R.K.

PAYNE

T H E T H E O R Y O F M E A N I N G IN B U D D H I S T
LOGICIANS: THE HISTORICAL AND INTELLECTUAL
CONTEXT OF APOHA

INTRODUCTION

The idea of apoha is one which kept Buddhist, 1Wllmfirns~and Nyfiya-

Vaigesika thinkers busy for several hufidred years. The Buddhists in
explaining and defending, the M-Lmfirnsaand Nyfiya-Vaigesika in
attacking and criticizing, if not also purposefully misunderstanding.
However, the idea of apoha is one which is easily misunderstood,
particularly when reduced to summary formulae such as: Apoha is the
'"theory that a word indicates an object merely through the exclusion
of other objects." 2 Although apparently simple enough, such a descrip-
tion quickly leads to a mass of philosophic problems.
The Buddhist thinkers for whom apoha was an important concept
are known as the Buddhist logicians. To me it seems unfortunate that
they came to be known by that name. The expression "logician"
connotes a limitation of inquiry, at least by analogy to the work of
Western logicians qua logicians. Quite to the contrary, the Buddhist
logicians display an expansion rather than a limitation of inquiry.
Their inquiry includes the full range of previous Buddhist thought --
epistemology, metaphysics and, most importantly, soteriology -- but
adds to it inquiry into systematic argumentation and logic. It is in the
work of Maitreya and Asanga that such skills attain respectable status
as an important part of the Bodhisattva's attainments. 3 From then on
logic per se plays an important role in Indian Buddhist thought. While
falling on infertile soil in China, logic continued to be an active part of
Buddhism in Tibet fight up into the present century?

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In relation to the idea of apoha, the single most important historical

figure is Dignaga. He is pivotal. While Buddhist use of logic preceded

Journal of lndian Philosophy 15 (1987) 261--284.

O 1987 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.
262 R.K. PAYNE

him by many centuries, he is the first Buddhist thinker to develop a

formal logic. 5 Systematic forms of argumentation had, for example,
been used at least as early as the Katthavatthu 6, and Dignaga's teacher
Vasubandhu wrote works entirely devoted to the subject of proper
argumentation. 7 However, up until the time of Dignaga, discussions
of logic and argumentation were mostly limited to listing specific
examples of acceptable and unacceptable arguments. Asahga and
Vasubandhu already knew that a reason (Tibetan and Sanskrit
expressions for technical terms are given in the Glossary) given
for a thesis must meet all of three conditions: the reason must be
a property of the subject of the thesis, it must exist in some or all
of the homogenous examples, and it must not exist in any of the
heterogenous examples. 8 However, Dignaga was able to abstract from
these general conditions to argument forms. This is explained in his
work Hetucakradhamaruh. 9 This is an intellectual achievement fully
equal to Aristotle's formulation of the rules of syllogistic logic 10, and
makes Dignaga one of the most important figures in the whole history
of Indian logic. 11
Following Dignaga there came a long line of Buddhist thinkers who
developed his ideas further. The most important of these for the
Tibetan tradition is Dharmakirti, who was the student of |svarasena,
who was himself one of Dignaga's students. 12 Dharmakirti's major
work was the Pramdnav~rttika, originally written as a commentary on
Dignaga's major work, the Pramdnasamuccaya. la It was Dharmakirti's
work, however, which became the root-text for the study of logic
in Tibet. Other important figures following Dignaga include
Devendrabodhi, Subhagupta, SS_ntaraksita, Kaly~. a Raksita,
Dharmottara, Ratnakirti, Jfi~masri, SafikarS_nanda and MoksLkaragupta
(further information on each of these can be found in the Appendix).
During the whole of this time, the schools which opposed the
Buddhist logicians were the Ny~ya-Vai~esika and NYLrnSms~ schools.
These were realistic schools of thought, largely based on common
sense notions of the way things are. 14 The dialogue which continued
between these three schools was very important for all three of them. 15
The ~Vlm~'as~ school is usually classed together with the VedS.nta,
just as the Ny~ya and Vai~esika are grouped with one another. The
 THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF APOHA 263

M-lmfirns~ were mostly concerned with liturgy and ritual aspects of the
Vedas, both in the sense of the proper conduct of them and in the
sense of the philosophic justification of them. TM One of the theories
maintained by the Mimarnsa, one which is relevant to our study of
apoha, was that the meaning of xvords is inherent in the sound of the
words themselves. 16 This idea, so at odds with our own contemporary
understanding of the function of sound in the communication of
meaning, was also at odds with Buddhist conceptions. 17 This argument
is still taught today, and in its contemporary form is as follows: the
basic nature of things is vibratory; Sanskrit, the holy language of the
Vedas, expresses the same vibratory qualities in its sounds as those of
the things themselves; for example, a chair has a certain vibratory
quality as its essential nature, the Sanskrit word for chair has the same
vibratory qualityJ 8 It is this ontological identity which makes for the
effectiveness of the Vedic hymns and mantras, and further for the
effectiveness of the rituals of which they are the central point.
Jaimini in the Mimfimsfi Sfitra meets six objections to this theoryfl 9
For example there is the objection that a word is seen to follow from
effort, i.e., it is a product of human action and therefore not eternal.
However, Jaimini, and his commentator Sabara, respond that the word
is manifested rather than produced, i.e., that it is eternal and is only
made apparent through effort. 2°
The Mimfimsfi thinkers, then, were concerned with maintaining the
validity of the Vedas and the Vedic rituals. This was done by their
theory concerning the eternality of words and that the meaning of
words is naturally inherent in the eternal sounding of words. Since the
effectiveness of the Vedic rituals was thought to depend on this unity
of eternal sound and meaning, the M-unfirnsfi were naturally the
opponents of any theory, like the Buddhist, which separated words
from meanings.
The Nyfiya-Vai~esika is actually the two schools, Nyfiya and
Vai~esika. However, their concerns and methods are alike enough that
they are generally classed together. Both of these schools are analytic 2~
and realist schools, i.e., they " . . . treat the data of waking conscious-
ness from the point of view of waking consciousness itself..."22 They
share a fundamental metaphysics of atomic realism 23, which was the
264 R.K. PAYNE

contribution of the physical and metaphysical concerns of the

Vai~esika. The Nyfiya contributed a concern with logic and episte-
mology as the means to true knowledge and liberation. 24
The Nyfiya maintained that the meaning of a word is a complex of
three parts:

The meaning of a word is, according to us, the genus, form and individual. An
individual is that which has a definite form and is the abode of particular qualities.
The form is that which (indicates or) is called the token of the genus. The 'universal'
is the cause (or basis) of comprehensive cognition. 25

From this it is clear that for the Nyfiya the meaning of a word is an
external referent, which was held to be of three parts. This position is
clearly in disagreement with the Buddhist positions which held that
meaning is essentially an internal process.
The Nyfiya were mostly interested in questions of logic and rea-
soning, while the Vai~esika contributed cosmological and metaphysical
theories, a6 Apparently accepting and using the Ny~ya position on
word and meaning, the Vai~esika developed another theory important
to the understanding of apoha -- that of exclusion (Skt.: vi~esa), The
importance of this idea of exclusion as highlighting by contrast the
meaning of apoha is discussed more fully below.
In contrast to these positions, the Buddhists held what has been
identified as a nominalist position, 26a and which might also be called a
conventionalist position regarding meaning. The Buddha himself said
that "... one should not cling to dialectical usage nor go beyond the
limits of convention. ''27 A referent can be indicated by different
words. There are definite limits to the universality of what are in fact
only conventionally meaningful usages. This is pointed out by the fact
that changes take place in what a thing is called, e.g., the name of a
mountain may change from one historical period to another. If the
~VlmS.rnsfi theory were correct, then the hill would have to change as
well. Another indication of the traditional Buddhist view concerning
the meaning of words is to be found in the apparent contention that it
is a statement as a whole that is to be considered as fundamental in
understanding its meaning, rather than the individual words which go
to make up the statement. 28
Similarly, Paramfirtha, a contemporary of Dignaga's 29, held a
 THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF APOHA 265

position regarding the relation of words and meanings which has been
restated as:

Names are arbitrarily assigned to objects by convention and are based upon neither
meaning n o r the properties of an object. The process of reference is therefore an
arbitrary one, not one indicating a necessary relationship between name and referent,
If there were a strictly necessary relationship between name and object, the name
would be the only medium through which one could understand the nature of an
object. If the name were the only medium through which one could understand the
object, one would be unable to understand the object without hearing the name.
Names, however, are assigned to objects arbitrarily and are not based upon either
meaning or the properties of an object. Consequently, one can understand the object
(either through its sense or through the properties upon which the sense is based)
without knowing the name. Therefore, names do not signify the nature of an object
and names are not the only medium through which one can understand an object. 3°

In brief then, we can say that prior to Dignaga the Buddhists had
long held a nominalist view which he was able to bring into focus
with his idea of apoha. The Buddhist position had been held in
contrast with the MimS_msfi and Nyfiya-Vai~esika positions. The
M-Lrnfimsfi held that meaning is inherent in sound which itself is
eternal. The Nyfiya-Vaigesika on the other hand held that meaning is a
matter of the external referent, its form as identifying it, and its
universal by which it is fully cognized. Dignaga's formulation of the
idea of apoha as explaining meaning and its relation to words is in
direct opposition to both of these latter views.

SUPPORTING CONCEPTS

There are certain key ideas which when understood provide us access
to the context of apoha. These key ideas are: the two sources of truth,
perception and inference; the difference between the particular and
the general, particularly as it applies to the epistemology and meta-
physics of perception; the complex nature of negation; and the Ny~ya-
Val~esika notion of exclusion. Without these ideas to support the
concept of apoha, it appears either as absurdly contradictory to
common experience or as trivially true.
266 R.K. PAYNE

THE TWO SOURCES OF TRUTH

Dignaga and those who follow him take as their primary concern the
question of valid sources of knowledge, i.e., his philosophy is primarily
epistemological in nature. 31 His intention was to establish a firm basis
for the practice of Buddhism which is seen as a movement toward
a direct experiential knowing of truth, i.e., the real. For example,
Dharmakirti opens his Nyayabindu with the statement, "All successful
human action is preceded by right knowledge." 32 As valid sources of
knowledge, Dignaga holds that there are only two -- perception and
inference.33
Prior to Dignaga, the Yogacara position held that there are three
means of knowing reality. In the Bodhisattva-Bhhmi Asanga says that
knowledge of reality can arise in ordinary beings by the three valid
sources of knowledge: "direct perception, inference, and the testimony
of trustworthy persons." 34
This last, the testimony of trustworthy persons, is almost unique to
the strict adherents to the system of Maitreya and Asanga. 35 Dignaga
does not accept it as a separate and independent source of knowledge.
Indeed, it is dependent upon the fact that it does not contradict direct
perception and inference for its asserted validity. The qualifier
"trustworthy" is an important clue to this since presumably the
criterion for trustworthiness is accordance with direct perception and
inference. Dignaga, then, eliminates testimony as an independent valid
source of cognition, limiting himself and his followers to direct per-
ception and inference alone.
Moksakaragupta explains these two as follows:

This (valid cognition) is twofold: indeterminate (pratyaksa, i.e., perception or direct

knowledge) and determinate cognition (anumfina, i.e., inference or indirect knowl-
edge). Pratyaksa is (a compound which can be analysed into) aksatia pratigata, i.e.,
"connected with or depending on the sense-organ", aksa here standing for indriya
(sense-organs) called eyes, ears, nose, tongue and skin. Knowledge brought about by
them is named indeterminate cognition (or direct perception). 36
By m~tna (of anum~tna) is meant that an object is measured by this means. The
(prefix) anu- is in the sense of "later". That is to say, "after" having grasped a logical
mark and having remembered the connection between the mark and that which
possesses the mark, we get, regarding the concerned locus such as a mountain,
knowledge which refers to an object not directly perceived. This knowledge is meant
by the term "inference."37
 THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF APOHA 267

This is in direct conflict with the positions held by the Ny~ya and
~ma~_rnsh thinkers. The Nyfiya hold that there are four valid sources
of knowledge -- perception, inference, testimony, and analogy. 38 the
Vaigesika agree only with the first two, rejecting analogy and sub-
suming testimony under inference. 39 The MimS.msfi maintain that there
are five valid sources of knowledge -- inference, analogy, implication,
testimony, and non-perception. 4° Without going into the details of
each of these, we can briefly say that of the Ny~ya sources Dignaga
would probably subsume both analogy and testimony under inference.
Of the Mimfunsfi sources he would probably subsume analogy, impli-
cation and testimony all under inference and either reject non-percep-
tion altogether or subsume it under perception.
Dharmakirti explains perception as being direct knowledge, i.e.,
knowledge which is free of both illusion and cognitive constructs. 41
Dharmottara in his commentary to this explains that the cognitive
constructs referred to by Dharmakirti are mental acts which either are
or could be accompanied by a verbal expression. By including the
group of potentially verbally accompanied mental acts, the mental acts
of the very young and the mute are included in the definition of
cognitive constructs. 42 As for illusions, Dharmakirti gives an interesting
set of examples of the causes of illusions: color-blindness, rapid
motion, travelling on board a ship, and sickness. 43
Moks~karagupta in discussing the point makes it clear that the
criterion involved in the designation of a thing as illusory is that of its
effectiveness. An illusory experience is one which does not correspond
to something which is really effective, e.g., an illusory flame cannot
burn. However, a non-illusory perception is one which does corre-
spond to something which is effective "in time, space and fOITfl. ''44
Dharmakirti then explains that there are four kinds of direct
knovcledge.45 These are: sensations per se, the mental awareness
directly following on the sensation, self-awareness and yogic intuition
in deep meditation. 46 This last is the key to all Buddhist practice since
it is what allows for direct and full understanding and experience of
the Four Noble Truths. 47
Moks~karagupta stresses this point when he says:

Meditation practice means to imagine (an object) repeatedly in the mind. The
268 R . K . PAYNE

knowledge which is produced on the termination of the intensive meditation on the

truth is devoid of determining factors (i.e., cognitive constructs) and non-erroneous
(i.e., non-illusory). The true object is the four-fold noble truth named pain, the causes
(of pain), the extinction (of pain), and the way to the extinction? 8

P A R T I C U L A R AND G E N E R A L

F o r the logicians the real is m o m e n t a r y and effective. 49 It is utterly

unique and is the basis of perception. T h e real is the object of direct
knowledge, and concerning it D h a r m a k i r t i says that:

(Concerning direct knowledge) its object is the (extreme) particular.

That alone (i.e., the extreme particular) represents ultimate reality.
Because the essence of reality is just efficiency.
Different from it is the universal character.
It (i.e., the universal character) is the province of indirect knowledge (i.e., inference). 5°
M o k s ~ k a r a g u p t a explains at greater length:

It is to be known that the fourfold indeterminate knowledge has as its object the
particular. The particular here means the unique characteristic of a reality which is
determined in space, time and form. The following is meant by this statement: (To
take the example of) a jar, its particular characteristics may be described as follows: it
is capable of containing water, etc.; is manifested before us as particularly determined
in space, time and form; is free from ideas, impermanence and others; and as object
of our purposive action, is distinct from things both of the same and of a different
class.51

Since what is real is the b a s e of perception, there can be no false

perceptions. 52 H o w e v e r , these p e r c e p t i o n s of the real are prelinguistic
and preconceptual. 53 T h e m o m e n t a r y and effective reals are utterly
unique and individual, and, therefore, c a n n o t b e generalized about.
T h e y are n o t the universals which are the basis of language and
concept. 54 Linguistic thinking being b a s e d on c o n c e p t s and n a m e s is
entirely s e p a r a t e f r o m p e r c e p t i o n which is b a s e d on the m o m e n t a r y
and effective real individuals. 55 T h e s e two, the universal linguistic
c o n c e p t s and the specific inexpressible percepts, are the only two
sources of k n o w l e d g e a c c e p t e d by Dignaga and his followers, and
once we u n d e r s t a n d this sharp and c o m p l e t e distinction b e t w e e n the
real particular and the linguistic universal we are in a position to see
that the idea of a p o h a only applies to the c o n c e p t u a l realm. C o n c e p t s
have nothing to do directly with the real realm of the m o m e n t a r y
 THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF APOHA 269

particulars, and therefore our ordinary notion of meaning as being the

reference of a word to a real objective entity is not appropriate to our
attempt to understand apoha.
When then does a word refer to? For Dignaga it does not in any
literal sense refer, but rather exists in a mutually supporting relation
with a conceptual construct. Dignaga states, "Speech is born out of
conceptual construction and conceptual construction is born out of
speech. T M This latter conceptual construct is what claims to have the
misleading qualities of permanence, identity and objective external
reality. Dignaga identifies five kinds of conceptual constructs: proper
names, class concepts, quality concepts, action concepts, and sub-
stance concepts27 A proper name such as "Half Dome" distinguishes
the thing so identified on the basis of the name itself. A class concept
such as automobile distinguishes the thing so identified on the basis of
the class identified. "White" distinguishes the thing identified by means
of a quality. A cook is identified by the actions a cook undertakes, i.e.,
cooking. A substance, e.g., a ring, identifies a thing in terms of that
substance, e.g., a ringbearer.
The apparent referring quality of words is, then, only a reference to
one of these five kinds of conceptual constructs. Words can never
refer to reals since words are basically class names which are unable
to identify a unique particular. Also, the real supposedly referred to
has long ago disappeared, since it is momentary. Thus in Dignaga's
epistemology there are three main players. There is the momentary
real which is the basis of perception, the conceptual construct pur-
porting to be an object, and the word or concept which refers to the
supposed object.
The importance then of the division between particular and general
for apoha is that it is the negative quality of apoha which provides for
what meaning there is in the relation between word and particular. For
Dignaga this cannot be an affirmative relation alone, but must also
include a negative one of excluding inappropriate associations between
words and other particulars.

NEGATION

For the Buddhist logicians statements are of three kinds. The first kind
270 R . K . PAYNE

are simple affirmative statements, e.g., "This book is blue." The second
are simple negative statements, e.g., 'q'his book is not red." The third
kind are statements which are negative by implication, e.g., "If this
book is blue, then it is not red."
It is this last conception of negation as negation by implication that
is the key to understanding the assertion that the meaning of a word is
the negation of the opposite. Negation by implication links a simple
affirmation and a simple negation into a necessarily linked pair. To say
"this" is a "book" simultaneously means that it is not anything else, it
is not anything which would fall into the category "not a book." What
is important here is that the meaning of the affirmative and negative
statements are mutually dependent one upon the other, and that the
word differentiates everything in the world into two categories, e.g.,
book and non-book. This differentiation, based on the underlying
connection between affirmations and negations as revealed by negation
by implication, is the differentiation meant by Dignaga in his statement
that the meaning of a word is the negation of the opposite. 58

EXCLUSION

The last concept that needs to be understood is one which appears

to be quite similar to apoha, and was propounded by the Nyfiya-
Vaigesika school. Within their realist's notion of the universal the
Ny~ya-Vaigesika could readily explain the perception of common-ness
as being the inherence of a quality in an object. From this position,
however, it is difficult to explain the perception of differences. Since
they were dependent upon a realist conception of things, the basis
for differences also had to be a quality subsisting in an object. The
difficulty lies in the fact that qualities were understood as being
universals, i.e., common to many or all things. In order to explain
differences, then, exclusion was theorized to be an actual universally
present quality, which by being present in all things made them all
different from one another. This quality of exclusion could easily be
misunderstood as being much the same as apoha since they both work
to distinguish things from each other. Yet this similarity is only
superficial. 59
The difference between the two ideas lies in the different meta-
 THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF APOHA 271

physical systems which underlie them. Exclusion is a material quality

inhering in a real abiding external object. It is perceived by the subject
as the distinction between objects which are otherwise similar, e.g.,
two bottles cast from the same mold. Apoha, on the other hand, is a
description of the way in which concepts mean. Apoha is subjective
and related to the way in which thought works, while exclusion is
objective and related to the qualities of external objects. What is
thought to be a real abiding externally present material object by the
Ny~ya-Vaigesika is explained as only being a conceptual construct by
the Buddhists.

SUMMARY
These supporting concepts enable us to much more adequately
understand the meaning of apoha. First, a sharp distinction is drawn
between the real and the conceptual; the real is particular, unique,
momentary and the basis of perception, while the conceptual is
universal, general, only supposedly objective and the basis of language.
Second, the complex nature of negation discloses the kind of negation
meant by apoha. Negation by implication is seen as disclosing the
necessary relation between simple affirmations and simple negations. It
is in this sense that Dignaga asserts that the meaning of words lies in
the negation of the opposite. Third, the idea of apoha as the differen-
tiation of concepts is to be distinguished from the Ny~ya-Vai~esika
notion of exclusion as a materially present quality in objects.
Ratnakirti, and Moksflkaragupta following him, use the idea of
negation by implication to explain apoha as the simultaneity of and
logical relation between a positive assertion concerning an episte-
mological object and a negative assertion concerning all things which
are not that epistemological object. For example, Ratnakirti in
accordance with the theory of apoha explains that the term cow
"harbors" the negation of non-cow in the same way that blue is
harbored in the term blue lotus. The exclusion of the other, i.e., the
negation of the non-cow, is held by Ratnakirti to be an actually
apprehended attribute of the cow cognized (as distinct from the cow
in itself). He says "... discrimination of non-cow inevitably arises
simultaneously with the perception of the cow, for (the negation of
272 R.K. PAYNE

non-cow) is the qualifier (of the individual). ''6° This interaction

between the positive and the negation of the other, i.e., the relation of
negation by implication, as a simultaneous interaction is necessary lest
when, e.g., asked to tie up a cow one ties up a horse instead.
Moksftkaragupta denies three possible interpretations of apoha
before putting forth his own definition. The first is that when an
external object is conceptualized this is done as "the other (the
dissimilar) is discriminated from this. ''61 The second is much the
same, only it is in terms of the mental image, i.e., the epistemological
object rather than the ontological object as in the first. The third
is that apoha means the negation of an assertion, i.e., the simple
absence of the other. All three of these interpretations are unaccept-
able to MoksS.karagupta. He defines apoha as "the affirmation (of
a positive entity) qualified by discrimination (of it from all other
entities)." 62
MoksS_karagupta goes on to explain this simultaneity more fully:

• . . those who stress affirmation think that after we have known the cow, we con-
sequently determine the discrimination of the essence of the cow from that of the
non-cow; those who stress the negative function of apoha are of the opinion that we
first know the discrimination of the dissimilar thing and then consequently confirm the
thing which is discriminated from others, viz., the cow. Thus (both interpretations) are
wrong• For at the time of judgment we do not experience an order of comprehension
in which (negation or affirmation) occurs first. In fact, it is not the case that one,
having understood the affirmation, later confirms the negation by implication, or that
one having understood the negation later confirms what is discriminated (from the
dissimilar). Therefore, we say that the very understanding of the cow is the same as
the understanding of what is discriminated from the dissimilar.63

We can see from this that for Ratnakirti and MoksS.karagupta

apoha meant the simultaneous affirmation of and negation of the
dissimilar from the (epistemological) object. Moksftkaragupta's concern
with the "time of judgment" also shows that the idea of apoha was
understood by them as being psychologically descriptive. In the
process of identifying an epistemological object as some particular
thing, neither the negative nor the positive function have priority but
are, rather, complementary one to the other. This simultaneity and
complementarity are supported by the examination of mind "at the
time of judgment," i.e., it is a psychological description of the process
of identification of an epistemological object as some particular thing.
 THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF APOHA 273

It is this fact of apoha describing the process of identification

which, as described above, places apoha in the inference category of
sources of truth. Apoha is clearly, therefore, involved with words and
concepts rather than being on the perception side where it would have
to be a metaphysical concept describing the real or absolute.
Putting the idea of apoha into contemporary terms we can say that
it is a psychological descriptor for the bipolar relation of concepts.
Dignaga and the other Buddhist logicians are then to be understood
here as being involved in producing a phenomenological description
of linguistic thought processes. More broadly, as in the discussion of
perception, they are involved in the phenomenological description
of consciousness, a favorite Buddhist undertaking. As such, the
work of the Buddhist logicians fits into the larger soteriological
intention of all Buddhist thinkers, since enlightenment is understood
to follow from insight into the nature of consciousness as productive
of suffering.
Some authors have criticized the logicians as being overly con-
cerned with the un-Buddhist occupation of arguing. 64 However, when
their work is seen as expanding our understanding of the nature and
working of consciousness, the logicians are certainly worthy of our
respect.

APPENDICES: COMPARISON WITH THE THOUGHT OF SARTRE

Although the comparison of Buddhist ideas with those of Western

must always be carefully done, it can at times add to our under-
standing. While facile or glib comparisons all too often suppress real
differences, if the contexts of ideas are taken into account and simi-
larities beyond purely superficial ones are still found, then we have a
firm ground for making assertions about the identitity of the ideas
being compared.
The idea from Western thought which most closely approaches
Dignaga's apoha is Sartre's nrgatit~s. In his major work on existential
philosophy Being and Nothingness, Sartre is attempting to work out
the ontological relation between Being and nothingness. In this inquiry
he finds nothingness present in Being: "Nothingness lies coiled in the
274 R.K. PAYNE

heart of being -- like a worm. ''65 The presence of nothingness in Being

is experienced as what Sartre refers to as negations.

The function of negation varies according to the nature of the object considered.
Between wholly positive realities (which however retain negation as the condition of
the sharpness of their outlines, as that which fixes them as what they are) and those in
which the positivity is only an appearance concealing a hole of nothingness, all
gradations are possible. In any case it is impossible to throw these negations back into
an extra-mundane nothingness since they are dispersed in being, are supported by
being, and are conditions of reality. Nothingness beyond the world accounts for
absolute negation; but we have just discovered a swarm of ultramundane beings which
possess as much reality and efficacy as other beings, but which inclose within them-
selves non-being.66

In relation to human being negations are called by Sartre

"nrgatitrs." "There is an infinite number of realities which are not only
objects of judgment, but which are experienced, opposed, feared, etc.,
by the human being and which in their inner structure are inhabited
by negation, as by a necessary condition of their existence. We shall
call them n~gatit~s." 67 The strongest parallel with Dignaga's apoha
comes when Sartre explains that human beings: " . . . u s e nrgatitrs to
isolate and determine existents -- i.e., to think t h e m . . . - 6 8 Nrgatit~s
are not only then the basis for purely negative judgments but also
establish for " . . . wholly positive r e a l i t i e s . . , the sharpness of their
outlines...,,69 The origin of negation is human consciousness itself. 7°
The ability to create nrgatitrs is that which discriminates human
consciousness from the continuity of Being. This ability to negate
Being is what disengages human being from its past, thereby establish-
ing human being irrevocably in freedom. 71
It seems then that apoha could be extended to include the way in
which human consciousness is able to create freedom from karma.
The binding nature of karma is similar to the causal continuity of
Being for Sartre. Where Sartre finds the reality of freedom to lie in
the ability of human consciousness to negate Being through negatites,
the Buddhist thinkers might have seen in apoha (as the integral
relation of positive and negative elements within meaning) a key to
breaking out of the causal chain of karma.
Dharmakirti indeed developed a similar thought. Since ignorance is
the basic factor in binding one to karma, once the mind is freed of
 THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF APOHA 275

ignorance and has direct insight into reality then one has achieved
enlightenment, i.e., freedom. 72 The thought constructions of the mind
are similar to the realities of the world in the sense that the reality as
defined as a not-non-A is similar to the thought construction A. E.g.,
the collection of utterly unique realities which we call (as thought
constructions) tables are each in reality not a non-table. This " . . .
similarity is an unreal relation, to be sure, and yet, its destruction
constitutes freedom in a meaningful sense, since by breaking the
unreal relation between mind and its constructions, one is able to
destroy the conceptualizing faculty of mind, and to achieve direct
insight into the things-in-themselves which constitute the flux of
reality." 73
The major difference between Sartre and the Buddhist logicians lies
in the latters' soteriological concern. Although a soteriological orienta-
tion has been developed by some of the existentialists (particularly
the existential psychologists and theologians) around the ideas of
authenticity, and good and bad faith, Sartre has no such concern
himself. His notion of freedom while like enlightenment avoided by
most people through the distractions of daily life 74, is not something
which should be worked toward. In other words Sartre's analysis of
human being is a descriptive one while that of the Buddhists is
normative.

HISTORICAL AND BIBLIOGRAPHIC APPENDIX

The information which follows concerns the important Buddhist

thinkers in India who wrote on apoha. The format used to present this
information is:
name in Sanskrit name in Tibetan
(dates, authority abbreviations given below)
title of work on apoha in Sanskrit title in Tibetan
translator(s) name(s) (number in Peking
catalog)
Abbreviations for dates are:
V for Vidhybhusana, N for Nakamura (in Potter), B for Bhattacharya
(in Potter), P for Potter, S for Sharma, and F for Frauwallner
276 R.K. PAYNE

In addition to the sources cited in the text, the following sources

were used to compile this appendix:
Karl H. Potter
The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, vol. 1, Bibliography
Motilal Banarsidass, 1970
Erich Frauwallner
"Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic"
Wiener Zeitschrifl fur die Kunde Sud- und Ostasiens, Band V,
1961
Catalog to the Peking Edition of the Tibetan Tripitaka Suzuki
Research Foundation
1. Dignaga Phyogs kyi glang po
(V: c. 500AD, N: 400 to 480, F: 480 to 540, S: c. 400AD)
Pramfmasamuccaya Tshad ma kun las btus pa
Tr: Gser gyi go cha, Dad pahi shes tab (P. 5700)
Pram~.nasamuccayav.rtti Tshad ma kun las btus pa hgrel
pa
Tr: Gser gyi go cha, Dad pahi shes rab (P. 5702)
Tr: Vasudhararaksita, Seng rgyal (P. 5701)
2. Dharmakirti Chos kyi grags pa
(V: c. 635 to 650AD, F: 600 to 660, S: c. 550)
Pram~navfirttikakfirikfi Tshad ma rnam hgrel gyi tshig
lehur bcas pa
Tr: Sabhfitisrisfmti, Dge bahi blo gros (P. 5709)
Pramfmav~rttikavrtti Tshad ma rnam hgrel gyi hgrel pa
Tr: apparently unknown (P. 5717a)
3. Devendrabuddhi (Devendrabodhi) Lha dbang blo
(V: c.650AD, F: 630 to 690)
PramS. av~rttikapafijik~ Tshad ma rnam hgrel gyi dkah
hgrel
Tr: Subhfitisri, Dge bahi blo gros (P. 5717b)
4. Subhagupta apparently not translated
(F: 720 to 780, N: 650 to 750)
Any~pohasiddhi
 THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF APOHA 277

5. Santaraksita Shi ba htsho

(V: 749AD, F: 725 to 788, N: 680 to 740, S: c. 700)
Tattvasarn.grahak~rikfi De kho na nyid bsdus pahi tshig
lehur byas pa
Tr: Gunfikarasribhadra, Dpal lha btsan pa, Shi ba hod
(P. 5764)
6. Kamalasfla (Tibetan name not identified)
(V: c. 750, F: 740 to 795, N: 700 to 750, S: c. 725)
Tattvasaqa. grahapafijikfi De kho na nyid bsuds pahi dkah
hgel
Tr: Devendrabhadra, Grags hbyor shes rab (P. 5765)
7. Kalyfinaraksita Dge srungs
(V: c. 829AD, S: c. 829)
Anyfipohavicfirakfirikfi Gshan sel brtag pahi tshi lehur
byas pa
Tr: apparently unknown (P. 5744, not
5774 as given
in Peking catalog
index)
8. Dharmottara Chos mchog
(V: c. 847AD, N: 730 to 800, F: 750 to 810, S: c.800)
A(nyfi)pohanfimfiprakarana Gshan sel bashes bya bahi rab to
byed pa
Tr: Skal ldan rgyal po, Blo ldan shes rab (P. 5748)
9. Karn.akagomin apparently not translated
(S: c. 875)
Pramfinavfirttikasvavrttit~fi
10. PrajfiS_karagupta Shes rab hbyung gnas sbas pa
(B: early 10th century, V: c. 940, S: c. 750)
Pramfinavfirttikfilamkfira Tshad ma rnam hgrel gyi rgyan
Tr: Skal ldan rgyal po, Blo ldan rgyal po (P. 5719)
translation revised by: Kumarasri, Hphags pa shen
11. Jfifinasrimitra (Tibetan name not identified)
(B: 982 to 1055, S: 1025)
278 R . K . PAYNE

Vajrayanakoti dvayapohanama Rdo rje theg pahi mthah gnyis sel

bashes bya ba
Tr: apparently unknown (P. 4537)
both Sharma and Potter give the author's work on apoha as
Apohaprakaran. a, but this was not found in the Peking
12. Ratnakirti apparently not translated
(V: c. 940 to 1000, P: early l l t h century, S: 1050)
Apohasiddhi
13. Sankarfinanda (Tibetan name not identified)
(V: c. 1050AD, P. 1050)
Apohasiddhi Sel ba grub pa
Tr: Manoratha, Blo ldan shes rab (P. 5754)
14. Moksfikaragupta Thar pahi hbyung gnas kyi sbas pa
(V: c. l l 0 0 A D , P: 1100)
Tarkabhhs~ Rtog gehi skad
Tr: Dpal ldan, Blo gros brtan pa (P. 5762)

GLOSSARY

This glossary gives the English, Sanskrit and Tibetan for technical
terms used in the text. It is not intended to be a definitive statement of
the best equivalents of terms, but rather a guide to the differing usages
of the translators of the various works quoted in this paper.
It was not possible to establish definite or full Tibetan equivalents
in all cases. Where I have constructed the Tibetan, this is indicated by
placing it in parentheses and following it with a question mark. Where
only a partial equivalent was possible this is indicated by placing both
of the equated parts in parentheses.
In addition to the works cited in the body of the text, the following
references were used for this glossary:
Takashi Hirano
An Index to the Bodhicaryfivat~ra Pafijik~, Chapter IX
Suzuki Research Foundation, 1966
Gadjin M. Nagao
Index to the Mahgtyfina-Sfitrfilarhkfira
Nippon Gakujutsu Shink6-kai, 1961
 THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF APOHA 279

R. Sasaki, compiler
Mah~vyutpatti, and Index
Suzuki Research Foundation, Reprint Series, n.d.
analogy
upamfina
nye bar hjal ba
concerned locus
dharmin
(chos can?)

determining factors
kalpanfipodha
rtog pa dang bral ba
exclusion
visesa
khyad par, khyad par dang bcas pa
four fold noble truth
caturfiryasatya
hphags pahi bden pa bshi po
general
sfimfinya
spyi
heterogenous example
vipakse sattvam
(mi mthun pahi phyogs la yod pa?)
homogenous examples
sapakse sattvam
mthun pahi phyogs la yod pa
ideas
dharma
chos
imagine
samfiropa
sgro btags pa, sgro hdogs pa, hdogs pa
280 R.K. PAYNE

implication
arthfipatti
don gyi(s) go ba
inference
anumfina
rjes su dpag pa
logic
pramfina
tshad ma
logical mark (probans)
linga
rtags
meditation practice
bhfivanfi
sgom pa
momentariness
ksanika
skad cig ma (nyid)
(negation by) implication
arthfipattital~.
don ma yin par (h)byung ba
non-perception
anupalabdhi
mi dmigs pa
particular
svalaksana
• •

rang gyi mtshan nyid

perception, direct perception
pratyaksa
mngon sum
purposive action
pravrtti
hjug pa, hbyung ba
 THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF APOHA 281

reason
hetu
rgyu, rgyu mtshan
space, time and form
desak~lfik~raniyata
(desakfila -- yul dang dus)
subject (of a thesis)
dharmin
(chos can?)
testimony
sabda
sgra
that which possesses the mark (probandum)
lingin
(rtags can?)
thesis
paksadharmatva
phyogs kyi chos
those who stress affirmation
vidhiv~din
(vidhi -- cho ga)
those who stress the negative function of apoha
niv.rttyapohav~din
(niv.rtti -- ldog (pa), ldog par bya (ba))
universal
sfimfinyalaksana
spyihi mtshan nyid
valid sources of knowledge
pram~na
tshad ma

NOTES AND REFERENCES

R. S. Y. Chi, Biddhist Formal Logic, p. 31. Luzac, 1969.
282 R.K. PAYNE

2 Masaaki Hattori, Digndga, On Perception, p. 12. Harvard University Press, 1968.

3 G. Tucci, On Some Aspects of the Doctrines of Maitreya(natha) and Asanga, p. 52.
University of Calcutta, 1930, Reprinted by the Chinese Materials Center, Inc., San
Francisco, 1975.
4 Douglas D. Daye, 'Buddhist Logic,' p. 127. In Charles Prebish, editor, Buddhism: A
Modern Perspective, pp. 127 to 132. Pennsylvania State University Press, 1975.
5 I. M. Bochenski, A History of Formal Logic, pp. 4 3 1 , 4 3 7 . Translated and edited by
Ivo Thomas. Chelsea Publishing Co., 1970.
6 S. C. Vidyabhusana, A History oflndian Logic, p. 235. Motilal Banarsidass, 1970,
See also Daye (4), p. 127.
7 G. Tucci, Pre-Dinnaga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources, p. ix,
Gaekwad's Oriental Series. No. XLIX, 1929. Reprinted by the Chinese Materials
Center, Inc., San Francisco, 1976, see also Tucci (3), p. 70.
s Hattori (2), p. 4; and Bochenski (5), pp. 435 to 437.
9 Vidyabhusana (6), p. 284
l0 Paul Edwards, Editor in Chief, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 4, p. 514.
Macmillan Publishing Co. and The Free Press, 1972.
11 D. N. Shastri, Critique oflndian Realism, p. 1. Agra University, 1964, See also,
Tarthang Tulku, "A History of the Buddhist Dharma," p. 59. In Crystal Mirror, vol. 5,
pp. 3 to 330, Dharma Publishing, 1977.
12 Tfiranfitha, History of Buddhism in India, p. 229. Translated from the Tibetan by
Lama Chimpa and A. Chattopadhyaya, and edited by D. Chattopadhyaya Indian
Institute of Advanced Study, 1970. And, Bu-ston, History of Buddhism, part two, p.
152. Translated from the Tibetan by E. Obermiller, Materialen zur Kunde des
Buddhismus, vol. 18, 1931. Reprinted by the Suzuki Research Foundation, n.d.
13 For Dignaga see: Bu-ston (12), pp. 150 to 151; T~ran~tha (12), pp. 182 to 184;
and Tarthang Tulku (11), pp. 77 to 78. For Dharmakirti see: Bu-ston (12), pp. 154 to
155; Tfiranfitha (12), pp. 237 to 239; and Tarthang Tulku (11), p. 80. Summaries of
each are also given by A. K. Warder, Indian Buddhism, pp. 454 to 468. Motilal
Banarsidass, 1970.
14 S. Dasgupta, A History oflndian Philosophy, vol. 1, p. 310. Cambridge University
Press, 1932, Reprinted by Motilal Banarsidass, 1975.
is D. N. Shastri (11), pp. 6 to 7. Also, Th. Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of
Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word "Dharma", pp. 23 to 24. Royal Asiatic
Society, 1923, Reprinted by Motilal Banarsidass, 1970. And, P. S. Jaini, "The
Vaibh~sika Theory of Words and Meanings," pp. 95 to 96. In Bulletin of the School
of oriental and African Studies, pp. 95 to 107, 1959.
15a S. Chatterjee and D. Datta, Introduction to Indian Philosophy, p. 315. University
of Calcutta, 1960.
16 Heinrich Zimmer, Philosophies oflndia, p. 607. Princeton University Press, 1967.
17 Diana Paul, "An Introductory Note to Param~rtha's Theory of Language," ms. p.
14. To appear in the Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 7, 1979.
18 This version of the idea was taught to me by an instructor in Sanskrit at an ashram
in San Jose. The instructor was American rather than Indian and had received his
own training somewhere in San Francisco.
19 S. Radhakrishnan and Chas. Moore, A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy, pp. 488
to 489. Princeton University Press, 1957.
 THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF APOHA 283

20 These arguments are a bit simpler to follow if one remembers that in Sanskrit
every letter in a word is pronounced and therefore has a sound.
21 Radhakrishnan and Moore (19), p. 356.
22 H. Zimmer (16), p. 608.
23 Radhakrishnan and Moore (19), p. 356.
24 Chatterjee and Datta (15a), p. 163.
25 Radhakrishnan and Moore (19), p. 370, m.m.
26 H. Zimmer (16), p. 608.
26a Karl H. Potter, Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, vol. 2, p. 138. Princeton
University Press, 1977.
27 K. N. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, p. 313. George, Allen and
Unwin, Ltd., 1963. Quoted from the Maffhima Nikaya.
28 Jayatilleke (27), p. 313.
29 K. Ch'en, Buddhism in China, A Historical Survey, pp. 134 to 135. Princeton
University Press, 1964.
30 Paul (17) ms. pp. 11 to 12.
31 Warder (13), p. 448.
32 Dharmakirti, Nydya-Bindu. Translated from the Sanskrit by Th. Stcherbatsky. In
Buddhist Logic, vol. 2, p. 1. Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., c. 1930; published
as parts I and II of Vol. XXVI of the "Bibliotheca Buddhica" Reprinted by Dover
Publ. Inc., 1962.
33 Warder (13), p. 455.
34 C. Bendall and L. de la Vallee Poussin, "Bodhisattva-Bhfimi, A Text-Book of the
Yogacara School, (Summary)," p. 221. Le Museon, vol. VI, 1905, pp. 38 to 52, and
vol. VII, 1906, pp. 213 to 230. And, Janice Dean Willis, On Knowing Reality, the
Tattvdrtha Chapter ofAsatiga's Bodhisattvabhumi, p. 74. Columbia University Press,
1979.
35 Tucci (3), pp. 68 to 69.
36 Moksfikaragupta, An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy (Tarkabhdsd), p. 29,
m.m. Translated from the Sanskrit and Tibetan by Yuichi Kajiyama, Memoirs of the
Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University, 1966.
37 Moksfikaragupta (36), p. 30, m.m.
3s Dasgupta (14), pp. 332 to 355.
39 Dasgupta (14), pp. 354 to 355.
4o Dasgupta (14), pp. 387 to 399.
4~ Dharmakirti (32), p. 14. See also, Bimal K. Matilal. Epistemology, Logic, and
Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis, pp. 38 to 39. Mouton and Co. N.V.,
Publ., The Hague, 1971.
42 Dharmakirti (32), pp. 19 to 20.
43 Dharmakirti (32), pp. 24.
44 Moksgtkaragupta (36), p. 43.
45 Dharmakirti (32), p. 25. And, Moks~karagupta (36), pp. 44 to 54.
46 Dharmakirti (32), pp. 25 to 33.
47 Charlene McDermott, "Yogic Direct Awareness as Means of Valid Cognition in
Dharmakirti and Rgyal-tshab," p. 149. In Minoru Kiyota and Elvin W. Jones (eds.)
Mahdy~ina Buddhist Meditation: Theory and Practice, pp. 144 to 166 University Press
of Hawaii, 1978.
284 R.K. PAYNE

Moks§karagupta (36), p. 53, m.m.

49 Stcherbatsky (32), vol. 1, p. 184.
50 Dharmakirti (32), p. 33 to 38, m.m.
5~ Moksfikaragupta (36), p. 56, m.m.
52 Matilal (41), p. 39.
53 Shastri (15), p. 344.
54 Shastri (15), p. 345.
55 Matilal (41), p. 37.
56 Matilal (41), p. 40.
57 Matilal (41), p. 35 and p. 41.
58 D. Sharma, The Differentiation Theory of Meaning in Indian Logic, pp. 34 to 35.
Mouton and Co. N.V., Publ., The Hague, 1969.
59 Shastri (15), pp. 314 to 318.
60 Ratnakirti, Apohasiddhi, p. 55. Translated by D. Sharma from the Sanskrit. In
(58), pp. 47 to 101.
61 Moksfikaragupta (36), p. 122.
62 Moks,~karagupta (36), p. 123, m.m.
63 Moks~karagupta (36), pp. 123 to 124.
64 Edward Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, p. 265. University of Michigan Press,
1962.
65 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 21. Translated from the French by H.
E. Barnes. Philosophical Library, 1956.
66 Sartre (65), p. 21.
67 Sartre (65), p. 21.
68 Sartre (65), p. 27.
69 Sartre (65), p. 21.
70 Klaus Hartmann, Sartre's Ontology, p. 51. Northwestern University Press, 1966.
71 Hartmann (70), p. 52.
72 Karl H. Potter, Presuppositions oflndia's Philosophies, pp. 188 to 189. Prentice-
Hall of India (Private) Ltd., 1965. Reprint of Prentice-HaU, Inc., U.S.A. edition, 1963
73 Potter (72), p. 189.
74 Sartre (65), p. 43.