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 JACKUP OPERATIONS IN THE GULF OF MEXICO
LESSONS LEARNED FROM RECENT HURRICANES

A. C. MORANDI, AMERICAN GLOBAL MARITIME INC.

11767 Katy Freeway, Suite 660, Houston, Texas 77079

ABSTRACT
Hurricanes Ivan, Katrina and Rita had a major impact on offshore operations in the Gulf of Mexico, affecting jack-
up drilling units, semi-submersible drilling units, fixed platforms, floating production systems as well as pipelines.
The present paper summarizes the lessons learned and the steps taken by industry to improve design and assessment
standards, with a focus on issues relevant to jack-up operations.
Key Words: Jack-up, Reliability, Hurricanes, Structure, Foundation

1. BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

Offshore operations in the Gulf of Mexico were impacted by Hurricane Lili in 2002 and to a much greater extent by
Hurricanes Ivan, Katrina and Rita (IKR) in 2004 and 2005. Total insured losses due to IKR exceeded 13 Billion US
Dollars and prompted reviews of the design and operation of offshore structures, with technical work led by
industry organizations such as the Offshore Operators Committee (OOC), the International Association of Drilling
Contractors (IADC) and the American Petroleum Institute (API) as well as by individual rig owners and operators.
New standards have been developed while existing ones are under review in order to improve the future
performance of the Gulf of Mexico offshore infrastructure. Key issues such as environmental criteria and loads, air
gap loss, foundation and structural performance have been studied in the light of such events and lessons have been
learned which can benefit future offshore operations and standards. This paper reviews the progress made so far
with a focus on jack-up operations and development of standards such as SNAME T&R 5-5A1 and ISO 19905-12.

2. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The design of offshore structures and the development of offshore standards benefited from a legacy of lessons
learned from major hurricanes and from developments in technology in response to the challenging issues posed by
such events. In its early days, the offshore industry developed in the Gulf of Mexico under the leadership of
individuals who were able to advance and enable new technology developments with the limited available
knowledge. Hurricanes Carla, Hilda, Betsy, and Camille impacted the Gulf of Mexico in the 1960’s and were
defining events for a generation of engineers, leading to the early versions of API RP 2A. Hurricane Andrew in
1992 was another major event which triggered significant developments in storm hindcasting and in platform design
and assessment.
As far as jack-ups were concerned, accident data3,4 up to 2005 indicated that structural failure in general was a
minor contributor to rig damage when compared to other causes such as blowout, collision, explosion and fire.
Foundation failure was an important risk for jack-ups but mostly during the preload phase (potential for punch-
through). The small number of jack-up failures during the major hurricanes discussed above did not attract the same
level of attention as failure of fixed platforms, for example.
As far as operations are concerned, the focus in the Gulf of Mexico has been on protecting human life and the
environment by tracking hurricanes and evacuating / securing rigs and wells ahead of such extreme events. US
federal regulations required a Permit to Drill prior to commencing drilling of a well under an approved Exploration
Plan. The information to be submitted for approval included an identification of the maximum environmental and
operational conditions the rig was designed to withstand. According to 30 CFR § 250.414, for example, such
condition was verified by the documentation of operational limitations imposed by the American Bureau of
Shipping (ABS) classification society or other appropriate classification society and either a U.S. Coast Guard
(USCG) Certificate of Inspection or a USCG Letter of Compliance.
The jack-up operational limitations usually take the form of generalized benchmark storms with the following
parameters: water depth (WD), wave height (H) and period (T), air gap (AG), wind velocity (V w), spudcan
penetration (d) and current velocity (Vc). The ABS MODU code, for example, requires units in unrestricted offshore
service to withstand a severe storm condition with Vw = 100 knots. Vw represents the wind velocity at 10m (33ft)
above mean sea level. However, wave height H and period T and the current velocity and profile are left to be
specified by the rig owner.
In practice the benchmark storms developed over the years and contained in the rig marine operations manual
(MOM) represent a description of the operational limitations of the rigs that is not directly related to other
descriptions such as a return period storm / load or a Saffir / Simpson Hurricane Scale. While certain rig designs
have benchmark storms comparable to 100-year environmental conditions, others fall short and have benchmark
storms comparable to 5- or 10-year return period environmental conditions. While some rigs are designed with
unconditionally conservative assumptions, others may have been designed assuming certain trade-offs such as
assuming that foundation fixity effects are sufficient to offset dynamic amplification and p-delta effects (it was
common to class early jack-ups without inclusion of dynamics for water depths not exceeding 100m, for example).
While some rigs are designed with highly redundant leg structures, others are designed with highly optimized and
less redundant leg structures.
Concerning air gap, benchmark storms are developed under the assumption that waves will generate loads on the
legs, appurtenances and spudcan structures only and not impinge on the hull. An air gap of 50ft, consistent with
fixed platform design practice, was considered a prudent value to be used for jack-ups but this was largely depend
on the rig owner and marine warranty surveyor.
Spudcan penetration is another important parameter. Many designs have benchmark penetrations of 25ft but it is not
uncommon for such rigs to achieve 100ft penetrations in the soft soils of the Gulf of Mexico, providing significant
foundation restraint and energy dissipation beyond design assumptions. However, in such soft soils there is the
potential for significant additional leg penetration if the leg reactions during a storm exceed the leg reactions during
preload, which might further expose the hull to wave impact. Prudent operators would provide adequate soil data
and rig owners would minimize such risk by assessing the spudcan load-penetration curve against additional
settlement based on the soil conditions on the site and by preloading the rig leg-by-leg to maximize the leg vertical
reaction during preload. The extent to which such practice was followed was largely dependent on the operator, rig
owner and marine warranty surveyor.
All of these factors played an important role on the rig survivability. The SNAME T&R Bulletin 5-5A1 attempts to
cover them but was not widely applied in the Gulf of Mexico because of modeling and calibration issues 5,
particularly related to foundation modeling.
A final important factor was the development of analytical tools which progressively removed conservatism from
the design and analysis process, with direct impact on operations. For example, it became a widespread practice to
develop rig specific nomograms where increased variable load could be utilized in sites where the water depth was
lower than the operating manual limits. In addition, rigs were upgraded with leg structural reinforcement, addition
of hull sponsons and / or extra pinions. All such developments allowed the operating limits of some rigs to be
extended beyond their initial design capability.

3. WARNING SIGNS – HURRICANES OPAL AND LILI

The extensive development work that followed Hurricane Andrew increased the confidence in predictive design
methods. It was estimated6 that during Hurricane Andrew around 100 fixed platforms designed after 1977 survived
conditions exceeding a 100-year return period value. Such platforms were designed in the late 1970’s and 1980’s to
design loads estimated6 to be some 30% lower than those recommended by the 20th Edition of API RP 2A7 (which
was based on BAST – Best Available Technology).
Consequence-based criteria evolved8 where the full 20th Edition API RP 2A would be used for L-1 platforms – new
designs for high consequence platforms The lower design loads of the 1970’s and 1980’s could be used for L-2
platforms – more common platforms in water depths up to 400 ft. Lower design loads could also be used in the
assessment of existing platforms (older then 5 years) with A-1 denoting high-consequence economic exposure to
the full hurricane population. A-2 (lower consequence) platforms would have as minimum to address human safety
by surviving sudden storms which arise locally in the Gulf of Mexico and do not have time to mature as the big
hurricanes approaching from the Atlantic. In terms of full population of hurricanes the A-2 platforms could have
their ultimate strength (as determined by pushover analysis) at 85% to 120% of the 100-year loading calculated
from the 20th Edition of API RP 2A7.
Against such background, Hurricane Opal hit the Florida panhandle in October 1995. The US National Hurricane
Center reported that over the water it had been a Category 4 storm and its central pressure deficit was higher than
any previous storm that had not reached Category 5 severity. In addition, it was a top wave maker. However, it did
not impact the Gulf of Mexico oil infrastructure and went relatively unnoticed.
Another key aspect was Opal’s rapid deepening process which completely transforms the storm in a day or two.
The difficulties that rapid deepening poses for forecasters and operators are twofold: the hurricane becomes
devastatingly intense, and events can outrun forecasts.
Hurricane Lili was the most intense hurricane of the 2002 season. As it moved across the Caribbean, Lili fluctuated
in intensity and was a Category 1 hurricane near western Cuba on October 1 st, 2002. Between Cuba and Louisiana,
Lili intensified to 145 knots wind speed (Category 4 Hurricane) on October 2nd, 2002 and maintained intensity into
October 3rd, 2002. It suddenly lost intensity and was a much weaker hurricane by landfall. Lili was a Category 4
hurricane while over the north-central Gulf of Mexico and during the early hours of October 3rd, 2002 it passed
through the Green Canyon and Eugene Island areas. A study9,10 into the impact of Hurricane Lili highlighted several
issues such as deficiencies in instrumentation and data collection during extreme events, costly damage to
secondary equipment, damage to topsides equipment due to large motions and a need to review procedures for
securing and tie-down as well as the complex issues related to metocean data and its translation into design bases.
These issues were not so severe during Lili but would prove to be critical during the major hurricanes that followed.
Hurricane Lili led to the loss of the Rowan Houston jack-up rig11, the first serious hurricane related incident with a
jack-up rig since Hurricane Andrew.

4. THE TERRIBLE TRIPLETS – IVAN, KATRINA AND RITA (IKR)

Hurricanes Ivan in 2004 and Katrina and Rita in 2005 would have a much greater impact on the offshore
infrastructure in the Gulf of Mexico. These were events of far reaching consequences, such as the massive damage
caused to the city of New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina.
The highest measured waves during Katrina were at 11GMT on August 29th, 2005, when the National Data Buoy
Center (NDBC) buoy 42040 situated at the water depth of 444m (see www.ndbc.noaa.gov and www.nhc.noaa.gov
for location with respect to the hurricane track and intensity) measured the significant wave height H s = 16.91 m (or
55 ft). This buoy is in the Central Gulf of Mexico where, according to state-of-the-art API environmental criteria12,
the 200-year significant wave height for this water depth is 16.40m. By interpolation, the highest measured point in
Katrina was a 260-year return period value.
Hurricane Ivan was the strongest hurricane of the 2004 Atlantic hurricane season. The storm formed in early
September, and became the ninth named storm, the sixth hurricane, and the fourth major hurricane of the year. Ivan
reached Category 5 strength on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale, the highest possible category, and it became
the sixth (now ninth) most intense Atlantic hurricane on record, as well as the only Category 5 storm of the season.
Ivan caused catastrophic damage to Grenada, which it struck directly at Category 3 intensity, and heavy damage to
Jamaica, Grand Cayman, and the western tip of Cuba. After peaking in strength, it moved north-northwest across
the Gulf of Mexico to make landfall as a strong Category 3 storm in the United States, in Orange Beach, Alabama,
causing very heavy damage there. Ivan dropped heavy rains on the Southeastern United States as it looped across
Florida and back into the Gulf of Mexico. The remnant low from the storm regenerated into a new tropical system,
which moved into Louisiana and Texas, causing minimal damage.
On September 16th, 2004, a significant wave height of 15.97m (52.4 ft) was reported at NDBC buoy 42040 as the
center of Hurricane Ivan passed overhead. In addition, two significant wave height measurements of 17.1m and
17.9m were taken by gauges deployed by the Naval Research Laboratory in the vicinity of buoy 42040, which
constitute the largest waves ever recorded around U.S. waters. By interpolation, this highest measured point in Ivan
was a 470-year return period value according to state-of-the-art API environmental criteria12.
Ivan set several other records. When Ivan first became a Category 3 hurricane on September 5 th, 2004 (1800 UTC),
it was centered near 10.2 degrees north; this is the most southerly location on record for a major hurricane in the
Atlantic basin. Just six hours later, Ivan also became the most southerly Category 4 hurricane on record in the
Atlantic basin when it reached that intensity while located at 10.6 degrees north. Finally, Ivan managed to become
the most southerly Category 5 hurricane on record in the Atlantic basin; it achieved this at midnight (UTC) on
September 9 while centered at 13.7 degrees north. Ivan had the world record of 33 (32 consecutive) 6 hourly reports
at or above category 4 strength.
The measured data for hurricane Rita is more limited and the highest significant wave height values recorded do not
exceed the ones for Ivan and Katrina. However, Hurricane Rita cut through the Gulf of Mexico shelf leading to
widespread damage to jack-ups and fixed platforms in shallower water.
Table 1 shows preliminary data13 on insured losses due to IKR. Such costs were presented in 2006 and by now may
have escalated to higher values. The staggering insurance cost of fixed platform failures dominated the overall costs
and prompted a re-examination of insurance policies for such facilities, which are now much more specific to risk
factors than before.
Table 2 shows data14 on platforms destroyed during the several hurricanes that affected the Gulf of Mexico. A few
observations can be made in reviewing Table 2. A clear cyclic pattern can be observed with major events clustered
around more critical periods and then followed by much lesser activity. Also the number of platforms destroyed
increases as many more platforms are deployed over time.
In an attempt to quantify risks as an input to risk-cost economic analyses, a closer examination of the data by
Marshall15 suggested the following ‘sliding scale’ for the average annual risk rate (AARR) for platform loss: L1
(newbuild) - 0.1% per year, A1 (re-assessment of high consequence platform) - 0.25% per year, A2-E-120%
(lower consequence, collapse at 120% of the 100-year load according to the 20th Edition of API RP 2A) - 0.5% per
year, A2-E-100% - 1% per year, A2-E-85% - 2% per year, A2 safety (lower consequence designed to sudden
hurricane only) - 5% in the Central Gulf of Mexico.
Tables 3 and 4 show data on incidents and losses related to Mobile Drilling Units (MODUs), semi-submersibles in
Table 3 and Jack-up in Table 4. Again it can be seen that the impact of IKR was unique in historical terms, in part
due to the ferocity of these hurricanes and in part due to the deployment of more and more rigs offshore.

5. PICKING UP THE PIECES

A major implication of these severe environmental events has been the need to remove the debris from damaged
structures, Figures 1 and 2. In terms of the impact of lost drilling rigs on revenue, such rigs are obviously no longer
worth their day rates (at an excellent market), but in addition their owners have to pay the day rate of the support
vessels needed to clean up the damaged structures on the sea floor. Sample pictures of recovered jack-up leg
sections are shown in Figures 3 to 5 – these are sampled from different rigs for illustration purposes only.
An interesting observation from several recovered leg sections is that damage was localized at the lower guide
regions with the remaining of the leg behaving largely in an elastic manner, much as predicted by FE analyses as
shown in Figures 6 and 7. These sample plots are from different rigs and for illustration purposes only.
Another observation is that a significant degree of failure in one leg seemed to trigger failure of the other legs and
eventually all three legs parting mostly at the lower guide level, much as predicted by FE analyses. The main
analytical difficulty in simulating rig collapse was not in the structural behavior but in determining the level of
foundation fixity under each of the legs.

6. LESSONS LEARNED – ENVIRONMENTAL CRITERIA

As previously discussed, the maximum wave heights during Hurricane Ivan corresponded to a return period of 470-
years, highlighting the challenge of predicting long-term extreme environmental events based on available reliable
records which may not exceed more than 50 years, for example. There are large statistical uncertainties which
increase with the return period of interest and the environmental criteria provided by metocean experts tends to be a
best fit to existing data with a confidence interval of around 50%, as shown in Figure 8.
The maximum wave heights derived from such data are in effect most probable maximum or median values which
have a relatively large probability of being exceeded during the reference return period and design safety margins
need to take such uncertainties into account. It has become accepted practice in the latest deep water projects to deal
with such events by verifying the global performance against a survival event (no safety factors) with return period
of 1,000-years and such practice has proved effective during IKR.
It is also important to understand the Gulf of Mexico from a rig (or platform) fleet perspective. From a statistical
perspective the Gulf can be treated as 25 independent regions approximately 100 miles apart. On average, it is
expected that every 4 years, at least one of such regions (and all structures in it) will be confronted with a site-
specific 100-year event. Based on the same rationale, every 40 years at least one of such regions is expected to be
exposed to the 1,000-year event. All else being equal, as industry expends across the Gulf more structures will be
exposed to such major events.
Another subtlety of such statistics is that they pool together data from different points across a given sector and over
a certain period of time. Such data is then used to derive point estimates of the long term significant wave height,
for example. This makes sense under the implicit assumption of ergodicity (main statistical properties do not vary
significantly with space and time, again within a certain region), which tends to hold true for the statistics of water
surface elevation.
However, two important aspects have been recently highlighted by Forristal 16. First, as shown in Figure 9, a very
high wave may look as an outlier within a 1-hour sample of an extreme storm but may actually fit existing models
well in the context of a longer period of time. This can be tackled successfully as proposed by Tromans 17 by treating
entire storms as independent events as opposed to the common design practice of considering 3-hour seastates as
design events.
Another important aspect, which has important implications for the air gap under the decks of fixed platforms, is
that the maximum crest over an area will have a higher value than the point estimate. Considering a structure with a
deck 50 m by 50 m, the maximum crest somewhere under that deck may be 1.18 times higher than the maximum
crest at a single fixed point as used in traditional design.

Localized damage has sometimes been observed on the lower decks of platforms after storms, Figure 10. This
damage has often been hard to reconcile with hindcast significant wave heights and standard crest statistics. The
fact that the expected maximum over the area of a deck is substantially greater than the expected maximum at a
point may go a long way to explaining this behavior. A small amount of water in the deck does not affect the
structural integrity of the platform but designers should be aware that the potential for green water at some location
in the deck is much greater than would be estimated from statistics of crests at one point.

Present thinking is that deck elevations should exceed the 100-year maximum crest elevation utilizing the latest met
data12 plus 15% for the local random wave crest plus a minimum of 1.5m (5ft) of safety margin on air gap to
account for uncertainties. Any likely subsidence should be added to the 1.5m safety margin. Any equipment or
structure within such an air gap should be hardened to resist local wave forces. For static wave force calculations of
global jacket loads, it is not unreasonable to ignore such local crests above the nominal estimate, and utilize
traditional regular wave models and kinematics factor.
Another key factor in the new environmental criteria12 for the Gulf of Mexico was the recognition of regional
variability within the Gulf as shown in Figure 11. It is particularly noticeable that a significant increase in
environmental criteria for the Central Region of the Gulf of Mexico was implemented in recognition of the potential
effect of warm eddies spinning out of the loop current. A warm eddy such as the ones present in the Gulf can be a
major source of energy to a storm that passes over it. Normally, hurricane winds draw the heat stored in these
pockets of ocean water to fuel the storm. At the same time the winds may also mix the warm surface water with
cooler water below as the storm passes by and the upwelling of cool water by the wind can weaken slow-moving
storms. However, the layer of warm water in the eddy is so thick that the ocean surface is less susceptible to storm-
induced cooling than it is outside the eddy. The extra heat often gives hurricanes a burst of energy that can lead to
rapid intensification. This is believed to have happened, for example, in early October 1995, when Hurricane Opal
intensified over the central Gulf of Mexico from a 95-mph Category 2 hurricane to a Category 4 hurricane with 150
mph winds in only 14 hours.
Air gap requirements for the Central Gulf of Mexico (and including the 15% factor for the random wave crest) may
require raising recommended deck heights by as much as 24ft.

7. LESSONS LEARNED – JACK-UP FAILURES

Table 5 summarizes an estimate of the return period associated with the highest wave heights predicted for jack-ups
affected by Katrina and Rita, considering the latest metocean criteria12.
Detailed studies of some of these cases were conducted 18 and the main conclusions were:

 All the rigs that were lost were subjected to loading exceeding their design limits.

 Overall the survivals / losses can be largely explained in terms of a combination of higher / lower reserve
strength and favorable / unfavorable soil conditions, favorable / unfavorable storm headings (non-collinear
environmental conditions and overall loading not coinciding with critical headings).

 Leg settlement may have contributed to wave impingement on the deck further increasing the total load.

 A combination of large (96ft) penetration (high fixity) into a soft clay layer and high soil reserve strength
from an underlying sand layer contributed to the survival without damage of a rig loaded much beyond its
design limits.

 An air gap of 60 - 62ft would have been sufficient to clear the hurricane crests, with some allowance for
leg settlement.

 In order to survive events like Katrina and Rita in water depths exceeding 350ft, a rig design such as the
Super Gorilla, for example, would be necessary at an estimated fabrication cost of USD 300 Million.
 8. DESIGN AND ASSESSMENT STANDARDS
The jack-up industry responded with a joint effort between API and IADC which resulted in the publication, ahead
of the 2006 hurricane season, of Recommended Practice 95J for jack-up operations19. This recommended practice,
which was mandated by the MMS in a Notice to Lessees (NTL), proposed more stringent requirements concerning
air gap, mandated operators to provided soil properties for all jack-up locations and to allow more time for preload
operations and determined that conductor loads be accounted for if the jack-up rig is left supporting the platform
conductor after a hurricane evacuation.
In addition a Gulf of Mexico Annex to SNAME T&R 5-5A1 (and later to ISO 19905-12) is under development with
recommended criteria for jack-up assessments. Environmental loading is recommended for manned operations and
survival assessments against full population hurricanes are discussed although no specific criteria are given at this
stage since these depend on economic criteria to be set by different stakeholders.
More recently, API developed three interim bulletins that introduce new hurricane metocean conditions12 for the
Gulf of Mexico and address the application of the new metocean conditions using the present design practices and
standards:
Bulletin 2INT - MET, Interim Guidance on Hurricane Conditions in the Gulf of Mexico 12. This bulletin will present
the metocean conditions for four identified regions of the Gulf of Mexico (West, West Central, Central, and East).
The information included in the bulletin can be used in the independent extremes of wind, wave, current and surge
and will be presented for multiple return periods. The proposed document provides wind velocities, deepwater
(water depth greater than or equal to 1,000 m) wave conditions, current information, surge and tidal amplitude.
Storm surge and tide, significant wave height (Hs), individual expected maximum wave height (H max), and
individual expected maximum crest elevation will also be included.

Bulletin 2INT - DG, Interim Guidance for Design of Offshore Structures for Hurricane Conditions. This bulletin
will provide interim guidance on how to apply the new metocean conditions to platforms that are at a point in the
design phase where it is still possible to consider the effects of the new met/ocean conditions on the structure being
designed. The documents for which these interim guidelines will apply are RP 2A, RP 2FPS, RP 2T, RP 2SK, RP
2RD, and Bulletin 2TD.

Bulletin 2INT - EX, Interim Guidance for Assessment of Existing Offshore Structures for Hurricane Conditions.
This bulletin will provide interim guidance to Owners/Operators and Engineers for the assessment of existing fixed
and floating permanent offshore structures in the Gulf of Mexico as a result of the updated metocean conditions.
The document will also highlight load reduction measures to mitigate damage from hurricane conditions.

The development of new standards and upgrade of existing ones continues under the leadership of the API HEAT
(Hurricane Evaluation and Assessment Team)20,21.

9. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The industry continues to learn from major environmental events and improve offshore design and assessment
standards for the development of new designs and to harden the existing infrastructure. These are key steps to
protect stakeholders from major financial loss and safeguard US energy security.
As far as jack-up operations are concerned, rig owners and insurance underwriters will continue to face the
challenges of operating in the Gulf and there will be a continuing need to balance risk and cost trade-offs. This
paper briefly discussed several of the advanced tools available for improved decision making such as long-term
hindcast models, wave crest modeling, pushover analysis and risk and reliability assessment.
Further development and implementation of the Gulf of Mexico Annex is a critical step in the direction of
improving jack-up assessments. The development of survivability assessment techniques is also an important step,
and improved foundation modeling remains the area where future technical development is necessary.
 10. REFERENCES

[1] - Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers: ‘Recommended practice for site specific assessment of
mobile jack-up units’. SNAME T&R Bulletin 5-5A, Jersey City, 1st Edition, Rev. 2, January 2002.
[2] - International Standards Organization: ‘ISO 19905-1, Site-specific assessment of mobile offshore units - Part 1:
Jack-ups. - 1st edition, Draft Version.
[3] - Sharples, B.P.M., Bennet, W.T., Trickey, J.C.: ‘Risk analysis of jack-up rigs’. 2nd Intl. Conference ‘The Jack-
up Drilling Platform, City University, 1989.
[4] - Jack, R.L., Hoyle, M.J.R., Smith, N.P.: ‘The facts behind jack-up accident statistics’. 8th Intl. Conference ‘The
Jack-up Drilling Platform, City University, 2001.
[5] - Morandi, A.C., Virk, G.S.: ‘Reliability-based code calibration: Application to jack-up structures. Paper 12076,
Offshore Technology Conference, Houston, 2000.
[6] - Efthymiou, M., van de Graaf, J.W., Tromans, P.S., Hines, I.: ‘Reliability based criteria for fixed steel offshore
platforms’. Proc. Offshore Mechanics and Arctic Engineering, OMAE’96, Vol. I – Part A, pp. 129-141, ASME,
1996.
[7] - American Petroleum Institute: ‘Recommended practice for planning, designing and constructing fixed offshore
platforms’. API RP 2A, Working Stress Design, 20th Ed., 1993.
[8] - American Petroleum Institute: ‘Recommended practice for planning, designing and constructing fixed offshore
platforms’. API RP 2A, Working Stress Design, 21 st Ed., 2000. Errata / Supplement 2, 2005.
[9] - Global Maritime: ‘Assessment of performance of deepwater floating production facilities during hurricane
Lili’, Report to the US Minerals Management Service, GMH-3704-1377 Rev 1, dated 30th June 2004. Web
Link: http://www.mms.gov/tarprojects/471/471AA.pdf
[10] - Morandi, A.C., Mercier, J., Bea, R.G.: ‘Performance of deepwater floating production facilities during
Hurricane Lili’. Paper 16804, Offshore Technology Conference, Houston, 2004.
[11] - Sharples, B.P.M., Bea, R.G.: ‘Post-mortem failure assessment of MODUs during Hurricane Lili’. Paper
16804, Offshore Technology Conference, Houston, 2004.
[12] - American Petroleum Institute: ‘Interim Guidance on Hurricane Conditions in the Gulf of Mexico’, API Bull
2INT-MET, May 2007.
[13] - Giddings, R., Miller, J.: ‘Gulf of Mexico wind – An insurance market perspective’. IADC Mooring
Workshop, Houston, 23rd May 2006.
[14] - Energo Engineering, Inc.: ‘Assessment of fixed offshore platform performance in hurricanes Andrew, Lili
and Ivan’, Report to the US Minerals Management Service, January 2006. Web Link:
http://www.mms.gov/tarprojects/549/E05114MMSProject549FinalReport.pdf.
[15] - Marshall, P.: ‘Offshore Technology: Lessons from API HEAT WG3’. 10th July 2007.
[16] - Forristall. G.Z.: ‘Understanding rogue waves: Are new physics really necessary?’. University of Hawaii, Web
Link: http://www.soest.hawaii.edu/PubServices/2005pdfs/Forristall.pdf
[17] - Tromans, P.S., Vanderschuren, L.: ‘Response based design conditions in the North Sea: application of a new
method’. Proc. Offshore Technology Conference. OTC 7683, Houston, 1995.

[18] - Morandi, A.C.: ‘Impact of Hurricanes Katrina / Rita on jack-up rigs’, SNAME OC-7 Gulf of Mexico Annex,
DNV, Oslo, Norway, 7th November 2006.
[19] - American Petroleum Institute: ‘Gulf of Mexico jackup operations for hurricane season (interim
recommendations)’, API RP 95J, 2006.
[20] - Wisch, D.J., Ward, E.G.: ‘Offshore standards - The impact of hurricanes Ivan / Katrina / Rita’. Paper
OMAE2007-29764, 26th International Conference on Offshore Marine and Arctic Engineering, OMAE 2007,
June 10-15, 2007, San Diego, California, USA.
[21] - Wisch, D.J., Ward, E.G.: ‘Legacy of the Terrible Triplets and Standards of the Future’. Paper OTC 18979,
Offshore Technology Conference, Houston, 2007.
[22] - SMIT International: ‘Leg removal Adriatic VII’. Picture from the following website:
http://www.smit.com/sitefactor/page.asp?pageid=884.
 Table 1 – Insured Losses (in Million USD) during Ivan, Katrina and Rita13

Hurricane Contractors Fixed Platforms Total

Ivan 211 1,691 1,902
Katrina 468 5,923 6,391
Rita 666 4,295 4,961
Total 1,345 11,909 13,254

Table 2 – Fixed Platform Losses14

Hurricane Year Number
Grand Island 1948 2
Carla 1961 3
Hilda 1964 14
Betsy 1965 8
Camille 1969 3
Carmen 1974 2
Frederic 1979 3
Juan 1985 3
Andrew 1992 28
Lili 2002 7
Ivan 2004 7
Katrina 2005 46
Rita 2005 68
Total 194

Table 3 – Semi-Submersible Major Events

Hurricane Year Impact

Hilda 1964 1 Capsized, 1 Drifted
Elena 1985 2 Drifted
Andrew 1992 2 Drifted, of which 1 hit a fixed platform
Georges 1998 None
Lili 2002 1 drifted 43 miles, 1 lost 6 of 8 mooring lines
Ivan 2004 5 Drifted
Katrina 2005 9 Drifted
Rita 2005 8 Drifted

Table 4 – Jack-up Losses

Hurricane Year Impact
Andrew 1992 1 mat unit lost mat and drifted 50 miles
Lili 2002 1 mat and 1 independent leg total loss
Ivan 2004 1 independent leg total loss
Katrina 2005 4 independent leg total loss
Rita 2005 6 independent leg total loss
 Table 5 – Wave Height Return Period for 11 Worst Affect Jack-ups on Katrina and Rita
Rig Event Water Depth Max. Wave Height Area Return Period
(ft / m) (ft / m) (Years)
Rowan New Orleans Katrina 155 / 47.2 70 / 21.3 Central 50
Rowan Paris Katrina 156 / 47.5 72 / 21.9 Central 70
Rowan Bob Palmer Katrina 355 / 108.2 80 / 24.4 Central 70
Rowan Louisiana Rita 230 / 70.1 72 / 21.9 West Central 270
Rowan Fort Worth Rita 230 / 70.1 73 / 22.3 West Central 290
Rowan Halifax Rita 306 / 93.3 70 / 21.3 West Central 200
Rowan Gorilla 4 Rita 365 / 111.3 75 / 22.9 West Central 230
ENSCO 74 Katrina 205 / 62.5 73 / 22.3 Central 55
ENSCO 69 Rita 215 / 65.5 71 / 21.6 West Central 250
ENSCO 105 Rita 245 / 74.7 73 / 22.3 West Central 280
GSF AD 7 Rita 252 / 76.8 73 / 22.3 West Central 280

Figure 1 – Underwater Jack-up Leg Section Figure 2 – Fixed Platform Destroyed by Rita

Figure 3 – Removal of Jack-up Leg Sections

Figure 4 – Leg Sections below Lower Guide22

Figure 5 – Leg Damage in Lower Guide Area

Figure 6 – Pushover Analysis of Jack-up Rigs

 Figure 7 – Failure Initiation in Lower Guide Area

Figure 8 – Typical Long Term Distribution of Significant Wave Height

 Figure 9 – Probability of Exceedance of Individual Waves for Hurricane Ivan at the Marlin TLP 16

Figure 10 – Damage to Platform Helideck

Figure 11 – US Gulf of Mexico Regions and Areas of Applicability12

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