Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Crimprosec
Crimprosec
SYLLABUS
DECISION
YAP, J :
p
"1. Violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of R.A. 3019 for giving D' Group,
a private corporation controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official functions
through manifest partiality and evident bad faith;
"2. Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of R.A. 3019 for receiving a check
of P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity
Trading Corporation as consideration for the release of a check of
P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing services rendered for the
Constitutional Convention Referendum in 1973;
"3. Violation of Section 7 of R.A. 3019 on three (3) counts for his failure to
file his Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the calendar years 1973,
1976 and 1978."
Accordingly, on June 12, 1985, the following informations were filed with
the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner:
Re: Criminal Case No. 10499
"The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses Francisco
S. Tatad with Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of July, 1973 in the City of Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being then the Secretary of the Department (now
Ministry) of Public Information, did then and there, wilfully and unlawfully
demand and receive a check for P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar,
President/General Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as
consideration for the payment to said Corporation of the sum of
P588,000.00, for printing services rendered for the Constitutional
Convention Referendum of January, 1973, wherein the accused in his
official capacity had to intervene under the law in the release of the funds
for said project.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the
Office of the Tanodbayan on May 16, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
Re: Criminal Case No. 10500
"The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accused FRANCISCO
S. TATAD with Violation of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
That on or about the 31st day of January, 1974 in the City of Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, a public officer being then the Secretary of the
Department (now Ministry) of Public Information, did then and there
wilfully and unlawfully fail to prepare and file with the Office of the
President, a true detailed and sworn statement of his assets and liabilities,
as of December 31, 1973, including a statement of the amounts and
sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses
and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year
(1973), as required of every public officer.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the
Office of the Tanodbayan on June 20, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
Re: Criminal Case No. 10501
"The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO
S. TATAD with Violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known asthe Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
committed as follows:
That on the about the month of May, 1975 and for sometime prior thereto,
in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer being then
the Secretary of the Department (now Ministry) of Public Information, did
then and there, wilfully and unlawfully give Marketing Communication
Group, Inc. (D' Group), a private corporation of which his brother-in-law,
Antonio L. Cantero, is the President, unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official functions, through manifest
partiality and evident bad faith, by allowing the transfer of D' GROUP of
the funds, assets and ownership of South East Asia Research Corporation
(SEARCH), allegedly a private corporation registered with the Securities
and Exchange Corporation on June 4, 1973, but whose organization and
operating expenses came from the confidential funds of the Department
of Public Information as it was organized to undertake research, projects
for the government, without requiring an accounting of the funds advanced
by the Department of Public Information and reimbursement thereof by D'
GROUP, to the damage and prejudice of the government.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the
office of the Tanodbayan on May 16, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
Re: Criminal Case No. 10502
"The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO
S. TATAD with Violation of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
That on or about the 31st day of January, 1977 in the City of Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, a public officer being then the Secretary of the
Department (now Ministry) of Public Information, did then and there
wilfully and unlawfully fail to prepare and file with the Office of the
President, a true and sworn statement of his assets and liabilities, as of
December 31, 1976, including a statement of the amounts of his personal
and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next
preceding calendar year (1976), as required of every public officer.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the
Office of the Tanodbayan on June 20, 1988.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
Re: Criminal Case No. 10503
"The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO
S. TATAD with Violation of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of April, 1979, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, a public officer being then the Secretary of the
Department (now Ministry) of Public Information, did then and there
wilfully and unlawfully fail to prepare and file with the Office of the
President, a true, detailed and sworn statement of his assets and
liabilities, as a December 31, 1978, including a statement of the amounts
and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family
expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding
calendar year (1978), as required of every public officer.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the
office of the Tanodbayan on June 20, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
On July 22, 1985, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a consolidated
motion to quash the information on the following grounds: LLjur
In a number of cases, 1 this Court has not hesitated to grant the so-called
"radical relief" and to spare the accused from undergoing the rigors and
expense of a full-blown trial where it is clear that the has been deprived of due
process of law or other constitutionally guaranteed rights. Of course, it goes
without saying that in the application of the doctrine enunciated in those cases,
particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each
case.
Coming to the case at bar, the following relevant facts appear on record
and are largely undisputed. The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally
filed what he termed "a report" with the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security
Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing charges of alleged violations
of Rep. Act No. 3019against then Secretary of Public Information Francisco
S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end
of 1979 when it became widely known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had
a falling out with President Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet. On
December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal
complaint filed with the Tanodbayan and docketed as TBP Case No. 8005-16-
07. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980 — which was
around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres.
Marcos — by referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security
Command, for investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was
submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft and
corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By
October 25, 1982, all affidavit and counter-affidavits were in and the case was
ready for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on July 5, 1985
that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of
the corresponding criminal informations against the accused Francisco Tatad.
Five (5) criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12,
1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone.
A painstaking review of the facts can not but leave the impression that
political motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling the
prosecutorial process in this case. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were,
only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly,
departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary
investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits
by the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security
Command for fact-finding investigation and report. cdphil
After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of this case, we are
constrained to hold that the inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary
investigation and filing the information in the instant case is violative of the
constitutionally guaranteed right of the petitioner to due process and to a
speedy disposition of the cases against him. Accordingly, the informations in
Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503 should be
dismissed. In view of the foregoing, we find it unnecessary to rule on the other
issues raised by petitioner.
Accordingly, the Court Resolved to give due course to the petition and to
grant the same. The informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10502
and 10503, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Francisco S. Tatad" are
hereby DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued on October 22,
1985 is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr.,
Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes and Griño-
Aquino, JJ.,concur.
(Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 72335-39, [March 21, 1988], 242 PHIL
|||
563-577)
EN BANC
SYLLABUS
RESOLUTION
TEEHANKEE, C.J : p
Last August 21st, our nation marked with solemnity and for the first time
in freedom the third anniversary of the treacherous assassination of foremost
opposition leader former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. imprisoned for
almost eight years since the imposition of martial law in September, 1972 by
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, he was sentenced to death by firing squad
by a military tribunal for common offenses alleged to have been committed long
before the declaration of martial law and whose jurisdiction over him as a civilian
entitled to trial by judicial process by civil courts he repudiated. Ninoy pleaded
in vain that the military tribunals are admittedly not courts but mere instruments
and subject to the control of the President as created by him under the General
Orders issued by him as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and that he had already been publicly indicted and adjudged guilty
by the President of the charges in a nationwide press conference held on
August 24, 1971 when he declared the evidence against Ninoy "not only strong
but overwhelming." 1 This followed the Plaza Miranda bombing of August 21,
1971 of the proclamation rally of the opposition Liberal Party candidates for the
November, 1971 elections (when eight persons were killed and practically all of
the opposition candidates headed by Senator Jovito Salonga and many more
were seriously injured), and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus under Proclamation No. 889 on August 23, 1971. The massacre was
instantly attributed to the communists but the truth has never been known. But
the then President never filed the said charges against Ninoy in the civil courts.
Ninoy Aquino was nevertheless thereafter allowed in May, 1980 to leave
the country to undergo successful heart surgery. After three years of exile and
despite the regime's refusal to give him a passport, he sought to return home
"to strive for a genuine national reconciliation founded on justice." He was to be
cold-bloodedly killed while under escort away by soldiers from his plane that
had just landed at the Manila International Airport on that fateful day at past 1
p.m. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-blank into the back of his
head by a murderous assassin, notwithstanding that the airport was ringed by
airtight security of close to 2,000 soldiers — and "from a military viewpoint, it
(was) technically impossible to get inside (such) a cordon." 2 The military
investigators reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot
Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed
only days later as Rolando Galman, although he was the personal friend of
accused Col. Arturo Custodio who picked him up from his house on August 17,
1983) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned
him down in turn. The military later filmed a re-enactment of the killing scripted
according to this version and continuously replayed it on all TV channels as if it
were taken live on the spot. The then President instantly accepted the military
version and repeated it in a nationally televised press conference that he gave
late in the evening of August 22, 1983, wherein he said, in order to induce
disbelief that the military had a hand in the killing, that "if the purpose was to
eliminate Aquino, this was not the way to do it."
The national tragedy shocked the conscience of the entire nation and
outraged the free world. The large masses of people who joined in the ten-day
period of national mourning and came out in millions in the largest and most
orderly public turnout for Ninoy's funeral reflected their grief for his martyrdom
and their yearning for the truth, justice and freedom.LibLex
"The task of the Board was clear and unequivocal. This task was not only
to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the death of the late
former Senator. Of greater significance is the awesome responsibility of
the Board to uphold righteousness over evil, justice over injustice,
rationality over irrationality, humaneness over inhumanity. The task was
indeed a painful test, the inevitable result of which will restore our
country's honored place among the sovereign nations of the free world
where peace, law and order, freedom, and justice are a way of life.
"More than any other event in contemporary Philippine history, the killing
of the late former Senator Aquino has brought into sharper focus, the ills
pervading Philippine society. It was the concretization of the horror that
has been haunting this country for decades, routinely manifested by the
breakdown of peace and order, economic instability, subversion, graft and
corruption, and an increasing number of abusive elements in what are
otherwise noble institutions in our country — the military and law
enforcement agencies. We are, however, convinced that, by and large,
the great majority of the officers and men of these institutions have
remained decent and honorable, dedicated to their noble mission in the
service of our country and people.
"The tragedy opened our eyes and for the first time confirmed our worst
fears of what unchecked evil would be capable of doing. As former Israeli
Foreign Minister Abba Eban observes. 'Nobody who has great authority
can be trusted not to go beyond its proper limits.' Social apathy, passivity
and indifference and neglect have spawned in secret a dark force that is
bent on destroying the values held sacred by freedom-loving people.
"To assert our proper place in the civilized world, it is imperative that public
officials should regard public service as a reflection of human ideals in
which the highest sense of moral values and integrity are strictly required.
"A tragedy like that which happened on August 21, 1983, and the crisis
that followed, would have normally caused the resignation of the Chief of
the Armed Forces in a country where public office is viewed with highest
esteem and respect and where the moral responsibilities of public officials
transcend all other considerations."
It is equally the fact that the then President through all his recorded public
acts and statements from the beginning disdained and rejected his own Board's
above findings and insisted on the military version of Galman being Ninoy's
assassin. In upholding this view that "there is no involvement of anyone in his
government in the assassination," he told David Briscoe (then AP Manila
Bureau Chief) in a Radio-TV interview on September 9, 1983 that "I am
convinced that if any member of my government were involved, I would have
known somehow . . . Even at a fairly low level, I would have known. I know how
they think. I know what they are thinking of." 7 He told CBS in another interview
in May, 1984 (as his Fact Finding Board was holding its hearings) the following:
"CBS: 'But indeed there has been recent evidence that seems to
contradict earlier reports, namely, the recent evidence seems to indicate
that some of the guards may have been responsible (for shooting Ninoy)."
"MARCOS: 'Well, you are of course wrong. What you have been reading
are the newspapers and the newspaper reports have been biased. The
evidence still proves that Galman was the killer. The evidence also shows
that there were intelligence reports connecting the communist party to the
killing.'" 8
In his reply of October 25, 1984 to General Ver's letter of the same date
going on leave of absence upon release of the Board's majority report
implicating him, he wrote that "(W)e are even more aware, general, that the
circumstances under which the board has chosen to implicate you in its findings
are fraught with doubt and great contradictions of opinion and testimony. And
we are deeply disturbed that on the basis of so-called evidence, you have been
so accused by some members of the Board," and extended "My very best
wishes to you and your family for a speedy resolution of your case," 9 even as
he announced that he would return the general to his position as AFP Chief "if
he is acquitted by the Sandiganbayan." In an interview on June 4, 1985 with
the Gamma Photo Agency, as respondent court was hearing the cases, he was
quoted as saying that "as will probably be shown, those witnesses (against the
accused) are perjured witnesses." 10
It was against this setting that on November 11, 1985 petitioners
Saturnina Galman and Reynaldo Galman, mother and son, respectively, of the
late Rolando Galman, and twenty-nine (29) other petitioners, composed of
three former Justices of this Court, five incumbent and former university
presidents, a former AFP Chief of Staff, outstanding members of the Philippine
Bar and solid citizens of the community, filed the present action alleging that
respondents Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan committed serious irregularities
constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of
the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the
Philippines to due process of law. They asserted that the Tanodbayan did not
represent the interest of the people when he failed to exert genuine and earnest
efforts to present vital and important testimonial and documentary evidence for
the prosecution and that the Sandiganbayan Justices were biased, prejudiced
and partial in favor of the accused, and that their acts "clouded with the gravest
doubts the sincerity of government to find out the truth about the Aquino
assassination." Petitioners prayed for the immediate issuance of a temporary
restraining order restraining the respondent Sandiganbayan from rendering a
decision on the merits in the pending criminal cases which it had scheduled on
November 20, 1985 and that judgment be rendered declaring a mistrial and
nullifying the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial
before an impartial tribunal by an unbiased prosecutor. 10-a
At the hearing on November 18, 1985 of petitioners' prayer for issuance
of a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent court from rendering a
decision in the two criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two
votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed for. The Court also granted
petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to respondents' separate comments
and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page
memorandum for the prosecution as filed in the Sandiganbayan, the signature
page of which alone had been submitted to the Court as Annex 5 of his
comment. cdll
But ten days later on November 28, 1985, the Court by the same nine-
to-two-vote ratio in reverse, 12 resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the
temporary restraining order issued ten days earlier enjoining the
Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. 13 The same Court majority denied
petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent
Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not
served on them and which they alleged was "very material to the question of
his partiality, bias and prejudice" within which to file a consolidated reply thereto
and to respondents' separate comments, by an eight-to three vote, with Justice
Gutierrez joining the dissenters. 14
On November 29, 1985, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,
alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such action and
urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits because if the charge
of partiality and bias against the respondents and suppression of vital evidence
by the prosecution are proven, the petitioners would be entitled to the reliefs
demanded: The People are entitled to due process which requires an impartial
tribunal and an unbiased prosecutor. If the State is deprived of a fair opportunity
to prosecute and convict because certain material evidence is suppressed by
the prosecution and the tribunal is not impartial, then the entire proceedings
would be null and void. Petitioners prayed that the Sandiganbayan be
restrained from promulgating their decision as scheduled anew on December
2, 1985.
On December 5, 1985, the Court required the respondents to comment
on the motion for reconsideration but issued no restraining order. Thus, on
December 2, 1985, as scheduled, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its
decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged, declaring them
innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. This marked another
unusual first in that respondent Sandiganbayan in effect convicted the very
victim Rolando Galman (who was not on trial) as the assassin of Ninoy contrary
to the very information and evidence submitted by the prosecution. In
opposition, respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of
acquittal, the instant case had become moot and academic. On February 4,
1986, the same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for
lack of merit, with the writer and Justice Abad Santos maintaining our dissent.
On March 20, 1986, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second
motion for reconsideration attached therewith. The thrust of the second motion
for reconsideration was the startling and therefore unknown revelations of
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera as reported in the March 6, 1986 issue of
the Manila Times entitled "Aquino Trial a Sham," that the then President had
ordered the respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Bernardo
Fernandez and the prosecution panel headed by Herrera to whitewash the
criminal cases against the 26 respondents accused and produce a verdict of
acquittal.
cdrep
On April 3, 1986, the Court granted the motion to admit the second
motion for reconsideration and ordered the respondents to comment thereon. 15
Respondent Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez stated in his
Manifestation filed on April 11, 1986 that he had ceased to hold office as
Tanodbayan as of April 8, 1986 when he was replaced by the new Tanodbayan,
Raul M. Gonzales, but reiterating his position in his comment on the petition,
he added "relative to the reported alleged revelations of Deputy Tanodbayan
Manuel Herrera, herein respondent never succumbed to any alleged attempts
to influence his actuations in the premises,having instead successfully resisted
perceived attempts to exert pressure to drop the case after preliminary
investigation and actually ordered the filing and prosecution of the two (2)
murder cases below against herein private-party respondents." He candidly
admitted also in his memorandum: "There is not much that need be said about
the existence of pressure. That there were pressures can hardly be denied; in
fact, it has never been denied." 15-a He submitted that "even as he vehemently
denies insinuations of any direct or indirect complicity or participation in any
alleged attempt to supposedly whitewash the cases below, . . . should this
Honorable Court find sufficient cause to justify the reopening and retrial of the
cases below, he would welcome such development so that any wrong that had
been caused may be righted and so that, at the very least the actuations of
herein respondent in the premises may be reviewed and reexamined, confident
as he is that the end will show that he had done nothing in the premises that
violated his trust as Tanodbayan (Ombudsman)." New Tanodbayan Raul M.
Gonzales in his comment of April 14, 1986 "interposed no objection to the
reopening of the trial of the cases . . . as, in fact, he urged that the said cases
be reopened in order that justice could take its course."
Respondents Justices of the Sandiganbayan First Division in their
collective comment of April 9, 1986 stated that the trial of the criminal cases by
them was valid and regular and decided on the basis of evidence presented
and the law applicable, but manifested that "if it is true that the former
Tanodbayan and the Deputy Tanodbayan, Chief of the Prosecution Panel, were
pressured into suppressing vital evidence which would probably alter the result
of the trial, Answering Respondents would not interpose any objection to the
reopening of those cases, if only to allow justice to take its course." Respondent
Sandiganbayan Justice Bienvenido C. Vera Cruz, in a separate comment,
asserted that he passed no note to anyone; the note being bandied about is not
in his handwriting; he had nothing to do with the writing of the note or of any
note of any kind intended for any lawyer of the defense or even of the
prosecution; and requested for an investigation by this Court to settle the note-
passing issue once and for all.
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera, in his comment of April 14, 1986
affirmed the allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he
revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were
ordered by Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. He amplified
his revelations, as follows:
"1. AB INITIO, A VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL!
Incidents during the preliminary investigation showed ominous signs that
the fate of the criminal case on the death of Ex-Senator Benigno Aquino
and Rolando Galman on August 21, 1983 was dooned to an ignominous
end. Malacañang wanted dismissal — to the extent that a prepared
resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel (composed of the
undersigned, Fiscals Ernesto Bernabe and Leonardo Tamayo) for
signature. This, of course, was resisted by the panel, and a resolution
charging all the respondents as principals was forwarded to the
Tanodbayan on January 10, 1985.
2. MALACAÑANG CONFERENCE PLANNED SCENARIO OF TRIAL.
At 6:00 p.m. of said date (January 10) Mr. Ferdinand E. Marcos (the
former President) summoned to Malacañang Justice Bernardo Fernandez
(the Tanodbayan), Sandiganbayan Justice Manuel Pamaran (the
Presiding Justice) and all the members of the Panel.
Also present at the meeting were Justice Manuel Lazaro (the Coordinator)
and Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, who left earlier, came back and left again.
The former President had a copy of the panel's signed resolution
(charging all accused as principals), evidently furnished him in advance,
and with prepared notes on the contents thereof. LLjur
The former President started by vehemently maintaining that Galman shot
Aquino at the tarmac. Albeit initially the undersigned argued against the
theory, to remain silent was the more discreet posture when the former
President became emotional (he was quite sick then).
During a good part of the conference, the former President talked about
Aquino and the communists, lambasting the Agrava Board, specially the
Legal Panel. Shifting to the military he rumbled on such statements as: 'It
will be bloody . . . Gen. Ramos, though close to me, is getting ambitious
and poor Johnny does not know what to do' . . . 'our understanding with
Gen. Ramos is that his stint is only temporary, but he is becoming
ambitious;' . . . 'the boys were frantic when they heard that they will be
charged in court, and will be detained at city jail.'
From outright dismissal, the sentiment veered towards a more pragmatic
approach. The former President more or less conceded that for political
and legal reasons all the respondents should be charged in court.
Politically, as it will become evident that the government was serious in
pursuing the case towards its logical conclusion, and thereby ease public
demonstrations; on the other hand, legally, it was perceived that after (not
IF) they are acquitted, double jeopardy would inure. The former President
ordered then that the resolution be revised by categorizing the
participation of each respondent.
In the matter of custody of the accused pendente lite the Coordinator was
ordered to get in touch with Gen. Narciso Cabrera, Gen. Vicente Eduardo
and Director Jolly Bugarin to put on record that they had no place in their
respective institutions. The existence of PD No. 1950 (giving custody to
commanding officers of members of AFP charged in court) was never
mentioned.
It was decided that the presiding justice (First Division) would personally
handle the trial, and assurance was made by him that it would be finished
in four to six months, pointing out that, with the recent effectivity of the
New Rules on Criminal Procedure, the trial could be expedited.
Towards the end of the two hour meeting and after the script had been
tacitly mapped out, the former President uttered: 'Magmoro-moro na lang
kayo.'
The parting words of the former President were: 'Thank you for your
cooperation. I know how to reciprocate.'
While still in the palace grounds on the way out, the undersigned
manifested his desire to the Tanodbayan to resign from the panel, or even
the office. This, as well as other moves to this effect, had always been
refused. Hoping that with sufficient evidence sincerely and efficiently
presented by the prosecution, all involves in the trial would be conscience-
pricked and realize the futility and injustice of proceeding in accordance
with the script, the undersigned opted to say on."
Herrera further added details on the "implementation of the script," such as the
holding of a "make-believe raffle" within 18 minutes of the filing of the
Informations with the Sandiganbayan at noon of January 23, 1985, while there
were no members of the media; the installation of TV monitors directly beamed
to Malacañang; the installation of a "war room" occupied by the military;
attempts to direct and stifle witnesses for the prosecution; the suppression of
the evidence that could be given by U.S. Airforce men about the "scrambling"
of Ninoy's plane; the suppression of rebuttal witnesses and the bias and
partiality of the Sandiganbayan; its cavalier disregard of his plea that it "should
not decide these cases on the merits without first making a final ruling on the
Motion for Inhibition;" and the Presiding Justice's over-kill with the declaration
that "the Court finds all accused innocent of the crimes charged in the two
informations, and accordingly, they incur neither criminal nor civil liability,"
adding that "in the almost twenty years that the undersigned has been the
prosecutor in the sala of the Presiding Justice this is the only occasion where
civil liability is pronounced in a decision of acquittal." He "associated himself
with the motion for reconsideration and likewise prayed that the proceedings in
the Sandiganbayan and its decision be declared null and void."
New Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoñez' comment of April 25, 1986
submitted that a declaration of mistrial will depend on the veracity of the
evidence supportive of petitioners' claim of suppression of evidence and
collusion. He submitted that this would require reception of evidence by a Court-
appointed or designated commissioner or body of commissioners (as was done
in G.R. No. 71316, Fr. Romano case; and G.R. No. 61016, Morales case; and
G.R. No. 70054, Banco Filipino case); and that if petitioners' claim were
substantiated, a reopening of the double murder case is proper to avoid a
miscarriage of justice since the verdict of acquittal would no longer be a valid
basis for a double jeopardy claim. prLL
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and
travesty of justice to stand unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are
courts of law and justice and equity. They would have no reason to exist if they
were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to
subvert and suppress the truth, instead of repositories of judicial power whose
judges are sworn and committed to render impartial justice to all alike who seek
the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong,
without fear or favor and removed from the pressures of politics and prejudice.
More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know
the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake. In life, as an accused
before the military tribunal Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was
entitled to due process of law and trial in the regular civil courts before an
impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. In death, Ninoy, as the victim of
the "treacherous and vicious assassination" and the relatives and sovereign
people as the aggrieved parties plead once more for due process of law and a
retrial before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. The Court is
constrained to declare the sham trial a mock trial — the non-trial of the century
— and that the predetermined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab
initio.
1. No double jeopardy. — It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy
cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgment
of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which represents the sovereign
people in criminal cases is denied due process. As the Court stressed in the
1985 case of People vs. Bocar, 27
"Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and
prove its case, its right to due process is thereby violated. 27-a
"The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic
constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the
violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional
issue (Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, L-30026, 37 SCRA
420 [Jan. 30, 1971] which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will.
Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a
decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction
(Aducayen vs. Flores, L-30370 [May 25, 19731, 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co.
vs. Enage, L-30111-12, 49 SCRA 416 Feb. 27, 1973]). Any judgment or
decision rendered notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a
'lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or
ignored wherever it exhibits its head' (Aducayen vs. Flores, supra).
"Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and
void for lack of jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a proper basis
for a claim of double jeopardy (Serino vs. Zosa, supra).
xxx xxx xxx
"Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a
competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been
entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the express consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The
lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it
violated the right of the prosecution to due process.
"In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the
criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts
amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not
expose the accused to a second jeopardy."
More so does the rule against the invoking of double jeopardy hold in the
cases at bar where as we have held, the sham trial was but a mock trial where
the authoritarian president ordered respondents Sandiganbayan and
Tanodbayan to rig the trial and closely monitored the entire proceedings to
assure the predetermined final outcome of acquittal and total absolution as
innocent of all the respondents-accused. Notwithstanding the laudable efforts
of Justice Herrera which saw him near the end "deactivating" himself from the
case, as it was his belief that its eventual resolution was already a foregone
conclusion, they could not cope with the misuse and abuse of the overwhelming
powers of the authoritarian President to weaken the case of the prosecution, to
suppress its evidence, harass, intimidate and threaten its witnesses, secure
their recantation or prevent them from testifying. Fully aware of the
prosecution's difficulties in locating witnesses and overcoming their natural fear
and reluctance to appear and testify, respondent Sandiganbayan maintained a
"dizzying tempo" of the proceedings and announced its intention to terminate
the proceedings in about 6 months time or less than a year, pursuant to the
scripted scenario. The prosecution complained of "the Presiding Justice's
seemingly hostile attitude towards (it)" and their being the subject of warnings,
reprimand and contempt proceedings as compared to the nil situation for the
defense. Herrera likewise complained of being "cajoled into producing
witnesses and pressed on making assurances that if given a certain period,
they will be able to produce their witnesses," Herrera pleaded for "a reasonable
period of preparation of its evidence" and cited other pending cases before
respondent court that were pending trial for a much longer time where the
"dizzying tempo" and "fast pace" were not maintained by the
court. 28 Manifestly, the prosecution and the sovereign people were denied due
process of law with a partial court and biased Tanodbayan under the constant
and pervasive monitoring and pressure exerted by the authoritarian President
to assure the carrying out of his instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted
verdict of acquittal such as that in the case at bar is a void judgment. In legal
contemplation, it is no judgment at all. It neither binds nor bars anyone. Such a
judgment is "a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw". It is a terrible
and unspeakable affront to the society and the people. To paraphrase
Brandeis: 29 If the authoritarian head of the government becomes the
lawbreaker, he breeds contempt for the law, he invites every man to become a
law unto himself, he invites anarchy. prLL
(b) It is manifest that this does not involve a case of mere irregularities in
the conduct of the proceedings or errors of judgment which do not affect the
integrity or validity of the judgment or verdict.
(c) The contention of one of defense counsel that the State and the
sovereign people are not entitled to due process is clearly erroneous and
contrary to the basic principles and jurisprudence cited hereinabove.
(d) The submittal of respondents-accused that they had not exerted the
pressure applied by the authoritarian president on public respondents and that
no evidence was suppressed against them must be held to be untenable in the
wake of the evil plot now exposed for their preordained wholesale exoneration.
(e) Respondents' invocation of the writer's opinion in Luzon Brokerage
Co., Inc. vs. Maritime Bldg. Co., Inc. 36 is inappropriate. The writer therein held
that a party should be entitled to only one Supreme Court and may not
speculate on vital changes in the Court's membership for review of his lost case
once more, since public policy and sound practice demand that litigation be put
to an end and no second pro forma motion for reconsideration reiterating the
same arguments should be kept pending so long (for over six (6) years and one
(1) month since the denial of the first motion for reconsideration). This opinion
cannot be properly invoked, because here, petitioners' second motion for
reconsideration was filed promptly on March 20, 1986 following the denial under
date of February 4th of the first motion for reconsideration and the same was
admitted per the Court's Resolution of April 3, 1986 and is now being resolved
within five months of its filing after the Commission had received the evidence
of the parties who were heard by the Court only last August 26th. Then, the
second motion for reconsideration is based on an entirely new material ground
which was not known at the time of the denial of the petition and filing of the
first motion for reconsideration, i.e, the secret Malacañang conference on
January 10, 1985 which came to light only fifteen months later in March, 1986
and showed beyond per-adventure (as proved in the Commission hearings) the
merits of the petition and that the authoritarian president had dictated and
predetermined the final outcome of acquittal. Hence, the ten members of the
Court (without any new appointees) unanimously voted to admit the second
motion for reconsideration. 37
4. With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now
be tried before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. — There has
been the long dark night of authoritarian regime, since the fake ambush in
September, 1972 of then Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile (as now
admitted by Enrile himself) was staged to trigger the imposition of martial law
and authoritarian one-man rule, with the padlocking of Congress and the
abolition of the office of the Vice-President.
As recently retired Senior Justice Vicente Abad Santos recalled in his
valedictory to the new members of the Bar last May, "In the past few years, the
judiciary was under heavy attack by an extremely powerful executive. During
this state of judicial siege, lawyers both in and outside the judiciary perceptively
surrendered to the animus of technicality. In the end, morality was overwhelmed
by technicality, so that the latter emerged ugly and naked in its true
manifestation."
Now that the light is emerging, the Supreme Court faces the task of
restoring public faith and confidence in the courts. The Supreme Court enjoys
neither the power of the sword nor of the purse. Its strength has mainly in public
confidence, based on the truth and moral force of its judgments. This has been
built on its cherished traditions of objectivity and impartiality, integrity and
fairness and unswerving loyalty to the Constitution and the rule of law which
compels acceptance as well by the leadership as by the people. The lower
courts draw their bearings from the Supreme Court. With this Court's judgment
today declaring the nullity of the questioned judgment or acquittal and directing
a new trial, there must be a rejection of the temptation of becoming instruments
of injustice as vigorously as we rejected becoming its victims. The end of one
form of injustice should not become simply the beginning of another. This
simply means that the respondents accused must now face trial for the crimes
charged against them before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor
with all due process. What the past regime had denied the people and the
aggrieved parties in the sham trial must now be assured as much to the
accused as to the aggrieved parties. The people will assuredly have a way of
knowing when justice has prevailed as well as when it has failed. cdrep
The notion nurtured under the past regime that those appointed to public
office owe their primary allegiance to the appointing authority and are
accountable to him alone and not to the people or the Constitution must be
discarded. The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the
people, under our system of government, is to fill the public posts. While the
appointee may acknowledge with gratitude the opportunity thus given of
rendering public service, the appointing authority becomes functus officio and
the primary loyalty of the appointed must be rendered to the Constitution and
the sovereign people in accordance with his sacred oath of office. To
paraphrase the late Chief Justice Earl Warren of the United States Supreme
Court, the Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no constituency,
serve no majority nor minority but serve only the public interest as they see it in
accordance with their oath of office, guided only the Constitution and their own
conscience and honor.
5. Note of Commendation. — The Court expresses its appreciation with
thanks for the invaluable services rendered by the Commission composed of
retired Supreme Court Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, chairman, and retired
Court of Appeals Justices Milagros German and Eduardo Caguioa as
members. In the pure spirit of public service, they rendered selflessly and
without remuneration thorough, competent and dedicated service in
discharging their tasks of hearing and receiving the evidence, evaluating the
same and submitting their Report and findings to the Court within the scheduled
period and greatly easing the Court's burden.
ACCORDINGLY, petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is
granted. The resolutions of November 28, 1985 dismissing the petition and of
February 4, 1986 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration are hereby set
aside and in lieu thereof, judgment is hereby rendered nullifying the
proceedings in respondent Sandiganbayan and its judgment of acquittal in
Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Gen. Luther Custodio, et al." and ordering a re-trial of the said cases which
should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the
requirements of due process, so that the truth may be finally known and justice
done to all.
This resolution is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.
Yap, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
Feria, Fernan and Narvasa, JJ., took no part.
Feliciano, J., I join Gutierrez, Jr., J., in his statements in the last three
paragraphs (prior to the dispositive paragraph) of his Separate Concurring
Opinion.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
Consistent with what I had perceived as the need to establish the truth
behind the vicious assassination of the late Senator Benigno Aquino, as
expressed in my dissenting opinion in Galman vs. Pamaran (138 SCRA 294,
379 [1985]), and so that justice may be done, I vote for the re-trial prayed for by
petitioners.
There is reason to believe that some vital evidence had been suppressed
by the prosecution, or that it had disregarded, as immaterial or irrelevant,
evidence which, if presented, could affect the outcome of the case. As it is, the
prosecution failed to fully ventilate its position and to lay out before respondent
Court all the pertinent facts which could have helped that Court in arriving at a
just decision. It had, thus, failed in its task.
"A public prosecutor is 'the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is
as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case but that
justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and every definite sense
the servant of the law, the two fold aim of which is that guilt shall not
escape or innocence suffer." [Italics ours] (Suarez vs. Platon, 69 Phil 556
[1940]).
"He owes the state, the court and the accused the duty to lay before the
court the pertinent facts at his disposal with methodical and meticulous
attention, clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in his
evidence to the end that the court's mind may not be tortured by doubts,
the innocent may not suffer, and the guilty may not escape unpunished"
(People vs. Esquivel, 82 Phil. 453 [1948]).
Respondent Court, in showing partiality for the accused from beginning
to end, from the raffle of the subject cases to the promulgation of judgment,
which absolved the accused, en masse, from any and all liability, is equally
culpable for miscarriage of justice. Due process of law, which "requires a
hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal" and the right of every
litigant to "nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial Judge" (Gutierrez
vs. Santos, 112 Phil. 184 [1961]; Castillo vs. Juan, 62 SCRA 124 [1975]), was
violated.prLL
On November 28, 1985, this Court dismissed the petition for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction and lifted a Temporary Restraining
Order earlier granted. We are now acting on a motion for reconsideration filed
by the petitioners.
When the Court initially dismissed the petition, I issued a separate
concurring and dissenting opinion. The issues before us were novel and
momentous. I felt that in immediately dismissing the petition, we were denying
the petitioners every reasonable opportunity to prove their allegations of non-
independent and biased conduct of both the prosecution and the trial court. I
stated that the issues of miscarriage of justice and due process arising from
that conduct should be allowed more extended treatment. With then Associate
Justices Claudio Teehankee and Vicente Abad Santos, I, therefore, dissented
from the Court's resolution denying the petitioners' motions to continue
presenting their case.
Since the majority of the Court, however, had decided to resolve the
petition on its merits and the findings of the Vasquez Commission were still for
the future, I concurred in the result of this Court's action on two grounds — (1)
the right of the accused to speedy trial and (2) the presumption in law that
judicial acts are regularly performed and that public officers have discharged
their duties in accordance with law.
The findings of the Vasquez Commission now confirm my initial
misgivings and more than overcome the presumption of regular performance
of official duty upon which I based my concurrence.
What were some of these misgivings now given substance by the
investigation?
Mistrial is usually raised by the accused. In this petition neither the
accused nor the prosecution saw anything wrong in the proceedings. We had
the unusual phenomenon of the relatives of one victim, prominent lawyers and
law professors, and retired Justices assuming the uncommon role of alleging
not only a biased Sandiganbayan but also a Tanodbayan holding back its own
evidence. Instead of allowing the heated passions and emotions generated by
the Aquino assassination to cool off or die down, the accused insisted on the
immediate rendition of a decision.
The Sandiganbayan is usually sober and respectful in its relations with
the Supreme Court. I, therefore, found it strange and unfortunate why, in its
Comment, the Sandiganbayan should question our authority to look into the
exercise of its jurisdiction. There was the further matter of television cameras
during trial, their effect on the witnesses and the judges, and other mischievous
potentialities.
The report of the Vasquez Commission now shows that there was more
to these misgivings and suspicions than appeared in the records at that time.
The Court's opinion penned by the Chief Justice states in detail why the
Sandiganbayan was not an impartial tribunal and the Tanodbayan not an
unbiased prosecutor.
The right against double jeopardy is intended to protect against repeated
litigations and continuous harassment of a person who has already undergone
the agony of prosecution and trial for one and the same offense. It certainly was
never Intended to cover a situation where the prosecution suppresses some of
its own evidence, where the accused correctly and eagerly anticipate a
judgment of acquittal, and where the court appears to have made up its mind
even before trial has started.
Under the circumstances found by the Vasquez Commission, there was
a failure of trial tantamount to no trial at all. A "moro-moro" could not possibly
result in a just or valid decision.
I am, however, constrained to write this separate opinion to emphasize a
concern of this Court and of all Filipinos who want genuine justice to be realized
in this case.
In the same way that we deplore the pressures and partiality which led
to the judgment of acquittal, we must insure that absolutely no indication of bias,
prejudgment, or vindictiveness shall taint the retrial of this case. The fairly
strong language used by the Court in its main opinion underscores the gravity
with which it views the travesties of justice in this "trial of the century." At the
same time, nothing expressed in our opinion should be interpreted as the
Supreme Court's making a factual finding, one way or another, about the
perpetrators of the Aquino or the Galman killing. Any statements about the
circumstances of the assassination or about the military version of the killings
are intended solely for one issue - whether or not the Sandiganbayan acquittals
should be set aside and a retrial ordered.
Neither our final resolution of this petition, the stature of the persons
involved, pakikisama, utang na loob for an appointment or reappointment, or
any other extraneous matters should color or influence the future course of this
case.
Needless to say, any person who, in the past, may have formally
expressed opinions about the innocence or guilt of the accused should be
neither a prosecutor or judge in any forthcoming trial. It is not enough for the
future proceedings to be fair; they should be above any suspicion of partiality,
bias, rancor, or vindictiveness. It would be unfortunate if, in the conduct of
further proceedings in this case, erroneous impressions may arise that a
prosecutor or judge has prejudged the guilt or innocence of any accused.
Having just declared a mistrial, we should not again declare the retrial as
another mistrial, ad infinitum.
For the reasons abovestated, I concur in the decision of the Court to grant
the petitioners' second motion for reconsideration.
Feliciano, J., concur in the last three paragraphs (prior to the dispositive
paragraph).
(Galman v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 72670, [September 12, 1986], 228 PHIL
|||
42-102)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 131652. March 9, 1998.]
SYNOPSIS
SYLLABUS
DECISION
VITUG, J :
p
Pending before this Court are two separate petitions, one filed by
petitioner Bayani M. Alonte, docketed G.R. No. 131652, and the other by
petitioner Buenaventura Concepcion, docketed G.R. No. 131728, that assail
the decision of respondent Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., of the Regional
Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 53, of Manila finding both petitioners guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. The two petitions were consolidated. llcd
Separate Opinions
PUNO, J ., concurring and dissenting:
The facts are critical and need to be focused. Petitioners were charged
with rape in Criminal Case No. 15993 which was raffled to Br. 25 of the RTC of
Biñan, Laguna. The charge is principally based on the following affidavit dated
October 31, 1996 of Ms. Juvie-Lyn Punongbayan, a 16-year old minor, viz.:
REPLY-AFFIDAVIT
(TUGON SA MGA SALAYSAY NILA MAYOR BAYANI ALONTE, WELLA
CONCEPCION, RICARDO LACAYAN at JAIME MENDOZA)
Ako si JUVIE-LYN Y. PUNONGBAYAN, Filipino, walang asawa, 16
years old, at kasalukuyang nasa pangangalaga ng Department of Social
Welfare and Development, matapos makapanumpa ayon sa batas, ay
nagsasaad:
1. Wala pong katotohanan ang lahat nakasaad sa mga salaysay ni
Mayor Bayani Alonte at Buenaventura "Wella" Concepcion, ng kanilang
mga testigo na sila Ricardo (Ading) Lacayan y Aguilar at Jaime Bagtas
Mendoza.
2. Ang totoo po ay inabuso ako ni Mayor nung September 12,
1996, katulad nga ng naihayag ko na sa aking sinumpaang salaysay.
Ayon sa driver ng tricycle na nasakyan ko pagkatapos ng insidente, hindi
lang po ako, kundi marami pa pong babae ang inabuso ni Mayor. Sabi pa
nga ng driver ay naaawa siya sa akin, at lumaban daw ako. Tinawagan
ko na rin po ang lahat ng mga babae na naging biktima ni Mayor; wag
silang matakot, lumabas at ilahad ang pangaabuso ni Mayor.
Ang detalya nung panggagahasa
ni Alonte at ang partisipasyon
ni Wella Concepcion
3. Nakalahad po sa sumusunod na talata ang detalya ng pang-
aabuso sa akin ni Mayor. Pinakikita rin dito kung paano siya
nakipagsabwatan kay Wella Concepcion. Sa pamamagitan nito ay
mapapabulaanan na rin ang mga nakasaad sa salaysay nila at ng mga
testigo nila.
4. Nakilala ko si Wella Concepcion, dance instructor, nung
bandang last week ng August 1996. Noon ay naghahanda ako para sa
"Miss Education" beauty contest sa Perpetual Help College of Laguna.
Doon ako nag-aaral. First year college ako, at education ang kursong pinili
ko. Ang nasabing contest ay ginanap nung Sept. 20, 1996. Kapag
nagkikita kami ni Wella para sa ensayo, nagkukuwentuhan din kami, at
nabanggit niya na may kaibigan siyang bakla na nagdadala ng babae kay
Mayor Alonte. Waway daw ang pangalan ng bakla. Hindi ko pa kilala si
Waway noon.
5. Nung Sept. 7, niyaya ako ni Wella na sumali sa dance contest
sa "Sang Linggo NAPO SILA" sa Channel 2, na itatanghal sa Sept. 11,
1996. Wala na daw po akong aalalahanin. Siya daw ang bahala sa
costume at transportation. Pumayag ang nanay ko, dahil wala na kaming
gagastusin. Hindi ko tinanong kay Wella kung saan galing ang costume.
Akala ko may ipapagamit lang siya sa akin.
6. Nung Sept. 8, pinakilala ni Wella si Waway sa akin. Si Waway
ang nagturo sa amin ng sayaw para sa TV contest. Mula nung araw na
yon hanggang Sept. 10 ay nagsanay kami sa bahay ng kapatid ni Waway
sa St. Francis Subdivision, Biñan, Laguna. Tatlo kami sa dance group:
ako at ang dalawang lalaki na ipinakilala sa akin ni Waway: si Melchor at
Darius.
7. Nagpunta kami sa studio sa Delta nung Sept. 11. Bago kami
magsayaw, habang inaayos ni Wella yung damit ko, sinabi niya na dapat
manalo kami dahil si Mayor Alonte daw ang nag-sponsor ng costume
namin. Noon ko lang ito nalaman. Hindi kami nanalo sa contest, pero
nagkaroon pa rin kami ng premyong P1,500.00 na pinaghatian namin.
8. Pagkatapos ng contest, at nung nakapagpalit na ako ng damit,
binabalik ko kay Wella ang costume ko. Sabi niya iuwi ko daw ito dahil
gagamitin ko ito saMiss Education contest, sa presentation ng mga
candidates. Mula sa studio, nagpunta kaming lahat sa isang kainan sa
tapat ng Delta at, pagkatapos namin kumain, humiwalay yung ibang
kasama namin.
9. Dinala ako ni Wella sa isang department store at binili niya ako
ng sandals. Inikot niya ako sa lugar na yon at binili niya ako ng pagkain.
Tapos ay sumakay kami ng bus pauwi sa Laguna. Nung nasa bus
kami, niyaya ako ni Wella na magpunta sa bahay ni Mayor para
magpasalamat ng personal para sa costume namin. Pumayag ako at sabi
ko kay Wella na sunduin niya ako sa bahay ng 10:00 a.m. sa susunod na
araw, Sept. 12. Nakarating ako sa bahay ng 5:00 p.m. ng araw na yon,
Sept. 11.
10. Nung Sept. 12, hinintay ko si Wella ng 10:00 a.m. Nung hindi
siya dumating umalis kami ng Tita ko dahil sinamahan ko siya sa health
center. Sumunod pala si Wella doon, pero hindi kami nagkita kasi saglit
lang kami doon. Bumalik siya sa bahay, at doon na kami nagkita. Tapos
ay umalis kami ni Wella papunta kay Mayor. Tumawid kami ng kalye, at
pumara ako ng tricycle. Pero kahit marami na akong pinara, ayaw ni Wella
na sumakay doon. Maya-maya, may tricycle na dumating na hindi naman
pinara ni Wella. Basta huminto na lang sa harap namin. Doon kami
sumakay ni Wella. Si Wella ang nagturo sa driver kung saan kami
pupunta. Nag-uusap sila ng driver habang papunta kami kay Mayor.
11. Bumaba kami sa tapat ng bahay na bukas ang gate. May
swimming pool sa loob, alam na alam ni Wella and pasikot-sikot nang
bahay tuloy-tuloy siya sa loob at sumunod naman ako. Wala kaming taong
nakita, pero bukas pati yung pintuan ng bahay. Dinala ako ni Wella sa
sala. Napakaganda ng loob ng bahay. Mayroong wallpaper na may design
na leaves and flowers; may carpet sa sahig. May mahabang hagdan
patungo sa dalawang pintuan.
12. Tinanong ko kay Wella kung nasaan si Mayor. Sabi niya ay
nasa munisipyo daw; darating na daw maya-maya. Pagkaraan ng mga 15
minutes, dumating si Mayor na nakasakay sa green na kotse. Lumabas
siya sa kaliwang pintuan sa harap ng kotse. Wala siyang kasama.
13. Pumasok si Mayor sa loob ng bahay. Naghubad siya ng
sapatos. Sabi ni Wella: "Mayor, si Juvie; Juvie si Mayor."
14. Umupo si Mayor sa tabi ko. Kinamayan niya ako at sinabi niya:
"Hi, I'm Arthur" sabay hinalikan niya sa ako sa lips. Hindi ako naka-react
dahil nagulat at kinabahan ako.
15. Nagmamadaling nagpaalam si Wella. Kinuha ni Mayor ang
wallet sa bulsa sa likod ng kanyang pantalon. Dumukot siya ng P1,000 na
buo. Inabot niya ito kay Wella. Patayo na ako pero hinawakan ni Mayor
ang braso ko. Wag daw akong sasama kay Wella. Sinabi ko kay Wella na
wag niya akong iiwanan, pero parang wala siyang narinig. Basta tuloy-
tuloy siyang umalis.
16. Nung kami na lang ni Mayor ang natira, pinainom niya ako ng
mineral water. Uminom ako dahil nauuhaw ako. Nanlabo ang paningin ko
at nanghina ako.
17. Nawalan ako ng malay. Ang sumunod ko na lang na
natatandaan ay nandoon na ako sa kwarto. Wala akong damit.
Nakadagan si Mayor sa akin. May malaking salamin sa pader. Doon ko
nakita na walang kadamit-damit si Mayor.
18. Hawak ako ni Mayor sa magkabilang braso. Pinipisil niya ito
kaya nagkaroon ako ng pasa sa kaliwang braso (at ito ay nawala lang
pagkatapos ng tatlong araw).
19. Naramdaman ko na pilit na pinasok ni Mayor ang ari niya sa
aking ari. Nasaktan ako. Nagmakaawa ako. Umiiyak ako nung sinabi ko
sa kanya na tigilan niya ako; nasasaktan ako; may anak rin siyang babae.
Sabi niya wag daw akong maingay at i-embrace ko na lang daw siya. Lalo
akong umiyak dahit nandidiri ako sa kanya, at sa ginagawa niya sa akin.
Naghalo ang galit, pandidiri at takot. Wala akong magawa kundi
magmakaawa. Hindi ko siya maitulak dahil nanghihina ako, nakadagan
siya sa akin, mataba siya, at hawak-hawak niya ang braso ko. Pero kahit
nagmamakaawa ako, tinuloy pa rin niya at pinasok niya ulit ang ari niya
sa aking ari.
20. Maya-maya ay tumigil siya. Tumayo siya at sabi niya: "ang
panty mo, nasa tabi mo." Kinuha ko ang panty ko, tumayo ako at sinuot
ko ito. Hinanap ko ang damit ko, at nakita ko ang walking shorts, bra at t-
shirt ko sa sahig. Pinulot ko ito at sinuot ko. Habang sinusuot ko, umiiyak
pa rin ako. Pagkatapos kong magbihis, umupo ako sa mahabang upuan
sa may gilid ng kama.
21. Samantala, pagkatapos sabihin ni Mayor na nasa tabi ko ang
panty ko, nagpunta siya sa banyo na transparent ang pinto. Wala siyang
suot pagpunta niya doon. Paglabas niya, nakasuot na siya ng checkered
brief na kulay black and white. Pumunta siya sa kabilang gilid ng kama.
Kinuha niya ang damit niya na nakahanger sa pader. Sinuot niya ito.
Lumabas siya ng kwarto. Hindi nagtagal ay pumasok siya ulit at sinabi
niya na nandiyan na daw ang sundo ko.
22. Tumayo ako. Sinabi ko na aalis na ako. Nung papunta na ako
sa pintuan, lumapit si Mayor sa akin. May hawak-hawak siyang dalawang
pirasong P1,000. Tiniklop niya ito; binaba niya yung neckline ng t-shirt ko,
at pinasok niya ang pera sa aking bra. Nagalit ako. Kinuha ko ang pera at
tinapon ko ito sa kanya. Sabi ko hindi ako bayarang babae. Nagalit siya
at pinagbantaan ako. Sabi niya: "Pag nagsalita ka, alam mo na kung ano
ang mangyayari sa iyo." Tiningnan ko siya, at umalis ako pababa.
23. Mayroon tricycle na nakaabang sa labas. Sumunod si Mayor.
Lumapit siya sa driver at binigyan niya ito ng P100. Tapos ay umalis na
kami.
24. Umiiyak pa rin ako nung nasa tricycle. Sabi ko sa driver na
ginahasa ako ni Mayor. Sabi niya masuwerte daw ako at maaga akong
pinauwi dahil yung mga ibang babae daw na dinadala kay Mayor ay
pinauwi ng madaling-araw o hating-gabi. Minsan, dalawa o tatlo pa nga
daw ang dinadala doon, at yung iba ay naka-uniform pa. Naaawa daw
siya sa akin, kaya magsumbong daw ako. Nakokonsensiya daw siya dahil
isa siya sa dalawang tricycle driver na naghahatid ng mga babae doon.
Sabi pa nga niya, babae din daw ang ina niya, kaya din siya
nakokonsensiya. Dinagdag pa niya na kung may kasiyahan kina Mayor,
isang van ng mga babae ang nadoon. Pagdating namin sa bahay ng Lola
ko, sabi niya bago siya umalis: "Lumaban ka."
On December 13, 1996, the private complainant thru her
counsel, Atty. Remedios C. Balbin and Asst. Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo
Guiab, Jr., of the Department of Justice petitioned this Court for a change of
venue. They cited as ground the great danger to the lives of both the private
complainant, the immediate members of her family, and their witnesses as they
openly defy the principal accused, Mayor Alonte who is acknowledged as a
powerful political figure and almost an institution in Biñan, Laguna . . ."
On March 31, 1997, the private complainant, thru the then Secretary of
Justice, the Honorable Teofisto Guingona and Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio
Zuno filed a Manifestation and Motion for the early resolution of the petition for
change of venue. They submitted the affidavits of the private complainant, her
counsel Atty. Remedios C. Balbin, Dolores Mercado-Yambao, Bienvenido
Salandanan and Evelyn Celso to prove their allegation that they "are exposed
to kidnapping, harassment, veiled threats and tempting offers of bribe money
— all intended to extract an 'affidavit of desistance' from the private
complainant." Worth bright lining are the two (2) affidavits of Atty. Remedios
C. Balbin, counsel for the private complainant, relating the fantastic amount of
P10M bribe money allegedly offered to her. The first affidavit dated February
24, 1997 states:
I. Remedios C. Balbin, of legal age, Filipino, married, with
residence at #5 Uranus Street, Congressional Avenue Subdivision,
Quezon City, after having duly sworn in accordance with law, depose and
say:
1. That I am the Private Prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 96-19-B
for rape, filed with the Biñan RTC, Branch 25, entitled 'People of the
Philippines vs. Bayani Arthur Alonte, et al.;
2. That as Private Prosecutor, it is my avowed duty to be faithful to
the interests of my client, Ms. Juvie-lyn Punongbayan;
3. That on several occasions, I was visited at my Office at the
Quezon City Hall Compound, by a lawyer who introduced himself as Atty.
Leo C. Romero, representing the Accused Mayor Bayani Arthur Alonte;
4. That my calendar at the People's Bureau, Quezon City Hall,
shows that he came to see me about eight (8) times, but we talked only
about three (3) timesbecause I was always busy attending to the problems
of Quezon City's urban poor and the landowners of private properties
illegally occupied by them;
5. That in two (2) occasions, Atty. Romero conveyed to me the
message of Mayor Alonte, namely, to drop the rape case against him, and
that he would give a consideration of Ten Million Pesos (P10 Million) to
be apportioned as follows:
Five Million Pesos (P5M) — for the Private Complainant
Three Million Pesos (P3M) — for me as Private Prosecutor
Two Million Pesos (P2M) — for him as the mediator
6. That I explained to Atty. Romero that money does not matter at
all to the Complainant and her family even if they have very modest
means; that they want justice, which means a conviction for the charge of
rape;
7. That I also explained to Atty. Romero that the money he was
offering me was of no consequence to me because I had access to the
resources of my two (2) daughters, both of whom are in the medical field
abroad, and of Mr. Filomeno Balbin, Labor Attache then assigned in
Riyadh;
8. That I told him that I cannot be tempted with his offer because
spiritual consideration are more important to me than the material. Also,
that I usually handle cases pro bono (at abunado pa) where the litigant is
in dire need of legal assistance but cannot afford to pay for the lawyer's
fees, as in Juvie-lyn's case;
9. That I gave Atty. Romero a copy of the decision of the Supreme
Court promulgated December 10, 1996, entitled "People of the Philippines
vs. Robert Cloud" (GR No. 119359; Crim. Case No. Q-90-12660) for
parricide involving the death of a 2 1/2 year old boy. I wrote on page one
of the xerox copy of the decision: 'To Atty. Leo Romero — so you will
understand,' and to which I affixed my signature.
10. That I told him explicitly: 'we cannot simplify the entire
proceedings. You advise Mayor Alonte to surrender (one mitigating
circumstance), plead guilty (another mitigating circumstance), get a
conviction and suffer the corresponding penalty. Otherwise, we have
nothing to talk about.'
11. That I emphasized that his suggestion for Mayor Alonte to
plead guilty to 'act of lasciviousness' merely was ridiculous;
12. That when the Complainant's Affidavit on the offer of Ms. Emily
Vasquez for a valuable consideration in exchange for an affidavit of
desistance in the rape was exposed by media, Atty. Romero came to see
me and thanked me for not exposing him in similar fashion. I assured him
that he will not be an exception and that I was just too busy then to execute
an affidavit on the matter, as I do now;
13. That I have not received other similar offers of valuable material
consideration from any other person, whether private party or government
official. However, I have been separately advised by several concerned
persons that I was placing my personal safety at great risk. The victim's
family will have great difficulty in finding another lawyer to 'adopt' them in
the way I did, which gives them strength to pursue their case with
confidence and the accused Mayor is aware that I am the obstacle to an
out-of-court settlement of the case. Also, that I had my hands full, as it is,
as the Head of the QC People's Bureau, Housing Development Center,
and Special Task Force on Squatting and Resettlement, and the
numerous cases filed by me or against me, connected with my
performance of official duties, and I should not add more legal problems
despite my authority to engage in private law practice.
14. That this affidavit is executed in order to put on record the
attempt to influence me directly, in exchange for valuable consideration to
drop the rape charge against Mayor Bayani Arthur Alonte.
February 24, 1997, City of Manila.
SGD. REMEDIOS C. BALBIN
REMEDIOS C. BALBIN
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 26th day of March,
1997, Metro Manila.
Community Tax Certificate - 5208733
Date Issue 2-10-97
Quezon City
NOTARY PUBLIC
I agree with the learned disquisition of Mr. Justice Vitug that we should
set aside the conviction of the petitioners for patent violation of their right to due
process of law. I write this Separate Opinion to highlight the erroneousness of
the shocking stance of the State Prosecutor that the rape charge should be
dismissed in view of the desistance of the private complainant. But our ruling
giving no effect on the affidavit of desistance should not based on the reason
that it was procured by threat or intimidation or any payment of money as the
respondent judge opined in his Decision. The respondent judge arrived at this
conclusion on the basis of the affidavits of Atty. Balbin, the counsel of the private
complainant. This is erroneous for Atty. Balbin was never called to the witness
stand to testify on the truth of her affidavits. Her affidavits therefore are hearsay
evidence and should not have been relied upon by the respondent judge. The
affidavit of desistance cannot abort the rape charge against the petitioners on
the simple ground that it did not state that the private complainant-affiant was
not raped by petitioner Alonte. In truth, the private complainant affirmed her
earlier Reply-Affidavit where she narrated in detail how petitioner Alonte raped
her. Moreover, the rape charge has been filed in Court and it is not anymore
the absolute privilege of the complainant to desist from continuing with the case.
This separate opinion unequivocably addresses the issue of whether the
desistance of the victim can stop the further prosecution of the petitioners.
I
In Philippine jurisprudence, desistance has been equated with
recantation or retraction.
To "recant" means to "withdraw or repudiate formally and publicly;" 18 "to
renounce or withdraw a prior statement.'' 19 To "retract" means to "take back;"
"to retract an offer is to withdraw it before acceptance." 20 A recantation usually
applies to a repudiation by a complainant or a witness, either for the prosecution
or the defense, who has previously given an extra-judicial statement 21 or
testimony in court. 22 Repudiation may be made in writing, i.e., by sworn
statement, 23 or by testifying on the witness stand. 24
Mere retraction by a witness or by complainant of his or her testimony
does not necessarily vitiate the original testimony or statement, if
credible. 25 The general rule is that courts look with disfavor upon retractions of
testimonies previously given in court. 26 This rule applies to
crimes, 27 offenses 2 8 as well as to administrative offenses. 29 The reason is
because affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from poor and ignorant
witnesses, usually through intimidation or for monetary
consideration. 30 Moreover, there is always the probability that they will later be
repudiated 31 and there would never be an end to criminal litigation. 32 It would
also be a dangerous rule for courts to reject testimonies solemnly taken before
courts of justice simply because the witnesses who had given them later on
changed their minds for one reason or another. This would make solemn trials
a mockery and place the investigation of the truth at the mercy of unscrupulous
witnesses. 33
The general rule notwithstanding, the affidavit should not be peremptorily
dismissed as a useless scrap of paper. There are instances when a recantation
may create serious doubts as to the guilt of the accused. 34 A retracted
statement or testimony must be subject to scrupulous examination. The
previous statement or testimony and the subsequent one must be carefully
compared and the circumstances under which each was given and the reasons
and motives for the change carefully scrutinized. The veracity of each statement
or testimony must be tested by the credibility of the witness which is left for the
judge to decide. 35 In short, only where there exists special circumstances in the
case which when coupled with the retraction raise doubts as to the truth of the
testimony or statement given, can a retraction be considered and upheld. 36
A survey of our jurisprudence reveals that the same rule has been
applied to affidavits of desistance. 37 An affidavit of desistance is understood to
be a sworn statement executed by a complainant in a criminal or administrative
case that he or she is discontinuing the action filed upon his or her complaint
for whatever reason he or she may cite. The court attaches no persuasive value
to a desistance especially when executed as an afterthought. 38 However, as in
retractions, an affidavit of desistance calls for a reexamination of the records of
the case. 39
In private crimes, an affidavit of desistance filed by a private complainant
is also frowned upon by the courts. Although such affidavit may deserve a
second look at the case, there is hardly an instance when this Court upheld it
in private crimes and dismissed the case on the sole basis thereof. Indeed, a
case is not dismissed upon mere affidavit of desistance of the complainant,
particularly where there exist special circumstances that raise doubts as to the
reliability of the affidavit. 40
Usually in private crimes, an affidavit of desistance is executed by the
private complainant after pardoning and forgiving the offender. In this instance,
the court treats the affidavit as in express pardon. 41 It does not ipso
facto dismiss the case but determines the timeliness and validity thereof.
Private crimes are crimes against chastity such as adultery and
concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness. Their
institution, prosecution and extinction are governed by Article 344 of
the Revised Penal Code, viz:
"Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage,
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness. — The crimes of
adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended spouse.
The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without
including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor in any case, if
he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape, or acts of
lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by
the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor in any
case, the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-named
persons, as the case may be.
In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape,
the marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the
criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. The
provisions of this paragraph shall also be applicable to the co-principals,
accomplices and accessories after the fact of the above-mentioned
crimes."
Private crimes cannot be prosecuted except upon complaint filed by the
offended party. In adultery and concubinage, the offended party must implead
both the guilty parties and must not have consented or pardoned the offenders.
In seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, the complaint must be
filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents or guardian. The
complainant-must not have expressly pardoned the offender.
Article 344 also provides for the extinction of criminal liability in private
crimes. It mentions two modes: pardon and marriage, which when validly and
timely made, result in the total extinction of criminal liability of the
offender. 42 The pardon in private crimes must be made before the institution of
the criminal action. 43 In adultery and concubinage, the pardon may be express
or implied while in seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, the
pardon must be express. In all cases, the pardon must come prior to the
institution of the criminal action. After the case has been filed in court, any
pardon made by the private complainant, whether by sworn statement or on the
witness stand, cannot extinguish criminal liability. The only act that extinguishes
the penal action and the penalty that may have been imposed is the marriage
between the offender and the offended party. 44
As this Court declared in the case of Donio-Teves v. Vamenta, Jr.: 45
"The term "private crimes" in reference to felonies which cannot be
prosecuted except upon complaint filed by the aggrieved party, is
misleading. Far from what it implies, it is not only the aggrieved party who
is offended in such crimes but also the State. Every violation of penal laws
results in the disturbance of public order and safety which the State is
committed to uphold and protect. If the law imposes the condition that
private crimes like adultery shall not be prosecuted except upon complaint
filed by the offended party, it is, as herein pointed earlier "out of
consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the
outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial."
Once a complaint is filed, the will of the offended party is ascertained and
the action proceeds just as in any other crime. This is shown by the fact
that after filing a complaint, any pardon given by the complainant to the
offender would be unavailing. It is true, the institution of the action in so-
called private crime is at the option of the aggrieved party. But it is equally
true that once the choice is made manifest, the law will be applied in full
force beyond the control of, and inspite of the complainant, his death
notwithstanding."
The filing of a complaint in private crimes is merely a condition precedent
to the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty
parties.46 It is the complaint that starts the prosecutory proceeding without
which the fiscal and the court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the case. 47 Once
the complaint is filed, the action proceeds just as in any other crime.
We follow the postulate that a criminal offense is an outrage to the
sovereign state 48 and the right of prosecution for a crime is one of the attributes
of the sovereign power. 49 Thus, criminal actions are usually commenced by the
State, through the People of the Philippines, and the offended party is merely
a complaining witness. 50 In private crimes, however, or those which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio, the offended party assumes a more predominant
role since the right to commence the action or refrain therefrom, is a matter
exclusively within his power and option. 51 The sovereign state deems it the
wiser policy, in private crimes, to let the aggrieved party and her family decide
whether to expose to public view the vices, faults and disgraceful acts occurring
in the family. 52 But once the offended party files the complaint, her will is
ascertained and the action proceeds just as in any other crime. The decision of
the complainant to undergo the scandal of a public trial necessarily connotes
the willingness to face the scandal. 53 The private complainant is deemed to
have shed off her privacy and the crime ceases to be "private" and becomes
"public." The State, through the fiscal, takes over the prosecution of the case
and the victim's change of heart and mind will not affect the State's right to
vindicate the outrage against the violation of its law. 54
This is the reason why pardon in crimes of chastity must come before the
institution of the criminal action. Pardon by the offended party extinguishes
criminal liability when made while the crime is still "private" and within the
control of the offended party. But once the case is filed in court, the pardon
cannot ipso factooperate to dismiss the case. After the institution of the criminal
action, any pardon given by the complainant to the offender would be
unavailing, 55 except of course when the offender validly marries the offended
party. 56 The offended party's pardon of the offender in a seduction case after
the criminal action had been instituted constitutes no bar to said action. 57 A
pardon given in a rape case after the filing of the action in court "comes too late
to hide the shameful occurrence from public notice." 58
Even the death of the offended party cannot extinguish the case once it
is filed in court. 59 If the offended party dies immediately after filing the complaint
but before the institution of the criminal action, his death is not a ground to
dismiss the case. 60 Clearly, the will and participation of the offended party is
necessary only to determine whether to file the complaint or not. Thereafter, the
will of the State prevails.
Article 344 does not include desistance of the offended party from
prosecuting the case as a ground for extinction of criminal liability whether
total 61 or partial.62 Hence, only when the desistance is grounded on forgiveness
and pardon and is made before the institution of the criminal action, can it
extinguish criminal liability. Desistance, per se, is not equivalent to pardon.
In the case at bar, the "Affidavit of Desistance" of Juvielyn is not an
express pardon of the accused and the crime committed. Private complainant
desisted from prosecuting the case against the petitioners because she wished
"to start life anew and live normally again." She reiterated this reason on the
witness stand. She complained that members of the media were bothering and
harassing her and that she wanted to go back to her normal life. She never said
that she forgave the petitioners. She did not absolve them from their culpability.
She did not give any exculpatory fact that would raise doubts about her rape.
She did not say that she consented to petitioner Alonte's acts. Moreover, the
rape case is already in court and it is no longer her right to decide whether or
not the charge should be continued. As we held in Crespo v. Mogul: 63
xxx xxx xxx
"The rule in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information
is filed in court any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or conviction
or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the court.
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of
criminal cases even while the case is already in court he cannot impose
his opinion on the trial court. The court is the best and sole judge on what
to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its
exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed
by the fiscal should be addressed to the court who has the option to grant
or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the
arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a
reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the records of the investigation."
II
The next issue is the validity of the conviction of petitioners. Petitioners
contend that they were convicted without undergoing any trial. Respondent
judge insists otherwise. He claims that petitioners submitted the case on the
merits and relied principally on the Affidavit of Desistance. He recounts the
events that took place before the presentation of private complainant as
revealed by the transcripts of November 7, 1997, viz:
"Prosecutor Campomanes
Your Honor, the complaining witness/private complainant Juvielyn
Punongbayan is present here in Court, and a while ago, I was given
a copy of her Affidavit of Desistance, so I would like to present her
in order to attest to the veracity of her Affidavit of Desistance, your
Honor, and for the Court to hear her testimony.
Court
We will have a separate trial, this involved a heinous offense and
that there is not even any plea-bargaining in this case.
Prosecutor Campomanes
Yes, your Honor, I understand that.
Court
So you have to mark now your documentary evidence in
preparation for trial.
Prosecutor Campomanes
Yes, your Honor.
Court
There are many documentary evidence mentioned by the Supreme
Court in its seven (7) page . . . (may I see the record) seven (7)
page resolution, dated September 2, 1997, and that this case was
assigned to this Court as the trial Judge. This Court has already
arraigned the accused and he pleaded not guilty, and so the next
step is pre-trial. The Order of the Supreme Court is to direct this
Court not only to determine the voluntariness but also the validity
of the Affidavit of Desistance mentioned by the Court which was
also brought to the attention of the Supreme Court. llcd
Prosecutor Campomanes
And to the Department of Justice likewise your Honor.
Court
And that's why the Supreme Court instead of resolving it sent the
records to this Court to determine the voluntariness and the validity
of the Desistance, but they must be determined after trial on the
merits.
Prosecutor Campomanes
Your Honor please, representing the people. Its events now will
prove that there is no more need for the prosecution to go on trial
of this case, considering that the private complainant herself had
already furnished the Department of Justice a copy of her Affidavit
of Desistance.
Court
What does it say there?
Prosecutor Campomanes
That she is no longer interested in further prosecuting this case,
and that she is now desisting in going to full blown trial, and
considering your Honor, further, that this is a private offense, then,
the Department of Justice feels that it can not be more popish than
the Pope.
Court
That is the stand of the Department of the Justice. But the Supreme
Court belongs to a different Department, I am governed by the
Supreme Court, because I am a Judge, I am not from the
Department of Justice.
Prosecutor Campomanes
We are all aware your Honor, that we will just be prolonging the
agony, in fairness to everybody, considering that we are
representing the people, but we are not representing only . . . the
Department of Justice is not only representing the complainant in
this case but we are also for justice to be rendered to the
respondent as well.
Court
I am rendering fair justice to everyone. That is the sense of this
Court. That is the perception of this Court with respect to the
Supreme Court resolution, in the first place, that Affidavit does not
negate the commission of the crime. You want us to dismiss this
case when the Affidavit does not negate the commission of the
crime?
Prosecutor Campomanes
That's why we will be presenting her in Open Court, your Honor.
Court
Just to affirm that?
Prosecutor Campomanes
No to prove . . .
Court
What happened . . . how about the Prosecution Department, they
have control of the prosecution, and the offended party herself, has
not negated the commission of the crime, is there anything there to
show that she did not . . . that the accused . . . did not commit the
crime charged?
Prosecutor Campomanes
That's why we will be presenting her in Court, whatever is not here
will be clarified.
Court
So, we will go to a trial on the merits you present that affidavit, that's
a part of your evidence.
Prosecutor Campomanes
The people is ready to present that . . . the complaining witness.
Court
We will have a trial on the merits.
Prosecutor Campomanes
Your Honor please, being a woman, I have extensively discussed
this matter with the complaining witness and she intimated to this
representation that she can not bear another day of coming here,
with all these people staring at her with everybody looking at her
as if she is something . . .
Court
On December 13, 1996, petitioner Punongbayan through private
counsel, Atty. Remedios C. Balbin and the Assistant State
Prosecutor Guiab, Jr. who is not here both were relieved and
changed with a new lady prosecutor, prayed that the case be tried
by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, they cited the following
grounds: 'THE GREAT DANGER TO THE LIVES OF BOTH
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT AND THE IMMEDIATE MEMBERS OF
HER FAMILY AND THEIR WITNESSES AS THEY OPENLY
IDENTIFIED THE PRINCIPAL ACCUSED MAYOR ALONTE WHO
IS ACKNOWLEDGED AS A POWERFUL POLITICAL FIGURE
AND ALMOST AN INSTITUTION IN BIÑAN LAGUNA AND [THE]
GREAT DANGERS TO THE LIVES OF WITNESSES WHO
OTHERWISE WISH TO COME OUT IN THE OPEN AND TESTIFY
ON THE MORAL AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES OF BOTH
ACCUSED PERPETRATED UPON VERY YOUNG GIRLS
STUDENTS OF BIÑAN LAGUNA THAT WILL NOT DO SO IN THE
TERMS OF THE ACCUSED MAYOR" that is why it was the prayer
of the offended party and the Supreme Court granted the Motion
for Change of Venue, and we are now on a new venue, where the
danger to the lives of the witness is no longer present, on January
7, 1997, Alonte filed an Opposition thereto, and on April 23, 1997,
the petitioner, the offended party through the Honorable Secretary
of Justice Teofisto Guingona and Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito
Zuno filed a Manifestation and Motion for Resolution of the Petition
For Change of Venue. Attached to the motion of the Honorable
Secretary of Justice Guingona and Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito Zuno were the affidavits of the petitioner, her lawyer,
Atty. Remedios Balbin, Dolores Yambao, Bienvenido Salandanan
and Evelyn Celso with their contention that the prosecution
witnesses and the private counsel of petitioner are exposed to
kidnapping, harassment, grave threats and tempting offers of bribe
money, that was the stand of your department . . . And then later
on June 28, 1997 . . . we have to review this case because this
involves public interest . . . on June 23, 1997, Atty. Casano in behalf
of the oppositors, two (2) oppositors, filed a motion to dismiss the
petition for change of venue in the Supreme Court on the ground
that it has become moot, he alleges that the petitioner despite the
motion to resume the proceedings in criminal case no. 96-19-B in
said motion, the petitioner informed the Court that she is desisting
. . . informed the Supreme Court that she is desisting from
proceeding with the case, it is the same affidavit she prayed that
the trial Court, on her affidavit of desistance . . . Atty. Casano also
submitted to this Court, to the Supreme Court the manifestation of
the petitioner joining the oppositors' prayer to dismiss her petition
to a change of venue, the manifestation was also signed by Atty.
Remedios Balbin as private prosecutor, the Supreme Court
required Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiab to
comment on the motion to dismiss filed by Atty. Casano which
involve the same affidavit that you have just read. On August 22,
1997, assistant Chief State Prosecutor Guiab filed his comment, he
alleged that he is not aware of the desistance of the petitioner in
criminal case no. 96-19-B, and in said desistance there is two (2)
legal effect, [that] the public prosecutor has the control and
direction of the prosecution in criminal action, he prayed for the
denial of the Motion to Dismiss and reiterated his petition for
change of venue, the Supreme Court granted the change of venue
and in granting the change of venue the highest tribunal which we
are all subordinates, says: for the record, in their manifestation and
motion for the resolution of petition to a change of venue the
Secretary of Justice and Chief State Prosecutor submitted various
affidavits in support of their allegations that prosecution witnesses
and private legal counsel are exposed to KIDNAPPING,
HARASSMENT, GRAVE THREATS, AND TEMPTING OFFERS
OF BRIBE MONEY all intended to extract an affidavit of desistance
from the private complainant, this is now the affidavit of desistance
in her affidavit dated December 16, 1996, the petitioner the
offended party, the herein offended party Juvielyn Punongbayan
alleged etc . . . etc . . . in support of her petition and then she alleged
that during the last week of February, 1997, she was visited by one
Lourdes Salaysay, she stated that Mrs. Salaysay told her that Mrs.
Alonte, wife of Mayor Alonte requested her to settle Alonte's case,
she was informed that Mrs. Alonte was offering P10,000,000.00,
will send her to school and give her house and send her parents
abroad, Atty. Remedios C. Balbin is not here now, I am just quoting
the Supreme Court, counsel, private counsel of petitioner also
executed an affidavit dated February 1997, quote: the Supreme
Court quote to them: to put on record the attempting, influence,
directly, in exchange of valuable consideration, that the Rape
charge against Mayor Bayani Arthur Alone, she alleged that in two
(2) occasions Atty Romero conveyed to me the message of Mayor
Alonte, namely: to drop the rape case against him, and that he
would give a consideration of P10,000,000.00 'to be apportioned
as follows: P5,000,000.00, for the private complainant, your client
and the prosecutor P3,000,000.00 for me, as private prosecutor,
that is what Atty. Balbin said, P4,000,000.00 for her, the mediator,
so there seems to be a liberal flow of blood money, that is why the
Supreme Court ordered the Court to determine the validity, and
there is another, dated March 19, 1997. I have to remind everybody
about what happened, this thing did not come from me, I am not
fabricating anything this comes from the highest tribunal jurat, to
whom I am responsible, another affidavit of Atty. Balbin, she
narrated the continuing attempts to bribe her and threatened her,
so there were continuing events, they alleged, the People's
Bureau, Office of the Mayor of Quezon city, extensively discuss the
squatting case with against his client, that after a brief exchange on
the status of the case, they confided to me his real purpose, that it
started of by saying he was the legal counsel of the gambling lords
of Malabon for which he get a monthly retainer of P15,000.00
exclusive of transportation expenses, but he also stated that he
knows all the network of the gambling lord through out the country,
which is quite strong and unified, that I then ask him "what do you
mean? " " Is Alonte into gambling too, that he is part of the network
you speak of?", that Atty. Daga did not reply, but instead said, they
are prepared to double the offer made to by Atty. Romero which
was published in the newspaper at P10,000,000.00, so, its double,
double your money, so its P20,000,000.00, that I told him, its Atty.
Balbin, that all the money in the world, all the money in the world
will not make me change my position against my client executing a
desistance and that Alonte's voluntary surrender plea of guilty to
rape, conviction, and the imposition of the corresponding penalty
will satisfy the ends of justice, but I told him, that my client's case
is not isolated, there being five (5) other minors similarly place and
Alonte's will be stopped from doing more harm that Atty. Daga, then
told me in Filipino if you do not accede to a desistance, then they
will be force to but because he did not [complete] the sentence
asked him directly, what do you mean, what do you intend to do,
and he replied, go on with the case, [buy] the judge, [buy] the judge,
that I am believing, and I reacted saying, but they have already
done so, Judge Francisco Biñan, Judge Francisco Biñan suddenly
change his attitude towards the prosecution, perhaps you are
referring to the next judge when the petition for change of venue is
finally granted that Atty. Daga did not reply, and he reiterated that
his principal, referring to them again as gambling lords, wanted
desistance, after which he excused himself and left, that I execute
this affidavit, as Atty . Balbin attests to the truth of the incident with
Atty. Dionisio Daga which occurred in the afternoon of March 6,
1997 at my office, stating . . . ( JUDGE READING THE RECORDS
OF THE CASE )
Court
Then, the Supreme Court said, these affidavits, the one attached
gave specific names, dates and methods . . . a coercion of
corruption, the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 96-19-B (JUDGE
CONTINUED READING THE RECORDS OF THE CASE ) that is
desisting for pursuing her complaint for Rape petitioner a minor,
they have . . . illicit, influence and due pressure to prevent . . .
Criminal Case No. 96-19-B to any of its Branch, just to call the
Criminal Case No. 96-19-B shall be raffled, shall result the
petitioner's motion to resume proceedings, filed in Branch 26, in the
RTC of Laguna, to determine the voluntariness and validity of the
petitioner's desistance in the light of the position of the public
prosecutor, Assistant Chief Prosecutor Leonardo Guiab . . . I. don't
know what will be the outcome . . . you may contend that because
of that affidavit of the desistance there is reasonable doubt . . . etc
. . . but still, that will be placing the cart before the horse . . . you
have to go to a regular trial on the merits . . . because this is a
heinous offense which cannot . . . and during the pre-trial cannot
be subject to a plea-bargaining, and with respect to its new law
which took effect in 1993, that is a new one, it was placed to the
category of a heinous offense . . .
Prosecutor Campomanes
So we go on trial your Honor, and we will present the complaining
witness, and let the Court decide on the basis of the complainants
testimony . . . private complainant's testimony before this
Honorable Court . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Prosecutor Campomanes
That's why we are presenting the private complainant, the principal
witness, the mother who is also a signatory to this affidavit of
desistance, everybody who have been a part and participant in the
making and preparation of this affidavit of desistance, they have
already signed these affidavit of desistance.
Court
And we also have the affidavits mentioned by the Supreme Court,
because I was . . . all of those documents in the determination of
whether that affidavit is valid.
Prosecutor Campomanes
Yes, your Honor.
Court
We . . . the Court cannot close his eyes to the other affidavits . .
. because . . . that's why precisely the Supreme Court ordered me
to hear this case.
Prosecutor Campomanes
We understand that your Honor.
Court
There are may conflicting matters to be solve . . . conflicting matters
to be tackled in this case.
Prosecutor Campomanes
May we present the private complainant, your Honor . . ." 64
The records show that the hearing of November 7, 1997 was set for
arraignment of the petitioners. 65 After the counsels made their respective
appearances, Prosecutor Campomanes presented her authority to appear as
prosecutor in lieu of Asst. Chief State Prosecutor Guiyab, Jr., both petitioners
pleaded not guilty to the charge. Respondent judge then set the case for pretrial
which the parties, however, waived. The proceedings continued and Prosecutor
Campomanes manifested there was no need for the prosecution to go to trial
in view of the Affidavit of Desistance of the private complainant. Respondent
judge, however, observed that private complainant did not negate the
commission of the crime in her Affidavit of Desistance. Respondent judge
expressed his misgivings on the validity of the Affidavit of Desistance because
of the September 2, 1997 Resolution of this Court citing affidavits where
allegations of bribery were made to extract said affidavit from complainant.
Prosecutor Campomanes then offered to present the private complainant to
attest to the voluntariness and veracity of her Affidavit of Desistance.
Respondent judge averred whether the court should proceed to a trial on the
merits. Prosecutor Campomanes declared that they could go on trial and let the
court decide the merits of the case on the basis of the testimony of private
complainant and the other witnesses. It was then that private complainant was
presented as a witness.
From the garbled transcripts of the hearing on November 7, 1997, it is
not clear what both respondent judge and the public prosecutor intended the
proceedings to be. Respondent judge repeatedly declared that the proceedings
before him was to be a trial on the merits. The public prosecutor agreed to go
to trial, but at the same time moved to present private complainant and her
witnesses to testify on the voluntariness of her Affidavit of Desistance.
Respondent judge and the public prosecutor were, obviously, not tuned in to
each other.
I agree with the majority that the November 7, 1997 proceedings could
not have been a trial on the merits. First of all, the proceedings did not conform
with the procedure for trial as provided in the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Section 3 of Rule 119 provides:
"Sec. 3. Order of Trial. — The trial shall proceed in the following
order:
(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge
and, in the proper case, the civil liability.
(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense, and
damages, if any, arising from the issuance of any provisional remedy in
the case.
(c) The parties may then respectively present rebutting evidence
only, unless the court, in furtherance of justice, permits them to present
additional evidence bearing upon the main issue.
(d) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be deemed
submitted for decision unless the court directs the parties to argue orally
or to submit memoranda.
(e) However, when the accused admits the act or omission charged
in the complaint or information but interposes a lawful defense, the order
of trial may be modified accordingly."
In the case at bar, petitioners were never instructed to present evidence
to prove their defenses. The parties were never given the opportunity to present
their respective evidence rebutting the testimony of private complainant. There
was no admission by petitioners of the charge in the information as to justify a
change in the order of trial. 66
Our criminal rules of procedure strictly provide the step by step procedure
to be followed by courts in cases punishable by death. 67 This rule also applies
to all other criminal cases, particularly where the imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua. The reason for this is to assure that the state makes no mistake in
taking life and liberty except that of the guilty. 68 Thus:
"Judges should be reminded that each step in the trial process
serves a specific purpose. In the trial of criminal cases, the constitutional
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused requires that an
accused be given sufficient opportunity to present his defense. So with
the prosecution as to its evidence.
Hence, any deviation from the regular course of trial should always
take into consideration the rights of all the parties to the case, whether the
prosecution or defense." 69
Second, the admission of private complainant's affidavit of October 21,
1996 was made solely in response to respondent judge's own questioning. 70 It
was this affidavit which respondent judge used to convict the petitioners. This
affidavit, however, was not marked nor was it formally offered before the court.
The Revised Rules on Evidence clearly and expressly provide that "[t]he court
shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered." 71 Evidence
not formally offered in court will not be taken into consideration by the court in
disposing of the issues of the case. Any evidence which a party desires to
submit for the consideration of the court must formally be offered by
him, 72 otherwise it is excluded and rejected. 73
Third, where there is a doubt as to the nature of the criminal proceedings
before the court, this doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused who must
be given the widest latitude of action to prove his innocence. 74 It is in
petitioners' favor that the proceedings of November 7, 1997 be ,treated as a
hearing on the motion to dismiss, not a trial on the merits. To rule otherwise will
effectively deny petitioners due process and all the other rights of an accused
under the Bill of Rights and our Rules in Criminal Procedure. cdtai
PHIL 700-770)
EN BANC
SYLLABUS
DECISION
FERNANDO, J : p
||| (People v. Dramayo, G.R. No. L-21325, [October 29, 1971], 149 PHIL 107-116)
EN BANC
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J : p
Petitioners then pray that the statutory provisions they have challenged
be declared null and void for being violative of the Constitution.
I. The procedural aspect.
At the outset, it should be stated that this Petition suffers from basic
procedural infirmities, hence, traditionally unacceptable for judicial resolution.
For one, there is a misjoinder of parties and actions. Petitioner Dumlao's
interest is alien to that of petitioners Igot and Salapantan. Petitioner Dumlao
does not join petitioners Igot and Salapantan in the burden of their complaint,
nor do the latter join Dumlao in his. They, respectively, contest completely
different statutory provisions. Petitioner Dumlao has joined this suit in his
individual capacity as a candidate. The action of petitioners Igot and Salapantan
is more in the nature of a taxpayer's suit. Although petitioners plead time
constraints as the reason of their joint Petition, it would have required only a
modicum more of effort for petitioner Dumlao, on one hand, and petitioners Igot
and Salapantan, on the other, to have filed separate suits, in the interest of
orderly procedure.
For another, there are standards that have to be followed in the exercise
of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate
case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed
upon in order to decide the case (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]).
It may be conceded that the third requisite has been complied with, which
is, that the parties have raised the issue of constitutionality early enough in their
pleadings.
This Petition, however, has fallen far short of the other three criteria.
A. Actual case and controversy.
It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited to the determination
of actual cases and controversies.
Petitioner Dumlao assails the constitutionality of the first paragraph of
section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted earlier, as being contrary to the
equal protection clause guaranteed by the Constitution, and seeks to prohibit
respondent COMELEC from implementing said provision. Yet, Dumlao has not
been adversely affected by the application of that provision. No petition seeking
Dumlao's disqualification has been filed before the COMELEC. There is no
ruling of that constitutional body on the matter, which this Court is being asked
to review on Certiorari. His is a question posed in the abstract, a hypothetical
issue, and in effect, a petition for an advisory opinion from this Court to be
"rendered without the benefit of a detailed factual record." Petitioner Dumlao's
case is clearly within the primary jurisdiction (see concurring Opinion of now
Chief Justice Fernando in Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30, 96 [1978]) of
respondent COMELEC as provided for in section 2, Art. XII-C, for
the Constitution the pertinent portion of which reads:
"Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall have the following
power and functions.
1) . . .
2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns
and qualifications of all members of the National Assembly and elective
provincial and city officials." (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision must also be related to section 11 of Art. XII-C,
which provides:
"Section 11. Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may
be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof."
B. Proper party.
The long-standing rule has been that "the person who impugns the
validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement" (People vs. Vera, supra).
In the case of petitioners Igot and Salapantan, it was only during the
hearing, not in their Petition, that Igot is said to be a candidate for Councilor.
Even then, it cannot be denied that neither one has been convicted nor charged
with acts of disloyalty to the State, nor disqualified from being candidates for
local elective positions. Neither one of them has been alleged to have been
adversely affected by the operation of the statutory provisions they assail as
unconstitutional. Theirs is a generalized grievance. They have no personal nor
substantial interest at stake. In the absence of any litigate interest, they can
claim no locus standi in seeking judicial redress. LibLex
It is true that petitioners Igot and Salapantan have instituted this case as
a taxpayer's suit, and that the rule enunciated in People vs. Vera, above stated,
has been relaxed in Pascual vs. The Secretary of Public Works (110 Phil. 331
[1960], thus:
". . . it is well settled that the validity of a statute may be contested
only by one who will sustain a direct injury in consequence of its
enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions nullifying, at the instance of
taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds, upon the
theory that 'the expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the State for
the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a
misapplication of such funds,' which may be enjoined at the request of a
taxpayer."
In the same vein, it has been held:
"In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the
requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute, the general
rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers have
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised
by taxation and they may, therefore, question the constitutionality of
statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys."
(Philippine Constitution Association, Inc., et als., vs. Gimenez, et als. 15
SCRA 479 [1965]).
However, the statutory provisions questioned in this case, namely, sec.
7, BP Blg. 51, and sections 4, 1, and 6 BP Blg. 52, do not directly involve the
disbursement of public funds. While, concededly, the elections to be held
involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said
petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation
of specific constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power" (Flast
v. Cohen, 392 U.S., 83 [1960]), or that there is a misapplication of such funds
by respondent COMELEC (see Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works, 110
Phil. 331 [1960]), or that public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public
funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
(Philippine Constitution Association vs. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 [1966]), citing
Philippine Constitution Association vs. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 [1965]).
Besides, the institution of a taxpayer's suit, per se, is no assurance of judicial
review. As held by this Court in Tan vs. Macapagal (43 SCRA 677 [1972]),
speaking through our present Chief Justice, this Court is vested with discretion
as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained.
C. Unavoidability of constitutional question.
Again upon the authority of People vs. Vera, "it is a well-settled ruled that
the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the
courts unless that question is properly raised an presented in appropriate cases
and is necessary to a determination of the case; i.e., the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented."
We have already stated that, by the standards set forth in People vs.
Vera, the present is not an "appropriate case" for either petitioner Dumlao or for
petitioners Igot and Salapantan. They are actually without cause of action. It
follows that the necessity for resolving the issue of constitutionality is absent,
and procedural regularity would require that his suit be dismissed.
II. The substantive viewpoint.
We have resolved, however, to rule squarely on two of the challenged
provisions, the Courts not being entirely without discretion in the matter. Thus,
adherence to the strict procedural standard was relaxed in Tinio vs. Mina (26
SCRA 512 [1968]); Edu vs. Ericta (35 SCRA 481 [1970]); and in Gonzalez vs.
Comelec (27 SCRA 835 [1969]), the Opinion in the Tinio and Gonzales cases
having been penned by our present Chief Justice. The reasons which have
impelled us are the paramount public interest involved and the proximity of the
elections which will be held only a few days hence.
Petitioner Dumlao's contention that section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is
discriminatory against him personally is belied by the fact that several petitions
for the disqualification of other candidates for local positions based on the
challenged provision have already been filed with the COMELEC (as listed in
p. 15, respondent's Comment). This tellingly overthrows Dumlao's contention
of intentional or purposeful discrimination. LexLib
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J ., concurring:
FERNANDO, C .J ., concurring:
Hence my concurrence.
TEEHANKEE, J ., dissenting:
I also concur with the pronouncement made in the majority decision that
in order that a judgment of conviction may be deemed "as conclusive evidence"
of the candidate's disloyalty to the State and of his disqualification from office,
such judgment of conviction must be final and unappealable. This is so
specifically provided in Section 22 of the 1978 Election Code. 5 Otherwise, the
questioned provision would deny the bona fide candidate substantive due
process and would be grossly violative of his constitutional right of presumption
of innocence and of the above-quoted provision of the 1973
Constitution protecting candidates for public office from any form of harassment
and discrimination.
ADDENDUM
When the case was voted upon a second time last January 21st, there
appeared to be a majority in favor of the declarations and pronouncements
above referred to in the two preceding paragraphs, in view of the urgency of the
matter and the evil sought to be avoided. However, as of this writing, January
23, 1980 in the afternoon, such majority seems to have been dissipated by the
view that the action to nullify such second paragraph of section 4 of the Batas in
question is premature and has not been properly submitted for adjudication
under the strict procedural requirements. If this be the case, my above views,
termed as concurrences, should be taken as dissents against the majority
action. prLL
EN BANC
SYLLABUS
DECISION
VITUG, J :p
The Court is called upon, in this petition for certiorari, to resolve the
conflicting claims of the parties on the meaning of the term "fugitive from
justice" as that phrase is so used under the provisions of Section 40(e) of the
Local Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160). That law states:
"Sec. 40. Disqualifications. — The following persons are
disqualified from running for any elective local position:
"xxx xxx xxx
"(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or
abroad(.)"
Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate for the elective position of
Governor in the Province of Quezon in the 11th May 1992 elections filed this
petition forcertiorari praying for the reversal of the resolution of the
Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") which dismissed his petition for quo
warranto against the winning candidate, herein private respondent Eduardo
Rodriguez, for being allegedly a fugitive from justice. prLL
Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Section 65 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) states that
the qualifications for elective provincial, city, municipal, and barangay
officials shall be those provided for in the Local Government Code. The
quondam Local Government Code was B.P. Blg. 337, which was
superseded by R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991.Section 39 of the latter provides for the
qualifications and election of local elective officials. Section 40
enumerates those who are disqualified from running for any elective
local position, among whom is a:
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or
abroad.
The term "fugitive from justice" refers not only to those who flee
after conviction to avoid punishment but also to those who, after being
charged, flee to avoid prosecution. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Jose C.
Vitug finds the definition given to it by the Oversight Committee, i.e., "a
person who has been convicted by final judgment," as appearing in
Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991, as inordinate and an undue circumscription
of the law. I agree.
But this is only one side of the coin. I further submit that it also
unreasonably expands the scope of the disqualification in the 1991
Local Government Code because it disqualifies all those who have been
convicted by final judgment, regardless of the extent of the penalty
imposed and of whether they have served or are serving their sentences
or have evaded service of sentence by jumping bail or leaving for
another country. The definition thus disregards the true and accepted
meaning of the word fugitive. This new definition is unwarranted for
nothing in the legislative debates has been shown to sustain it and the
clear language of the law leaves no room for a reexamination of the
meaning of the term.
I do not share the doubt of Mr. Justice Vitug on the
constitutionality of the disqualification based on the presumption of
innocence clause of the Bill of Rights. There are certain fundamental
considerations which do not support the application of the
presumption. LLpr
(Marquez, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 112889, [April 18, 1995],
|||
EN BANC
DECISION
CRUZ, J : p
The petitioner seeks reversal of the decision of the respondent court dated
February 27, 1986, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Generoso Corpuz y Padre,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Malversation
of Public Funds, and there being no modifying circumstances in
attendance, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby
sentences him to suffer imprisonment ranging from Twelve (12) Years
and One (1) Day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to restitute to the provincial
government of Nueva Vizcaya the sum of P50,596.07 which is the
amount misappropriated, and to pay the costs of this suit. Further, the
accused is ordered to suffer the penalty of perpetual special
disqualification, and to pay a fine equal to the amount embezzled.
SO ORDERED.
As Supervising Accounting Clerk in the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of
Nueva Vizcaya, the petitioner was designated Acting Supervising Cashier in the
said Office. In this capacity, he received collections, disbursed funds and made
bank deposits and withdrawals pertaining to government accounts. llcd
On April 13, 1981, his designation as Acting Supervising Cashier was terminated,
and on April 22, 1981, a Transfer of Accountabilities was effected between the
petitioner and his successor. The Certificate of Turnover revealed a shortage in
the amount of P72,823.08. 1
A letter of demand dated April 22, 1981, required the petitioner to produce the
missing amount but he was able to pay only P10,159.50. The balance was
demanded in another letter dated October 12, 1981. This was subsequently
reduced by P12,067.51 through the payment to the petitioner of temporarily
disallowed cash items and deductions from his salary before his dismissal from
the service. 2
On September 27, 1982, a final letter of demand for the total deficiency of
P50,596.07 was sent to the petitioner. The demand not having been met, an
information for malversation of the said amount was filed against him with the
respondent court on October 11, 1983.
The above facts are not denied by the petitioner. 3 He insists, however, that he is
not guilty of the charge because the shortage imputed to him was malversed by
other persons.
His claim is that the P50,000.00 constituting the bulk of the shortage represented
the unliquidated withdrawal made by Paymaster Diosdado Pineda through one of
four separate checks issued and encashed while the petitioner was on official
leave of absence. He avers he was later made to post the amount in his cash
book by Acting Deputy Provincial Treasurer Bernardo C. Aluning and he had no
choice but to comply although he had not actually received the said amount. cdll
The four checks drawn from the Philippine National Bank and the corresponding
vouchers dated are described as follows:
1. Provincial Voucher dated December 22, 1980 from the General Fund
in the amount of P50,000.00 and paid by PNB Check No. 956637 dated
December 22, 1980.
2. Provincial Voucher dated December 23, 1980 from the Infrastructure
Fund in the amount of P50,000.00 and paid by PNB Check No.
SN958525 dated December 23, 1980.
3. Provincial Voucher dated December 23, 1980 from the General Fund
in the amount of P50,000.00 and paid by PNB Check No. 956639J dated
December 22, 1980.
4. Provincial Voucher dated December 29, 1980 from the Infrastructure
Fund in the amount of P50,000.00 and paid by PNB Check No. 958226
dated December 29, 1980.
Testifying for the prosecution, Pineda insisted he had liquidated all four checks
after the amounts thereof were disbursed, turning over to the petitioner the
corresponding withdrawal vouchers, paid vouchers, and payrolls, (which were all
submitted as exhibits). 4 He added that the petitioner was not really absent on
the dates in question as alleged but was in fact the one who prepared the said
checks in the morning before attending to his sick wife in the hospital, returning
to the office in the afternoon. He said that the payroll payments made on
December 22, 23 and 29, 1980, were liquidated on December 29, 1980, after the
petitioner came back from the hospital. 5
Acting Provincial Treasurer Perfecto Martinez corroborated Pineda's testimony
that the petitioner was not on official leave on the dates in question. He said that
although Check No. 958525 had already been encashed on December 23, 1980,
the encashment was not immediately recorded in the petitioner's cashbook,
"which (was) one way of temporarily hiding the early detection of a shortage." It
was only in March 1981 that the shortage was discovered and, when confronted
with it, the petitioner had no explanation to offer. 6
Aluning denied he had exerted pressure on the petitioner to post the shortage in
the petitioner's cash book. He explained that after receiving the bank statement
from the PNB for December 1980, he discovered that although the amount of
P50,000.00 appeared to have been already encashed, the encashment was not
reflected in the petitioner's cash book. As his superior, he required the petitioner
to make the proper entry in the cash book because the amount withdrawn was
already part of the latter's accountability. 7
After considering the evidence of the parties, the Sandiganbayan, through
Justice Amante Q. Alconcel, made the following findings:
The evidence on record is devoid of any explanation from the defense as
to the amount of P595.87. Hence, the accused must be held answerable
for the misappropriation of the said amount.
As to the amount of P50,000.00, We are not disposed to give credence
to his claim that same has not been liquidated by the paymaster, for the
following reasons:
First, Check No. 958525 is only one of four (4) checks issued and
encashed for the same purpose, and that is, to pay salary differentials as
well as salaries and wages of provincial officials and employees of the
province of Nueva Vizcaya covering the period, January to December,
1980. Issuance and encashment occurred on December 23, 1980, and
in fact, another check (No. 956639) was also issued and encashed on
the same day. The two (2) other checks (Nos. 956637 and 958526) were
issued and encashed on December 22 and 29, 1980, respectively.
Except for Check No. 958525, which was only entered in accused's
Cash Book on March 31, 1981, or three (3) months after its issuance
and encashment, all the other three (3) were duly entered. Then Check
No. 956639 which, as pointed out above, was issued and encashed on
the same day as Check No. 958525, was duly entered in his Cash Book.
Non-entry of the latter check on time was a subtle way of camouflaging
the embezzlement of its money equivalent.
Secondly, there seems to be no logical reason why Checks, Nos.
956639 and 958525, could not have been liquidated together by
Diosdado Pineda who used the proceeds to pay salary differentials of
government officials and employees of the province of Nueva Vizcaya,
since these have been issued and encashed on the same day.
Thirdly, Diosdado Pineda, who was presented as a prosecution witness,
swore that he duly liquidated the proceeds of the four (4) checks as
follows:
ATTY. DEL ROSARIO ON DIRECT EXAMINATION:
q. If the payroll is already accomplished, where do you give the payroll?
a. I give it back to the cashier with the corresponding voucher to support
the vouchers paid by me or disbursed by me.
AJ ESCAREAL:
q. So that your cash advances will be liquidated?
a. Yes, Your honor.
xxx xxx xxx
q. In the absence of the cashier, to whom do you give these documents?
a. I give them to the cashier only, no other person.
ATTY. DEL ROSARIO
q. In his absence, do you keep these documents?
a. Yes, Your Honor.
q. For payrolls that you paid for December 22, 23 and 29, when did you
give these payrolls to the cashier?
a. On December 29, sir.
AJ ESCAREAL:
q. Duly accomplished?
a. Duly accomplished, Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
AJ ALCONCEL:
q. Where did you see your cashier on the 29th?
a. At the office, Your Honor.
ATTY. DEL ROSARIO:
q. At what time?
a. In the afternoon, sir.
AJ ALCONCEL:
q. Are you not aware that your cashier was absent on that date?
a. He was present on that day, sir. He would go out because the wife
was supposedly having a check-up but in the afternoon, he would
return. (t.s.n., March 29, 1985, pp. 16-18)
The cashier referred to by the witness is the accused, Generoso P.
Corpuz.
And fourthly, We are not impressed by accused's claim that he was
absent on December 22, 23 and 29, 1980. His witness, Diosdado
Pineda, declared otherwise. His Employee's Leave Card (Exhibit J),
wherein his earned leaves are indicated, shows that during the month of
December, 1980, he earned 1.25 days vacation leave and 1.25 days
sick leave, which is the same number of days vacation and sick leaves
that he earned monthly from July 7, 1976 to October 1981. Moreover,
even if it were true that he was absent on December 23, 1980, the day
when Check No. 958525 was issued and encashed, yet, the other check
which was issued and encashed on the same day was duly liquidated.
The above findings are mainly factual and are based on substantial evidence.
There is no reason to disturb them, absent any of the exceptional circumstances
that will justify their review and reversal. On the contrary, the Court is convinced
that the facts as established point unmistakably to the petitioner's guilt of the
offense charged.
This conclusion is bolstered by the Solicitor General's observation that:
Moreover, petitioner's denial of responsibility for the missing P50,000.00
is negated by the following factors:
First. When he entered the said amount in his cash book in March, 1981,
he did not make any notation that said amount, though entered, was not
actually received.
SECOND DIVISION
SYLLABUS
DECISION
REGALADO, J : p
The instant petition seeks the reversal of the decision of respondent Court of
Appeals dated May 8, 1990, affirming the decision rendered by respondent Court
of Tax Appeals which found the vessel M/T "ULU WAI" liable under Section
2530(a) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (Presidential Decree
No. 1464), as amended, and its cargo of 1,100 metric tons of gas oil and 1,000
metric tons of fuel oil liable under Section 2530(a), (f), and (1-1) of the same
Code and ordering the forfeiture of the said vessel and its cargo. 1
The facts as culled from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
20470 are as follows:
"The M/T 'ULU WAI' a foreign vessel of Honduran registry, owned and
operated by Feeder International Shipping Lines of Singapore, left
Singapore on May 6, 1986 carrying 1,100 metric tons of gas oil and
1,000 metric tons of fuel oil consigned to Far East Synergy Corporation
of Zamboanga, Philippines.
"On May 14, 1986, the vessel anchored at the vicinity of Guiuanon
Island in Iloilo without notifying the Iloilo customs authorities. The
presence of the vessel only came to the knowledge of the Iloilo
authorities by information of the civilian informer in the area. Acting on
said information, the Acting District Collector of Iloilo dispatched a
Customs team on May 19, 1986 to verify the report.
"The Customs team found out that the vessel did not have on board the
required ship and shipping documents, except for a clearance from the
port authorities of Singapore clearing the vessel for 'Zamboan.'
"In view thereof, the vessel and its cargo were held and a Warrant of
Seizure and Detention over the same was issued after due investigation.
The petitioner then filed its Motion to Dismiss and to Quash the Warrants
of Seizure and Detention which the District Collector denied in his Order
dated December 12, 1986.
"In the course of the forfeiture proceedings, the parties, through their
respective counsel, agreed on a stipulation of facts, to wit:
'1. That the existence and identity of MT "ULU WAI"
subject of S1-2-86, herein identified as Exh. "A", is admitted.
'2. That the existence and identity of 1,100 metric tons of
gas oil, subject of S1-2-86-A, herein identified as Exh. "B", is
admitted;
'3. That the existence and identity of 1,000 metric tons of
fuel oil, subject of S1-2-86 herein identified as Exh. "B-1", is
admitted;
'4. That M/T "ULU WAI" left Singapore May 6, 1986 and
was cleared by Singapore customs authorities for Zamboanga,
Philippines;
'5. That subject vessel arrived at Guiuanon Island,
Municipality of Nueva Valencia, sub-province of Guimaras,
Province of Iloilo, Philippines, about 1120HRS, May 14, 1986;
'6. That subject vessel was boarded by Customs and
Immigration authorities for the first time in the afternoon of May
19, 1986, at about 1600HRS;
'7. That an apprehension report dated May 21, 1986,
submitted by the Team Leader of the Customs and Immigration
Team, Roberto Intrepido, marked and identified as Exh. "C", is
admitted;
'8. That at the time of boarding, the Master of subject
vessel could not produce any ship and/or shipping documents
regarding her cargo except the Port Clearance Certificate No.
179999 issued by the Port of Singapore authority dated May 4,
1986, marked as Exh. "D", which is hereby admitted;
'9. That on May 26, 1986, the Master of M/T "ULU WAI",
Capt. Romeo E. Deposa filed a Marine Protest dated same date,
which Marine Protest, marked and identified as Exh. "E", is
hereby admitted;
'10. That the sworn statement of said Capt. Romeo E.
Deposa, marked and identified as Exh. "F", given on May 26,
1986 before Atty. Hernando Hinojales, Customs Legal Officer, is
admitted;
'11. That the sworn statement of Mr. Antonio Torres,
Owner's representative of M/T "ULU WAI", marked and identified
as Exh. "G" given before Atty. Hernando Hinojales on May 28,
1986, is admitted;
'12. That the sworn statement of Wilfredo Lumagpas,
Master of M/T "CATHEAD" given before Lt. Dennis Asarraga on
June 4, 1986, marked and identified as Exh. "H", is admitted;
'13. That the existence of Fixture Note No. FN-M-86-05-41
entered into by and between the National Stevedoring &
Lighterage Corporation and the Far East Synergy Corporation,
marked and identified as Exh. "I", is admitted; and
'14. That the Preliminary Report of Survey Sounding
Report dated June 17, 1986, signed by J.P. Piad, Surveyor of
Interport Surveying Services, Inc. and duly attested by Ernesto
Cutay, Chief Officer of the M/T "ULU WAI" marked and identified
as Exh. "J", is also admitted.'" 2
On March 17, 1987, the District Collector issued his decision, with the following
disposition:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the M/T 'ULU WAI' is hereby
found guilty of violating Section 2530 (a) of the Tariff and Customs Code
of the Philippines (PD 1464), as amended, while her cargo of 1,100 M/T
Gas Oil and 1,000 M/T Fuel Oil are hereby found guilty of violating
Section 2530 (a), (f), and (1-1) under the same Code and are hereby
forfeited in favor of the Republic of the Philippines.
"SO ORDERED." 3
Petitioner appealed to the Commissioner of Customs who rendered a decision
dated May 13, 1987, the decretal portion of which reads:
On May 8, 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered its questioned decision affirming
the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration
having been denied on July 4, 1990, it interposed this instant petition contending
that:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in finding on the basis of circumstantial evidence
that an illegal importation had been committed;
2. Petitioner was deprived of property without due process of law in that its right
to be presumed innocent was not recognized and the decision was not supported
by proof beyond reasonable doubt; and
3. The sworn statements of Deposa and Torres were taken without assistance of
counsel in violation of their constitutional right thereto. 8
We find no merit in the Petition.
1. It must be here emphasized that a forfeiture proceeding under tariff and
customs laws is not penal in nature, contrary to the argument advanced by
herein petitioner. In the case of People vs. Court of First Instance of Rizal, etc., et
al., 9 this Court made an exhaustive analysis of the nature of forfeiture
proceedings, in relation to criminal proceedings, as follows:
". . . It is quite clear that seizure and forfeiture proceedings under the
tariff and customs laws are not criminal in nature as they do not result in
the conviction of the offender nor in the imposition of the penalty
provided for in Section 3601 of the Code. As can be gleaned from
Section 2533 of the code, seizure proceedings, such as those instituted
in this case, are purely civil and administrative in character, the main
purpose of which is to enforce the administrative fines or forfeiture
incident to unlawful importation of goods or their deliberate possession.
The penalty in seizure cases is distinct and separate from the criminal
liability that might be imposed against the indicted importer or possessor
and both kinds of penalties may be imposed.
"In the case at bar, the decision of the Collector of Customs, as in other
seizure proceedings, concerns the res rather than the persona. The
proceeding is a probe on contraband or illegally imported goods. These
merchandise violated the revenue law of the country, and as such, have
been prevented. From being assimilated in lawful commerce until
corresponding duties are paid thereon and the penalties imposed and
satisfied either in the form of fine or of forfeiture in favor of the
government who will dispose of them in accordance with law. The
importer or possessor is treated differently. The fact that the
administrative penalty befalls on him is an inconsequential incidence to
criminal liability. By the same token, the probable guilt cannot be
negated simply because he was not held administratively liable. The
Collector's final declaration that the articles are not subject to forfeiture
does not detract his findings that untaxed goods were transported in
respondents' car and seized from their possession by agents of the law.
Whether criminal liability lurks on the strength of the provision of the
Tariff and Customs Code adduced in the information can only be
determined in a separate criminal action. Respondents' exoneration in
the administrative cases cannot deprive the State of its right to
prosecute. But under our penal laws, criminal responsibility, if any, must
be proven not by preponderance of evidence but by proof beyond
reasonable doubt."
Considering, therefore, that proceedings for the forfeiture of goods illegally
imported are not criminal in nature since they do not result in the conviction of the
wrongdoer nor in the imposition upon him of a penalty, proof beyond reasonable
doubt is not required in order to justify the forfeiture of the goods. In this case, the
degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence which means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. 10
In the case at bar, we find and so hold that the Government has sufficiently
established that an illegal importation, or at least an attempt thereof, has been
committed with the use of the vessel M/T "ULU WAI," thus warranting the
forfeiture of said vessel and its cargo pursuant to the provisions of the Tariff and
Customs Code. LLjur
Section 1202 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides that importation begins
when the carrying vessel or aircraft enters the jurisdiction of the Philippines with
intention to unload therein. It is clear from the provision of the law that mere
intent to unload is sufficient to commence an importation. And "intent," being a
state of mind, is rarely susceptible of direct proof, but must ordinarily be inferred
from the facts, 11 and therefore can only be proved by unguarded, expressions,
conduct and circumstances generally. 12
In the case at bar, that petitioner is guilty of illegal importation, there having been
an intent to unload, is amply supported by substantial evidence as clearly
demonstrated by this comprehensive discussion in respondent court's decision:
"It is undisputed that the vessel M/T 'ULU WAI' entered the jurisdiction of
the Philippines. The issue that calls for Our resolution is whether or not
there was an intention to unload. The facts and circumstances borne by
the evidence convince Us that there was intent to unload. The following
circumstances unmistakably point to this conclusion.
"1. Considering that the vessel came from Singapore, the route to
Zamboanga was shorter and Iloilo lies further north. It is not logical for
the sailing vessel to travel a longer distance to get the necessary repairs.
"2. When the vessel M/T 'ULU WAI' anchored at Guiuanon Island,
Guimaras, Iloilo, it did not notify the Iloilo port or Customs authorities of
its arrival. The master of the vessel did not file a marine protest until 12
days after it had anchored, despite the supposed urgency of the repairs
needed and notwithstanding the provision (Sec. 1016) of the Code
requiring the master to file protest within 24 hours.
"3. At the time of boarding by the customs personnel, the required ship's
and shipping documents were not on board except the clearance from
Singaporean port officials clearing the vessel for Zamboanga. Petitioner
claims that these were turned over to the shipping agent who boarded
the vessel on May 15, 1986. However, this claim is belied by the sworn
marine protest (Exhibit 'E') of the master of M/T 'ULU WAI.' Mr. Romeo
Deposa.
'It was only on or about the 20th of May when I instructed
one of the crew to: get down of (sic) the vessel and find means
and ways to contact the vessel's representative.'
Moreover, in such Sworn Statement (Exhibit 'G'), ship agent, Antonio
Torres, stated that he did not know the buyer of the oil, which is
impossible if he had the Local Purchase Order of the alleged buyer,
Pogun Construction SDN. Torres also swore that his knowledge came
from the vessel's owner, without mentioning the shipping documents
which indicate such data. He also said that he did not know the
consignee of the oil which would have been patent from the documents.
Lastly, as also pointed out by the court a quo, the captain of the vessel
M/T 'ULU WAI,' Romeo Deposa, in his sworn statement to custom
authorities on May 26, 1986, enumerated the documents he allegedly
gave to Mr. Antonio Torres, but did not mention as among them the
Local Purchase Order of Pogun Construction SDN and the Bill of Lading.
"4. When the vessel was inspected, the tugboat M/T 'CATHEAD,' and
the large M/T 'SEMIRANO NO. 819' were alongside it. A fixture note
revealed that the barge and the tugboat were contracted by Consignee
Far East Synergy to load the cargo of the vessel into the awaiting barge
and to discharge the same to Manila (Exhibits '1' and '1-1').
It is of no moment that the fixture note did not expressly mention the
vessel M/T 'ULU WAI.' Government witnesses, Asencio and Lumagpas,
testified that it was the vessel's cargo which was to be unloaded and
brought to Manila by them." 13
The aforequoted findings of fact of respondent Court of Appeals are in
consonance with the findings of both the Collector and the Commissioner of
Customs, as affirmed by the Court of Tax Appeals. We, therefore, find no
compelling reason to deviate from the elementary principle that findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals, and of the administrative and quasi-judicial bodies for that
matter, are entitled to great weight and are conclusive and binding upon this
Court absent a showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
Cdpr
3. The fact that the testimonies of Deposa and Torres were given without the
assistance of counsel may not be considered an outright violation of their
constitutional right to be assisted by counsel. As explained in the case of Nera
vs. The Auditor General: 14
"The right to the assistance of counsel is not indispensable to due
process unless required by the Constitution or a law. Exception is made
in the charter only during the custodial investigation of a person
suspected of a crime, who may not waive his right to counsel except in
writing and in the presence of counsel, and during the trial of the
accused, who has the right 'to be heard by himself and counsel,' either
retained by him or provided for him by the government at its expense.
These guarantees are embodied in the Constitution, along with the other
rights of the person facing criminal prosecution, because of the odds he
must contend with to defend his liberty (and before even his life) against
the awesome authority of the State.
"In other proceedings, however, the need for the assistance of counsel is
not as urgent nor is it deemed essential to their validity. There is nothing
in the Constitution that says a party in a non-criminal proceeding is
entitled to be represented by counsel and that without such
representation he will not be bound by such proceedings. The
assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal
profession was not engrafted in the due process clause such that without
the participation of its members the safeguard is deemed ignored or
violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot validly
act at all except only with a lawyer at his side."
Besides, if ever there was any doubt as to the veracity of the sworn statements of
Deposa and Torres, they should have been presented during any appropriate
stage of the proceedings to refute or deny the statements they made. This was
not done by petitioner. Hence, the presumption that official duty was regularly
performed stands. In addition, petitioner does not deny that Torres is himself a
lawyer. Finally, petitioner simply contends that the sworn statements were taken
without the assistance of counsel but, however, failed to allege or prove that the
same were taken under anomalous circumstances which would render them
inadmissible as evidence against petitioner. We thus find no compelling reason
to doubt the validity or veracity of the said sworn statements.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the judgment
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Padilla, JJ ., concur.
Sarmiento, J ., is on leave.
(Feeder International Line, Pte., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94262, [May
|||
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
MORAN, C.J : p
||| (People v. Holgado, G.R. No. L-2809, [March 22, 1950], 85 PHIL 752-757)
EN BANC
SYNOPSIS
Eduardo Agbayani was sentenced to death by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 106 of Quezon City for raping her 14-year old daughter, Eden. The
conviction was based on the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, Dr. Florante
Baltazar, the victim and SPO1 Salvador Buenviaje.
The defense, on the other hand, interpose the defense of denial and alibi,
and one of the evidence presented was the affidavit of desistance of the victim.
However, it was retracted by the victim during the presentation of the rebuttal
evidence claiming that she was only pressured by her mother and sister to sign it.
Hence, in this appeal the appellant questioned the credibility of the testimony
of the victim in view of her execution of the affidavit of desistance.
The Court ruled that affidavits, being taken ex parte, are generally
considered inferior to the testimony given in open court, and affidavits of
recantation have been invariably regarded as exceedingly unreliable, since they
can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses. It would be a dangerous
rule to reject the testimony taken before a court of justice simply because the
witness who gave it later on changed his mind for one reason or another. Such a
rule would make a solemn trial a mockery, and place the proceedings at the mercy
of unscrupulous witnesses. cIHCST
SYLLABUS
DECISION
PER CURIAM : p
The first assigned error does not persuade this Court. It is true that the
transcript of the stenographic notes of the proceedings of 22 December 1994 and
the order issued by the trial court after the conclusion of said proceedings only
state that the court appointed de oficio counsel with the consent of the said
accused. They do not categorically disclose that the trial informed appellant of his
right to counsel of his own choice. However, this does not mean that the trial court
failed to inform appellant of such right. The precise time the two counsel de
oficio were appointed is not disclosed in the record either. At the recorded portion
of the arraignment aspect of the proceedings on 22 December 1994, the two
formally entered their appearance, thus:
COURT:
Call the case.
(Interpreter calls the case).
FISCAL ROSARIO BARIAS:
For the prosecution, Your Honor.
ATTY. MARIETA AGUJA:
Respectfully appearing for the prosecution, Your Honor under the
control and direct supervision of the Trial Prosecutor, Your Honor,
we are ready to present our first witness.
ATTY. BALDADO:
For the accused Your Honor, appointed as counsel de oficio.
ATTY. DE LA CRUZ:
For the accused, Your Honor appointed by the court as counsel de
oficio. 29
This obviously means that the appointment had taken place earlier. The trial
court's order 30 of 22 December 1994 states that said de oficio counsel were "duly
appointed by the Court with the consent of the accused." Since appellant has
miserably failed to show that he was not informed of his right to counsel, the
presumptions that the law has been obeyed and official duty has been regularly
performed by the trial court stand. 31 In other words, the trial court is presumed to
have complied with its four-fold duties under Section 6 32 of Rule 116 of the Rules
of Court, namely, (1) to inform the accused that he has the right to have his own
counsel before being arraigned; (2) after giving such information, to ask accused
whether he desires the aid of counsel; (3) if he so desires to procure the services
of counsel, the court must grant him reasonable time to do so; and (4) if he so
desires to have counsel but is unable to employ one, the court must assign
counsel de oficio to defend him. 33
It is settled that the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial
judge advised the accused of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to reverse
conviction. The reason being that the trial court must be presumed to have
complied with the procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases,
and that such a presumption can only be overcome by an affirmative showing to
the contrary. Thus it has been held that unless the contrary appears in the record,
or that it is positively proved that the trial court failed to inform the accused of his
right to counsel, it will be presumed that the accused was informed by the court of
such right. 34
In U .S. v. Labial, 35 this Court held:
Adhering to the doctrine laid down in that case, the only question
to be determined in this case is whether the failure of the record to disclose
affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused of their right to have
counsel is sufficient ground to reverse the judgment of conviction and to
send the case back for a new trial. Upon this point we are all agreed that
in the absence of an affirmative showing that the court below did in fact
fail to advise the accused of their rights under the provisions of sections
17 of General Orders No. 58, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 440,
the mere omission from the record brought here upon appeal of an entry
affirmatively disclosing that he did so, is not reversible error.
In the absence of an affirmative showing to the contrary, the court
below must be presumed in matters of this kind to have complied with the
provisions of law prescribing the procedure to be followed in the trial had
before him.
While in People v. Miranda 36 this Court explicitly stated:
However, said counsel calls attention to the fact that the record is
silent as to whether or not, at the time appellant was arraigned, the trial
court informed him of his right to be assisted by an attorney, under section
3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
This precise issue was determined in United States vs. Labial (27
Phil. 87, 88), in the sense that unless the contrary appears in the
records, it will be presumedthat the defendant was informed by the court
of his right to counsel. ". . . If we should insist on finding every fact fully
recorded before a citizen can be punished for an offense against the laws,
we should destroy public justice, and give unbridled license to crime.
Much must be left to intendment and presumption, for it is often less
difficult to do things correctly than to describe them correctly." (United
States vs. Labial, supra.) The same doctrine was reiterated in People vs.
Abuyen (52 Phil. 722) and in United States vs. Custan (28 Phil. 19). We
see no reason to modify it now.
In the instant case, the trial court appointed two de oficio counsel who
assisted the appellant at his arraignment, one of whom extensively cross-
examined the first witness for the prosecution, Dr. Florante Baltazar. 37 Besides, it
is only in this appeal that appellant raised the issue of the failure of the trial court
to inform him of the right to counsel. At no time did he previously raise it in the trial
court despite ample opportunity to do so. His consent to be assisted by counsel de
oficio, coupled with said counsel's extensive cross-examination of Dr. Baltazar,
may even be considered a waiver of his right to question the alleged failure of the
trial court to inform him of his right to counsel. 38
The cases of People v. Domenden 39 and People v. Cachero 40 cited by
appellant are inapplicable. In both cases the trial courts there clearly failed to
inform the accused of their right to counsel nor appoint de oficio counsel during the
arraignment. Nevertheless, we take this opportunity to admonish trial courts to
ensure that their compliance with their pre-arraignment duties to inform the
accused of his right to counsel, to ask him if he desires to have one, and to inform
him that, unless he is allowed to defend himself in person or he has counsel of his
choice, a de oficio counsel will be appointed for him, must appear on record.
Turning to the alleged violation of appellant's right to the 2-day period to
prepare for trial, Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court reads:
SEC. 9. Time to prepare for trial. — After a plea of not guilty, the
accused is entitled to two (2) days to prepare for trial unless the court for
good cause grants him further time.
It must be pointed out that the right must be expressly demanded. 41 Only
when so demanded does denial thereof constitute reversible error and a
ground for new trial. 42 Further, such right may be waived, expressly or
impliedly. 43 In the instant case, appellant did not ask for time to prepare for
trial, hence, he effectively waived such right.
During the succeeding hearings, appellant was represented by Atty. Temanil
of the Public Attorney's Office in Quezon City, who entered his appearance as de
parte, and not as de oficio, counsel. It is to be presumed that Atty. Temanil's
services were obtained pursuant to the law creating the Public Attorney's Office
(PAO), formerly the Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (CLAO). 44 There is at all no
showing that Atty. Temanil lacked the competence and skill to defend appellant.
The latter's contention that his counsel was not ready at all times because at the
hearing on 20 January 1995 he asked for a continuation as he has "not yet
interviewed [his] client,"45 is misleading. Atty. Temanil made that statement after
he cross-examined EDEN and after the judge realized that it was almost 1:00
o'clock in the afternoon and both of them were already hungry, thus:
ATTY. TEMANIL:
I just want to make it on record, Your Honor that from the start of
trial the witness appears to be fluent and suffers no difficulty in
answering the questions, even the questions propounded by the
Private Prosecutor, Your Honor.
COURT:
Put that on record.
That is true, Atty. Temanil, it is almost 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon
and we are both hungry now.
ATTY. TEMANIL.
I will just asked [sic] for continuance considering that I have not yet
interviewed my client, Your Honor. 46
Neither is there merit in appellant's claim that his counsel committed
irregularities: (1) in not considering the futility of the testimony of Adoracion Cruz;
(2) in not presenting the barangay captain in the evidence in chief for the defense,
and EDEN's mother and sister Fedelina in sur-rebuttal; and (3) in not cross-
examining exhaustively EDEN.
Adoracion Cruz was presented to corroborate appellant's alibi that he was
in the province and not in their rented room from 17 to 21 July 1994. On the other
hand, the testimony of the barangay captain could not alter the fact that rape was
committed in a rented room in a house along Makabayan Street in his barangay.
Appellant neither testified that he did not occupy a house numbered 30-A nor
denied that he was living with EDEN and her sisters in that room. Besides, he and
his children were not renting the entire house, but merely a room, which could
probably be the unit numbered "30-A" referred to by EDEN.
As to the presentation of EDEN's mother and sister Fedelina as sur-rebuttal
witnesses to disprove the claim of EDEN that they coerced her into signing the
affidavit of desistance, suffice it to state that there was nothing to show that they
were in fact willing to refute EDEN's claim.
Finally, contrary to appellant's allegation, a meticulous examination of the
transcripts of the stenographic notes convinces this Court that Atty. Temanil
sufficiently cross-examined EDEN. If he decided to terminate his cross-
examination, it could have been due to the futility of any further cross-examination
which might only prove favorable to the prosecution, as it might have opened
another window of opportunity for EDEN to strengthen her testimony.
The second assigned error is equally unpersuasive. It raises the issue of the
credibility of EDEN as a witness. One of the highly revered dicta Philippine
jurisprudence has established is that this Court will not interfere with the judgment
of the trial court in passing upon the credibility or opposing witnesses, unless there
appears in the record some facts or circumstances of weight and influence which
have been overlooked and if considered, would affect the result. This is founded
on practical and empirical considerations, i.e., the trial judge is in a better position
to decide the question of credibility, since he personally heard the witnesses and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying. 47 He had before him the
essential aids to determine whether a witness was telling the truth or lying. Truth
does not always stalk boldly forth naked; she often hides in nooks and crannies
visible only to the mind's eye of the judge who tried the case. To him appears the
furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or flippant
or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of
it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and
mien. 48 On the other hand, an appellate court has only the cold record, which
generally does not reveal the thin line between fact and prevarication that is crucial
in determining innocence or guilt. 49
At any rate, in view of the gravity of the offense charged and the extreme
penalty of death imposed, this Court took painstaking effort and meticulous care in
reviewing the transcripts of the stenographic notes of the testimonies of the
witnesses.
This Court is fully satisfied that EDEN told the truth that she was raped by
her father, herein appellant, on 19 July 1994, in their rented room in Barangay
Obrero, Quezon City. Her story was made even more credible by the simplicity and
candidness of her answers, as well as by the fact that it came from an innocent girl
writhing in emotional and moral shock and anguish. She must have been torn
between the desire to seek justice and the fear that a revelation of her ordeal might
mean the imposition of capital punishment on her father. By testifying in court, she
made public a painful and humiliating secret, which others may have simply kept
to themselves for the rest of their lives. She thereby jeopardized her chances of
marriage, as even a compassionate man may be reluctant to marry her because
her traumatic experience may be a psychological and emotional impediment to a
blissful union. Moreover, such a revelation divided her family and brought it shame
and humiliation.
If EDEN did testify regardless of these consequences and even allowed the
examination of her private parts, she did so inspired by no other motive than to
obtain justice and release from the psychological and emotional burdens the
painful experience had foisted upon her. It was then improbable that EDEN
fabricated a story of defloration and falsely charged her own father with a heinous
crime.
What appellant claims to be improbabilities in the testimony of EDEN are
more apparent than real. The presence of her sisters in the small room did not at
all make impossible the commission of rape. The evil in man has no conscience.
The beast in him bears no respect for time and place; it drives him to commit rape
anywhere even in places where people congregate such as in parks, along the
roadside, within school premises, and inside a house where there are other
occupants. 50In People v. Opena, 51 rape was committed in a room occupied also
by other persons. In the instant case, EDEN's other companions in the room when
she was molested by appellant were young girls who were all asleep.
That EDEN was unable to resist or shout for help can easily be explained by
the fact that appellant threatened to kill her. Whether or not he was armed was of
no moment. That threat alone coming from her father, a person who wielded such
moral ascendancy, was enough to render her incapable of resisting or asking for
help.
Intimidation in rape cases is not calibrated nor governed by hard and fast
rules. Since it is addressed to the victim's and is therefore subjective, it must be
viewed in light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the
commission of the crime. It is enough that the intimidation produced fear — fear
that if the victim did not yield to the bestial demands of the accused, something far
worse would happen to her at that moment. Where such intimidation existed and
the victim was cowed into submission as a result thereof, thereby rendering
resistance futile, it would be the height of unreasonableness to expect the victim
to resist with all her might and strength. If resistance would nevertheless be futile
because of intimidation, then offering none at all does not mean consent to the
assault so as to make the victim's submission to the sexual act voluntary. 52
In any event, in a rape committed by a father against his own daughter, as
in this case, the former's moral ascendancy or influence over the latter substitutes
for violence or intimidation. 53 Likewise, it must not be forgotten that at her tender
age of 14 years, EDEN could not be expected to act with the equanimity of
disposition and with nerves of steel, or to act like a mature and experienced woman
who would know what to do under the circumstances, or to have courage and
intelligence to disregard the threat. 54 Even in cases of rape of mature women, this
Court recognized their different and unpredictable reactions. Some may shout;
some may faint; and some may be shocked into insensibility; while others may
openly welcome the intrusion. 55
Neither does the fact that EDEN continued to live with appellant in the same
rented room disprove the rape. While she was hurt physically, psychologically and
emotionally, yet the thought must have been irresistible and compelling that her
assailant was her own father, who was both a father and mother to her since her
mother was in Saudi Arabia and who provided her with the daily wherewithal to
keep her alive. Besides, a less harsh life outside was uncertain. Instances are not
few when daughters raped by their fathers stayed with the latter and kept in the
deepest recesses of their hearts the evil deed even if the memory thereof haunted
them forever. LibLex
Nor is there merit in the insistent claim that EDEN's affidavit of desistance
"must have necessarily contradicted her previous testimony." We have earlier
quoted in full this affidavit of desistance. Plainly, nowhere therein did she retract
her previous testimony or claim that she was raped by her father. In any case,
EDEN withdrew her affidavit of desistance and solemnly declared that she was
pressured by her mother and sister to sign it. Moreover, affidavits, being taken ex
parte, are generally considered inferior to the testimony given in open court; 56 and
affidavits of recantation have been invariably regarded as exceedingly unreliable,
since they can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses. It would be a
dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before a court of justice simply
because the witness who gave it later on changed his mind for one reason or
another. Such a rule would make a solemn trial a mockery, and place the
proceedings at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. 57
This Court has no doubt that appellant is guilty as charged. The penalty
therefor is death under the first circumstance mentioned in Article 335(7) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, which provides, in part, as
follows:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim.
This law may be difficult to accept for those who believe that the verdict of
death for a sin or crime is God's exclusive prerogative. But the fundamental law of
the land allows Congress, for compelling reasons, to impose capital punishment in
cases of heinous crimes, 58 hence the passage of R.A. No. 7659. Hoc quidem per
quam durum est sed ita lex scripta est. The law may be exceedingly hard but so
the law is written and the Court is duty-bound to apply it in this case.
To the appellant who inflicted his animal greed on his daughter in a
disgusting coercion of incestuous lust, thereby forsaking that which is highest and
noblest in his human nature and reducing himself to lower than the lowliest animal,
the full force of the law must be weighed against him, for he deserves no place in
society. All that we concede to him is a modification of the award of "P75,000.00
as damages," which is hereby reduced to P50,000.00 in accordance with current
case law.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106, in Criminal Case No. Q-94-
59149 finding accused-appellant EDUARDO AGBAYANI y MENDOZA guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of rape defined and penalized
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, and
imposing upon him the penalty of DEATH, subject to the above modification as to
the amount of indemnity.
Two Justices voted to impose upon the accused-appellant the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
Upon finality of this Decision, let certified true copies thereof, as well as the
records of this case, be forwarded without delay to the Office of the President for
possible exercise of executive clemency pursuant to Article 83 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of R.A. No. 7659.
With costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Panganiban and Martinez, JJ ., concur.
(People v. Agbayani y Mendoza, G.R. No. 122770, [January 16, 1998], 348
|||
PHIL 341-369)
FIRST DIVISION
SYNOPSIS
SYLLABUS
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J : p
Atty. Salvador Sabio entered his appearance as counsel for the accused-
complainant on December 2, 1996 and asked for the cancellation of the scheduled
hearings on December 5 and 6, 1996 as he had to study the case. The court
granted the request for postponement of Atty. Sabio and reset the case on January
24, 1997 with a strong warning that it will not allow any further dilatory
postponement. In the afternoon of January 23, 1997, the court received another
motion for postponement filed by Atty. Sabio requesting for the cancellation of the
January 24 hearing. The court, considering the same as another delaying tactic,
immediately issued an order denying the motion. In spite of the denial of the motion
for postponement, Atty. Sabio failed to appear.
On February 4, 1997, accused-complainant again asked for the voluntary
inhibition of the presiding judge which the court again denied for being merely a
dilatory scheme.
On March 24, 1997, when the case was called for hearing, Atty. Sabio
informed the court that he received a written note from the accused-complainant
discharging him as counsel, to which the court responded by ruling that Atty. Sabio
would only be allowed to withdraw as accused-complainant's lawyer upon the entry
of appearance of a new defense counsel.
In a Resolution of the Court of Appeals promulgated on April 29, 1997,
Judge Chiongson was required to submit a COMMENT 8 on a Petition
for Certiorari andMandamus filed by accused-complainant. Said document has
also been submitted to the Court as Supplemental Comment to this administrative
case. 9
Respondent judge reiterated his belief that his appointment of a counsel de
oficio to represent the accused-complainant is justified because of the vexatious
and oppressive delay on the latter's part who has been represented by a
counsel de parte who refuses or fails to appear during hearings. He averred that
the records of the case will show that the accused-complainant and his lawyers
have employed every means fair, but mostly foul, to delay the resolution of Criminal
Case No. 94-15772. He added that the Petition for Certiorari and the
Administrative Case were filed for the purpose of not only delaying the resolution
of the case but also to pressure him into inhibiting himself.
As to the allegation of oppression in connection with a criminal case for
slander where accused-complainant was the alleged offended party while
respondent judge was then the Municipal Trial Judge of MTC, Branch 3, Bacolod
City to which the case was being tried, Judge Chiongson belies the same. He
explains that the prosecution in the said case had rested while the defense filed a
demurrer which was granted.
He narrates that the case for slander was filed by herein accused-
complainant against Mrs. Esparcia, a school teacher and sister of a victim alleged
to have been killed by the accused-complainant, when said Mrs. Esparcia told the
accused-complainant "Murderer, why are you not in jail" or words to that effect.
This was made when accused-complainant was seen roaming around the vicinity
of the police station when he was supposed to be a detention prisoner.
Accordingly, respondent judge granted the Demurrer on the finding of the court
that the utterance of Mrs. Esparcia was not slanderous but was merely an
expression of exasperation and disgust.
On the charge of Gross Ignorance of the Law, for having tried Criminal Case
No. 55099 for violation of B.P. 22 against accused-complainant in the absence of
counsel, respondent judge asserts that accused-complainant has nothing to do
with said criminal case as can be gleaned from the Order relied upon as basis for
the aforementioned charge.
Respondent judge concludes that the sequence of events hereinabove
discussed, exposes clearly the false and dissembled charges filed against him as
well as the determined efforts of the accused-complainant and his counsel to
frustrate the ends of justice.
We find this administrative complaint devoid of merit.
Verily, the facts and circumstances of this case point to the pervasive and
prevaricated procrastination of the proceedings undertaken by the accused-
complainant and his counsel. Contrary to what accused-complainant would want
to impress upon this Court, it seems that he has been the oppressor while
respondent judge Roberto Chiongson appears to be the oppressed. Through the
course of the proceedings in the subject criminal case, accused-complainant had
filed several Motions for Inhibition, a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus and this
administrative complaint with the view of delaying the eventual disposition of the
case.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr.,C.J.,Melo, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.
(Amion v. Chiongson, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1371, [January 22, 1999], 361 PHIL
|||
542-555)
FIRST DIVISION
SYNOPSIS
The information for murder filed against the appellants failed to avert that
they conspired with each other in the commission of the offense charged. But then,
after trial, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 5 convicted the
appellants as charged, finding that there was conspiracy between and among them
in the commission of the crime and the indeterminate penalty of twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal,as minimum to forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua,as
maximum was imposed. The conviction was based on the evidence presented by
the prosecution that in the evening of October 20, 1994, while the victim Jonathan
Calpito and Jonathan Gosil were confronting the fishball vendor who did not admit
that he had short-changed Calpito, eight men approached and aggressively
confronted Calpito and Gosil. Appellant Emilio then embraced Calpito from behind
and appellants Salvador Quitlong and Ronnie Quitlong held Calpito's right hand
and left hand, respectively. Calpito struggled unsuccessfully to free himself.
Suddenly, Ronnie Quitlong stabbed Calpito at the left side of his body just below
the nipple which became the cause of his death. On the other hand, the appellants
gave no alibi and admitted their presence at the vicinity of the crime scene,
however, they denied any participation in the commission of the crime.
Hence, this appeal.
The Court ruled that in the absence of conspiracy, so averred and proved,
an accused can only be made liable for the acts committed by him alone and his
criminal responsibility is individual and not collective. As so it is that must be so
held in this case. The conflicting claims of the prosecution and the defense on who
stabbed the victim is an issue that ultimately and unvoidably goes into the question
of whom to believe among the witnesses. This issue of credibility requires a
determination that is concededly best left to the trial court with its unique position
of having been enabled to observe that elusive and incommunicable evidence of
the deportment of witnesses on the stand. Findings of the trial court, following that
assessment, must be given the highest degree of respect absent compelling
reasons to conclude otherwise.
Appellant Ronnie Quitlong is found guilty of the crime of murder for the killing
of Jonathan Calpito and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Appellants Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr. are found guilty as
accomplices in the commission of the crime.
SYLLABUS
DECISION
VITUG, J :
p
On 21 April 1995, the trial court, following his evaluation of the respective
submissions of the prosecution and the defense, including their rebuttal and sur-
rebuttal evidence, rendered its now assailed decision.
In their assignment of errors, the Quitlong brothers would have it —
"1. That the Honorable Lower Court gravely abused its discretion
and/or acted in excess of or without jurisdiction in finding that conspiracy
may readily be inferred inspite of explicit failure to allege in the information
or complaint;
"2. That the Honorable Lower Court gravely abused its discretion
and/or acted in excess of or without jurisdiction in finding that there was
conspiracy between and among the accused-appellants in the
commission of the crime;
"3. That the Honorable Lower Court gravely abused its discretion
and/or acted in excess of or without jurisdiction in finding the accused-
appellants guilty of the crime of Murder instead of Homicide." 12
In his case, appellant Senoto contends that the trial court has erred in finding
conspiracy among the accused and argues that the crime committed is homicide,
not murder, given the circumstances.
On the particular issue of conspiracy, the trial court had this to say:
"The question is whether or not the herein three accused
participated in, and may be held guilty as co-principals by reason of
conspiracy for, the fatal stabbing of the victim, Calpito, there being no
dispute that the latter died due to the solitary stab inflicted on him.
"But before proceeding any further, the Court takes notice of the
lapse committed, perhaps inadvertently, by the prosecution in drafting the
indictment. Both the original and amended Informations fail to explicitly
allege conspiracy.This could have been timely cured if obeisance had
been observed of the admonition, often given, that the prosecution should
not take the arraignment stage for granted but, instead, treat the notice
thereof as a reminder to review the case and determine if the complaint
or information is in due form and the allegations therein contained are
sufficient vis-a-vis the law involved and the evidence on hand. It is
fortunate that in the case at bench conspiracy may readily be inferred from
the way the allegation of abuse of superior strength has been phrased, to
wit: '. . . the above-named accused, being then armed with a knife, with
intent to kill . . . and taking advantage of their numerical superiority and
combined strength did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab JONATHAN CALPITO y CASTRO . . . ."' 13 prLL
Citing Balmadrid vs. Sandiganbayan 14 the trial court has opined that
"conspiracy may be deemed adequately alleged if the averments in the Information
logically convey that several persons (have been) animated with the single
purpose of committing the offense charged and that they (have) acted in concert
in pursuance of that purpose." 15 Holding that no direct proof is essential and that
it suffices that the existence of a common design to commit the offense charged is
shown by the acts of the malefactors and attendant circumstances, the trial court
has concluded:
"In the case on hand, it bears repeating that Ronnie Quitlong and
Salvador Quitlong were admittedly responding to Jesus Mendoza's call for
help through the latter's daughter. They must have, therefore, been
disposed, out of empathy with a fellow sidewalk vendor, to lend Mendoza
all the assistance the latter needed under the circumstances. They were
joined, according to prosecution witnesses Lito Adjaro and Herbert
Soriano, by no less than six others, including Emilio Senoto, Jr. They
came upon Mendoza engaged in a heated altercation with the victim
Calpito. When they reached Calpito, they pushed him and started beating
him up and his companion Jonathan Gosil. Four to five men manhandled
Calpito who kept on retreating and even went around Soriano's parked
jeep until he was cornered. Senoto then held Calpito's body from behind;
Ronnie, his left hand; and Salvador, his right hand, and they mauled him.
Calpito struggled to free himself but that proved futile and, instead, Ronnie
stabbed him once. It was only then that he was released and when he fell
down on his back, his attackers still kicked him. Only the arrival of some
policemen made some of the assailants stop and run away. However,
Ronnie, Salvador and Senoto, kept on kicking the victim and they were
restrained and arrested.
"Guided by the jurisprudential authorities heretofore cited, it
becomes ineluctable for the Court to conclude that Ronnie, Salvador and
Senoto acted in a conspiracy and may thus be held liable as co-principals
for the death of Calpito." 16
Overwhelming, such as it may have been thought of by the trial court,
evidence of conspiracy is not enough for an accused to bear and to respond to all
its grave legal consequences; it is equally essential that such accused has been
apprised when the charge is made conformably with prevailing substantive and
procedural requirements. Article III, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution, in
particular, mandates that no person shall be held answerable for a criminal offense
without due process of law and that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
first be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 17 The right
to be informed of any such indictment is likewise explicit in procedural rules. 18 The
practice and object of informing an accused in writing of the charges against him
has been explained as early as the 1904 decision of the Court
in U .S. vs. Karelsen; 19 viz:
"First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge
against him as will enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail
himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further
prosecution for the same cause, and third, to inform the court of the facts
alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support
a conviction, if one should be had. (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92
U.S.,542).In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be
stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and
intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable
particularity of times, place, names (plaintiff and defendant),and
circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation
of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime
charged."
An information, in order to ensure that the constitutional right of the accused
to be informed of the nature and cause of his accusation is not violated, must state
the name of the accused; the designation given to the offense by the statute; a
statement of the acts or omissions so complained of as constituting the offense;
the name of the offended party; the approximate time and date of the commission
of the offense;.and the place where the offense has been committed. 20 In
embodying the essential elements of the crime charged, the information must set
forth the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability
of the accused so that the accused can properly prepare for and undertake his
defense. One such fact or circumstance in a complaint against two or more
accused persons is that of conspiracy. Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary
recital of fact which, if not excepted from or objected to during trial, may be
corrected or supplied by competent proof, an allegation, however, of conspiracy,
or one that would impute criminal liability to an accused for the act of another or
others, is indispensable in order to hold such person, regardless of the nature and
extent of his own participation, equally guilty with the other or others in the
commission of the crime. Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated,
the individual acts done to perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary
importance, the act of one being imputable to all the others. 21 Verily, an accused
must know from the information whether he faces a criminal responsibility not only
for his acts but also for the acts of his co-accused as well.
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of
conspiracy or allege all the details thereof, like the part that each of the parties
therein have performed, the evidence proving the common design or the facts
connecting all the accused with one another in the web of the conspiracy. Neither
is it necessary to describe conspiracy with the same degree of particularity
required in describing a substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment
contains a statement of the facts relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in
ordinary and concise language, with as much certainty as the nature of the case
will admit, in a manner that can enable a person of common understanding to know
what is intended, and with such precision that the accused may plead his acquittal
or conviction to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. It is said,
generally, that an indictment may be held sufficient "if it follows the words of the
statute and reasonably informs the accused of the character of the offense he is
charged with conspiring to commit, or, following the language of the statute,
contains a sufficient statement of an overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy,
or alleges both the conspiracy and the contemplated crime in the language of the
respective statutes defining them." 22
The information charging herein appellants for the death of Jonathan
Calpito, as amended, has but simply stated:
"That on or about the 20th day of October 1994, in the City of
Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, being then armed with a knife, with intent to kill
and with treachery and taking advantage of their numerical superiority and
combined strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab JONATHAN CALPITO Y CASTRO suddenly and
unexpectedly, without any warning whatsoever, inflicting upon him a stab
wound at the left thorax at the level of the 7th rib, left medclavicular line,
penetrating the pereduum and left ventricle causing left remothones of
700 cc and hemoperecuduum of 250 cc, which directly caused his death.
"CONTRARY TO LAW." 23
The opinion of the trial court to the effect that conspiracy may
be inferred from the allegation of abuse of superior strength and with the aid of
armed men, i.e.,that "...the above-named accused, being then armed with a knife,
with intent to kill ...and taking advantage of their numerical superiority and
combined strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab JONATHAN CALPITO Y CASTRO ..." 24 is difficult to accept.
Conspiracy arises when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy comes to life at
the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and
forthwith to actually pursue it. 25 Verily, the information must state that the accused
have confederated to commit the crime or that there has been a community of
design, a unity of purpose or an agreement to commit the felony among the
accused. Such an allegation, in the absence of the usual usage of the words
"conspired" or "confederated" or the phrase "acting in conspiracy," must aptly
appear in the information in the form of definitive acts constituting conspiracy. In
fine, the agreement to commit the crime, the unity of purpose or the community of
design among the accused must be conveyed such aseither by the use of the term
"conspire" or its derivatives and synonyms or by allegations of basic facts
constituting the conspiracy. Conspiracy must be alleged, not just inferred, in the
information on which basis an accused can aptly enter his plea, a matter that is not
to be confused with or likened to the adequacy of evidence that may be required
to prove it. In establishing conspiracy when properly alleged, the evidence to
support it need not necessarily be shown by direct proof but may be inferredfrom
shown acts and conduct of the accused.
In the absence of conspiracy, so averred and proved as heretofore
explained, an accused can only be made liable for the acts committed by him alone
and this criminal responsibility is individual and not collective. 26 And so it is that
must be so held in this case. The conflicting claims of the prosecution and the
defense on who stabbed the victim is an issue that ultimately and unavoidably goes
into the question of whom to believe among the witnesses. This issue of credibility
requires a determination that is concededly best left to the trial court with its unique
position of having been enabled to observe that elusive and incommunicable
evidence of the deportment of witnesses on the stand. 27 Findings of the trial court,
following that assessment, must be given the highest degree of respect absent
compelling reasons to conclude otherwise. 28
The Court is not, at this time and in this instance, disposed to deviate from
the foregoing rule. In the first place, Lito Adjaro, the eyewitness in the stabbing of
Calpito, has steadfastly stood by, even on rebuttal, to his story on the commission
of the crime. A witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward and
spontaneous manner, as well as remains consistent on cross and rebuttal
examination, is not likely to be an incredible witness. 29 Secondly, the defense has
failed to establish any ill motive on the part of Adjaro that would have prompted
him to testify wrongly against appellants. Where there is no evidence to indicate
that the prosecution witness has been actuated by any improper motive, it would
be hard to reject the supposition that a person will not prevaricate and cause
damnation to one who has brought him no harm. 30 Finally, Herbert Soriano and
the police, who have testified seeing the already wounded Calpito lying on the
ground and still being attacked, both corroborate Adjaro's positive identification of
appellants as the persons who did maul Calpito.
After positively pointing to appellants in open court to be the persons who
ganged up on Calpito, Adjaro testified on their respective participation's in the
commission of the crime; thus:
"PROSECUTOR:
"Q Now, you pointed to Emilio Senoto, Jr. as one of the persons who held
the deceased Jonathan Calpito. What part of the body of Jonathan
Calpito did he hold? llcd
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr.,Bellosillo, Panganiban and Quisumbing, JJ ., concur.
||| (People v. Quitlong, G.R. No. 121562, [July 10, 1998], 354 PHIL 372-396)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 111399. September 27, 1996.]
SYLLABUS
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., J : p
EN BANC
DECISION
ABAD SANTOS, J : p
(a) . . .
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present,
share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in
connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and
any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to
intervene under the law."
The petitioner states:
"Assuming in gratia argumenti, petitioner's guilt, the facts make out
a case of Direct Bribery defined and penalized under the provision of
Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and not a violation of Section 3,
subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended.
"The evidence for the prosecution clearly and undoubtedly support,
if at all, the offense of Direct Bribery, which is not the offense charged and
is not likewise included in or is necessarily included in the offense
charged, which is for violation of Section 3, subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act
3019, as amended. The prosecution showed that: the accused is a public
officer; in consideration of P4,000.00 which was allegedly solicited,
P2,000.00 of which was allegedly received, the petitioner undertook or
promised to dismiss a criminal complaint pending preliminary investigation
before him, which may or may not constitute a crime; that the act of
dismissing the criminal complaint pending before petitioner was related to
the exercise of the function of his office. Therefore, it is with pristine clarity
that the offense proved, if at all, is Direct Bribery." (Petition, p. 5.)
Upon the other hand, the respondents claim:
"A reading of the above-quoted provision would show that the term
'transaction' as used thereof is not limited in its scope or meaning to a
commercial or business transaction but includes all kinds of transaction,
whether commercial, civil or administrative in nature, pending with the
government. This must be so, otherwise, the Act would have so stated in
the 'Definition of Terms', Section 2 thereof. But it did not, perforce leaving
no other interpretation than that the expressed purpose and object is to
embrace all kinds of transaction between the government and other party
wherein the public officer would intervene under the law." (Comment, p.
8.)
It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not
a contract. Neither was it a transaction because this term must be construed as
analogous to the term which precedes it. A transaction, like a contract, is one
which involves some consideration as in credit transactions and this element
(consideration) is absent in the investigation conducted by the petitioner.
In the light of the foregoing, We agree with the petitioner that it was error
for the Sandiganbayan to have convicted him of violating Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No.
3019.
The petitioner also claims that he cannot be convicted of bribery under
the Revised Penal Code because to do so would be violative of his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. Wrong. A reading of the information which has been reproduced
herein clearly makes out a case of bribery so that the petitioner cannot claim
deprivation of the right to be informed.
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the
Sandiganbayan is modified in that the petitioner is deemed guilty of bribery as
defined and penalized by Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to two (2) years of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay
a fine of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos. The rest of the judgment is hereby
affirmed. Costs against the petitioner. Cdpr
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr.,
Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la
Fuente and Cuevas, JJ.,concur.
(Soriano, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-65952, [July 31, 1984], 216 PHIL
|||
177-182)
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
FERNANDO, J : p
EN BANC
SYNOPSIS
SYLLABUS
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J : p
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Ynares-
Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.
||| (People v. Tee, G.R. Nos. 140546-47, [January 20, 2003], 443 PHIL 521-554)
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
FERNANDO, J : p
A plea based on the constitutional right to a speedy trial 1 led this Court
to act affirmatively on a certiorari proceeding for the dismissal of a case then
pending in the Court of Appeals. Considering the length of time that had
elapsed, it is readily discernible why an inquiry into the matter is well-nigh
unavoidable. The accusation for robbery against petitioners Francisco Flores
and Francisco Angel was filed as far back as December 31, 1951. The decision
rendered on November 29, 1955 found them guilty of the crime charged. The
notice of appeal was filed on December 8, 1955. 2 For a period of three years,
until February 10, 1958, no action was taken by the Court of Appeals. On that
day, there was a resolution remanding the records of the case to the lower court
for a rehearing of the testimony of a certain witness deemed material for the
disposition of the case. 3 Such a resolution was amended by a second
resolution dated August 5, 1959, which granted the motion for counsel of
appellants, now petitioners, to set aside the decision so that evidence for the
defense on certain new facts or matters may be received and that a new
decision in lieu of the old one may be rendered in accordance with the facts as
found. 4 Accordingly, the case was returned to the lower court with the former
decision set aside so that the trial could be had, but nothing was done for about
a year because the offended party failed to appear notwithstanding the six or
seven dates set for such hearing. 5 It was further alleged that when thereafter
he did take the witness stand, his testimony was far from satisfactory,
characterized as a mere "fiasco" as he could no longer remember the details of
the alleged crime, there was even a failure to identify the two accused. 6 Instead
of rendering a new decision, the former one having been set aside as required
by the Court of Appeals, the lower court merely sent back the records to the
appellate tribunal. 7 At that stage, five more years having elapsed without
anything being done, petitioners sought the dismissal of the cases against them
due to such inordinate delay in their disposition, which covered the period of
December 8, 1955 to May 10, 1965, a period of almost a decade; thus did they
invoke their constitutional right to a speedy trial. 8 Respondent Court of Appeals
was unresponsive, notwithstanding the vigorous plea on the part of counsel for
petitioners, its last order being a denial of a second motion for reconsideration
dated January 28, 1966. In the answer on behalf of the People of the
Philippines, the facts as above set forth were substantially admitted. However,
a special and affirmative defense raised was that the case was not properly
captioned, as the People of the Philippines, against whom it is filed, is not a
tribunal or an office exercising Judicial functions and that without the Court of
Appeals being made a party to the petition, it cannot be said that it stated facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Moreover, on the merits, the view was
expressed that under the circumstances, it was not adequately shown that the
right to a speedy trial had been violated, as the Court of Appeals had taken all
the steps necessary to complete the transcript of stenographic notes of the
original trial.
On the above undisputed facts, there is more than sufficient warrant for
the conclusion that the right to a speedy trial, so zealously guarded in both
the 1935and the present Constitutions, had not been accorded due respect.
There is thus merit in the petition.
1. The constitutional right to a speedy trial, as was noted in a recent
decision, Acebedo v. Sarmiento, 9 "means one free from vexatious, capricious
and oppressive delays, . . ." 10 Thus, if the person accused were innocent, he
may within the shortest time possible be spared from anxiety and apprehension
arising from a prosecution, and if culpable, he will not be kept long in suspense
as to the fate in store for him, within a period of course compatible with his
opportunity to present any valid defense. As was also pointed out in Sarmiento:
"The remedy in the event of a non-observance of this right is by habeas corpus
if the accused were restrained of his liberty, or by certiorari, prohibition, or
mandamus for the final dismissal of the case." 11 The above ruling is a
reiteration of the doctrine announced, even before the 1935 Constitution, in
Conde v. Rivera, 12 a 1924 decision. In that case, Justice Malcolm announced
categorically that the trial, to comply with the requirement of the then organic
law, the Philippine Autonomy Act, must be "free from vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays." 13 Further: "We lay down the legal proposition that, where
a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial
of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this
instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding
in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of
his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom." 14
In the first Supreme Court decision after the 1935 Constitution took
effect, People v. Castañeda, 15 where it was shown that the criminal case had
been dragging on for almost five years and that when the trial did finally take
place, it was tainted by irregularities, this Court set aside the appealed decision
of conviction and acquitted the accused. As was pointed out by
the ponente, Justice Laurel: "The Government should be the last to set an
example of delay and oppression in the administration of justice and it is the
moral and legal obligation of this court to see that the criminal proceedings
against the accused come to an end and that they be immediately discharged
from the custody of the law." 16 It was on the basis of the above judgment that
the dismissal of a second information for frustrated homicide was ordered by
this Court, where the evidence disclosed that the first information had been
dismissed after a lapse of one year and seven months from the time the original
complaint was filed during which time on the three occasions the case was set
for trial, the private prosecutor twice asked for postponements and once the
trial court itself cancelled the entire calendar for the month it was supposed to
have been heard. 17 The same result followed in Esguerra v. De la
Costa, 18where the first complaint was filed on August 29, 1936, the accused
having been criminally prosecuted for an alleged abuse of chastity in a justice
of the peace court but after over a year and three months, with the lower court
twice dismissing the case, he still had to face trial for the same offense on a
new information, thus compelling him to resort to a mandamus suit to compel
the lower court to terminate the case was his right to a speedy trial was violated,
a remedy deemed appropriate by this Court.
There was another occasion where Justice Laurel spoke for this Court
on this specific issue. That was in Mercado v. Santos. 19 Here, for a period of
about twenty months, the accused was arrested four times on the charge of
falsifying his deceased wife's will. Twice, the complaints were subsequently
withdrawn. The third time he was prosecuted on the same charge, he was able
to obtain a dismissal. Then came on the part of the provincial fiscal, a motion
for reinvestigation. The lower court was in a receptive mood. It ordered that the
case be heard on the merits. The accused moved to dismiss, but he did not
succeed. He tried the Court of Appeals, but he failed again. He elevated the
matter to this Court; he prevailed. It was stressed in Justice Laurel's opinion:
"An accused person is entitled to a trial at the earliest opportunity. . . . He cannot
be oppressed by delaying the commencement of trial for an unreasonable
length of time. If the proceedings pending trial are deferred, the trial itself is
necessarily delayed." 20 The opinion likewise considered as not decisive the
fact that the provincial fiscal did not intervene until an information was filed
charging the accused with the crime of falsification the third time. Thus:
"The Constitution does not say that the right to a speedy trial may be availed of
only where the prosecution for crime is commenced and undertaken by the
fiscal. It does not exclude from its operation cases commenced by private
individuals. Where once a person is prosecuted criminally, he is entitled to a
speedy trial, irrespective of the nature of the offense or the manner in which it
is authorized to be commenced." 21 The latest decision in point, Acebedo v.
Sarmiento, 22 presented an even clearer case. The information for damage to
property was filed on August 3, 1959. There the matter rested until May 19,
1965, when the accused moved to dismiss. The lower court denied the motion
in his order of July 10, 1965. Two more years elapsed, the period now covering
almost eight years, when the trial was commenced. When one of the witnesses
for the prosecution failed to appear, the provincial fiscal sought the
postponement, but the accused countered with a motion for dismissal. The
lower court acceded, and this Court sustained him, even if thereafter it changed
its mind and reinstated the case.
Petitioners can thus invoke the constitutional guarantee that the trial
should be speedy. In the absence of any valid decision, the stage of trial has
not been completed. In this case then, as of May 10, 1965, when they moved
to dismiss in the Court of Appeals, petitioners could validly contend that they
had not been accorded their right to be tried as promptly as circumstances
permit. It was not the pendency in the Court of Appeals of their cases that
should be deemed material. It is at times unavoidable that appellate tribunals
cannot, even with due diligence, put an end to suits elevated to them. What is
decisive is that with the setting aside of the previous decision in the resolution
of August 5, 1959, petitioners could validly premise their plea for dismissal on
this constitutional safeguard. That is the sole basis for the conclusion reached
by us — considering the controlling doctrine announced with such emphasis by
this Court time and time again.
2. That is about all that needs be said. The crucial issue has been met.
The decisive question has been answered. There is an affirmation of the worth
of the constitutional right to a speedy trial. Not too much significance should be
attached to the procedural defect pointed out in the answer of the People of the
Philippines that the Court of Appeals should have been made the party
respondent. What cannot be sanctioned was its failure to accord respect to this
particular constitutional right. It did amount at the very least to a grave abuse of
discretion. Whatever deficiency in the pleading may then be singled out, it
cannot obscure the obvious disregard of one of the most important safeguards
granted an accused. To deny petitioners the remedy sought would be to exalt
form over substance. At any rate, the petition could be considered, and rightly
so, as being directed at the Court of Appeals. Moreover, the defenses that could
have interposed to justify the action taken were invoked by the People of the
Philippines. They certainly did not avail. Our decisions on the right to a speedy
Trial speak too categorically to be misread. This is one of those situations then
where, in the apt language of the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Makalintal,
"technicalities should give way to the realities of the situation." 23
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted, and the order of the
Court of Appeals in CA-GR No. 16641-R entitled, People v. Francisco Flores,
et al., of September 28, 1965 denying the motion to dismiss as well as its order
of January 8, 1966 denying the motion for reconsideration, and the order of
January 28, 1966 denying the second motion for reconsideration are hereby
set aside, nullified, and considered of no force and effect. The criminal case
against petitioners in the aforesaid CA-GR No. 16641-R are ordered dismissed.
Costs de oficio.
Makalintal, C.J., Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., did not take part.
Separate Opinions
ANTONIO, J., concurring:
||| (Flores v. People, G.R. No. L-25769, [December 10, 1974], 158 PHIL 967-975)
FIRST DIVISION
SYLLABUS
DECISION
MALCOLM, J : p
||| (Conde v. Rivera, G.R. No. 21741, [January 25, 1924], 45 PHIL 650-652)
Tenth Congress
Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Speedy Trial Act of 1998."
Section 2. Mandatory Pre-Trial in Criminal Cases. - In all cases cognizable by the Municipal Trial
Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court, and the
Sandiganbayan, the justice or judge shall, after arraignment, order a pre-trial conference to consider
the following:
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial.
Section 3. Pre-Trial Agreement. - All agreements or admissions made or entered into during the
pre-trial conference shall be reduced to writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise
the same shall not be used in evidence against the accused. The agreements in relation to matters
referred to in Section 2 hereof is subject to the approval of the court: Provided, That the agreement
on the plea of the accused to a lesser offense may only be revised, modified, or annulled by the
court when the same is contrary to law, public morals, or public policy.
Section 4. Nonappearance at Pre-Trial Conference. - Where counsel for the accused or the
prosecutor does not appear at the pre-trial conference and does not offer an acceptable excuse for
his/her lack of cooperation, the pre-trial justice or judge may impose proper sanctions or penalties.
Section 5. Pre-Trial Order. - After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order reciting the
actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit the
trial to matters not disposed of and control the course of action during the trial, unless modified by
the court to prevent manifest injustice.
Section 6. Time Limit for Trial. - In criminal cases involving persons charged of a crime, except
those subject to the Rules on Summary Procedure, or where the penalty prescribed by law does not
exceed six (6) months imprisonment, or a fine of One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or both,
irrespective of other imposable penalties, the justice or judge shall, after consultation with the public
prosecutor and the counsel for the accused, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other
short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall
the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as
otherwise authorized by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 3, Rule 22 of
the Rules of Court.
Section 7. Time Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and Between
Arraignment and Trial. - The arraignment of an accused shall be held within thirty (30) days from
the filing of the information, or from the date the accused has appeared before the justice, judge or
court in which the charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. Thereafter, where a plea of not
guilty is entered, the accused shall have at least fifteen (15) days to prepare for trial. Trial shall
commence within thirty (30) days from arraignment as fixed by the court.
If the accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, he/she shall state whether he/she interposes a
negative or affirmative defense. A negative defense shall require the prosecution to prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while an affirmative defense may modify the order of trial and
require the accused to prove such defense by clear and convincing evidence.
Section 8. Time Limit Following an Order for New Trial. - If the accused is to be tried again
following an order of a court for a new trial, the trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from the
date the order for a new trial becomes final, except that the court retrying the case may extend such
period but in any case shall not exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the date the order for a
new trial becomes final if unavailability of witnesses or other factors resulting from passage of time
shall make trial within thirty (30) days impractical.
Section 9. Extended Time Limit. - Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Act, for the
first twelve-calendar-month period following its effectivity, the time limit with respect to the period
from arraignment to trial imposed by Section 7 of this Act shall be one hundred eighty (180) days.
For the second twelve-month period the time limit shall be one hundred twenty (120) days, and for
the third twelve-month period the time limit with respect to the period from arraignment to trial shall
be eighty (80) days.
Section 10. Exclusions. - The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time
within which trial must commence:
(a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the accused, including
but not limited to the following:
(1) delay resulting from an examination of the accused, and hearing on his/her
mental competency, or physical incapacity;
(2) delay resulting from trials with respect to charges against the accused;
(4) delay resulting from hearings on pre-trial motions: Provided, That the delay does
not exceed thirty (30) days,
(6) delay resulting from a finding of the existence of a valid prejudicial question; and
(7) delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty (30) days, during
which any proceeding concerning the accused is actually under advisement.
(b) Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of the accused or an
essential witness.
(c) Any period of delay resulting from the fact that the accused is mentally incompetent or
physically unable to stand trial.
(d) If the information is dismissed upon motion of the prosecution and thereafter a charge is
filed against the accused for the same offense, or any offense required to be joined with that
offense, any period of delay from the date the charge was dismissed to the date the time
limitation would commence to run as to the subsequent charge had there been no previous
charge.
(e) A reasonable period of delay when the accused is joined for trial with a co-accused over
whom the court has not acquired jurisdiction, or as to whom the time for trial has not run and
no motion for severance has been granted.
(f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any justice or judge motu
propio or on motion of the accused or his/her counsel or at the request of the public
prosecutor, if the justice or judge granted such continuance on the basis of his/her findings
that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public
and the defendant in a speedy trial. No such period of delay resulting from a continuance
granted by the court in accordance with this subparagraph shall be excludable under this
section unless the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its
reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance
outweigh the best interests of the public and the accused in a speedy trial.
Section 11. Factors for Granting Continuance. - The factors, among others, which a justice or
judge shall consider in determining whether to grant a continuance under subparagraph (f) of
Section 10 of this Act are as follows:
(a) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in the proceeding would be likely to make
a continuation of such proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice.
(b) Whether the case taken as a whole is so novel, so unusual and so complex, due to the
number of accused or the nature of the prosecution or otherwise, that it is unreasonable to
expect adequate preparation within the periods of time established by this Act.
Section 12. Public Attorney's Duties Where Accused is Imprisoned. - If the public attorney
knows that a person charged of a crime is preventively detained, either because he/she is charged
of a bailable crime and has no means to post bail, or is charged of a non-bailable crime, or is serving
a term of imprisonment in any penal institution, the public attorney shall promptly:
(a) Undertake to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial, or cause a notice to be served
on the person having custody of the prisoner mandating such person to so advise the
prisoner of his/her right to demand trial.
(b) Upon receipt of a notice, the person having custody of the prisoner shall promptly advise
the prisoner of the charge and of his/her right to demand trial. If at any time thereafter the
prisoner informs the person having custody that he/she demands trial, such person shall
cause notice to that effect to be sent promptly to the public attorney.
(c) Upon receipt of such notice, the public attorney shall promptly seek to obtain the
presence of the prisoner for trial.
(d) When the person having custody of the prisoner receives from the public attorney a
properly supported request for temporary custody of the prisoner for trial, the prisoner shall
be made available to that public attorney.
Section 13. Remedy Where Accused is Not Brought to Trial Within the Time Limit. - If an
accused is not brought to trial within the time limit required by Section 7 of this Act as extended by
Section 9, the information shall be dismissed on motion of the accused. The accused shall have the
burden of proof of supporting such motion but the prosecution shall have the burden of going
forward with the evidence in connection with the exclusion of time under Section 10 of this Act.
In determining whether to dismiss the case with or without prejudice, the court shall consider, among
other factors, the seriousness of the offense, the facts and circumstances of the case which led to
the dismissal, and the impact of a reprosecution on the implementation of this Act and on the
administration of justice. Failure of the accused to move for dismissal prior to trial or entry of a plea
of guilty shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismissal under this section.
Section 14. Sanctions. - In any case in which counsel for the accused, the public prosecution or
public attorney:
(a) knowingly allows the case to be set for trial without disclosing the fact that a necessary
witness would be unavailable for trial;
(b) files a motion solely for the purpose of delay which he/she knows is totally frivolous and
without merit;
(c) makes a statement for the purpose of obtaining continuance which he/she knows to be
false and which is material to the granting of a continuance; or
(d) otherwise willfully fails to proceed to trial without justification consistent with the
provisions of this Act, the court may, without prejudice to any appropriate criminal and/or
administrative charges to be instituted by the proper party against the erring counsel if and
when warranted, punish any such counsel or attorney, as follows:
(1) in the case of a counsel privately retained in connection with the defense of an
accused, by imposing a fine not exceeding; fifty percent (50%) of the compensation
to which he/she is entitled in connection with his/her defense of the accused;
(2) by imposing on any appointed counsel de officio or public prosecutor a fine not
exceeding Ten thousand pesos (10,000.00); and
(3) by denying any defense counsel or public prosecutor the right to practice before
the court considering the case for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days.
The authority to punish provided for by this section shall be in addition to any other authority
or power available to the court. The court shall follow the procedures established in the
Rules of Court in punishing any counsel or public prosecutor pursuant to this section.
Section 15. Rules and Regulations. - The Supreme Court shall promulgate rules, regulations,
administrative orders and circulars which shall seek to accelerate the disposition of criminal cases.
The rules, regulations, administrative orders and circulars formulated shall provide sanctions against
justices and judges who willfully fail to proceed to trial without justification consistent with the
provisions of this Act.
Section 16. Funding. - For the effective implementation of the rules, regulations, administrative
orders and circulars promulgated under this Act, the amount of Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) annually shall be appropriated from the allocation of the Supreme Court under the
General Appropriations Act. Thereafter, such additional amounts as may be necessary for its
continued implementation shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.
Section 17. Act Not a Bar to Speedy Trial Claim Under the Constitution. - No provision of this
Act shall be interpreted as a bar to any claim of denial of speedy trial as required by Article III,
Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 18. Repealing Clause. - All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and
regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.
Section 19. Separability Clause. - In case any provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional, the
other provisions shall remain in effect.
Section 20. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in
the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation: Provided, That Section 7 of this Act
shall become effective after the expiration of the aforementioned third-calendar-month period
provided in Section 9 of this Act.
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
FERNANDO, J : p
The novel issue presented in this prohibition proceeding arose from the
gnawing fear that the prized ideal of "the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge" 1 implicit in the due process guarantee may be set at naught.
Petitioners are among being tried by respondent Judge for the offense of
robbery in band with homicide. Thereafter, an extrajudicial statement by one
Rolando Reyes, who was later on likewise indicted for the same offense,
implicating petitioners, was subscribed before respondent Judge. That was
the background of a motion for his disqualification, as the aforesaid Rolando
Reyes, when called upon to testify as an additional witness for the
prosecution impugned his written declaration stating that it was executed as a
result of a threat by a government agent. It is now contended that such a
repudiation would not sit well with respondent Judge, who had thus placed
himself in a position of being unable to pass on such question with that
degree of objectivity required by due process, although admittedly, such a
move did not fall squarely within one of the specific grounds to inhibit
judges. 2 Respondent Judge turned down this plea for disqualification. Hence
this petition, based on the asserted violation of a constitutional right not to be
convicted of an offense without due process of law. This Court, after t careful
consideration of the matter and in the light of past decisions to be hereafter
noted, looks upon such failure of respondent Judge to disqualify himself as a
grave abuse of discretion correctible by prohibition. The petition is meritorious.
The facts, in the language of the petition, follow: "On or about June 4,
1971, the American Express Bank at Sangley Point, Cavite, was robbed and
an American serviceman was killed. In connection with that robbery, and the
death of the serviceman, four (4) criminal actions were filed against petitioners
and docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. CCC-VII-843 to 846, Cavite, for robbery
in band with homicide, all captioned 'People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, vs.
Manuel Mateo, et al., Accused' . . . The Information fell in the sala of the
Honorable Respondent Judge because the complaints were filed there; and, in
fact, it was the Honorable Respondent Judge who ordered District State
Prosecutor Cornelio Melendres [or] Assistant City Fiscal Enrique A. Cube to
conduct the preliminary investigation. Petitioners Manuel Mateo, Jr. and
Esmeraldo Cruz were arraigned on June 24, 1971 while petitioners Roberto
Martinez @ Ruben Martinez filed a Motion To Dismiss on the ground of
"insufficiency of evidence for failure of prosecution (1) to prove the existence of
conspiracy, and (2) to identify the accused by competent evidence.' On
September 25, 1971, petitioner Roberto Martinez @ Ruben Martinez amplified
his motion to dismiss with a Supplemental Motion based on the claim that 'the
pre-trial identification by prosecution witness Elliot Grey of your accused
Roberto Martinez in a police line-up in the absence of defendant's counsel is
unconstitutional; and the in-court testimony of said Elliot Grey identifying your
accused Roberto Martinez is inadmissible in evidence and should be stricken
out from the records'. The prosecution opposed the motion to dismiss. To date,
the motions to dismiss have not been decided by the Honorable Respondent
Judge . . . In the meantime, another suspect in the Sangley Point Robbery —
one Rolando Reyes — was arrested. On October 5, 1971, when petitioner's
Motion to Dismiss together with the Opposition thereto were submitted for
resolution, the Honorable Presiding Judge in an Order ruled that 'pursuant to
Sec. 6, Rule 135 of the New Rules of Court, let the Motion to Dismiss be
resolved until after the prosecution has presented and rested its evidence as
against Rolando Reyes . . . It appears that the said Rolando Reyes had
executed an extrajudicial statement on October 1, 1971 and had signed and
sworn to its truth before the Honorable Respondent Judge; and, in that
statement had implicated petitioners; evidently, the Honorable Respondent
Judge was aware of this, and it was for this reason that he had deferred ruling
on petitioner Ruben Martinez' motions and supplemental motion to dismiss 'until
after the prosecution has presented and rested its evidence as against Rolando
Reyes.' Rolando Reyes, however, was tried separately from and in absence of
petitioners; so that the proceedings against him did not constitute evidence
against petitioner. So, on November 26, 1971, while petitioner Martinez' Motion
and Supplemental Motion to Dismiss remained unresolved, the prosecution
filed a 'Motion to Present Additional Evidence.' . . . On December 4, 1971,
petitioner Manuel Mateo filed an Opposition to the prosecution's Motion to
Present Additional Evidence on the ground that 'to allow the prosecution to
present additional evidence in favor of the State after the prosecution has
rested, while the accused has a pending motion to dismiss under consideration
would be prejudicial to the substantial rights of herein accused because it would
effectively deprive him of a fair trial.' . . . On December 24, 1971, respondent
Judge granted the prosecution's 'Motion to Present Additional Evidence' ruling
that 'it is well settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction and elsewhere that it is
within the sound discretion of the court whether or not to allow the presentation
of additional evidence after the parties have rested their case.' . . . On February
3, 1972, the prosecution called Rolando Reyes as an additional witness, and in
the course of his testimony, marked an extrajudicial statement purportedly
executed by him on October 1, 1971 as Exh. 'P' . . . Rolando Reyes repudiated
it, stated that he had executed it because he had been threatened by a
government agent. The statement, Exh. 'P' . . . , purports to have been
subscribed and sworn to before the respondent Judge on October 1, 1971. As
soon as the foregoing facts were made of record in the case, defendants
[petitioners herein] verbally moved to suspend the proceedings to enable them
to file a motion to disqualify the Honorable Respondent Judge; and the motion
for suspension was granted. On February 5, 1971, petitioners filed a Joint
Motion for Disqualification of respondent Judge contending that respondent
Judge 'in the exercise of his sound discretion [should] disqualify himself from
sitting in this case under the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 of the
Rules of Court,' because Rolando Reyes had repudiated the statement that he,
Reyes, had sworn to before the Honorable Respondent Judge and the latter
perforce would have to pass upon that repudiation . . . On February 11, 1972,
the prosecution filed an Opposition to petitioners' Joint Motion for
Disqualification . . . On February 12, 1972, respondent Judge denied petitioners'
Joint Motion for Disqualification." 3
The specific question raised not having been passed upon previously,
coupled with the exhaustive petition submitted by counsel for petitioners,
Senator Jose W. Diokno, led this Court, in its resolution of February 25, 1972
to require comment from respondent Judge, with a temporary restraining order
likewise being issued. The then Solicitor General, now Associate Justice, Felix
Antonio, did so in an equally well-researched pleading on March 16, 1972
which, by our resolution of March 22, was considered his answer. Thereafter,
with memoranda being submitted by both parties, the case was deemed
submitted for decision on August 4 last year. There is, to repeat, a highly
persuasive and scholarly quality in the manner in which the plea for petitioners
was made. Nonetheless, with due recognition of the imperative character of the
safeguard of due process connoting, at the very least, an impartial tribunal. the
Court cannot consider the circumstances disclosed a sufficient to call for the
disqualification of respondent Judge.
1. It is now beyond dispute that due process cannot be satisfied in the
absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to reassure
litigants of his being fair al being just. Thereby there is the legitimate expectation
that the decision arrived at would be the application of the law to the facts as
found by a judge who does not play favorites. For him, the parties stand on
equal footing. In the language of Justice Dizon: "It has been said, in fact, that
due process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested
tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality
of an impartial judge." 4 He should, to quote from another decision "at all times
manifest depth commitment and concern to the cause of justice according to
legal norms, a cerebral man who deliberately holds in check the tug and pull of
purely personal preferences and prejudices which he shares with the rest of his
fellow mortals." 6 penned by Justice Castro, should strive to be at all times
"wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. Elementary due process
requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. A judge has
both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner
completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity." 7 Nor is
this to imply that prior to Gutierrez, there had been no awareness of the due
process aspect of an impartial tribunal even if not explicitly referred to. As noted
by Justice Street as far back as 1926 in Government v. Abella, 8 a 1926
decision, if the Supreme Court "were of the opinion that the litigant had not had
a fair trial, a new trial could be granted." 9 There was a reiteration of such a view
in a case decided in 1933, Dais v. Torres, 10 with Justice Vickers asponente, in
these words: "Although a judge may not have been disqualified [according to
the Code of Civil Procedure], nevertheless if it appears to this court that the
appellant was not given a fair and impartial trial because of the trial judge's bias
or prejudice, this court will order a new trial, if it deems it necessary, in the
interest of justice." 11
2. Conformably to what was so emphatically asserted in Gutierrez as the
fundamental requisite of impartiality for due process to be satisfied, the Rules
of Court provision on disqualification when revised three years later in 1964
contains this additional paragraph: "A judge may, in the exercise of his sound
discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other
than those mentioned above." 12 Thereby, it is made clear to the occupants of
the bench that outside of pecuniary interest, relationship or previous
participation in the matter that calls for adjudication, there may be other causes
that could conceivably erode the trait of objectivity, thus calling for inhibition.
That is to betray a sense of realism, for the factors that lead to preferences or
predilections are many and varied. It is well, therefore, that if any such should
make its appearance and prove difficult to resist, the better course for a judge
is to disqualify himself. That way, he avoids being misunderstood. His
reputation for probity and objectivity is preserved. What is even more important,
the ideal of an impartial administration of justice is lived up to. Thus is due
process vindicated. There is relevance to what was said by Justice Sanchez in
Pimentel v. Salanga, 13 drawing "attention of all judges to appropriate
guidelines in a situation where their capacity to try and decide a case fairly and
judiciously comes to the fore by way of challenge from any one of the parties.
A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when
suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one
party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstance
reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful
self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the peoples
faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflect the
probability that a losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the thought
that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him. That
passion on the part judge may be generated because of serious charges
misconduct against him by a suitor or his counsel, is not altogether remote. He
is a man, subject to the frailties of other men. He should, therefore, exercise
great care and caution before making up his mind to act or withdraw from a suit
where that party or counsel is involved. He could in good grace inhibit himself
where that case could be heard by another judge and where no appreciable
prejudice would be occasioned to others involved therein. On the result of his
decisions to sit or not to sit may depend to a great extent the all-important
confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. If after reflection he should resolve
to voluntarily desist from sit a case where his motives or fairness might be
seriously impugned, his action is to be interpreted as giving meaning and
substance to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137. He serves the cause
of the law who forestalls miscarriage of justice." 14
3. The imperfections of human institutions being such, what is fit and
proper is not always achieved. The invitation to judges to disqualify themselves
is not always heeded. For that matter, it is not always desirable that they should
do so. It could amount in certain cases to their being recreant to their trust.
Justice Perfecto's warning is not to be ignored; "to shirk the responsibility"
entails "the risk of being called upon to account for his dereliction." 15 It could
be an instrument whereby a party could inhibit a judge in the hope of getting
another more amenable to his persuasive skill. With all such considerations in
mind, there is still cogency in the approach that would look with favor on the
exercise of discretion in favor of disqualification, given the likelihood that bias
or prejudice is unavoidable. Even before the amendment of Section 1 of Rule
137, this Court, in at least two decisions, 16 gave its approval to such a move.
Then came People v. Gomez, 17 where this Court, the ponente being Justice J.
P. Bengzon, held: "Now considering that the Revised Rules of Court, already in
effect when respondent Judge filed his answer herein containing the prayer to
be disqualified from the case, although not yet in effect when the proceedings
at issue were taken in the court below, states in Section 1 of Rule 137 that, 'A
judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting
in a case, for just or valid reasons' other than the usual grounds for
disqualification, this Court, after considering all the circumstances of the case,
finds as reasonable, respondent Judge's afore-stated request for
disqualification from further sitting in the Richard case, and We rule that he is
thereby deemed, in light of the new Rules, to have inhibited himself from further
taking cognizance of the case." 18
There is even greater deference paid to the due process requirement of
impartiality when, in Luque v. Kayanan, 19 decided in 1969, this Court, through
Justice Sanchez, could categorically rule: "All suitors, we must say, are entitled
to nothing short of the cold neutrality of an independent, wholly-free,
disinterested and impartial tribunal. It has been said that 'next in importance to
the duty of rendering a righteous judgment is that of doing it in such a manner
as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the judge.' Let it not
be said that the administration of justice in this country suffers from too many
human imperfections. To our mind, respondent judge should inhibit himself
since it has become apparent that his further continuance in Case 4871 would
not be in the best interest of justice, which he is bound to serve." 20 There was
a reiteration of such a principle in Paredes v. Gopengco, 21 where the following
appears in the opinion of Justice Teehankee for the Court: "It is pertinent to
state that the restriction provided in the Rule against appeal or stay of the
proceedings where the trial judge denies a motion for his disqualification is not
an absolute rule even in civil cases, and has not been taken as precluding a
resort in appropriate cases to the special civil actions of prohibition and
certiorari before the higher courts for determination, ahead of the judgment on
the merits, whether the trial judge committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction refusing to disqualify
himself." 22 There is thus respectable authority for the view that with the
possibility of a trial being tainted by partiality, this Court can step in to assure
respect for the demands of due process.
4. Petitioners can assert then, and rightly so, that we have the power to
set aside the order denying the motion for disqualification. While the discretion
in the first instance belongs to respondent Judge, its exercise is subject to our
corrective authority. Certainly, there can be no question its being considered
abused if it can be shown that to refuse inhibition is to cast valid doubts as to a
court's impartiality. The specific issue then that must be resolved is whether the
circumstance of a party having subscribed before respondent Judge an extra-
judicial statement purporting to describe the manner in which an offense was
committed, later on repudiated by him as the product of intimidation in the
course of his having been asked to testify against petitioners, would suffice to
negate that degree of objectivity the Constitution requires? The answer must
be in the affirmative. Petitioners are thus entitled to the relief sought.
Respondent Judge could not be totally immune to what apparently was
asserted before him in such extrajudicial statement. Moreover, it is unlikely that
he was not in the slightest bit offended by the affiant's turnabout with his later
declaration that there was intimidation by a government agent exerted on him.
That was hardly flattering to respondent Judge. It is not only that. His sense of
fairness under the circumstances could easily be blunted. The absence of the
requisite due process element is thus noticeable. There is this circumstance
even more telling. It was he who attested to its due execution on October 1,
1971 wherein Rolando Reyes admitted his participation in the crime and in
addition implicated petitioners. At that time, their motion for dismissal of the
charges against them was pending; its resolution was deferred by respondent
Judge until after the prosecution had presented and rested its evidence against
affiant, who was himself indicted and tried for the same offense, but in a
separate proceeding. It cannot be doubted then that respondent Judge in effect
ruled that such extra-judicial statement was executed freely. With its repudiation
on the ground that it was not so at all, coercion having come into the picture
there is apparent the situation of a judge having to pass on a question that by
implication had already been answered by him. Such a fact became rather
obvious. For respondent Judge was called upon to review a matter on which he
had previously given his opinion. It is this inroad in one's, objectivity that is
sought to be avoided by the law on disqualification. The misgivings then as to
the requirement of due process for "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" not
being met are more than justified. Hence the conclusion reached by us.
5. To avoid any further controversies of this nature, lower court judges
are well-advised to limit themselves to the task of adjudication and to leave to
others the role of notarizing declarations. The less an occupant of the bench
fritters away his time and energy in tasks more incumbent on officials of the
executive branch, the less the danger of his being a participant in any event
that might lend itself to the interpretation that his impartiality has been
compromised. There is much to be said for displaying zeal and eagerness in
stamping out criminality, but that role is hardly fit for a judge who must bide his
time until the case is before him. He must ever be on guard lest what is done
by him, even from the best of motives, may be thought of as eroding that
objectivity and sobriety which are the hallmarks of judicial conduct. Thus should
he attend to the performance of the sacred trust that is his.
WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is granted. The restraining
order is issued by this Court on February 25, 1972 is made permanent. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra,
JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., concurs in this and the separate concurring opinion of
Mr. Justice Teehankee.
Teehankee, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
(Mateo, Jr. v. Villaluz, G.R. Nos. L-34756-59, [March 31, 1973], 151-A PHIL 21-
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34)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-30104. July 25, 1973.]
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J : p
The pivotal question in this petition for certiorari and prohibition, one
which thus far has remained unresolved, is the meaning to be accorded the
constitutional right to public trial. 1 More specifically, did respondent Judge
commit a grave abuse of discretion in stigmatizing as violative of such a
guarantee the holding of the trial of the other respondents 2 inside the chambers
of city court Judge Gregorio Garcia named as petitioner. 3 That was done in the
order now impugned in this suit, although such a procedure had been agreed
to beforehand by the other respondents as defendants, the hearings have been
thus conducted on fourteen separate occasions without objection on their part,
and without an iota of evidence offered to substantiate any claim as to any other
person so minded being excluded from the premises. It is thus evident that what
took place in the chambers of the city court judge was devoid of haste or
intentional secrecy. For reasons to be more fully explained in the light of the
facts ascertained — the unique aspect of this case having arisen from what
turned out to be an unseemly altercation, force likewise being employed, due
to the mode in which the arrest of private petitioner for a traffic violation was
sought to be effected by the two respondent policemen thus resulting in charges
and counter-charges with eight criminal cases being tried jointly by city court
Judge in the above manner — we rule that there was no transgression of the
right to a public trial, and grant the petition.
It was alleged and admitted in the petition: "In Branch I of the City Court
of Manila presided over by petitioner Judge, there were commenced, by
appropriate informations all dated January 16, 1968, eight (8) criminal actions
against respondents Edgardo Calo, and Simeon Carbonnel and Petitioner
Francisco Lorenzana, as follows: a. Against Edgardo Calo (on complaint of
Francisco Lorenzana) (1) Criminal Case No. F-109191, for slight physical
injuries; (2) Criminal Case No. F-109192, also for slight physical injuries; and
(3) Criminal Case No. F-109193, for maltreatment; b. Against Simeon
Carbonnel (id.) (1) Criminal Case No. F-109197, for maltreatment; (2) Criminal
Case No. F-109196, for slight physical injuries; and (3) Criminal Case No. F-
109198 for light threats; (c) Against Francisco Lorenzana (on complaint of Calo
and Carbonnel) (1) Criminal Case No. F-109201, for violation of Sec. 887 of the
Revised Ordinances of Manila (resisting an officer); and (2) Criminal Case No.
F-109200, for slander." 4 The above was followed by this recital: "The trial of
the aforementioned cases was jointly held on March 4, 1968, March 18, 1968,
March 23, 1968, March 30, 1968, April 17, 1968, April 20, 1968, May 4, 1968,
May 11, 1968, June 1, 1968, June 15, 1968, June 22, 1968, June 29, 1968,
August 3, 1968 and August 10, 1968. All the fourteen (14) trial dates — except
March 4 and 18, and April 17, 1968 — fell on a Saturday. This was arranged by
the parties and the Court upon the insistence of respondents Calo and
Carbonnel who, as police officers under suspension because of the cases,
desired the same to be terminated as soon as possible and as there were many
cases scheduled for trial on the usual criminal trial days (Monday, Wednesday
and Friday), Saturday was agreed upon as the invariable trial day for said eight
(8) criminal cases." 5 Also this: "The trial of the cases in question was held, with
the conformity of the accused and their counsel, in the chambers of Judge
Garcia." 6 Then came these allegations in the petition: "During all the fourteen
(14) days of trial, spanning a period of several months (from March to August,
1968), the accused were at all times represented by their respective counsel,
who acted not only in defense of their clients, but as prosecutors of the
accusations filed at their clients' instance. There was only one (1) day when
Atty. Consengco, representing respondent Calo and Carbonnel, was absent.
This was on April 20, 1968. But at the insistence of Pat. Carbonnel, the trial
proceeded, and said respondent cross-examined one of the witnesses
presented by the adverse party. In any case, no pretense has been made by
the respondents that this constituted an irregularity correctible on certiorari. At
the conclusion of the hearings the accused, thru counsel, asked for and were
granted time to submit memoranda. Respondents Calo and Carbonnel, thru
counsel, Atty. Rafael Consengco, submitted a 14-page memorandum with not
less than 35 citations of relevant portions of the transcript of stenographic notes
in support of their prayer for exoneration, and for the conviction of petitioner
Lorenzana in respect of their countercharges against the latter. It is worthy of
note that up to this date, said respondents Calo and Carbonnel had not
objected to — pointed out — any supposed irregularity in the proceedings thus
far; the memorandum submitted in their behalf is confined to a discussion of the
evidence adduced in, and the merits of the cases." 7 It was stated next in the
petition: "The promulgation of judgment was first scheduled on September 23,
1968. This was postponed to September 28, 1968, at the instance of Atty.
Rafael Consengco, as counsel for respondents Calo and Carbonnel, and again
to October 1, 1968 at 11 o'clock in the morning, this time at the instance of Atty.
Consengco and Atty. Francisco Koh who had, in the meantime, also entered
his appearance as counsel for respondents Calo and Carbonnel. The
applications for postponement were not grounded upon and supposed defect
or irregularity of the proceedings." 8
Mention was then made of when a petition for certiorari was filed with
respondent Judge: "Early in the morning of October 1, 1968, Edgardo Calo and
Simeon Carbonnel, thru their counsel, Atty. Rafael S. Consengco, filed with the
Court of First Instance a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with application
for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction . . . [alleging jurisdictional
defects]." 9 Respondent Judge acting on such petition forthwith issued a
restraining order thus causing the deferment of the promulgation of the
judgment. After proceedings duly had, there was an order from him "declaring
that 'the constitutional and statutory rights of the accused' had been violated,
adversely affecting their 'right to a free and impartial trial' [noting] ;that the trial
of these cases lasting several weeks were held exclusively in chambers and
not in the court room open to the public';" and ordering the city court Judge,
now petitioner, "to desist from reading or causing to be read or promulgated the
decisions he may have rendered already in the criminal cases (in question) . . .
pending in his Court, until further orders of this Court.'" 10
A motion for reconsideration proving unavailing, petitioners on January
28, 1969, elevated the matter to this Tribunal by means of the present suit for
certiorari and prohibition. In its resolution of February 3, 1969, respondents
were required to answer, with a preliminary injunction likewise being issued. As
was to be expected the answer filed by respondent Judge on March 11, 1969
and that by the other respondents on March 19, 1969 did attempt to justify the
validity of the finding that there was a failure to respect the right to a public trial
of accused persons. Neither in such pleadings nor in the memorandum filed,
although the diligence displayed by counsel was quite evident, was there any
persuasive showing of a violation of the constitutional guarantee of a public trial,
the basic issue to be resolved. Rather it was the mode of approach followed by
counsel Andres R. Narvasa for petitioners that did manifest a deeper
understanding of its implications and ramifications. Accordingly, as previously
stated, it is for us to grant the merits prayed for.
1. The 1935 Constitution which was in force at the time of the
antecedents of this petition, as set forth at the outset, explicitly enumerated the
right to a public trial to which an accused was entitled. So it is, as likewise made
clear, under the present dispensation. As a matter of fact, that was one
constitutional provision that needed only a single, terse summation from the
Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, Delegate, later Justice, Jose
P. Laurel, to gain acceptance. As was stressed by him: "Trial should also be
public in order to offset any danger of conducting it in an illegal and unjust
manner." 11 It would have been surprising if its proposed inclusion in the Bill of
Rights had provoked any discussion, much less a debate. It was merely a
reiteration of what appeared in the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, popularly
known as the Jones Law. 12 Earlier, such a right found expression in the
Philippine Bill of 1902, likewise an organic act of the then government of this
country as an unincorporated territory of the United States. 13 Historically, as
was pointed out by Justice Black, speaking for the United States Supreme
Court in the leading case of In re Oliver: 14 "This nation's accepted practice of
guaranteeing a public trial to an accused has its roots in [the] English common
law heritage." 15He then observed that the exact date of its origin is obscure,
"but it likely evolved long before the settlement of [the United States] as an
accompaniment of the ancient institution of jury trial." 16 It was then noted by
him that there, "the guarantee to an accused of the right to a public trial first
appeared in a state constitutionin 1776." 18 He could conclude his historical
survey thus: "Today almost without exception every state by constitution,
statute, or judicial decision, requires that all criminal trials be open to the
public." 19 Such is the venerable, historical lineage of the right to a public trial.
2. The crucial question of the meaning to be attached this provision
remains. The Constitution guarantees an accused the right to a public trial.
What does it signify? Offhand it does seem fairly obvious that here is an
instance where language is to be given a literal application. There is no
ambiguity in the words employed. The trial must be public. It possesses that
character when anyone interested in observing the manner a judge conducts
the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on such
attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No
relationship to the parties need be shown. The thought that lies behind this
safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded further protection,
that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and not tainted with any
impropriety. It is not amiss to recall that Delegate Laurel in his terse summation
of the importance of this right singled out its being a deterrence to arbitrariness.
It is thus understandable why such a right is deemed embraced in procedural
due process. 20 Where a trial takes place, as is quite usual, in the courtroom
and a calendar of what cases are to be heard is posted, no problem arises. It
is the usual course of events that individuals desirous of being present are free
to do so. There is the well recognized exception though that warrants the
exclusion of the public where the evidence may be characterized as "offensive
to decency or public morals."21
What did occasion difficulty in this suit was that for the convenience of
the parties, and of the city court Judge, it was in the latter's air-conditioned
chambers that the trial was held. Did that suffice to vitiate the proceedings as
violative of this right? The answer must be in the negative. There is no showing
that the public was thereby excluded. It is to be admitted that the size of the
room allotted the Judge would reduce the number of those who could be
present. Such a fact though is not indicative of any transgression of this right.
Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions. Some are smaller than others.
Moreover, as admitted by Justice Black in his masterly In re Oliver opinion, it
suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial being public if the accused could
"have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what offense he
may be charged." 22
Then, too, reference may also be made to the undisputed fact at least
fourteen hearings had been held in chambers of the city court Judge, without
objection on the part of respondent policemen. What was said by former Chief
Justice Moran should erase any doubt as to the weight to be accorded, more
appropriate]y the lack of weight, to any such objection now raised. Thus: "In
one case, the trial of the accused was held in Bilibid prison. The accused,
invoking his right to a public trial, assigned the procedure thus taken as error.
The Supreme Court held that as it affirmatively appears on the record that the
accused offered no objection to the trial of his case in the place where it was
held, his right is deemed waived." 23 The decision referred to, United States v.
Mercado, 24 was handed down sixty-eight years ago in 1905.
It does seem that the challenged order of respondent is far from being
invulnerable.
3. That is all that need be said as to the obvious merit of this petition. One
other objection to the conduct of the proceedings by the city court Judge may
be briefly disposed of. Respondent Judge would seek to lend support to an
order at war with the obvious meaning of a constitutional provision by harping
on the alleged abdication by an assistant fiscal of his control over the
prosecution. Again here there was a failure to abide by settled law. If any party
could complain at all, it is the People of the Philippines for whom a fiscal speaks
and acts. The accused cannot in law be termed an offended party for such an
alleged failure to comply with official duty. Moreover, even assuming that
respondent policemen could be heard to raise such a grievance, respondent
Judge ought to have been aware that thereby no jurisdictional defect was
incurred by the city court Judge. As was so emphatically declared by Justice
J.B.L. Reyes in Cariaga v. Justo-Guerrero: 25 "The case below was
commenced and prosecuted without the intervention, mediation or participation
of the fiscal or any of his deputies. This, notwithstanding, the jurisdiction of the
court was not affected . . . but the court should have cited the public prosecutor
to intervene . . . ," 26
4. There is much to be said of course for the concern displayed by
respondent Judge to assure the reality as against the mere possibility of a trial
being truly public. If it were otherwise, such a right could be reduced to a barren
form of words. To the extent then that the conclusion reached by him was
motivated by an apprehension that there was an evasion of a constitutional
command, he certainly lived up to what is expected of a man of the robe. Further
reflection ought to have convinced him though that such a fear was unjustified.
An objective appraisal of conditions in municipal or city courts would have gone
far in dispelling such misgivings. The crowded daily calendar, the nature of the
cases handled, civil as well as criminal, the relaxed attitude on procedural rules
not being strictly adhered to all make for a less tense atmosphere. As a result
the attendance of the general public is much more in evidence; nor is its
presence unwelcome. When it is remembered further that the occupants of
such courts are not chosen primarily for their legal acumen, but taken from that
portion of the bar more considerably attuned to the pulse of public life, it is not
to be rationally expected that an accused would be denied whatever solace and
comfort may come from the knowledge that a judge, with the eyes of the
persons in court alert to his demeanor and his rulings, would run the risk of
being unjust, unfair, or arbitrary. Nor does it change matters, just because, as
did happen here, it was in the air-conditioned chambers of a city court judge
rather than in the usual place that the trial took place.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted nullifying,
setting aside, and declaring bereft of any legal force or effect the order of
respondent Judge Felix Domingo, dated November 29, 1968 for being issued
with grave abuse of discretion. The writ of prohibition sought by petitioner is
likewise granted, commanding respondent Judge or any one acting in his place
to desist from any further action in Civil Case No. 74830 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, except that of dismissing the same. The preliminary writ of
injunction issued by this Court in its resolution of February 26, 1969 against the
actuation of respondent Judge is made permanent. With costs against
respondent policemen, Edgardo Calo and Simeon Carbonnel.
Makalintal, Actg. C .J ., Teehankee, Makasiar, Antonio and Esquerra,
JJ ., concur.
Castro, J ., did not take part.
Zaldivar and Barredo, JJ ., are on leave.
(Garcia v. Domingo, G.R. No. L-30104 (Resolution), [July 25, 1973], 152 PHIL
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129-139)
EN BANC
[A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC. September 13, 2001.]
Fortun Narvasa & Salazar Law Offices and Saguisag and Associates Law
Offices for J. Estrada.
SYNOPSIS
The Court ruled that considering the significance of the trial before the
Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada and the importance of preserving
the records thereof, the Court believes that there should be an audio-visual
recording of the proceedings. The recordings will not be for live or real time
broadcast but fordocumentary purposes. Only later will they be
available for public showing, after the Sandiganbayan shall have promulgated
its decision in every case to which the recording pertains. The master film
shall be deposited in the National Museum and in the Records Management
and Archives Office for historical preservation and exhibition pursuant to law.
SYLLABUS
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE RULE MUST BE OF GENERAL APPLICATION.
— In the petition, albeit entitled an administrative matter, the only issue raised is
whether the cases of a former President pending before the Sandiganbayan can
be covered by live television and radio broadcast. The matter now being sought to
be addressed by my esteemed colleagues is not even an issue. If it has to be
considered at all, the rule must be of general application and promulgated after a
thorough study and deliberation, certainly far more than what have been said and
done in this case. Hearings, where expert opinion is sought and given, should
prove to be helpful and of value.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J : p
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J :p
Footnotes
1.Nine (9) members of the court, namely, JUSTICES VITUG, KAPUNAN, MENDOZA,
PARDO, BUENA, GONZAGA-REYES, YNARES-SANTIAGO, DE LEON, and
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, vote to deny reconsideration, while six (6), namely,
Chief Justice DAVIDE, JR. and JUSTICES BELLOSILLO, MELO, PUNO,
PANGANIBAN, and QUISUMBING, vote to grant a reconsideration.
2.CHIEF JUSTICE DAVIDE, JR. and JUSTICES BELLOSILLO, MELO, PUNO,
MENDOZA, PANGANIBAN, QUISUMBING, and GONZAGA-REYES
3.JUSTICES VITUG, KAPUNAN, PARDO, BUENA, YNARES-SANTIAGO, DE LEON,
and SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ .
4.R.A. No. 8492 provides in pertinent parts:
SEC. 7. Duties and Function. — The [National] Museum shall have the following duties
and functions:
7.1. Acquire documents, collect, preserve, maintain, administer and exhibit to the
public, cultural materials, objects of art, archaeological artifacts, ecofacts, relics
and other materials embodying the cultural and natural heritage of the Filipino
nation, as well as those of foreign origin. Materials relevant to the recent history
of the country shall be likewise acquired, collected, preserved, maintained,
advertised and exhibited by the Museum. (Emphasis added)
EN BANC
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Upon reconsideration, and after weighing once more the rights guaranteed
by the Constitution that are involved in this case, this Court partially grants
reconsideration of the June 14, 2011 Resolution. For reasons to be discussed
below, this Court is now disallowing the live media broadcast of the trial of the
"Maguindanao massacre" cases but is still allowing the filming of the
proceedings for (1) the real-time transmission to specified viewing areas, and (2)
documentation.
The Court in the June 14, 2011 Resolution recognized "the impossibility of
accommodating even the parties to the cases — the private complainants/families
of the victims and other witnesses — inside the courtroom," as there were 57
victims and 197 accused that were involved, and under strict guidelines, made use
of modern technology "to provide the only solution to break the inherent limitations
of the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a transparent, open and public trial." 12
Upon review of the matter, however, the Court has sought a way to provide
a public trial as required by the Constitution 13 and the Rules, 14 which is a right
granted to the accused, without inviting media frenzy that affect the due process
rights of the accused in this high-profile case.
While this Court recognizes the freedom of the press and the right to public
information, which, by the way, are rights that belong to non-direct parties to the
case, the rights of the direct parties should not be forgotten. In a clash among
these competing interests and in terms of the values the Constitution recognizes,
jurisprudence makes it clear that the balance should always be weighed in favor
of the accused. 15
The constitutional rights specific to the accused under Section 14, Article III
of the Constitution such as the right to due process of law, 16 to be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, 17 and to an impartial and public trial 18 and
the requirement of the highest quantum of proof 19 to justify deprivation of his
liberty (or even of his life) provide more than ample justification to take a second
look at the view that a camera that broadcasts the proceedings live on television
has no place in a criminal trial because of its prejudicial effects on the rights of
accused individuals. DTcASE
This Court, in Re: Live TV and Radio Coverage of the Hearing of President
Corazon C. Aquino's Libel Case, 20 found that the live coverage of judicial
proceedings involve an inherent denial of due process, which we quote:
Experience likewise has established the prejudicial effect of
telecasting on witnesses. Witnesses might be frightened, play to the
camera, or become nervous. They are subject to extraordinary out-of-
court influences which might affect their testimony. Also, telecasting not
only increases the trial judge's responsibility to avoid actual prejudice to
the defendant, it may as well affect his own performance. Judges are
human beings also and are subject to the same psychological reactions
as laymen. For the defendant, telecasting is a form of mental harassment
and subjects him to excessive public exposure and distracts him from the
effective presentation of his defense.
The television camera is a powerful weapon which intentionally or
inadvertently can destroy an accused and his case in the eyes of the
public. 21
In this case that has achieved notoriety and sensational status, a greater
degree of care is required to safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused. To
be inthe best position to weigh the conflicting testimonies of the witnesses, the
judge must not be affected by any outside force or influence. Like any human
being, however, a judge is not immune from the pervasive effects of media. 22
So must the witnesses be shielded from the pressure of being aware that
their testimony is broadcasted live over television and radio, to be scrutinized and
judged by the court of public opinion. A witness' behavior and self-consciousness
before the camera in a high-profile case such as this case might compromise the
reliability of the fact-finding process, which in turn could skew the judge's
assessment of his or her credibility, necessarily affecting the resolution of the
case. cEaCTS
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 92415. May 14, 1991.]
SYLLABUS
DECISION
GANCAYCO, J : p
The facts are accurately related by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City
as follows:
"It appears from the Evidence that Adolfo Quiambao is a businessman
selling textile materials. He has a stall in the Hilltop Market in Baguio
where he sells his goods. But sometimes on weekends, he goes to
Abatan, Buguias, Benguet to sell his goods.
On September 19, 1987 at about 3:00 to 4:00 A.M., he went to Abatan,
Buguias, Benguet using his Ford Fiera with his driver Felizardo Galves
and a certain Jimmy Jetwani (a bombay), where he sold his goods in the
afternoon until at night and so, stayed overnight thereat.
The next day, at about 7:00 A.M. of September 20, 1987, after breakfast,
Adolfo Quiambao, his driver Felizardo Galvez, and Jimmy Jetwani
proceeded to Mankayan, Benguet. This time four Muslims rode with
them, namely: Omar Mapalao, Rex Magumnang, Aliman Bara-akal, and
a certain Anwar Hadji Edris. Incidentally, Omar Mapalao and Rex
Magumnang had previously rode once with Adolfo Quiambao in the
latter's vehicle sometime September 13, 1987 while Anwar Hadji Edris
(alias Randy) was known to Adolfo Quiambao for sometime already.
They arrived in Mankayan at about 8:00 A.M. They stayed 4 hours in
Mankayan to sell goods and collect from customers.
At about 12:00 noon of the same day of September 20, 1987, they, the
same passengers previously, started from Mankayan going back to
Abatan, Buguias, Benguet, with one passenger added, Simeon Calama.
At Abatan, Adolfo Quiambao collected amounts from his customers for
about an hour.
At about 1:00 to 2:00 P.M. on September 20, 1987, Adolfo Quiambao
proceeded on his way back to Baguio. They were 10 in all who rode in
his Ford Fiera, namely: (1) his driver Felizardo Galves; (2) Jimmy
Jetwani; (3) Simeon Calama, a son of his customer in Mankayan; (4)
Rene Salonga, a friend with whom he stayed in Abatan when he started
his business; (5) Eduardo Lopez, a co-vendor who sells also goods in
Abatan; (6) Omar Mapalao; (7) Rex Magumnang; (8) Aliman Bara-akal;
(9) Anwar Hadji Edris; and (10) Adolfo Quiambao himself.
On the way, they stopped at Natubleng, Buguias, Benguet at about 3:00
P.M. where Jimmy Jetwani and Adolfo Quiambao collected their credits
for less than an hour.
From there, they proceeded to Sayangan, Atok, Benguet where they
stopped at about 5:00 P.M. for Adolfo Quiambao and Jimmy Jetwani to
collect their credits. At Sayangan, too, they ate in a restaurant.
It was about 6:00 P.M. already when they left Sayangan to proceed to
Baguio. But when they left Sayangan, Adolfo Quiambao noticed that
there were now 5 Muslims with apparently Gumanak Ompa joining them
making them 11 passengers in all in his Ford Fiera.
On the way back to Baguio, after about an hour of driving, one of the
passengers stopped the vehicle in order to urinate. So they all alighted
to urinate. At this point, Adolfo Quiambao took over driving telling his
driver Felizardo Galvez to rest.
After about 30 minutes of driving from the time Adolfo Quiambao took
over, one of the Muslims stopped the vehicle at Km. 24, Caliking, Atok,
Benguet, in order to urinate. And so again they stopped with the Muslims
alighting to urinate.
Thereafter, when Adolfo Quiambao was about to start the vehicle to
proceed to Baguio, while waiting for the Muslims to board, Omar
Mapalao went to the left side of the vehicle near the driver's seat,
pointed a gun (Exh. G) at Adolfo Quiambao and announced 'This is a
holdup.' Another Muslim went to the other side of the front seat while
another Muslim went to the back to guard the back door of the Ford
Fiera. And Gumanak Ompa and Rex Magumnang, each armed with a
knife, went inside the back of the Ford Fiera and pointed their knives on
the passengers. Forthwith, Omar Mapalao, while pointing the gun,
ordered all passengers in front to go inside the back of the vehicle.
Adolfo Quiambao and Jimmy Jetwani complied. But as Adolfo Quiambao
went inside the back of the vehicle, he heard arguing outside and
noticed a rumble and a commotion by the left side of the vehicle
involving his driver, Felizardo Galvez, and the Muslims. As a
consequence, the driver Galves was injured. Adolfo Quiambao pleaded
that they are willing to give their money and valuables provided they (the
Muslims) will not harm them. Rex Magumnang and Gumanak Ompa,
while poking their knives on the passengers, divested Adolfo Quiambao
of P40,000.00, Jimmy Jetwani of P14,000.00, and Simeon Calama of
P3,700.00 in cash, watch and clothes.
After divesting the passengers of their money, Rex Magumnang went to
the driver's seat to start the vehicle but could not and so he called for
Adolfo Quiambao to start it. But Adolfo Quiambao, too, could not start
the vehicle. Angered, Omar Mapalao started counting 1 to 3 threatening
to shoot Quiambao if the vehicle would not start. Adolfo Quiambao
pleaded that he was not the driver and so called for Felizardo Galvez,
despite the latter being injured, to start the vehicle. After Galvez was
able to start the engine, immediately Rex Magumnang went by the side
of the driver, Galvez, and took hold of the steering wheel while ordering
the latter to step on the accelerator and proceed to the direction of the
left side of the road towards the precipice (bangin) indicating an intention
to have the vehicle driven to the precipice. It was at this point when
Galvez struggled and fought with Rex Magumnang for control of the
steering wheel as it was being directed to the ravine. It was good Galvez
was able to step on the brakes on time to prevent it from falling into the
precipice. It was then that Rex Magumnang stabbed and thrust the knife
on Galvez with the latter jerking saying 'aray' in pain. At this point, too,
the passengers panicked and jumped out of the vehicle scampering in
different directions for safety. Adolfo Quiambao jumped out into the
ground first and when he saw Mapalao pointing a gun at him, he jumped
into the precipice thinking it was better than to be shot at and in doing so
hurt himself. The driver Galvez fell to the ravine upon being stabbed.
Jimmy Jetwani jumped out of the vehicle and ran to the mountains
without looking back. Simeon Calama and Eduardo Lopez and Rene
Salonga, too, jumped out and sought safety on the road.
Meantime, a vegetable truck passed by and immediately Aliman Bara-
akal boarded the same on the front seat with the driver. Eduardo Lopez
also ran after the same truck and boarded it at the back. Not far behind
the first vegetable truck was another vegetable truck following it. Simeon
Calama stopped it asking for help but Omar Mapalao, with gun in his
hand, prevented him. And so the second vegetable truck went on but
before it could fully pass by, Simeon Calama took the chance of
boarding it when Omar Mapalao's attention was diverted.
Thus, the two vegetable trucks proceeded on their way till they stopped
at the toll gate at Acop, Tublay, Benguet. Immediately, Simeon Calama
and Eduardo Lopez alighted and reported to the Police Station near the
toll gate that they were held up and that one of the Muslims who held
them up was in the first truck parked near the toll gate. Aliman Bara-akal
was, thus, arrested by the Tublay Police and the amount of P4,015.00
was recovered from him when frisked at the Police Station.
Meanwhile, at the crime scene, the 3 Muslims left thereat, Omar
Mapalao, Rex Magumnang and Gumanak Ompa, fled to the mountains
leaving their victims and avoided the road so as not to be seen.
It is not clear on record where Anwar Hadji Edris (alias Randy) went after
the holdup but in any case he eluded arrest.
After the Muslims have left, Adolfo Quiambao went up to the road level
and by then saw also his driver Galvez wounded lying in the precipice.
Thereafter, another vegetable truck passed by, and Adolfo Quiambao
asked the driver to help them bring his wounded driver, Felizardo
Galvez, from the ravine. Thus, Galvez was brought up to the road and
placed inside the Ford Fiera. The vegetable truck driver helped in
starting the Ford Fiera. And from there, they proceeded immediately to
the Benguet Hospital at La Trinidad, Benguet, but when there was no
doctor, they brought Galvez to the Baguio General Hospital.
At the Baguio General Hospital, efforts to save the life of Felizardo
Galvez proved futile as the next morning he died of his stab wounds.
Dr. Wi submitted an Autopsy Report (Exh. A) as follows:
'I. STAB WOUNDS:
1. Right Mid-clavicular area, 7th Intercostal Space,
penetrating with round edges, 0.5 x 0.5 cm.
2. Left Lumbar area, level 11th Intercostal Space,
penetrating, with clean cut edges, 1.9 cm.
3. Anterior-superior right pre-auricular area, with clean cut
edges, 3.5 cm., and 2 cm. deep.
4. Right Mid-clavicular area level 2nd rib, non penetrating,
3 x 0.7 cm., and 2 cm. deep.
5. Left anterior Deltoid area, 9.5 cm. (extended Surgically).
6. Posterior leaf of the left Diaphragm 3 cm. with
hemorrhages around the wound.
7. Through and through, Right lower lobe of the Lung, 0.5 x
0.5 cm. with round edges.
'II. INCISED WOUNDS:
1. Right lateral neck, superficial, 2 cm.
2. Left supraclavicular to left submandibular area,
superficial, 12.5 cm.
3. Left upper arm, lateral area, 2 cm. and 2 mm. deep.'
Dr. Wi, also, submitted a sketch of the human body showing the stab
wounds sustained in the body of Felizardo Galvez (Exh. B and Exh. C)
and the Death Certificate (Exh. D) showing the cause of death as
'Hypovolemic Shock secondary to Multiple Stab wounds at the right
anterior superior and auricular area, right anterior chest, left deltoid area,
left lumbar area, posterior with laceration of the right lower lobe of the
lung, etc.'
Adolfo Quiambao was also treated of his injuries as shown in his Medical
Certificate (Exh. E).
Subsequently, the Tublay Police were able to locate and apprehend on
September 21, 1987 at Sto. Niño, Tublay, Omar Mapalao, Rex
Magumnang and Gumanak Ompa.
Also, Jimmy Jetwani, who fled to the mountains at the scene of the
incident was found and rescued the next morning after the holdup.
In a confrontation at the Tublay Police Station on September 22, 1987,
Adolfo Quiambao, Jimmy Jetwani and Simeon Calama positively
identified the four (4) Muslims in custody, Omar Mapalao, Rex
Magumnang, Gumanak Ompa and Aliman Bara-akal as among those
who held them up at the Halsema Road (mountain trail), Km. 24,
Caliking, Atok, Benguet.
Adolfo Quiambao, Jimmy Jetwani and Simeon Calama gave their
statements (Exhs. F, M and N) to the police.
At the Tublay Police Station, too, the gun caliber .38 paltik (Exh. G) with
5 live ammunitions (Exhs. G-1 to G-5) and the knife (Exh. G-6) used in
the holdup were recovered from the possession of Gumanak Ompa.
Finally, the policemen who apprehended Aliman Bara-akal at the toll
gate executed a joint affidavit (Exhs. O and P) and the policemen who
apprehended Mapalao, Ompa and Magumnang at Sto. Niño, Tublay,
executed a joint affidavit (Exh. R)." 1
In due course, an amended information was filed in the RTC of Baguio City
charging Rex Magumnang, Aliman Bara-akal, Anwar Hadji Edris, Gumanak
Ompa and Omar Mapalao of the crime of Highway Robbery with Homicide,
defined and penalized under Presidential Decree No. 532, which was allegedly
committed on September 20, 1987 at Km. 24 along Halsema Road, Caliking,
Atok, Benguet.
Upon arraignment, accused Omar Mapalao, Gumanak Ompa, Rex Magumnang
and Aliman Bara-akal, assisted by their counsel, pleaded not guilty.
Accused Anwar Hadji Edris had not been arrested and remained at large. On
March 17, 1988, accused Aliman Bara-akal died in jail during the trial so the case
was dismissed as to him on April 4, 1988. Accused Rex Magumnang, after being
positively identified by witnesses Adolfo Quiambao, Jimmy Jetwani and Simeon
Calama during the trial, escaped from detention on September 25, 1988 when
brought for medical treatment to the Baguio General Hospital, so the trial in
absentia continued as to him. LLpr
After the trial on the merits, a decision was rendered by the trial court on January
12, 1990 convicting the accused of the offense charged as follows —
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Omar Mapalao y Dianalan,
Gumanak Ompa, and Rex Magumnang guilty beyond reasonable doubt
as principals by direct participation, of the offense of Robbery with
Homicide in a Highway in violation of PD 532, as charged, and hereby
sentences each of them to suffer imprisonment ofReclusion Perpetua, to
indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of deceased Felizardo Galvez
the sum of Sixty Thousand (P60,000.00) Pesos for his death; to
indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties Adolfo Quiambao the
sum of Forty Thousand (P40,000.00) Pesos; Jimmy Jetwani the sum of
Fourteen Thousand (P14,000.00) Pesos; and Simeon Calama, the sum
of Three Thousand Seven Hundred (P3,700.00) Pesos as actual
damages, all indemnifications being without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The accused Omar Mapalao and Gumanak Ompa being detention
prisoners are entitled to 4/5 of their preventive imprisonment in
accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code in the service of
their sentence.
The gun caliber .38 paltik (Exh. G) with 5 live ammunitions (Exhs. G-1 to
G-5), and the knife (Exh. G-6) being instruments of the crime are hereby
declared forfeited and confiscated in favor of the State.
SO ORDERED." 2
Not satisfied therewith the accused Omar Mapalao and Rex Magumnang
appealed the decision to this Court alleging the following errors:
"I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER SIGNIFICANT
EXCULPATORY FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE
CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE ON THE PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE AND PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS GUILTY AS PRINCIPALS IN THE CRIME CHARGED
AND SENTENCING THEM TO SUFFER AN INDETERMINATE
SENTENCE OF FROM 17 YEARS, 4 MONTHS AND 1 DAY OF
RECLUSION TEMPORAL AS MINIMUM TO 20 YEARS OF
RECLUSION TEMPORAL AS MAXIMUM." 3
Parenthetically, the appeal of appellant Rex Magumnang should be struck down.
After arraignment and during the trial, he escaped from confinement and had not
been apprehended since then. Accordingly, as to him the trial in
absentia proceeded and thereafter the judgment of conviction was promulgated.
Nevertheless, through counsel, he appealed to this Court. Under Section 8, Rule
122 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Court, may "upon motion of the
appellee or on its own motion, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from
prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the
pendency of the appeal." In this case, appellant Magumnang remained at large
even as his appeal was pending. Hence, by analogy his appeal must be
dismissed.
The reason for this rule is because once an accused escapes from prison or
confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in
court and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court he is
deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.
Thus when as in this case he escaped from confinement during the trial on the
merits and after his arraignment, and so the trial in absentia proceeded and the
judgment against him was promulgated in accordance with Section 14(2) Article
III of the 1987 Constitution, nonetheless, as he remained at large, he should not
be afforded the right to appeal therefrom unless he voluntarily submits to the
jurisdiction of the court or is otherwise arrested, within fifteen (15) days from the
notice of the judgment against him. While at large as above stated he cannot
seek relief from the Court as he is deemed to have waived the same and he has
no standing in court.
To this effect a modification is in order of the provision of the last sentence of
Section 6, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides:
"If the judgment is for conviction, and the accused's failure to appear
was without justifiable cause, the court shall further order the arrest of
the accused, who may appeal within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
decision to him or his counsel."
It should provide instead that if upon promulgation of the judgment, the accused
fails to appear without justifiable cause, despite due notice to him, his bondsmen
or counsel, he is thereby considered to have waived his right to appeal. However,
if within the fifteen (15) day period of appeal he voluntarily surrenders to the court
or is otherwise arrested, then he may avail of the right to appeal within said
period of appeal.
By the same token, an accused who, after the filing of an information, is at large
and has not been apprehended or otherwise has not submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court, cannot apply for bail or be granted any other relief by the
courts until he submits himself to its jurisdiction or is arrested. prLL
In Gimenez vs. Nazareno, 4 this Court had occasion to rule on a similar case in
this wise —
"First of all, it is not disputed that the lower court acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the accused-private respondent when he appeared
during the arraignment on August 22, 1973 and pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged. In criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is acquired either by his arrest for voluntary appearance in
court. Such voluntary appearance is accomplished by appearing for
arraignment as what accused-private respondent did in this case.
But the question is this — was that jurisdiction lost when the accused
escaped from the custody of the law and failed to appear during the
trial? We answer this question in the negative. As We have consistently
ruled in several earlier cases, jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon
the instance of parties but continues until the case is terminated.
To capsulize the foregoing discussion, suffice it to say that where the
accused appears at the arraignment and pleads not guilty to the crime
charged, jurisdiction is acquired by the court over his person and this
continues until the termination of the case, notwithstanding his escape
from the custody of the law.
Going to the second part of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution aforecited a 'trial in absentia' may be had when the following
requisites are present; (1) that there has been an arraignment; (2) that
the accused has been notified; and (3) that he fails to appear and his
failure to do so is unjustified.
In this case, all the above conditions were attendant calling for a trial in
absentia. As the facts show, the private respondent was arraigned on
August 22, 1973 and in the said arraignment he pleaded not guilty. He
was also informed of the scheduled hearings set on September 18 and
19, 1973 and this is evidenced by his signature on the notice issued by
the lower court. It was also proved by a certified copy of the Police
Blotter that private respondent escaped from his detention center. No
explanation for his failure to appear in court in any of the scheduled
hearings was given. Even the trial court considered his absence
unjustified.
The lower court in accordance with the aforestated provisions of
the 1973 Constitution, correctly proceeded with the reception of the
evidence of the prosecution and the other accused in the absence of
private respondent, but it erred when it suspended the proceedings as to
the private respondent and rendered a decision as to the other accused
only.
Upon the termination of a trial in absentia, the court has the duty to rule
upon the evidence presented in court. The court need not wait for the
time until the accused who escaped from custody finally decides to
appear in court to present his evidence and cross-examine the
witnesses against him. To allow the delay of proceedings for this
purpose is to render ineffective the constitutional provision on trial in
absentia. As it has been aptly explained:
'. . . The Constitutional Convention felt the need for such a
provision as there were quite a number of reported instances
where the proceedings against a defendant had to be stayed
indefinitely because of his non-appearance. What the
Constitution guarantees him is a fair trial, not continued
enjoyment of his freedom even if his guilt could be proved. With
the categorical statement in the fundamental law that his absence
cannot justify a delay provided that he has been duly notified and
his failure to appear is unjustified, such an abuse could be
remedied. That is the way it should be, for both society and the
offended party have a legitimate interest in seeing to it that crime
should not go unpunished.'
The contention of the respondent judge that the right of the accused to
be presumed innocent will be violated if a judgment is rendered as to
him is untenable. He is still presumed innocent. A judgment of conviction
must still be based upon the evidence presented in court. Such evidence
must prove him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Also, there can be no
violation of due process since the accused was given the opportunity to
be heard.
Nor can it be said that an escapee who has been tried in
absentia retains his rights to cross-examine and to present evidence on
his behalf. By his failure to appear during the trial of which he had notice,
he virtually waived these rights. This Court has consistently held that the
right of the accused to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses
is a personal right and may be waived. In the same vein, his right to
present evidence on his behalf, a right given to him for his own benefit
and protection, may be waived by him.
Finally, at this point, We note that Our pronouncement in this case is
buttressed by the provisions of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
particularly Section 1(c) of Rule 115 which clearly reflects the intention of
the framers of our Constitution,to wit:
'. . . The absence of the accused without any justifiable
cause at the trial on a particular date of which he had notice shall
be considered a waiver of his right to be present during that trial.
When an accused under custody had been notified of the date of
the trial and escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right
to be present on said date and on all subsequent trial dates until
custody is regained . . .'
Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that an
escapee who has been duly tried in absentia waives his right to present
evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine
witnesses who testified against him."
Now to the appeal of appellant Omar Mapalao.
The main thrust of his appeal is a denial of his complicity. While he admitted to
be among the passengers of the vehicle on that fateful day and to be present
during the holdup, he alleged that he did not participate at all in the commission
of the crime and that he did not know anything about its commission as in fact he
left with Magumnang after the alleged holdup. He also asserted that the
prosecution witnesses could not have identified him in view of the darkness of
the night then. He said that when they were apprehended by the police no
firearm or money was found in his possession.
The Court finds that the appeal is devoid of merit.
The evidence shows very clearly that on the date of the holdup the appellant was
already a passenger in the vehicle of Adolfo Quiambao since 7:00 A.M. of
September 20, 1987 which was driven by Felizardo Galvez, with Jimmy Jetwani,
Quiambao, Rex Magumnang, Aliman Bara-akal, Anwar Hadji Edris and Calama.
They were together the whole day up to the evening in going to Abatan, Buguias,
Benguet and in the afternoon of the same day they were also together on the
way back to Baguio from Abatan until the holdup occurred in the early evening of
the same day at Km. 24, Caliking, Atok, Benguet. The Muslims stopped the
vehicle to urinate at said place. Appellant went to the left side of the vehicle near
the driver's seat and pointed a gun at Quiambao and announced "this is a
holdup." A Muslim went to the other side of the front sea while another Muslim
went to the back to stand guard. Gumanak Ompa and Rex Magumnang, each
armed with a knife, went inside the back of the Ford Fiera and pointed their
knives at the passengers. Appellant while pointing the gun ordered the
passengers to go to the back of the vehicle so Quiambao and Jetwani complied.
After Quiambao went to the back of the vehicle he noticed a commotion near the
left side of the vehicle involving his driver Galvez and the Muslims. Galvez was
harmed. Quiambao pleaded that they are willing to give their money and
valuables provided the Muslims will not harm them. Rex Magumnang and
Gumanak Ompa divested Quiambao of P40,000.00, Jetwani of P14,000.00 and
Calama of P3,700.00 in cash, a watch and clothes while poking their knives at
them. cdrep
Magumnang tried to start the vehicle but as he could not he called Quiambao to
start it but the latter also failed. Angered, the appellant started counting 1 to 3
threatening to shoot Quiambao if the vehicle did not start. Quiambao called
Galvez who was able to start the engine. Magumnang went by the side of Galvez
and took the steering wheel and drove towards the precipice. Galvez struggled
and fought with Magumnang for control of the steering wheel as it was directed to
the ravine. Magumnang stabbed and thrust the knife at Galvez. The passengers
panicked and jumped and ran away in different directions. Mapalao, Magumnang
and Ompa fled to the mountains.
From the foregoing evidence of the prosecution there can be no question as to
the participation of the appellant in the robbery holdup. He was positively
identified by witnesses who were together with the appellant from the morning up
to the evening of the same day in the Ford Fiera. Quiambao categorically
testified that it was the appellant who was holding the gun with two hands
ordered them to give their cash collections and personal belongings to
them. 5 Jimmy Jetwani corroborated Quiambao's testimony in that it was the
appellant who ordered them at gunpoint to get down from the vehicle and to go to
the back and to give their money to them. Although it was already dark there was
a light inside the vehicle. 6
On cross-examination Jetwani stuck to his identification of the appellant as one
of the culprits as he saw not only his face but the gun he used by the side of the
door facing him and Quiambao. 7 Another prosecution witness, Simeon Calama,
also identified appellant as the one who pointed a gun at them in front. He stated
he is familiar with his voice as during the journey they were joking with each
other. 8
The identification of the culprits in offenses of this nature is vital and decisive. In
this case the identification was made by eyewitnesses who were together with
the appellant practically the whole day in the same vehicle, and who themselves
are the victims of the holdup staged by the appellant with his other co-accused.
Although it was already dark there was light in the vehicle. Moreover, there were
no other persons in the vicinity at the time of the holdup except the appellant, his
co-accused and the victims. LLphil
Contrary to the claim of appellant that he is innocent as he did not escape
together with Edris who was allegedly the principal player in the holdup, the fact
remains that the appellant escaped to the mountains together with his co-
accused Magumnang and Gumanak Ompa. Their escape is evidence of their
guilt.
As the Court observed at the opening paragraph of this decision, robbery
attended by homicide or murder is certainly a heinous offense, more so when in
this case it is committed in the highway. There is hardly any justification for the
court to share the leniency of the trial court by imposing only the life
imprisonment as penalty. The circumstances of the commission of the offense do
not justify at all or require any killing or injury to be inflicted on any of the victims.
The appellant and his confederates were all armed while the victims were not.
They were at their mercy. None of them attempted to fight back or to resist. They
gave all their valuables and personal belongings. All they were pleading for was
that their lives be spared. It fell on deaf ears. It was a senseless killing for no
valid reason. The appellant and his confederates deserve the supreme penalty of
death and no less. Cdpr
But as the Court said, this is not possible under the Constitution.
Our peace and order situation today is very volatile. We have experienced
several attempted coups and we are warned of other possible coups. Our peace
and order problem is a continuing one. The division in our society is obvious and
gaping. Our country is suffering from the economic depression caused not only
by the recent calamities that visited us which were compounded by the Gulf War.
Thus, measures should be undertaken in order to minimize if not entirely prevent
serious crimes against life, chastity and of property resulting in the wanton taking
of human life. Our hope is for a lasting peace and order in our society. A law
must now be enacted defining what are the heinous offenses punishable with the
death penalty. We should not tarry too long.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against
the defendants-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., concurs in the result. I am against the death penalty.
Footnotes
(People v. Mapalao, G.R. No. 92415, [May 14, 1991], 274 PHIL 354-369)
|||
FIRST DIVISION
SYLLABUS
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J :p
In two separate informations dated 28 February 1981 and filed with the then
Court of First Instance, now Regional Trial Court, of Negros Oriental, Engracio
Valeriano, Juanito Rismundo, Macario Acabal, Abundio Nahid and several John
Does were charged with the crimes of Murder and Frustrated Murder. The
accusatory portion in the information for murder, 1 docketed as Criminal Case No.
4585, reads as follows:
"That sometime in the evening of the 28th of January, 1980, at
Nagbinlod, Municipality of Sta. Catalina, Province of Negros Oriental,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, including several 'John Does', conspiring and
confederating with one another, with intent to kill, and with treachery and
evident premeditation and being then armed with bolos and 'pinuti', did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use
personal violence on the person of one Rizalina Apatan Silvano while the
latter was about to leave her house and inflicting upon her injuries, to wit:
'right leg amputated below the knee; left leg hacked behind the knee;
abdomen hacked with viscerae evacerated,' and did then and there set
the house on fire while the aforementioned Rizalina Apatan Silvano was
inside said house trying to escape therefrom, and allowing her to be
burned inside said house which was burned to the ground, thereby
causing upon said Rizalina Apatan Silvano her death and burning her
beyond recognition.
That the crime was committed with attendant aggravating
circumstances of nighttime, by a band, by means of fire, craft [,] fraud or
disguise employed; and that means have been employed which brought
added ignominy to the natural effects of their acts.
Contrary to Article 248 in relation to Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code."
The information for frustrated murder, 2 docketed as Criminal Case No.
4584, alleged that in the evening of the 28th of January 1980 — immediately after
the commission of the murder charged in Criminal Case No. 4585 — the accused
hacked and struck Wilson Silvano, son of the victim in the murder case, with bladed
weapons such as bolos and pinuti thereby inflicting upon him multiple hack
wounds which would have produced the crime of murder were it not for the timely
and able medical assistance given to him. It further alleged that the crime was
committed with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia or treachery and the
aggravating circumstances of nighttime, by a band, with the aid of armed men or
persons who insure or afford impunity, and that craft, fraud or disguise were
employed.
At the arraignment, all the accused, except the John Does who remained
unidentified and at large, pleaded not guilty in both cases. 3 Thereafter, upon
agreement of the parties, joint trial was ordered by the trial court. 4
Trial on the merits was conducted by Branch 37 of the court a quo presided
over by Judge Temistocles B. Diez. But on 16 May 1987, a fire gutted the building
where Branch 37 was located and the records of these two cases were burned.
The records were subsequently reconstituted upon petition of the prosecuting
fiscal. 5The testimonies of the witnesses were retaken, however, before it could
commence, accused Engracio Valeriano jumped bail and the warrant for his arrest
issued on 16 November 1987 was returned unserved because he could not be
found. 6 An alias warrant for his arrest was issued on 26 June 1989, 7 but he
remains at large up to the present.
The evidence for the prosecution, as disclosed by the testimonies of its
witnesses, is as follows:
Antonio Silvano, then the barangay captain of Barangay Nagbinlud, Sta.
Catalina, Negros Oriental, testified that at about 8:30 o'clock in the evening of 28
January 1980, or two nights before the 30 January 1980 local election, three men
entered his yard. He recognized these men as Juanito Rismundo, his neighbor
since 1964, Engracio Valeriano, also another neighbor, and Macario Acabal, his
sub-barangay captain. 8 The three men called him, but he did not answer. Instead,
his wife, Rizalina, did and she told them that he was attending a meeting "in the
town." They did not believe her and replied that they just saw Antonio enter the
house. Juanito asked her whether they (Antonio and Rizalina) were selling their
votes because they will buy them but Rizalina answered in the negative. Juanito
then said, "You choose, if you want something to happen to you or not [sic]."
Another man, Abundio Nahid, asked Antonio to come down because they have
something to tell him. As Antonio was about to kick the door open, he saw the men
outside his house increasing in number and were armed with bladed weapons
(pinuti). When he turned around, Antonio smelled gasoline and he saw Abundio
Nahid set fire to his store located at the right side of his house. 9 He and his wife
Rizalina escaped to the roof of the kitchen while the other members of their family
who were in that house — their son Elmer Silvano and eldest daughter Celsita
Legaspina with her two children - escaped towards the sugarcane field which was
about thirty meters away. When Rizalina fell from the roof to the floor, Macario
Acabal, Juanito Rismundo and Engracio Valeriano hacked her. Each of them
delivered a single blow with Abundio Nahid hitting her four times. 10
On cross-examination, Antonio Silvano admitted that, as barangay captain
of Nagbinlud, Sta. Catalina, and as trusted man of Mrs. Clotilde Carballo in whose
land his house is built, he supported the latter as the official candidate of the KBL
for Mayor of Sta. Catalina, as well as the other candidates of her party for the local
election of 30 January 1980, including Lorenzo Teves, the KBL's candidate for
Governor of the Province of Negros Oriental. On the other hand, the accused
supported and campaigned hard for Mrs. Carballo's opponent, a certain Jose
Napigkit who was a candidate of the Pusyon Bisaya and who eventually won in the
election. In his barrio, Mrs. Carballo lost heavily to Napigkit. 11 He further admitted
that although he first reported the incident to the Philippine Constabulary (PC)
which investigated him, he cannot remember if he was made to sign anything by
the PC investigator. On 15 February 1980, he was again investigated but this time
in the office of Governor Teves. There, he was made to subscribe and swear to an
affidavit 12 that, as admitted by the prosecuting fiscal, was made the basis for the
filing of the information. No statement by the PC was presented to the fiscal. 13
Visitacion Silvano, wife of Wilson who is the son of Antonio and Rizalina,
testified that she heard the shouts for help of her mother-in-law 14 so she woke up
Wilson. He then went down the house and turned on the headlights of the truck
parked in front of their house facing his parents' house which was located three
kilometers away. He ran towards the burning house of his parents but before he
reached it, he was met by Engracio Valeriano and the latter hacked him. When he
ran away, Engracio's companions, Juanito Rismundo, Macario Acabal and
Abundio Nahid, chased him until he reached the sugarcane fields. 15 Visitacion
stayed in her house and saw Engracio Valeriano hack her husband. She also saw
the other accused-appellants in the vicinity of the house of her parents-in-law. 16
Dr. Avelino Torres, Chief of Hospital of Bayawan District Hospital, examined
the body of Rizalina Silvano at 1:00 o'clock in the early morning of 29 January
1980 and was presented as a witness for the prosecution. According to him, the
body was burned and charred beyond recognition but the parts thereof were still
intact. It was still warm and smelt of freshly burned flesh. 17 He found the following
"evidence of hacking:"
"(1) right leg amputated below the knee;
(2) left leg hacked behind the knee;
(3) abdomen hacked with viscerae eviscerated." 18
He concluded that the wounds were inflicted before the body was
burned. 19 He also examined Wilson Silvano at about 1:30 o'clock that same
morning and found seven hack wounds on Wilson. He testified at the trial that
without medical attention, Wilson could have bled to death. 20
Atty. Castulo Caballes, then the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance
of Negros Oriental, stated in court that on 7 February 1980, he was fetched from
his house by someone from the office of Governor Lorenzo Teves and was asked
to assist the Governor in taking the affidavit of Juanito Rismundo. 21 After the latter
"admitted that was his affidavit," he "subscribed to him the oath and so [he] signed
as a notary public." 22 In this affidavit, Rismundo implicated Jose Napigkit as
having ordered the kidnapping and killing of KBL leaders and the burning of their
houses.
Also on 7 February 1980, according to Atty. Elson Bustamante, then
Assistant Provincial Attorney, he was called by Governor Teves to assist in the
taking of the statements also of Juanito Rismundo. The Governor himself
propounded the questions to Juanito who was accompanied by the son of Mrs.
Carballo and a PC soldier named Lodove. Bustamante heard Mrs. Carballo's son
tell the Governor that Juanito went to their (Carballos') house and "confessed" to
a certain incident which happened in Sta. Catalina on 28 January 1980, and since
there were PC soldiers still assigned to the Carballos' residence at that time, they
brought Juanito to Governor Teves, the Provincial Chairman of the KBL. 23
Another prosecution witness, Jufelinito Pareja, then Provincial Fiscal of
Negros Oriental, told the court that on 18 February 1980, accused Macario Acabal
was brought to his office. Acabal subscribed and swore to a statement before him.
The latter first read it to Acabal and after ascertaining that Acabal voluntarily
executed the statement, he administered the oath to said affiant. 24 This sworn
statement also implicated Jose Napigkit.
Accused-appellants put up the defense of alibi. They allege that they were
in different places when the incident in question occurred. Macario Acabal was in
sitio Canggabok, Nagbinlud, Sta. Catalina, attending the wake for deceased
barangay captain Filomeno Cumahig. 25 On 29 January 1980, he was arrested by
military men in the house of his aunt at the breakwater of Poblacion Sta. Catalina.
One of them struck him three times on his left and right chest with an armalite rifle.
Thereafter, he was loaded into a pick-up truck owned by Mrs. Clotilde Carballo and
taken to her house. On 7 February 1980, he was brought to Bayawan and was
again manhandled, causing injuries to him which required treatment at the
Bayawan District Hospital, as certified by Dr. Torres. From the hospital, he was
brought to the municipal jail of Bayawan and then to the Provincial Jail in
Dumaguete City. Later, he was taken to the office of the Governor and was forced
to sign an affidavit (Exhibit "F"). Prior to 28 January 1989, he did not know the
other accused in this case. 26
Juanito Rismundo was in Sitio Dinapo, Bgy. Alangilan, Sta. Catalina,
graining corn in the house of Alfreda Ortega. 27 On 6 February 1980, he met a PC
soldier named Boy Gudobe (Lodove), who was then stationed in Bgy. Kawitan,
Sta. Catalina, accompanied by Diosdado Silvano, grandson of Antonio Silvano, at
the Sta. Catalina market. Gudobe allegedly hit him and, together with Diosdado
and a Boy Carballo, the son of Mrs. Clotilde Carballo, brought him to the Capitol
Building in Dumaguete City. While there, he averred that he was forced by a lawyer
to sign an affidavit (Exhibit "D") in the office of the Governor after he was struck
with the handle of a revolver at the back of his head. 28
Abundio Nahid was in his house in Sugong Milagros, Sta. Catalina, Negros
Oriental, about 20 kilometers from Nagbinlud. He charged that Wilson Silvano
testified against him because the Silvanos supported Mrs. Carballo of the KBL
while he led the supporters of Mrs. Carballo's opponent Jose Napigkit of
the Pusyon Bisaya. 29
The prosecution presented on rebuttal Mrs. Clotilde Carballo and Fiscal
Wilfredo Salmin. The former testified that on 7 February 1980 accused Juanito
Rismundo voluntarily surrendered to her at her residence in Sta. Catalina and told
her that he wanted to see the Governor. She then asked her son to bring Juanito
to Dumaguete City. 30
Fiscal Wilfredo Salmin belied the claim of Acabal that he (Salmin) went to
the Provincial Jail on 10 February 1980 and forced Acabal to sign a document. He
alleged that on 16 February 1980, not on 10 February 1980 as claimed by Acabal,
Acabal came to his office at the Provincial Attorney's Office and executed a sworn
statement, but Acabal did not sign the same upon the advice of Atty. Geminiano
Eleccion. 31
After the completion of the re-taking of the testimonies of the witnesses in
Branch 37, Criminal Cases Nos. 4584 and 4585 were re-raffled to Branch 33 of
the trial court, then presided over by Judge Pacifico S. Bulado. 32
The decision 33 of the trial court, per Judge Pacifico S. Bulado, dated 31
October 1991 but promulgated on 20 December 1991, contained no specific
dispositive portion. Its rulings are found in the last two paragraphs which read as
follows:
"The elements of murder in this case, Criminal Case No. 4585 for
the killing of Rizalina Apatan-Silvano having been proved by the
prosecution beyond doubt, the accused JUANITO RISMUNDO,
MACARIO ACABAL and ABUNDIO NAHID, considering the attendant
qualifying aggravating circumstances of nighttime, use of fire by burning
the house of victim Rizalina Apatan-Silvano in order to forcibly drive her
out of her house and hack her to death, the abuse of superior strength,
the penalty impossable [sic] here will be in its maximum degree, that is
reclusion perpetua taking into account Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, the penalty now for murder is Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion
Perpetua, and for all the accused to indemnify the heirs of the victim the
sum of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos since this case occurred [sic]
in 1980. For the wounding of the victim Wilson A. Silvano, this Court
believes that simple frustrated homicide only is committed by the accused
Engracio Valeriano only. But since the person who actually inflicted the
injuries of victim Wilson Silvano, accused Engracio Valeriano only is
nowhere to be found, hence, not brought to the bar of justice, he being a
fugitive or at large, no penalty could be imposed on him since he is beyond
the jurisdiction of this court to reach. All the other two (2) accused,
JUANITO RISMUNDO and ABUNDIO NAHID are hereby ordered and
declared absolved from any criminal responsibility from frustrated
homicide.
The bail bond put up by the three accused, namely: Juanito
Rismundo, Macario Acabal and Abundio Nahid are hereby ordered
cancelled and let a warrant of arrest be issued for their immediate
confinement." 34
The trial court rejected the defense of alibi because "[i]t was not shown by
plausible and convincing evidence . . . that it was physically impossible for them to
go to the scene of the crime and to return to the place of residence (People vs.
Solis, 182 SCRA 182)." Upon the other hand, it ruled that "the prosecution
witnesses . . . clearly, positively identified them as the culprits, they being
neighbors for a long time and co-workers." 35
Immediately after the promulgation of the decision, counsel for the accused
manifested in open court their intention to appeal the decision. On the same day,
counsel for accused Abundio Nahid filed a notice of appeal with a motion for the
immediate release of his client, which was opposed by the prosecution. The court a
quo denied the motion also on the same day. 36
On 31 December 1991, all the convicted accused filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the denial of the motion for immediate release. The later motion
was denied on 3 January 1992. A day earlier or on 2 January 1992, accused
Macario Acabal and Juanito Rismundo had filed their notice of appeal. 37
The records of both cases were transmitted to us and we accepted the
appeal on 26 February 1992.
The accused-appellants raise in their Brief 38 the following assignment of
errors:
"I. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
CANCELLING THE BAIL BONDS OF ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AND
ORDERING THEIR IMMEDIATE ARRESTS WHEN THE ONLY
PENALTY IMPOSED BY IT FOR ALL THE ACCUSED IS "TO
INDEMNIFY THE HEIRS OF THE VICTIM THE SUM OF THIRTY
THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS.
II. THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER AS DEFINED
AND PUNISHED UNDER ARTICLE 248 OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES (ANTONIO SILVANO,
WILSON SILVANO, AND VISITACION SILVANO), HUSBAND AND
CHILDREN, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE DECEASED RIZALINA APATAN-
SILVANO, HAVE POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED THE ACCUSED AS THE
CULPRITS WHEN ONLY ANTONIO SILVANO TESTIFIED AS TO WHO
ALLEGEDLY KILLED HIS WIFE, AND WHILE OTHER TWO (2)
WITNESSES ONLY TESTIFIED AS TO THE WOUNDING OF WILSON
SILVANO BY ENGRACIO VALERIANO AND ALL THESE WITNESSES
WERE VERY VOCAL IN THEIR SILENCE AS TO THE IDENTITIES OF
THE ACCUSED FOR A LONG TIME.
IV. AND, THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT GRAVELY
ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ALL THE ACCUSED FOR
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE AND/OR AT LEAST ON THE
HYPOTHESIS OF REASONABLE DOUBT."
In support of the first assigned error, they claim that: (a) the trial court could
not have ordered the cancellation of their bail bonds and their arrest and immediate
confinement because the only penalty it imposed on them was "to indemnify the
heirs of the victim the sum of thirty thousand (P30,000.00) pesos" without imposing
any sentence; it merely suggested that ". . . the penalty impossable [sic] here will
be in its maximum degree, that is reclusion perpetua . . ."; and (b) since they
already perfected their appeal immediately after the promulgation of the sentence,
the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case and could not validly cancel their bail
bonds and order their arrest. 39
In its Brief, 40 the Appellee asserts that the judgment appealed from is valid
and enforceable. Although the word "impossable" [sic] is "imprecise," it is clear that
what the judge actually meant was that the penalty of reclusion perpetua was what
the law allowed or mandated him to impose. As to the grant of bail, since they
committed a capital offense and the court had already found that the evidence of
their guilt is strong, the accused-appellants should not be entitled to bail.
We find that the decision substantially complies with the Rules of Court on
judgments as it did sentence the accused-appellants to reclusion perpetua. A
judgment of conviction shall state (a) the legal qualification of the offense
constituted by the acts committed by the accused, and the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances attending the commission, if there are any; (b) the
participation of the accused in the commission of the offense, whether as principal,
accomplice or accessory after the fact; (c) the penalty imposed upon the accused;
and (d) the civil liability or damages caused by the wrongful act to be recovered
from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of
the civil liability by a separate action has been reserved or waived. 41 As we earlier
observed, the challenged decision does not contain the usual dispositive portion.
The last two paragraphs of the decision merely embody its conclusions that: (1)
the appellants are guilty of murder, and (2) taking into account the "attendant
qualifying aggravating circumstances of nighttime, use of fire by burning the house
of the victim, . . . the abuse of superior strength," "the penalty imposable . . . will
be in its maximum degree, that is reclusion perpetua" considering that "the penalty
now for murder is reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua." While the decision
leaves much to be desired, it nevertheless contains the court's findings of facts,
the law applicable to the set of facts and what it believes to be the imposable
penalty under the law, that is, reclusion perpetua which is actually the penalty
imposed on the accused-appellants. It is obvious that they clearly understood that
they were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and were
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. 4585.
Were it otherwise, they would not have declared in open court their intention to
appeal immediately after the promulgation of the decision and would not have
subsequently filed their written notice of appeal.
Accused-appellants contend that the trial court did not impose any sentence
and so cannot cancel anymore their bail bonds and direct their arrest and
immediate commitment because it already lost jurisdiction over their persons when
they perfected their appeal.
In connection with Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court on bail,
we ruled in People vs. Cortez 42 that:
". . . an accused who is charged with a capital offense or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua, and is thereafter convicted of the
offense charged, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right
even if he appeals the case to this Court since his conviction clearly
imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong."
We have already said that the decision did impose the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Since the order cancelling their bail bonds and directing their arrest
is containedin the decision itself, it is apparent that their abovementioned
contention is highly illogical. At the time the order in question was made, the
trial court still had jurisdiction over the persons of the accused-appellants. For
too obvious reasons, their notices of appeal which they claim have put an end
to the trial court's jurisdiction over them could not have been filed before the
promulgation of the decision. The order is therefore valid and enforceable.
Also, it may be recalled that the accused-appellants had earlier raised this
issue before us in a petition for habeas corpus dated 16 January 1992 and
docketed as G.R. Nos. 103602-03. We dismissed that petition on 17 February
1992 for failure to comply with requirement no. (2) of Revised Circular No. 1-
88 and Circular No. 28-91 on forum shopping. 43Their motion for
reconsideration was denied on 27 May 1993.
The trial court, however, erred in considering nighttime, use of fire and abuse
of superior strength as "attendant qualifying aggravating circumstances." The
information in Criminal Case No. 4585 alleged only treachery and evident
premeditation as qualifying aggravating circumstances. Nighttime, band, use of
fire, craft, fraud or disguise and ignominy were alleged as generic aggravating
circumstances only. The trial court cannot elevate the status of any of the generic
aggravating circumstances and consider them as qualifying circumstances for the
crime of murder. Moreover, nighttime is not a qualifying circumstance under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code.
It was likewise an error for the trial court to state that "the penalty now for
murder is reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua." The penalty for murder
remains to be reclusion temporal maximum to death. But in view of paragraph (1),
Section 19, Article III of the Constitution prohibiting the imposition of the penalty of
death, where death would have been the proper penalty in a case, the court must
instead impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua. 44
The trial court further erred in holding that no penalty could be imposed on
accused Engracio Valeriano in Criminal Case No. 4584 because he "is nowhere
to be found, hence, not brought to the bar of justice, he being a fugitive or at large."
The court ignored the fact that Engracio jumped bail after he had been arraigned,
just before the retaking of evidence commenced. Paragraph (2), Section 14, Article
III of the Constitution permits trial in absentia after the accused has been arraigned
provided he has been duly notified of the trial and his failure to appear thereat is
unjustified. One who jumps bail can never offer a justifiable reason for his non-
appearance during the trial. Accordingly, after the trial in absentia, the court can
render judgment in the case 45 and promulgation may be made by simply recording
the judgment in the criminal docket with a copy thereof served upon his counsel,
provided that the notice requiring him to be present at the promulgation is served
through his bondsmen or warden and counsel. 46
Having disposed of the first issue raised by the accused-appellants, we now
come to the second, third and fourth assigned errors which shall be discussed
jointly, considering that they are interrelated and deal with the question of whether
or not the guilt of the accused-appellants was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The accused-appellants contend that the trial court erred in relying on the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses Antonio Silvano, Wilson Silvano and
Visitacion Silvano and in concluding that they clearly and positively identified the
accused-appellants as the culprits. According to them, only Antonio Silvano
testified that he saw the accused burn his house, kill his wife Rizalina and drag her
into the fire. Neither Visitacion Silvano nor Wilson Silvano testified that they saw
what occurred in the elder Silvanos' house. But even the testimony of Antonio
Silvano is not reliable because it lacks truthfulness and validity. They singled out
his testimony that while the fire was raging, his wife told him to save himself as she
will also save herself, then the direction of the wind changed and he jumped from
the roof of the house into the bushes. They concluded that he could not have seen
who killed his wife. 47 Also, the ruling that conclusions and findings of the lower
court are entitled to great weight is not applicable in this case because the judge
who heard the testimonies of the witnesses in its entirety was not the same judge
who penned the decision. They further stressed the delay incurred by Antonio in
reporting the crime to the authorities. The crime was committed on 28 January
1980 but he reported it to the Office of the Governor of Negros Oriental in
Dumaguete City only on 18 February 1980 or some 21 days after its commission.
Finally, they maintain that they have sufficiently established their defense of alibi.
On the other hand, the Appellee seeks the affirmance of the judgment
convicting the accused. The Appellee reasons out that the accused-appellants
were positively identified by prosecution witness Antonio Silvano; and that even
while it is true that only Antonio Silvano saw the murderers, Visitacion and Wilson
Silvano testified on the presence of the accused-appellants at the scene of the
crime.
As the Appellee admits, however, the most damning testimony against the
accused-appellants in this case is only that of Antonio Silvano who claimed that he
actually saw them hack and kill his wife. To us, whether such testimony could be
relied upon is altogether a different matter. Although it is a settled rule that the
findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses should be given the highest
respect because it had the advantage of observing the demeanor of the witnesses
and can discern if such witnesses are telling the truth or lying through their
teeth, 48 we cannot rely on that rule in this appeal because the judge who heard
the testimonies of the witnesses was not the same judge who penned the decision.
Judge Temistocles Diez of Branch 37 received and heard the testimonies of the
witnesses but it was Judge Pacifico S. Bulado who rendered the decision. The
latter had no opportunity to observe the witnesses' deportment and manner of
testifying, which are important considerations in assessing credibility. 49
We have carefully read the transcripts of the testimony of Antonio Silvano.
We cannot give him full faith and credit for the following reasons:
1. Although he testified on cross-examination that he first reported the
incident to and was investigated by the PC, it is clear to this Court that it was only
on 15 February 1980, or on the eighteenth day after the incident that he was
investigated at the office of the Governor. Being the barangay captain of
Nagbinlud, the owner of a house that was intentionally set on fire, the father of the
man who was hacked several times and almost died, and the husband of the
murder victim whose body was charred beyond recognition, the compelling call of
duty and the mournful cry for justice cannot tolerate any delay in reporting the
incident to the proper authorities. The prosecution was hard put for an explanation
for this delay; it did not even attempt to make any. If Antonio Silvano could offer no
explanation therefor, it could only mean that he was either unable to identify the
real perpetrators of the crime against his family or he was afraid to do so. For
whichever reason, such failure only bolsters the claim of the defense that the crime
was committed by the "Salvatore" group whose operations Antonio admitted he
was very much aware of, thus:
"Q As such barangay captain you remember that in the month of January,
1980 there was such a group of armed men referred to or
commonly called as Salvatore, is that correct that used to roam
around in the interior part of Sta. Catalina?
A Yes, that is true.
Q And this group of men used to plunder or steal from houses, kill certain
persons and burn also houses, is that correct?
A Yes, that is true.
Q And this group of men known as 'Salvatore' continued to exist even after
January 1980?
A That was only up to 1980.
Q Yes, but after January 1980 this 'Salvatore' group continued to exist for
sometime up to or beyond the year 1980, is that correct?
A They were only about 2 weeks because they were arrested by the
authorities.
Q That is two weeks after January 28, 1980?
A Yes." 50
Furthermore, it is doubtful whether Antonio did report the incident to the PC
as no PC personnel corroborated him thereon and according to him, he did not
sign any statement during the said investigation, which is unusual. The fiscal
himself admitted in open court that no statement taken by the PC was submitted
to his office. 51If indeed Antonio was investigated by the PC, the investigator should
have formally taken his statement in view of its importance. As no such statement
was proved to exist, it is logical to presume that Antonio did not or could not
disclose to the investigator the names of the perpetrators.
2. Antonio admitted on cross-examination that he had no quarrel and
misunderstanding 52 or grudges 53 whatsoever with the accused-appellants. If that
were so, it is odd that he could not explain why he, a barangay captain who was
expected to attend to the requests and problems of his constituents, deliberately
chose not to respond to the alleged call of the accused-appellants on the night of
the incident and instead allowed his wife to lie to them by saying that he was
attending a meeting. Again, the only plausible explanation for his behavior was
that the men who came belonged to the "Salvatore" group and this terrified him,
for he knew that the group had been roaming around, killing people and burning
houses in his area.
3. Also, on cross-examination, Antonio affirmed as true the contents of his
sworn statement 54 taken two weeks after the incident. In it, he failed to state the
fact that he witnessed the killing of his wife and to identify her killers. 55 Since his
sworn statement was precisely taken to obtain from him vital facts relative to the
incident, more specifically on the killing of his wife, and considering that he had
already stated therein that he saw the accused-appellants, it is contrary to human
nature and inconsistent with experience for him to fail to identify them as the killers
of his wife, if such is the fact. It has been said that where the omission in the
affidavit refers to a very important detail such that the affiant would not have failed
to mention it, the omission could affect the affiant's credibility. 56 Verily, it was
obvious from his answer to Question No. 16 of the investigator that he had no
opportunity to identify the killers:
"Q Question No. 16, 'Q-What else did you do?', and you answered, 'A-My
wife told me to just save myself because she will also save herself.
Thereafter the wind changed it(s) course and (the) fire grew big and
because of this, I had the occasion to jumped (sic) from our house
and thereafter I ran towards the bushes.' . . .
A Yes, sir, that is true.
Q How far is that bush to which you ran from your house which was
burning?
A It is about thirty (30) meters because it is a sugarcane field." 57
FIRST DIVISION
SYLLABUS
DECISION
MALCOLM, J : p
We find the proven facts as brought out in the trial of this case to be as
follows.
Doroteo Natividad on the afternoon of October 22, 1915, fastened his
carabao valued at P150 in his corral situated in the barrio of Trapiche,
municipality of Tananuan, Province of Batangas. On the following morning
when he went to look after the animal, he found the gate to the corral open
and that the carabao had disappeared. He reported the matter to the
Constabulary, and a patrol of the Constabulary under the leadership of
sergeant Presa, now deceased, on the 20th of November following,
encountered the accused Lazaro Javier, Apolinario Mendoza, and Placido de
Chavez leading a carabao. When the ladrones saw the Constabulary, they
scattered in all directions. On the following day, the Constabulary found this
carabao tied in front of the house of one Pedro Monterola in the barrio of
Santa Clara, municipality of San Pablo. The carabao was identified by
Doroteo Natividad as the one which had been taken from his corral on the
night of October 22, 1915, and by the Constabulary as the one seen in the
possession of the accused.
As corroborative of such evidence, we have the well-known legal
principle, which as applied to cases of this character is that, although the
persons who unlawfully took a certain carabao are not recognized at the time,
and their identify remains entirely unknown, nevertheless, if the stolen animal
is found in the possession of the accused shortly after the commission of the
crime and they make no satisfactory explanation of such possession they may
be properly convicted of the crime. (See U.S. vs. Divino [1911], 18 Phil. 425.)
In the present instance, the attempt of the accused to insinuate that one of the
Constabulary soldiers testified against them falsely because of enmity is
hardly believable.
The foregoing statement of the facts and the law disposes of all but one
assignment of error, namely, that the lower court erred in admitting Exhibit B
of the prosecution as evidence. Exhibit B is the sworn statement of sergeant
Presca, now deceased, whose signature was identified, before the justice of
the peace of the municipality of Santo Tomas, Province of Batangas.
Appellant's argument is predicated on the provision of the Philippine Bill of
Rights which says, "That in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to meet the witnesses face to face," and the provision of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, section 15 (5), which say that "In all criminal
prosecutions the defendant shall be entitled: . . . to be confronted at the trial
by and to cross-examine the witnesses against him." With reference to the
clause of the Bill of Rights, which we have quoted, Justice Day said in a case
of Philippine origin (Dowdell vs. U.S. [1911], 221 U.S. 325) that it "intends to
secure the accused in the right to be tried, so far as facts provable by
witnesses are concerned, by only such witnesses as meet him face to face at
the trial, who give their testimony in his presence, and give to the accused an
opportunity of cross-examination. It was intended to prevent the conviction of
the accused upon depositions or ex parte affidavits, and particularly to
preserve the right of the accused to test the recollection of the witness in the
exercise of the right of cross-examination." In other words, confrontation is
essential because cross-examination is essential. A second reason for the
prohibition is that a tribunal may have before it the deportment and
appearance of the witness while testifying. (U.S. vs. Anastasio [1906], 6 Phil.,
413.) The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands has applied this
constitutional provision on behalf of accused persons in a number of cases.
(See for example U.S. vs. Tanjuanco [1902], 1 Phil., 374; U.S. vs. Bello [1908,
12 Phil. 87.) It is for us now to determine whether the present facts entitle the
accused to the protection of the Bill of Rights or whether the facts fall under
some exception thereto.
The sworn statement of Presa was not made by question and answer
under circumstances which gave the defense an opportunity to cross-examine
the witness. The proviso of the Code of Criminal Procedure as to
confrontation is therefore inapplicable. Presa's statement again is not the
testimony of a witness deceased, given in a former action between the same
relating to the same matter. Consequently, the exception provided by section
298. No. 8, of the Code of Civil Procedure and relied upon by the prosecution
in the lower court is also inapplicable. Nor is the statement of Presca a dying
declaration or a deposition in a former trial or shown to be a part of the
preliminary examination. Under these circumstances, not to burden the
opinion with an extensive citation of authorities, we can rely on the old and
historic case of R. vs. Paine (1 Salk., 281 [King's Bench Div]) occurring in the
year 1696. It Bristol under oath, but not in P's presence, was offered. It was
objected that B, being dead, the defendant had lost all opportunity of cross-
examining him. The King's Bench consulted with the Common Pleas, and "it
was the opinion of both courts that these depositions should not be given in
evidence, the defendant not being present when they were taken before the
Mayor and so had lost the benefit of a cross-examination." Although we are
faced with the alternative of being unable to utilize the statements of the
witness now deceased, yet if there has been no opportunity for cross-
examination and the case is not one coming within one of the exceptions, the
mere necessity alone of accepting the statement will not suffice. In fine,
Exhibit B was improperly received in evidence in the lower court.
With such a resolution of this question, we could, as has been done in
other cases, further find this to be versible error and remand the case for a
new trial. We are convinced, however, that this would gain the accused
nothing except delay for the testimony of the owner of the carabao and of the
two Constabulary soldiers, rebutted by no reasonable evidence on behalf of
the accused, is deemed sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The facts come under article 518, No. 3, connection with article 520, as
amended, of the Penal Code. Accordingly the defendants and appellants are
each sentenced to four years, two months, and one day of presidio
correccional, with the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay one-
third part of the costs of both instances; the carabao shall be returned to
Doroteo Natividad, if this has not already been done. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson, Araullo, Street, and Avanceña,
JJ., concur.
||| (U.S. v. Javier, G.R. No. L-12990, [January 21, 1918], 37 PHIL 449-453)
EN BANC
DECISION
CRUZ, J :p
It is settled that if a separate trial is allowed to one of two or more defendants, his
testimony therein imputing guilt to any of the co-accused is not admissible
against the latter who was not able to cross-examine him. 1 The issue in this
case is whether or not such testimony was considered by the respondent court
against the petitioner, who claims that it was in fact the sole basis of his
conviction. prLL
The petitioner, along with several others, were charged in four separate
informations with estafa through falsification of public documents for having
allegedly conspired to defraud the government in the total amount of P26,523.00,
representing the cost of repairs claimed to have been undertaken, but actually
not needed and never made, on four government vehicles, through falsification of
the supporting papers to authorize the illegal payments 2 Docketed as CC Nos.
6681, 6682, 6683 and 6684, these cases were tried jointly for all the accused
until after the prosecution had rested, when Genaro Basilio, Alejandro
Macadangdang and petitioner Talino asked for separate trials, which were
allowed. 3 They then presented their evidence at such trials, while the other
accused continued defending themselves in the original proceedings, at which
one of them, Pio Ulat, gave damaging testimony against the petitioner, relating in
detail his participation in the questioned transactions. 4 In due time, the
Sandiganbayan rendered its decision in all the four cases finding Talino, Basilio,
Macadangdang, Ulat and Renato Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes charged while absolving the other defendants for insufficient evidence.
This decision is now challenged by the petitioner on the ground that it violates his
right of confrontation as guaranteed by the Constitution.
In its decision, the respondent court ** makes the following remarks about the
separate trial:
"The peculiarity of the trial of these cases is the fact that We allowed,
upon their petition, separate trials for the accused Basilio and Talino and
Macadangdang. This being the case, We can only consider, in deciding
these cases as against them, the evidence for the prosecution as well as
their own evidence. Evidence offered by the other accused can not be
taken up.
"It would really have been simpler had there been no separate trial
because the accused Pio B. Ulat said so many incriminatory things
against the other accused when he took the stand in his own defense.
But because Basilio, Talino and Macadangdang were granted separate
trials and they did not cross examine Ulat because, as a matter of fact,
they were not even required to be present when the other accused were
presenting their defenses, the latter's testimonies can not now be
considered against said three accused.
"We cannot understand why, after it had heard the long and sordid story
related by Ulat on the stand, the prosecution did not endeavor to call
Ulat and put him on the stand as part of its rebuttal evidence. Had this
been done, there would have been no impediment to the consideration
of Ulat's testimony against all the accused." 5
The grant of a separate trial rests in the sound discretion of the court and is not a
matter of right to the accused, especially where, as in this case, it is sought after
the presentation of the evidence of the prosecution. 6 While it is true that Rule
119, Section 8, of the Rules of Court does not specify when the motion for such a
trial should be filed, we have held in several cases that this should be done
before the prosecution commences presenting its evidence, although, as an
exception, the motion may be granted later, even after the prosecution shall have
rested, where there appears to be an antagonism in the respective defenses of
the accused. 7 In such an event, the evidence in chief of the prosecution shall
remain on record against all the accused, with right of rebuttal on the part of the
fiscal in the separate trial of the other accused. 8
The rule in every case is that the trial court should exercise the utmost
circumspection in granting a motion for separate trial, allowing the same only
after a thorough study of the claimed justification therefor, if only to avoid the
serious difficulties that may arise, such as the one encountered and regretted by
the respondent court, in according the accused the right of confrontation.
The right of confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Constitution 9 to the person facing criminal prosecution who should know, in
fairness, who his accusers are and must be given a chance to cross-examine
them on their charges. No accusation is permitted to be made against his back or
in his absence nor is any derogatory information accepted if it is made
anonymously, as in poison pen letters sent by persons who cannot stand by their
libels and must shroud their spite in secrecy. That is also the reason why ex
parte affidavits are not permitted unless the affiant is presented in court 10 and
hearsay is barred save only in the cases allowed by the Rules of Court, like the
dying declaration. 11
In United States v. Javier, 12 this Court emphasized:
". . . With reference to the clause of the Bill of Rights, which we have
quoted, Justice Day said in a case of Philippine origin (Dowdell v. U.S.
[1911], 221 U.S. 325) that it `intends to secure the accused in the right to
be tried, so far as facts provable by witnesses are concerned, by only
such witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial who give their
testimony in his presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of
cross-examination. It was intended to prevent the conviction of the
accused upon depositions or ex parte affidavits, and particularly to
preserve the right of the accused to test the recollection of the witness in
the exercise of the right of cross-examination.' In other words,
confrontation is essential because cross-examination is essential. A
second reason for the prohibition is that a tribunal may have before it the
deportment and appearance of the witness while testifying. (U.S. v.
Anastacio [1906], 6 Phil. 413.) The Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands has applied this constitutional provision on behalf of accused
persons in a number of cases. (See for example U.S. v. Tanjuanco
[1902], 1 Phil., 374; U.S. v. Bello [1908], 11 Phil., 526; U.S. v. De la Cruz
[1908], 12 Phil. 87.) . . . ."
We have carefully studied the decision under challenge and find that the
respondent court did not consider the testimony given by Ulat in convicting the
petitioner. The part of that decision finding Talino guilty made no mention of Ulat
at all but confined itself to the petitioner's own acts in approving the questioned
vouchers as proof of his complicity in the plot to swindle the government. Thus: LexLib
554-561)
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
GARCIA, J : p
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this appeal by way of a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the following issuances
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66038, to wit:
1. Decision dated 20 August 2002, 1 dismissing the appeal filed by
herein petitioner Domingo Roco contra the 18 October 2000
resolution of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Roxas City,
denying due course to and dismissing his petition
for certiorari in SP Case No. 7489; and
2. Resolution dated 12 May 2003, 2 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The material facts are not at all disputed:
Petitioner Domingo Roco was engaged in the business of buying and selling
dressed chicken. Sometime in 1993, he purchased his supply of dressed chicken
from private respondent Cal's Poultry Supply Corporation (Cal's Corporation, for
short), a domestic corporation controlled and managed by one Danilo Yap. As
payment for his purchases, petitioner drew five (5) checks payable to Cal’s
Corporation against his account with the Philippine Commercial and Industrial
Bank (PCIB), which checks bear the following particulars:
Check No. Date Amount
For its part, the corporation itself maintained that the production of the
above-mentioned documents was inappropriate because they are immaterial and
irrelevant to the crimes for which the petitioner was being prosecuted.
In a resolution dated 19 October 1999, the MTCC, this time thru its regular
Presiding Judge, Judge Edward B. Contreras, denied petitioner's request on the
following grounds: (a) the requested documents, book ledgers and other records
were immaterial in resolving the issues posed before the court; and (b) the
issuance of the subpoenas will only unduly delay the hearing of the criminal cases.
His motion for reconsideration of the denial resolution having been similarly
denied by Judge Contreras, petitioner then went to the RTC on a petition
for certiorariwith plea for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of
Judge Contreras, which petition was docketed in the RTC as SP Case No. V-
7489. cDAITS
In a resolution dated 18 October 2000, the RTC denied due course to and
dismissed the petition for petitioner's failure to show that Judge Contreras
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. A
motion for reconsideration was thereafter filed by petitioner, but it, too, was likewise
denied.
Undaunted, petitioner went on appeal via certiorari to the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 66038.
As stated at the outset hereof, the Court of Appeals, in a decision dated 20
August 2002, 4 dismissed the petition and accordingly affirmed the impugned
resolutions of the RTC. With his motion for reconsideration having been denied by
the same court in its resolution of 12 May 2003, 5 petitioner is now with us via the
present recourse on his submissions that —
I.
. . . THE DENIAL OF THE REQUEST FOR THE ISSUANCE OF
SUBPOENA AD TESTIFICANDUM AND SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM IS
VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED AS
ENSHRINED IN ART. III, SEC. 14 (2) OF THE CONSTITUTION; and
II.
. . . THERE MUST BE A BALANCING OF INTEREST BETWEEN THE
RIGH [sic] OF AN ACCUSED TO PROVE HIS INNOCENCE AND THE
RIGHT OF A COMPLAINANT TO THE SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF HIS
CASE.
As we see it, the pivotal issue is whether or not the three (3) courts below
committed reversible error in denying petitioner's request for the issuance of
subpoenaad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum in connection with the five
(5) criminal cases for violation of BP 22 filed against him and now pending trial
before the MTCC.
We rule in the negative.
A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to
testify at the hearing or trial of an action or at any investigation conducted under
the laws of the Philippines, or for the taking of his deposition. 6
In this jurisdiction, there are two (2) kinds of subpoena, to wit: subpoena ad
testificandum and subpoena duces tecum. The first is used to compel a person to
testify, while the second is used to compel the production of books, records, things
or documents therein specified. As characterized in H.C. Liebenow vs. The
Philippine Vegetable Oil Company: 7
The subpoena duces tecum is, in all respects, like the ordinary
subpoena ad testificandum with the exception that it concludes with an
injunction that the witness shall bring with him and produce at the
examination the books, documents, or things described in the
subpoena. aEDCAH
Well-settled is the rule that before a subpoena duces tecum may issue, the
court must first be satisfied that the following requisites are present: (1) the books,
documents or other things requested must appear prima facie relevant to the issue
subject of the controversy (test of relevancy); and (2) such books must be
reasonably described by the parties to be readily identified (test of definiteness).
Again, to quote from H.C. Liebenow: 8
In determining whether the production of the documents described
in a subpoena duces tecum should be enforced by the court, it is proper
to consider, first, whether the subpoena calls for the production of
specific documents, or rather for specific proof, and secondly,
whether that proof is prima facie sufficiently relevant to justify
enforcing its production. A general inquisitorial examination of all the
books, papers, and documents of an adversary, conducted with a view to
ascertain whether something of value may not show up, will not be
enforced. (Emphasis supplied) CHIEDS
Further, in Universal Rubber Products, Inc. vs. CA, et al., 9 we held:
Well-settled is Our jurisprudence that, in order to entitle a party to
the issuance of a ‘subpoena duces tecum,’ it must appear, by clear and
unequivocal proof, that the book or document sought to be produced
contains evidence relevant and material to the issue before the court,
and that the precise book, paper or document containing such
evidence has been so designated or described that it may be
identified. (Emphasis supplied)
Going by established precedents, it thus behooves the petitioner to first
prove, to the satisfaction of the court, the relevancy and the definiteness of the
books and documents he seeks to be brought before it.
Admittedly, the books and documents that petitioner requested to be
subpoenaed are designated and described in his request with definiteness and
readily identifiable. The test of definiteness, therefore, is satisfied in this case.
It is, however, in the matter of relevancy of those books and documents to
the pending criminal cases that petitioner miserably failed to discharge his burden.
In the recent case of Aguirre vs. People of the Philippines, 10 the Court
reiterated the following discussions regarding violations of BP 22:
. . . what the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check not
the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating
to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum
prohibitum. (Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 301). All the elements,
therefore, of the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 are all present in the
instant criminal cases and for which the accused is solely liable, to wit: [a]
the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for
value; [2] the knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of
issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and [3]
subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. (Navarro vs. Court of
Appeals, 234 SCRA 639).
We stress that the gravamen of the offense under BP 22 is the act of making
or issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentment
for payment. 11 The offense is already consummated from the very moment a
person issues a worthless check, albeit payment of the value of the check, either
by the drawer or by the drawee bank, within five (5) banking days from notice of
dishonor given to the drawer is a complete defense because the prima
facie presumption that the drawer had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds
or credit at the time of the issuance of the check and on its presentment for
payment is thereby rebutted by such payment. 12
Here, petitioner would want it appear that the books and documents subject
of his request for subpoena duces tecum are indispensable, or, at least, relevant
to prove his innocence. The Court disagrees.
Based on the records below and as correctly pointed out by the Court of
Appeals, petitioner had been issued by Cal’s Corporation with temporary receipts
in the form of yellow pad slips of paper evidencing his payments, which pad slips
had been validated by the corporation itself. Clear it is, then, that the production of
the books and documents requested by petitioner are not indispensable to prove
his defense of payment. In the words of the appellate court:
The Petitioner admitted, when he testified in the Regional Trial
Court, that he had been issued temporary receipts in the form of yellow
pad slips of paper, by the Private Respondent, for his payments which
were all validated by the Private Respondent (Exhibits "8" and "F" and
their submarkings). Even if the temporary receipts issued by the Private
Respondent may not have been the official receipts for Petitioner's
payments, the same are as efficacious and binding on the Private
Respondent as official receipts issued by the latter.
We do not find any justifiable reason, and petitioner has not shown any, why
this Court must have to disbelieve the factual findings of the appellate court. In
short, the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum or ad testificandum to compel the
attendance of Vivian Deocampo or Danilo Yap of Cal's Corporation or their duly
authorized representatives, to testify and bring with them the records and
documents desired by the petitioner, would serve no purpose but to further delay
the proceedings in the pending criminal cases.
Besides, the irrelevancy of such books and documents would appear on
their very face thereof, what the fact that the requested Audited Income
Statements, Audited Balance Sheets, Income Tax Returns, etc. pertained to the
years 1994 to 1999 which could not have reflected petitioner's alleged payment
because the subject transaction happened in 1993. Again, we quote from the
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals:
The checks subject of the criminal indictments against the
Petitioner were drawn and dated in 1993. The Petitioner has not
demonstrated the justification, for the production of the books/records for
1994, and onwards, up to 1999. Especially so, when the "Informations"
against the Petitioner, for violations of BP 22, were filed, with the Trial
Court, as early as 1994. aCSHDI
We are inclined to believe, along with that court, that petitioner was just
embarking on a "fishing expedition" to derail "the placid flow of trial".
With the above, it becomes evident to this Court that petitioner’s request for
the production of books and documents referred to in his request are nakedly
calculated to merely lengthen the proceedings in the subject criminal cases, if not
to fish for evidence. The Court deeply deplores petitioner's tactics and will never
allow the same.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the challenged decision
and resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Carpio Morales, JJ., concur.
||| (Roco v. Contreras, G.R. No. 158275, [June 28, 2005], 500 PHIL 275-287)