DOMINADOR C. BALDOZA v HON. JUDGE RODOLFO B.

DIMAANO
THE FACTS:
In a verified letter-compliant dated September 9, 1975, the Municipal Secretary of Taal, Batangas, charged
respondent Judge with abuse of authority in refusing to allow employees of the Municipal Mayor to examine
the criminal docket records of the Municipal Court to secure data in connection with their contemplated report
on the peace and order conditions of the said municipality.
THE CONTENTION OF RESPONDENT:
Respondent Judge answered that:
1) There has never been an intention to refuse access to official court records, but the same is always
subject to reasonable regulation as to who, when, where, and how they may be inspected. He further
asserted that a court has the power to prevent an improper use or inspection of its records, and
furnishing copies may be refused when the motivation is not serious, not of legitimate interest, out of
whim or fancy, or mere curiosity, or to gratify private spite or promote public scandal.
2) Some of the cases filed and decided by the Municipal Court after the declaration of Martial Law and
years after the election still bore the stigma of partisan politics as shown in the affidavits and
testimonies of witnesses.
3) The padlocks of the door of the Court has recently been tampered by inserting papers and matchsticks.
4) To allow an indiscriminate and unlimited exercise of the right to free access might do more harm than
good to the citizenry of Taal. Disorder and chaos might result, defeating the very essence of their
request.
The case was thereupon referred to Judge Francisco Riodique for investigation and report.
At the preliminary hearing on October 16, 1975, Taal Mayor Corazon Caniza filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint, but the motion was denied by the investigating judge. After formal investigation, he found out that
respondent Judge did not commit acts of abuse of authority, and therefore, he should be exonerated.

THE ISSUE:
Whether or not the rules and conditions imposed by respondent Judge Dimaano on the inspection of the
docket books infringe upon the constitutional right of individuals to information.

HELD:
The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint. It held that respondent Judge did not commit abuse of authority.

BASIS:
1) As found by the investigating judge, the respondent allowed the complainant to open and view
the docket books of the said respondent with certain conditions and under his control and
supervision. It has not been shown that the rules and conditions imposed by respondent were
unreasonable. The access to public records predicated on the right of the people to acquire information
on matters of public concern.
 2) The incorporation of the right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free
exchange of information in a democracy. Information is needed to enable the members of society to
cope with the exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed: “Maintaining the flow of
information depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination depends on protection
for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably
ceases.” However, restrictions on access to certain records may be imposed by law. Thus, access
restrictions imposed to control civil insurrection have been permitted upon a showing of immediate and
impending danger that renders ordinary means of control inadequate to maintain order.

DAVID v ARROYO [May 3, 2006]

These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing Presidential
Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners contend that respondent officials of the Government, in their
professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions, are actually trampling upon the very freedom
guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence, such issuances are void for being unconstitutional.

FACTS:

 On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency:
o xxx by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine
Constitution which states that: "The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call
out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .," and in my capacity as their
Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law
and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well
as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as
provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.
 She also issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the members of the AFP and PNP "to
immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent
acts of terrorism and lawless violence."
 On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national emergency and after all
these petitions had been filed, the President lifted PP 1017. She issued Proclamation No. 1021
declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist.

 RESPONDENTS stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy
among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army (NPA), and some members of
the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. They considered the aim to
oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reins of government as a clear and present danger.
o On January 17, 2006, Captain Nathaniel Rabonza et al, members of the Magdalo Group
indicted in the Oakwood mutiny, escaped their detention cell in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City.
o On February 17, 2006, the authorities got hold of a document entitled "Oplan Hackle I " which
detailed plans for bombings and attacks during the PMA Alumni Homecoming in Baguio City.
The plot was to assassinate selected targets including some cabinet members and President
Arroyo herself. The next day, a bomb was found and detonated at the PMA parade ground.
o On February 21, 2006, Lt. San Juan was recaptured in a communist safehouse in Batangas
province with copies of subversive documents, among others. Prior to his arrest, Lt. San Juan
 announced through DZRH that the "Magdalo’s D-Day would be on February 24, 2006, the 20th
Anniversary of Edsa I."
o On February 23, 2006, PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao intercepted information that members of the
PNP- Special Action Force were planning to defect. Thus, he immediately ordered SAF
Commanding General Marcelino Franco, Jr. to "disavow" any defection. The latter promptly
obeyed and issued a public statement: "All SAF units are under the effective control of
responsible and trustworthy officers with proven integrity and unquestionable loyalty."
o On the same day, at the house of former Congressman Peping Cojuangco, businessmen and
mid-level government officials plotted moves to bring down the Arroyo administration
o B/Gen. Danilo Lim et al confided to Gen. Senga that a huge number of soldiers would join the
rallies to provide a critical mass and armed component to the Anti-Arroyo protests to be held on
February 24, 2005.
o Earlier, the CPP-NPA called for intensification of political and revolutionary work within the
military and the police establishments in order to forge alliances with its members and key
officials.
o Respondents further claimed that the bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in
Bulacan and Bataan was also considered as additional factual basis for the issuance of PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5. So is the raid of an army outpost in Benguet resulting in the death of three
(3) soldiers. And also the directive of the Communist Party of the Philippines ordering its front
organizations to join 5,000 Metro Manila radicals and 25,000 more from the provinces in mass
protests.
o By midnight of February 23, 2006, the President convened her security advisers and several
cabinet members to assess the gravity of the fermenting peace and order situation. She
directed both the AFP and the PNP to account for all their men and ensure that the chain of
command remains solid and undivided. To protect the young students from any possible trouble
that might break loose on the streets, the President suspended classes in all levels in the entire
National Capital Region.
 PETITIONERS cited several incidents following the proclamation:
o Immediately, the Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and
activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the
permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments.
o Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales stated that political rallies, which to the President’s mind were
organized for purposes of destabilization, are cancelled.
o Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor announced that "warrantless arrests and take-over
of facilities, including media, can already be implemented."
o Groups of protesters (members of Kilusang Mayo Uno [KMU] and National Federation of Labor
Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno [NAFLU-KMU]) still marched from various parts of Metro Manila with
the intention of converging at the EDSA shrine.
o Those who were already near the EDSA site were violently dispersed by huge clusters of anti-
riot police. The well-trained policemen used truncheons, big fiber glass shields, water cannons,
and tear gas to stop and break up the marching groups, and scatter the massed participants.
o According to petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno, the police cited PP 1017 as the ground for the
dispersal of their assemblies.
o During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested (without warrant) petitioner
Randolf S. David, a professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also
arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
o At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5,
 raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila. The raiding team confiscated news stories by
reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue.
o A few minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the police surrounded
the premises of another pro-opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid
Abante.
o Also, on February 25, 2006, the police arrested Congressman Crispin Beltran, et al.

In case Sir asks the grounds for each case:

1. In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners Randolf S. David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it
encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) itis a subterfuge to avoid the
constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly.
2. In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Ninez Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. challenged the
CIDG’s act of raiding the Daily Tribune offices as a clear case of "censorship" or "prior restraint." They
also claimed that the term "emergency" refers only to tsunami, typhoon, hurricane and similar
occurrences, hence, there is "absolutely no emergency" that warrants the issuance of PP 1017.
3. In G.R. No. 171485, petitioners herein are Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero, and twenty one
(21) other members of the House of Representatives, including Representatives Satur Ocampo, Rafael
Mariano, Teodoro Casiño, Liza Maza, and Josel Virador. They asserted that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
constitute "usurpation of legislative powers"; "violation of freedom of expression" and "a
declaration of martial law." They alleged that President Arroyo "gravely abused her discretion in
calling out the armed forces without clear and verifiable factual basis of the possibility of lawless
violence and a showing that there is necessity to do so."
4. In G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU, NAFLU-KMU, and their members averred that PP 1017 and G.O.
No. 5 are unconstitutional because (1) they arrogate unto President Arroyo the power to enact
laws and decrees; (2) their issuance was without factual basis; and (3) they violate freedom of
expression and the right of the people to peaceably assemble to redress their grievances.
5. In G.R. No. 171400, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc. (ALGI) alleged that PP 1017 and G.O. No.
5 are unconstitutional because they violate (a) Section 4 of Article II, (b) Sections 1, 2, and 4 of
Article III, (c)Section 23 of Article VI, and (d) Section 1720 of Article XII of the Constitution.
6. In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz et al., alleged that PP 1017 is an "arbitrary and
unlawful exercise by the President of her Martial Law powers." And assuming that PP 1017 is not
really a declaration of Martial Law, petitioners argued that "it amounts to an exercise by the
President of emergency powers without congressional approval." In addition, petitioners asserted
that PP 1017 "goes beyond the nature and function of a proclamation as defined under the Revised
Administrative Code."
7. And lastly, in G.R. No. 171424,petitionerLoren B. Legarda maintained that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are
"unconstitutional for being violative of the freedom of expression, including its cognate rights
such as freedom of the press and the right to access to information on matters of public concern, all
guaranteed under Article III, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution." In this regard, she stated that these
issuances prevented her from fully prosecuting her election protest pending before the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal.

ISSUE 1: W/N Court may review factual bases the President’s exercise
While the Court considered the President’s "calling-out" power as a discretionary power solely vested in his
wisdom, it stressed that "this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised
within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave
abuse of discretion." This ruling is mainly a result of the Court’s reliance on Section 1, Article VIII of 1987
Constitution which fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the
acts of the political departments. Under the new definition of judicial power, the courts are authorized not only
"to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," but also "to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." The latter part of the
authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before a
forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government. It speaks of judicial
prerogative not only in terms of power but also of duty.

As to how the Court may inquire into the President’s exercise of power, Lansang adopted the test that "judicial
inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the President’s decision is correct," but that "the
President did not act arbitrarily." Thus, the standard laid down is not correctness, but arbitrariness.
In Integrated Bar of the Philippines, this Court further ruled that "it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show
that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis" and that if he fails, by way of proof, to
support his assertion, then "this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the
pleadings."

Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is
totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum
shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming
part of the records. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations,
the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid.

Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, President Arroyo was not expected to simply fold her arms
and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However,
the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty

ISSUE 2: CONSTITUTIONALITY of PP1017 and GO No 5 – PARTLY CONSTI and UNCONSTI

The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:

1. "by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII … do hereby command the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all
forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion"
2. "and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction;"
3. "as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency."

First Provision: Calling-out Power

 Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence"
of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law.
  The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that "whenever it becomes necessary," the
President may call the armed forces "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion."
 Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in
suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary police action. But every act
that goes beyond the President’s calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires.
 It is pertinent to state, however, that there is a distinction between the President’s authority to declare a
"state of rebellion" (in Sanlakas) and the authority to proclaim a state of national emergency. While
President Arroyo’s authority to declare a "state of rebellion" emanates from her powers as Chief
Executive, the statutory authority cited in Sanlakas was Section 4, Chapter 2, Book II of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, which provides:
o SEC. 4. – Proclamations. – Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition
of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or
regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force
of an executive order.
 President Arroyo’s declaration of a "state of rebellion" was merely an act declaring a status or condition
of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4 cited above.
 In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo
did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent
or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a
provision on the State’s extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business
affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously,
such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless, without legal significance, or not written, as in the case
of Sanlakas.

 PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law.

 The declaration of Martial Law is a "warn[ing] to citizens that the military power has been called upon
by the executive to assist in the maintenance of law and order, and that, while the emergency lasts,
they must, upon pain of arrest and punishment, not commit any acts which will in any way render more
difficult the restoration of order and the enforcement of law."
 A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning
of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military
courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.
 PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is no more than a call by the President to the armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. As such, it cannot be used to justify acts that only under
a valid declaration of Martial Law can be done. Its use for any other purpose is a perversion of its
nature and scope, and any act done contrary to its command is ultra vires.
 Justice Mendoza further stated that specifically, (a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b)
ban on public assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d)
issuance of Presidential Decrees, are powers which can be exercised by the President as Commander-
in-Chief only where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus.

Second Provision: "Take Care" Power – UNCONSTI INSOFAR AS IT GRANTS GMA TO PROMULGATE
DECREES
The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This
is based on Section 17, Article VII. In the exercise of such function, the President, if needed, may employ the
powers attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the country, including the
Philippine National Police.

Petitioners argue that PP 1017 is unconstitutional as it arrogated upon President Arroyo the power to enact
laws and decrees in violation of Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution, which vests the power to enact laws in
Congress. They assail the clause "to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction."

Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate "decrees"?

The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order No. 292
(Administrative Code of 1987). She may issue any of the following: Executive Orders, Admin Orders,
Proclamations, Memorandum Orders, Memorandum Circulars, Gen/Special Orders.

President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances. She cannot issue decrees.

This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority
to promulgate "decrees."

Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states
that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives."

To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s
exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.

President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore,
cannot be enforced. With respect to "laws," she cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws,
such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the
like. She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless
violence.

Third Provision: Power to Take Over

The import of this provision is that President Arroyo, during the state of national emergency under PP 1017,
can call the military not only to enforce obedience "to all the laws and to all decrees x x x" but also to act
pursuant to the provision of Section 17, Article XII.

Petitioners, particularly the members of the House of Representatives, claim that President Arroyo’s inclusion
of Section 17, Article XII in PP 1017 is an encroachment on the legislature’s emergency powers.

A distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare "a state of national emergency" and
to exercise emergency powers. To the first, as elucidated by the Court, Section 18, Article VII grants the
President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold
constitutional issues arise.

Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads:

SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting
separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.
 (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President,
for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary
and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

Clearly, the [Framers] did not intend that Congress should first authorize the President before he can declare a
"state of national emergency." The logical conclusion then is that President Arroyo could validly declare the
existence of a state of national emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment.

But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest, requires a delegation from Congress.

Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2),
Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power
not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable
for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow
Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.

Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of
private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally
reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the "the State may, during the emergency and
under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned
public utility or business affected with public interest," it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether
or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him
pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.

RE: RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE; THE RIGHT AGAINST WARRANTLESS
ARREST; AND THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH, OF EXPRESSION, OF THE PRESS, AND OF ASSEMBLY
Of the seven (7) petitions, three (3) indicate "direct injury” resulting from the implementation, pursuant to GO
No 5.
1. In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners David and Llamas alleged that, on February 24, 2006, they were
arrested without warrants on their way to EDSA to celebrate the 20th Anniversary of People Power
I. The arresting officers cited PP 1017 as basis of the arrest.
2. In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. claimed that on
February 25, 2006, the CIDG operatives "raided and ransacked without warrant" their office. Three
policemen were assigned to guard their office as a possible "source of destabilization." Again, the basis
was PP 1017.
3. And in G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU and NAFLU-KMU et al. alleged that their members were
"turned away and dispersed" when they went to EDSA and later, to Ayala Avenue, to celebrate the 20th
Anniversary of People Power I.

Can this Court adjudge as unconstitutional PP 1017 and G.O. No 5 on the basis of these illegal acts? In
general, does the illegal implementation of a law render it unconstitutional? NO
The criterion by which the validity of the statute or ordinance is to be measured is the essential basis for the
exercise of power, and not a mere incidental result arising from its exertion.
Significantly, there is nothing in G.O. No. 5 authorizing the military or police to commit acts beyond what
are necessary and appropriate to suppress and prevent lawless violence, the limitation of their authority
in pursuing the Order. Otherwise, such acts are considered illegal.
G.R. No. 171396 (David et al.) – Right against warrantless arrest was violated, as well right to peaceably
assemble provided under Sec 4, Article III.
Petitioner David, et al. were arrested [without warrant] while they were exercising their right to peaceful
assembly. They were not committing any crime, neither was there a showing of a clear and present danger
that warranted the limitation of that right. As can be gleaned from circumstances, the charges of inciting to
sedition and violation of BP 880 were mere afterthought.
Neither of the two (2) exceptions mentioned in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure [i.e. in
flagrante delicto and hot pursuit] justifies petitioner David’s warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the
charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the arresting officers could invoke was their
observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the invective "Oust Gloria Now" and their erroneous
assumption that petitioner David was the leader of the rally.146 Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered
his immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not
wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to
sedition. Further, he also stated that there is insufficient evidence for the charge of violation of BP 880 as it
was not even known whether petitioner David was the leader of the rally.147

G.R. No. 171409, (Cacho-Olivares, et al.) presents another facet of freedom of speech i.e., the freedom
of the press.
First, the Daily Tribune’s offices were searched without warrant;second, the police operatives seized several
materials for publication; third, the search was conducted at about 1:00 o’ clock in the morning of February 25,
2006; fourth, the search was conducted in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security
guard of the building; and fifth, policemen stationed themselves at the vicinity of the Daily Tribune offices.
The search is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct
of search and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offence to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house, room,
or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or
in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the
same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the
property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that
it be served at any time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as
it constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless
violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition,
the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution
is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned
public utility or business affected with public interest without prior legislation.

G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should
implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of lawless violence." Considering that "acts of terrorism" have not yet been defined and made
punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the
KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were
committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of
standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of
the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials, are
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

BORIS MEJOFF vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS [1949 and 1951]

G.R. No. L-2855 [July 30, 1949]
FACTS:

 Boris Mejoff was a Russian brought into the Philippines from Shanghai as a secret operative by the
Japanese forces.
 Upon liberation, he was arrested as a Japanese spy by the US Army Counter Intelligence Corps, and
was handed to the Commonwealth government for disposition in accordance with Commonwealth Act
No. 682. The People’s Court ordered his release.
 The deportation board referred Mejoff to the immigration authorities because he had no travel
documents and thus was illegally in the country.
 April 5, 1948: The Board of Commissioners of Immigration declared that Mejoff illegally entered the
Philippines in 1944, without inspection and admission by the immigration officials at a designated port
of entry.
 He was thus ordered to be deported on the first available transportation to Russia.
 May 1948: Mejoff was transferred to the Cebu Provincial Jail together with 3 other Russians to await
the arrival of some Russian vessels.
 July and August: Two Russian boats called at the Cebu Port, but refused to take Mejoff and his
companions alleging lack of authority to do so.
 October 1948: After repeated failures to ship Mejoff abroad, the authorities moved him to Bilibid Prison
at Muntinlupa where he has been confined up to the present time, inasmuch as the Commissioner of
Immigration believes it is for the best interest of the country to keep him under detention while
arrangements for his deportation are being made.
 Mejoff filed a petition for habeas corpus.
ISSUES:

 W/N Mejoff may be deported - YES

 W/N Mejoff should be released - NO
RULING:
Mejoff contended that having been brought to the Philippines legally by the Japanese forces, he may not be
deported. He also argues that the statutory period to do that under the laws has long expired.
It is enough to say that the argument would deny to this Government the power and the authority to eject from
the Islands any and all of that members of the Nipponese Army of occupation who may still be found hiding in
remote places. Which is absurd.
Moreover, under Section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, any alien who enters this country
"without inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a designated point of entry" is subject to
deportation within five years.
In Borovsky vs. Commissioner of Immigration: SC denied the request for habeas corpus.
"It must be admitted that temporary detention is a necessary step in the process of exclusion or
expulsion of undesirable aliens and that pending arrangements for his deportation, the Government has
the right to hold the undesirable alien under confinement for a reasonable length of time. However,
under established precedents, too long a detention may justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
"The meaning of "reasonable time" depends upon the circumstances xxx. Considering that this
Government desires to expel the alien xxx we must presume it is making efforts to carry out the decree
of exclusion by the highest officer of the land. xxx And unless it is shown that the deportee is being
indefinitely imprisoned under the pretense of awaiting a chance for deportation or unless the
Government admits that it cannot deport him or unless the detainee is being held for too long a period
our courts will not interfere.
The difference between this and the Borovsky case lies in the fact that the record shows Mejoff has been
detained since March, 1948. However, considering that in the United States (where transportation facilities are
much greater and diplomatic arrangements are easier to make) a delay of twenty months in carrying out an
order of deportation has not been held sufficient to justify the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, this
petition must be, and it is hereby denied. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-4254 [September 26, 1951]
FACTS:

 Mejoff filed a second petition for habeas corpus after the Court upheld his temporary detention as “a
necessary step in the process of exclusion or expulsion of undesirable aliens and that pending
arrangements for his deportation.”
 No period was fixed within which the immigration authorities should carry out the contemplated
deportation. The Court stated that "the meaning of 'reasonable time' depends upon the circumstances,
specially the difficulties of obtaining a passport, the availability of transportation, the diplomatic
arrangements with the governments concerned and the efforts displayed to send the deportee away;"
but "under established precedents, too long a detention may justify the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus."
 Over 2 years have passed since the promulgated decision, and the Government has not yet removed
Mejoff out of the country because no ship or country would take Mejoff.
ISSUE: W/N Mejoff should be released – YES [with terms]
RULING:
Aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no right of asylum even if they are "stateless," which the
petitioner claims to be. It is also true that foreign nationals, who are not enemies and against whom no charge
has been made other than that their permission to stay has expired, may not indefinitely be kept in detention.
The protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law and except for crimes committed
against the laws of the land is not limited to Philippine citizens but extends to all residents, except enemy
aliens, regardless of nationality.
The petitioner's entry into the Philippines was not unlawful; he was brought by the armed and belligerent forces
of a de facto government whose decrees were law during the occupation.
Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 3) the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of Nation."
In "Universal Declaration of Human Rights": the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights as
applied to all human beings were proclaimed. It was there resolved that "All human beings are born free and
equal in degree and rights" (Art. 1); that "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, nationality or social origin, property, birth, or other status" (Art. 2): that "Every one has the right to an
effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by
the Constitution or by law" (Art. 8); that "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile" (Art.
9); etc.
In U. S. vs. Nichols, 47 Fed. Supp., 201, it was said that the court "has the power to release from custody an
alien who has been detained an unreasonably long period of time by the Department of Justice after it has
become apparent that although a warrant for his deportation has been issued, the warrant cannot be
effectuated;" that "the theory on which the court is given the power to act is that the warrant of deportation, not
having been able to be executed, is functus officio and the alien is being held without any authority of law."
In Staniszewski vs. Watkins (1948), 90 Fed. Supp., 132: The Court sustained the writ of habeas corpus and
order the release of the petitioner on his own recognizance, but required him to inform the immigration officials
at Ellis Island by mail on the 15th of each month, stating where he is employed and where he can be reached
by mail. If the government does succeed in arranging for petitioner's deportation to a country that will be ready
to receive him as a resident, it may then advise the petitioner to that effect and arrange for his deportation in
the manner provided by law.

It was alleged that Mejoff was engaged in subversive activities, and fear was expressed that he might join or
aid the disloyal elements if allowed to be at large. Bearing in mind the Government's allegation in its answer
that "the herein petitioner was brought to the Philippines by the Japanese forces," and the fact that Japan is no
longer at war with the United States or the Philippines nor identified with the countries allied against these
nations, the possibility of the petitioner's entertaining or committing hostile acts prejudicial to the interest and
security of this country seems remote.
If we grant, for the sake of argument, that such a possibility exists, still the petitioner's unduly prolonged
detention would be unwarranted by law and the Constitution, if the only purpose of the detention be to
eliminate a danger that is by no means actual, present, or uncontrollable.
[T]he right of accused to bail pending appeal of his case xxx depends upon the discretion of the court, whereas
the right to be enlarged before formal charges are instituted is absolute. As already noted, not only are there
no charges pending against the petitioner, but the prospects of bringing any against him are slim and remote.
The writ will issue commanding the respondents to release the petitioner from custody upon these terms: The
petitioner shall be placed under the surveillance of the immigration authorities or their agents in such form and
manner as may be deemed adequate to insure that he keep peace and be available when the Government is
ready to deport him. The surveillance shall be reasonable and the question of reasonableness shall be
submitted to this Court or to the Court of First Instance of Manila for decision in case of abuse. He shall also
put up a bond for the above purpose in the amount of P5,000 with sufficient surety or sureties, which bond the
Commissioner of Immigration is authorized to exact by section 40 of Commonwealth Act No. 613.

Kuroda v. Jalandoni, G.R. No. L-2662, March 26, 1949

Facts: Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the
Philippines during the Japanese occupation, was charged before the Philippine Military Commission of war
crimes (with having unlawfully disregarded and failed “to discharge his duties as such commander to control
the operations of members of his command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes
against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces, in violation of the laws and
customs of war).
He questioned the constitutionality of E.O. No. 68 that created the National War Crimes Office and
prescribed rules on the trial of accused war criminals.
He contended that: 1. the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention on Rules and
Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore he is charged of crimes not based on law, national and
international. 2. The participation of attorneys Melville Hussey and Robert Port, who are not attorneys
authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines, is a diminution of our personality as an
independent state, and that they have no personality as prosecutors because US is not a party in interest in
the case.

Issue: 1. WON E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional thus the military tribunal has jurisdiction.

2. Whether American lawyers may participate in a case under a military commission when they are not
qualified to practice law in the Philippines

Ruling: 1. Yes, E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional hence the tribunal has jurisdiction to try Kuroda.

Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that –

The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.

In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day including the
Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence
established by the United Nation all those person military or civilian who have been guilty of planning preparing
or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental
thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor.
Consequently in the promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines
has acted in conformity with the generally accepted and policies of international law which are part of the our
Constitution. xxx

Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts
committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a
signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of
the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of
international law. In fact these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations the United
State and Japan who were signatories to the two Convention. Such rule and principles therefore form part of
the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our
Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of
rule and principle of international law as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or shall
be a signatory.

2. Yes. American lawyers may participate in a case under a military commission. The military
commission is a special military tribunal governed by special law and not by the Rules of Court which govern
ordinary civil court. There is nothing in Executive Order No. 68 which requires that counsel appearing before
said commission must be attorneys qualified to practice laws in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of
Court. In fact, it is common in military tribunals that counsel for the parties are usually military personnel who
are neither attorneys nor even possessed of legal training.

Orquiola vs Tandang Sora Development Corporation

Facts: Pura Kalaw Ledesma was the registered owner of Lot in Tandang Sora, Quezon. This parcel of land
was adjacent to certain portions of Lot of the Piedad Estates registered in the name of Herminigilda Pedro.

On October 29, 1964, Herminigilda sold the lots to Mariano Lising who then registered both lots in the name of
M.B. Lising Realty and subdivided them into smaller lots. Certain portions of the subdivided lots were sold to
third persons including herein petitioners, spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola. The other portions were
registered in the name of the heirs of Pedro, heirs of Lising, and other third persons.

Sometime in 1969, Pura Kalaw Ledesma filed a complaint, against Herminigilda Pedro and Mariano Lising for
allegedly encroaching upon his lot. During the pendency of the action, Tandang Sora Development
Corporation replaced Pura Kalaw Ledesma as plaintiff by virtue of an assignment of the lot made by Ledesma
in favor of said corporation. Trial continued for three decades.

On August 21, 1991, the trial court finally adjudged defendants Pedro and Lising jointly and severally liable for
encroaching on plaintiffs land.

As a result the Deputy Sheriff of Quezon City directed petitioners to remove the house they constructed on the
land they were occupying. However defendants and the present occupants of the subject property failed to
comply. Thus, there is now a need to demolish the structures in order to implement the said decision.

Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition with prayer for a restraining order and
preliminary injunction alleging that they bought the subject parcel of land in good faith and for value, hence,
they were parties in interest. Moreover, they contended that the writ of demolition issued in connection
therewith cannot be enforced against them because to do so would amount to deprivation of property without
due process of law.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and was denied.
Hence, this petition.

Issues: 1. WON the alias writ of execution may be enforced against petitioners; and
2. WON petitioners were innocent purchasers for value and builders in good faith.
Held: 1. No, the alias writ of execution cannot be enforced against petitioners. Petitioners argue that the
appellate court erred when it relied heavily on our ruling in Vda. de Medina vs. Cruz in holding that petitioners
are successors-in-interest of Mariano Lising, and as such, they can be reached by the order of execution even
though they were not impleaded as parties thereto.

Petitioners submit that Medina case is not applicable in this case because the circumstances therein are
different from the circumstances in the present case. Medina markedly differs from the present case on major
points:
1. The petitioner in Medina acquired the right over the houses and lot subject of the dispute after the
original action was commenced and became final and executory. In the present case, petitioners acquired
the lot before the commencement of Civil Case.
2. The right over the disputed land of the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioner in Medina was based
on a title of doubtful authenticity, allegedly a Titulo de Composicion Con El Estado issued by the Spanish
Government in favor of one Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, while the right over the land of the
predecessors-in-interest of herein petitioners is based on a fully recognized Torrens title.
3. Petitioners in this case acquired the registered title in their own names, while the petitioner in Medina
merely relied on the title of her predecessor-in-interest and tax declarations to prove her alleged ownership
of the land. He can rely solely on the title and he is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as
are annotated on the title.

It is our view here that the petitioners, spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola, are fully entitled to the legal
protection of their lot by the Torrens system, unlike the petitioner in the Medina case who merely relied on a
mere Titulo de Composicion.

2. Yes, petitioners were innocent purchasers for value and builders in good faith. A buyer in good faith is one
who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such
property. He is a buyer for value if he pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before he has
notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property. The determination of whether one is a
buyer in good faith is a factual issue which generally is outside the province of this Court to determine in a
petition for review. An exception is when the Court of Appeals failed to take into account certain relevant facts
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. the sale to petitioners was made before Pura
Kalaw Ledesma claimed the lot. Petitioners could reasonably rely on Mariano Lising Certificate of Title which at
the time of purchase was still free from any third party claim. Hence, considering the circumstances of this
case, we conclude that petitioners acquired the land subject of this dispute in good faith and for value.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Respondents are hereby enjoined from enforcing the decision in
Civil Case No. Q-12918 through a writ of execution and order of demolition issued against petitioners.

HARRY S. STONEHILL v HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO

Facts: Petitioners and the corporation they form were alleged to have committed "violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code,” to which they were
served 42 search warrants, directing any peace officer to search petitioners’ persons and/or premises of their
offices, warehouses and/or residences for: “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence,
receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing
all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).”
Petitioners filed with the Supreme Court an action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction. They
alleged that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the
Rules of Court — because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and
things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were
issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the
searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money
seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law .
On March 22, 1962, Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. However, the writ
was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the
corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers,
documents and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.7

Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be
split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned
corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
Issue: Validity of the search warrants.

Held:
a). As regards the first group, The SC held that petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the
contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said
corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein
petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations,
and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful
search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.Consequently, petitioners
herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized
from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission
of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and
may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.

B.) The 3 warrants issued to search petitioners’ residences are void. Thus, the searches and seizures
made therein are made illegal.

The constitution protects the people’s right against unreasonable search and seizure. It provides:

(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth
in said provision; and
(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

In the case at bar, none of these are met.

The warrant was issued from mere allegation that petitioners committed a “violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.” As no specific violation has
been alleged, it was impossible for the judges who issued said warrants to have found the existence of
probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it
is sought has performed or committed violations of the law. In other words, it would be a legal heresy, of the
highest order, to convict anybody of a “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code,” — as alleged in the aforementioned applications —
without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes. General warrants are also to be
eliminated, as the legality or illegality of petitioners’ transactions is immaterial to the invalidity of the general
warrant that sought these effects to be searched and seized: “Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or
papers showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit
and loss statements.”
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was
compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.

Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of
petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the
seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus
openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized
be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination
of general warrants.

Respondent-prosecutors invoke the Moncado vs People’s Court ruling: even if the searches and seizures
under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in
evidence against petitioners herein.

The Court abandoned the position taken in the Moncado case. It held that the only practical means of
enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures is, in the language of the
Federal Supreme Court: x x x If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in
evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his
rights to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed
are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials
to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those
great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in
the fundamental law of the land.

JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT v COURT OF APPEALS,

The limits of government regulation under the State's Police Power are once again at the vortex of the
instant controversy. Assailed is the government's power to control deployment of female entertainers to Japan
by requiring an Artist Record Book (ARB) as a precondition to the processing by the POEA of any contract for
overseas employment. By contending that the right to overseas employment, is a property right within the
meaning of the Constitution, petitioners vigorously aver that deprivation thereof allegedly through the onerous
requirement of an ARB violates the due process clause and constitutes an invalid exercise of the police power.
The factual antecedents are undisputed.
Following the much-publicized death of Maricris Sioson in 1991, former President Corazon C. Aquino
ordered a total ban against the deployment of performing artists to Japan and other foreign destinations. The
ban was, however, rescinded after leaders of the overseas employment industry promised to extend full
support for a program aimed at removing kinks in the system of deployment. In its place, the government,
through the Secretary of Labor and Employment, subsequently issued Department Order No. 28, creating the
Entertainment Industry Advisory Council (EIAC), which was tasked with issuing guidelines on the training,
testing certification and deployment of performing artists abroad.
Pursuant to the EIAC's recommendations,[1] the Secretary of Labor, on, issued Department Order No. 3
establishing various procedures and requirements for screening performing artists under a new system of
training, testing, certification and deployment of the former. Performing artists successfully hurdling the test,
training and certification requirement were to be issued an Artist's Record Book (ARB), a necessary
prerequisite to processing of any contract of employment by the POEA.
Thereafter, the Department of Labor, following the EIAC's recommendation, issued a series of orders fine-
tuning and implementing the new system. Prominent among these orders were the following issuances:
1. Department Order No. 3-A, providing for additional guidelines on the training, testing, certification and
deployment of performing artists.

2. Department Order No. 3-B, pertaining to the Artist Record Book (ARB) requirement, which could be
processed only after the artist could show proof of academic and skills training and has passed the required
tests.

3. Department Order No. 3-E, providing the minimum salary a performing artist ought to receive (not less than
US$600.00 for those bound for Japan) and the authorized deductions therefrom.

4. Department Order No. 3-F, providing for the guidelines on the issuance and use of the ARB by returning
performing artists who, unlike new artists, shall only undergo a Special Orientation Program (shorter than the
basic program) although they must pass the academic test.

The Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines (FETMOP), filed a class suit assailing
these department orders, principally contending that said orders 1) violated the constitutional right to travel; 2)
abridged existing contracts for employment; and 3) deprived individual artists of their licenses without due
process of law. FETMOP, likewise, averred that the issuance of the Artist Record Book (ARB) was
discriminatory and illegal and "in gross violation of the constitutional right... to life liberty and property." Said
Federation consequently prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the aforestated
orders.
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. and Kary International, Inc., herein petitioners, filed a Motion for
Intervention in said civil case, which was granted by the trial court in an Order dated 15 February, 1995.
However, the trial court issued an Order denying petitioners' prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and
dismissed the complaint. However the CA dismissed the same.

Issue: W/N the orders violated the petitioners Constitutional rights.

Held: No. The latin maxim salus populi est suprema lex embodies the character of the entire spectrum of
public laws aimed at promoting the general welfare of the people under the State's police power. As an
inherent attribute of sovereignty which virtually "extends to all public needs,"[2] this "least limitable"[3] of
governmental powers grants a wide panoply of instruments through which the state, as parens patriae gives
effect to a host of its regulatory powers.
Thus, police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare or the common good. As the assailed Department Order
enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order,
particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or
unreasonably.
Of the hundreds of thousands of workers who left the country for greener pastures in the last few years,
women composed slightly close to half of those deployed, constituting 47% between 1987-1991, exceeding
this proportion (58%) by the end of 1991,[6] the year former President Aquino instituted the ban on deployment
of performing artists to Japan and other countries as a result of the gruesome death of Filipino entertainer
Maricris Sioson.
Pursuant to the alarming number of reports that a significant number of Filipina performing artists ended
up as prostitutes abroad (many of whom were beaten, drugged and forced into prostitution), and following the
deaths of a number of these women, the government began instituting measures aimed at deploying only
those individuals who met set standards which would qualify them as legitimate performing artists. In spite of
these measures, however, a number of our countrymen have nonetheless fallen victim to unscrupulous
recruiters, ending up as virtual slaves controlled by foreign crime syndicates and forced into jobs other than
those indicated in their employment contracts. Worse, some of our women have been forced into prostitution.
 Clearly, the welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was paramount in the issuance of
Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists to
"high risk" destinations, a measure which would only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at
the very least rationalizes the method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and
artistic skills from them and limits deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for the
unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least
lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies.
In any event, apart from the State's police power, the Constitution itself mandates government to extend
the fullest protection to our overseas workers. The basic constitutional statement on labor, embodied in Section
18 of Article II of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and
promote their welfare.

More emphatically, the social justice provision on labor of the 1987 Constitution in its first paragraph
states:
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized and promote
full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
Obviously, protection to labor does not indicate promotion of employment alone. Under the welfare and
social justice provisions of the Constitution, the promotion of full employment, while desirable, cannot take a
backseat to the government's constitutional duty to provide mechanisms for the protection of our workforce,
local or overseas.
We now go to petitioners' assertion that the police power cannot, nevertheless, abridge the right of our
performing workers to return to work abroad after having earlier qualified under the old process, because,
having previously been accredited, their accreditation became a property right," protected by the due process
clause. We find this contention untenable.
A profession, trade or calling is a property right within the meaning of our constitutional guarantees. One
cannot be deprived of the right to work and the right to make a living because these rights are property rights,
the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an actionable wrong.[12]
Nevertheless, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has
always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the state particularly
when their conduct affects either the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the
State, the public health and welfare and public morals.According to the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas, it must of course be within the legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in
which every one may so use his own property so as not to pose injury to himself or others. [13]
In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the permissible scope of
regulatory measures is certainly much wider.[14] To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violates
the due process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating
entry to the practice of various trades or professions.Professionals leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid
written and practical exams before they are deemed fit to practice their trade. Seamen are required to take
tests determining their seamanship. Locally, the Professional Regulation Commission has began to require
previously licensed doctors and other professionals to furnish documentary proof that they had either re-trained
or had undertaken continuing education courses as a requirement for renewal of their licenses. It is not claimed
that these requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a property right under the due process clause. So
long as Professionals and other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no such deprivation exists.
Finally, it is a futile gesture on the part of petitioners to invoke the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution to support their argument that the government cannot enact the assailed regulatory measures
because they abridge the freedom to contract. In Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Drilon,
we held that "[t]he non-impairment clause of the Constitution... must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by
the government."[15] Equally important, into every contract is read provisions of existing law, and always, a
reservation of the police power for so long as the agreement deals with a subject impressed with the public
welfare.
 The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or class privilege. It
is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to which it is directed or by the territory in
which it is to operate. It does not require absolute equality, but merely that all persons be treated alike under
like conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.
REQUISITES of EQUAL PROTECTION (CLASSIFICATION) We have held, time and again, that the
equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification for so long as such classification is
based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular
legislation. If classification is germane to the purpose of the law, concerns all members of the class, and
applies equally to present and future conditions, the classification does not violate the equal protection
guarantee.
In the case at bar, the challenged Department Order clearly applies to all performing artists and
entertainers destined for jobs abroad. These orders, we stressed hereinbefore, further the Constitutional
mandate requiring Government to protect our workforce, particularly those who may be prone to abuse and
exploitation as they are beyond the physical reach of government regulatory agencies. The tragic incidents
must somehow stop, but short of absolutely curtailing the right of these performers and entertainers to work
abroad, the assailed measures enable our government to assume a measure of control.

Bernardo VS NLRC

Facts:

 Petitioners numbering 43 are deaf–mutes who were hired on various periods from 1988 to 1993 by respondent
Far East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters through a uniformly worded agreement called
‘Employment Contract for Handicapped Workers. Subsequently, they are dismissed.
 Petitioners maintain that they should be considered regular employees, because their task as money sorters
and counters was necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank. They further allege that their
contracts served merely to preclude the application of Article 280 and to bar them from becoming regular
employees.
 By the time this case arose, there were fifty-six (56) deaf-mutes employed under said agreement.
 Disclaiming that complainants were regular employees, respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company
maintained that complainants who are a special class of workers.
 The hearing impaired employees were hired temporarily under [a] special employment arrangement which was
a result of overtures made by some civic and political personalities to the respondent Bank:
 that complainants were hired due to pakiusap of Arturo Borjal;
 that the tellers themselves already did the sorting and counting chore as a regular feature and integral part
of their duties;
 that the tellers were relieved of this task of counting and sorting bills in favor of deaf-mutes without
creating new positions as there is no position either in the respondent or in any other bank in the
Philippines which deals with purely counting and sorting of bills in banking operations.
 that they were told from the start, "with the assistance of government representatives," that they could not
become regular employees because there were no plantilla positions for "money sorters," whose task
used to be performed by tellers.
 that their contracts were renewed several times, not because of need "but merely for humanitarian
reasons."
 that "as of the present, the "special position" that was created for the petitioners no longer exist[s] in
private respondent [bank], after the latter had decided not to renew anymore their special employment
contracts."

 The LA &, on appeal, the NLRC ruled against petitioners, holding that they could not be deemed regular
employees since they were hired as an accommodation to the recommendation of civic oriented personalities
whose employments were covered by Employment Contracts w/ special provisions on duration of contract as
specified under Art. 80.
 Hence, the terms of the contract shall be the law between the parties.
 Issues raised by Petitioners:

1. W/N the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the petitioners — money sorters and
counters working in a bank — were not regular employees.

2. W/N the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the employment contracts signed and
renewed by the petitioners — which provide for a period of six (6) months — were valid.

3. W/N the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in not applying the provisions of the Magna Carta for the
Disabled (Republic Act No. 7277), on proscription against discrimination against disabled persons.

Main Issue Resolved by the Supreme Court:

In the main, the Court will resolve whether petitioners have become regular employees.

Respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company argues that a review of the findings of facts of the NLRC is not
allowed in a petition for certiorari. Specifically, it maintains that the Court cannot pass upon the findings of
public respondent that petitioners were not regular employees.

True, the Court, as a rule, does not review the factual findings of public respondents in a certiorari proceeding.
In resolving whether the petitioners have become regular employees, we shall not change the facts found by
the public respondent. Our task is merely to determine whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion
in applying the law to the established facts, as above-quoted from the assailed Decision.

RULING:

 The petition is meritorious. However, only the employees, who worked for more than six months and whose
contracts were renewed are deemed regular, a 27 total. Hence, their dismissal from employment was illegal.
 The facts, viewed in light of the Labor Code and the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, indubitably show that
the petitioners, except sixteen of them, should be deemed regular employees.
 As such, they have acquired legal rights that this Court is duty-bound to protect and uphold, not as a matter of
compassion but as a consequence of law and justice Bank alleges that these contracts were prepared in
accordance with Art. 80 which states that any worker who employs handicapped workers shall, in entering into
an employment agreement, provide the duration of the employment period.
 However, succeeding events and the enactment of RA No. 7277 (the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons),
justify the application of Article 280 From the 56 handicapped workers hired under the contract, 37 were
renewed.
 This renewal is an indicator that their tasks were beneficial and necessary to the bank More importantly, these
facts show that they were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their positions. In other words, their
disability did not render them unqualified or unfit for the tasks assigned to them.
 Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled employee should be given the same
terms and conditions of employment as a qualified able-bodied person. The fact that the employees were
qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the employment contracts from the ambit of Article 80.
 Since the Magna Carta accords them the rights of qualified able-bodied persons, they are thus covered by
Article 280 of the Labor Code.
 The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer,
by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or
trade in its entirety. Also if the employee has been performing the job for at least one year, even if the
performance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing need for its
performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the business. As
applied to the case.
 Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and desirable to the business of respondent
bank. With the exception of sixteen of them, petitioners performed these tasks for more than six months.
 Thus twenty-seven petitioners should be deemed regular employees Therefore, the twenty-seven petitioners
are entitled to security of tenure; their services may be terminated only for a just or authorized cause. Because
respondent failed to show such cause, they are deemed illegally dismissed.
 The case upheld the validity of an employment contract with a fixed term. However, the court notes that the
decisive determinant in term employment should not be the activities that the employee is called upon to
perform but the day certain agreed upon the parties. Also, where from the circumstances it is apparent that the
periods have been imposed to preclude acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, they should be struck
down or disregarded as contrary to public policy and morals.
 In this case, Article 280 and not Article 80 applies because petitioners are qualified for their positions.
 An employee is regular because of the nature of work and the length of service, not because of the mode or
even the reason for hiring them.
 Final statement from the ponencia: The noble objectives of Magna Carta for Disabled Persons are not based
merely on charity or accommodation, but on justice and the equal treatment of qualified persons, disabled or
not. In the present case, the handicap of petitioners (deaf-mutes) is not a hindrance to their work. The eloquent
proof of this statement is the repeated renewal of their employment contracts.
 The petition is GRANTED. The decision on the NLRC is reversed and set aside. Respondent is ordered
to pay back wages and separation pay to the 27 petitioners.

Phil Merchant Marine School vs CA

Facts:

 Petitioner was established in Manila in 1950 to train and produce competent marine officers.
 Public respondent Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) has repeatedly disapproved
petitioner's requests for renewal permit/recognition due to the following recurrent violations against public
respondent’s orders:
 that Petitioner is ordered to cease operating without a renewal permit/recognition;
 that Petitioner is deficient in terms of the minimum requirements as provided in DECS Order No. III, series
of 1987, which refers to the policies and standards for Maritime Education Plan;
 that Petitioner school has not acquired its own school site and building. The present school campus is not
conducive for training and is found to be very limited in space so that there is difficulty for school
development and expansion;
 that the petitioner is ordered to phase-out its Marine Engineering and Marine Transportation courses.
 Despite these violations, petitioner still continued to enrol students and still offered courses in Marine
Engineering and Marine Transportation.
 The DECS informed petitioner that it had received reports that petitioner enrolled freshmen for its maritime
programs which were ordered phased out.
 Petitioner moved for reconsideration regarding the non-compliance with the DECS minimum requirements and
subsequently moved for reconsideration regarding the phasing out of the two Marine courses stated above.
 Both motions were denied by the DECS.
 Petitioner appealed to the Office of the President. Pending appeal, the DECS issued a Closure Order.
 Thereafter, petitioner sought reconsideration of the Closure Order alleging compliance with the DECS
requirements.
 The Office of the President dismissed the appeal finding no reason to disturb the DECS action.
 Petitioner moved for reconsideration praying that the case be remanded to the DECS for another ocular
inspection and evaluation of its alleged improved facilities. Petitioner anchored its motion on the proposition
that since it had made substantial improvements on school equipment and facilities there existed no valid
ground to deny them a permit to offer maritime courses.
 After another circumspect review of the case, the Office of the President found no cogent reason to set aside
its previous resolution. Petitioner assailed both resolutions of the Office of the President before respondent
Court of Appeals by way of certiorari. It alleged that the resolutions failed to meet the constitutional
requirement of due process because the basis for affirming the DECS phase-out and closure orders was not
sufficiently disclosed.
 Respondent CA dismissed the petition and denied the motion for reconsideration.
 ISSUE:

W/N the petitioner was denied due process of law.

RULING:

 Set against the records of the case, the assertion of petitioner that it was deprived of its right to a hearing and
any opportunity whatsoever to correct the alleged deficiencies readily collapses.
 Petitioner has gone all the way up to the Office of the President to seek a reversal of the phase-out and closure
orders. There is thus no reason to complain of lack of opportunity to explain its side as well as to comply with
the alleged deficiencies.
 The Office of the President properly ignored (in the sense that it did not find worthy of consideration) the
alleged supervening events, i.e., substantial improvements on school equipment and facilities during the
pendency of the case before said Office because the improvements should have been undertaken starting
1986.
 The earlier narration of facts clearly demonstrates that before the DECS issued the phase-out and closure
orders, petitioner was duly notified, warned and given several opportunities to correct its deficiencies and to
comply with pertinent orders and regulations.

ROGELIO ABERCA et al vs. MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER et al

Facts:
The case is rooted from the alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties
of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (Task Force Makabansa - TFM)
ordered by General Fabian Ver.
Plaintiffs allege, among others that complying with said order:
- elements of the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search
warrants;
- that during these raids, certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal
items belonging to plaintiffs;
- that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts;
- that for some period after their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers;
- that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel;
- that military men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them
in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them;
- that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly
extract information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish
them, said plans being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants.
Plaintiffs sought damages (actual/compensatory, moral, and exemplary) from the respondents.
A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants alleging that:
(1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a
damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended;
(2) assuming that the courts can entertain the present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts
done in the performance of their official duties; and
(3) the complaint states no cause of action against the defendants.
RTC decision: Issued a resolution granting the dismissal of the plaintiff’s petition.

Issue/s:
1. Whether or not the respondents are covered by the mantle of the immunity from suit (NO)
2. Whether or not the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for
damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties
guaranteed under the Constitution. (NO)

Ruling:
The Court found the petition meritorious.
At the heart of petitioners' complaint is Article 32 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be
liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process
(7) of law;
(8) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;
(9) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(10) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures;
(11) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(12) The privacy of cmmunication and correspondence;
(13) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law;
(14) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of grievances;
(15) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(16) The rigth of the accused against excessive bail;
(17) The rigth of the aaccused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in behalf;
(18) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against ones self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or
from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person
confessing becomes a State witness;
(19) Freedom from excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in
accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and
(20) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a
criminal offense, the against grieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil
action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal
prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.

Respondents’ Contention:
As public officers they are covered by the mantle of state immunity from suit for acts done in the performance
of official duties or function. In support of said contention, respondents maintain that —
“Respondents are members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Their primary duty is to safeguard public
safety and order. The Constitution no less provides that the President may call them "to prevent or supress
lawless violence, invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof." (Constitution, Article VII,
Section 9).

Petitioners’ allegation:
Their causes of action proceed from respondent General Ver's order to Task Force Makabansa to launch pre-
emptive strikes against communist terrorist underground houses in Metro Manila. Petitioners claim that this
order and its subsequent implementation by elements of the task force resulted in the violation of their
constitutional rights against unlawful searches, seizures and arrest, rights to counsel and to silence,
and the right to property and that, therefore, respondents Ver and the named members of the task force
should be held liable for damages.

1. As to Respondents’ contention on Immunity from suit:

The Court found it untenable.
It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were merely responding
to their duty, as they claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion"
this cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving commission untrammeled by any constitutional
restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and
protected by the Constitution.
The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe
obedience and allegiance at all times.
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in
damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not
exempt the respondents from responsibility.
This is not to say that military authorities are restrained from pursuing their assigned task or carrying out their
mission with vigor. What we are merely trying to say is that in carrying out this task and mission, constitutional
and legal safeguards must be observed.

2. On the issue that plaintiff’s action is barred by the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
The Court also did not find it meritorious.
We find merit in petitioners' contention that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does
not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other
violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or
detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention through the
writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.
Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and cause of action for damages are explicitly recognized in
P.D. No. 1755 which amended Article 1146 of the Civil Code by adding the following to its text:
However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a quasi-delict) arises from or out of any
act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial
Law including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one (1) year.
Petitioners have a point in contending that even assuming that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus suspends petitioners' right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does not and
cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because of respondents' confiscation of
their private belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment.
However, we find it unnecessary to address the constitutional issue pressed upon us. On March 25, 1986,
President Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 2, revoking Proclamation Nos. 2045 and 2045-A
(PROCLAIMING THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF MARTIAL LAW THROUGHOUT THE
PHILIPPINES) and lifting the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The question therefore
has become moot and academic.
Accordingly, we grant the petition. With costs against private respondents.

Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo

Petitioner: Secretary of National Defense; Chief of staff, AFP

Respondents: Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo
This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
filed before this Court by herein respondents on August 23, 2007 to stop herein petitioners and/or their officers
and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights.
While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October
24, 2007. Forthwith, therein petitioners filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as
Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs.
On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23, 2007 Petition as a petition under the
Amparo Rule. The petition was remanded to the CA to conduct a summary hearing. The Court of Appeals
ruled IN FAVOR of herein RESPONDENTS. Hence, the appeal.
FACTS:
On 14 February 2006, at past noon, Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo (Brothers) were abducted
by military men belonging to the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) on the suspicion that they
were members and supporters of the New People’s Army (NPA). Furthermore, the said abductors were looking
for a certain “Bestre”. In their captivity, the brothers were repeatedly beaten and tortured and questioned about
their knowledge of the NPA. They also learned that they were being held in place for their brother, Bestre, a
suspected leader of the communist insurgents. Sometime in the third week of detention, Raymond attempted
to escape. He discovered that they were in Fort Magsaysay (Palayan, Nueva Ecija). He was however
recaptured and tortured. Detention in Fort Magsaysay lasted for 3 and a half months.
The Manalo Brothers were transferred to different places several times, one day they were brought to
Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan to meet Maj. Gen. Jovito Palparan, Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division.
Gen. Palparan told the Manalo brother to tell their parents to not go to rallies and hearings regarding their
disappearance. Instead, they should help in the capture of “Bestre”. Respondents were then brought to their
parents’ house to deliver Palparan’s message. Their parents agreed out of fear. After three months in Sapang,
they were again transferred to Camp Tecson where in they met other desaperacidos (including the still-missing
University of the Philippines students Karen Empeno and Sherlyn Cadapan) who were also suspected of being
communist insurgents and members of the NPA. All the captives were chained every night. They were told that
their families would be killed if they escaped. They were continually beaten and made to do chores. On June
13, 2017, the brothers were brought to Pangasinan to raise poultry and farm the land of a certain “Caigas”, a
commander of a battalion. It was there where the brothers planned their escape. After eighteen months of
restrained liberty, torture and other dehumanizing acts, the brothers were able to escape on August 13, 2007,
and subsequently filed the petition in the court. Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of
respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. Dr. Molino specialized in forensic medicine and was connected
with the Medical Action Group, an organization handling cases of human rights violations, particularly cases
where torture was involved. His findings showed that the scars borne by respondents were consistent with their
account of physical injuries inflicted upon them.
ISSUE # 1: WON the filing of the Writ of Amparo Proper?
HELD: YES.

1. After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals (based on
substantial evidence) that respondents were abducted from their houses in Sito Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na
Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on February 14, 2006 and were continuously detained until they escaped
on August 13, 2007. The abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were narrated by
respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing manner. His account is dotted with countless
candid details of respondents' harrowing experience and tenacious will to escape, captured through his
different senses and etched in his memory.

2. We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalo's statements were not
corroborated by other independent and credible pieces of evidence. Raymond's affidavit and
testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical
reports prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by the physical injuries
inflicted on respondents, also corroborate respondents' accounts of the torture they endured while in
detention. Respondent Raymond Manalo's familiarity with the facilities in Fort Magsaysay such as the
"DTU," as shown in his testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the "Division Training
Unit,"1 firms up respondents' story that they were detained for some time in said military facility.
With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the victim during detention,
it logically holds that much of the information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims
themselves, and the veracity of their account will depend on their credibility and candidness in their
written and/or oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated by other evidence such as physical
evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify in the places where they were
detained. Where powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify
against them comes as no surprise.

3. We now come to the right of the respondents to the privilege of the writ of Amparo. There is no
quarrel that the enforced disappearance of both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo has now
passed as they have escaped from captivity and surfaced. But while respondents admit that they are no
longer in detention and are physically free, they assert that they are not "free in every sense of the
word" as their "movements continue to be restricted for fear that people they have named in their
Judicial Affidavits and testified against (in the case of Raymond) are still at large and have not been
held accountable in any way. These people are directly connected to the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and are, thus, in a position to threaten respondents' rights to life, liberty and security.” They claim that
they are under threat of being once again abducted, kept captive or even killed, which constitute a
direct violation of theirright to security of person.

In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to their right to life and liberty,
and a violation of their right to security.
While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees essentially the right to be alive - upon
which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee
of the secure quality of this life, viz: "The life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that
his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the
assurance that the government he established and consented to, will protect the security of his person
and property. The ideal of security in life and property... pervades the whole history of man. It touches every
aspect of man's existence." In a broad sense, the right to security of person "emanates in a person's legal and
uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to
exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also
of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature, temperament, and lawful
desires of the individual."
First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear." In its "whereas" clauses, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that "a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of
speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the
common people." (emphasis supplied) Some scholars postulate that "freedom from fear" is not only an
aspirational principle, but essentially an individual international human right. It is the "right to security of
person" as the word "security" itself means "freedom from fear." Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) also provides for the right to security of person, viz:
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance
with such procedure as are established by law. (emphasis supplied)
The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.
In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is the right and any threat to the rights to
life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus,
a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as
people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the variation of the
prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in
the Amparocontext, it is more correct to say that the "right to security" is actually the "freedom from
threat." Viewed in this light, the "threatened with violation" Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of
the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.
Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security.
Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, one's body cannot be
searched or invaded without a search warrant.128 Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute
dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases,
the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against persons
because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person.129
Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily integrity. When employed to vitiate the free
will such as to force the victim to admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating information, it constitutes an invasion
of both bodily and psychological integrity as the dignity of the human person includes the exercise of free will.
Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution more specifically proscribes bodily and psychological
invasion, viz:
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall
be used against him (any person under investigation for the commission of an offense). Secret
detention places, solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free will - although not involving
invasion of bodily integrity - nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security in the sense of "freedom
from threat" as afore-discussed.
Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from dehumanizing abuses of persons under investigation for the
commission of an offense. Victims of enforced disappearances who are not even under such investigation
should all the more be protected from these degradations.
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the government. In
the context of the writ of Amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under
Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and
guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in
this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article
II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the
Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government
does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting
effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal
killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar
of justice.
ISSUE # 2: Whether there is a continuing violation of respondents' right to security.
First, the violation of the right to security as freedom from threat to respondents' life, liberty and
security.
While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if they escaped, their families, including them,
would be killed. In Raymond's narration, he was tortured and poured with gasoline after he was caught the first
time he attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay. A call from a certain "Mam," who wanted to see him before
he was killed, spared him.
This time, respondents have finally escaped. The condition of the threat to be killed has come to pass.
It should be stressed that they are now free from captivity not because they were released by virtue of a lawful
order or voluntarily freed by their abductors. It ought to be recalled that towards the end of their ordeal,
sometime in June 2007 when respondents were detained in a camp in Limay, Bataan, respondents' captors
even told them that they were still deciding whether they should be executed.
The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye while they were in detention.
With their escape, this continuing threat to their life is apparent, more so now that they have surfaced
and implicated specific officers in the military not only in their own abduction and torture, but also in
those of other persons known to have disappeared such as Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño, and
Manuel Merino, among others.
Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and protection by private
citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty and security. The threat vitiates their free will as they are
forced to limit their movements or activities. Precisely because respondents are being shielded from the
perpetrators of their abduction, they cannot be expected to show evidence of overt acts of threat such as face-
to-face intimidation or written threats to their life, liberty and security. Nonetheless, the circumstances of
respondents' abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an
apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute
threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of Amparo.
Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by the government. Apart from the failure of
military elements to provide protection to respondents by themselves perpetrating the abduction, detention,
and torture, they also miserably failed in conducting an effective investigation of respondents' abduction as
revealed by the testimony and investigation report of petitioners' own witness, Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost
Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division.
The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited, superficial, and one-sided. He merely relied
on the Sworn Statements of the six implicated members of the CAFGU and civilians whom he met in the
investigation for the first time. He was present at the investigation when his subordinate Lingad was taking the
sworn statements, but he did not propound a single question to ascertain the veracity of their statements or
their credibility. He did not call for other witnesses to test the alibis given by the six implicated persons nor for
the family or neighbors of the respondents.
In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National Defense attested that in a Memorandum Directive dated
October 31, 2007, he issued a policy directive addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff, that the AFP should adopt
rules of action in the event the writ of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of the AFP,
which should essentially include verification of the identity of the aggrieved party; recovery and preservation of
relevant evidence; identification of witnesses and securing statements from them; determination of the cause,
manner, location and time of death or disappearance; identification and apprehension of the person or persons
involved in the death or disappearance; and bringing of the suspected offenders before a competent
court.150Petitioner AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit attesting that he received the above
directive of respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on this directive, he immediately caused
to be issued a directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged
disappearance and the recent reappearance of the respondents, and undertook to provide results of the
investigations to respondents.151 To this day, however, almost a year after the policy directive was issued by
petitioner Secretary of National Defense on October 31, 2007, respondents have not been furnished the results
of the investigation which they now seek through the instant petition for a writ of Amparo.
Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion that there is a
violation of respondents' right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government.
In sum, we conclude that respondents' right to security as "freedom from threat" is violated by the
apparent threat to their life, liberty and security of person. Their right to security as a guarantee of
protection by the government is likewise violated by the ineffective investigation and protection on the part of
the military.
In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these rights are snuffed out from
victims of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. The writ of amparo is a tool that gives voice to
preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
December 26, 2007 is affirmed - ACCORDINGLY, the PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO is GRANTED
Note: (Baka tanungin lang ni sir like sa Continuing mandamus...)
The adoption of the Amparo Rule is a result of the two-day National Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial
Killings and Enforced Disappearances sponsored by the Court on July 16-17, 2007.
It was an exercise for the first time of the Court’s expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our people’s
constitutional rights
The Amparo concept evolved into the (1) amparo libertad for the protection of personal freedom, equivalent to
the habeas corpus writ; (2) amparo contra leyes for the judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes; (3)
amparo casacion for the judicial review of the constitutionality and legality of a judicial decision; (4) amparo
administrativo for the judicial review of administrative actions; and (5) amparo agrario for the protection of
peasants’ rights derived from the agrarian reform process
“Amparo” literally means “protection” in Spanish.
Amparo libertad is comparable to the remedy of habeas corpus found in several provisions of the 1987
Constitution.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS:

 This is a consolidated petition in this to declare Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C.
Aquino as unconstitutional. The assailed law provides that:
Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a member of the
Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive
Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in
the government and government corporations and receive the corresponding
compensation therefor; Provided, that this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or
committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of which the President is the Chairman.

 The petitioners alleged that the cited provision of EO 284 contravenes the provision of Sec. 13, Article VII
which declares:
The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice
any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract
with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

 The petitioners upheld that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" used in Section 13
of Article VII meant that the exception must be expressly provided in the Constitution.
 Public respondents contended that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in the Constitution" in Section
13, Article VII makes reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB insofar as the appointive officials
mentioned therein are concerned. The provision relied upon by the respondents provides:
Sec. 7. . . . . .
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.
ISSUE 1: WON Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B is the exception to the prohibition provided in
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
HELD 1: NO. The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on
the President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or
elsewhere is concerned.
Although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple
offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the
Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically
prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding
any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself. While
all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the
government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to
all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the
exception applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies
and assistants.
The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to refer
only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a
member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in those instances provided
under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the
Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
Furthermore, to construe said qualifying phrase as respondents would have us do would render
nugatory and meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the framers of the Constitution to impose a
stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with
respect to holding other offices or employment in the government during their tenure. It would also obliterate
the distinction so carefully set by the framers of the Constitution as to when the high-ranking officials of the
Executive Branch from the President to Assistant Secretary, on the one hand, and the generality of civil
servants from the rank immediately below Assistant Secretary downwards, on the other, may hold any other
office or position in the government during their tenure

ISSUE 2: WON the prohibition apply to positions held in ex officio capacity?

NO. Provided that the additional duties must not only be closely related to, but must be required
by the official's primary functions.
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of
the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials
specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required
by the primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that these posts do no comprise "any other
office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional
duties and functions on said officials. The term ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of office." Ex-officio
likewise denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other
appointment or authority than that conferred by the office." The additional duties must not only be closely
related to, but must be required by the official's primary functions. If the functions required to be performed are
merely incidental, remotely related, inconsistent, incompatible, or otherwise alien to the primary function of a
cabinet official, such additional functions would fall under the purview of "any other office" prohibited by the
Constitution.
ISSUE 3: WON the respondents be obliged to reimburse the perquisites they have received from
the offices they have held pursuant to EO 284?
NO. During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be considered de facto
officers and as such entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. It has been held that "in cases where
there is no de jure officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had possession of the office and has
discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in an
appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office. Any per diem,
allowances or other emoluments received by the respondents by virtue of actual services rendered in the
questioned positions may therefore be retained by them.

Overall, Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional as it actually allows a member of the cabinet,
undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department to hold multiple
offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

KILOS BAYAN v JANALO

Facts:
Private respondent Gregory Ong (Ong), following the promulgation of the Court’s Decision in Kilosbayan
Foundation v. Ermita,1 filed a petition2 under Rule 108 of the Rules Court for the
"amendment/correction/supplementation or annotation" of the entry on citizenship in his Certificate of Birth,
over which public respondent Leoncio Janolo, Jr. presided.
Via the present recourse of certiorari and prohibition, petitioners Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay
Katarungan Foundation assail four Orders and the Decision emanating from the proceedings in the RTC case.
As Ong’s petition was set for hearing by the RTC, petitioners-therein oppositors filed a motion for voluntary
inhibition, which the RTC denied a day after it was filed and prior to the hearing on the motion. Despite the
pendency of petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, the RTC proceeded to hear Ong’s petition.
Meanwhile, the RTC declared petitioners in default. Petitioners’ motion to vacate the order of default was
likewise denied. Subsequently, the RTC granted Ong’s petition and recognized him as a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines.
In the present petition, petitioners assert that public respondent "erred and committed grave abuse of
discretion [i]n declaring herein [p]etitioners as having defaulted.

Issue: Whether or not there was a valid ground in defaulting the petitioners (Yes).

Ruling:
Rules of procedure, especially those prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, have often
been held as absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy
discharge of business. Section 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides that "[t]he civil registrar and any
person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition
thereto."
The trial court pointed out that petitioners filed their entry of appearance without any attached Opposition to
Ong’s petition and that, despite the grant to them of additional five days they still failed to make a submission.
For a motion to lift an order of default to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be made by
motion under oath by one who has knowledge of the facts; (2) it must be shown that the failure to file answer
was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence; and (3) there must be a proper showing of the
existence of meritorious defense.
As the trial court observed, the motion to vacate or set aside the order of default failed to comply with
paragraph (b), Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court,56 it noting, inter alia, that the motion was "not under
oath, it failed to explain or justify why movants have not filed any opposition to the petition, and it was not
accompanied by an affidavit of merit."57
Indeed, a trial court has no authority to consider a motion to lift the order of default where such motion was not
made under oath.
In this case, petitioners’ unverified motion does not contain any justifiable reason for their failure to file an
appropriate responsive pleading.
Moreover, the filing of a motion for inhibition could not toll the running of the reglementary period to file a
responsive pleading. Despite the grant of an extension of time, petitioners did not file an Opposition to Ong’s
Petition, even one ex abundante ad cautelam that would have sufficiently dealt with their concern over the
alleged pending incident.
Further, petitioners failed to allege, much less demonstrate, a meritorious defense or any argument to protect
whatever interest they may have under the entry which they resist to be corrected, either embodied in a
separate affidavit of merit or embedded in the verified motion itself.61 Petitioners would later admit that they are
"not real adversarial litigants in the juridical sense" as they are acting as "judicial monitors and
observers."621âwphi1
Velayo-Fong v. Velayo63 discusses the meaning of meritorious defense:
“..when a party files a motion to lift order of default, she must also show that she has a meritorious defense or
that something would be gained by having the order of default set aside. The term meritorious defense implies
that the applicant has the burden of proving such a defense in order to have the judgment set aside. Thus, her
motion must be accompanied by a statement of the evidence which she intends to present if the
motion is granted and which is such as to warrant a reasonable belief that the result of the case would
probably be otherwise if a new trial is granted.”
Accordingly, public respondent did not arbitrarily declare them in default and deny their motion to lift the order
of default.