Angelaki

Journal of the Theoretical Humanities

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Deleuze and Love

Hannah Stark

To cite this article: Hannah Stark (2012) Deleuze and Love, Angelaki, 17:1, 99-113

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0969725X.2012.671669

Published online: 18 Jun 2012.

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 ANGEL AK I
journal of the theoretical humanities
volume 17 number 1 March 2012

illes Deleuze’s scattered writings on love sit

G uncomfortably in conventional understand-
ings of his work yet, I claim, they may have
unrealised potential for both scholars of his work
and theorists of intimacy more generally.
Although much work on sex and sexuality is
underpinned by Deleuze and Guattari’s concept
of desire, only recently have Deleuze’s writing on
love been theorised.1 This is perhaps not
surprising, as his work on love may appear to
be at odds with both his anti-humanism and his
refusal to regard the human subject as either
stable or coherent. But this is the case only if love
is imagined to require ‘‘the human’’ and ‘‘the
subject’’ to perform it, or if such matters are
presumed to be absent from Deleuze’s work.
Examining Deleuze’s comments on love is
hannah stark
important because love itself needs to be
subjected to more rigorous critical investigation.
In a 2007 lecture on love at the European
Graduate School, Michael Hardt suggested that DELEUZE AND LOVE
the academic reluctance to theorise love has not
only limited how it is understood but also
engendered critical resistance to intellectual complete but also – and more problematically –
work in the area (‘‘About’’). This problem has natural and inevitable. Love needs to be inter-
been caused partly by ideological investments in rogated, however, precisely because it is imbri-
the way in which love has been socially organised, cated in a network of discourses about gender,
particularly in conventional attitudes to both sexuality, patriarchy, capitalism and the family.
romantic and familial love.2 In the West, This is particularly important in the Western
Zygmunt Bauman argues, love is understood philosophical tradition, which, by constructing
predominantly in terms of sexual difference, and love as a metaphysical concept, enables its
the generative power of penetrative heterosexual problematic ideological investments to pose as
intercourse in reproduction (25). ‘‘The dominant both foundational and unchanging. What is lost
contemporary notions of love,’’ Hardt agrees, ‘‘do by positioning love in these ways is an acknowl-
indeed conceive love as [. . .] a process of fusion edgement of the various social and historical
or merging’’ (‘‘Red’’ 2). In this framework the constructions of both love and the practices of
heterosexual couple is represented as two com- loving.
plementary halves of the one whole. This The way in which love has traditionally been
structure positions heterosexuality as not only organised, in heterosexual couples and nuclear

ISSN 0969-725X print/ISSN1469-2899 online/12/010099^15 ß 2012 Taylor & Francis

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0969725X.2012.671669

99
 deleuze and love
families, is socio-historically specific and there-
fore subject to change. Although models of free,
radical, or ‘‘transgressive’’ love indicate that
normative ideology has failed to monopolise the
‘‘naturalness’’ of heterosexual love, they are
subject to the same contingencies. The various
ways in which love can be both imagined and
enacted is facilitated by the critiques of these
normative structures. As Kelly Oliver argues:
[o]ur relationships, family structures, and
family dynamics change when we can imagine
them differently; and as we recreate our
families outside the restrictive and unrealistic
ideal of the nuclear family, we transform our
images of ourselves, our relations to others,
and the possibility of love. (16)
This is not just a matter of imagining different
structures. It also involves acknowledging that
transgressions of these repressive structures are
already occurring, although our current identitar-
ian systems of meaning and value render them
unintelligible. This is because any deviation from
normative systems, no matter how minuscule,
reveals their failure by questioning the assump-
tion that they are culturally universal and/or
biologically innate.
Deleuze’s work on love, I claim, provides a
radical framework for thinking about human
intimacy, as it is premised on the proliferation
of difference and is part of his project of critiquing
identity and identitarian systems. Before extra-
polating the particularity of Deleuze’s sustained
interest in love, which I will address in the final
section of this article, I will offer a context into
which this work can be placed. In the first section
of the article I examine Deleuze’s philosophical
position on identity and difference. If the
Deleuzian subject is commensurate with the
ontology proposed in Difference and Repetition,
then it is founded on a metaphysical difference
that undermines identity as anything but a
momentary congealing in time. How, I ask,
might the extremely abstract subject that
Deleuze proposes, a subject who can make no
claim to identity, be considered to have a capacity
for relating to others? Furthermore, how might
this subject be capable of intimacy and love? In
the second section of this article, and in response
to these questions, I will extrapolate the trajectory
of Deleuze’s critique of the self/Other relation
from his early publications (‘‘Description’’;
‘‘Statements’’) to his important (and much
criticised) later work on Tournier, which appeared
in the appendix to The Logic of Sense, and the
concluding remarks in the fifth chapter of
Difference and Repetition: ‘‘Asymmetrical
Synthesis of the Sensible.’’3 I then turn to the
infrequent, yet important, references that Deleuze
has made to love throughout his writings in which
it becomes central to the negotiation of difference
and novelty.
This may all sound too humanist an investiga-
tion to be appropriate to Deleuze’s work;
however, as this trajectory demonstrates, this
line of investigation has been present in his work
since his earliest publications. My interest in this
article is in how Deleuze’s work not only accounts
for a radical relationality between people but also
advances new resources for speculating about the
kinds of ethical practices, and the forms of
intimacy, that might be possible.
difference and identity
In Difference and Repetition Deleuze demon-
strates the existence of difference outside of the
ways it is captured in ‘‘identity, opposition,
analogy and resemblance’’ (29). To conceive of
difference solely in terms of these categories is to
ignore the difference that, Deleuze suggests,
subsists beneath them: ‘‘a swarm of differences,
a pluralism of free, wild or untamed differences; a
properly differential and original space and time’’
(50). The goal of a philosophy of difference, he
writes, is to ‘‘rescue difference from its maledic-
tory state’’ (29) and to reveal the underlying field
of differential relations.
Deleuze theorises difference in this way in
order to challenge the metaphysical place of
identity. He does this through a sustained
critique of Hegel.4 This can be seen as one of
the outcomes of his work on the history of
philosophy (particularly as it is established in his
work on Spinoza, Nietzsche, and Bergson), which
systematically demonstrates that there is another
philosophy of difference whose legacy operates
counter to the Hegelian dialectic. Deleuze argues
100

that Hegel conceived of difference as infinitely
large by figuring it dialectically as contradiction,
which positions difference at its absolute max-
imum (Difference 44). Quoting from Science of
Logic, on which his criticism of Hegel in
Difference and Repetition is principally based,
he writes: ‘‘[d]ifference as such is already
implicitly contradiction [. . .] receiving in contra-
diction the negativity which is the indwelling
pulsation of self-movement and spontaneous
activity’’ (Science 442 qtd in Difference 44;
emphasis Deleuze’s). For Deleuze, a model of
difference which exists always at the (infinitely
large) limit of contradiction and enables self-
constitution through negation is a ‘‘logical
monster’’ in the service of identity (Difference
49). The process of negation as formulated in
Hegel’s dialectic determines that things always
contain what they are not as part of their essence
(Difference 45–46). Although this structure
allows for endless encounters with difference,
they are always aimed squarely at the horizon of
identity (which can never be reached). ‘‘Hegel’s
circle is not the eternal return,’’ Deleuze writes,
but ‘‘only the infinite circulation of the identical
by means of negativity’’ (50).
What Deleuze offers in place of Hegel’s
dialectical understanding of difference is an
ontology of difference and repetition, founded
on the idea that difference is the origin of all
things. ‘‘[D]ifference is behind everything,’’
Deleuze writes, ‘‘but behind difference there is
nothing’’ (57). Significantly, Deleuze does not
deny the existence of identity as it is experienced.
Bryant confirms that:
Deleuze is quite happy to say that representa-
tion, identity and recognition are real phe-
nomena of our experience. We recognize
things. We identify things. We represent
things. If we did not do these things, then
there would be no problem of representation
and identity. (5)
For Deleuze, however, identity can never be more
than a secondary and temporary effect, because
being is difference itself (Difference 50).
‘‘Being,’’ Deleuze writes, ‘‘is said in a single
and same sense of everything of which it is said,
but that of which it is said differs: it is said of
101
stark
difference itself’’ (36). In this version of the
world, identity is only ever a momentary illusion
which undermines the ontological reality of
incessant difference.
In light of Deleuze’s ontology of difference and
repetition, locating the possibility of a functional
subject in his work is a daunting task. Deleuze is
deeply suspicious of the subject because he
considers it (like God) to be a ‘‘stronghold of
transcendence in modern philosophy’’ (Neil 429).
He worked on the history of philosophy partly in
order to create a system in which transcendent
entities such as this would have no place. It is not
that subjectivity is absent in Deleuze’s work; he
just did not want to confer on it metaphysical
primacy which would make it a transcendent
principle. This is because he regards the subject
as always the effect of other processes, both micro
and macro. What this means, Bryant concludes,
is that ‘‘the subject cannot function as the
ultimate ground’’ (178).
The subject that Deleuze elucidates in
Difference and Repetition is the one which he
considers best suited to his ontology of difference
and repetition, in which identity is not a primary
manifestation but only ever a secondary effect.
This subject cannot be constrained by identitar-
ian frameworks because it is always caught in the
process of becoming different. In this text he
continues his preoccupation with a radically
constructivist notion of subjectivity, which is
evident, significantly, in his early monograph
Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on
Hume’s Theory of Human Nature. Along these
lines, Deleuze’s interest in Difference and
Repetition is in those processes and forces over
which the subject has limited control, but which
nonetheless constitute it along constructivist
lines.
The residual subject of Difference and
Repetition is ‘‘larval,’’ because it exists beneath
and prior to a subject endowed with the capacity
to act. This larval self is therefore the condition of
all actions. ‘‘Selves are larval subjects,’’ Deleuze
writes; ‘‘the world of passive syntheses constitutes
the system of the self, under conditions yet to be
determined, but it is the system of a dissolved
self’’ (Difference 78). This needs to be con-
textualised with Deleuze’s work on the Image of
 deleuze and love
thought, in which he insists that thought does not
emerge as evidence of the interiority of a
Cartesian subject but instead exists as a response
to the problems which the world generates.
Deleuze concludes that thought can be sustained
not by a fully developed subject like Descartes’s
cogito (118) but only by a larval subject. This is
because Deleuze thinks that the dynamism
required for the resonance of discordant series
(which is central to both the processes of
individuation and the manifestation of difference
through different/ciation) can be experienced
‘‘only at the borders of the livable’’ (ibid.). It
occurs ‘‘under conditions beyond which it would
entail the death of any well-constituted subject
endowed with independence and activity’’ (ibid.).
It is for this reason that Deleuze (and Guattari)
return repeatedly to the figure of the embryo,
which, although incomplete, can sustain pro-
cesses of becoming different which a fully
constituted adult cannot. The embryo can there-
fore be seen to ‘‘live the unlivable’’ (Difference
215), because it embodies a flexibility which
enables it to differentiate in a manner which a
fully formed adult would find impossible.5 The
larval subject can also access the dynamism
manifested by the embryo because it is not a fully
constituted and stable self but only a ‘‘rough
draft’’ (Desert 97). Instead of enabling the self to
consolidate into a subjective identity, the differ-
ential power of Ideas turns it into larvae. This is
because ‘‘larvae bear Ideas in their flesh’’
(Difference 219). This larval subject is capable
of enacting difference in ways inconceivable for
the Enlightenment model of subjectivity. It
cannot be the foundation of thought precisely
because it is only the effect of other processes; it
is the site rather than the source of thought.
For Deleuze, the recognisable subject is
replaced by those processes of individuation in
which difference is unfolded. His subject is
premised on the rejection of those aspects of
subjectivity which constitute the liberal indivi-
dual (such as agency, self-knowledge, consistency,
coherence, and the ability to effect change rather
than be affected by it). In this respect he appears
to embrace extreme abstraction. However,
because he already theorises the ‘‘I’’ and the
‘‘Self’’ as abstract universals, his imperative is to
address more adequately the concrete differences
which compose the world and undermine all
knowable form. His point is that the ways in
which the Self is deployed limit our engagement
with a deeper level of difference. But there is a
more significant problem with the ‘‘I’’ and the
‘‘Self’’: in ignoring the processes of individuation
which operate beneath their assumed coherence
they are ‘‘defenceless against a rising of the
ground which holds up to them a distorted or
distorting mirror in which all presently thought
forms dissolve’’ (Difference 152).
Nevertheless, Deleuze’s rendering of subjectiv-
ity is extremely abstract, with his subject
remaining a slippery theoretical figure. If identity
is rejected on a metaphysical level, what does this
mean for the potential for a Deleuzian subject-in-
process to engage with other subjects-in-process?
If ethics can be seen to exist in the relational
space between individuals, what capacity is there
for Deleuze’s subject to relate to others in a
meaningful way? How can this subject be
imagined to offer anything to our understanding
of human intimacy and love? The capacity to
envisage intersubjective relations in the context
of Deleuze’s work is what occupies me in the next
section of this article.
the otherwise other
Deleuze’s work on the possibility of relationality
between his radically abstract subjects is evident
in his consideration of the figure of the Other.
Exploration of self/other relations, and what this
indicates about subjectivity, provides the founda-
tion for his comments about love. The figure of
the Other is perhaps one of the most contested
aspects of his work. Deleuze’s own ambivalent
treatment of the Other is mirrored in the field of
Deleuze studies, which is split between those who
claim Deleuze’s work on the Other is the basis of
ethics, and those who think that his apparent
eradication of the Other is both ethically and
politically problematic.6 This seeming annihila-
tion of the Other poses a significant challenge to
much twentieth-century philosophy, and to
ethical theory in particular, in which the Other
has come to occupy such a privileged position.
102

Deleuze’s first engagement with the Other is
located in his early work on Sartre, whom he
describes as the ‘‘first great philosopher of the
Other’’ (Logic 366 n. 12). In Deleuze’s relation-
ship to Sartre, Faulkner detects both ‘‘fidelity’’
and ‘‘betrayal’’ (‘‘Deleuze’’ 25) because, although
Deleuze greatly admired Sartre, he ultimately
distanced himself from Sartre’s conceptualisation
of the self/Other relation.7 Articles translated as
‘‘Description of Woman: For a Philosophy of the
Sexed Other’’ and ‘‘Statements and Profiles’’
indicate that his engagement with Sartre had
begun prior to 1945. These publications fit
awkwardly into the Deleuzian oeuvre.
Notwithstanding Faulkner’s rigorous defence of
these texts, to describe their gender politics as
problematic is an understatement because their
position on women is essentialist and conspicu-
ously equates women with the flesh. It must be
remembered, however, that Deleuze was in his
very early twenties when he first published them,
and that Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex
had not yet appeared in French. It is also worth
considering that they may never have been re-
published and translated into English if Deleuze’s
subsequent work had not attracted so much
attention. They certainly cannot sustain much
critical interrogation. Nevertheless, they make
interesting reading in relation to feminist cri-
tiques of Deleuze, particularly by Jardine and
Braidotti.8
What Deleuze initially found attractive was
Sartre’s focus on the structure of alterity, and his
construction of it as an ontological rather than
epistemological concern (Boundas, ‘‘Foreclosure’’
340). ‘‘Deleuze approves,’’ Boundas writes, when
‘‘Sartre offers the constitution of the self as a
problem to be solved, instead of an answer to a
non-existing question’’ (ibid.). Deleuze was
hesitant, however, about the place of ‘‘looking’’
in Sartre’s work. This is evident when he objects
that Sartre’s formulation of subject/object rela-
tions assumes a ‘‘reciprocity of consciousness’’
(‘‘Description’’ 17), which enables the Other to
be recognised as another subject. In the
Deleuzian schema, it also became problematic
to figure the Other as another subject, because
such a structure is not only limiting but also
ontologically compromising. These attitudes are
103
stark
commensurate with Deleuze’s repeated example
that there is no ‘‘person’’ to be fatigued: there is
fatigue, ‘‘and that is all’’ (ibid.).9 In The Logic of
Sense he writes:
The error of philosophical theories is to reduce
the Other sometimes to a particular object,
and sometimes to another subject. (Even a
conception like Sartre’s, in Being and
Nothingness, was satisfied with the union of
the two determinations, making the Other the
object of my gaze, even if he in turn gazes at
me and transforms me into an object.) (307)
Deleuze attempted to demolish Sartre’s concep-
tion of the subject by arguing that, because
‘‘things do not have to wait for me in order to
have their signification’’ (‘‘Description’’ 17), the
Other must exist independently of its function in
subject/object relations: that structure is thereby
made redundant. This critique emanates from his
own theory of differential relations, which achieve
their potential by eradicating structural bound-
aries such as subject and object.
This must also be read in the context of
Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism, which does
not concern itself with the lived experience of a
stable subject (Difference xx) because it is a way
of thinking about experience that does not depend
on the distinction between subject and object.10
Boundas claims that Deleuze always values
empiricism more highly than phenomenology
(‘‘Deleuze’’ 5). The reason for this is evident in
Elizabeth Grosz’s insight that Deleuze’s work is
not part of the affective turn, which she clarifies
as phenomenological, because of the value it
confers on a subject who experiences (252). For
Deleuze, there is no subject who experiences the
objective world: there is only experience. Because
experience is not internal to a subject, it operates
transcendentally on a plane of immanence.
Colebrook explains: ‘‘Deleuze argues that there
simply is the givenness of the world. From this we
might distinguish subjects and objects but this
would always be after the event’’ (58; emphasis in
original). This implicit critique of Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology, which posits a subject
who experiences the objective world, was to be
continued and developed in Deleuze’s work on
Tournier’s Friday.
 deleuze and love
Published in French in 1967, and translated
into English in 1969, Tournier’s Friday is an
early postmodern reworking of Defoe’s Robinson
Crusoe, which examines how the stranded
protagonist relates to his surroundings in the
absence of other people. Friday interests Deleuze
precisely because the absence of the Other
enables its role to be examined (Logic 307).
Deleuze separates the ‘‘a priori Other’’ (ibid.;
emphasis in original), which is the possibility of
the Other in a structural sense, from the
‘‘concrete Other’’ (318; emphasis in original),
which he describes as ‘‘I for you and you for me’’
(ibid.), and in this way he distinguishes the
general from the particular. The a priori Other
precedes the manifestation of subjects and
objects, which are subsequently organised
through this structure. The Other is therefore a
mediating structure which organises the percep-
tual field: bringing into existence things which
the subject cannot perceive, it offers them as
potential objects of desire (Logic 305–06). The
Other therefore structures the world for us in
such a way that, according to Levi Bryant, we
become social subjects (15). This anticipates a
claim subsequently made by Deleuze and
Guattari: namely, that desire is social, and that
its current organisation into heterosexual couples
and nuclear families is socio-historically specific
(Anti-Oedipus).
Because the Other structure is a priori,
Reynolds thinks that Deleuze’s exclusion of it
from the transcendental field of difference and
repetition is unsustainable (‘‘Deleuze’s’’ 81).
However, I would argue that Deleuze positions
the Other structure as a social rather than a
metaphysical a priori. What is significant is that
he is not claiming that the Other structure is not
part of our lived reality; rather, it is a secondary
manifestation which, to a certain extent, renders
coherent the complexity of the differential
relations of difference and repetition. The Other
which Deleuze rejects is, therefore, not other
people per se, but the a priori Other as the
general category. Deleuze illustrates this through
the figure of Tournier’s Robinson, whose desire,
in the absence of other people, becomes ‘‘solar’’
(Logic 318): it is an ‘‘elemental’’ sexuality
(Tournier, Friday 211; emphasis in original).
At this point Robinson encounters the ‘‘otherwise
Other’’ (Logic 319), the ‘‘real structure of
alterity’’ (Boundas, ‘‘Foreclosure’’ 341). Deleuze
describes this as ‘‘not an Other, but something
wholly other’’ (Logic 317), that ‘‘otherwise
Other’’ which is revealed when the structure of
the Other is erased. The function of Friday in
Tournier’s text becomes evident here. Robinson
finds himself otherwise only when he stops
organising his world thorough the structure of
the a priori Other.11 Re-birthing from the womb
of Speranza, he re-directs his desire into copulat-
ing with the ground, in what Jardine describes as
a ‘‘cosmic orgy’’ (57): discovering beneath
Speranza another island, he encounters in
Friday the otherwise Other.12 Only by abandon-
ing the Other structure can he encounter the
otherwise Other in their difference.
What Deleuze’s work in ‘‘Description of
Woman’’ and ‘‘Statements and Profiles’’ has in
common with his later work on Tournier (and
with Difference and Repetition) is the descrip-
tion of the Other as ‘‘the expression of a possible
world’’ (Logic 309). This is a phrase that he will
also use in relation to love. Deleuze himself
attributes the expression to Tournier, referring in
1945 to the unpublished manuscript of Friday
(‘‘Description’’ 23 n. 3). There are also strong
Leibnizian resonances in this notion of possible
worlds, although the key difference between
Deleuze and Leibniz comes to the fore here in
such a way that Deleuze’s own concept of
difference comes into relief. Whereas for
Leibniz the world is inherently harmonious
(because only compossibility exists in an actual
sense), for Deleuze compossibility and incompos-
sibility co-exist fundamentally. Consequently,
divergence can be reconfigured positively as a
condition of possibility (Difference 123). Deleuze
insists that the endless divergence within
sequences can be affirmed as part of the series
itself (56). This enables incompossibles (or
alternative possible worlds) to diverge from,
rather than contradict, one another (48).
This revision of Leibniz is critical to under-
standing Deleuze’s use of ‘‘possible worlds.’’ As
Deleuze and Guattari point out in What is
Philosophy?, Leibniz’s possible worlds are not
endowed with reality (17). For Deleuze, however,
104

the Other as the expression of a possible world is
a potential and affective reality. The same
example is used in The Logic of Sense and
Difference and Repetition, where a terrified face
exemplifies the expression of an alternative
relation to the world which Deleuze describes as
a frightening ‘‘possible world’’ (Logic 307;
Difference 260). In this way, he writes, ‘‘our
possibles are always Others’’ (Difference 260).
Because the subject annihilates its own possible
world every time it encounters the one presented
by the Other, the self is never more than a ‘‘past
world’’ (Logic 310). ‘‘The mistake of theories of
knowledge,’’ Deleuze concludes, ‘‘is that they
postulate the contemporaneity of subject and
object, whereas one is constituted only through
the annihilation of the other’’ (ibid.).
Deleuze regards the individual as an expressive
structure. It is ‘‘[i]ndeterminate, floating, fluid,
communicative, and enveloping-enveloped’’
(Difference 258). This focus on expression enables
him to avoid crediting the Other with the internal
and coherent consciousness which he denies
subjectivity. This enables Deleuze to posit the
other person in such a way as to preserve an
unrepresentable residue, thereby preventing them
from being incarcerated in fixed categories of
identity. ‘‘What remains ‘unthought’ and ‘out-
side’ representation,’’ Lambert writes, ‘‘is pre-
cisely the difference that is implicated and
enveloped (interiorized) in the idea of another
possible world that the Other Person expresses as
a reality’’ (33; emphasis in original). This is
centrally important to how Deleuze challenges the
place afforded the subject in Western metaphy-
sics. Individuals express possible worlds through
affect and sensation, therefore the notion of the
self as interiorised thought has no traction in his
schema. This is not the relation between subject
and object, nor self and Other, nor subject and
subject: it is between expressive individuals. What
matters is how the Other expresses a world: such
expressions occur regardless of whether or not
there is a subject to ‘‘receive’’ it.13 As a result of
its continuous relations with others, the Deleuzian
individual exists in a constantly unfinished state
of individuation. Consequently, Deleuze’s use of
the term ‘‘individual’’ cannot be understood as a
form of self-contained individualism.
105
stark
It is in the context of the perspectivism of
Leibniz’s monad that Deleuze describes the
individual as expressive. The Leibnizian indivi-
dual contains Ideas and intensities, but expresses
only a portion of them with clarity, thus leaving
the rest obscure. It expresses its perspective on
them without benefit of a subject to do the
expressing: there is only the expression itself. In
this way, the immanent world becomes populated
with differing expressions of the same virtual
whole. Individuals express their perspectives
through a necessarily vague assemblage of affects
and sensations. Whenever we encounter another
individual, we come into contact with the way
another person affectively engages with their
surroundings. Our own empirical engagement
with the world is unique, Deleuze argues, and is
broadened by witnessing how other individuals
both engage in and articulate their own affective
experiences of the world. ‘‘The duty of the other
(if one may speak of duty),’’ Bogue writes, ‘‘is to
affect and be affected, to suspend, as much as one
can, the categorization and comprehension of the
other, and to open oneself to the undetermined,
hidden possible worlds that are expressed in the
affective signs of the other’’ (Deleuze’s 13).
Deleuze’s rejection of the structural Other in
favour of the otherwise Other indicates the
importance he places on the particularity of
other people as complicated, and, at times,
incoherent, entities. In this way he gives value
not to what conforms to the rigid ideal of what a
subject is but to how our relation to others reveals
the fallacy of the stable, identitarian subject.
Deleuze insists that the existence of other people
(as expressions of possible worlds) is what enables
further individuation to be experienced because it
is premised on the explication and proliferation of
difference. By denying the self any significant
role, Deleuze elevates the importance of other
and different expressions of the world
(Difference 281).14
love
Love cannot be described as a dominant theme in
Deleuze’s work. However, its significance is
twofold. First, Deleuze had an enduring interest
in love, returning to it repeatedly. This is evident
 deleuze and love
in his earliest articles, throughout the develop-
ment of his own philosophy of difference, and in
his collaborative publications with Guattari (and
Parnet). This brings me to my second point: for
Deleuze, philosophy, particularly reading (and
mutating) the history of philosophy, was a
process of love. In Negotiations, in his letter to
Michel Cressole, he makes the link between doing
philosophy ‘‘in his own name’’ and the undoing
of the subject which I have been discussing in this
article. ‘‘Individuals,’’ he writes,
find a real name for themselves, rather, only
through the harshest exercise in depersonaliza-
tion, by opening themselves up to the multi-
plicities everywhere within them, to the
intensities running through them. A name as
the direct awareness of such intensive multi-
plicity is the opposite of the depersonalization
effected by the history of philosophy;
it’s depersonalization through love rather
than subjection. What one says comes
from the depths of one’s ignorance, the
depths of one’s own underdevelopment.
(Negotiations 6–7)
This is, I think, a beautiful sentiment. Here
philosophy is divorced from the prerogative of
mastery and becomes an act of love. It is at those
moments when the self is undone, and we are
confounded with what is unknown (rather than
what is known), that thought and creativity
become possible.15
Deleuze makes explicit the connections
between love, subjectivity and otherness in his
earliest publications. ‘‘Description of Woman’’
is, as I have already indicated, an engagement
with Sartre’s notion of the Other, but, more
specifically, it is a critique of his work on love.
‘‘Statements and Profiles’’ continues to develop
these themes. Faulkner outlines that this
opposition to Sartre’s notion of love signals
Deleuze’s refusal to privilege consciousness and
therefore is consistent with his continual
imperative to undermine Western Philosophy’s
privileging of the subject (Faulkner,
‘‘Introduction’’ 86). For Deleuze, to love some-
one is to find in them the particular, rather than
the general, to locate not what makes them
cohere as a subject but what undermines this
coherence. In this way, love is an important
illustration of how Deleuze envisages the
capacity for intersubjective relation.
What also becomes apparent in these early
articles is the connection between the other as an
expression of a possible world and love. This
becomes important to his explication of love in
both The Logic of Sense and Difference and
Repetition. ‘‘There is no love,’’ he writes, ‘‘which
does not begin with the revelation of a possible
world as such, enwound in the other which
expresses it’’ (Difference 261).16 In both these
texts Deleuze relates this to the figure of
Albertine in Proust’s Remembrance of Things
Past (Logic 308; Difference 261). By bringing to
bear on this reference Deleuze’s most extended
treatment of love in Proust and Signs, we can
understand how love functions in his work as a
whole. Deleuze’s book on Proust describes love as
an apprenticeship to signs (Proust 7). This is
intelligible as part of his general theory of
signification, which states that signifiers artifi-
cially over-code a field of difference. Love, here,
is conceived of as a process of deciphering. Its
function is to expose that flux of difference,
which, instead of consolidating subject/object or
self/Other positions, results in a process of
depersonalisation (Proust 37).
Deleuze returns to love again in Capitalism
and Schizophrenia. The extended examination of
love in these latter publications illuminates in
particular Deleuze’s own work on the self/Other
relation and will be important to the ethical scope
of his work that I will outline in my concluding
statements. The examination of love in both
volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia is
conducted outside the confines of the coded
system of psychoanalysis. Love is a central
concept in Anti-Oedipus, Protevi argues, because
it is ‘‘anti-Oedipality itself’’ (187). In this text
Deleuze and Guattari attempt to liberate love
from Oedipal configurations of it. ‘‘Sexuality and
love,’’ they write ‘‘do not live in the bedroom
with Oedipus, they dream instead of wide open
spaces’’ (116). This is commensurate with
Deleuze’s critical interest in ‘‘perversion’’ in
both The Logic of Sense and ‘‘Statements and
Profiles.’’ Both these texts examine the multiple
ways in which desire and love can function when
106

it is no longer the domain solely of heteronorma-
tive couples and nuclear families.17
In A Thousand Plateaus, love attains a
cosmological pitch. In relation to the body
without organs, it appears on a list which includes
‘‘the simple Thing, the Entity, the full Body, the
stationary Voyage, Anorexia, cutaneous Vision,
Yoga, Krishna’’ and ‘‘Experimentation’’
(Thousand 167). Signalling the moment of
openness to a difference which is beyond identity,
analogy, opposition or resemblance, love trans-
cends the principles which determine intellig-
ibility. Love is, therefore, not about recognition
either of the Other or by the Other, but is instead
impersonal. This does not mean that it is not
specific – only that it is concerned with the
eradication of the stable and self-identical subject,
the person, the organism. In this context, Deleuze
and Guattari write of love in terms of lines of
flight into imperceptibility, a point reaffirmed by
Deleuze in his Dialogues with Parnet (46). It is
worthwhile quoting Deleuze and Guattari at some
length on this matter:
One has become imperceptible and clandestine
in motionless voyage. Nothing can happen, or
can have happened, any longer. Nobody can
do anything for or against me any longer. My
territories are out of grasp, not because they
are imaginary, but the opposite: because I am
in the process of drawing them. Wars, big and
little, are behind me. Voyages, always in tow
of something else, are behind me. I no longer
have any secrets, having lost my face, form,
and matter. I am now no more than a line. I
have become capable of loving, not with an
abstract, universal love, but a love I shall
choose, and that shall choose me, blindly, my
double, just as selfless as I. One has been saved
by and for love, by abandoning love and self.
Now one is no more than an abstract line, like
an arrow crossing the void. Absolute deterri-
torialization. One has become like everybody/
the whole world (tout le monde), but in a way
that can become like everybody/the whole
world. One has painted the world on oneself,
not oneself on the world. (Thousand 220–21)
This passage encapsulates the extraordinary range
of Deleuze’s critical attitude to love. The idea of
the double here is reminiscent of his claim in the
107
stark
Tournier piece that the otherwise Other is neither
subject nor object but a true double: ‘‘one who
reveals pure elements and dissolves objects,
bodies, and the earth’’ (Logic 317). In
Dialogues, Deleuze and Parnet examine the
possibility of experiencing love by shattering it
(46): only by abandoning limited notions of love
can new forms of love, desire and connection
become possible. This theme is tied inextricably
to subjective recognition and to the perceptibility
of things within identity categories. What
possibilities might there be for love beyond that
limited notion of it, which socially is coded
(Oedipal) and sanctioned (as reproductive hetero-
sexuality)? What is possible beyond those forms
of love rendered recognisable by that ideology?
More importantly, what possibility is there for a
love which not only does not require the stable
and identitarian subject but is also actively
engaged in undoing that structure? What are
the consequences of this radical construction of
love for Deleuze’s interrogation of subjectivity?
In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari
explicitly connect love to naming. They write that
love is an act of depersonalisation on the body
without organs, and that it is precisely what
makes naming possible. This is because, by
denying recognition and undoing the pretence of
the coherence of identity positions, we can
experience others as multiplicities. By refusing
to confer primacy on identity we can acknowledge
that the changing and multi-faceted desires of
subjects make them complex and incoherent.
This is why Deleuze and Guattari describe love as
‘‘[h]eavenly nuptials, multiplicities of multipli-
cities’’ (Thousand 39–40). The interaction
between lover and beloved is founded on their
unknowability, a condition determined by the
virtual and the process of becoming. In this
context, Watson writes, love is molecular because
it is what dissolves personhood and the subject: it
is ‘‘[i]ntimacy without subjectification’’ (90).
Love, Deleuze and Guattari argue, brings into
existence the ‘‘most intense discernibility in the
instantaneous apprehension of the multiplicities
belonging to him or her, and to which he or she
belongs’’ (Thousand 40).
For Deleuze, the constitutive function of love
generates the proliferation of difference. This is
 deleuze and love
what enables him to depart radically from
philosophical tradition, which represents love in
terms of merging, unity, and recognition. The
encounter with other people, with otherwise
Others, is a process by which the self is
undone.18 The depersonalisation which love
entails eradicates the subject while retaining
both subjectivity and subjective experience.
This is what enables the consolidation of
differences in forms beyond those which are
recognisable and perceptible within our current
identitarian systems. Far from erasing subjectiv-
ity, Deleuze’s work proliferates the possibilities
for subjectivities which are unrecognisable
because they are beyond our current systems
for establishing meaning and ascertaining value.
By refusing to accept the fiction that subjectivity
is stable and that identity can be either
metaphysically definitive or strategically valu-
able, we enable new points of connection to be
made and therefore new assemblages to become
possible. This is why in Protevi’s formulation
love is ‘‘complexity producing novelty’’ (191).
‘‘Love,’’ he writes, ‘‘is the call to enter that
virtual and open up the actual, to install inclusive
disjunctions so that the roads not taken are still
accessible, so that we might experiment and
produce new bodies’’ (184). It is because this
productive relationality is such a radical compo-
nent of Deleuze’s work that ethics is an
important, albeit often implicit, aspect of it.
conclusion: ethics
What I think is important in Deleuze’s references
to love is that they can be read as an illustration
of the ethics that can be located in work. For
Deleuze, love is tied to the notion of novelty, both
in the generation of philosophy as a creative act
and also in the production of new affects and
sensations, new bodies, assemblages and subjec-
tivities, in encounters with other people. In
Difference and Repetition these encounters can
be seen as the location of ethics. Here the ethical
imperative is: ‘‘not to explicate oneself too much
with the other, not to explicate the other too
much, but to maintain one’s implicit values and
multiply one’s own world by populating it with
all those expresseds that do not exist apart from
their expressions’’ (Difference 261). This may
sound like a ridiculously complex way to arrive at
the idea that other people are perhaps unknow-
able, and to confirm that epistemology does
violence to ontology. But it has far-reaching
implications for ethical theory. For what Deleuze
is claiming is that ethical relations are not made
possible by developing better knowledges of
either the Other or of other people. This model
is not identitarian: recognition is neither con-
ferred nor received. Instead, ethics becomes
possible by constantly suspending knowledge,
and reaffirming that suspension in every
encounter.
In focusing on the relations between indivi-
duals in this article I do not want to suggest that
this makes the world more harmonious. Deleuze
does not consider the relations between indivi-
duals harmonious: on the contrary, writes
Reynolds, he ‘‘continually reaffirms the impossi-
bility and failure of all theoretical positions that
presuppose any kind of harmonious connection
between self and world, and self and others’’
(‘‘Deleuze’s’’ 70). This is commensurate with
both his valuing of dissonance and his postulation
of a ‘‘new harmony’’ based on discord (Fold 121).
The relation to other people is not reassuring: we
do not find in others either a reflection of our
self, or a system of identifications, or a structure
of reciprocal recognition. In this sense, refusing
to participate in identity or identitarian systems
can be seen as an ethical prerogative. Deleuzian
ethics acknowledges the differential relations
which compose ontology and undermine identity.
The scope for the realisation of relationality in
Deleuze’s work is particularly significant for
ethical debates, as our capacity to relate to
others, and, more importantly, to those who are
different from ourselves, is a central aspect of
ethical practice. Deleuze’s ontology of difference
and repetition is premised on the refusal of
identity and the continual proliferation of
difference. Because this ontology prevents the
Deleuzian subject from being premised on the
recognition of identity, it becomes open to
difference in a fundamental sense. In this way,
love, as Deleuze theorises it, becomes exemplary
of ethics. Love is the negotiation of alterity
through the explication and generation
108

of difference. Only by abandoning identity can
the subject engage with others in a way that
enables it to experience this alterity comprehen-
sively. A Deleuzian engagement with both others
and the world, Bryant writes, requires us to ‘‘seek
out those gaps, events, traumas, shocks, and
encounters which upset the smooth continuity of
the subject, call its recognition into question, and
introduce it to a domain that is neither that of the
subject nor of the object’’ (266).
It is for this reason that Deleuze rejects the a
priori Other in favour of the otherwise Other. The
version of love he proposes must be seen in this
light: abandoning what is recognisable about both
the self and other people does not limit the
capacity for ethics, politics, human interactions
or even love to be theorised; instead, for Deleuze,
these are the conditions which enable the
realisation of the possibility of love. This
reconfiguration of love necessarily relocates the
ethical relation and the possibi-
lity for intimacy beyond identity
and constructs an ethics in which
difference is not merely enabled
but affirmed.
notes
I would like to acknowledge Jessica Murrell, Ken
Ruthven and MandyTreagus for their helpful com-
ments on this work in its various forms. I would
also like to thank the anonymous Angelaki
reviewer for their careful and insightful reading of
this piece.
1 To date, the most significant treatment of love in
relation to Deleuze’s work is by John Protevi. Love
is also examined in Janell Watson in order to the-
orise what Deleuze and Guattari’s writings on
courtly love mean for intimacy and domestication,
by Stephen Hawkins in relation to the event, and in
a brief vignette on love’s erotics by Todd May in
Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction. John Raymaker’s
Empowering Philosophy and Science with the Art of
Love: Lonergan and Deleuze in Light of Buddhist^
Christian Ethics also examines Deleuze and love
but, in privileging a transcendent religious frame-
work, is at odds with Deleuze’s work.This book is
not in dialogue with the field of Deleuze studies
and as such I have disregarded it. I would suggest
that recent work by Michael Hardt (‘‘Prison’’;
‘‘About’’; ‘‘Red’’) on a political concept of love also
109
stark
demonstrates a debt to Deleuze.This work can be
situated within a broader movement in contem-
porary critical theory to re-examine love’s politi-
cal potential, of which recent work by Terry
Eagleton, bell hooks and Chela Sandoval can be
seen as typical. In his work with Antonio Negri in
Multitude, Hardt suggests that what we need is ‘‘a
more generous and more unrestrained conception
of love’’ (351). Hardt attributes to love a dynamism
which figures it as a constitutive force. In according
love the power to be ‘‘productive, even ontologi-
cally productive’’ (‘‘About’’), Hardt suggests that
love needs to be conceptualised as a negotiation
in which things are practised and learned. In this
way, he proposes that love can be seen as a ‘‘kind
of training ground for the creation of subjectivities
capable of [. . .] democracy’’ (‘‘About’’). This is sig-
nificant to the way in which we read Deleuze’s
work on love because it offers a version of the
Deleuzian subject which is capable of political
engagement.
2 Catherine Belsey, for example, finds the implica-
tion of love in both normative heterosexuality and
traditional models of gendered behaviour proble-
matic.Theorising love from a feminist perspective
is difficult for Belsey because it has been ideologi-
cally mobilised so thoroughly and in ways that con-
tribute to the social and political constraint of
women (74).
3 This path through Deleuze’s work is significant
because it has been subject to much of the criti-
cism of his work on ethical and political grounds,
advanced notably by Peter Hallward (Out), Alice
Jardine and Dorothea Olkowski. Olkowski’s work
inThe Universal (in the Realm of the Sensible) is parti-
cularly interesting for this article because she sug-
gests that Deleuze’s work on self/Other relations
offers an impoverished rendering of human rela-
tionships. She writes that in this schema it is
‘‘impossible that there would ever be any intimate
relations between anyone’’ (43). This article is, in
part, a response to Olkowski’s suggestion that
Deleuze’s world might actually be a loveless place
situated in a plane of immanence which is ‘‘anon-
ymous, empty, gray’’ (47).
4 It is perhaps unfair to accuse Hegel, as Deleuze
does, of being subservient to identity; he is cer-
tainly not a generous reader of Hegel’s work. In
contrast, Judith Butler’s work on the ecstatic
nature of the Hegelian subject as always ‘‘beside
itself’’ (20), or Jean-Luc Nancy’s work on the
‘‘trembling’’ Hegelian subject (45), provides good
 deleuze and love
illustrations of how this subject can be said to exist
in a state in which its identity is constantly dis-
placed. Although Deleuze’s reading of Hegel might
render it in black and white, this (mis)reading still
needs to be recognised as a significant element of
Deleuze’s construction of his own ontology of
difference.
5 In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari
explain that his reference to an embryo (and to an
egg) has nothing to do with regression (181).
6 Deleuze’s work in this area is affirmed by
Boundas (‘‘Foreclosure’’), James Williams (working
on morality) (Gilles Deleuze’s Difference; Gilles
Deleuze’s Logic; ‘‘Why’’), and Bogue (Deleuze’s;
‘‘Speranza’’); it is criticised by Jardine, Hallward
(‘‘Deleuze’’; ‘‘Limit’’; Out), Olkowski, and Reynolds
(‘‘Deleuze’s’’; ‘‘Transcendental’’). It should be noted
that Olkowski’s hesitation with Deleuze appears in
the cited publication and not in her previous work.
7 Deleuze reveals his admiration of Sartre in
Dialogues (12, 57). In his biographical sketch of
Deleuze,Tournier notes that, in his early twenties,
Deleuze was ‘‘heavily’’ influenced by Sartre
(‘‘Gilles’’ 202). In Deleuze’s piece on Sartre’s refusal
of the Nobel Prize,‘‘He Was MyTeacher,’’published
initially in1964 and again in English in Desert Islands,
Deleuze describes that Sartre taught ‘‘new ways
to think’’ (77), and concludes: ‘‘Sartre remains my
teacher’’ (79).
8 Like the concept of becoming-woman, the pro-
blematic nature of gender politics in Deleuze’s own
work and his collaborations with Guattari could
be reinvestigated profitably in relation to his
juvenilia.
9 See also Deleuze ‘‘Statements’’ and ‘‘The
Exhausted’’ (Essays).
10 As Boundas argues, however, Deleuze’s rejec-
tion of the categorical distinction between subject
and object does not mean his transcendental
empiricism is not tied to the problem of subjectiv-
ity, which he returns to throughout his work. He
comments: ‘‘Deleuze will never waver in his con-
viction that only empiricists have the right access
to the problem of subjectivity’’ (‘‘Deleuze’’ 14).
11 This is, notably, the point at which Jardine’s cri-
ticism of Deleuze is directed because she takes the
eradication of the Other to mean the eradication
of the feminine (59).This interpretation is certainly
plausible if Deleuze’s work is read in a particular
way. Tournier’s Robinson could be said to usurp
female space, or at least to appropriate it for male
self-transformation, when he declares: ‘‘I must con-
sider myself feminine and the bride of the sky’’
(Friday 212; emphasis in original). But Jardine’s
claim that this is a world of ‘‘mono-sexual, broth-
erly machines’’ (59) cannot be sustained in light of
Deleuze’s appeal to the otherwise Other. For
an interesting refutation of this piece see
Bogue (‘‘Speranza’’), who, with reference to
Deleuze’s work on Tournier’s Friday, argues that
the absence of woman inTournier’s novel is not so
much misogynistic (as Jardine contends) but
homoerotic.
12 The gendering at work here is problematic.
Robinson’s re-birth codes Speranza as not only
female and maternal but also as an object of male
self-transformation. His copulation with the
ground is also commensurate with representa-
tions of colonisation as rape.
13 This contrasts explicitly with Sartre’s focus on
the gaze as something which objectifies the
Other, and in turn makes the subject the object
of the Other.
14 Tournier likewise signals that others are more
important than the self by naming his novel after
Friday rather than Robinson.
15 Love is also an important element of Deleuze’s
collaborative work. In the same letter he notes
that his work with Guattari was founded on ‘‘the
way we understood and complemented, deperso-
nalized and singularized ^ in short, loved ^ one
another’’ (Negotiations 7). Deleuze’s collaborative
work brings up the notion of friendship, and the
relationship this has to the possibility of creativity.
Deleuze’s treatment of friendship is ambivalent.
Although in the ABC interviews he suggests that
he is not interested in an‘‘actual friend’’ but in how
this figure has operated in the history of philoso-
phy (qtd in Goh 220), his relationship with
Guattari (and also Parnet) as ‘‘actual’’ friends/colla-
borators was important for the production of
much of his work and for how he conceptualised
creativity. Like love, the concept of friendship
comes up many times throughout Deleuze’s work
and, although I do not have the space to map this in
this article, it is important for Deleuze studies to
consider because friendship, like love, is about the
meaningful ways in which we relate to the Other/
other. For a detailed analysis of the place of friend-
ship in Deleuze’s work and life see Charles J.
110

Stivale, and for a discussion of Deleuze’s references
to friendship in relation to community see Goh.
16 The connection of love to (possible) worlds will
be taken up once again in Anti-Oedipus in which
Deleuze and Guattari write: ‘‘we always make
love with worlds’’ (294).
17 This supports Verena Andermatt Conley’s
claim that Deleuze and Guattari’s work anticipates
contemporary queer theory (24).
18 This is not unlike Butler’s claim that our rela-
tions to others undo us (19). For both these thin-
kers, the encounter with difference alters the
subject so fundamentally as to undo its coherence.
They disagree, however, on the ethical place of
recognition in this process. For Butler, the sub-
ject’s engagement with the other is filtered neces-
sarily through recognition. For Deleuze, on the
other hand, only by abandoning recognition can
the subject engage with others in a way that
enables it to experience alterity comprehensively.
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Hannah Stark
University of Tasmania
Private Bag 82
Hobart 7000
Australia
E-mail: hannah.stark@utas.edu.au