well as
cities of Plav and Gusinje—to Montenegro. That had negative consequences for the further development of the
situation in the Balkans and in Europe in general. According to some estimates, in 1913 Albania has obtained
only half of the Albanian lands if we consider the territory and the Albanian population living in the former
Ottoman Empire (Castellan, 1980).
One should agree in this context that Russia’s approach toward the borders of Albania was quite complex.
For example, Russian prominent diplomat A. M. Petryaev supported delimitation between Albania and Greece
according to Albanians’ plans. In March 1913, he wrote a private letter to Head of the 2nd political department
in Russian foreign ministry G. N. Trubetzkoy and stressed that for Russia it would be better to enlarge
Albania’s territory to the south (towards Greece) with the goal to neutralize Albanian territorial aspirations
towards Serbia and Montenegro and oppose the rise of Albanian nationalism.
Petryaev has also critisized position of Serbia in his territorial dispute with Albania. He pointed out that
Serbian demand for acquiring Djakovica simply provoces Austria-Hungary and complicates the work of the
Balkan peace conference in London: “I think the Austrians will concede Djakovo [Djakovica] and may be
already could do it if there were not different irrelevant statements and speeches by the Serbs ‘qui indisposent
les autrichiens’” (Archive, d. 2087).
In accordance with the provisions of the London Peace Conference, Great Powers sent to the Balkan states
collective Declaration, which stressed the need for the adoption of all appropriate measures to protect the rights
and interests of national minorities. In regard to Serbia, the diplomatic representatives of the Great Powers in
Belgrade made official representation in the above-mentioned sense on 17 August 1913. They also underlined
the fact that Serbian troops continued to stay on Albanian territory, contrary to the relevant resolutions of the
London conference. Serbia refused to take into account Russian arguments for leaving Albanian territory and to
prevent conflict with Austria-Hungary. Serbian diplomats stressed that Austria-Hungary will not take any
decisive action because she “missed too many cases to cause serious harm to Serbia during the Balkan crisis”
(Archive, d. 530).
Serbia’s actions have provoked a new escalation of the problems along Serbo-Albanian border, which
forced the Great Powers to take active measures. Powers of the Triple Alliance presented in Belgrade an
ultimatum. Russia at the crucial moment forced the Serbian government to make concessions that prevent
European war in autumn of 1913.
The relations between Russia and Serbia on one hand and between Austria-Hungary and Albania on the
other hand were to a very significant extent pattern of the “Axle and Spokes” principle. That principle was later
actively used by the US foreign policy towards East Asia as well as Spain and sucessfully helped to prevent
dangereous expansionist ambitions of regional states (Cha, 2016).
After World War I, the Great Powers finally recognized Albania’s independence, but her borders remained
unsolved by Albanian leaders’ point of view. That “burden” seriously undermined situation in the Balkan
during XX century and resulted in conflicts in Kosovo, Macedonia, and Preshevo Valley (1998-2001). The role
of international actors in those conflicts was controversial. “Double standards” were imposed on Kosovo,
Macedonia, and Preshevo Valley and actually Albanian national problem to a very significant extent remains
unsolved.
“An inherent property of human nature is to interpret the unknown by using the previously familiar”, but
this approach is simplistic—rightly emphasizes the French expert of the international relations Bertrand Badie.
He urges “to go to the inclusive vision of the new international relations” (Badie, 2016, p. 20).
That “inclusive vision” is the main option that could help to understand the Albanian matter in past,
present, and future.
References
Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire. Fond Glavniy Archive V-А2, op. 181, d. 675, l. 33.
Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire. Fond Politarchive, op. 482, d. 61, l. 24-26, 33.
Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire. Fond Politarchive, op. 482, d. 530, l. 165, 183, 184, 187.
Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire. Fond Politarchive, op. 482, d. 531, l. 375, 385.
Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire. Fond Politarchive, op. 482, d. 2081, l. 21.
Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire. Fond Politarchive, op. 482, d. 2082, l. 45, 60, 75.
Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire. Fond Politarchive, op. 482, d. 2084, l. 152, 231, 232, 326.
Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire. Fond Politarchive, op. 482, d. 5338, l. 1-10.
An outline of the PSR of Albania. (1978). Tirana: 28 Nentori.
Arsh, G. L., Senkevich, I. G., & Smirnova, N. D. (1965). Kratkaya istoriya Albanii. Moscow: Nauka.
Badie, B. (2016). Has history restarted? International Trends, 14(2), 6-20.
Cha, V. D. (2016). Powerplay: The origins of the American alliance system in Asia. Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University
Press.
Castellan, G. (1980). L'Albanie. Paris: Armeline.
Iskenderov, P. A. (2018). Aleksandr Mikhailovich Petryaev. Voprosy Istorii, 2018(1), 18-32.
Iskenderov, P. A. (2017). SSHA i albanskoye nacionalnoye dvizheniye 1878-1918. Voprosy Istorii, 2017(10), 113-121.
Kratkaya istoriya Albanii. (1992). Moscow: Nauka.
Morrison, K. (2009). Montenegro: A modern history. London—New York: I. B. Tauris.
Potemkina, V. P. (1945). Istoriya diplomatii, II. Moscow-Leningrad: Ogiz.
Puto, A. (1982). L’independence albanaise et la diplomatie des Grandes Puissances (1912-1914). Tirana: 8 Nentori.
Puto, A. (1988). La question albanaise dans les actes internationaux de l’époque imperialiste, IL. Tirana.
Rakić, M. (1985). Konzulska pisma 1905-1911. Beograd: Prosveta.
Reuter, J. (1982). Die Albaner in Jugoslawien. München: Oldenbourg.
Sapronova, M. A. (2015). Stanovleniye novoy gosudarstvennosti na Arabskom Vostoke. International Trends, 13(3), 26-38.
Sbornik dogovorov Rossii s drugimi gosudarstvami 1856-1917. (1952). Moscow: Gospolitizdat.
Skendi, S. (1967). The Albanian national awakening 1978-1912. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Slavyanskiy mir, Saint Petersburg, 1908. No. 1.
Smirnova, N. D. (2003). Istoriya Albanii v XX veke. Moscow: Nauka.
Vickers, M. (1995). The Albanians. A modern history. London—New York: I. B. Tauris.
Zayonchkovskiy, A. M. (1938). World War of 1914-1918. Vol. I. Campaign 1914-1915. Moscow: Voenizdat.
doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2018.04.004
D DAVID PUBLISHING
Bureaucracy: Max Weber’s Concept and Its Application to

Pakistan
Irfan Ahmed Shaikh

University of Sindh, Jamshoro, Pakistan
Arshad Islam
International Islamic University, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
Bashir Ahmed Jatoi
University of Sindh, Jamshoro, Pakistan
To investigate Max Weber’s concept of bureaucracy and its relevance to Pakistan’s civil service, this study explains
the system of governance followed in different nations, its function, and bureaucratic formulations in the
well-managed and administered state. The paper analyzes reasons for the poor performance of Pakistani public
service provision. International development doctrines pertaining to governance are based on accountable to the
governments and effective bureaucracy. This study explores the formation of the Pakistani state and civil service
and its role in the implementation of government policies. Irrespective of the system of governance followed across
different nations, the presence, and functioning of a bureaucratic set-up is crucial to manage and administer the
state. However, in Pakistan there has been an egregious failure of the bureaucratic set-up to achieve this vision.
This study explores the reasons why based on Weberian sociological theory affirming that the main characteristic
of bureaucracy is espirit de corps, doing things for the good of the institution (i.e., civil service) even if goes
against the public interest. This study analyzes such orientation in the context of a major developing state, Pakistan.
The essential principal function of bureaucracy is to honestly and sincerely implement the government policies on
behalf of the people. The government provides representation of the national interest, mainly when democratically
elected, while the bureaucracy provides skills and know-how; the latter is liable to the former, but often not directly
to the public. Thus, bureaucrats are usually known as “civil servants”, who provide continuity in governance and
daily life, despite the vagaries of changes in government. This is a qualitative research entirely based on literature
survey from library data collected from books and articles.
Keywords: bureaucracy, Max Weber, government policies, democracy, Pakistan
Introduction
This paper comprehensively explores the concept of bureaucracy taking into account the set of interlinked
aspects to the topic under discussion rather than treating it as an isolated and unified construct. “Bureaucracy”
Irfan Ahmed Shaikh, Ph.D. in History & Civilization, assistant professor, Department of General History, University of Sindh,
Jamshoro, Pakistan
Arshad Islam, Ph.D., associate professor, Department of History and Civilization, International Islamic University, Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia
Bashir Ahmed Jatoi, M.Phil, Lecturer, Department of General History, University of Sindh, Jamshoro, Pakistan.
252 BUREAUCRACY: MAX WEBER’S CONCEPT AND ITS APPLICATION TO PAKISTAN
is a versatile term that embodies diverse meanings, particularly in post-structuralize interpretations (Du Gay,
2005). Rather than enriching the idea of bureaucracy by giving rise to an altogether new idea, this approach just
brings to surface how different pieces of literature on bureaucracy are inter-dependent and evolve side by side
while pronouncing antagonistic views of the idea of bureaucracy. This paper traces the development of the idea
of bureaucracy from the early conceptualization of Max Weber to study the concept of bureaucracy from
different perspectives and diverse angles. The principal objective of this paper is to point out how the different
writings on bureaucracy adopt a particular kind of narrative, whereby bureaucracy is instituted due to a failure
to develop organizational structures that can address external influences, with special reference to Pakistan after
its independence in 1947.
Truly speaking, bureaucracy is inseparably linked with the emergence of the modern state that was defined
by its development from pre-modern bureaucratic organizations. In this sense, the term actually corresponds to
bureaucracy’s representative structure of our times. To facilitate an understanding of the emergence of
bureaucracy and how it is viewed by the public, it is essential to explore how management thinking is today
influenced by Western paradigms. However, it is to be noted that before the field of management emerged as a
unique discipline, fully organized economic and mercantile activities were evolved in the light of partially
formalized knowledge and some ideologies.
The existence of highly organized governmental and administrative systems is attested from the earliest
civilizations in Mesopotamia and Egypt, whose very existence as complex societies necessitated bureaucracy.
Formal study of the phenomenon of state organization can be traced to Greece, such as Aristotle’s
differentiation between “the art of household management” (oekonomia) and “the art of moneymaking”
(chrematistike) (Swedberg, 1998). By managing the household, he meant converting nature into utilities used
for domestic life including goods, food stuffs, and some exclusive kinds of services, whereas moneymaking
constituted the act of economic regulation, such as public mints, treasuries, and revenue. Aristotle (384-322
B.C.E.) certainly considered the latter to be a less worthy occupation and certainly undesirable for a
philosopher. In Politics, Aristotle narrated the story in which Thales of Miletus (620-546 B.C.E.) purchased
olive presses and then leased them to olive-farmers during harvest times to demonstrate how easy it is for a
philosopher to make money in case he wished it, but how he should rather devote his precious time to more
intellectually important subjects like geometry, politics, or rhetoric. This disdain for chrematistike persisted
among the civilizations influenced by the Greeks until early modern times (Styhre, 2007).
The modern versions of bureaucratic organization and the managerial tasks connected to it stem from
theological discourses, and Weber (1992) linked it particularly to Protestantism and the associated birth of
capitalism. The Protestant work ethic stripped Christianity of its exoteric manifestations, including the eternal
rhythm of the seasons and social hierarchy, to be replaced by an industrious cult of work and stern social moral
values. Several criticisms have been made against the Weberian view of the relationship between Protestantism
and capitalism (Styhre, 2007), including that Catholic city-states like Venice and Genoa in medieval Italy were
the first commercial trading centers of Europe, and the Catholic empires of Spain and Portugal predated the
Protestant ones of the Netherlands and England in their plunder of the Americas and Asia. Some scholars had
stated that Weber reversed causality, saying that Protestantism was the result of capitalism rather than being its
impetus (Wren, 1972). However, Weber’s primary notion that certain concepts and beliefs have a very long and
predominantly latent functions and unanticipated effects remains a major contribution to the understanding of
the emergence of modern capitalism.
BUREAUCRACY: MAX WEBER’S CONCEPT AND ITS APPLICATION TO PAKISTAN 253
Guillén (1994) talked of more recent connections between religion and management. For example, in the
UK, Quaker families controlled several corporations doing a variety of businesses like banking (Lloyds and
Barclays), accounting (Price Waterhouse Cooper), and confectionery (Cadbury and Rowntree) (Guillén, 1994).
The primitive models of administration therefore chiefly relied on what is called as “normative control”;
religious concepts and ideologies decided what kind of economic and commercial ventures were allowed and
prohibited. More recent forms of managerial thinking are mainly connected with rational forms of control,
mainly developed in domains like accounting and book-keeping. An example of this was the Venetian Luca
Paciolo’s double-entry book-keeping method, spoken of in his Summa de Arithmetica, Geometrica, Proportioni,
et Proportionalita, published in 1494 (Wren, 1972).
The development of management thinking and practice before the transformation of European societies by
the industrial revolution was not well organized and systematic. They were predominantly concerned with
looking for solutions to some practical issues connected with day-to-day management. During the initial years
when industrial capitalism was taking shape, characterized by the modernization process, the concept of
management on the shop-floor level was predominant.
The concept of bureaucracy is inseparably linked with the modern society. However, several historians
and anthropologists talk of the presence of bureaucratic methods and bureaucratic institutions seen in
pre-modern and tribal societies too (De Landa, 1997). The French historian Marc Bloch (1962) stated that
primitive forms of organized bureaucracy in Europe beyond the purview of the church and the papal court were
seen dating back to the feudal period, stemming from the eleventh and twelfth centuries. In fact, much earlier
than this, some developed cultures of the world had well-developed and organized forms of administration and
procedures with regard to judicial proceedings, education, governance, and religious organizations, notably
China. At the same time, it cannot be denied that the evolution of modern bureaucracy has been largely
supported by the ability to write, back-up, disseminate, and replicate the information (Bloch, 1962).
Jack Goody (1986) analyzed the bureaucratic organization of primitive societies and pointed out that the
practice of writing was the one and only notable skill that preceded the birth of the bureaucratic state. Writing is
critical in the development of bureaucratic states, even though relatively complex forms of government are
possible without it. Writing was not essential to the development of the state but of a certain type of state, the
bureaucratic state. Apart from writing, Kallinikos (2004) strongly opined that every bureaucratic set-up rests on
the foundation of new concept pertaining to individualism and the freedom and rights of individuals contained
in the bourgeois ethos:
Bureaucracy and modernity are… inextricably bound up with one another. Bureaucracy is the organization form of
modernity. It is closely associated with the overall cultural orientations of modern man, the social mobility that coincided
with the gradual dissolution of premodern stratification, and he is burgeoning bourgeoisie ideals of individual freedom and
justice, which it helped itself to embed. (Kallinikos, 2004, p. 22)
In socialism as understood by Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820-1895), the bourgeoisie
was the only revolutionary group that had the capabilities to alter early modern society by investing it with their
inherent values and ideas (Styhre, 2007). Kallinikos (2004) stated that the bourgeoisie promoted social values
that pointed out the exclusive kind of organization that is hierarchical in its composition, namely “bureaucracy”.
In fact, the ideas of dissociating professional life, family life, and personal likings are discovered at the core of
values:
The emergence of the bureaucratic form of organization was predicated on a major anthropological innovation (that is,
a new way of conceiving humanity and institutionally embedding it) that we have tended to take for granted these days,
namely, the clear and institutionally supported separation of work from the rest of people’s lives. The conception of work
as a distinct sphere of social life, sufficiently demarcated vis-à-vis other social spheres, has had a decisive significance for
constitution of the modern workplace. (Kallinikos, 2003, p. 614)
To sum up, one of the essential formative influences of the modern society is a movement from a kind of
regime ruled over by autocratic tendencies and authoritarianism to a special kind of organizational structure
that is characterized by the values, such as transparency, expertness, and well-organized inquiries. This is in
fact a very important kind of progression in the formation of modern society, with concepts of emancipation
and citizenship rights; bureaucratic organization can be said to have contributed a great deal towards this
development; in theory this is wholly good, but the reality is often far from desirable in many developing
countries, to the extent that bureauphobia has become the norm. To understand this, we have to analyze Max
Weber’s views pertaining to the structure of the bureaucratic organization.
Weber’s Views on Bureaucracy

Weber’s seminal contributions to modern social thinking were based on sociology, economics, and
philosophy, in which he held chairs in Freiburg, Heidelberg, and Munich, respectively. Weber had the ability to
converse fluently in English, French, and Spanish, with a good hold over Russian and Hebrew. His position as
one of the most popular social thinkers is not disputed to this day, in the fields of jurisprudence, philosophy,
economics, history, and theology; however, his accomplished work on bureaucracy is his most popular
contribution to the realm of social sciences. According to Blau and Scott (1963), Weber’s concepts of
bureaucracy are “undoubtedly the most important general statements on formal organization”. Bendix (1971)
said that “none of the critics of Weber’s analysis has yet dispensed with his definition”. Weber was successful
in recognizing the evolution of a bureaucratic kind of organization in Germany and stated that the new
developments there suggested a novel form of administration (Styhre, 2007). Weber attributed the
accumulation of wealth—and thus the emergence of modern capitalism—to the birth of bureaucracy in the
modern world.
The growing demands on culture… are determined, though to a varying extent, by the growing wealth of the most
influential strata in the state. To this extent increasing bureaucratisation is a function of the increasing possession of goods
used for consumption, and of an increasingly sophisticated technique of fashioning external life—a technique which
corresponds to the opportunities provided by such wealth. This reacts with the standard of living and makes for an
increasingly subjective indispensability of organized, collective, inter-local, and thus bureaucratic, provision for the most
varied wants, which previously were either unknown, or were satisfied locally or by private economy. (Weber, 1947, p.
213)
Weber’s key work, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Economy and Society), identifies a set of concepts that
make up the bureaucratic system, featuring a number of complicated ones which are very tough to render in
English (here we adopt Höpfl’s translations, 2006, p. 10). Bureaucracy enjoys Herrschaft (“authority”), by
virtue of which it is able to rule over other systems. The personnel in the administration are confined to
well-defined domains of Kompetenzen (delimited “jurisdiction”). They work through Fachwissen (“official
competence”) acquired from Kontorwissenschaft (“administrative science”). We might say that the bureaucratic
organization is a kind of straff (“taut”). The bureaucracy rules over Machtmittel (“power tools”) and also
Verwaltungsmittel (“way of administration”) to carry out its responsibilities with a primary concentration on
Akten (“record maintenance”) (Weber, 1947). For Weber, “bureaucracy” meant a more effective kind of
organization than traditional “collegiate” types of governance:
The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization has always been its purely technical superiority over
any other form of organization. The fully developed bureaucratic mechanism compares with other organizations exactly as
does the machine with the non-mechanical modes of production. Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files,
continuity, discretion, strict subordination, reduction of friction and of material and personal costs—these are raised to the
optimum point in the strictly bureaucratic administration, and especially in its monocratic form. As compared with all
collegiate, honorific, and avocational forms of administration, trained bureaucracy is superior on all these points. And as
far as complicated asks are concerned, paid bureaucratic work is not only more precise but, in the last analysis, it is often
cheaper than even formally unremunerated honorific service. (Weber, 1947, p. 214)
Based on these perspectives, the bureaucratic system offers some advantages to society with a range of
essential services by depending on coordination and infrastructure to a large extent. According to Weber,
contemporary society cannot dispense with bureaucracy, and bureaucrats are the carriers of the values of
transparency and predictability that are integral and important values of democracy. At the same time, Weber
has been highly appreciated for earning a wide popularity by providing a grim image of the bureaucratic
organization, in which he compared it to an iron cage administered by closed-minded professionals who have
almost no empathy and interest that can stretch outside their area of expertise. Thus, while Weber appeared
enthusiastic regarding the potential of bureaucratic organization, he also critiqued its inherent dysfunctions and
errors. One of the limitations of bureaucracy is its powerful obsession with what is called as “rationalist”
thinking, a way of approach that prescribes utility and practical solutions to the challenges spotted (Styhre,
2007), as he stated:
Naturally, bureaucracy promotes a “rationalist” way of life, but the concept of rationalism allows for widely differing
contents. Quite generally, one can say that the bureaucratisation of all domination very strongly furthers the development
of “rational matter-of-factness” and the personality type of the professional expert. (Weber, 1947, p. 240)
Influenced by this tendency, a bureaucrat tends to confine himself to the portals of brutal and rigid
“factism” wherein he tends to take only bare facts into account. Weber was greatly worried about such a
negative and inhumane mode of thinking and said that this tendency had given rise to an altogether new genre
where bureaucrats are pictured as heartless and obstructive administrators characterized by a “bureaucratic
personality” more concerned with blind adherence to rules and regulations and self-serving organizational goals
than with actual practical outcomes from their work in serving human beings or even society in general.
Power Structure (Hierarchy)

An important topic in the domains of the bureaucratic writings is concerned with the creative potentials of
bureaucracies. Several writers have a notion that bureaucracies are actually poor arenas for those who innovate.
Some thinkers have also conducted empirical studies on this aspect. Thompson (1969) studied the connection
between innovation and bureaucracy and defined the former as the generation, acceptance, and implementation
of new ideas, processes, and products or services. Innovation, therefore, implies the capacity to change and
adapt (Thompson, 1969). Because “innovation” refers to bringing about variety, it is viewed as an essential
capacity both for cross-functional collaboration as well as gaining novel set of abilities and processes.
Thompson felt bureaucrats are poor innovators: “Innovation is more risky for the bureaucrat than for the
entrepreneur”. During the bureaucratization of firms, the emerging system organizes the various activities into
well-defined domains of responsibility. As a result, an order is imposed and conflicts and uncertain situations
are resolved. Thompson stated: “Other things being equal, the less bureaucratized (monocratic) the organization,
the more conflict and uncertainty and the more innovation” (Thompson, 1969).
Within a large number of other concerns, one of the disadvantages of the bureaucratic organization is its
mechanical dependence on the concept of “extrinsic motivation” forming part of the motivation theory. For
instance, extrinsic motivation is that which is drawn from outside the individual from benefits like salaries,
bonuses, rewards, and other incentives (Styhre, 2007). For Thompson, innovation is highly concerned with
“intrinsic motivation”, the kind of encouragement sourced from within budding from the individual’s personal
likings and goals. For instance, this is something like the zealous interest of a scientist to know how a given
process can be explored in the scientific parlance. The extrinsic reward system, administrated by the hierarchy
of authority, stimulates conformity rather than innovation. Creativity is promoted, for the most part, by an
internal commitment, by intrinsic rewards (Thompson, 1969). Also, Thompson opined that the idea of
professionalism has to be subsequently cultivated in bureaucracies:
Professionalism… is an alternative to bureaucracy (or the market) as a social control. As a system of control, it is
pluralistic and collegiate rather than monocratic and hierarchical. The rewards it offers are professional recognition for
increasing competence (professional growth) and the intrinsic satisfaction associated with professional work. (Thompson,
1969, p. 93)
A particular field of interest relevant to this discussion is “bureaucratization”, which is the implementation
of bureaucratic processes and regulations within the purview of an organization. Today, the idea of
“bureaucratization” is viewed rather negatively due to widespread dissatisfaction and aversion to
bureaucratization and its mechanical, unproductive, and monotonous systems and routines (Styhre, 2007).
However, as Albrow (1970) noted, the concept has not always been negative:
In the 1920s it was quite normal to speak of a bureaucratization of the firm, meaning the introduction of systematic
administration and the growth of the number of purely administrative employees… If the firm itself is viewed as a
bureaucracy then we can conceive of the bureaucratization of society in terms of an increase in the number of and size of
its organizations. (Albrow, 1970, pp. 104-105)
During the early modern period that preceded the beginning of the twentieth century, bureaucratization
pertained to the evolution of a modern state apparatus. Bendix (1971) stated:
The term “bureaucratization” serves to designate these patterns of social change, which can be traced to the royal
households of medieval Europe, to the eventual employment of university-trained jurists as administrators, to the civilian
transformation of military controllers on the Continent, and to the civil-service reforms in England and the United States in
the nineteenth century. These several changes were related to other social trends, especially the development of the
universities, the money economy, the legal system, and representative institutions. (Bendix, 1971, p. 133)
Since bureaucratization is one of the chief processes involved in modernizing European society, the
concept of bureaucratization today appears connected to enforcing the formalizing practices in institutions in
order to align them with the established rules and formal procedures. Stinchcombe (1959) attempted to
distinguish between two kinds of administration known as “bureaucratic administration” and “craft
administration”. Bureaucratic administration is predominantly seen in manufacturing companies where
professionals assume the responsibility to plan, while construction firms are characterized by craft
administration, where employees are given the role of decision making for the tasks under their purview
(Styhre, 2007). Therefore for Stinchcombe, bureaucratization appeared to be a form of official communication:
Bureaucratization of administration may be defined as a relatively permanent structuring of communications channels
between continuously functioning officials. This permanent structuring of channels of legitimate communications,
channels defined by the permanent official status of the originator of the communication and of its receiver, permits the
development of routine methods of processing information upward and authoritative communication downward. That is, it
permits administration on the basis of files and the economic employment of clerical workers. (Stinchcombe, 1959, p. 176)
Roy (1981) considered the US State Department explanation of bureaucratization as being constituted of:
(1) growth in size, (2) appointment and promotion on the basis of merit, and (3) organizational differentiation
(Roy, 1981). As per the Weberian bureaucratic model, bureaucracies function as the principal carriers of
democratization, i.e., they need to consider the interests of all stakeholders. Roy’s research focuses more on
specific interests than other issues and sums up that bureaucratization does not always pertain to a neutral type
of justifiable governance:
The findings challenge the notion that a bureaucratic, universalistic orientation necessarily opens up an organization
to a wider set of interests than does a particularistic organization. Although universalistic criteria may open up broader
opportunities for many groups, they do not assure allocation of equal costs and benefits for all groups. (Roy, 1981, p. 420)
Blau (1956) wrote: “Bureaucracy… can be defined as organization that maximizes efficiency in
administration, whatever its formal characteristics, or as an institutionalized method of organizing social
conduct in the interests of administrative efficiency”. In this view, bureaucracy is considered to be enhancing
efficiency rather than harming it. When we analyze many such pieces of literature, we find bureaucracy is
portrayed plainly either as good or bad. Such binary thinking is constrained and cannot contribute to
purposefully rehabilitating bureaucracy. Therefore, we need to adopt a more balanced approach to be able to
study the merits and demerits of bureaucracy in an unbiased way.
Adler and Borys (1996) endeavored to tackle a binary method of thorough process and talk about
“coercive” and “enabling” bureaucracies. The former is a system that suppresses the employee’s professional
life and places several rules and regulations that can obstruct their work—in this system, there are fewer
occasions to come across a sensible work opportunity; the latter (the enabling bureaucracy) is a system that
offers enough assistance to the stakeholders to discharge their responsibilities. This system emerges from the
values including transparency, being able to predict, engagement in a value-free environment, a just approach
towards all the clients and several other values of bureaucracy. Adler and Borys (1996) underlined how
bureaucracy can be beneficial and harmful at the same time (Styhre, 2007). This is perhaps a sort of balanced
view of bureaucracy, and only such an approach can encourage newer concepts and outlooks paving way for
the stemming of new perspectives of bureaucracy. If we can call this approach a kind of rehabilitation, then it is
the need of the hour in the realms of organization theory and studies in the domains of management.
This paper studies the concept of bureaucracy from two angles: The first stand perceives how it first
emerges in a discourse and is subsequently re-formulated; the other stands view it as a specific organization
form. During contemporary times, the discursive evolution of ideas and perceptions connected to such ideas
does not indicate the empirical conditions in a society. We find in bureaucracy a strong disagreement between
the neglect of bureaucracy on one side and a faithful dependence on the bureaucratic structure in all structures
of society on the other hand. While a stand point dismisses bureaucracy as fundamentally flawed and perverted,
the other stand point views it as the popularly implemented form of social organization. Obviously, such a
critical view that prevails today is encouraged by the present-day generation’s inclination towards fluxing
epistemologies. For instance, the several modern ideologies on social institutions subscribe to the state of
becoming or what is progressively on the move (in a flux or in evolution) without being stagnant. On the other
hand, an individual during medieval times rather preferred to remain stable and predictable, being greatly
influenced by religious scriptures interpreted in light of Aristotelian metaphysics. In today’s world, the concept
of change is heralded as being capable of liberating human beings from slavery to a paradise of individual
freedoms fostered by bureaucratic structures and institutions. People today look to the world around them as
constantly moving and changing. In addition, several ideologies of our times deem such views as fashionable.
Several scientists, sociologists, and philosophers today focus on various theories and epistemologies favoring
change over stability and fluidity over stagnant entities. Paul Virilio (2002) talked of the difference between the
“tactical war” or the “war of siege”, where attacking the forts is the main task, and the “war of movement” that
focuses on destroying by using bombs and missiles. The earlier form of war is what is called as the pre-modern
and medieval war. The later is the modern war allowing speed to take the central role. In the former kinds of
wars, movement was slow, and the enemies made fortifications to defend their regions. During modern times,
wars move rapidly. The bureaucracy depicts the pre-modern fashion of stressing on stability and “fortification”,
whereas the structures of bureaucracy during modern times are characterized by the concept of speed, which
Virilio labels as “dromology” (Styhre, 2007).
A Historical Overview of Bureaucratic Conduct in Pakistan

The characteristic bureaucratic structure of Pakistan had its source and inspiration in the colonial
administration system that primarily aimed to exercise its administrative talents to further the interests and
imperatives of colonialism. Pakistan’s bureaucracy faithfully copied the cadre-based system that was the
typically characteristic feature of Indian Civil Service (ICS), which was the principal machinery of the colonial
administration. Looking at this hierarchical structure, we find the ICS in the next strata of the provincial-level
services, with the subordinate civil services forming the base structure. This kind of structure was already
popular under the All India Civil Service. Those recruited by the ICS were posted with different responsibilities
both in the federal as well as provincial governments. While a greater segment of the provincial cadre officers
were inducted only for positions with the provincial government, in some extraordinary cases where the
officers demonstrated some exceptional capabilities they were drafted to fill vacancies and positions available
in other provinces as well as with the federal government (Cheema & Sayeed, 2006).
Until 1879 natives were never given positions in the higher echelons of the bureaucratic service, but once
the All India Civil Service was established, more or less the whole of the provincial service cadre was filled
with Indians, and between the years 1887 and 1947 a large number of highly educated natives were inducted
into the ICS. The official barring of Indians from entering the ICS was replaced by very tough recruitment
procedures and guidelines that governed the British civil servants, which amounted to an unofficial barrier to
natives seeking to enter the ICS (Cheema & Sayeed, 2006). When the “native” bureaucracy unfolded
unintentionally, it did not in any way suggest Indianisation in terms of format and purpose, as Zafarullah, Khan,
and Rahman (1997) noted:
Indianisation of the central civil service remained far from being fully achieved. The bureaucracy continued to be
closed to the majority, elitist in education and training, and articulative of the interests of the English aristocracy.
(Zafarullah et al., 1997)
While there was a high degree of imperial control exercised over the political scene, the situation
suggested that bureaucracy rather functioned within a domestic framework thoroughly insulated from outside
context of virtually complete domestic insularity. The other balancing kind of institutions that existed in the
other realms like legislature, local governance, or social interest groups functioned only in a weakened form.
The result was obvious: The bureaucracy was totally free from any domestic political pressures, and thus it
never felt any compelling need to respond to the interests of the public at large (Cheema & Sayeed, 2006).
The Immediate Aftermath of Independence: 1947-1958
Both India and Pakistan inherited from the colonial government one of the most advanced civil service
systems of the world when the British Empire left South Asia. Punctuated by savage and inhumane brutalities,
the imperial authorities had effected a gradual transformation from an early modern feudal conglomeration of
principalities into an independent state with a robust public service. This was to be particularly instrumental in
holding Pakistan together during its early period, with its political fragility due to the inherent nature of the
quasi-Islamic state carved out from British India. While the pseudo-democratic political apparatus, including
the military, was dominated by landowning “feudals”, the civil service prevented the machinery of the state
from disintegrating. Compared to the contemporaneous situation in India, Pakistani bureaucracy’s institutional
ascendency was significantly strengthened and emboldened by the nature of political leadership (Cheema &
Sayeed, 2006).
Sayeed (1980) noted that in the aftermath of partition, a good number of bureaucrats (the overwhelming
number of them still being Britons) complained to the people in governance that there was a great deal of
political interference from ministers:
Jinnah could have drawn from these two conclusions: one, to place the politicians under bureaucratic tutelage; and
two, to improve the [Muslim League] party machinery to eliminate some of the factions and accommodate others. He
[Jinnah] was after all a dying man and could think of only immediate short term remedies. In settling for the first
alternative, he not only took care of the immediate problems but laid the foundations for future actions and policies of his
successor governments that outdid him in establishing bureaucratic control over politicians. (Sayeed, 1980, p. 26)
The thoroughly unstable political situation during the 1947-1958 periods enabled the bureaucrats to gain
supremacy and control over the politicians. With this characteristic, the bureaucratic structure went in for
centralization and it became thoroughly insulated from the general public; thus, while some sort of
accountability existed from within (i.e., among insiders), the bureaucracy was exempt from conventional
political or judicial accountability. The political leadership of those times did not have any clear objectives
behind running and administering the state, which paved the way for the bureaucrats to evolve their own
agenda that would take care of their own well-being as a caste. This reflected some influences from the ICS,
especially with regard to political representation. The bureaucracy strongly pursued an agenda of development
through industrialization, but a stable political basis for democratization was lacking. Though a good amount of
state-building was achieved, it was at the cost of nation building. Above all, the Pakistani military
establishment greatly influenced national policy decisions. This tendency was noted evidently after Pakistan
went in for the South-East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization
(CENTO-1955) military alliances. Several political experts have remarked that the state structure was highly
dominated by a “bureaucratic-military oligarchy” (Cheema & Sayeed, 2006).
Talking of the bureaucratic structure, there was a far-reaching evolution that was achieved following the
partition of Pakistan and it was the eradication of the provincial cadre from the civil services. This paved way
for the development of a fully centralized bureaucratic structure, which though functionally efficient was less
accountable to politicians and the electorate at large. During the mid-1950s, One Unit was instituted, which
gave further momentum to the centralization of the political organization. The ICS was renamed as the CSP
(civil service of Pakistan), but the mode of functioning was completely inherited from the All India Civil
Service, without any trace of change, and the upper strata of the bureaucracy remained intact (Cheema &
Sayeed, 2006).
Post Marshal Law Period: 1958-1971
The bureaucratic-military oligarchy remained ascendant throughout the 1960s. In 1958 the military took
over the administration and the bureaucracy gained unfettered control over the policy-making process. One of
the biggest achievements of bureaucracy during those times was the highly restrictive political environment.
The bureaucracy strengthened itself during this time period by resorting to three strategies (Cheema & Sayeed,
2006).
In the first place, the bureaucracy secured a constitutional protection in the 1962 Constitution and
succeeded in insulating itself from any kind of political interference. In addition, the basic democracies (BD)
system was streamlined to further strengthen the powers of bureaucrats over the politicians in the local level too.
When there was already a centralized bureaucratic structure, the ability of the bureaucracy to meddle in the
political processes on the local level was entrenched. In the second place, the developmental model adopted
during those times was of an interventionist kind that enabled the CSP to stay in the central place of policy
framing and the execution processes. The influential members in the bureaucracy were actually exploiting the
situation and were amassing wealth through large rents generated in the manufacturing sector (Nadvi & Sayeed,
2003). This position further encouraged the bureaucracy’s interests to continue with the same kind of profitable
economic policies adopted during those times, despite their damaging impact on resource distribution both
across regions and income groups.
In the third place, as a result of the over-stretching domination exercised by the CSP on the administrative
system, several other trends and tendencies developed and spread. Ethnic domination became a prevailing force
in the oligarchical nepotism that commandeered the state apparatus for personal and sectional benefits. One
notable loser in this process was the East Pakistani; in the civil service, there was negligible representation of
the Bengalis, especially in the upper echelons. When we observed the scene in 1960s, we found a thorough
domination of the bureaucracy over the social and political domains achieved and nurtured through the
interlocking relationships forged between the members of different elite social groups (Cheema & Sayeed,
2006). Sayeed (1980) clearly grasped this idea, stating:
In the years 1965-66, the secretary of foreign affairs, Pakistan’s ambassador in Washington and the secretaries of
Home and Kashmir Affairs and the Economic Affairs Division were related. Similarly, some of the senior civil servants
were linked by family ties to members of the military hierarchy. And civil service, military and business hierarchies were
becoming interrelated through new matrimonial ties. (Sayeed, 1980, p. 73)
Talking about our model, the scenario during 1960s proves that the Ayub regime went by far more clearly
defined objectives for its policies and functions. The principal objectives of his regime were economic growth
and repressing the political processes. While the bureaucracy underwent centralization, the political process of
those times did not show any visible signs of favoring the voters and patrons with personal favors. However,
with respect to the issues of supervising and the accountability of the bureaucracy, the outcomes appear rather
mixed. The bureaucrats of these times were paid fat salaries, but it is far from being clear how their
malfeasance was perceived. During several instances, the bureaucrats (particularly the CSP) evidently
demonstrated an arbitrary approach not showing any accountability to the political leadership, which could not
be checked. Clearly this tendency was not characteristic of a system that was inspired and influenced by the
colonial bureaucracy. Therefore, it boils down to the fact that political leadership (even during Ayub’s regime)
was incapacitated at least to a considerable extent which nurtured this tendency in bureaucrats.
Conclusion
To conclude, in almost all parts of the world, the principal function of bureaucracy is to faithfully and
sincerely implement the policies of the government ruling over the state. The government provides
representation of the national interest, particularly when democratically elected, while the bureaucracy provides
skills and know-how; the latter is accountable to the former, but often not directly to the public. Thus
bureaucrats are traditionally known as “civil servants”.
Civil servants provide continuity in governance and daily life, despite the vagaries of changes in
government. However, while politicians often come and go, and the nexus of governmental power can shift and
mutate, civil servants remain entrenched in their spheres of professional capacity, often gaining the upper hand
over inexperienced or uncertain ministers and carving out their own domains within the state apparatus. While
often involved in an advisory capacity, civil servants are instituted to be involved in policy execution, not
policy formulation; while they might assist the political leadership of the state to formulate various policies,
based on their expertise, they are not intended to have any decisive or authoritative role steering the ship. As
elected representatives of the state, politicians in the governing role are the only authorized class to formulate
policies.
In Pakistan the political leadership has failed to discharge its role of policy formulation for numerous
reasons (generally attributable to the demographic and political turbulence of state formation after Partition)
that are not of primary concern to this study; suffice it to say that their own power grabbing and failure to lay
the foundations of a genuine political formation enabled the accrual of political power by the bureaucratic
cadre.
Thus the unique characteristic of the Pakistani bureaucracy is that it managed to take over the reins of
government from politicians; aside from this, it is a conventional bureaucratic civil service in terms of its
inherent nature and style of functioning, i.e., rigid and inflexible, stifling of innovation and reflection, with high
corruption, and mechanically rolling on in its functions while impeding constructive initiatives or routine
business. Therefore, when it comes to reformation and improvement of the existing system, bureaucrats are
poor players.
Furthermore, they honor the lack of accountability expected of unelected bureaucrats in conventional
systems (who are held to account by politicians), by not reflecting the interests, sentiments, and aspirations of
the public. Therefore, if they need to play the policy making role, they fail, as they do not consult or welcome
the participation of the public, as the latter is not integrated into their systemic programming. In a typical
third-world developing country, such as Pakistan, bureaucracies have become thoroughly politicized in a way
that is significantly detrimental to constructive state governance. This is a serious plight that must be noted
under the topic of approaching the merits and demerits of the working of bureaucracy in these countries. In
Pakistan, policy making even on key issues remains thoroughly unstructured, and policy that does emerge
reflects the whims and fancies of a privileged class. This condition has imbued every walk of national life with
despair in the machinery of government. It is the need of the hour to take a rapid step toward a more systematic
and institutionalized kind of policy making process in the larger interests of the country.
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doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2018.04.005
D DAVID PUBLISHING
Analysis on the Consular Dimension of Sino-Indian Relations∗
XIA Liping
China Foreign Affairs University, Beijing, China
This article explains reasons from the consular perspective why people to people exchange between China and
India is not so active. Review of evolution of bilateral consular relations reveals that the basis of cross border
personnel exchanges is weak with the closing of consulates of both countries in each other’s territory for nearly
three decades. Relatively, small number of Chinese and Indian consular posts in each other’s territory means
inconvenience for citizens to apply for visa for visiting the other and seeking consular assistance and protection.
Inflexible visa policy of both countries toward citizens of the other party also accounts for the none-activeness.
Considering the important role played by civilian exchange in advancing bilateral relations, China and India should
establish more consular posts in each other’s territory and further relax visa requirements.
Keywords: China, India, consular relations, people to people exchange, visa
Introduction
Relations between China and India have great significance as they are major countries of global influence.
Despite twists and turns, Sino-Indian relations have made progresses in recent years. There are frequent
exchanges of high-level visits. India became a full member of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, setting up a
new platform for cooperation. Bilateral trade between China and India rose 20.3% to 84.4 billion USD in 2017,
the highest on record since the two countries started bilateral trade relations several decades ago. 1 However,
people to people exchange between China and India is not so active although they are neighbors and countries
with huge population. In 2015, the number of personnel exchanges between the two countries is about 889
thousand, including 730 thousand from India to China and 160 thousand from China to India, 2 while the total
number of Chinese citizens traveling outside Mainland China reached 117 million in 2015 3 and the number of
Indian nationals’ departures from India in 2015 was 20.38 million. 4 That means Chinese citizens traveling to
India accounted for 0.013% of the total Chinese outbound travelers and Indians traveling to China were about
3.581% of the total Indian outbound travelers. In 2016, Chinese citizens’ arrivals in India reached 251,315,
∗
Acknowledgement: This article is part of a Research Project funded by China National Social Science Foundation entitled
Improvement of China’s Consular Service under the Initiative of OBOR (16BGJ015).
XIA Liping, Ph.D., professor, Department of Diplomatic Studies, China Foreign Affairs University, Beijing, China; Member of
the Academic Board ,Research Center for Beijing International Exchanges and Foreign Affairs Administration
1
“Ministry of Commerce holds regular press conference (26 April 2018)”, available online at
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/xwfbh/20180426.shtml, Ministry of Commerce of China.
2
China’s Relations with India (latest update: January 2017), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/yz_676205/1206_677220/sbgx_677224/.
3
“Chinese citizens made 117 million outbound trips, spending $104.5 billion in 2015”,
http://www.chinanews.com/cj/2016/10-19/8036363.shtml.
4
“Indian Tourism Statistics at a Glance 2017” (p. 19). PDF version can be downloaded from the website of Ministry of Tourism,
http://www.tourism.gov.in/market-research-and-statistics;
http://tourism.gov.in/sites/default/files/Other/english%20India%20Torurism%20Statics%20020917.pdf.
264 ANALYSIS ON THE CONSULAR DIMENSION OF SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS
about 2.85% of all foreign arrivals in India. 5 What are the reasons leading to these phenomena?
In a globalized world, with increasing interaction between peoples across borders, consular affairs, as an
inalienable part of diplomatic work, are becoming more and more important. Some scholars compare consular
service as Cinderella in the limelight. 6 Consular dimension also provides a good perspective to explore
bilateral relations. Although a lot of research has been made on the relationships between China and India,
there has been little study on the consular dimension. This article tries to study Sino-Indian relations from the
consular perspective, to be exactly, by reviewing the development of bilateral consular relations, the number of
consular posts of China and India in each other’s territory and examining two countries’ visa policy toward
each other’s citizen, aiming to find out the reasons accounting for the small scale of personnel exchange and
suggesting ways of improvement.
Slow and Tortuous Development of Consular Relations

The evolution of consular relations between China and India can be divided into three phases as follows:
(1) 1950s-1960s
People’s Republic of China (P. R. China) was founded in October, 1949. Among all non-socialist
countries, India is the second to recognize the new communist regime of China and the first to establish
diplomatic relations with P. R. China. After the two countries started their diplomatic relations in April 1950,
China set up two consulates in India (Kolkata, 1950 and Bombay, 1953) and Indian also set up two in China
(Shanghai, 1950 and Lhasa, 1952). Although relations between the two countries are quite good, Chinese
government declined the request from India of establishing a consulate in Kashi (in Xinjiang Uygur
Autonomous Region) in 1953 (Department of Consular Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, China’s
Consular Affairs, World Affairs Press, 2014, p. 23). After 1962 border clash, the two countries closed their
consulates on each other’s territory.
(2) 1970s-1990s
Relations between China and India restored gradually after they resented ambassadors mutually in 1976.
Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China in 1988 opened a new chapter in bilateral relations. Talks
on reopening consulates started after1985 and agreements were reached in 1991. Chinese consulate in Bombay
reopened in 1992 and Indian consulate in Shanghai in 1993. China and India also signed bilateral consular
agreement in 1991. Indian Consulate General in Hong Kong remained open after Hong Kong’s return to China
in 1997 (Department of Consular Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, China’s Consular Affairs,
World Affairs Press, 2014, pp. 182-183).
(3) After 2000
From 2008 to 2016, China and India had three rounds of consular consultative talks, mainly focusing on
the relaxation of India’s visa policy toward Chinese and streamlining the visa application process. Besides this,
agreements on setting up new consulates were reached in November 2011, with China setting up a consulate in
Kolkata and India in Guangzhou (Department of Consular Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China,
5
“Indian Tourism Statistics at a Glance 2017” (p. 6). PDF version can be downloaded from the website of Ministry of Tourism,
http://www.tourism.gov.in/market-research-and-statistics;
http://tourism.gov.in/sites/default/files/Other/english%20India%20Torurism%20Statics%20020917.pdf.
6
Heijmans, Maaike and Jan Melissen, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, “Clingendael”: Foreign Ministries and
the Rising Challenge of Consular Affairs: Cinderella in the Limelight,
http://www.diplomacy.edu/Conferences/MFA/papers/heijmansmelissen.pdf.
ANALYSIS ON THE CONSULAR DIMENSION OF SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS 265
China’s Consular Affairs, World Affairs Press, 2014, pp. 267-268). In 2015, two sides reached another
agreement under which India allowed China to set up a new consulate in Chennai (Department of Policy
Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, China’s Foreign Affairs, 2016, p. 341). As to the end of 2016,
China had two consulates in India (Bombay and Kolkata) and India had four consulates in China (Shanghai,
Guangzhou, Chengdu, and Hong Kong) (Department of Policy Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China,
China’s Foreign Affairs, 2017, p. 372; p. 382; p. 388).
In brief, China established normal consular relations with India soon after it was founded in 1949. As a
result of 1962 border war, consular relations were cut off, making people to people exchange very difficult and
even impossible. With the resuming of mutual high-level visits at the end of 1980s, consulates were restored in
1990s, and bilateral personnel exchange increased gradually. However, Rome is not built in one day. By
comparing the general situation of India’s consular posts abroad and that of China and the two countries’ visa
policy toward each other’s citizen, we may find more reasons accounting for the small scale of people to people
exchange between these two neighbors with large populations.
Small Number of Consular Posts in Each Other’s Territory

Consular posts played an important role in promoting bilateral exchanges. Consular functions under the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations include providing protection and assistance in the receiving State to
nationals, both individuals and bodies corporate of the sending State within the limits permitted by international
law; furthering the development of commercial, economic, cultural, and scientific relations between the sending
State and the receiving State; issuing passports and travel documents to nationals of the sending State, and visas
or appropriate documents to persons wishing to travel to the sending State, and etc. 7
Table 1 displays that India is not one of the top 14 countries in which China has established the most
number of consular posts. Among BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), China has five
Consulates General in Russia, three in both Brazil and South Africa. Although China and India had reached
agreement on setting up a new Consulate General in Chennai, it is still on the paper at the present. Table 2
shows that China is among the top 10 countries in which India has established the most number of consular
posts. Afghanistan, one of India’s neighbors, much smaller in area and population, has even more Indian
consular posts than China. It is obvious that the number of consular posts of China and India in each other’s
territory does not match the reality that China and India are close neighbors with enormous populations, and
they are going to build the strategic cooperative partnership. Moreover, practically this means that it is
inconvenient for citizens of both countries to apply for visa before their travel to the other country and to seek
consular assistance and protection when they are in the other country. Let alone the important part played by
consular posts in promoting bilateral relations, especially bilateral exchanges at the local and grass-roots level.
Table 1
Chinese Consular Posts Abroad (Top 14, as to the End of 2016)
Total number of Number of Number of other types
Hosting country
consular posts consulates general of consular posts
Japan 6 6 0
Russia 5 5 0
United States 5 5 0
7
Article 5, Consular functions, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.
Australia 5 5 0
France 5 4 1 consulate
Canada 4 4 0
Germany 4 4 0
(table 1 continued)
Hosting country
Thailand 4 3 1 consular office
Brazil 3 0 0
Indonesia 3 3 0
Malaysia 3 3 0
South Korea 3 3 0
South Africa 3 3 0
United Kingdom 3 3 0
Note. Source: Department of Policy Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, China’s Foreign Affairs, 2017, pp. 370-380.
Table 2
Indian Consular Posts Abroad (Top 10, as to August 30, 2017)
Country
United States of America 5 5 0
Afghanistan 4 4 0
United Kingdom 4 2 2 honorary consuls
China 3 3 0
Australia 3 3 0
Germany 3 3 0
Indonesia 2 2 0
Iran 2 2 0
Burma 2 2 0
Sri Lanka 2 2 0
United Kingdom 3 3 0
Note. Source: Ministry of External Affairs of India, http://www.mea.gov.in/indian-missions-abroad-new.htm
Inflexible Visa Policy

China and India apply relatively strict visa policy on each other’s citizen. For tourists, all Indians (except
transits) traveling to Mainland China and all Chinese (except transits) traveling to India must apply for visa in
advance and there is no treatment of visa-free or visa-on-arrival. The author will take the most common
category of visa, tourist visa as an example to discuss the inflexibility of the visa policy.
Visa requirements are different for Indian tourists to Hong Kong, Macao, and Mainland China. Indian
tourists in Hong Kong and Macao enjoy 14 days and 30 days visa-free treatment respectively. 8 For Indian
tourists to Mainland China, they can only enjoy 24-hour transit visa-free treatment. For tourist visa, Indian
applicants must submit the following documents: (1) documents showing the itinerary including air ticket
booking record (round trip) and proof of a hotel reservation, etc., or an invitation letter issued by a relevant
entity or individual in China. The invitation letter should contain the following information: (a) information on
8
About Macao’s the visa-free treatment to Indian tourists, see website of the Police Bureau of Macao,
http://www.fsm.gov.mo/psp/cht/psp_top5_2_1.html; about Hong Kong’s the visa-free treatment to Indian tourists, see website of
Hong Kong Immigration Service, https://www.immd.gov.hk/hks/message_from_us/ind_par.html.
ANALYSIS ON THE CONSULAR DIMENSION OF SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS 267
the applicant (full name, gender, date of birth, etc.); (b) information on the planned visit (arrival and departure
dates, place(s) to be visited, etc.); and (c) information on the inviting entity or individual (name, contact
telephone number, address, official stamp, signature of the legal representative or the inviting individual); (2)
personal written statement (covering letter with details as follows: place to visit, name, address, and contact
number of the inviting/contact company/person), certification letter from the working unit of the applicant
(with details as follows: name and contact number of the working unit, the applicant’s income statement), or
original copy of recent six-month bank statement of the applicant; (3) if an applicant repeatedly applies for
tourist visa to China, the following information shall be covered in the personal statement: reasons for revisit,
the places the applicant plans to visit this time, and places he/she visited before; and (4) if the applicants travel
in China on a group basis, the invitation letter issued by the travel agency is required (Chinese Embassy in New
Delhi, 2013).
At present, China gives visa-free treatment to foreigners in the following two cases. One is that tourists
holding passports of Japan, Singapore, and Brunei can visit Mainland China visa-free with 15 days’ duration of
stay since 2003; the other is that foreigners holding the passports of the following 53 countries entering China
from the airports and ports in Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang provinces (started from January 30, 2016),
Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei provinces (started from December 28, 2017), and some ports in Liaoning province
(started from January 1, 2018) can enjoy 144-hour visa-free transit treatment. These 53 countries include
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Russia, United Kingdom, Ireland, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania, Monaco, Belarus, USA, Canada, Brazil, Mexico,
Argentina, Chile, Australia, New Zealand, Korea, Japan, Singapore, Brunei, UAE, and Qatar (China State
Immigration Administration, 2018). India is not on this list. 9
During President Xi Jinping’s visit to India in September 2014, in a joint statement, the two sides
announced the launch of the “China-India Cultural Exchange Program” to further promote cultural and personal
exchanges between the two countries, including the holding of the “Indian Tourism year” in China in 2015 and
“China Tourism year” in India in 2016. When Prime Minister Modi visited China in May 2015, he announced
that India would implement an “e-tourism visa” to China (Chinese Embassy in New Delhi, 2015). Tourists
holding ordinary Chinese passport (including Hong Kong passport and Macao passport) are eligible for
e-tourism visa since July 30, 2015. For e-tourism single entry visa, Chinese applicants need to submit the
following documents: (1) visa application form (no column to be left unfilled) duly signed along with
photograph pasted at the designated space; (2) copy of the passport; (3) copy of the Chinese ID card (both
sides); (4) copy of the air ticket for return/onward journey; (5) undertaking from the applicant regarding
financial standing stating that he/she has sufficient funds for the visit; and (6) detailed itinerary duly signed by
the applicant. Entry regulations for e-tourist visa holder include that their personal biometric information will
be collected at the Indian port of entry. Ports of entry are limited to nine airports, such as Bangalore, Chennai,
Kachin, Delhi, Goa, Hyderabad, Calcutta, Mumbai, and Trivandrum. Exit is not restricted to certain ports.
Chinese can only apply for this single entry visa no more than twice a year (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
9
China State Immigration Administration. (2018). Foreigners from some countries can enjoy 144-hours visa-free transit
treatment. Retrieved from http://www.mps.gov.cn/n2254996/n2254999/c5977739/content.html.
China, 2015).
As to re-entry tourist visa, Chinese citizens are listed in the same category as nationals of Afghanistan,
China, Iran, Pakistan, Iraq, Sudan, foreigners of Pakistan origin, and Stateless persons. The application
procedure is more complex. According to the regulation, there should be a gap of at least two months between
two visits to India on a tourist visa on re-entry of nationals of this category. In case of requirement to visit India
within two months, special permission should be sought from the concerned Indian Embassy or Consulate.
Such re-entry within the stipulated gap of two months may be permitted only in emergent situations like death
or serious illness in the family, non-availability of connecting flights to return to his or her country of origin or
travel to another country, or any other exigent situation which can be duly justified with proper documentation
to the satisfaction of the Indian Embassy or Consulate. Where permission is accorded in such cases, registration
with the local Foreigners Registration Office would be required within 14 days of arrival in India. 10
Besides Chinese, Indian e-visa facility is available for nationals of more than 160 countries. 11
As it shows above, Indian’s visa requirement for Chinese tourists is relatively simpler than that of China’s
for Indian tourists. However, only three years ago did India begin applying e-tourist visa to Chinese citizens.
For those Chinese visitors who want to visit India more than twice a year, it is nearly impossible. Indian tourists
planning to visit China still need to submit various kinds of documents. In order to encourage more people to
people interaction, further efforts should be made by the governments of China and India to relax visa
regulations toward each other.
Conclusion
All in all, communication between peoples is the basis of relations between nations. For the sake of
encouraging people to people exchange and advancing the development of bilateral relations, improvements in
consular cooperation can be made in the following specific areas: first, streamline China’s visa application
process for Indian tourists and relax the requirements for Chinese citizens applying for Indian tourist re-entry
visas; second, more consular consultative talks should be held as part of the efforts to promote exchanges
between peoples, such as exploring the possibility of establishing more consular posts on each other’s territory.
Nowadays, when further development of China and Indian relations is often beset by high political issues
including boundary disputes, influence of global powers and strive for the dominance of the geopolitical
structure, and etc., low political issues, such as expanding people to people exchange, can help to lay a good
foundation for the future bilateral relations. In this sense, consular cooperation is necessary and vital.
References
Department of Consular Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China. (2014). China’s consular affairs. World Affairs Press.
Department of Policy Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China. (2017). China’s foreign affairs 2017. World Affairs Press.
India applies e-tourism visa to Chinese citizens. Retrieved from http://cs.mfa.gov.cn/gyls/lsgz/fwxx/t1286895.shtml
Ministry of Tourism of India. Tourism statistics at a glance 2017. Retrieved from
http://tourism.gov.in/sites/default/files/Other/english%20India%20Torurism%20Statics%20020917.pdf
Heijmans, Maaike and Jan Melissen, Netherlands Institute of International Relations. “Clingendael”: Foreign Ministries and the
Rising Challenge of Consular Affairs: Cinderella in the Limelight. Retrieved from
http://www.diplomacy.edu/Conferences/MFA/papers/heijmansmelissen.pdf
10
Tourist visa, Indian Embassy in Beijing, http://indianembassybeijing.in/tourist-visa.php.
11
List of countries can be found on the website of Indian Embassy in Beijing, E-visa,
https://indianvisaonline.gov.in/evisa/tvoa.html.

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International Relations and Diplomacy (ISSN 2328-2134) Volume 6, Number 4,2018

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International Relations

David Publishing Company

Aims and Scope:

David Publishing Company

David Publishing Company

Editorial Board Members of International Relations and Diplomacy:

Good Governance and Growth in Emerging Countries. A Critical Review 231

Albanian National Movement

Great Powers and Albanian National Movement (1878-1914) 239

Bureaucracy: Max Weber’s Concept and Its Application to Pakistan 251

Analysis on the Consular Dimension of Sino-Indian Relations 263

History and Evolution of Nigeria-US Military, Security, and

South Africa’s Leadership Threat

Nigeria’s Non-aligned Posturing

Defence and Strategic Cooperation

The Defence Pacts

The Controversial “Emergency” US Military Assistance

Military Cooperation and National Interest

 Protect the nascent democracy against military incursions;

US and the June 12 Election Annulment

In Defence of Their Countries

The Enemy Between: Managing the Taylor Saga

Obama’s Visit to Africa

Good Governance and Growth in Emerging Countries:

Keywords: states failures, good governance, economic growth, development policy

political regime through elections or violence.

 Better governance has a significantly positive effect on per capita income.

Mushtaq Khan’s Criticism and Theoretical Alternative

Great Powers and Albanian National Movement (1878-1914)

Petr Akhmedovich Iskenderov

Bureaucracy: Max Weber’s Concept and Its Application to

Irfan Ahmed Shaikh

Keywords: bureaucracy, Max Weber, government policies, democracy, Pakistan

Weber’s Views on Bureaucracy

Power Structure (Hierarchy)

A Historical Overview of Bureaucratic Conduct in Pakistan

Analysis on the Consular Dimension of Sino-Indian Relations∗

Keywords: China, India, consular relations, people to people exchange, visa

Slow and Tortuous Development of Consular Relations

Small Number of Consular Posts in Each Other’s Territory

Inflexible Visa Policy

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