IB Extended Essay History: Indonesian 1965-66 Massacre

A Study of American Intervention in Indonesian Affairs in the 1960s
“How valid is Marshall Green’s position on CIA involvement towards the 1965-1966 mass
killings of the Indonesian Communist Party members?”
History
Word Count: 4000

Table of Contents
Introduction ............................................................................................................ 2
Background ............................................................................................................ 3
The Lists.................................................................................................................. 5
Financial and Military Aid .................................................................................... 9
Propaganda ........................................................................................................... 12
Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 15
Bibliography ......................................................................................................... 17
1
Introduction
Over the past 53 years, an increasing amount of evidence has arisen that supposedly
exposes the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) as collaborators in the 1965-66 mass killings
of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) members. However, despite such evidence, there
were still a number of US officials that have vehemently denied any role in the PKI killings.
One such official is former US ambassador in Indonesia, Marshall Green. In Michael Wines’
1990 New York Times article, Green regarded journalist Kathy Kadane’s account of the
killings as false and said that the CIA had not been involved in the ordeal.1 Green has since
released a number of statements denying further disinvolvement in the killings including the
release of the lists containing the names of PKI members that the Indonesian military used to
carry out the assassinations. To the casual reader, it would seem that Green’s claims are to be
discarded since evidence clearly says otherwise. However, it is worth noting that Green was
the former US Ambassador in Indonesia and should definitely have some merit in his words.
Therefore, it leads readers to question, “How valid is Marshall Green’s position on CIA
involvement towards the 1965-1966 mass killings of the Indonesian Communist Party
members?”
Although the incident itself happened more than half a century ago, families today
still have not received any form of compensation for their loss. Reaffirming the involvement
of the CIA in these killings would allow justice to be brought on the families. Additionally,
revealing the true operations of the CIA would raise discussions on how they should function
today. Discussion on matters such as the extent the CIA is allowed to interfere in another
country’s affairs could possibly prevent another 1965 from happening on a more drastic
scale. Unveiling the truths about the incident could also encourage a concern among
1
Michael Wines, “C.I.A. Tie Asserted in Indonesia Purge by Michael Wines.” The New York Times, July 12,
1990, https://www.nytimes.com/1990/07/12/world/cia-tie-asserted-in-indonesia-purge.html.
2
Indonesians to be more aware of government plans in the event that it might be harmful to
them. It encourages political awareness that could also potentially stop another 1965.
Among the different perspectives present in this event, of course the two most
prominent would be those who believe the US had intervened and the report as testified by
officials. Notable sources that defend the former position include Franklin B. Weinstein,
pioneers of Indonesian studies in the US based in Cornell University, as well as Kathy
Kadane who is an acclaimed journalist on the killings. Naturally, those defending the latter
would include Green himself and other CIA officials like Marks Mansfield. However, with
analysis of both perspectives, the final verdict of the event should be that Green’s testimony
is false and that the US did have a role in the PKI killings.
Background
The PKI was a Communist group in Indonesia founded by Dutch colonialist Henk
Sneevliet in 1913 and soon grew to become one of the largest Communist parties in the world
next to China and Russia.2 Since the beginning of his presidency in 1945, Indonesia’s first
president, Sukarno, had allowed the PKI to exist as a party as per his non-alignment
sentiments, meaning he did not stand for any particular ideology. This did not sit well with
the Western powers nor the Soviets as this meant Indonesia did not side with anyone during
the Cold War.3 This disfavour for Indonesia’s non-alignment policy is believed by many to
be the reason the US decided to intervene. The intent of the killings was not only to eradicate
communists, but to ultimately overthrow Sukarno.4 The killings begun after the events of 30
September 1965 where six army generals were assassinated by PKI cadre. The assassination
gave the military incentive to take out the Communist Party supposedly with the help of the
2
Paul Hampton, “Communism and Stalinism in Indonesia.” Workers’ Liberty #61, February, 2000,
http://archive.workersliberty.org/wlmags/wl61/indonesi.htm.
3
Bradley R. Simpson, Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations, 1960-
1968 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 16.
4
Simpson, 174.
3
CIA with the most notable aid being the compiled list of all suspected PKI members. By the
end of 1966, it is presumed that the army had killed somewhere between 500,000 to a million
Indonesians. Not all of whom were PKI members, some being Chinese, intellectuals, artists,
women’s rights groups, as well as many other left-leaning movements.
As previously mentioned, among the contributions the US gave, was the list of PKI
members. Additionally, the US had also provided assistance in the form of financial and
military aid as well as spread anti-PKI propaganda. This would not be the first time the US
had provided assistance to rebel groups in Indonesia. In 1957, the US as well as the UK and
Australia were proven to have given money and weapons covertly to the rebellion groups in
Sumatra and Sulawesi in an event known as the Outer Islands Rebellion.5
As more declassified documents began to make their appearance in public almost 50
years after the events of 1965, more investigations have been made by journalists and other
news outlets on the true role of the US in the killings. Journalists such as Kadane and Wines
have gone on to seek out information straight from the source by interviewing officials such
as former Deputy CIA Station Chief, Joseph Lazarsky, and former embassy employee,
Robert Martens who supposedly distributed the lists himself, and as mentioned previously,
Marshall Green who denied the allegations made on the US more than most officials.
5
“Outer Islands Rebellion,” School of Humanities and Social Sciences, UNSW, July 9, 2009,
https://www.unsw.adfa.edu.au/school-of-humanities-and-social-sciences/east-timor/english/historical-
context/outer-islands-rebellion.
4
The List
As mentioned previously, the US was most notably suspected to have sent out a list
containing the names of suspected PKI members with the intention that the Indonesian Army
would use it to eliminate them. It had already been established by many US officials that the
list was indeed sent out. However, there are many inconsistent statements from these officials
on the death list and any US intention for intervening with the eradication of PKI
communists. Kadane does a good job with compiling multiple officials’ statements in one of
her articles.6 Of the many confessions that confirm US complicity is Howard Federspiel, a
current specialist in Indonesian affairs within the Bureau of Intelligence and Research who
did not deny when asked about the lists saying, “No one cared, so long as they were
communists, that they were being butchered.”7 Aforementioned Joseph Lazarsky and Edward
Masters, former chief of intelligence in the Indonesian embassy,8 also confirmed
contributions from the CIA to create this list.9 However, Lazarsky’s account should perhaps
be taken with a grain of salt as he was apparently unaware that Bob Martens had been the one
to release the list.10 This is definitely suspicious as being Deputy Station Chief, he should
know this information.
Martens confessed to releasing the list on his own accord in a record of US foreign
relations stating “I and I alone decided to pass those ‘lists’ to the non-Communist forces. I
6
Kathy Kadane, “U.S. Officials' Lists Aided Indonesian Bloodbath In '60s,” The Washington Post, May 21,
1990, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/05/21/us-officials-lists-aided-indonesian-
bloodbath-in-60s/ff6d37c3-8eed-486f-908c-3eeafc19aab2/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.c2420e92d402.
7
8
Jimmy Carter, “Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1977,” (Washington:
General Services Administration, National Archives and Records Service, Office of the Federal Register, 1977),
1811.
9
10
5
neither sought nor was given permission to do so by Ambassador Marshall Green or any
other embassy official.”11 This fact could explain why Green and some other higher ranked
officials denied any involvement in the event if Martens had decided to distribute the lists
without any supervising officials knowing.
Oddly enough, despite Martens claiming he never asked Green’s permission to send
the list, there has been records of Green acknowledging the existence of such a list. In the US
National Security Archives, there was evidence of Green sending an airgram on 10 August
1966 to Washington reporting that he was aware of such a list that and commented on
“Indonesian security authorities who [seemed] to lack even the simplest overt information on
PKI leadership at the time.”12 The list Martens had sent had also been a list of top PKI cadre
and that was the list Green had also referenced in his airgram.13 In a report written by the
editorial of Indonesian newspaper, Tempo.co, explained in depth Martens’ collecting
methods including him confessing that he would write names on a card whenever a leader of
a regional group gave a public statement and at the end of the year he would have a collection
of cards.14 Tempo.co itself is a credible publication having been operational since 1995 and
won multiple awards including a Silver Award for “the Best Mobile Media 2011” from the
Asia Digital Media Award in 2011.15 In the article itself, the editorial team had referenced the
declassified US documents that contained information about the involvements of the different
US officials in the mass killings. However, because the authors of the article were generally
laboured as “Tempo.co,” it is difficult to evaluate the credibility of the author themselves.
11
Edward C. Keefer, “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-68 Volume XXVI,” (Historical Document,
Washington, 2000), 386.
12
Thomas Blanton, “State Historians Conclude U.S. Passed Names Of Communists To Indonesian Army,
Which Killed At Least 105,000 In 1965-66,” Washington, D.C., July 27, 2001,
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB52/.
13
14
“G30S:Kisah Diplomat AS yang Bikin Daftar Nama Target Di-dor!,” Tempo.co, October 15, 2015,
https://nasional.tempo.co/read/706409/g30skisah-diplomat-as-yang-bikin-daftar-nama-target-di-
dor/full&view=ok.
15
“Tempo.co,” last accessed March 10, 2019, https://www.tempo.co/about.
6
As one might notice, there has been a lack of Indonesian sources being referenced.
This would mostly be due to Indonesian government documents still being classified and a
lack of response from the government concerning the killings even 50 years later. The topic
itself is a sensitive topic in Indonesia and discussion on the topic is limited.
However, contrary to Green’s statement, several accounts mention that Indonesian
officials were fully capable of compiling the list themselves and should therefore not need
CIA help. Author John Hughes who accounted the 1965 coup in one of his books believes
that the Indonesian Army would not need any help locating PKI members as it was common
knowledge at the time.16 Martens also confirms that he compiled the list using the PKI
newspapers that “were available to everyone.”17 Masters echoes this idea as he was certain
that Indonesian military operatives were not “village idiots” needing help from the CIA, or
the US for that matter, in gathering these names.18 It is possible to argue that the US
provision of the lists were useless since apparently the Indonesian Army should have already
known the names of these personnel and so the US would not be held as accountable for
sending an organised list of names to the informed Indonesians. However, even if it was true
that the Indonesian Army had existing knowledge about the PKI, it still does not erase the
fact that the US did provide a list to the Army - be it for easier elimination or additional
information - and were complicit in the killings despite what Green insisted.
Interestingly enough, despite the contradicting statements, there seemed to be a
common theme with officials who confirmed the existence of the lists. They all seemed to
have no idea or denied that the lists were being used as death lists. In one of Kadane’s
articles, she broadly stated that the officials were only made aware that Suharto was using the
16
John Hughes, “The End of Sukarno A Coup That Misfired: A Purge That Ran Wild,” (Singapore:
Archipelago Press, 2002), 152.
17
18
7
list to seek out PKI members after the embassy had sent it out. However, when they were
asked if those sought out members were murdered, the questioned officials had been
“evasive.”19 An instance of this evasiveness can be found in Michael Wines’ article. Wines
reported that when asked about the distribution of the list, Masters had been agreeable saying
that the CIA “knew where the names were going.”20 However, when confronted about
whether or not the officials approved of the list and knew of the consequences it would pose,
he simply stated that he had forgotten since other pressing matters were at hand and this case
“was not No. 1.”21 The answers given by Masters as well as the other officials certainly raise
suspicion since it implies that the embassy knew what the names would be used for, yet either
did not care or maybe even wanted the killings to happen all while hiding behind the excuse
of having to take care of more important matters. Wines himself is a seasoned author on
sensitive, political matters such as the making of US election laws and legislation and has
been writing for The New York Times since 1988.22 Readers can be assured that Wines’
article was not written by a novice on controversies.
Regardless of whether or not officials had been aware of the purpose of the lists, it is
clear that there was indeed a list compiled and sent out despite Green’s denial.
19
20
21
22
“Michael Wines,” https://www.nytimes.com/by/michael-wines.
8
Financial and Military Aid
Initially, the US had offered financial and military assistance in hopes that Indonesia
would finally break away from the non-aligned policy it maintained during the early phases
of the Cold War.23 Sukarno had been steadfast to his non-alignment policy as he - along with
the rest of the Indonesian government at the time - had been deeply suspicious of most
foreign powers especially for a country that had just gotten its independence. In his
presidency, Sukarno had advocated for independence from foreign powers as a full
breakaway from Indonesia’s colonial past or “Nekolim” as he called it which was an
abbreviation of neo-colonialism, colonialism, and imperialism.24 This in turn caused distrust
and skepticism between Indonesia and other foreign powers. Franklin Weinstein elaborates
on this in his book “Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence,” citing that
Sukarno “had never really trusted China”, seeing them as unreliable, instead “using” them for
for aid.25 That was also true for the Soviets. When Khrushchev had decided on his own
accord to publicly criticise Stalin, the PKI had been skeptical of “Moscow’s commitment to
the anti-imperialist struggle.”26 Despite Sukarno’s protests however, aid was still needed
because, as a new country, Indonesia was still not ready to stand on its own. Again, this
launched Indonesia into a non-alignment policy in which aid was received from many
different powers while Sukarno went around vocalising about his distaste for imperialism.27
Of all the powers, however, the US had reacted to this non-aligned policy with the most
vigour.
While compiling his research for his book, Weinstein obtained sources from a number
of Indonesian sources including then foreign minister, Adam Malik as well as having
23
Simpson, 16.
24
Franklin B. Weinstein, “Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence,” (Jakarta: Equinox
Publishing, 2007), 297.
25
Weinstein, 298.
26
Weinstein, 300.
27
Simpson, 16-17.
9
American sources such as those obtained from the Department of Foreign Affairs in the US.28
His balanced research allowed for a clear picture of US-Indonesian relations from both sides.
Weinstein also had the opportunity to collaborate with George Kahin in writing his book and,
as previously established, Kahin was a professor of Indonesian Studies at Cornell University
at the time as a pioneer for the subject.29 Thus, Weinstein’s book is an exceptional source in
detailing the nature of relations between the two countries.
Historically, this would not be the first time the US has given aid to Indonesian rebel
movements. The aforementioned rebel movements in 1957 being a notable example of that.
In one instance, the Indonesian Army had received some $50,000 from the CIA as well as
weapons.30 In fact, Kahin says that “During November and December of 1957 there was a
considerably greater influx of modern US weapons, financed by the United States and
delivered to rebel-held ports by commercial freighters and over the beach by US
submarines,” and many of those weapons remained on Indonesian soil up until the 1965
killings.31 The UK and Australia had also played a hand during the Outer Islands Rebellion.
Jumping forward to 2 December, 1965, there had been records from the State
Department archives that evidence then-Ambassador Green approving Rp 50,000,000 - or
about $27,700 at the time - being handed over to the Kap-Gestapu, the leading rebel military
group against Sukarno.32 Former Secretary of State, Dean Rusk’s October 1965 statement
was brought up in the International People’s Tribunal on Crimes against Humanity Indonesia
1965 held in November 2016 saying that if US support was decisive in the extermination of
28
Weinstein, 13.
29
Weinstein, 14.
30
Audrey R. Kahin and George McT. Kahin, “Subversion as a Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and
Dulles Debacle in Indonesia,” (Washington: University of Washington Press, 1997), 120.
31
Kahin and Kahin, 121.
32
Thomas Blanton, “State Historians Conclude U.S. Passed Names Of Communists To Indonesian Army,
Which Killed At Least 105,000 In 1965-66,” Washington, D.C., July 27, 2001,
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB52/.
10
the PKI, then the US should not “miss the opportunity.”33 The preceding statement provides a
motive for the US to give such support as it had already been established that the US were not
fond of the PKI and therefore wanted them gone. This tribunal was specifically focused on
solving ethical crimes in Indonesia such as the 1965 killings. What the prosecution found was
that in October 1965, “the provision of small arms, communications equipment and medical
supplies” were distributed covertly to the Indonesian Army by the CIA as well as to any
group that had any anti-PKI sentiments.34 However, because the tribunal itself self-
categorised as non-binding, meaning they did not expect the offenders to undergo
consequences, that lack of incentive to condemn offending parties might lead to less thorough
research than perhaps a true court case would. Despite that, the amount of research put into
the tribunal was quite thorough in its resources. The tribunal employed many passionate
individuals, among them being Judge Zak Yacoob, an experienced judge and advocate for
human rights causes such as the apartheid cases in South Africa.35 Despite the thoroughness
of the research and the dedicated panel, however, because it is a volunteer tribunal, it should
not be taken with as much merit as some of the other sources.
Another notable area of aid the US had provided was the funding of SESKOAD or the
Indonesian Army Command and General Staff College. The organisation is a school that
specifically trained ground commanders and acted as the “Indonesian Army nerve center”
where generals would discuss any “organisational and political matters.”36 During the 1965
mass killings, it was SESKOAD commanded by then General Suharto that led the
exterminations. It is also reported that the mentors at the institute had received “manuals and
33
Helen Jarvis and John Gittings, “Final Report of the IPT 1965: Findings and Documents of the IPT 1965,”
(Report, November 2016), http://www.tribunal1965.org/en/final-report-of-the-ipt-1965/.
34
35
“Justice Zak Yacoob,” Constitutional Court of South Africa, last accessed on February 8, 2019,
https://www.concourt.org.za/index.php/11-former-judges/67-justice-zak-yacoob.
36
David Ranson, “The Berkeley Mafia and the Indonesian Massacre,” University of Texas, last accessed
February 8, 2019, http://la.utexas.edu/users/hcleaver/357L/357LRansomBerkeleyMafia.htm.
11
methods” of teaching from American command schools.37 Prior to the killings, around
October 1965, the number of Indonesian officers that had received military training in the US
had been well over 1,200.38 Around this time, a group of Indonesians known as the “Berkeley
Mafia” that had gone to the University of California in Berkeley had returned to Indonesia as
“high-level civilian advisors” to the Army.39 Arguably, the US should not be blamed for
Indonesians deciding to train in the US, but this admittance of Indonesian students into their
schools had been one of the many factors that established and maintained a positive
relationship between the US and Indonesia.40 This relationship had been the highway for all
sorts of help Indonesia had received from the US be it the lists or military aid.
Again, like the lists, Green’s statement about the US not being involved at all is
nullified not only by the many reports on the transactions, but also by the fact that he himself
decided to send money to the Indonesian military.
Propaganda
In terms of propaganda, not only had the US been complicit in the motivation, but had
also collaborated with other Western powers such as the UK and Australia to motivate an
uprising against the PKI. These Western powers, including the US, had placed emphasis on
“psychological warfare” such as utilising propaganda in order to stir a sense of “fear and
confusion” in Indonesian citizens about the PKI as well as the Indonesian Army in hopes that
the PKI would mobilise a coup attempt.41 This would prove as a double benefit as not only
was Sukarno overthrown, but the PKI were also eliminated in the process. The US especially
37
38
Wayne L. Hays, “Report of the Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations of
the Committee of Foreign Affairs,” (Hearing Report, Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1971), 18.
39
40
Wayne L. Hays, “Report of the Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations of
41
Simpson, 157.
12
had been caught “informally trying to persuade” the Indonesian Army to organise “some sort
of action against Sukarno.” 42 And indeed, any motives harboured by the US paired with any
existing suspicions held by the Indonesian military, were enough to topple Sukarno and his
government.43
As stated in the reports from the International Tribunal, the UK had allegedly set up a
“sophisticated propaganda apparatus” based in Singapore that utilised black propaganda and
unofficial ties with other Western outlets.44 Black propaganda can be defined as any false
information spread by a party to antagonise the opposing side such as this case in which the
British spread false information about the PKI to the public. Under their apparatus, they had
also utilised the BBC to broadcast a number of supposed Communist threats as well as
exaggerated accounts of the G30S movement at Lubang Buaya where six army generals were
killed by PKI sympathisers, describing the severely mutilated corpses of the generals with
gouged eyes and castrated genitals.45 Interestingly, copies of the autopsies of these generals
had emerged and showed no signs of the alleged “torture, mutilation and castration” as the
BBC initially reported.46 Like the UK, Australia had also ran a propaganda operation and,
like the UK, it had been biased towards accounts given by the Indonesian Army to the
Embassy which was then relayed back to Canberra and then Radio Australia on the
instructions of Australian Ambassador, Keith Shann.47
Using communication channels previously established between the two countries, the
US had motivated and provided moral support for the anti-Communist movements in
42
Michael R. J. Vatikiotis, “Indonesian Politics under Suharto: The Rise and Fall of the New Order,” (London:
Routledge, 1998), 20.
43
Vatikiotis, 20.
44
45
46
47
13
Indonesia.48 Even up until the 1965 killings, the US had been supportive and even
encouraged the mass killings.49 However, in terms of propaganda, the Indonesians seemingly
did not need much help as Suharto did a good job of spreading anti-Communist propaganda
of his own through his hold of the Indonesian media. It was no secret that Suharto’s rule was
authoritarian in nature and that included the closing of a third of Indonesian newspapers with
the remaining outlets subjected to “an intricate, if chaotic, web of security restrictions and
draconian legislation.”50 Yet, despite Suharto’s efforts in spreading his own propaganda, the
US and the other Western powers still took it upon themselves to spread more propaganda.
Bradley Simpson accounts in his book “Economists with Guns: Authoritarian
Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations, 1960-1968” a collaboration between the US
and UK had also contributed in the spreading of a rumour that a coup was to ensue, aimed to
overthrow Sukarno.51 An instance of this rumour being spread was in a letter from Howard
Jones to William Bundy in which Jones stated that he caught wind of plans for a coup from
the Indonesian Army leaders and suggested Bundy report it to Sukarno.52 Despite the news of
a coup being no more than a ruse, this action made clear to the Indonesian Army where
American support lied in the anti-Communist movement.53 Simpson’s work has been cited a
number of times especially in reference to the mass killings as he is the founder of the
declassification effort at the National Security Archive, seeking to declassify US government
documents on Indonesia and East Timor during Suharto’s rule.54 Because he has such access
to government files, the sources he used in his book came from those files as proven by the
48
Wayne L, Hays, “Report of the Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations of
49
Simpson, 16.
50
Kjersti Haraldseide, “Old ways in the New Days? How the 1965/66 massacres are covered in the Indonesian
press today,” (master’s thesis, University of Oslo, 2014), 2.
51
Simpson, 159.
52
Howard Jones to William Bundy, April 23, 1965, in Foreign Relations 1964-1968, Volume XXVI, Indonesia;
Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xxvi/4444.htm
53
Simpson, 159.
54
Bradley Simpson, “Bradley Simpson,” last accessed March 10, 2019, https://history.uconn.edu/faculty-by-
name/bradley-simpson/.
14
example of the letter he referenced. Hence, he would be a reliable author to look at when
researching the massacres.
Although other countries were also involved in the spreading of propaganda about the
PKI, that still does not erase the fact that the US had also played a hand in the distribution of
false information. Again, Green’s point is rendered invalid as the US did have a role in the
rising tension between Indonesian Army and the PKI.
Conclusion
It is through thorough analysis of reports accounting for the death lists, financial and
military aid, as well as propaganda that the US can be proved as complicit in the 1965-66
killings despite Marshall Green’s insistence otherwise. Investigating the attitudes US officials
had on the PKI allowed for insight into their motives and those motives led to the creation of
a list confirmed by Martens, the alleged distributor of said list. Those same motives also led
to the US providing financial and military aid in the form of military training for SESKOAD
ranks and the provision of weapons. Finally, in addition to the US contributing funding, they,
along with other Western powers, worked together to not only ensue hatred for the PKI, but
to also encourage the PKI into initiating a coup in order to have an excuse to kill them off.
Now that it seems as though the US were at least somewhat involved in the mass
killing operations of 1965-66, the next step would be to consider the consequences of said
involvement. However, that begs the question of the extent of such consequences. Would a
simple payment of money compensate for the loss of families? Should the US and other
countries guilty of a similar crime be put under a set of rules to prevent another calamity?
Moreover, there is the added matter of questioning if the US can be justified in their
intervention. Could it have been reasonable for the US to aid the Indonesian Army in killing
15
the PKI? Confirming the US’s involvement in the massacre is a feat easier accomplished than
justifying its necessity.
16
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IB Extended Essay History: Indonesian 1965-66 Massacre

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IB Extended Essay History: Indonesian 1965-66 Massacre

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A Study of American Intervention in Indonesian Affairs in the 1960s

killings of the Indonesian Communist Party members?”

Word Count: 4000

Financial and Military Aid .................................................................................... 9

pioneers of Indonesian studies in the US based in Cornell University, as well as Kathy

women’s rights groups, as well as many other left-leaning movements.

Sumatra and Sulawesi in an event known as the Outer Islands Rebellion.5

As more declassified documents began to make their appearance in public almost 50

Masters, former chief of intelligence in the Indonesian embassy,8 also confirmed

know this information.

without any supervising officials knowing.

editorial of Indonesian newspaper, Tempo.co, explained in depth Martens’ collecting

laboured as “Tempo.co,” it is difficult to evaluate the credibility of the author themselves.

itself is a sensitive topic in Indonesia and discussion on the topic is limited.

However, contrary to Green’s statement, several accounts mention that Indonesian

Interestingly enough, despite the contradicting statements, there seemed to be a

article was not written by a novice on controversies.

breakaway from Indonesia’s colonial past or “Nekolim” as he called it which was an

abbreviation of neo-colonialism, colonialism, and imperialism.24 This in turn caused distrust

as previously established, Kahin was a professor of Indonesian Studies at Cornell University

detailing the nature of relations between the two countries.

delivered to rebel-held ports by commercial freighters and over the beach by US

Department archives that evidence then-Ambassador Green approving Rp 50,000,000 - or

not be taken with as much merit as some of the other sources.

decided to send money to the Indonesian military.

instructions of Australian Ambassador, Keith Shann.47

Bradley Simpson accounts in his book “Economists with Guns: Authoritarian

Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations, 1960-1968” a collaboration between the US

declassification effort at the National Security Archive, seeking to declassify US government

researching the massacres.

rising tension between Indonesian Army and the PKI.

justifying its necessity.

Blanton, Thomas. “State Historians Conclude U.S. Passed Names Of Communists To

Central Intelligence Agency. Weekly Summary Special Report: Suharto's Indonesia.

"Indonesia: Vengeance with a Smile." TIME Magazine. July 15, 1966.

Simpson, Bradley R., Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and

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