2D Civpro Digests Compilation Judge Boom PDF

2D CIVPRO DIGESTS COMPILATION BPI V HONTANOSAS .................................................................................................
58
JUDGE BOOMSRI RODOLFO BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK V SPS. YUJUICO ...................................................... 59
SPOUSES SARAZA VS FRANCISCO ..........................................................................61
TABLE OF CONTENTS UNITED OVERSEAS BANK VS ROSEMOORE MINING ........................................ 63
TOPIC I – APPLICABILITY OF RULES 1-71 .......................................................... 6 PACIFIC CONSULTANTS INTERNATIONAL ASIA, INC. v. SCHONFELD ........... 64
REPUBLIC VS. HARP ................................................................................................... 6 SPS. OCHOA VS. CHINA BANK ................................................................................ 66
PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK VS. PAPA ....................................................................8 UNION BANK V MAUNLAD HOMES ....................................................................... 67
TOPIC II – JURISDICTION ...................................................................................... 10 DE LEON V DELA LLANA ......................................................................................... 69
SIBAL VS BUQUEL ..................................................................................................... 10 TOPIC IV – PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS ........................................................... 71
MALAYAN INSURANCE VS ALIBUDBUD ............................................................... 12 HEIRS OF HINOG BERTULDO HINOG V. MELICOR ............................................ 71
SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD. v. ASUNCION...................................................... 16 DE LA CRUZ V JOAQUIN .......................................................................................... 73
TACAY VS. RTC OF TAGUM ...................................................................................... 18 LIMBAUAN V ACOSTA .............................................................................................. 74
PHILIPPINE FIRST INSURANCE V PYRAMID LOGISTICS .................................. 20 OCO VS. LIMBARING ................................................................................................ 78
PROTON PILIPINAS CORP. V BANQUE NATIONALE ........................................... 22 CARAVAN TRAVEL V. ABEJAR ................................................................................ 80
TIJAM VS SIBONGHANOY ........................................................................................ 25 GUY V. GACOTT ......................................................................................................... 82
RIVERA v. HON. CATALO ......................................................................................... 27 TOPIC V – CAUSE OF ACTION ............................................................................... 84
AALA v. UY ..................................................................................................................29 TOPIC VI – PLEADINGS .......................................................................................... 84
AGARRADO VS. LIBRANDO-AGARRADO ............................................................... 32 TATLONGHARI V. BANGKO KABAYAN-IBAAN RURAL BANK............................ 84
BARANGAY MAYAMOT V ANTIPOLO CITY ............................................................ 34 CASENT REALTY V. PHILBANKING CORPORATION ........................................... 86
PT&T V SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. ............................................................ 35 MUNICIPALITY OF TIWI V. BETITO ....................................................................... 89
ORIBELLO VS CA .......................................................................................................38 SPS SANTOS V. ALCAZAR ......................................................................................... 92
SPOUSES PAJARES vs. REMARKABLE LAUNDRY AND DRY CLEANING ......... 40 NORTH GREENHILLS ASSOCIATION V MORALES .............................................. 94
BUENAFLOR v. RAMIREZ .........................................................................................42 PADILLA VS GLOBE ASIATIQUE ............................................................................. 97
BAUTISTA VS. LINDO................................................................................................ 43 MBTC V. CPR PROMOTIONS.................................................................................... 99
MASLAG V MONZON ................................................................................................. 45 QUINTOS VS. NICOLAS .......................................................................................... 100
PADLAN V DINGLASAN ............................................................................................ 47 GO V. RICO ............................................................................................................... 102
ERORITA VS DUMLAO ..............................................................................................50 BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS UY.............................. 104
BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES V. CA ...................................................................... 52 MEDISERV INC. VS CA ........................................................................................... 106
HINOG v. MELICOR ................................................................................................... 54 GAJUDO V. TRADERS ROYAL BANK .................................................................... 108
TOPIC III - VENUE ..................................................................................................... 56 MARTINEZ V REPUBLIC ......................................................................................... 110
RADIOWEALTH VS. NOLASCO ................................................................................ 56 TOPIC VII – BILL OF PARTICULARS ................................................................. 112
1 | 2D CIVPRO DIGESTS COMPILATION | JUDGE BOOMSRI RODOLFO
TOPIC VIII – SERVICE.............................................................................................112 AQUINO V. QUIAZON ..............................................................................................165
PHILIPPING SAVINGS BANK VS PAPA ..................................................................112 LOURDES SUITES VS BINARAO............................................................................ 168
PASCUAL V. FIRST CONSOLIDATED RURAL BANK ...........................................113 MANILA BANKING CORPORATION VS UP BAGUIO ...........................................170
TOPIC IX - SUMMONS .............................................................................................114 PADILLA VS. GLOBE ASIATIQUE ........................................................................... 171
BORLONGAN VS BDO ..............................................................................................114 TOPIC XII – DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS ............................................................... 174
MANOTOC V. CA .......................................................................................................116 PINGA V SANTIAGO ................................................................................................. 174
ONG V CO ...................................................................................................................119 CRUZ VS CA ............................................................................................................... 176
DE PEDRO VS. ROMASAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION .............................121 CA VS ALVAREZ ........................................................................................................178
CARSON REALTY v. RED ROBIN SECURITY AGENCY ........................................ 123 KO V. PNB ................................................................................................................. 180
ROBINSON V. MIRALLES ....................................................................................... 125 TOPIC XIII – PRE-TRIAL ....................................................................................... 181
ORION SECURITY CORPORATION VS. KALFAM ENTERPRISES, INC. ............ 127 LARA’S GIFT AND DECORS INC V PNB GEN ........................................................ 181
B.D. LONG SPAN BUILDERS, INC. V. R.S. AMEPLOQUIO REALITY ................. 129 TOPIC XIV – CALENDAR OF CASES .................................................................. 183
WONG V FACTOR-KOYAMA ....................................................................................131 TOPIC XV – COMPUTATION OF TIME.............................................................. 183
CEZAR VS. RICAFORT-BAUTISTA ......................................................................... 133 TOPIC XVI – SUBPOENA....................................................................................... 183
BELEN V. CHAVEZ ................................................................................................... 135 TOPIC XVII – MODES OF DISCOVERY ............................................................. 183
MOTEFALCON V VASQUEZ .................................................................................... 137 GEORG VS. HOLY TRINITY COLLEGE .................................................................. 183
PALMA V. GALVEZ ................................................................................................... 140 INGRID SAL SANTAMARIA V. CLEARY .................................................................185
PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE PTE LTD. VS. DAKILA TRADING ....................... 142 MARCELO v. SANDIGANBAYAN.............................................................................187
MACASAET V. CO ..................................................................................................... 144 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN ................................. 189
TOPIC X - MOTIONS ................................................................................................ 146 FORTUNE CORPORATION v CA ............................................................................. 191
DE GUZMAN V. CHICO............................................................................................ 146 REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN............................................................................193
JOS MANAGING BUILDERS V. UNITED OVERSEAS BANK ............................... 147 SALES VS. SABINO ...................................................................................................195
TAN V. CA .................................................................................................................. 149 VERAN VS CA ............................................................................................................196
GARCIA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN............................................................................... 151 LOCSIN VS SANDIGANBAYAN .............................................................................. 198
TOPIC XI – MOTION TO DISMISS ...................................................................... 154 METRO MANILA SHOPPING MECCA CORP. VS. TOLEDO ................................ 200
REPUBLIC VS. MEGA PACIFIC ............................................................................... 154 DUQUE V. CA ........................................................................................................... 203
CONTRERAS V. ROVILLA WATER SUPPLY INC .................................................. 157 MANZANO V. DESPABILADERAS ......................................................................... 204
NARCISO V. GARCIA ............................................................................................... 159 CAPITOL HILLS GOLF V. SANCHEZ ..................................................................... 206
BOSTON EQUITY VS CA ...........................................................................................161 SOLIDBANK CORP V. GATEWAY ........................................................................... 208
SANCHEZ V. SANVHEZ ........................................................................................... 163 TOPIC XVIII - INTERVENTION ........................................................................... 210
HEIRS OF FAVIS V. GONZALES ............................................................................. 164 RODRIGUEZ V. CA .................................................................................................. 210
TOPIC XIX – CONSOLIDATION OR SEVERANCE.......................................... 212 VALENCIA VS CA ...................................................................................................... 251
TOPIC XX – TRIAL ................................................................................................... 212 DWIKARNA VS DOMINGO ..................................................................................... 253
TOPIC XXI – TRIAL BY COMMISSIONER ........................................................ 212 CORTES V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ......................................................... 255
TOPIC XXII – DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE ...................................................... 212 FABIAN VS DESIERTO ............................................................................................ 256
REPUBLIC V. TUVERA ............................................................................................ 212 SEVILLA TRADING VS AVA.................................................................................... 257
TOPIC XXIII – JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS ......................................... 214 DE CHAVEZ VS OMBUDSMAN .............................................................................. 259
MENESES V. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM ........................................... 214 DAGAN V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN .......................................................... 260
TOPIC XXIV – SUMMARY JUDGMENT ............................................................ 216 EDILLO VS DULPINA .............................................................................................. 262
MORALES V MORALES ........................................................................................... 216 NEYPES VS CA ......................................................................................................... 264
SPS. PASCUAL VS FIRST CONSOLIDATED RURAL BANK .................................. 218 ESCOTO VS PAGCOR ............................................................................................... 266
ONTIMARE V. ELEP ............................................................................................... 220 CIR VS KEPCO .......................................................................................................... 268
ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,, vs. PCIB ...... 221 SIBAL VS BUQUEL .................................................................................................. 270
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS V. SPS. GO .....................................222 APOSTOLIC VICAR VS SISON ................................................................................. 271
TOPIC XXV – JUDGMENTS, FINAL ORDER, AND ENTRY THEREOF ....224 TOPIC XXVII – PROCEDURE IN COURT OF APPEALS ............................... 273
TOPIC XXVI – POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES ................................................224 TOPIC XXVIII – PROCEDURE IN SUPREME COURT .................................. 273
RIVERA VS. CATALO ...............................................................................................224 TOPIC XXIX – PROVISIONAL REMEDIES ...................................................... 273
HEIRS OF ALBANO VS. RAVANES .........................................................................226 LWUA VS LOCAL WATER UTILITIES ................................................................... 273
PURCON VS. MRM .................................................................................................. 228 LIM, JR. VS. LAZARO .............................................................................................. 275
REPUBLIC VS SPOUSES DE CASTRO ................................................................... 230 MANGILA VS. COURT OF APPEALS ...................................................................... 275
PEOPLE V. BITANGA ............................................................................................... 231 VALDEVIESO VS. DAMALERIO ..............................................................................277
FRAGINAL v. PARANAL ..........................................................................................232 MARPHIL VS. ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION.............................................. 278
GRANDE v. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES.................................................233 PHIL-AIR CONDITIONING VS. RCJ LINES .......................................................... 280
IMPERIAL VS ARMES.............................................................................................. 235 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. MEGA PACIFIC E SOLUTIONS, INC ...... 280
PINAUSUKAN SEAFOOD VS FEBTC ...................................................................... 237 GOMOS v. ADIONG.................................................................................................. 282
VIOS VS. PANTANGCO ............................................................................................239 ALLGEMEINE-BAU-CHEMIE PHILS., INC., VS. METROPOLITAN BANK & .... 286
PROVOST VS CA ....................................................................................................... 241 TRUST CO., HONORABLE N. C. PERELLO ........................................................... 286
ENCARNACION VS AMIGO.....................................................................................242 REPUBLIC VS. PRINCIPALIA MANA..................................................................... 288
PBCOM V. CA ............................................................................................................ 245 BENGUET MANAGEMENT CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS............. 289
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V ORTIGAS AND COMPANY LIMITED SECOND DIVISION AUSTRALIAN PROFESSIONAL REALTY, INC. VS..............291
PARTNERSHIP ......................................................................................................... 247
MUNIPALITY OF PADRE GARCIA, BATANGAS ....................................................291
ROSS RICA VS ONG .................................................................................................249

EVY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. VALIANT AUTHORITY ............................................................................................................. 345
ROLL FORMING SALES CORPORATION ..............................................................293
REPUBLIC VS. MANGOTARA ................................................................................. 347
SUNRISE GARDEN CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS .......................... 295
BARING VS. ELENA LOAN AND CREDIT ............................................................. 350
GARRIDO VS. TORTOGO ........................................................................................296
BPI VS. CO ................................................................................................................. 351
GARCIA V. MOJICA................................................................................................. 298
DBP VS. SPOUSES GATAL ...................................................................................... 353
REPOL V. COMELEC ................................................................................................299
SPS. DATO VS. BANK OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS ................................................. 354
SIY VS. TOMLIN ....................................................................................................... 301
VILLANUEVA VS. CHERDAN LENDING INVESTORS CORPORATION ............ 354
DBP V. CARPIO ........................................................................................................ 303
MARQUEZ VS. ALINDOG ....................................................................................... 357
ALIM VS. COURT OF APPEALS ..............................................................................305
HEIRS OF MAGLASANG V. MANILA BANKING CORP ....................................... 357
ALLIED LEASING CORP. VS. COURT OF APPEALS .............................................307
TABASONDRA VS. CONSTANTINO ........................................................................361
CITIBANK, N.A. VS. COURT OF APPEALS ............................................................ 308
QUILO VS. BAJAO.................................................................................................... 363
SEBASTIAN VS. VALINO ......................................................................................... 310
BALIBAGO FAITH BAPTIST CHURCH VS. FAITH IN CHRIST ........................... 363
TOPIC XXX – SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS ........................................................... 312
UNIONBANK VS PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES ............................................. 365
ORTEGA VS. QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT........................................................ 312
TUAZON VS. ISAGON .............................................................................................. 367
MALANA VS. TAPPA ................................................................................................ 314
AMPIL VS. MANAHAN ............................................................................................ 367
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY VS. NE MAGNO CONSTRUCTION ................... 315
FAIRLAND KNITCRAFT V PO ................................................................................ 369
CONCEJERO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ................................................................ 317
ROBERTS VS. PAPIO ............................................................................................... 372
MONETARY BOARD VS. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK ................................... 318
TERAÑA_VS._HON. DE_SAGUN .......................................................................... 374
LAGUNA METTS CORPORATION VS. CA .............................................................. 319
ERORITA VS. DUMLAO .......................................................................................... 376
REPUBLIC VS. ST. VINCENT DE PAUL COLLEGES, INC., .................................. 321
MANALANG VS. BACANI ........................................................................................ 378
THENAMARIS PHILIPPINES, INC VS. COURT OF APPEALS .............................323
AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE VS. COURT OF APPEALS ............................... 380
CITY OF MANILA VS. CUERDO ..............................................................................326
BENEDICTO VS. CA ................................................................................................. 382
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS VS. HON. DEVANADERA ............................................... 327
QUINAGORAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS .............................................................. 384
BUCAL VS. BUCAL, ..................................................................................................329
TABUJARA VS. JUDGE ASDALA ............................................................................ 386
PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES VS. PHILTRANCO SERVICE UNION 330
TOKIO MARINE MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY INC. VS. VALDEZ .......... 388
DE LEON VS. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY ......................................................332
DIGITAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. CANTOS............. 390
REPUBLIC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN .........................................................................334
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LISTANA .............................................. 390
PATACSIL VS. COURT OF APPEALS ...................................................................... 337
TIONGCO VS. SALAO .............................................................................................. 393
WILSON VS. ERMITA ..............................................................................................339
TOPIC XXXI – EXECUTION ................................................................................. 394
REPUBLIC VS. SERENO .......................................................................................... 341
DAVIS VS. DAVIS ..................................................................................................... 394
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK VS. BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT ... 345
BPI VS. GUEVARRA ................................................................................................. 396
ACBANG VS. LUCZON, JR., ..................................................................................... 397
SAN BUENAVENTURA VS. MIGRINO .................................................................. 398
ANAMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS ......................................................................... 400
RUBIO VS. ALABATA ............................................................................................... 401
ABRIGO VS. FLORES .............................................................................................. 403
PAREL VS. PRUDENCIO ......................................................................................... 403

TOPIC I – APPLICABILITY OF RULES 1-71 4. The Senate committees concluded that he used spurious documents in
support of his Petition for Recognition.
REPUBLIC VS. HARP a. The Certificate of Live Birth of Gonzalez (his father) appeared to be
“simulated, if not, highly suspicious” 2
Petitioner/s: Republic of the Philippines, DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzalez,
5. The Senate committees directed the BI and DOJ to examine the authenticity
BI Commissioner Alipio Fernandez, etc.
of the documents submitted by certain PBA players, including Harp, and to
Respondent/s: Davonn Maurice C. Harp
determine if they were indeed PH citizens.
6. The DOJ created a special committee to investigate the citizenship of the PBA
Doctrine:
players identified.
A liberal construction of the rules of procedure is in order when the ends of
a. It reported that there was "substantial evidence to conduct summary
justice would be better served by a review of the case on the merits rather
deportation proceeding xxx for 'misrepresentation as a Filipino
than by a dismissal based on technicalities.
citizen xxx."
7. DOJ Resolution: revoked the recognition accorded to Harp and others
The general rule is that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within
8. RTC: Harp and another PBA player (Pennisi) filed a Petition for Prohibition
the period prescribed by law is, not only mandatory, but jurisdictional, and
to enjoin the revocation of citizenship.
failure to conform to the rules will render the judgment sought to be
a. Six days after, the BI issued a Summary Deportation Order.
reviewed final and unappealable. By way of exception, unintended lapses
9. CA: Harp withdrew his RTC petition. He then filed a Petition for
are disregarded so as to give due course to appeals filed beyond the
Review with an application for injunction in the CA to reverse the DOJ
reglementary period on the basis of strong and compelling reasons, such as
Resolution and BI Summary Deportation Order. The CA granted Harp’s
serving the ends of justice and preventing a grave miscarriage thereof. The
petition and set aside the deportation order. [relevant fact]
purpose behind the limitation of the period of appeal is to avoid an
a. It held that Harp, who was a recognized citizen of the Philippines,
unreasonable delay in the administration of justice and to put an end to
could not be summarily deported; and that his citizenship may only
controversies.
be attacked through a direct action in a proceeding that would
respect his rights as a citizen.
Facts: 10. SC: The Republic of the PH, the SOJ and BI Commissioner, among others,
1. Harp was born and raised in the USA to Toiya Harp and Manuel Gonzalez on appealed to assail the CA Decision:
Jan 1977. While visiting the PH, he was discovered by talent scouts. He was a. The CA had no jurisdiction over his appeal because the petition had
later drafted to play in the PBA. been filed out of time; and [relevant issue]
2. 2002: Harp was invited to participate in a Senate investigation conducted by i. Harp received his copy of the DOJ Resolution on Oct 19,
the Committee on Games, Amusement and Sports and the Committee on 2004. Therefore, he only had until Nov 3, 2004 to file
Constitutional Amendments, Revision of Codes and Laws. his appeal.
a. The inquiry sought to review the processes and requirements ii. However, Harp only filed his appeal on Nov 4, 2004.
involved in the acquisition and determination of Philippine Hence, the DOJ Resolution became final, and the CA could
citizenship in connection with the influx of bogus Fil-Am or Filipino- no longer modify it.
foreign basketball players. iii. Harp contends that he only appealed on Nov 4 because he
3. It was established that Harp had previously obtained recognition as a PH had to wait for the RTC to grant him leave to withdraw his
citizen from the BI and the DOJ, where he submitted certain documents. 1 pending petition. The one-day delay was due not to his
1Birth certificate; certified true copy of the birth certificate of his father, Manuel Manuel’s Filipino citizenship at the time of his birth; Harp’s passport; passport of
Gonzales; certification from the Consulate General of the PH stating that Manuel Harp’s parents; marriage contract of Harp’s parents
Gonzales became a citizen of the USA only on Nov 10, 1981; affidavit affirming 2 Alterations, erasures; discrepancy in middle name; marriage of Gonzalez’ parents
not established
thoughtlessness but to avoid violating the rule against 4. All things considered, a liberal construction of the rules of procedure is in
forum-shopping. order. The ends of justice would be better served by a review of this case on
the merits rather than by a dismissal based on technicalities.
Issue/s: WoN the CA had jurisdiction over the Petition for Review despite it being filed
out of time - YES Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Resolution of the
Department of Justice dated 18 October 2004 and the Summary Deportation Order
Ratio: dated 26 October 2004 issued by the Bureau of Immigration are hereby SET ASIDE.
1. The one--day delay in the filing of the Petition is excusable. SO ORDERED.
a. The limited period of appeal was instituted to prevent parties from
intentionally and unreasonably causing a delay in the administration Notes
of justice. The dismissal of a petition is unwarranted if the element Notes:
of intent to delay is clearly absent from a case. The SC also found that the DOJ erroneously revoked Harp’s citizenship.
b. Here, the delay in the filing of the Petition was for a valid reason, i.e.
Harp had to wait for the RTC Order allowing him to withdraw his
then pending Petition.
c. It is likewise clear that he did not intend to delay the administration
of justice, as he in fact filed the appeal with the CA on the very same
day the RTC issued the Order.
2. Gonzalez vs Pennisi involved exactly the same circumstances, and the Court
ruled that the one--day delay was justified.
a. A one--day delay does not justify the appeal's dismissal where no
element of intent to delay the administration of justice could be
attributed to the petitioner.
b. The general rule is that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and
within the period prescribed by law is, not only mandatory, but
jurisdictional, and failure to conform to the rules will render the
judgment sought to be reviewed final and unappealable.
c. By way of exception, unintended lapses are disregarded so as to give
due course to appeals filed beyond the reglementary period on the
basis of strong and compelling reasons, such as serving the ends of
justice and preventing a grave miscarriage thereof. The purpose
behind the limitation of the period of appeal is to avoid an
unreasonable delay in the administration of justice and to put an end
to controversies.
3. It is not disputed that there was a pending petition for prohibition before the
trial court.
a. Before filing the petition for review before the CA, Harp had to
withdraw the petition for prohibition before the trial court.
b. The RTC granted the withdrawal only on 4 November 2004, the date
of filing of the petition for review before the Court of Appeals.
c. Under the circumstances, we find the one-day delay in filing the
petition for review excusable.

PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK VS. PAPA ○ PSB insists that it timely filed its motion for reconsideration. It
personally filed the subject motion before the RTC on 10 November
Petitioners: Philippine Savings Bank (PSB)
2009, or the last day of the 15-day prescriptive period. PSB also
Respondents: Josephine L. Papa (Papa)
claims that, although it deviated from the usual mode of service as
prescribed by the Rules of Court when it served the copy of the
Doctrine: While procedural rules may be relaxed in the interest of justice,
aforesaid motion by private courier service, there was still effective
it is well-settled that these are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication
service upon Papa considering that she received the motion for
of cases. The relaxation of procedural rules in the interest of justice was
reconsideration through her counsel.
never intended to be a license for erring litigants to violate the rules with
● Additionally, PSB contends that the timeliness of the filing of the motion for
impunity. Liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules can
reconsideration should not be reckoned from the date of the actual receipt by
be invoked only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and
the adverse party, but on the actual receipt thereof by the RTC, pointing out
circumstances. While litigation is not a game of technicalities, every case
that filing and service of the motion are two different matters.
must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure
● PSB further argues that, notwithstanding the said deviation, a liberal
an orderly and speedy administration of justice.
construction of the rules is proper under the circumstances and that the Court
has the power to suspend its own rules especially when there appears a good
Facts: and efficient cause to warrant such suspension.
● On 30 March 2006, petitioner Philippine Savings Bank (PSB) filed before the Issue/s:
MeTC a complaint for collection of sum of money against respondent 1. W/N PSB timely filed its MR even though the service of the motion was made
Josephine L. Papa (Papa). 1 day late --NO
○ In its complaint, PSB alleged that Papa obtained a loan and Papa 2. W/N the procedural rules should be relaxed in favor of PS Bank --NO
executed a promissory note. When the obligation fell due, Papa
defaulted in her payment. Ratio:
● The MeTC rendered a decision in favor of PSB and against Papa because PSB 1. Indeed, filing is the act of presenting the pleading or other paper to the clerk
was able to establish its cause of action against Papa by preponderance of of court; whereas, service is the act of providing a party with a copy of the
evidence. pleading or paper concerned.
● The RTC reversed and set aside the MeTC decision and ruled that:
○ PSB failed to prove its cause of action due to its failure to prove the Nevertheless, although they pertain to different acts, filing and service go hand-in-hand
existence and due execution of the promissory note and must be considered together when determining whether the pleading, motion, or
● On 10 November 2009, PSB filed its motion for reconsideration, wherein it any other paper was filed within the applicable reglementary period. Precisely, the
admitted that it received the copy of the 14 October 2009 RTC decision on 26 Rules require every motion set for hearing to be accompanied by proof of service thereof
October 2009. to the other parties concerned; otherwise, the court shall not be allowed to act on it, and
● In its opposition to PSB’s motion for reconsideration, Papa posited that the such motion is deemed to be not filed.
RTC decision had already attained finality. In some decided cases, the Court considered filing by private courier as equivalent to
● Although PSB filed the motion for reconsideration on 10 November 2009, it filing by ordinary mail.16 The Court opines that this pronouncement equally applies to
appears that service of the said motion was made one (1) day late as service of pleadings and motions. Hence, to prove service by a private courier or
PSB availed of a private courier service instead of the modes of service ordinary mail, a party must attach an affidavit of the person who mailed the motion or
prescribed under the Rules of Court. As such, PSB’s motion for pleading.
reconsideration is deemed not to have been made on the date it was deposited Service by ordinary mail is allowed only in instances where no registry service exists
to the private courier for mailing but rather on 11 November 2009, the date it either in the locality of the sender or the addressee. 17 This is the only credible
was actually received by Papa. justification why resort to service by ordinary mail or private courier may be allowed.
● The RTC denied PSB’s motion for reconsideration. In this case, PSB admits that it served the copy of the motion for reconsideration to
● Aggrieved, PSB filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Revised Rules Papa’s counsel via private courier. However, said motion was not accompanied by an
of Court before the CA. affidavit of the person who sent it through the said private messengerial service

Very clearly, PSB failed to comply with the requirements under Rule 13, Section 7 for
an effective service by ordinary mail. While PSB explained that personal service was not
effected due to lack of time and personnel constraints, it did not offer an acceptable
reason why it resorted to “private registered mail” instead of by registered mail. In
particular, PSB failed to indicate that no registry service was available in San Mateo,
Rizal, where the office of Papa’s counsel is situated, or in Makati City, where the office
of PSB’s counsel is located. Consequently, PSB failed to comply with the required proof
of service by ordinary mail. Thus, the RTC is correct when it denied PSB’s motion for
reconsideration, which, for all intents and purposes, can be effectively considered as
not filed.
Since PSB’s motion for reconsideration is deemed as not filed, it did not toll the running
of the 15-day reglementary period for the filing of an appeal; and considering that PSB’s
appeal was filed only after the expiration of the 15-day period on 10 November 2009,
such appeal has not been validly perfected. As such, the subject 14 October 2009
decision of the RTC had already attained finality as early as 11 November 2009.
1. The Court stresses that the bare invocation of “the interest of substantial
justice” or, in this case, “good or efficient case” is not a magic wand that will
automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. Procedural rules
are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may
have prejudiced a party’s substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required
to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may
be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the
degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed.20
The Court has reiterated that rules of procedure, especially those prescribing the time
within which certain acts must be done, are absolutely indispensable to the prevention
of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of business. 21 While
procedural rules may be relaxed in the interest of justice, it is well-settled that these are
tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. The relaxation of procedural rules
in the interest of justice was never intended to be a license for erring litigants to violate
the rules with impunity. Liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules can
be invoked only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While
litigation is not a game of technicalities, every case must be prosecuted in accordance
with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of
justice.22
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The 21 July 2011 Decision and the 1 February 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 112611 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

TOPIC II – JURISDICTION ii. or through extrinsic fraud,
iii. and only when other remedies are wanting.
SIBAL VS BUQUEL b. In the present case, Sibal was able to avail of other remedies when he
led before the RTC a motion to quash the writ of execution and a
Petitioners: Camilo Sibal
motion to annul judgment.
Respondents: Pedro Buquel, Santiago Buquel, Jr., Rosalinda Buquel,
c. The Court has instituted safeguards by:
represented by Francisco Buquel
i. Limiting the grounds for annulment to lack of jurisdiction
and extrinsic fraud,
Doctrine: Annulment of judgment will not lie unless the fraud is committed
ii. And by prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of
by the adverse party, not by one's own lawyer.
Court that:
1. The petitioner should show that the ordinary
Facts: remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
1. Respondents Pedro, Santiago Jr., Rosalinda, and Francisco Buquel inherited other appropriate remedies are no longer available
from their parents, Santiago Sr., and Faustina, a parcel of land. without fault on the part of the petitioner.
2. In 1999, Camilo Sibal (petitioner) and Tobi Mangoba took possession of a iii. A petition for annulment that ignores or disregards any of
portion of the inherited property. the safeguards cannot prosper.
3. The Buquels then made several demands against Sibal and Mangoba 2. In re: Extrinsic fraud
a. For them to vacate and turn over the property a. Not every kind of fraud justifies the action of annulment of judgment.
b. Sibal and Mangoba however refused to do so. i. Only extrinsic fraud does.
4. The Buquels then filed a complaint before the Tuguegarao RTC for recovery of b. Fraud is extrinsic when:
possession and damages. i. The unsuccessful party has been prevented from fully
a. The RTC ruled in favor of the Buquels. exhibiting his case,
b. The RTC Decision then became final and executory. 1. by fraud or deception against him by his opponent,
5. Sibal then filed a Petition for Annulment of the RTC Decision in the CA. a. as by keeping him away from court,
a. Citing lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud as grounds. b. a false promise of a compromise;
b. The CA dismissed this Petition. c. or where the defendant never had
6. In the SC, Sibal again raises the following grounds for the Annulment of knowledge of the suit,
Judgment of the RTC Decision: i. being kept in ignorance by the
a. The RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the case acts of the plaintiff;
i. As the complaint merely alleged that the value of the d. or where an attorney fraudulently or
property is 51k, without mentioning its assessed value. without authority connives at his defeat;
ii. Only the real property tax order of payment was attached to 2. These and similar cases which show that there has
the complaint never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of
1. Not the tax declaration the case are reasons for which a new suit may be
Issue/s: WoN the RTC Decision should be annulled for lack of jurisdiction and for sustained to set aside and annul the former
extrinsic fraud. judgment and open the case for a new and fair
hearing.
Ratio: c. Extrinsic fraud must:
NO i. Arise from an act of the adverse party,
1. A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in ii. And the fraud must be of such nature as to have deprived
nature that it may be availed of only if: the petitioner of its day in court.
a. The judgment, final order, or final resolution sought to be annulled iii. The fraud is not extrinsic if the act was committed by the
was rendered petitioner's own counsel.
i. by a court lacking jurisdiction 3. Similarity between Sibal’s case and Pinausukan Seafood v FEBTC
a. In the FEBTC case: iv. There was likewise no indication that his counsel was in fact
i. the Court noticed that the petition's own language in cahoots with the Buquels to obtain the assailed judgment.
mentioned mistake and gross negligence on the part of v. Sibal must therefore bear the unfortunate consequences of
petitioner's own counsel. his actions.
ii. The petition even suggested that the negligence of its vi. As a litigant, he should not have entirely left the case in his
counsel may constitute professional misconduct counsel's hands, for he had the continuing duty to keep
b. The Court then ruled that such neglect of counsel, even if it were true, himself abreast of the developments, if only to protect his
was not tantamount to extrinsic fraud own interest in the litigation.
i. Because it did not emanate from any act of FEBTC as the 1. He could have discharged said duty by keeping in
prevailing party, regular touch with his counsel, but he failed to do
ii. And did not occur outside the trial of the case. so.
iii. What is certain, for purposes of application of Rule 47, is
that mistake and gross negligence cannot be equated to the Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
extrinsic fraud under Rule 47. Appeals dated March 16, 2011 and its Resolution dated July 7, 2011 in CA-G.R. SP No.
c. By its very nature, extrinsic fraud relates to a cause that is collateral 104774 are hereby AFFIRMED.
in character,
i. i.e., it relates to:
1. any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in
litigation
2. which is committed outside of the trial of the case,
3. where the defeated party has been prevented from
presenting fully his side of the cause,
4. by fraud or deception practiced on him by his
opponent.
ii. And even in the presence of fraud, annulment will not lie
unless the fraud is committed by the adverse party,
not by one's own lawyer.
iii. In the FEBTC case, the remedy of the client is to proceed
against his own lawyer
1. and not to re-litigate the case where judgment had
been rendered.
d. In this case:
i. Sibal asserts that the negligence of his former counsel in
handling his defense during the proceedings resulted in
violation of his right to due process.
ii. He claims that his counsel's inexcusable negligence denied
him of his day in court.
iii. However, he admitted that he attended only one stage of the
proceedings below, which was the preliminary conference.
1. He was not aware of the subsequent proceedings
as he was totally dependent on his former counsel
and would merely wait for the latter to notify him
if his attendance would be required.

MALAYAN INSURANCE VS ALIBUDBUD a. Alibudbud was under obligation to pay in full the acquisition cost of
the car issued to her by Malayan;
Petitioners: Malayan Insurance Company, Inc.
b. Alibudbud's ownership over the car is not yet absolute for it bears the
Respondents: Diana P. Alibudbud
notation "encumbered"
c. The replevin was converted into a money claim in view of
Doctrine: The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it
Alibudbud's vehement refusal to surrender the car.4
from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of
7. CA: set aside the RTC decision
law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive. In several decisions,
a. The RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance over the replevin
however, the Court enumerated the exceptional circumstances when the
action because of the "employer--employee" relations between
Supreme Court may review the findings of fact of the CA. (Footnote 3)
the parties. Alibudbud could not have availed of the benefits of the
Car Financing Plan if she was not employed by Malayan.
Facts:
1. Alibudbud was employed by Malayan on July 2004 as SVP for its Sales Issue/s: WoN the SC has jurisdiction to rule upon the findings of fact in this case –
Department. As SVP, she was issued a 2004 Honda Civic under Malayan’s Car YES
Financing Plan, conditioned on the following stipulations:
a. She must continuously stay and serve Malayan for at least 3 full years Ratio:
from the date of the availment of the Car Financing Plan 1. It is well--settled that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought
b. In case of resignation/retirement/termination before the three-year to it from the CA is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed
period, she shall pay in full 100% share of Malayan and the to it, its findings of fact being conclusive.
outstanding balance of her share of the cost of the motor vehicle a. In several decisions, however, the Court enumerated the
2. Alibudbud also executed a Promissory Note and a Deed of Chattel Mortgage. exceptional circumstances5 when the Supreme Court may
(See Notes for contents) review the findings of fact of the CA, such as in the instant case.
3. July 18, 2005: Alibudbud was dismissed from Malayan due to redundancy. 2. A careful study of the case would reveal that the RTC correctly took cognizance
She refused to surrender the car upon demand. of the action for replevin contrary to the pronouncement of the CA.
4. RTC: Malayan instituted a Complaint for replevin and/or sum of money. a. Replevin is an action whereby the owner or person entitled to
5. Labor Arbiter: Alibudbud later filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal. repossession of goods or chattels may recover those goods or chattels
a. The Complaint was dismissed. Malayan undertook a valid from one who has wrongfully distrained or taken, or who wrongfully
re-organization program in view of the downturn in the latter's sales detains such goods or chattels.
and an exercise of management prerogative.3 3. The CA declared that "[Alibudbud] could not have availed of the Car Financing
6. RTC: granted the complaint for replevin. Plan if she was not an employee of [Malayan]. The status of being an
3 She moved for a suspension of the proceedings in the RTC, arguing that her (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; [relevant in this case]
complaint with the LA was a prejudicial question, but this was denied. (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
4 Stipulated in the Promissory Note - See Notes they are based;
5 Only cited in the decision + Riano: (9) when the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; briefs, are not disputed by the respondent;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; contradicted by the evidence on record; and
facts; (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, could justify a different
(5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; conclusion
(6) when in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
employee and officer of [Alibudbud] in [Malayan] was, therefore, one of the possession of the mortgaged property to Malayan, thereby compelling it to institute
pre-condition before she could avail of the benefits of the Car Financing Plan. an action for delivery, Alibudbud shall pay Malayan attorney's fees of 25% of the
Such being the case, there is no doubt that [Alibudbud's] availing of the Car principal due and unpaid, and all expenses and cost incurred in relation therewith
Financing Plan being offered by [Malayan] was necessarily and intimately including the premium of the bond obtained for the writ of possession.
connected with or related to her employment in the aforesaid Company."
a. It should be noted, however, that the present action involves the
parties' relationship as debtor and creditor, not their "employer-
-employee" relationship.
b. Malayan's demand for Alibudbud to pay the 50% company equity
over the car or, to surrender its possession, is civil in nature.
c. The trial court's ruling also aptly noted the Promissory Note and
Deed of Chattel Mortgage voluntarily signed by Alibudbud to secure
her financial obligation to avail of the car being offered under
Malayan's Car Financing Plan.
d. Clearly, the issue in the replevin action is separate and distinct from
the illegal dismissal case.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated May 15, 2013
and Resolution dated September 6, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
92940 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated November 28, 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27, in Civil Case No. 05-113528 is, accordingly,
REINSTATED.
Notes: Contents of PN + Deed of Chattel Mortgage

(1) the loan of P360,000.00 shall be payable in 60 equal monthly installments at the
rate of P7,299.50 each, commencing on August 15, 2004 and every succeeding month
thereafter until fully paid; (2) Alibudbud shall refund Malayan an amount equivalent
to its 50% equity share in the motor vehicle, or P360,000.00 if she leaves Malayan
within three years from the availment of the subject vehicle; (3) should Alibudbud
resign, retire or otherwise be terminated or separated from Malayan's employ, any
remaining unpaid balance on the principal obligation shall immediately fall due and
demandable upon her who shall remit the same to Malayan within five days from
effectivity of such separation/termination; (4) Malayan is authorized to apply to the
payment of outstanding obligation of Alibudbud any such amounts of money that may
be due her from the company; (5) interests on all amounts outstanding as of the date
when all Alibudbud's obligations are treated immediately due and payable, shall be
compounded every 30 days until said obligations are fully paid; (6) Alibudbud shall
pay a penalty at the rate of 16% per annum on all amounts due and unpaid; (7) in case
Alibudbud fails to pay any installment, or any interest, or the whole amount
remaining unpaid which has immediately become due and payable upon her
separation from the Malayan, the mortgage on the property may be foreclosed by
Malayan, or it may take other legal action to enforce collection of the obligation; (8)
upon default, Alibudbud shall deliver the possession of the subject vehicle to Malayan
at its principal place of business; and (9) should Alibudbud fail or refuse to deliver the
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. CA
Issue/s:
Petitioners: Manchester Development Corporation
Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS, CITY LAND DEVELOPMENT
1. W/N the court acquired jurisdiction over the case when the amount of the
CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS, ANDREW LUISON, GRACE LUISON
docket fee paid was erroneous --NO
and JOSE DE MAISIP,
2. W/N the amendment of the complaint or similar pleading and the payment of
Doctrine: The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the
the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading vested
payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or
juris-diction in the Court --NO
similar pleading will not thereby vest juris-diction in the Court, much less
the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended
Ratio: “A case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the
pleading.
actual date of filing in court.” Thus, in the present case the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case by the payment of only P410.00 as docket fee. Neither can
All complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should
the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For all legal
specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the
purposes there is no such original complaint that was duly filed which could be
pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the
amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all
assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply
subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court are null and void.
with this requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise
be expunged from the record.
The basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the amount of damages sought in
the original complaint and not in the amended complaint.
Facts:
● This case is an action for torts and damages and specific performance with The Court frowns at the practice of counsel who filed the original complaint in this case
prayer for temporary restraining order. of omitting any specification of the amount of damages in the prayer although the
● The amount of damages sought is not specified in the prayer although the body amount of over P78 million is alleged in the body of the complaint. This is clearly
of the complaint alleges the total amount of over P78 Million as damages intended for no other purpose than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not
suffered by plaintiff to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the filing fee.
● The docket fee paid upon filing of complaint in the amount only of P410.00 by
considering the action to be merely one for specific performance where the To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and
amount involved is not capable of pecuniary estimation is obviously other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only
erroneous. in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered
● When this under-re assessment of the filing fee in this case was brought to the in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with
attention of this Court, an investigation was immediately ordered. this requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged
● Petitioner through another counsel filed an amended complaint, deleting all from the record.
mention of the amount of damages being asked for in the body of the
complaint. The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed
● The trial court directed that the amount of damages be specified in the docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest
amended complaint. juris-diction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the
● It was only then that plaintiffs specified the amount of damages in the body of amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi case [14] in so far
the complaint in the reduced amount of P10,000,000.00. Still no amount of as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed.
damages were specified in the prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted.
● CA: ruled that the basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the amount Notes:
of damages sought in the original complaint and not in the amended (In case J. Boom asks…the Magaspi case:
complaint. Upon the filing of the complaint there was an honest difference of opinion as to the
● Petitioners in support of their contention that the filing fee must be assessed nature of the action in the Magaspi case. The complaint was considered as primarily
on the basis of the amended complaint cite the case of Magaspi vs. Ramolete. an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land. The damages
stated were treated as merely ancillary to the main cause of action. Thus, the docket
fee of only P60.00 and P10.00 for the sheriff's fee were paid. Although the payment of
the docketing fee of P60.00 was found to be insufficient, nevertheless, it was held that
since the payment was the result of an "honest difference of opinion as to the correct
amount to be paid as docket fee" the court "had acquired jurisdiction over the case and
the proceedings thereafter had were proper and regular." Hence, as the amended
complaint superseded the original complaint, the allegations of damages in the
amended complaint should be the basis of the computation of the filing fee.)
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of

merit.

SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD. v. ASUNCION a. In the body of the said second amended complaint however, Manuel
Uy Po Tiong alleges actual and compensatory damages and
Petitioners: SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS
attorney's fees in the total amount of about P44,601,623.70.
and D.J. WARBY
6. Judge Asuncion found the second amended complaint in compliance with the
Respondents: HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge,
Resolution. Hence, the reassessment by the Clerk of Court based on private
Branch 104, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City and MANUEL CHUA UY PO
respondent's claim of "not less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and
TIONG
compensatory damages" amounted to P39,786.00 as docket fee. This was
subsequently paid by Manuel Uy Po Tiong.
Doctrine: The Court in this case liberally applied the rule regarding
7. Sun Insurance then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
payment of docket fees. Although the paid docket fee was insufficient, the
questioning the said order of Judge Asuncion.
Court held that the case should not be dismissed since the respondent
a. The CA ruled in favor of Manuel Uy Po Tiong.
showed willingness to comply with the rules after he had been ordered to
pay additional docket fees after the re-assessment of his amended
Issue: Whether or not the case should be dismissed for the insufficient payment of
complaint.
docket fees. NO.
Facts: Ratio:
1. February 28: Sun Insurance Office (SIOL for brevity) filed a complaint with 1. The main thrust of the petition is that the CA erred in not finding that the
the RTC for the consignation of a premium refund and a judicial declaration lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over Civil Case No. Q-41177 on the
of nullity of a fire insurance policy. ground of nonpayment of the correct and proper docket fee.
a. The fire insurance policy was issued in favor of private respondent a. Sun Insurance allege that while it may be true that Manuel Uy Po
Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Tiong had paid the amount of P182,824.90 as docket fee, considering
2. March 28: Manuel Uy Po Tiong filed a complaint in the RTC for the refund of that the total amount sought to be recovered in the amended and
premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. supplemental complaint is P64,601,623.70 the docket fee that should
a. The complaint sought: the payment of actual, compensatory, moral, be paid by private respondent is P257,810.49, more or less.
exemplary and liquidated damages, attorney's fees, expenses of 2. Not having paid the same, Sun Insurance contend that the complaint should
litigation and costs of the suit. be dismissed.
b. Although the prayer in the complaint did not quantify the amount of a. Sun Insurance cited the case of Manchester Development Corp. v.
damages sought said amount may be inferred from the body of the CA: The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the
complaint to be about 50M. payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the
3. Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by Manuel Uy Po Tiong as complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the
docket fee which prompted Sun Insurance’s' counsel to raise his objection. Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts
Said objection was disregarded by respondent Judge Jose P. Castro who was sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi Case in
then presiding over said case. so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and
4. The Court en banc issued a Resolution in Administrative Case No. 85-10- reversed.
8752-RTC directing the judges in said cases to reassess the docket fees and 3. On the other hand, Manuel Uy Po Tiong claims that the ruling in Manchester
that in case of deficiency, to order its payment. The Resolution also requires cannot apply retroactively to Civil Case No. Q41177 for at the time said civil
all clerks of court to issue certificates of re-assessment of docket fees. All case was filed in court there was no such Manchester ruling as yet.
litigants were likewise required to specify in their pleadings the amount a. He avers that what is applicable is the ruling of this Court in Magaspi
sought to be recovered in their complaints. v. Ramolete, wherein this Court held that the trial court acquired
5. In compliance with the said resolution, Manuel Uy Po Tiong private filed a jurisdiction over the case even if the docket fee paid was insufficient.
"Compliance" and a "Re-Amended Complaint" stating therein a claim of "not 4. SC: The contention that Manchester cannot apply retroactively to this case is
less than Pl0,000,000. 00 as actual compensatory damages" in the prayer. untenable. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as

applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the
Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. additional docket fees as required.
5. The present case, as above discussed, is among the several cases of under- 7. Nevertheless, Sun Insurance contend that the docket fee that was paid is still
assessment of docket fee which were investigated by this Court together with insufficient considering the total amount of the claim.
Manchester. The facts and circumstances of this case are similar to a. This is a matter which the clerk of court of the lower court and/or his
Manchester. [IMPORTANT: Read the facts stated below to properly duly authorized docket clerk or clerk in-charge should determine
understand the flow of the case] and, thereafter, if any amount is found due, he must require the
a. In the body of the original complaint, the total amount of damages private respondent to pay the same.
sought amounted to about P50 Million. In the prayer, the amount of 8. Thus, the Court rules as follows:
damages asked for was not stated. a. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory
b. The action was for the refund of the premium and the issuance of the pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a
writ of preliminary attachment with damages. trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
c. The amount of only P210.00 was paid for the docket fee. action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied
d. Manuel Uy Po Tiong filed an amended complaint wherein in the by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
prayer it is asked that he be awarded no less than P10,000,000.00 within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
as actual and exemplary damages but in the body of the complaint prescriptive or reglementary period.
the amount of his pecuniary claim is approximately P44,601,623.70. b. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party
e. Said amended complaint was admitted and the private respondent claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed
was reassessed the additional docket fee of P39,786.00 based on his until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court
prayer of not less than P10,000,000.00 in damages, which he paid. may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also
f. Manuel Uy Po Tiong filed a supplemental complaint alleging an in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
additional claim of P20,000,000.00 in damages so that his total c. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing
claim is approximately P64,601,620.70. In line with this, he paid an of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee
additional docket fee of P80,396.00. but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the
g. After the promulgation of the decision of the respondent court on pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by
August 31, 1987 wherein private respondent was ordered to be the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on
reassessed for additional docket fee ,he then paid an additional the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or
docket fee of P62,132.92. his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect
● Total amount paid by Manuel Uy Po Tiong: the additional fee.
P182,824.90
● Total amount of his claim in the amended Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Clerk of
complaint: P64,601,620.70, Court of the court a quo is hereby instructed to reassess and determine the additional
● Total amount that Sun Insurance insists that filing fee that should be paid by private respondent considering the total amount of the
Manuel Uy Po Tiong must have paid: P257,810.49. claim sought in the original complaint and the supplemental complaint as may be
6. The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the present case. gleaned from the allegations and the prayer thereof and to require private respondent
a. However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional to pay the deficiency, if any, without pronouncement as to costs.
docket fee until the case was decided by this Court on May 7, 1987.
Thus, in Manchester, due to the fraud committed on the government,
this Court held that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over
the case and that the amended complaint could not have been
admitted inasmuch as the original complaint was null and void.
b. In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called
for considering that, unlike Manchester, Manuel Uy Po Tiong

TACAY VS. RTC OF TAGUM respondent judges directed to dismiss all the complaints without prejudice to
private respondent Pineda's re-filing a similar complaint that complies with
Petitioners: MAXIMO TACAY, PONCIANO PANES AND ANTONIA
Circular No. 7.
NOEL
● The joint petition re-asserted that because the complaints had failed to state
Respondents: REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF TAGUM, DAVAO DEL
the amounts being claimed as actual, moral and nominal damages, the Trial
NORTE, BRANCHES 1 AND 2, PRESIDED BY HON. MARCIAL
Courts had not acquired jurisdiction over the actions
FERNANDEZ AND HON. JESUS MATAS, RESPECTIVELY, PATSITA
GAMUTAN, CLERK OF COURT, AND GODOFREDO PINEDA
Issue:
Whether or not the RTCs have jurisdiction over the 3 actions despite the complaints
Doctrine:
failing to state the amounts being claimed as actual, moral and nominal damages -
YES. The RTCs still have jurisdiction.
Facts:
● Pineda was the owner of a parcel of land. The previous owner had allowed the Ratio:
defendants to occupy portions of the land by mere tolerance ● One reason that the joint petition should be dismissed is because the copies of
● Needing to use the property, Pineda demanded defendants to vacate the the challenged Orders were not certified by the proper Clerk of Court or his
property and pay reasonable rentals, but these demands had been refused duly authorized representative. Certification was made by the petitioners'
● Three actions for recovery of possession (acciones publicianas) were counsel, which is not allowed.
separately instituted by Godofredo Pineda against three defendants. ● Another reason is that it failed to demonstrate any grave abuse of discretion
● One civil case was raffled under Judge Matas and the other two were raffled on the part of the respondent Judges or the existence of any proper cause for
under Judge Fernandez the issuance of the writ of mandamus
● The prayer of each complaint contained a handwritten notation reading, ● The actions are not basically for the recovery of sums of money. They are
"P5,000.00 as and for," immediately above the typewritten words, "Actual principally for recovery of possession of real property, in the nature of an
damages, as proven," the intention apparently being to make the entire phrase accion publiciana.
read, "5,000.00 as and for actual damages as proven." ● What determines the court's jurisdiction in this type of actions is the nature
● Motions to dismiss were filed alleging that the Trial Court had not acquired thereof, not the amount of the damages allegedly arising from or connected
jurisdiction of the case because: with the issue of title or possession, and regardless of the value of the property
a. the complaint violates the mandatory and clear provision of SC Circular No. 7 by ● a real action may be commenced and prosecuted without an accompanying
failing to specify all the amounts of damages which plaintiff is claiming from defendant; claim for actual, moral, nominal or exemplary damages; and such an action
and would fall within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the RTC
b. for failure to allege the assessed value of the subject lot in dispute ● BP 129 provides that RTCs shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction inter
● Judge Matas denied the motion to dismiss and later ordered the striking out, alia over "all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
of the handwritten amount of "P5,000.00 as and for" including the property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and
typewritten words "actual damages as proven" unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is
● Judge Marcial Fernandez also denied the motion to dismiss declaring that: conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
a. since the action at bar is for Reivindicatoria, Damages and Attorney's fees the Court Municipal Circuit Trial Courts."
has the exclusive jurisdiction ● The rule applies regardless of the value of the real property involved, whether
b. the claims for actual, moral and nominal damages are only one aspect of the cause of it be worth more than P20,000.00 or not, infra. The rule also applies even
action, and where the complaint involving realty also prays for an award of damages; the
c. because of absence of specification of the amounts claimed as moral, nominal and amount of those damages would be immaterial to the question of the Court's
actual damages, they should be expunged from the records. jurisdiction.
● Ascribing grave abuse of discretion to both Judges Matas and Fernandez, the ● SC Circular No. 7 cannot be invoked as authority for the dismissal of the
defendants filed with the SC a Joint Petition for certiorari, prohibition and actions at bar.
mandamus, with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction, that said orders be annulled and
● That circular, avowedly inspired by Manchester has but limited application to b. But where -- as in the case at bar -- the fees prescribed for an action involving real
said actions. Moreover, the rules therein laid down have since been clarified property have been paid, but the amounts of certain of the related damages (actual,
by Sun Insurance moral and nominal) being demanded are unspecified, the action may not be dismissed.
● Docket or filing fees are assessed on the basis of the "sum claimed," on the one The Court undeniably has jurisdiction over the action involving the real property,
hand, or the "value of the property in litigation or the value of the estate," on acquiring it upon the filing of the complaint or similar pleading and payment of the
the other. prescribed fee.
● There are, in other words, actions or proceedings involving real property, in
which the value of the property is immaterial to the court's jurisdiction, ● What should be done is simply to expunge those claims for damages as to
account thereof being taken merely for assessment of the legal fees; and there which no amounts are stated, which is what the respondent Courts did, or
are actions or proceedings, involving personal property or the recovery of allow, on motion, a reasonable time for the amendment of the complaints so
money and/or damages, in which the value of the property or the amount of as to allege the precise amount of each item of damages and accept payment
the demand is decisive of the trial court's competence (aside from being the of the requisite fees therefor within relevant prescriptive period.
basis for fixing the corresponding docket fees
Dispositive:
I. Where the action is purely for the recovery of money or damages, the docket fees are WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
assessed on the basis of the aggregate amount claimed, exclusive only of interests and
costs. Two situations may arise.
a. One is where the complaint or similar pleading sets out a claim purely for money or
damages and there is no precise statement of the amounts being claimed. In this event
the rule is that the pleading will not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be
expunged from the record.
In such case, the complaint or pleading may be dismissed, or the claims as to which the
amounts are unspecified may be expunged, although as aforestated the Court may, on
motion, permit amendment of the complaint and payment of the fees provided the
claim has not in the meantime become time-barred.
b. The other is where the pleading does specify the amount of every claim, but the fees
paid are insufficient; and here again, the rule now is that the court may allow a
reasonable time for the payment of the prescribed fees, or the balance thereof, and upon
such payment, the defect is cured and the court may properly take cognizance of the
action, unless in the meantime prescription has set in and consequently barred the right
of action.
II. Where the action involves real property and a related claim for damages as well, the
legal fees shall be assessed on the basis of both (1) the value of the property and (2) the
total amount of related damages sought
a. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the action if the filing of the initiatory pleading
is accompanied by the payment of the requisite fees, or, if the fees are not paid at the
time of the filing of the pleading, as of the time of full payment of the fees within such
reasonable time as the court may grant, unless, of course, prescription has set in in the
meantime

PHILIPPINE FIRST INSURANCE V PYRAMID LOGISTICS no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, where the filing of
the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the prescribed docket fee.
Petitioners: PHILIPPINE FIRST INSURANCE CO., INC. and
PARAMOUNT GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION,
Issue/s:
Respondents: PYRAMID LOGISTICS AND TRUCKING CORPORATION
Did the CA err when it applied the Sun Life doctrine despite clear showing of Pyramid's
(formerly PANACOR INTEGRATED WAREHOUSING AND TRUCKING
intention to evade the payment of the correct docket fee?
CORPORATION)
Ratio:
Doctrine:
1. Under the Rules of Court, docket fees are assessed on the basis of the sum claimed or
the value of the property in litigation or the value of the estate, on the other.
Facts: 2. In the case of Tacay v RTC, the Court clarified the effect of Sun Trust on the
1. Pyramid Logistics and Trucking Corp (Pyramid) owns a delivery van. The van was Manchester doctrine: that complaints, petitions, answers, and similar pleadings should
loaded with goods belonging to California Manufacturing Corporation (CMC) but the specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading
goods never reached its destination. Pyramid's driver and helper cannot be found. but also in the prayer, has not been altered. What has been revised is the rule that
2. Pyramid filed an insurance claim against PhilFirst but PhilFirst refused to subsequent amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest
compensate for the loss. The goods were valued at Php 907 149. jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amount
3. In its complaint for specific performance and damages, Pyramid prayed: sought in the amended pleading, the trial court now being authorized to allow payment
“. . . that after due proceedings, judgment be rendered, ordering [herein petitioners] to of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive
comply with their obligation under their respective Insurance Policies by paying to [it] period or reglementary period. Moreover, a new rule has been added, governing the
jointly and severally, the claims arising from the subject losses. awards of claims not specified in the pleading i.e., damages arising after the filing of the
THAT, [herein petitioners] be adjudged jointly and severally to pay to [it], in addition complaint or similar pleading as to which the additional filing fee therefore shall
to the foregoing, the following: constitute a lien on the judgment.
1. The sum of PHP 50,000.00 plus PHP 1,500.00 for each Court session Two situations may arise. One is where the complaint or similar pleading sets out a
attended by counsel until the instant [case] is finally terminated, as and for attorneys claim purely for money and damages and there is no statement of the amounts being
fees...” claimed. In this event the rule is that the pleading will not be accepted nor admitted, or
4. Pyramid was assessed P610 docket fee, apparently on the basis of the amount of shall otherwise be expunged from the record. In other words, the complaint or pleading
P50,000 specified in the prayer representing attorneys fees, which it duly paid. may be dismissed, or the claims as to which amounts are unspecified may be expunged,
5. Pyramid later filed an amended complaint containing minor changes in the body but although as aforestated the Court may, on motion, permit amendment of the complaint
bearing the same prayer. and payment of the fees provided the claim has not in the meantime become time-
6. PhilFirst filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction because of barred. The other is where the pleading does specify the amount of every claim, but the
Pyramid's failure to pay the docket fees in full. PhilFirst argues that Pyramid was trying fees paid are insufficient; and here again, the rule now is that the court may allow a
to defraud the court in paying the docket fees since in the body of the complaint, reasonable time for the payment of the prescribed fees, or the balance thereof, and upon
Pyramid specifically alleged that it lost goods valued at Php 907 149. However, in the such payment, the defect is cured and the court may properly take cognizance of the
prayer in the complaint, Pyramid deliberately omitted to specify what these damages action, unless in the meantime prescription has set in and consequently barred the right
are but only mentioned the attorney’s fees, thereby misleading the docket clerk in the of action.
assessment of the the filing fee at Php 610 only, which was based on the Php50K
attorney’s fee. Motion to dismiss denied. MR denied. CA partially granted PhilFirst's 3. In this case, Pyramid captioned its complaint as one for specific performance and
petition for certiorari and ordered Pyramid to pay the proper docking fees. MR before damages but the body seeks collection of claims-sums of money, which Pyramid knew
the CA denied, hence the case at bar. (Php 900K as alleged in the body). Pyramid, however, failed to specify in its prayer
7. PhilTrust invokes the Manchester doctrine that a pleading which does not specify (both in the original and amended complaint) the amount of the claims/damages.
in the prayer the amount sought shall not be admitted or shall otherwise be expunged,
and that the court acquires jurisdiction only upon the payment of the prescribed docket 4. Pyramid argues that it omitted the amount of damages claimed in the prayer because
fee. Pyramid, on the other hand, invokes the Sun Life Insurance doctrine relaxing the it was not aware of the extent of PhilFirst's liability and that the amount should be left
Manchester ruling by allowing payment of the docket fee within a reasonable time, in to the trial court's determination. The Court, however, found Pyramid’s argument of
no merit and ruled that: first, Pyramid's motion is actually an action for collection of its
claim it admittedly knew; second, assuming that Pyramid has other claims yet to be
determined, the general rule is that it is the duty of the parties claiming such damages
to specify the amount sought on the basis of which the court may make a proper
determination, and for the proper assessment of the appropriate docket fees. The
exception contemplated as to claims not specified or to claims although
specified are left for determination of the court is limited only to any
damages that may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading
for then it will not be possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate as
to the amount thereof
Dispositive: Petition denied

PROTON PILIPINAS CORP. V BANQUE NATIONALE i. To prevent the trial court from acquiring jurisdiction over
the case.
Petitioners: Proton Pilipinas Corp., Automotive Philippines, ASEA One
8. The RTC denied the petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss.
Corp., and Autocorp.
a. The RTC held that the docket fees were properly paid.
Respondents: Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP)
b. And that even granting arguendo that the docket fees were not
properly paid, the RTC cannot just dismiss the case.
Doctrine: While the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a
i. The RTC has not yet ordered to pay the correct docket fees,
jurisdictional requirement, even its non-payment at the time of filing does
1. Thus the Motion to dismiss is premature, aside
not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid
from being without any legal basis.
within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when the
c. The RTC also cited National Steel Corp v CA
party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing
i. Although the payment of the proper docket fees is a
such payment.
jurisdictional requirement:
1. The trial court may allow the plaintiff in an action
Facts: to pay the same within a reasonable time within
1. In 1995, Proton availed of credit facilities of BNP. the expiration of applicable prescription or
a. To guarantee the payment of Proton’s obligation, Automotive, ASEA, reglementary period.
and Autocorp executed a corporate guarantee to the extent of $2M. ii. If the plaintiff fails to comply with this requirement:
b. Proton and BNP then entered into three trust receipt agreements. 1. The defendant should timely raise the issue of
2. Under the trust agreements: jurisdiction
a. Proton would receive imported passenger motor vehicles and hold 2. Or else he would be considered in estoppel.
them in trust for BNP. iii. In the latter case, the balance between appropriate docket
b. Proton would be free to sell the vehicles subject to the condition that: fees and the amount actually paid by the plaintiff will be
i. it would deliver the proceeds of the sale to BNP, considered a lien on any award he may obtain in his favor.
ii. to be applied to its obligations to it. 9. Upon filing the case on certiorari and mandamus to the CA, the CA likewise
c. In case the vehicles are not sold, Proton would return them to BNP, denied the petition.
together with all the accompanying documents of title. a. Where the action is purely for recovery of money or damages, the
3. Allegedly, Proton failed to deliver the proceeds of the sale and return the docket fees are assessed on the basis of the aggregate amount
unsold motor vehicles. claimed, exclusive only of interests and costs.
4. Pursuant to the corporate guarantee: b. Assuming arguendo that the correct filing fees was not made, the rule
a. BNP demanded from Automotive, Asea and Autocorp the payment is that:
of the amount of US$1,544,984.40: i. The court may allow a reasonable time for the payment of
i. Representing Proton's total outstanding obligations. the prescribed fees, or the balance thereof,
b. The guarantors refused to pay, however. ii. and upon such payment, the defect is cured and the court
5. Hence, BNP led on September 7, 1998 before the Makati Regional Trial Court may properly take cognizance of the action.
(RTC) a complaint against petitioners praying that: 1. Unless in the meantime prescription has set in and
a. They be ordered to pay: consequently barred the right of action.
(1) US$1,544,984.40 plus accrued interest and other related charges thereon iii. In this case, the Judge did not make any finding that the
subsequent to August 15, 1998 until fully paid, and filing fee paid by BNP was insufficient.
(2) an amount equivalent to 5% of all sums due from petitioners as attorney's fees. c. On the issue of the correct dollar-peso rate of exchange:
6. The Makati RTC Clerk of Court assessed the docket fees which BNP paid at i. The Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Makati pegged
P352,116.30 7 which was computed as follows: it at P43.21 to US$1.
7. The petitioners then led on October 12, 1998 a Motion to Dismiss: ii. In the absence of any office guide of the rate of exchange
a. On the ground that BNP failed to pay the correct docket fees which said court functionary was duty bound to follow,
1. The rate he applied is presumptively correct.
b. HOWEVER, the ruling in Manchester was clarified in Sun Insurance
Issue/s: WoN the RTC lacked jurisdiction for underpayment of docket fees by BNP Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion 6 when this Court held that in the
former there was clearly an effort to defraud the government in
Ratio: avoiding to pay the correct docket fees, whereas in the latter the
NO plaintiff demonstrated his willingness to abide by paying the
1. Yes, the docket fees paid by respondent were insufficient. additional fees as required.
a. In re: CA’s conclusion that the clerk of court did not err when he i. In Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional docket
applied the exchange rate of US$1 = P43.00 "[i]n the absence of any fee until the case was decided by this Court on May 7, 1987.
office guide of the rate of exchange which said court functionary was 1. Thus, in Manchester, due to the fraud committed
duty bound to follow,[hence,] the rate he applied is presumptively on the government, this Court held that the court
correct," a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and
i. The same does not lie. that the amended complaint could not have been
1. The presumption of regularity of the clerk of admitted inasmuch as the original complaint was
court's application of the exchange rate is not null and void.
conclusive. It is disputable. ii. In the present (SIOL v Asuncion) case, a more liberal
2. As such, the presumption may be overturned by interpretation of the rules is called for considering that,
the requisite rebutting evidence. unlike Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his
3. In the case at bar, petitioners have adequately willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional
proven with documentary evidence 36 that the docket fees as required.
exchange rate when the complaint was filed on 1. The decision in Manchester must have had that
September 7, 1998 was US$1 = P43.21. sobering influence on private respondent who
2. HOWEVER, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional thus paid the additional docket fee as ordered by
requirement, even its non-payment at the time of filing does not automatically the respondent court.
cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within the applicable 2. It triggered his change of stance by manifesting his
prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when the party involved willingness to pay such additional docket fee as
demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment. may be ordered.
a. In a case which was cited, Manchester Dev’t. Co. v CA, it is true that 3. Thus, when insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs and there
his Court held that the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only was no intention to defraud the government, the Manchester rule does not
upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees, hence, it concluded apply.
that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. 4. In the case at bar, BNP merely relied on the assessment made by the clerk of
court which turned out to be incorrect.
6 SIOL v Asuncion Rules: therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is 3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the ling of the
not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed ling fee but, subsequently, the
fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has
reglementary period. been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall
constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional
pleadings, which shall not be considered led until and unless the ling fee prescribed fee.

a. Under the circumstances, the clerk of court has the responsibility of
reassessing what respondent must pay within the prescriptive
period, failure of which the complaint merits dismissal.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED in part. The July 25, 2001
Decision and the December 18, 2001 Resolution of the Court Appeals are hereby
MODIFIED. The Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City is
ordered to reassess and determine the docket fees that should be paid by
respondent, BNP, in accordance with the Decision of this Court, and direct
respondent to pay the same within 15 days, provided the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period has not yet expired. Thereafter, the trial
court is ordered to proceed with the case with utmost dispatch. SO ORDERED.

TIJAM VS SIBONGHANOY 4. Spouses Tijam then made a demand on the Surety but upon failure to satisfy
the judgment, they moved for a second motion for execution against the
Petitioners: Serafin Tijam et. al.
counterbond.
Respondents: Magdaleno Sibonghanoy alias Gavino Sibonghanoy and
a. The CFI granted the motion, and the writ was issued.
Lucia Baguio; Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. [appellant]
5. The Surety moved to quash the writ of execution on the ground that the
same was issued without the required summary hearing provided in the Rules.
Doctrine: Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the
This was denied by the CFI.
courts exclusively by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of
6. The Surety then appealed the denial of its motion for quashal to the CA. The
the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any
question of lack of jurisdiction was not raised among its assignment of errors 7.
stage of the proceedings. However, a party may be barred by laches when
The CA denied the appeal.
he invokes the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief against his
7. 1963: The Surety later filed a motion asking for extension of time to file
opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
a motion for reconsideration. This was granted.
question that same jurisdiction.
8. The Surety then filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction of the
CFI over the case, alleging that:
Disclaimer: dami talagang motions and writs na ganap sorry a. A month before the Spouses Tijam filed their complaint in the CFI,
the Judiciary Act of 1948 had already become effective. It deprived
Facts: the CFI original jurisdiction over cases in which the demand,
1. 1948, CFI: Spouses Tijam commenced a civil case for recovery of money exclusive of interest, is not more than P2000. Therefore, the CFI did
against Spouses Sibonghanoy for P1,908. not have jurisdiction over the case.
a. A writ of attachment was issued by the CFI against Spouses 9. The CA certified the case to the SC.
Tibonghanoy’s properties, but the writ was dissolved upon the filing
of a counter-bond by the Spouses Tibonghanoy and Manila Surety Issue/s: WoN the Surety is estopped by laches from raising the issue of jurisdiction –
and Fidelity (Surety). YES
2. CFI rendered judgment in favor of Spouses Tijam. After the decision became
final and executory, the CFI issued a writ of execution against Spouses Ratio:
Tibonghanoy, which was returned unsatisfied. 1. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively
3. Spouses Tijam then moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take
the Surety’s bond. (Fact #1a) cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the
a. The Surety filed an opposition against the motion proceedings.
i. Grounds: the absence of a demand upon the Surety to pay 2. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, the
the amount of the judgment and failure to prosecute Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour for
ii. The Surety prayed the Court not only to deny the the purpose of annulling everything done heretofore in the case with its active
motion for execution but also the following participation.
affirmative relief: “to relieve the [Surety] of its liability, 3. Although the action, originally, was exclusively against the Sibonghanoy
if any, under the bond in question” spouses, the Surety became a quasi-party when it filed a counter-bond for the
b. The Court denied the motion of Spouses Tijam solely on the dissolution of the writ of attachment issued by the court of origin. Since then,
ground that no demand was made on the Surety for the satisfaction it acquired certain rights and assumed specific obligations in connection with
of the judgment. the pending case.
a. At the filing of the first motion for execution against the
counter-bond, the Surety not only filed a written opposition praying
7 No summary hearing in the issuance of the writ of execution; in ordering the

issuance of execution against the Surety; in denying the motion to quash
for its denial but also asked for an additional affirmative relief —
that it be relieved of its liability under the counter-bond upon the
grounds relied upon in support of its opposition — lack of
jurisdiction of the court not being one of them.
b. Then, at the hearing on the second motion for execution against the
counter-bond, the Surety appeared, through counsel, to ask for time
within which to file an answer or opposition thereto. This motion was
granted, but instead of such answer or opposition, the Surety filed
the motion to dismiss mentioned heretofore.
4. A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways
and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by
deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
a. Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned
it or declined to assert it. The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands"
is based upon grounds of public policy xxx.
5. It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure
affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain
such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean -
OREGON, US CASE).
a. The question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject
matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases
because the party is barred from such conduct not because the
judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an
adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice cannot be
tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.
6. The Court frowns upon the "undesirable practice" of a party submitting his
case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and
attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.
Dispositive: UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are hereby
affirmed, with costs against the appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.

RIVERA v. HON. CATALO Issue/s: W/N a void judgment for want of jurisdiction can never become final and any
writ of execution based on it is void --YES
Petitioners: FLOR GILBUENA RIVERA
Respondents: HON. LEANDRO C. CATALO
Ratio: Indeed, under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment,
Doctrine: A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all.
a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no
It neither is a source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts
longer be modified in any respect. However, there are recognized exceptions to this
performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal
general rule such as (1) the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc
effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution based on
entries which cause no prejudice to any party, (2) void judgments, and (3)
it is void.
whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision
rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.rer
Under the law, the court may modify or alter a judgment even after the same
claw
has become executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its
Under the second exception, a void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at
execution unjust and inequitable
all. It neither is a source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts performed
pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never
Facts: become final and any writ of execution based on it is void.
● Rivera filed her Amended Petition before the RTC, praying for the issuance of ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
new owner's duplicate copy of a TCT, alleging: The court may modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become executory
○ That the owner's duplicate copy of the said title is missing whenever circumstances transpire rendering its execution unjust and inequitable, as
● On May 18, Judge Catalo rendered his decision granting the petition on the where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or
basis of the evidence presented by complainant, particularly the affidavit of alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and executory. In other
loss and the certification issued by the Register of Deeds and ordering the RD words, if there are facts and circumstances that would render a judgment void or unjust
to issue a new Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT. after its finality, and render its execution a complete nullity, such judgment cannot
● The RTC decision became final and executory on July 3, 2012. exude immutability.
● On October 15, RD Acting Records Dacanay formally filed her Manifestation
before the RTC stating that: In this case, Judge Catalo correctly recalled the judgment because the second and third
○ TCT No. 3460 had long been cancelled; exceptions on the doctrine of finality of judgments were squarely applicable. After the
○ On August 16, the RD issued a letter recalling the approval of The finality of the RTC, it was discovered that TCT No. 3460 had been cancelled as early as
annotation of the Affidavit of Loss on TCT No. 3460 after it was April 2, 1924. Complainant, when later asked to present his stand, failed to contradict
discovered that the said title was not lost, rather, it was cancelled by the allegation that he falsified his affidavit of loss. Clearly, these subsequent events
virtue of valid transactions raised a red flag and placed the Respondent Judge on his toes. Judge Catalo realized an
○ The basis of the petition for issuance of new owner's duplicate, which execution of such judgment would definitely be unjust and inequitable as it would be
was an affidavit of loss, was totally false, untrue and fabricated. sanctioning fraud and irregularity. It would judicially permit the issuance of a new
● Acting thereon, Judge Catalo issued an order requiring the complainant and owner's duplicate copy of a title which was no longer in existence.
all the parties concerned to attend a hearing on November 7, 2012 on the
Manifestation filed by Dacanay. Judge Catalo was correct in stating that the judgment was void and could not have
● Despite being given 15 days to give his side, the complainant did not appear in attained finality. A court has no jurisdiction to order the issuance of a new owner's
court. duplicate copy of a certificate of title when it was, in fact, not lost. Here, the original
● Judge Catalo recalled and set aside the May 18, 2012 decision of the RTC. title was not lost but officially cancelled. Hence, Judge Catalo correctly exercised his
● Aggrieved, Rivera filed the subject administrative complaint before the Court judicial prerogative to amend and control his factually and legally infirm decision.
alleging that Judge Catalo committed gross misconduct for recalling a final
and executory judgment. It was only after due process and hearing that Judge Catalo issued his order recalling
○ Accordingly, complainant prays that Judge Catalo be dismissed from the decision of the RTC. Based on the foregoing, as the respondent complied with the
the service with forfeiture of all his retirement benefits. established procedural and substantial rules to nullify a final judgment, no fault can be
ascribed to his actions..
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondent Judge Leandro C.
Catalo, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 256, Muntinlupa City, is
DISMISSED.

AALA v. UY 4. Petitioners allege that Tagum City is predominantly agricultural. Although it
boasts of expansive highways "lined with tall palm trees" and a state-of-the-
Petitioners: CRISANTO M. AALA, ROBERT N. BALAT, DATU BELARDO
art city hall, Tagum City still has an outstanding debt of ₱450 million. The
M. BUNGAD, CESAR B. CUNTAPAY, LAURA S. DOMINGO, GLORIA M.
income level of its 240,000 inhabitants remains constant, and due to
GAZMEN-TAN, and JOCELYN P. SALUDARES-CADAYONA
unreasonable business taxes, most businesses have either scaled down or
Respondents: HON. REY T. UY, in his capacity as the City Mayor of
closed.
Tagum City, Davao del Norte, MR. ALFREDO H. SILAWAN, in his capacity
a. Set against this factual backdrop, petitioners assail the validity of
as City Assessor of Tagum City, HON. DE CARLO L. UY, HON. ALLAN L.
City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012. They further allege that the
RELLON, HON. MARIA LINA F. BAURA, HON. NICANDRO T.
ordinance equated the market values of unused and undeveloped
SUAYBAGUIO, JR., HON. ROBERT L. SO, HON. JOEDEL T. CAASI, HON.
lands to that of fully developed lands. Hence, the ordinance
OSCAR M. BERMUDEZ, HON. ALAN D. ZULUETA, HON. GETERITO T.
discriminates against poor land owners who do not have the means
GEMENTIZA, HON. TRISTAN ROYCE R. AALA, HON. FRANCISCO C.
to pay the increased amount of real property taxes.
REMITAR, in their capacity as City Councilors of Tagum City, Davao del
5. Well-aware of the doctrines on the hierarchy of courts and exhaustion of
Norte, HON. ALFREDO R. PAGDILAO, in his capacity as ABC
administrative remedies, they beg this Court's indulgence to allow immediate
representative, and HON. MARIE CAMILLE C. MANANSALA, in her
and direct resort to it. According to petitioners, this case is exempt from the
capacity as SKF representative
application of the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. Furthermore, petitioners
assert that the issue they have raised is purely legal and that the case involves
Doctrine: Inexcusable non-compliance with the doctrine of hierarchy of
paramount public interest, which warrants the relaxation of the rule on
courts and the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies may be
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
the cause of dismissal.
a. Furthermore, they asserted that the Secretary of Justice does not
have the power to suspend the implementation of the questioned
Facts: ordinance. Moreover, the 60-day period given to the Secretary of
1. Petitioners question the validity of City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 of the City Justice within which to render a decision would merely constitute
of Tagum, Davao del Norte. delay.
a. The proposed ordinance sought to adopt a new schedule of market b. Under the Local Government Code of 1991, the amount of real
values and assessment levels of real properties in Tagum City. property tax assessed must first be paid before a protest may be
2. Aala and Ferido asserted that City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 violated Section entertained. However, petitioners contend that the taxpayers of
217 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which provides that "[r]eal Tagum City would not be able to comply with this rule due to lack of
property shall be classified, valued and assessed on the basis of its actual use money. Petitioners justify immediate resort to this Court due to this
regardless of where located, whoever owns it, and whoever uses it." impasse.
a. The ordinance categorized all lands in Tagum City either into 6. Respondents point out that the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is only
commercial or industrial lands, regardless of the purpose to which directed against judicial and quasi-judicial acts. Moreover, there is a plain,
they were devoted and the extent of their development (i.e: those speedy, and adequate remedy available to petitioners under the law.
properties located in a predominantly commercial area is classifed as a. Citing Section 187 of the Local Government Code of 1991,
commercial, regardless of the purpose to which they were devoted). respondents argue that petitioners should have exhausted
According to the petitioners, this blanket classification of real administrative remedies by filing an appeal before the Secretary of
properties was erroneous because real property should be classified, Justice.
valued, and assessed not according to its location but on the basis of 7. Respondents further argue that in directly filing their Petition before this
actual use. Court, petitioners violated the doctrine on hierarchy of courts since the
3. It also violated Section 191 where petitioners pointed out that the market Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and the Regional Trial Courts have
values of residential lands, which were reclassified under the ordinance as concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and
commercial, increased from ₱600.00 per square meter to ₱5,000.00 per mandamus.
square meter, or by 833% in a span of only 3 years.
Issues:
1. Whether or not this case falls under the exceptions to the doctrine on The case does not fall under any of the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of
hierarchy of courts. NO. administrative remedies.
2. Whether or not this case falls under the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion 1. Under Section 187 of the Local Government Code of 1991, aggrieved taxpayers
of administrative remedies; NO. who question the validity or legality of a tax ordinance are required to file an
appeal before the Secretary of Justice before they seek intervention from the
Ratio: regular courts.
The case does not fall under any of the exceptions of the doctrine on hierarchy of 2. Parties are generally precluded from immediately seeking the intervention of
courts.8 courts when "the law provides for remedies against the action of an
administrative board, body, or officer."
1. None of the exceptions to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts are present in 3. The practical purpose behind the principle of exhaustion of administrative
this case. remedies is to provide an orderly procedure by giving the administrative
2. The doctrine on hierarchy of courts is a practical judicial policy designed to agency an "opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly [and] to prevent
restrain parties from directly resorting to this Court when relief may be unnecessary and premature resort to the courts.
obtained before the lower courts. 4. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, like the doctrine on
a. The logic behind this policy is grounded on the need: hierarchy of courts, is not an iron-clad rule. It admits of several well-defined
i. to prevent "inordinate demands upon the Court's time and exceptions.9
attention which are better devoted to those matters within 5. In Alta Vista Golf and Country Club v. City of Cebu, this Court excluded the
its exclusive jurisdiction," case from the strict application of the principle on exhaustion of
ii. to prevent the congestion of the Court's dockets. administrative remedies, particularly for non-compliance with Section 187 of
3. Although petitioners raise questions of law, other interrelated factual issues the Local Government Code of 1991, on the ground that the issue raised in the
have emerged from the parties' arguments, which this Court deems Petition was purely legal.
indispensable for the proper disposition of this case (i.e: to compare the new a. In this case, however, the issues involved are not purely legal. There
schedule of fair market values with the old schedule of fair market values and are factual issues that need to be addressed for the proper disposition
determine whether the increase was exorbitant.) of the case.
a. In order to resolve these factual issues, the SC will be tasked to 6. To question the validity of the ordinance, petitioners should have first filed an
receive evidence from both parties. However, the initial reception appeal before the Secretary of Justice. However, petitioners justify direct
and appreciation of evidence are functions that this Court cannot resort to this Court on the ground that they are entangled in a "catch- 22
perform. These functions are best left to the trial courts. This Court situation." They believe that filing an appeal before the Secretary of Justice
is not a trier of facts. would merely delay the process and give the City Government of Tagum ample
time to collect real property taxes.
8 Immediate resort to the SC may be allowed when any of the following grounds are lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the
present: (1) when genuine issues of constitutionality are raised that must be administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is irreparable injury; (6) when the
addressed immediately; (2) when the case involves transcendental importance; (3) respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President,
when the case is novel; (4) when the constitutional issues raised are better decided by bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion
this Court; (5) when time is of the essence; (6) when the subject of review involves of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a
acts of a constitutional organ; (7) when there is no other plain, speedy, adequate nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case
remedy in the ordinary course of law; (8) when the petition includes questions that proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate
may affect public welfare, public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of remedy; (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
justice; (9) when the order complained of was a patent nullity; and (10) when the intervention; and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the complainant; (12)
appeal was considered as an inappropriate remedy. when no administrative review is provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified
9 (1) [W]hen there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a political agency applies; and (14) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative
legal question; (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal and amounts to remedies has been rendered moot.
7. The questioned ordinance was published in July 2012. Had petitioners
immediately filed an appeal, the Secretary of Justice would have had enough
time to render a decision.
a. Section 187 of the Local Government Code of 1991 gives the Secretary
of Justice 60 days to act on the appeal.
b. Within 30 days from receipt of an unfavorable decision or upon
inaction by the Secretary of Justice within the time prescribed,
aggrieved taxpayers may opt to lodge the appropriate proceeding
before the regular courts.
8. The "catch-22 situation" petitioners allude to does not exist. Under Section
166 of the Local Government Code of 1991, local taxes "shall accrue on the first
(1st) day of January of each year.”
a. When the questioned ordinance was published in July 2012, the City
Government of Tagum could not have immediately issued real
property tax assessments. Hence, petitioners had ample time within
which to question the validity of the tax ordinance.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus

is DISMISSED.

AGARRADO VS. LIBRANDO-AGARRADO ● In determining whether a case is incapable of pecuniary estimation,
identifying the nature of the principal action or remedy sought is primarily
Petitioners: MA. ROSARIO AGARRADO, RUTH LIBRADA AGARRADO
necessary.
AND ROY AGARRADO, for themselves and for the bene􀀯t of their siblings
● If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
and co-owners ROBERTO AGARRADO, REUEL ANDRES AGARRADO,
capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal
HEIRS OF THE LATE RODRIGO AGARRADO, JR., REX AGARRADO and
courts or in the Courts of First Instance would depend on the amount of the
JUDY AGARRADO
claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to
Respondents: RISTITA LIBRANDO-AGARRADO AND ANA LOU
recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
AGARRADO-KING
consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such
actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in
Doctrine:
terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by Courts of First Instance
● For actions on partition, the subject matter is two-phased:
Facts: ● Partition is at once an action (1) for declaration of co-ownership and (2) for
● Petitioner Aggarados (Ma. Rosario, Ruth, and Roy) owns a 287-square-meter segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties
land but unknown to them, their father had children with another woman. involved. Thus, in a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks, first, a
These children, Cristita and Ana Lou 􀀯led a complaint before the RTC for the declaration that he/she is a co-owner of the subject properties, and second,
partition of the property with Ma. Rosario, Ruth, Roy, "and other heirs of the conveyance of his/her lawful share
Rodrigo Agarrado" as defendants ● while actions for partition are incapable of pecuniary estimation owing to its
● RTC ordered the parties to partition the subject property among themselves two-phased subject matter, the determination of the court which will acquire
● CA affirmed but modified that: jurisdiction over the same must still conform to Sec. 33 (3) of B.P. 129, as
1. Cristita and Ana Lou as well as defendants-appellants as co-owners of the subject amended.
property ● If the value exceeds P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 as the case may be, it is the
2. judicial partition in the following manner: Regional Trial Courts which have jurisdiction under Sec. 19(2)
(a) Cristita Librando Agarrado is entitled to 2/9; ● Jurisdiction is de􀀯ned as the power and authority of a court to hear, try, and
(b) Ma. Rosario, Ruth and Roy are entitled to 6/9 plus 1/4 to be divided equally among decide a case. To exercise this, the court or adjudicative body must acquire,
them unless they agree otherwise; and among others, jurisdiction over the subject matter, which is conferred by law
(c) Ana Lou is entitled to 1/9 of the property. and not by the consent or acquiescence of any or all of the parties or by
erroneous belief of the court that it exists
● Ma. Rosario etc. seek to determine the effect on jurisdiction of the failure to ● Sections 19 (2) and 33 (3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 state
indicate the market value of the subject property in the complaint filed before that in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or
the RTC. any interest therein, the RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
where the assessed value of the property exceeds P20,000.00 or, for civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds P50,000.00
Issue: ● For those below the foregoing threshold amounts, exclusive jurisdiction lies
Whether or not the failure to indicate the market value of the subject property in the with the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTC), Municipal Trial Courts (MTC), or
complaint filed before the RTC has the effect of removing jurisdiction from RTC - YES. Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTC).
Complaint should be dismissed because RTC has no jurisdiction ● The court should ONLY look into the facts alleged in the complaint to
determine whether a suit is within its jurisdiction
Ratio: ● Only these facts can be the basis of the court's competence to take cognizance
● CA said that the action for partition instituted by Cristita etc. in the RTC is one of a case, and that one cannot advert to anything not set forth in the complaint,
incapable of pecuniary estimation, which would thus confer jurisdiction over such as evidence adduced at the trial, to determine the nature of the action
the case to the RTC. thereby initiated.
● Absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it
cannot be determined whether the RTC or the MTC has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the petitioner's action . Indeed, the courts cannot take
judicial notice of the assessed or market value of the land.
● The rule on determining the assessed value of a real property, insofar as the
identi􀀯cation of the jurisdiction of the 􀀯rst and second level courts is
concerned, would be two-tiered:
● First, the general rule is that jurisdiction is determined by the assessed value
of the real property as alleged in the complaint; and
● Second, the rule would be liberally applied if the assessed value of the
property, while not alleged in the complaint, could still be identi􀀯ed through
a facial examination of the documents already attached to the complaint.
● In the present case, the complaint did indeed lack any indication as to the
assessed value of the subject property. More, none of the documents annexed
to the complaint and as attached in the records of this case indicates any such
amount. Thus, the petitioners are correct in restating their argument against
the RTC's jurisdiction, for it has none to exercise.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the April 19, 2013 Decision and March 27, 2014
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 02669, as well as the January
17, 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, of Bacolod City in Civil Case
No. 03-11893 are hereby SET ASIDE. The complaint is hereby DISMISSED without
prejudice to its refiling in the proper court.

BARANGAY MAYAMOT V ANTIPOLO CITY
Ratio:
Petitioners: Barangay Mayamot
1. Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of the courts to hear, try and decide
Respondents: ANTIPOLO CITY, SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD OF
cases. The designation or caption is not controlling more than the allegations in the
ANTIPOLO, BARANGAYS STA. CRUZ, BAGONG NAYON AND
complaint.
MAMBUGAN, AND CITY ASSESSOR AND TREASURER
2. In this case, it is of no moment that Barangay Mayamot's petition before the RTC was
Doctrine: The RTC is without jurisdiction to settle a boundary dispute
captioned as one for nullity of Resolution No. 97-89. the allegations and issues raised
involving barangays in the same city or municipality. Said dispute shall be
by Barangay Mayamot are centered on the alleged inconsistency between its perceived
referred for settlement to the sangguniang panglungsod or sangguniang
actual and physical territory and its territory and boundaries, as defined and identified
bayan concerned. If there is failure of amicable settlement, the dispute shall
after the Bureau of Lands Cadastral Survey No. 29-047 and the provisions of BP Blg.
be formally tried by the sanggunian concerned and shall decide the same
787 to 794 were consolidated and integrated by respondent City Assessor into the map
within sixty (60) days from the date of the certification referred to. Further,
of Antipolo. Thus, contrary to Barangay Mayamot's argument that the issue is the
the decision of the sanggunian may be appealed to the RTC having
validity of Resolution No. 97-89, the issue to be resolved is the boundary dispute
jurisdiction over the area in dispute, within the time and manner prescribed
between Barangay Mayamot on the one hand, and Barangays Bagong Nayon, Sta. Cruz,
by the Rules of Court.
Cupang, and Mambugan, on the other hand.
Facts: 3. According to RA 7160, the RTC is without jurisdiction to settle a boundary dispute
1. In 1984, BP 787 to 794 were passed creating 8 new barangays (Barangays Beverly involving barangays in the same city or municipality. Said dispute shall be referred for
Hills, Dalig, Bagong Nayon, San Juan, Sta. Cruz, Munting Dilaw, San Luis, and settlement to the sangguniang panglungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned. If there
Inarawan) in the Municipality of Antipolo. is failure of amicable settlement, the dispute shall be formally tried by the sanggunian
concerned and shall decide the same within sixty (60) days from the date of the
2. To integrate the territorial jurisdiction of the new barangays to the map of Antipolo, certification referred to. Further, the decision of the sanggunian may be appealed to the
the Sangguniang Bayan of Antipolo passed a resolution commissioning the City RTC having jurisdiction over the area in dispute, within the time and manner
Assessor to plot and delineate the territorial boundaries of the now 16 barangays of prescribed by the Rules of Court. by virtue of the Local Government Code of 1991, the
Antipolo. RTC lost its power to try, at the first instance, cases of boundary disputes, and it is only
when the intermediary steps have failed that resort to the RTC will follow as provided
3. Brgy. Mayamot filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity and/or Annulment of in the laws.
Resolution No. 97-89 and Injunction against the respondents before the RTC of
Antipolo. Brgy. Mayamot claims while BP Blg. 787 to 794 did not require Barangay Dispositive: in view of the foregoing, this petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Mayamot to part with any of its territory, the adoption of Resolution No. 97-89 reduced Decision dated January 30, 2009 and Resolution dated March 31, 2009 of the Court of
its territory to one-half of its original area and was apportioned to Barangays Sta. Cruz, Appeals are AFFIRMED
Bagong Nayon, Cupang, and Mambugan.
4. RTC dismissed the petition, ruling, among others, that Any issue of discrepancy
resulting in the adoption of Resolution [No.] 97-89 between the boundary defined in
the Cadastral Survey Plan and the actual physical boundary itself of Barangay Mayamot
is a boundary dispute which should have been properly ventilated in accordance with
the remedies available under the Local Government Code of 1983. Appeal to the CA
denied. CA ruled that the RTC correctly dismissed the case because it has no original
jurisdiction to try and decide a barangay boundary dispute. Hence the case at bar.
Issue/s:
W/N the RTC has original jurisdiction over a boundary dispute.-- NO
PT&T V SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. a. Raising the issue that the access charges imposed by Smart were
allegedly "discriminatory and not in conformity with those of other
Petitioners: PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH & TELEPHONE CORP.
carriers."
Respondents: SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC.
b. The NTC then ordered Smart and PT&T to attend mediation
conferences in order to thresh out the issues.
Doctrine: The courts cannot and will not determine a controversy
c. After the mediation efforts failed, the NTC directed the parties to file
involving a question within the competence of an administrative tribunal,
their respective pleadings, after which it would consider the case
the controversy having been so placed within the special competence of the
submitted for resolution.
administrative tribunal under a regulatory scheme.
6. Before the parties were able to submit the pleadings, Smart led a complaint
with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (RTC) against PT&T.
Facts: a. Smart alleged that PT&T was in breach of its contractual obligation
1. RA 7925 gave the NTC the authority to approve or adopt access charge when it failed to pay its outstanding debt and denied its liability to
arrangements between two public telecommunication entities. Smart.
2. PT&T and Smart entered into an Agreement for the interconnection of their b. Accordingly, Smart prayed that PT&T be ordered to pay the sum of
telecommunication facilities. P1,387,742.33 representing its unpaid obligation and to comply with
a. The Agreement provided for the interconnection of Smart's Cellular the amended Agreement.
Mobile Telephone System (CMTS), Local Exchange Carrier (LEC) c. Smart also asked the RTC to issue a temporary restraining order
and Paging services with PT&T's LEC service. against the NTC and PT&T, which the RTC granted.
3. However, PT&T had difficulty meeting its financial obligations to Smart. 7. PT&T then sought for the dismissal of the civil case.
a. Thus the parties amended the Agreement, which extended the a. Raising the ground of lack of jurisdiction, non-observance of the
payment period and allowed PT&T to settle its obligations on doctrine of primary jurisdiction, and exhaustion of administrative
installment basis. remedies.
b. The amended Agreement also specified that Smart's access charge to 8. The RTC denied PT&T’s motion to dismiss.
PT&T would increase from P1.00 to P2.00 once PT&T's unpaid a. The RTC reasoned that allowing the NTC to proceed and adjudicate
balance reaches P4 Million and that PT&T's access charge to Smart access charges would violate Smart's contractual rights.
would be reduced from P8.69 to P6.50. b. The RTC also held that the nature of the civil case was incapable of
c. Upon full payment, PT&T's access charge would be further reduced pecuniary estimation which squarely falls within its jurisdiction.
to P4.50. c. It added that the NTC has no jurisdiction to adjudicate breaches of
4. Smart then sent a letter informing PT&T that it increased the access charge contract and award damages.
from P1.00 to P2.00 starting April 1, 2005 in accordance with the amended 9. PT&T then elevated the case to the CA through a petition for certiorari, which
Agreement. the latter denied.
a. However, PT&T sent a letter to Smart claiming that the latter 10. Arguments:
overcharged PT&T on outbound calls to Smart's CMTS. a. PT&T:
i. PT&T cited the NTC resolution in a separate dispute i. The NTC has primary jurisdiction over the determination of
between Smart and Digitel: access charges.
1. Where the NTC ultimately disallowed the access ii. PT&T characterizes the NTC case as one involving the
charges imposed by Smart for being validity of interconnection rates, as opposed to one
discriminatory and less favorable than terms involving purely a breach of contract and claim for damages
offered to other public telecommunication entities cognizable by the RTC.
(PTEs). iii. PT&T adds that the writ of preliminary injunction issued by
ii. Accordingly, PT&T demanded a refund of P12,681,795.13 the RTC against NTC constitutes interference with a co-
from Smart equal body.
5. PT&T led a letter-complaint with the NTC: b. Smart:

i. The dispute was purely contractual; hence, it properly falls c. Smart cannot rely on the non-impairment clause because it is a limit
within the jurisdiction of the RTC. on the exercise of legislative power and not of judicial or quasi-
ii. Although the Agreement contained technical terms, Smart's judicial power.
position is that the NTC has no jurisdiction over bilateral 3. Access charges directly affect the State's goal of making basic
interconnection agreements voluntarily negotiated and telecommunications services accessible to everyone at affordable rates.
entered into by PTEs. a. If the access charges are too high, the cost to end-users may well be
iii. Smart’s complaint before the RTC is one which is incapable prohibitive.
of pecuniary estimation and, accordingly, falls within the b. Smart cannot simply invoke the freedom of contract to shield it from
RTC's jurisdiction. the intervention of the NTC, especially when the law itself sanctions
iv. Smart's theory is that, because it is seeking to enforce the the agency's intervention.
Agreement, the action falls within the ruling of Boiser v. c. As correctly pointed out by PT&T:
Court of Appeals that the regular courts, not the NTC, have i. "[b]ecause petitioner and respondent are public utility
jurisdiction over cases involving breach of contract and PTEs subject to regulation by the NTC, their freedom to
damages. enter into contracts is not absolute but subject to the police
v. The specialized knowledge and expertise of the NTC is not power of the State, especially when it comes to matters
indispensable or even necessary in this case since . . . affecting public interest and convenience.”
[Smart] simply seeks to enforce and implement the 4. To accord with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction:
contractual agreement between the parties and their rights a. The courts cannot and will not determine a controversy involving a
and obligations in relation thereto. question within the competence of an administrative tribunal, the
controversy having been so placed within the special competence of
Issue/s: the administrative tribunal under a regulatory scheme.
WoN the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case b. In that instance, the judicial process is suspended pending referral to
the administrative body for its view on the matter in dispute.
Ratio: c. Consequently, if the courts cannot resolve a question that is within
NO the legal competence of an administrative body prior to the
1. RA 7925 regulates access charge arrangements between two PTEs: resolution of that question by the latter, especially where the
a. Access Charge/Revenue Sharing. — The access charge/revenue question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
sharing arrangements between all interconnecting carriers shall be requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the
negotiated between the parties and the agreement between the administrative agency to ascertain technical and intricate matters of
parties shall be submitted to the Commission. In the event the parties fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the
fail to agree thereon within a reasonable period of time, the dispute purposes of the regulatory statute administered, suspension or
shall be submitted to the Commission for resolution. dismissal of the action is proper.
2. The mere fact that Smart and PT&T negotiated and executed a bilateral 5. Here, it would be more proper for the RTC to yield its jurisdiction in favor of
interconnection agreement does not take their stipulations on access charges the NTC since the determination of a central issue, i.e., the matter of access
out of the NTC's regulatory reach. charges, requires the special competence and expertise of the latter.
a. This has to be so in order to further one of the declared policies of RA 6. Under Rule 58, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the court
7925 of expanding the telecommunications network by improving where the action is pending may grant the provisional remedy of preliminary
and extending basic services in unserved and underserved areas at injunction.
affordable rates. a. Generally, trial courts have the ancillary jurisdiction to issue writs of
b. A contrary ruling would severely limit the NTC's ability to discharge preliminary injunction in cases falling within its jurisdiction,
its twin mandates of protecting consumers and promoting consumer including civil actions that are incapable of pecuniary estimation and
welfare, and would go against the trend towards greater delegation claims for sum of money exceeding P400,000.00, among others.
of judicial authority to administrative agencies in matters requiring b. There are, however, exceptions to this rule,
technical knowledge.
i. Such as when Congress, in the exercise of its power to
apportion jurisdiction, restricts the authority of regular
courts to issue injunctive reliefs.
ii. Similarly, RA 8975 provides that no court, other than the
Supreme Court, may issue provisional injunctive reliefs
which would adversely affect the expeditious
implementation and completion of government
infrastructure projects.
iii. Another well- recognized exception is that courts could not
interfere with the judgments, orders, or decrees of a court
of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction.
1. This rule of non- interference applies not only to
courts of law having equal rank but also to quasi-
judicial agencies statutorily at par with
such courts. (i.e. the NTC)
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED . The Decision

dated February 18, 2009, as well as the Resolution dated July 23, 2009, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97737 are SET ASIDE. The writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 146, Makati City is DISSOLVED. The
Regional Trial Court, Branch 146, Makati City is further directed to SUSPEND its
proceedings until the National Telecommunications Commission makes a nal
determination on the issue involving access charges. SO ORDERED.

ORIBELLO VS CA
Ratio:
Petitioners: Berlinda Oribello
1. A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so
Respondents: Court of Appeals (Special Former Tenth Division) and
exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when other remedies are
Remedios Oribello
wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought to be
annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic
Doctrine: A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in
fraud.
equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when other
a. Yet, the remedy, being exceptional in character, is not allowed to be
remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final
so easily and readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final
resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking
judgments, orders or resolutions.
jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud.
b. The Court has thus instituted safeguards:
i. by limiting the grounds for the annulment to lack of
The Court of Appeals exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over actions
jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, and
for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts (if the ground is
ii. by prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
extrinsic fraud).
that the petitioner should show that the ordinary remedies
of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
Facts: remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
1. RTC: Remedios Oribello, represented by her natural father Alfredo Selga, petitioner.
instituted an action for partition and damages involving 12 parcels of land iii. A petition for annulment that ignores or disregards any of
against Berlinda Oribello. the safeguards cannot prosper.
a. Berlinda was the second wife of Toribio Oribello. The latter’s first 2. The attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a judgment, final
wife was Emilia, whom he divorced in the USA. order or final resolution is understandable, for the remedy disregards the
b. Remedios’ action was anchored on the theory that he is the adopted time--honored doctrine of immutability and unalterability of final
daughter of Toribio and Emilia. judgments, a solid corner stone in the dispensation of justice by the courts.
c. Berlinda denies that Remedio was Toribio’s adopted daughter - that a. The doctrine of immutability and unalterability serves a two-fold
the decree of adoption was fraudulently secured by Selga in purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice
Occidental Mindoro and therefore void. and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial
2. The RTC dismissed the case, holding that Remedios was not a co-owner of the business; and (b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk
properties. of occasional errors, which is precisely why the courts exist.
a. It also nullified the adoption decree, holding that it was b. As to the first, a judgment that has acquired finality becomes
obtained through fraud and machination. immutable and unalterable and is no longer to be modified in any
3. The CA, upon appeal by Remedios, vacated and set aside the RTC’s decision. respect even if the modification is meant to correct an erroneous
The case was remanded to the lower court for the second phase of the partition conclusion of fact or of law, and whether the modification is made by
suit. the court that rendered the decision or by the highest court of the
a. The CA also pointed out that even if the adoption proceedings had land.
suffered from infirmities, the RTC did not have the authority to annul c. As to the latter, controversies cannot drag on indefinitely because
the adoption decree and to dismiss the complaint for partition for fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice
that reason; and that at any rate the petitioner still had the option demand that the rights and obligations of every litigant must not
either to file a petition for relief or an action for the annulment of the hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time.
adoption decree in the appropriate court. 3. The objective of the remedy of annulment of judgment or final order is to undo
4. Berlinda appealed to the SC, insisting that or set aside the judgment or final order, and thereby grant to the petitioner an
opportunity to prosecute his cause or to ventilate his defense.
Issue/s: WoN the RTC had the jurisdiction to nullify the adoption decree in the action
for partition - NO
a. If the ground relied upon is lack of jurisdiction, the entire
proceedings are set aside without prejudice to the original action
being refiled in the proper court.
b. If the judgment or final order or resolution is set aside on the ground
of extrinsic fraud, the CA may on motion order the trial court to try
the case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein.
[pertinent in this case, since fraud was alleged]
c. The remedy is by no means an appeal whereby the correctness of the
assailed judgment or final order is in issue; hence, the CA is not called
upon to address each error allegedly committed by the trial court.
4. Based on the foregoing, the RTC did not have the jurisdiction to determine the
validity of the decree of adoption issued by the CFI of Occidental Mindoro by
virtue of the equal rank and category between the RTC and the CFI.
a. The proper court with jurisdiction to do so was the CA, which has
been vested by Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 the exclusive
original jurisdiction over actions for the annulment of the judgments
of the RTC, to wit:
i. Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. - The [Court of Appeals] shall exercise:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for
annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and xxx
5. It is also relevant to mention that the judgment or final order of a court of law
can be set aside only through a direct attack commenced in the court of
competent jurisdiction.
a. For this reason, any attack in this action for partition against the
validity of the adoption decree issued by the CFI of Occidental
Mindoro cannot be permitted because such would constitute a
collateral attack against the judgment in the adoption case.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision
promulgated on July 31, 2003 by the Court of Appeals; REINSTATES the Judgment of
the Regional Trial Court rendered on March 30, 1998 dismissing Civil Case No. A- 1757
entitled Remedios Oribello, represented by her Atty. -in- Fact Alfredo Selga v. Berlinda
P. Oribello and ORDERS respondent Remedios Oribello to pay the costs of suit. SO
ORDERED.
Notes: The SC found that Remedios did not discharge her burden of proof as the
plaintiff to show that she was entitled to the partition.

SPOUSES PAJARES vs. REMARKABLE LAUNDRY AND DRY CLEANING
Issue/s: W/N the RTC was correct in categorizing Civil Case No. CEB-39025 as an
Petitioners: SPOUSES PAJARES
action for damages seeking to recover an amount below its jurisdictional limit --YES
Respondents: REMARKABLE LAUNDRY AND DRY CLEANING
Ratio:
Doctrine: Where the complaint primarily seeks to recover damages, all
1. A complaint primarily seeking to enforce the accessory obligation contained
claims for damages should be considered in determining which court has
in the penal clause is actually an action for damages capable of pecuniary
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case regardless of whether they
estimation.
arose from a single cause of action or several causes of action.
Spouses Pajares' responsibility under the above penal clause involves the payment of
liquidated damages because under Article 2226 of the Civil Code the amount the parties
A complaint primarily seeking to enforce the accessory obligation contained
stipulated to pay in case of breach are liquidated damages.
in the penal clause is actually an action for damages capable of pecuniary
2. What Remarkable Laundry primarily seeks in its Complaint is to recover
estimation.
liquidated damages (which it termed as "incidental and consequential
damages") premised on the alleged breach of contract committed by the
Facts: Spouses Pajares when they unilaterally ceased business operations. Breach of
● Remarkable Laundry and Dry Cleaning filed a Complaint denominated as contract may also be the cause of action in a complaint for damages
"Breach of Contract and Damages"against spouses Pajares before the RTC. 3. True, breach of contract may give rise to a complaint for specific performance
● Remarkable Laundry alleged that it entered into a Remarkable Dealer Outlet or rescission of contract. In which case, the subject matter is incapable of
Contract with Spouses Pajares whereby the latter, acting as a dealer outlet pecuniary estimation and, therefore, jurisdiction is lodged with the RTC.
○ Spouses Pajares failed to follow the required standard purchase However, breach of contract may also be the cause of action in a complaint for
quota in the dealership agreement. They ceased dealer outlet damages. Thus, it is not correct to immediately conclude, as the CA
operations on account of lack of personnel; erroneously did, that since the cause of action is breach of contract, the case
○ Remarkable Laundry made written demands upon Spouses Pajares would only either be specific performance or rescission of contract because it
for the payment of penalties imposed and provided for in the may happen, as in this case, that the complaint is one for damages.
contract, but the latter failed to pay; and, that Spouses Pajares' 4. In an action for damages, the court which has jurisdiction is
violation constitutes breach of contract. determined by the total amount of damages claimed. Paragraph 8,
● The complaint sought the award of ₱200,000.00 as incidental and Section 1938 of BP 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,39 provides that
consequential damages; the amount of ₱30,000.00 as legal expenses; the where the amount of the demand exceeds ₱100,000.00, exclusive of interest,
amount of ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and the amount of ₱20,000.00 damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs,
as cost of the suit, or for the total amount of ₱280,000.00 as damages exclusive jurisdiction is lodged with the RTC. Otherwise, jurisdiction belongs
● The RTC dismissed the Civil Case for lack of jurisdiction, stating: to the Municipal Trial Court. The above jurisdictional amount had been
○ Under the provisions of BP 129 as amended by RA 7691, the amount increased to ₱200,000.00 on March 20, 1999 and further raised to
of demand or claim in the complaint for the RTC to exercise exclusive ₱300,000.00 on February 22, 2004 pursuant to Section 5 of RA 7691. 41
original jurisdiction shall exceed ₱300,000.00; otherwise, the action 5. Then in Administrative Circular No. 09-9442 this Court declared that "where
shall fall under the jurisdiction of the MTC. In this case, the total the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of
amount of demand in the complaint is only ₱280,000.00, which is action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the
less than the jurisdictional amount of the RTCs. Hence, this Court jurisdiction of the court." In other words, where the complaint primarily seeks
(RTC) has no jurisdiction over the instant case. to recover damages, all claims for damages should be considered in
● Remarkable Laundry filed its Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that as the determining which court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case
Civil Case is for breach of contract, or one whose subject is incapable of regardless of whether they arose from a single cause of action or several causes
pecuniary estimation, jurisdiction thus falls with the RTC. of action.
● The CA aside the Order of the RTC and remanding the case to the court a quo
for further proceedings.

6. Since the total amount of the damages claimed by the Remarkable Laundry in
its Complaint filed with the RTC on September 3, 2012 amounted only to
₱280,000.00, said court was correct in refusing to take cognizance of the case.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the December 11, 2013
Decision and March 19, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB SP No.
07711 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The February 19, 2013 Order of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 17, Cebu City dismissing Civil Case No. CEB-39025 for lack of
jurisdiction is REINSTATED.

BUENAFLOR v. RAMIREZ Ratio:
1. The jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of a particular action is
Petitioners: HON. CESAR D. BUENAFLOR
determined by the plaintiffs allegations in the complaint and the principal
Respondents: JOSE R. RAMIREZ, JR.
relief he seeks in the light of the law that apportions the jurisdiction of courts.
2. It cannot be disputed that Ramirez's complaint was thereby challenging the
Doctrine: Disciplinary cases and cases involving personnel actions
validity of his termination from the service. Such challenge was outside of the
affecting employees in the Civil Service, like appointment or separation
RTC's sphere of authority. Instead, it was the CSC that was vested by law with
from the service, are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CSC.
jurisdiction to do so.
3. Disciplinary cases and cases involving personnel actions affecting employees
Facts: in the Civil Service, like appointment or separation from the service, are within
1. Chairman Domingo of the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) the exclusive jurisdiction of the CSC.
appointed respondent Jose R. Ramirez, Jr. as Executive Assistant III and a. Indeed, the Constitution vests in the CSC the jurisdiction over all
concurrently designated him as Assistant Accountant. employees of the Government, including all its branches,
2. Sometime after, Chairman Domingo resigned, and petitioner Cesar D. subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, as well as government-
Buenaflor succeeded him. owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
3. Buenaflor terminated Ramirez as of the same date as Chairman Eugenio's b. Ramirez was one such employee. The agency in which he had been
resignation on the ground that his tenure had expired by virtue of the position appointed by Chairman Domingo was the PAGC, an office
of Executive Assistant being personal and confidential, and, hence, co- established by President Macapagal-Arroyo through Executive Order
terminous with that of the appointing authority. No. 12 as an agency under the Office of the President. His complaint
4. Believing that his appointment had been contractual in nature, Ramirez sued thus came under the jurisdiction of the CSC.
in the RTC to declare his dismissal null and void. 4. Buenaflor was entirely justified in raising in his answer the special and
5. Buenaflor, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), affirmative defense that the RTC was bereft of jurisdiction to hear and resolve
contended, among others, that Ramirez had failed to exhaust administrative Ramirez's complaint.
remedies and should have instead filed an administrative complaint in the 5. When a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has
Civil Service Commission (CSC). is to dismiss the action.
6. RTC: The RTC rendered judgment declaring Buenaflor guilty of unlawful 6. Any further actions the RTC took, including rendering the decision on
termination because he had not discharged his burden of proving that December 28, 2007, were void and ineffectual. Verily, the decisions or orders
Ramirez's employment was co-terminous with that of Chairman Domingo. rendered by courts without or in excess of their jurisdiction are void, and
7. Buenaflor assailed the order of the RTC by petition for certiorari in the CA, cannot be the source of any right, or the creator of any obligation.
alleging that the RTC thereby gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari;
8. CA: The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari on technical grounds: ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the resolutions promulgated by the Court of Appeals on
a. The petition docs not state the date of issue of petitioner's counsel's January 31, 2012 and April 24, 2012; DISMISSES Civil Case No. 01-4577-8 entitled
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Certificate of Jose R. Ramirez v. Hon. Cesar D. Buenaflor; and ORDERS the respondent to pay the
Compliance, as required under Bar Matter No. 1922, dated June 3, costs of suit.
2008.
b. Petitioner's counsel's PTR number is not current.
c. The actual addresses of the parties are not stated in the petition, in
violation of Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in not
declaring that the RTC has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the instant civil service
related case, which is under the sole jurisdiction of the CSC. YES.

BAUTISTA VS. LINDO real actions, jurisdictional amount is determinative of whether it is the
municipal trial court or the RTC that has jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioners: SURVIVING HEIRS OF ALFREDO R. BAUTISTA, NAMELY:
EPIFANIA G. BAUTISTA AND ZOEY G. BAUTISTA
Issues:
Respondents: FRANCISCO LINDO AND WELHILMINA LINDO; AND
● Whether or not the RTC erred in granting the motion for the dismissal of the
HEIRS OF FILIPINA DAQUIGAN, NAMELY: MA. LOURDES DAQUIGAN,
case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. - Yes. RTC
IMELDA CATHERINE DAQUIGAN, IMELDA DAQUIGAN AND
should not have dismissed the case. It has jurisdiction over the
CORSINO DAQUIGAN, REBECCA QUIAMCO AND ANDRES QUIAMCO,
subject matter.
ROMULO LORICA AND DELIA LORICA, GEORGE CAJES AND LAURA
● Whether the action filed by petitioners is one involving title to or possession
CAJES, MELIDA BAÑEZ AND FRANCISCO BAÑEZ, MELANIE
of real property or any interest therein or one incapable of pecuniary
GOFREDO, GERVACIO CAJES AND ISABEL CAJES, EGMEDIO
estimation. - It is one incapable of pecuniary estimation.
SEGOVIA AND VERGINIA SEGOVIA, ELSA N. SAM, PEDRO M. SAM
AND LINA SAM, SANTIAGO MENDEZ AND MINA MENDEZ, HELEN M.
Ratio:
BURTON AND LEONARDO BURTON, JOSE JACINTO AND
● Daquigan etc argue that repurchase is a real action capable of pecuniary
BIENVENIDA JACINTO, IMELDA DAQUIGAN, LEO MATIGA AND
estimation.
ALICIA MATIGA, FLORENCIO ACEDO JR., AND LYLA VALERIO
● The course of action embodied in the complaint by Bautista is to enforce his
right to repurchase the lots he formerly owned pursuant to the right of a free-
Doctrine:
patent holder under Sec. 119 of CA 141 or the Public Land Act.
● The complaint to redeem a land subject of a free patent is a civil action
Facts: incapable of pecuniary estimation.
● Bautista inherited a free-patent land. After selling the land to Daquigan etc, ● Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the complaint and
Bautista filed a complaint for repurchase against respondents before the RTC the character of the relief sought
anchoring his cause of action on Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. (CA) ● In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not
141, otherwise known as the “Public Land Act,” capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of:
a. first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily
SECTION 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the RTCs would
legal heirs, within a period of five years from the date of the conveyance. depend on the amount of the claim.
b. But where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of
● Daquigan filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the complaint failed to state money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
the value of the property sought to be recovered. principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the
● They asserted that the total selling price of all the properties is only sixteen subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and, hence, are
thousand five hundred pesos (PhP 16,500), and the selling price or market incapable of pecuniary estimation. These cases are cognizable exclusively by RTCs.
value of a property is always higher than its assessed value. Since BP 129, ● Settled jurisprudence considers some civil actions as incapable of pecuniary
grants jurisdiction to the RTCs over civil actions involving title to or estimation:
possession of real property or interest therein where the assessed value is 1. Actions for specific performance;
more than PhP 20,000, then the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint 2. Actions for support which will require the determination of the civil status;
in question since the property which Bautista seeks to repurchase is below the 3. The right to support of the plaintiff;
PhP 20,000 jurisdictional ceiling 4. Those for the annulment of decisions of lower courts;
● RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction because Bautista failed to 5. Those for the rescission or reformation of contracts;
allege in his complaint that the value of the subject property exceeds 20 6. Interpretation of a contractual stipulation
thousand pesos. Furthermore, what was only stated therein was that the total ● The present cause of action to redeem the land is one for specific performance.
and full refund of the purchase price of the property is PhP 16,500. This ● Bautista filed a complaint to enforce his right granted by law to recover the lot
omission was considered by the RTC as fatal to the case considering that in subject of free patent. Ergo, it is clear that his action is for specific
performance, or if not strictly such action, then it is akin or analogous to one
of specific performance. Such being the case, his action for specific
performance is incapable of pecuniary estimation and cognizable by the RTC.
● At first blush, it appears that the action filed by Bautista involves title to or
possession of the lots he sold to respondents. Since the total selling price is
less than PhP 20,000, then the MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over the
case. This proposition is incorrect for the re-acquisition of the lots by Bautista
or herein successors-in-interests, the present petitioners, is but incidental to
and an offshoot of the exercise of the right by the latter to redeem said lots
pursuant to Sec. 119 of CA 141.
● The reconveyance of the title to petitioners is solely dependent on the exercise
of such right to repurchase the lots in question and is not the principal or main
relief or remedy sought. Thus, the action of petitioners is, in reality, incapable
of pecuniary estimation, and the reconveyance of the lot is merely the outcome
of the performance of the obligation to return the property conformably to the
express provision of CA 141.
● Even if we treat the present action as one involving title to real property or an
interest therein which falls under the jurisdiction of the first level court under
Sec. 33 of BP 129, as the total selling price is only PhP 16,000 way below the
PhP 20,000 ceiling, still, the postulation of respondents that MTC has
jurisdiction will not hold water. This is because respondents have actually
participated in the proceedings before the RTC and aggressively defended
their position, and by virtue of which they are already barred to question the
jurisdiction of the RTC following the principle of jurisdiction by estoppel.
● The party raising defenses to the complaint, actively participating in the
proceedings by filing pleadings, presenting his evidence, and invoking its
authority by asking for an affirmative relief is deemed estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the court
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The

April 25, 2013 and July 3, 2013 Orders of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No.
(1798)-021 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 32 in Lupon, Davao Oriental is ORDERED to proceed
with dispatch in resolving Civil Case No. (1798)-021.
No pronouncement as to costs.

MASLAG V MONZON 1.Was the RTC correct in following Section 8, Rule 40 and in ruling that it has
jurisdiction over the case because the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
Petitioners: Darma Maslag
estimation?-- NO
Respondents: Elizabeth Monzon
2. Was the CA correct in dismissing Maslag's appeal?-- YES
Doctrine: Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by law and
it is "not within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or
Ratio:
conveniently set aside." Neither would the active participation of the parties
Issue 1
nor estoppel operate to confer original and exclusive jurisdiction where the
court or tribunal only wields appellate jurisdiction over the case.
1. Since the case involves a question of jurisdiction, the Court motu proprio reviewed
and passed upon the same even at this late stage of the proceedings. Maslag's primary
Facts: relief was to recover ownership of real property, which is an action "involving title to
real property" (action where "the plaintiff’s cause of action is based on a claim that she
1. In 1987, Elizabeth Monzon, the owner of the adjacent parcel of land being occupied owns such property or that she has the legal rights to have exclusive control, possession,
by plaintiff Maslag, informed the Maslag that the respective parcels of land being enjoyment, or disposition of the same). Sec. 19 of BP 129 as amended by RA 7691 states:
claimed by them can now be titled. Monzon suggested the creation of a common fund “Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
for the titling of the lands. When the title was finally issued by the Registry of Deeds, original jurisdiction:
the same was only in the name of Elizabeth Monzon and WILLIAM GESTON. The name
of Darma Maslag was fraudulently omitted. (1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation
2. Maslag filed a complaint for reconveyance of real property with declaration of nullity (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
of original certificate of title (OCT) against Monzon et al. The complaint was filed before interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty
the MTC of La Trinidad, Benguet. MTC ruled in favor of Maslag. thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where x x x the
assessed value of the property exceeds Fifty thousand pesos ([P]50,000.00) except
3. Monzon appealed to the RTC. RTC ruled that MTC had no jurisdiction over the actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original
subject matter of the case since the land is incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence the jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
RTC has jurisdiction over it. Following Sec 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, the RTC Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;”
took cognizance of the case. 2. In this case, the Declaration of Real Property shows that the disputes property has
“SECTION 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of jurisdiction. – x an assessed value of Php 12 400, which is within the jurisdiction of the MTC.
xx
If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the Issue 2
subject matter, the Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has 1. There are two modes of appealing an RTC decision or resolution on issues of fact and
original jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance with the preceding law. The first mode is an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 in cases where the RTC
section, without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and additional exercised its original jurisdiction. It is done by filing a Notice of Appeal with the RTC.
evidence in the interest of justice. “ The second mode is a petition for review under Rule 42 in cases where the RTC
exercised its appellate jurisdiction over MTC decisions. It is done by filing a Petition for
4. RTC reversed the MTC decision. Maslag filed a notice of appeal under Rule 41 Review with the CA. In this case, the MTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
(ordinary appeal) before the CA. CA dismissed the appeal, ruling that the proper the subject matter of the case; hence, there is no other way the RTC could have taken
remedy was appeal under Rule 42 since the RTC rendered the assailed decision in its cognizance of the case and review the RTC's judgment except in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction. In her MR, Maslag argues that the RTC rendered the decision in appellate jurisdiction.
its original jurisdiction since the MTC had no jurisdiction in the first place. MR denied.
2. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by law and it is "not within the
Issue/s: courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside." Neither
would the active participation of the parties nor estoppel operate to confer original and
exclusive jurisdiction where the court or tribunal only wields appellate jurisdiction over
the case. Thus, the CA is correct in holding that the proper mode of appeal should have
been a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, and not an ordinary
appeal under Rule 41.
3. Seeing the futility of arguing against what the RTC actually did, petitioner resorts to
arguing for what the RTC should have done. Maslag maintains that the RTC should
have issued its May 4, 2004 Resolution in its original jurisdiction because it had earlier
ruled that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the cause of action.
Maslag’s argument lacks merit. To reiterate, only statutes can confer jurisdiction. Court
issuances cannot seize or appropriate jurisdiction. It has been repeatedly held that "any
judgment, order or resolution issued without jurisdiction is void and cannot be given
any effect." Since BP 129 already apportioned the jurisdiction of the MTC and the RTC
in cases involving title to property, neither the courts nor the petitioner could alter or
disregard the same. Besides, in determining the proper mode of appeal from an RTC
Decision or Resolution, the Court looks at what type of jurisdiction was actually
exercised by the RTC, not what type of jurisdiction the RTC should have exercised.
Dispositive: Petition for Review is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed May 31,
2006 and September 22, 2006 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
83365 are AFFIRMED.

PADLAN V DINGLASAN a. The RTC found Padlan to be a buyer in good faith.
8. The Sps. Dinglasan then appealed to the CA, which reversed the RTC ruling
Petitioners: EDITHA PADLAN
and ruled in favor of the Sps. DInglasan.
Respondents: ELENITA DINGLASAN and FELICISIMO DINGLASAN
a. The CA found that Padlan purchased the property in bad faith from
Lorna.
Doctrine: A complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property
b. The CA opined that although a purchaser is not expected to go
subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court
beyond the title, based on the circumstances surrounding the sale,
has jurisdiction over the action.
Padlan should have conducted further inquiry before buying the
disputed property.
Where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real
c. The fact that Lorna bought a 5,000-square-meter property for only
property, it should be led in the proper court having jurisdiction over the
P4,000.00 and selling it after four months for the same amount
assessed value of the property subject thereof.
should have put petitioner on guard.
9. Padlan then filed for an MR, arguing that the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction
Facts: over the subject matter of the case and her person.
1. Elenita Dinglasan owned a parcel of land. a. The CA denied Padlan’s MR.
2. While on board a jeepney, Elenita’s mother, Lilia Baluyot, had a convo with b. The CA held that when the RTC denied Padlan's motion to dismiss
Maura Passion regarding the sale of Elenita’s land. the case for lack of jurisdiction:
a. Believing that Maura was a real estate agent, Lilia borrowed the i. Padlan neither moved for a reconsideration of the order nor
owner's copy of the TCT from Elenita and gave it to Maura. did she avail of any remedy provided by the Rules.
b. Maura then subdivided the property into several lots from Lot No. ii. Instead, she kept silent and only became interested in the
625-A to Lot No. 625-O, under the name of Elenita and her husband case again when the CA rendered a decision adverse to her
Felicisimo Dinglasan claim.
3. Through a falsified deed of sale bearing the forged signature of Elenita and her
husband Felicisimo, Maura was able to sell the lots to different buyers. Issue/s:
a. Maura sold Lot No. 625-K to Lorna Ong. 1. WoN the court has acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
b. Lorna sold the lot to petitioner Editha Padlan for P4,000.00. Thus a Ratio:
TCT was issued in the name of Padlan. 1. NO.
4. After learning what had happened, Sps. Dinglasan (Elenita and Felicisimo) a. In order to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action,
demanded Padlan to surrender possession of Lot No. 625-K, but the latter an examination of the complaint is essential.
refused. i. Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the
5. The Sps. Dinglasan were then forced to file a case before the Regional Trial subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined
Court (RTC) of Balanga, Bataan for the Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a
Title No. 137466, docketed as Civil Case No. 438-ML. concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the
a. Summons was, thereafter, served to Editha Padlan through her plaintiff's cause of action.
mother, Anita Padlan. ii. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has
6. Editha Padlan then filed an Opposition to Declare Defendant in Default with jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations
Motion to Dismiss Case for Lack of Jurisdiction Over the Person of Defendant. contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of
a. Padlan claimed that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over her, whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or
because the summons was not validly served upon her person, but some of the claims asserted therein.
only by means of substituted service through her mother. iii. The averments in the complaint and the character of the
b. Padlan maintained that she has long been residing in Japan after she relief sought are the ones to be consulted.
married a Japanese national and only comes to the Philippines for a b. The Sps. Dinglasan’s complaint narrates the ff:
brief vacation once every two years. i. That they are the duly registered owners of Lot No. 625.
7. The RTC denied Padlan’s Motion to Dismiss, but still ruled in favor of Padlan.
ii. Without their knowledge and consent, the land was divided matter of who between the conflicting parties is the lawful
into several lots under their names through the fraudulent owner of the subject property and ultimately entitled to its
manipulations of Maura. possession and enjoyment.
iii. One of the lots was Lot 625-K. ii. The action is, therefore, about ascertaining which of these
iv. On April 26, 1990, Maura sold the subject lot to Lorna. parties is the lawful owner of the subject lot, jurisdiction
v. Lorna sold the lot to petitioner for a consideration in the over which is determined by the assessed value of
amount of P4,000.00. such lot.
vi. Despite demands from the Sps. DInglasan, Padlan refused e. A complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property
to surrender possession of the subject property. subject of the complaint to determine which court has jurisdiction
vii. Sps. DInglasan were thus constrained to engage the services over the action.
of a lawyer and incur expenses for litigation. i. In the case at bar, the only basis of valuation of the subject
viii. Sps. DInglasan prayed for the RTC: property is the value alleged in the complaint that the lot
(a) to declare TCT No. 137466 null and to revive TCT No. T-105602 which was originally was sold by Lorna to petitioner in the amount of P4,000.00.
issued and registered in the name of the Spouses; and ii. No tax declaration was even presented that would show the
(b) to order Padlan to pay attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00 and litigation valuation of the subject property.
expenses of P20,000.00, plus cost of suit. iii. In fact, in one of the hearings, the Sps.’ counsel informed
c. In the present controversy, before the relief prayed for by the the court that they will present the tax declaration of the
Spouses in their complaint can be granted, the issue of who property in the next hearing since they have not yet
between the two contending parties has the valid title to the obtained a copy from the Provincial Assessor's Office.
subject lot must first be determined before a determination of iv. However, they did not present such copy.
who between them is legally entitled to the certificate of title covering f. Where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real
the property in question. property, it should be led in the proper court having jurisdiction over
d. From the Complaint, the case led by the Spouses is not simply a case the assessed value of the property subject thereof.
for the cancellation of a particular certificate of title and the revival i. Since the amount alleged is only P4,000.00, the MTC10 and
of another. not the RTC11 has jurisdiction.
i. The determination of such issue merely follows after a court ii. Therefore, all proceedings in the RTC are void.
of competent jurisdiction shall have first resolved the
10MTC Jurisdiction under RA 7691: Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and original jurisdiction:
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: (1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
xxx xxx xxx estimation;
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty
or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), except actions for forcible entry into and
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred
declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
assessed value of the adjacent lots. Trial Courts; . . .
RTC Jurisdiction under BP 129:

11

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86983, dated June 29, 2007, and its Resolution dated
October 23, 2007, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, dated July 1, 2005, is declared NULL and VOID. The complaint in Civil Case No.
438-ML is dismissed without prejudice. SO ORDERED.

ERORITA VS DUMLAO 6. Spouses Erorita appealed to the CA arguing that the complaint is an unlawful
detainer case. Thus, the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
Petitioners: Spouses Herminio Erorita and Editha Erorita
case.
Respondents: Spouses Ligaya and Antonio Dumlao
a. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.
b. It CA ruled that the applicable law on jurisdiction when the
Doctrine: The allegations in the complaint determine the nature of an
complaint was filed was RA 7691.
action and jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction does not depend on the
i. This law provides that in civil actions involving a real
complaint’s caption. Nor is jurisdiction changed by the defenses in the
property’s title or possession, jurisdiction depends on the
answer; otherwise, the defendant may easily delay a case by raising other
property’s assessed value and location – if the assessed
issues, then, claim lack of jurisdiction. [Jurisdiction over subject
value exceeds fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) in Metro
matter]
Manila, and twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) outside
of Metro Manila, the RTC has jurisdiction. If the assessed
As a general rule, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be
value does not exceed these amounts, then, the Municipal
raised at any time, or even for the first time on appeal. An exception to
Trial Court (MTC) has jurisdiction.
this rule is the principle of estoppel by laches. Estoppel by laches may only
c. Because the tax declaration showed that the assessed value of the
be invoked to bar the defense of lack of jurisdiction if the factual milieu is
property and its improvements exceeded P20,000.00, the CA
analogous to Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.
concluded that the RTC had jurisdiction.
Facts: d. It held that this case involves an action for possession of real property
1. Spouses Dumlao are the registered owners of a parcel of land located in and not unlawful detainer.
Oriental Mindoro. The San Mariano Academy is built on the property.
a. They bought the property in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale in 1990.
Because the former owners, Spouses Erorita, failed to redeem it, the
title was consolidated in the buyers’ name. Issue/s:
2. Spouses Dumlao allowed the Spouses Erorita to continue operating the school 1. WoN the RTC has jurisdiction since the allegations in the complaint show a
on the property. case for unlawful detainer - NO
a. The Spouses Erorita appointed Hernan and Susan Erorita as the San 2. WoN the issue of lack jurisdiction over the subject matter was timely raised -
Mariano Academy’s administrators. YES
3. Spouses Dumlao alleged that the Eroritas failed to pay rentals since 1990. Ratio:
a. Spouses Erorita countered that the Dumlaos allowed them to FIRST ISSUE
continue to run the school without rental out of goodwill and 1. The allegations in the complaint determine the nature of an action
friendship. and jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction does not depend on the
4. Spouses Dumlao asked the Eroritas to vacate the property. complaint’s caption. Nor is jurisdiction changed by the defenses in the answer;
a. Although the Spouses Erorita wanted to comply, they could not otherwise, the defendant may easily delay a case by raising other issues, then,
immediately close the school without clearance from the Department claim lack of jurisdiction.
of Education, Culture, and Sports to whom they are accountable. 2. To make a case for unlawful detainer, the complaint must allege that:
5. RTC: Spouses Dumlao filed a complaint for recovery of possession a. Initially, the defendant lawfully possessed the property, either by
before the RTC against Hernan, Susan, and Spouses Erorita. contract or by plaintiff’s tolerance;
a. The RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Dumlao. b. The plaintiff notified the defendant that his right of possession is
b. It ordered the Eroritas to immediately vacate the property. It also terminated;
prohibited them from accepting enrollees to the San Mariano c. The defendant remained in possession and deprived plaintiff of its
Academy. enjoyment; and
d. The plaintiff filed a complaint within one year from the last demand
on defendant to vacate the property.
3. A review of the complaint shows that:
a. The owners, Spouses Dumlao, allowed the Eroritas to continue
operating the school on the disputed property;
b. In a demand letter, the Spouses Dumlao told the Eroritas to pay
and/or vacate the property;
c. They refused to vacate the property; and
d. The Spouses Dumlao filed the complaint within a year from the last
demand to vacate.
4. Thus, although the complaint bears the caption "recovery of possession," its
allegations contain the jurisdictional facts for an unlawful detainer case.
a. Under RA 7691, an action for unlawful detainer is within the MTC’s
exclusive jurisdiction regardless of the property’s assessed value.
5. Since a decision rendered by a court without jurisdiction is void, the RTC’s
decision is void.
SECOND ISSUE
1. As a general rule, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised
at any time, or even for the first time on appeal. An exception to this rule is
the principle of estoppel by laches.
2. Estoppel by laches may only be invoked to bar the defense of lack of
jurisdiction if the factual milieu is analogous to Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.
a. In that case, lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time after
almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been
rendered and after the movant actively participated in several stages
of the proceedings. It was only invoked, too, after the CA rendered a
decision adverse to the movant.
3. Figueroa v. People: The failure to assail jurisdiction during trial is not
sufficient for estoppel by laches to apply. When lack of jurisdiction is raised
before the appellate court, no considerable length of time had elapsed for
laches to apply.
4. The factual setting of this present case is not similar to Tijam so as to trigger
the application of the estoppel by laches doctrine. As in Figueroa, Spouses
Erorita assailed the RTC’s jurisdiction in their appeal before the CA. Asserting
lack of jurisdiction on appeal before the CA does not constitute laches.
Furthermore, the filing of an answer and the failure to attend the pre-trial do
not constitute the active participation in judicial proceedings contemplated in
Tijam.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition. The July 28, 2010
decision and January 4, 2011 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 92770
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, we DECLARE the June 4, 2007
decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. C-492 void for lack of jurisdiction. SO ORDERED.

BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES V. CA her motion to dismiss despite discovery, during the trial of the case, of
evidence that would constitute a
Petitioners: BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC.,
● ground for dismissal of the case.
Respondents:COURT OF APPEALS AND LOLITA G. TOLEDO
● Boston Equity argues that Lolita Toledo's motion to dismiss questioning the
trial court's jurisdiction was filed more than six years after her amended
Doctrine: The concept of jurisdiction has several aspects, namely: (1)
answer was filed. According to Boston Equity, Lolita Toledo had several
jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) jurisdiction over the parties; (3)
opportunities to assail the trial court's jurisdiction but never did so for six
jurisdiction over the issues of the case; and (4) in cases involving property,
straight years. Citing the doctrine laid down in the case of Tijam, et al. v.
jurisdiction over the res or the thing which is the subject of the litigation.
Sibonghanoy, et al, claiming that Lolita Toledo's failure to raise the question
of jurisdiction at an earlier stage bars her from later questioning it, especially
The aspect of jurisdiction which may be barred from being assailed as a
since she actively participated in the proceedings conducted by the trial court.
result of estoppel by laches is jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Issue/s:
Thus, the principle of estoppel by laches finds no application in a case where
1. W/N the Tijam doctrine can be applied in this case in claiming that Lolita Toledo is
the issue is the court's jurisdiction over the person of defendant .
estopped from questioning the trial court's jurisdiction over the person of Manuel--NO
Instead, the principles relating to jurisdiction over the person of the parties
2. W/N the court acquired jurisdiction over Manuel Toledo --NO
are pertinent herein. The defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of
a party to a case must be invoked when an answer or a motion to dismiss is
Ratio:
filed in order to prevent a waiver of the defense.
1. The concept of jurisdiction has several aspects, namely: (1) jurisdiction over
the subject matter; (2) jurisdiction over the parties; (3) jurisdiction over the
Facts: issues of the case; and (4) in cases involving property, jurisdiction over the res
● Boston Equity filed a complaint for sum of money with a prayer for the or the thing which is the subject of the litigation.
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the spouses Manuel and
Lolita Toledo. The aspect of jurisdiction which may be barred from being assailed as a result of
● Lolita Toledo filed an Answer dated 19 March 1998 but she filed a Motion for estoppel by laches is jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Leave to Admit Amended Answer in which she alleged, among others, that her
husband and co-defendant, Manuel Toledo (Manuel), is already dead. In subsequent cases citing the ruling of the Court in Tijam, what was likewise at issue
● Boston Equity then filed a Motion for Substitution,praying that Manuel be was the jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject matter of the case. In all of these
substituted by his children as party-defendants. This motion was granted by cases, the Supreme Court barred the attack on the jurisdiction of the respective courts
the trial court. concerned over the subject matter of the case based on estoppel by laches, declaring
● The trial of the case then proceeded. Boston Equity, as plaintiff, presented its that parties cannot be allowed to belatedly adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking
evidence and its exhibits were thereafter admitted. the jurisdiction of a court to which they submitted their cause voluntarily.
● In 2004, the reception of evidence for Lolita Toledo was cancelled upon
agreement of the parties. Here, what Lolita Toledo was questioning in her motion to dismiss before the trial court
● In 2004 Lolita Toledo instead of filing a demurrer filed a motion to dismiss was that court's jurisdiction over the person of defendant Manuel. Thus, the
the complaint, citing the following as grounds: (1) that the complaint failed to principle of estoppel by laches finds no application in this case. Instead, the principles
implead an indispensable party or a real party in interest; hence, the case must relating to jurisdiction over the person of the parties are pertinent herein. The
be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action; (2) that the trial court did "objection on jurisdictional grounds which is not waived even if not alleged in a motion
not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel (3) that the trial court erred to dismiss or the answer is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. x x x Lack of
in ordering the substitution of the deceased Manuel by his heirs; and (4) that jurisdiction over the subject matter can always be raised anytime, even for the first time
the court must also dismiss the case against Lolita Toledo on appeal, since jurisdictional issues cannot be waived x x x subject, however, to the
● The trial court denied the motion to dismiss for having been filed out of time principle of estoppel by laches."
● Lolita Toledo filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging
that the trial court seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in denying
Since the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of a party to a case is not one
of those defenses which are not deemed waived under Section 1 of Rule 9, such defense Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 28
must be invoked when an answer or a motion to dismiss is filed in order to prevent a February 2006 and the Resolution dated 1 August 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
waiver of the defense.If the objection is not raised either in a motion to dismiss or in G.R. SP No. 88586 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE
the answer, the objection to the jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff or the
defendant is deemed waived by virtue of the first sentence of the above-quoted Section
1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred when it made a sweeping pronouncement in its
questioned decision, stating that "issue on jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceeding, even for the first time on appeal" and that, therefore, Lolita Toledo timely
raised the issue in her motion to dismiss and is, consequently, not estopped from
raising the question of jurisdiction. As the question of jurisdiction involved here is that
over the person of the defendant Manuel, the same is deemed waived if not raised in
the answer or a motion to dismiss. In any case, Lolita Toledo cannot claim the defense
since "lack of jurisdiction over the person, being subject to waiver, is a personal defense
which can only be asserted by the party who can thereby waive it by silence.
2. Jurisdiction over the person of a defendant is acquired through a valid service of

summons; In the case at bar, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person
of Manuel since there was no valid service of summons upon him, precisely because he
was already dead even before the complaint against him and his wife was filed in the
trial court. Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal by the trial court of the
complaint against Sereno only.
In a suit or proceeding in personam of an adversary character, the court can acquire no

jurisdiction for the purpose of trial or judgment until a party defendant who actually or
legally exists and is legally capable of being sued, is brought before it. It has even been
held that the question of the legal personality of a party defendant is a question of
substance going to the jurisdiction of the court and not one of procedure.
Since the proper course of action against the wrongful inclusion of Manuel as party-
defendant is the dismissal of the case as against him, thus did the trial court err when
it ordered the substitution of Manuel by his heirs. Substitution is proper only where the
party to be substituted died during the pendency of the case. Here, since Manuel
was already dead at the time of the filing of the complaint, the court never acquired
jurisdiction over his person and, in effect, there was no party to be substituted.
3. There is no basis for dismissing the complaint against Lolita Toledo herein. Thus,
as already emphasized above, the trial court correctly denied her motion to dismiss.
It is clear that the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party to the collection case,
for the simple reason that the obligation of Manuel and his wife, Lolita Toledo herein,
is solidary.
HINOG v. MELICOR the correct docket fees. However, it ordered the reinstatement of the case by
way of motion of the private respondents, upon payment of the correct docket
Petitioners: HEIRS OF BERTULDO HINOG
fees.
Respondents: HON. ACHILLES MELICOR, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge, RTC, Branch 4, 7th Judicial Region, Tagbiliran City, Bohol, and
NOTE: The SC noted that the petitioners erred by directly resorting to the SC, and such
CUSTODIO BALANE, RUFO BALANE, HONORIO BALANE, and TOMAS
failure was considered as a sufficient cause for the dismissal of the action at bar.
BALANE
Issue: Whether or not the case was properly reinstated. NO.
Doctrine:
Ratio:
Facts: 1. After recognizing the jurisdiction of the trial court by seeking affirmative relief
1. Private respondents Custodio, Rufo, Tomas and Honorio, all surnamed in their motion to serve supplemental pleading upon private respondents,
Balane, filed a complaint for Recovery of Ownership and Possession, Removal petitioners are effectively barred by estoppel from challenging the trial courts
of Construction and Damages against Bertuldo Hinog. jurisdiction.
a. They [private respondents] allowed Bertuldo to use a portion of the a. If a party invokes the jurisdiction of a court, he cannot thereafter
said property for a period of ten years and construct thereon a small challenge the courts jurisdiction in the same case. To rule otherwise
house of light materials at a nominal annual rental of P100 only, would amount to speculating on the fortune of litigation, which is
considering the close relations of the parties; after the expiration of against the policy of the Court.
the ten-year period, they demanded the return of the occupied 2. It must be clarified that the said order is but a resolution on an incidental
portion and removal of the house constructed thereon but Bertuldo matter which does not touch on the merits of the case or put an end to the
refused and instead claimed ownership of the entire property. proceedings.
2. Accordingly, private respondents sought to oust Bertuldo from the premises a. It is an interlocutory order since there leaves something else to be
of the subject property and restore upon themselves the ownership and done by the trial court with respect to the merits of the case.
possession thereof, as well as the payment of moral and exemplary damages, b. As such, it is not subject to a reglementary period.
attorneys fees and litigation expenses in amounts justified by the evidence c. Moreover, the remedy against an interlocutory order is generally not
3. Bertuldo, on the other hand, alleged ownership of the disputed property by to resort forthwith to certiorari, but to continue with the case in due
virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by one Tomas Pahac with the course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an
knowledge and conformity of private respondents. appeal in the manner authorized by law.
4. Pre-trial ensued. Bertuldo died without completing his evidence. Atty. d. Only when the court issued such order without or in excess of
Tinampay withdrew as counsel for Bertuldo as his services were terminated jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and when the assailed
by petitioner Bertuldo Hinog III. Atty. Petalcorin then entered his appearance interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal
as new counsel for Bertuldo. would not afford adequate and expeditious relief will certiorari be
5. Atty. Petalcorin filed a motion to expunge the complaint from the record and considered an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order.
nullify all court proceedings on the ground that private respondents failed to 3. Furthermore, the fact that private respondents prayed for payment of
specify in the complaint the amount of damages claimed so as to pay the damages in amounts justified by the evidence does not call for the dismissal of
correct docket fees. the complaint for violation of SC Circular No. 7, dated March 24, 1988 which
6. Private respondents opposed the motion to expunge on the following grounds: required that all complaints must specify the amount of damages sought not
x x x (b) Atty. Petalcorin has not complied with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules only in the body of the pleadings but also in the prayer in order to be accepted
of Court which provides that the death of the original defendant requires a and admitted for filing.
substitution of parties before a lawyer can have legal personality to represent a. Sun Insurance effectively modified SC Circular No. 7 by providing
a litigant and the motion to expunge does not mention of any specific party that filing fees for damages and awards that cannot be estimated
whom he is representing; x x x constitute liens on the awards finally granted by the trial court.
7. The trial court thereafter ordered the complaint to be expunged from the 4. No formal substitution of the parties was effected within thirty
records and the nullification of all court proceedings taken for failure to pay days from date of death of Bertuldo, as required by Section 16, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court. Needless to stress, the purpose behind the rule on
substitution is the protection of the right of every party to due process. It is to
ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly represented in
the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate.
a. Non-compliance with the rule on substitution would render the
proceedings and judgment of the trial court infirm because the court
acquires no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives
or of the heirs on whom the trial and the judgment would be binding.
b. Thus, proper substitution of heirs must be effected for the trial court
to acquire jurisdiction over their persons and to obviate any future
claim by any heir that he was not apprised of the litigation against
Bertuldo or that he did not authorize Atty. Petalcorin to represent
him.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for

lack of merit.

TOPIC III - VENUE P400,000.00 are within its authority to hear and decide. It is an error,
therefore, for the RTC to claim lack of jurisdiction over the case.
RADIOWEALTH VS. NOLASCO ● Primarily, jurisdiction is conferred by law and not subject to stipulation of the
parties. It relates to the nature of the case. On the contrary, venue pertains to
Petitioners: RADIOWEALTH FINANCE COMPANY, INC.,
the place where the case may be filed. Unlike jurisdiction, venue may be
Respondents: ROMEO T. NOLASCO AND REYNALDO T. NOLASCO
waived and subjected to the agreement of the parties provided that it does not
cause them inconvenience.
Doctrine:
● Section 2, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which was relied upon
by the RTC to support its ruling of dismissal, reads as follows:
Facts: Section 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced and tried
● The Nolascos secured a loan from Raiowealth in the amount of P1,908,360.00 where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or
To secure the payment of the loan, the respondents constituted a Chattel any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant
Mortgage over a Fuso Super Great Dropside Truck, 2001 Model where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
● Radiowealth filed a complaint for Sum of Money and Damages with ● It is merely permissive as manifested by the use of the term "may."
Application for Writ of Replevin with the RTC praying that the respondents ● Moreover, the clear language of the ensuing provision of Section 4 expressly
be ordered to pay their balance of P1,600,153.02 or, in the alternative, allows the venue of personal actions to be subjected to the stipulation of the
surrender the possession of the motor vehicle subject of the Chattel Mortgage parties
● RTC issued an Order directing the issuance of the Writ of Replevin. Section 4. When rule not applicable. - This Rule shall not apply.
● Citing Section 2, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, RTC dismissed (a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or
motu proprio the case for lack of jurisdiction since neither the petitioner nor (b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on
the respondents reside within the jurisdiction of the trial court. the exclusive venue thereof.
● Radiowealth filed an MR pointing out that the sum of money involved ● Since convenience is the raison d'etre of the rules of venue, it is easy to accept
amounting to P1,600,153.02 is well within the jurisdiction of the RTC. the proposition that normally, venue stipulations should be deemed
Further, the venue is also proper, considering that there is a provision in the permissive merely, and that interpretation should be adopted which most
promissory note which states that any action to enforce payment of any sums serves the parties' convenience
due shall exclusively be brought in the proper court within the National ● In this case, in the promissory note executed and signed by the parties, there
Capital Judicial Region or in any place where the petitioner has a branch or is a provision which states that "[a]ny action to enforce payment of any sums
office at its sole option. due under this Note shall exclusively be brought in the proper court within the
National Capital Judicial Region or in any place where [the petitioner] has a
Issue: branch/office, at its sole option."
Whether the RTC correctly dismissed the complaint motu proprio for not having ● Thus, the petitioner's filing of the case in San Mateo, Rizal, where it maintains
jurisdiction because of improper venue - No. RTC is incorrect. Venue can be stipulated a branch is proper and should have been respected by the RTC especially when
by parties. there appears no objection on the part of the respondents.
● Also, RTC may not motu proprio dismiss the case on the ground of improper
venue. It is a matter personal to the parties and without their objection at the
Ratio: earliest opportunity, as in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, it is deemed
● RTC confused the terms jurisdiction and venue, which are completely waived.
different concepts. ● Thus, unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to
● RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by Radiowealth considering the dismiss, the venue cannot be truly said to have been improperly laid, as for all
nature of the case and the amount involved. practical intents and purposes, the venue, though technically wrong, may be
● Jurisdiction' is the court's authority to hear and determine a case. The court's acceptable to the parties for whose convenience the rules on venue had been
jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by law devised.
● The amount of P1,600,153.02 involved in the instant case is undoubtedly
within the jurisdiction of the RTC, as all money claims exceeding Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Amended Order dated July 21, 2016 and
Order dated September 1, 2016 of the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch
75, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and Civil Case No. 2806-15 SM is hereby ordered
REINSTATED. The RTC is ordered to proceed with dispatch in the disposition of the
mentioned case.

BPI V HONTANOSAS 2. According to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is one that
affects title to or possession of real property, or an interest therein. Such action
Petitioners: BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
is to be commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over the
Respondents: HON. JUDGE AGAPITO L. HONTANOSAS, JR.,
area wherein the real property involved, o ra portion thereof, is situated, which
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 16, CEBU CITY, SILVERIO
explains why the action is also referred to as a local action. In contrast, the
BORBON, SPOUSES XERXES AND ERLINDA FACULTAD, AND XM
Rules of Court declares all other actions as personal actions. Such actions may
FACULTAD & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
include those brought for the recovery of personal property, or for the
enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the
Doctrine: An action annul a real estate mortgage is a personal action,
recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or
hence, the rules regarding venue for personal action apply.
property.16 The venue of a personal action is the place where the plaintiff or
any of the principal plaintiffs resides,or where the defendant or any of the
Facts: principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where
1. Sps Silverio et al obtained a loan from BPI. The Sps executed a promissory note and he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff, for which reason the action is
the loan was secured by real estate mortgages on several parcels of land, continuing considered a transitory one.
surety agreement, and a chattel mortgage on a Mitsubishi Pajero. Sps Silverio et al's 3. In this case, based on the allegation in the complaint, the respondents seek
obligation reached Php 17, 983, 191 but they had only been able to pay Php 13 million. the nullification of the promissory notes, continuing surety agreement, checks
BPI required Sps Silverio et al to issue postdated checks to cover the loan under the and mortgage agreements for being executed against their will and vitiated by
threat of foreclosing on the mortgages irregularities, not the recovery of the possession or title to the properties
burdened by the mortgages. There was no allegation that the possession of the
2. Sps Silverio et al filed an action to declare the nullity of the promissory notes,real properties under the mortgages had already been transferred to the petitioner
estate and chattel mortgages and continuing surety agreement they had executed in in the meantime.
favor of BPI. They argue that the contracts are contracts of adhesion favouring BPI. The 4. The Court applied the ruling in Hernandez v Rural Bank. The Court pointed
Sps also prayed for writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the foreclosure. In its out in the Hernandez case that with respect to mortgage, the rule on real
answer, BPI argues that it had the legal right to foreclose the mortgages. BPI also filed actions only mentions an action for foreclosure of a real estate mortgage. It
a motion to dismiss because the venue was improperly laid and the proper legal fees does not include an action for the cancellation of a real estate mortgage.
has not been paid. BPI argues that since the action is a real action, the complaint should 5. Thus, Pasig City, where the parties reside, is the proper venue of the action
have been filed in the place where the land is located and not in the place where the Sps to nullify the subject loan and real estate mortgage contracts. The Court of
resided. Appeals committed no reversible error in upholding the orders of the Regional
Trial Court denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss the case on the ground of
3. RTC denied BPI's motion to dismiss but granted Sps Silverio's application for improper venue.
preliminary injunction. CA affirmed. Hence the case at bar.
Being a personal action, therefore, Civil Case No. CEB-26468 was properly
brought in the RTC in Cebu City, where respondent XM Facultad and
Development Corporation, a principal plaintiff, had its address.
Issue/s:
1. Should the case be dismissed for non-payment of the correct amount of the docket 6. Upon the same consideration, BPI’s contention that the filing and docket
fee and improper venue?-- NO fees for the complaint should be based on the assessed values of the mortgaged
real properties due to Civil Case No. CEB-26468 being a real action cannot be
Ratio: upheld for lack of factual and legal bases.
1. An action for the declaration of the nullity of a contract of loan and its
accompanying continuing surety agreement, and the real estate and chattel Dispositive:
mortgages, was a personal action; hence, its filing in Cebu City, the place of
business of one of the plaintiffs, was correct under Section 2, Rule 4 of the
Rules of Court.
BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK V SPS. YUJUICO 5. The Sps. Yujuico then filed for a Motion for Reconsideration, raising for the
first time the ground of improper venue.
Petitioners: BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC.
a. They contended that the action for the recovery of the deficiency,
Respondents: Sps. BENEDICTO & TERESITA YUJUICO
being a supplementary action of the extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings, was a real action that should have been brought in the
Doctrine: Venue of an action depends on whether it is a real or a personal
Manila RTC because Manila was the place where the properties were
action.
located.
6. The Makati RTC denied the Sps. Yujuico’s MR.
An action to recover the deficiency after the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
a. It held that it would be improper for the RTC to dismiss the BPI’s
real property mortgage is a personal action, for it does not affect title to or
complaint on the ground of improper venue, assuming that the venue
possession of real property, or any interest therein.
is indeed improperly laid, since the said ground was not raised
in the defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
In civil proceedings, venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and may be
7. The Sps. Yujuico then assailed the Decision to the CA by petition for certiorari.
waived by the defendant if not seasonably raised either in a motion to
a. Again argued that the venue was improperly laid.
dismiss or in the answer.
8. The CA ruled in favor of the Sps. Yujuico.
a. The CA held that a suit for recovery of the deficiency after the
Facts: foreclosure of a mortgage is in the nature of a mortgage action
1. The City of Manila filed a complaint in the RTC against the Sps. Yujuico for because its purpose is precisely to enforce the mortgage contract;
the expropriation of five parcels of land located in Tondo, Manila, which are i. It is upon a written contract and upon an obligation of the
registered in the name of Teresita Yujuico. mortgage-debtor to pay the deficiency which is created by
a. Two of the parcels of land were previously mortgaged to Citytrust law.
Banking Corporation, BPI Family Savings Bank’s predecessor-in- ii. As such, the venue of an action for recovery of deficiency
interest, under a First Real Estate Mortgage Contract. must necessarily be the same venue as that of the
2. The RTC ruled in favor of the City and declared the 5 parcels of land extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage.
expropriated for public use. b. Thus, the suit for judgment on the deficiency filed by respondent BPI
a. The judgment became final and executory. against petitioners Yujuico, being an action emanating from the
b. BPI subsequently filed a Motion to Intervene in Execution with foreclosure of the real estate mortgage contract between them, must
Partial Opposition to Defendant's Request to Release, necessarily be filed also at the RTC of Manila, not at the RTC of
i. But the RTC denied the motion for having been "filed out of Makati.
time."
ii. Hence, BPI decided to extrajudicially foreclose the Issue/s:
mortgage constituted on the two parcels of land subject of 1. WoN BPI filed the deficiency claim in the wrong venue
the Sps. Yujuico’s loan. 2. WoN the ground of improper venue which was belatedly filed should be
iii. After holding the public auction, the sheriff awarded the appreciated by the CA.
two lots to BPI as the highest bidder at P10,000,000.00. Ratio:
3. BPI then claimed for deficiency against the Sps. Yujuico amounting to 18.5M 1. NO
in the Makati RTC. a. It is basic that the venue of an action depends on whether it is a real
a. The Sps. Yujuico filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that BPI’s claim or a personal action.
had been waived. i. The determinants of whether an action is of a real or a
4. The Makati RTC ruled in favor of BPI. personal nature have been fixed by the Rules of Court and
a. Held that there was nothing to support the claim that the obligation relevant jurisprudence.
had been abandoned or extinguished apart from the Sps. Yujuico’s ii. According to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court:
contention that the properties had been subjected to expropriation 1. A real action is one that affects title to or
by the City of Manila. possession of real property, or an interest therein.
2. Thus, an action for partition or condemnation of, b. As earlier indicated, they came to raise the objection of improper
or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property is a venue for the first time only in their reply to the petitioner's comment
real action. on their Motion for Reconsideration. They did so belatedly.
3. The real action is to be commenced and tried in the c. In civil proceedings, venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and may
proper court having jurisdiction over the area be waived by the defendant if not seasonably raised either in a
wherein the real property involved, or a portion motion to dismiss or in the answer.
thereof, is situated, which explains why the action d. Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court thus expressly stipulates
is also referred to as a local action. that:
iii. In contrast, the Rules of Court declares all other actions as i. Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to
personal actions. dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.
1. Such actions may include: ii. As it relates to the place of trial, indeed, venue is meant to
a. Those brought for the recovery of provide convenience to the parties, rather than to restrict
personal property, their access to the courts.
b. Or for the enforcement of some contract iii. In other words, unless the defendant seasonably objects,
c. Or recovery of damages for its breach, any action may be tried by a court despite its being the
d. Or for the recovery of damages for the improper venue.
commission of an injury to the person or
property. Dispositive: WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari;
2. The venue of a personal action: REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on
a. Is the place where the plaintiff or any of March 31, 2006; REINSTATE the orders dated October 17, 2003 and February 1, 2005
the principal plaintiffs resides, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, in Makati City; and ORDER the respondents
b. Or where the defendant or any of the to pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.
principal defendants resides,
c. Or in the case of a non-resident
defendant where he may be found, at the
election of the plaintiff, for which reason
the action is considered a transitory one.
iv. Based on the distinctions between real and personal
actions:
1. An action to recover the deficiency after the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real property
mortgage is a personal action, for it does not affect
title to or possession of real property, or any
interest therein.
v. Given the foregoing, BPI correctly filed in the Makati RTC
because Makati was the place where the main office of the
BPI was located.
2. NO.
a. It would be improper to dismiss BPI’s deficiency claim on the ground
of improper venue, assuming that the venue had been improperly
laid, considering that the Sps. Yujuico had not raised such ground in
their Motion to Dismiss.

SPOUSES SARAZA VS FRANCISCO a. They opposed Francisco’s complaint on the ground that the amount
of ₱1,200,000.00 remained unpaid.
Petitioners: Spouses Teodoro and Rosario Saraza & Fernando Saraza
4. The RTC ruled in favor of Francisco.
Respondents: William Francisco
a. It found that Francisco fully paid the P3.2M.
b. However, only Fernando should be held liable for Francisco’s claims,
Doctrine: A case for specific performance with damages is a personal
since the main action was for specific performance, specifically to
action which may be filed in a court where any of the parties reside.
compel him to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the 100 sqm
Makati property.
Facts: 5. CA: Fernando appealed to the CA, now raising the issue that the Imus RTC
1. Francisco filed a complaint against the Spouses Saraza and Fernando. lacked jurisdiction since it involved the adjudication of a property in Makati.
a. He alleged that in 1999, Francisco and Fernando executed an a. The CA dismissed the appeal.
Agreement. b. The CA cited Fernando’s failure to seasonably file before the lower
i. It was agreed that Fernando would sell his 100 sqm share court a motion to dismiss stating that the action should have been
in a Makati lot, which was still registered in the name of an filed in Makati City.
Emilia Serafico. c. More importantly, the Court explained that the case was a personal
ii. P1.2M was paid upon execution while the balance of P2M action since it did not involve a claim of ownership of the subject
was to be pain on installments to PNB to cover a loan of property, but only sought Fernando’s execution of a deed of sale.
Spouses Saraza, Fernando’s parents, with the bank. Issue/s: WoN the Imus RTC had jurisdiction over the case - YES
iii. A final deed of sale would be executed upon full payment of
the PNB loan. Ratio:
b. It was agreed upon that should the parties fail for any reason to 1. Although the end result of Francisco’s claim was the transfer of the subject
transfer the subject property to Francisco’s name, Spouses Saraza’s property to his name, the suit was still essentially for specific performance, a
property (SSP) encumbered to PNB to secure the loan that was to be personal action, because it sought Fernando’s execution of a deed of absolute
paid by Francisco shall be considered a collateral in favor Francisco. sale based on a contract which he had previously made.
c. Spouses Saraza signified their conformity to the Agreement. 2. The Court’s ruling in Cabutihan v. Landcenter Construction & Development
d. Francisco was also allowed to take immediate possession of SSP Corporation is instructive.
through a contract of lease. a. In the said case, a complaint for specific performance that involved
e. The Sarazas likewise furnished PNB with an Authority allowing property situated in Parañaque City was instituted before the RTC of
Francisco to pay their obligations to the PNB, to negotiate for a loan Pasig City.
restructuring, to receive the owner’s duplicate copy of SSP upon full b. When the case’s venue was raised as an issue, the Court sided with
payment of the loan secured by its mortgage, and to perform such therein petitioner who argued that "the fact that ‘she ultimately
other acts as may be necessary in connection with the settlement of sought the conveyance of real property’ not located in the territorial
the loan. jurisdiction of the RTC of Pasig is x x x an anticipated consequence
2. When the remaining balance of the PNB loan reached ₱226,582.13, Francisco and beyond the cause for which the action [for specific performance
asked for the Sarazas’ issuance of an SPA that would authorize him to receive with damages] was instituted."
from PNB the owner’s duplicate copy of SSP upon full payment of the loan. 3. Siasoco v. Court of Appeals: A case for specific performance with damages is
a. The Sarazas denied the request. a personal action which may be filed in a court where any of the parties reside.
b. Upon inquiry from PNB, Francisco found out that the Sarazas had 4. Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court then governs the venue for Francisco’s
instead executed an Amended Authority, which provided that the action. It provides that personal actions "may be commenced and tried where
owner’s duplicate copy of the SSP TCT should be returned to the the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant
mortgagors upon full payment of the loan. or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident
c. Spouses Saraza also caused the eviction of Francisco from SSP. defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff."
3. Imus, Cavite RTC: These prompted Francisco to institute the civil case for 5. Considering Francisco’s statement in his complaint that he resides in Imus,
specific performance, sum of money and damages with the RTC. Cavite, the filing of his case with the RTC of Imus was proper.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Decision dated June 28, 2011 and Resolution dated
September 30, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93961 are AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION in that the award of Pl00,000.00 as damages in favor of
respondent William Francisco is deleted. SO ORDERED.
Notes:
National Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals:
● The Court held that an action that seeks the execution of a deed of sale over a
parcel of land is for recovery of real property, and not for specific performance,
because the primary objective is to regain ownership and possession of the
property.
● It was explained that the prayer in National Steel was not in any way
connected to a contract that was previously executed by the party against
whom the complaint was filed, unlike in Cabutihan where the parties had
earlier executed an undertaking for the property’s transfer, correctly giving
rise to a cause of action either for specific performance or for rescission, as in
this case.

UNITED OVERSEAS BANK VS ROSEMOORE MINING
• The case in RTC manila involved the enforcement of the contract between Rosemoore
Petitioners:
and the Bank. (Rosemoore says United Overseas did not release the full amount of the
Respondents:
loan). The purpose being the enforcement of a contract, it is a personal action which
tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
Doctrine: Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest
defendants or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has
jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion
• On the other hand, the case in RTC Malolos was filed for the purpose of restraining
thereof, is situated.
the Bank from consolidating the titles over the foreclosed Bulacan properties because
the loan secured by the mortgage had not yet become due and demandable. It is an
Facts: action to annul the foreclosure sale which is a real action, which should be commenced
• Rosemoor Mining obtained a credit facility of P80 million from Westmont Bank (now and tried in the province where the property or part thereof lies.
known as United Overseas Bank.) To secure the credit, one real estate mortgage
agreement, covering 8 parcels of land, was executed by Rosemoore in favor of United • Looking at the foregoing, it is apparent that the rights asserted and the reliefs sought
Overseas Bank. The real agreement was executed in the City of Manila. However, 6 of are not identical. Rosemoore mining did not engage in forum shopping.
these parcels of land were situated in Bulacan and 2 parcels were in Nueva Ecija.
2. The action to annul the foreclosure sale was properly brought before the RTC Malolos
• Pursuant to the credit facility, Rosemoore mining obtained numerous letters of credit. even if it included properties in Nueva Ecija.
Predictably, they were unable to pay and the mortgage properties were foreclosed.
United Overseas Bank was the highest bidder in the auction. Thereafter, United • Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be
Overseas Bank caused the annotation of the Notarial Certificates of Sale on the titles of commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein
the properties. Rosemoore then filed 2 complaints against United Overseas: one in the the real property involved,
RTC of Manila and another in the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. or a portion thereof, is situated.
• United Overseas then filed a motion to dismiss contending that Rosemoore engaged • The venue of the action for nullification of the foreclosure sale is properly laid with
in forum shopping by filing a case in Bulacan after filing the case in RTC Manila. the Malolos RTC even if two of the properties mortgaged together with the Bulacan
properties are situated in Nueva Ecija. Following the above-quoted provision of the
Issue/s: Rules of Court, the venue of real actions affecting properties found in different
1. W/N Rosemoore mining engaged in forum shopping by filing 2 cases against United provinces is determined by the singularity or plurality of the transactions involving said
Overseas Bank –NO parcels of land. Where said parcels are the object of one and the same
2. W/N the action to invalidate the foreclosure sale was properly brought in the Malolos transaction, the venue is in the court of any of the provinces wherein a parcel of land is
RTC even as regards the properties in Nueva Ecija – YES situated.
Ratio: • In the present case, there is a single transaction. There is only one proceeding sought
to be nullified and that is the extra-judicial mortgage foreclosure sale. And there is only
1. Rosemoore mining did not engage in forum shopping one initial transaction which served as the basis of the foreclosure sale and that is the
single mortgage contract which incidentally included properties located in different
• The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties areas.
for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of
obtaining a Dispositive:
favorable judgment. There must be sameness in the parties involved, sameness in the
rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, and as a result, a decision in one case would bar
the other
on the ground of res judicata.
PACIFIC CONSULTANTS INTERNATIONAL ASIA, INC. v. SCHONFELD i. Schonfeld was a Canadian citizen, a transient expatriate
who had left the Philippines.
Petitioners: PACIFIC CONSULTANTS INTERNATIONAL ASIA, INC.
ii. Schonfeld’s cause of action was based on his letter of
and JENS PETER
employment executed in Tokyo, Japan, hence, under the
Respondents: KLAUS K. SCHONFELD
principle of lex loci contractus, the complaint should have
been filed in Tokyo, Japan.
Doctrine: Venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a rule, supersede the
iii. Moreover, under the General Conditions of Employment
general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court in the absence
appended to the letter of employment, Schonfeld and PCIJ
of qualifying or restrictive words. They are not exclusive but, rather
had agreed that any employment-related dispute should be
permissive. If the intention of the parties were to restrict venue, there must
brought before the London Court of Arbitration.
be accompanying language clearly and categorically expressing their
9. Schonfeld contended that he was employed by PPI to work in the Philippines
intention.
under contract separate from his contract of employment with PCIJ.
a. He insisted that his employer was PPI, a Philippine-registered
Facts: corporation.
1. Schonfeld is a Canadian citizen and was a resident of British Columbia, b. He further insisted that the principles of forum non conveniens and
Canada. lex loci contractus do not apply, and that although he is a Canadian
2. Pacicon Philippines, Inc. (PPI) is a Philippine corporation engaged in the citizen, Philippine Labor Laws apply in this case.
business of providing specialty and technical services both in and out of the 10. LA: The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the PCIJ. It ruled that the Philippines
Philippines. was only the duty station where Schonfeld was required to work under the
a. It is a subsidiary of Pacific Consultants International of Japan (PCIJ) General Conditions of Employment. PCIJ remained respondents employer
3. PCIJ engaged in consultancy services for water and sanitation in the despite his having been sent to the Philippines. It further recognized that the
Philippines. parties had agreed that any differences regarding employer-employee
4. Schonfeld was employed by PCIJ and was assigned to PPI as its Sector relationship should then be submitted to the jurisdiction of the court of
Manager in the Philippines. arbitration in London.
a. His salary was to be paid partly by PPI and PCIJ.
5. [see notes for a copy of the Letter of Employment of Schonfeld] Issue: Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over Schonfeld’s claim despite
a. IMPORTANT: Section 21 of the General Conditions of Employment12 the undisputed fact that he is a foreign national who was hired abroad by a foreign
6. However, PCIJ and PPI had not been successful in the water and sanitation corporation, and that he executed his contract of employment abroad, and had agree
sector in the Philippines. Schonfeld was then terminated from employment. that any dispute between them shall be finally settled by the Court of Arbitration in
7. Schonfeld filed with PPI several money claims (i.e: unpaid salary, leave pay, London. YES.
air fare from Manila to Canada). PPI partially settled some of his claims
(US$5,635.99), but refused to pay the rest. Ratio:
8. Schonfeld filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal against PPI with the Labor 1. The settled rule on stipulations regarding venue, as held by this Court in the
Arbiter. vintage case of Philippine Banking Corporation v. Tensuan, is that while they
a. This was opposed by PCI on the following grounds: (1) the Labor are considered valid and enforceable, venue stipulations in a contract do
Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the subject matter; and (2) venue not, as a rule, supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the
was improperly laid. Revised Rules of Court in the absence of qualifying or restrictive
b. It averred that: words.
12SECTION 21: Any question of interpretation, understanding or fulfillment of the Company and which can not be settled amicably, is to be finally settled, binding to
conditions of employment, as well as any question arising between the Employee and both parties through written submissions, by the Court of Arbitration in
the Company which is in consequence of or connected with his employment with the London.
2. They should be considered merely as an agreement or additional forum, not You will, from the date of commencement, be [seconded] to our subsidiary Pacicon
as limiting venue to the specified place. They are not exclusive but, rather Philippines, Inc. in Manila, hereinafter referred as Pacicon. Pacicon will provide you
permissive. with a separate contract, which will define that part of the present terms and conditions
3. If the intention of the parties were to restrict venue, there must be for which Pacicon is responsible. In case of any discrepancies or contradictions between
accompanying language clearly and categorically expressing their purpose the present Letter of Employment and the contract with Pacicon Philippines, Inc. or in
and design that actions between them be litigated only at the place named by the case that Pacicon should not live up to its obligations, this Letter of Employment
them. will prevail.
4. In the instant case, no restrictive words like: only, solely, exclusively in this
court, in no other court, save particularly, nowhere else but/except, or words XXX
of equal import were stated in the contract.
5. Hence, it cannot be said that the court of arbitration in London is an exclusive
venue to bring forth any complaint arising out of the employment contract.
6. PCI insistence on the application of the principle of forum non conveniens
must be rejected. The bare fact that Schonfeld is a Canadian citizen and was a
repatriate does not warrant the application of the principle for the following
reasons:
a. The Labor Code of the Philippines does not include forum non
conveniens as a ground for the dismissal of the complaint.
b. The propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a
factual determination; hence, it is properly considered as defense.
c. In Bank of America, NT&SA, Bank of America International, Ltd. v.
Court of Appeals, this Court held that: x x x [a] Philippine Court may
assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that
the following requisites are met:
i. that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may
conveniently resort to;
ii. that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an
intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and,
iii. that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to
enforce its decision. x x x
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76563 is AFFIRMED. This case is REMANDED to the
Labor Arbiter for disposition of the case on the merits.
NOTES:
XXX
LETTER OF EMPLOYMENT
This Letter of Employment with the attached General Conditions of Employment
constitutes the agreement under which you will be engaged by our Company on the
terms and conditions defined hereunder. In case of any discrepancies or contradictions
between this Letter of Employment and the General Conditions of Employment, this
Letter of Employment will prevail.

SPS. OCHOA VS. CHINA BANK some other body or office not a court of justice, the claim may not be
categorized under either term.
Petitioners: SPOUSES HERMES P. OCHOA AND ARACELI D. OCHOA
● Unlike an action, an extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage is
Respondents: CHINA BANKING CORPORATION
initiated by filing a petition not with any court of justice but with the office of
the sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made.
Doctrine:
● If ever the executive judge comes into the picture, it is only because he
exercises administrative supervision over the sheriff. But this administrative
Facts: supervision, however, does not change the fact that extrajudicial foreclosures
● Sps Ochoa's mortgaged real property located in Parañaque City over which are not judicial proceedings, actions or suits
China bank was granted a special power to foreclose extra-judicially. Thus, by ● With respect to the venue of extrajudicial foreclosure sales, Act No. 3135, as
express provision of Section 2 of Act 3135, the sale can only be made in amended, applies, it being a special law dealing particularly with extrajudicial
Parañaque City. foreclosure sales of real estate mortgages, and not the general provisions of
● Under Act 3135: the Rules of Court on Venue of Actions.
○ Section 1. When a sale is made under a special power inserted in or ● Consequently, the stipulated exclusive venue of Makati City is relevant only to
attached to any real-estate mortgage hereafter made as security for actions arising from or related to the mortgage, such as petitioners' complaint
the payment of money or the fulfillment of any other obligation, the for Annulment of Foreclosure, Sale, and Damages
provisions of the following sections shall govern as to the manner in
which the sale and redemption shall be effected, whether or not Dispositive:
provision for the same is made in the power. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration is hereby
○ Sec. 2. Said sale cannot be made legally outside of the province in DENIED.
which the property sold is situated; and in case the place within said
province in which the sale is to be made is the subject of stipulation,
such sale shall be made in said place or in the municipal building of
the municipality in which the property or part thereof is situated
● Sps Ochoa insist that it was error for the CA to rule that the stipulated
exclusive venue of Makati City is binding only on their complaint for
Annulment of Foreclosure, Sale, and Damages filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Parañaque City, but not on China bank's Petition for Extrajudicial
Foreclosure of Mortgage, which was filed with the same court.
Issue/s:
Ratio:
● The exclusive venue of Makati City, as stipulated by the parties and
sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, cannot be made to apply
to the Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure filed by respondent bank because
the provisions of Rule 4 pertain to venue of actions, which an extrajudicial
foreclosure is not.
● Action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which one party
prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong
● The determinative or operative fact which converts a claim into an "action or
suit" is the filing of the same with a "court of justice." Filed elsewhere, as with

UNION BANK V MAUNLAD HOMES Issue/s: Is the action an ejectment suit or accion reivindicatoria?-- EJECTMENT
SUIT. MeTC has jurisdiction
Petitioners: UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
Respondents: MAUNLAD HOMES, INC. and all other persons or entities
Ratio:
claiming rights under it
1. The jurisdiction of a court is determined by the nature of the action pleaded
by the litigant through the allegations in his complaint.
Doctrine: Ejectment actions shall be filed in "the municipal trial court of
2. Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one
the municipality or city wherein the real property involved x x x is situated,"
who unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his
Section 4 of the same Rule provides that the rule shall not apply "where the
right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The
parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the
possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became
exclusive venue thereof."
illegal due to expiration or termination of the right to possess. Under Section
1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the action must be filed "within one (1) year
Facts: after the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession." Thus, to fall
1. Union Bank is the owner of a commercial complex located in Malolos, within the jurisdiction of the MeTC, the complaint must allege that:
Bulacan, known as the Maunlad Shopping Mall. a. the defendant originally had lawful possession of the property, either
2. In 2002, Union Bank entered into a contract to sell with Maunlad Homes by virtue of a contract or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(Price: Php 151 million, Php2.4 million downpayment, balance to be b. eventually, the defendant’s possession of the property became illegal
amortized over the succeeding 180- month period) or unlawful upon notice by the plaintiff to defendant of the expiration
3. Under the contract, Union Bank authorized Maunlad Homes to take or the termination of the defendant’s right of possession;
possession of the property and to build or introduce improvements thereon. c. thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and
The parties also agreed that if Maunlad Homes violates any of the provisions deprived the plaintiff the enjoyment thereof; and
of the contract, all payments made will be applied as rentals for the use and d. within one year from the unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession of the property, and all improvements introduced on the land will possession, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment
accrue in favor of Union Bank. In the event of rescission due to failure to pay 3. In this case, Union Bank alleged all the four requirements, thereby vesting
or to comply with the terms of the contract, Maunlad Homes will be required jurisdiction to the MeTC.
to immediately vacate the property and must voluntarily turn possession over 4. Despite Maunlad Homes’ claim of ownership of the property, the Court ruled
to Union Bank that the MeTC retained its jurisdiction over the action. A defendant may not
4. Maunlad Homes defaulted, prompting Union Bank to file an ejectment suit divest the MeTC of its jurisdiction by merely claiming ownership of the
against Maunlad before the MeTC of Makati. Maunlad argued that it is the property.
owner of the property as Union Bank did not reserve ownership of the 5. Under Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, "when the defendant raises
property under the terms of the contract. By virtue of its ownership, Maunlad the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession
Homes claimed that it has the right to possess the property cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of
5. MeTC dismissed Union Bank's complaint, ruling that the Bank's cause of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession." Section
action was was based on a breach of contract and that both parties are 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, however, states that "the judgment x x x shall
claiming a better right to possess the property based on their respective claims be conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in no wise bind the
of ownership of the property. The MeTC ruled that the appropriate action to title or affect the ownership of the land or building."
resolve these conflicting claims was an accion reivindicatoria, over which it 6. Regarding the issue about venue, the Court ruled while Section 1, Rule 4 of the
had no jurisdiction. RTC affirmed. RTC noted that assuming the action is an Rules of Court states that ejectment actions shall be filed in "the municipal
ejectment suit, the venue was improper because the case was filed in Makati trial court of the municipality or city wherein the real property involved x x x
(the venue specified in the contract) and not in Bulacan (the location of the is situated," Section 4 of the same Rule provides that the rule shall not apply
land). The RTC declared that Union Bank cannot rely on the waiver of venue "where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action
provision in the contract because ejectment is not an action arising out of or on the exclusive venue thereof." Since the unlawful detainer action is
connected with the contract. CA affirmed. connected with the contract, Union Bank rightfully filed the complaint with
the MeTC of Makati City
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the decision dated
October 28, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 107772. Respondent
Maunlad Homes, Inc. is ORDERED TO VACATE the Maunlad Shopping Mall, the
property subject of the case, immediately upon the finality of this Decision. Respondent
Maunlad Homes, Inc. is further ORDERED TO PAY the rentals-in-arrears, as well as
rentals accruing in the interim until it vacates the property.
The case is REMANDED to the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 64, to
determine the amount of rentals due. In addition to the amount determined as unpaid
rent, respondent Maunlad Homes, Inc. is ORDERED TO PAY legal interest of six
percent (6o/o) per annum, from November 19, 2003, when the demand to pay and to
vacate was made, up to the finality of this Decision. Thereafter, an interest of twelve
percent ( 12%) per annum shall be imposed on the total amount due until full payment
is made.
SO ORDERED.

DE LEON V DELA LLANA d. The MCTC decision became final and executory.
4. Gilbert then filed another complaint (second ejectment complaint) under
Petitioners: Robert and Nenita De Leon
the same facts in the MTC-Davao, this time with his spouse Analyn as co-
Respondents: Gilbert and Analyn Dela Llana
plaintiff.
a. In the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping:
Doctrine: Because the contract which stipulated for the exclusive venue
i. Gilbert and Analyn disclosed that a previous ejectment
for disputes was void for being absolutely simulated, the general rule on the
complaint had been filed, but was dismissed due to
filing of real actions, which is where the property is situated, prevails.
improper venue.
5. The MTC-Davao ruled in favor of Gilbert and Analyn.
Facts: a. Did not rule on the issue of res judicata.
1. Gilbert Dela Llana filed an unlawful detainer complaint (first ejectment b. Ruled that the undated lease contract was not simulated.
complaint) against Robert De Leon before the MCTC of Nabunturan- 6. Robert then appealed to the RTC, which reversed the MTC-Davao ruling on
Mawab, Compostela Valley. the basis of improper venue.
a. Gilbert averred that sometime in 1999, he, through an undated a. Held that venue for real actions does not admit of any exceptions,
contract of lease, leased a portion of his property to Robert, which that the proper venue for forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases
Robert intended to use as a lottery outlet. is the municipal trial court of the municipality or city where said
b. The lease contract had a term of 5 years and contained a stipulation property is situated,
that any case arising from the same shall be led in the courts of Davao i. Which in this case, should be the Municipal Trial Court of
City only. Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, not Davao.
c. Gilbert claimed that Robert failed to pay their rental arrears to him b. Relative thereto, it held that the parties' stipulation on venue as
and refused to vacate the subject property, despite repeated found in their undated lease contract could not be enforced,
demands. i. Considering that the cause of action herein is not one for
2. As defense, Robert contended that the undated lease contract was breach of contract or specific performance, but for
simulated, hence not binding. unlawful detainer whose venue was specifically
3. The MCTC dismissed the first ejectment complaint. provided for by the Rules of Civil Procedure.
a. Held that the undated lease contract was relatively simulated and 7. Gilbert and Analyn then appealed to the CA, which reversed the RTC ruling
thus was not binding. and reinstated the MTC-Davao ruling.
b. The MCTC found that: a. The CA categorically ruled that in unlawful detainer cases, venue may
i. There was no effort on Gilbert's part to collect any rental be validly stipulated by the contracting parties.
payments from Robert for more or less six (6) years and that
it was only upon the filing of the said complaint that Gilbert Issue/s:
wanted them ejected. 1. WoN the second ejectment complaint is barred by res judicata
ii. Accordingly, the MCTC sustained Robert’s assertion that 2. WoN the second ejectment complaint is filed on the proper venue
the undated lease contract was a mere formality so as to
comply with the requirement of the Philippine Charity Ratio:
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) in order to install a lottery 1. YES, the second ejectment complaint is barred by res judicata
outlet. a. In the first ejectment complaint, the MCTC-Nabunturan-Mawab had
c. The MCTC also opined that assuming arguendo that the lease already dismissed Robert’s complaint for being relatively (absolutely
contract is not simulated: daw dapat according to the SC) simulated.
i. The dismissal of Gilbert's complaint was still in order on b. Decision was not premised on a mere technical ground, particularly,
the ground of improper venue given that the parties on improper venue.
expressly agreed that any dispute arising from the same i. This is evinced by the qualifier "granting arguendo"
shall be brought before the courts of Davao City only, to the which opens the discussion thereof, to show that the rst
exclusion of other courts. ejectment complaint would, according to the MCTC-
Nabunturan-Mawab, have been dismissed on improper
venue notwithstanding the undated lease contract's
simulated character.
2. NO, it was not filed in the proper venue because the filing itself is barred by
res judicata
a. With the undated lease contract definitely settled as absolutely
simulated, and hence, void, there can be no invocation of the
exclusive venue stipulation on the part of either party;
i. Thus, the general rule on the filing of real actions in the
court where the property is situated — as in the filing of the
first ejectment complaint before the MCTC-Nabunturan-
Mawab located in Compostela Valley same as the subject
property of this case — prevails.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 31, 2013 and the
Resolution dated March 31, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03523-MIN
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ejectment complaint of respondents-
spouses Gilbert and Analyn dela Llana in Civil Case No. 19,590-B-06 before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Davao City, Branch 2 is DISMISSED without
prejudice as afore-discussed.
SO ORDERED.

TOPIC IV – PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition
Issue: (1) WON the petitioners may challenge the court’s jurisdiction? NO
HEIRS OF HINOG BERTULDO HINOG V. MELICOR (2) WON the non-payment of the proper docket fee at the time of the filing of the
complaint automatically causes the dismissal of the action? NO
Petitioner/s: Heirs of Hinog Bertuldo Hinog II, Bertuldo Hinog III,
Bertuldo Hinog, Jr., Jocelyn Hinog, Bertoldo Hinog IV, Bertoldo Hinog V,
Ratio:
Edgardo Hinog, Milagros H. Pabatao, Lilian H. King, Victoria H. Engracia,
(1)
Terisita C. Hinog, Paz H. Besana, Roberto C. Hinog, Vicente C. Hinog, Roel
After recognizing the jurisdiction of the trial court by seeking affirmative relief in their
C. Hinog, Marilyn C. Hinog, Bebot C. Hinog, lordes C. Hinog, Pablo Chiong,
motion to serve supplemental pleading upon private respondents, petitioners are
Arlene Lanasang (All respresented by Bertuldo Hinog III)
effectively barred by estoppel from challenging the trial court's jurisdiction. If a party
invokes the jurisdiction of a court, he cannot thereafter challenge the court's
Respondent/s: MELICOR, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC,
jurisdiction in the same case. To rule otherwise would amount to speculating on the
Branch 4, 7th Judicial Region, Tagbiliran City, Bohol, and CUSTODIO
fortune of litigation, which is against the policy of the Court.
BALANE, RUFO BALANE, HONORIO BALANE, and TOMAS BALANE
It is worth noting that when Bertuldo filed his Answer on July 2, 1991, he did not raise
the issue of lack of jurisdiction for non-payment of correct docket fees. Instead, he
Doctrine: After recognizing the jurisdiction of the trial court by seeking
based his defense on a claim of ownership and participated in the proceedings before
affirmative relief in their motion to serve supplemental pleading upon
the trial court. It was only in September 22, 1998 or more than seven years after filing
private respondents, petitioners are effectively barred by estoppel from
the answer, and under the auspices of a new counsel, that the issue of jurisdiction was
challenging the trial court's jurisdiction. If a party invokes the jurisdiction
raised for the first time in the motion to expunge by Bertuldo's heirs.
of a court, he cannot thereafter challenge the court's jurisdiction in the same
After Bertuldo vigorously participated in all stages of the case before the trial court and
case.
even invoked the trial court's authority in order to ask for affirmative relief, petitioners,
considering that they merely stepped into the shoes of their predecessor, are effectively
Facts: The Balanes, the private respondents in this case, filed a complaint for the barred by estoppel from challenging the trial court's jurisdiction. Although the issue of
recovery of ownership and possession as well as removal of construction and damages jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings as the same is conferred by
(moral & exemplary) against Bertuldo Hinog. law, it is nonetheless settled that a party may be barred from raising it on ground of
It was alleged that the Balanes are the owners of a 1400sqm parcel of land in Bohol, laches or estoppel.
which they have rented to Bertuldo for 10 years with an annual rental of 100php.
Bertuldo, thereafter, constructed a house of light materials in the said lot. (2) The Court has held that the Manchester rule has been modified in Sun Insurance
However, after the expiry of the 10 years, Bertuldo refused to surrender the lot and even Office, Ltd. (SIOL) vs. Asuncion, which defined the following guidelines involving the
claimed ownership over the same by virtue of a deed of absolute sale executed by one payment of docket fees:
Tomas Pahac, with the alleged conformity of the Balanes. 1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
Trial on the merits ensued but Bertuldo died without completing his evidence. subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
Consequently, Bertuldo III designated Atty. Petalcorin to be his new counsel. The latter accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fees
filed a motion to expunge the complaint and nullify all proceedings on the ground that within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
the amount of damages claimed is not stated so the proper docket fee was not paid by reglementary period.
the Balanes hence the court did not acquire jurisdiction. Under the Manchester Ruling, XXX
Non- payment of the correct docket fee is jurisdictional. Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement,
The trial court granted the motion but later on reinstated the case after the payment of even its non-payment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of
the correct docket fee. the case, as long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary
Instead of filing for an MR, a supplemental pleading was filed by Atty. Petalcorin period, more so when the party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the
appending therein the Deed of Sale of the lot in question. The trial court denied the rules prescribing such payment.[46] Thus, when insufficient filing fees were initially
supplemental pleading on the ground that the Deed is a new matter, never mentioned paid by the plaintiffs and there was no intention to defraud the government, the
in the original answer prepared by Bertuldo’s original counsel. Manchester rule does not apply.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
No costs.

DE LA CRUZ V JOAQUIN and present evidence in defense of the deceased. These actions negate any
claim that the right to due process was violated.
Petitioner/s: Spouses Julita de la Cruz and Felipe de la Cruz
4. The heirs of Pedro Joaquin voluntary appeared and participated in the case.
Respondent/s: Pedro Joaquin
The appellate court had ordered his legal representatives to appear and
substitute for him. The substitution even on appeal had been ordered
Doctrine:
correctly.
A formal substitution by heirs is not necessary when they themselves
5. The rule on the substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a
voluntarily appear, participate in the case, and present evidence in defense
requirement of due process. Thus, when due process is not violated, as when
of the deceased.
the right of the representative or heir is recognized and protected,
noncompliance or belated formal compliance with the Rules cannot affect the
Facts: validity of a promulgated decision. Mere failure to substitute for a deceased
1. A complaint was filed by Pedro Joaquin for the recovery of possession and plaintiff is not a sufficient ground to nullify a trial court's decision.
ownership, cancellation of title, and damages against Sps. de la Cruz.
2. Joaquin alleged that he obtained a P9000 loan in 1974 from the Sps., payable Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and
on 1979. This was secured by a Deed of Sale of a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija Resolution are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners
in favor of the Sps.
3. The parties also executed another document called “Kasunduan”.
4. Joaquin alleges that:
a. The Deed of Sale is actually an equitable mortgage as seen in the
Kasunduan
5. RTC ruled that the parties entered into a sale with a right of repurchase, and
Joaquin exercised his right to repurchase when he made two valid tender of
payments. The Sps. were required to reconvey the property.
6. The CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. In a Resolution in 2004, the CA ordered the
substitution by legal representatives, in view of Joaquin’s death in 1988.
7. The Sps. assert that
a. There being no substitution by the heirs after Joaquin died during
the pendency of the case, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over
litigation.
Issue: WHETHER the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case upon the death of
Joaquin - NO
Ratio:
1. When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished, the
Rules of Court require a substitution of the deceased. The procedure is
specifically governed by Section 16 of Rule 3 ROC.
2. The Court has nullified not only trial proceedings conducted without the
appearance of the legal representatives of the deceased, but also the resulting
judgments. In those instances, the courts acquired no jurisdiction over the
persons of the legal representatives or the heirs upon whom no judgment was
binding.
3. This general rule notwithstanding, a formal substitution by heirs is not
necessary when they themselves voluntarily appear, participate in the case,
LIMBAUAN V ACOSTA b) When Faustino remonstrated, Paulino led two (2) criminal
complaints against Faustino with the Metropolitan Trial Court for
Petitioner/s: Charles Limbauan
"Malicious Mischief" and "Unjust Vexation".
Respondent/s: Faustino Acosta
i) However the Court issued an Order dismissing the cases for
failure of Paulino to comply with PD 1508.
Doctrine: A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at
7) Paulino, in the meantime, conveyed the beerhouse to Juanita Roces.
any time before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a
a) Juanita and Faustino entered into an oral contract of lease over the
reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served.
parcel of land for a monthly rental of P60.00.
b) About a year thereafter, Juanita suddenly stopped paying to Faustino
Facts: her rentals for the property.
1) In 1938, the Government acquired the Tala Estate in Kalookan for a i) It turned out that Juanita conveyed the beerhouse to her
leprosarium. nephew, Charles Limbauan, who assumed the lease from
a) However, the Gov’t only used 1/5th of the property. his aunt and who then paid the monthly rentals for the
b) AND under RA 4085, segregation of those with leprosy is no longer property in the amount of P60.00 to Faustino.
mandated. c) However, in November, 1987, Charles stopped paying rentals to
2) In the meantime, the State found it necessary to establish new residential Faustino claiming that:
areas and utilizing inexpensive land in order to serve low-income families i) Since the property was government property, Faustino had
whose housing needs can only be met by the Government. no right to lease the same and collect the rentals therefore.
a) On April 26, 1971, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued (1) However, Faustino did not file any complaint nor
Proclamation No. 843 unlawful detainer against Charles.
i) Allocating the property to the Department of Health, the 8) Congress then approved Republic Act 7999:
National Housing Corporation, the PHHC and Department a) Under which the State converted a portion of the Estate, with a total
of Social Welfare and Development area of 120 hectares, for use as a housing site for residents and
3) It was also decreed that: employees of the Department of Health, with the National Housing
a) More precise identities of the parcels of land allocated to the Authority as the leading implementing agency.
government will be made only after a final survey shall have been 9) After the passage by Congress of Republic Act 7999, Faustino led a complaint
completed. against Charles with the Lupon for ejectment, for failure of Charles to pay his
4) A joint PHHC-Bureau of Lands team was tasked to undertake the necessary rentals from October, 1987.
segregation survey and inquiries on private rights within the Estate. a) The Lupon issued a "Certification to File Action"
a) In the Interim, it was decreed that no transfer of title shall be made 10) On January 2, 1996, Faustino, through Law Interns in the office of Legal Aid
until the enactment of a law allowing the use of the site for purposes of the University of the Philippines, sent a letter to Charles:
other than that of a leprosarium. a) Demanding Charles to vacate the property within five days from
5) In the meantime, Faustino Acosta took possession of a vacant portion of the notice
Tala Estate and constructed his house. i) For his failure to pay the monthly rentals in the amount of
a) In August, 1982, Faustino Acosta, who was then a Barangay P60.00 a month since October, 1987.
Councilman, executed a deed styled "Registration of Property", b) Charles Limbauan ignored the letter and refused to vacate the
attested by the Barangay Captain over another vacant portion of the property.
Estate. 11) Faustino, then led, on February 7, 1996, a complaint for "Unlawful Detainer"
6) Faustino Acosta then took possession of the property, constructed a fence against Charles with the Metropolitan Trial Court.
around the perimeter of the property and planted vegetables thereon. a) Praying for the immediate restoration of the premises to Faustino
a) However, in 1984, Paulino Calanday took possession of the said 12) Upon suggestion of the Court, Faustino Acosta sent another letter of demand
property without the consent of Faustino, constructed an edifice to Charles Limbauan, dated March 7, 1996:
thereon and used the same as a beerhouse. a) Demanding Charles to vacate the property this time within 15 days
from notice,
i) Otherwise, Faustino will institute the appropriate action for a) According to Charles Limbauan, Faustino’s demand letter gave him
his eviction from the property. a five-day period only instead of fifteen (15) days within which to
ii) Charles Limbauan received the letter, on March 13, 1996, comply with the demand to vacate.
but refused to vacate the property. i) A jurisdictional requisite, not having been complied with,
iii) Faustino forthwith led a "Motion to Approve Attached the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Amended Complaint" with the Court which was granted by
the Court. Issue: WoN the MTC erred in allowing the Amendment as its purpose was to confer
13) Charles Limbauan interposed the defense that: jurisdiction of the case upon itself -- NO, the MTC was correct in allowing the
a) That Faustino had no cause of action against him Amendment by Faustino.
i) because the property on which the beerhouse was
constructed is owned by the government since the Ratio: [Only read #1 and #2 if u really want to understand the case (or if u still have
government is the owner of the property, Faustino had no time), but if ur in a real hurry, proceed to #3 cuz that’s the important part in this case]
right of possession over the property and collect rentals 1) In re: Section 2, Rule 70 (unlawful detainer)
therefore. a) The demand to pay rent and vacate is necessary if the action for
(1) Besides, it was unfair for Faustino, who was unlawful detainer is anchored on the non-payment of rentals, as in
already in possession of the lot at No. 786 B. San this case.
Roque, Barangay 187 to still claim possession over b) The same rule explicitly provides that the unlawful detainer suit must
the subject property. be commenced:
b) And that the Court had no jurisdiction over the action of the Faustino i) Only if the lessee fails to comply after the lapse or expiration
i) As it was one of accion publiciana and not one for unlawful of 15 days in case of lands and 5 days in case of buildings:
detainer. (1) From the time the demand is made upon the
14) The MTC ruled in favor of Faustino. lessee.
a) Found that Faustino adduced evidence that Charles Limbauan was a c) The demand required and contemplated in Section 2 of Rule 70 is a
lessee over the property and, hence, the Charles Limbauan was jurisdictional requirement for the purpose of bringing an unlawful
estopped from assailing Faustino’s title over the property. detainer suit for failure to pay rent.
15) Charles Limbauan then led a "Petition for Review" with the CA and posed the i) It partakes of an extrajudicial remedy that must be pursued
following issues: before resorting to judicial action
a) whether or not the remedy of the Respondent in the Metropolitan (1) Such that full compliance with the demand would
Trial Court for unlawful detainer was proper; render unnecessary a court action.
b) the subject property was government property and, hence, cannot be d) In short, for the purpose of bringing an ejectment suit, two requisites
the lawful subject of a lease contract between the Petitioner and must concur:
Respondent and, hence, the latter had no right to have the Petitioner i) There must be failure to pay rent or to comply with the
evicted from the property and to collect rentals from him. conditions of the lease; and
16) The CA dismissed the Petition for Review and affirmed the MTC’s decision. ii) There must be demand both to pay or to comply and vacate
17) Charles Limbauan argues that there must be a prior demand to vacate the within the periods speci ed in Section 2, particularly, 15 days
leased premises and pay the rent and a 15-day period from the time of demand in the case of land and 5 days in the case of buildings.
must have lapsed before a complaint for unlawful detainer may be (1) The first requisite refers to the existence of the
commenced pursuant to Section 2, Rule 70. 13 cause of action for unlawful detainer while the
13Sec. 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand. — Unless otherwise posting such notice on the premises if no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails
stipulated, such action by the lessor shall be commenced only after demand to pay or to comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five (5) days in the
comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee, or by case of buildings.
serving written notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises, or by
second refers to the jurisdictional requirement of whether a new cause of action or change
demand in order that said cause of action may be in theory is introduced, at any time
pursued. before the filing of any responsive
e) As the subject matter in this case is a parcel of land, the expiration of pleading.
the fifteen-day period is a prerequisite to the filing of an action for (b) Undoubtedly, when Faustino led his
unlawful detainer. Amended Complaint on May 16, 1996,
2) In re: Faustino’s observance of the 15 day period: no responsive pleading had yet
a) Faustino’s first demand letter dated January 2, 1996 gave petitioner been filed by Limbauan, thus, the MTC
five (5) days from receipt within which to pay the unpaid rentals and validly admitted the said amended
vacate the premises. complaint.
i) Limbauan received the demand letter on January 10, 1996 b) It is well-settled that amendment of pleadings is favored and should
while Faustino brought the action for unlawful detainer on be liberally allowed in the furtherance of justice in order to determine
February 7, 1996, which was clearly more than 15 days every case as far as possible on its merits without regard to
from the time petitioner received the demand technicalities.
letter on January 10, 1996 and well within the one- i) This principle is generally recognized in order that the real
year period set forth by Section 1, Rule 70. controversies between the parties are presented, their
ii) Thus, the fact that respondent's demand letter granted rights determined and the case decided on the merits
petitioner five (5) days to pay and to vacate the subject without unnecessary delay to prevent circuity of action and
property is of no moment needless expense.
(1) Because what is important and required under c) Limbauan also contends that the MTC's purpose for admitting the
Section 2 of Rule 70 is for the lessor to allow a amended complaint was to eliminate the jurisdictional defect of the
period of fifteen (15) days to lapse before original complaint.
commencing an action for unlawful i) Limbauan cites cases which declared that:
detainer. (1) The amendment of the complaint could not be
iii) Evidently, Faustino actually complied with this allowed when its purpose is to confer jurisdiction
requirement. upon the court, since the court must first acquire
(1) Hence, MTC did not err for assuming jurisdiction jurisdiction over the case in order to act validly
over Faustino’s complaint and in not dismissing therein.
the same. d) Limbauan’s contention is devoid of merit.
3) In re: Amendment i) As earlier discussed, Faustino’s original complaint was free
a) Upon the advice of the MTC, Faustino sent another demand letter from any jurisdictional flaw and the MTC had jurisdiction
dated March 7, 1996 to Limbauan, this time giving the latter fifteen over the case to begin with.
(15) days within which to vacate the subject property. ii) Thus, the cited cases are not applicable in the instant case.
i) When Limbauan still refused, Faustino was compelled to iii) Hence, the MTC was correct in allowing the amendment.
file a Motion to Approve Attached Amended Complaint. e) Furthermore, it is a well-settled rule that what determines the nature
(1) The said motion was rightly granted by the MTC in of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the
accordance with Section 2, Rule 1014 allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief
(a) Under this provision, a party has the sought.
absolute right to amend his pleading
14Sec. 2. Amendments as a matter of right. — A party may amend his pleading once
as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, in
the case of a reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served.
f) A complaint for unlawful detainer is deemed sufficient if it alleges
that the withholding of the possession or the refusal to vacate is
unlawful, without necessarily employing the terminology of the law.
i) Here, Faustino alleged that he acquired possessory rights
over the subject property by virtue of a government grant.
(1) He leased the property to Limbauan for a monthly
rental of P60.00.
(2) When Limbauan failed to pay the rentals, Faustino
eventually sent two demand letters asking
petitioner to pay and vacate the premises.
(3) Limbauan refused, thereby depriving Faustino of
possession of the subject property.
(4) Clearly, the complaint alleges the basic elements
of an unlawful detainer case, which are sufficient
for the purpose of vesting jurisdiction over it in the
MTC.
g) Likewise, Limbauan’s allegation in his petition that he received
Faustino’s second demand letter on May 8, 1996 was belied by the
records of this case, the truth being that, the said demand letter dated
March 7, 1996 was received by petitioner on March 13, 1996.
i) The letter granted Limbauan fifteen (15) days within which
to pay and vacate the subject property.
ii) Faustino’s Amended Complaint was led on May 16, 1996
which was obviously two (2) months from the time
petitioner had notice of the demand, and again more than
15 days as required by Section 2, Rule 70.
h) In sum, Faustino clearly satisfied the jurisdictional requirement of
prior demand to vacate within the period set by the rules.
i) The MTC validly acquired jurisdiction over both the original
complaint and the amended complaint.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED. The assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 49144 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

OCO VS. LIMBARING b. Through deceit and manipulation respondent was able to convince Sabas to
execute the two deeds of sale
Petitioner: Spouses Anthony and Percita Oco
c. Sabas informed Percita that the agricultural land had never been sold
Respondents: Victor Limbaring
d. She refused to pay the P25,000 because the suspensive conditions stated in
the promissory note had never been complied with.
e. She paid for all the expenses incurred in their transaction
DOCTRINE: In an action on a contract, only the parties involved in such
f. Her alleged failure to pay the P25,000 and for other deceits, Victor filed a
contract are real parties in interest. Absent any stipulation that such
criminal complaint, resulting for the Victor to be guilty of forum shopping.
contract would involve third persons (Contracts pour artrui) or that such
g. Victor was not the real party in interest and had no legal standing to sue
transaction would result into a trust relationship (which would make a
h. The lots were acquired without paying any consideration, thus should be
trustor a real party in interest) would deem a third person NOT A REAL
returned to Percita without consideration as well.
PARTY IN INTEREST.
i. Deeds of Sale reconveying the lots acknowledged receipt of consideration.
j. Oco filed a Demurrer to evidence
FACTS: k. RTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the complaint and counterclaim
1. A certain Sabas Limbaring subdivided his lot covered by TCT 5628 into two l. Court of Appeals: A trust relationship was created when Victor purchased the
lots. He then executed a part of such lot in favor of Jennifer Limbaring through a deed lot in favor of his daughters thus, he is a real party in interest
of sale and another in favor of Sarah Jane Limbaring. Accordingly, the original TCT was m. Oco appealed to the Supreme Court
cancelled and a TCT was issued each to Sabas and Jane. ISSUE/S:
2. Sensing some irregularities, Sabas’s daughter Percita Oco filed a case of 1. Is Victor Limbaring a real party in interest? - NO
perjury and falsification of documents against her uncle Victor Limbaring, the father of
Sarah and Jennifer. RATIO:
3. During the pre-litigation conference called by the City Prosecutor, the parties 1. Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides that “a real party in interest is
agreed that the two parcels of land should be reconveyed to Percita who was to pay the party who stands to party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
respondent all the expenses that had been incurred and would be incurred due to the the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by
transfer of the titles to her name. law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
4. Victor demanded P30,000 for the estimates expenses for documentation, party in interest”
capital gains and documentary stamp taxes and other registration fees. 2. The abovementioned rule has 2 requirements: (a) to institute an action, the
5. Percita succeeded in lowering the amount to P25,000 for which she executed plaintiff must be the real party in interest and (2) the action must be prosecuted in the
an undertaking. name of the real party in interest.
6. Pursuant to their agreement, Victor facilitated the transfer of the titles to 3. The purposes of these provisions are (a) Prevent the prosecution of actions by
Percita from his daughters. Percita left without paying the P25,000. persons without any right, title, or interest in the case (b) require that the actual party
7. Thus, Victor filed a complaint of rescission of the sales contracts with recovery entitled to local legal relief be the one to prosecute the action (c) avoid multiplicity of
of possession and ownership of the two parcels of land. suits and (d) discourage litigation and keep it within certain bounds pursuant to sound
8. Oco filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Victor was not the real public policy.
party in interest. 4. Interest – within the meaning of the Rules means material interest or an
9. Victor contended that he was trustor, whose property was being held in trust interest in the issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as
by his daughters. He averred that on the assumption that he was not the real party in distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved.
interest, he was entitled to an amendment of the pleadings. 5. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of
10. RTC denied the motion to dismiss. the court as the plaintiff in an action.
11. Oco filed an Answer with counterclaim alleging that: 6. Not a real party in interest = case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause
a. Respondent had tried to secure a DAR clearance and to have a certificate of of action
title issued in his name but failed because RA6657 prohibited the acquisition of more 7. Parties to a contract are the real parties in interest in an action upon it, as
than five hectares. consistently held by the Court. Thus, third parties to be involved must be stated
expressly (such as contracts pour artrui). A mere incidental benefit is not enough.
8. In this case, the action involved is an action on a contract which clearly show
that Jennifer and Sarah Limbaring were the vendors and Percitaa Oco was the vendee.
As a rule these three should the only be real parties in interest.
9. An argument that a trust relationship was formed is untenable. In this case,
there was no trust relationship that was established. Victor only presented bare
assertions ta trust was created. Respondent failed to rebut the presumption that it is a
gift in favor of the child. Failure to rebut that the land given to the daughters were
actually not gifts but constitutes a trust relationship does not create a trust relationship
at all. This scenario is the exemption of implied trusts in Art. 1448 of the Civil Code.
10. Absent any clear proof that a trust was created, Victor cannot be deemed a real
party in interest.

CARAVAN TRAVEL V. ABEJAR ● CA: affirmed with modification.
● Caravan filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied in the CA’s
Petitioner/s: CARAVAN TRAVEL AND TOURS INTERNATIONAL, INC.
assailed Resolution.
Respondent/s: ERMILINDA R. ABEJAR
● Hence, this Petition was filed.
Doctrine:
Issue:
One who exercises substitute parental authority over the victim’s person
1. W/N respondent Abejar is a real party in interest who may bring an action for
suffers actual loss and is considered as a real party in interest.
damages against petitioner Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. on
account of Jesmariane R. Reyes' death.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
2. W/N petitioner should be held liable as an employer, pursuant to Article 2180
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
of the Civil Code.
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
Ratio:
Facts: I.
● Jesmariane R. Reyes (Reyes) was walking along the west-bound lane of
Sampaguita Street, United Parañaque Subdivision IV, Parañaque City. Having exercised substitute parental authority, respondent suffered actual loss and is,
● A Mitsubishi L-300 van was travelling along the east-bound lane, opposite thus, a real party in interest in this case.
Reyes. ● It is particularly noticeable that Article 1902 stresses the passive subject of the
● To avoid an incoming vehicle, the van swerved to its left and hit Reyes. obligation to pay damages caused by his fault or negligence.
● Alex Espinosa (Espinosa), a witness to the accident, went to her aid and loaded ● The article does not limit or specify the active subjects, much less the relation
her in the back of the van. that must exist between the victim of the culpa aquiliana and the person who
● Espinosa told the driver of the van, Jimmy Bautista (Bautista), to bring Reyes may recover damages, thus warranting the inference that, in principle,
to the hospital. anybody who suffers any damage from culpa aquiliana, whether a relative or
● Instead of doing so, Bautista appeared to have left the van parked inside a not of the victim, may recover damages from the person responsible therefor.
nearby subdivision with Reyes still in the van.
● An unidentified civilian came to help and drove Reyes to the hospital. II.
● Upon investigation, it was found that the registered owner of the van was
Caravan. Respondent's Complaint is anchored on an employer's liability for quasi-delict
● Caravan is a corporation engaged in the business of organizing travels and provided in Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
tours. ● Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
● Bautista was Caravan's employee assigned to drive the van as its service driver. household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though
● Caravan shouldered the hospitalization expenses of Reyes. the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
● Despite medical attendance, Reyes died two (2) days after the accident. ● The resolution of this case must consider two (2) rules:
● Respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar (Abejar), Reyes' paternal aunt and the ○ First, Article 2180's specification that "[e]mployers shall be liable for
person who raised her since she was nine (9) years old, filed before the the damages caused by their employees . . . acting within the scope of
Regional Trial Court of Parañaque a Complaint for damages against Bautista their assigned tasks.”
and Caravan. ○ Second, the operation of the registered-owner rule that registered
● Abejar alleged that Bautista was an employee of Caravan and that Caravan is owners are liable for death or injuries caused by the operation of their
the registered owner of the van that hit Reyes. vehicles.
● Summons could not be served on Bautista. ● These rules appear to be in conflict when it comes to cases in which the
● Thus, Abejar moved to drop Bautista as a defendant. employer is also the registered owner of a vehicle.
● The Regional Trial Court granted her Motion. ● Article 2180 requires proof of two things:
● RTC: found that Bautista was grossly negligent in driving the vehicle. It ○ First, an employment relationship between the driver and the owner;
awarded damages in favor of Abejar. ○ Second, the driver acted within the scope of his or her assigned tasks.
● On the other hand, applying the registered-owner rule only requires the ● The liability imposed on the registered owner is direct and primary.
plaintiff to prove that the defendant-employer is the registered owner of the ● It does not depend on the inclusion of the negligent driver in the action.
vehicle. ● Instead of insisting that Bautista—who was nothing more than a necessary
● Thus, it is imperative to apply the registered-owner rule in a manner that party—should not have been dropped as a defendant, or that petitioner, along
harmonizes it with Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. with Bautista, should have been dropped, petitioner (as a co-defendant
● In light of this, the appropriate approach is that in cases where both the insisting that the action must proceed with Bautista as party) could have opted
registered-owner rule and Article 2180 apply, the plaintiff must first establish to file a cross-claim against Bautista as its remedy.
that the employer is the registered owner of the vehicle in question.
● Once the plaintiff successfully proves ownership, there arises a disputable The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error when it awarded actual damages
presumption that the requirements of Article 2180 have been proven. to respondent.
● As a consequence, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to show that no ● Respondent had personal knowledge of the facts sought to be proved by the
liability under Article 2180 has arisen. Certificate, i.e. that she spent P35,000.00 for the funeral expenses of Reyes.
● This disputable presumption, insofar as the registered owner of the vehicle in Thus, the Certificate that she identified and testified to is not hearsay.
relation to the actual driver is concerned, recognizes that between the owner ● Both the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court found Bautista grossly
and the victim, it is the former that should carry the costs of moving forward negligent in driving the van and concluded that Bautista's gross negligence
with the evidence. was the proximate cause of Reyes' death.
● The registration of the vehicle, on the other hand, is accessible to the public. ● As such, petitioner must pay the exemplary damages arising from the
● Here, respondent presented a copy of the Certificate of Registration of the van negligence of its driver.
that hit Reyes. ● For the same reasons, the award of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity is
● The Certificate attests to petitioner's ownership of the van. justified.
● Petitioner itself did not dispute its ownership of the van.
● Consistent with the rule we have just stated, a presumption that the Dispositive:
requirements of Article 2180 have been satisfied arises. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 3, 2005 is
● It is now up to petitioner to establish that it incurred no liability under Article AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (a) actual damages in the
2180. amount of P35,000.00 shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the time it
● This it can do by presenting proof of any of the following: was judicially or extrajudicially demanded from petitioner Caravan Travel and Tours
○ First, that it had no employment relationship with Bautista; International, Inc. until full satisfaction; (b) moral damages, exemplary damages, and
○ Second, that Bautista acted outside the scope of his assigned tasks; attorney's fees shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the
○ Or third, that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in Regional Trial Court Decision until full satisfaction; and (c) civil indemnity shall earn
the selection and supervision of Bautista. interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the Court of Appeals Decision
● On the first, petitioner admitted that Bautista was its employee at the time of until full satisfaction.
the accident.
● On the second, petitioner was unable to prove that Bautista was not acting
within the scope of his assigned tasks at the time of the accident.
● On the third, petitioner likewise failed to prove that it exercised the requisite
diligence in the selection and supervision of Bautista.
● Employing a person holding a non-professional driver's license to operate
another's motor vehicle violates Section 24 of the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code
● Evidently, petitioner did not only fail to exercise due diligence when it selected
Bautista as service driver; it also committed an actual violation of law.
Petitioner's argument that it should be excused from liability because Bautista was
already dropped as a party is equally unmeritorious.
GUY V. GACOTT b. A partner must be separately impleaded before he can be bound by a
judgment - so NO
Petitioner/s: Michael Guy
Ratio:
Respondent/s: Atty. Glenn Gacott
a.
● Section 11, Rule 14 of Rules of Civil Procedure - when the defendant is a
Doctrine:
corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the
A judgment of a court is conclusive and binding only upon the parties and
Philippines with a juridical personality, the service of summons may be made
their successors-in-interest after the commencement of the action in court.
on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
A decision rendered on a complaint in a civil action or proceeding does not
treasurer, or in-house counsel.
bind or prejudice a person not impleaded therein, for no person shall be
○ Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements that such provision
adversely affected by the outcome of a civil action or proceeding in which
provides an exclusive enumeration of the persons authorized to
he is not a party.
receive summons for juridical entities.
■ QSC was never shown to have been served with the
Facts: summons through any of the enumerated authorized
● Gacott (from Palawan) purchased 2 transreceivers from Quantech Systems persons to receive such
Corp. (in Manila) through its employee, Medestomas. ○ Service of summons upon persons other than those officers
○ Major defects - Gacott personally returned enumerated in Section 11 is invalid. Even substantial compliance is
○ Medestomas received and promised to replace within 2 weeks. not sufficient service of summons.
● Gacott did not receive the replacement units. ● Service of summons is merely procedural in nature and the lack of or defect in
○ QSC: there were no available units and that it could not refund the the service of summons may be cured by the defendant's subsequent voluntary
price. submission to the court's jurisdiction through his filing a responsive pleading
● Gacott filed for damages. such as an answer.
○ RTC ordered QSC and Medestomas to pay Gacott - became final so ○ QSC filed its Answer despite the defective summons. Thus,
Gacott got a Writ of Execution jurisdiction over its person was acquired through voluntary
● Gacott learned that QSC was not a corporation, but a general partnership appearance.
where Guy was the General Manager.
○ Sheriff verified in DOTC-LTO and learned that Guy had vehicles b.
registered. ● Although a partnership is based on delectus personae or mutual agency,
○ Gacott instructed sheriff to attach 1 of the motor vehicles, which he whereby any partner can generally represent the partnership in its business
did. affairs, it is non sequitur that a suit against the partnership is necessarily a
■ Notice of Attachment was served upon the custodian of suit impleading each and every partner.
DOTC-LTO and Guy. ○ A partnership is a juridical entity that has a distinct and separate
● Guy filed a Motion to Lift Attachment, saying that he was not a judgment personality from the persons composing it.
debtor, and thus, his vehicle could not be attached. ● In relation to the rules of civil procedure, a judgment of a court is conclusive
○ RTC denied: Guy should be treated as general partner who may be and binding only upon the parties and their successors-in-interest after the
held solidarily liable with QSC and Medestomas. commencement of the action in court.
● Guy moved for reconsideration: he was neither impleaded as a defendant nor ○ A decision rendered on a complaint in a civil action or proceeding
validly served with summons and thus, RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over does not bind or prejudice a person not impleaded therein, for no
his person. person shall be adversely affected by the outcome of a civil action or
○ RTC denied; CA affirmed proceeding in which he is not a party.
Issue: ■ conforms to the guarantee of due process of law
1. W/N the RTC’s jurisdiction over QSC extended to the person of Guy ● Guy was never made a party to the case.
a. Flawed service of summons, but voluntary appearance cured the
defect
○ He did not have any participation in the entire proceeding until his
vehicle was levied upon and he suddenly became QSC's "co-
defendant debtor" during the judgment execution stage.
● Money judgments are enforceable only against the property incontrovertibly
belonging to the judgment debtor.
○ The power of the court in executing judgments extends only to
properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone.
○ The duty of the sheriff is to levy the property of the judgment debtor,
not that of a third person.
● With regard to partnerships, ordinarily, the liability of the partners is not
solidary.
○ The joint liability of the partners is a defense that can be raised by a
partner impleaded in a complaint against the partnership.
○ In other words, only in exceptional circumstances shall the partners'
liability be solidary in nature.15
■ It was not shown that Guy or the other partners did a
wrongful act or misapplied the money or property he or the
partnership received from Gacott.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 25, 2012 Decision
and the March 5, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94816 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52,
Puerto Princesa City, is ORDERED TO RELEASE Michael C. Guy's Suzuki Grand Vitara
subject of the Notice of Levy/Attachment upon Personalty.
15 Article 1823. The partnership is bound to make good the loss: (2) Where the partnership in the course of its business receives money or property of
a third person and the money or property so received is misapplied by any partner
(1) Where one partner acting within the scope of his apparent authority receives while it is in the custody of the partnership.
money or property of a third person and misapplies it; and
Article 1824. All partners are liable solidarily with the partnership for everything
chargeable to the partnership under Articles 1822 and 1823.
TOPIC V – CAUSE OF ACTION ● Valdez and Brual had since died so it is also sought to include their estate and
heirs as plaintiffs, as the latter’s consent to substitute their predecessors could
TOPIC VI – PLEADINGS not be secured. Eugenia (Pedro’s spouse) was included as plaintiff
● RTC admitted SAC; While the case is pending, Sps. Tatlonghari discovered
TATLONGHARI V. BANGKO KABAYAN-IBAAN RURAL BANK evidence which shows that it was Tolentino, one of the co-plaintiffs was
responsible for the anomalous transaction with Bangko
Petitioner/s: Sps. Tatlonghari & Eugenia Tatlonghari (Sps. Tatlonghari)
● As Atty Castillo and Salva, the collaborating counsels of record, were both
Respondent/s: Bangko Kabayan-Ibaan Rural Bank (Bangko)
hired by Pedro and Tolentino, Sps. Tatlonghari decided to engage the services
of their own counsel which is Atty. Villanueva.
Doctrine: As a matter of judicial policy, courts are impelled to treat
● Atty. Villanueva filed then a motion leave to file for third amended complaint
motions for leave to file amended pleadings with liberality. This is especially
(TAC) alleging that the title to their property had already been consolidated in
true when a motion for leave is filed during the early stages of proceedings
favor of Bangko, and the original and amended complaints contained no
or, at least, before trial.
allegations or prayer pertaining specifically to their cause of action against
Bangko, which might bar them from getting the complete relief in the civil
Facts: case.
● A certain Pedro Ilagan filed a complaint for annulment of SPA, PN, and REM ● TAC fully described the property in question and stated that it was an entirely
against Bangko and sheriff of Batangas before the RTC different property from the one covered by REM in favor of Bangko. Sps.
● He alleged that the Office of the Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC had posted and Tatlonghari prated for the reconveyance of their property which Bangko
published notices of Sheriffs Sale against him as the attorney-in-fact of a maliciously and unlawfully foreclosed.
certain Matilde Valdez (Valdez), married to Crispin Brual (Brual), and herein ● RTC denied motion to leave to file TAC. CA affirmed.
petitioners spouses Ernesto and Eugenia Tatlonghari, setting the Issue: Whether the motion for leave to file TAC must be denied? NO
auction sale of properties belonging respectively to the said couples allegedly Ratio:
for the satisfaction of Pedro's indebtedness to Bangko amounting to ● Our rules of procedure allow a party in a civil action to amend his pleading as
P3,000,000.00. a matter of right, so long as the pleading is amended only once and before a
● He denied that he obtained a loan from Bangko and that Sps. Tatlonghari or responsive pleading is served (or, if the pleading sought to be amended is a
Valdez constituted him as an atty-in-fact for the purpose of mortgaging their reply, within ten days after it is served). Otherwise, a party can only amend his
respective properties as collateral to Bangko. pleading upon prior leave of court.
● After the original complaint was filed, Pedro convinced Sps. Tatlonghari to ● As long as it does not appear that the motion for leave was made with bad faith
join him in the civil case against Bangko or with intent to delay the proceedings, courts are justified to grant leave and
● Pedro informed Sps. Tatlonghari that Bangko used a falsified SPA and made allow the filing of an amended pleading.
it appear that they had authorized him to obtain a loan from it, secured by a ● Once a court grants leave to file an amended pleading, the same becomes
real estate mortgage on their property which was the subject of foreclosure binding and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it appears that the court
proceedings had abused its discretion.
● Sps. Tatlonghari did not issue any SPA in favor of Pedro so they agreed to join ● A meticulous inspection of the records reveal that other than the allegation
him in the case. They accepted Atty. Castillo (Pedro’s counsel) to represent that they did not execute any SPA in favor of Pedro authorizing him to use
them their property as collateral for his loan with the bank, the FAC and SAC are
● Sps. Tatlonghari and Pedro together with Valdez and Brual, as plaintiffs, filed bereft of any material allegations pertaining to their personal involvement in
an amended complaint (First Amended Complaint - FAC) against defendants. the case against Bangko.
● Atty. Salva of the Salva Salva & Salva Law office entered the appearance of the ● They contained no cause of action with respect to that of Sps. Tatlonghari. SAC
law firm as collaborating counsel for plaintiffs. only contain specific relief for Sps. Sandoval who purportedly the true and
● Through Atty. Salva, plaintiffs filed a manifestation and motion for leave to lawful owners of the property previously registered in the name of deceased
file a Second Amended Complaint (SAC) to include additional Valdez.
plaintiffs Sps. Tolentino and Sandoval, who had previously purchased the ● The RTC should have allowed such admission if only to prevent the circuitry
mortgaged property of Valdez of action and the unnecessary expense of filing another complaint anew.
Although it is true that the RTC exercises discretion in this respect, it should
have been more circumspect and liberal in the exercise of its discretion. With
the admission of the Third Amended Complaint, the ultimate goal of
determining the case on its real facts and affording complete relief to all the
parties involved in this case would then be realized.
● It appears from the records that the inexcusable delay upon which the denial
of Sps. Tatlonghari's motion was grounded was not their fault nor was the
same deliberately caused. Records are bereft of evidence to show that such
delay was attributable to them, or that in filing their motion, they were
impelled by bad faith.
● With respect to the lack of conforme of Atty. Salva on the Sps. Tatlonghari's
motion, there is no rule requiring the written consent of a former attorney
prior to his substitution. (Sec. 26, Rule 138)
● What the rule requires is mere notice to the adverse party. (Sec. 26, Rule 138)
● An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in
which he appears. As such, Atty. Villanueva, who has entered his appearance
on behalf of the Sps. Tatlonghari and filed their motion for leave to file third
amended complaint, should be recognized as their new counsel of record who
is fully authorized to act for and on their behalf.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated January
29, 2015 and the Resolution dated August 5, 2015 rendered by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 126390 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial
Court of Batangas City, Branch 7 is directed to ADMIT petitioners' third amended
complaint and continue with the proceedings with utmost dispatch.
Notes:
Section 26. Change of attorneys. - An attorney may retire at any time from any action
or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also
retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client,
should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that
he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney
newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the
former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse
party.
A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his
place, but if the contract between client and attorney has been reduced to writing and
the dismissal of the attorney was without justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to
recover from the client the full compensation stipulated in the contract. However, the
attorney may, in the discretion of the court, intervene in the case to protect his rights.
For the payment of his compensation the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments
for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgment,
rendered in the case wherein his services had been retained by the client

CASENT REALTY V. PHILBANKING CORPORATION in the latter months of 1989, which showed that Casent had no more outstanding loan;
G.R. No. 150731| September 14, 2007 | VELASCO, JR., J.: and
4. Assuming that Casent still owed Philbanking, the latter was already estopped since
Petitioner/s: Casent Realty Development Corporation
in October 1988, it reduced its authorized capital stock by 50% to wipe out a deficit of
Respondent/s: Philbanking Corporation
PhP 41,265,325.12.
Doctrine: Rule 8, Section 8 specifically applies to actions or defenses
● The parties failed to reach an amicable settlement during the pre-trial
founded upon a written instrument and provides the manner of denying it.
conference.
It is more controlling than Rule 6, Section 10 which merely
● Thereafter, Philbanking presented its evidence and formally offered its
provides the effect of failure to file a Reply. Thus, where the defense
exhibits.
in the Answer is based on an actionable document, a Reply specifically
● Casent then filed a Motion for Judgment on Demurrer to the Evidence,
denying it under oath must be made; otherwise, the genuineness and due
pointing out Philbanking’s failure to file a Reply to the Answer which raised
execution of the document will be deemed admitted
the Dacion and Confirmation Statement constituted an admission of the
genuineness and execution of said documents; and that since the Dacion
Facts: obliterated petitioners obligation covered by the promissory notes, the bank
● On appeal to this Court through Rule 45 is the Decision and Resolution of the had no right to collect anymore.
CA in the case entitled Philbanking Corporation v. Casent Realty
Development Corporation. RTC: ruled in favor of Casent and dismissed the complaint.
○ The CA reversed the Order of the Makati City RTC,which granted
petitioners demurrer to evidence and dismissed the complaint filed CA: reversed the decision of the RTC.
by respondent. ● It ruled that under the Rules of Civil Procedure, the only issue to be resolved
● In 1984, petitioner Casent Realty executed 2 promissory notes (PNs) in favor in a demurrer is whether the plaintiff has shown any right to relief under the
of Rare Realty Corporation (Rare Realty) amounting to Php 981K, one would facts presented and the law.
become due on June 25, the other on June 27, 1985. ● Thus, it held that the trial court erred when it considered the Answer which
● Aug. 8, 1986: the PNs were assigned to respondent Philbanking Corporation alleged the Dacion, and that its genuineness and due execution were not at
through a Deed of Assignment. issue.
● Philbanking alleged that despite demands, Casent failed to pay the PNs upon ● The CA found that under the Deed of Assignment, Philbanking clearly had the
maturity such that its obligation already amounted to Php 5.6M as of July 15, right to proceed against the promissory notes assigned by Rare Realty.
1993. Philbanking filed on July 20, 1993 a complaint before the Makati City ● Casent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA.
RTC for the collection of said amount.
● In its Answer, Casent raised the following as special/affirmative defenses: Argument of Casent:
● when it presented these documents in its Answer, Philbanking should have
1.The complaint stated no cause of action or if there was any, the same was denied the same under oath.
barred by estoppel, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, laches, prescription, ● Since Philbanking failed to file a Reply, the genuineness and due execution of
payment, and/or release; said documents were deemed admitted, thus also admitting that the loan was
2. On August 27, 1986, the parties executed a Dacion en Pago which ceded and already paid.
conveyed Casent’s property in Iloilo City to Philbanking, with the intention of totally
extinguishing Casent’s outstanding accounts with it. Argument of Philbanking:
● Petitioner presented a Confirmation Statement issued by respondent ● Philbanking states that while it failed to file a Reply, all the new matters were
stating that petitioner had no loans with the bank as of December 31, deemed controverted pursuant to Section 10, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court
1988. ● Also, the loan which was covered by the Dacion refers to another loan of
3. Casent complied with the condition in the Dacion regarding the repurchase of the petitioner.
property since the obligation was fully paid. Philbanking sent confirmation statements

Issues: ● The facts referred to in Section 8 should include all the means sanctioned by
1. Does respondent’s failure to file a Reply and deny the Dacion and the Rules of Court in ascertaining matters in judicial proceedings.
Confirmation Statement under oath constitute a judicial admission of the ○ These include judicial admissions, matters of judicial notice,
genuineness and due execution of these documents? YES. stipulations made during the pre-trial and trial, admissions, and
2. Should judicial admissions be considered in resolving a demurrer to evidence? presumptions, the only exclusion being the defendants evidence.
If yes, are the judicial admissions in this case sufficient to warrant the
dismissal of the complaint? YES. ● Since respondent failed to file a Reply, in effect, respondent admitted the
genuineness and due execution of said documents. This judicial admission
[Note: Petitioner still lost the case because the Dacion and the confirmation statement should have been considered by the CA in resolving the demurrer to evidence.
did not prove that Casent’s liability has been extinguished. Read the Notes.] ● Rule 129, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:
Ratio: Section 4. Judicial admissions.An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the
● Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: course of the proceeding in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may
be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no
Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of such admission was made.
his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts
and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall ● On appeal to the CA, Philbanking claimed that even though it failed to file a
have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of Reply, all the new matters alleged in the Answer are deemed controverted
dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. anyway, pursuant to Rule 6, Section 10:
● Gutib v. Court of Appeals: defined a demurrer to evidence as an objection by Section 10. Reply.A reply is a pleading, the office or function of which is to deny, or
one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his allege facts in denial or avoidance of new matters alleged by way of defense in the
adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make answer and thereby join or make issue as to such new matters. If a party does not file
out a case or sustain the issue. such reply, all the new matters alleged in the answer are deemed controverted.
○ What should be resolved in a motion to dismiss based on a demurrer
to evidence is whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief based on ● We agree with petitioner. Rule 8, Section 8 specifically applies to actions or
the facts and the law. defenses founded upon a written instrument and provides the manner of
○ The evidence contemplated by the rule on demurrer is that which denying it. It is more controlling than Rule 6, Section 10 which
pertains to the merits of the case, excluding technical aspects such merely provides the effect of failure to file a Reply.
as capacity to sue. ● Thus, where the defense in the Answer is based on an actionable document, a
● Casent points out that the defense of Dacion and Confirmation Statement, Reply specifically denying it under oath must be made; otherwise, the
which were submitted in the Answer, should have been specifically genuineness and due execution of the document will be deemed admitted.
denied under oath by Philbanking in accordance with Rule 8, Section 8 ● Since respondent failed to deny the genuineness and due execution of the
of the Rules of Court: Dacion and Confirmation Statement under oath, then these are deemed
admitted and must be considered by the court in resolving the demurrer to
Section 8. How to contest such documents. When an action or defense is founded upon evidence.
a written instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided ● We held in Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. v. Sweet Lines,
in the preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be Inc. that [w]hen the due execution and genuineness of an instrument are
deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and deemed admitted because of the adverse party’s failure to make a specific
sets forth, what he claims to be the facts; but the requirement of an oath does not apply verified denial thereof, the instrument need not be presented formally in
when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when evidence for it may be considered an admitted fact.
compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the March 29, 2001 Decision and November 7, 2001 Resolution of the
CA are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
Notes:
Issue: WON the Dacion and Confirmation Statement sufficiently prove that
petitioners liability was extinguished.
Ratio:
● Respondent asserts that in executing the Dacion, the intention of the parties
was to settle only the loans of petitioner with respondent, not the obligation
of petitioner arising from the promissory notes that were assigned by Rare
Realty to respondent.
● Admission of the genuineness and due execution of the Dacion and
Confirmation Statement does not prevent the introduction of evidence
showing that the Dacion excludes the promissory notes. Petitioner, by way of
defense, should have presented evidence to show that the Dacion includes the
promissory notes.
● Long story short, Philbanking was able to prove that the Dacion and
Confirmation Statement extinguished Casent’s liability to it, which is different
from Casent’s liability to Rare Realty.

MUNICIPALITY OF TIWI V. BETITO ● NPC President Malixi, through a letter, informed Mayor Corral and Governor
Salalima that starting with the January 1993 installment, NPC will directly pay
Tiwi its share in the payments under the MOA.
Petitioner/s: Municipality of Tiwi, represented by Hon. Mayor
● The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay passed Ordinance No. 09-92 which
Jaime C. Villanueva and the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi,
authorized the Provincial Treasurer to sell the real properties at a public
Respondent/s: Antonio B. Betito
auction, and to cause the immediate transfer thereof to the winning bidder;
and declared as forfeited in favor of Albay, all the payments already made by
Doctrine: Judgment on the pleadings is improper when the answer to the
NPC under the MOA.
complaint tenders several issues.
● From Albay’s refusal to remit Tiwi’s share stemmed several administrative
complaints and court cases that Atty. Betito allegedly handled on behalf of
Facts: Tiwi to recover the latter’s rightful share in the unpaid realty taxes, including
● In NPC v. Province of Albay the Court found that NPC is liable for unpaid real the case of Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. In this case, the Court held, among
estate taxes on its properties (geothermal plants) located in the Province of others, that the elective officials of Albay are administratively liable for abuse
Albay. The properties were previously sold at an auction sale conducted by of authority due to their unjustified refusal to remit the rightful share of Tiwi
Albay to satisfy NPC’s tax liabilities. As the sole bidder, Albay acquired in the subject realty taxes.
ownership over said properties. ● Betito sought to enforce the Contract of Legal Services after rendering legal
● The NPC, through its then President Malixi, and Albay, represented by then services which allegedly benefited Tiwi. In his Complaint for sum of money,
Governor Salalima, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) where he claims that he handled numerous cases which resulted to the recovery of
NPC agreed to settle its tax liabilities estimated at P214M. Tiwi’s share in the realty taxes, which resulted to the collection of the amounts
● Tiwi Mayor Corral requested Governor Salalima to remit the rightful tax of P110.9M and P35.5M from the NPC as well as other amounts. Under the
shares of Tiwi and its barangays where the NPCs properties were located Contract of Legal Services, he is entitled to 10% of whatever amount that
relative to the payments already made by NPC to Albay. The Sangguniang would be collected from the NPC.
Bayan of Tiwi passed Resolution No. 12-92 requesting the Sangguniang ● However, despite repeated demands for the Sangguniang Bayan to pass an
Panlalawigan of Albay to hold a joint session for the purpose of discussing the appropriate ordinance for the payment of his attorneys fees, the SB refused to
distribution of the NPC payments. Governor Salalima replied that the request pass the ordinance and to pay what is justly owed him. Betito prayed that
cannot be granted as the initial payment was only an earnest money and that ○ Tiwi be ordered to pay P11M in attorneys fees and 10% of the other
the total amount to be collected from the NPC was still being validated. amounts to be determined during trial plus interest and damages;
● Because of the conflict between Tiwi and Albay, NPC requested a clarification ○ that the Sangguniang Bayan be ordered to pass the necessary
from the Office of the President as to the extent of the shares of the LGUs in appropriation ordinance;
the real estate tax collections. ○ that the municipal treasurer surrender all the receipts of payments
● The Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi passed Resolution No. 15-92 authorizing made by the NPC to Tiwi from January 1993 to December 1996 for
Mayor Corral to hire a lawyer to represent Tiwi in the recovery of their rightful the examination of the court;
share in the realty taxes. Mayor Corral sought the services of respondent Atty. ○ and that Tiwi pay P500,000.00 as attorneys fees
Antonio B. Betito and Atty. Alberto Lawenko. They entered into a Contract of ● Petitioners, current officials of Tiwi admitted that the Sangguniang Bayan
Legal Services. The contract provided, among others, that Betito and Lawenko passed Resolution No. 15-92 but denied that said resolution authorized then
would receive a 10% contingent fee on whatever amount of realty taxes that Mayor Corral to enter into the subject contract.
would be recovered by Tiwi through their efforts. ○ Mayor Corral exceeded her authority when she bound Tiwi to 10% of
● OP, through then Chief Presidential Legal Counsel Antonio T. Carpio, opined the amount of realty taxes recovered from NPC.
that the MOA entered into by NPC and Albay merely recognized and ○ The legal services should have been limited to the execution of the
established NPCs realty taxes. The sharing scheme and those entitled to the decision in National Power Corporation v. Province of Albay as per
payments to be made by NPC under the MOA should be that provided under Resolution No. 15-92.
the law, and since Tiwi is entitled to share in said realty taxes, NPC may remit ○ they are not aware of the cases which respondent allegedly handled
such share directly to Tiwi. on behalf of Tiwi since these cases involved officials of the previous
administration;
○ That the Contract of Legal Services was not ratified by the ● A motion for judgment on the pleadings admits the truth of all the material
Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi in order to become effective and relevant allegations of the opposing party and the judgment must rest on
○ that the realty taxes were recovered by virtue of the opinion rendered those allegations taken together with such other allegations as are admitted in
by then Chief Presidential Legal Counsel Carpio and not through the the pleadings. It is proper when an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise
efforts of respondent admits the material allegations of the adverse partys pleading. However, when
○ As to the amount of P110.9M in realty taxes, the same was received it appears that not all the material allegations of the complaint were admitted
by Albay and not Tiwi in the answer for some of them were either denied or disputed, and the
○ the amount of P35.5M is part of the share of Tiwi in the utilization of defendant has set up certain special defenses which, if proven, would have the
the national wealth. effect of nullifying plaintiffs main cause of action, judgment on the pleadings
● Betito filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and/or partial cannot be rendered.
summary judgment ● In the instant case, records reveal that Betito and Tiwi set-up multiple levels
● RTC: the trial court rendered a partial judgment on the pleadings in favor of of claims and defenses, respectively, with some failing to tender an issue while
Betito others requiring the presentation of evidence for resolution. The generalized
○ Petitioners did not specifically deny under oath the Contract of Legal conclusion of both the trial and appellate courts that petitioners answer
Services and Resolution No. 15-92. Consequently, the genuineness admits all the material averments of the complaint is, thus, without basis. For
and due execution of these documents are deemed admitted this reason, a remand of this case is unavoidable. However, in the interest of
pursuant to Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the justice and in order to expedite the disposition of this case which was filed
authority of Mayor Corral to enter into the subject contract was with the trial court way back in 1999, we shall settle the issues that can be
deemed established resolved based on the pleadings and remand only those issues that require a
○ the authority given to Mayor Corral to hire a lawyer was not only for trial on merits as hereunder discussed.
the purpose of executing the decision in NPC v. Albay but extended ● Preliminarily, it was erroneous for the trial court to rule that the genuineness
to representing the interest of Tiwi in other cases as well. Further, and due execution of the Contract of Legal Services was impliedly admitted by
the said resolution did not impose as a condition precedent the petitioners for failure to make a sworn specific denial thereof as required by
ratification of the subject contract by the Sangguniang Bayan in Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. This rule is not applicable when the
order to render it effective. Lastly, the trial court ruled that the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument. In the instant
answer admitted, that Tiwi was paid the amounts of P110.9M and case, the subject contract was executed between Betito and Lawenko, on the
P35.5M, hence, Betito is entitled to 10% thereof as attorney’s fees one hand, and Tiwi, represented by Mayor Corral, on the other. None of the
under the terms of the contract petitioners, who are the incumbent elective and appointive officials of Tiwi as
● CA affirmed the RTC decision of the filing of the Complaint, were parties to said contract. Nonetheless, in
○ Petitioners cannot claim that the contract required ratification their subsequent pleadings, petitioners admitted the genuineness and due
because this is not a requisite for the enforceability of a contract execution of the subject contract. We shall, thus, proceed from the premise
against a local government unit under the express terms of the that the genuineness and due execution of the Contract of Legal Services has
contract and the provisions of the LGC. already been established. Furthermore, both parties concede the contents and
○ petitioners are estopped from questioning the enforceability of the efficacy of Resolution 15-92. As a result of these admissions, the issue, at least
contract after having collected and enjoyed the benefits derived as to the coverage of the subject contract, may be resolved based on the
therefrom. pleadings as it merely requires the interpretation and application of the
provisions of Resolution 15-92 vis--vis the stipulations in the subject contract.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the application of the rule of judgment on the pleadings and/or
summary judgment is baseless, improper and unwarranted in the case at bar. – YES Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The October 19, 2005 Decision and March
Ratio: 10, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 79057 are REVERSED
● Judgment on the pleadings is improper when the answer to the complaint and SET ASIDE. This case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings to
tenders several issues.
determine the reasonable amount of attorneys fees which respondent is entitled to in
accordance with the guidelines set in this Decision.

5. Paragraph 6 of the complaint is specifically denied as the same does not reflect the
SPS SANTOS V. ALCAZAR correct amount. The defendants[’] computation is that the amount of ₱600,000.00 is
the only amount due and the instrument used as the actionable document does not
Petitioner/s: Sps. Fernando and Ma. Elena Santos
reflect the correct substance of the transaction and indicates a reformation of the
Respondent/s: Lolita Alcazar, represented by her Atty-in-Fact Delfin
actionable document;
Chua
6. Paragraph 7 is specifically denied as defendants are willing to pay the correct amount,
not the amount in the complaint as the same does not indicate the correct amount
Doctrine: The genuiness of a document must be denied under oath in the
owing to the plaintiff;
Answer otherwise it will be deemed admitted as evidence.
● The trial court essentially held that Sps, in their Answer, admitted that they
entered into transactions with the respondent for the delivery of paint and
Facts: construction materials,
● Lolita Alcazar, proprietor of Legazpi Color Center (LCC), instituted through ● CA affirmed
her attorney-in-fact Delfin Chua a Complaint for sum of money against
spouses Fernando and Ma. Elena Santos, to collect the value of paint and Issue: W/N Sps failed to deny the authenticity of the “Acknowledgement” in their
construction materials obtained by the latter from LCC amounting to Answer thus making such document admissible as evidence. YESSSSSSSSSSssss
₱1,456,000.00, which remained unpaid despite written demand.
● Alcazar’s cause of action is based on a document entitled "Acknowledgment" Ratio:
apparently executed by hand by petitioner Fernando ● Respondent’s failure to present the original copy of the Acknowledgment
● “This is to certify that I acknowledge my obligation in the amount of One during the taking of her testimony for the second time, and the presentation
Million Four Hundred Fifty Six Thousand (₱1,456,000), Philippine Currency of a mere photocopy thereof at said hearing, does not materially affect the
with LEGAZPI COLOR CENTER, LEGAZPI CITY.” (only signed by Fernando outcome of the case.
and NOT Ma. Elena) ● While it is a basic rule of evidence that the original copy prevails over a mere
● Alcazar thus prayed that judgment be rendered ordering Sps to pay her the photocopy, there is no harm if in a case, both the original and a photocopy
sum of ₱1,456,000.00, with interest at the rate of 3% per month; attorney’s thereof are authenticated, identified and formally offered in evidence by the
fees in the amount of ₱72,800.00, and ₱1,500.00 per court appearance; and party proponent.
costs of the suit. ● More to the point is the fact that petitioners failed to deny specifically under
● Alcazar alleged in her Complaint: oath the genuineness and due execution of the Acknowledgment in their
4. That as part of the agreement, defendants also obligated themselves to pay plaintiff Answer. The effect of this is that the genuineness and due execution of the
at the rate of 3% interest per month based on the unpaid principal, to cover the cost of Acknowledgment is deemed admitted.
money; ● "By the admission of the genuineness and due execution [of such document]
5. That as of December, 2000, the total obligation of defendants with plaintiff which is meant that the party whose signature it bears admits that he signed it or
consists of principal and interest was ₱1,456,000.00, a copy of the document where that it was signed by another for him with his authority; that at the time it was
defendants acknowledged their unpaid obligation is hereto attached as Annex "B"; signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party
(referring to the above Acknowledgment) relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any formal
6. That on January 5, 2001, plaintiff sent a final demand to defendants to pay the requisites required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue
indebtedness, but said demand fell on deaf ears and defendants did not even bother to stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him. Hence, such defenses as that the
communicate with plaintiff, copy of the demand letter is hereto attached as Annex "C"; signature is a forgery x x x; or that it was unauthorized x x x; or that the party
● Sps sought the dismissal of the Complaint, alleging among others that – charged signed the instrument in some other capacity than that alleged in the
4. Paragraph 5 is specifically denied as the document which Defendant Fernando T. pleading setting it out x x x; or that it was never delivered x x x, are cut off by
Santos signed does not reflect the true contract or intention of the parties, the the admission of its genuineness and due execution."
actionable document is incorrect and has to be reformed to reflect the real indebtedness ● "There is no need for proof of execution and authenticity with respect to
of the defendants; documents the genuineness and due execution of which are admitted by the
adverse party." With the consequent admission engendered by petitioners’
failure to properly deny the Acknowledgment in their Answer, coupled with
its proper authentication, identification and offer by the respondent, not to
mention petitioners’ admissions in paragraphs 4 to 6 of their Answer that they
are indeed indebted to respondent, the Court believes that judgment may be
had solely on the document, and there is no need to present receipts and other
documents to prove the claimed indebtedness.
● The Acknowledgment, just as an ordinary acknowledgment receipt, is "valid
and binding between the parties who executed it, as a document evidencing
the loan agreement they had entered into."
● The absence of rebutting evidence occasioned by petitioners’ waiver of their
right to present evidence renders the Acknowledgment as the best evidence of
the transactions between the parties and the consequential indebtedness
incurred
● However, as correctly argued by petitioners, only Fernando may be held liable
for the judgment amount of ₱1,456,000.00, since Ma. Elena was not a
signatory to the Acknowledgment.
● She may be held liable only to the extent of ₱600,000.00, as admitted by her
and Fernando in paragraph 5 of their Answer; no case against her may be
proved over and beyond such amount, in the absence of her signature and an
acknowledgment of liability in the Acknowledgment.
● The rule that the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be
deemed admitted, unless the adverse party specifically denies them under
oath, applies only to parties to the document.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The September 27, 2007

Decision and May 23, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
87935 are AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION in that petitioner Ma. Elena Santos is
held liable for the principal and interest only to the extent of ₱600,000.00.

NORTH GREENHILLS ASSOCIATION V MORALES ○ The construction was for the benefit of all NGA members including
Atty. Morales and that use of the side entrance for 33 years could not
Petitioner/s: North Greenhills Association
have ripened into an easement of right of way.
Respondent/s: Atty. Narciso Morales
○ It also sought payment of 878,778.40 corresponding to annual
membership dues since 1980
Doctrine: The criteria to determine whether the counterclaim is
● HLURB arbiter ordered the removal of the pavilion
compulsory or permissive are as follows
○ WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby
(a) Are issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim
rendered ordering respondents of the removal of the pavilion and the
largely the same?
relocation of the common toilet in a place where it will not be a
(b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claim absent the
nuisance to any resident. Respondents are further directed to remove
compulsory rule?
the obstruction to the side door of the complainant. All other claims
(c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as
and counterclaims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
well as defendant's counterclaim?
● NGA appealed and the HLURB Board modified the decision
(d) Is there any logical relations between the claim and the counterclaim?
○ WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Regional
A positive answer to all four would indicate that the counterclaim is
Office is hereby MODIFIED. Accordingly, respondent NGA is
compulsory.
ordered to relocate the restroom constructed or being constructed in
the McKinley Park away from the walls of any resident and where it
Failure to raise the issue of unpaid association dues or its dismissal if
will not block complainant's side door access to the park.
properly raised will not be a bar to the filing of the appropriate separate
● NGA appealed to the OP and the OP affirmed the decision
action to collect it
● NGA filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of Rules of Court before the CA
● CA affirmed the decision
Facts: ○ As to the counterclaim of NGA for association dues, the CA held that
● Atty. Morales is a resident of North Greenhills subdivision in San Juan City the claim was in the nature of a permissive counterclaim, which was
● His house is located alongside club Filipino avenue and adjacent to Mckinley correctly dismissed by the OP.
park, a space operated by North Greenhills Association (NGA) ● MR denied
● He had a personal access door, which he built through a wall separating his
house from the park Issue:
● NGA is the undisputed owner of the park acquiring such through a donation 1.)WON HLURB had jurisdiction over the complaint filed by Atty Morales? YES
by Ortigas and Co. 2.)WON the restroom built is a nuisance per accidens? NO
● NGA started constructing a pavilion or kiosk occupying the side of the park 3.)WON NGA had the right to block Atty. Morales’ access to the park? YES
adjacent to the residence 4.)WON CA correctly ruled that the counterclaim for unpaid association dues was a
● Part of the design was a restroom to serve the needs of the park permissive counterclaim? YES (RELEVANT ISSUE CAN SKIP TO THE END)
● Atty. Morales objected to the construction of the restroom and filed a
complaint before the HLURB seeking demolition of the pavilion which was Ratio:
then being built WON THE RESTROOM WAS A NUISANCE PER ACCIDENS
● In an amended complaint, he alleged that for 33 years he had an open, ● A nuisance per accidens is one which depends upon certain conditions and
continuous, immediate access to the subdivision park and that such access to circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated
the park was one of the considerations in his purchase of the lot without due hearing in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing
● He also claimed that the construction was illegal because it violated his right does in law constitute a nuisance
to immediate access to the park ● Proper appreciation of evidence before a court or tribunal is required before a
● NGA in its answer with compulsory counterclaim rejected the assertions and property is deemed a nuisance per accidens
contended the following ● Conclusions of the CA were speculative
○ That as absolute owner of the park, it had the right to fence the - “The said toilet, to Our mind, poses sanitary issues which could
property and impose reasonable conditions for the use thereof adversely affect not only the Respondent but his entire household as
well. Even if there exists a perimeter wall between Respondent's ○ when the multiple claims involve the same factual and legal issues;
house and the toilet, the odor emanating from the latter could easily ○ or when the claims are offshoots of the same basic controversy
find its way to the dining area, and the foul and noxious smell would between the parties.
make it very difficult and annoying for the residents of the house to ● The criteria to determine whether the counterclaim is compulsory or
eat. Moreover, the proximity of the toilet to Respondent's house permissive are as follows
places the people residing therein at greater risk of contracting ○ (a) Are issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the
diseases both from improperly disposed waste and human counterclaim largely the same?
excrements, as well as from flies, mosquitoes, and other insects, ○ (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claim
should petitioner NGA fail to maintain the cleanliness in the said absent the compulsory rule?
structure. Verily, the determining factor when the toilet is the cause ○ (c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs
of the complaint is not how much it smells or stinks but where it is claim as well as defendant's counterclaim?
located as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a ○ (d) Is there any logical relations between the claim and the
person of ordinary sensibilities.” counterclaim?
● By the use of the words "would, should, could," it can be discerned that the CA ● A positive answer to all four would indicate that the counterclaim is
was not even sure that the restroom has caused such annoyance to Atty. compulsory. Otherwise it is permissive
Morales or his family. ● Here, the main issues in the complaint are limited only to the propriety of
● NO certification by the city health officer was ever submitted barring Atty. Morales from accessing the park through the side door and
whether the restroom constructed by NGA is a nuisance per se. On the other
WON NGA HAD THE RIGHT TO BLOCK ATTY. MORALES’ ACCESS hand, the counterclaim is simply concerned with collecting from Atty. Morales
● Under the civil code, NGA as owner of the park may exclude others from access his unpaid association dues for the past thirty (30) years.
to, and enjoyment of its property ● Payment or non-payment of association dues are distinct matters that do not
● NGA’s legal right to block the access door is beyond doubt. Atty. Morales never relate to whether the main cause of Atty. Morales against NGA was proper.
introduced any evidence that he had acquired any right by prescription or by ● WON there was payment is irrelevant to the main issues considering that the
agreement or legal easement to access the park through his side door pleadings filed essentially reflected an admission of membership of Atty.
● He also never claimed that the side door was his only access to the park Morales in the association.
● A right as a member to use the park, does not allow him to assert his access to ● Failure to raise the issue of unpaid association dues or its dismissal if properly
the park through his side door raised will not be a bar to the filing of the appropriate separate action to collect
it
WON THE COUNTER CLAIM WAS PERMISSIVE
● The counterclaim for unpaid dues was permissive and therefore the Dispositive:
affirmation of its dismissal was proper WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The March 13, 2015 Decision and
● A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or any relief, which a the February 3, 2016 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 131707, are
defending party may have against an opposing party, which at the time of suit REVERSED insofar as it affirmed (1) Atty. Morales' entitlement to an unbridled access
arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the same transaction or to the park through his side door; and (2) the order to relocate the restroom to another
occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's complaint area.
● It is compulsory in the sense that it is within the jurisdiction of the court, does
not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction and will be barred in the future if not set up
in the answer to the complaint in the same case
● a counterclaim is compulsory if there should exist a logical relationship
between the main claim and the counterclaim
○ there exists such a relationship when conducting separate trials of
the respective claims of the parties would entail substantial
duplication of time and effort by the parties and the court;
PADILLA VS GLOBE ASIATIQUE 7. Pasig RTC
a. Globe et. al. claimed that:
Petitioner/s: Aida Padilla
i. The malicious unfounded civil action by Padilla wrought
Respondent/s: Globe Asiatique Realty Holdings Corp., Filmal Realty
havoc to their businesses and lives
Corp., Delfin Lee and Dexter Lee (Globe et. al.)
ii. The CTS Facility Agreements were novated by a term loan.
Padilla knew this and with malice, executed a “perjured”
Doctrine: A counterclaim arising from an unfounded suit may proceed
Affidavit.
despite the dismissal of the main complaint pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 17.
b. They also sought to hold the RTC Judge liable for issuing the writ of
preliminary attachment.
Facts: c. Padilla filed her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,
1. Philippine National Bank (PNB) entered into several Contracts to Sell praying for the dismissal of Globe et. al.’s complaint on the ff.
(CTS) Facility Agreements with Globe Asiatique Realty and Filmal Realty, grounds:
represented by Delfin Lee and Dexter Lee, President and Vice-President, i. Submission of a false certification of non-forum shopping
respectively, of the two corporations. and blatant commission of forum shopping (failure to
2. Pursuant to and as a condition for the CTS Facility availments, Globe et. al. disclose a criminal complaint)
executed Deeds of Assignment covering accounts receivables16 over ii. Litis pendentia
subdivision houses they would sell through Contracts to Sell with their buyers. iii. Failure to attach the alleged actionable document (term
a. They acknowledged the total amount ₱1.3B released. loan) in violation of Sec. 7, Rule 8
3. In 2010, Globe et. al. defaulted. iv. Failure to state a cause of action
4. In a letter, PNB made a formal and final demand upon Globe et. al. to settle v. Cannot be personally held liable for her official acts done
the total amount of ₱974,377,159.10. for and in behalf of PNB
a. It claimed that it discovered 231 out of 240 Contracts to Sell to have d. Judge Gutierrez filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ff. grounds:
either non-existent addresses of buyers or the names of the buyers i. No cause of action against him; and
are non-existent or both. ii. the Pasig RTC has no jurisdiction over the case and his
5. PNB filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money and damages with prayer person, movant being of co-equal and concurrent
for writ of preliminary attachment before the Pasay RTC against Globe et. al. jurisdiction
They alleged: e. The Pasig RTC dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
a. Fraud and misrepresentation committed by Globe et. al. f. It later issued an Order (2012), stating that:
b. The Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping attached i. Acting on [Globe et. al’s] Complaint is a brazen
to the complaint was signed by PNB’s SVP of the Remedial violation of the principle of judicial stability, which
Management Group, Padilla, who likewise executed an "Affidavit essentially states that the judgment or order of a court of
in Support of the Application for the Issuance of the Writ competent jurisdiction may not be interfered with by any
of Preliminary Attachment”. court of concurrent jurisdiction for the simple reason that
6. Pasay RTC the power to open, modify or vacate the said order is not
a. Order: granted preliminary attachment after finding that Globe et. only possessed but is restricted to the court in which the
al. are guilty of fraud judgment or order is rendered
b. Before the Pasay RTC could act on all the motions, Globe et. al. filed ii. The Court would have to pass upon the veracity of Globe et.
a complaint for damages in the Pasig RTC against Padilla and Judge al.’s claims that they were unjustly injured by the orders
Gutierrez of the Pasay RTC. issued by Pasay RTC
16Just to clarify: these were Accounts Receivables of Globe and Filmal since they were
selling subdivision houses through Contracts to Sell; they assigned it to PNB so that if
the buyers would pay, the proceeds would automatically go to PNB
iii. Therefore, upholding once more the principle of judicial thus be determined separately and independently from the
stability, this Court is impelled to refuse to hear the jurisdiction of the same court in the same case over the subject
counterclaims of Padilla. matter and the parties in respondent's complaint.
6. In the present case, the Pasig RTC should have allowed Padilla’s counterclaim
Issue: WoN the dismissal of the complaint automatically results in the dismissal of to proceed notwithstanding the dismissal of Globe et. al.’s complaint, the same
counterclaims pleaded by the defendant - NO being compulsory in nature and with its cause not eliminated by such
dismissal.
Ratio: a. She was hailed to a separate court (Pasig RTC) even while the dispute
1. A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an in the Pasay RTC was still being litigated, and she already incurred
opposing party. expenses defending herself, having been sued in her personal
a. It is in the nature of a cross-complaint; a distinct and independent capacity.
cause of action which, though alleged in the answer, is not part of the b. The accusations hurled against her were serious (perjury and
answer. misrepresentation in executing the affidavit in support of the
b. Counterclaims may be either compulsory17 or permissive. application for writ of attachment before the Pasay RTC) — with
2. Padilla’s counterclaim for damages in her Answer before the Pasig RTC is hints at possible criminal prosecution apart from that criminal
compulsory. complaint already filed.
a. She alleged suffering and injury caused to her as a consequence of c. The Pasig RTC clearly erred in refusing to hear the counterclaims
the filing of the baseless complaint. upon the same ground for dismissal of the complaint, i.e., lack of
b. The court, however, dismissed her counterclaim upon the same jurisdiction in strict observance of the policy against interference
ground of lack of jurisdiction as its resolution supposedly would with the proceedings of a co-equal court.
entail passing upon the validity of orders and processes still pending 7. Globe et. al. contend that if Padilla is allowed to prove her counterclaims
before the Pasay RTC. before the Pasay RTC, they have no choice but to justify their action in filing
3. Before the 1997 Rules, the Court held18 that if a court does not have their case before the Pasig RTC by going back to the allegations in their
jurisdiction to entertain the main action of the case and dismisses the same, complaint that they are merely vindicating themselves against the perjured
then the compulsory counterclaim, being ancillary to the principal affidavit executed by petitioner which led to the issuance of the illegal orders
controversy, must likewise be dismissed since no jurisdiction remained for of the Pasay City RTC that resulted to the damage and injury sustained by
any grant of relief under the counterclaim. respondents.
4. Under the 1997 Rules, it is now explicitly provided that the dismissal of the a. Obviously, Globe et. al. are invoking judicial stability which we find
complaint due to failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his case is "without inapplicable insofar as Padilla’s counterclaim arises from Globe et.
prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the al.’s unfounded suit.
same or in a separate action.” (Sec. 3, Rule 17) b. Padilla faulted Globe et. al. in prematurely, and in a contumacious
5. Perkin v Dakila: act of forum shopping, filing a separate damage suit when there is no
a. Distinction must be made over respondent's complaint and over final judicial determination yet of any irregularity in the attachment
petitioner's counterclaim — while it may have no jurisdiction over proceedings before the Pasay City RTC.
the former, it may exercise jurisdiction over the latter. The
compulsory counterclaim attached to petitioner's Answer ad Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated November
cautelam can be treated as a separate action xxx. Petitioner could 12, 2012 and May 8, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 155 in Civil
have instituted a separate action for the very same claims but, for the Case No. 73132 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Said court is hereby directed
sake of expediency and to avoid multiplicity of suits, it chose to to proceed with the presentation of evidence in support of the compulsory counterclaim
demand the same in Civil Case No. MC99-605. Jurisdiction of the of petitioner Aida Padilla.
RTC over the subject matter and the parties in the counterclaim must
17Rule 6, Section 7 18 Metals Engineering vs CA (1988)

MBTC V. CPR PROMOTIONS another case; 2 opposing claims arose from the same set of transactions; the
compelling test of compulsoriness was satisfied)
Petitioner/s: Metrobank
● AS TO THE ISSUE OF TIMELINESS (related to civpro), a defending party’s
Respondent/s: CPR Promotions & Sps. Reynoso
compulsory counterclaim must be interposed at the time he files his answer.
Failure to do so will bar such claim. Initially, respondents claimed moral and
Doctrine: A defending party’s compulsory counterclaim must be interposed
exemplary damages and atty’s fees. Later on, in their appellate brief filed
at the time he files his answer. Failure to do so will bar such claim.
before CA, the filed a counterclaim to seek the recovery of excess of bid price.
Their belated assertion is fatal and will not cure their failure to timely raise
Facts: such claim; thus, barring their claim.
● CPR promotions obtained a loan from Metrobank covered by 15 promissory 2. Given MTBC’s conflicting allegations as to the amount due as of the date of
notes all signed by Metrobank’s treasurer, president of CPR and Sps. Reynoso. foreclosure, the computation offered by metrobank can’t be accepted at face value. It
Total amount = P12.8M also failed to substantiate its claims.
● As a security, Sps. Reynoso executed 2 deeds of real estate mortgage (REM)
and also a continuing surety agreement binding themselves solidarily with
CPR to pay all loans the latter obtained from Metrobank. Dispositive:
● The loans matured and the respondents defaulted, prompting Metrobank to WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby PARTIALLY
file a petition for extra-judicial foreclosure sale of the properties, which were GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 28, 2011
subsequently sold at a public sale. Despite the sale, Metrobank alleged that in CA-G.R. CV No. 91424 and its February 13, 2012 Resolution are hereby AFFIRMED
there is still a deficiency worth P2.6M which the respondents failed to pay with MODIFICATION. The award of refund in favor of respondents in the amount of
despite repeated demands. Thus, this action for collection of sum of money. P722,602.22 with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum is hereby DELETED
● RTC: in favor of Metrobank
● CA: in favor of respondents. Adjudged that Metrobank should return P722k
representing the remainder of proceeds of the foreclosure sale with 6%
interest per annum FROM THE DATE OF FILING THE ANSWER WITH
COUNTERCLAIM ON MARCH 26, 1999 until paid to respondents.
Issues:
1. WoN respondents were able to timely set-up their claim for refund. - NO
2. WoN Metrobank was able to prove the amount claimed. - NO
Ratio:
1. WoN respondents were able to timely set-up their claim for refund. - NO.
Metrobank belatedly raised their compulsory counterclaim.
Test in determining whether a claim is compulsory or permissive:
1. Are the issues of fact/law raised by the claim largely the same?
2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claims, absent the
compulsory counterclaim rule?
3. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well
as defendant’s claim?
4. In there a logical relation bet. the claim and counterclaim such that it would
result to substantial duplication of effort and time by parties and court if trials
will be conducted separately? (known as THE COMPELLING TEST OF
COMPULSORINESS)
● A claim for recovery of the excess in the bid price vis-a-vis the amount due
should be interposed as a COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM. (reasons: both
cases, substantially same evidence is needed; adjudication in one will bar
b. Judgment must be on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a
consideration of evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties;
QUINTOS VS. NICOLAS c. Judgment is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; and
Petitioner/s: Vilma Quintos, Florencia Dancel, and Catalino Ibarra
d. There must be, between first and second actions, identity of parties,
Respondent/s: Pelagia Nicolas, Noli Ibarra, Santiago Ibarra, Pedro
of subject matter, and cause of action.
Ibarra, David Ibarra
2. In this case, respondents admit that they filed an action for partition which
was dismissed and has attained finality. The subject property in the partition
Doctrine: Dismissal with prejudice under the rules of court cannot defeat
case and the present case is the same, and that in both cases, respondents raise
the right of a co-owner to ask for partition at any time, provided there is no
the same action for partition. Lastly, there is identity of parties not only when
actual adjudication of ownership of shares yet.
the parties in the case are the same, but also between those in privity with
them such as between their successors.
Facts: 3. According to the rules of court, dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute has
1. Petitioners Quintos, Dancel, Ibarra, and respondents are siblings. They the effect of adjudication on the merits and is necessarily understood to be
inherited a 281 sqm parcel of land in Tarlac, which is now the subject of with prejudice to the filing of another action, unless otherwise provided.
dispute between them. 4. However, dismissal with prejudice under the rules of court cannot defeat the
2. The respondents brought an action for partition against petitioners but it was right of a co-owner to ask for partition at any time, provided there is no actual
dismissed for failure of the parties to appear despite due notice. Neither party adjudication of ownership of shares yet.
appealed, thus, the ruling on the partition proceeding became final. 5. Art. 494 provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in co-ownership,
3. Respondents then resorted to executing a deed of adjudication to transfer the and that each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing
property in favor of the ten siblings. As a result, new TCT was issued. owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
4. Respondents then sold their 7/10 undivided share over the property in favor 6. The law expressly provides that each co-owner may demand at any time the
of co-respondents Candelarios. An agreement of Subdivision was also entered partition of the thing owned in common.
which resulted to the name of Candelarios inscribed in the TCT. 7. Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3, and the right granted
5. Petitioners then filed a complaint for quieting of title alleging that: to co-owners under Art. 494 of Civil Code, the latter must prevail. To construe
a. During their parent’s lifetime, their properties were distributed to otherwise would diminish the substantive right of a co-owner through
the siblings, and that the land and house subject of this case was promulgation of rules.
given to the petitioners as part of their share. 8. Art. 496 supports this view as it provides that “Partition shall be governed by
b. They had been in adverse possession of the property for 40 years. the Rules of Court insofar as they are consistent with the Civil Code.”
6. Respondents contend that petitioners are already barred by estoppel because 9. This is not to say, however, that the action for partition will never be barred
the petitioners offered to buy 7/10 of the share of respondents, thus, by res judicata. There can still be res judicata in partition cases concerning the
recognizing the respondent’s ownership over the 7/10 share. same parties and the same subject matter once the respective shares of the co-
7. Moreover, by way of counterclaim, the respondents allege the partition of the owners have been determined with finality by a competent court with
property. jurisdiction or if the court determines that partition is improper for co-
8. RTC dismissed the case finding that Candelarios own the 7/10 share over the ownership does not or no longer exists.
land.
9. Aggrieved, petitioners now contend that respondent’s counterclaim of Dispositive: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby PARTLY
partition is already barred by laches or res judicata. GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
Issue: CV No. 98919 dated July 8, 2013 and November 22, 2013, respectively, are hereby
1. WoN respondent’s counterclaim for partition is already barred by laches or AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The case is hereby REMANDED to the RTC,
res judicata. - NO Branch 68 in Camiling, Tarlac for purposes of partitioning the subject property in
Ratio: accordance with Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. SO ORDERED.
1. There is res judicata when the following requisites are present:
a. The judgment or order is final;
(Partly granted siya because mali daw CA in saying agreement for subdivision was
valid)

GO V. RICO ○ the probate court removed Bella Guerrero as special administratrix
GR No. 140682, April 25, 2006 and appointed in her stead Resurrecion Bihis who renewed the lease
contracts with the defendants
Petitioner/s: WILSON GO and PETER GO
● The MeTC ordered the ejectment of the defendants (for petitioners)
Respondent/s: ANITA RICO, in substitution of the late Pilar Rico
● RTC reversed MeTC- that the determination of ownership is an indispensable
issue (for defendants)
Doctrine: a certification against forum shopping by counsel and not by the
● The CA dismissed the petition outright for failure to comply with the Rule on
principal party himself is no certification at all.
Certification of Non-Forum shopping (against petitioners)
The reason for requiring that it must be signed by the principal party
○ It was the counsel, Atty. Erlinda B. Espejo, who signed the same
himself is that he has actual knowledge, or knows better than anyone else,
instead of the petitioners themselves
whether he has initiated similar action/s in other courts, agencies or
● In MR with CA, Atty. Erlinda B. Espejo alleged that she was compelled to sign
tribunals.
the certification against forum shopping because petitioner Wilson Go left for
Filing of a belated certification against forum shopping does not cure the
the United States to attend to his ailing father, while petitioner Peter Go was
defect since it should have been filed simultaneously with the petition.
in Cebu for an important business commitment
(see Sec. 5, Rule 7 and Sec. 2, Rule 42)
○ that if she waited for any of the petitioners to sign the certification,
the period to file the petition could expire
Facts: ○ and that she has a Special Power of Attorney wherein petitioners
● Wilson Go and Peter Go, petitioners, filed a Complaint for Ejectment against authorized her to represent them during the pre-trial and hearing
defendants Pilar Rico (now deceased), mother of Anita Rico, respondent ● Petitioners attached to their motion the certification against forum shopping
herein, Catalina Pablico, Violeta Medrano, Elmer Molit, Osmando signed by petitioner Wilson Go (in the MR with CA)
Pagdanganan, Bobby Marquisas, Alexis Leynes, and all persons claiming ○ But MR still denied
rights under them. ● Petitioners now assert that the court should have applied the Rules on
● Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of the land with an certification against forum shopping liberally in their favor.
existing building in Quezon City Issue:
○ The building units were leased to several of the respondents which is W/N the counsel is permitted to sign a Certification against non-forum shopping? - NO
now expired (see Sec. 5, Rule 7 and Sec. 2, Rule 42)
○ their continued stay in the leased premises is on a month-to-month Ratio:
basis; ● The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint
● Petitioners then sent the defendants, a reminder of the termination of their or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn
monthly lease contracts with demand to vacate certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith (the
○ despite notice, the defendants refused to do so. pleading)
● Respondents contend that petitioners do not own the premises ● Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by
○ Since it was part of the estate of the late Felisa Tamio de mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be
Buenaventura, which is now subject of the probate proceedings cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice
before the Regional Trial Court ● The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a certification
○ In effect, the defendants allege that they are the lessees of Felisa under oath that he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving
Tamiode Buenaventura since 1988; that their lease contracts have the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different
not been terminated divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency
○ Further, the defendants allege that a fictitious sale took place ○ there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of
between Bella A. Guerrero, then special administratrix of the estate, the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or
in her personal capacity, and the petitioners proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court,
■ This was done without approval of the probate court and in the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other
conspiracy with the petitioners tribunal or agency,

● These provisions are mandatory requirements in the filing of the Certification
against forum shoppping
● a certification by counsel and not by the principal party himself is no
certification at all
● The reason for requiring that it must be signed by the principal party himself
is that he has actual knowledge, or knows better than anyone else,
whether he has initiated similar action/s in other courts, agencies or tribunals
● petitioners filing of a belated certification against forum shopping did not cure
the defect considering that it should have been filed simultaneously with the
petition.
● Secondly, they failed to show justifiable cause for their failure to personally
sign the certification
○ The explanation is an afterthought as it was not alleged by counsel in
her certification against forum shopping
● The Special Power of Attorney executed by petitioners in favor of their
counsel, Atty. Erlinda B. Espejo, is merely for the latter to represent them
during the pre-trial and subsequent hearing and is not a substitute for the
required certification against forum shopping duly signed by the
petitioners
● While we have ruled time and again that litigants should have the amplest
opportunity for a proper and just disposition of their cause free, as much as
possible, from the constraints of procedural technicalities however, equally
settled is the rule that, save for the most persuasive of reasons, strict
compliance with procedural rules is enjoined to facilitate the orderly
administration of justice
Dispositive:
In sum, we find no reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The assailed
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53342 are AFFIRMED.Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS UY ● Respondent asserted that the delays were justified and not attributable to him,
as portions of the Project were delivered piecemeal and could not be worked
Petitioner/s: THE BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT
on immediately pending the completion of work by the other contractors.
AUTHORITY et, al
● Petitioners maintained that respondent Uy was in delay with work "slippage"
Respondent/s: ELPIDIO UY
beyond tolerable levels and that respondent had already pulled out his
equipment and machineries, and stopped working sometime in October 1999.
Doctrine: The certification of non-forum shopping may be signed not only
● Respondent Uy received from PEA a Letter of Termination of the LCA which
by the petitioners but also any of the principal parties.
prompted him to file a civil case for Injunction and Damages with the
There was substantial compliance with the Rules when only the
Parañaque RTC against PEA, petitioner BCDA, and private petitioners. The
petitioner signed in behalf of all the other petitioners of the certificate of
RTC judge issued a 72–hour Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), enjoining
non-forum, shared a common interest in them, had a common defense in
petitioners from excluding respondent from his contractual obligations under
the complaint for partition, and filed the petition as a collective, raising only
the LCA. Subsequently, the case was raffled to the same Judge in the said trial
one argument to defend their rights over the properties in question.
court, who, after the preliminary hearing of the case, extended the TRO for 17
The subsequent and substantial compliance of an appellant may call
days.
for the relaxation of the rules of procedure
CA: RTC has jurisdiction to hear the injunctive case and to issue the TRO
Facts:
● Republic Act No. 7227 and EO no. 40 s 1992 were passed whereby BCDA was Petitioner: under R.a. no. 7227, the implementation of projects for the conversion of
created for the conversion of military reservations and their extension and to military bases into productive uses shall not be restrained or enjoined except by an
raise fund for the by the sale of portions of Metro Manila military camps. order of the supreme court, hence, the lower court has no jurisdiction to hear and
● To carry out the Project and other fund generating projects pursuant to RA decide the civil case.
7227 and EO 40, the BCDA entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
with the Public Estates Authority (PEA), designating the latter as Project
Manager. Respondent:
● Thereafter, the BCDA, PEA, and the Philippine National Bank (PNB) executed ● petitioners did not file a motion for reconsideration from the assailed CA
a Pool Formation Trust Agreement (PFTA), creating an asset pool to generate Decision, an alleged pre-requisite before this Court can entertain petitions
funds for the development of the Project. under Rule 45
● After the requisite public bidding, the PEA entered into a Landscaping and ● the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was defective as only
Construction Agreement (LCA) with respondent Elpidio Uy, doing business one of the petitioners affixed his signature, (Ramon P. Ereneta) and such sole
under the name and style of Edison Development and Construction. signatory cannot represent petitioner BCDA as no Board Resolution was
Subsequent to the LCA, the same parties forged a negotiated Construction presented conferring such authority
Agreement. ● there is no proper joinder of parties considering that the major issue raised by
● The LCA stipulated that respondent shall fulfill his contractual obligation petitioner BCDA is its invocation of RA 7227.
within a period of 450 calendar days from its start, reckoned 14 days from
respondent’s receipt of the notice to proceed. Specifically, the scope of Issue:
respondent Uy’s work in the LCA was to construct three (3) vertical structures, WON the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was defective as only
the Terrasoleum structures, and the landscaping. one of the petitioners affixed his signature - NO
● Aside from respondent, two other contractors were engaged in the Project— WON RTC has jurisdiction to hear an injunctive case and to issue a TRO against the
Makati Development Corporation (MDC) and Romago Electric, Inc. (REI) BCDA. - YES
● The parties presented diametrically opposing versions on its progress.
Nonetheless, it is undisputed that there were delays in the construction and Ratio:
landscaping under the LCA, and for which several extensions were granted to Signature of a principal party sufficient for verification and certification
respondent Uy by PEA. ● There is compliance with the requirements of the Rules. Dismissal of appeals
that is purely on technical grounds is frowned upon.
● While only petitioner Ramon P. Ereneta signed the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping such is not fatal to the instant petition. Dispositive:
● In Calo, we agreed with petitioners that the signature of only one petitioner in WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED and the July 31, 2000 Decision of
the verification and certification of non-forum shopping satisfies the the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO. The Regional Trial Court,
requirement under Section 2, Rule 42 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure. Parañaque City, Branch 260 is directed to hear without delay Civil Case No. 99-0425
In Calo, we relied on Condo Suite Club Travel, Inc., v. NLRC30 —where we for Injunction and Damages, but is prohibited from issuing TROs and writs of
ruled that the certification of non-forum shopping may be signed not only by preliminary injunction.
the petitioners but also any of the principal parties.
● In the instant case, Mr. Ramon P. Erenta, a member of the Investment
Committee of the Heritage Park Management Corporation, is a principal party
in the instant case having been impleaded in Civil Case No. 99-0425 pending
in the RTC.
● More so, in Calo, we also cited Cavile, et al. v. Heirs of Clarita Cavile, et. al.31
where the court held that there was substantial compliance with the Rules
when only the petitioner signed in behalf of all the other petitioners of the
certificate of non-forum shopping being relatives and co-owners of the
properties in dispute, shared a common interest in them, had a common
defense in the complaint for partition, and filed the petition as a collective,
raising only one argument to defend their rights over the properties in
question.
● In the same vein, this is also true in the instant case where petitioners have
filed their petition as a collective, sharing a common interest and having a
common single defense.
● Anent the lack of a BCDA Board Resolution authorizing Ramon P. Ereneta,
such defect has been substantially complied with by the subsequent filing of a
Letter of Authority to represent and sign pleadings for and on behalf of BCDA
in the instant case.
● In Jaro v. Court of Appeals, the court held that the subsequent and substantial
compliance of an appellant may call for the relaxation of the rules of
procedure." At any rate, this petty technicality deserves scant consideration
where the question at issue is one purely of law and there is no need to delve
into the veracity of the allegations in the petition. As we have held time and
again, imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure are to be
disregarded, except where substantial rights would otherwise be prejudiced.
RTC has jurisdiction over action for injunction
● Firmly established is the doctrine that "jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred by law." Section 19 of BP 129 shows that a Regional Trial Court has
jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation. Jurisprudence has recognized complaints for
injunction with a prayer for temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction.
● The Parañaque RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint of respondent Uy it
being a case in which the subject of litigation for permanent injunction against
the termination of his contract, is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
MEDISERV INC. VS CA ● Landheights seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration and subsequently
submitted a Secretary’s Certificate stating that the Board of Directors affirms
Petitioner/s: Mediserv Inc
the authority of Mr. Dickson Tan to file the Petition for Review. CA then
Respondent/s: Landheights Development Corporation
reinstated the petition for review.
● Mediserv then went to the SC invoking Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of
Doctrine: It is settled that liberal construction of the rules may be invoked
Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides that failure to comply with the
in situations where there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error
requirements on certification against forum shopping shall not be curable by
in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the
mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be
proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with
cause for dismissal of the case.
the rules.
● Mediserv asserts that the appellate court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in reinstating the petition for
Facts: review filed by respondent corporation.
● On September 1994, Mediserv, Inc. executed a real estate mortgage in favor of Issue: W/N the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion when it reinstated the petition.
China Banking Corporation as security for a loan. The mortgage was
constituted on a 500-square meter lot with improvements located in Manila. Ruling: No
● Mediserv defaulted on its obligation with Chinabank and the real estate
mortgage was foreclosed. At the public auction sale Landheights Development Ratio:
Corporation emerged as the highest bidder with a bid price of P17,617,960.00 ● Mediserv cites Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
for the subject property. amended, which provides that failure to comply with the requirements on
● April 1998, Landheights filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila certification against forum shopping shall not be curable by mere amendment
an Application for Possession of Real Estate Property Purchased at an Auction of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for dismissal
Sale under Act No. 3135 and was eventually issued with the TCT. of the case.
● On March 2000, Landheights, seeking to recover possession of the subject ● Under Rule 46, Section 3, paragraph 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
property, filed a verified complaint for ejectment against Mediserv before the amended, petitions for certiorari must be verified and accompanied by a
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. sworn certification of non-forum shopping.
● MeTC of Manilarendered a decision in favor of Landheights. Mediserv ● A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading
appealed the decision to the RTC of Manila and was granted. MR by and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge
Landheights was also denied. Pet for review with the CA was also dismissed or based on authentic records. The party need not sign the verification. A
because the written authority of Dickson Tan to sign the verification and party’s representative, lawyer or any person who personally knows the truth
certification on non-forum shopping, as well as the copies of the complaint of the facts alleged in the pleading may sign the verification.
and answer, are not attached to the petition ● On the other hand, a certification of non-forum shopping is a
● Landheights filed a motion for reconsideration and subsequently submitted a certification under oath by the plaintiff or principal party in the complaint or
Secretary’s Certificate stating that the Board of Directors affirms the authority other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief or in a sworn certification
to file the Petition for Review. Hence, the CA reinstated the petition for annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith,
review. (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the
● Thus, Mediserv went to the SC invoking Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his
Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides that failure to comply with the knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein;
requirements on certification against forum shopping shall not be curable by (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present
mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be status thereof; and
cause for dismissal of the case. Petitioner thus asserts that the appellate court (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court
jurisdiction in reinstating the petition for review filed by respondent wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
corporation. ● In one case, the certification of non-forum shopping was signed by the
petitioner corporation’s counsel; hence, the CA dismissed the petition for
failure to comply with Revised Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91, as WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The September 16, 2003 and November 7,
amended. The motion for reconsideration was denied because the petitioner 2003 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
has not adequately explained its failure to have the certification against forum
shopping signed by one of its officers. Neither has it shown any compelling Let the records of this case be REMANDED to the Court of Appeals which is hereby
reason for the SC to disregard strict compliance with the rules. DIRECTED to take appropriate action thereon in light of the foregoing discussion with
● In one case, the SC explained that the requirement regarding verification of a DISPATCH. With costs against the petitioner.
pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. Such requirement is simply a condition SO ORDERED.
affecting the form of the pleading, non-compliance with which does not
necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply
intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true
and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation,
and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The court may order the correction
of the pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is
not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance
with the rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may
thereby be served.
● On the other hand, the lack of certification against forum shopping is generally
not curable by the submission thereof after the filing of the petition. Section
5, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the failure of the
petitioner to submit the required documents that should accompany the
petition, including the certification against forum shopping, shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal thereof. The same rule applies to certifications
against forum shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which
are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is authorized to file a petition
on behalf of the corporation.
● The SC in numerous relaxed the rule requiring the submission of the
certifications and has applied the rule of substantial compliance under
justifiable circumstances with respect to the contents of the certification.
● Thus, if the SC has allowed the belated filing of the certification against forum
shopping for compelling reasons in previous rulings, with more reason should
it sanction the timely submission of such certification though the proof of the
signatory’s authority was submitted thereafter.
● Here, Landheights rectified its failure to submit proof of authority to sign the
verification/certification on non-forum shopping on its behalf when the
required document was subsequently submitted to the CA.
● It is settled that liberal construction of the rules may be invoked in situations
where there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading,
provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and
connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the rules. After all,
rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; they
are used only to help secure substantial justice.
Dispositive:

GAJUDO V. TRADERS ROYAL BANK which motion was, however, denied by the Trial Court in its Order on the
ground that the bank has not yet filed its answer.
Petitioner/s: ERLINDA GAJUDO, FERNANDO G.R. No. 151098
● The petitioners filed a motion to declare the bank in default, thereunder
GAJUDO, JR., ESTELITA GAJUDO,
alleging that no answer has been filed despite the service of summons on it on
BALTAZAR GAJUDO and DANILO Present:
26 September 1990.
ARAHAN CHUA
● The Trial Court declared the motion submitted for resolution upon
Respondent/s: TRADERS ROYAL BANK
submission by petitioners of proof of service of the motion on the bank.
Doctrine: The mere fact that a defendant is declared in default does not
● Upon proof that petitioners had indeed served the bank with a copy of said
automatically result in the grant of the prayers of the plaintiff. To win, the
motion, the Trial Court issued an Order of default against the bank.
latter must still present the same quantum of evidence that would be
● On petitioner's’ motion, they were by the Court allowed to present evidence ex
required if the defendant were still present. A party that defaults is not
parte. Thereafter, the Trial Court rendered the new questioned partial
deprived of its rights, except the right to be heard and to present evidence
decision.
to the trial court. If the evidence presented does not support a judgment for
● Aggrieved, the bank filed a motion to set aside the partial decision by default
the plaintiff, the complaint should be dismissed, even if the defendant may
against it.
not have been heard or allowed to present any countervailing evidence.
● The CA ruled in favor of respondent bank. Even if the CA stated that the
erroneous docket number placed on the Answer filed before the trial court was
Facts: not an excusable negligence by the bank’s counsel and that these were binding
on the bank, the petitioners had not convincingly established their
● In mid 1977 Danilo Chua obtained a loan from the Traders Royal Bank in the right to relief as there was no ground to invalidate the foreclosure
amount of P75,000.00 secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land. sale of the mortgaged property.
● The loan was not paid and thus the bank commenced extrajudicial ● They stated that an extrajudicial foreclosure sale did not require personal
foreclosure proceedings on the property. notice to the mortgagor, that there was no allegation or proof of
● On the rescheduled auction sale, the Sheriff of Quezon City sold the property noncompliance with the publication requirement and the public posting of the
to the bank, the highest bidder therein, for the sum of P24,911.30. notice of sale, and that there was no showing of inadequacy of price as no
● The other petitioners (Gajudo) assailed this because bid price was shockingly competent evidence was presented to show the real market value of the land
or unconscionably low. sold or the readiness of another buyer to offer a price higher than that at which
● [Petitioners] filed a complaint in the RTC against [respondent] Traders Royal the property had been sold. Moreover, petitioners failed to prove that the bank
Bank, the City Sheriff of Quezon City and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City had agreed to sell the property back to them. After pointing out that the
seeking the annulment of the extra-judicial foreclosure and auction sale made redemption period had long expired, respondent’s written communications to
by [the] city sheriff of Quezon City of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 16711 Petitioner Chua only showed, at most, that the former had made a proposal
of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, the conventional redemption thereof, for the latter to buy back the property at the current market price.
and prayed for damages and the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. ● The petitioners argue that the quantum of evidence for judgments flowing
● The bank, filed its answer with counterclaim, asserting that the foreclosure from a default order under Section 3 of Rule 9 is not the same as that provided
sale of the mortgaged property was done in accordance with law; that for in Section 1 of Rule 133 (Preponderance of Evidence rule - which basically
petitioners slept on their rights when they failed to redeem the property within states that the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a
the one year statutory period; preponderance of evidence)
● Upon discovering that the foreclosed property was sold by the bank to the Issues: W/N the CA erred in failing to apply the provisions of Sec 3, Rule 9 ([and in
Ceroferr Realty Corporation, and that the notice of lis pendens annotated on applying instead] the rule on preponderance of evidence under Section 1, Rule 133 of
the certificate of title of the foreclosed property, had already been cancelled, the Rules of Court.) - No
the petitioners refiled the complaint and impleaded as additional defendants
the Ceroferr Realty Corporation. Ratio: No, the CA did not err. Between the two rules, there is no incompatibility that
● Summons were served on the bank. Supposing that all the defendants would preclude the application of either one of them. Section 3 of Rule 9 governs the
had filed their answer, the petitioners filed a motion to set case for pretrial, procedure the trial court is directed to take when a defendant fails to file an answer.
According to this provision, the court "shall proceed to render judgment granting the
claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant," subject to the court’s discretion on
whether to require the presentation of evidence ex parte. The same provision also sets
down guidelines on the nature and extent of the relief that may be granted.
The party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of
evidence. Moreover, parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence, not upon
the weakness of the defense offered by their opponent. This principle holds true,
especially when the latter has had no opportunity to present evidence because of a
default order. Needless to say, the extent of the relief that may be
granted can only be as much as has been alleged and proved with preponderant
evidence required under Section 1 of Rule 133.
Complainants are not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for, once the
defendants are declared in default. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court
has ascertained that the relief is warranted by the evidence offered and the facts proven
by the presenting party. Being declared in default does not constitute a waiver of rights
except that of being heard and of presenting evidence in the trial court.
Although the defendant would not be in a position to object, if the evidence presented
should not be sufficient to justify a judgment for the plaintiff, the complaint must be
dismissed.
While petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex parte under Section 3 of Rule 9,
they were not excused from establishing their claims for damages by the required
quantum of proof under Section 1 of Rule 133.
Moreover, the grant of damages was not sufficiently supported by the evidence for the
following reasons.
1. The petitioners were not deprived of their property without cause. There has been
no allegation or proof of noncompliance with the requirement of publication and public
posting of the notice of sale. Neither has there been competent evidence to show that
the price paid at the foreclosure sale was inadequate. Thus, there was no ground to
invalidate the sale.
2. The petitioners have not convincingly established their right to damages on the
basis of the purported agreement to repurchase. Without reiterating our prior
discussion on this point, we stress that entitlement to actual and compensatory
damages must be proved even under Section 3 of Rule 9.
In sum, the petitioners have failed to convince this Court of the strength of their
position, notwithstanding the advantage they enjoyed in presenting their evidence ex
parte. Not in every case of default by the defendant is the complainant entitled to win
automatically.
Dispositive: Petition is DENIED.

MARTINEZ V REPUBLIC complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law, even without need of the prior filing
of a motion to set aside the order of default.
Petitioner/s: Jose R. Martinez
2. Under Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, as amended, the order of
Respondent/s: Republic of the Philippines
default may be issued if no person appears and answers within the time allowed. The
RTC appears to have issued the order of general default simply on the premise that no
Doctrine: A defendant party declared in default retains the right to appeal
oppositor appeared before it on the hearing, despite the fact that the Republic had
from the judgment by default on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove
already duly filed its opposition
the material allegations of the complaint, or that the decision is contrary to
3. RTC erred in declaring oppositor in default simply because he failed to appear on
law, even without need of the prior filing of a motion to set aside the order
the day of the initial hearing.
of default.
4. RTC should have accorded the oppositor ample opportunity to establish its claim.
However, the SC cannot decide on the validity of the default order since Republic did
FACTS: not challenge such.
1. Martinez filed a petition for registration in his name for three parcels of land 5. According to Rule 9, Section 3 of the RoC, the effects on the parties of an order of
located in Cortes, Surigao del Sur with an area of 3,700sqm. He alleged that default are:
a. He had acquired the property in 1952 through purchase from his uncle whose Sec. 3. Default; declaration of. If the defending party fails to answer within the time
predecessors-in-interest were traceable up to 1870s; allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the
b. He had remained in continuous possession of the lotsl defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default.
c. The lots remained unencumbered; Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such
d. They became private property through prescription; relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the
e. He had to initiate the proceedings since the Director of Land Management Services claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk
failed to do so despite the completion of the cadastral survey. of court.
2. RTC of Surigao del Sur set the case for initial hearing and ordered the publication
of the notice. (a) Effect of order of default.A party in default shall be entitled to notice of subsequent
3. Republic opposed the application on the grounds that: proceedings but shall not take part in the trial.
a. Martinez’ possession was not in accordance with Sec 48 (b) of CA141; (b) Relief from order of default.A party declared in default may any time after notice
b. His muniments of title were insufficient to prove bonafide acquisition and thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default
possession of the property; upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or
c. The lots formed part of public domain. excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of
4. RTC issued an Order of General Default because no party appeared to oppose the default may be set aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may impose in the
application during the hearing, and subsequently, decreed the registration of the lots in interest of justice.
the name of Martinez. RTC concluded that Martinez and his predecessors have been in (c) Effect of partial default.When a pleading asserting a claim states a common cause
open, continuous, public possession of the lots for over 100 years. of action against several defending parties, some of whom answer and the others fail to
5. LRA informed RTC that only 2 lots were referred to in the Notice published since do so, the court shall try the case against all upon the answers thus filed and render
the other lot was omitted due to the lack of an approved survey plan. judgment upon the evidence presented.
6. CA reversed RTC and ordered the dismissal of the application on the ground that 6. Under the 1997 RoC and Lina v. Court of Appeals:
the evidence presented by Martinez is insufficient to support his application. a. The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before
7. Hence, this petition. judgment, file a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that
his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that
ISSUE/s: WoN Republic, through OSG, can still appeal the RTC’s decision after it had he has meritorious defenses; (Sec 3, Rule 18)
been declared in default – YES b. If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the
default, but before the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for
RATIO: new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37;
1. A defendant party declared in default retains the right to appeal from the judgment c. If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and
by default on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of the executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and
d. He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the
evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been
presented by him.
A defendant party declared in default retains the right to appeal from the judgment by
default on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of the
complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law, even without need of the prior filing
of a motion to set aside the order of default. We reaffirm that the Lim Toco doctrine,
denying such right to appeal unless the order of default has been set aside, was no
longer controlling in this jurisdiction upon the effectivity of the 1964 Rules of Court,
and up to this day.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.

TOPIC VII – BILL OF PARTICULARS ● Filing and service is different from each other. Filing is the act of presenting
the pleading or other paper to the clerk of court. On the other hand, service is
TOPIC VIII – SERVICE the act of providing a party with a copy of the pleading or paper concerned.
● However,filing and service go hand in hand when in determining if the
PHILIPPING SAVINGS BANK VS PAPA pleading, motion or any other paper was filed within the applicable
reglementary period. The Rules require every motion set for hearing to be
Petitioner/s: PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK
accompanied by proof of service thereof to the other parties concerned;
Respondent/s: JOSEPHINE L. PAPA
otherwise, the court shall not be allowed to act on it, effectively making such
Doctrine:
motion as not filed.
- Filing and service are different from each other, but they go hand
● The kind of proof of service required will depend on the mode of service used.
in hand in determining if the pleading, motion or any other
Rule 13, Section 13 of the Rules of Court provides:
document was filed within the reglementary period
SECTION 13. Proof of Service . — Proof of personal service shall
- To prove service a party must attach the affidavit of the person
consist of a written admission of the party served, or the official return of the server, or
who mailed the motion or pleading. Otherwise, it is deemed as not
the affidavit of the party serving, containing a full statement of the date, place and
filed
manner of service. If the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of an
affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with section 7 of this Rule.
Facts: If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the
● Papa obtained a flexi-loan of P207,600.00, payable in installments from registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed
PSBank. immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter
● For the said loan, Papa executed a promissory note. together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the
● On due date, Papa defaulted on her loan. Despite repeated demands, she was addressee.
unable to pay her loan. ● The court considers filing by private courier as the same as filing via ordinary
● PSB filed in the Metc a complaint for collection of sum of money against Papa. mail. Thus, to prove service, a party must attach an affidavit of the person who
In response, Papa claims that she had already paid the obligation thru the mailed the motion or pleading. Further, such affidavit must show compliance
staggered payments she made to the bank. The metc ruled in favor of PSB. with Rule 13, Section 7 of the Rules of Court which provides that service shall
● RTC: Ruled in favor of Papa because PSB was unable to prove the existence of be made by registered mail. It is only when it is unavailable that that service
the PN. The RTC decision was rendered on Oct 14, 2009. PSB received the may be done by ordinary mail.
decision on Oct 26, 2009. ● PSB’s service by private courier failed to comply with Rule 13 sec 7 as it did
● PSB filed its MR on Nov 10, 2009 to the court while Papa received the MR on not explain the reason why it did not use registered mail. Moreover, it was not
Nov 11, 2009. accompanied by the affidavit of the person who sent it to the private
● In its opposition to PSB's motion for reconsideration, Papa claims that the messengerial service.
RTC decision had already attained finality. Papa explained that although PSB ● Since PSB's MR is deemed as not filed, it did not toll the running of the 15-day
filed the motion for reconsideration on 10 November 2009, it appears that reglementary period for the filing of an appeal; and considering that PSB's
service of the said motion was made 1 day late as PSB availed of a private appeal was filed only after the expiration of the 15-day period on Nov 10 2009,
courier service instead of the modes of service prescribed under the Rules of such appeal has not been validly perfected. As such, the subject Oct 14 2009
Court. As such, the MR is deemed to have been made not on the date that it decision of the RTC had already attained finality as early as Nov 11 2009.
was deposited to the private courier but in the date that it was received by Papa
(Nov 11, 2009)
Dispositive:
Issue: WON the RTC decision has attained finality due to the service of the MR to Papa WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The 21 July 2011
beyond the prescribed period? Yes Decision and the 1 February 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
112611 are AFFIRMED.
Ratio:

PASCUAL V. FIRST CONSOLIDATED RURAL BANK
RATIO:
Petitioner/s: Sergio Pascual and Emma Servillion Pascual
Respondent/s: First Consolidated Rural Bank (BOHOL), Inc., Robinsons
The petitioners received the assailed resolution of November 16, 2011 on November 24,
Land Corporation, Atty. Antonio Espinosa, Register of Deeds, Butuan City
2011. Under Section l, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, they had 15 days from receipt (or
until December 9, 2011) within which to move for its reconsideration or to appeal to the
Doctrine: Section 1 (d) of Rule III of the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court
Supreme Court.
of Appeals provide that motions sent through private messengerial services
are deemed filed on the date of the CA's actual receipt of the same
They dispatched the Motion for Reconsideration (on the Resolution dated 16
November 2011) on December 9, 2011 through private courier (LBC).
FACTS:
The CA actually received the motion on December 12, 2011. Considering that Section 1
Pascual filed a petition for annulment of judgment in the CA to nullify a decision in a (d) of Rule III of the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals provided that motions
SpecPro case in the RTC. sent through private messengerial services are deemed filed on the date of the CA's
actual receipt of the same, the motion was already filed out of time by December 12,
After filing of the responsive pleadings, the CA scheduled the preliminary conference 2011.
and ordered the parties to file their respective pre-trial briefs.
Needless to remind, the running of the period of appeal of the final resolution
Instead of filing the briefs, Pascual filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and a Motion promulgated on November 16, 2011 was not stopped, rendering the assailed resolution
to Hold Pre-Trial in Abeyance. Pascual wanted the appellate court to resolve their final and executory by operation of law.
motions first and hold in abeyance the pre-trial.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the assailed resolutions of the
The CA resolved the case against Pascual. The appellate court’s reason, among others, Court of Appeals promulgated in CA-G.R. SP No. 04020-MIN; and ORDERS the
was that: petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
“It is not for the petitioners to arrogate whether or not pre-trial may be suspended or
dispensed with, or that their motions be resolved first, as the same are discretionary
upon the court taking cognizance of the petition. Furthermore, their failure to furnish
private respondent Robinsons Land Corporation a copy of their Motion for
Reconsideration of our denial of their TRO and/or WPI, and to submit proof of service
thereof to this court is tantamount to failure to obey lawful orders of the court.”
This (failure to obey lawful orders of the court) the CA ruled, is one ground for
dismissing their petition.
Pascual then moved for reconsideration, (from the ratio, it appeared that such motion
was sent via private messengerial service [LBC]) but was denied for being filed out of
time. Unrelenting, they presented a Respectful Motion for Reconsideration which the
CA also denied.
Hence this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the motions and other papers sent to the CA by private messengerial
services are deemed filed on the date of the CA’s actual receipt - YEST
TOPIC IX - SUMMONS ● The Makati RTC found the defendants liable to pay BDO ₱32,543,856.33 plus
12% interest; The Makati RTC issued a Writ of Execution stating that in the
BORLONGAN VS BDO event that the judgment obligors cannot pay all or part of the obligation, the
sheriff shall levy upon the properties of the defendants to satisfy the award.
Petitioner/s: CARMELITA T. BORLONGAN
● The Sheriff failed to serve the Writ of Execution because the defendants were
Respondent/s: BANCO DE ORO (formerly EQUITABLE PCI BANK)
not operating in the Fumikilla Compound.
● The property of Sps. Borlongan became the subject of an auction, and BDO
Doctrine: The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient
was the highest bidder.
of due process and compliance with the rules regarding the service of the
● After such discovery, Eliseo executed an affidavit of adverse claim and filed a
summons is as much an issue of due process as it is of jurisdiction.
Complaint for Annulment of Surety Agreements, Notice of Levy on
Attachment, Auction Sale and Other Documents, with the Pasig RTC.
As a rule, summons should be personally served on a defendant. When
● He claims that the property is family home that belong to their conjugal
summons cannot be served personally within a reasonable period of time,
partnership of gains and that the surety agreements were signed without his
substituted service may be resorted to. Service of summons by publication
consent and did not redound to the benefit of their family
can be resorted to only if the defendant's "whereabouts are unknown and
● BDO filed a Motion to Dismiss based on res judicata and failure to state a cause
cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.
of action
● The Pasig RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction because it has
Facts: already been decided upon by the Makati RTC and that the husband of a
● In 1976, Eliseo Borlongan, Jr. (Eliseo) and his wife Carmelita, acquired a real judgment debtor is not a stranger to a case who can file a separate and
property in Valle Verde II, Pasig City. independent action to determine the validity of the levy and sale of a property.
● In 2012, they went to the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City to obtain a copy of ● On MR, the Pasig RTC reinstated the case with qualification: it could not
the TCT in preparation for a prospective sale of the subject property. annul the surety agreements since Eliseo was not a party to those agreements
● To their surprise, the title contained an annotation that the property covered and the validity and efficacy of these contracts had already been decided by
thereby was the subject of an execution sale. the Makati RTC.
● Sps. Borlongan found out that BDO filed a complaint for sum of money against ● Both Eliseo and BDO referred the Pasig RTC's Decision to the Court of Appeals
Tanchom Corporation, the principal debtor of loan obligations obtained from (CA).
the bank. ● The CA ruled in favor of BDO and ordered the Pasig RTC to cease from hearing
● Carmelita was one of those impleaded, who supposedly signed 4 security the case commenced by Eliseo. It found that Eliseo is not a stranger who can
agreements to guarantee the obligation of Tancho Corp., amounting to P13.5M initiate an action independent from the case where the attachment and
● The Makati RTC issued an order directing the service of summons to all the execution sale were ordered.
defendants at the business address of Tancho Corp - Fumakilla Compound. ● On appeal before the SC, the Court denied Eliseo’s petition
● However, such property has already been foreclosed by BDO and its ● The Makati RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Possession and the issuance
ownership has already been consolidated in BDO’s name. Thus, the summons of a new TCT covering the subject property in favor of BDO
were unserved because the defendants were no longer holding office at the ● Carmelita filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment, and the issuance of a
Fumakilla Compound TRO before the CA. She claims that the Makati RTC had not acquired
● There was only a single attempt for the personal service of summons; BDO jurisdiction over her person as the service of summons were defective. It was
moved for leave to serve the summons by publication. It was granted. denied. Hence, this petition
● BDO filed an ex-parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Attachment against
the defendants. It was granted by the Makati RTC. Issue: WoN the CA erred in not issuing a TRO - YES
● The sheriff failed to serve the summons since Carmelita was no longer residing
at the given address and the said address is for 'rent,' as per information Ratio:
gathered from the security guard on duty." The Makati RTC declared the ● For a court to decide on the propriety of issuing a TRO, it must only inquire
defendants, including Carmelita, in default. into the existence of two things: (1) a clear and unmistakable right that must

be protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED.
prevent serious damage. (1) The January 20, 2015 Decision and May 26, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
● In this case, Carmelita has a clear and unmistakable right that must be in CA-G.R. SP No. 133994 are hereby REVERSED and SETASIDE. The Regional Trial
protected. This right is not just her proprietary rights over the subject property Court of Pasig, Branch 155 is ordered to continue with the proceedings and decide Civil
but her constitutionally protected right to due process before she can be Case No. 73761 with reasonable dispatch.
deprived of her property. (2) The November 12, 2014 and March 23, 2015 Resolutions of the appellate court in
● The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process CA-G.R. SP No. 134664 are REVERSED and SETASIDE.
and compliance with the rules regarding the service of the summons is as Accordingly, let a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) be issued enjoining,
much an issue of due process as it is of jurisdiction. prohibiting, and preventing respondent Banco De Oro, its assigns, transferees,
● As a rule, summons should be personally served on a defendant. When successors, or any and all other persons acting on its behalf from possessing, selling,
summons cannot be served personally within a reasonable period of time, transferring, encumbering or otherwise exercising acts of ownership over the property
substituted service may be resorted to. Service of summons by publication can subject of the controversy. Said TRO shall remain valid and effective until such time as
be resorted to only if the defendant's "whereabouts are unknown and cannot the rights and interests of the parties in CA-G.R. SP No. 134664 shall have been
be ascertained by diligent inquiry. determined and finally resolved.
● The hierarchy and rules in the service of summons are as follows:
(1) Personal service;
(2) Substituted service, if for justifiable causes the defendant cannot be served
within a reasonable time; and
(3) Service by publication, whenever the defendant's whereabouts are
unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.
● The rules on the service of summons other than by personal service may be
used only as prescribed and only in the circumstances authorized by statute.
The impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown by stating that
efforts have been made to find the defendant personally and that such efforts
have failed before substituted service may be availed.
● For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several
attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable
period [of one month) which eventually resulted in failure to prove
impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts" means at least three (3)
tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must
cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of
service can be confirmed or accepted.
● The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and
circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service. The efforts made
to find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly
narrated in detail in the Return.
● In this case, summons were served via publication, yet such resort was
unjustified:
○ There was only a single attempt by the sheriff to personally serve
summons
○ Neither was it impossible to locate the residence of petitioner and her
whereabouts - her address can be found in the General Information
Sheet of Tancho Corporation, a public document

MANOTOC V. CA ● The trial court rejected Manotoc’s Motion to Dismiss on the strength of its
findings that her residence, for purposes of the Complaint, was Alexandra
Petitioner/s: MA. IMELDA M. MANOTOC
Homes, Unit E-2104, No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig, Metro Manila, based on
Respondent/s: HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and AGAPITA
the documentary evidence of respondent Trajano. The trial court relied on the
TRAJANO on behalf of the Estate of ARCHIMEDES TRAJANO
presumption that the sheriffs substituted service was made in the regular
performance of official duty, and such presumption stood in the absence of
Doctrine: The courts jurisdiction over a defendant is founded on a valid
proof to the contrary.
service of summons. Without a valid service, the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction over the defendant, unless the defendant voluntarily submits to
Issue: Whether or not the substituted service is valid. NO.
it.
Ratio:
The Sheriff’s Return must state with particularity the attendant facts and
● Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of
circumstances which would show impossibility of personal service. It must
summons or the defendant’s voluntary appearance in court. When the
also state that the summons was left with a person of suitable age and
defendant does not voluntarily submit to the courts jurisdiction or when there
discretion residing in defendant’s house or residence.
is no valid service of summons, any judgment of the court which has no
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and void.
Facts: ● In an action strictly in personam, personal service on the defendant is the
● Respondent Trajano seeks the enforcement of a foreign courts preferred mode of service, that is, by handing a copy of the summons to the
judgment rendered by the United States District Court of Honolulu, Hawaii, defendant in person. If defendant, for excusable reasons, cannot be served
United States of America, in a case entitled Agapita Trajano, et al. v. Imee with the summons within a reasonable period, then substituted service can be
Marcos-Manotoc a.k.a. Imee Marcos, Civil Case No. 86-0207 for wrongful resorted to. While substituted service of summons is permitted, it is
death of deceased Archimedes Trajano committed by military intelligence extraordinary in character and in derogation of the usual method of service.
officials of the Philippines allegedly under the command, direction, authority, Hence, it must faithfully and strictly comply with the prescribed requirements
supervision, tolerance, sufferance and/or influence of defendant Manotoc, and circumstances authorized by the rules. Indeed, compliance with the rules
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 39 of the then Revised Rules of Court. regarding the service of summons is as much important as the issue of due
● Based on paragraph two of the Complaint, the trial court issued a Summons process as of jurisdiction.
addressed to Manotoc at Alexandra Condominium Corporation or Alexandra ● Section 8 of Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court which applies
Homes, E2 Room 104, at No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig City. to this case provides: If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable
● The Summons and a copy of the Complaint were allegedly served upon Macky time as provided in the preceding section [personal service on defendant],
de la Cruz, an alleged caretaker of Manotoc at the condominium unit service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
mentioned earlier. When Manotoc failed to file her Answer, the trial court defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
declared her in default through an Order. residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular
● Hence, Manotoc, by special appearance of counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over her person due to
an invalid substituted service of summons. The grounds to support the motion DISCUSSION ON THE REQUIREMENTS TO EFFECT A VALID SUBSTITUTED
were: (1) the address of defendant indicated in the Complaint (Alexandra SERVICE
Homes) was not her dwelling, residence, or regular place of business as ● IMPOSSIBILITY OF PROMPT PERSONAL SERVICE
provided in Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court; (2) the party (de la Cruz), ○ The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that
who was found in the unit, was neither a representative, employee, nor a defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of
resident of the place; (3) the procedure prescribed by the Rules on personal prompt service.
and substituted service of summons was ignored; (4) defendant was a resident ○ Section 8, Rule 14 provides that the plaintiff or the sheriff is given a
of Singapore; and (5) whatever judgment rendered in this case would be reasonable time to serve the summons to the defendant in
ineffective and futile. person, but no specific time frame is mentioned.

○ Reasonable time is defined as so much time as is necessary under the ● A COMPETENT PERSON IN CHARGE
circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, ○ If the substituted service will be done at defendants office or regular
conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that should be done, place of business, then it should be served on a competent
having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the person in charge of the place.
other party. ○ Thus, the person on whom the substituted service will be made must
○ To the sheriff, reasonable time means 15 to 30 days because at the be the one managing the office or business of defendant,
end of the month, it is a practice for the branch clerk of court to such as the president or manager; and such individual must
require the sheriff to submit a return of the summons assigned to the have sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the
sheriff for service. The Sheriffs Return provides data to the Clerk of defendant in the summons, its importance, and the prejudicial
Court, which the clerk uses in the Monthly Report of Cases to be effects arising from inaction on the summons.
submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator within the first
ten (10) days of the succeeding month. Thus, one month from the SHERIFF’S RETURN
issuance of summons can be considered reasonable time THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on many occasions several attempts were made to serve the
with regard to personal service on the defendant. summons with complaint and annexes issued by this Honorable Court in the above
○ For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be entitled case, personally upon the defendant IMELDA IMEE MARCOS-MANOTOC
several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons located at Alexandra Condominium Corpration [sic] or Alexandra Homes E-2 Room
within a reasonable period [of one month] which eventually resulted 104 No. 29 Merlaco [sic] Ave., Pasig, Metro-Manila at reasonable hours of the day but
in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. Several attempts to no avail for the reason that said defendant is usually out of her place and/or residence
means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different or premises.That on the 15th day of July, 1993, substituted service of summons was
dates. resorted to in accordance with the Rules of Court in the Philippines leaving copy of said
● SPECIFIC DETAILS IN RETURN summons with complaint and annexes thru [sic] (Mr) Macky de la Cruz, caretaker of
○ The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and the said defendant, according to (Ms) Lyn Jacinto, Receptionist and Telephone
circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service. The Operator of the said building, a person of suitable age and discretion, living with the
efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind said defendant at the given address who acknowledged the receipt thereof of said
the failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. processes but he refused to sign.
The date and time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries
made to locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the WHEREFORE, said summons is hereby returned to this Honorable Court of origin,
alleged residence or house of defendant and all other acts done, duly served for its record and information.
though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be specified
in the Return to justify substituted service. INVALID SUBSTITUTED SERVICE IN THE CASE AT BAR
● A PERSON OF SUITABLE AGE AND DISCRETION ● A meticulous scrutiny of the aforementioned Return readily reveals the
○ If the substituted service will be effected at defendants house or absence of material data on the serious efforts to serve the
residence, it should be left with a person of suitable age and Summons on petitioner Manotoc in person. There is no clear valid
discretion then residing therein. reason cited in the Return why those efforts proved inadequate, to reach the
○ A person of suitable age and discretion is one who has attained the conclusion that personal service has become impossible or unattainable
age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is considered to have outside the generally couched phrases of on many occasions several attempts
enough discernment to understand the importance of a summons. were made to serve the summons x x x personally, at reasonable hours during
○ The sheriff must therefore determine if the person found in the the day, and to no avail for the reason that the said defendant is usually out of
alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the her place and/or residence or premises.
recipients relationship with the defendant is, and whether said ● Given the fact that the substituted service of summons may be assailed, as in
person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons the present case, by a Motion to Dismiss, it is imperative that the pertinent
and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least facts and circumstances surrounding the service of summons be described
notify the defendant of said receipt of summons. These matters must with more particularity in the Return or Certificate of Service.
be clearly and specifically described in the Return of Summons.
● It has not been shown that respondent Trajano or Sheriff Caelas, who served
such summons, exerted extraordinary efforts to locate petitioner.
● The court, in another case, ruled that the narration of the efforts made to find
the defendant and the fact of failure written in broad and imprecise words will
not suffice. The facts and circumstances should be stated with more
particularity and detail on the number of attempts made at personal service,
dates and times of the attempts, inquiries to locate defendant, names of
occupants of the alleged residence, and the reasons for failure should be
included in the Return to satisfactorily show the efforts undertaken. That such
efforts were made to personally serve summons on defendant, and those
resulted in failure, would prove impossibility of prompt personal service.
● Granting that such a general description be considered adequate, there is still
a serious nonconformity from the requirement that the summons must be left
with a person of suitable age and discretion residing in defendants house or
residence. Thus, there are two (2) requirements under the Rules: (1) recipient
must be a person of suitable age and discretion; and (2) recipient must reside
in the house or residence of defendant.
● Both requirements were not met. In this case, the Sheriffs Return lacks
information as to residence, age, and discretion of Mr. Macky de la Cruz, aside
from the sheriffs general assertion that de la Cruz is the resident caretaker of
Manotoc.
● It is doubtful if Mr. de la Cruz is residing with petitioner Manotoc in the
condominium unit considering that a married woman of her stature in society
would unlikely hire a male caretaker to reside in her dwelling. With Manotoc’s
allegation that Macky de la Cruz is not her employee, servant, or
representative, it is necessary to have additional information in the Return of
Summons. Besides, Mr. Macky de la Cruz’s refusal to sign the Receipt for the
summons is a strong indication that he did not have the necessary relation of
confidence with Manotoc.
● Due to non-compliance with the prerequisites for valid substituted service, the
proceedings held before the trial court perforce must be annulled.
Dispositive: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Petition for Review is hereby

GRANTED and the assailed March 17, 1997 Decision and October 8, 1997 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals and the October 11, 1994 and December 21, 1994 Orders of the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Pasig City, Branch 163 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

ONG V CO ● Ong filed a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of
Court before the CA claiming that she was never notified of the cases filed
Petitioner/s: YUK LING ONG
against her
Respondent/s: BENJAMIN T. CO
● Ong alleged that:
1. Co committed extrinsic fraud because he deliberately indicated a
Doctrine: Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
wrong address to prevent her from participating in the trial;
governs actions for annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions,
2. jurisdiction over her person was not acquired in the 2nd
and Section 2 thereof explicitly provides only two grounds for annulment of
petition because of an invalid substituted service of summons as no
judgment: (1) extrinsic fraud and (2) lack of jurisdiction.
sufficient explanation, showing impossibility of personal service, was
stated before resorting to substituted service of summons;
Facts: a. the alleged substituted service was made on a security guard
● Petitioner Yuk Ling Ong, a British-Hong Kong national, and respondent of their townhouse and not on a member of her household
Benjamin Co, a Filipino citizen, were married on October 3, 1982 ● CA rendered the assailed decision finding the petition for annulment of
● In 2001, Co filed a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of judgment to be devoid of merit
psychological incapacity before the RTC
○ Co stated that petitioner’s address was 600 Elcano St., Binondo, Issue:
Manila 1. W/N the facts proven by the petitioner constitute extrinsic fraud within the purview
● In 2002, Co filed another petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court -- NO
psychological incapacity before the RTC 2. W/N the Trial Court in Civil Case No. 02-0306 validly acquired jurisdiction over the
○ Co indicated that Ong’s address was 23 Sta. Rosa Street, Unit B-2 person of the petitioner – NO
Manresa Garden Homes, Quezon City
● RTC issued summons Ratio:
○ Process server Rodolfo Torres, Jr. stated that substituted service of ● Annulment of judgment is an equitable principle not because it allows a party-
summons with the copy of the petition was effected after several litigant another opportunity to reopen a judgment that has long lapsed into
futile attempts to serve the same personally on Ong finality but because it enables him to be discharged from the burden of being
○ Said documents were received by Mr. Roly Espinosa, a security bound to a judgment that is an absolute nullity to begin with
officer ● Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, governs actions for
● RTC rendered a decision finding respondent’s marriage with petitioner as void annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions, and Section 2 thereof
ab initio and stated that: explicitly provides only two grounds for annulment of judgment:
○ summons was served on petitioner but she failed to file her 1. extrinsic fraud
responsive pleading within the reglementary period 2. lack of jurisdiction
○ petitioner was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential
marital obligations ON EXTRINSIC FRAUD (WRONG ADDRESS)
● In 2008, Ong received a subpoena from the Bureau of Immigration and ● Ong’s contention on the existence of extrinsic fraud is too unsubstantial to
Deportation directing her to appear before the said agency because her warrant consideration
permanent residence visa was being subjected to cancellation proceedings
since her marriage with Co was nullified by the court ON THE LACK OF JURISDICTION (SUBSTITUTED SERVICE OF SUMMONS)
● Ong was furnished with the copies of the following documents: ● Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the judgment or
1. 1st petition for declaration of nullity of marriage; final order is either lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
2. 2nd petition for declaration of nullity of marriage;; action (substantive law), or lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
3. Decision of the RTC Parañaque on 2nd petition, declaring the petitioner (procedural law; involves the service of summons or other
marriage between Ong and Co as void ab initio; and processes on the petitioner)
4. their marriage contract with the subject decision annotated thereon ● Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of
summons or the defendant's voluntary appearance in court.
● If the defendant does not voluntarily appear in court, jurisdiction can be THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT on August 1, 2002, substituted service of summons with
acquired by personal or substituted service of summons as laid out under copy of petition, were effected to respondent, Yuk Ling H. Ong, at the Unit B-2, No. 23
Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court Sta. Rosa St., Manresa Garden Homes, Manresa Garden City, Quezon City, after
several futile attempts to serve the same personally. The said documents were
Sec. 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons shall be received by Mr. Roly Espinosa of sufficient age and discretion, the Security Officer
served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive thereat.
and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
● The server’s return utterly lacks sufficient detail of the attempts undertaken
Sec. 7. Substituted Service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served by the process server to personally serve the summons on petitioner
within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected ● The server did not state the specific number of attempts made to perform the
(a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of personal service of summons; the dates and the corresponding time the
suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at attempts were made; and the underlying reason for each unsuccessful service.
defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge He did not explain either if there were inquiries made to locate the petitioner,
thereof. who was the defendant in the case.
● The server’s return did not describe in detail the person who received the
Requirements of a substituted service of summons (MANOTOC V CA): summons, on behalf of petitioner
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service ● It simply stated that the summons was received “by Mr. Roly Espinosa of
● For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several sufficient age and discretion, the Security Officer thereat”
attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable ● Aside from the server’s return, Co failed to indicate any portion of the records
period of one month which eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility which would describe the specific attempts to personally serve the summons
of prompt service ● Given that the meticulous requirements in Manotoc were not met, there was
● Several attempts = at least three tries preferably on at least two different dates an invalid substituted service of summons. Accordingly, the decision must be
+ sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful declared null and void
(2) Specific Details in the Return
● The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and DISPOSITIVE PORTION
circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service
○ date and time of the attempts on personal service WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 27, 2012 Decision and the March
○ inquiries made to locate the defendant 26, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 106271 are hereby
○ name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The December 11, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial
defendant Court, Branch 260, Parañaque City is hereby declared VOID.
○ all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant
(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion
● The sheriff must therefore determine if the person found in the alleged
dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipient's
relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the
significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately deliver
it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons
● must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of Summons
IN THE CASE AT BAR:
SERVER’S RETURN

DE PEDRO VS. ROMASAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION ● Since none of the defendants filed an answer, the RTC then issued an order
GR No. 194751, 26 November 2014 declaring the title and free patents issued to all defendants null and void.
● Shortly after, De Pedro, through her counsel, filed a motion for new trial
Petitioner/s: Aurora De Pedro
claiming that her counsel received the notice of the Jan 7, 2000 decision on
Respondent/s: Romasan Development Corporation
March 16, 2000. De Pedro also asserted that the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over her person because of improper and defective service of
Doctrine: The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service
summon, claiming that the Feb 22, 1999 summon was not personally served
of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return;
upon her. Also, she argued that this present case should have been dismissed
otherwise, any substituted service made in lieu of personal service cannot
on the ground of litis pendentia because the same property was the subject of
be upheld. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of
a pending civil case in another court.
the usual method of service.
● The RTC dismissed her motion for new trial and said that a summon was
validly served upon her through publication.
Facts: ● De Pedro then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA to assail the RTC
● Romasan Development Corporation (Romasan) filed several complaints for decision. However, the CA dismissed her petition and affirmed the RTC’s
nullification of free patent and original certificates of title against numerous decision.
defendants. One of them is Aurora de Pedro (De Pedro). ● Hence, this petition before the Supreme Court.
● Romasan said it was the owner and possessor of a parcel of land in Antipolo
City, as evidence by its Certificate of Title. Issue:
● Mr. Rodrigo Ko, a representative of Romasan, discovered in 1996 that De Was the service of summon by publication (substituted service) justified? -- No.
Pedro put up fence in the property. Ko confronted De Pedro about it but De
Pedro was able to show a title and documents evidencing her ownership. Upon
investigation by Romasan, it was discovered that the DENR issued free Ratio:
patents to De Pedro covering a portion of the subject property. ● In this case, the Sheriff’s return shows no detail of his effort to serve the
● Romasan is now challenging the grant made to De Pedro and several others. summon personally. Hence, no substituted service or service by publication
Romasan filed a complaint and claimed that the issuance by the DENR was will be allowed based on such defective return.
illegal since the property was already released for disposition to private ● As a rule, Personal Service of Summons is the preferred mode of service.
individuals. However, other modes of serving summons may be done when justified.
● Attempts were made to personally serve summons on De Pedro but they all Service of Summons by Publication in a newspaper of general circulation is
failed. The officer’s return dated Feb 22, 1999 had the following content: allowed when the defendant or respondent is designated as an unknown
owner or if his whereabouts are “unknown and cannot be ascertained by
OFFICER’S RETURN diligent inquiry.”
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th and 18th day of February, 1999, I have served a ● But such defect is cured when the defendant or respondent voluntarily
copy of the summons with complaint and annexes dated January 29, 1999 issued by appears in trial or participates in the proceedings, it is generally construed as
Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 74, Antipolo City upon sufficient service of summons. As in this case, the filing of a motion for new
defendants in the above-entitled case on the following, to wit; trial or reconsideration is tantamount to voluntary appearance.
1. AURORA N. DE PEDRO – Unserved for the reason that according to the messenger ● Proper service of summon is needed because failure to serve summons means
of Post Office of Pasig their [sic] is no person in the said given address. that the court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
● Romasan then filed a motion to serve summon and the complaint BY ○ Jurisdiction over the persons of defendants or respondents is
PUBLICATION. The motion was granted and was published in People’s acquired by the court either through a (1) valid service of
Balita. summons; or (2) voluntary submission. Voluntary submission is
● Thereafter, Romasan moved to declare all defendants in its complaints, made when defendant participates in the trial despite improper
including De Pedro, in default for failure to file their answers. service of summons

○ Jurisdiction over the parties is required regardless of the type of
action – whether action in personam, in rem or quasi in rem.
Jurisdiction over the person is still needed in action in in rem and
quasi in rem to satisfy the requirements of due process. Due process
requires that those with interest to the thing in litigation be notified.
Violation of due process rights is a jurisdictional defect. Hence,
regardless of the nature of the action, proper service of summons is
imperative.
● When other modes are availed, the Sheriff’s return must contain
circumstances that warranted the deviation from preferring personal service
of summons. Otherwise, the substituted service cannot be upheld.
● A Sheriff’s return enjoys a presumption of regularity if it contains (1) details
of the circumstances of his attempt to serve the summons personally; and (2)
particulars showing the impossibility of serving the same within reasonable
time. No presumption of regularity if the return was merely pro forma.
● Despite the foregoing, the SC ruled that the CA was correct not to grant De
Pedro’s motion for new trial because “lack of court jurisdiction over her
person” is not one of the grounds to grant a new trial. It should have been the
proper subject of an action for annulment of judgment.
● However, De Pedro was barred from filing a petition for annulment of
judgment. Under the Rules, an action for annulment of judgment may be
based only on two grounds: (1) extrinsic fraud; and (2) lack of jurisdiction.
● In several cases, the Court has held that such action may NOT be invoked (1)
where the party has availed himself of the remedy of new trial, appeal, petition
for relief, or other appropriate remedy and lost; or (2) where he has failed to
avail himself of those remedies through his own fault or negligence.".
● In this case, the grounds she asserted for a motion for new trial and the action
for annulment are the same: lack of jurisdiction and litis pendentia. The Court
ruled that her actions raising the same grounds reveals an intent to secure a
judgment in her favor by abusing and making a mockery of legal remedies
provided by law.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED; The Court of Appeals July 7, 2010 decision in
CA G.R. SP. No. 96471 is AFFIRMED.

CARSON REALTY v. RED ROBIN SECURITY AGENCY may not be able to comply with the 15-day prescribed period.Thus, when
GR No. 225035, 2017-02-08 || Regado || Velasco Jr., J:. Carson sought for an affirmative relief of a 15-day extension from April 27,
2007 to file its pleading, it already voluntarily submitted itself to the
Petitioner/s: Carson Realty & Management Corp
jurisdiction of the RTC.
Respondent/s: Red Robin Security Agency and Monina Santos
● On November 9, 2007, Process Server Pajila submitted his Officer's Report
stating in essence that he attempted to serve the alias Summons dated
Doctrine:
September 24, 2007 on the President and General Manager of Carson, as well
● Before substituted service of summons is resorted to, the parties
as on the Board of Directors and Corporate Secretary, but they were not
must: (a) indicate the impossibility of personal service of
around.
summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted
● Hence, he was advised by a certain Lorie Fernandez, the '"secretary" of the
to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served
company, to bring the alias Summons to the law office of Atty. Roxas but to no
upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in
avail
the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of
● This prompted him (process server) to resort to substituted service of the alias
business of the defendant.
Summons by leaving a copy thereof with a certain Mr. JR Taganila, but the
● As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is
latter also refused to acknowledge receipt of the alias Summons
deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. This,
● Atty. Roxas filed a Manifestation stating that the alias Summons was again
however, is tempered only by the concept of conditional
improperly and invalidly served as his law office was not empowered to receive
appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to
summons on behalf of Carson.
challenge, among others, the court's jurisdiction over his person
● the RTC denied the motion filed by Santos to declare Carson in default due to
cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority
improper service of summons.
● Thereafter, Santos requested the RTC for the issuance of another alias
Facts: Summons. The RTC granted this request and issued an alias Summons dated
● On March 2007, respondent Santos filed a Complaint for Sum of Money and September 9, 2008.Santos filed a second Motion to Declare Defendant in
Damages against petitioner Carson with the RTC. As per the Officer's Return Default in January 2009. The RTC granted the motion and allowed her to
dated April 12, 2007 of Process Server Pajila, a copy of the Summons dated present her evidence ex-parte in its Order dated June 29, 2009.
April 11, 2007, together with the Complaint and its annexes, was served upon ● On August 27, 2009, Carson filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Order of
Carson at its business address through its "corporate secretary," Precilla S. Default.The RTC denied the same.
Serrano. ● Carson filed an urgent Motion for reconsideration. In the meantime, Santos
● Thereafter, the appointed Corporate Secretary and legal counsel of Carson, filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Set for Hearing and for Reception of Evidence
Atty. Roxas filed an Appearance and Motion dated April 25, 2007 with the Before the Branch Clerk of Court
court wherein the latter entered his appearance and acknowledged that the RTC Ruling: Denied Carson’s urgent MR and granted Santos’ Ex-Parte Motion to set
Summons was served and received by one of the staff assistants of Carson. case for hearing and for reception of evidence before the branch clerk
● Atty. Roxas prayed for an extension of 15 days from April 27, 2007 within CA Ruling: Denied the petition filed by Carson and ruled that the RTC had properly
which to file a responsive pleading. acquired jurisdiction over Carson due to its voluntary appearance in court.
● The RTC noted the appearance of Atty. Roxas and granted his request for
extension of time to file a responsive pleading. Issues:
● Instead of filing a responsive pleading, Atty. Roxas moved to dismiss the (1) Whether the RTC acquired jurisdiction over Carson -YES
complaint, alleging that the Summons dated April 11, 2007 was not served on (2) Whether Carson was properly declared in default - YES
any of the officers and personnel authorized to receive summons under the
Rules of Court. Ruling:
● In her Comment, Santos countered that while the Summons was initially RTC Acquired jurisdiction over Carson .The substituted service of summons is valid
received by Serrano, who as it turned out was a staff assistant and not the ● In actions in personam, such as the present case, the court acquires
corporate secretary of Carson, the corporation acknowledged receipt of the jurisdiction over the person of the defendant through personal or substituted
Summons when Atty. Roxas alleged in his Appearance and Motion that he service of summons.
● However, because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of acknowledging Carson's receipt of the Summons dated April 11, 2007 and
service and personal service of summons is preferred over substituted service, seeking additional time to file its responsive pleading. As noted by the CA,
parties do not have unbridled right to resort to substituted service of Carson failed to indicate therein that the Appearance and Motion was being
summons. Before substituted service of summons is resorted to, the filed by way of a conditional appearance to question the regularity of the
parties must: (a) indicate the impossibility of personal service of service of summons. Thus, by securing the affirmative relief of additional time
summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to file its responsive pleading, Carson effectively voluntarily submitted to the
to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served jurisdiction of the RTC.
upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in Carson was properly declared in default
the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of ● It bears noting that the propriety of the default order stems from Carson's
business of the defendant. failure to file its responsive pleading despite its voluntary submission to the
● We find that resort to substituted service was warranted since the jurisdiction of the trial court reckoned from its filing of the Appearance and
impossibility of personal service is clearly apparent. Motion, and not due to its failure to file its answer to the September 8, 2008
● The foregoing requirements for a valid substituted service of summons were alias Summons
substantially complied with.
● Indeed, the Return established the impossibility of personal service to WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 20, 2015 and
Carson's officers, as shown by the efforts made by Process Server Pajila to Resolution dated June 8, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA¬ G.R. SP No. 121983 are
serve the September 8, 2008 alias Summons on Carson's President/General AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.
Manager. In particular, several attempts to serve the summons on these
officers were made on four separate occasions: October 2, 2008, October 16,
2008, October 27, 2008, and October 28, 2008, but to no avail.
● On his fourth and final attempt, Process Server Pajila served the summons on
Fernandez, Carson's receptionist, due to the unavailability and difficulty to
locate the company's corporate officers.
● The pertinent portion of the Return states: Substituted service of summons
was resorted to by leaving the copy of the Alias Summons at the company's
office through its employee, MS. LORIE FERNANDEZ, however, she refused
to acknowledge receipt of the process.
● Based on the facts, there was a deliberate plan of Carson's for its officers not
to receive the Summons.
In any event, even if We concede the invalidity of the substituted service, such is of little
significance in view of the fact that the RTC had already acquired jurisdiction over
Carson early on due to its voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
● Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint.
On the other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired
either through the service of summons upon them or through their voluntary
appearance in court and their submission to its authority.
● As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is
deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. This,
however, is tempered only by the concept of conditional appearance, such that
a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the
court's jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to
its authority.
● Carson voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC when it filed,
through Atty. Roxas, the Appearance and Motion dated April 25, 2007
ROBINSON V. MIRALLES ● The trial court ruled in favor of Miralles. A copy of the order was sent to
Robinson by registered mail at her new address. Upon motion of Miralles, the
Petitioner/s: Remelita M. Robinson
trial court issued a writ of execution.
Respondent/s: Celita B. Miralles
● Robinson then filed a petition for relief from judgment by default, claiming
that she was not properly served summons. Hence this appeal.
Doctrine: For substituted service to be justified, the following
circumstances must be clearly established: (a) personal service of summons
Issue: Whether the substituted service of summons was valid. YES.
within a reasonable time was impossible; (b) efforts were exerted to locate
the party; and (c) the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age
Ratio:
and discretion residing at the party’s residence or upon a competent person
● Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought
in charge of the party’s office or place of business. Failure to do so would
against him or her. In a civil action, service of summons is the means by which
invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds.
the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Any judgment
without such service, in the absence of a valid waiver, is null and void.
Facts: ● Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, the
● Celita Miralles filed with the RTC of Paranaque City a complaint for sum of service of summons may be made through personal or substituted service in
money against Remelita Robinson. Allegedly, Remelita borrowed the manner provided for in Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of
US$20,054.00 from Miralles as shown by a Memorandum of Agreement they Procedure, as amended, thus:
both executed. ○ SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant – Whenever practicable, the
● Summons was served on Robinson at her given address. However, per return summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant
of service of Sheriff Maximo Potente, she no longer resides at such address. in person, or if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to
● The trial court issued an alias summons to be served at No. 19 Baguio St., him.
Alabang Hills, Muntinlupa City, Robinson’s new address. Again, the summons ○ SEC. 7. Substituted service – If, for justifiable causes, the defendant
could not be served. cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the
● According to the Sheriff: “The Security Guard assigned at the gate of Alabang preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the
Hills refused to let me go inside the subdivision so that I could effect the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable
service of the summons to Robinson. The security guard alleged that Robinson age and discretion then residing therein; or (b) by leaving the copies
had given them instructions not to let anybody proceed to her house if she is at the defendant’s office or regular place of business with some
not around. competent person in charge thereof.
○ I explained to the Security Guard that I am a sheriff serving the ● Under our procedural rules, personal service is generally preferred over
summons to Robinson, and if she is not around, summons can be substituted service, the latter mode of service being a method extraordinary
received by any person of suitable age and discretion living in the in character.
same house. Despite all the explanation, the security guard by the ● Robinson contends that the security guard is not the proper party to receive
name of A.H. Geroche still refused to let me go inside the subdivision summons:
and served the summons to Robinson. The same thing happened ○ We have ruled that the statutory requirements of substituted service
when I attempted to serve the summons previously. must be followed strictly, faithfully, and fully and any substituted
● Therefore, the summons was served by leaving a copy thereof together with service other than that authorized by the Rules is considered
the copy of the complaint to the security guard by the name of A.H. Geroche, ineffective. However, we frown upon an overly strict application of
who refused to affix his signature on the original copy thereof, so he will be the Rules. It is the spirit, rather than the letter of the procedural
the one to give the same to Robinson. rules, that governs.
● Miralles then filed a motion to declare Robinson in default for her failure to ○ In his Return, Sheriff Potente declared that he was refused entry by
file an answer seasonably despite service of summons. The Trial court allowed the security guard in Alabang Hills twice. The latter informed him
her to present her evidence ex parte. that Robinson prohibits him from allowing anybody to proceed to
her residence whenever she is out. Obviously, it was impossible for

the sheriff to effect personal or substituted service of summons upon
Robinson.
○ We note that she failed to controvert the sheriff’s declaration. Nor
did she deny having received the summons through the security
guard.
○ Considering her strict instruction to the security guard, she must
bear its consequences. Thus, we agree with the trail court that
summons has been properly served upon Robinson and that it has
acquired jurisdiction over her.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and we AFFIRM the assailed
Orders of the RTC, Branch 274, Parañaque City, in Civil Case No. 00-0372. Costs
against petitioner.

ORION SECURITY CORPORATION VS. KALFAM ENTERPRISES, INC. ● Kalfam maintains that its filing of an opposition to Orion's motion to declare
Kalfam in default and other subsequent pleadings questioning the trial courts
Petitioner/s: ORION SECURITY CORPORATION
jurisdiction over it does not amount to voluntary appearance.
Respondent/s: KALFAM ENTERPRISES, INC.
● Kalfam stresses it was not properly served with summons via substituted
service since the security guard on whom it was purportedly served was not
Doctrine:
the competent person contemplated by Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
1. in case of substituted service, there should be a report indicating
● TC ruled in favor of Orion. CA reversed it saying that summons was not validly
that the person who received the summons in the defendants
served on Kalfam
behalf was one with whom the defendant had a relation of
confidence ensuring that the latter would actually receive the
Issue:
summons
Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over respondent either by (1) valid
2. A party who makes a special appearance in court challenging the
substituted service of summons on respondent; or (2) respondents voluntary
jurisdiction of said court based on the ground of invalid service of
appearance in the trial court and submission to its authority. - NO for both.
summons is not deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court.
Ratio:
● Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint.
Facts: On the other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired
● Orion Security Corporation is engaged in the business of providing security either through the service of summons upon them or through their voluntary
services. One of its clients is Kalfam Enterprises, Inc. appearance in court and their submission to its authority
● Kalfam was not able to pay Orion for services rendered. Orion thus filed a ● As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant.
complaint for collection of sum of money. ● It is only when summons cannot be served personally within a reasonable
● The sheriff tried to serve the summons and a copy of the complaint on the period of time that substituted service may be resorted to.
secretary of Kalfam's manager. However, Kalfam's representatives allegedly ● Kalfam's president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
refused to acknowledge their receipt. treasurer, or in-house counsel never received the summons against
● When Kalfam failed to file an Answer, Orion filed a motion to declare Kalfam respondent, either in person or by substituted service.
in default.The trial court, however, denied the motion on the ground that there ● Note that in case of substituted service 19, there should be a report indicating
was no proper service of summons on Kalfam that the person who received the summons in the defendants behalf was one
● Orion then filed a motion for alias summons, which the trial court granted. with whom the defendant had a relation of confidence ensuring that the latter
● The process server again left the summons and a copy of the complaint would actually receive the summons
through Kalfam's security guard, who allegedly refused to acknowledge their ● Orion failed to show that the security guard who received the summons in
receipt. respondents behalf shared such relation of confidence that respondent would
● Again, Kalfam failed to file an Answer and Kalfam was declared in default. surely receive the summons.
● Thereafter, Orion was allowed to adduce evidence ex parte ● The trial court never acquired jurisdiction over Kalfam by the its voluntary
● According to Orion, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Kalfam due to appearance in court proceedings.
the its voluntary appearance. Orion insists substituted service of summons on ● A party who makes a special appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction
Kalfam's security guard is substantial compliance with the rule on service of of said court based on the ground of invalid service of summons is not deemed
summons, in view of the exceptional circumstances in the present case. to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
● Kalfam however, counters that the special appearance of its counsel does not
constitute voluntary appearance.
19SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at
within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge
(a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of thereof.
● Kalfam, in its special appearance, precisely questioned the jurisdiction of the
trial court on the ground of invalid service of summons. Thus, it cannot be
deemed to have submitted to said courts authority.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated February 17, 2004
and Resolution dated April 22, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70565
are AFFIRMED. Let the case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings
upon valid service of summons to respondent. No pronouncement as to costs.

B.D. LONG SPAN BUILDERS, INC. V. R.S. AMEPLOQUIO REALITY the service of summons upon them or through their voluntary appearance in court and
their submission to its authority. The service of summons is a vital and indispensable
Petitioner/s: B.D. Long Span Builders, Inc.
ingredient of due process. As a rule, if defendants have not been validly summoned, the
Respondent/s: R.S. Ameploquio Reality
court acquires no jurisdiction over their person, and a judgment rendered against them
is null and void.
Doctrine: If the summons cannot be served on the defendant personally
within a reasonable period of time, then substituted service may be resorted
2. Section 11 of Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
to. Nonetheless, the impossibility of prompt personal service must be
SEC. 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity.' When the defendant is a
shown by stating that efforts have been made to find the defendant
corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines
personally and that such efforts have failed. This is necessary because
with a juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner,
substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is a
general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
method extraordinary in character and hence may be used only as
prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. The statutory
3. As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant. In case of a
requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and
domestic private juridical entity, the service of summons must be made upon an officer
fully, and any substituted service other than that authorized by statute is
who is named in the statute (i.e., the president, managing partner, general manager,
considered ineffective.
corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel), otherwise, the service is
insufficient. The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will
receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons
Facts: be served on a representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will
1. BD Long Span Builders and R.S Ampeloquio Realty entered into a contract where BD know what to do with the legal papers served on him.
Long Span agreed to render “rip rapping” construction services at Ampeloquio
International Resort in Cavite for Php50M. They entered into another contract for 4. However, if the summons cannot be served on the defendant personally within a
Php30M. To secure performance, BD Long Span deposited a cash bond (Php800K). reasonable period of time, then substituted service may be resorted to. Section 7 of Rule
14 provides:
2. R.S Ampeloquio failed to comply with its obligations under the Agreements, resulting SEC. 7. Substituted service.' If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served
in the cancellation of the project. BD Long Span demanded the return of the cash bond within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected
but RS Ampeloquio refused. (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at
3. BD Long Span filed with the RTC a complaint for rescission of contract and damages defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge
against respondent. Summons and a copy of the complaint were served on thereof.
respondent, through its staff member, Romel Dolahoy.
5. Nonetheless, the impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown by stating
4. RS Ampeloquio failed to file an Answer or any responsive pleading to the complaint. that efforts have been made to find the defendant personally and that such efforts have
Upon motion of BD Long Span, RTC declared RS Ameploquio in default. RTC ruled in failed. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method
favor of BD Long Span. CA reversed. BD Long Span appealed to the SC, hence the case of service. It is a method extraordinary in character and hence may be used only as
at bar. prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. The statutory requirements
of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted
Issue: service other than that authorized by statute is considered ineffective.
Did the CA err in ruling that there was invalid service of summons upon respondent,
and hence the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over RS Ampeloquio?-- NO 6. In this case, the Return by Process Server provides:
This is to certify that:
Ratio:
1. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint. On the On October 17, 2002 at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning, undersigned tried to cause
other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service of the Summons together with the attached complaint & its annexes in the
above-entitled case to the defendant at his given address on record. Mr Romel Dalahoy, No. 78259. Let the case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings upon
a staff of said Realty received the said Summons with the attached complaint & its valid service of summons to respondent.
annexes as evidenced by the former's signature as appearing on the original copy of the
aforesaid Summons.
Henceforth, the said Summons with the attached complaint & its annexes to Atty.
Evangeline V. Tiongson, Clerk of Court V, this Court, is respectfully returned, DULY
SERVED, by substituted service.
October 17, 2002, Muntinlupa City

Angelito C. Reyes
Process Server
7.Clearly, the summons was not served personally on the defendant (respondent)
through any of the officers enumerated in Section 11 of Rule 14; rather, summons was
served by substituted service on the defendant's staff member, Romel Dolahoy.
Substituted service was resorted to on the server's first attempt at service of summons,
and there was no indication that prior efforts were made to render prompt personal
service on the defendant.
Moreover, nothing on record shows that Romel Dolahoy, the staff member who
received the summons in respondent's behalf, shared such relation of confidence
ensuring that respondent would surely receive the summons. Thus, following our ruling
in Orion, we are unable to accept petitioner's contention that service on Romel Dolahoy
constituted substantial compliance with the requirements of substituted service.
8. Petitioner's contention that respondent's filing of Notice of Appeal effectively cured

any defect in the service of summons is devoid of merit. It is well-settled that a
defendant who has been declared in default has the following remedies, to wit: (1) he
may, at any time after discovery of the default but before judgment, file a motion, under
oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer was due
to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has a meritorious defense;
(2) if judgment has already been rendered when he discovered the default, but before
the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under
Section 1(a) of Rule 37; (3) if he discovered the default after the judgment has become
final and executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and (4)
he may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence
or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by
him.19 Thus, respondent, which had been declared in default, may file a notice of
appeal and question the validity of the trial court's judgment without being considered
to have submitted to the trial court's authority.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Court of Appeals'

Decision dated 14 July 2005 and Resolution dated 30 September 2005 in CA-G.R. CV
WONG V FACTOR-KOYAMA acquire jurisdiction over his person; and that he was not given the opportunity to
oppose Koyamas Motion to have him declared in default.
Petitioner/s: ALEXANDER TAM WONG
Respondent/s: CATHERINE FACTOR-KOYAMA
RTC denied, CA dismissed Wong’s petition for Certiorari (improper remedy). Hence,
Wong filed the instant petition.
Doctrine: Before resorting to substituted service, a sheriff is enjoined to
try his best efforts to accomplish personal service on the defendant. And
IN THE MEANTIME, since the neither the CA nor the SC issued a TRO, the RTC
since the defendant is expected to try to avoid and evade service of
continued the hearing of the case. It allowed Wong to cross-examine Koyama, which
summons, the sheriff must be resourceful, persevering, canny, and diligent
Wong’s counsel extensively did, even though the previous order of default had not been
in serving the process on the defendant. Resorting to substituted service,
lifted. The RTC allowed this in the interest of justice and fair play.
after merely trying to serve the summons at the defendant’s residence on
three different dates while he was in his office, is improper.
Issues:
1. WON the Sheriff properly resorted to substituted service of summons --- NO
Facts: 2. WON the Court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant Wong
A Complaint for specific performance, sum of money, and damages was filed with the --- YES
RTC by private respondent Koyama against Wong.
● Koyama alleged in her Complaint that Wong deliberately refused to execute Ratio:
and deliver a deed of absolute sale, and to surrender the TCT of a 1. The Court, after a careful study of Sheriff Baloloy’s Return, finds that he improperly
condominium in California Garden Square, Mandaluyong City, which she had resorted to substituted service upon Wong of the summons.
already bought from him. Where the action is in personam, i.e., one that seeks to impose some responsibility or
● Koyama further averred that she had been renting out the subject property to liability directly upon the person of the defendant through the judgment of a court, and
foreign tourists, but Wong padlocked the same while she was in Japan the defendant is in the Philippines, the service of summons may be made through
attending to her business. When she requested him to open the subject personal or substituted service in the manner described in Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14 of
property, he reportedly mauled her, causing her physical injuries, and also the Revised Rules of Court.
took her personal belongings.
Under our procedural rules, service of summons in person of defendants is generally
The RTC issued summons addressed to Wong at his residence in Quezon City. However, preferred over substituted service.
the original summons and the accompanying copy of the Complaint and its Annexes ● Substituted service derogates the regular method of personal service. It is an
were eventually returned to the RTC by Sheriff Baloloy. extraordinary method since it seeks to bind the respondent or the defendant
● In his Return, he indicated that the summons should already be deemed to the consequences of a suit even though notice of such action is served not
DULY SERVED. upon him but upon another to whom the law could only presume would notify
● According to him, Sheriff Baloloy had repeatedly attempted to serve the him of the pending proceedings.
summons at Wongs residential address on three different dates, but Wong was
always not around according to the latters housemaids. Sheriff Baloloy then The Court requires that the Sheriffs Return clearly and convincingly show the
attempted to leave the summons with Mira, Wong’s caretaker, who is of legal impracticability or hopelessness of personal service. Proof of service of summons must:
age, and residing at the same address for two and a half years, but Mira refused (a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time;
to acknowledge or receive the same. (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and
(c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion
After the lapseof the 15-day reglementary periodand upon motion of Koyama, the RTC who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of
declared Wong in default and allowed Koyama to present her evidence ex parte. business, of the defendant.
Wong, by special appearance of counsel,then filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss It is likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in
asserting that there was no service of summons upon him, hence, the RTC did not the proof of service or in the officers return. The failure to comply faithfully, strictly and

fully with all the foregoing requirements of substituted service renders the service of
summons ineffective. Dispositive:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. Costs against the petitioner.
Apart from establishing that Sheriff Baloloy went to Wongs residence on three different
dates, and that the latter was not around every time, there is nothing else in the Sheriffs
Return to establish that Sheriff Baloloy exerted extraordinary efforts to locate Wong.
● During his visits to Wongs residence, Sheriff Baloloy was informed by the
housemaids that Wong was at his office.
● There is no showing, however, that Sheriff Baloloy exerted effort to know
Wongs office address, verify his presence thereat, and/or personally serve the
summons upon him at his office.
● Although Wong was out of town when Sheriff Baloloy attempted to serve the
summons at the formers residence on one of the dates, there was no indication
that Wongs absence was other than temporary or that he would not soon
return.
Sheriff Baloloys three visits to Wongs residence hardly constitute effort on his part to
locate Wong; and Wongs absence from his residence during Sheriff Baloloys visits,
since Wong was at the office or out-of-town, does not connote impossibility of personal
service of summons upon him.
● It must be stressed that, before resorting to substituted service, a sheriff is
enjoined to try his best efforts to accomplish personal service on the
defendant. And since the defendant is expected to try to avoid and evade
service of summons, the sheriff must be resourceful, persevering, canny, and
diligent in serving the process on the defendant.
2.The RTC acquired jurisdiction over Wong by virtue of his voluntary appearance
before it.
Even without valid service of summons, a court may still acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, if the latter voluntarily appears before it.
The Court here noted that the RTC acquired jurisdiction NOT when Wong filed a
motion to dismiss, BUT when he, through counsel, extensively cross-examined Koyana,
despite knowledge that the order of default had not yet been lifted.
By actively participating in the hearing, he effectively acknowledged full control of the

RTC over the case and over his person as the defendant therein; he is, thus, deemed to
have voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of said trial court.
The Court further stressed the fact that the RTC already rendered a Decision and Wong
filed with the RTC a Notice of Appeal. Given these developments, the Court deems it
unnecessary to still address the issue of whether Wong was improperly declared in
default by the RTC in its Order.

CEZAR VS. RICAFORT-BAUTISTA Parte Motion to Re-Set Hearing. The records also disclose that the rescheduled hearing
did not push through and in fact, it was rescheduled a couple of more times per
Petitioner/s: Virgilio P CEZAR
agreement of the parties. Finally, public respondent granted private respondent's
Respondent/s: HON. HELEN RICAFORT-BAUTISTA in her capacity as
Motion for Execution. Hence, the present petition.
Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 260, City of Parañaque and SPECIFIED
MATERIALS, CO
Issue: WON the court a quo acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by
virtue of substituted service of summons effected by sheriff Juan C. Marquez.
Doctrine: A voluntary appearance is a waiver of the necessity of a formal
notice. An appearance in whatever form, without expressly objecting to the
Ratio:
jurisdiction of the court over the person, is a submission to the jurisdiction
There are two ways through which jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent is
of the court over the person
acquired – either through the service of summons upon them or through their
voluntary appearance in court.
Facts: Specified Materials Corp. filed a Complaint for collection of sum of money The Rules of Court requires that, whenever practicable, summons must be served by
against petitioner arising from the latter's failure to pay the construction materials it handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person. In case the defendant refuses to
purportedly purchased under a credit line extended by private respondent. As receive and sign for it, by tendering the summons to him or her. However, in the event
petitioner failed to pay for the construction materials that summons cannot be served within a reasonable time, the Rules permit that
substituted service may be resorted to.
private respondent sent two letters to petitioner and his brother, Perfecto, reminding
them of their obligation. Private respondent's representatives met with petitioner in In this case, the sheriff employed the substituted service of summons. It must be
order to reconcile their conflicting records. During said meeting, petitioner allegedly emphasized that laws providing for modes other than the personal service of summons
admitted that he failed to take into account some deliveries. Petitioner then requested must be strictly followed in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person
that they meet again after two days so that he could verify his documents but he failed of respondent or defendant. Compliance therewith should appear affirmatively on the
to show up for the subsequent meetings. return.
Thereafter, private respondent sent a final demand letter to petitioner.
As the sheriff's return in the present case does not contain any statement with regard
After the filing of the complaint, summons was issued to petitioner and this was served to the impossibility of personal service the same is patently defective and so the
by the Sheriff Marquez, stating in his return that it was served to petitioner thru Mr. presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions will not lie.
Arsenio Robles, an employee of the former who is authorized to transact business, as Nevertheless, we still hold that jurisdiction was validly acquired by the trial court.
per his signature appearing below summons. Although the substituted service upon him of summons was defective, said defect was
cured by his voluntary appearance.
Petitioner failed to file his Answer. Thus, private respondent moved that he be declared
in default which was granted by the court. Private respondent was able to present its A voluntary appearance is a waiver of the necessity of a formal notice. An appearance
evidence. Petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside Decision arguing that the trial court did in whatever form, without expressly objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the
not acquire jurisdiction over his person. This motion was denied. person, is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court over the person. While the formal
method of entering an appearance in a cause pending in the courts is to deliver to the
Following the denial of its Motion to Set Aside Decision, petitioner filed before the CA clerk a written direction ordering him to enter the appearance of the person who
a Petition for Annulment of Judgment, Preliminary Injunction with Prayer for TRO. subscribes it, an appearance may be made by simply filing a formal motion, or plea or
This petition was dismissed. Petitioner then filed a MR but this was denied. Hence, answer. This formal method of appearance is not necessary. He may appear without
Petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the SC which denied the same such formal appearance and thus submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court. He
for failure to comply with procedural requirements. may appear by presenting a motion, for example, and unless by such appearance he
specifically objects to the jurisdiction of the court, he thereby gives his assent to the
Thereafter, private respondent filed a Motion for Execution before the trial court. The jurisdiction of the court over his person.
scheduled hearing of this motion was ordered reset after petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-
As the records of this case disclose, after private respondent moved for the execution of
the trial court's decision, petitioner filed a motion for a re-setting of the court's hearing
thereon.
Hence, in this case, petitioner's filing of a Motion for Re-setting of the Hearing
effectively cured the defect of the substituted service of summons. Petitioner's
insistence of lack of jurisdiction over his person is utterly lacking in any legal basis.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Petition is

DISMISSED. The Decision dated 9 September 1997 rendered by the Regional Trial
Court of Parañaque City in Civil Case No. 96-0473 is hereby AFFIRMED and the
Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 16 June 1999 is hereby LIFTED

BELEN V. CHAVEZ Issue:
WHETHER the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the persons of Sps Belen thru either the
Petitioner/s: Sps. Domingo M. Belen and Dominga P. Belen herein
proper service of summons or the appearance of the late Atty. Alcantara - YES, service
represented by their atty-in-fact Nery B. Avecilla
to Sps Belen were defective but by virtue of Atty. Alcantara’s appearance,
Respondent/s: Hon. Pablo R. Chavez, presiding Judge, RTC branch 87,
the RTC acquired jurisdiction.
Rosario, Batangas and all other persons acting under his orders and Sps.
Silvestre and N. Pacleb and Patricia A. PACLEB, represented therein by the
Ratio:
attorney in fact Joselito Rioveros
SUMMONS
1. The action in the instant case is in the nature of an action in personam because
Doctrine: The Court can acquire jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil
Sps. Pacleb are suing to enforce their personal rights under the foreign
case by means of summons or by the defendant’s voluntary appearance and
judgment.
submission to the authority of the Court.
a. In an action in personam wherein the defendant is a non-
resident who does not voluntarily submit himself to the
Facts: authority of the court, personal service of summons is essential to the
1. The instant petition originated from the action of Sps Pacleb, represented by acquisition of jurisdiction over her person. If he is not found in the
their atty in fact Rioveros, for the enforcement of a foreign judgement against state, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and
Sps Belen. therefore cannot validly try and decide the case against him.
2. Sps Pacleb argue that they secured a judgement by default in a case rendered b. An exception was laid down in Gemperle v. Schenker wherein a
by the Superior Court of the State of California. This judgement ordered Sps. non-resident was served with summons through his wife, who was a
Belen to pay $56,204.69 representing loan repayment. resident of the Philippines and who was his representative and
3. The summons was served on Sps Belen’s address in San Gregorio, Alaminos, attorney-in-fact in a prior civil case filed by him.
Laguna and was received by a certain Marcelo. 2. It has been consistently maintained that Sps Belen were not physically present
4. The counsel for Sps Belen, Atty Alcantara, filed an answer arguing that Sps in the Philippines. Atty. Alcantara had already averred that Sps Belen were
Belen were actually residents of California, USA. residents of California, U.S.A. and that he was appearing only upon the
5. In view of Sps Belen’s failure to attend the pre-trial conference, the RTC instance of petitioners' relatives.
ordered the ex parte presentation of evidence for Sps Pacleb. 3. The service of summons on Sps Belen's purported address in San Gregorio,
6. Before the presentation of evidence, Atty Alcantara filed a motion to dismiss. Alaminos, Laguna was defective and did not serve to vest in court jurisdiction
The RTC held the ex parte presentation of evidence in abeyance. But the over their persons.
motion was eventually denied by the RTC. 4. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the appearance of
7. During the pendency of the proceedings, Atty Alcantara died without the RTC Atty. Alcantara and his filing of numerous pleadings were sufficient to vest
being informed. jurisdiction over the persons of Sps Belen. Through certain acts, Atty.
8. The RTC promulgated a decision against Sps Belen. A copy of the decision Alcantara was impliedly authorized by Sps Belen to appear on their behalf.
intended for Atty Alcantara was returned with the notation “Addressee Atty. Alcantara attached in the motion to dismiss a duly authenticated copy of
Deceased”. Another copy of the decision was sent to the Laguna address of the judgment of dismissal and a photocopy of the identification page of
Sps. Belen. petitioner Domingo Belen's U.S. passport. These documents could have been
9. Sps. Pacleb obtained a writ of execution which lead to Sps Belen’s property supplied only by petitioners, indicating that they have consented to the
being levied. appearance of Atty. Alcantara on their behalf. In sum, petitioners voluntarily
10. Atty Culvera entered his appearance for Sps. Belen and he subsequently filed submitted themselves through Atty. Alcantara to the jurisdiction of the RTC.
a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution. This was denied. COPY OF THE RTC DECISION
11. Atty Culvera also filed on Jan 6, 2004 a Notice of Appeal from the RTC 5. Upon the death of Atty. Alcantara, the lawyer-client relationship between him
decision arguing that he only received a copy of the decision on Dec 29, 2003. and petitioners has ceased, thus, the service of the RTC decision on him is
12. Sps. Belen elevated the case via Rule 65 to the CA, imputing grave abuse of ineffective and did not bind petitioners.
discretion. This was dismissed by the CA. 6. The subsequent service on petitioners' purported "last known address" by
registered mail is also defective because it does not comply with the requisites
under the aforequoted Section 7 of Rule 13 on service by registered mail.
Section 7 of Rule 13 contemplates service at the present address of the party
and not at any other address of the party.
7. Therefore, the running of the fifteen-day period for appeal did not commence
upon the service of the RTC decision to Atty. Alcantara or at the Laguna
address. It is deemed served on Sps Belen only upon its receipt by Atty.
Culvera on 29 December 2003. Therefore, the filing of the Notice of Appeal on
06 January 2004 is within the reglementary period and should be given due
course.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED
and the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88731 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the orders dated 7 July 2004 and 2 February
2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Rosario, Batangas, Branch 87 are SET ASIDE. The
RTC is also ordered to GIVE DUE COURSE to the Notice of Appeal filed by Atty.
Culvera on 06 January 2004. Costs against private respondents. aD

MOTEFALCON V VASQUEZ a) Vasquez was furnished with court orders and notices of the
proceedings at his last known address, but these were returned as he
Petitioner/s: Dolores Motefalcon & Laurence Montefalcon
had allegedly moved to another place and left no new
Respondent/s: Ronnie Vasquez
address.
8) In 2001, the court granted petitioners' prayers:
Doctrine: Summons in a suit in personam against a temporarily absent
a) Explaining that they had no ill- motive and that Dolores gave a
resident may be by substituted service.
truthful testimony.
b) The court added that Vasquez admitted the truth of the allegations
A plaintiff is merely required to know the defendant's residence, office or
by his silence.
regular business place. It is immaterial that defendant does not receive
c) It further explained that Laurence's certificate of live birth, being a
actual notice.
public document, is irrefutably a prima facie evidence of illegitimate
filiation.
Facts: 9) In the same year, Vasquez surfaced.
1) In 1999, petitioner Dolores P. Montefalcon filed a Complaint for a) He filed a notice of appeal to which petitioners opposed.
acknowledgment and support b) Appeal was granted by the court.
a) Against respondent Ronnie S. Vasquez c) Before the appellate court, he argued that the trial court erred in
i) Before the RTC of Naga City. trying and deciding the case as it "never" acquired
2) Alleging that her son Laurence is the illegitimate child of Vasquez: jurisdiction over his person, as well as in awarding P5,000-per-
a) She prayed that Vasquez be obliged to give support to co-petitioner month support, which was allegedly "excessive and exorbitant."
Laurence Montefalcon, whose certificate of live birth he signed as 10) The appellate court noted that the service of summons on Vasquez was
father. "defective" as there was no explanation of impossibility of personal service and
b) According to petitioners, Vasquez only gave a total of P19,000 as an attempt to effect personal service.
support for Laurence since Laurence was born in 1993. 11) Petitioner’s Arguments:
c) Vasquez allegedly also refused to give him regular school allowance a) Petitioners justify the validity of substituted service as Vasquez had
despite repeated demands. left as overseas seafarer when the sheriff served the summons on July
d) Petitioner Dolores added that she and Vasquez are not legally 19, 2000 in Taguig.
married, and that Vasquez has his own family. b) Noting that Vasquez's seaman's book indicated that he left the
3) A sheriff tried to serve the summons and complaint on Vasquez in Aro-aldao, country on January 24, 2000 and came back on October 12, 2000,
Nabua, Camarines Sur. they criticize the appellate court for anchoring its rulings on
a) Vasquez's grandfather received them as Vasquez was in Manila. mere technicality.
b) Vasquez's mother returned the documents to the clerk of court, who c) Petitioners insist that a substituted service is the normal method if
informed the court of the non-service of summons. one is temporarily away from the country as personal service abroad
4) Petitioners then filed a motion to declare Vasquez in default. or by publication are not ordinary means of service.
a) The court denied it for lack of proper service of summons. 12) Vasquez’ Arguments:
5) In 2000, the court issued an alias summons on Vasquez at "10 Int. President a) Vasquez counters that because he was abroad, service of summons
Garcia St., Zone 6, Signal Village, Taguig, Metro Manila" upon petitioners' should have been personal or by publication
motion. i) As substituted service is proper only if a defendant is in the
a) Albeit a Taguig deputy sheriff served it by substituted service on country.
Vasquez's caretaker Raquel Bejer, the sheriff's return incorrectly b) Vasquez also added that the sheriff's return did not state that he
stated "Lazaro" as Vasquez's surname. exerted efforts to personally serve the summons.
6) Another alias summons was issued, also received by Bejer.
7) On petitioners' motion, the trial court declared Vasquez in default for failure Issue: WoN there is a valid substituted service of summons on Vasquez to clothe the
to file an answer despite the substituted service of summons. trial court with jurisdiction over his person.

5) Because Section 16 of Rule 14 uses the words "may" and "also", it is not
Ratio: mandatory.
1) To acquire jurisdiction over the person of a defendant, service of summons a) Other methods of service of summons allowed under the Rules may
must be personal, or if this is not feasible within a reasonable time, then by also be availed of by the serving officer on a defendant-seaman.
substituted service. 6) Ideally, Vasquez must be personally served summons.
2) It is of judicial notice that overseas Filipino seafarers are contractual a) But was personal service of summons practicable? Conversely, was
employees. substituted service of summons justified?
a) They go back to the country once their contracts expire, and wait for 7) Obviously, personal service of summons was not practicable since the
the signing of another contract with the same or new manning defendant was temporarily out of the country.
agency and principal if they wish. a) To proceed with personal service of summons on a defendant-
b) It is therefore common knowledge that a Filipino seaman seaman who went on overseas contract work — would not only be
often has a temporary residence in the urban areas like impractical and futile — it would also be absurd.
Metro Manila, where majority of the manning agencies hold 8) The impossibility of prompt personal service was shown by the fact that the
offices, aside from his home address in the province where he Naga City-based sheriff purposely went to a barrio in Camarines Sur to serve
originates. the summons personally on Vasquez.
3) In this case, respondent Vasquez hails from Camarines Sur but he has lived in a) When service of summons failed, said sheriff ascertained the
Taguig City when the complaint was filed. whereabouts of Vasquez.
a) Notice may then be taken that he has established a residence in either b) Upon being informed that Vasquez was in Manila, the Naga court
place. commissioned a Taguig City-based sheriff to serve the summons.
4) Residence is a place where the person named in the summons is living at the c) Both the Naga and Taguig sheriffs inquired about Vasquez's
time when the service was made, even though he was temporarily abroad at whereabouts, signifying that they did not immediately resort to
the time. substituted service.
a) As an overseas seafarer, Vasquez was a Filipino resident temporarily d) There was no undue haste in effecting substituted service.
out of the country. e) The fact that the Naga court allowed a reasonable time to locate
b) Hence, service of summons on him is governed by Rule 14, Section Vasquez to as far as Taguig shows that there was indeed no
16 of the Rules of Court: precipitate haste in serving the summons.
SEC. 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. — When any action is 9) In this case, we agree that the substituted service in Taguig was valid and
commenced against a defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who justified because previous attempts were made by the sheriffs to serve the
is temporarily out of it, service may, by leave of court, be also effected out of the summons, but to no avail.
Philippines, as under the preceding section. a) Diligent efforts were evidently exerted in the conduct of the
SEC. 15. Extraterritorial service. — When the defendant does not reside and is not concerned sheriffs in the performance of their official duty.
found in the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or b) Also, the person who received the alias summons was of suitable age
relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the and discretion, then residing at Vasquez's dwelling.
defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief c) There is no quarrel that it was really Vasquez's residence, as
demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest evidenced by his employment contract, executed under the
therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines, supervision and authority of the Philippine Overseas Employment
service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal service as Administration (POEA).
under section 6; or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places d) Vasquez cannot deny that in his contract of employment and
and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and seafarer's information sheet, both bearing POEA's letterhead, his
order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the address in Metro Manila was what was correctly mentioned in the
defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order granting alias summons that Bejer received.
such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days i) She must have informed Vasquez one way or another of the
after notice, within which the defendant must answer. suit upon his return in October 2000 after finishing his
nine-month contract with Fathom Ship Management.
e) Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that he had enough time to have (1) It was only when a judgment against him was
the default order set aside. rendered by the trial court that he questioned the
i) The default judgment was rendered on May 28, 2001. validity of service of summons before the appellate
ii) He also had enough time to file a motion for court.
reconsideration. (2) Such failure to appear, and then later to question
(1) But he did nothing. the court's jurisdiction over his person, should not
10) The interregnum between the first but failed attempt at personal service by be taken against herein petitioners.
the RTC of Naga City in Vasquez's place in Camarines Sur to the final e) Between Vasquez's self-serving assertion that he only came to know
substituted service in Metro Manila by a Taguig RTC sheriff was almost eight of the case when his mother told him about the trial court's decision
months, a reasonable time long enough to conclude that personal service had and the sheriff's return on the substituted service which carries a
failed and was futile. presumption of regularity, the latter is undoubtedly deserving of
11) Montalban v Maximo discussion by the SC: more faith and credit.
a) We held in said case that the normal method of service of summons i) The sheriff's certificate of service of summons is prima facie
on one temporarily absent is by substituted service because personal evidence of the facts set out in it.
service abroad and service by publication are not ordinary means of ii) Only clear and convincing evidence may overcome its
summoning defendants. presumption of regularity.
b) Summons in a suit in personam against a temporarily absent iii) Given the circumstances in the present case, we agree that
resident may be by substituted service as domiciliaries of a State are the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty on
always amenable to suits in personam therein. the part of the sheriff stands.
c) "Residence" is the place where the person named in the summons is
living at the time when the service is made, even though he may be Dispositive:
temporarily out of the country at the time. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 29, 2003 and
i) A plaintiff is merely required to know the defendant's Resolution dated July 19, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71944 are
residence, office or regular business place. REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated May 28, 2001 of the Regional Trial
ii) He need not know where a resident defendant actually is at Court, Branch 19, Naga City in Civil Case No. RTC '99-4460 is hereby REINSTATED.
the very moment of filing suit.
iii) He is not even duty-bound to ensure that the person upon Costs against respondent.
whom service was actually made delivers the summons to
the defendant or informs him about it. SO ORDERED.
iv) The law presumes that for him.
v) It is immaterial that defendant does not receive actual
notice.
d) More importantly, the letter of the law must yield to its spirit.
i) The absence in the final sheriff's return of a statement about
the impossibility of personal service does not conclusively
prove that the service is invalid.
ii) Such failure should not unduly prejudice petitioners if what
was undisclosed was in fact done.
iii) Proof of prior attempts at personal service may have been
submitted by the plaintiff during the hearing of any incident
assailing the validity of the substituted service had Vasquez
surfaced when the case was heard.
iv) In fact, he was declared in default.

PALMA V. GALVEZ her clarification/verification before the Philippine Consulate in Ireland; thus, the
counsel prayed for another 20 days to file the Answer.
Petitioner: Leah Palma
· Private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss 6 on the ground that the RTC had
Respondents: HON. DANILO P. GALVEZ, in his capacity as PRESIDING
not acquired jurisdiction over her as she was not properly served with summons, since
JUDGE of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOILO CITY, BRANCH 24;
she was temporarily out of the country; that service of summons on her should conform
and PSYCHE ELENA AGUDO
to Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
· Petitioner opposed this arguing that a substituted service of summons on private
DOCTRINE: A dwelling, house or residence refers to the place where the
respondent's husband was valid and binding on her; that service of summons under
person named in the summons is living at the time when the service is
Section 16, Rule 14 was not exclusive and may be effected by other modes of service,
made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time.
i.e., by personal or substituted service.
· RTC issued its assailed Order granting private respondent'smotion to dismiss. It
The service of the summons intended for the defendant that must be left
found that while the summons was served at private respondent's house and received
with the person of suitable age and discretion residing in the house of the
by respondent's husband, such service did not qualify as a valid service of summons on
defendant. Compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is
her as she was out of the country at the time the summons was served, thus, she was
as important as the issue of due process as that of jurisdiction.
not personally served a summons
· Petitioner is now before the Court alleging that the public respondent committed
The rule presupposes that such a relation of confidence exists between the
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (Rule 65
person with whom the copy is left and the defendant and, therefore,
Certiorari)
assumes that such person will deliver the process to defendant or in some
way give him notice thereof
ISSUE/S: Did Judge Galvez committed a grave abuse of discretion amount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when he ruled for the dismissal of the case on the grounds of
FACTS: improper service of summons - YES/NO
· Leah Palma filed with the RTC an action for damages against the Philippine Heart
Center (PHC), Dr. Danilo Giron and Dr. Bernadette O. Cruz, alleging that the RATIO:
defendants committed professional fault, negligence and omission for having removed · In civil cases, the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
her right ovary against her will, and losing the same and the tissues extracted from her either by the service of summons or by the latter's voluntary appearance and
during the surgery. submission to the authority of the former.
· Although the specimens were subsequently found, petitioner was doubtful and · Private respondent was a Filipino resident who was temporarily out of the
uncertain that the same was hers as the label therein pertained that of somebody else. Philippines at the time of the service of summons; thus, service of summons on her is
· Respondents filed their respective answers. governed by Rule 14 of the Rules of Court:
· Palma subsequently filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Complaint,
praying for the inclusion of additional defendants who were all nurses at the PHC, Ø Sec. 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. — When an action is
namely, Karla Reyes, Myra Mangaser and herein private respondent Agudo. commenced against a defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who
· Summons were subsequently issued to them. is temporarily out of it, service may, by leave of court, be also effected out of the
· RTC's process server submitted his return of summons stating that the alias Philippines, as under the preceding section. (Emphasis supplied)
summons, together with a copy of the amended complaint and its annexes, were served
upon private respondent thru her husband Alfredo Agudo, who received and signed the Ø SEC. 15. Extraterritorial service. — When the defendant does not reside and is not
same as private respondent was out of the country. found in the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or
· Counsel of private respondent filed a Notice of Appearance and a Motion for relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the
Extension of Time to File Answer 4 stating that he was just engaged by private defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief
respondent's husband as she was out of the country and the Answer was already due. demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest
· The Counsel of Private Respondent asked for another extentsion stating that while therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines,
the draft answer was already finished, the same would be sent to private respondent for service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal service as
under section 6; or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places
and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and
order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the
defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem su􀀯cient. Any order granting
such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days
after notice, within which the defendant must answer.
Ø SEC. 7. Substituted service. — If, for justi􀀯able causes, the defendant cannot be
served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be
effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies
at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge
thereof.
· The Court held that a dwelling, house or residence refers to the place where the
person named in the summons is living at the time when the service is made, even
though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time.
· The service of the summons intended for the defendant that must be left with the
person of suitable age and discretion residing in the house of the defendant.
Compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as important as the issue
of due process as that of jurisdiction.
· The rule presupposes that such a relation of confidence exists between the person
with whom the copy is left and the defendant and, therefore, assumes that such person
will deliver the process to defendant or in some way give him notice thereof.
· In this case, the Sheriff's Return stated that private respondent was out of the
country; thus, the service of summons was made at her residence with her
husband,Alfredo P. Agudo, acknowledging receipt thereof. Alfredo was presumably of
suitable age and discretion, who was residing in that place and, therefore, was
competent to receive the summons on private respondent's behalf.
· RTC had indeed acquired jurisdiction over the person of private respondent when
the latter's counsel entered his appearance on private respondent's behalf, without
qualification and without questioning the propriety of the service of summons, and
even filed two Motions for Extension of Time to File Answer.
· In effect, private respondent, through counsel, had already invoked the RTC's
jurisdiction over her person by praying that the motions for extension of time to file
answer be granted.
· Filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for additional
time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default
with motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court.

PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE PTE LTD. VS. DAKILA TRADING ● Dakila filed a motion to admit amended complaint, which sought to change
name of PEIA to PERKIN. It claims that PEIA became a sole proprietorship
Petitioner/s: PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE PTE LTD.
owned by PERKIN and changed its name to Perkinelmer Asia.
Respondent/s: DAKILA TRADING CORPORATION
● RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss of PEIP, compelling PEIP to file Answer to
Amended Complaint.
Doctrine: Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of
● Dakila now alleges that PERKIN’s ownership over personal property in the
the complaint, while jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is
form of shares of stocks in PEIP. The allegations, being mainly for damages,
acquired either through the service of summons upon them in the manner
relates to a property which PERKIN has claim or interest or lien, thus, falling
required by law or through their voluntary appearance in court and their
under the requisites of extraterritorial service under Rule 14. Thus, summons
submission to its authority.
was validly served.
Facts: Issue: W/N the service of summons was proper - No.

● Respondent Dakila Trading entered into a Distribution Agreement in 1990
with Perkin-Elmer Instruments Asia Pte Ltd. (PEIA), a corporation duly Ratio:
organized and existing under the laws of Singapore and engaged in the ● There can never be a valid extraterritorial service of summons upon it, because
business of manufacturing, producing, selling or distributing various the case before the court a quo involving collection of a sum of money and
laboratory/analytical instruments. In the agreement, PEIA appointed the damages is, indeed, an action in personam, as it deals with the personal
respondent as the sole distributor of its products in the Philippines. liability of the petitioner to the respondent by reason of the alleged unilateral
○ Dakila Trading was also granted the right to purchase and sell the termination by the former of the Distribution Agreement.
products of PEIA subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the ● The cause of action is anchored on the claim that petitioner unilaterally
Distribution Agreement. terminated the Distribution Agreement. Thus, the action instituted by
○ PEIA, on the other hand, shall give respondent a commission for the respondent affects the parties alone. It is an action in personam: any judgment
sale of its products in the Philippines. therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded.
● Under the same agreement, respondent shall order the products of PEIA, ● Being an action in personam, personal service of summons within the
which it shall sell in the Philippines, either from PEIA itself or from Perkin- Philippines is necessary in order for the RTC to validly acquire jurisdiction
Elmer Instruments (Philippines) Corporation (PEIP), an affiliate of PEIA. over the person of the petitioner.
○ PEIP is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine ○ This is not possible in the present case because the petitioner is a
laws, and involved in the business of wholesale trading of all kinds of non-resident and is not found within the Philippines.
scientific, biotechnological, and analytical instruments and ○ The allegation in the Amended Complaint that petitioner had
appliances. personal property (shares of stock) in PEIP which is within the
○ PEIA allegedly owned 99% of the shares of PEIP. Philippines did not make the case fall under the instances under Sec
● In 1997, PEIA unilaterally terminated the Distribution Agreement. prompting 15 Rule 14.
respondent to file before the RTC of Mandaluyong, a Complaint for Collection ● Under Section 15, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, there
of Sum of Money and Damages with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of are only four instances wherein a defendant who is a non-resident and is not
Attachment against PEIA and PEIP. found in the country may be served with summons by extraterritorial service:
● RTC ruled denying the prayer for attachment. (1) when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff;
● Dakila filed for Ex Parte Motions for Issuance of Summons and for Leave of (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is property, within the
Court to Deputize Dakila’s General Manager to serve summons outside of the Philippines, in which the defendant claims a lien or an interest, actual or contingent;
Philippines. This was granted by the RTC. An alias summons was served to (3) when the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the
Perkinelmer Asia (Singapore based sole proprietorship owned by PERKIN, defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; and
allegedly distinct from PEIA). (4) when the defendant non-resident’s property has been attached within the
● PEIP moved to dismiss, stating that there is no cause of action. PERKIN Philippines. In these instances, service of summons may be effected by
alleged that Service of summons was erroneous. (a) personal service out of the country, with leave of court;
(b) publication, also with leave of court; or
(c) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
● Also, mere allegations of personal property within the Philippines does not
necessarily make the property subject of an action.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 4 April 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 78981,
affirming the Orders, dated 4 November 2002 and 20 June 2003, of the Regional Trial
Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 212, in Civil Case No. MC99-605, is hereby
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Respondent’s Amended Complaint in Civil Case No.
MC99-605 as against the petitioner is hereby ordered DISMISSED, and all the
proceedings against petitioner in the court a quo by virtue thereof are hereby
DECLARED NULL AND VOID. The Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch
212, is DIRECTED to proceed without further delay with the resolution of respondent’s
Complaint in Civil Case No. MC99-605 as to defendant PEIP, as well as petitioner’s
counterclaim. No costs.

MACASAET V. CO
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss, and directed petitioners to file their answers to
Petitioner/s: ALLEN A. MACASAET, NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR.,
the complaint within the remaining period allowed by the Rules of Court. MR denied.
ISAIAS ALBANO, LILY REYES, JANET BAY, JESUS R. GALANG, AND
The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
RANDY HAGOS
Respondent/s: FRANCISCO R. CO, JR

Issue: W/N the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the petitioners. —YES
Doctrine: The service of the summons should firstly be effected on the
Ratio:
defendant himself whenever practicable. Such personal service consists
either in handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person, or, if
Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction in personam — the power of the court to
the defendant refuses to receive and sign for it, in tendering it to him.
render a personal judgment or to subject the parties in a particular action to the
judgment and other rulings rendered in the action — is an element of due process that
If, for justifiable reasons, the defendant cannot be served in person within
is essential in all actions, civil as well as criminal, except in actions in rem or quasi in
a reasonable time, the service of the summons may then be effected either
rem.
(a) by leaving a copy of the summons at his residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copy
Jurisdiction over the defendant in an action in rem or quasi in rem is not required, and
at his office or regular place of business with some competent person in
the court acquires jurisdiction over an action as long as it acquires jurisdiction over the
charge thereof.
res that is the subject matter of the action.
Facts: As the initiating party, the plaintiff in a civil action voluntarily submits himself to the
On July 3, 2000, respondent, a retired police officer sued Abante Tonite, a daily tabloid jurisdiction of the court by the act of filing the initiatory pleading. As to the defendant,
of general circulation; its Publisher Allen A. Macasaet; its Managing Director Nicolas the court acquires jurisdiction over his person either by the proper service of the
V. Quijano; its Circulation Manager Isaias Albano; its Editors Janet Bay, Jesus R. summons, or by a voluntary appearance in the action.
Galang and Randy Hagos; and its Columnist/Reporter Lily Reyes (petitioners),
claiming damages because of an allegedly libelous article petitioners published. The service of the summons fulfills two fundamental objectives, namely: (a) to vest in
the court jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; and (b) to afford to the
The RTC in due course issued summons to be served on each defendant, including defendant the opportunity to be heard on the claim brought against him. As to the
Abante Tonite, at their business address at Monica Publishing Corporation, 301-305 former, when jurisdiction in personam is not acquired in a civil action through the
3rd Floor, BF Condominium Building, Solana Street corner A. Soriano Street, proper service of the summons or upon a valid waiver of such proper service, the
Intramuros, Manila. ensuing trial and judgment are void.
In the morning of Sept 18, 2000, RTC Sheriff Raul Medina proceeded to the stated The service of the summons should firstly be effected on the defendant himself
address to effect the personal service of the summons on the defendants. But his efforts whenever practicable. Such personal service consists either in handing a copy of the
to personally serve each defendant in the address were futile because the defendants summons to the defendant in person, or, if the defendant refuses to receive and sign for
were then out of the office and unavailable. it, in tendering it to him.
He returned in the afternoon of that day to make a second attempt at serving the If, for justifiable reasons, the defendant cannot be served in person within a reasonable
summons, but he was informed that petitioners were still out of the office. He decided time, the service of the summons may then be effected either (a) by leaving a copy of
to resort to substituted service of the summons, and explained why in his sheriff's the summons at his residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
return. residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copy at his office or regular place of business with
some competent person in charge thereof. The latter mode of service is known as
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint, alleging lack of jurisdiction over substituted service because the service of the summons on the defendant is made
their persons because of the invalid and ineffectual substituted service of summons. through his substitute
Sheriff Medina twice attempted to serve the summons upon each of petitioners in
person at their office address, the first in the morning of September 18, 2000 and the
second in the afternoon of the same date. Each attempt failed because Macasaet and
Quijano were "always out and not available" and the other petitioners were "always
roving outside and gathering news."
After Medina learned from those present in the office address on his second attempt
that there was no likelihood of any of petitioners going to the office during the business
hours of that or any other day, he concluded that further attempts to serve them in
person within a reasonable time would be futile. The circumstances fully warranted his
conclusion.
He was not expected or required as the serving officer to effect personal service by all
means and at all times, considering that he was expressly authorized to resort to
substituted service should he be unable to effect the personal service within a
reasonable time.
In reality, petitioners' insistence on personal service by the serving officer was

demonstrably superfluous. They had actually received the summonses served through
their substitutes, as borne out by their filing of several pleadings in the RTC. They had
also availed themselves of the modes of discovery available under the Rules of Court.
Such acts evinced their voluntary appearance in the action.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on March 8, 2002; and
ORDERS petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
(Note: Issue regarding Abante Tonite being neither a natural or a juridical person and
therefore could not be sued —CA categorized Abante as a corporation by estoppel,
having represented itself to the public as a corp)

TOPIC X - MOTIONS ● A certificate against forum shopping is not a requirement in an ex parte
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession. An ex parte petition for the
DE GUZMAN V. CHICO issuance of writ of possession is not a complaint or other initiatory pleading
as contemplated in Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Petitioner/s: Angelina De Guzman, Gilbert De Guzman, Virgilio De
● Although the private respondent denominated its pleading as a petition, it is,
Guzman, Jr., Anthony De Guzman
nonetheless, a motion.
Respondent/s: Gloria Chico
● What distinguishes a motion from a petition or other pleading is not its form
or the title given by the party executing it, but rather its purpose. A petition
Doctrine: No certificate against forum shopping is required in a petition or
for the issuance of a writ of possession does not aim to initiate new litigation,
motion for issuance of a writ of possession.
but rather issues as an incident or consequence of the original registration or
cadastral proceedings. As such, the requirement for a forum shopping
Facts: certification is dispelled.
● The case is about a property situated in Bangkal, Makati City ● Based on jurisprudence, writ of possession may be issued in land registration
● On May 24, 2006, the property was sold at a public auction of tax delinquent proceedings, judicial and extrajudicial foreclosure and execution sales.
properties conducted by the Makati Govt pursuant to LGC. Respondent was ● Respondent's ownership over the property is affirmed by the final and
the winning bidder and Makati executed certificate of sale in her favor executory judgment for the new certificate of title. To be clear, a writ of
● Petitioners failed to redeem the property within one-year period possession is defined as a writ of execution employed to enforce a judgment
● On July 12, 2007, respondent filed with the RTC of Makati an application for to recover the possession of land, commanding the sheriff to enter the land
new certificate of title and give its possession to the person entitled under the judgment.
● RTC ordered that title over the property be consolidated and transferred in
the name of respondent. Register of Deeds cancelled the old title and issued a Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 31,
new title in favor of respondent 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 114103 is hereby AFFIRMED.
● Respondent in the same court moved for the issuance of a writ of possession
however this was denied for failure to set the motion for hearing. Respondent
(for the same property) again filed an ex parte petition for the issuance of writ
of possession with the RTC
● The court granted it and the writ was subsequently issued
● Petitioners filed an urgent motion to cite respondent for contempt and to
nullify the proceedings (the 2nd writ case) on the ground of defective
certification of non-forum shopping (NFS)
● Respondent alleged that the petitioners’ objection to the certification against
forum shopping was deemed waived for failure to timely object. She also
claimed that forum shopping did not exist
● The court denied petitioner’s petition ruling that the ex parte petition was not
a initiatory pleading which does not require certificate of NFS
● Petitioners filed MR but it was denied. They also filed a special civil action of
certiorari before the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion on lower courts and
averred that the tax auction sale is governed by LGC and not by Act 3135 (law
about regulation of sale of property regarding real estate mortgage)
● CA ruled that there is no forum shopping.
Issue: WON certificate against forum shopping is required in a motion for issuance of
writ of possession? NO
Ratio:

JOS MANAGING BUILDERS V. UNITED OVERSEAS BANK ■ citing the cases of Golez v. Leonidas and Buyco v.
Baraquia, where the SC held that a WPI is deemed lifted
Petitioner/s: JOS Managing Builders, Inc. and Eduardo Olaguer
upon dismissal of the main case, its purpose as a provisional
Respondent/s: United Overseas Bank Phils (formerly Westmont Bank),
remedy having been served, despite the filing of an appeal
Emmanuel Mangosing, and David Goh Chai Eng
● Petitioners filed a MR and respondents filed a motion to expunge the MR since
the petitioners violated the 3-day notice rule.
Doctrine:
○ Respondents alleged that the hearing for petitioners’ MR was set on
An injunction or restraining order which is not void must be obeyed while
Nov. 7, 2014 but they received the notice only on Nov. 6.
it remains in full force and effect, and has not been overturned.
○ RTC granted motion to expunge
The fact that an injunction or restraining order has been dissolved or
terminated, or has expired, does not necessarily protect a person in a
Issue:
proceeding against him for a violation of the injunction or order while it was
1. W/N RTC was correct in giving due course to respondents’ motion to dismiss
in force.
- YES
2. W/N RTC was correct in dismissing the contempt case for being moot - NO
Facts:
Annulment case Ratio:
● JOS and Olaguer (petitioners) filed to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure sale 1.
against United Overseas and Atty. De Guzman (notary public) in RTC-QC, ● Even after an answer has been filed, the Court has allowed a defendant to file
Branch 98 (RTC 98). a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction, (2) litis
○ In 2000, RTC issued a WPI (2000 writ) against respondents pendentia, (3) lack of cause of action, and (4) discovery during trial of
prohibiting them from consolidating title to the properties and evidence that would constitute a ground for dismissal.
committing acts prejudicial to petitioners. ○ Respondents’ motion to dismiss was based on an event that
○ RTC annulled the sale. transpired after it filed its answer ad cautelam.
■ Respondents appealed to CA (later on mentioned in the 2.
case that CA reversed). ● The consequent dissolution of the 2000 writ did not render the contempt case
Contempt case moot since the facts and circumstances in the 2 cases cited by the RTC differ
● While pending, respondents sold the properties to Onshore Strategic Assets. from this case.
○ Petitioners filed to declare respondents in contempt of court - being ○ In Golez and Buyco, the alleged acts in violation of the WPI were
an indirect contempt in violation of the 2000 writ. committed AFTER the writ was lifted upon the dismissal of the main
● Respondents filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. action, such that a case for contempt on the ground of violation of the
○ That the sale did not violate the WPI since petitioners did not plead writ would be unavailing.
that the sale was prejudicial to them ○ Here, the sale of the properties—which is the act alleged to be in
○ RTC Br 220 and CA denied violation of the 2000 writ—was conducted while the 2000 writ was
● Respondents in their answer ad cautelam (as precautionary measure) still subsisting.
contended that 2000 writ merely prohibited consolidating title and not selling ■ In fact, the 2000 writ was issued on May 17, 2000, while the
or transferring and that it was not prejudicial because 1997 Rules of Civil sale was made on May 5, 2008 and RTC annulled the sale
Procedure allows transfers pendente lite. in June 12, 2008.
● Contempt case was re-raffled. Respondents filed a 2nd motion to dismiss. ● The reversal by the CA of the ruling of RTC 98 in the annulment case and the
○ That the annulment case was reversed by the CA and that it automatic dissolution of the 2000 writ will not protect respondents from an
automatically dissolved the 2000 writ because a WPI is merely action ascribing a violation of the 2000 writ, which was committed while it
ancillary to the main case was still in full force and effect.
○ That the contempt case became moot since it would be illogical to ○ An injunction or restraining order which is not void must be obeyed
held them in contempt for a lawful act while it remains in full force and effect, and has not been overturned,
○ RTC granted that is, in general, until the injunction or restraining order has been
set aside, vacated, or modified by the court which granted it, or until
the order or decree awarding it has been reversed on appeal or error.
○ The fact that an injunction or restraining order has been dissolved or
terminated, or has expired, does not necessarily protect a person in
a proceeding against him for a violation of the injunction or order
while it was in force, as by acts between granting of the injunction
and its termination, at least where the proceeding is one to punish
for a criminal contempt.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The October 7, 2014 and July
20, 2015 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87 in Civil Case No.
Q-11-69413 are hereby REVERSED. The case is REMANDED to the court a quo for
continuance of the trial of the case.
Notes:
Notably, this is not to say that respondents are already guilty of indirect contempt.
Whether respondents violated the 2000 writ is not for us to decide. Remanded

TAN V. CA ● Hence, this petition.
Petitioners: ANNIE TAN
Issue:
Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS and BLOOMBERRY EXPORT
1. W/N the omission through inadvertence of a notice of hearing of a motion for
MANUFACTURING, INC.
reconsideration filed with the trial court is a fatal defect which did not stop the
running of the period to appeal, thus rendering the assailed decision final and
Doctrine:
executory.
The requirements laid down in Sec. 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court that
the notice of hearing shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall
Ratio:
state the time and place for the hearing of the motion, are mandatory. If not
● The petition is devoid of merit.
religiously complied with, they render the motion pro forma. As such the
● Petitioner admits the categorical and mandatory character of the directives in
motion is a useless piece of paper that will not toll the running of the
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, which read:
prescriptive period.
○ SEC. 4. Hearing of motion. Except for motions which the court may
act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every
Facts: written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.
● Petitioner Annie Tan, doing business under the name and style AJ & T ○ Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the
Trading, leased a portion of the ground floor of her building, more specifically hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its
described as Stall No. 623, Carvajal Street, Binondo, Manila, in favor of receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of
Bloomberry Export Manufacturing, Inc. hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter
● The lease was for a period of five years starting on February 17, 1995 and notice.(4a)
ending on February 17, 2000, at a monthly rental of P20,000 for the first three ○ SEC. 5. Notice of hearing. The notice of hearing shall be addressed
years. to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the
● For several alleged violations of the lease contract, petitioners filed against hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of
private respondent a complaint for ejectment, docketed as Civil Case No. the motion.(5a)
148798-CV. ● The requirements laid down in Sec. 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court that the
● As its rental payment was refused by petitioner, private respondent instituted notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall state the time and
a case for consignation, docketed as Civil Case No. 148814-CV. place for the hearing of the motion, are mandatory.
● The two cases were consolidated. ● If not religiously complied with, they render the motion pro forma.
● In due course, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Manila, Branch I, ● As such the motion is a useless piece of paper that will not toll the running of
rendered a Decision which disposed as follows: the prescriptive period.
● For failing to attach a notice of hearing to the Motion for Reconsideration,
… For this reason, except for the costs of suit, this Court hereby orders the dismissal of petitioner proffers the following excuses:
the complaint of [petitioner].The counterclaim and damages sought by [private ○ (1) her former counsels messenger, due to an honest mistake,
respondent are] likewise ordered dismissed. The case for consignation in Civil Case No. inadvertently omitted the fourth page of the motion containing the
148814-CV has become moot and academic for failure of [petitioner] to appeal the crucial Notice of Hearing; and
decision of the Metropolitan [Trial] Court, Branch 15, Manila, allowing the [private ○ (2) because of the pressure of work, her former counsel was unable
respondent] to consign rental payments to the Court of Manila. Besides, the complaint to follow up such motion until the day said counsel requested the
for consignation being in conformity with law, [private respondent] is allowed to setting of a hearing.
continue consigning with this Court all rentals that [may be] due… ● The SC is not in the least convinced.
● First, it is unfair to place the blame for such omission on the messenger.
● RTC: Affirmed MTC Decision. ○ The burden of preparing a complete pleading falls on counsels
● CA: Held that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in setting for shoulders, not on the messengers.
hearing petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, notwithstanding the fact that ○ The counsel is ultimately responsible for the acts or omissions of his
said Motion contained no notice of hearing. agents. Hence, the messengers conduct can neither justify the
counsels mistake nor warrant a departure from the mandate of the ● Petitioner can obtain proper payment of rentals through a motion for
aforesaid procedural rules. execution in the case below.
● Second, it is incredible that the fourth page containing the Notice of Hearing ● The MTC may have dismissed her ejectment case, but it did not exculpate
was left behind due to honest mistake. private respondent from its liabilities.
○ In fact, there was no such page. ● Petitioner is, therefore, not being deprived of her property without due
○ Petitioners claim is belied by the following pertinent portions of the process.
subject Motion for Reconsideration. ● Indeed, there is no miscarriage of justice to speak of.
● The normal practice is to note, at the end of the pleading, that a copy was ● Having failed to observe very elementary rules of procedure which are
furnished to the adverse party. mandatory, petitioner caused her own predicament.
● Thus, petitioner’s motion ended exactly at the bottom of the third page as ● To exculpate her from the compulsory coverage of such rules is to undermine
evidenced by the copy-furnished notation. the stability of the judicial process, as the bench and bar will be confounded
● It is safe to conclude that there was no accidental or excusable neglect in not by such irritating uncertainties as when to obey and when to ignore the Rules.
including a fourth page in this case.
● In other words, petitioners counsel simply failed to include a notice of hearing. DIspositive:
● The fact that petitioner’s former counsel calendared the motion for hearing WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision is
for August 23, 1996 belies the excuse that an alleged fourth page had been left AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
behind.
● In the first place, if a notice of hearing had been included in the Motion for
Reconsideration, there would have been no need for petitioner to file the
Motion to set the time and date of hearing.
● What is clear is that said counsel filed the latter Motion, only after private
respondent had submitted its Motion for Entry of Judgment -- with copy
furnished petitioners counsel -- on the ground that petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration was a mere scrap of paper that did not stop the period for
appeal.
● While it is true that any motion that does not comply with the requirements
of Rule 15, Rules of Court should not be accepted for filing and, if filed, is not
entitled to judicial cognizance, the Supreme Court has likewise held that
where rigid application of the rule will result in manifest failure or miscarriage
of justice, technicalities may be disregarded in order to resolve the case.
● Liberal construction of this rule has been allowed by this Court in the following
cases:
○ (1) where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or
miscarriage of justice, especially if a party successfully shows that the
alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not
apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein;
○ (2) where the interest of substantial justice will be served;
○ (3) where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the
sound and judicious discretion of the court; and
○ (4) where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with
the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the
case at bar falls under any of these exceptions.

GARCIA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN motion is a mere scrap of paper and could not interrupt the running
GR No. 167103, 31 August 2006 of the period to file an answer due to be filed not later than 17
November 2004.
Petitioner/s: Major General Carlos F. Garcia, AFP (Ret.)
○ The mere filing by Garcia of the petition in G.R. No. 165835 would
Respondent/s: Sandiganbayan (SB), Republic of the Philippines (RP)
not automatically warrant the deferment of the proceedings in the
Sandiganbayan, especially where no writ of injunction or restraining
Doctrine: The subsequent action of the court on a defective motion does
order was issued in the special civil action for certiorari.
not cure the flaw, for a motion with a fatally defective notice is a useless
● 25 Jan. 2005: Garcia, et al. filed their Motion for Reconsideration and/or to
scrap of paper, and the court has no authority to act thereon.
Admit Attached Answer, arguing that the pendency of the petition in G.R. No.
165835 had the effect of holding in abeyance the proceedings in the forfeiture
Facts: (This case is already the Resolution.) (Facts were vague in relation to the Motion case before the SB, which was denied in 3 Feb. 2005.
to dismiss issue.) ● SB: The Motion for Reconsideration does not comply with the requisites in
● The petition for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired property filed against Sec. 3 (b), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court which prescribes the relief from the
petitioner Garcia, his wife, and two sons before the Sandiganbayan by the order of default. (notes for codal provision.)
Ombudsman which spawned two petitions for certiorari involving different ○ The MR does not show the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
questions of law. negligence that caused their failure to file an answer or that they have
● The first petition, (G.R. No. 165835) which questioned the jurisdiction of a meritorious defense.
the SB over petitions for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired property filed under ○ The motion contains a defective verification since it was only Garcia
RA 1379 was dismissed in July 2005. who verified the allegations when he should have been joined by the
● This case disposes of the second petition filed by petitioner Garcia other respondents, and Garcia’s verification was based only on
assailing respondent Sandiganbayan's Resolution of 20 January knowledge and belief and not on personal knowledge and authentic
2005 which denied his Motion to Dismiss, as well as its Resolution of 3 records.
February 2005 denying the reconsideration. ● So Garcia filed the present case with the ff arguments:
● On 17 November 2004, the last day for filing an answer, Garcia, et al. filed ○ The Motion to Dismiss was timely filed and thus tolled the running
the aforementioned Motion to Dismiss in regard to the petition for of the period to file an answer.
forfeiture on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of SB over special civil ○ [IMPT] While Garcia does not dispute that the hearing of the
actions for forfeiture under RA 1379. motion was set beyond the 10-day period prescribed in the
● While the first petition was pending before this Court, the action for forfeiture Rules, he argues that the underlying principle of the requirements
proceeded. for a notice of hearing is due process, that is, that the adverse party
● 25 Nov. 2004: the Republic filed a motion seeking: (1) to expunge the Motion must be made aware of exactly when the motion shall be submitted
to Dismiss of Garcia, et al., (2) to declare Garcia, et al. to be in default, and (3) so as to give him an opportunity to object thereto. Since the motion
that judgment by default be rendered in favor of petitioner therein (herein to dismiss was set for hearing on a definite date and time, the motion
respondent Republic). complies with the principle of due process.
● [Assailed resolution] 20 Jan. 2005: the SB issued a resolution denying ○ Since the SB had ruled on (denied) the Motion to Dismiss based on
the Motion to Dismiss and granting the RP’s motion of 25 Nov. 2004^ by the merits, he had less than 5 days only within which to file its
declaring Garcia, et al. in default and setting the case for ex parte answer.
reception of evidence. ○ Since he received the summons on 12 Nov. 2004, he had until 17
○ The SB ruled that it has jurisdiction over petitions for forfeiture Nov. 2004 to file his answer.
under R.A. No. 1379 and that the authority to file the petition for ● RP’s argument:
forfeiture of properties unlawfully acquired is lodged with the Office ○ The Motion to Dismiss should be expunged on the ground that the
of the Ombudsman. motion contained a defective notice of hearing that set the same for
○ SB held that the Motion to Dismiss suffers from a fatal procedural hearing 3 days beyond the 10-day period provided for under Sec. 5,
defect in that it does not comply with the mandatory provision of Sec. Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, the Republic argued, the
5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court on notice of hearing. Hence, the Motion to Dismiss is a mere scrap of paper which does not merit
consideration and likewise does not toll the running of the period to before this Court would be rendered moot by the continuation of the
file an answer. proceedings.
Issue:
● W/N Garcia’s Motion to Dismiss contained a defective notice of hearing? YES. Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Sandiganbayan
● W/N Garcia was in default? YES Resolutions dated 20 January 2005 and 3 February 2005 are UPHELD. Respondent
Ratio: Sandiganbayan is ORDERED to resume further proceedings with deliberate dispatch
● SC reiterates Bacelonia v. Court of Appeals in accordance with this resolution. Costs against petitioner.
○ Which holds that Sec. 5, Rule 15 of the Rules uses the
mandatory term must in fixing the period within which the Notes:
motion shall be scheduled for hearing, so that a motion that ● Garcia tried to argue using the principle of judicial courtesy. The
fails to comply with this mandatory provision is pro forma and does Sandiganbayan ruled the principle of judicial courtesy is inapplicable to the
not merit the attention and consideration of the court. case since it applies only when the action of the lower court in the course of its
● In the case at bar, Garcia does not even refute the fact that the Motion to proceedings will result in rendering moot the very issue brought before the
Dismiss was scheduled for hearing on 3 December 2004 (idk kung saan higher court. In the present case, the continuation of the proceedings before
galing yung date na ‘to), or 3 days beyond the 10-day period in Sec. 5, Rule the Sandiganbayan will not make academic the issue of jurisdiction raised
15. before the Court in G.R. No. 165835. The Sandiganbayan further noted that
● Thus, the motion is a mere scrap of paper which does not toll the running of the issue of application of the principle of judicial courtesy to the case was
the prescriptive period to file an answer and is not entitled to judicial triggered by petitioners act of forum shopping when they filed the petition in
cognizance. G.R. No. 165835 before this Court simultaneously with the filing of the Motion
● The Motion to Dismiss remains defective and of no legal effect despite the to Dismiss before the Sandiganbayan.
disposition by the Sandiganbayan of the issue raised in the motion. ● While Garcia immediately sought recourse via the Motion for
● The subsequent action of the court on a defective motion does not cure the Reconsideration and/or To Admit Attached Answer, the contentions he
flaw, for a motion with a fatally defective notice is a useless scrap of paper, and raises therein do not address the grounds for which he, his wife and sons were
the court has no authority to act thereon. declared in default.
● The Sandiganbayan recognized that the motion suffered from a fatal ○ His line of reasoning in his motion for reconsideration is directed
procedural defect, declaring that any motion that does not comply with Sec. 5, towards the denial of the Motion to Dismiss and does not lay down
Rule 15 of the Rules must be regarded as a mere scrap of paper, should not be the considerations for the lifting of the order of default.
accepted for filing, and if filed, is not entitled to judicial cognizance and does ○ In fact, as observed by the Sandiganbayan, the motion for
not affect any reglementary period involved for the filing of the requisite reconsideration fails to comply with the requirements of Sec. 3 (b),
pleading, but nevertheless addressed the issue of lack of jurisdiction. Rule 9, which is the proper remedy to lift an order of default
● Error may be imputed to the Sandiganbayan in delving into the merits of the
Motion to Dismiss since the effect of non-compliance with the requisites for a Rule 15, Section 5. Notice of hearing. — The notice of hearing shall be
valid notice of hearing is that the motion is legally non-existent, that is as if it addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing
has never been filed. which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.
● There is actually no motion which the court should act upon; it was nothing Rule 9, Section 3 (b). Default; declaration of. — If the defending party fails to
but a piece of paper filed with the court and presented no question which the answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming
court could decide. party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending
● The SB’s action on the merits of the motion to dismiss is a mere surplusage. It party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the
does not detract from or contradict its ruling that the motion to dismiss is a claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion
mere scrap of paper. requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be delegated
● In cases where the SBs interlocutory orders are challenged before this Court, to the clerk of court. (1a, R18)
the Sandiganbayan should continue, not suspend, proceedings before it where (b) Relief from order of default. — A party declared in default may at any time
no temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction is issued by after notice thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order
this Court and there is an absence of a strong probability that the issues raised of default upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense. In such case,
the order of default may be set aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may
impose in the interest of justice. (3a, R18)

TOPIC XI – MOTION TO DISMISS make that determination after conducting appropriate proceedings
and observing due process.
REPUBLIC VS. MEGA PACIFIC ● The COMELEC also filed a Motion for Leave to Use ACMs which was denied.
○ SC: allowing the use of the ACMs would have the effect of illegally
Petitioner/s: Republic of the Philippines
reversing and subverting a final decision previously promulgated
Respondent/s: Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc., Willy U. Yu, Bonnie S. Yu,
● Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal filed an Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to
Enrique T. Tansipek, Rosita Y. Tansipek, Pedro O. Tan, Johnson W. Fong,
Reopen the Case; and to Intervene and Admit the Attached Petition in
Bernard I. Fong, and *Lauriano A. Barrios
Intervention which was denied.
● Respondent MPEI filed a Complaint for Damages with the RTC Makati, from
Doctrine: When a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by
which the instant case arose.
a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for that trial has
○ notwithstanding the nullification of the contract, the COMELEC was
been given, the judgment of the court — as long as it remains unreversed —
still bound to pay the amount of P200M, representing the difference
should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them.
between the value of the ACMs and the support services delivered
and the payment previously made by the COMELEC.
Facts: ● Petitioner filed its Answer with Counterclaim and argued that respondent
● RA 8436 authorized the COMELEC to use an automated election system for MPEI could no longer recover the unpaid balance from the void automation
the May 1998 elections. However, the it failed to materialize and votes were contract, since the payments made were illegal disbursements of public funds.
canvassed manually during the 1998 and the 2001 elections. In 2004, they ○ A null and void contract vests no rights and creates no obligations,
again attempted to implement the automated election system and invited and thus produces no legal effect at all.
bidders to apply for the procurement of supplies, equipment, and services. ○ Petitioner demanded from respondents the return of the payments
Respondent MPEI, as lead company, purportedly formed a joint venture - made pursuant to the automation contract. Individual respondents,
known as the Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC) - together with other being the incorporators of MPEI, likewise ought to be impleaded and
companies. Subsequently, MPEI, on behalf of MPC, submitted its bid proposal held accountable for MPEI's liabilities. The creation of MPC was,
to COMELEC. after all, merely an ingenious scheme to feign eligibility to bid.
● After due assessment, the Bids and Awards Committee recommended that the ● Petitioner prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against
project be awarded to MPC and the project was eventually awarded to MPC. the properties of MPEI and individual respondents on the grounds that the
● Despite the award to MPC, the COMELEC and MPEI executed the automation fraudulent misrepresentation of respondents as to their eligibility to
contract for the aggregate amount of P1.248B. Pursuant to the automation participate in the bidding for the COMELEC automation project and the
contract, MPEI delivered 1,991 ACMs to the COMELEC. COMELEC made failure of the ACMs to comply with mandatory technical requirements.
partial payments to MPEI in the aggregate amount of P1.05 billion. ○ RTC denied. There was an absence of factual allegations as to how
● The full implementation of the automation contract was rendered impossible the fraud was actually committed.
because the SC declared the contract null and void. ● Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA, arguing that the trial court had acted
● As a consequence of the nullification of the automation contract, SC directed with grave abuse of discretion in denying the application for a writ of
the Ombudsman to determine the possible criminal liability of persons attachment.
responsible for the contract, and the SolGen to protect the government from ○ CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and ruled that there was
the ill effects of the illegal disbursement of public funds in relation to the sufficient basis for the issuance of a writ of attachment in favor of
automation contract. petitioner.
● Private respondents in moved for reconsideration but was denied. ● However, upon motion for reconsideration, the CA reconsidered its earlier
○ SC: no prejudgment had been made on private respondents' criminal decision and directed the remand of the case to the RTC Makati for the
liability. Although the 2004 Decision stated that the Ombudsman reception of evidence of allegations of fraud and to determine whether
shall "determine the criminal liability, if any, of the public officials attachment should necessarily issue.
(and conspiring private individuals, if any) involved in the subject ● Petitioners filed a Rule 45 Petition arguing that the CA erred in ordering the
Resolution and Contract," There was no premature conclusion on remand of the case to the trial court for the reception of evidence to determine
any wrongdoing, but precisely a direction to the Ombudsman to the presence of fraud. Petitioner contends that this Court's 2004 Decision was
sufficient proof of the fraud committed by respondents in the execution of the ● Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, clearly sets forth the instances when
voided automation contract. a petition for certiorari can be used as a proper remedy:
○ Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or
Issue: officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
● Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the remand of the case to the trial without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
court for the reception of evidence to determine the presence of fraud? – discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
YES!!! appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
Ratio: course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
● Petitioner argues that the findings of this Court in the 2004 Decision serve as in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
sufficient basis to prove that, at the time of the execution of the automation judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of
contract, there was fraud on the part of respondents that justified the issuance such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs
of a writ of attachment. Fraud on the part of respondents MPEI and Willy, as as law and justice may require.
well as of the other individual respondents has been established. ● The Court had to ascertain from the evidence whether the COMELEC
● A writ of preliminary attachment is a provisional remedy issued upon the committed grave abuse of discretion, and in the process, were justified in
order of the court where an action is pending. Through the writ, the property making some factual findings. This Court has indeed made factual findings
or properties of the defendant may be levied upon and held thereafter by the based on the evidence presented before it; in turn, these factual findings
sheriff as security for the satisfaction of whatever judgment might be secured constitute the controlling legal rule between the parties that cannot be
by the attaching creditor against the defendant. modified or amended by any of them. This Court is bound to consider the
● Petitioner relied upon Section 1 (d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court as basis for factual findings made in the 2004 Decision in order to declare that there is
its application for a writ of preliminary attachment. This provision states: fraud for the purpose of issuing the writ of preliminary attachment.
○ Section 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue. — At the ● The factual findings are conclusive and have been established as the
commencement of the action or at any time before entry of judgment, controlling legal rule in the instant case, on the basis of the principle of res
a plaintiff or any proper party may have the property of the adverse judicata — more particularly, the principle of conclusiveness of judgment.
party attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that This doctrine of res judicata which is set forth in Section 47 of Rule 39 of the
may be recovered in the following cases: (d) In an action against a Rules of Court lays down two main rules, namely: (1) the judgment or decree
party who has been guilty of a fraud in contracting the debt or of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation
incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought, or in the between the parties and their privies and constitutes a bar to a new action or
performance thereof. suit involving the same cause of action either before the same or any other
● The Court agrees with petitioner that respondent MPEI committed fraud by tribunal; and (2) any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or
securing the election automation contract; and, in order to perpetrate the necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent
fraud, by misrepresenting that the actual bidder was MPC and not MPEI, court in which a judgment or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively
which was only acting on behalf of MPC. We likewise rule that respondent settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the
MPEI has defrauded petitioner, since the former still executed the automation parties and their privies whether or not the claims or demands, purposes, or
contract despite knowing that it was not qualified to bid for the same. The subject matters of the two suits are the same.
established facts surrounding the eligibility, qualification and existence of ● Undeniably, the present case is merely an adjunct of the 2004 case, in which
MPC — and of MPEI for that matter — and the subsequent execution of the the automation contract was declared to be a nullity. Needless to say, the 2004
automation contract with the latter, when all taken together, constitute badges Decision has since become final. As earlier explained, this Court arrived at
of fraud that We simply cannot ignore. several factual findings showing the illegality of the automation contract; in
● Respondents argue that the 2004 Decision did not resolve and could not have turn, these findings were used as basis to justify the declaration of nullity.
resolved the factual issue of whether they had committed any fraud, as the SC ● Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, those material facts
is not a trier of facts; and the 2004 case, being a certiorari case, did not deal became binding and conclusive on the parties, in this case MPEI and,
with questions of fact. It is obvious that respondents are merely trying to ultimately, the persons that comprised it. When a right or fact has been
escape the implications or effects of the nullity of the automation contract that judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when
they had executed. an opportunity for that trial has been given, the judgment of the court — as
long as it remains unreversed — should be conclusive upon the parties and
those in privity with them. Thus, the CA should not have required petitioner
to present further evidence of fraud on the part of respondent Willy and MPEI,
as it was already necessarily adjudged in the 2004 case.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Amended
Decision dated 22 September 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 95988
is ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. A new one is entered DIRECTING the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 59, to ISSUE in Civil Case No. 04-346, entitled Mega
Pacific eSolutions, Inc. vs. Republic of the Philippines, the Writ of Preliminary
Attachment prayed for by petitioner Republic of the Philippines against the properties
of respondent Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc., and Willy U. Yu, Bonnie S. Yu, Enrique T.
Tansipek, Rosita Y. Tansipek, Pedro O. Tan, Johnson W. Fong, Bernard I. Fong and
Lauriano Barrios.

CONTRERAS V. ROVILLA WATER SUPPLY INC ● They still attached to their amended complaint the sworn declaration with
SPA, but the caption of the amended complaint remained the same.
Petitioner/s: REBECCA PACAÑA-CONTRERAS and ROSALIE PACAÑA
● At the subsequent pre-trial, the respondents manifested to the RTC that a
Respondent/s: ROVILA WATER SUPPLY, INC., EARL U KOKSENG,
substitution of the parties was necessary in light of the deaths of Lourdes and
LILIA TORRES, DALLA P. ROMANILLOS and MARISSA GABUYA
Luciano. They further stated that they would seek the dismissal of the
complaint because the petitioners are not the real parties in interest to
Doctrine: A motion to dismiss based on complaint “states no cause of
prosecute the case.
action” should be made before pre-trial.
● The pre-trial pushed through as scheduled and the RTC directed the
respondents to put into writing their earlier manifestation. The RTC issued a
Facts: pre-trial order where one of the issues submitted was whether the complaint
● Petitioners Rebecca Pacaña-Contreras and Rosalie Pacaña, children of should be dismissed for failure to comply with Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules
Lourdes Teves Pacaña and Luciano Pacaña, filed the present case against of Court which requires that every action must be prosecuted in the name of
Rovila Inc., Earl, Lilia, Dalla and Marisa for accounting and damages. the real party in interest.
● The Contreras and Pacana claimed that their family has long been known in ● (The pre-trial already done) Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the
the community to be engaged in the water supply business; grounds, among others, that the petitioners are not the real parties in interest
● Contreras alleged that Lilia was a former trusted employee in the family to institute and prosecute the case and that they have no valid cause of action
business who hid business records and burned and ransacked the family files. against the respondents.
● Lilia also allegedly posted security guards and barred the members of the ● RTC denied MTD
Pacaña family from operating their business. ● CA reversed
● She then claimed ownership over the family business through a corporation Issue: W/N the motion to dismiss by Rovila Water Supply inc is timely filed.
named "Rovila Water Supply, Inc." (Rovila Inc.) NOOOooooooo
● Upon inquiry with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Ratio:
petitioners claimed that Rovila Inc. was surreptitiously formed with the ● The motion to dismiss in the present case based on failure to state a cause of
respondents as the majority stockholders. action was not timely filed and was thus waived
● The respondents did so by conspiring with one another and forming the ● Applying Rule 16 of the Rules of Court which provides for the grounds for the
respondent corporation to takeover and illegally usurp the family business’ dismissal of a civil case, the respondents’ grounds for dismissal fall under
registered name. Section 1(g) and (j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, particularly, failure to state
● In forming the respondent corporation, the respondents allegedly used the a cause of action and failure to comply with a condition precedent
name of Lourdes as one of the incorporators and made it appear in the SEC (substitution of parties), respectively.
documents that the family business was operated in a place other than the ● The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court provides for the
Pacaña residence. period within which to file a motion to dismiss under the grounds enumerated.
● Thereafter, the respondents used the Pacaña family’s receipts and the ● Specifically, the motion should be filed within the time for, but before the
deliveries and sales were made to appear as those of the respondent Rovila filing of, the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim.
Inc. ● Equally important to this provision is Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court
● Using this scheme, the respondents fraudulently appropriated the collections which states that defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to
and payments. dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except for the following grounds:
● The petitioners filed the complaint in their own names although Rosalie was 1) the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; 2) litis pendencia; 3)
authorized by Lourdes through a sworn declaration and special power of res judicata; and 4) prescription.
attorney (SPA). ● Therefore, the grounds not falling under these four exceptions may be
● The respondents filed a first motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC considered as waived in the event that they are not timely invoked.
had no jurisdiction over an intra-corporate controversy. ● As the respondents’ motion to dismiss was based on the grounds which should
● The RTC denied the motion. be timely invoked, material to the resolution of this case is the period within
● Lourdes died and the petitioners amended their complaint, with leave of court which they were raised.

● Both the RTC and the CA found that the motion to dismiss was only filed after
the filing of the answer and after the pre-trial had been concluded.
● Considering that the petition for certiorari filed by Rovila Water Supply is an
original and not an appellate action, the CA had no records of the RTC’s
proceedings upon which the CA could refer to in order to validate the
respondents’ claim.
● Clearly, other than the respondents’ bare allegations, the CA had no basis to
rule, without proof, that the respondents alleged the grounds for dismissal as
affirmative defenses in the answer.
● The respondents, as the parties with the burden of proving that they timely
raised their grounds for dismissal, could have at least attached a copy of their
answer to the petition.
● Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, a motion to dismiss based
on the grounds invoked by the respondents may be waived if not raised in a
motion to dismiss or alleged in their answer.
● On the other hand, "the pre-trial is primarily intended to make certain that all
issues necessary to the disposition of a case are properly raised.
● The purpose is to obviate the element of surprise, hence, the parties are
expected to disclose at the pre-trial conference all issues of law and fact which
they intend to raise at the trial, except such as may involve privileged or
impeaching matter."
● The issues submitted during the pre-trial are thus the issues that would govern
the trial proper. The dismissal of the case based on the grounds invoked by the
respondents are specifically covered by Rule 16 and Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court which set a period when they should be raised; otherwise, they are
deemed waived.
● Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are really different
from each other.
● On the one hand, failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of
the pleading, and is a ground for dismissal under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.
● On the other hand, lack of cause [of] action refers to a situation where the
evidence does not prove the cause of action alleged in the pleading.
● The Court cannot uphold the dismissal of the present case based on the
grounds invoked by the respondents which they have waived for failure to
invoke them within the period prescribed by the Rules. The Court cannot also
dismiss the case based on "lack of cause of action" as this would require at
least a preponderance of evidence which is yet to be appreciated by the trial
court.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated January
27, 2005 and the resolution date June 6, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 71551 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The heirs of the spouses Luciano and
Lourdes Pacaña, except herein petitioner and Lagrimas Pacaña-Gonzalez, are
ORDERED IMPLEADED as parties plaintiffs and the RTC is directed tp proceed with
the trial of the case with DISPATCH.
NARCISO V. GARCIA ● Narciso filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which also denied her
petition and affirmed the RTCs order
Petitioner/s: ELOISA R. NARCISO
○ The CA held that, while a motion to lift order of default may be filed
Respondent/s: ESTELITA P. GARCIA
at any time after notice and before judgment, Narciso needed to
allege facts constituting fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
Doctrine:
negligence that prevented her from answering the complaint. She
The running of the period to file an answer is suspended during a motion to
also needed to show a meritorious defense or that something would
dismiss
be gained by having the order of default set aside
Issue:
Facts: WON the CA gravely abused its discretion in affirming the order of default that the RTC
● Garcia (respondent) filed a complaint for damages against Narciso issued against petitioner Narciso? Yes
(petitioner) before RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga.
● Narciso filed a motion to dismiss the complaint alleging that the RTC had no Ratio:
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint since it averred facts ● Section 3, Rule 9 of Rules of Court
constitutive of forcible entry. Narciso also assailed the venue as improperly ○ Default; declaration of. If the defending party fails to answer within
laid as the acts complained of were committed in Angeles City the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the
● Garcia opposed the motion to dismiss and sought to have Narciso declared in claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such
default failure, declare the defending party in default…
● On November 30, 2004 RTC denied Narcisos motion to dismiss and as a ● Here, however, Narciso filed a motion to dismiss Garcia’s complaint before
consequence, declared her in default for failing to file an answer filing an answer. Section 1, Rule 16 allows her this remedy
● On December 22, 2004, Narciso filed a motion for reconsideration of the ○ SEC. 1. Grounds. Within the time for but before filing the answer to
orders denying her motion to dismiss and declare her in fault for failing to file the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may
an answer be made on any of the following grounds…
● In her opposition, Garcia sought to present her evidence ex parte. In the ● As a consequence of the motion to dismiss, the running of the period during
meantime the presiding judge retired and Judge Divina Luz Aquino-Simbulan which the rules required her to file her answer was deemed suspended
replaced him as acting judge of the concerned RTC ● When the TC denied her motion to dismiss, she had the balance of her period
● Judge Simbulan referred the case for mediation. When it failed the trial court for filing an answer under Section 4, Rule 16
set the case for judicial dispute resolution as component of pre-trial ○ SEC. 4. Time to plead. If the motion is denied, the movant shall file
● The JDR failed and case was re raffled for pre trial proper his answer within the balance of the period prescribed by Rule 11 to
● On March 26, 2007 having noted that the court had not yet acted on Narcisos which he was entitled at the time of serving his motion, but not less
motion for reconsideration (denying her motion to dismiss and declaring her than five (5) days in any event, computed from his receipt of the
in default) the trial court set the case for hearing notice of the denial. If the pleading is ordered to be amended, he shall
● On August 24, 2007 the trial court denied Narcisos motion for file his answer within the period prescribed by Rule 11 counted from
reconsideration. It ruled that since she had already been declared in default as service of the amended pleading, unless the court provides a longer
early as November 30, 2004 and since she had not filed any motion to lift the period.
order of default within the allowable time, Narciso could no longer assail such ● But apart from opposing defendants motion to dismiss, plaintiff Garcia asked
default order. the trial court to declare Narciso in default for not filing an answer, altogether
● On September 3, 2007 Narciso filed a motion to lift the order of default against disregarding the suspension of the running of the period for filing such an
her. She claimed that the protracted resolution of her motion for answer during the pendency of the motion to dismiss
reconsideration and the referral of the case for mediation prevented her from ● TC committed a serious error when it granted Garcia’s prayer and
filing an answer. She also pointed out that she filed a case for ejectment simultaneously denied Narcisos motion to dismiss and declared her in default
against Garcia and succeeded in obtaining a decision against the latter. ● Narciso was not yet in default as she had at least 5 days to file her answer.
● Trial court denied the motion Furthermore Narciso also had the right to file a motion for reconsideration of
the trial courts order denying her motion to dismiss. Only after the trial court
shall have denied it does Narciso become bound to file her answer to Garcia’s
complaint.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Court ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated December 8, 2010 and Resolution dated April 11, 2011 in CA-
G.R. SP 106425, LIFTS the order of default that the Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 44, entered against petitioner Eloisa Narciso, and
DIRECTS that court to allow her to file her answer to the complaint and proceed to hear
the case with dispatch. The court DISSOLVES the temporary restraining order that it
issued on June 8, 2011 to enable the trial court to resume proceedings in the
case.Ï‚rÎ±lÎ±Ï‰lÎ¹brÎ±r

a. The order of the trial court denying a motion to dismiss is merely
BOSTON EQUITY VS CA interlocutory, as it neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case
and still leaves something to be done by the court before a case is
Petitioner/s: Boston Equity Resources, Inc.
finally decided on the merits.
Respondent/s: Court of Appeals and Lolita Toledo
b. Therefore, the proper remedy in such a case is to appeal after a
decision has been rendered.
Doctrine:
c. A writ of certiorari is resorted to only to correct a grave abuse of
discretion. It is not designed to correct erroneous findings and
Facts: conclusions made by the courts.
1. In 1997, Boston Equity filed a complaint for sum of money with a prayer for 2. Even assuming that certiorari is the proper remedy, the trial court did not
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Spouses Manuel and commit grave abuse of discretion in denying Lolita’s motion to dismiss.
Lolita Toledo in the RTC. a. It, in fact, acted correctly when it issued the questioned orders as
2. 1998: Lolita filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Answer, where she Lolita’s motion to dismiss was filed 6 years and 5 months after she
alleged that her husband/co-defendant, Manuel, is already dead. (death filed her amended Answer.
certificate: he died on July 13, 1995) b. This circumstance alone already warranted the outright dismissal of
3. Manuel’s children later substituted him in the proceedings. the motion for having been filed in clear contravention of the express
4. The reception of evidence for Lolita was cancelled upon the parties’ mandate of Sec. 1, Rule 16, which states that a motion to dismiss shall
agreement. be filed “within the time for but before the filing of an answer to the
a. Counsel for Lolita was given a period of 15 days to file a demurrer. complaint or pleading asserting a claim.”
5. 2004: However, Lolita instead filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, 3. More importantly, Lolita’s motion to dismiss was filed after Boston has
citing the following: completed the presentation of its evidence in the trial court, giving credence
a. Failure to state a cause of action, since the complaint failed to to Boston’s and the trial court's conclusion that the filing of the motion to
implead an indispensable party or a real party-in-interest dismiss was a mere ploy on the part of Lolita to delay the prompt resolution
b. The trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel of the case against her.
pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 4. Lolita’s motion to dismiss under consideration is not the first motion to
c. The trial court erred in ordering the substitution of Manuel by his dismiss she filed in the trial court.
heirs a. It appears that she had filed an earlier motion to dismiss on the sole
d. The court must also dismiss the case against Lolita in accordance ground of the unenforceability of Boston’s claim under the Statute of
with Sec. 6, Rule 86 Frauds, which motion was denied by the trial court.
6. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss in an Order, citing Sec. 1, 5. More telling is the following narration of the trial court in its Order denying
Rule 16 Lolita’s motion for reconsideration of the denial of her motion to dismiss.
a. "[W]ithin the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint
or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made” As can be gleaned from the records, with the admission of plaintiff's exhibits, reception
b. The MR for the denial was also dismissed, on the ground that of defendants' evidence was set on March 31, and April 23, 2004 . . . . On motion of the
Lolita’s attack on the jurisdiction of the court was barred by laches defendant[s], the hearing on March 31, 2004 was cancelled.
for failing to raise the issue despite several chances to do so
7. Lolita filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, which the CA granted. On April 14, 2004, defendants sought the issuance of subpoenaed testificandum and
duces tecum to one Gina M. Madulid, to appear and testify for the defendants on April
Issue: WoN the CA erred in granting the writ of certiorari in favor of Lolita - YES 23, 2004. Reception of defendants' evidence was again deferred to May 26, June 2 and
June 30, 2004, . . . .
Ratio:
1. The special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the On May 13, 2004, defendants sought again the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum and
denial by the trial court of a motion to dismiss. ad testificandum to the said Gina Madulid. On May 26, 2004, reception of defendants
[sic] evidence was cancelled upon the agreement of the parties. On July 28, 2004, in
the absence of defendants' witness, hearing was reset to September 24 and October 8,
2004 . . . .
On September 24, 2004, counsel for defendants was given a period of fifteen (15) days
to file a demurrer to evidence. On October 7, 2004, defendants filed instead a Motion
to Dismiss
6. Lolita’s act of filing multiple motions, such as the first and earlier motion to
dismiss and then the motion to dismiss at issue here, as well as several
motions for postponement, lends credibility to the position taken by Boston,
which is shared by the trial court, that Lolita is deliberately impeding the early
disposition of this case.
7. The filing of the second motion to dismiss was, therefore, "not only improper
but also dilatory.
8. Thus, the trial court, "far from deviating or straying off course from
established jurisprudence on [the] matter, . . . had in fact faithfully observed
the law and legal precedents in this case."
9. The CA, therefore, erred not only in entertaining Lolita’s petition for
certiorari, it likewise erred in ruling that the trial court committed grave abuse
of discretion when it denied Lolita’s motion to dismiss.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 28

February 2006 and the Resolution dated 1 August 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 88586 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the Regional Trial
Court dated 8 November 2004 and 22 December 2004, respectively, in Civil Case No.
97-86672, are REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Manila is hereby
DIRECTED to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. 97-86672 against respondent
Lolita G. Toledo only, in accordance with the above pronouncements of the Court, and
to decide the case with dispatch. SO ORDERED.

SANCHEZ V. SANVHEZ days to file his rejoinder, after which, it considered the matter submitted for
resolution.
Petitioner/s: Modesto Sanchez
● The affirmative defense of prescription does not automatically warrant the
Respondent/s: Andrew Sanchez
dismissal of a complaint under Rule 16 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. An
allegation of prescription can effectively be used in a motion to dismiss only
Doctrine: The elements of laches must be proven positively. Laches is
when the complaint on its face shows that indeed the action has already
evidentiary in nature, a fact that cannot be established by mere allegations
prescribed. If the issue of prescription is one involving evidentiary matters
in the pleadings and cannot be resolved in a motion to dismiss. At this stage
requiring a full-blown trial on the merits, it cannot be determined in a motion
therefore, the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of laches is
to dismiss. Those issues must be resolved at the trial of the case on the merits
premature. Those issues must be resolved at the trial of the case on the
wherein both parties will be given ample opportunity to prove their respective
merits, wherein both parties will be given ample opportunity to prove their
claims and defenses.
respective claims and defenses.
● Contrary to Modesto’s contention, it is not apparent from the complaint that
the action had already prescribed. Furthermore, it should be noted that it is
Facts: the relief based on the facts alleged, and not the relief demanded, which is
● The subject of this case is a deed of absolute sale (DAS), exceuted on Nov. 25, taken into consideration in determining the cause of action. Therefore, in
1981, which expressly states that a parcel of land registered in the name of terms of classifying the deed, whether it is valid, void or voidable, it is of no
Respondent Andrew covered by a TCT was conveyed to his brother Petitioner significance that the relief prayed for was Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale.
Modesto through a sale. ● The issue of prescription hinges on the determination of whether the sale was
● Respondent assailed the said document as fraudulent. While he admitted that valid, void or voidable. The issue of prescription in this case is best ventilated
he sent the DAS to petitioner in response to latter’s offer to buy the land, in a full-blown proceeding before the trial court where both parties can
respondent alleged that the sale didn’t push through because petitioner didn’t substantiate their claims.
have money. He also said that it was not notarized and was undated; that he ● The elements of laches must be proven positively. Laches is evidentiary in
tried to retrieved the DAS from petitioner but failed. He further alleged that nature, a fact that cannot be established by mere allegations in the pleadings
he continued to allow petitioner to occupy the property since their ancestral and cannot be resolved in a motion to dismiss. At this stage therefore, the
home was built thereon. dismissal of the complaint on the ground of laches is premature. Those issues
● This liberality extended to petitioner’s live-in partner Yap, as evidenced by a must be resolved at the trial of the case on the merits, wherein both parties
usufruct, who offered to buy the land again on 2001 for petitioner but will be given ample opportunity to prove their respective claims and defenses.
defendant refused. Later on, it was discovered that the Certificate of title was
missing. Respondent filed an affidavit of loss but he later discovered that
petitioner filed a petition for reconstitution of TCT on the basis of DAS. Dispositive:
● Thus, respondent filed for the annulment of said document. The complaint
was amended to cancellation of new title and reconveyance of title. Petitioner WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, we resolve to DENY the instant petition. The
alleged lack of cause of actoin, prescription and laches. RTC dismissed the 16 July 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED
complaint on grounds of laches and prescription. CA reversed. to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 39 for trial and judgment on the merits.
Issue:
WoN RTC erred in dismissing respondent’s case on the grounds of prescription and
laches. - YES
Ratio:
● YES. RTC didn’t conduct a hearing to receive evidence proving that Andrew
was guilty of prescription or laches. There’s no full blown trial. RTC admitted
the amended complaint and gave respondent 15 days to comment on
petitioner’s MTD based on affirmative defenses & likewise gave petitioner 15
HEIRS OF FAVIS V. GONZALES 10. Petitioners contend that the case is not subject to compromise as it involves
future legitime.
Petitioner/s: HEIRS OF DR. MARIANO FAVIS SR. represented by their
Issue:
co-heirs and Attorneys-in-Fact MERCEDES A. FAVIS and NELLY FAVIS-
1. W/N CA erred in dismissing the complaint - YES
VILLAFUERTE
Ratio:
Respondent/s: JUANA GONZALES, her son MARIANO G. FAVIS, MA.
1. CA’s dismissal is hinged on Art. 151 of the Family Code which states that No
THERESA JOANA D. FAVIS, JAMES MARK D. FAVIS, all minors
suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless earnest efforts
represented herein by their parents SPS. MARIANO FAVIS and
towards a compromise have been made.
LARCELITA D. FAVIS,
2. CA treated Art. 151 as a condition precedent, non-compliance of which is a
ground for dismissal under the rules of court.
Doctrine: Sec. 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the court
3. Such interpretation is misplaced. Rule 16 treats of the grounds for a motion to
may motu proprio dismiss a claim, namely: Lack of jurisdiction over the
dismiss the complaint. It must be distinguished from the grounds under Rule
subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata, and prescription of action.
9, Sec. 1 which deals with dismissal of the claim by the court motu proprio.
4. Sec. 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the court may motu
Facts: proprio dismiss a claim, namely: Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
1. Dr. Mariano Favis was married to Capitolina Aguilar with whom he had seven litis pendentia, res judicata, and prescription of action.
children. 5. For grounds to dismiss a complaint, the Rule requires that such a motion
2. When Capitolina died, Dr. Favis took Juana Gonzales as his common-law wife should be filed "within the time for but before filing the answer to the
with whom he had one child, Mariano. complaint or pleading asserting a claim." The time frame indicates that
3. When Dr. Favis and Juana got married, Dr. Favis executed an affidavit thereafter, the motion to dismiss based on the absence of the condition
acknowledging Mariano as one of his legitimate children. Mariano had 4 precedent is barred.
children. 6. In this case, failure to allege a failed attempt at a compromise as a condition
4. Dr. Favis died intestate leaving the following properties: precedent was deemed waived since it was not raised during the petitioner’s
a. 2 Residential land in Ilocos Sur answer or motion to dismiss. In fact, it was the court of appeals that dismissed
b. Commercial building erected on the land the case motu proprio. Premises considered, the defense of condition
c. A house precedent had already been waived.
d. Orchard land
5. Prior to his death, Dr. Favis allegedly executed a Deed of donation transferring Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and
and conveying a parcel of residential land in Brgy 1 Ilocos Sur and the SET ASIDE and the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, Branch
Commercial building erected therein in favor of his grandchild with Juana 20 is AFFIRMED.
(Mariano’s children).
6. Petitioners filed an action for annulment of the donation alleging that the
donation prejudiced their legitime.
7. In their answer with counterclaim, respondents assert that the properties
donated do not form part of the estate of the late Dr. Favis because the
donation was made inter vivos.
8. RTC nullified the deed of donation on the ground that at the time of donation,
Dr. Favis was 92 and is plagued with illnesses which has affected his full
control of his mental capacity. It also ruled that Juana and Mariano are
compulsory heirs.
9. Respondents appealed and the CA motu proprio ordered the dismissal of the
complaint for failure of petitioners to make an averment that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made, as mandated by Art. 151 of the Family
Code.
AQUINO V. QUIAZON was spurious and could not prevail over a Land Registration Decree
issued in favor of their predecessor-in-interest
Petitioner/s: LETICIA NAGUIT AQUINO, MELVIN NAGUIT, ROMMEL
○ The predecessors-in-interest of petitioners were among the
NAGUIT, ELMA NAGUIT TAYAG, YSSEL L. NAGUIT, ROSALINA
oppositors in the land registration proceeding but, nevertheless,
NAGUIT AUMENTADO, RIZEL NAGUIT CUNANAN, CARIDAD NAGUIT
after the trial, the subject lot was awarded, decreed and titled in favor
PARAJAS, MILLIE NAGUIT FLORENDO, MARNEL NAGUIT, EDUARDO
of respondents' predecessor-in-interest,
NAGUIT, JOSE NAGUIT, ZOILO NAGUIT, AND AMELIA NAGUIT
● The RTC Set a preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses
DIZON, represented by YSSEL L. NAGUIT
○ There was the Cadastral case No. 5 which proved that the
Respondent/s: CESAR B. QUIAZON, AMANDA QUIAZON, JOSE B.
respondents’ predecessors-in-interest were declared as the absolute
QUIAZON AND REYNALDO B. QUIAZON, represented by JAIME B.
owners
QUIAZON
● RTC ruled in favor of respondents on the ground of lack of cause of action or
failure to state a cause of action based on the evidence presented during the
Doctrine: The ground of "lack of cause of action," is not one of the grounds
preliminary hearing
for a motion to dismiss under Rule 16, and hence, not proper for resolution
● But CA reversed that it was within the discretion of the trial court to conduct
during a preliminary hearing held pursuant to Section 6.
a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defense of lack of cause of action or
failure to state a cause of action, where both parties were given the chance to
In determining the existence of a cause of action, only the statements in the
submit arguments and evidence for or against the dismissal of the complaint.
complaint may properly be considered. It is error for the court to take
● Petitioners argue that the CA gravely erred in considering external factors
cognizance of external facts or hold preliminary hearings to determine their
beyond the allegations in the petition.
existence. If the allegation in a complaint furnish sufficient basis by which
○ They aver that it is a settled rule that to determine the sufficiency of
the complaint may be maintained, the same should not be dismissed
a cause of action, only facts alleged in the complaint shall be
regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by the defendants.
considered, and it is error for the court to take cognizance of external
facts or hold a preliminary hearing to determine their existence.
Facts:
● A complaint for Annulment and Quieting of Title was filed before the RTC by Issue:
the petitioners alleging that they were the heirs of the late Epifanio Makam W/N the CA erred in affirming the dismissal of petitioners' complaint on the ground of
and Severina Bautista, who acquired a house and lot by virtue of a Deed of Sale lack of cause of action or failure to state a cause of action?- YES.
○ that since then, they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in Ratio:
open, continuous, adverse, and notorious possession for more than
a hundred years ● The Court notes that respondents raised the affirmative defense in their
○ that they exhibited this through constructing houses and paying real Answer that petitioners "have no valid, legal and sufficient cause of action,"
estate taxes on the property raising factual matters, which is effectively the ground of "lack of cause of
○ That their inquiry with the Register of Deeds of San Fernando, action."
Pampanga confirmed that the property had been titled in the name ● Although the two grounds were used interchangeably, it can be gleaned from
of respondents under a TCT that was invalid, ineffective, voidable or the decisions of both the trial court and the CA that respondents' defense of
unenforceable "lack of cause of action" was actually treated as a "failure to state a cause of
● Respondents asserted that they were the absolute owners of the subject land action," which is a ground for a motion to dismiss under Rule 16.
and that they had inherited the same from their predecessor-in-interest, ○ apparent from their reliance on Section 6 of Rule 16, which pertains
Fausta Baluyut, one of the registered owners under Original Certificate of Title to grounds of a motion to dismiss raised as affirmative defenses
(OCT) ○ The CA even referred to both as one and the same ground for a
○ Further, respondents contend that those petitioners had been motion to dismiss when it stated that: "Indubitably, lack of cause of
occupying the property by mere tolerance. action or failure to state a cause of action, being one of the grounds
○ Respondents argue that the petitioners "have no valid, legal and for a motion to dismiss, is included thereby."
sufficient cause of action "against them, because their deed of sale
● The trial court held a preliminary hearing resolving the ground of "lack of ○ facts which appear, by record or document included in the pleadings,
cause of action" pursuant to Section 6 of Rule 16, which allows the court to to be unfounded.,
hold a preliminary hearing on grounds for dismissal provided in the same rule ■ inquiry is not confined to the complaint if culled
that have been raised as an affirmative defense in the answer. ● from annexes and other pleadings submitted by
● The ground of "lack of cause of action," as already explained, however, is not the parties;
one of the grounds for a motion to dismiss under Rule 16, and hence, not ● from documentary evidence admitted by
proper for resolution during a preliminary hearing held pursuant to Section 6. stipulation which disclose facts sufficient to defeat
● On this point alone, the trial court clearly erred in receiving evidence on the the claim; or
ground of "lack of cause of action" during the preliminary hearing. ● from evidence admitted in the course of hearings
● The factual matters raised by respondents in their affirmative defense arguing related to the case.
the non-existence of a cause of action, should have been duly resolved during ● it is not "lack or absence of cause of action" that is a ground for dismissal of
a trial on the merits of the case. Rule 16 of the Rules of Court enumerates the the complaint under Rule 16, but rather, that "the complaint states no cause
grounds for a motion to dismiss. (See Sec. 1(g)) of action."
● The test for determining the existence of a cause of action is whether or not, ● The issue submitted to the court was, therefore, the determination of the
admitting hypothetically the truth of the allegations of fact made in the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint to constitute a cause of action
complaint, a judge may validly grant the relief demanded in the complaint and not whether those allegations of fact were true, as there was a hypothetical
● In determining the existence of a cause of action, only the statements in the admission of facts alleged in the complaint.
complaint may properly be considered. ● An affirmative defense, raising the ground that there is no cause of action as
○ It is error for the court to take cognizance of external facts or hold against the defendants poses a question of fact that should be resolved after
preliminary hearings to determine their existence. the conduct of the trial on the merits.
○ If the allegation in a complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the ● A reading of respondents' arguments in support of this ground readily reveals
complaint may be maintained, the same should not be dismissed that the arguments relate not to the failure to state a cause of action, but to the
regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by the defendants. existence of the cause of action, which goes into the very crux of the
● in a motion to dismiss a complaint based on lack of cause of action, the controversy and is a matter of evidence for resolution after a full-blown
question submitted to the court for determination is the sufficiency of the hearing.
allegations of fact made in the complaint to constitute a cause of action, and ● It is of note that although the trial court might not have erred in holding a
not on whether these allegations of fact are true, for said motion must preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses of prescription and res
hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint; that the judicata, it is readily apparent from the decisions of the lower courts that no
test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether or not, disquisition whatsoever was made on these grounds.
admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the ● It cannot be denied that evidence in support of the ground of "lack of cause of
same in accordance with the prayer of said complaint. action" was received and given great weight by the trial court. In fact, all the
● Stated otherwise, the insufficiency of the cause of action must appear in the evidence given credence by the trial court were only in support of the ground
face of the complaint in order to sustain a dismissal on this ground, for in the of "lack of cause of action."
determination of whether or not a complaint states a cause of action, only the ● This all the more highlight that the trial court erred in receiving evidence to
facts alleged therein and no other matter may be considered, and the court determine whether the complaint failed to state a cause of action.
may not inquire into the truth of the allegations, and find them to be false ● Although neither the RTC nor the CA ruled on the affirmative defenses of
before a hearing is had on the merits of the case; and it is improper to inject prescription and res judicata, it appears that this case could not have been
in the allegations of the complaint facts not alleged or proved, and use these dismissed on these grounds.
as basis for said motion. ○ First, an action to quiet title is imprescriptible if the plaintiffs are in
Exceptions and Section 6 of Rule 16 not applicable possession of the property, which is the situation prevailing in the
● If there is no hypothetical admission of present case.
○ the veracity of allegations if their falsity is subject to judicial notice; ○ Second, there appears to be no res judicata nor a violation of the
○ allegations that are legally impossible; prohibition against forum shopping considering that Civil Case No.
○ facts inadmissible in evidence; and
5487 had been dismissed, without prejudice, years before petitioners
initiated their complaint for quieting of title.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The March 13, 2012 Decision of the Court of
Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 92887 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is ordered
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court for trial on the merits of the case.
SO ORDERED.

LOURDES SUITES VS BINARAO Issue:
WON a dismissal based on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action
Petitioner/s: LOURDES SUITES (Crown Hotel Management
cannot be deemed a dismissal with prejudice under the Rules- NO
Corporation)
Respondent/s: NOEMI BINARO
Ratio:
Doctrine:
● Petitioner has misinterpreted the ruling in Macaslang v. Zamora:
The complaint for lack of cause of action is dismissed due to the failure of
“Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading, and is a
petitioner to preponderantly establish its claim by clear and convincing
ground for dismissal under Rule 16 ROC.
evidence.The dismissal with prejudice is likewise not an exercise of wanton
Lack of cause [of] action refers to a situation where the evidence does not prove the
or palpable discretion. It must be noted that this case is an action for small
cause of action alleged in the pleading.
claims where decisions are rendered final and unappealable, hence, a
Justice Regalado, a recognized commentator on remedial law, has explained the
decision dismissing the same is necessarily with prejudice.
distinction:
x x x What is contemplated is a failure to state a cause of action which is provided in
Facts: Sec. 1(g) of Rule 16. This is a matter of insufficiency of the pleading. Sec. 5 of Rule 10,
● Petitioner Lourdes Suites is the owner and operator of a hotel located along which was also included as the last mode for raising the issue to the court, refers to the
Kalayaan Avenue, Makati City. It executed two (2) contracts with Respondent situation where the evidence does not prove a cause of action. This is, therefore, a
Noemi Binarao for room accommodations for two groups of students (AQ matter of insufficiency of evidence.
College of Nursing & Health Sciences Students and Mariano Marcos State Failure to state a cause of action is different from failure to prove a cause of action. The
University College of Nursing & Health Sciences Students) remedy in the first is to move for dismissal of the pleading, while the remedy in the
● According to petitioner’s records, respondent was able to pay the the total second is to demur to the evidence, hence reference to Sec. 5 of Rule 10 has been
contract price . However, petitioner claimed that there was an unpaid balance eliminated in this section. The procedure would consequently be to require the pleading
of ₱47,810.00 representing the charges for damages to the furniture, a lost key to state· a cause of action, by timely objection to its deficiency; or, at the trial, to file a
and excess guests. demurrer to evidence, if such motion is warranted.
● Thus, on 25 July 2011, petitioner sent a demand letter to respondent for the ● The remedies discussed in Macaslang are those which are available to the
unsettled amount which Respondent failed to pay, prompting petitioner to file defendant. The courts are not precluded from dismissing a case for lack of
a Statement of Claim for collection of sum of money plus damages before the cause of action (i.e. insufficiency of evidence).
MeTC. ● In civil cases, courts must determine if the plaintiff was able to prove his case
● In her Response, respondent alleged that she is not obliged to pay the claimed by a preponderance of evidence which is defined as "x x x the probability of
amount because petitioner billed the charges twice. Petitioner then impugned the truth. It is evidence that is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief
the validity of the Response, stating that "it was not made in the form of an than that which is offered in opposition thereto."
Answer as required by Section 1, Rule 11 of the Revised Rules of Court. As correctly stated by the RTC:
MTC: ● The basis of [the] public respondent in dismissing the complaint for lack of
● the defendant has already paid her monetary obligation and even made an cause of action is the failure of petitioner to preponderantly establish its claim
overpayment. against the private respondent by clear and convincing evidence. Hence,
● The MeTC dismissed the complaint with prejudice for lack of cause of action public respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed
RTC: the Complaint for lack of cause of action, as he referred to the evidence
● there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MeTC. presented and not to the allegations in the Complaint.
● Denied petitoner’s motion for reconsideration ● The dismissal of the complaint with prejudice is likewise not an exercise of
Petitioner: Even after the presentation of evidence by both parties, a complaint cannot wanton or palpable discretion. It must be noted that this case is an action for
be dismissed with prejudice based on lack of cause of action because: (1) this ground is small claims where decisions are rendered final and unappealable, hence, a
not expressly provided for under the Rules on Small Claims Cases;16 and (2) if there decision dismissing the same is necessarily with prejudice.
was a failure to prove a cause of action the only available remedy would be a demurrer
filed by the defendant. Dispositive:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 7 September 2012 of
Branch 148 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati in SCA Case No. 12-458 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

MANILA BANKING CORPORATION VS UP BAGUIO motion was based on the deed of dacion en pago, which was not even alleged
in the complaint.
Petitioner/s: The Manila Banking Corporation
● Since the deed of dacion en pago had been expunged from the record, the trial
Respondent/s: UP Baguio, GDI
court erred in its finding of payment and lack of cause of action base on the
deed.
Doctrine: It must be pointed out that while the Court allows a relaxation
● In the case at bar, there had been no presentation of evidence yet and
in the application of procedural rules in some instances, courts and litigants
petitioner had not rested its case. Therefore the August 17, 1999 Order
are enjoined to follow rules strictly because they are designed to facilitate
properly denied the motion to dismiss for being improper under either Rule
the adjudication of cases
16 or 33.
● The trial court had also made a premature statement in its Omnibus Order
Facts: dated April 21, 1997 that the dacion en pago settled the loan and the case, even
● On November 26, 1981, the Manila Banking granted a ₱14 million credit line as it also stated that respondent university was used as a “dummy” of GDI.
to the UP Baguio Inc for the construction of additional buildings and purchase ● If indeed there was fraud, considering the uncollateralized loan, its diversion,
of new equipment. non-payment, absence of demand although overdue, and the dacion en pago
● On behalf of the university, then Vice-Chairman Fernando C. Bautista, Jr. where title of the property accepted as payment cannot be transferred, the
signed PN Nos. 10660, 10672, 10687, and 10708 and executed a continuing fraud should be uncovered to determine who are liable to pay the loan.
surety agreement. However, Bautista, Jr. diverted the net proceeds of the loan.
● He endorsed and delivered the four checks representing the net proceeds to
respondent Group Developers, Inc. The loan was not paid.
● On February 12, 1990, the bank filed a complaint for a sum of money with Dispositive:
application for preliminary attachment against the university, Bautista, Jr. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the trial court’s April 11, 2002
and his wife Milagros, before the RTC of Makati City. and June 27, 2003 Orders. The trial court is ORDERED to proceed with the pre-trial
● Five years later, on March 31, 1995, the bank amended the complaint and and hear this case with dispatch. No pronouncement as to costs.
impleaded GDI as additional defendant.
● Consequently, even if the loan was overdue, the bank did not demand payment Hello I saw the link where u copy pasted this in verbatim:
until February 8, 1989. By way of cross-claim, the university prayed that GDI https://www.scribd.com/document/97781925/Manila-Banking-Co-vs-University-of-
be ordered to pay the university the amount it would have to pay the bank. On Baguio
December 14, 1995, the bank and GDI executed a deed of dacion en pago.
● On March 19, 1998, the university moved to dismiss the amended complaint. Please refrain from copy pasting next time!!!
On October 14, 1999 the university moved to set the case for pre-trial on
December 2,1999.
● On August 3, 2000, the trial court resolved GDI’s motion to resolve the
motion to dismiss and defer pre-trial. On August 29, 2001, the university filed
a manifestation with motion for reconsideration of the August 17, 1999 Order
denying the University’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint.
Issue: W/N the trial court erred in dismissing the amended complaint, without trial,
upon motion of respondent University. - YES
Ratio:
● In this case, the University’s March 19, 1998 motion to dismiss the amended
complaint was improper under Rule 16 because it was filed after respondent
University filed its responsive pleading, its Answer.
● Also the motion’s merit could not be determined based solely on the
allegations of the initiatory pleading, the amended complaint, since the
damages with prayer for writ of preliminary attachment before the RTC of
Pasay City (Civil Case No. R-PSY-10-04228-CV)
PADILLA VS. GLOBE ASIATIQUE ○ PNB alleged in detail the fraudulent acts and misrepresentations
committed by respondents in obtaining PNB's conformity to the CTS
Petitioner/s: AIDA PADILLA
Facility Agreements and the release of various sums to respondents
Respondent/s: GLOBE ASIATIQUE REALTY HOLDINGS
in the total amount of P974,377,159.10.
CORPORATION, FILMAL REALTY CORPORATION, DELFIN S. LEE
○ PNB accused Globe Asiatique of falsely representing that they have
Summary: In this case, Padilla's counterclaim for damages raised in her
valid and subsisting contracts to sell, which evidently showed they
answer before the Pasig City RTC is compulsory, alleging suffering and
had no intention to pay their loan obligations.
injury caused to her as a consequence of the unwarranted filing of the
Second Case -- Pasig City RTC Case (Civil Case No. 73132)** This is the case wherein
baseless complaint filed by Globe Asiatique. PASIG City RTC however,
petitioner Padilla filed her counterclaim:
dismissed her counterclaim when it dismissed the main complaint filed
➢ Meanwhile, defendants Globe Asiatique, Filmal, Delfin S. Lee and Dexter L.
against her upon the same ground of lack of jurisdiction as its resolution
Lee filed on August 10, 2011 a complaint for Damages against Judge
supposedly would entail passing upon the validity of orders and processes
Gutierrez (judge in the Pasay RTC) and Aida Padilla in the RTC of PASIG
still pending before the Pasay City RTC.
City (Civil Case No. 73132), alleging that:
Doctrine:
○ The civil action" filed by Aida Padilla (petitioner) which wrought
**This case reiterated the prevailing Pinga doctrine. The doctrines in
havoc to their businesses and lives was malicious and unfounded.
Metals Engineering, International Container, and BA Finance are
○ And that Padilla executed a "perjured" Affidavit in support of the
abandoned.**
application for writ of preliminary attachment before the Pasay City
The dismissal of the complaint DOES NOT automatically result in the
RTC.
dismissal of counterclaims pleaded by the defendant. Under the 1997 Rules
● Judge Gutierrez moved to dismiss the complaint against him on the following
of Civil Procedure, it is now explicitly provided that the dismissal of the
grounds: (1) respondents have no cause of action against him; and (2) the
complaint due to failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his case is “without
PASIG City court has no jurisdiction over the case and his person, movant
prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in
being of co-equal and concurrent jurisdiction.
the same or in a separate action.” The Rules mandates that claims for
★ Padilla filed her Answer With Compulsory Counterclaims, praying for
damages and attorney's fees based on unfounded suit constitute
the dismissal of respondents' complaint contending that:
compulsory counterclaim which must be pleaded in the same action or,
○ in any event, there is no basis for respondents' claim for
otherwise, it shall be barred. It will then be iniquitous to require the
damages arising from the issuance of the writ of preliminary
petitioner to make the counterclaim in the present action, under threat of
attachment before the Pasay City RTC considering that the Bond is
losing his right to claim the same ever again in any other court, yet make
valid and sufficient to secure and answer for whatever damages
his right totally dependent on the fate of the respondent's complaint.
respondents may have suffered by reason of such issuance should it
**Difference from the Pinga case:
be finally decided that PNB was not entitled to the said bond.
While the declaration in Pinga refers to instances covered by Section 3, Rule
★ On April 2, 2012, the RTC of PASIG City issued an Order dismissing Civil Case
17 on dismissal of complaints due to the fault of plaintiff, it does
No. 73132 for lack of jurisdiction.
not preclude the application of the same rule when the dismissal was
★ On May 7, 2012, petitioner filed a Motion to Set Counterclaims for Pre-Trial
upon the instance of defendant who correctly argued lack of
Conference.
jurisdiction over its person.
● On October 22, 2012, the PASIG City RTC denied Globe Asiatiques’ motion
for reconsideration of the April 2, 2012 Order dismissing their complaint.
Facts: ★ Padilla filed THIS petition for review under Rule 45 assailing the Orders
First Case -- Proceedings in the Pasay City RTC (Civil Case No. R-PSY-10-04228-CV) dated November 12, 2012 denying the motion to set the counterclaim
Philippine National Bank vs. Globe Asiatique Realty Holdings Corp, et al.: for pre-trial and May 8, 2013 denying petitioner's motion for
● PNB sued Globe Asiatique Realty Holdings Corporation, Filmal Realty reconsideration, issued by the RTC of PASIG City in Civil Case No. 73132.
Corporation, Delfin S. Lee and Dexter L. Lee for recovery of sum of money and ★ On November 12, 2012, the PASIG City RTC issued the first questioned
Order: (**explanation on why it dismissed Padilla’s counterclaim)
“Records show that this Court, issued an Order dated April 2, 2012, dismissing the case interfere either directly, as desired by plaintiff, or indirectly, as defendant Padilla would
on the ground that issues involved in this case already impinge upon the validity of the have it with the acts of a co-equal court.
Order dated August 25, 2010 and Writ of Attachment dated August 27, 2010 issued by
the
RTC Pasay City, a court of concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, in "Philippine Issue: W/N compulsory counterclaim by reason of the unfounded suit may prosper
National Bank vs. Globe Asiatique Realty Holdings Corp. et al." The ruling in said Order even if the main complaint had been dismissed --NO
dated April 2, 2012, was affirmed by this Court per its Order dated October 22, 2012,
whereby it reiterated that acting on the Globe Asiatique’s' Complaint is a violation of Ratio:
the principle of judicial stability, which essentially states that the judgment or Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it is now explicitly provided that the dismissal
order of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be interfered with by any court of of the complaint due to failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his case is “without
concurrent jurisdiction for the simple reason that the power to open, modify or vacate prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or
the said order is not only possessed but is restricted to the court in which the judgment in a separate action.”
or order is rendered or issued.
The effect of this amendment on previous rulings on whether the dismissal of a
The foregoing principles are equally applicable to the counterclaims of Aida Padilla. complaint carries with it the dismissal of the counterclaims as well, was discussed in
Indeed, to hear the counterclaims of defendant Aida Padilla will open the door, so to the case of Pinga v. The Heirs of German Santiago, thus:
speak, for Globe Asiatique to interpose as ostensible defenses its claims regarding the
alleged illegality of the aforesaid orders and writ of attachment issued by the RTC of The present rule reaffirms the right of the defendant to move for the dismissal
Pasay City. In effect this Court will be forced to dwell upon issues involving the pending of the complaint and to prosecute his counterclaim, The amendment to Section
civil case in the RTC Branch 199, Pasay City, thereby interfering, albeit indirectly, with 3, Rule 17 settles that "nagging question" whether the dismissal of the complaint carries
said issues. This is precisely the very evil which the Court sought to avoid when it with it the dismissal of the counterclaim, and opines that by reason of the amendments,
dismissed the Globe Asiatique’s complaint. Therefore, upholding once more the the rulings in Metals Engineering, International Container, and BA Finance "may be
principle of judicial stability, this Court is impelled to refuse to hear the counterclaims deemed abandoned."
of defendant Padilla.
● The Motion filed by defendant Aida Padilla is DENIED without prejudice to When the Court promulgated the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, including the amended
the re-filing of defendant Aida Padilla's causes of action against herein Rule 17, those previous jural doctrines that were inconsistent with the new rules
plaintiffs after final resolution of Civil Case No. R-PSY-10-04228 entitled incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure were implicitly abandoned insofar as
"Philippine National Bank vs. Globe Asiatique Realty Holdings Corp, et al." incidents arising after the effectivity of the new procedural rules on 1 July 1997. BA
★ Padilla's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied under the second Finance, or even the doctrine that a counterclaim may be necessarily dismissed along
assailed Order dated May 8, 2013, as follows: with the complaint, clearly conflicts with the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The
“As Padilla herself stated, the grant of her counterclaim calls for the determination of abandonment of BA Finance as doctrine extends as far back as 1997, when the Court
the issue of whether or not herein plaintiffs Globe had maliciously filed the Complaint adopted the new Rules of Civil Procedure. … we thus rule that the dismissal of a
against defendants Padilla. Necessarily, the Court in threshing out such issue complaint due to fault of the plaintiff is without prejudice to the right of the defendant
would be constrained to rule on whether the plaintiffs filed their complaint to prosecute any pending counterclaims of whatever nature in the same or separate
with a sinister design knowing fully well that their cause of action was action. We confirm that BA Finance and all previous rulings of the Court that are
baseless. Thus, the Court would have to pass upon the veracity or inconsistent with this present holding are now abandoned.
genuineness of plaintiffs' claims that they were unjustly injured by the
orders and processes issued by RTC Branch 119, Pasay City, in Civil Case Subsequently, in Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd. v. Dakila Trading Corporation this
No. R-PSY-10-04228 entitled "Philippine National Bank vs. Globe Asiatique Realty Court held that while the declaration in Pinga refers to instances covered by Section 3,
Holdings Corp. et al." Hence, whatever ruling this Court may arrive at on said Rule 17 on dismissal of complaints due to the fault of plaintiff, it does not preclude the
issues would inevitably impinge upon matters already pending before the application of the same rule when the dismissal was upon the instance of defendant
RTC Branch 119, Pasay City. who correctly argued lack of jurisdiction over its person. Further, in stark departure
Once more, under the principle of juridical stability, the Court is constrained to refuse from Metals Engineering, we declared that the court's jurisdiction over respondent's
to hear defendant Padilla's counterclaims. Verily, this Court cannot allow itself to complaint is not to be confused with jurisdiction over petitioner's counterclaim.
ground for dismissal of the complaint, i.e., lack of jurisdiction in strict observance of
Still anchored on the pronouncement in Pinga, we then categorically ruled that a the policy against interference with the proceedings of a co-equal court.
counterclaim arising from the unfounded suit may proceed despite the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the person of defendant-counterclaimant. As petitioner set forth in her Compulsory Counterclaim, there is actually no necessity
for the Pasig City RTC, in ruling on the merits of the counterclaim, to pass upon the
Now, having been directly confronted with the problem of whether the compulsory validity of the writ of attachment and related orders issued by the Pasay City RTC.
counterclaim by reason of the unfounded suit may prosper even if the main complaint
had been dismissed, we rule in the affirmative. Ironically, while it is the respondents who erroneously and maliciously asked the Pasig
City RTC to pass upon these issues still pending in a co-equal court, for which reason
It may also do well to remember that it is this Court which mandated that claims for the said court dismissed their complaint, petitioner was not allowed to prove her
damages and attorney's fees based on unfounded suit constitute compulsory counterclaim by reason of the unfounded suit in the same case as purportedly it will
counterclaim which must be pleaded in the same action or, otherwise, it shall be barred. entail verifying respondents' claim that they were prejudiced by the orders and
It will then be iniquitous and the height of injustice to require the petitioner to make processes in the Pasay City RTC.
the counterclaim in the present action, under threat of losing his right to claim the same
ever again in any other court, yet make his right totally dependent on the fate of the Dispositive:
respondent's complaint. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated November 12, 2012 and
May 8, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 155 in Civil Case No. 73132
If indeed the Court dismisses petitioner's counterclaim solely on the basis of the are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Said court is hereby directed to proceed with
dismissal of respondent's Complaint, then what remedy is left for the petitioner? It can the presentation of evidence in support of the compulsory counterclaim of petitioner
be said that he can still file a separate action to recover the damages and attorney's fees Aida Padilla.
based on the unfounded suit for he cannot be barred from doing so since he did file the
compulsory counterclaim in the present action, only that it was dismissed when
respondent's Complaint was dismissed. However, this reasoning is highly flawed and
irrational considering that petitioner, already burdened by the damages and
attorney's fees it may have incurred in the present case, must again incur
more damages and attorney's fees in pursuing a separate action, when, in
the first place, it should not have been involved in any case at all.
Since petitioner's counterclaim is compulsory in nature and its cause of action survives
that of the dismissal of respondent's complaint, then it should be resolved based on its
own merits and evidentiary support.
In the present case, the RTC of Pasig City should have allowed petitioner's counterclaim
to proceed notwithstanding the dismissal of respondents' complaint, the same being
compulsory in nature and with its cause not eliminated by such dismissal. It bears
stressing that petitioner was hailed to a separate court (Pasig City RTC) even while the
dispute between PNB and respondents was still being litigated, and she already
incurred expenses defending herself, having been sued by respondents in her personal
capacity. The accusations hurled against her were serious (perjury and
misrepresentation in executing the affidavit in support of the application for writ of
attachment before the Pasay City RTC) with hints at possible criminal prosecution apart
from that criminal complaint already lodged in the Pasig City Prosecutor's Office. The
Pasig City RTC clearly erred in refusing to hear the counterclaims upon the same

TOPIC XII – DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
On July of 2005, trial of the case had not yet been completed. The Santiagos, as
PINGA V SANTIAGO plaintiffs, had failed to present their evidence. At the hearing of July 27, 2005,
Santiago’s counsel on record failed to appear, sending instead a representative who
Petitioner/s: Edgardo Pinga
sought the postponement of the hearing.
Respondent/s: Heirs of German Santiago
Counsel for Pinga opposed the move for postponement and moved instead for the
dismissal of the case.
Doctrine:
Sec 2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. — Except as provided in the
RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground that it was obvious that Santiago had failed
preceding section, a complaint shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's
to prosecute the case for an unreasonable length of time. RTC also allowed Pinga to
instance save upon approval of the court and upon such terms and
present evidence ex-parte.
conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded
by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion for
Santiago filed an MR opting not to seek that his complaint be reinstated, but praying
dismissal, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. The dismissal
instead that the entire action be dismissed and Pinga be disallowed from presenting
shall be without prejudice to the right of the defendant to
evidence ex-parte. Santiago claimed that the order of the RTC allowing Pinga to present
prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action unless within
evidence ex-parte was not in accord with established jurisprudence. They cited cases
fifteen (15) days from notice of the motion he manifests his
where a counterclaim could not remain pending for independent adjudication.
preference to have his counterclaim resolved in the same action.
Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph
RTC promulgated an order granting Santiago’s MR and dismissing the counterclaim,
shall be without prejudice. xxx
citing as the only ground that there is no opposition to the MR.
Pinga filed an MR.
Sec 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. — If, for no justifiable cause, the
plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in
Santiago filed an Opposition to Pinga’s Urgent MR arguing that the prevailing
chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length
jurisprudential rule is that compulsory counterclaims cannot be adjudicated
of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the
independently of plaintiff’s cause of action, and the dismissal of the complaint carries
complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the
with it the dismissal of the compulsory counterclaims.
court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant
to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action.
Issue:
This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits,
WON dismissal of complaint (on the ground of the failure to prosecute on Santiago’s
unless otherwise declared by the court.
part) carries with it the dismissal of the compulsory counterclaims?
Facts: Ratio:
Heirs of German Santiago (Santiago) filed a complaint dated May 28, 1998 for
injunction and damages with RTC of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur against Pinga & NO. Sec. 3, Rule 17 applies. The dismissal of the complaint due to the fault of plaintiff
Saavedra (Pinga) alleging Pinga of unlawful entry to Santiago’s coco lands. does not necessarily carry with it the dismissal of the counterclaim, compulsory or
otherwise. In fact, the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the right of
In their Amended Answer with Counterclaim, Pinga disputed Santiago’s ownership of defendants to prosecute the counterclaim.
the properties in question. Pinga in turn prayed that because of Santiago’s forcible re-
entry in the properties and the irresponsible filing of the case, Pinga be awarded Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 17 envisage different factual situations. The dismissal of the
damages plus costs of suit. Santiago’s counsel sought the postponement of the hearing complaint under Section 2 is at the instance of plaintiff is without prejudice unless
schedule. otherwise stated in the order of the court. By reason thereof, to curb any frivolous
strategy of plaintiff for his benefit or to obviate possible prejudice to defendant, the
RTC ordered dismissal of the complaint. However, RTC subsequently reconsidered the plaintiff may not dismiss his complaint if the defendant has a counterclaim since said
order of dismissal as long as Santiago’s counsel would give priority to the case.
counterclaim would necessarily be divested of juridical basis and defendant would be
deprived of possible recovery thereon in that same judicial proceeding.
Section 3, on the other hand, contemplates a dismissal not procured by plaintiff,

although justified by causes imputable to him. This situation is ordered upon motion of
defendant or motu proprio by the court. Here, the issue of whether defendant has a
pending counterclaim, permissive or compulsory, is not of determinative significance.
The dismissal of plaintiff 's complaint is evidently a confirmation of the failure of
evidence to prove his cause of action outlined therein, hence the dismissal is
considered, as a matter of evidence, adjudication on the merits. This does not,
however, mean that there is likewise such absence of evidence to prove defendant's
counterclaim although the same arises out of the subject matter of the complaint which
was merely terminated for lack of proof. Thus understood, the complaint can
accordingly be dismissed, but relief can nevertheless be granted as a matter of course
to defendant on his counterclaim as alleged and proved.
Note: Old rule distinguishes compulsory counterclaims from permissive counterclaims

in so far as dismissal of the action is concerned on the theory that if the court dismisses
the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the compulsory counterclaim must
also be dismissed as it is merely ancilliary to the main action and no jurisdiction
remained for any grant of relief under the counterclaim.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated 9 August

2005 and 10 October 2005 of Branch 29, Regional Trial Court of San Miguel,
Zamboanga del Sur in Civil Case No. 98-012 are SET ASIDE. Petitioner’s counterclaim
as defendant in Civil Case. No. 98-012 is REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court is
ORDERED to hear and decide the counterclaim with deliberate dispatch.

CRUZ VS CA
Bunag Clanaoc and Juliana
Petitioner/s: JOSEFINA M. CRUZ and ERNESTINA M. CONCEPCION Bunag Arevalo.
Respondent/s: THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SECOND DIVISION,
MARIANO "BOY" BUNAG and ROLANDO BUNAG
Doctrine: Once a case is dismissed for failure to prosecute, this has the Civil Case No. Annulmen Petitioner: Mariano
effect of an adjudication on the merits and is understood to be with 2583-02 t of Title "Bo[y]" Bunag and
prejudice to the filing of another action. Unless there is a qualification (case in With Rolando Bunag
in the order of dismissal that it is without prejudice, the controversy for Damages
dismissal should be regarded as an adjudication on the merits this case) Respondents:
and is with prejudice. Josefina M. Cruz and
Ernestina M. Concepcion
Facts:
● This case is a petition for certiorari involving 4 cases
● Petitioners Cruz filed for a motion for outright dismissal of Civil case 2583
because it involves the same parties, subject matter and issues as Civil case
Civil case 4365, Unlawful Petitioner: Josefina Cruz
1600 which has become final and executory and Civil case 2573-02 which has
decided in favor detainer` and Ernestina
been dismissed due to res judicata.
of petitioner Concepcion
● In all 3 cases, both Ernestina and Mariano Bunag were parties and the subject
Respondent: Mariano
matter of the cases was a parcel of land in Gapan, Nueva Ecija. Thus, res
'Boy' Bunag, Rolando
judicata and accion pendente lite is present in this case.
Bunag, Remedios Bunag, et
● The respondents denied any knowledge of Case 1600, however the case was
al., Defendants."
still dimissed.
● Respondents filed an MR which was granted by the court and affirmed by the
Civil case 1600, Quieting Petitioner: Carlos L. Bunag,
CA. The court held that there was no identity of action, subject matter and
dismissed for of title Elias Bunag Natividad,
parties. They claim that since Mariano Bunag did not authorize nor give his
failure to Mariano Bunag, Salud
consent to Carlos Bunag to include him as one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case
prosecute Bunag Clanaoc and Juliana
No. 1600 and that herein plaintiffs Rolando Bunag is not a party to the said
Bunag
case, the dismissal of Civil Case No. 1600 will not bind them.
Arevalo,
● Respondents also claim that the dismissal of case 1600 was not a dismissal on
the merits.
Respondents :Josefina M.
● On the other hand, petitioners claim that Mariano’s affidavit wherein he
Cruz and Ernestina M.
alleged that he did not authorize Carlos Bunag to include him in case 1600 was
Concepcion as Heirs of
merely intended for delay. Also, the non-inclusion of Rolando in the said case
Sps. Carlos Maniquis and
is irrelevant as he was a party both to the injuction and ejectment case.
Marina Bunag
Moreover, there is identity of causes of action is present as the ownership of
the land and its rights of possession are the issues in all the cases.
Civil Case No. Injunction Petitioners:"Mariano 'Boy'
2573-02, Bunag and Rolando Bunag
Issue:
dismissed due to a
1. WON there is res judicata? YES
res judicata
2. WON there was dismissal on the merits of Case 1600? YES
Respondents: Carlos Bunag,
Elias Bunag Natividad,
Ratio:
Mariano Bunag, Salud
1. There is res judicata
- Under the rule of res judicata, also known as "bar by prior judgment," 2. There was dismissal on the merits.
a final judgment or order on the merits, rendered by a Court having - Rule 17 sec 3 of the rules of court provides:
jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, is conclusive in Section 3.Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. — If, for no justi􀀯able cause, the plaintiff
a subsequent case between the same parties and their successor-in- fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint,
interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these
special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the
title and in the same capacity. defendant or upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the
- The requisites essential for the application of the principle are: (1) defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This
there must be a final judgment or order; (2) said judgment or order dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise
must be on the merits; (3) the Court rendering the same must have declared by the court.
jurisdiction on the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must - The rule enumerates the instances where the complaint may be dismissed due
be between the two cases identity of parties, identity of subject to plaintiff's fault:
matter, and identity of causes of action. (1) if he fails to appear on the date for the presentation of his evidence in chief;
- In this case, all 4 elements were present. The 1st and 2nd elements (2) if he fails to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time; or
are undisputed. (3) if he fails to comply with the rules or any order of the court.
- On the 3rd element, there was a dismissal on the merits in this case. - Once a case is dismissed for failure to prosecute, this has the effect of an
Under the rules of court, a dismissal due to failure to prosecute is a adjudication on the merits and is understood to be with prejudice to the filing
dismissal on the merits unless such dismissal is qualified by the of another action. Unless there is a qualification in the order of
court. In this case, there was no qualification made by the court in its dismissal that it is without prejudice, the dismissal should be
decision. regarded as an adjudication on the merits and is with prejudice.
- On the 4th element: - In this case, the ruling did not mention that the dismissal is without prejudice.
Identity of parties- The denial of Mariano Bunag is only an afterthought after his Thus, the dismissal is with prejudice and is a judgment on the merits.
MR in the injunction charge was rejected because the court did not give weight to his
argument that he was unaware of his inclusion in case 1600. His execution of the Dispositive:
affidavit was only to made to make it appear that there was no identity of parties WHEREFORE,premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the
between the 2 cases. The non-inclusion of Rolando is irrelevant. Res judicata only needs Court of Appeals dated 19 March 2004 and its resolution dated 29 June 2004 are
substantial identity of parties to apply The addition or elimination of some parties does REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 2583-02 for Annulment of Title with
not alter the situation. There is substantial identity of parties when there is a Damages, pending before Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court of Gapan City, Nueva
community of interest between a party in the 1st case and a party in the 2nd case. Ecija, is herby ordered DISMISSED. With costs
Moreover, both parties shared an identity of interest from which flowed an identity of
relief. Such identity of interest is sufficient to make them privy-in-law, thereby
satisfying the requisite of substantial identity of parties.
Identity of subject matter- both cases involved the same parcel of land
Identity of causes of action- This does not mean absolute identity. The test to
determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same
evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential
to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same evidence or facts would sustain both
then the judgment on the 1st case is a bar to the subsequent action. The 2 cases are
different only in the form of action, but an examination of the allegations in the 2nd
case shows that the issues raised ( ownership of the land) and the relief sought (be
declared as owner and TCTs be issued in their names) are substantially the same. Both
cases required the same evidence.
CA VS ALVAREZ ● Mercedes Oliver sold the subject land to Filinvest, resulting in the issuance of
TCT in the name of Filinvest.
Petitioner/s: FILINVEST LAND, INC
● The heirs of the late Ricardo Alvarez filed a case for reconveyance, redemption
Respondent/s: HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ROMEO, ANTONIO,
and damages against Mercedes Oliver, Avelino Ramos and Jose Nunez,
JOSEFINA, RICARDO (JR.), all surnamed ALVAREZ and VENANCIA R.
before the RTC - Binan, Laguna. They filed an Amended Complaint for
Vda. de ALVAREZ, for herself as guardian ad litem for her minor children,
Annulment of Title with Reconveyance wherein they claim that the sale of the
RAMON, VERONICA, and FLORDELIZA, all surnamed ALVAREZ, and as
subject land was made without their knowledge, and it was only in the 1980s
necessary and indispensable party plaintiffs JAIME, VICTORIA, and
that they learned of such sale.
MANUEL, all surnamed ALVAREZ, and ROSARIO PARAM Vda. de
● They alleged that their mother and father, both illiterate, were deceived into
ALVAREZ
executing the Deed of Sale covering the subject land in favor of Mercedes
Oliver. They argue that such sale was void since the Deed of Sale was executed
Doctrine: There is identity of parties not only where the parties are the
in violation of the law.
same, but also those in privity with them, as between their successors-in-
● The case was dismissed for failure of the Heirs of Ricardo Alvarez and their
interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action, litigating
counsel to appear during the hearing for the reception of their evidence,
for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity.
despite due notice and after eight postponements. The order became final and
executory.
A dismissal for failure to prosecute has the effect of an adjudication on the
● The Heirs of Ricardo Alvarez filed a complaint against Mercedes Oliver and
merits, and operates as res judicata, particularly when the court did not
Filinvest before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication (PARAD) of Sta.
direct that the dismissal was without prejudice.
Cruz, Laguna, seeking to annul the Deed of Sale between the Spouses Alvarez
and Mercedes Oliver and the subsequent transfer between Mercedes Oliver
and Filinvest, on grounds similar to the complaint filed before the RTC of
Facts: Binan. They also sought the issuance of a restraining order enjoining Filinvest
● The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) awarded to Ricardo Alvarez the from bulldozing the subject land, which was occupied and cultivated by the
right to repurchase Lot No. 329 of the Laguna Resettlement Project in San respondents.
Pedro, Laguna. ● Mercedes and Filinvest Oliver filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of res
● Ricardo Alvarez, with the consent of his wife, Rosario Param, purchased the judicata and that the PARAD had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
land as evidenced by a Deed of Sale. According to such Deed, such property the case.
cannot be transferred within 10 years from the issuance of the certificate of ● The PARAD of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, dismissed the complaint on the ground of
title, other than the vendee’s relatives within the third civil degree by res judicata. Moreover, it ruled that the sale between the Spouses Alvarez and
consanguinity or affinity who are, at the same time, qualified beneficiaries, in Mercedes Oliver was valid.
accordance with the Agricultural Land Reform Code. ● On appeal, the DARAB reversed and set aside the Decision dismissing the
● Pending the issuance of the certificate of title of the said land, PD 1474 complaint, and ordered the reversion of the subject property to the
declared the Laguna Resettlement Project of the DAR as suitable for government. The DARAB ruled, too, that res judicata as a bar against filing a
residential, commercial, or industrial, or other non-agricultural purposes. complaint with the PARAD is not applicable in this case since there was no
This effectively repealed the ten-year prohibition on the transfer of agrarian adjudication of the merits before the RTC of Binan.
lands situated in the Laguna Resettlement Project.
● The Register of Deeds of the Province of Laguna issued the TCT covering the
subject land, in the name of Ricardo Alvarez. Issue:
● Sixteen days after the title was issued, Ricardo Alvarez and his wife sold the 1. WoN the sale between Ricardo Alvarez and Mercedes Oliver was void because
said land to Mercedes Oliver for P10, 000.00. Thus, TCT No. 62731 was it violated the prohibitory condition contained in the Deed of Sale between
cancelled, and TCT No. 64967 was issued in the name of Mercedes Oliver. Ricardo Alvarez and the Government – NO
However, Mercedes Oliver was not a relative within the third degree of 2. WoN res judicata applies - YES
consanguinity and had no capacity to personally cultivate the land, as required
of a qualified beneficiary. Ratio:
1. Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1474 empowers individuals who have legally - In this case, the first, third and fourth requirements have been complied. The
acquired lots in the (San Pedro Tunasan) Estate under Orders of Awards or Deeds of Order rendered by the RTC of Binan dismissing the case, is clearly final, as it
Sale, among others things, to sell or transfer their lots covered thereby. Therefore, disposed of all the rights and obligations of the parties before it. There was
transfers of land located within the Laguna Resettlement Project, made after the law never any question raised on the jurisdiction of the RTC to hear and decide
took effect, are valid and the restriction on transfer of the land within ten years after its the question of whether the sale executed between Ricardo Alvarez and
registration is no longer applicable. Mercedes Oliver was valid. It is also obvious that the allegations of the
respondents in their Amended Complaint filed before the RTC of Binan are
- A basic principle of statutory construction mandates that general legislation substantially identical to the Complaint filed before the PARAD; involved the
must give way to special legislation on the same subject, and generally be so same subject matter, and raised the same causes of action.
interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not
applicable. There is no question that Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1474 - Filinvest was named as a party only in the complaint before the PARAD, since
is inconsistent with Section 62 of Republic Act No. 3844. The former it acquired the property from Mercedes Oliver only on 22 December 1989,
authorizes the sale or transfer of agricultural lands within the Laguna after the case before the RTC was dismissed on 17 February 1997. Moreover,
Resettlement Project, while the latter law prohibits the transfer of agricultural the fact that its predecessor-in interest, Mercedes Oliver, was a party in the
lands distributed by the government to farmer-beneficiaries, at least for a case filed before the RTC of Bian satisfies the requirement on the identity of
limited period. Presidential Decree No. 1474 as a special law should govern parties. There is identity of parties not only where the parties are the same,
lands within the Laguna Resettlement Project, while Republic Act No. 3844 is but also those in privity with them, as between their successors-in-interest
a law generally applied to agrarian lands. by title subsequent to the commencement of the action, litigating for the same
thing and under the same title and in the same capacity.
2. Clearly, the respondents filed the case before the PARAD, not because the case
involved a dispute that would be properly resolved by the PARAD, but because they - Lastly, a dismissal for failure to prosecute has the effect of an adjudication on
were already barred from filing the case before the proper forum. The allegations and the merits, and operates as res judicata, particularly when the court did not
relief found in the Complaint filed by the respondents before the PARAD are direct that the dismissal was without prejudice.
conspicuously similar to those in the Amended Complaint which they had earlier filed
before the trial court of Binan. As earlier discussed, the trial court ordered the dismissal
of the case for failure to prosecute. When the respondents failed to file a motion for
reconsideration, despite due notice, such order became final.
- The doctrine of res judicata rests on the principle that parties should not be DISPOSITIVE:
permitted to litigate the same issue more than once. When a right or fact has WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court GRANTS this petition and REVERSES
been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 48396, dated 11 November 1998,
an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long affirming the Order of the DARAB nullifying the transfer certificate titles issued in the
as it is not reversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity names of Ricardo Alvarez, Mercedes Oliver and Filinvest Land Inc. since the DARAB
with them in law or estate. was without jurisdiction to issue the said Order. No costs. SO ORDERED.
- The following requisites must concur in order that a prior judgment may bar
a subsequent action: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) it
must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a
consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the
trial of the case; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must be, between the
first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of
action.

KO V. PNB 4. In the case at bar, 3 years have since lapsed from the filing of the complaint
on May 3, 2002 and the order of dismissal on April 27, 2005. Petitioners
Petitioner/s: LULLETE S. KO and ARLETTE SIMPLICIANO BASILIO
failure to prosecute their case and proceed with the trial during the span of
Respondent/s: PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Laoag Branch, and the
three years leads to no other conclusion than that petitioners have no interest
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ILOCOS NORTE
in seeing their case terminated at the earliest possible time; or that petitioners
case is unmeritorious from inception. Whichever the case may be, the
Doctrine: Unreasonable absences of both plaintiff and their counsel (i.e:
dismissal order of the trial court stand and is now immutable.
conflict in schedule, lack of knowledge of trial dates) in the trial proceedings
is a ground for dismissal.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed April 27, 2005
Order of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 14 and its July 28, 2005
Facts: Resolution in Civil Case No. 12523-14 are AFFIRMED.
1. The case stemmed from an action filed by Ko and Basilio in the trial court for
Annulment of Mortgage, Extra-judicial Foreclosure Sale, Annulment of
Transfer Certificate of Title and Deed of Sale.
2. The complaint alleged that the assailed mortgage and the foreclosure
proceedings were null and void since the written consent of Ko and Basilio, as
beneficiaries of the mortgaged property, were not secured.
3. PNB denied the claim and alleged that in the execution of the mortgage,
petitioners in fact gave their consent.
4. During the course of the proceedings, Ko, Basiliio, and their counsel (Atty.
Lorenzo Castillo) failed to attend a scheduled trial.
5. Upon motion of PNB, the complaint was dismissed.
Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in dismissing the case. NO.
Ratio:
1. The trial court dismissed the complaint due to petitioners and counsels
apparent lack of interest to prosecute the case.
2. Petitioners counsel argued that their repeated failure to attend the hearing
was caused by conflicts in his schedule and by his lack of knowledge
of the trial dates. He also contended that respondent bank and counsel have
been similarly guilty thereof, and that petitioners have informed the court of
ongoing negotiations for the repurchase of the foreclosed property. Hence,
petitioners invoke liberality and the primordial interest of substantial justice
over the strict enforcement of the rules of technicality.
3. We are not persuaded. In every action, the plaintiff is duty-bound to prosecute
the same with utmost diligence and with reasonable dispatch to enable him to
obtain the relief prayed for and, at the same time, minimize the clogging of the
court dockets. The expeditious disposition of cases is as much the duty of the
plaintiff as the court. It must be remembered that a defendant in a case
likewise has the right to the speedy disposition of the action filed against him
considering that any delay in the proceedings entail prolonged anxiety and
valuable time wasted.

TOPIC XIII – PRE-TRIAL ● LGDI filed a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against PNB
Gen and UCPB
LARA’S GIFT AND DECORS INC V PNB GEN
Pre-trial:
Petitioner/s: LARA'S GIFT AND DECORS, INC.
● On account of the voluminous documentary exhibits to be presented,
Respondent/s: PNB GENERAL INSURERS CO., INC. AND UCPB
identified, and marked, the parties allotted six meetings/conferences just for
GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC.
the pre-marking of exhibits
Doctrine: The parties are mandated under Sec. 2 of the JA Rule to file
After termination of pretrial conference:
and serve the judicial affidavits of their witnesses, together with their
● RTC issued a Pre-Trial Order in which the parties were given the opportunity
documentary or object evidence, not later than five days before pre-trial or
to amend or correct any errors found therein within five days from receipt
preliminary conference
thereof
● In the same Order, all the parties made a reservation for the presentation of
Sec. 10 of the same Rule states that the failure to timely submit the
additional documentary exhibits in the course of the trial
affidavits and documentary evidence shall be deemed to be a waiver of their
● The parties filed their respective Motions to Amend/Correct Pre-Trial Order
submission.
BUT none of the parties sought to amend the Pre-Trial Order for the purpose
of submitting additional judicial affidavits of witnesses or the admission of
A reservation in the Pre-Trial Order is tantamount to a waiver of the
additional documentary exhibits not presented and pre- marked during the
application of Secs. 2 and 10 of the JA Rule.
Pre-Trial Conference
Facts: Trial proper:

● Petitioner Lara's Gifts and Decors, Inc. (LGDI) is engaged in the business of ● 2nd witness, Mr. Villafuerte testified on his involvement and participation in
manufacturing, selling, and exporting various handicraft items and decorative the management and operations of LGDI and stated that his participation in
products the business was reduced to a mere advisor of his wife, Mrs. Lara Maria
● LGDI leased buildings/warehouses located at Taguig City for business Villafuerte (Mrs. Villafuerte), LGDI's president
operations and storage areas of its goods
● The handicraft products, raw materials, and machineries and equipment of Mr. Villafuerte’s cross-examination:
LGDI were insured against fire and other allied risks with respondent PNB ● LGDI furnished PNB Gen and UCPB with a copy of the 2 nd Supplemental
General Insurers Co., Inc. (PNB Gen) covering a period of 1 year Judicial Affidavit of Mrs. Villafuerte
● The insurance policy, which is in the nature of an "open policy" ● PNB Gen, through a Motion to Expunge, sought to strike from the records the
○ PNB Gen assumed 55% of the total amount insured said 2nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit of Mrs. Villafuerte and all documents
○ Respondent UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc. (UCPB), as co- attached thereto for alleged violation of Administrative Matter No. 12-8-8-SC,
insurer, assumed the remaining 45% otherwise known as the "Judicial Affidavit Rule" (JA Rule) and A.M. No. 03-
● Approximately four hours before the policy was about to expire, a fire broke 1-09-SC, or the Guidelines on Pre-Trial
out and razed some of the buildings leased by LGDI ● PNB and UCPB stated that the document was never presented, marked, or
● LGDI immediately claimed from the respondents for the loss and damage of compared during the various Pre-Trial Conferences of the case, or were never
its insured properties presented to the insurers and adjusters early on
● Taking into consideration the findings of independent adjusters and the
report of its forensic specialists, PNB Gen and UCPB denied LGDI's claim for Mr. Villafuerte’s redirect examination:
coverage of liability under the insurance policy due to the following reasons: ● LGDI’s counsel produced the Questioned Documents in open court and asked
1) violation of policy conditions; 2) misdeclaration/subsequent exclusion of Mr. Villafuerte to identify those documents, seeking to introduce and mark
laser machines from claim for machineries and equipment; and 3) absence of them as exhibits
independent and competent evidence to substantiate loss ● PNB Gen and UCPB immediately objected in open court to the introduction
and presentation of the Questioned Documents
● They argued that since these documents were not presented, identified,
marked, and even compared with the originals during the Pre-Trial The 2nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit of Mrs. Villafuerte was properly admitted by
Conference, they should be excluded pursuant to the Guidelines on Pre-Trial the trial court.
and JA Rule ● According to Sec 2 of the JA Rule, parties must file with the court and serve
on the adverse party the Judicial Affidavits of their witnesses not later than
Issue: five days before pre-trial or preliminary conference
WON introduction of additional documentary exhibits during trial and the filing of the ● While the belated submission of evidence is not totally disallowed, it is still
2nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit of Mrs. Villafuerte may be allowed by the Courts - subject to several conditions, which LGDI failed to comply with
YES ● The records are bereft of any justification, or "good cause," for the filing of the
2nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit during trial instead of during the pre-trial
Ratio: ● LGDI merely filed and served the affidavit without any accompanying motion
● The JA Rule was promulgated to address congestion and delays in courts. setting forth any explanation and valid reason for the delay
Designed to expedite court proceedings, it primarily affects the manner by ● The 2nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit was properly admitted in evidence by
which evidence is presented in court, particularly with regard to the taking of the trial court. As can be gleaned from the Pre-Trial Order, both parties
the witnesses' testimonies. Consequently, in lieu of direct testimony in court, reserved the right to present additional evidence, thus:
the parties are required to submit the judicial affidavits of their witnesses
within a given period. Nevertheless, the JA Rule was not devised to All the parties made a reservation for the presentation of additional documentary
supplant or amend existing procedural rules; rather, it is designed exhibits in the course of the trial.
to supplement and augment them. In this regard, reference must be
made to the Guidelines on Pre-Trial in relation to the Rules on Pre-Trial, Clearly, the foregoing reservation is tantamount to a waiver of the application of Secs.
which, interestingly, both parties invoke in support of their respective 2 and 10 of the JA Rule.
arguments.
The parties are bound by the contents of the Pre-Trial Order. Records do not disclose
The JA Rule and the Guidelines on Pre-Trial do not totally proscribe the submission of that the PNB Gen and UCPB endeavored to amend the Pre-Trial Order to withdraw
additional evidence even after trial had already commenced their assent to their reservation. Consequently, they cannot now dispute the contents
● The parties are mandated under Sec. 2 of the JA Rule to file and serve the of the Pre-Trial Order.
judicial affidavits of their witnesses, together with their documentary or object
evidence, not later than five days before pre-trial or preliminary conference Dispositive:
● Sec. 10 of the same Rule states that the failure to timely submit the WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Amended Decision of the
affidavits and documentary evidence shall be deemed to be a waiver of their Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 138321 and 138774 is hereby REVERSED and SET
submission ASIDE. The Court of Appeals' December 21, 2015 Decision is REINSTATED.
● The submission of evidence beyond the mandated period in the JA Rule is
strictly subject to the conditions that: a) the court may allow the late
submission of evidence only once; b) the party presenting the evidence
proffers a valid reason for the delay; and c) the opposing party will not be
prejudiced thereby.
● The Guidelines on Pre-Trial instructs the parties to submit their respective
pre-trial briefs at least three (3) days before the pre-trial, containing, inter
alia, the documents or exhibits to be presented and to state the purposes
thereof
● Notwithstanding the foregoing procedural prescription, the same rule confers
upon the trial court the discretion to allow the introduction of additional
evidence during trial other than those that had been previously marked and
identified during the pre-trial, provided there are valid grounds
TOPIC XIV – CALENDAR OF CASES second-party assignor assigned said amount in favor of petitioner. Petitioner
paid for the Group's domestic and international airplane tickets.
TOPIC XV – COMPUTATION OF TIME ● Eventually, Petitioner claimed that the second-party assignor/respondent and
the foundation-grantor have not paid and refused to pay their obligation
TOPIC XVI – SUBPOENA under the MOA. Petitioner prayed that they be ordered to solidarily pay the
amount representing the principal amount mentioned in the Agreement,
TOPIC XVII – MODES OF DISCOVERY moral, exemplary, and actual damages, legal fees, and cost of suit.
● Respondent argued that the MOA on which petitioner based its cause of action
GEORG VS. HOLY TRINITY COLLEGE does not state that respondent is a party. Neither was respondent obligated to
GR No. 190408, 20 July 2016 pay the amount for the European Tour of the Group nor did it consent to
complying with the terms of the MOA. Respondent asserted that the
Petitioner/s: BENJIE B. GEORG REPRESENTED BY BENJAMIN C.
thumbmark of Sr. Medalle was secured without her consent. Respondent
BELARMINO, JR.
maintained that since it was not a party to the MOA, it is not bound by the
Respondent/s: HOLY TRINITY COLLEGE, INC
provisions stated therein.
● RTC reconsidered its Order and issued a Writ of Attachment against
Doctrine: After acquiring jurisdiction over the case, the court has the
respondent. The Trial Court did not give probative weight to the deposition of
discretion to decide whether a deposition may or may not be taken. It follows
Sr. Medalle, saying that her counsel failed to conform to Sec. 20, Rule 23 of
that it also has the discretion to disregard a deposition for non-compliance
the Rules
with the rules.
● On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s decision and relieved
respondent of any liability for petitioner's monetary claims.
Facts:
● The Holy Trinity College Grand Chorale and Dance Company (Group) was Issue:
organized in 1987 by Sr. Teresita Medalle (Sr. Medalle), the President of (relevant to our discussion)
respondent Holy Trinity College in Puerto Princesa City. In 2001, the Group Is the RTC correct in not admitting the deposition of Sr. Medalle? - YES.
was slated to perform in Greece, Italy, Spain and Germany.
● A certain Edward Enriquez (Enriquez), who allegedly represented Sr. Medalle, Ratio:
contacted petitioner Benjie B. Georg to seek assistance for payment of the ● The Supreme Court sided with the RTC. The SC basically affirmed the decision
Group's international airline tickets. of the RTC not to give credence to the deposition of Sr. Medalle because it was
● Petitioner owns a German travel agency named “DTravellers Reiseburo procedurally infirm.
Georg.” Petitioner, in turn, requested her brother, Atty. Benjamin Belarmino, ● In Republic of the Phils, v. Sandiganbayan, we held that:
Jr. (Atty. Belarmino), to represent her in the negotiation with Enriquez. Depositions pending action may be conducted by oral examination or written
● On 24 April 2001, MOA was executed between petitioner, represented by Atty. interrogatories, and may be taken at the instance of any party, with or without leave of
Belarmino, as first party-assignee; the Group, represented by Sr. Medalle, O.P. court. Leave of court is not necessary to take a deposition after an answer to the
and Attorney-in-Fact Enriquez as second-party assignor, and S.C. Roque complaint has been served. It is only when an answer has not yet been filed (but
Group of Companies Holding Limited Corporation and S.C. Roque jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property subject of the
Foundation Incorporated, represented by Violeta P. Buenaventura, as action) that prior leave of court is required. The reason for this is that before filing of
Foundation-Grantor. the answer, the issues are not yet joined and the disputed facts are not clear.
○ NOTE: during this time, Sr. Medalle was in the hospital following a ● In this case, respondent's counsel filed a Notice of Deposition for the Taking
stroke she appears to have suffered of Deposition on 28 October 2002. The Answer with Counterclaim was only
● Under the said Agreement, Georg, through her travel agency, will advance the filed on 21 February 2005. In this instance, respondent should have asked for
payment of international airplane tickets in favor of the Group on the leave of court. Considering that the trial court has the discretion to decide
assurance of the Group represented by Sr. Medalle through Enriquez that whether a deposition may or may not be taken, it follows that it also has the
there is a confirmed financial allocation from the Foundation-Grantor. The discretion to disregard a deposition for non-compliance with the rules.

● Indeed, there is no record of any certification from Notary Public Romeo
Juayno stating that the witness, Sr. Medalle in this case, was sworn to by him
and that the deposition is a true record of the testimony given by Sr. Medalle.
Furthermore, petitioner correctly noted that respondent's counsel did not
seek a leave of court to conduct a deposition in violation of Section 1, Rule 23
of the Rules of Court:
Section 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken. — By leave of court after
jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property which is the subject
of the action, or without such leave after an answer has been served, the testimony of
any person, whether a party or not, may be taken, at the instance of any party, by
deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories. The attendance of
witnesses may be compelled by the use of a subpoena as provided in Rule 21.
Depositions shall be taken only in accordance with these rules. The deposition of a
person confined in prison may be taken by leave of court on such terms as the court
prescribes.
● In sum, the SC ruled in favor of the petitioner based on the evidence presented
in court such as:
○ Sr. Medalle affixed her thumbmark on the MOA with full mental
capacity; there was no fraud employed by the Petitioner to induce Sr.
Medalle from entering into the MOA.
○ Sr. Medalle is authorized to transact on behalf of the group. Sr.
Medalle, as President of Holy Trinity, is clothed with sufficient
authority to enter into a loan agreement. Assuming arguendo that
Sr. Medalle was not authorized by the Holy Trinity College Board, the
doctrine of apparent authority applies in this case.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 17 November 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 89990 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision dated 29 November 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Tabaco City
in Civil Case No. T-2161 is hereby REINSTATED in toto.

● Cleary chose the Philippine system to file his suit, and yet he deprived the
INGRID SAL SANTAMARIA V. CLEARY court and the parties the opportunity to observe his demeanor and directly
propound questions on him.
Petitioner/s: INGRID SALA SANTAMARIA & ASTRID SALA BOZA
● GoPerez filed a separate Opposition , arguing that the oral deposition was not
Respondent/s: THOMAS CLEARY
intended for discovery purposes if Cleary deposed himself as plaintiff. Since
he elected to files suit in the Philippines, he should submit himself to the
Doctrine: In keeping with the principle of promoting the just, speedy and
procedures and testify before the RTC of Cebu. Moreover, Go-Perez argued
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding, depositions are
that oral deposition in the United States would prejudice, vex, and oppress her
allowed asa "departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceeding so
and her co-petitioners who would need to incur costs to attend.
examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be observed
● TC denied Cleary's Motion for Court Authorization to Take Deposition in the
by the trial judge."
Order dated June 5, 2009. It held that depositions are not meant to be a
substitute for actual testimony in open court. As a rule, a deponent must be
Facts: presented for oral examination at trial as required under Rule 132, Section 1
● Cleary, an American citizen with office address in California, filed a Complaint of the Rules of Court. "As the supposed deponent is the plaintiff himself who
for specific performance and damages against Miranila Land Development is not suffering from any impairment, physical or otherwise, it would be best
Corporation, Manuel S. Go,Ingrid Sala Santamaria, Astrid Sala Boza,and for him to appear in court and testify under oath[.]"
Kathyrn Go-Perez before the RTC of Cebu. ● Cleary elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
● The Complaint involved shares of stock of Miranila,for which Cleary paid ● The Court of Appeals granted Cleary's Petition for Certiorari and reversed the
US$191,250.00. Cleary sued in accordance with the Stock Purchase and Put trial court's ruling . It held that Rule 23, Section 1 of the Rules of Court allows
Agreement he entered into with Miranila Land Development Corporation, the taking of depositions, and that it is immaterial that Cleary is the plaintiff
Manuel S. Go, Santamaria, Boza, andGo-Perez. Paragraph 9.02 of the himself. It likewise denied reconsideration.
Agreement provides:
Anysuit, action or proceeding with respect to this Agreement may be brought ISSUE:
in
(a) the courts of the State of California, (b) the United States District Court for Whether or not the the Court of Appeals erred in granting the Petition for
the Central District of California, or (c) the courts of the country of Certiorari and reversing the trial court's denial of respondent' s Motion for
Corporation's incorporation, as Cleary may elect in his sole discretion, and the Court Authorization toTakeDeposition
Parties hereby submit to any such suit, action proceeding or judgment and
waives any other preferential jurisdiction by reason of domicile. HELD:No.
● Cleary elected to file the case in Cebu. ● Petitioners argue that the deposition sought by respondent is not for discovery
● Santamaria, Boza, and Go -Perez filed their respective Answers with purposes as he is the plaintiff himself. To support their contention, they cite
Compulsory Counterclaims. North west v. Cruz, where this Court held that Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
● The trial court then issued a notice of pre-trial conference. In his pre-trialbrief, — on the examination of witnesses in open court — should be observed since
Cleary stipulated that he would testify "in support of the allegations of his the deposition was only to accommodate the petitioner's employee who was in
complaint, either on the witness stand or by oral deposition."Moreover, he the United States, and not for discovery purposes.
expressed his intent in availing himself "of the modes of discovery under the ● Jurisprudence has discussed how "[u]nder the concept adopted by the new
rules." Rules, the deposition serves the double function of a method of discovery —
● Cleary moved for court authorization to take deposition. He prayed that his with use on trial not necessarily contemplated — and a method of presenting
deposition be taken before the Consulate-General of the Philippines in Los testimony. "The taking of depositions has been allowed as a departure from
Angeles and be used as his direct testimony. open-court testimony. Jonathan Land oil International Co., Inc. v. Spouses
● Santamaria and Boza opposed the Motion and argued that the right to take Mangundadatu is instructive:
deposition is not absolute. They claimed that ● The Rules of Court and jurisprudence, however, do not restrict a deposition to
the sole function of being a mode of discovery before trial. Under certain
conditions and for certain limited purposes, it may be taken even after trial
has commenced and maybe used without the deponent being actually called
to the witness stand. In Dasmariñas Garments v. Reyes, we allowed the taking
of the witnesses' testimonies through deposition, in lieu of their actual
presence at the trial.
● Thus, "[d]epositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any
action, whenever necessary or convenient." There is no rule that limits
deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibition
against the taking of depositions after pre-trial." There can be no valid
objection to allowing them during the process of executing final and executor
judgments, when the material issues of fact have become numerous or
complicated.
● In keeping with the principle of promoting the just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding, depositions are allowed asa
"departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceeding so examining
witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be observed by the trial
judge."
● Depositions are allowed, provided they are taken in accordance with the
provisions of the Rules of Court (that is, with leave of court if the summons
have been served, without leave of court if an answer has been submitted);
and provided, further, that a circumstance for their admissibility exists.
●
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED

MARCELO v. SANDIGANBAYAN ● Third Amended Complaint – RP was granted a leave to file the 3rd amended
complaint, impleading petitioner corporation and two others. As alleged,
Petitioner/s: EDWARD T. MARCELO, MARCELO FIBERGLASS CORPORATION,
newly impleaded corporations are owned and dummies of the individual
PHIL-ASIA AGRO INDUSTRIES CORP., PHILIPPINE SPECIAL SERVICES CORP.,
defendant.
PROVIDENT INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES CORP., MARCELO CHEMICAL &
● Petitioner corporations filed their respective answers to the said amended
PIGMENT CORP., FARMERS FERTILIZER CORP., INSULAR RUBBER CO., INC.,
complaint that they are not owned by Marcelo who is merely a stockholder.
HYDRONICS CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, MARCELO RUBBER &
● In 1991, Marcelo submitted his own Pre-trial brief with written
LATEX PRODUCTS, INC., POLARIS MARKETING CORP., H. MARCELO & CO.,
interrogatories, first set and request for admission.
INC., MARCELO STEEL CORP., PHILIPPINE CASINO OPERATORS CORP., and
● In 1996, MFC filed Pre-trial brief with written interrogatories, first set and
MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER CORP.,
request for admission same as with the petitioner corporations.
Respondent/s: SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
● RP filed an answer to written interrogatories to that of Marcelo.
GOOD GOVERNMENT
● 1997, petitioners filed three separate Motions for Judgment.
○ Marcelo’s Motion was based on two grounds: 1. No genuine issue of
Doctrine: MODES OF DISCOVERY; THE RULES OF COURT PRESCRIBES THE
fact/no cause of action 2. Marcelo requested to admit the truth on
PROCEDURES AND DEFINES ALL THE CONSEQUENCES FOR REFUSING TO
the matter of fact in Pre-Trial brief but RP did not reply to request
COMPLY WITH THE DIFFERENT MODES OF DISCOVERY – The Republic cannot
pursuant to Sec 2 Rule 26.
plausibly evade the consequences of its failure to answer written interrogatories and
○ MFC’s motion for summary judgment: 1. No genuine issue offact/no
requests for admission. If the plaintiff fails or refuses to answer the interrogatories,
cause of action 2. RP failed and continued refusal to answer the
it may be a good basis for the dismissal of his complaint for non-suit unless he can
written interrogatories and reply to the request for admission of
justify such failure or refusal.To be sure, the Rules of Court prescribes the procedures
certain facts set forth in its pre-trial brief.
and defines all the consequences for refusing to comply with the different modes of
○ Other petitioner corporations: same grounds as Marcelo and MFC.
discovery. The case of Republic v. Sandiganbayan, a case for recovery of ill-gotten
● RP filed separate opposition only to Marcelo and MFC and in turned filed their
wealth where the defendants served upon the PCGG written interrogatories but the
respective replies.
latter refused to make a discovery, is relevant.
● Sandiganbayan denied motions of Marcelo and MFC. MR also denied.
● Sandiganbayan wrote: The answers of RP to the written interrogatories
Facts: propounded by - Marcelo indubitably show the existence of genuine factual
● Joint petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks the issues between the parties through the alleged favored contract mentioned in
reversal and setting aside of the Resolution dated August 27, 2001 of the the complaint; and whether or not [MFC] was used as conduit by - Marcelo
Sandiganbayan in its Civil Case No. 21, a suit for recovery of ill-gotten allegedly to amass ill-gotten wealth.
wealth, with damages, initiated by the Republic of the Philippines
(Republic or RP, for short), denying herein petitioners' respective Issue: Whether the Republic of the Philippines complied with the modes of discovery
motions for summary judgment and its Resolution 2 of November 19, 2002 as prescribed by the Rules of Court.
which likewise denied their separate motions for reconsideration.
● In 1982, a contract was entered into by the Republic (RP) through Philippine Ratio:
Navy and MFC for the construction of 55 units of fiber glass speed boats. ● Petition impressed with merit.
● PCGG in behalf of Republic filed a complaint with Sandiganbayan against ● In Baseco v. PCGG, the Court made it abundantly clear that the right and duty
MFC, through its President Marcelo, Ver (deceased) and Spouses Marcoses of the Government to recover ill-gotten wealth are undisputed. The Court
alleging that Marcelo and Ver were taking advantage of relationship with the added the caveat, however, that plain and valid that right may be, a balance
Marcoses in obtaining a favored contract, cash advances (79% of agreed must still be sought to the end that "proper respect be accorded and adequate
contract price) and obtaining loans from foreign banks. protection assured, the fundamental rights of private property and free
● Second Amended Complaint – RP filed its reply followed by Marcelos’ enterprise. . . ." Among the things we stressed in BASECO is the need, in ill-
Rejoinder. gotten wealth cases, to give due regard to the basic rights of the parties, with
● RP Request for admission on Marcelo, the latter included counter request for particular emphasis on the right to property and the requirement of
the admission on matters. evidentiary substantiation.
● CONSEQUENCES FOR NOT ANSWERING THE WRITTEN ● REFUSAL TO MAKE DISCOVERY: the 'law imposes serious sanctions
INTERROGATORIES: on the party who refuses to make discovery, such as dismissing the action or
○ It is noted that allegation partakes of a conclusion of fact proceeding or part thereof, . . .; taking the matters inquired into as established
unsupported by a particular averment of circumstances that will in accordance with the claim of the party seeking discovery; refusal to allow
show why such inference or conclusion was arrived at. the disobedient party support or oppose designated claims or defenses; . . .
○ It cannot be over-emphasized that the Republic cannot any more ● RULE 25 Interrogatories to Parties: all that is entailed to activate or put
prove malice or wrongdoing on the part of either Marcelo or MFC, or in motion the process of discovery by interrogatories to parties under Rule 25
that the separate corporate identity of MFC was used for unlawful of the Rules of Court, is simply the delivery directly to a party of a letter setting
means. For, the Republic has veritably acknowledged the forth a list of questions with the request that they be answered individually.
regularity of the boat-construction contract by its failure to That is all. The service of such a communication on the party has the effect of
answer written interrogatories and the request for imposing on him the obligation of answering the questions "separately and
admission propounded by petitioner MFC. To be precise, fully in writing under oath", and serving "a copy of the answers on the party
the Republic did not answer the following written submitting the interrogatories . . ." The sanctions for refusing to make
interrogatories of MFC discovery have already been mentioned.
○ The Republic did not also answer the written interrogatories of the ● RULE 26 Admission By Adverse Party: discovery under Rule 26 is begun by
other defendant corporations. In effect, the Republic admitted the nothing more complex than the service on a party of a letter or other written
non-participation of the other defendant corporations in the communication containing a request that specific facts therein set forth . . . be
contracts in question. This is evident from the following written admitted in writing. That is all. Again, the receipt of such a communication by
interrogatories which were deemed admitted by the Republic the party has the effect of imposing on him the obligation of serving the party
○ The Republic cannot plausibly evade the consequences of its failure requesting admission with "a sworn statement either denying specifically the
to answer written interrogatories and requests for admission. If the matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the
plaintiff fails or refuses to answer the interrogatories, it may be a reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters", failing
good basis for the dismissal of his complaint for non-suit unless he in which "(e)ach of the matters of which admission is requested shall be
can justify such failure or refusal. deemed admitted". . .
● The Rules of Court prescribes the procedures and defines all the ● To stress, the Rules of Court require every pleading to "contain in a methodical
consequence/s for refusing to comply with the different modes of discovery. and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on
The case of Republic v. Sandiganbayan, a case for recovery of ill-gotten which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense". A transgression of
wealth where the defendants served upon the PCGG written interrogatories this rule is fatal.
but the latter refused to make a discovery, is relevant. ● In view of the absence of specific averments in the Republic's complaint, the
● The law says that every pleading "shall contain in a . . . concise and direct same is defective for it presents no basis upon which the court should act, or
statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim for the defendant to meet it with an intelligent answer. The Republic tags, at
or defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of mere evidentiary every turn, the PN-MFC contract to be a "favored contract", without, however,
facts.". If this requirement is not observed, i.e., the ultimate facts are alleged so much as stating with sufficient particularity the circumstances that led it to
too generally or "not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to arrive at such conclusion.
enable a bill of particulars seeking a "more definite statement" may be ordered
● The truth is that "evidentiary matters" may be inquired into and learned by Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the Resolutions
the parties before the trial. Indeed, it is the purpose and policy of the law that of the Sandiganbayan dated August 27, 2001 and November 19, 2002 are REVERSED
the parties — before the trial if not indeed even before the pre-trial — should and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the complaint against the petitioners in Civil Case No.
discover or inform themselves of all the facts relevant to the action, not only 21 is DISMISSED.
those known to them individually, but also those known to their adversaries;
in other words, the desideratum is that civil trials should not be carried on in
the dark; and the Rules of Court make this ideal possible through the
deposition-discovery mechanism set forth in Rules 24 to 29. . . .

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN ● This Resolution was mainly about whether to cite PCGG for contempt or not.
This Resolution did not rule on the admissibility of the evidence.
Petitioner/s: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
● Moreover, that Resolution was decided BEFORE the formal offer of evidence.
Respondent/s: SANDIGANBAYAN, BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, JR.,
● The issue of the admissibility of documentary evidence arises only upon
DOMINADOR R. SANTIAGO, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA MARCOS,
formal offer thereof. This is why objection to the documentary evidence must
BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, SR., GLICERIA R. TANTOCO, AND MARIA LOURDES
be made at the time it is formally offered, and not earlier.
TANTOCO-PINEDA
● Seasonable objection to the subject “Exhibits” can only be properly made upon
formal offer.
Doctrine:
● Objection to the identification and marking of the document is not equivalent
● Objection to the identification and marking of the document is not equivalent
to objection to the document when it is formally offered in evidence. What
to objection to the document when it is formally offered in evidence. What
really matters is the objection to the document at the time it is formally offered
really matters is the objection to the document at the time it is formally
as an exhibit.
offered as an exhibit.
● Tantoco and Santiago's “Motion Filed Under Rule 29,” was but in pursuance
of their continuing objection to the marking of evidence not produced at
discovery
Facts: ● Moreover, remember that the SC granted the motion for production and
● The Republic, through the PCGG, commenced a complaint for “reconveyance, inspection of documents filed by Tantoco and Santiago.
reversion, accounting, restitution and damages” against Respondents. ● PCGG's failure to offer a plausible explanation for its concealment of the main
● Tantoco and Santiago filed a Motion for Production and Inspection of bulk of its exhibits even when it was under a directive to produce them gives
Documents. The Sandiganbayan and SC granted it. rise to a reasonable inference that the PCGG at the very outset, had no
● On pre-trial, PCGG produced documents pre-marked as Exhibit “A” to “LLL” intention whatsoever of complying with the directive of the Court
● However, over the objections of Tantoco and Santiago, the PCGG produced ● Indeed, it is the purpose and policy of the law that the parties — before the
and caused the pre-marking of additional documents, Exhibits “MMM” to trial if not indeed even before the pre-trial — should discover or inform
“AAAAAAA.” themselves of all the facts relevant to the action, not only those known to them
● Tantoco and Santiago filed a “Motion under Rule 29,” claiming that Exhibits individually, but also those known to adversaries; in other words, the
“MMM” to “AAAAAAA.”were never produced at the discovery proceedings desideratum is that civil trials should not be carried on in the dark; and the
and praying that PCGG be sanctioned for contempt. Sandigan denied it. Rules of Court make this ideal possible through the deposition-discovery
● On trial, new documents not shown at discovery were still being marked. mechanism set forth in Rules 24 to 29.
● The Sandiganbayan denied admission of Exhibits “MMM” to “AAAAAAA” in
the Formal Offer of Evidence filed by Republic. It declared that the PCGG must
be prevented from offering in evidence all the documents that were not Dispositive:
produced and exhibited at the time the PCGG was under a directive to do so WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we deny the instant Petition for lack of merit.
The Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0008 (dated 3 June 2009) is
Issue: AFFIRMED.
W/N Sandiganbayan should admit Exhibits “MMM” to “AAAAAAA,” even if PCGG
failed to submit the documentary evidence during discovery - NO. Bersamin Separate Opinion:
● Only a willful or bad-faith refusal to comply with a discovery order should
Ratio: warrant the imposition of a harsh sanction under Rule 29 of the Rules of
● In excluding Exhibits “MMM” to “AAAAAAA,” the Sandiganbayan properly Court, like exclusion of evidence.
exercised its discretion over evidence formally offered by the prosecution. ● The general purpose of the sanctions is to render the discovery process
● The Sandiganbayan issued an earlier Resolution saying that the exclusion of effective. Sanctions serve an additional threefold purpose, namely: (1) to
the Exhibits “would be too technical,” since their non-production “could be ensure that a party will not be able to profit from its own failure to comply
attributed to inadvertence rather than willful disobedience.” HOWEVER, with discovery; (2) to secure compliance with the particular order at hand; and
(3) to act as a general deterrent in the case and in other litigations.
● The requirement of “willfulness” or “bad faith” as a condition for the
imposition of discovery sanction is particularly crucial when the sanction to
be imposed is harsh or prejudicial to the claim or defense of the disobedient
party, like the dismissal of the case, or, as in this instance, the exclusion of
evidence.
● Bad faith or willfulness should not be inferred from the mere failure of the
Republic to render a plausible explanation. Good faith should be presumed in
favor of the Republic.
● Tantoco and Santiago still carried the burden to show that the failure to
produce the documents during the discovery proceeding had been in bad faith
or willful. Absent such showing, the Republic should not be sanctioned with
exclusion of its evidence.
● Absent such proof and consistently with good faith which is presumed, the
non-production or non-marking of the additional exhibits at the discovery
proceedings could be attributed to inadvertence rather than willful
disobedience

FORTUNE CORPORATION v CA 6. CA affirmed. MR denied. Hence the petition for certiorari at bar.
Petitioner/s: Fortune Corporation
Issue: Should the deposition take place?— YES
Respondent/s: CA and Inter-Merchants Corporation
Ratio:
Doctrine:
1. The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as a device,
a. under the present Rules the fact that a party has resorted to a particular method of
along with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic issues
discovery will not bar subsequent use of other discovery devices, as long as the party
between the parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to those issues.
is not attempting to circumvent a ruling of the court, or to harass or oppress the other
party.
2. The principle is reflected in Sec. 2, Rule 24 (governing depositions ) which generally
allows the examination of a deponent —1) "regarding any matter, not privileged, which
b. The availability of the proposed deponent to testify in court does not constitute
is relevant to the subject of the pending action, whether relating to the claim or defense
"good cause" to justify the court's order that his deposition shall not be taken. That
of any other party,2) as well as:(a) "the existence, description, nature, custody,
the witness is unable to attend or testify is one of the grounds when the deposition of
condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things" an (b) "the
a witness may be used in court during the trial. But the same reason cannot be
identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts."
successfully invoked to prohibit the taking of his deposition.
3. Section 16 of Rule 24 clearly states that it is only upon notice and for good cause that
Facts: the court may order that the deposition shall not be taken. The matter of good cause is
1. An action for breach of contract was filed by petitioner Fortune Corporation against to be determined by the court in the exercise of judicial discretion. Good cause means
respondent Inter-Merchants Corporation. a substantial reason — one that affords a legal excuse. Whether or not substantial
reasons exist is for the court to determine, as there is no hard and fast rule for
2. After Inter-Merchants had filed its Answer, Fortune served Inter-Merchant with determining the question as to what is meant by the term "for good cause shown."
written interrogatories pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Court. The interrogatories
were answered by respondent corporation through its board chairman, Juanito A. 4. In this case, Inter-Merchant failed to show a good cause not to hold the deposition:
Teope. Pre-trial conference was scheduled.
a. under the present Rules the fact that a party has resorted to a particular method of
3. However, Fortune served Inter-Merchant a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral discovery will not bar subsequent use of other discovery devices, as long as the party is
Examination of Juanito Teope. not attempting to circumvent a ruling of the court, or to harass or oppress the other
party.
4. Inter-Merchant opposed on the following grounds:
a. herein petitioner has previously availed of one mode of discovery, that is, the written b. The availability of the proposed deponent to testify in court does not constitute "good
interrogatories which practically covered all the claims, counterclaims and defenses in cause" to justify the court's order that his deposition shall not be taken. That the witness
the case; (b) there is absolutely no sound reason or justification advanced for the taking is unable to attend or testify is one of the grounds when the deposition of a witness may
of the oral deposition; (c) such taking would cause annoyance, embarrassment and be used in court during the trial. But the same reason cannot be successfully invoked to
oppression upon the prospective deponent, Juanito A. Teope; (d) Mr. Teope has no prohibit the taking of his deposition.
intention of leaving the country; and (e) the intended deponent is available to testify in
open court if required during the trial on the merits. The right to take statements and the right to use them in court have been kept entirely
distinct. The utmost freedom is allowed in taking depositions; restrictions are imposed
5. The trial court issued an order that the deposition should not be taken because: (a) upon their use. As a result, there is accorded the widest possible opportunity for
it is unwarranted since Juanito already earlier responded to written interrogatories and knowledge by both parties of all the facts before the trial. Such of this testimony as may
has said that he is available to testify in court and (b) To allow the deposition will be appropriate for use as a substitute for viva voce examination may be introduced at
deprive the Court of the opportunity to ask clarificatory questions, if any, on the the trial; the remainder of the testimony, having served its purpose in revealing the
proposed deponent who appears to be a vital witness. facts to the parties before trial, drops out of judicial picture.

Regardless of the development of devices for pre-trial fact investigation, our legal
system is now thoroughly committed to the notion that on trial itself the adducing of
facts by viva voce testimony of witnesses — whose demeanor and manner are subject
to the observation of the judge — is superior to the use of written statements of the same
witnesses. Preference for oral testimony has dictated most of the limitations on the use
of depositions as evidence. And since their use as evidence was originally conceived as
the sole function of depositions proper, the limitations on their taking dovetailed with
the limitations on their use. But under the concept adopted by the new Rules, the
deposition serves the double function of a method of discovery — with use on trial not
necessarily contemplated — and a method of presenting testimony.
c. The Court also agrees with Fortune’s argument that the mere fact that the court could
not thereby observe the behavior of the deponent does not justify the denial of the right
to take deposition. If this was the case, no deposition would ever be taken because said
objection is common to all depositions.
d. In the absence of proof, the allegation that Fortune merely intended to annoy, harass
or oppress the proposed deponent cannot ably support the setting aside of a notice to
take deposition. Once a party has requested discovery, the burden is on the party
objecting to show that the discovery requested is not relevant to the issues, and to
establish the existence of any claimed privilege. These, private respondent has failed to
do so. Consequently, its objection to the taking of the deposition cannot be sustain.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision of

respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and judgment is
hereby rendered ORDERING the court a quo to allow herein petitioner to take the
deposition upon oral examination of Juanito S. Teope in and for purposes of Civil Case
No. SP-3469 pending before it.
SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN ● The case was set for pretrial, but was however reset and all other parties were
required to submit pre-trial briefs before the scheduled reset pretrial hearing.
Petitioner/s: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION
● Tantoco and Santiago then filed with the Sandiganbayan a pleading
ON GOOD GOVERNMENT)
denominated INTERROGATORIES TO PLAINTIFF, and an AMENDED
Respondent/s: SANDIGANBAYAN, BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, JR. and
INTERROGATORIES TO PLAINTIFF afterward. They also filed a MOTION
DOMINADOR R. SANTIAGO
FOR PRODUCTION AND INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS.
● These amended interrogatories21 and motion for production and inspection of
Doctrine: Evidentiary matters may be inquired into and learned by the parties
documents22 chiefly sought factual basis to specific averments of PCGG’s
before the trial.
amended complaint.
● Sandiganbayan admitted both amended interrogatories and the motion of the
Facts: defendants.
● Private respondents Tantoco and Santiago — together with Ferdinand Marcos, ● PCGG opposed to such admission, which the Sandiganbayan treated as an
Imelda Marcos, Bienvenido Tantoco, Sr., Gliceria Tantoco, and Maria Lourdes MR.
Tantoco-Pineda-are defendants in a civil case at the Sandiganbayan ● Sandiganbayan promulgated 2 Resolutions:
commenced by the PCGG in behalf of the republic. The action was one for a. Denying the reconsideration of the Resolution allowing production
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages and was filed of documents (translate: yes, we will allow the interrogatories)
pursuant to EO 14 of President Corazon Aquino. b. Reiterating by implication the permission to serve the amended
● Both respondents being served with summons, did not file answers. Instead, interrogatories on the plaintiff PCGG
they jointly filed a motion to strike out some portions of the complaint and for ● PCGG now contends that the said interrogatories should be nullified because
bill of particulars of other portions. PCGG then filed an opposition, they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
subsequently replied to by the movants. jurisdiction:
● By order, the Sandiganbayan gave 45 days to expand its complaint to make a. They were not specific, do not name particular individuals to whom
more specific allegations. This order was done to expedite proceedings and they are propounded (being addressed only to PCGG)
accommodate the defendants. b. They deal with factual matters which the Sandiganbayan had already
● Tantoco and Santiago then presented a MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE declared as part of PCGG’s proof upon trial
INTERROGATORIES under Rule 25 of the Rules of Court. They sought an c. It would make PCGG Commissioners and officers witnesses, in
answer to the question: “Who were the Commissioners of the PCGG20, who contravention of EO 14
approved or authorized the includes of Messengers Tantoco and Santiago as ● TRO was issued directing Sandiganbayan to desist from enforcing the
the defendants in the case”. resolutions.
● PCGG responded by filing a motion to strike out said motion and
interrogatories as being impertinent, queer, weird, or procedurally bizarre as Issue: W/N the (Amended) Interrogatories should be nullified - NO.
the purpose thereof lacks merit.
● PCGG filed an expanded complaint in compliance with the above-mentioned Ratio:
order. ● Although it is a requirement that ultimate facts are to be alleged in the
● Sandiganbayan denied the motion to strike out, for bill of particulars, and for complaint, evidentiary matters may be inquired into and learned by the
leave to file interrogatories, holding them to be without legal and factual basis. parties before the trial and even pre-trial.
20 Aside from Ramon Diaz who verified the complaint conceal assets of Marcoses / Is it plaintiff’s position that Tourist Duty Free Shops Inc
21Questions in the interrogatories include: What specific property does the are beneficially owned by defendants as dummies of the Marcoses
plaintiff claim it has the right to recover from Tantoco and Santiago for being ill- 22 To see the official records and minutes of the meeting of the PCGG in their
gotten/ what specific acts were committed by defendants in concert with Marcos and decision-making regarding the filing of the complaint
in furtherance of the plan to accumulate ill-gotten wealth / what specific acts….to
● The desideratum is that civil trials should not be carried on in the dark and
the Rules of Court make this possible through mechanism set forth in Rule
24-29.
● The field of inquiry that may be covered by depositions or interrogatories is as
broad as when the interrogated party is called as a witness to testify orally at
trial. The inquiry extends to all facts which are relevant, whether they be
ultimate or evidentiary, excepting only those matters which are privileged.
● The deposition-discovery procedure was designed to remedy the conceded
inadequacy and cumbersomeness of the pretrial functions of notice-giving,
issue-formulation, and fact revelation theretofore performed primarily by the
pleadings.
● What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of every bit of information which
may be useful in the preparation for trial such as identity, location of persons
having knowledge, and the existence, description, location of any tangible
things. Hence, this deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a liberal
treatment.
● Thus, it is correct for defendants to seek leave to serve interrogatories, because
discovery was being availed of before an answer had been served.
● As a response to the allegations of petitioners, the Court said (refer to facts):
a. Interrogatories shall be answered by any officer in the PCGG
competent to testify on its behalf
b. Neither can they validly argue that the Amended Interrogatories lack
specificity. It is not a ground for suppressing such. It is the precise
purpose of discovery to ensure the mutual knowledge of relevant
facts on the part of all parties even before trial. Either party may
compel the other to disgorge whatever facts as he has in possession.
c. There is nothing wrong in making the PCGG Commissioners and
officers witnesses, as there is nothing wrong in a party’s making his
adversary his witness.
● Such action is not a fishing expedition. In the first place, PCGG is required to
establish a claim. The Court points out the fishing expeditions are precisely
permitted through modes of discovery. PCGG’s immunity from suit is not a
ground to refuse to answer the amended interrogatories
Dispositive:
WHEREORE, the petition is DENIED, without pronouncement as to costs. The TRO
issued is lifted and set aside.
Cruz, concurring:
One function of the court not generally appreciated is to educate the reader on the
intricacies and even the mustique of the law. The opinion performs the function with
impressive expertise and makes the modes of discovery less esoteric or inaccessible to
many members of the bar.

SALES VS. SABINO Ratio:
GR No. 133154, 9 December 2005 1. A deposition is not to be used when the deponent is at hand. Any deposition offered
during a trial to prove the facts therein set out, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of the
Petitioner/s: JOWEL SALES
deponent in open court, may be opposed and excluded on the ground of hearsay.
Respondent/s: CYRIL A. SABINO
However, depositions may be used without the deponent being called to the witness
stand by the proponent, provided the existence of certain conditions is first
Doctrine: A party who participated in the deposition of the opposing party’s
satisfactorily established. Among these is when the witness is out of the Philippines.
witness is not estopped from objecting to the admission of the testimony. However,
a certification from the Bureau of Immigration attesting to the departure of a
The trial court had determined that deponent Bueneres Corral was abroad when the
witness for purposes of deposition and satisfaction of the requirements under Sec
offer of his deposition was made.
04 Rule 24 is sufficient. The possibility that the witness might have returned is for
● This factual finding of absence or unavailability of witness to testify deserves
the party opposing the admission of the deposition to prove. Merely offering the
respect, having been adequately substantiated. As it were, the certification by
possibility of return is insufficient.
the Bureau of Immigration Exh. BB- provides that evidentiary support.
● Had deponent Buaneres Corral indeed returned to the Philippines subsequent
Facts: to his departure, petitioner could have presented evidence to show that such
Respondent Sabino filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Sales, driver of the was the case. As it is, however, the petitioner does not even assert the return
vehicle involved in the accident which ultimately caused the death of Sabino’s son, as a fact, only offering it as a possibility since no contrary proof had been
Elbert. adduced.
Before any responsive pleading could be filed, Sabino, as plaintiff a quo, notified the 2. Petitioner not estopped
defendants that he will take the deposition of one Buaneres Corral before the Clerk of As jurisprudence teaches, it matters not that opportunity for cross-examination was
Court, RTC- Pasig City. afforded during the taking of the deposition; for normally, the opportunity for cross-
● The deposition thus took place, and with the active participation of Sales’ examination must be accorded a party at the time the testimonial evidence is actually
counsel who even lengthily cross-examined the deponent. presented against him during the trial or hearing.
● In the course of trial, respondent had the deposition of Buaneres Corral ● In fine, the act of cross-examining the deponent during the taking of the
marked as her Exhibits DD and EEwith submarkings. deposition cannot, without more, be considered a waiver of the right to object
to its admissibility as evidence in the trial proper.
Thereafter, Sabino made a Formal Offer of Exhibits, among which are Exhibits DD and ● In participating, therefore, in the taking of the deposition, but objecting to its
EE, including a certification from the Bureau of Immigration attesting to the departure admissibility in court as evidence, petitioner did not assume inconsistent
for abroad of Buaneres Corral. positions. He is not, thus, estopped from challenging the admissibility of the
deposition just because he participated in the taking thereof.
However, Sales opposed the admission of the depositions, on the ground that the ● Further, under Section 29, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, objections to the
jurisdictional requirements for their admission under Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules competency of a witness or the competency, relevancy, or materiality of
of Court were not complied with. Discounting the probative value of the certification testimony may be made for the first time at the trial and need not be made at
from the Bureau of Immigration, he argues that said certification merely proves the fact the time of the taking of the deposition, unless they could be obviated at that
of Corral having left the country on the date therein mentioned. It does not, however, point.
establish that he has not returned since then and is unavailable to be present in court
to personally testify. Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
Issues:
1. WON the requirements of Section 4, Rule 24 (now Section 3) were satisfied -- YES
2. WON the petitioner in cross-examining the deponent during the taking of his
deposition waived any and all objections in connection therewith. --- NO

VERAN VS CA show that the witness was so old and infirm as not to be able to come to court to testify,
as contended by plaintiffs in their opposition to the deposition-taking.
Petitioner/s: SILVERIO VERAN, LUIS VERAN, CRISTINA VERAN, LEON
VERAN, GREGORIO SALAMERA, and GENEROSA SALAMERA
TC ruled in favor of plaintiffs.
CA reversed decision of trial court and ordered for the reconveyance
Respondent/s: The HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PRIMITIVA VILLAREAL
Doctrine:
Issues:
Facts: (1) WON the CA erred in finding the rejection by the TC of Aplonia Glodoveza’s
deposition as erroneous? NO
Plantiffs brought an action to recover a parcel of land against Primitiva Villareal, who (2) WON Petitioners argue that respondent court erred in concluding that the letter
died during the pendency of the case and was substituted accordingly. Defendant, who dated February 25, 1921 of Francisco Veran addressed to private respondent, seeking a
is a cousin of the plaintiffs refused to vacate the lot claiming co-ownership, and P1.00 yearly contribution for taxes gave rise to the presumption that private respondent
inheritance from their common ancestor. Defendant in his amended answer said: had been in possession of the disputed portion of the lot since 1921. NO.
a. That the land was subected to oral extrajudicial partition to the three children of the (3) WON the expiration of the one-year period from the issuance of an Original
late spouses, for a special purpose, i.e., to enable each of them to own a land by the Certificate of Title covering the disputed lot in favor of the heirs of Aleja Glodoveza will
roadside suited for residential purpose. not bar private respondent's action for reconveyance. NO.
b. That of all the real properties, left by the aforenamed spouses, the plaintiffs' mother
Aleja Glodoveza received as her share in the extrajudicial partition of Lot No. 1742 a Ratio:
portion of Lot No. 1744, consisting of residential and rice land; and a part of Lot No.
1832, all of the Atimonan Cadastre; whereas, the defendant's mother Leocadia 1. NO. The deposition of Apolonia Glodoveza was taken on January 21, 1961. At that
Glodoveza received only two parcels of land. time the applicable rules of procedure were provided in the (old) Rules of Court, Section
c.That even if the plaintiffs have registered the said land said registration was secured I of Rule 18 of which states:
thru fraud, deceit, representation and by illegal means to great damage of herein Section 1. Deposition pending action, when may be taken.-By leave of court after
defendant, and she and the latter have filed their protest to the Director of Lands after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property which is the subject
they learned that the plaintiffs through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, by illegal of the action, or without such leave after an answer has been served, the testimony of
means and irregularly obtained their free patent any person, whether a party or not, may be taken, at the instance of any party, by
deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories. ...
The trial of the case was suspended indefinitely in petition of both pearties, since the
administrative case was still pending. However, when the plaintiffs changed their Considering that the deposition was taken long after the answer had been filed and
counsel, the latter moved for the setting of the case for trial after almost four years from served, there was therefore no need to seek the approval of the trial court for the taking
Dec. 5, 1955 when the complaint was filed, the motion was granted, but for failure of of the deposition, notice of such taking being sufficient. In the instant case, it is not
the defendants to appear on the date set for hearing, plaintiffs were allowed to present disputed that notice of the deposition-taking was received by petitioners well before the
their evidence ex-parte, after which decision was rendered on Dec. 15, 1959 in favor of intended date and that although petitioners filed an opposition, this was not acted upon
the plaintiff and against the defendant. Upon a motion for reconsideration, the decision by the trial court before the taking of the deposition.
was set aside in order to allow the defendant to present her evidence, after filing an
amended answer, on the advice of the trial court itself, so as to include a prayer for the Leave of court for taking depositions should, however, be distinguished from the
reconveyance of the disputed portion of the lot, said lot, described as Lot 1744, having approval of the court for the use of the deposition Under Section 4 of Rule 24 of the
been already registered in the name of Aleja Glodoveza, the predecessor of plaintiffs. Revised Rules of Court, which was already in force and effect when the deposition was
offered in evidence:
Defendant offered as part of her evidence the deposition of Apolonia Glodoveza, but it xxx xxx xxx
was denied admission by the trial court on the ground that no proof was submitted to (c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for
any purpose if the court finds:
xxx xxx xxx As found by the Court of Appeals, this conclusion is buttressed by the testimony of
(3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or Enrique Glodoveza (p. 6, Decision) and documentary evidence (p. 8, Decision).
imprisonment;
xxx xxx xxx 2. NO. Petitioners argue that respondent court erred in concluding that the letter dated
February 25, 1921 of Francisco Veran addressed to private respondent, seeking a P1.00
Thus, with regard to the use of a deposition, there is occasion for the court to exercise yearly contribution for taxes gave rise to the presumption that private respondent had
its discretion, the proper time being when the deposition is formally offered in been in possession of the disputed portion of the lot since 1921. Petitioners contend that
evidence. the letter refers to a different lot owned by Francisco Veran. As the facts relative to this
In the instant case, the trial court did not admit the deposition when it was formally matter are not quite clear, this Court is inclined to respect the findings of the Court of
offered, on the ground that petitioners were denied their right to cross-examine the Appeals:
deponent. However, the Court of Appeals, in deciding to admit the deposition,
observed: 3. Private respondent's counterclaim for reconveyance was made in her amended
The rejection of said deposition is assigned as one of the errors of the trial court. From answer filed on March 4, 1961, some seven and a half years after the issuance of the title
the facts sufficiently disclosed by the records, We find no irregularity in its execution. in the name of the heirs of Aleja Glodoveza on December 3, 1953, but well within the
The reason for the taking was disclosed not only in the notice, but also in the deposition ten-year prescriptive period for bringing an action for reconveyance based on an
itself. To reject such a deposition on the ground considered by the trial court smacks of implied or constructive trust resulting from fraud in securing title
a technicality which does not serve the ends of substantial justice. The counsel of the
plaintiffs was notified sufficiently in advance of the deposition-taking, and his
opposition was not acted upon favorably before the day set for the taking of the Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
deposition. If he failed to appear on that day, as he could have done if he exerted diligent
efforts, he did so at his own risk.
The findings of fact supporting this conclusion of the Court of Appeals not being
disputed, We agree that, under the circumstance, petitioners' contention that they were
denied their right to cross-examine the deponent is unfounded.
Further, as pointed out by respondent, before the deposition was formally offered,
respondent had already testified as to the age of deponent.
ATTY. BALDEO:
Q Do you know Apolonia Glodoveza?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where is she now, do you know?
A She is in Atimonan.
Q Do you know how old she is now?
A She is very old, more or less, ninety years, (tsn, pp. 13-14, May 30, 1963).
Apparently, this was overlooked by the trial court when it denied admission of the
deposition.
In view of the foregoing, it cannot be argued that the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error when it decided to admit the deposition of Apolonia Glodoveza.
As correctly observed by respondent court:
With the admission of the deposition, a very significant fact gets into the records which
is that the assignment of the lot in question was to the three sisters, not to Aleja alone,
and the segregation or apportionment thereof among the said sisters was made by their
eldest sister, Ruperta Glodoveza in 1905. (p. 7, Decision).
LOCSIN VS SANDIGANBAYAN a. With regard to the parties, petitioners wanted to insert John Does
as defendants, and to highlight the capacity of plaintiffs as
Petitioner/s: VIVIAN Y. LOCSIN, YAO SHIONG SHIO, OSCAR MANUEL, RAMON
stockholders allegedly not privy to the assailed transactions
LINAN, PAZ Y. FLORES, for and on their own behalf, and SIXTO O. RACELIS, for and
b. The gargantuan amendments were proposed in the allegations
on behalf of ORIENTAL PETROLEUM AND MINERAL CORPORATION
common to all causes of action where petitioners wanted to
Respondent/s: THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, PRESIDENTIAL
insert a historical background and other allegations emphasizing
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST, REV.
that a large portion of plaintiff Oriental's unsubscribed capital stock
EMETERIO BARCELON, S.J., EDUARDO F. HERNANDEZ, GUILLERMO PABLO,
were allegedly taken illegally by Marcos and his cronies through the
JR., AMPARO BARCELON, ANTONIO CAGUIAT, RAMON A. PEDROSA, JAIME L.
initial issuance of 1 billion shares, and the subsequent issuances of
LEDESMA, SIMPLICIO J. ROXAS, VALERIANO FUGOSO, WILFREDO SAÑARES,
an additional 1.85 billion shares and 2.5 billion shares;
ULTRANA MINERALS CORP., INDEPENDENT REALTY CORP., PERFORMANCE
c. In standing to sue, petitioners wanted to insert in paragraphs 3.02,
INVESTMENT CORP., MID-PASIG LAND DEVELOPMENT CORP., FABIAN VER,
3.05, and 3.07 some statements to emphasize their standing and
PIEDRAS PETROLEUM CORP., and RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING
right to recover what were allegedly illegally taken from Oriental
CORPORATION
through duress or extortion
d. On the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, petitioners wanted
Doctrine: The proper remedy against an order denying a motion to admit
to insert the statement that it is absurd to seek relief from the PCGG
amendments to a pleading is to continue with the trial and interpose the proper
which is the adverse part
testimonial and documentary evidence to prove ultimate facts that are supposed to be
e. In the first cause of action, petitioners wanted to add averments
included in the amended complaint.
that PCGG's claim over the subject shares based on Campos' affidavit
is illegal as Campos did not own the shares
Facts: f. In the second cause of action, petitioners wanted to insert the
1. Individual petitioners are stockholders of petitioner Oriental. Oriental is averment that E. Barcelon was remiss of his task to recover the
engaged in the exploration, development, acquisition, financing, and subject shares by unlawfully usurping the opportunity to acquire
management of petroleum and mineral resources. them at a bargain
2. It was organized on October 10, 1969, and had PhP10 billion common shares g. In the third cause of action, petitioners wanted to add the
which were divided into two classes with the same rights and privileges averment which is a mere reiteration of the proposed amendment in
(1) six billion Class "A" common shares to be issued only to Filipino citizens and the first cause of action that Campos' affidavit did not confer to PCGG
(2) four billion Class "B" common shares which may be issued to aliens. or the Government ownership over the subject Oriental share
3. Respondents corporations were those wherein the shares allegedly illegally h. In the fourth cause of action, petitioners wanted to add the
obtained by former President Marcos were placed, and from which the averment of the PCGG's alleged consistent stance that Marcos
disputed shares were taken or sequestered by respondent PCGG. unlawfully accumulated wealth by confiscating businesses and
4. Yao Shiong Shio, Oscar Manuel, and Ramon Linan filed a Complaint for taking undue advantage of his power
Declaration of Nullity of Presidential Commission on Good Government i. In the fifth cause of action, petitioners wanted to insert the
(PCGG) Deed of Sale, Sequestration Orders with Injunctive relief with the averment of the alleged nullity of the exchange of 2.5 billion Oriental
Sandiganbayan. This was dismissed. shares with 2.5% interest in Service Contract No. 14 allegedly
5. Petitioners then amended the complaint. This was also dismissed. admitted by the PCGG in the Racketeering Influenced Corrupt
6. Petitioners filed a new complaint impleading Locsin et. al. Organizations case, that Oriental is one of the corporations
7. The instant petition for certiorari is filed with us attributing grave abuse of controlled by Rolando Gapud for Marcos
discretion on respondent anti-graft court for the rejection of petitioners' Issue: W/H the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in rejecting the
amended complaint. petitioners’ amended complaint - NO
8. Petitioners wanted to incorporate the following amendments into a bid to
show details on how the 1.85 billion shares (second block) and the 2.5 billion Ratio:
shares (third block) of Oriental were allegedly extorted by Marcos and his 1. The SC agrees with the Sandiganbayan that the proposed amendments are
cronies through simulated transactions and systematic abuse of power: substantial.
2. Respondent court took into consideration the fact that the 19 defendants have view of the presentation of the pieces of evidence before the Court to support
already filed their answers. To entertain the amended pleading will put back the proposed changes in the complaint.
the case to square one. Some or all the defendants may file motions to dismiss
anchored on grounds that spring from the new averments of the amended Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the
complaint. March 21, 1990 Resolution and May 12, 1998 Order of the SB First Division are hereby
3. Even if the defendants will not resort to a motion to dismiss, some, if not all, AFFIRMED. S.B. Case No. 0042 is DISMISSED with respect to respondents Eduardo
will surely ask motions for extensions of time to file their responsive pleading F. Hernandez, Valeriano Fugoso, and Antonio Caguiat. Let the SB continue with the
due to the substantial and myriad details incorporated in the amended hearing and resolution of the case with dispatch. Costs against petitioners.
complaint. Again, a prolongation of the events in a case will be experienced. SO ORDERED.
4. It is clear from the many proposed changes in the complaint that said
averments pertain to evidentiary facts and are not essential components of the
ultimate facts of petitioners' complaint. Being merely evidentiary facts, the
proposed amendments then are unnecessary to justify admission by the SB.
5. The proper remedy against an order denying a motion to admit amendments
to a pleading is to continue with the trial and interpose the proper testimonial
and documentary evidence to prove ultimate facts that are supposed to be
included in the amended complaint. It is only in the presence of extraordinary
circumstances evincing a patent disregard of justice and fair play where resort
to a petition for certiorari is proper.
6. Petitioners are not entirely without an adequate remedy if their only objective
in amending the complaint is to provide details or amplification to their
allegations in the original complaint.
7. Under A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, which enhanced Rule 18 on Pre-trial, parties are
required to use the different modes of discovery and deposition under Rules
23, 25, 26, 27, and 28 within five (5) days from the filing of the answer.
Petitioners can avail of written interrogatories under Rule 25 to obtain
information from respondents on the proposed amendments or make use of
the request for admission by adverse party under Rule 26 to procure
categorical answers under oath from the adverse party relating to the alleged
details.
8. The pre-trial brief has to identify all pieces of evidence to be presented during
trial whether parole, documentary, or object. These pieces of evidence will
certainly provide the details sought to be incorporated by petitioners in their
amended complaint.
9. The judge during the pre-trial conference is tasked to find out whether the
pleadings especially the complaint and the answer are in order. If not, then he
can order the amendments if necessary.
10. If petitioners can show to the satisfaction of the court based on the pieces of
evidence they intend to present that amendments to their complaint are in
order, then the judge would issue the appropriate order for the amendment of
the complaint.
11. Unlike the bare allegations of petitioners in the amended complaint, during
pre-trial, the probability of having said amendments accepted are greater in

a) That petitioners failed to file any written claim for tax refund or
METRO MANILA SHOPPING MECCA CORP. VS. TOLEDO credit with the Office of the City Treasurer of Manila.
5) On July 8, 2004, Petitioners sent the City Treasurer and the City of Manila a
Petitioner/s: Metro Manila Shopping Mecca Corp., Shoemart, Inc., SM Prime
Request for Admissions & Interrogatories (Request for Admission),
Holdings, Inc., Star Appliances Center, Super Value, Inc., Ace Hardware
which inter alia requested:
Philippines, Inc., Health and Beauty, Inc., Jollimart Phils. Corp., and Surplus
a) The admission of the fact that the Petitioners filed a written protest
Marketing Corporation
with the City Treasurer and the City of Manila.
Respondent/s: Ms. Liberty Toledo, in her capacity as the City Treasurer of Manila,
b) The City Treasurer and the City of Manila did not respond to the said
and the City of Manila
Request for Admission.
Doctrine:
The Ruling of the RTC
If the matters in a request for admission have already been admitted or denied in
6) RTC ruled in favor of the Petitioners.
previous pleadings by the requested party the latter cannot be compelled to admit
or deny them anew.
The Ruling of the CTA Division
7) Reversed the RTC Decision.
In turn, the requesting party cannot reasonably expect a response to the request and
a) Ruled that petitioners failed to comply with Section 196 of the LGC,
thereafter, assume or even demand the application of the implied admission rule in
i) Considering that their letter dated October 19, 2001 to the
Section 2, Rule 26.
City Treasurer and the City of Manila was a mere protest
letter
Facts: (1) And as such, could not be treated as a written
1) Respondent Liberty M. Toledo, as Treasurer of respondent City of Manila claim for refund.
(City), assessed Petitioners for their fourth quarter local business taxes .
pursuant to Section 21 of the Manila Revenue Code. The Ruling of the CTA En Banc
a) Consequently, Petitioners paid under protest. 8) In its Decision dated September 8, 2009, the CTA En Banc upheld the CTA
2) In a letter: Division's ruling and found that:
a) Petitioners informed the Office of the City Treasurer of Manila of the a) Petitioners' claim for refund should be denied for their failure to
nature of the foregoing payment, comply with the requisites provided for by law.
b) Assailing as well the unconstitutionality of Section 21 of the Manila i) I.e. for failing to file any written claim for tax refund / credit
Revenue Code. to the respondents.
c) Petitioners' protest was however denied. 9) On October 1, 2009, petitioners moved for reconsideration but the CTA En
3) On October 20, 2003, Petitioners filed a case with the Regional Trial Court of Banc denied the same in its Resolution dated January 4, 2010.
Manila (RTC) against the City Treasurer and the City of Manila 10) The Petitioners argue in the SC that since the City Treasurer and the City of
a) Reiterating their claim that Section 21 of the Manila Revenue Code is Manila did not respond / answer to their Request for Admission (that they
null and void. (petitioners) have actually submitted a tax refund / claim):
b) Accordingly, they sought the refund of the amount of local business a) The Respondents (City Treasurer and the City of Manila) have
taxes they previously paid to the City, plus interest. admitted the truth and veracity of their (Petitioners’) requested fact
4) For their part, the City Treasurer and the City of Manila filed a Motion to pursuant to Rule 2623.
Dismiss and Answer.
23 SEC. 1. Request for admission. — At any time after issues have been joined, a party of fact set forth in the request. Copies of the documents shall be delivered with
may file and serve upon any other party a written request for the admission by the the request unless copies have already been furnished.
latter of the genuineness of any material and relevant document described in and
exhibited with the request or of the truth of any material and relevant matter
Issue: Whether petitioners are entitled to a tax refund/credit--NO. b) Otherwise stated, if the matters in a request for admission have
already been admitted or denied in previous pleadings by the
Ratio: requested party:
1) A perusal of Section 196 of the LGC reveals that in order to be entitled to a i) The latter cannot be compelled to admit or deny them anew.
refund/credit of local taxes, the following procedural requirements must c) In turn, the requesting party cannot reasonably expect a response to
concur: the request and thereafter, assume or even demand the application
a) First, the taxpayer concerned must file a written claim for of the implied admission rule in Section 2, Rule 26.
refund/credit with the local treasurer; and d) The rationale behind this exception had been discussed in the case of
b) Second, the case or proceeding for refund has to be filed within two CIR v. Manila Mining Corporation, citing Concrete Aggregates
(2) years from the date of the payment of the tax, fee, or charge or Corporation v. CA , where the Court held as follows:
from the date the taxpayer is entitled to a refund or credit. i) “As Concrete Aggregates Corporation v. Court of Appeals
2) Records disclose: holds, admissions by an adverse party as a mode of
a) That while the case or proceeding for refund was filed by petitioners discovery contemplates of interrogatories that would clarify
within two (2) years from the time of payment, and tend to shed light on the truth or falsity of the
i) They, however, failed to prove that they have filed a allegations in a pleading, and does not refer to a mere
written claim for refund with the local treasurer reiteration of what has already been alleged in the
considering that such fact — although subject of their pleadings; otherwise, it constitutes an utter redundancy
Request for Admission which the City Treasurer and the and will be a useless, pointless process which petitioner
City of Manila did not reply to — had already been should not be subjected to.”
controverted by the the City Treasurer and the City 5) Petitioner controverted, in its Answers, the matters set forth in the City
of Manila in their Motion to Dismiss and Answer. Treasurer and the City of Manila’s Petitions for Review before the CTA
3) Based on the Rule 26: a) The requests for admission being mere reproductions of the matters
a) Once a party serves a request for admission regarding the truth of already stated in the petitions.
any material and relevant matter of fact, b) Thus, petitioner should not be required to make a second denial of
b) The party to whom such request is served is given a period of fifteen those matters it already denied in its Answers.
(15) days within which to file a sworn statement answering the same. 6) Likewise, in the case of Limos v. Odones, the Court explained:
c) Should the latter fail to file and serve such answer: a) “A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce
i) Each of the matters of which admission is requested shall or reiterate the allegations of the requesting party's
be deemed admitted. pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact
4) The exception to this rule is: described in the request, whose purpose is to establish said party's
a) When the party to whom such request for admission is served had cause of action or defense. Unless it serves that purpose, it is
already controverted the matters subject of such request in an earlier pointless, useless and a mere redundancy.”
pleading. 7) Records show that Petitioners filed their Request for Admission with the RTC
and also served the same on the City Treasurer and the City of Manila,
SEC. 2. Implied admission. — Each of the matters of which an admission is requested Objections to any request for admission shall be submitted to the court by the party
shall be deemed admitted unless, within a period designated in the request, which requested within the period for and prior to the filing of his sworn statement as
shall not be less than fifteen (15) days after service thereof, or within such further time contemplated in the preceding paragraph and his compliance therewith shall be
as the court may allow on motion, the party to whom the request is directed files and deferred until such objections are resolved, which resolution shall be made as early as
serves upon the party requesting the admission a sworn statement either denying practicable.
specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail
the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters.
a) Requesting that the fact that they filed a written claim for refund with
the City Treasurer of Manila be admitted.
b) The City Treasurer and the City of Manila, however, did not — and in
fact, need not — reply to the same
i) Considering that they have already stated in their Motion to
Dismiss and Answer that Petitioners failed to file any
written claim for tax refund or credit.
c) In this regard, respondents are not deemed to have admitted the
truth and veracity of petitioners' requested fact.
8) Indeed, it is hornbook principle that a claim for a tax refund/credit is in the
nature of a claim for an exemption and the law is construed in strictissimi juris
against the one claiming it and in favor of the taxing authority.
a) Consequently, as Petitioners have failed to prove that they have
complied with the procedural requisites stated under Section 196 of
the LGC, their claim for local tax refund/credit must be denied.
Dispositive:

DUQUE V. CA 10. Spouses failed to respond to the request, thus citing Rule 26, Sec. 1 and 2 ruled in
favor of petitioners.
Petitioner: Fortunata N. Duque and Marcosa Valenzuela
11. Respondents appealed to the CA which the CA reversed the decision.
Respondents: CA, Edna and Enrico Bonifacio.
12. The CA argued that the matters of which admission by the respondents is being
DOCTRINE: A party should not be compelled to admit matters of fact already
sought in the petitioners’ request for admission are those already denied by the
admitted by his pleading and concerning where there is no issue nor should he be
respondents in their respective Answers to the two Complaints filed against them thus,
required to make a second denial in his answer to the complaint. A request for
the request for admission was invalid.
admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the
requesting party’s pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact,
ISSUE/S: W/N the matters the petitioners requested the respondents to admit were
or documents described in and exhibited with the request, whose purpose is to
already denied in their Answer- YES
establish said party’s cause of action or defense. Unless it serves that purpose, it is
pointless, useless and mere redundancy.
RATIO:
1. The prevailing rule in 1988 when the request for admission was made is Rule
FACTS: 26 of the Revised Rules of Court which seeks to obtain admissions from the
1. Duque and Valenzuela filed a complaint before the RTC of Valenzuela alleging adverse party regarding the genuiness of relevant documents or relevant
that Spouses Enrcio and Edna Bonifacio negotiated with them certain checks in matters of fact through requests for admissions to enable a party to discover
exchange for cash amounting to P270,000. the evidence of the adverse side thereby facilitating an amicable settlement of
2. Bonifacio represented themselves to be holders in due course and for value the case or expediting the trial of the same. However if the request for
and they allegedly claimed that the checks were sufficiently funded. admission only serves to delay the proceeding by abetting redundancy in the
3. However upon presentation by Duque and Valenzuela of the said checks on pleadings, the intended purpose for the rule will certainly be defeated.
their maturity dates, the same were dishonored. 2. In the present case, petitioners requested the admission of three things:
4. Each of the petitioners gave Bonifacio notice of dishonor and made repeated a. They negotiated with plaintiffs for valuable consideration the checks
demands. annexed to the respective complaints
5. Respondents Bonifacio refused to honor said checks or replace such with cash. b. Defendant Edna Bonifacio signed separate PNs acknowledging that
6. Bonifacio denied that they negotiated with the petitioners any of the checks she is indebted to Duque and Valenzuela
annexed and also denied that they represented themselves to petitoners that they were c. Petitioners in the two cases sent letters of demand to the
holders in due course and for value of said checks. They also denied that they respondents.
represented having sufficient checks and denied that they drew and issued all the 3. The first matter sought to be admitted were the same checks referred to and
checks alluded to by petitioners. annexed in the Complaint which was already denied by respondents in their
7. Bonifacio contends that upon learning that the checks were returned to the Answer. Clearly, to require an admission on this point even thought it was
petitioners, they made arrangements for settlement but only for the checks duly already denied in the Answer would be superfluous.
assigned by them. Lastly, respondents dispute the true amount of their liability to the 4. In Po v. CA, the Court held that “a party should not be compelled to admit
petitioners a s alleged in their Separate Complaints claiming that they do not owe that matters of fact already admitted by his pleading and concerning where there
much either to them. is no issue nor should he be required to make a second denial in his answer to
8. RTC issued a pre-trial order defining the principal issues and setting the cases the complaint. A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or
for trial on the merits. reiterate the allegations of the requesting party’s pleading but should set forth
9. Petitioners filed a Request for Admission and furnished to counsel for relevant evidentiary matters of fact, or documents described in and exhibited
Bonfacios specifically requesting that they admit that: with the request, whose purpose is to establish said party’s cause of action or
a. They negotiated with plaintiffs for valuable consideration the checks annexed defense. Unless it serves that purpose, it is pointless, useless and mere
to the respective complaints redundancy.”
b. Defendant Edna Bonifacio signed separate PNs acknowledging that she is
indebted to Duque and Valenzuela
c. Petitioners in the two cases sent letters of demand to the respondents.

MANZANO V. DESPABILADERAS ● No response was proffered by Luz until the course of trial, Luz filed a list of
times admitted to have been delivered and those not admitted noting that
Petitioner/s: Roger Manzano
Deliveries admitted do not bear the actual price agreed upon or the
Respondent/s: Luz Despabiladeras
specifications requested
● Manzano filed a motion for partial judgment and execution alleging
Doctrine: Implied Admission: Each of the matters of which an admission is
substantial justice will be served if partial judgment would issue on the
requested shall be deemed admitted unless, within a period designated in the
pleadings in respect to those items admitted to have been received by Luz and
request, which shall not be less than ten (10) days after service thereof, or within
attaching the list prepared by Manzano containing items with the
such further time as the court may allow on motion and notice, the party to whom
corresponding prices admitted to have been received by the respondent
the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a sworn
● Luz opposed the motion saying That the motion appears to have been based
statement either denying specifically the matters of which an admission is
on the list of items on file with the court which defendant admitted to have
requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either
been delivered to her by plaintiff but which, will still be litigated in order to
admit or deny those matters.
determine the actual cost or value as the delivery receipts did not contain or
reflect the true agreement between the parties or the cost does not appear on
Facts: the receipt at the time of the delivery of the item
● Respondent Luz obtained credit from petitioner Manzano various ● The trial court issued the order “Considering that Luz, up to this time ha[s]
construction materials which she used in her construction project at not answered under oath the request for admission, as prayed for by the
Camarines Sur Polytechnic Colleges (CSPC) counsel for the plaintiff, the facts requested to be admitted are hereby
● Manzano claimed that he delivered to respondent 307k worth of materials confirmed.
● Luz having paid only 130k exclusive of interest despite receipt of payments
from CSPC, Manzano filed a complaint for sum of money praying that pending Issue: What is the legal consequence when a request for admission of material and
final determination of case, a suppliers lien be established and enforced on the relevant facts pursuant to Rule 26 is not answered under oath within the period stated
yet collectible payments Luz has against CSPC in the Rules by a party litigant served therefore? DEEMED ADMITTED
● Luz answers with counterclaim and alleged that Manzano substantially
altered the prices Ratio:
● Manzano replied that the two checks represented payment for past obligations ● At the commencement on April 6, 1990 of the action, the prevailing rule, Rule
● RTC granted Manzano’s motion to establish and enforce suppliers lien. As 26 of the 1964 Rules of Court, Sections 1 and 2 of which were substantially
required by court, Manzano filed a bond. reproduced in the present Rules,provides:
● After the pre-trial conference, there is no dispute that Manzano delivered and
Luz received the materials but Luz does not agree on the cost claimed by SECTION 1. Request for admission. At any time after issues have been joined, a party
Manano. It is mutually agreed that Manzano shall submit an offer to stipulate may serve upon any other party a written request for the admission by the latter of the
showing an itemized list of construction materials delivered to Luz together genuineness of relevant documents described in and exhibited with the
with the cost claimed by Manzano within 15 days furnishing copy thereof to request or of the truth of any material and relevant matters of fact set forth in the
Luz who will state her objections if any, or comment therein within the same request. Copies of the documents shall be delivered with the request unless copies have
period. already been furnished.
● Instead of submitting an offer to stipulate, Manzano filed a request for SECTION 2. Implied Admission. Each of the matters of which an admission is
admission asking Luz to admit within 15 days requested shall be deemed admitted unless, within a period designated in the request,
- That on the specific dates set forth in Annexes A, A-1 and A-2 hereof, which shall not be less than ten (10) days after service thereof, or within such further
plaintiff delivered to and defendant received the various items time as the court may allow on motion and notice, the party to whom the request is
particularly described in said annexes duly covered by the invoices directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a sworn statement either
respectively set forth therein; denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in
- That of the total amount of P314,610.50 representing the value of the detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters.
goods described in Annexes A, A-1 and A-2, plaintiff has paid only
P130,000.00.
● Respondent having failed to discharge what is incumbent upon her under Rule
26, that is, to deny under oath the facts bearing on the main issue contained
in the Request for Admission, she was deemed to have admitted that she
received the construction materials, the cost of which was indicated in the
request and was indebted to petitioner in the amount of P184,610.50
(P314,610.50 less the partial payment of P130,000.00).
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the

Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 36, dated July 7, 1997 is hereby REINSTATED
with the MODIFICATION that respondent Luz Despabiladeras is hereby ordered to pay
petitioner Roger Manzano the amount of P62,610.50 plus interest at the legal rate (12%
per annum) from the filing of the complaint up to the time of actual payment, and that
the award of attorneys fees is deleted.

CAPITOL HILLS GOLF V. SANCHEZ ○ And that they needed more time to find the list of stockholders which
was in the bodega
Petitioner/s: Capitol Hills Golf & Country Club, Inc. and Pablo Roman, Jr.
● The trial court issued a resolution which gave the petitioners one last chance
Respondent/s: Manuel Sanchez
to comply, reiterating the 2002 order.
○ If petitioners fail to comply, they will be cited in contempt of court
Doctrine:
and will be ordered to pay a fine of P10k for every day of delay
The enumeration of options given to the court under Sec 3, Rule 29 of the Rules is not
● Petitioners: the threatened citation for contempt is not in line with the policy
exclusive, as shown by the phrase "among others."
that there should be willfulness or that the contumacious act be done
Contempt of court may be a sanction for refusing to produce docs.
deliberately in disregard of the authority of the court
○ CA denied: the resolution was pursuant to the Interim Rules with the
Facts: suppletory application of Sec. 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil
● July 1, 2002 - Sanchez (stockholder of Capitol) filed a petition for nullification Procedure
of the annual meeting of stockholders of May 21, 2002 and the special meeting
of stockholders of April 23, 2002. Issue: W/N petitioners may be punished for contempt - YES, indirect contempt
○ Petitioners with co-defendants filed an Answer with Counterclaims
and a Motion for Preliminary Hearing of Defendants’ Affirmative Ratio:
Defenses - denied ● Sec 4, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules - in addition to a possible treatment of a
○ Case did not say if Sanchez’s petition was granted party as non-suited or as in default, the sanctions prescribed in the Rules for
● Sanchez filed a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents - granted; failure to avail of, or refusal to comply with, the modes of discovery shall apply
2002 order required petitioner to produce the ff docs: ● Sec 3, Rule 29 of the Rules of CivPro - if a party or an officer or managing agent
1. The list of stockholders of record as of March 2002; of a party refuses to obey an order to produce any document or other things
2. All proxies, whether validated or not, which have been received by the defendants; for inspection, copying, or photographing or to permit it to be done, the court
3. The specimen signatures of all stockholders as contained in the Stock and Transfer may make such orders as are just
Book or on the stub of the stock certificate; and ○ The enumeration of options given to the court under Sec 3, Rule 29
4. The tape recording of the stockholders' meeting on April 23, 2002 and May 21, 2002. of the Rules is not exclusive, as shown by the phrase "among others."
● Procedural matters which delayed case to 2007 (not impt yung sa footnotes)24 ● To ensure that availment of the modes of discovery is otherwise untrammeled
○ Inspection did not push through because of deferments. and efficacious, the law imposes serious sanctions on the party who refuses to
■ Another did not push through since the corp secretary make discovery, such as
Defensor was out of town and Roman showed no ○ dismissing the action or proceeding or part thereof, or rendering
willingness to comply. judgment by default against the disobedient party;
○ Parties agreed to defer the pre-trial conference until the actual ○ contempt of court, or arrest of the party or agent of the party;
inspection on Dec 12, 2006 -moved to Jan 11, 2007 ○ payment of the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining
● During the inspection, only document produced was the Stock and Transfer a court order to compel discovery;
Book of the corp (no.3) ○ taking the matters inquired into as established in accordance with
○ Petitioners alleged that they could not find from the corp records the the claim of the party seeking discovery;
copies of the proxies submitted by the stockholders, including the ○ refusal to allow the disobedient party support or oppose designated
tape recordings claims or defenses; striking out pleadings or parts thereof; staying
further proceedings
24Petitioners filed to defer the implementation - denied by RTC and CA

Another judge took over after the previous was appointed to CA; then such inhibited
himself because of close friendship relation with petitioners’ counsel; next judge also
inhibited
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The March 13,
2008 Decision and April 28, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 100911, which affirmed the September 3, 2007 Resolution of the Quezon City
Regional Trial Court, Branch 226, are AFFIRMED.
Notes:
● Nagpahaba sa case is about proceedings for indirect contempt

SOLIDBANK CORP V. GATEWAY ● Some documents were presented such as the invoices with regard to the Back
End services Agreement
Petitioner/s: Solidbank Corporation (Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company)
● Solidbank was not satisfied so it filed a motion to cite Gateway and its officers
Respondent/s: Gateway Electronics Corporation, Jaime Hidalgo and Israel
in contempt for refusal to produce pertinent documents
Maducdoc
● TC denied this but chastised Gateway for exerting no diligent efforts to
produce the docs
Doctrine:
● TC ruled in favor of Solidbank. CA reversed.
Facts: Issue:
● Gateway obtained from Solidbank four currency denominated loans to be 1. Whether Solidbanks motion for production and inspection of documents and
used as capital for its manufacturing operations. the Order of the trial court dated January 30, 2001 failed to comply with
● Loans were covered by promissory notes (PN) Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court? YES
● To secure the loans, Gateway assigned to Solidbank proceeds of its Back-end
Services Agreement with Alliance Semiconductor Corporations (Alliance) Ratio:
● In 2000, Gateway failed to comply with its loan obligations having an 1. SECTION 1. Motion for production or inspection; order. Upon motion of any
outstanding debt of $1.9M party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending
● Solidbank’s demands to pay were not heeded by Gateway so it filed a collection may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or
of sum of money against Gateway photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated
● In 2002, Solidbank filed an amendment complaint to implead the officers and documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible
stockholders PRasad, Reyes, Maducdoc, Hidalgo and Calderon who signed in things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any
their personal capacity a Continuing Guaranty to become sureties for any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or
existing indebtedness of Gateway to Solidbank. TC admitted the amended control; or (b) order any party or permit entry upon designated land or other
complaint and impleaded them property in his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring,
● Earlier in 2000, Solidbank filed a motion for production and inspection of surveying, or photographing the property or any designated relevant object or
documents on the basis of infor received from Mr Eichler the chief financial operation thereon. The order shall specify the time, place and manner of
officer of ALliance, that Gateway received from Alliance the proceeds or making the inspection and taking copies and photographs, and may prescribe
payment of the Back and Services agreement. Relevant portion of motion: such terms and conditions as are just.
a) The originals, duplicate originals and copies of all documents pertaining to, arising ● The modes of discovery are accorded a broad and liberal treatment. Rule 27 of
from, in connection with or involving the Back-end Services Agreement of defendant the Revised Rules of Court permits fishing for evidence, the only limitation
GEC and Alliance Semiconductors; being that the documents, papers, etc., sought to be produced are not
privileged, that they are in the possession of the party ordered to produce them
b) The originals, duplicate originals and copies of all books of account, financial and that they are material to any matter involved in the action
statements, receipts, checks, vouchers, invoices, ledgers and other financial/accounting ● In this regard, Solidbank claims that they have received information from the
records and documents pertaining to or evidencing financial and money transactions Chief Financial Officer of Alliance that Gateway had already received
arising from, in connection with or involving the Back-end Services Agreement of payments under the agreement. In order to ascertain the veracity of the
defendant GEC and Alliance Semiconductors; and information, Solidbank availed of the discovery procedure under
c) The originals, duplicate originals and copies of all documents from whatever source Rule 27. The purpose of Solidbanks motion is to compel Gateway to produce
pertaining to the proceeds/payments received by GEC from Alliance Semiconductors. the documents evidencing payments received from Alliance in connection
● TC granted the motion for production and inspection of documents with the Back-end Services Agreement.
● Gateway filed a motion to reset the production and inspection of documents ● Solidbank was able to show good cause for the production of the documents.
to give them enough time to gather and collate the documents in their It had also shown that the said documents are material or contain evidence
possession - GRANTED relevant to an issue involved in the action. However, Solidbanks motion
● Solidbank filed a motion for issuance of a show cause order for Gateways was fatally defective and must be struck down because of its failure to
failure to comply with the TC order of production and inspection specify with particularity the documents it required Gateway to produce.
Solidbanks motion for production and inspection of documents called for a
blanket inspection. Solidbanks request for inspection of all documents
pertaining to, arising from, in connection with or involving the Back-end
Services Agreement was simply too broad and too generalized in
scope.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is

DENIED for lack of merit.

TOPIC XVIII - INTERVENTION ● Subsequently, ADRDI was also able to have its notice of adverse claim over
the subject property annotated on the TCTs of BCPI and WPFI, respectively.
RODRIGUEZ V. CA ● ADRDI subsequently transferred the subject property to Amado Araneta
G.R. No. 184589, June 13, 2013 (Araneta) to whom a TCT was issued on March 1983.|||
● Nov. 1996: Landicho executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject
Petitioner/s: DEOGENES O. RODRIGUEZ,
property in favor of herein petitioner Rodriguez. Two years later, on June 1,
Respondent/s: HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND PHILIPPINE CHINESE
1998, Landicho died.
CHARITABLE ASSOCIATION, INC.
● Seven years after, in 2005, Rodriguez filed an Omnibus Motion before the RTC
of San Mateo, Rizal, where he alleged that the Decision of the CFI which
Doctrine: Interventions have been allowed even beyond the period prescribed in
confirmed Landicho's title over the subject property has not been executed.
the Rule, when demanded by the higher interest of justice. Interventions have also
● Rodriguez specifically stated that no decree of registration had been issued by
been granted to afford indispensable parties, who have not been impleaded, the
the LRC Commissioner (now the Administrator of the Land Registration
right to be heard even after a decision has been rendered by the trial court, when
Authority [LRA]) and that no OCT had been ever issued by the ROD in
the petition for review of the judgment has already been submitted for decision
Landicho's name. As Landicho's successor-in-interest to the subject property,
before the Supreme Court, and even where the assailed order has already become
Rodriguez prayed that the decision be issued.
final and executory.
● In the course of the proceedings concerning the aforementioned Omnibus
The allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound
Motion, Rodriguez submitted the TCT of PCCAI but alleged that said
discretion of the court after consideration of the appropriate circumstances. We
certificate of title was fictitious.
stress again that Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of procedure whose object
● The RTC issued a subpoena commanding PCCAI to appear at the hearing of
is to make the powers of the court fully and completely available for justice.
Land Reg. Case set on November 8, 2006 at 9:00 a.m.; to bring its TCT and
Tax Declaration; and to testify in connection therewith.
Facts: ● PCCAI filed a Verified Motion for Leave to Intervene in the case, claiming that
● Jan. 1965: Purita Landicho filed before the CFI of Rizal an Application for it was an indispensable party as the TCT in its name remains to be valid and
Registration of a piece of land, measuring 125 hectares which formerly was the case was thus a collateral attack on its title.
several parcels of land, located in Rizal (subject property). ● The court reasoned that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the motion of
● Nov. 1965: the CFI confirmed the title of Purita Landicho to the parcel of land the petitioners because the action was a mere continuation of the land
under consideration and ordered the registration thereof in her name and registration case which was started 40 years ago.
personal circumstances aforementioned. ● PCCAI filed an MR, and the court resolved this together with the motion to
● July 1966: Register of Deeds Santos issued to Landicho a TCT rather than an intervene. In denying both motions, the court said that what it merely did was
OCT for the subject property; and although the TCT stated that it was issued to reiterate a decision which was already previously final and executory. It did
pursuant to Decree No. 1480, no other detail regarding the decree and the not try anything new but merely reiterated the decision after finding out that
original registration of the subject property was filled out. no decree of registration and title were issued pursuant to the said decision so
● The subject property was thereafter sold several times, and the sale could be no intervention could be entertained.
traced from Landicho to Blue Chips Projects, Inc. (BCPI), to Winmar Poultry ● The RTC favorably acted on Rodriguez's Omnibus Motion.
Farm, Inc. (WPFI), and finally, to herein respondent Philippine Chinese Issue: W/N the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that PCCAI had legal
Charitable Association, Inc. (PCCAI) in July 1975. standing to prevent or suspend the execution of the 1965 decision. NO.
● Meanwhile, A. Doronila Resources Dev., Inc. (ADRDI) instituted a Civil Case
where ADRDI asserted ownership over the subject property, which was a Ratio:
portion of a bigger tract of land measuring around 513 hectares, covered by a ● Although the matter brought before the CA did not involve ownership over the
TCT dated Feb. 1956, in the name of said corporation. land, the appellate court had no choice but to take cognizance of the conflicting
● This bigger tract of land was originally registered in the name of Meerkamp claims of ownership, especially with both PCCAI and Rodriguez deriving their
Co. under OCT No. 301, pursuant to Decree No. 1480, issued on November titles from Landicho. As stated by the LRA in its Manifestation, a TCT was
22, 1906. issued in favor of Landicho instead of an OCT because there was already an
● ADRDI caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the TCT of BCPI.
OCT covering a bigger piece of land including the one Landicho was claiming. derived their title from Landicho, so the former’s intervention would not
The TCT in her favor in effect cancelled the OCT to that extent. unduly delay or prejudice the right of Landicho. Third, PCCAI only moved to
intervene so as to oppose Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion since a title already
● The case is all the more complicated by the fact that there is a pending case in exists in its name. Fourth, after learning about Rodriguez’s Omnibus Motion
another court between Araneta and PCCAI. To issue a decree of registration through a subpoena issued to it, PCCAI was reasonably expected to oppose it.
and OCT in favor of Rodriguez would give rise to a third certificate of title over It was the most opportune and expedient remedy available to PCCAI, and the
the same property, which would be contrary to the purpose of the Torrens RTC should have allowed it to intervene.
system of registration. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to make
ownership of lands more secure by quieting title to lands and forever barring
any question as to its legality. In this case, PCCAI is the registered owner of Dispositive: ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The Decision dated
the said parcel of land, and it is better entitled to the protection of the Torrens May 26, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101789, reversing and setting
system until its title is subsequently annulled or cancelled. aside the Orders dated April 10, 2007 and November 22, 2007 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 75 of San Mateo, Rizal in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098, is AFFIRMED
● Under Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree, the validity of a Torrens with the MODIFICATION deleting the second sentence of the dispositive portion for
title cannot be collaterally attacked in any proceeding. Rodriguez’s Omnibus being a superfluity.
Motion is a collateral attack since he is asserting ownership over the land and
claiming that PCCAI’s title was spurious, without even praying that the said
title be cancelled or declared void. Such cannot be allowed.
● Regarding intervention, the rule is provided in Rule 19 of the Rules

of Court. The property is presently covered by a TCT in the name of PCCAI.
As the registered owner, it clearly has a legal interest in the property and the
issuance of another certificate of title in favor of Rodriguez would adversely
affect its interest by casting a cloud on its TCT. Although Rule 19 is explicit on
the period when a motion to intervene may be filed, the Court allowed
exceptions in several cases in the past, as when the higher interest of justice
demanded, or when an indispensable party who was not impleaded was given
a chance to be heard even after the trial court rendered a decision and while
the case was pending review with the SC. Intervention had also been granted
even after a decision becomes final and executory.
● In Lim v. Pacquing, the motion for intervention filed by the Republic of the
Philippines was allowed by this Court to avoid grave injustice and injury and
to settle once and for all the substantive issues raised by the parties. In fine,
the allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound
discretion of the court after consideration of the appropriate circumstances.
Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of procedure whose object is to make the
powers of the court fully and completely available for justice. Its purpose is
not to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of
justice.
● The circumstances of the case justify the relaxation of the rules. First, the
interests of PCCAI and Rodriguez only arose after the decision rendered by
the CFI became final and executory. Second, both PCCAI and Rodriguez
TOPIC XIX – CONSOLIDATION OR SEVERANCE Peaks despite existing laws expressly prohibiting the exportation of
mahogany of the narra species and Twin Peaks’ lack of qualification
TOPIC XX – TRIAL to be a grantee thereof for lack of sufficient logging equipment to
engage in the logging business.
TOPIC XXI – TRIAL BY COMMISSIONER ○ Twin Peaks exploited the country’s natural resources by engaging in
large-scale logging and the export of its produce through its Chinese
TOPIC XXII – DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE operators whereby respondents obtained a revenue of approximately
₱45M.
REPUBLIC V. TUVERA ● Respondents filed an Omnibus Motion to Nullify Writ of Sequestration and/or
| GR No. 148246 | 16 February 2007 the Mission Order.
○ The Sandiganbayan issued a Temporary Restraining Order against
the PCGG requiring it to cease, refrain and desist from further
Respondent/s: Juan C. Tuvera, Victor P. Tuvera and Twin Peaks Development
implementing the Writ of Sequestration and the Mission Order, and
Corporation
granted a Writ of Preliminary Injunction covering the Mission Order.
The Sandiganbayan deferred its resolution on the Motion to Lift the
Doctrine: Res judicata is an inappropriate ground for sustaining a demurrer to
Writ of Sequestration.
evidence, even as it stands as a proper ground for a motion to dismiss. A demurrer
● The Republic presented three (3) witnesses during the trial.
may be granted if, after the presentation of plaintiff’s evidence, it appears upon the
○ Joveniana M. Galicia, Chief of the National Forest Management
facts and the law that the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. In contrast, the
Division of the Forest Management Bureau, testified that TLA No.
grounds for res judicata present themselves even before the presentation of evidence,
356 covers 26,000 hectares of forest land located in the Municipality
and it should be at that stage that the defense of res judicata should be invoked as a
of Isabela, Province of Quirino. Upon cross-examination, Galicia
ground for dismissal.
stated that she was not yet the chief of the Division when the
documents she identified were submitted to the Bureau. She further
Facts: stated it was her first time to see the aforementioned documents
● Twin Peaks was a corporation engaged in the real estate business, whose when she was asked to bring the same before the trial court.
incorporators, including respondent Victor, the son of respondent Juan ○ Fortunato S. Arcangel, Regional Technical Director III of the DENR,
Tuvera, who was then Presidential Executive Assistant of President Marcos. testified that that under FAO No. 11, a public bidding is required
● President Marcos granted the award of a Timber License Agreement (TLA No. before any license agreement or permit for the utilization of timber
356) in favor of Twin Peaks to operate on forest land and to export 10,000 within the forestry land is issued but no public bidding was
cubic meters of mahogany of the narra species. As a result, Twin Peaks was conducted for TLA No. 356. He explained that no such bidding was
able to engage in logging operations. conducted because of a Presidential Instruction not to accept any
● When President Marcos was ousted, President Aquino established the PCGG. application for timber licensing as a consequence of which bidding
PCGG issued a Writ of Sequestration on all assets, properties, records, procedures were stopped. Upon cross-examination, Arcangel said
documents, and shares of stock of Twin Peaks on the ground that all the assets that at the time TLA No. 356 was issued, the Revised Forestry Code
of the corporation are ill-gotten wealth for having been acquired directly or of the Philippines was already in effect but there were still provisions
indirectly through fraudulent and illegal means. This was followed two days in FAO No. 11 that remained applicable such as the terms and
later by Mission Order 88 implementing the aforementioned Writ of conditions of granting a license. He also stated that the issuance of
Sequestration. the license to Twin Peaks emanated from the President of the
● PCGG, in behalf of the Republic, filed a Complaint impleading as defendants Philippines.
Juan and Victor Tuvera, as well as the then-exiled President Marcos. ○ Teresita M. Zuñiga, employee of the Bureau of Internal
○ Juan Tuvera, as Presidential Executive Assistant of President Revenue,identified the 1986 Income Tax Returns of stockholders of
Marcos, took advantage of his relationship with the President by Twin Peaks.
engaging in a scheme to unjustly enrich himself. This was allegedly ● With leave of court, respondents filed a Demurrer to Evidence. Respondents
accomplished on his part by securing TLA No. 356 on behalf of Twin argued that the Republic failed to present sufficient legal affirmative evidence
to prove its claim. Respondents also cited the factual antecedents culminating ● The Court finds no basis to declare the Republic as having substantial interest
with the Court’s decision in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Corp., Inc. v. Sec. of as that of Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. In the first place, the Republic’s cause
Environment and Natural Resources. of action lies in the alleged abuse of power on respondents’ part in violation of
● Sandiganbayan sustained the demurrer to evidence and referred to the R.A. No. 3019 and breach of public trust, which in turn warrants its claim for
decision of this Court in Ysmael in holding that res judicata applies. restitution and damages. Ysmael, on the other hand, sought the revocation of
○ Sandiganbayan held that the validity of TLA No. 356 was already TLA No. 356 and the reinstatement of its own timber license agreement.
fully adjudicated in a Resolution/Order issued by the Office of the Indeed, there is no identity of parties and no identity of causes of action
President on 14 August 1987, which had become final and executory between the two cases.
with the failure of the aggrieved party to seek a review thereof. The ●
Sandiganbayan continued that the above pronouncement is Dispositive:
supported by this Court in Ysmael. Consequently, the Sandiganbayan WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated
concluded, the Republic is barred from questioning the validity of 23 May 2001 is REVERSED. Respondents Juan C. Tuvera, Victor P. Tuvera and Twin
TLA No. 356 in consonance with the principle of res judicata. Peaks Development Corporation are hereby ordered to jointly and severally pay to the
Issue: Republic of the Philippines One Million (₱1,000,000.00) Pesos, as and for temperate
Whether or not a demurrer to evidence may be granted on the ground of res judicata - damages, and One Million (₱1,000,000.00) Pesos, as and for exemplary damages, plus
No costs of suit.
Ratio:
● Res judicata is an inappropriate ground for sustaining a demurrer to evidence,
even as it stands as a proper ground for a motion to dismiss. A demurrer may
be granted if, after the presentation of plaintiff’s evidence, it appears upon the
facts and the law that the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. In contrast, the
grounds for res judicata present themselves even before the presentation of
evidence, and it should be at that stage that the defense of res judicata should
be invoked as a ground for dismissal. Properly speaking, the movants for
demurral who wish to rely on a controlling value of a settled case as a ground
for demurrer should invoke the ground of stare decisis in lieu of res judicata.
● An examination of the Sandiganbayan’s Resolution shows that dismissal of
the case on demurrer to evidence was principally anchored on the Republic’s
failure to show its right to relief because of the existence of a prior judgment
which consequently barred the relitigation of the same issue. In other words,
the Sandiganbayan did not dismiss the case on the insufficiency of the
Republic’s evidence nor on the strength of respondents’ evidence. Rather, it
based its dismissal on the existence of the Ysmael case which, according to it,
would render the case barred by res judicata.
● For res judicata to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the
following requisites must concur: (1) the former judgment or order must be
final; (2) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (3) it must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties;
and (4) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties,
of subject matter, and of causes of action. When there is only identity of issues
with no identity of causes of action, there exists res judicata in the concept of
conclusiveness of judgment.

● The parties were then given a period within which to file their respective
TOPIC XXIII – JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS motions for judgment on the pleadings and comment/opposition thereto,
after which the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution.
MENESES V. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM ● On February 7, 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision dismissing the complaint.
It was the RTC's ruling that since the subject property was taken from
Petitioner/s: Anacelto R. Maneses et. al (too many)
petitioners on October 21, 1972 under the DAR's Operation Land Transfer
pursuant to P.D. No. 27, then just compensation must be based on the value
Respondent/s: Seceretary of Agrarian Reform et.al (too many)
of the property at the time of taking.
● CA affirmed
Doctrine: A judgment on the pleadings may be sought only by a claimant, who is
● Petitioners argue that the CA erred in sustaining the propriety of the motion
the party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim; or to obtain
for judgment on the pleadings filed by respondents with the RTC.
a declaratory relief.
● It was the CA's ruling that the motion for judgment on the pleadings was
proper since respondents can be considered as plaintiffs in a counter-claim.
Facts: ● Respondents, however, argue that the CA Decision dated May 30, 2002 is
● Petitioners were co-owners pro-indiviso of an irrigated rice land in Barangay already final and executory due to petitioners' failure to seasonably file a
Batasan, San Miguel, Bulacan, registered in the name of their grandparents, motion for reconsideration.
the spouses Ramon Meneses and Carmen Rodriguez-Meneses.
● Property was distributed to farmer-beneficiaries by virtue of Presidential Issue: W/N the RTC’s judgement on the pleadings filed by respondents is proper.
Decree No. 27 (P.D. No. 27). NOOOOoooo
● Petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, Branch 13, a
complaint for determination and payment of just compensation. Ratio:
● DAR claimed that the filing of the case is premature since there is no valuation ● On the propriety of the filing of a motion for judgment on the pleadings by the
yet made by the DAR based on E.O. No. 228, and petitioners must cooperate LBP and adopted by the DAR Secretary – the Court finds that the CA erred in
with the DAR by submitting all the necessary papers for proper valuation and sustaining its propriety.
expeditious payment of the land. ● Rule 34, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, provides that a judgment on the
● The DAR also claimed that it must first determine the valuation before resort pleadings is proper when an answer fails to render an issue or otherwise
to the court can be made. admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading.
● RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. According to the RTC, ● The essential question is whether there are issues generated by the pleadings.
the determination of just compensation must first be filed with the DAR and A judgment on the pleadings may be sought only by a claimant, who is the
not the Special Agrarian Court. party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim; or to
● Petitioners filed a complaint for determination and payment of just obtain a declaratory relief.
compensation with the DARAB. The DARAB, however, dismissed the ● In this case, the separate Answers filed by the respondents definitely tendered
complaint on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to hear and decide issues, as it made specific denials of the material allegations in the complaint
valuation cases covered by P.D. No. 27, as the same is within the exclusive and asserted affirmative defenses, which would bar recovery by petitioners.
administrative powers of the Office of the Secretary. Moreover, it was erroneous for the RTC to require the filing of a motion for
● Because of the foregoing dismissal, petitioners filed with the RTC a motion to judgment on the pleadings and for the LBP and the DAR Secretary to file the
re-open and calendar case for hearing, which was granted by the RTC. same since in the first place, the latter are neither plaintiffs in the case nor
● During the hearing held on August 14, 1997, the parties agreed as to the issue counter-claimants or cross-claimants.
to be resolved – "whether or not the plaintiffs [petitioners] are entitled to just ● What the RTC obviously meant to be filed was a motion for summary
compensation as provided for in Republic Act No. 6657 (R.A. No. 6657) and judgment, a procedural device designed for the prompt disposition of actions,
the Constitution of 1987 and not P.D. No. 27 which was the basis of valuation which may be rendered if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions and
made by defendants Secretary of Agrarian Reform and the Land Bank of the admissions on file show that, after a summary hearing, there is no genuine
Philippines of the subject parcel of land which was acquired in October 21, issue regarding any material fact, except as to the amount of damages, and the
1972."
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, and which may be
applied for by either a claimant or a defending party.
● This is obvious from the fact that although the Answers raised issues, these
were not factual ones requiring trial, nor were they genuine issues, as the
parties were able to agree to limit the same to whether petitioners are entitled
to just compensation under R.A. No. 6657 and not P.D. No. 27.
● Given the foregoing conclusion, this case should then be remanded to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, Branch 13, for the final determination
of just compensation.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May

30, 2002 and Resolution dated December 9, 2002 rendered by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 60355 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The records of this case is
ordered REMANDED to Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, Branch 13, for further
proceedings with deliberate dispatch and in accordance with the Court's discussion in
this Decision.

TOPIC XXIV – SUMMARY JUDGMENT ● Meanwhile, per order of the RTC, summons to the heirs of Martina Morales
Enriquez who were residing abroad were allowed to be served personally
MORALES V MORALES ● They were later declared in default. In response one of Martina’s heirs filed a
motion to dismiss and alleged that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over
Petitioner/s: HEIRS OF ERNESTO MORALES, NAMELY: ROSARIO M.
his person because he was not furnished with a copy of the amended
DANGSALAN, EVELYN M. SANGALANG, NENITA M. SALES, ERNESTO JOSE
complaint
MORALES, JR., RAYMOND MORALES, AND MELANIE MORALES
● In the hearing dated February 8, 2012 the RTC heard the testimony of the
Respondent/s: ASTRID MORALES AGUSTIN, REPRESENTED BY HER
respondent. There being no other witnesses to be presented, the respondent
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, EDGARDO TORRES
manifested that she was ready to submit her formal offer of exhibits.
● RTC rendered its decision via a summary judgment in favor of respondent
Doctrine:
● The RTC ruled that: (1) the estate of a deceased who died intestate may be
partitioned without need of any settlement or administration proceeding; and
Facts: (2) the RTC properly and lawfully rendered summary judgment
● Respondent Astrid Agustin is a grandchild of Jayme Morales who owned a despite the absence of any motion from any of the parties praying
parcel of land with improvements for the application of the rules thereon.
● Respondent initiated a complaint with Lydia Morales, her cousin for the ● CA affirmed the decision
partition of Jayme’s property
● Heir of Jayme are shown below Issue
○ Vicente Morales, who was survived by his children: (a) herein 1.) WON partition of the subject property is proper despite the absence of the
deceased defendant Ernesto Morales (substituted by his heirs who settlement of the estate of the deceased registered owner?
are now petitioners herein); (b) Abraham Morales (also deceased); 2.) WON the RTC could motu proprio apply the rule on summary judgment? NO
(c) former plaintiff and, eventually, defendant Lydia Morales (now 3.) WON the RTC could validly render a decision even in the absence of proof of proper
also deceased); and (d) original defendant Angelita Ragasa; service of summons to some of the real parties in interest in a quasi in rem proceeding?
○ Simeon Morales, who was survived by his children: (a) herein
respondent Astrid Morales Agustin; (b) Leonides Morales; (c) Ratio (Issue on Summary Judgment)
Geraldine Morales-Gaspar; and (d) Odessa Morales; - Summary judgment is allowed by rule 35 of the rules of court
○ Jose Morales, who was survived by his children: (a) Victoria Geron; - It is a procedure aimed at weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early
(b) Vicente Morales; (c); Gloria Villasenor; (d) Amalia Alejo; (e) stage of the litigation
Juliet Manuel; (f) Rommel Morales; and (g) Virgilio Morales (now - It is granted to settle expeditiously a case if on motion of either party, there
deceased); appears from the pleading, deposition, admissions and affidavits that no
○ Martina Morales-Enriquez, who was survived by her children: (a) important issues of fact are involved except the amount of damages
Evelina Lopez; (b) Emeterio Enriquez; (c) Elizabeth Somera; and (d) - The crucial question is: are the issues raised by petitioners not genuine so as
Bernardita Alojipan to justify a summary judgment?
● In response to respondent’s complaint, the heirs of Jose Morales filed an - In Evangelista vs. Mercator Finance Corp. the Court has already defined a
answer which admitted the allegations in the complaint and interposed no genuine issue as an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence,
objection to the partition provided that their present positions on the subject as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived, set up in bad
property are respected faith and patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for
● Ernesto filed an answer with motion to dismiss and compulsory counterclaims trial.
alleging 1.) Respondent had no cause of action against the petitioner because - Where facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for
the proper remedy should not be complaint for partition but rather settlement a summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial
of the intestate estate of Jayme and his wife and 2.) Respondent has no - However, the propriety of issuing a summary judgment springs not only from
more right of participation over the subject property because it has the lack of a genuine issue which is raised by either party, but also from the
been long conveyed to Ernesto Morales by respondent’s parents, observance of the procedural guidelines for the rendition of such
Simeon and Leonila Morales judgment. Thus, in Caridao, the Court nullified the summary judgment
issued by the trial court when the rules on summary judgment was applied - The father of herein petitioners attached “several hand written receipts
despite the absence of a motion from the respondent asking for the application showing payment of their share to the property, then called ‘camarin’
thereof - RTC and CA dismissed such arguments claiming that it is of no moment in the
- In Calubaquib et al. vs. Republic of the Phils.,the Court once more was asked instant case of partition as respondent was asserting her right as a co owner
to determine the propriety of the summary judgment rendered by the trial of the subject property by virtue of her successional right
court judge in the absence of any motion filed by the parties for that purpose. - These opinions, however, are reversible errors on the part of both the trial
In ruling for the nullity of such issued judgment the court said court and the CA. The question of who shall inherit which part of the property
- “The filing of a motion and the conduct of a hearing on the and in what proportion is in the province of the partition of the estate of a
motion are therefore important because these enable the court deceased. That an heir disposed of his/her aliquot portion in favor of another
to determine if the parties' pleadings, affidavits and exhibits in heir is a matter that should be fully litigated on in a partition proceeding
support of, or against, the motion are sufficient to overcome the - The truthfulness of this allegation, however, could only be ascertained through
opposing papers and adequately justify the finding that, as a matter the presentation of evidence during trial, and not in a summary judgment.
of law, the claim is clearly meritorious or there is no defense to the - More, the RTC did not only commit reversible error by rendering a summary
action” judgment despite the presence of a genuine issue, it also committed reversible
- Even in the pretrial stage of a case, a motion for the application of summary error by applying the rules on summary judgment despite the absence of any
judgment is necessary. motion from any of the parties that prayed for the rule's application.
- Spouses Pascual vs. First Consolidated Rural Bank
- “To be clear, the rule only spells out that unless the motion for such WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
judgment has earlier been filed, the pre-trial may be the occasion in Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 101991 dated August 13, 2015 and April 21, 2016,
which the court considers the propriety of rendering judgment on the respectively, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is ORDERED
pleadings or summary judgment. If no such motion was earlier filed, REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, of Laoag City for further
the pre-trial judge may then indicate to the proper party to initiate proceedings. The trial court judge is ORDERED to hear the case with dispatch.
the rendition of such judgment by filing the necessary
motion.Indeed, such motion is required by either Rule 34 (Judgment
on the Pleadings) or Rule 35 (Summary Judgment) of the Rules of
Court. The pre-trial judge cannot motu proprio render the judgment
on the pleadings or summary judgment. In the case of the motion for
summary judgment, the adverse party is entitled to counter the
motion.”
- Here the Court is of the opinion that the petitioners, from the beginning of the
proceedings, have already submitted an issue of fact that definitively
calls for the presentation of evidence. They have, for all intents and
purposes, presented a genuine issue that should have foreclosed the rendition
of a summary judgment.
- Petitioners have not questioned the fact that the property belonged to Jayme.
However, they had asserted that respondent had no more right of
participation over the same
- Answer with motion to dismiss and compulsory counter-claims claimed that:
- 7.4 Astrid Morales Agustin has no more right or participation –
Plaintiff's supposed share in the property, together with her siblings,
have long been conveyed to herein defendant Ernesto Morales by
said plaintiff's own parents, the late Simeon Morales and Leonila
Morales. Thus, plaintiff has no more footing to demand partition of
the lot for her benefit.
SPS. PASCUAL VS FIRST CONSOLIDATED RURAL BANK Ratio:
The CA erred when it declared "it is only at the pre--trial that the rules allow the courts
Petitioner/s: Spouses Sergio and Emma Pascual
to render judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment, as provided by Section
Respondent/s: First Consolidated Rural Bank, Robinsons Land Corporation,
2(g) of Rule 18."
Atty. Espinosa (Register of Deeds, Butuan City)
1. The filing of the motion for summary judgment may be done prior to the pre-
-trial.
Doctrine: The filing of the motion for summary judgment may be done prior to
2. Sec. 1, Rule 35 permits a party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim,
the pre--trial.
or cross-claim or seeking declaratory relief to file the motion for a summary
judgment upon all or any part thereof in his favor (and its supporting
Summary judgment is a procedural technique that is proper only if there is no
affidavits, depositions or admissions) "at any time after the pleading in
genuine issue as to the existence of a material fact, and that the moving party is
answer thereto has been served;"
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
3. Sec. 2 of Rule 35 instructs that a party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may file the motion for
Facts: summary judgment (and its supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions)
1. Spouses Pascual filed a petition for annulment of judgment in the CA to nullify upon all or any part thereof "at any time."
and set aside the decision rendered in Special Proceedings Case No. 4577 by 4. Spouses Pascual properly filed their motion for summary judgment prior to
the Butuan RTC. the pre--trial (assuming that they thereby complied with the requirement of
a. It ordered the cancellation of their notice of lis pendens recorded in supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions).
TCT No. RT-42190 in the Register of Deeds.
2. The CA scheduled the preliminary conference and ordered the parties to file Summary judgment is a procedural technique that is proper only if there is no genuine
their respective pre--trial briefs. issue as to the existence of a material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to a
3. Instead of filing their pre--trial brief, Spouses Pascual filed a Motion for judgment as a matter of law.
Summary Judgment and a Motion to Hold Pre-Trial in Abeyance. 1. It is a method intended to expedite or promptly dispose of cases where the
4. At the scheduled preliminary conference, the Spouses Pascual and their facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions,
counsel did not appear. admissions, and affidavits on record.
5. CA: promulgated a Resolution dismissing the petition, stating that: 2. The term genuine issue is defined as an issue of fact that calls for the
a. Spouses Pascual, instead of complying with our order, filed the twin presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue that is sham,
motions, averring that it behooves us to rule first on their motions fictitious, contrived, set up in bad faith and patently unsubstantial so as not to
before pre-trial could be conducted, "especially with the constitute a genuine issue for trial.
incompatibility of a pending Motion for Summary Judgment vis--a- 3. The court can determine this on the basis of the pleadings, admissions,
-vis the conduct of pre-trial conference." documents, affidavits, and/or counter--affidavits submitted by the parties to
b. Considering that a Petition for Annulment of Judgment is an original the court.
action before the Court of Appeals, pre--trial is mandatory, whereby 4. Where the facts pleaded by the parties are contested, proceedings for a
the failure of the plaintiff to appear would mean dismissal of the summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial.
action with prejudice. The filing of a pre-trial brief has the same 5. The party moving for the summary judgment has the burden of clearly
import. demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of fact.
c. In fact, contrary to the Spouses’ assertion, it is only at the pre--trial 6. Upon the plaintiff rests the burden to prove the cause of action and show that
that the rules allow the courts to render judgment on the pleadings the defense is interposed solely for the purpose of delay.
and summary judgment, as provided by Section 2 (g) of Rule 18. 7. After the plaintiffs burden has been discharged, the defendant has the burden
to show facts sufficient to entitle him to defend.
Issue: WoN the CA could resolve their Motion for Summary Judgment before pre-trial
could proceed - YES (But the Spouses still lost the case for non-appearance in the pre- RULE 18 Sec. 2. Nature and purpose. The pre--trial is mandatory. The court shall
trial - didn’t include this part) consider:
(g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of
dismissing the action should a valid ground therefor be found to exist.
Rule 18, Sec. 2 only spells out that unless the motion for such judgment has earlier
been filed, pre--trial may be the occasion in which the court considers the propriety of
rendering judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment.
1. If no such motion was earlier filed, the pre--trial judge may then indicate to
the proper party to initiate the rendition of such judgment by filing the
necessary motion.
2. Such motion is required by either Rule 34 (Judgment on the Pleadings) or
Rule 35 (Summary Judgment) of the Rules of Court.
3. The pre--trial judge cannot motu proprio render the judgment on the
pleadings or summary judgment.
4. In the case of the motion for summary judgment, the adverse party is entitled
to counter the motion.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the assailed resolutions of the Court
of Appeals promulgated in CA-G.R. SP No. 04020- MIN; and ORDERS the petitioners
to pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.u

ONTIMARE V. ELEP was rendered against the movant and despite the existence of disputed facts,
hence, the reason why they are assailing it.
Petitioner/s: JOSE D. ONTIMARE, JR., and RENE D. ONTIMARE, as sons/heirs,
● Rule 34, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
substituted for their deceased father and the original party JOSE M. ONTIMARE,
○ SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. — . . . After the hearing, the
SR.
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleading,
Respondent/s: SPS. RENATO and ROSARIO ELEP
depositions, and admissions on file together with the affidavits, show
that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue
Doctrine: When summary judgment is rendered after the presentation of evidence
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
by both parties in a full blown trial, and where during the trial, the party was able to
judgment as a matter of law.
present his witnesses and had cross-examined the witnesses of the opposing party,
● For summary judgment to be proper, 2 requisites must concur: 1. There must
the trial court’s decision is merely denominated as summary judgment. But in
be no genuine issue on any material fact except for the amount of damages
essence, it is actually equivalent to a judgment on the merits.
and 2. The moving party must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
● When on their face, the pleadings tender a genuine issue, summary judgment
Facts: is not proper. An issue is genuine if it requires the presentation of evidence.
● Ontimare Sr. and the Sps. Elep are neighbors in Hyacinth Street, Roxas ● In this case, the summary judgment was rendered AFTER the presentation of
District, Quezon City. Ontimare Sr’s house was adjacent to Sps. Elep’s. evidence by both parties in a full blown trial. During the 2-year trial of the
Ontimare’s terrace extends to the boundary between his property and Elep’s. case, Ontimare had presented his own witness and had cross-examined the
● The latter wanted to build a four-door, two storey apartment on their lot. They witnesses of the opposing party.
applied for a building permit. Elep also wrote to Ontimare seeking for his ● The TC’s decision was merely denominated as summary judgment but in
written consent for the construction of a firewall adjacent to Ontimare’s essence, it is actually equivalent on the merits, making the rule on summary
existing firewall. judgment inapplicable in this case.
● Ontimare, instead of consenting, filed a Complaint with the Building Official
asking that the request for a building permit be withheld since a firewall would Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision, of the
adversely affect the ventilation and market value of his property. Court of Appeals dated July 18, 2003, in CA-G.R. CV No. 69138 is AFFIRMED. Costs
● A Cease and Desist Order to stop the construction was issued but was lifted against petitioners.
thereafter. Complaint of Ontimare was dismissed.
● The Building Official ordered Ontimare to make adjustments in the
construction of his house. Eleps were issued a new building permit.
● One day, while Eleps’ workers were plastering and water-proofing the firewall,
Ontimare fired his shotgun, threatening to kill anyone who would enter his
property. Because of this, a portion of the firewall remained unfinished. Water
seeped in the building and damaged the sanding. Eleps filed an action for
damages.
● After trial, Ontimare moved for a summary judgment while Eleps moved or
resolution of the case on the merits. RTC issued the summary judgment which
grants the petition of Eleps and awards the damages sought for. CA affirmed.
Issue: WON the RTC is correct in granting the summary judgment? - YIZZ
Ratio:
● Ontimares argue that summary judgment may issue only in favor of a moving
party and only when there is no genuine issue on any material fact except for
the amount of damages. They insist that the summary judgment in his case
ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,, vs. PCIB 1. W/N there is a genuine issue as to a material fact which rules out the propriety
of the summary judgment. -NO
Petitioner/s: ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION.
Ruling:
(ASIAKONSTRUKT)
1. Under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended, except as to the
Respondent/s: PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK
amount of damages, when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, summary
Doctrine: Even if on their face the pleadings appear to raise issues, when the
judgment may be allowed.
affidavits, depositions and admissions show that such issues are not genuine, then
2. Summary or accelerated judgment is a procedural technique aimed at weeding
summary judgment as prescribed by the Rules must ensue as a matter of law. The
out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of litigation thereby avoiding the
determinative factor, therefore, in a motion for summary judgment, is the presence
expense and loss of time involved in a trial.
or absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact.
3. Under the Rules, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no
genuine issues of fact which call for the presentation of evidence in a full-
Facts: blown trial.
1. Asiakonstrukt obtained US dollar credit accommodations from PCIB in the 4. Even if on their face the pleadings appear to raise issues, when the affidavits,
amount of $4,487,000 which was secured by promissory notes. depositions and admissions show that such issues are not genuine, then
2. Asiakonstrukt executed deeds of assignment of receivables from Napocor to summary judgment as prescribed by the Rules must ensue as a matter of law.
PCIB. were entered into to ensure prompt payment of the loan. The determinative factor, therefore, in a motion for summary judgment, is the
3. However, the promissory notes were not fully paid despite repeated verbal and presence or absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact.
written demands. And as a result of the refusal to pay, which was tainted with 5. A "genuine issue" is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of
fraud, PCIB suffered damages. evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.
4. PCIB contends that there is fraud because they discovered from the telephone 6. The party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating
inquiries to Napocor, that Asiakonstrukt had already collected the receivables clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the
assigned to PCIB a long time ago. Thus, it was clear that Asiakonstrukt never complaint is patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for
had any intention of complying with the deeds of assignment. trial.
5. PCIB filed an action for collection of sum of money with prayer for a writ of 7. In this case, petitioner admitted, in its Answer the due execution and
attachment. authenticity of the documents appended to the complaint. The petitioner did
6. RTC issued a writ of attachment against all the property of Petitioner. To not deny its liability for the principal amount claimed by the respondent in its
satisfy the claim of $4,553,446. complaint. The petitioner merely alleged, by way of defenses, that it failed to
7. Asiakonstrukt filed its answer denying that it has not paid, despite demands, pay its account because of the region-wide economic crisis that engulfed Asia.
the due and demandable obligations. Petitioner also denies having 8. The petitioner failed to append, to its "Opposition" to the "Motion for
fraudulently misappropriated the receivables mentioned in the deed of Summary Judgment", Affidavits showing the factual basis for its defenses of
assignments. "extraordinary deflation," including facts, figures and data showing its
8. Petitioner also pleads that it is under a severe financial crisis which adversely financial condition before and after the economic crisis and that the crisis was
affected and ultimately put it out of business. the proximate cause of its financial distress.
9. PCIB filed a verified motion for Summary Judgment, contending that 9. The failure of the petitioner to append to its "Opposition" any "Affidavits"
the defenses interposed are sham. Defendant opposed the motion for showing that its defenses were not contrived or cosmetic to delay judgment
summary judgment insisting that its answer tendered genuine and substantial created a presumption that the defenses of the petitioner were not offered in
issues of material facts which require a full-blown trial. good faith and that the same could not be sustained
10. RTC ruled in favor of PCIB on the motion for summary judgment. That there
remains no question of facts in issue. Further, the proffered defenses are Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the assailed CA decision is AFFIRMED in toto and this
worthless, unsubstantial, sham and contrived. petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
11. CA affirmed the judgment.
Issue:

PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS V. SPS. GO
Ratio:
Petitioner/s: PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS
● the supposed admission of the Sps. Go on the allegations in the complaint is
Respondent/s: SPOUSES JOSE C. GO and ELVY T. GO
clearly not sufficient to justify the rendition of summary judgment in the case
Doctrine: following the filing of pleadings, if, on motion of a party and after
for sum of money,
hearing, the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions and admissions on file
○ considering that there are other allegations embodied and defenses
show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any
raised by the defendants-appellants in their answer which raise a
material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law,
genuine issue as to the material facts in the action
summary judgment may be rendered
● There exists genuine issues as to three material facts which have to be
Where one of the parties disclaimed knowledge of something so patently within his
addressed during trial
knowledge, categorically stated in the Answer that there was no prior demand, that
○ the fact of default
they were not in default, and that the amount of the outstanding loan would have to
○ the amount of the outstanding obligation
be ascertained based on official records.
○ the existence of prior demand
Facts: ● The Rule (35) states that following the filing of pleadings, if, on motion of a
● 2 loans were entered into by Jose Go with PBCom as evidenced by 2 party and after hearing, the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions and
promissory notes (payable within 10 years) admissions on file show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no
○ Loan No. 1 was Php 17,982, 222.22 genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to
○ Loan No. 2 was P80M a judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment may be rendered
● Go also executed 2 pledge agreements covering shares of stock ● A genuine issue is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence
○ The value of these shares later plunged as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.
○ So PBCom notified Go that it was renouncing the pledge agreements ○ When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then
● PBCom then filed before the RTC a complaint for sum of money with a prayer there is no real or genuine issue or question as to the facts, and
for a writ of preliminary attachment against the Sps. Go alleging that only 3 summary judgment is called for.
installments were paid by the latter ● The party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating
● Sps. Go filed an Answer with Counterclaim denying the allegations clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the
● Later, PBCom filed a verified motion for summary judgement on the following complaint is patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for
grounds: trial.
○ That the Answer interposed no specific denials on the material ● Trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do
averments in the complaint such as the fact of default, the entire so only when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact.
amount being already due and demandable by reason of default, and ○ When the facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested,
the fact that the bank had made repeated demands for the payment proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial.
of the obligations ● the fact of the parties having executed the very documents sued upon, that is,
○ in short: there were no genuine issues raised as to any material fact the deed of exchange, deed or mortgage or promissory note, is so plainly and
● The Sps. Go opposed the motion arguing that they had tendered genuine necessarily within the knowledge of the denying parties that any averment of
factual issues calling for the presentation of evidence such as: ignorance as to such fact must be palpably untrue.
○ with respect to the fact of default, the amount of the outstanding ● In this case, however, Spouses Go are not disclaiming knowledge of the
obligation, and the existence of prior demand, which were duly transaction or the execution of the promissory notes or the pledge agreements
questioned in the special and affirmative defenses set forth in the sued upon.
Answer ● The matters in contention are whether or not respondents were in default,
● The RTC granted PBCom’s motion whether there was prior demand, and the amount of the outstanding loan.
○ Which the CA reversed and set aside ○ These are the matters that the parties disagree on and by which
reason they set forth vastly different allegations in their pleadings
Issue: which each will have to prove by presenting relevant and admissible
WON it is proper to proceed with a summary judgement?- NO evidence during trial.
● Where one of the parties disclaimed knowledge of something so patently
within his knowledge, in this case, respondents Spouses Go categorically
stated in the Answer that there was no prior demand, that they were not in
default, and that the amount of the outstanding loan would have to be
ascertained based on official records.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED

TOPIC XXV – JUDGMENTS, FINAL ORDER, AND ENTRY THEREOF ● The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) opined that Judge Catalo was
administratively liable, not for gross misconduct, but for gross ignorance of
TOPIC XXVI – POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES the law.
Issue: Whether or not a judge can retract his decision that has acquired finality? - YES
RIVERA VS. CATALO Ratio:
● Gross ignorance of the law by a judge presupposes an appalling lack of
Petitioner/s: FLOR GILBUENA RIVERA
familiarity with simple rules of law or procedures and well-established
Respondent/s: . HON. LEANDRO C. CATALO, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL
jurisprudence that tends to erode the public trust in the competence and
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 256, MUNTINLUPA CITY
fairness of the court which he personifies. In this case, the Court is not at all
Doctrine: a void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It neither is
convinced that Judge Catalo committed gross ignorance of the law.
a source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to
● Indeed, under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of
it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become
judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
final and any writ of execution based on it is void. It may be said to be a lawless thing
unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect. Like any other rule,
which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever
however, there are recognized exceptions to this general rule such as (1) the
it exhibits its head.
correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause
Facts: no prejudice to any party, (2) void judgments, and (3) whenever
● Complainant filed her Amended Petition before the RTC, praying for the circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its
issuance of new owner's duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) execution unjust and inequitable.
No. 3460. The case was raffled to the branch presided by Judge Catalo. ● Under the second exception, a void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no
● The amended petition alleged that complainant was one of the heirs of Juan judgment at all. It neither is a source of any right nor the creator of any
Gilbuena (Gilbuena); that TCT No. 3460 was registered under the name of obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it
Gilbuena; and that the owner's duplicate copy of the said title had remained have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution
missing despite their diligent efforts to locate the same. When the case was based on it is void. It may be said to be a lawless thing which can be treated as
called for hearing, no oppositor appeared before the RTC. Upon motion, an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its
complainant was allowed to present evidence exparte. head.
● Judge Catalo rendered his decision granting the petition for issuance of new ● In the case of Abalos v. Philex Mining Corporation, the Court reiterated the
owner's duplicate copy on the basis of the evidence presented by complainant, third exception, concerning unjust and inequitable judgments.
particularly the affidavit of loss and the certification issued by the Register of ● Under the law, the court may modify or alter a judgment even after the same
Deeds of Muntinlupa City (RD). has become executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its
● The RTC decision became final and executory and the Certificate of Finality execution unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances
was issued. justifying or requiring such modification or alteration transpired after the
● RD Acting Records Officer Vivian V. Dacanay (Dacanay), formally filed her judgment has become final and executory.
Manifestation before the RTC stating that the title was not lost, rather, it was ● If there are facts and circumstances that would render a judgment void or
cancelled by virtue of valid transactions and conveyance that the basis of the unjust after its finality, and render its execution a complete nullity, such
petition for issuance of new owner's duplicate, which was an affidavit of loss, judgment cannot exude immutability.
was totally false, untrue and fabricated. ● In this case, Judge Catalo correctly recalled the judgment because the second
● Thus, Respondent Judge issued an order requiring the complainant and all and third exceptions on the doctrine of finality of judgments were squarely
the parties concerned to attend a hearing on the Manifestation filed by applicable. After the finality of the RTC decision on July 3, 2012, it was
Dacanay. Despite being given 15 days to give his side, the complainant did not discovered that TCT No. 3460 had been cancelled as early as April 2, 1924.
appear in court. Complainant, when later asked to present his stand, failed to contradict the
● Aggrieved, complainant filed the subject administrative complaint before the allegation that he falsified his affidavit of loss. Clearly, these subsequent
Court alleging that Judge Catalo committed gross misconduct for recalling a events raised a red flag and placed the Respondent Judge on his toes. Judge
final and executory judgment. Catalo realized an execution of such judgment would definitely be unjust and
inequitable as it would be sanctioning fraud and irregularity. It would
judicially permit the issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of a title which SO ORDERED.
was no longer in existence. Where there is no original, there can be no
duplicate.
● Judge Catalo was correct in stating that the judgment was void and could not
have attained finality. Citing the case of New Durawood Co., Inc. v. CA,22 he
stressed that a court had no jurisdiction to order the issuance of a new owner's
duplicate copy of a certificate of title when it was, in fact, not lost. Here, the
original title was not lost but officially cancelled. Hence, Judge Catalo
correctly exercised his judicial prerogative to amend and control his factually
and legally infirm decision.
● Also, the Court does not share the view of the OCA that the respondent should
have waited for an action under Rule 47 to assail the final judgment. First, it
can hardly be expected that the RD would itself file an independent action to
annul the final judgment before the Court of Appeals. Second, an action under
Rule 47 is not the only remedy to assail a final judgment. In Arcelona v. CA,23
the Court cited the explanation of Senator Vicente J. Francisco in his treatise
regarding the remedies against a void judgment in this manner:
● The validity of a final judgment may be attacked on the ground that the
judgment or order is null and void, because the court had no power or
authority to grant the relief or no jurisdiction over the subject matter or over
the parties or both. The aggrieved party may attack the validity of the
final judgment by a direct action or proceeding in order to annul the
same, as certiorari, which is not incidental to, but is the main object of the
proceeding. The validity of a final judgment may also be attacked
collaterallyas when a party files a motion for the execution of the
judgment and the adverse party resists the motion by claiming that
the court has no authority to pronounce the judgment and that the
same is null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
or over the parties.darclaw
● In the LRC case, Dacanay filed a manifestation moving for the recall of the
final judgment. This manifestation should have been considered as an
opposition to the execution of judgment as she declined to implement the
flawed court order.
● Judge Catalo correctly rectified his questionable decision. Had he not acted
responsibly, the void judgment would have spawned double and conflicting
titles and would have wreaked havoc on the revered Torrens System of land
registration.
● Based on the foregoing, as the respondent complied with the established
procedural and substantial rules to nullify a final judgment, no fault can be
ascribed to his actions.
● Hence, Judge Catalo committed no gross ignorance of the law.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondent Judge Leandro C. Catalo, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 256, Muntinlupa City, is DISMISSED.
HEIRS OF ALBANO VS. RAVANES 2. Petitioners' Manifestation and Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment is, in
actuality, a motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision.
Petitioner/s: HEIRS OF GAMALIEL ALBANO
3. Hence, contrary to the allegation of respondent-spouses and the finding of the
Respondent/s: SPS. MENA C. RAVANES AND ROBERTO RA VANES
CA, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision, albeit in
Doctrine: The filing of a second motion for reconsideration is prohibited under Rule
the guise of a "Manifestation and Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment." In
52, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended and the prevailing
fact, the relief prayed for by petitioners in this manifestation and
1999 Internal Rules of the Procedure of the CA. Being a prohibited pleading, a second
motion is the same relief obtained once a motion for
motion for reconsideration does not have any legal effect and does not toll the
reconsideration is filed on time.Rule 52, Section 4 of the Rules of Court
running of the period to appeal.
provides that generally, a motion for reconsideration filed on time stays the
execution of the judgment sought to be reconsidered.It thus baffles us why
Facts: petitioners captioned their motion as a "Manifestation and Motion to Suspend
● On September 4, 2007, petitioners received notice of the CA Decision. Execution of Judgment" when the effect sought is one and the same —to stay
● On September 19, 2007, they filed a Manifestation and Motion to Stay the execution of judgment. This carelessness only brought confusion to
the Execution of Judgment, which the CA denied in its February 20, respondent-spouses and the CA.
2008 Resolution.The petitioners received a copy of this Resolution on 4. Since the Manifestation and Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment is a
February 22, 2008. motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision, petitioners' receipt of the
○ (Note: Petitioners' Manifestation and Motion to Stay Execution of resolution denying it triggers the running of the 15-day period
Judgment is, in actuality, a motion for reconsideration of the CA within which to file an appeal. Petitioners received a copy of the February
Decision. 20, 2008 Resolution on February 22, 2008. Thus, counting 15 days from
○ Since the Manifestation and Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment receipt, petitioners had only until March 8, 2008 to file a petition for review.
is a motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision, petitioners' 5. On March 7, 2008, however, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
receipt of the resolution denying it triggers the running of the 15-day the February 20, 2008 Resolution instead. This motion for reconsideration
period within which to file an appeal. Petitioners received a copy of partakes of the nature of a second motion for reconsideration. In Tagaytay City
the February 20, 2008 Resolution on February 22, 2008. Thus, v. Sps. De Los Reyes, we ruled that a motion for reconsideration, even if it was
counting 15 days from receipt, petitioners had only until March 8, not designated as a second motion for reconsideration, is a disguised second
2008 to file a petition for review.) motion for reconsideration if it is merely a reiteration of the movant's earlier
● On March 7, 2008, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the arguments. Here, petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration is just that—a mere
February 20, 2008 Resolution of the CA. rehash of the arguments raised in their earlier Manifestation and Motion to
● The CA also denied this motion in its July 7, 2008 Resolution, a copy of Stay Execution of Judgment, which we found previously to be their (first)
which was received by the petitioners on July 14, 2008. motion for reconsideration.
● Subsequently, petitioners filed before us a Motion for Additional Period 6. The filing of a second motion for reconsideration is prohibited under Rule 52,
to File Petition for Review,which we granted. They prayed that they be Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended and the prevailing
given additional 30 days within which to file their petition or from July 29, 1999 Internal Rules of the Procedure of the CA. Being a prohibited pleading,
2008 to August 28, 2008. a second motion for reconsideration does not have any legal effect and does
● Petitioners filed the petition for review on August 28, 2008. not toll the running of the period to appeal.
ISSUE: W/N the CA Decision is already final and executory –YES 7. To rule that finality of judgment shall be reckoned from the receipt of the
RULING: resolution or order denying the second motion for reconsideration would
1. The above narration of material dates gives a semblance that the present result to an absurd situation whereby courts will be obliged to issue orders or
petition was seasonably filed. However, the records show that petitioners resolutions denying what is a prohibited motion in the first place, in order that
should have reckoned the 15-day period to appeal from the receipt of the the period for the finality of judgments shall run, thereby, prolonging the
denial of the Manifestation and Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment, and disposition of cases. Moreover, such a ruling would allow a party to forestall
not from their receipt of the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration. Having the running of the period of finality of judgments by virtue of filing a
failed to do so, petitioners' right to appeal by certiorari lapsed as early as prohibited pleading; such a situation is not only illogical but also unjust to the
March 9, 2008 when the assailed CA Decision became final and executory. winning party.
8. The same principle is likewise applicable by analogy in the determination of
the correct period to appeal. Reckoning the period from the denial of the
second motion for reconsideration will result in the same absurd situation
where the courts will be obliged to issue orders or resolutions denying a
prohibited pleading in the first place.
9. An appeal is not a matter of right, but is one of sound judicial discretion. It
may only be availed of in the manner provided by the law and the rules. A
party who fails to question an adverse decision by not filing the proper remedy
within the period prescribed by law loses the right to do so as the decision, as
to him, becomes final and binding.
10. Considering that petitioners reckoned the period to appeal on the date of
notice of the denial of the second motion for reconsideration on July 7, 2008,
instead of the date of notice of the denial of the first motion for reconsideration
on February 22, 2008, the present petition filed only on August 28, 2008 is
evidently filed out of time. The petition, being 173 days late, renders
the CA Decision final and executory. Thus, we do not have
jurisdiction to pass upon the petition.
11. While there are instances when we relax the application of procedural rules,
the present petition is not one of them. Liberal application of the rules is an
exception rather than the rule. In this case, petitioners failed to address the
issue of finality of the CA Decision when it was raised in respondent Mena's
Comment to the Manifestation and Motion to Stay Execution in the CA. Upon
the denial of the manifestation and motion due to finality of the CA Decision,
petitioners again ignored the issue of finality in their Motion for
Reconsideration. Up until respondent-spouses' Comment before us, which
again alleged the finality of the CA Decision, petitioners continued to be mum
on the issue. Petitioners' silence as to the timeliness of their appeal is suspect.
Thus, in the absence of exceptional circumstances and effort on the part of
petitioners to justify the liberal application of the rules, we are constrained to
deny the petition.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution

of the Court of Appeals dated August 29, 2007 and July 7, 2008, respectively, are
hereby AFFIRMED.

PURCON VS. MRM ● On September 30, 2005, the NLRC Third Division issued a resolution
dismissing the appeal for lack of merit.
Petitioner/s: Julio B. Purcon, Jr.
● On December 20, 2005, the motion for reconsideration was dismissed for lack
Respondent/s: MRM Philippines Inc.
of merit
● On May 9, 2007, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for review on
Doctrine: Rule 38, Section 1. Original cases cognizable. – Only petitions for
certiorari under Rule 45
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, disciplinary
● SC denied the petition for the following reasons: (1) the petition was filed
proceedings against members of the judiciary and attorneys, and cases affecting
beyond the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days fixed in Section 2, Rule 45
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls may be filed originally in the
in relation to Section 5(a), Rule 56, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended;
Supreme Court.
(2) failure to pay on time docket and other fees and deposit for costs in
violation of Section 3, Rule 45, in relation to Section 5(c) of Rule 56; and (3)
Facts: insufficient or defective verification under Section 4, Rule 7
● On May 6, 2008, petitioner filed the instant petition for relief from judgment
● This started from a complaint filed by petitioner for reimbursement of medical Issue: WON Petitioner can avail of a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of
expenses, sickness allowance and permanent disability benefits with prayer the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure from Our resolution denying his petition for review -
for compensatory, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees before NO
the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
Ratio:
● Petitioner alleged that on January 28, 2002, respondent MRM Philippines, ● A petition for relief from judgment is not an available remedy in the Supreme
Inc. hired him as a seaman on board the vessel M/T SARABELLE 2. Court.
● He signed a contract for three (3) months with a monthly salary of $584.00. ● First, although Section 1 of Rule 38 states that when a judgment or final order
According to petitioner, his work involved a day-to-day activity that required is entered through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, a party
exertion of strenuous effort. in any court may file a petition for relief from judgment, this rule must be
● On the second week of June 2002, he felt an excruciating pain in his left interpreted in harmony with Rule 56, which enumerates the original cases
testicle. He was diagnosed with hernia. On June 26, 2002, he was repatriated cognizable by the Supreme Court, thus:
due to his ailment. ● Section 1. Original cases cognizable. – Only petitions for certiorari,
● On July 24, 2002, Dr. Alegre declared that he was fit to resume work. When prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, disciplinary
he reported to MRM Philippines, Inc. hoping to be re- hired for another proceedings against members of the judiciary and attorneys, and cases
contract, he was told that there was no vacancy for him. affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls may be filed
● On September 17, 2003, he consulted Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo, an internist- originally in the Supreme Court.
cardiologist of Philippine Heart Center. After a thorough medical examination ● A petition for relief from judgment is not included in the list of Rule 56 cases
and evaluation, he was diagnosed with EPIDIDYMITIS, LEFT; UPPER originally cognizable by this Court.
RESPIRATORY TRACT INFACTION WITH INPEDIMENT GRADE XIV. ● In Dela Cruz v. Andres, SC reiterated that a petition for relief from judgment
● Respondents, countered that since petitioner’s ailment, hernia, is not work- is not an available remedy in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.
related, he is not entitled to disability benefit and related claims. ● Second, while Rule 38 uses the phrase "any court," it refers only to
● In fact, he was declared fit to resume work on July 23, 2002 by the company- Municipal/Metropolitan and Regional Trial Courts.
designated physician. ● As revised, Rule 38 radically departs from the previous rule as it now allows
● Labor Arbiter Donato G. Quinto, Jr. rendered its decision dismissing the the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court which decided the case or issued
complaint for utter lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter explained that petitioner the order to hear the petition for relief.
was fit to resume work as a seafarer as of July 23, 2002 as his "hernia" was ● Third, the procedure in the CA and the Supreme Court are governed by
already cured or non-existent. separate provisions of the Rules of Court. As it stands, neither the Rules of
● Unfortunately, he was not accommodated due to lack of vacancy. Court nor the Revised Internal Rules of the CA allows the remedy of petition
● On May 5, 2005, complainant-appellant (petitioner) filed a memorandum of for relief in the CA.
appeal with the NLRC Third Division.
● There is no provision in the Rules of Court making the petition for relief
applicable in the CA or this Court. The procedure in the CA from Rules 44 to
55, with the exception of Rule 45 which pertains to the Supreme Court,
identifies the remedies available before said Court such as annulment of
judgments or final orders or resolutions (Rule 47), motion for reconsideration
(Rule 52), and new trial (Rule 53). Nowhere is a petition for relief under Rule
38 mentioned.
● If a petition for relief from judgment is not among the remedies available in
the CA, with more reason that this remedy cannot be availed of in the Supreme
Court. This Court entertains only questions of law. A petition for relief raises
questions of facts on fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, which
are beyond the concerns of this Court.
● Nevertheless, even if SC delve into the merits of the petition, the same must
still be dismissed. The late filing of the petition for review does not amount to
excusable negligence. Petitioner’s lack of devotion in discharging his duty,
without demonstrating fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence,
cannot be a basis for judicial relief. For a claim of counsel’s gross negligence
to prosper, nothing short of clear abandonment of the client’s cause must be
shown.
● The relief afforded by Rule 38 will not be granted to a party who seeks to be
relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy of law
was due to his own negligence, or mistaken mode of procedure for that matter;
otherwise the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of
appeal which has already been lost, either because of inexcusable negligence
or due to a mistake of procedure by counsel.
● In exceptional cases, when the mistake of counsel is so palpable that it
amounts to gross negligence, this Court affords a party a second opportunity
to vindicate his right. But this opportunity is unavailing in the instant case,
especially since petitioner has squandered the various opportunities available
to him at the different stages of this case. Public interest demands an end to
every litigation and a belated effort to reopen a case that has already attained
finality will serve no purpose other than to delay the administration of justice.
● Finally, it is a settled rule that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks
to be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at
law was due to his own negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure;
otherwise, the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of
appeal which has already been lost either because of inexcusable negligence
or due to mistaken mode of procedure by counsel.
Dispositive: ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED.

WON the annulment of judgment should be granted to the Spouses? No
REPUBLIC VS SPOUSES DE CASTRO
Ratio:
Petitioner/s: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the Department
- A petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a remedy granted only
of Environment and Natural Resources, Region IV-B,
under exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, has
failed to avail of the ordinary or other appropriate remedies provided by law.
Respondent/s: SPOUSES FLORENCIO DE CASTRO and ROMELIA CALIBOSO
Such action is never resorted to as a substitute for a party's own neglect in not
DE CASTRO
promptly availing of the ordinary or other appropriate remedies.
- Though the spouses were unaware of the trial court’s decision, the moment
Doctrine:
that they were personally served the writ of execution they would have had
A petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 can only be availed of if a party
ample time to file a motion to quash the writ of execution or file a petition for
fails to move for a new trial, or appeal from, or file a petition for relief against said
relief of judgment. This is because the writ of execution was not immediately
issuances or take appropriate remedies through no fault of his own inaction or
implemented by the sheriff as it was satisfied only on July 20, 2006.
negligence.
- Because they failed to avail of the remedies, they are now barred from
resorting to the action for annulment of Judgment under rule 47. Otherwise,
Facts: they would benefit from their own inaction or negligence.
● A free patent was granted to Marcelo Manipon on a parcel of land in Naujan,
Oriental Mindoro. An OCT was then issued to him Dispositive:
● Manipon sold the lot to Spouses De Castro WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED and the assailed Court
● An investigation was conducted by LMB which found that lot was not an of Appeals Decision dated June 26, 2009 and Resolution dated September 30, 2009
inalienable and disposable land of the public domain since it it is within the are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, but only insofar as the Court of Appeals nullified
established reservation for the exclusive use of non-christian tribes known as
the Paitan Mangyan reservation and was proclaimed as such under 1) the Order dated April 29, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 40 of Calapan City
Proclamation no. 809. granting petitioner's motion for the issuance of a writ of execution,
● Since the Proclamation has not been amended, revoked or repealed, the 2) the Writ of Execution dated August 2, 2005, and all execution proceedings/actions
Solgen filed a complaint for cancellation and reversion against Manipon and pursuant thereto, and
Sps. De castro. During this time, Manipon had been dead for 10 years. 3) the trial court's order to immediately serve a copy of its Decision dated October 9,
● Spouses De Castro were declared in default due to their failure to file an 2002 upon respondents.
answer despite receipt of the summons. Their motion to lift order of default
was denied for lack of merit since the failure was due to neglect and oversight. The trial court's Order dated April 29, 2004, the Writ of Execution dated August 2,
● The court nullified Manipon’s free patent. No MR was filed, thus the decision 2005 and all proceedings/actions pursuant to the implementation of its October 9,
became final and executory. Subsequently, a writ of execution was served on 2002 Decision, are declared in order and accordingly REINSTATED
respondents.
● Sps De Castro filed a petition for annulment of judgment because the court
did not acquire jurisdiction over Manipon as he was dead when the RP filed
its complaint. Hence, his title remains to be valid as well as theirs because
their tile only emanates from Manipon’s.
● CA denied the annulment of petition of judgment but found that the Sps were
not given the copy of the trial court’s decision.
● The spouses claim that the only found out about the decision (issued Oct
9,2002) only when the trial court’s sheriff personally served upon them a copy
of the writ of execution of the decision on Sep 29, 2005.
Issue:
PEOPLE V. BITANGA
Petitioner/s: People of the Philippines and Hon. Bricio Ygana
Issue: Whether the CA was correct in granting the petition of Bitanga, invoking Rule
Respondent/s: Rafael Bitanga
47 – NO
Doctrine: The remedy of Annulment of Judgment by the Court of Appeals cannot
Ratio:
be resorted to when the RTC judgment being questioned was rendered in a criminal
Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, limits the scope of the remedy of annulment of
case.
judgment to the following:
Section 1. Coverage. This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of
Facts: judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for
On the basis of Traders Royal Bank’s (TRB) complaint, an information for Estafa was which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
filed against Rafael Bitanga before the RTC. remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
The People presented testimonies of three TRB employees on how Bitanga duped the The remedy cannot be resorted to when the RTC judgment being
bank. When it was time for the defense to present his case, Bitanga and his counsel questioned was rendered in a criminal case. The 2000 Revised Rules of
failed to appear and adduce evidence. Criminal Procedure itself does not permit such recourse, for it excluded Rule 47 from
the enumeration of the provisions of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which
Upon motion, a warrant of arrest was issued and Bitanga’s right to adduce evidence was have suppletory application to criminal cases.
deemed waived.
In addition, Sec. 18. Application of certain rules in civil procedure to criminal cases.
On Feb. 29, 2000, the RTC promulgated in absentia, a decision finding Bitanga guilty The provisions of Rules 42, 44 to 46 and 48 to 56 relating to procedure in the Court
as charged. of Appeals and in the Supreme Court in original and appealed civil cases shall be
applied to criminal cases insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the
Bitanga then filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with Prayer for provisions of this Rule.
Other Reliefs on the ground that extrinsic fraud was allegedly perpetuated upon him by
his counsel of record, Atty. Benjamin Razon, alleging that he received the Feb decision There is no basis in law or the rules, therefore, to extend the scope of Rule 47 to criminal
only in December of 2001. cases.
The CA granted the Petition for Annulment of Judgment in the March 31 2003, the
decretal portion of which reads: Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The March 31, 2003 Decision
and July 18, 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are ANNULLED and SET
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the petition is hereby ASIDE.
GRANTED. Accordingly, the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa City,
Branch 153 being tainted with circumstances constitutive of extrinsic fraud which
deprived the petitioner herein of his day in court is SET ASIDE. Resultantly, Criminal
Case No. 103677 is remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings to give
herein petitioner opportunity to present his evidence in said case and for the trial court
to render judgment in accordance with the evidence adduced. Corollarily, the petitioner
may be released and allowed to be on bail unless there are other valid and legal reasons
for his continued detention.
SO ORDERED.
The MR being denied, a petition for review was filed before the SC.
However, such petition cannot be availed of in this case because it is only limited to
FRAGINAL v. PARANAL final judgments and orders rendered by Regional Trial Courts in civil actions. Final
G.R. No. 150207 | February 23, 2007 judgments or orders of quasi-judicial tribunals or administrative bodies are not
susceptible to petitions for annulment under Rule 47.
Petitioner/s: VALENTIN P. FRAGINAL, TOMAS P. FRAGINAL and ANGELINA
FRAGINAL-QUINO
The right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the
Respondent/s: THE HEIRS OF TORIBIA BELMONTE PARAÑAL, represented
manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions of law. There must then
by PEDRO PARAÑAL, FELISA PARAÑAL, ABRAHAM PARAÑAL, IRENEA
be a law expressly granting such right. This legal axiom is also applicable and even more
ACABADO and JOSEFA ESTOY
true in actions for annulment of judgments which is an exception to the rule on finality
of judgments.
Doctrine: The doctrine of finality of judgment means that judgments of courts or
awards of quasi-judicial bodies, even if erroneous, must become final at a definite
Second, Section 1, Rule 47 does not allow a direct recourse to a petition for annulment
time appointed by law. However, this doctrine permits equitable remedies.
of judgment if other appropriate remedies are available. In this case, the proper
remedy, as provided for in the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure, was to appeal to the
Facts: The heirs of Toribia Belmonte Parañal filed with the Office of the Provincial DARAB. Fraginal et. al. failed to avail such recourse.
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB), Camarines Sur, a Complaint for Termination of Tenancy Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Relationship, Ejectment, and Collection of Arrear Rentals and Damages against
Valentin Fraginal, Tomas P. Fraginal and Angelina Fraginal-Quino
Fraginal et.al questioned the jurisdiction of the PARAD, claiming that they were not
tenants and the property they were tilling were under the jurisdiction of the DENR
PARAD ruled in favor of the Heirs of Paranal and ordered the ejectment of Fraginal
et.al. It considered the documentary evidence presented by the latter as a mere scrap
of paper, as it fails to technically describe the property in question, and there was no
list of supposed tenants attached unto such document
After two years, Fraginal et.al filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment
claiming that the decision was void because PARAD had no jurisidiction over the
subject matter. It was dismissed because the a petition for annulment of judgement is
a remedy exclusive to judgments and final orders and resolution in civil actions of
Regional Trial Courts
Hence, this petition
Issue: WoN a petition for annulment of judgement may be availed of - NO
Ratio: The doctrine of finality of judgment means that judgments of courts or awards
of quasi-judicial bodies, even if erroneous, must become final at a definite time
appointed by law. However, this doctrine permits equitable remedies, such as a Petition
for Annulment of Judgment.

GRANDE v. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil
action of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial,
Petitioner/s: PIO C. GRANDE, RUFINO C. GRANDE, AIDA C. GRANDE,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer
FLORENCIA GRANDE-SANTOS, TERESITA GRANDE-VIOLA, JOSEPHINE
available through no fault of the petitioner.
GRANDE DOMINGO (representing the heirs of Crisanta Grande-Domingo), and
● Clearly, Rule 47 applies only to petitions for the nullification of judgments
ESTANISLAO CARPIO, QUIBAL (representing the heirs of Rosita Grande-Quibal)
rendered by regional trial courts filed with the Court of Appeals. It does not
Respondent/s: UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
pertain to the nullification of decisions of the Court of Appeals.
● Petitioners argue that although Rule 47 is a newly-established rule, the
Doctrine: A petition for annulment of judgment is only allowed in exceptional
procedure of annulment of judgments has long been recognized in this
cases. SC has no authority to take cognizance of a petition for annulment of judgment
jurisdiction.
of any lower court.
○ That may be so, but this Court has no authority to take cognizance of
an original action for annulment of judgment of any lower court.
Facts: ○ The only original cases cognizable before this Court are petitions for
1) The CA dismissed the appeal interposed by the Grandes dismissing their certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus,
complaint for recovery of ownership and reconveyance of the subject property disciplinary proceedings against members of the judiciary and
on the ground of lack of cause of action. attorneys, and cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
a) The RTC Decision concluded that the subject property was covered and consuls.
by a Torrens title as early as 1914 and it was only in 1984, or 70 years ○ Petitions for annulment of judgment are not among the cases
after the issuance of the title, that Grandes filed their action for originally cognizable by this Court.
recovery of ownership and reconveyance. ● Moreover, if what is desired is an appeal from a decision of the Court of
b) During the interregnum, ownership of the property was acquired by Appeals, which Grandes could have been entitled to under ordinary
respondent University of the Philippines as an innocent purchaser circumstances, the only mode of appeal cognizable by this Court is a petition
for value, so the RTC found and the appellate court upheld. for review on certiorari.
2) Grandes, through their former counsel, received a copy of the CA Decision on ● Admittedly, this Court has discretionary power to take cognizance of a petition
28 December 1998, and a copy of the Resolution denying their motion for over which it ordinarily has no jurisdiction if compelling reasons, or the nature
reconsideration on 17 March 2000. and importance of the issues raised, warrant the immediate exercise of its
a) However, Grandes failed to elevate the rulings of the CA to jurisdiction.
this Court. They claim that their former counsel had neglected to ○ Hence, in Del Mar v. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp., the Court
inform them of the receipt of the Resolution denying their motion for took cognizance of an original petition for injunction after
reconsideration. determining that the allegations therein revealed that it was actually
b) As a result, the Decision of the CA became final and executory. one for prohibition.
3) It was only more than a year after the CA’s ruling had become final, that ○ We, however, cannot adopt that tack for purposes of this case.
Grandes filed with this Court the present Petition for Annulment of Judgment, Ostensibly, even if the averments in the present petition sufficiently
seeking the nullification of the rulings. present the existence of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction and on that basis it could be treated as a
Issue: Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of the petition for annulment of special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, still it could not be
judgment of the CA. NO. given due course since it was filed way beyond the period for filing
such special civil action. Moreover, certiorari can only lie if there is
Ratio: no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
● The annulment of judgments, as a recourse, is equitable in character, allowed ordinary course of law.
only in exceptional cases, as where there is no available or other adequate ● The Grandes cited quite a few cases in support of their claim that the
remedy. purported negligence of their former counsel sufficiently justifies the
● It is generally governed by Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. annulment of the judgment of the Court of Appeals. We are not impressed.
Section 1 thereof expressly states that the Rule shall govern the annulment by
○ Only Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals involved a petition for
annulment of judgment but the petition therein was regular and in
order, assailing as it did a decision of the Regional Trial Court before
the Court of Appeals.
○ Unlike in Apex, the present petition is bereft of mooring under
procedural law. Hence, Apex is not a governing precedent in this
case.
● It is also worthy of note that the challenge to the decisions of the Court of
Appeals and the RTC ultimately involve questions of fact, even necessitating
an examination of the boundaries of the subject property. Both the RTC and
the Court of Appeals arrived at common findings on all decisive factual issues,
and the Court is not wont to engage in another factual review.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

IMPERIAL VS ARMES ● Presiding Judge Consulta, without issuing summons, dismissed the Petition
motu proprio saying:
Petitioner/s: RENE H. IMPERIAL and NIDSLAND RESOURCES AND
○ RTCs have no jurisdiction over the SEC and as such, an action
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
assailing the decision of the SEC should be brought before the CA
Respondent/s: HON. EDGAR L. ARMES, Presiding Judge of Branch 4, Regional Trial
● Cruz elevated the case to the CA by way of a special civil action for certiorari
Court, 5th Judicial Region, Legazpi City and ALFONSO B. CRUZ, JR.
○ CA ruled RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
Petition, and therefore ordered that the case be remanded to RTC
Doctrine: RTCs have no jurisdiction to annul judgments of quasi-judicial bodies of
● Even before summons could be issued, Presiding Judge Basilla issued an
equal rank. CA also has no jurisdiction over such an action. Section 9 of BP 129 and
Order dismissing the Petition
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court both state that the CA has jurisdiction over annulment of
● Upon Cruz's MR, Judge Basilla reversed his ruling in an Order
judgments of regional trial courts only. The "silence of B.P. Blg. 129 on the jurisdiction
● Judge Basilla subsequently voluntarily inhibited himself, and the RTC Petition
of the CA to annul judgments or final orders and resolutions of quasi-judicial bodies
was reraffled to Branch 4 presided by Respondent Judge Armes
like the DARAB indicates its lack of such authority.
● Respondent Judge Armes denied the Omnibus Motion and Supplemental
Motion in an Order
Facts: ○ The Order held that the RTC has jurisdiction over the case
● Julian Napal and Rene Imperial entered into a MOA to organize a domestic
corporation to be named NIDSLAND which would engage in the real estate Issue:
business W/N RTC has jurisdiction to declare the nullity of the Decision of the SEC – NO
● Napal undertook to convey to NIDSLAND a tract of land consisting of four lots
and to Imperial a two hectare portion of these lots in order to develop the land Ratio:
into a subdivision
● Imperial, as his contribution to NIDSLAND, committed to perform the RTC Petition should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
following obligations: to settle Napal's obligation to the Rural Bank of Ligao ● The Revised Rules on Civil Procedure provides for a remedy that may be used
which was about to foreclose its mortgage on the land; pay Napal's tax to assail a void judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
liabilities to the BIR which encumbered with a tax lien the largest portion of ● Rule 47 of the Rules of Court states that an action for the annulment of
the land, etc judgment may be filed before the CA to annul a void judgment of regional trial
● While Imperial faithfully complied with his obligations under the courts even after it has become final and executory
Memorandum of Agreement, Napal failed to convey to NIDSLAND a certain ● The RTC Petition filed by Cruz clearly captures the material allegations in a
portion of land, in particular Lot 15-C petition for annulment of judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
● Napal sold Lot 15-C to Cruz as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale the person of one of the parties under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
● As Napal continued to refuse to convey Lot 15-C to NIDSLAND, Imperial filed
for himself and in representation of NIDSLAND a derivative suit before the ● The Rules on Civil Procedure provides a remedy called annulment of
SEC judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction
● SEC proceeded with the hearing without acquiring jurisdiction over Cruz ● Rule 47 limits its application to regional trial courts and municipal trial courts
● SEC Hearing Officer Gonzales rendered a Decision in favor of Imperial and ● Rule 47 allows a resort to the CA only in instances where the judgment
NIDSLAND challenged was rendered by regional trial courts
○ Deed of Absolute Sale between Napal and Cruz void ab initio as it
was simulated Springfield case:
○ SEC ordered the cancellation of the TCT in the name of Cruz ● RTCs have no jurisdiction to annul judgments of quasi-judicial bodies of equal
● Since Napal did not appeal the SEC Decision, it became final and executory rank
● Cruz filed a pleading denominated as a "Petition" before RTC which sought to ● CA also has no jurisdiction over such an action
nullify the SEC Decision ● Section 9 of BP 129 and Rule 47 of the Rules of Court both state that the CA
has jurisdiction over annulment of judgments of regional trial courts only

● The "silence of B.P. Blg. 129 on the jurisdiction of the CA to annul judgments
or final orders and resolutions of quasi-judicial bodies like the DARAB
indicates its lack of such authority
● RTC Petition filed by Cruz is not the proper remedy to assail the SEC Decision
● Applying the doctrine in the Springfield case, since it is an action for the
annulment of judgment, the RTC Petition cannot prosper because this remedy
is not available in this particular case
SEC Decision was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to an excess of
jurisdiction
● The error in Cruz's RTC Petition does not automatically warrant a dismissal
of these proceedings
● The SEC, in nullifying the sale between Napal and Cruz and in ordering the
cancellation of Cruz's TCTs in favor of NIDSLAND, overstepped its
jurisdiction
● The SEC Decision was rendered with grave abuse of discretion
● Where the controversy does not call for the use of any technical expertise, but
the application of general laws, the case is cognizable by the ordinary courts
● SEC does not have jurisdiction to order the cancellation of the sale between
Napal and Cruz
● It also has no jurisdiction to cancel Cruz's TCT and order its transfer to
NIDSLAND
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals' Resolution dated March 6, 2007 in the First
Consolidated Case is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Further, we rule that Branch 4,
Regional Trial Court, Legazpi City has no jurisdiction over Cruz's Petition. Thus, the
Regional Trial Court's Decision dated March 24, 2009 is NULLIFIED.
The Court of Appeals' Decision dated September 13, 2010 in the Second Consolidated
Case is also REVERSED and SET ASIDE. We rule that the Securities and Exchange
Commission's Decision dated November 10, 1998 is VOID. Thus, the Deed of
Conveyance dated January 13, 1999 executed in compliance with this Decision is
NULLIFIED. The proper parties can file the appropriate petition for cancellation of title
in the trial court which has jurisdiction to nullify the certificates of title issued to
NIDSLAND by virtue of the void SEC Decision.

PINAUSUKAN SEAFOOD VS FEBTC Villaflor, in whom it entirely relied upon, should not preclude it from
obtaining relief; and that it needed a chance to prove in the RTC that Bonier
Petitioner/s: PINAUSUKAN SEAFOOD HOUSE, ROXAS BOULEY ARD, INC.
had no right to mortgage its property.
Respondent/s: FAR EAST BANK & TRUST COMPANY, NOW BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS AND HECTOR I. GALURA
Issue:
Should the court relax its rules and grant Pinausukan’s petition for annulment? – NO.
Doctrine: Extrinsic fraud, as a ground for the annulment of a judgment, must
emanate from an act of the adverse party, and the fraud must be of such nature as to
Ratio:
have deprived the petitioner of its day in court. The fraud is not extrinsic if the act was
● A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in
committed by the petitioner's own counsel.
nature that it may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and
only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought to be annulled was
Facts: rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud.
● In 1993, Bonier de Guzman (Bonier), president of Pinausukan Seafood, ● The attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a judgment, final
executed a REM over Pinausukan’s land in favor of FEBTC. order or final resolution is understandable, for the remedy disregards the
● When the obligation ballooned to P15M, the Bank commenced an extrajudicial time-honored doctrine of immutability and unalterability of final judgments
foreclosure. Public auction was scheduled on Oct. 8, 2001. ● If the judgment or final order or resolution is set aside on the ground of
● Learning about this, Pinausukan, represented by de Guzman brought an extrinsic fraud, the CA may on motion order the trial court to try the case as if
action for annulment of REM, averring that Bonier obtained the loan in his a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein. The remedy is by no
personal capacity and without Pinausukan’s consent (no board resolution) means an appeal whereby the correctness of the assailed judgment or final
● Pinausukan applied for TRO to stop the Bank and the sheriff from proceeding order is in issue; hence, the CA is not called upon to address each error
with the extrajudicial foreclosure and public auction. allegedly committed by the trial court.
● The parties informed the court that they were attempting to settle the case. ● Given the extraordinary nature and the objective of the remedy of annulment
But during the scheduled hearing, counsels of both parties did not appear of judgment or final order, Pinausukan must be mindful of and should closely
despite having agreed thereto. Hence, the RTC dismissed the case for failure comply with the following statutory requirements for the remedy as set forth
to prosecute. The Order of dismissal attained finality. in the Rules of Court:
● On June 24, 2003, the Sheriff issued a notice of extrajudicial sale. Pinausukan 1. only when the petitioner can no longer resort to the ordinary
received the notice a week after. remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
● On July 24, 2003, Pinausukan filed a Petition for Annulment in the CA, remedies through no fault of the petitioner
seeking to nullify the RTC Order dismissing the case. The petition was under 2. The action of annulment of judgment must be limited to the ground
the verification of Roxanne de Guzman-San Pedro (Roxanne), one of the of either extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction. Fraud is extrinsic
directors and concurrently the EVP for Finance and Treasurer of Pinausukan. “where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting
In the petition, she alleged that Pinausukan’s counsel was guilty of gross and fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his
palpable negligence in failing to keep track of the case and failing to apprise opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a
Pinausukan of the developments of the case. compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the
● On July 31, 2003 the CA dismissed the Petition for Annulment for failure to suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an
attach the affidavits of witnesses attesting to and describing the alleged attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat;
extrinsic fraud. these and similar cases which show that there has never been a real
● On Sept. 12, 2003, the CA denied Pinausukan’s Motion for Reconsideration. contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a new
● Hence, this petition. suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment
● Pinausukan argues that the requirement for attaching the affidavits of and open the case for a new and fair hearing." Nonetheless, extrinsic
witnesses to the petition for annulment should be relaxed; that even if fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have
Roxanne had executed the required affidavit as a witness on the extrinsic been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.
fraud, she would only repeat therein the allegations already in the petition,
thereby duplicating her allegations under her oath; that the negligence of Atty.
3. The action, if based on extrinsic fraud, must be filed within four years
from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud; and if based on lack of
jurisdiction, must be brought before it is barred by laches or estoppel.
4. petition should be verified, and should allege with particularity the
facts and the law relied upon for annulment, as well as those
supporting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or
defense, as the case may be. The need for particularity cannot be
dispensed with because averring the circumstances constituting
either fraud or mistake with particularity is a universal requirement
in the rules of pleading.
● Pinausukan’s petition for annulment suffered from procedural and
substantive defects
○ Procedural Defect: failure to submit together with the petition the
affidavits of witnesses or documents supporting the cause of action
(fourth requirement).
○ Substantive Defect: the supposed neglect of Atty. Villaflor
(petitioner’s counsel) does not constitute extrinsic fraud
contemplated by Rule 47. It is merely amounts to mistake and gross
negligence, or professional misconduct. Extrinsic fraud relates to a
cause that is collateral in character i.e. it relates to any fraudulent act
of the prevailing party in litigation which is committed OUTSIDE of
the trial. Annulment will not lie unless the fraud is committed by the
adverse party, not by one’s own lawyer.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the assailed resolutions of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on July 31, 2003 and September 12, 2003; and ORDERS the petitioner to
pay the costs of suit.

VIOS VS. PANTANGCO ● The CA concluded that the MTC decision had not yet attained finality and the
writ of execution is consequently invalid because Vios had 15 days or until
Petitioner/s: CHARLIE VIOS and SPS. ROGELIO and TERESITA ANTONIO,
August 7 within which to appeal the decision. But on August 5 or 2 days before
and as nominal party, Hon. Emilio L. Leachon, Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 224,
the decision became final and executory he filed a motion to be furnished a
Quezon City
copy of the decision.
Respondent/s: MANUEL PANTANGCO, JR.
● However, the CA also ruled that the RTC went too far when it ruled on the
insufficiency of the evidence adduced by petitioner. The RTC Decision, except
Doctrine:
in so far as it nullified the writ of execution issued by the MTC in the ejectment
proceedings, is itself null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
Facts: Issue:
The Ejectment Case at the MTC 1. W/N the CA erred in entertaining Pantangco's Petition for Declaration of
● Respondent Pantangco filed with the MTC a complaint for ejectment and Nullity of the RTC Decision - YES
damages against petitioners Vios and Spouses Antonio. 2. W/N the RTC decision which was not appealed became final; and, right or
● Petitioner Vios was represented at the MTC proceedings by his counsel of wrong; the RTC's ruling became the law of the case that may no longer be
record, Atty.Sollano, while the petitioners Spouses Antonio were represented disturbed - NO
by Atty.Genova.
● The MTC rendered a decision in Pantangco's favor, ordering the petitioners to Ratio:
immediately vacate the premises. 1.
● Notices and copies of the MTC decision were transmitted to the petitioners ● A petition for certiorari — the remedy that petitioner Vios availed of to
through their counsels of record. Atty. Sollano received a copy on July 23, question the MTC decision before the RTC — is an original action whose
1996. resulting decision is a final order that completely disposes of the petition.
● On August 5, 1996, Atty. Mauricio, Jr., filed a Notice of Appearance stating ● The proper remedy from the RTC decision on the petition for certiorari is an
that petitioner Vios received an incomplete copy of the decision from his ordinary appeal to the CA under Section 2, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of
former counsel, Atty. Sollano, and requesting the MTC to furnish petitioner Court.
Vios with a complete copy of the MTC decision. ○ Section 2. Modes of appeal. —
● Pantangco filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution, arguing that ○ (a) Ordinary appeal. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases
the decision is already final and executory as no notice of appeal was filed decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
within the reglementary period. The MTC granted the motion. jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court
The Certiorari Case at the RTC which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and
serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
● Petitioner Vios filed with the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus ● An order or a judgment is deemed final when it finally disposes of a pending
with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, assailing both the action, so that nothing more can be done with it in the trial court.
MTC decision and the writ of execution. ● An interlocutory order does not dispose of the case completely, but leaves
● Petitioner Vios assailed the propriety of the writ of execution, on the ground something to be done as regards the merits of the latter.
that the MTC decision is not yet final because Atty. Sollano, to whom a copy ● Pantangco did not appeal, he sought to review the RTC certiorari decision
of the decision was sent, had previously withdrawn as Vios' counsel. through a "Petition for Declaration of Nullity of the RTC Decision" based on
● The RTC rendered a decision in petitioner Vios' favor. It annulled the MTC Rule 47.
decision as well as the related writ of execution. ● Pantangco's Rule 47 remedy is fatally defective because its use against an RTC
At the Court of Appeals decision in a certiorari case is foreclosed by the availability of an appeal to the
● Pantangco filed with the CA a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of the RTC CA.
Decision. He claims that the RTC decision is void, given that the MTC decision ● The CA erred from the very beginning in ruling on Pantangco's petition.
cannot be assailed on certiorari; the proper remedy is an ordinary appeal from
the MTC decision. 2.
Law of the case doctrine
● The law of the case doctrine is not applicable. The law of the case doctrine
applies in a situation where an appellate court has made a ruling on a question
on appeal and thereafter remands the case to the lower court for further
proceedings.
● In this case, no opinion has been made in a former appeal that can be
considered the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties
thereafter.
The status of the RTC Decision
● The RTC has no jurisdiction to review, reverse or modify, in any manner

whatsoever, the MTC's decision on the merits of the ejectment case via a
petition for certiorari led under Rule 65; if the petitioners wanted a review of
the MTC decision, they should have instead filed an appeal.
● Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not
errors of judgment. When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error
committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being
exercised when the error was committed.
● Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact — a
mistake of judgment — appeal is the proper remedy.
● Thus, the RTC decision is partly void insofar as it modified and reversed the
MTC decision on the merits. In this light, the RTC decision cannot be fully
considered a final and controlling ruling that must govern the parties.
● On the other hand, the RTC dispositions on matters within its jurisdiction or
competence to decide are valid and binding.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition and declare
the Court of Appeals in error in ruling on the merits of respondent Pantangco's Rule 47
petition. We DENY the petition insofar as it asks us to recognize the decision of the
Regional Trial Court dated August 4, 1997 as fully valid and binding; the only valid
aspects we can recognize are those relating to the lack of finality of the decision of the
Municipal Trial Court dated July 12, 1996 and the invalidity of the writ of execution that
the Municipal Trial Court subsequently issued. The parties are directed to act guided
by this Decision

PROVOST VS CA ● At the outset, we note that this case involves an error of judgment and not of
jurisdiction. Thus, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
Petitioner/s: SPS. DOLORES MIRANDA and JEAN PROVOST
is not proper. Nevertheless, we shall give due course to the instant petition as
Respondent/s: THE COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. VICTOR and FE A. RAMOS
one proper for review under Rule 45.
● We stress that regional trial courts have jurisdiction over complaints for
Doctrine: While RTCs have jurisdiction over complaints for recovery of ownership
recovery of ownership or accion reivindicatoria. Section 8, Rule 40 of the
or accion reivindicatoria, Sec 8 of Rule 40 nonetheless allows the RTC to decide the
Rules on Civil Procedure nonetheless allows the RTC to decide the case
case brought on appeal from the MTC which, even without jurisdiction over the
brought on appeal from the MTC which, even without jurisdiction over the
subject matter, may decide the case on the merits.
subject matter, may decide the case on the merits.
● In the instant case, the MTC should have dismissed the complaint outright for
Facts: lack of jurisdiction but since it decided the case on its merits, the RTC
● Private respondents, spouses Victor and Fe Ramos, are the owners of a parcel rendered a decision based on the findings of MTC.
of land in Camiguin.
● Adjacent to the lot is a parcel of land owned by petitioner Dolores Miranda As to the decision:
Provost. ● Simply, the main issue in this case is whether petitioners encroached on the
● Sometime in 1992, the Provosts constructed a fence separating the two lots. property of private respondents.
The Ramoses, believing that the Provosts encroached on a portion of their lot, ● Private respondents anchor their claim on the deed of donation and an old
demanded the return of the encroached area but the latter refused. survey plan, while petitioners base theirs on the deed of absolute sale and the
● The Ramoses thus had a relocation survey and the relocation survey showed corrected survey plan.
that the fence was indeed on their land. ● We sustain the decision of the RTC. Significantly, the parties do not deny that
● The Provost spouses disagreed, arguing that the cadastral survey plan used a correction survey was made; that the same was approved; and that the area
had been disapproved by the DENR Regional Office for being defective and of the private respondents property under the corrected survey plan was
was replaced with a correction survey of Barangay Tupsan, Mambajao. reduced, while that of petitioners was increased.
● Upon request of petitioners Provosts, another relocation survey was done ● In an action to recover under Article 434 of the Civil Code, the claimant must
using the approved cadastral survey plan. This relocation survey showed that (1) establish the identity of the property sought to be recovered and (2) rely on
the fence was within petitioners property. the strength of his title and not on the weakness of defendants claim.
● Ramos spouses filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession ● What defines a piece of land is not the area, calculated with more or less
with damages and with prayer for preliminary injunction before the MTC. certainty, mentioned in the description but the boundaries therein laid down,
They alleged that the Provosts encroached on their lot. as enclosing the land and indicating its limits.
● MTC dismissed the complaint and held that the Ramoses failed to prove their
ownership and possession of the disputed area. Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court
● On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTC decision, stating that the claim by the of Appeals and its Resolution are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
Ramoses over the property sought to be recovered was based on a disapproved Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin, Branch 28 is REINSTATED with the
survey plan. MODIFICATION that the award of actual damages, litigation expenses and attorneys
● Private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. It reversed the RTC fees are deleted. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
decision and ordered the Provosts to vacate the area, remove the fence, and
pay damages.
Issue: Whether respondent Court of Appeals exceeded the limits of its jurisdiction in
deciding the appeal of private respondents outside of the issue raised in the decisions
of both the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court.
Ratio:

ENCARNACION VS AMIGO ● The RTC should have taken cognizance of the case. If the case is tried on the
merits by the Municipal Court without jurisdiction over the subject matter,
Petitioner/s: VICTORIANO M. ENCARNACION
the RTC on appeal may no longer dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction
Respondent/s: NIEVES AMIGO
thereof. Moreover, the RTC shall no longer try the case on the merits, but shall
decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented in the lower court,
Doctrine:
without prejudice to the admission of the amended pleadings and additional
evidence in the interest of justice.
Facts:
● Victoriano M. Encarnacion is the registered owner of a land Dispositive:
● He filed a complaint in the MTC against Amigo for ejectment, damages with WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
injunction and prayer for restraining order June 30, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 73857 ordering the remand of Civil Case No. Br. 20-
● MTC ruled in favor of Encarnacion 1194 to the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, for further
● On appeal, RTC dismissed the case on the ground that as the MTC had no proceedings, is AFFIRMED.
jurisdiction over the case, RTC thus acquired no appellate jurisdiction thereof.
● Encarnacion filed a petition for review under Rule 42 before the CA Nocosts.
● CA remanded the case to RTC
Issue:
Whether the proper action is accion publiciana and not ejectment - YES.
Ratio:
● The three kinds of actions for the recovery of possession of real property are:
1. Accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding which may be either that for forcible
entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), which is a summary action for
recovery of physical possession where the dispossession has not lasted for more than
one year, and should be brought in the proper inferior court;
2. Accion publiciana or the plenary action for the recovery of the real right of
possession, which should be brought in the proper Regional Trial Court when the
dispossession has lasted for more than one year; and
3. Accion reinvindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion, which is an action for the
recovery of ownership which must be brought in the proper Regional Trial Court.
● CA committed no error in holding that the proper action in this case is accion
publiciana; and in ordering the remand of the case to the RTC
● The length of time that Encarnacion was dispossessed of his property made
his cause of action beyond the ambit of an accion interdictal and effectively
made it one for accion publiciana.
● After the lapse of the one-year period, the suit must be commenced in the RTC
via an accion publiciana which is a suit for recovery of the right to possess. It
is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of
realty independently of title
● Amigo's actual entry was in 1985 but it was only on March 2, 2001 or sixteen
years after, when Encarnacion filed his ejectment case.
● Amigo should have filed an accion publiciana case which is under the
SERRANO v. GUTIERREZ Ratio:
1. In the first place, MTC had jurisdiction over the case because according to the Rules
Petitioner/s: FEDERICA M. SERRANO, LUCILA M. RAZON, ARMANDO M.
of Court, in ejectment cases, When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in
LAYUG AND ROMEO MORALES
his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the
issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the
Respondent/s: SPOUSES ANSELMO GUTIERREZ AND CARMELITA
issue of possession. The RTC, therefore, erred in agreeing that MTC had no
GUTIERREZ
jurisdiction over the case.
Doctrine: In the exercise of the RTC’s appellate jurisdiction, the jurisdictional
2. The RTC also erred in applying Sec. 8 Rule 40:
amounts for the RTC’s original jurisdiction are irrelevant.
“Sec. 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of jurisdiction.If an
appeal is taken from an order of the lower court dismissing the case without a trial on
Sps. Anselmo and Carmelita Gutierrez filed a complaint for forcible entry before the the merits, the Regional Trial Court may affirm or reverse it, as the case may be. In
MTC against Federica Serrano et al. The subject of the complaint was an 11780 sqm case of affirmance and the ground of dismissal is lack of jurisdiction over the subject
untenanted agricultural land in Pampanga. Sps. Gutierrez claim that they are the matter, the Regional Trial Court, if it has jurisdiction thereover, shall try the case on
registered owners of the land and that Serrano et al, by means of strategy and stealth, the merits as if the case was originally filed with it. In case of reversal, the case shall
criminally entered the land and constructed concrete structures thus rendering the land be remanded for further proceedings.
unsuitable for agriculture. Serrano et al, on the other hand, countered that the subject If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the
land was a portion of the estate of Albino Morales, and as heirs of Albino Morales, they subject matter, the Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has
were in actual, adverse, continuous and physical possession thereof. original jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance with the
preceding section, without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and
2. MTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisidiction, stating that the real issue involved additional evidence in the interest of justice.”
was the question of ownership and not mere possession de facto since both parties are
claiming to be the owners of the land. The first paragraph contemplates an appeal from an order of dismissal issued without
trial of the case on the merits. On the other hand, the second paragraph deals with an
3. Sps. Gutierrez appealed the decision to the RTC. RTC ordered Serrano et al to vacate appeal from an order of dismissal but the case was tried on the merits. Both
land. Interestingly, the trial court cited its approval of the dismissal by the MTC for lack paragraphs, however, involve the same ground for dismissal, i.e., lack of jurisdiction.
of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, invoking the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 40[9] of Clearly, the Section is inapplicable to the present case since, as the Court
the Rules of Court, the RTC deemed itself capable of resolving the issue of ownership of Appeals correctly held, the MTC had jurisdiction over this ejectment
and thus ruling in favor of Sps. Gutierrez. case even if the question of possession could be resolved without passing
upon the issue of ownership.
4. Serrano et al appealed to the CA, questioning the jurisidiction of the RTC and arguing
that since the land is agricultural land, it is the DARAB who has jurisidiction over the Nonetheless, the RTC had appellate jurisdiction over the case and its decision should
case. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The appellate court disposed of the be deemed promulgated in the exercise of that jurisdiction. Petitioners submit that
jurisdictional issue by declaring that contrary to the pronouncements of the two (2) the assessed value of the subject property removes the case from the RTC jurisdiction.
lower courts, the MTC retains jurisdiction over the instant ejectment case even if the They cite Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No.
issue involved was ownership. At the same time, the appellate court sustained the RTCs 7691, which provides, thus:
direct adjudication of the case instead of remanding the same to the MTC. It observed SECTION 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases.Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
that since the parties have already presented their evidence on the merits of the case original jurisdiction:
before the MTC and the trial courts decision was based on these evidence, the purpose (1) x x x x
of remand, which is to afford parties an opportunity to present evidence, has been (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
served.Serrano et al are now assailing the CA decision. interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value
Issue: Did the RTC erroneously apply par. 2 of Sec. 8, Rule 40?-- YES exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred
upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts;
xxxx
We do not agree. At first glance, it appears that based on the P13,300.00 assessed
value of the subject property as declared by respondents,the RTC would have no
jurisdiction over the case. But the above-quoted provision refers to the original
The RTCs appellate jurisdiction, as contrasted to its original jurisdiction, is provided

in Section 22 of the same Act, thus:
“SECTION 22. Appellate jurisdiction.Regional Trial Courts shall exercise appellate

jurisdiction over all cases decided by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions.
Such cases shall be decided on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in
the court of origin such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties
or required by the Regional Trial Courts. The decision of the Regional Trial Courts in
such cases shall be appealable by petition for review to the Court of Appeals which
may give it due course only when the petition shows prima facie that the lower court
has committed an error of fact or law that will warrant a reversal or modification of
the decision or judgment sought to be reviewed.”
Primarily, the above quoted provision vests upon the RTC the exercise of appellate
jurisdiction over all cases decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial
jurisdictions.Clearly then, the amount involved is immaterial for purposes of the RTCs
appellate jurisdiction. All cases decided by the MTC are generally appealable to the
RTC irrespective of the amount involved.
The RTC made an exhaustive and definitive finding on the main cause of action. The
trial court is capacitated to make this finding in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction, as it would, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. Section 8, Rule 40,
by allowing the RTC to try the case even if the MTC had no jurisdiction so long as the
MTC had conducted trial on the merits, demonstrates that remand is expendable. A
remand to the MTC, therefore, has become inefficacious in view of the judgment of
the RTC. Given the sufficiency of evidence presented before it, the RTC may, as it did,
resolve the case on the merits.
Dispositive: petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP

No. 67395 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the award of attorneys fees is
DELETED. Costs against petitioners.

PBCOM V. CA
Issue:
Petitioner/s: PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS
Whether respondent Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
Respondent/s: HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. HONORIO E. GUANLAO,
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied PBCOM's petition for certiorari and
JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
mandamus on the ground that a prior motion for reconsideration is required
COURT, MAKATI CITY, BRANCH 56, TRAVELLER KIDS INC., CELY L.
GABALDON-CO AND JEANNIE L. LUGMOC
Ratio:
● In this case, PBCOM assails the RTC Order denying due course to its notice
Doctrine:
of appeal. In Neplum, Inc. v. Orbeso, SC ruled that a trial court's order
disallowing a notice of appeal, which is tantamount to a disallowance or
Facts: dismissal of the appeal itself, is not a decision or final order from which an
● Complaint for collection of a sum of money in the amount of P8,971,118.06 appeal may be taken. The suitable remedy for the aggrieved party is to elevate
was filed by PBCOM against private respondents before the RTC of Makati the matter through a special civil action under Rule 65.
City. ○ Clearly, contrary to the CA's finding, PBCOM availed itself of the
● Private respondents moved for the dismissal of the Complaint alleging that correct remedy in questioning the disallowance of its notice of
their obligation had already been paid in full and that the RTC had no appeal.
jurisdiction over the case because PBCOM failed to pay the correct docket fees. ○ Under exceptional circumstances, as when stringent application of
● September 29, 2010 - the RTC issued an Order directing PBCOM to pay the rules will result in manifest injustice, the Court may set aside
additional docket fees in the amount of P24,765.70, within fifteen days from technicalities and proceed with the appeal.
receipt of thereof. ○ Thus, the assailed RTC Order, denying due course to PBCOM's notice
● PBCOM paid the additional docket fees but filed its Compliance with the RTC of appeal on the ground that it was a wrong remedy, is a patent
only on November 11, 2010. nullity. The RTC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
● In the interim, however, the RTC issued an Order dated November 4, 2010, ● Special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 will not lie unless a motion for
dismissing PBCOM's Complaint. reconsideration is filed before the respondent court;30 there are well-defined
● November 22, 2010 - PBCOM filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated exceptions established by jurisprudence, such as
stating that it had paid the additional docket fees within the period prescribed ○ where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
by the court as evidenced by the Official Receipt attached thereto jurisdiction
● May 3, 2011 - In an Order, the RTC denied PBCOM's motion for ○ where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been
reconsideration. duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as
● May 26, 2011 - undaunted, PBCOM timely filed a Notice of Appeal. those raised and passed upon in the lower court
● June 2, 2011 - the RTC issued an Assailed Order, denying due course to ○ where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question
PBCOM's Notice of Appeal on the ground that said appeal is not the proper and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the
remedy. Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is
● Without filing a motion for reconsideration, PBCOM filed a Petition for perishable
Certiorari and Mandamus with the CA. ○ where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would
● July 31, 2014 - the CA issued the assailed Decision denying PBCOM's Petition be useless
for Certiorari and Mandamus and affirming the order of the RTC, with a ○ where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme
reason that, apart from availing itself of a wrong mode of appeal, PBCOM urgency for relief;
failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of a motion for ○ where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and
reconsideration. The CA emphasized that the filing of a motion for the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable
reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for a petition for certiorari to ○ where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
prosper. process
● August 26, 2014 - PBCOM filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid ○ where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had
Decision, but the same was denied by the CA for having been filed out of time. no opportunity to object
○ where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is
involved.
Dispositive:
In fine, the assailed RTC Order, denying due course to PBCOM's notice of appeal on the
ground that it was a wrong remedy, is a patent nullity. The RTC acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Order dated June 2, 2011 issued
by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 56 in Makati City and the assailed Decision dated
July 31, 2014 and Resolution dated May 5, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 120884, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court, Branch
56 in Makati City is DIRECTED to give due course to petitioner's Notice of Appeal dated
May 26, 2011 and to elevate the case records to the Court of Appeals for the review of
petitioner's appeal. No costs. SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V ORTIGAS AND COMPANY LIMITED o If the appeal of the RTC decision raises only pure questions of law, it must, in all
PARTNERSHIP cases, be taken to the SC on a petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45.
On the other hand, an appeal by notice of appeal from the decision of the RTC in the
Respondent/s: Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership
exercise of its original jurisdiction to the CA is proper if the appellant raises questions
of fact or both questions of fact and questions of law.
Doctrine: Orders denying motions for reconsideration are not always interlocutory
● There is a question of law when the appellant raises an issue as to what law
orders. A motion for reconsideration may be considered a final decision, subject to an
shall be applied on a given set of facts.
appeal, if "it puts an end to a particular matter," leaving the court with nothing else to
● There is a question of fact when the court is required to examine the truth or
do but to execute the decision.
falsity of the facts presented.
Facts: The sole issue raised by petitioner Republic of the Philippines to the Court of Appeals
● Respondent Ortigas filed with the RTC of Pasig a petition for authority to sell is whether respondent Ortigas’ property should be conveyed to it only by donation, in
to the government a portion of its lot, pursuant to the request of DPWH, to be accordance with Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
used for the road widening of the C-5 Flyover. ● This question involves the interpretation and application of the provision. It
● RTC granted the petition. However, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, does not require the Court of Appeals to examine the truth or falsity of the
represented by the OSG, filed an opposition, alleging that respondent Ortigas' facts presented. Neither does it invite a review of the evidence. The issue raised
property can only be conveyed by way of donation to the government, citing before the Court of Appeals was, therefore, a question purely of law.
Section 50 of the Property Registration Decree. Hence, it then filed a motion ● The proper mode of appeal is through a petition for review under Rule 45.
for reconsideration of the RTC order granting the petition; Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the appeal on this
● RTC denied. Republic of the Philippines then filed a notice of appeal. ground.
However, the CA dismissed the appeal on the ground that an order or
judgment denying a motion for reconsideration is not appealable. Nevertheless, we take time to emphasize that Rule 41, Section 1 is based on the implied
● Petitioner Republic of the Philippines then filed a motion for reconsideration premise in the same section that the judgment or order does not completely dispose of
of the CA’s resolution. It contends that Rule 37, Section 9 of the Rules of the case. What it prohibits is an appeal taken from an interlocutory order. An
Procedure contemplates as non-appealable only those orders which are not interlocutory order or judgment, unlike a final order or judgment, does "not completely
yet final. The October 3, 2001 order (RTC’s order denying Republic’s MR) was dispose of the case [because it leaves to the court] something else to be decided upon."
already final as it confirmed the June 11, 2001 judgment (RTC granting
Ortigas’ petition) of the court. Orders denying motions for reconsideration are not always interlocutory orders. A
● CA denied the motion for reconsideration on the ground of lack of motion for reconsideration may be considered a final decision, subject to an appeal, if
jurisdiction, ruling that even if the order denying the motion for "it puts an end to a particular matter," leaving the court with nothing else to do but to
reconsideration was appealable, the appeal was still dismissible for lack of execute the decision.
jurisdiction because petitioner Republic of the Philippines raised only a
question of law. The trial court’s order denying petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ motion for
reconsideration of the decision granting respondent Ortigas the authority to sell its
Issue: WON the CA gravely erred in denying petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ property to the government was not an interlocutory order because it completely
appeal based on technicalities -- -NO disposed of a particular matter. An appeal from it would not cause delay in the
administration of justice. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ appeal to the Court of
Ratio: Appeals, however, was properly dismissed because the former used the wrong mode of
Appeals from the RTC to the CA under Rule 41 must raise both questions of fact and appeal.
law.
o appeals taken from the RTC to the CA raising only pure questions of law are not Dispositive:
reviewable by the CA. In which case, the appeal shall not be transferred to the
appropriate court. Instead, it shall be dismissed outright.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED. The trial court is directed to proceed with the case with due and deliberate
dispatch in accordance with this decision.

detainer. It is equally settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, an allegation that
ROSS RICA VS ONG the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed
sufficient, without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. Hence, the phrase
Petitioner/s: ROSS RICA SALES CENTER, INC. and JUANITO KING & SONS,
"unlawful withholding" has been held to imply possession on the part of defendant,
INC. (RRSC & JKI)
which was legal in the beginning, having no other source than a contract, express or
implied, and which later expired as a right and is being withheld by defendant.
Respondent/s: SPOUSES GERRY ONG and ELIZABETH ONG (SPOUSES ONG)
Series of SALES transactions: SPOUSES ONG -> MANDAUE PRIMERR -> RRSC
In the subject complaint, RRSC & JKI alleged that they are the registered owners of the
& JKI
lots covered by TCT Nos. 36466, 36467 and 36468. By their implied tolerance, they
have allowed SPOUSES ONG, the former owners of the properties, to remain therein.
Doctrine: The filing of the Motion for Reconsideration may be deemed as an
Nonetheless, they eventually sent a letter to SPOUSES ONG asking that the latter vacate
effective withdrawal of the defective Notice of Appeal. Since the filing of the notice
the said lots. SPOUSES ONG refused, thereby depriving RRSC & JKI of possession of
of appeal is erroneous, it is considered as if no appeal was interposed.
the lots. Clearly, the complaint establishes the basic elements of an unlawful detainer
case, certainly sufficient for the purpose of vesting jurisdiction over it in the MTC.
Facts:
MANDAUE PRIME had acquired the properties from the spouses ONG through a Deed 2. NO. Rule 42 governs the mode of appeal applicable in this case. Sec. 1 provides:
of Absolute Sale dated July 14,, 1994. However this latter deed of sale and the transfers Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. -- A party desiring to appeal from a decision
of title consequential thereto were subsequently sought to be annulled by spouses ONG of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified
in a complaint filed on Feb 13 1005 before the MAndaue RTC. Later on RRSC, and JKI petition for review with the CA, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the
had acquired the lands from Mandaue Prime Estate Realty through a sale. corresponding docket and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00 for
costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a copy of the
MANDAUE PRIME wrote SPOUSES ONG informing them of its intent to use the lots petition. The petition shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of
and asking them to vacate within thirty (30) days from receipt of the letter. But the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial
SPOUSES ONG refused to vacate, thereby unlawfully withholding possession of said or reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon proper motion and the
lots. HENCE, a complaint for ejectment filed by RRSC & JKI (new owners) against payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs
SPOUSES ONG, before the MTC of Mandaue City. before the expiration of the reglementary period, the CA may grant an additional period
of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension
MTC and RTC ruling: Rodering Spouses ONG to vacate the premises in question and shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen
to peacefully turn over possession thereof to RRSC and JKI. (15) days.
CA ruling: the MTC had no jurisdiction over said case as there was no contract between Since the unlawful detainer case was filed with the MTC and affirmed by the RTC, RRSC
the parties, express or implied, as would qualify the same as one for unlawful detainer. & JKI should have filed a Petition for Review with the CA and not a Notice of Appeal
with the RTC. However, we consider this to have been remedied by the timely filing of
Issue: the Motion for Reconsideration on the following day. Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of
1. WON the Complaint satisfies the jurisdictional requirements for a case of Court allows the withdrawal of appeal at any time, as a matter of right, before the filing
unlawful detainer properly cognizable by the MTC. YES. of the appellee’s brief. Applying this rule contextually, the filing of the Motion for
2. WON the RTC decision has already become final and executory at the time the Reconsideration may be deemed as an effective withdrawal of the defective Notice of
petition for review was filed. NO. Appeal.
Ratio: Perforce, the period of appeal was tolled by the Motion for Reconsideration and started
to run again from the receipt of the order denying the Motion for Reconsideration. A
1. YES, MTC/RTC HAD JURISDICTION. RATIO: The presence of a contract is not a Motion for Additional Time to File the Petition was likewise filed with the CA. Counting
requisite for unlawful detainer case, the allegation in the complaint that there was fifteen (15) days from receipt of the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration and the
unlawful withholding of possession is sufficient to make out a case for unlawful
ten (10)-day request for additional period, it is clear that SPOUSES ONG filed their
Petition for Review on time.
RRSC & JKI invoke to the ruling in People v. De la Cruz[7] that once a notice of appeal
is filed, it cannot be validly withdrawn to give way to a motion for reconsideration. The
factual circumstances in the two cases are different.
De la Cruz is a criminal case, governed by criminal procedure. Section 3, Rule 122 of

the Rules of Court provides that the proper mode of appeal from a decision of the RTC
is a notice of appeal and an appeal is deemed perfected upon filing of the notice of
appeal.
In the case at bar, a petition for review before the CA is the proper mode of appeal from
a decision of the RTC. Since the filing of the notice of appeal is erroneous, it is
considered as if no appeal was interposed.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
6 January 1998 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision dated 24 April 1996 of
the Municipal Trial Court of Mandaue City REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Costs
against respondents.

VALENCIA VS CA 11. Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., by authority of the President,
affirmed the order of the DAR.
Petitioner/s: VICTOR G. VALENCIA
12. Valencia then brought his case to the Court of Appeals.
Respondent/s: COURT OF APPEALS, HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., as
13. Court of Appeals dismissed the case on a technical ground, i.e., that his
Executive Secretary, HON. ERNESTO GARILAO, Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
appeal was filed out of time.
CRISOSTOMO M. CORPIN, Regional Director, DAR Region VII, SANTOS GARGAYA,
a. that petitioner should have filed with the CA a petition for review
JULIANO MAGDAYAO, CRESCENCIANO FRIAS, FEDERICO JARE, ROSENDO
within 15 days from receipt of the order of the DAR Secretary
LOBRESCO, ERNESTO LOBRESCO, FELICIANO LOBRESCO, CATALINO MANTAC,
pursuant to Sec. 54 of R. A. No. 6657 and Supreme Court Adm.
VICTORIANO MONTE-FALCON, FRANCISCO OBANG, AMBROSIO SEMILLANO,
Circ. No. 1-95, instead of elevating the case to the Office of the
ROGELIO TAMAYO and EDILBERTO LOBRESCO
President pursuant to DAR Memo. Circ. No. 3, series of 1994.
b. Hence, according to the Court of Appeals, the petition of Valencia
Doctrine: An administrative decision must first be appealed to administrative
was filed out of time.
superiors up to the highest level before it may be elevated to a court of justice for review.
14. Public respondents aver
The power of judicial review may therefore be exercised only if an appeal is first made
a. that EO 292, the legal basis of DAR Memo, refers to the procedure
by the highest administrative body in the hierarchy of the executive branch of
for administrative appeals from an agency to the Department Head
government.
which in this case is the DAR through its Secretary.
b. That there is no provision for appeal to the Office of the President
Facts: since in the administrative structure the Secretary of Agrarian
1. Victor Valencia leased the subject land to Andres Flores, who in turn Reform is the alter ego of the President
designated several people to cultivate the land. c. that EO 292 cites the finality of the decision of the appellate agency
2. Some of these designated people, Respondents herein, applied for Certificates without providing for a further appeal
of Land Transfer (CLT) under the Operation Land Transfer Program. 15. Valencia contends that
3. After the expiration of the lease with Flores, Valencia ordered the respondents a. an appeal to the Office of the President from the Secretary of
to vacate, but instead they continued to cultivate the land. Agrarian Reform is proper under the doctrine of exhaustion of
4. Valencia filed a letter of protest with the Minister of Agrarian Reform to take administrative remedies
back the actual possession of his property
5. While the investigation was being conducted by the DAR pursuant to Issue: WHETHER an appeal to the Office of the President from the Department
Valencia’s letter of protest, but before it could be terminated, the DAR issued Secretary pursuant to DAR Memo, is proper under the doctrine of exhaustion of
the questioned CLTs to respondents. administrative remedies? YES
6. Valencia filed a second letter of protest and requested an investigation and
subsequent cancellation of the CLTs.
7. An administrative investigation was conducted by the DAR Hearing Officer, Ratio:
Atty. Vilmo Ampong. 1. Where two (2) rules on the same subject, or on related subjects, are apparently
8. Atty. Ampong, in his Investigation Report and Recommendations found that in conflict with each other, they are to be reconciled by construction, so far as
the right of private respondents to the land ceased upon the termination of the may be, on any fair and reasonable hypothesis.
lease contracts. Atty. Ampong further confirmed that Valencia did not receive 2. The purpose of the DAR Memo is to provide a mode of appeal for matters not
anything from respondents as consideration for tilling his land. Consequently, falling within the jurisdictional ambit of the DARAB under R. A. No. 6657 and
Atty. Ampong recommended that the CLTs issued to respondents be correct technical errors of the administrative agency. In such exceptional
cancelled. cases, the Department Secretary has established a mode of appeal from the
9. DAR Regional Office, notwithstanding the Investigation Report and Department of Agrarian Reform to the Office of the President as a plain,
Recommendations, dismissed Valencia's protest. speedy, adequate and inexpensive remedy in the ordinary course of law. This
10. This prompted Valencia to appeal to the Office of the President under would enable the Office of the President, through the Executive Secretary, to
authority of DAR Memo. Circ. No. 3, series of 1994, arguing that the review technical matters within the expertise of the administrative machinery
Secretary of Agrarian Reform erred in considering respondents as tenants.
before judicial review can be resorted to by way of an appeal to the Court of
Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.
3. The purpose of the SC Adm. Circ. now embodied in Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, is to invoke the constitutional power of judicial review over
quasi-judicial agencies, such as the DAR and the Office of the President in
other cases by providing for an appeal to the Court of Appeals.
4. In this case, the CA ruled that the appeal before it was filed beyond the
reglementary period as petitioner appealed to the Office of the President, and
not to the Court of Appeals, where it should have been brought.
5. In Tan v. Director of Forestry this Court ruled that even if the respondent was
a Department Secretary, an appeal to the President was proper where the law
expressly provided for exhaustion.
6. The DAR Memo. expressly provides for an appeal to the Office of the
President.
7. Thus, Valencia filed on 24 November 1993 a timely appeal by way of a petition
for review under Rule 43 to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the
Office of the President, which was received on 11 November 1993, well within
the 15-day reglementary period.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32669 dated 27 July 1995 and its Resolution dated
22 September 1995 denying the Motion for Reconsideration are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE,and a new one is entered.

DWIKARNA VS DOMINGO b) Since petitioner and his co-accused were charged with violation of
the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, and were
Petitioner/s: Agus Dwikarna
ordered detained by the Bureau of Immigration, their temporary
Respondent/s: Hon. Andrea D. Domingo, Commissioner, Bureau Of Immigration,
release could not be effected.
Gen. Leandro Mendoza, Chief, Philippine National Police, Gen. Jaime G. Caringal,
6) Aggrieved, petitioner and his co-accused led a petition for habeas corpus
Chief, Intelligence Group, Philippine National Police, Ronaldo P. Ledesma, Chief,
at the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 70045
Bureau of Special Inquiry, and The Board Of Commissioners, Bureau Of Immigration
a) Alleging in the main that petitioner and his co-accused were "illegally
arrested and illegally restrained of their personal liberty in violation
Doctrine: Certiorari is not a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. An appeal is a
of their human rights."
statutory privilege and it may only be exercised in the manner provided by law.
7) While the case was pending resolution by the Court of Appeals, the
information against Tamsil Lin Rung and Abdul Balfas in Criminal Case No.
Facts: 02-0576 was withdrawn.
1) Agus Dwikarna and two other Indonesian nationals, namely, Abdul Jamal a) Consequently, Lin Rung and Balfas were released from custody and
Balfas and Hamsid Lin Rung, were at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, the deportation case with respect to them were likewise dismissed.
checking in their luggage for x-ray screening in preparation for their departure b) That left Dwikarna as the sole petitioner in the case.
for Bangkok, Thailand. 8) The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for habeas corpus:
a) The police authorities apprehended them when they were found to a) Without passing on the legality of the arrest of petitioner
be in possession of two pieces oval-shaped C-4 plastic explosives and DWIKARNA, but even assuming arguendo that his arrest was illegal,
five pieces detonating cords. supervening events bar his subsequent release. . . . For
2) The following day, an information was led against petitioner and his two DWIKARNA had already been charged by the BI for
companions in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 117, for violation violation of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
of PD 1866 (illegal possession of rearms and ammunition), as amended. amended.
a) The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 02-0576. Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his
3) A charge sheet was led by the special prosecutor of the Bureau of Immigration detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
against petitioner and his two co-accused,
a) Docketed as D.C. No. ADD No. 02-004, for violation of section His remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly
37(a)(7) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. issued.
b) Office and Inquest Prosecutor Bernabe Augustus C. Solis ordered
their detention with the PNP Intelligence Group. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released
4) The charge sheet was amended and petitioner and his co- accused were further had been charged before any court.
charged with violation of section 37(a)(8) of the same Act.
a) Being members of the Islamic extremist movements particularly the The term 'court' includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau
Jema'ah Islamiah and Mejahidoon Indonesia, they are involved in of Immigration. (Rodriguez v. Bonifacio, 344 SCRA 524, 541 [2000], Emphasis
riots in Indonesia and organized (sic), advocates, or teaches the supplied).
assault of public o cial and destruction of public and private property 9) Dwikarna then moved for the dismissal of the amended charge sheet in D.C.
and overthrow of organized government, thus they are undesirable No. ADD No. 02-004.
aliens. a) He also filed a motion for the early resolution of the case.
5) Meanwhile, petitioner and his co-accused were allowed to post bail for their b) Both motions are still pending resolution by the Board of
provisional liberty, per the release order dated March 22, 2002, issued by the Commissioners.
trial court in Criminal Case No. 02-0576. 10) Dwikarna then led the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and
a) However, the order stated that the release was subject to the mandamus,
condition that "there exist(ed) no other legal cause to the effect that a) which prays for the issuance of a mandatory injunction, the
they remain confined under your custody." petitioner's release with finality from his detention as well as a writ

of prohibition enjoining absolutely and perpetually the proceedings b)Unfortunately, despite the availability of an appeal, petitioner
in BSI-D.C. No. ADD-02-251. pursued the wrong mode by filing directly with us a petition for
11) The trial court convicted petitioner of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. review on certiorari with mandamus in G.R. No. 155575.
02-0576 for illegal possession of explosive materials. c) Said petition was denied outright.
12) Dwikarna moved for a reconsideration of the decision and the reopening of d) Dwikarna’s conviction attained finality when the period to file an
the case for new trial. appeal lapsed.
a) Both motions were denied. e) He cannot now come to us through this petition for certiorari,
b) Dwikarna failed to appeal from said denials. i) because certiorari is not a substitute for the lost remedy of
c) His conviction became final and executory and was entered in appeal.
the book of entries of judgment. ii) An appeal is a statutory privilege and it may only be
d) Dwikarna moved to reconsider the entry of judgment but his motion exercised in the manner provided by law.
was denied. 3) On the deportation case against him in D.C. ADD 02-004, resort to court is
e) He appealed said denial directly to the SC. proper only after a decision is rendered by the Board of Commissioner of the
f) His appeal was dismissed outright for being the wrong mode of Bureau of Immigration.
appeal. a) The Bureau is the agency that can best determine whether petitioner
g) The trial court then directed the Director of the National Bilibid violated certain provisions of the Philippine Immigration Act of
Prisons, Bureau of Corrections, to implement the decision in 1940, as amended.
Criminal Case No. 02-0576 and ordered Dwikarna incarcerated at b) In this jurisdiction, courts will not interfere in matters which are
the National Bilibid Prisons. addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted
with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical
Issue: WoN Dwikarna is entitled to the extraordinary remedies of certiorari, knowledge and training of such agencies.
prohibition and mandamus--NO. c) If petitioner is dissatisfied with the decision of the Board of
Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration, he can move for its
Ratio: reconsideration.
1) The extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are i) If his motion is denied, then he can elevate his case by way
available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate of a petition for review before the Court of Appeals,
remedy in the ordinary course of law. pursuant to Section 1, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
a) The writ of certiorari does not lie where an appeal may be taken or Procedure.
where another adequate remedy is available for the correction of the
error. Dispositive:
b) Likewise, mandamus is granted only in cases where no other remedy
is available which is sufficient to afford redress. WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
c) Furthermore, a writ of mandamus will not generally lie from one The prayer for a temporary mandatory injunction for the release of petitioner is likewise
branch of the government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious DENIED.
reason that neither is inferior to the other.
2) As correctly argued by the Office of the Solicitor General, Dwikarna is not SO ORDERED.
without "other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law."
a) Before coming to us, Dwikarna should have first appealed his
conviction in Criminal Case No. 02-0576 to the Court of Appeals by
way of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court.

CORTES V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
ISSUE/S:
Petitioner: AMANDO P. CORTES
1. W/N petitioner committed procedural error in filing the petition for review?
Respondents: OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS), VICTORY M.
YES
FERNANDEZ, JULIO E. SUCGANG and NILO IGTANLOC
RATIO:
DOCTRINE: Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989
1. Petitioner misconstrued Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 or the
insofar as it provided for appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 from the decisions or
Ombudsman Act of 1989 and disregarded prevailing jurisprudence.
orders of the Ombudsman in administrative cases, had been declared
2. Section 27 provides, in part, that: In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders,
unconstitutional by this Court as early as in the case of Fabian v. Desierto.
directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the
Jurisprudence accords a different treatment with respect to an appeal in a criminal
Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the
case filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and pronounced that the remedy of an
written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for
aggrieved party in criminal complaints before the Ombudsman is to file with this
reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
· This provision, insofar as it provided for appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 from
the decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in administrative cases, had been declared
FACTS: unconstitutional by this Court as early as in the case of Fabian v. Desierto.
1. In his Complaint-Affidavit filed on 28 November 2006, Amando Cortes · The Court ruled in Fabian that appeals from decisions of the Office of the
charged respondents with violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, or the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and Misconduct. Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43, in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted
2. He alleged that during the period of 29 March 2006 to 1 April 2006, in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
respondents utilized a heavy equipment grader owned by the Province of Aklan in 3. Jurisprudence accords a different treatment with respect to an appeal in a criminal
levelling a portion of his land. He also claimed that the portion of the land destroyed case filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and pronounced that the remedy of an
has an area of 1,125 square meters and that several fruit trees were destroyed. aggrieved party in criminal complaints before the Ombudsman is to file with this Court
3. Cortes impleaded Fernandez for the latter's failure to ascertain from the a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Barangay Captain whether the roads sought to be levelled were barangay roads, and for 4. Considering that the case at bar was a consolidation of an administrative and a
issuing a driver's trip ticket to the Grader Operator. criminal complaint, petitioner had the option to either file a petition for review under
4. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) recommended the dismissal of the cases Rule 43 with the Court of Appeals or directly file a certiorari petition under Rule 65
due to the fact that two (2) other cases involving the same parties and issues had already before this Court. Neither of these two remedies was resorted to by petitioner.
been filed by petitioner. 5. By availing of a wrong remedy, this petition merits an outright dismissal. For failing
5. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the Consolidated Evaluation to overcome the procedural hurdle and for lack of merit, the petition must be denied.
Report. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) denied the motion for reconsideration.
6. Petitioner takes the appeal directly to this Court, via a petition for review on PETITION DENIED
certiorari , pursuant to Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act, assailing the denial of his
motion for reconsideration by the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas)
7. Petitioner claims that the complaints adverted to were filed by one Hernando
Cortes and they pertained to another parcel of land that was also graded and levelled
by respondents. Petitioner maintains that the affected portion of his land is covered by
an original certificate of title and that a document such as the inventory of barangay
roads upon which the authority to scrape and level barangay roads is based should have
been first annotated as lien to petitioner's certificate of title.
8. Igtanloc denied levelling and grading a portion of petitioner's land. According
to Igtanloc, he only followed the contours of the existing barangay road and did not
widen or create a new one. Fernandez asserts that he was merely acting in his official
capacity and exercising his duty in issuing a driver's trip ticket to Igtanloc.
FABIAN VS DESIERTO 1. Whether or not administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme
Petitioner/s: TERESITA G. FABIAN
Court. – NO.
Respondent/s: HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as ombudsman; HON.
JESUS F. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon; and NESTOR
Ratio:
V. AGUSTIN
● No. Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to
this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
Doctrine:
disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30,
Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate
It has been generally held that rules or statutes involving a transfer of cases from one
jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently
court to another, are procedural and remedial merely and that, as such, they are
presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which, as
applicable to actions pending at the time the statute went into effect or, in the case at
correctly explained in First Leparto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals,
bar, when its invalidity was declared.
et al. was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed
under its appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of
Accordingly, even from the standpoint of jurisdiction ex hypothesi the validity of the
legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the
transfer of appeals in said cases to the Court of Appeals can be sustained.
Court.
● Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now
Facts: required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review,
● PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction project under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court which
including those under the FMED. was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of
● Later, misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between the appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
parties.
● Fabian tried to terminate their relationship but Agustin refused and resisted Dispositive:
her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989),
intimidation and threats. together with Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of
● She eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case against him in a the Office of the Ombudsman), and any other provision of law or issuance
letter-complaint dated July 24, 1995. implementing the aforesaid Act and insofar as they provide for appeals in
● A complaint sought the dismissal of Agustin for violation of Section 19, R.A. administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme
No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 36 of P.D. No. 807 (Civil Court, are hereby declared INVALID and of no further force and effect.
Service Decree), with an ancillary prayer for his preventive suspension.
● The case later led to an appeal to the Ombudsman - who inhibited himself - The instant petition is hereby referred and transferred to the Court of Appeals for final
and transferred the case to the Deputy Ombudsman. disposition, with said petition to be considered by the Court of Appeals pro hac vice as
● The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and in the order exonerated the private a petition for review under Rule 43, without prejudice to its requiring the parties to
respondents from the administrative charges. submit such amended or supplemental pleadings and additional documents or records
● Fabian elevated the case to the SC, arguing that Section 27 of Republic Act No. as it may deem necessary and proper.
6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) that all administrative disciplinary cases,
orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be
appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10)
days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or
denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
Issue:

SEVILLA TRADING VS AVA ○ Jan 19, 2001 - filed before CA a Motion for Time to File Petition for
Certiorari
Petitioner/s: Sevilla Trading Company (Sevilla)
○ Feb 19, 2001 - filed before the CA a petition for certiorari under R65
Respondent/s: A.V.A. Tomas Semana (AVA), Sevilla Trading Workers Union
for the nullification of the decision of the arbitrator.
Super (Union)
● CA denied; also ruled that the proper remedy was a petition for review under
R43.
Doctrine: R65 is an independent action that cannot be availed of as a substitute for
the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that under R45 (R43 here),
Issue: W/N the proper remedy was petition for review, not certiorari - YES
especially if such loss or lapse was occasioned by one’s own neglect or error in the
choice of remedies.
Ratio:
● R43: SECTION 1. Scope. This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or
Facts: final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final
● For 2-3 years prior to 1999, in Sevilla’s computation of the 13th-month pay of orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the
its employees, it added to the base figure the amount of other benefits beyond exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are... and
the basic pay: overtime premium, holiday pay, night premium, leave pay, etc. voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.
○ Sevilla entrusted the preparation of payroll including the ● Certiorari under R65 is not, and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, where
computation and payment of the 13th-month pay and other benefits the latter remedy is available, as it was in this case.
to its office staff. ○ Sevilla failed to file an appeal within the fifteen-day reglementary
● When it changed the person in charge of the payroll, and after audit was period from its notice of the adverse decision of AVA.
conducted, it discovered the error of including non-basic pay in the base figure ○ It received a copy of the decision of AVA on Dec 20, 2000, and should
for the 13th-month pay. have filed its appeal under R43 on or before January 4, 2001.
○ Cited RR implementing PD 851 (13th-Month Pay Law): ○ Instead, it filed on Jan 19, 2001 a Manifestation and Motion for Time
■ Basic salary shall include all remunerations or earnings to File Petition for Certiorari, and on Feb 19, 2001, it filed a petition
paid by an employer to an employee for services rendered for certiorari under R65.
but may not include cost-of-living allowances granted ○ Clearly, Sevilla had a remedy of appeal but failed to use it.
pursuant to P.D. No. 525 or Letter of Instruction No. 174, ● R65 is an independent action that cannot be availed of as a substitute for the
profit-sharing payments, and all allowances and monetary lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that under R45 (R43 here),
benefits which are not considered or integrated as part of especially if such loss or lapse was occasioned by one’s own neglect or error in
the regular or basic salary of the employee at the time of the the choice of remedies.
promulgation of the Decree on December 16, 1975. ● The decision of AVA had become final when Sevilla filed its petition for
● Sevilla changed its computation of the 13th-month pay. certiorari - particularly upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal.
○ 13th-month pay = net basic pay ○ CA was correct in that it no longer had appellate jurisdiction to alter
○ It now excluded from the base figure the benefits beyond the basic or nullify the AVA’s decision.
pay.
○ Thus, the new computation reduced the employees’ 13th-month pay. Dispositive:
● The Union contested and having failed to resolve, it submitted the issue to the IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Semana of the National Conciliation and CA-G.R. SP No. 63086 dated 27 November 2001 and its Resolution dated 06 March
Mediation Board for consideration. 2002 are hereby AFFIRMED.
● Sevilla: in adjusting its computation, it merely rectified the mistake its
personnel committed in the previous years Notes:
● AVA Semana: in favor of Union, ordered to include again ● Assuming that R65 was the proper remedy, still there was no grave abuse since
AVA was correct that Sevilla’s stance of mistake in the computation was
● Dec 20, 2000 - Sevilla received the copy of the decision unmeritorious.
○ Sevilla failed to adduce other relevant evidence.
○ It only appended to its petition a copy of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement and an alleged corrected computation of the 13th-month
pay.
○ There was no explanation on why its inclusion of non-basic benefits
in the base figure was made by mistake, despite the clarity of statute
and jurisprudence at that time.

DE CHAVEZ VS OMBUDSMAN
Issue:
Petitioner/s: Ernesto De Chavez, Porfirio Ligaya, Rolando Lontok, Rolando Lontok
1. WON ombudsman committed GADALEJ in finding petitioner’s already liable
Jr., Gloria Mendoza
for cim offenses? NO
Respondent/s: Office of the Ombudsman and Nora Magnaye
2. WON ombudsman committed GADALEJ when it did not dismiss the two
separate but identical crim complaints of private respondents? NO
Doctrine: Fabian v. Desierto - Appeals from decisions of the public respondent
in administrative liability cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under
Ratio:
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Consequently, the
1. Petitioners contended that Ombudsman categorically stated that they are
administrative aspect of the present petition should be referred to the Court of
liable for the crim acts even though no discussion of probable cause was stated
Appeals for proper disposition. (Read the latter part)
(2005 resolution) - meaning that the ombudsman already ruled on their guilt
● The Court ruled that the Ombudsman is empowered by the Constitution and
Facts: RA 6770 to investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any
● Magnaye filed an administrative complaint against the petitioners based on person, any act or omission of any public employee or official - it may conduct
violation of Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and preliminary investigation
Employees (grave misconduct, oppression, prejudicial conduct, falsification ● The Ombudsman enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of
of official docs, dishonesty, neglect of duty official functions acc to Revised Rules of evidence
● Petitioners did the ff acc to the respondents: ● Thus when the ombudsman used the words “liable for” in his 2005 resolution,
- Collected proceeds of graduation fees of graduating class of 2000- he is presumed to have used these within the sense of limited power vested in
2001 without issuing an official receipts, did not conduct public him by the law and jurisprudence
bidding for the rental of caps and gowns ● Nowhere in the resolution that “guilty beyond reasonable doubt” was stated.
- Collected unauthorized fees ● Ombudsman resolution was based on private respondent sworn statements
- Conspired in designating close relatives to admin positions and notarized affidavits
- Made appointments without approval of BSU board
- Prevented the elected president of federation of supreme student 2. In determining the presence of forum shopping, there must be identity of Parties,
assembly to sit as member of the board rights or causes of action, reliefs sought
- Increase rates of fees without approval of BSU board ● Although the facts and circumstances are essentially the same, there is a
- Designated faculty members without any authority under the law, different cause of action
Collected notarial fees without issuing official receipts, Did not ● The first complaint was administrative based on grave misconduct and
renew the contract of 2 faculty members oppression (RA 6713) while the second complaint was a crim case violation of
● Private respondent filed complaint imputing crim liability to the BSU officials RA 3019
under RA 3019 ● One final and significant observation. This Court noted that the present
● Petitioners denied the allegations above petition seeks the annulment of public respondent’s Supplemental Resolution
● The findings of the Ombudsman were that there is a violation of the law for an dated 12 July 2005 on the criminal (OMB-1-01-1083-K) and administrative
aggregate understatement of cash and trust liabllity by P3M therefore they (OMB-1-01-1036-K) complaints of private respondent. Procedurally, the
are”liable” remedy of an aggrieved party in criminal complaints before the
● There is a failure to furnish certified statement of collections of grad fees and public respondent where the latter found probable cause is to file
related disbursements with this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Thus, we gave
● Ombudsman recommendation is to require the accountable officer to issue due course and resolved the issue of finding of probable cause in the criminal
receipts and deposit the collections in an authorized govt bank and enjoin the aspect of the instant petition.
accountant to record in the books the accounts of the college all collections ● This Court, however, cannot and will not pass judgment on the administrative
and disbursements liability of petitioners.
● Private respondent also filed a complaint accused the petitioners grave Dispositive:
oppression and harassments for giving her unsatisfactory performance ratings
DAGAN V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN Issue: WoN the CA erred in dismissing Dagan’s petition for certiorari under Rule 65
for being the incorrect mode of appeal? NO.
Petitioner/s: William Dagan
Ratio:
Respondent/s: Office of the Ombudsman, represented by Hon. Rogelio A. Ringpis,
● According to Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act (read notes), the SC said that
Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II, Jaime Dilag Y Agoncillo, Eduardo Jose
where the respondent is absolved of the charge, the decision shall be final and
Y Bautista, Vergel Cruz Y Aquino, Eduardo Domingo Y Cosculluela, Rogelio Tandiama
unappealable. Although the provision does not mention absolution, it can be
Y Arespacochaga, Reynaldo Fernando Y Galang, And Romeo Buencamino Y Francisco
inferred that since decisions imposing light penalties are final and
unappealable, with greater reason should decisions absolving the respondent
Doctrine: The decision of the OMB may be reviewed, modified or reversed via
of the charge be final and unappealable.
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on a finding that it had no
● This inference is validated by Section 7, Rule III of the the Rules of Procedure
jurisdiction over the complaint, or of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
of the OMB, to wit:
lack of jurisdiction. Rule 65 may be filed before the CA or the SC provided there is a
○ SEC. 7. Finality of decision. – Where the respondent is absolved of
clear showing of GADALEJ.
the charge and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is
public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one
Facts: month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be
● Petitioner Dagan filed a complaint-affidavit before the Office of the final and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision shall become
Ombudsman (OMB) against respondents for violation of Anti-Graft and final after the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the
Corrupt Practices Act; malversation; violation of the Code of Conduct and respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for
Ethical Standards of Public Officials and Employees; falsification of public certiorari shall have been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27 of
document; dishonesty and grave misconduct. RA 6770.
● The OMB’s Preliminary Investigation and Administrative Adjudication ● It was thus clarified that there are 2 instances where a decision,
Bureau rendered a Decision absolving respondents of charges of grave resolution or order of the OMB arising from an administrative case
misconduct, oppression, dishonesty, serious irregularities and violation of becomes final and unappealable: (1) where the respondent is absolved
laws. of the charge; and (2) in case of conviction, where the penalty imposed is
● Dagan filed a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation but on 25 November public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a
2005, the OMB denied the motion for lack of merit. fine equivalent to one month salary.
● Dagan then elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari under ● In this case, the respondents were absolved of the charges against them by the
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. OMB. Such decision is final and unappealable.
● The CA dismissed the petition for failure of petitioner to avail of the correct ● Petitioner’s remedy as ruled by the SC in Republic v. Francisco:
mode of appeal. ○ Decisions of administrative or quasi- administrative agencies which
● The CA in citing Fabian v. Hon. Desierto ruled that since the assailed issuances are declared by law final and unappealable are subject to judicial
of the Ombudsman are administrative in nature, the proper remedy is review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of gross
through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law.
Procedure. ○ When such administrative or quasi-judicial bodies grossly
● Dagan sought the reconsideration of the Resolution but it was denied on 6 misappreciate evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary
August 2008. conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse the factual findings.
● Dagan’s argument: The CA erred in dismissing his petition for certiorari. He ○ Thus, the decision of the OMB may be reviewed, modified or reversed
contends that the Fabian case applies only to a situation where the decision of via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on a
the OMB is that of conviction. finding that it had no jurisdiction over the complaint, or of grave
○ In case of exoneration, Dagan asserts that under Section 27 of the abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
Ombudsman Act, the decision is final, executory and unappealable. ● Considering that a special civil action for Certiorari is within the concurrent
Petitioner maintains that his only recourse to reverse and nullify the original jurisdiction of the SC and the CA, such petition should be initially
same is by way of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. filed with the CA in observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

● It is an established policy that a direct invocation of the SC’s original
jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special,
important and compelling reasons, clearly and specifically spelled out in the
petition.
● So, while Dagan employed the correct mode of review in this case, i.e., a special
civil action for certiorari before the CA, he failed to show grave abuse of
discretion committed by the OMB. Hence, the petition must fail.
Dagan seeks to refute the factual findings of the OMB.

● Basic is the rule that the findings of fact of the OMB are conclusive when
supported by substantial evidence and are accorded due respect and weight,
especially when, as in this case, they are affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
● It is only when there is grave abuse of discretion by the Ombudsman that a
review of factual findings may aptly be made.
● In reviewing administrative decisions, it is beyond the province of this Court
to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or
otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency with
respect to the sufficiency of evidence. It is not the function of this Court to
analyze and weigh the parties evidence all over again except when there is
serious ground to believe that a possible miscarriage of justice would thereby
result.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Notes:
Ombudsman Act: SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. – (1) All
provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and
executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall
be entertained only on any of the following grounds:
(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or
decision;
(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the
movant. The motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days from
filing: provided, that only one motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.

EDILLO VS DULPINA ○ They moved to reconsider the dismissal, to amend the petition, and
to admit their First Amended Petition. The CA denied the motions
Petitioner/s: SPS. HEBER & CHARLITA EDILLO
noting that the amended petition did not correct the infirmity of the
Respondent/s: SPS. NORBERTO & DESIDERIA DULPINA
original petition.
● Hence this petition under Rule 45 of the Rule of Court
Doctrine: The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process;
○ CA’s outright dismissal of the petition was unwarranted since the
it is a mere statutory privilege that may be exercised only in the manner and strictly
Petition for Review and the Amended Petition sufficiently recited the
in accordance with the provisions of law allowing the appeal. However, the right to
factual background of the case.
appeal is an essential part of the system of judicial processes, and courts should
○ the annexes to the original and amended petitions, consisting of the
proceed with caution in order not to deprive a party of the right to appeal.
Complaint, the Answer, the other pleadings, and the MCTC and RTC
Decisions, also contain this factual background. A relaxation of
Facts: technical rules is justified by the merits of the case the RTC had no
● Spouses Dulpina filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry against Spouses Edillo jurisdiction to entertain Spouses Dulpina’s appeal because the MCTC
with the MCTC. Decision had become final and executor
● Spouses Dulpina purchased from Camingue a 235sqm. residential lot and ○ the Motion for Reconsideration the plaintiffs-respondents filed is a
house located in Poblacion, San Isidro, Surigao del Norte, through a Deed of prohibited pleading in summary proceedings and did not stop the
Sale dated May 14, 1990. running of the period for the decisions finality.
● In August 2005, Heber Edillo, without their consent and against their express
prohibition, fenced off and occupied a 50sqm. portion of the western part of Issue: 1. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for review under Rule
the disputed property while uttering threats against Spouses Dulpina. 45 - YES
● In January 2006, they sent the Spouses Edillo a notice to vacate the disputed 2. Whether the RTC has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a final and executory
property, but the Spouses Edillo refused to comply. MCTC decision - No.
● In their Answer dated March 1, 2006, Spouses Edillo countered that the
Complaint states no cause of action. Ratio:
○ Spouses Dulpina failed to allege that they were in prior physical ● An appeal to the CA from an RTC Decision rendered in the exercise of its
possession of the disputed property. appellate jurisdiction is via a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Revised
○ They also alleged that they acquired the disputed property through Rules of Court. Section 2 of Rule 42 prescribes that the the petition shall set
three (3) separate Deeds of Absolute Sale from Saragoza, Forcadilla, forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, the issues raised, the
and Caunzad. specification of errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly committed by the
● MCTC dismissed the Complaint. Regional Trial Court, and the reasons or arguments relied upon for the
○ Spouses Dulpina filed a MR which the MCTC denied. allowance of the appeal.
● Spouses Dulpina filed a Notice of Appeal with the MCTC, which the latter ● Non-compliance with these requirements is sufficient ground for the
granted, so they filed their Appeal Memorandum with the RTC. dismissal of the Petition, pursuant to Section 3 of the same Rule.
● RTC aside the MCTC judgment and ordered the Spouses Edillo to vacate the ● In not a few cases, the Court has ruled that the right to appeal is neither a
subject property and to restore the Spouses Dulpina to their possession. natural right nor a part of due process; it is a mere statutory privilege that may
● Spouses Edillo filed a MR, but was denied, so they elevated the case to the CA be exercised only in the manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions
through a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. of law allowing the appeal. The party who seeks to appeal must comply with
○ They argued that the plaintiffs-respondents appeal with the RTC was the requirements of the law and the rules; failure to comply leads to the
filed out of time since the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure dismissal and the loss of the right to appeal.
prohibits the filing of a motion for reconsideration. ● However, the Court recognizes nonetheless that the right to appeal is an
● CA dismissed the petition under the grand that it does not contain a statement essential part of the system of judicial processes, and courts should proceed
of the factual background of the case, in violation of Sections 2 and 3 of Rule with caution in order not to deprive a party of the right to appeal. SC invariably
42 of the Rules of Court. made this recognition due to the overriding concern that every party-litigant
be given the amplest opportunity to ventilate and secure the resolution of his
cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. This line of rulings is based, situations where there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a
no less, on the Rules of Court which itself calls for a liberal construction of its pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the
provisions, with the objective of securing for the parties a just, speedy and proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. In this line of rulings, Rules. After all, rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid,
the Court has repeatedly stressed that litigation is not merely a game of technical sense; they are used only to help secure substantial justice.
technicalities. The law and jurisprudence grant to courts in the exercise of ● Spouses Dulpina’s filing of a motion for reconsideration of the MCTC
their discretion along the lines laid down by the SC the prerogative to relax judgment did not stop the running of the period for appeal since a motion for
compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under the Revised Rules on Summary
mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to put an end to litigation Procedure.
speedily and the parties right to an opportunity to be heard. ○ Jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases belongs
● Spouses Dulpina cited cases of Galang v. Court of Appeals and Tan v. Court of to the MTC. The RRSP applies to prevent undue delays in the
Appeals, but these rulings are not fully applicable to the present case as they disposition of cases; to achieve this end, the filing of certain
are not squarely in point. pleadings a motion for reconsideration, among others is prohibited.
○ Galang involved the dismissal of a petition with the CA for ● Thus, when the plaintiffs-respondents filed on June 5, 2007 a MR of the
nonpayment of costs within 3 days from notice of the order. It MCTC Judgment, the motion did not stop the running of the period for appeal.
involved a direct failure to comply with a CA directive a matter vastly With the continuous running of this period, the May 23, 2007 MCTC
different from, and greater than, the question of sufficiency posed in judgment (which Spouses Dulpina received through counsel on May 31, 2007)
this case. had long lapsed to finality when the plaintiffs-respondents filed their Notice
○ Tan involved a motion for reconsideration that was considered a of Appeal on July 30, 2007.
mere scrap of paper for lack of a notice of hearing. This is a matter ● A judgment that has become final and executory is immutable and
that, at its core, is a due process concern the failure to afford the unalterable; the judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if
opposing party the opportunity to respond to the motion in a duly the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
scheduled hearing. conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is
○ In both cases, the Court took into account the relative merits of the attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest Court of the
parties cases and found that a liberal interpretation, applied to the land.
interlocutory issues before us, would be for naught because the ● In the present case, the lapse of the period for appeal rendered the RTC
petitioners underlying cases clearly lacked merit. If the appeal is without any jurisdiction to entertain, much less grant, the plaintiffs-
meritorious on its face and relax the applicable rule of procedure only respondents appeal from the final and immutable MCTC judgment. This very
after a prima facie finding of merit. basic legal reality would forever be lost if the Courts allow the CA to dismiss
● That there was substantial compliance with the Rules because the background the defendants-petitioners appeal outright on the basis of a technicality that,
facts can be found within the four corners of the petition and its incorporated after all, has been substantially complied with.
annexes, is not a novel ruling for the SC. In the case of Deloso v. Marapao Dispositive:
(involving the same deficiency for lack of a specific and separate statement of WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the
facts outlining the factual background relied upon), SC said: Resolutions dated January 28, 2009 and June 11, 2009 of the Special Former Special
○ An examination of the petition filed with the Court of Appeals reveals Division of Five of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02436-MIN. The Decision
that while it does not contain a separate section on statement of facts, dated November 7, 2007 and Order dated July 1, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court,
the facts of the case are, in fact, integrated in the petition particularly Branch 31, Dapa, Surigao del Norte are ANNULLED. The Judgment dated May 23,
in the discussion/argument portion. Moreover, the decision of the 2007 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Del Carmen-San Isidro-San Benito, Surigao
DARAB which contains the facts of the case was attached to the del Norte is REINSTATED. Costs against the plaintiffs-respondents.
petition and was even quoted by the appellate court. The petition also
sufficiently discusses the errors committed by the DARAB in its
assailed decision.
● There was, therefore, substantial compliance with Sec. 6, Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court. It is settled that liberal construction of the Rules may be invoked in
NEYPES VS CA ● Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal
Petitioner/s: DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO,
before the Court of Appeals.
LOLITO VICTORIANO, JACOB OBANIA AND DOMINGO CABACUNGAN
● In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their
Respondent/s: HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF BERNARDO DEL
notice of appeal.
MUNDO, namely: FE, CORAZON, JOSEFA, SALVADOR and CARMEN, all
● They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only
surnamed DEL MUNDO, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON.
on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial
ANTONIO N. ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Branch 43, Regional Trial Court, Roxas,
court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice
Oriental Mindoro
of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well
within the reglementary period for appeal.
Doctrine: A party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from
● CA: dismissed appeal
receipt of the Regional Trial Court’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of
●
the order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or motion for
Issue: W/N the reglementary period had already elapsed. NOOOOOOOooooooo
reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either
motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse
Ratio:
of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.
● First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of
due process.
● It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and
Facts: in accordance with the provisions of law.
● Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito ● Sec. 39. Appeals. – The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions,
Victoriano, Jacob Obania and Domingo Cabacungan filed an action for awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all these cases shall be fifteen
annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award,
reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC judgment, or decision appealed from. Provided, however, that in habeas
● RTC decision: corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the
● (1) the petitioners’ motion to declare respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau notice of judgment appealed from. x x x
of Forest Development in default was granted for their failure to file an ● Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
answer, but denied as against the respondent heirs of del Mundo because the ● SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be taken within fifteen
substituted service of summons on them was improper; (15) days from the notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where
● (2) the Land Bank’s motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action was denied a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a
because there were hypothetical admissions and matters that could be record on appeal within thirty (30) days from the notice of judgment or final
determined only after trial, and order.
● (3) the motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirs of del Mundo, based on ● The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
prescription, was also denied because there were factual matters that could be reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial
determined only after trial.1 or reconsideration shall be allowed. (emphasis supplied)
● The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying ● Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the
their motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial court could very well notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A final judgment or order is
resolve the issue of prescription from the bare allegations of the complaint one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do
itself without waiting for the trial proper. with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which, considering the
● RTC: dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground that the action had evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and
already prescribed. obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses
● Petitioners filed MR. an action.
● RTC: dismissed MR ● As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of July 1, 1998 denying
● Petitioners filed a notice of appeal their motion for reconsideration should be construed as the "final order," not
● RTC denied notice of appeal holding that it was filed eight days late. the February 12, 1998 order which dismissed their complaint. Since they
received their copy of the denial of their motion for reconsideration only on shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed
July 22, 1998, the 15-day reglementary period to appeal had not yet lapsed from.
when they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998. ● The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation and independence
● What therefore should be deemed as the "final order," receipt of which triggers of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in
the start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal ¾ the February 12, 1998 which it ordinarily implies.
order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order dismissing the MR ● Hence, the use of "or" in the above provision supposes that the notice of
● We sustain petitioners’ view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15
motion for reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules. days from notice of the "final order," which we already determined to refer to
● We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the start of the 15-day the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.
reglementary period to appeal, did petitioners in fact file their notice of appeal ● In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to when the
on time? 15-day appeal period should be counted – from receipt of notice of judgment
● Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of judgment or (March 3, 1998) or from receipt of notice of "final order" appealed from (July
final order to appeal the decision of the trial court. 22, 1998).
● On the 15th day of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998), petitioners did ● Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from
not file a notice of appeal but instead opted to file a motion for receipt of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998.
reconsideration. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days,
● According to the trial court, the MR only interrupted the running of the 15- as already discussed.
day appeal period. It ruled that petitioners, having filed their MR on the last
day of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, had only one (1) day left to Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed
file the notice of appeal upon receipt of the notice of denial of their MR. decision of the Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let the
● Petitioners, however, argue that they were entitled under the Rules to a fresh records of this case be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
period of 15 days from receipt of the "final order" or the order dismissing their
motion for reconsideration.
● But where such motion has been filed during office hours of the last day of the
period herein provided, the appeal must be perfected within the day following
that in which the party appealing received notice of the denial of said motion.
● To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants
fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a
fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional
Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new
trial or motion for reconsideration.
● Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing
appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42
on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals;
Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and
Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.
● The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be
counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
● We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the
fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of
notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not
inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal

ESCOTO VS PAGCOR at the Subic Bay Free Port Zone does not fall [sic] within the authority of the
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) under Republic Act No. 7227.
Petitioner/s: Antonio Escoto
● Second Assigned Error: The Court a quo committed an error in awarding
Respondent/s: PAGCOR
attorney's fees in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs.
● Respondents moved to dismiss the appeal arguing that based on the
Doctrine: The test of whether the question is one of law or of fact is whether the
appellant’s brief, the promoters were submitting issues of a purely legal nature
appellate court can determine the issue without reviewing or evaluating the evidence.
and thus should be taken to the Court by petitioner for review on certiorari to
If no review or evaluation of the evidence is necessary, the question is one of law;
raise only questions of law
otherwise, it is a question of fact
● CA dismissed the appeal for raising only pure questions of law that were
outside the competence of an ordinary appeal under rule 41 of the ROC. The
CA also ruled that the propriety of the award of attorney's fees had ceased to
Facts: be a factual issue after the parties had admitted that the winning party would
● The petitioner and Edgar Laxamana were promoters of Legend International be entitled to the award, as in fact they had even stipulated on the amount to
Resort Limited be thus awarded; and that it would be unjust to allow the promoters to renege
● They organized a tourist oriented cockfighting derby to be held on May 8 and on their admissions regarding the recovery of the award of attorney's fees.
10, 2003 within the premises of LIRL within the Subic Bay Freeport Zone
● They obtained a permit to conduct the event from the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority
● Learning of the event, respondent advised LIRL to desist as cockfighting Issue:
activity was outside it competence as a hotel casino resort WON CA erred in dismissing the appeal? No
● This led to the promoters to bring a suit for injunction with application for a
temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction in the RTC Ratio:
● They averred that the respondent should be enjoined from ordering LIRL to ● To start with, the determination of whether or not the appeal was upon a
desist from holding the cockfighting derby because the charter of the question of law was within the discretion of the CA as the appellate court. The
respondent did not include the supervision, control and regulation of CA correctly relied on the assignment of errors expressly made in the
cockfighting activities in the premises of LIRL within the Subic Bay Freeport appellant's brief of the petitioner. The CA’s determination that the issues were
Zone; that the authority to regulate such activities was within the powers of purely legal questions deserved respect. The correctness of the determination
the SBMA under Republic Act No. 7227 should be assumed unless there is a clear showing of the CA thereby
● RTC issued a 20 day TRO to preserve status quo committing error or gravely abusing its discretion. Regrettably, the petitioner
● Respondents objected to the issuance on the following did not show so herein.
○ (a) the promoters were not the real parties in interest to maintain the ● The modes of appealing a judgment or final order of a court of law have been
suit; (b) they had no clear legal right to be protected; and (c) the outlined in Section 2, Rule 41 of the ROC
conduct of the cockfighting derby was not a right but a mere ○ Section 2. Modes of appeal.-
privilege, and that, as such, the compliance with the law was ○ (c) Appeal by certiorari.- In all cases where only questions of law are
mandatory before anyone could exercise the privilege. The raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by
respondent stated that one of the laws that the promoters had not petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45
complied with was Presidential Decree No. 449 (Cockfighting Law ● For purposes of item (c) , a question of fact arises when the doubt or difference
of 1974), which required a license for the cockfighting event to be arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts, and a question of law exists
issued by the relevant city or municipality when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of
● RTC dismissed the complaint facts
● The plaintiffs appealed, assigning errors to the RTC, as follows: ● The test of whether the question is one of law or of fact is whether the appellate
● First Assigned Error: The issue raised on the merits of the case is already court can determine the issue without reviewing or evaluating the evidence.
moot and academic; alternatively, the Court a quo committed an error in ● If no review or evaluation of the evidence is necessary, the question is one of
declaring that the permission or license to hold a one-time cockfight held (sic) law; otherwise, it is a question of fact
● Obviously decisive herein is the ascertainment of which law Republic Act No.
7227 (The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992) or Republic Act
No. 7160 (The Local Government Code) - would be controlling. This
ascertainment involves a purely legal question. In view of such nature of the
question being sought to be presented for review, the appeal to the CA was
improper.
● Dismissal of the appeal was the only proper outcome
● Section 2, Rule 50
○ Section 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals.
○ An appeal under Rule 41 taken from the Regional Trial Court to the
Court of Appeals raising only questions of law shall be dismissed,
issues purely of law not being reviewable by said court. Similarly, an
appeal by notice of appeal instead of by petition for review from the
appellate judgment of a Regional Trial Court shall be dismissed.
○ An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be
transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright.
● Subordinate to the ascertainment of the applicable law is the matter of
attorney's fees. The issue is similarly a purely legal question. This is because
the parties had expressly agreed on the attorney's fees, inclusive of the amount
thereof. In other words, the Court no longer has to delve into and resolve
whether or not any of the parties had been compelled to litigate to protect their
respective rights as to warrant the grant of attorney's fees under Article 2208
of the Civil Code in order to decide the matter.
● The court has no alternative but to enforce the entitlement of the successful
party to the fees that have been thereby transformed into liquidated damages.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the
resolutions promulgated on December 23, 2009 and June 2, 2010; and ORDERS the
petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

CIR VS KEPCO and Revised Rules of Court of the Tax Appeals do not expressly provide a
(2016) - J. Peralta remedy on annulment of judgments.
11. The CTA dismissed the CIR’s petition.
Petitioner/s: Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Respondent/s: Kepco Ilijan Corporation
Issue: WoN the CTA En Banc has jurisdiction over the petition for annulment of
judgment - NO
Doctrine: The CTA en banc has no jurisdiction to entertain petitions for
annulment of judgments of the CTA divisions (to preserve the principles that there
Ratio:
can be no hierarchy within a collegial court between its divisions and the en banc,
1. Annulment of judgment involves the exercise of original jurisdiction, as
and that a court's judgment, once final, is immutable).
expressly conferred on the CA by BP 129, Sec. 9(2).
2. It also implies power by a superior court over a subordinate one, as provided
Facts: in Rule 47, where the appellate court may annul a decision of the RTC, or the
1. For the 1st and 2nd quarters of the calendar year of 2000, Kepco Ilijan latter court may annul a decision of the MTC or METC.
Corporation filed its Quarterly VAT returns with the BIR. 3. The law and the rules are silent when it comes to a situation in which a court
2. Kepco’s Application for Zero Rated Sales for that year was also approved by is called upon to annul its own judgment.
the BIR. 4. More specifically, in the case at bar, the CTA sitting en banc is being asked to
3. After approval, Kepco filed its claim for refund of P449,569,448.73, as input annul a decision of one of its divisions.
tax incurred for those quarters. 5. However, the laws creating the CTA and expanding its jurisdiction 26 and the
4. BIR did not act on Kepco’s claim. CTA’s own rules of procedure27 do not provide for such a scenario.
5. Kepco filed a petition for review before the CTA First Division, which 6. It is the same situation among other collegial courts.
rendered a Decision25 finding Kepco entitled to the refund of a. To illustrate, the SC or the CA may sit and adjudicate cases in
P443,447,184.50. divisions consisting of only a number of members, and such
6. There being no MR filed, the decision became final and executory with an adjudication is already regarded as the decision of the
Entry of Judgment issued on Oct. 10, 2009. Court itself.
7. A Writ of Execution was issued on February 16, 2010 by the CTA, ordering the b. The divisions are not considered separate and distinct courts but are
refund of the amount to Kepco. divisions of one and the same court.
8. The CIR alleges that she learned only of the Decision and the issuance of the c. There is no hierarchy of courts within the SC and the CA, for they
Writ on March 7, 2011. each remain as one court notwithstanding that they also work in
a. She was informed through the Office of the Deputy Commissioner divisions.
for Legal and Inspection Group, which received a Memorandum 7. It appears contrary to these features that a collegial court, sitting en banc, may
from the Appellate Division of the National Office, recommending be called upon to annul a decision of one of its divisions which had become
the issuance of a Tax Credit Certificate in favor of Kepco. final and executory, for it is tantamount to allowing a court to annul its own
9. On April 11, 2011, the CIR filed a petition for annulment of judgment judgment and acknowledging that a hierarchy exists within such court.
with the CTA En Banc, praying the annulment of the Decision, Entry of a. In the process, it also betrays the principle that judgments must, at
Judgment, and Writ of Execution as well as the reopening of the case. some point, attain finality.
10. Kepco filed its Motion to Deny Due Course (to the petition for annulment of 8. Thus, the Revised Rules of the CTA and even the Rules of Court which apply
judgment), arguing that the CIR is not entitled to the annulment on the suppletorily thereto provide for no instance in which the en banc may reverse,
ground that the CTA En Banc is bereft of jurisdiction to entertain annul or void a final decision of a division.
annulment of judgments, on the premise that the Rules of Court, RA 9282, a. The Revised Rules of the CTA provide for no instance of an
annulment of judgment at all.
25September 11, 2009 27 Revised Rules of the CTA

26RA 1125 and 9282
b. Rule 47 provides for annulment of judgment done by a superior WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby DENIED. The
court. But, again, the said Rules are silent as to whether a collegial assailed Resolutions dated July 27, 2011 and November 15, 2011 of the Court of Tax
court sitting en banc may annul a final judgment of its own division. Appeals En Banc are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
9. The silence of the Rules may be attributed to the need to preserve the
principles that there can be no hierarchy within a collegial court between its
divisions and the en banc, and that a court's judgment, once final, is
immutable.
10. A direct petition for annulment of a judgment of the CTA to the
Supreme Court is likewise unavailing, for the same reason that there is
no identical remedy with the High Court to annul a final and executory
judgment of the Court of Appeals.
a. RA. 9282 puts the CTA on the same level as the CA, so that if the
latter's final judgments may not be annulled before the Supreme
Court, then the CTA's own decisions similarly may not be so
annulled.
11. Annulment of judgment is an original action, yet, it is not among the cases
enumerated in the Constitution's Article VIII, Section 5 over which the
Supreme Court exercises original jurisdiction.
12. Annulment of judgment also often requires an adjudication of facts, a task that
the SC loathes to perform, as it is not a trier of facts.
13. Nevertheless, there will be extraordinary cases, when the interest of justice
highly demands it, where final judgments of the Court of Appeals, the CTA or
any other inferior court may still be vacated or subjected to the Supreme
Court's modification, reversal, annulment or declaration as void.
a. But it will be accomplished not through the same species of original
action or petition for annulment as that found in Rule 47, but
through any of the actions over which the SC has original jurisdiction
as specified in the Constitution, like Rule 65.
14. The petition was therefore correctly dismissed. What the CIR should have filed
was a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Supreme Court, since
the decision, which has become final and executory, is no longer subject to
appeal.
Dispositive: To prevent similar disadvantageous incidents against the government in

the future, the BIR is DIRECTED to ADOPT mechanisms, procedures, or measures that
can effectively monitor the progress of cases being handled by its counsels. Likewise,
the Ombudsman is DIRECTED to CONDUCT an in--depth investigation to determine
who were responsible for the apparent mishandling of the present case that resulted in
the loss of almost half- a -billion pesos, which the government could have used to
finance its much needed infrastructure, livelihood projects, and other equally
important projects.

SIBAL VS BUQUEL present case, Sibal was able to avail of other remedies when he filed before the
RTC a motion to quash the writ of execution and a motion to annul judgment.
Petitioner/s: Camilo Sibal
● Moreover, parties aggrieved by final judgments, orders or resolutions cannot
Respondent/s: Pedro Buquel, Santiago Buquel Jr, Rosalinda Buquel, Francisco
be allowed to easily and readily abuse a petition for annulment of judgment.
Buquel
Thus, the Court has instituted safeguards by limiting the grounds for
annulment to lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, and that petitioner
Doctrine:
should show that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
● As a litigant, he should not have entirely left the case in his counsel's hands,
or other appropriate remedies are no longer available without fault on the part
for he had the continuing duty to keep himself abreast of the developments,
of the petitioner. A petition for annulment that ignores or disregards any of
if only to protect his own interest in the litigation. He could have discharged
the safeguards cannot prosper.
said duty by keeping in regular touch with his counsel, but he failed to do so.
● Extrinsic Fraud = relates to a cause that is collateral in character, i.e., it relates
● A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in
to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in litigation which is committed
nature that it may be availed of only if the judgment, final order, or final
outside of the trial of the case, where the defeated party has been prevented
resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction
from presenting fully his side of the cause, by fraud or deception practiced on
or through extrinsic fraud, and only when other remedies are wanting.
him by his opponent; these and similar cases which show that there has never
● The fraud is not extrinsic if the act was committed by the petitioner's own
been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a
counsel.
new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment and
open the case for a new and fair hearing. This fraud must arise from the act of
an adverse party and should have deprived petition of its day in court. The
Facts: fraud is not extrinsic if the act was committed by the petitioner's own counsel.
● Respondents (all named Buquel) inherited from their parents a parcel of ● Sibal asserts that the negligence of his former counsel in handling his defense
land (80k sqm) covered by an OCT. Sometime in 1999, petitioner took during the proceedings in Civil Case No. 6429 resulted in violation of his right
possession of a portion of the property which belonged to one of the to due process. He claims that his counsel's inexcusable negligence denied him
respondents. of his clay in court. However, he admitted that he attended only one stage of
● Thereafter, the Buquels made several demands against petitioner to vacate the proceedings below, which was the preliminary conference. He was not
and turn over the property, but the latter refused to do so. Hence, they filed a aware of the subsequent proceedings as he was totally dependent on his
complaint before the Tuguegarao RTC for recovery 0f possession and former counsel and would merely wait for the latter to notify him if his
damages. attendance would be required. There was likewise no indication that his
● RTC: In favor of Respondent Buquels. Decision became final, hence, the counsel was in fact in cahoots with the Buquels to obtain the assailed
issuance of a writ of execution. judgment. Sibal must therefore bear the unfortunate consequences of his
● CA: Petitioner filed petition for annulment raising lack of jurisdiction and actions. As a litigant, he should not have entirely left the case in his counsel's
extrinsic fraud which was Dismissed. hands, for he had the continuing duty to keep himself abreast of the
developments, if only to protect his own interest in the litigation. He could
Issue: have discharged said duty by keeping in regular touch with his counsel, but he
● W/N the RTC decision should be annulled on the ground of RTC’s lack of failed to do so.
jurisdiction over the case since the complaint merely alleged the property’s
value without alleging its assessed value and that respondents were guilty of
extrinsic fraud. - NO Dispositive:
Ratio:
● A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
nature that it may be availed of only if the judgment, final order, or final March 16, 2011 and its Resolution dated July 7, 2011 in CA-G.R. SP No. 104774 are
resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction hereby AFFIRMED.
or through extrinsic fraud, and only when other remedies are wanting. In the

APOSTOLIC VICAR VS SISON ○ that as the actual occupant of the subject property, the named
defendant is the real party-in-interest; an
Petitioner/s: APOSTOLIC VICAR OF TABUK, INC. REPRESENTED BY BISHOP
○ that the petitioner cannot resort to an action for annulment of
PRUDENCIO ANDAYA, JR.
judgment (an equitable remedy) because it lost its opportunity to
Respondent/s: SPOUSES ERNESTO AND ELIZABETH SISON AND VENANCIO
appeal after it failed to file its appellant's brief.
WADAS
● RTC in favor of petitioners
Doctrine: Rule 47 authorizes the RTC to dismiss a petition for annulment of
judgment outright if it has no substantial merit
Issue:
● Issue: WON the case was properly dismissed by the lower court?
Facts:
● Respondent Sps. Ernesto and Elizabeth Sison and Respondent Wadas filed a Ratio:
complaint for forcible entry against the Vicar Apostolic of Mountain Province ● Yes. The RTC dismissed the Vicariate of Tabuk's petition for annulment of
as represented by Fr. Gerry Gudmalin. judgment because it allegedly failed to state a cause of action. However, upon
● It was alleged that Fr. Gudmalin ordered the forcible demolition if their reviewing the RTC's 23 November 2009 order and examining the petition for
respective perimeter fences to expand the area of the Church. annulment, we conclude that the dismissal was actually due to lack of a cause
● The priest then began constructing a building that encroached portions of of action.
respondents' lot ● Rule 47 authorizes the RTC to dismiss a petition for annulment of judgment
● MCTC then rendered a judgement in favor of the respondents outright if it has no substantial merit
○ This decision became final and executory ● First, in an ejectment suit (action interdictal), the sole issue is the right of
● Petitioner Apostolic Vicar of Tabuk, Inc. Then filed an urgent manifestation physical or material possession over the subject real property independent of
stating that the ones impleaded were not the real owners of the land any claim of ownership by the parties involved. LoopOwnership over the
○ In effect they were not afforded due process since they were not property is immaterial and is only passed upon provisionally for the limited
impleaded nor served summons purpose of determining which party has the better right to possession.
● the Vicariate of Tabuk filed a Rule 47 petition for annulment of the MCTC ● Second, ejectment suits are actions in personam wherein judgment only binds
judgment parties who had been properly impleaded and were given an opportunity to be
○ It argued that the MCTC rendered the decision without acquiring heard.
jurisdiction over its person. ○ The MCTC judgment was only rendered against Fr. Gudmalin and
○ It also alleged that the Vicariate of Mt. Province no longer exists the Vicar Apostolic of Mountain Province, not against the petitioner
because it was dissolved in 1990 Vicariate of Tabuk. Hence, the petitioner can only be bound by the
● The respondents filed a motion to dismiss. MCTC judgment
● Petitioners seek annulment of judgment and to issue a mandatory injunction ○ if it is shown to be: (a) a trespasser, squatter, or agent of the
restoring its possession of the subject lot arguing that defendants fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the
○ Its petition for annnulment sufficiently stated a cause of action judgment; (b) a guest or other occupant of the premises with the
○ It is the real party-in-interest that should have been impleaded in the permission of the defendants; (c) a transferee pendente lite; (d) sub-
ejectment suit; lessee; (e) co-lessee; or (f) a member of the family, a relative, or other
○ it had legal standing to question the MCTC's failure to serve privy of the defendants.15
summons; and ● In such a case, a court hearing is required to determine the character of such
○ that its filing of a notice of appeal did not amount to voluntary possession. If the executing court finds that the petitioner is a mere successor-
submission to the MCTC's jurisdiction because the void judgment in-interest, guest, or agent of the defendants, the order of execution shall be
was already "final and executory" when the petitioner discovered it enforced against it
● In their comment, the respondents maintain ● Since the judgment was not rendered against the petitioner, it has no legal
○ that the MCTC acquired jurisdiction over the named defendant in the personality to ask for annulment of the judgment.
case;

● Understandably, the petitioner feels aggrieved because it claims ownership
over the subject lot that the MCTC ordered Fr. Gudmalin to turn over to the
respondents.
○ However, from a purely legal perspective, the MCTC judgment did
not prejudice the petitioner.
● This is not to say that the petitioner is left without a remedy in law. The
petitioner may still avail of the plenary action of accion reinvindicatoria
wherein the issue of its ownership may be thoroughly threshed out in a
full¬blown trial after which complete reliefs may be granted to the proper
parties.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs
against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

TOPIC XXVII – PROCEDURE IN COURT OF APPEALS preliminary injunction with the RTC of Quezon City. Alleging that LWUA and
DBM acted with grave abuse of discretion in adopting and implementing the
TOPIC XXVIII – PROCEDURE IN SUPREME COURT reorganization plan of LWUA, petitioners prayed that LWUA and DBM be
restrained on the ground that petitioners will suffer injustice and sustain
TOPIC XXIX – PROVISIONAL REMEDIES irreparable injury as 233 LWUA employees face immediate and outright
dismissal from service.
LWUA VS LOCAL WATER UTILITIES PROCEDURAL:
● Respondents filed their respective Oppositions to the petitioners' prayer for
Petitioner/s: LOCAL WATER UTILITIES ADMINISTRATION
TRO and/or preliminary injunction.
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION FOR PROGRESS (LEAP) et al.
● After hearing, the RTC granted the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
Respondent/s: LOCAL WATER UTILITIES ADMINISTRATION
● LWUA and DBM filed separate Motions for Reconsideration, but these were
(LWUA) and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and
denied by RTC
DBM
● LWUA and DBM then filed separate special civil actions for certiorari with
the CA questioning the subject RTC Order and Resolution. These petitions
Doctrine:
were subsequently consolidated and then granted by the CA
A writ of preliminary injunction, being an ancillary or auxiliary remedy, is
● Petitioners filed for Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by CA
available during the pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a
Issue:
litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests therein pending
● WON the dismissal of petitioners' principal action for certiorari, prohibition
rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final judgment in
and mandamus filed with the RTC results in the automatic dissolution of the
the case. It persists until it is dissolved or until the termination of the action
ancillary writ of preliminary injunction issued by the same court.- YES
without the court issuing a final injunction.awr
Ratio:
● This Court has ruled that because an appeal was available to the aggrieved
Facts: party, the action for certiorari would not be entertained. We emphasized in
● Pursuant to the EOs issued by President GMA to rationalize the functions of that case that the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive,
LWUA, its personnel was given the option to either remain or retire, or be not alternative or successive. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not
separated from government service. prosper, even if the ground is grave abuse of discretion.
● Task Force 421 was able to come up with a staffing pattern, consisting of 467 ● By filing the present special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65,
plantilla positions which was approved by the LWUA Board of Trustees. petitioners, therefore, clearly availed themselves of the wrong remedy. Under
● The DBM approved 447 plantilla positions out of the 467 proposed positions. Supreme Court Circular 2-90, an appeal taken to this Court or to the CA by a
20 positions were excluded from the plantilla because they were classified as wrong or an inappropriate mode merits outright dismissal. On this score
coterminous with the members of the LWUA Board of Trustees and are not alone, the instant petition is dismissible.
considered critical in the agency's operations. ● A writ of preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action
● LWUA issued Office Order No. 168-06 requiring the immediate or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court,
implementation of the following: (a) posting of the DBM-approved staffing agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It is merely a
pattern; (b) finalization by the Staffing Committee of the staffing guidelines to provisional remedy, adjunct to the main case subject to the latter's outcome.
be submitted to the Management and the Board of Trustees for approval; and It is not a cause of action in itself. The writ is provisional because it constitutes
(c) finalization by the Task Analysis Committee of the job descriptions under a temporary measure availed of during the pendency of the action and it is
the rationalized LWUA structure. The said Office Order also provided that the ancillary because it is a mere incident in and is dependent upon the result of
guidelines for the implementation of the approved staffing pattern shall the main action. Being an ancillary or auxiliary remedy, it is available during
include a general provision declaring that all employees may apply for a the pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve
maximum of five positions in the rationalized structure where they may and protect certain rights and interests therein pending rendition, and for
qualify. purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the case.
● On October 19, 2006, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition ● It is well settled that the sole object of a preliminary injunction, whether
and mandamus with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the
case can be heard.It is usually granted when it is made to appear that there is ● Thus, petitioners should have first brought their case to the appointing
a substantial controversy between the parties and one of them is committing authority, which in this case, is the LWUA Board of Trustees, and, thereafter,
an act or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause to the Civil Service Commission, which has primary jurisdiction over the case.
irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full On the basis of the abovequoted provisions, it is clear that petitioners failed to
hearing can be had on the merits of the case. It persists until it is dissolved or exhaust the administrative remedies given them by law before resorting to the
until the termination of the action without the court issuing a final filing of a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
injunction.awre Dispositive:
● Indubitably, in the present case, the writ of preliminary injunction was WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The Decision and Resolution of
granted by the RTC based on its finding that there was a need to protect the Court of Appeals, dated August 28, 2012 and January 15, 2013, respectively, in CA-
petitioners' rights to security of tenure during the pendency of the principal G.R. SP Nos. 100482 and 100662 are AFFIRMED.
action. After trial, however, the lower court found, among others, that, in SO ORDERED.
questioning the constitutionality of E.O. Nos. 279, 366 and 421 as well as
Resolution No. 69 of the LWUA Board of Trustees, petitioners failed to
establish the existence of an actual case or controversy which is ripe for
judicial determination. Thus, the RTC dismissed the principal action for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
● Even assuming that petitioners have a valid cause of action, in that their
security of tenure may be violated as a result of their transfer or termination
from service, the law, particularly Republic Act No. 6656, provides them with
ample remedies to address their alleged predicament, prior to filing an action
in court.
● Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is
allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed
himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or
her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still
be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to
decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy
should be exhausted first before the court's judicial power can be sought. The
premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one's cause of
action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on
practical and legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails
lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies.
Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will
shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been
completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency
concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case.
● Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact.
LIM, JR. VS. LAZARO  As such, it is available during its pendency which may be resorted to by a
litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests during the interim,
Petitioner/s: Alfredo Lim jr awaiting the ultimate effects of a final judgment in the case.
Respondent/s: Sps Lazaro
 In addition, attachment is also availed of in order to acquire jurisdiction over
the action by actual or constructive seizure of the property in those instances
Doctrine: Rule 57 of the Rules of Court (Rule 57), is an ancillary remedy where personal or substituted service of summons on the defendant cannot be
applied for not for its own sake but to enable the attaching party to realize effected.
upon the relief sought and expected to be granted in the main or principal  In this relation, while the provisions of Rule 57 are silent on the length of time
action; it is a measure auxiliary or incidental to the main action. within which an attachment lien shall continue to subsist after the rendition
of a final judgment, jurisprudence dictates that the said lien continues until
the debt is paid, or the sale is had under execution issued on the judgment or
Facts: until the judgment is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in the
 August 2005, Lim Jr filed a complaint for a sum of money with a prayer for same manner provided by law.
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the respondent  Applying these principles, the Court finds that the discharge of the writ of
Spouses Lazaro. preliminary attachment against the properties of Sps. Lazaro was improper.
 The RTC granted the writ of preliminary attachment application and upon the  Records indicate that while the parties have entered into a compromise
posting of the required bond issued the corresponding writ on October 2005. agreement which had already been approved by the RTC in its January 2007
Subsequently 3 parcels of land owned by the respondent spouses in Bulacan Amended Decision, the obligations have yet to be fully complied with
were levied upon.  The case at bench admits of peculiar character in the sense that it involves a
 Sps. Lazaro averred, among others, that Lim, Jr. had no cause of action against compromise agreement. Nonetheless, the parties to the compromise
them since: (a) Colim Merchandise (Colim), and not Lim, Jr., was the payee agreement should not be deprived of the protection provided by an
of the fifteen (15) Metrobank checks; and (b) the PNB and Real Bank checks attachment lien especially in an instance where one reneges on his obligations
were not drawn by them, but by Virgilio Arcinas and Elizabeth Ramos, under the agreement, as in the case at bench, where Antonio Garcia failed to
respectively. hold up his own end of the deal, so to speak.
 The parties later entered into a Compromise Agreement whereby Sps. Lazaro
agreed to pay Lim, Jr. the amount of P2,351,064.80 on an installment basis, Dispositive:
following a schedule of payments covering the period from September 2006 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The July 10, 2008 Decision and the
until October 2013. The RTC rendered a decision on the basis of the December 18, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100270 are
compromise. REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the March 29, 2007 Order of the Regional Trial Court
 Sps. Lazaro then filed an Omnibus Motion, seeking to lift the writ of of Quezon City, Branch 223 is NULLIFIED. Accordingly, the trial court is directed to
preliminary attachment annotated on the subject TCTs. RESTORE the attachment lien over Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-64940, T-
 RTC ruled that a writ of preliminary attachment is a mere provisional or 64939, and T-86369, in favor of petitioner Alfredo C. Lim, Jr.
ancillary remedy, resorted to by a litigant to protect and preserve certain rights
and interests pending final judgment.
 Considering that the case had already been considered closed and terminated
by the rendition of the decision based on the compromise agreement, the writ
of preliminary attachment should be lifted and quashed.
Issue:
 Whether or not the writ of preliminary attachment was properly lifted. NO
SiRrr
Ratio:
 By its nature, preliminary attachment, under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court
(Rule 57), is an ancillary remedy applied for not for its own sake but to enable
the attaching party to realize upon the relief sought and expected to be granted
in the main or principal action; it is a measure auxiliary or incidental to the
main action.

forum. Thus, the courts will allow the filing of any case in any venue as long as the
MANGILA VS. COURT OF APPEALS jurisdictional requirements are followed.
However, the case should still be dismissed because the Pasay City RTC does not have
Petitioner/s: ANITA MANGILA territorial jurisdiction over the case. Under the Rules of Court, the general rule in
Respondent/s: COURT OF APPEALS and LORETA GUINA personal actions is that the proper venue to file the case is where the defendant or
plaintiff resides. The exception to this rule is when parties agree to an exclusive venue,
Doctrine: A mere stipulation on the venue of an action is not enough to which as shown, they did not. In the complaint, it wasn’t Guina’s personal address that
preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues—the parties must be was alleged but the business address of her sole proprietorship, Air swift. However,
able to show that such stipulation is exclusive; Venue stipulations in a sole proprietorships do not have a separate juridical personality. As such,
contract, while considered valid and enforceable, do not as a rule, supersede they can’t file a suit. The case should have been filed either in Pasay (where Guina
the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court resides) or Pampanga (where Mangila resides).
It is the residence of the proprietor which should be considered as one of The objective of the rules on venue is to ensure a just and orderly administration of
the proper venues, not the business address of the sole proprietorship justice. This objective won’t be attained if the plaintiff is given unrestricted freedom to
choose where to file the complaint.
Facts: JUST IN CASE SIR ASKS: Another issue in this case was w/n there was a proper
● In 1988, petitioner Anita Mangila’s company Seafood Products hired the implementation of a writ of preliminary attachment. The SC decided that there was not
freight forwarding service of private respondent Loreta Guina’s Air Swift because the lower court implemented the writ before it had jurisdiction over the person
International, a sole proprietorship, to deliver assorted seafood products to of Mangila. When they served the summons to her household help in Pampanga, she
Guam. They agreed that Mangila would pay cash on delivery; however, she was in Guam. While Guina could have availed of provisional remedies, and while the
requested for seven days within which she would pay Guina for the first writ was properly issued, it was improperly implemented. Well-settled is the rule that
shipment. But after three more shipments, Mangila still hasn’t paid, and the while a writ can be issued even if the court did not have jurisdiction over the person of
shipping charges amounted to around P100k. The contracted stated that the defendant, it cannot be implemented until such jurisdiction is attained.
in case of suit, the parties agreed that proceedings would be
instituted in “Makati, Metro Manila.”
● However, when Guina sued for collection of sum of money, she did so
before the Pasay City RTC, where Air Swift had its principal place of
business.
● Mangila moved to dismiss the case on account of improper venue, since
the contract stipulates that the case should have been filed in Makati.
● Guina argues that “Makati” was added by mere inadvertence by the
printing press. She furnished an affidavit by the printing press’s general
manager admitting such inadvertence. She also said that Mangila knew that
Air Swift had its business in Pasay.
● The RTC ruled that Mangila should pay Guina the P100k plus interest and
attorney’s fees. The CA upheld it.
Issues:
1. W/N the case should be dismissed due to improper venue --YES
Held:
1. YES, but for different reasons than those alleged by Mangila. While their stipulation
as to venue is valid pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, it didn’t contain any
qualifying or restrictive words that would show their intent to have Makati as the
exclusive venue. As such, it should just be treated as an agreement to an additional

VALDEVIESO VS. DAMALERIO ● Insofar as third persons are concerned, what validly transfers or conveys a
perons interest in real property is the registration of the deed.
Petitioner/s: Bernardo Valdevieso
● Thus, when petitioner bought the property on Dec 5, 1995, it was at that point
Respondent/s: Candelario Damalerio and Aurea C. Damalerio
no more than a private transaction between im and the spouses Uy. It needed
to be registered before it could bind third parties including respondents.
Doctrine:
● When the registration finally took place on June 6, 1996, it was already too
late because by then the levy in favor of respondents pursuant to the
Facts: preliminary attachment ordered by the Gen Santos City RTC had already been
● On Dec 5, 1995, petitioner bought from Sps Lorenzo and Elenita Uy a parcel anntoated on the title.
of land. The deed of sale was not registered, nor was the title of the land ● The settled rule is that levy on attachment, duly registered, takes preference
transferred to petitioner. over a prior unregistered sale. THis result is a necessary consequence of the
● It came to pass that on Apr 19, 1996, Sps. Candelario and Aurea Damalerio fact that the property involved was duly covered by the Torrens system which
(respondents) filed with the RTC a complaint for a sum of money against sps. works under the fundamental principle that registration is the operative act
Lorenzo and Elenita Uy with application for the issuance of a Writ of which gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land.
Preliminary Attachment. ● Thu,s in the registry, the attachment in favor of renspondents appeared in the
● On Apr 23, 1996, the trial court issued a Writ of Preliminary Attachment by nature of a real lien when petitioner had his purchase recorded. The effect of
virtue of which the property, then still in the name of Lorenzo Uy but which the notation of said lien was to subject and subordinate the right of petitioner
had already been sold to petitioner was levied. The levy was duly recorded in as purchaser to the lien.
the Register of Deeds. ● Petitioner acquired ownership of the land only from the date of the recording
● On June 6, 1996, the TCT in the name of Lorenzo Uy was cancelled and in lieu of his title in the register, and the right of ownership which he inscribed was
thereof, a new TCT was issued in the name of petitioner. This new TCT carried not absolute but a limited right, subject to a prior registered lien of
with it the attachment in favor of respondents. respondents, a right which is preferred and superior to that of petitioner.
● On Aug. 14, 1996, petitioner filed a third party claim to discharge or annul the Dispositive:
attachment levied on the property on the ground that said property belongs to WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
him and no longer to Lorenzo and Elenita Uy. 43082 dated 25 September 1997, and its Resolution dated 10 February 1998, are hereby
● The trial court ruled for the petitioner. Respondents sought reconsideration AFFIRMED
which was denied. Respondents appealed to CA and reversed the resolution.
● Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this Petition for
Review on Certiorari
Issue:
● WON a registered writ of attachment on the land is a supoerior lien over that
of an earlier unregistered deed of sale?
Ratio:
● The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land
insofar as third persons are concerened, and in all cases under this Decree, the
registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the
province or city where the land lies.
● It should also be observed that at the time of the attachment of the property,
spouses Uy were still the registered owners of said property. Under the PD
1529, the execution of the deed of sale in favor of petitioner was not enough as
a succeeding step had to be taken, which was the registration of the sale from
the spuses Uy to him.

MARPHIL VS. ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION ● Subsequently, Marphil filed a case against allied bank for declaratory relief
and damages. They claim that they had already paid their obligations to Allied
Petitioner/s: MARPHIL EXPORT CORPORATION and IRENEO LIM
bank and that the Blank PN that Lim signed was void for lack of consideration.
● On the other hand, Allied bank filed a writ of preliminary attachment and
Respondent/s: ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION substituted by
compulsory counterclaim against Marphil and another writ of preliminary
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
attachment against Lim and Lim Shao Tong as they were sureties of the
obligation.
Doctrine: For a writ of preliminary attachment to prosper on the basis of
Issue:
fraud, the applicant must sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the
1. WON the writ of preliminary attachment was valid? No
alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from the
2. WON the blank PN was valid? no
debtor's mere non-payment of the debt or failure to comply with his
3. WON the obligations of Marphil on the previous PN’s were already fully paid?
obligation. He must be able to demonstrate that the debtor has intended to
yes
defraud the creditor.
Ratio:
1. The writ of preliminary attachment is invalid
Facts: - In this case, allied bank alleges that Marphil committed fraud by
● Marphil is a domestic company engaged in the exportation of cuttlefish, misrepresenting the shipping of cashew nuts at a volume less than
cashew nuts and similar agricultural products. To finance the purchase and what was required by the buyer.
export of these products, Marphil availed of several loans from allied bank - Under Sec. 1D of Rule 57 in the Rules of Court, a writ of preliminary
evidenced by several PNs. attachment may be issued at the commencement of action or at
● The loans were secured by continuing surety agreements executed by Lim, any time before entry of judgment. This is done so that the
Lim shao tong and Enrique ching. plaintiff may have the property of the adverse party attached as the
● Irrevocable letter of credits were given as collaterals for payment of the bills. security for satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered In an
Allied bank also required Marphil to execute a letter of agreement wherein action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in
they bound themselves to reimburse allied bank in case the drawee of the contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon
letters refuses to honor it. Upon negotiations of export bills/drafts that Allied which the action is brought, or in the performance thereof
Bank purchases from Marphil, the amount of the face value of the letters of - A writ of attachment may be dissolved or discharged in the ff
credit are credited in favor of Marphil. grounds:
● The transaction involved in this case is the exportation of Marphil of cashew (a) the debtor has posted a counter-bond or has made the requisite cash deposit;
nuts to Intan Ltd. Hongkong (Intan). Intan applied for 2 irrevocable letters of (b) the attachment was improperly or irregularly issued as where there is no ground for
credit from Nanyang (bank based in china) to cover its 2 purchase contracts attachment, or the affidavit and/or bond filed therefor are defective or insufficient:
with Marphil. (c) the attachment is excessive, but the discharge shall be limited to the excess;
● In the letters of credit, Marphil was the beneficiary while Allied Bank was the (d) the property attachment is exempt from preliminary attachment; or
correspondent bank. (e) the judgment is rendered against the attaching creditor.
● The 1st transaction went smoothly, however in the 2nd transaction, Nanyang - For a writ of preliminary attachment to prosper on the basis of fraud,
refused to honor the 2nd letter of credit due to discrepancies on the shipping the applicant must sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the
documents. alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from the
● Because Nanyang refused to honor the 2nd letter of credit, Allied bank then debtor's mere non-payment of the debt or failure to comply with his
reversed the credit entry of 1.9M that it made to Marphil’s account. Lim, one obligation. He must be able to demonstrate that the debtor has
of the authorized signatories of Marphil was also made to sign a blank PN intended to defraud the creditor.
which was filled up by allied bank in the amount of 1.5M. - In this case,the court found that the writ was irregularly issued.
(Note: Allied bank thought that the transaction will be honored by nanyang that’s why Allied Bank filed the application for the writ of preliminary
they credited the account of marphil. It was only after that they found out that the LOC attachment in the Collection Case against Lim as surety. However,
was dishonored) the allegations of fraud refer to the execution of the
promissory notes, and not on the surety agreement. The
application was bereft of any allegation as to Lim's participation in computed from May 7, 1990, until the date of finality of this judgment. The total
the alleged conspiracy of fraud. Also, the writ of preliminary amount shall thereafter earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from
attachment was granted in the Collection Case against Lim as surety, the finality of judgment until its satisfaction. Let the writ of preliminary attachment
yet there was no allegation on Lim's fraudulent intention in incurring issued against Ireneo Lim's property be DISSOLVED.
its obligation under the CG/CS Agreements. It cannot be inferred
that Lim had, at the time of contracting the obligation, the
preconceived intention to renege on his obligation under the CG/CS
Agreements because such agreements are normally required by a
bank or financing company anticipating to enter into a series of
credit transactions with a particular principal debtor. Moreover, the
agreements were also in force during the first transaction which went
smoothly. Thus, the 2nd transaction cannot be singled out to justify
that the surety agreement has been contracted through fraud.
- The case for declaratory relief cannot be used as evidence for a
preconceived intention not to pay the surety agreement because it is
a legitimate means resorted to by Marphil to clarify its existing
obligation w/ allied bank. If its intention was to renege on its
obligations, it would not have submitted itself to the jurisdiction of
the court where it can be ordered to pay any existing obligations.
2. The blank PN was invalid

- The court held that the blank PN was void. However, Marphil was
still liable for the payment of the 1.9M which was the amount equal
to the 2nd LOC.
- This obligation is supported by the letter agreement that Marphil
executed wherein it bound itself to refund the amount of the export
bill or draft in case the drawee bank dishonors it
- The Letter of Agreement is a contract between Marphil and Allied
Bank where the latter agreed to purchase the draft and credit the
former its value on the undertaking that Allied Bank will be
reimbursed in case the draft is dishonored. This obligation is direct,
and is independent, not only from the obligation under the draft, but
also from the obligation under the LOC.
3. The other previous PN’s were already paid

- The previous PNs were already paid as it covers only the 1st transaction which
was executed successfully.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is PARTLY GRANTED . The
January 12, 2009 Decision and May 12, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
MODIFIED. Marphil Export Corporation and Ireneo Lim are ordered to pay jointly and
severally Allied Banking Corporation (now Philippine National Bank) the principal
amount of P1,913,763.45, with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
PHIL-AIR CONDITIONING VS. RCJ LINES property is held by the sheriff as security for the satisfaction of whatever judgment that
might be secured by the attaching party against the defendant.
Petitioner/s: PHIL-AIR CONDITIONING CENTER
Respondent/s: RCJ LINES AND ROLANDO ABADILLA, JR. The grant of the writ is conditioned not only on the finding of the court that there exists
a valid ground for its issuance. The Rules also require the applicant to post a bond.
Doctrine: The dissolution of the preliminary attachment does
not result in the dissolution of the attachment bond. Section 4 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules) provides that "the party
applying for the order must...give a bond executed to the adverse party in the amount
fixed by the court, in its order granting the issuance of the writ, conditioned that the
Facts: latter will pay all the costs that may be adjudged to the adverse party and
 Phil-Air sold air-conditioning units to RCJ lines for the latter’s buses. RCJ was all damages that he may sustain by reason of the attachment, if the court
supposed to pay in installment thru the issuance of post-dated checks. Upon shall finally adjudge that the applicant was not entitled thereto."
maturity of the checks, however, it turned out that they were unfunded.
 Demands have been sent by Phil-Air to no avail. Hence, a complaint for a sum The enforcement of the writ notwithstanding, the party whose property is attached is
of money was filed by Phil-Air against RCJ, with prayer for the issuance afforded relief to have the attachment lifted.
of a writ of preliminary attachment.
 In RCJ’s answer with compulsory counterclaim, it admitted the purchase There are various modes of discharging an attachment under Rule 57, viz.: (1) by
transaction, but interposed the defense that there was breach of warranty on depositing cash or posting a counter-bond under Section 12; (2) by proving that the
the part of Phil-Air, the air-conditioners not being fit for a 45-49 seater buses. attachment bond was improperly or irregularly issued or enforced, or that the bond is
insufficient under Section 13; (3) by showing that the attachment is excessive under
 Pending disposition based on the merits, the RTC granted the application for
Section 13; and (4) by claiming that the property is exempt from execution under
the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment. Because of this, RCJ filed
Section 2.
a counter-bond, lifting the attachment of the buses.
 After trial however, it ruled in favor of RCJ and directed Phil-Air to refund RCJ Lines availed of the first mode by posting a counter-bond.
RCJ for the counter-bond the latter posted to have the attachment lifted. The
CA affirmed the same, the writ being improvidently issued. Under the first mode, the court will order the discharge of the attachment after (1) the
 Hence this petition. movant makes a cash deposit or posts a counter-bond and (2) the court hears the
motion to discharge the attachment with due notice to the adverse party.
Issue:
 Whether Phil-Air should be held liable to refund RCJ’s counter-bond posting, The amount of the cash deposit or counter-bond must be equal to that fixed by the court
on top of the initial attachment bond Phil-Air posted when it applied for the in the order of attachment, exclusive of costs. The cash deposit or counter-bond shall
writ of preliminary attachment. – No secure the payment of any judgment that the attaching party may recover in the action.
Ratio: The filing of a counter-bond to discharge the attachment applies when there has already
been a seizure of property by the sheriff and all that is entailed is the presentation of a
Phil-Air is not directly liable for the counter-bond premium and RCJ Lines' motion to the proper court, seeking approval of a cash or surety bond in an amount
alleged unrealized profits. equivalent to the value of the property seized and the lifting of the attachment on the
basis thereof. The counter-bond stands in place of the property so released.
The CA and the RTC erred when it held Phil-Air directly liable for the counter-bond
premium and RCJ Lines' alleged unrealized profits. Granting that RCJ Lines suffered To be clear, the discharge of the attachment by depositing cash or posting a counter-
losses, the judgment award should have been first executed on the attachment bond. bond under Section 12 should not be confused with the discharge sanctioned under
Only if the attachment bond is insufficient to cover the judgment award can Phil-Air be Section 13. Section 13 speaks of discharge on the ground that the writ was improperly
held liable. or irregularly issued or enforced, or that the attachment bond is insufficient, or that the
attachment is excessive.
Explained below isnthe purpose of a preliminary attachment, the procedure in
obtaining it, and the manner of having it lifted. To reiterate, the discharge under Section 12 takes effect upon posting of a counter-bond
or depositing cash, and after hearing to determine the sufficiency of the cash deposit or
A writ of preliminary attachment is a provisional remedy issued by the court where an counter-bond. On the other hand, the discharge under Section 13 takes effect only upon
action is pending to be levied upon the property or properties of the defendant. The showing that the plaintiffs attachment bond was improperly or irregularly issued, or

that the bond is insufficient. The discharge of the attachment under Section 13 must be Dispositive: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we hereby GRANT the
made only after hearing. petition. The September 15, 2010 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
85866 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
These differences notwithstanding, the discharge of the preliminary attachment either
through Section 12 or Section 13 has no effect on and does not discharge the attachment ACCORDINGLY, RCJ Lines is DIRECTED to pay:
bond. The dissolution of the preliminary attachment does not result in the 1.Eight Hundred Forty Thousand Pesos (P840,000.00) representing the unpaid
dissolution of the attachment bond.Justice Narvasa, writing his separate opinion balance of the purchase price;
in one case, explained: 2.Interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum on the unpaid balance to be computed
from November 5, 199086 until June 30, 2013;
3.Interest of six percent (6%) per annum on the unpaid balance to be computed from
The dissolution of the preliminary attachment upon security given [Section July 1, 2013,87 until fully paid;
12], or a showing of its irregular or improper issuance [Section 13], does not of 4.Attorney's fees in the fixed amount of P30,000.00. 88
course operate to discharge the sureties on plaintiffs own attachment The total amount to be recovered shall further be subject to the legal interest rate of six
bond. The reason is simple. That bond is executed to the adverse party,. . . conditioned percent (6 %) per annum from the finality of this decision until fully paid.89
that the ... (applicant) will pay all the costs which may be adjudged to the adverse party The attachment bond posted by Phil-Air shall be levied upon to satisfy the P50,000.00
and all damages which he may sustain by reason of the attachment, if the court shall temperate damages awarded to RCJ Lines and the P82,274.00 refund of the counter-
finally adjudge that the applicant was not entitled thereto." Hence, until that bond premium.
determination is made, as to the applicant's entitlement to the attachment, his bond
must stand and cannot be withdrawn.
In the present case, the RTC lifted the preliminary attachment after it heard RCJ Lines'
urgent motion to discharge attachment and the latter posted a counter-bond. The RTC
found that there was no fraud and Phil-Air had no sufficient cause of action for the
issuance of the writ of the attachment. As a consequence, it ordered Phil-Air to refund
the premium payment for the counter-bond and the losses suffered by RCJ Lines
resulting from the enforcement of the writ. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling in toto.
The Court reversed the CA and RTC rulings.
As discussed above, it is patent that under the Rules, the attachment bond answers for
all damages incurred by the party against whom the attachment was issued.60
Thus, Phil-Air cannot be held directly liable for the costs adjudged to and the damages
sustained by RCJ Lines because of the attachment. Section 4 of Rule 57 positively lays
down the rule that the attachment bond will pay "all the costs which may be adjudged
to the adverse party and all damages which he may sustain by reason of the attachment,
if the court shall finally adjudge that the applicant was not entitled thereto."
The RTC, instead of declaring Phil-Air liable for the alleged unrealized profits and
counter-bond premium, should have ordered the execution of the judgment award on
the attachment bond. To impose direct liability to Phil-Air would defeat the purpose of
the attachment bond, which was not dissolved despite the lifting of the writ of
preliminary attachment.
The order to refund the counter-bond premium is likewise erroneous. The premium
payment may be deemed a cost incurred by RCJ Lines to lift the attachment. Such cost
may be charged against the attachment bond.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. MEGA PACIFIC E SOLUTIONS, INC  The Court noted that MPEI’s machines failed the accuracy requirement set by
COMELEC; basically, the machines were sub-standard. COMELEC also
Petitioner/s: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES awarded the contract on the basis of the “demo version” that they tested
Respondent/s: MEGA PACIFIC ESOLUTIONS, INC., WILLY U. YU, without testing the final machine.
BONNIE S. YU, ENRIQUE T. TANSIPEK, ROSITA Y. TANSIPEK, PEDRO
O. TAN, JOHNSON W. FONG, BERNARD I. FONG, AND *LAURIANO A.
BARRIOS  The contract was nullified and became final and executory.
Doctrine: A writ of preliminary attachment is a provisional remedy issued  MPEI filed a complaint for damages arguing that, COMELEC was still bound
upon the order of the court where an action is pending. Through the writ, to pay the amount of P200,165,681.89, representing the difference between
the property or properties of the defendant may be levied upon and held the value of the ACMs and the support services delivered on one hand, and on
the other, the payment previously made by the COMELEC.
thereafter by the sheriff as security for the satisfaction of whatever
judgment might be secured by the attaching creditor against the
defendant.61 The provisional remedy of attachment is available in order  The REPUBLIC filed a Counterclaim arguing that there can be no recovery
because the contract was held void, thus, it annot vest any right or obligation.
that the defendant may not dispose of the property attached, and thus
It also demanded for the return of the payments already made.
prevent the satisfaction of any judgment that may be secured by the plaintiff
from the former.
 The REPUBLIC prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment against the properties of MPEI and individual respondents,
Facts: claiming that there was fraudulent misrepresentation as to their eligibility to
 For the 2004 elections, the COMELEC attempted to implement the automated participate in the bidding. It was denied for lack of factual allegations. Thus,
election system, which was authorized by RA 8436. there can be no corporate piercing to attach the properties of individual
respondents.
 COMELEC invited bidders. MPEI, as lead company, purportedly formed a

joint venture - known as the Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC) - together  On appeal, the CA reversed the the order and found that there was sufficient
with We Solv, SK C & C, ePLDT, Election.com and Oracle - which submitted basis for the grant of the application for a writ of attachment. On MR, however,
its bid proposal to COMELEC. the case was remanded to the RTC for reception of evidence of fraud. Hence,
this Rule 45 petition.
 After due assessment, the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) recommended
Issue: WoN the application for writ of preliminary attachment should be granted?
that the project be awarded to MPC. Through a Resolution, the COMELEC
YES!
awarded the project to MPC.
Ratio:
 Despite the award to MPC, the COMELEC and MPEI executed on 2 June
 Fraud on the part of respondent MPEI was sufficiently established by the
2003 the Automated Counting and Canvassing Project Contract (automation
factual findings of this Court in its 2004 Decision and subsequent
contract) for P1,248,949,088.
pronouncements.
 SEE DOCTRINE
 MPEI agreed to supply and deliver 1,991 units of ACMs and such other  The purpose and function of an attachment or garnishment is twofold: (1) it
equipment and materials necessary for the computerized electoral system in seizes upon property of an alleged debtor in advance of final judgment and
the 2004 elections. COMELEC made partial payments to MPEI in the holds it subject to appropriation, thereby preventing the loss or dissipation of
aggregate amount of P1.05 billion. the property through fraud or other means; and (2) it subjects the property of
the debtor to the payment of a creditor's claim, in those cases in which
 In 2004, the Court held that COMELEC committed GAD because it personal service upon the debtor cannot be obtained.
awarded the project to MPC, who did not participate in the bidding,  One of the grounds for application of a writ of preliminary attachment is: “In
but contracted with MPEI, a company that joined the bidding an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in contracting the debt
process but did not meet the eligibility requirements. or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought, or in the
performance thereof” (Sec. 1 (d), Rule 57).
 For a writ of preliminary attachment to issue under the above-quoted rule, the
applicant must sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the alleged
fraud. The fraud must relate to the execution of the agreement and must have
been the reason which induced the other party into giving consent which he
would not have otherwise given.
 The Republic discharged the burden of demonstrating the commission of
fraud in the two ways
o MPEI had perpetrated a scheme to secure the automation contract
by using MPC as supposed bidder and eventually succeeding in
signing the automation contract as MPEI alone, an entity which was
ineligible to bid in the first place.
o Fraud on the part of MPEI was further shown by the fact that despite
the failure of its ACMs to pass the tests conducted by the DOST, it
still acceded to being awarded the automation contract.
 The Court also held the piercing of the corporate veil is proper. Veil-piercing
in fraud cases requires that the legal fiction of separate juridical personality is
used for fraudulent or wrongful ends.
 There are several red flags of fraudulent schemes in the public procurement,
and the totality of which strongly indicate that MPEI was a sham corporation
formed merely for the purpose of perpetrating a fraudulent scheme.
 The red flags are as follows: (1) overly narrow specifications; (2) unjustified
recommendations and unjustified winning bidders; (3) failure to meet the
terms of the contract; and (4) shell or fictitious company.
 The Court further adds that all the individual respondents actively
participated in the perpetration of the fraud against the Republic, thus, their
personal assets may be subject to a writ of preliminary attachment by piercing
the corporate veil.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The

Amended Decision dated 22 September 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP.
No. 95988 is ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. A new one is entered DIRECTING the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 59, to ISSUE in Civil Case No. 04-346,
entitled Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc., vs. Republic of the Philippines, the Writ of
Preliminary Attachment prayed for by petitioner Republic of the Philippines against
the properties of respondent Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc., and Willy U. Yu, Bonnie S.
Yu, Enrique T. Tansipek, Rosita Y. Tansipek, Pedro O. Tan, Johnson W. Fong, Bernard
I. Fong and Lauriano Barrios.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

GOMOS v. ADIONG injunction to FAPE, in its principal office in Makati City, since the
place is outside the 12th judicial region where it belongs.
Petitioner/s: ATTY. JOSE ALFONSO M. GOMOS, FUND FOR
● Sheriff Acmad Alipanto and Saripada Ali Pacasum served an Order which was
ASSISTANCE TO PRIVATE EDUCATION (FAPE)
allegedly issued on a mere ex-parte motion by Saripada Ali Pacasum,
Respondent/s: JUDGE SANTOS B. ADIONG, Regional Trial Court,
reiterating the assailed orders of Judge Adiong with a warning that failure to
Branch 8, Marawi City
comply would be under pain of contempt of court.
● The Court of Appeals issued a TRO enjoining Judge Adiong from enforcing
Doctrine: A writ of preliminary injunction may issue only after prior
the assailed orders.
notice and hearing upon the adverse party.
○ Despite the TRO, Judge Adiong ordered the arrest of Dr. Borromeo
and certain FAPE employees for failure to comply with his directive.
Facts: ○ 2 of FAPEs employees, namely: Evangeline Domondon and Nenita
● Saripada Ali Pacasum filed a Special Civil Action for mandamus with Torres, were subsequently arrested and detained.
application for preliminary mandatory injunction against FAPE. ● Sultan Sabdulah Ali Pacasum filed a letter complaint before the OCA charging
○ He alleged that FAPE was required by law to pay subsidy to Pacasum Judge Adiong with gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct.
College, Inc. under the Educational Service Program of the ● OCA Findings: The OCA found that Judge Adiong was liable for:
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS); that although ○ gross ignorance of the law, oppression and abuse of authority;
the DECS has already released to FAPE the total amount of P746M ○ that Judge Adiong, as the Presiding Judge of RTC, Marawi City, has
for payment to different participating schools, FAPE refused to no authority to enforce a preliminary injunction in Makati City where
release to Pacasum College, Inc. the sum of P1,845,040 which the principal office of FAPE was located;
represented the remaining unpaid collectible of the said institution ○ that he violated the rights of FAPE employees when he summarily
for the school year 2000-2001; that the continued refusal by FAPE cited them in contempt without regard to the procedure prescribed
to release the said amount has caused the school to fail in its by the Rules of Court;
obligation to pay the salaries of its teachers for 3 months. ○ that he abused his authority when he issued a warrant of arrest
● On the same day the petition was filed, Judge Adiong granted the application despite a TRO issued by the CA
for preliminary mandatory injunction upon the posting by the petitioner of a
surety or property bond in the amount of P200K Issue: Whether or not Judge Adiong should be held administratively liable. YES.
● Judge Adiong also issued another order directing the president of FAPE, Dr.
Roberto T. Borromeo, to prepare and issue a check for P1,845,040.00 Ratio:
representing the payment to the Pacasum College, Inc. x x x payable to its ISSUE RELATING TO INJUNCTION
president and chairman Saripada Ali Pacasum, the petitioner herein. ● Judge Adiong granted Saripada Ali Pacasums application for preliminary
● Sheriff Acmad Alipanto served upon FAPE, through its president, summons mandatory injunction on the very same day the Special Civil Action No. 690-
and a copy of the petition. 01 was filed.
● FAPE filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the Court of ○ Sections 4(c) and 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is
Appeals, challenging the Orders, both dated February 26, 2001, issued by the very explicit that the writ of preliminary injunction may issue only
respondent judge. after prior notice and hearing upon the adverse party.
○ It argued that a pending ownership dispute between Sultan Sabdulah ● In issuing the subject writ on the very same day the application was filed and
Ali Pacasum and Saripada Ali Pacasum over the shares of the considering that the person against whom the same was to be served was
Pacasum College before the Securities and Exchange Commission located in Makati, summons could not have been served upon them or a
precludes the release of the remaining balance of the subsidy to hearing conducted in evident disregard of the due process requirements of the
Pacasum College under the ESC Program, which requires that any Rules of Court.
dispute must be settled first before the release could be made. The
petition further stated that the RTC of Marawi City has no ● Judge Adiong’s failure to comply with procedural due process is aggravated
jurisdiction to enforce the writs of mandamus and preliminary by his total inattention to the parameters of his jurisdiction.

○ As the presiding judge of RTC, Marawi City, he should have known
that Makati City was way beyond the boundaries of his territorial
jurisdiction insofar as enforcing a writ of preliminary injunction is
concerned.
○ Section 21(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, provides that the RTC
shall exercise original jurisdiction in the issuance of writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus
and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective
regions.
○ The rationale is that the trial court has no jurisdiction to issue a writ
of preliminary injunction to enjoin acts being performed or about to
be performed outside its territorial jurisdiction.
● In the case at bar, the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is not a
mere deficiency in prudence, or lapse of judgment on the part of respondent
judge but a blatant disregard of basic rules constitutive of gross ignorance of
the law. The responsibility of judges to keep abreast of the law and changes
therein, as well as with the latest decisions of the Supreme Court, is a pressing
need. One cannot seek refuge in a mere cursory acquaintance with the statute
and procedural rules. Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know,
excuses no one not even judges
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Santos B. Adiong, Presiding Judge

of Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Marawi City, is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of
the law for issuing a writ of preliminary injunction in violation of Section 21(1) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 and Sections 4(c) and 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
and for citing FAPE employees in contempt of court in disregard of Section 3, Rule 71
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from office
without salary and other benefits for SIX (6) MONTHS with WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

ALLGEMEINE-BAU-CHEMIE PHILS., INC., VS. METROPOLITAN BANK & issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
TRUST CO., HONORABLE N. C. PERELLO injunction enjoining Metrobank to consolidate its title and to take possession
of its properties
Petitioner/s: ALLGEMEINE-BAU-CHEMIE PHILS., INC.
● Petitioner Allgemeine filed a separate petition for the issuance of a TRO and a
Respondent/s: METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO., HONORABLE N.
writ of preliminary injunction with the CA also to enjoin the implementation
C. PERELLO, Presiding Judge of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT-
of the writ of possession issued by the Branch 276
MUNTINLUPA, BRANCH 276 and SHERIFF FELIX FALCOTELLO
○ Allgemeine alleged that its complaint-in-intervention in Civil Case
No. 00-196 (Branch 256) is its principal action but as the said court
Doctrine: An original action for injunction is outside the jurisdiction of
could not enjoin Branch 276 from implementing the writ of
the CA.
possession, both courts being of equal jurisdiction, it had no choice
but to file the petition with the appellate court
Facts: ● 10th division granted TRO but 7th Division of CA denied Allgemeine's prayer
● Under a loan agreement, Asian Appraisal Holdings, Inc. (AAHI) obtained a for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction for failure to establish a
loan from Solidbank Corporation (Solidbank) for the construction of Asian clear and unmistakable right to the subject properties
Star Building, a 20 storey commercial condominium built on lots covered by ● MR also denied
TCT Nos. 205967 and 205969
● As security for the loan, AAHI executed a real estate mortgage over its Issue:
property consisting of the aforementioned lots, and the Asian Star Building WON CA erred in denying the writ of preliminary injunction - NO
built thereon including all units, parking slots, common areas and other
improvements, machineries and equipment Ratio:
● AAHI entered into a contract to sell with petitioner Allgemeine-Bau-Chemie ● What petitioner filed with the appellate court was an original action for
Phils, Inc for the purchase of Units 1004 and 1005 and the right to the preliminary injunction which is a provisional and extraordinary remedy
exclusive use of parking slots P515, P516, P517, and P514 (the subject calculated to preserve or maintain the status quo of things and is availed of to
properties) prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be heard.
● AAHI and Solidbank informed petitioner Allgemeine of the real estate ○ An original action for injunction is outside the jurisdiction of the CA
mortgage forged by them ● Under B.P. 129, the CA has original jurisdiction only over actions for
● Petitioner Allgemeine fully settled its obligation to AAHI annulment of judgments of the RTCs and has original jurisdiction to issue
● As AAHI defaulted on its loan obligation, Metropolitan Bank and Trust writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus and quo warranto,
Company (Metrobank), to which the banking operations of Solidbank were and auxiliary writs or processes whether or not they are in aid of its appellate
integrated, filed before RTC a foreclosure of the mortgage jurisdiction.
● AAHI not long after filed also before the Muntinlupa RTC a complaint against ● The appellate court's jurisdiction to grant a writ of preliminary injunction is
Solidbank, for Specific Performance with Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the limited to actions or proceedings pending before it, as Section 2 of Rule 58 of
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage and was raffled to Branch 256 of the the Rules clearly provides:
RTC ○ SECTION 2. Who may grant preliminary injunction. - A preliminary
● The mortgaged properties were sold at public auction to the highest bidder, injunction may be granted by the court where the action or
Metrobank proceeding is pending. x x x
● Metrobank filed an Ex-Parte petition for the Issuance of a Writ of ● or in a petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus under Section 7 of
Possession of the subject properties and raffled to Branch 276, RTC of Rule 65, thus:
Muntinlupa, which was granted ○ SECTION 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. - The court
● Petitioner Allgemeine filed before Branch 256 of Muntinlupa RTC in Civil in which the petition is filed may issue orders expediting the
Case No. 00-196 (AAHI's complaint against Solidbank for Specific proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or
Performance with Preliminary Injunction) a motion for intervention, to which a writ of preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of
it attached a complaint-in-intervention with prayer for the annulment of the the parties pending such proceedings. The petition shall not
extra-judicial foreclosure sale, delivery of title, and damages and for the interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued
against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case.
● In the case at bar, petitioner Allgemeine's complaint-in-intervention was
pending before Branch 256 of the Muntinlupa RTC, not with the appellate
court.
● Petitioner Allgemeine's petition before the appellate court does not show, nay
allege, that in issuing the writ of possession, the Muntinlupa RTC acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion for it
to be treated as either one for certiorari or prohibition.
● Thus, for want of jurisdiction, the petition before the appellate court should
have been dismissed outright.
● At all events, it is well-settled that an order granting or denying a preliminary
injunction is not appealable.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions,

DENIED.

REPUBLIC VS. PRINCIPALIA MANA ● Meanwhile, Principalia filed a Motion to Dismiss with leave of court before the
RTC. It averred that because of the length of time the case has been pending,
Petitioner/s: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
it is no longer interested in pursuing the same. Also, Principalia said the
Respondent/s: PRINCIPALIA MANAGEMENT AND PERSONNEL
injunction case had become moot and academic following the subsequent
CONSULTANTS, INC.
renewal of its license.
● In response, Republic said that the renewal of Principalia’s license does not
Doctrine: Actions for injunction and damages lie within the exclusive and
bar the Supreme Court from ruling on the matters raised in herein petition.
original jurisdiction of the RTC, pursuant to Sec. 19 of BP 129
POEA also wanted SC to settle with finality which between the DOLE
Secretary and the RTC has jurisdiction over actions assailing a POEA Order
Facts: that involves immediate enforcement of penalties for serious offenses.
● In 2009, Principalia Management and Personnel Consultants, Inc.
(Principalia), a recruitment agency, was found by the POEA to have collected Issue:
from complainant Alejandro Ramos an excessive placement fee, which was in ● Does the RTC have jurisdiction over the injunction case? – YES.
violation of Sec 2(b), Rule I, Part VI of the 2002 POEA Rules and Regulations
(POEA Rules). Such violation carries the penalty of cancellation of license for Ratio:
the first offense. ● RTC can take cognizance of the Injunction Complaint, which "is a suit which
● Hence, upon receipt of Principalia of the aforesaid Order, its license was has for its purpose the enjoinment of the defendant, perpetually or for a
immediately cancelled by POEA pursuant to its Rules: particular time, from the commission or continuance of a specific act, or his
Stay of Execution. The decision of the Administration shall be stayed during the compulsion to continue performance of a particular act."
pendency of the appeal; Provided that where the penalty imposed carries the maximum ● Actions for injunction and damages lie within the exclusive and original
penalty of twelve months suspension or cancellation of license, the decision shall be jurisdiction of the RTC, pursuant to Sec. 19 of BP 129 (Judiciary
immediately executory despite the pendency of the appeal. Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by RA 7691
● Two days after the cancellation, Principalia sought to stay the implementation ● Administrative decisions on matters within the executive jurisdiction can be
of the POEA Order by filing a Complaint for Injunction with Application for set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law, and in
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary such cases, injunction may be granted.
Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction before the Mandaluyong RTC.
● Principalia claims that the cancellation not only deprived it of due process but Dispositive:
also jeopardized the deployment of hundreds of OFWs. WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. The April 4, 2011 Decision and August
● RTC issued a 72-hour TRO to allow the deployment of six workers scheduled 31, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 111874 are AFFIRMED.
to leave for work.
● In the meantime, Principalia appealed the POEA Order before the Office of
Secretary of DOLE
● POEA filed a Motion to Dismiss before the RTC for the injunction case based
on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and failure to exhaust administrative
remedies and forum shopping.
● RTC rejected POEA’s arguments. POEA’s subsequent motion for
reconsideration was likewise rejected.
● On appeal, the Court of Appeals debunked the argument of the Republic that
the injunction case is in reality an action for the reversal of POEA’s Order. CA
said the injunction case is only meant to determine the legality or propriety of
the immediate cancellation of Principalia’s license. CA said RTC had
jurisdiction over the matter and that no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the RTC. CA rejected Republic’s motion for reconsideration.
● Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court.
BENGUET MANAGEMENT CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS ● In Spouses Caviles v. Court of Appeals, we recognized the predicament that
|| INJUNCTION confronts a mortgagor seeking to restrain the extra-judicial foreclosure of
mortgages arising from a single transaction but concerning properties found
Petitioner/s: BENGUET MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
in different provinces. Thus
Respondent/s: COURT OF APPEALS, KEPPEL BANK PHILIPPINES, INC.,
● [W]e find it necessary to dwell on the issue of whether or not the act of
as Trustee for METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, UNITED
petitioners in filing three civil actions - one with the RTC of Makati, another
COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING
with the RTC of Bian, Laguna (Branch 24) and the third one, with the Bian
CORPORATION, FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY and BANK OF
Assisting Court, constitutes forum shopping.
THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS under the Mortgage Trust Indenture, and
● The problem of petitioners is an off-shoot of the express provisions of B.P. Blg.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CALAMBA
129, to wit:
● Sec. 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall
Doctrine:
exercise original jurisdiction:
● BMC is not guilty of forum shopping precisely because the remedy
● (1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
available to them under the law was the filing of separate
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part of
injunction suits. It is mandated to file only one case for a single
their respective regions; (Emphasis, supplied)
cause of action, e.g., breach of mortgage contract, yet, it cannot
● and Section 3, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court which provides that a party may
enforce any injunctive writ issued by the court to protect its
not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. (Emphasis
properties situated outside the jurisdiction of said court
supplied)
● In the said case, the mortgagors filed separate actions for breach of mortgage
Facts: contract with injunction to restrain the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings
● Benguet Management Corporation (BMC) and Keppel Bank Philippines Inc. commenced by the mortgagee in Makati and Bian, Laguna where the
(KBPI) entered into a Loan Agreement and Mortgage Trust Indenture. For the properties were situated. The Court did not find the mortgagors guilty of
consideration of Php 190M, BMC mortgaged its properties located in forum shopping insofar as the cases filed with the Makati and Bian, Laguna
Alaminos, Laguna and Iba, Zambales. (Branch 24) courts were concerned. The obvious reason is that since
● BMC defaulted so KBPI filed an application for extra-judicial foreclosure of injunction is enforceable only within the territorial limits of the
real estate mortgage first with the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional trial court, the mortgagor is left without remedy as to the
Trial Court in Iba and later with the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional properties located outside the jurisdiction of the issuing court,
Trial Court in San Pablo City. unless an application for injunction is made with another court
● BMC contended that the application should be denied on grounds of wrong which has jurisdiction over the latter properties.
remedy and forum-shopping. ● In the case at bar, BMC is not guilty of forum shopping precisely because the
● The trial court granted the foreclosure proceedings. remedy available to them under the law was the filing of separate injunction
● Hence, BMC filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, suits.
reiterating its arguments and assailing the validity of the foreclosure of its ● It is mandated to file only one case for a single cause of action, e.g., breach of
properties in Laguna. mortgage contract, yet, it cannot enforce any injunctive writ issued by the
● It prayed for the issuance of a preliminary injunction and/or temporary court to protect its properties situated outside the jurisdiction of said court.
restraining order to enjoin the scheduled sale of its properties in Laguna. ● Besides, BMC was honest enough to inform the Zambales court in the
● Since no injunction or restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals, certification of its complaint that it has a pending request not to give due
the auction sale proceeded as scheduled with KBPI as the highest bidder. course to the foreclosure proceedings with the San Pablo court, in the same
Issue: manner that its petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals notified the
● W/N KBPI violated the rule against forum-shopping in filing applications for appellate court of the pendency of its complaint with the Zambales court.
extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage with both the RTCs in Iba ● It would therefore be unfair to dismiss the cases filed by BMC on the ground
and San Pablo City of forum shopping where under the circumstances the law gives it no other
Ratio: remedy.

● The issues involved in the instant petition for certiorari are not only limited to
the propriety of the Court of Appeals denial of BMCs prayer to enjoin the
consolidation of title of the foreclosed properties in the name of private
respondents. There are likewise raised factual issues, i.e., the validity of the
foreclosure and the sale at public auction of its properties, which are yet to be
resolved by the Court of Appeals. Since this Court is not a trier of facts, the
remand of this case to the appellate court is necessary.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated April 5, 2002 and May 28, 2002, in CA-G.R.
SP No. 69503, insofar as they denied BMCs application for temporary restraining
order, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The status quo order issued by the Court on
June 26, 2002 shall stand until further order of the Court, and the instant case is
REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for determination of the case on its merits.
Petitioner BMC is ordered to inform the appellate court of the present status of Civil
Case No. RTC-1852-I, then pending with the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales,
Branch 70, and if it had been decided and the decision is on appeal in the Court of
Appeals, the latter may consider its consolidation with CA-G.R. SP No. 69503 if
warranted.

SECOND DIVISION AUSTRALIAN PROFESSIONAL REALTY, INC. VS. SHOPPING CENTER are hereby declared forfeited in favor of the
MUNIPALITY OF PADRE GARCIA, BATANGAS Municipality of Padre Garcia.
● There having been no timely appeal made, respondent filed a Motion for
Petitioner/s: AUSTRALIAN PROFESSIONAL REALTY, INC., JESUS
Execution of Judgment, which was granted by the RTC. A Writ of Execution
GARCIA, and LYDIA MARCIANO
was thus issued on 15 July 2005.
Respondent/s: MUNICIPALITY OF PADRE GARCIA BATANGAS
● After learning of the adverse judgment, petitioners filed a Petition for Relief
PROVINCE
from Judgment. This Petition was denied by the RTC. RTC also denied MR.
● Petitioners later filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
Doctrine: The grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the CA a Motion for the Issuance of Status
pending case rests on the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance of
Quo Order and Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or
the case, since the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end
Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The motion prayed for an order to restrain the
involves findings of fact left to the said court for its conclusive
RTC from further proceeding and issuing any further Order, Resolution, Writ
determination.
of Execution, and any other court processes in the case before it.
● The CA issued a Resolution denying the said motion, stating thus:
Facts: ○ After a careful evaluation of petitioners Motion for Issuance of Status
● In 1993, fire razed to the ground the old public market of respondent Quo Order and Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
Municipality of Padre Garcia, Batangas. The municipal government invited and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, We find that the matter is not
petitioner Australian Professional Realty, Inc. (APRI) to rebuild the public of extreme urgency and that there is no clear and irreparable injury
market and construct a shopping center. that would be suffered by the petitioners if the prayer for the issuance
● A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was executed between petitioner APRI of a Status Quo Order, Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or
and respondent, and the members of the Sangguniang Bayan, where APRI Writ of Preliminary Injunction is not granted.
undertook to construct a shopping complex in the 5,000-sq.-m. area. In ● CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration, stating that the mere preservation
return, APRI acquired the exclusive right to operate, manage, and lease stall of the status quo is not sufficient to justify the issuance of an injunction.
spaces for a period of 25 years.
● On 6 February 2003, respondent, through its Mayor, initiated a Complaint for Issue: Whether CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion
Declaration of Nullity of Memorandum of Agreement with Damages before for injunction. - NO. CA ruled correctly.
the RTC of Rosario, Batangas.
● On 6 October 2004, a Decision was rendered by the RTC, which, after Ratio:
narrating the testimonial evidence for respondent, stated: Procedural Issue: Propriety of a Petition for Review under Rule 45
● After the completion of the testimony of Victor M. Reyes, counsel for the ● Before proceeding to the substantive issues raised, we note that petitioners
petitioner manifested that he will file the formal offer of evidence in writing. resorted to an improper remedy before this Court. They filed a Petition for
Counsel for the petitioner filed before this Court his Formal Offer of Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to question the denial
Documentary Exhibits consisting of Exhibits A to H, inclusive of submarkings. of their Motion for the issuance of an injunctive relief.
Thereafter, an order was issued by the Court admitting all the exhibits ● Under Section 1 (c) of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, no appeal may be taken
formally offered by the petitioner thru counsel and this case was ordered from an interlocutory order. An interlocutory order is one that does not
submitted for resolution of the Court. There is no opposition in the instant dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be decided upon. An
petition. order granting or denying an application for preliminary injunction is
● WHEREFORE, in view thereof, and finding the petition to be sufficient in interlocutory in nature and, hence, not appealable. Instead, the proper remedy
form and substance, it being supported by sufficient evidence, judgment is is to file a Petition for Certiorari and/or Prohibition under Rule 65.
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff as against the respondents as follows: ● While the Court may dismiss a petition outright for being an improper
The MOA is hereby declared null and void for being contrary to law and public remedy, it may in certain instances proceed to review the substance of the
policy; respondents are hereby ordered to pay plaintiff for damages caused to petition. Thus, this Court will treat this Petition as if it were filed under Rule
the latter; and structures found within the unfinished PADRE GARCIA 65.

Substantive Issue: Grave abuse of discretion on part of CA ● A clear legal right means one clearly founded in or granted by law or is
● The issue that must be resolved by this Court is whether the CA committed enforceable as a matter of law. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s Motion for the Issuance of of the writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion. The possibility of irreparable
Status Quo Order and Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for injunction.
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction (Motion for Injunction). ● A perusal of the Motion for Injunction and its accompanying Affidavit filed
● A writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO are injunctive reliefs and before the CA shows that petitioners rely on their alleged right to the full and
preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights and interests. faithful execution of the MOA. However, while the enforcement of the Writ of
An application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO Execution, which would nullify the implementation of the MOA, is manifestly
may be granted upon the filing of a verified application showing facts entitling prejudicial to petitioner’s interests, they have failed to establish in their
the applicant to the relief demanded. Petition that they possess a clear legal right that merits the issuance of a writ
● Essential to granting the injunctive relief is the existence of an urgent of preliminary injunction.
necessity for the writ in order to prevent serious damage. A TRO issues only if
the matter is of such extreme urgency that grave injustice and irreparable No irreparable injury
injury would arise unless it is issued immediately. ● Damages are irreparable where there is no standard by which their amount
● Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rule of Court, a TRO may be issued only if it can be measured with reasonable accuracy.
appears from the facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that ● In this case, petitioners have alleged that the loss of the public market entails
great or irreparable injury would be inflicted on the applicant before the writ costs of about ₱30,000,000 in investments, ₱100,000 monthly revenue in
of preliminary injunction could be heard. rentals, and amounts as yet unquantified but not unquantifiable in terms of
● Thus, to be entitled to the injunctive writ, petitioners must show that: (1) there the alleged loss of jobs of APRIs employees and potential suits that may be
exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; filed by the leaseholders of the public market for breach of contract. Clearly,
(2) this right is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined; the injuries alleged by petitioners are capable of pecuniary estimation. Any
(3) the invasion of the right is material and substantial; and loss petitioners may suffer is easily subject to mathematical computation and,
(4) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious and if proven, is fully compensable by damages. Thus, a preliminary injunction is
irreparable damage. not warranted. With respect to the allegations of loss of employment and
● The grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case rests potential suits, these are speculative at best, with no proof adduced to
on the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case, since the substantiate them.
assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end involves findings of ● The foregoing considered, the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
fact left to the said court for its conclusive determination. denying the Motion for Injunction. In any case, petitioners may still seek
● Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion by a court in injunctive matters must recourse in their pending Petition before the Court of Appeals.
not be interfered with, except when there is grave abuse of discretion.
● Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals
implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of Resolutions dated 26 March 2008 and 16 June 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 102540 are
jurisdiction; or the exercise of power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by AFFIRMED. The Court of Appeals is directed to proceed with dispatch to dispose of the
reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of case before it.
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all
in contemplation of law.
● The burden is thus on petitioner to show in his application that there is
meritorious ground for the issuance of a TRO in his favor.
● In this case, no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the CA. It did not
exercise judgment in a capricious and whimsical manner or exercise power in
an arbitrary or despotic manner.
No clear legal right

EVY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. ● the issuance of an injunctive writ is necessary to prevent further damage since
VALIANT ROLL FORMING SALES CORPORATION its "business reputation and goodwill as a real estate developer, once tarnished
and sullied, cannot be restored."
Petitioner/s: Evy Construction and Development Corporation
Respondent/s: Valiant Roll Forming Sales Corporation
Issue:
● Whether or not Evy Construction and Development Corporation was denied
Doctrine:
due process when its application for a writ of preliminary injunction was
denied in the same proceeding as its application for a temporary restraining
Facts: order - NO
● Evy Construction purchased a parcel of land from Ang ● Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
● At the time of the sale, no lien or encumbrance was annotated on the title, Evy Construction and Development Corporation's application for injunctive
except for a notice of adverse claim filed by Ang relief. - NO
● In a separate case between Ang and Valiant Roll Forming Sales Corporation,
RTC ruled in favor Valiant Ratio:
● Thus A Writ of Execution and a Notice of Levy were issued against the
property Whether or not Evy Construction and Development Corporation was denied due
● Evy Construction filed with RTC ts Complaint for Quieting of Title/Removal process when its application for a writ of preliminary injunction was denied in the same
of Cloud, proceeding as its application for a temporary restraining order - NO
● It prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of ● While Rule 58, Section 4(d) requires that the trial court conduct a summary
preliminary injunction to enjoin the Register of Deeds from (1) compelling it hearing in every application for temporary restraining order regardless of a
to surrender its copy of the title and from (2) annotating any further grant or denial, Rule 58, Section 5 requires a hearing only if an application for
transactions preliminary injunction is granted.
● Evy prays for the issuance of an injunctive writ to prevent grave and ● Thus, Section 5 states that "[n]o preliminary injunction shall be granted
irreparable damage to its reputation as a real estate developer without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined,"
● RTC and CA denied it ● Inversely stated, an application for preliminary injunction may be denied even
● According to CA, Evy Construction failed to sufficiently establish that it would without the conduct of a hearing separate from that of the summary hearing
suffer grave and irreparable injury if additional recording and annotation of of an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
further transactions, orders, or processes relating to the sale of the property ● In this case, the hearing was denominated as a "hearing on the application for
to Valiant were made on the title. It observed that the grounds raised already temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction."
touched on the merits of its Complaint, resolution of which would amount to ● Evy's counsel was allowed to present its arguments and its witness but
prejudgment of the case conceded that the issues before the trial court were legal in nature.
● CA pointed out that Evy Construction could still sue for damages if the trial ● Evy cannot insist on a separate hearing for the application for preliminary
court eventually finds that the sale of the property to Valiant was invalid. It injunction, considering that it accepted that its application would be
also reminded Evy Construction that it had the remedy of proceeding against submitted for decision without the presentation of its witness.
the indemnity bond posted by Valiant for any damages it might suffer as a ● Evy was unable to substantiate its entitlement to a temporary restraining
result of the sale order.
● According to Evy: ● In any case, even if a separate hearing was granted, Evy would have presented
● it was denied due process when its application for preliminary injunction was the same arguments and evidence in the hearing. Thus, there can be no denial
denied in the same summary proceeding as the denial of its application for a of due process if the party alleging it has already been granted an opportunity
temporary restraining order. to be heard.
● it was entitled to the injunctive writ applied for since "real estate development
is an industry built on trust and public perception." Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Evy
Construction and Development Corporation's application for injunctive relief. - NO

● The sale between petitioner Evy Construction, Uyan, and Ang was not ● Petitioner alleges that the execution sale and the prior annotations on its title
annotated on the title at the time of its sale. caused ''crucial investors and buyers" to withdraw, "notwithstanding the
● A sale of property that is not registered under the Torrens system is binding considerable costs and expenses it already incurred."
only between the buyer and the seller and does not affect innocent third ● This is the grave and irreparable damage it sought to be protected from.
persons. However, the feared "damage" was caused by the execution sale and the
● The RTC could not have been faulted for ordering the annotation of the notice annotations already made on the title.
of levy on attachment on the title considering that when the Order (judgment ● Evy failed to establish the urgent and paramount necessity of preventing
in favor of Valiant) was issued, the property was still in Uyan's and Ang's further annotations on the title.
names. ● Thus, what Evy actually seeks is the removal of the annotations on its title,
● Thus, in determining whether or not Evy is entitled to injunctive relief, the which is precisely what it asked for in its Complaint. Therefore, its proper
courts would have to pass upon the inevitable issue of which between Evy and remedy is not the issuance of an injunctive writ but to thresh out the merits of
Valiant has the better right over the property, the very issue to be resolved in its Complaint before the trial court
the main case. ● In the event that the annotations on Evy's title are found by the trial court to
● A levy on attachment, duly registered, has preference over a prior unregistered be invalid, it would have adequate relief in the removal of the annotations and
sale and, even if the prior unregistered sale is subsequently registered before in the award of damages. Therefore, the trial court acted within the bounds of
the sale on execution but after the levy is made, the validity of the execution its discretion.
sale should be upheld because it retroacts to the date of levy
● General Rule:The prior levy on attachment carries over to the new certificate Dispositive:
of title, effectively placing the buyers in the position of their vendor under WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
litigation.
● Exception: knowledge of an unregistered sale is equivalent to registration." If
a party presents evidentiary proof that the judgment creditor had knowledge
of a valid sale between the judgment debtor and an innocent third party, that
knowledge would have the effect of registration on the judgment creditor.
● However, in this case, the validity of the liens and the validity of the Deed of
Absolute Sale are factual matters that have yet to be resolved by the trial court.
● The trial court must also determine whether or not Valiant had prior
knowledge of the sale.
● Thus, no injunctive writ could be issued pending a final determination of Evy's
actual and existing right over the property. The grant of an injunctive writ
could operate as a prejudgment of the main case.
● Even assuming that there is already a final determination of petitioner's right
over the property, petitioner still failed to prove the urgent and paramount
necessity to enjoin the Register of Deeds from making further annotations on
TCT
● Injury is considered irreparable if "there is no standard by which its amount
can be measured with reasonable accuracy."
● The injury must be such that its pecuniary value cannot be estimated, and
thus, cannot fairly compensate for the loss.
● For this reason, the loss of goodwill and business reputation, being
unquantifiable would be considered as grave and irreparable damage.
● However, in applications for provisional injunctive writs the applicant must
also prove the urgency of the application

SUNRISE GARDEN CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Issue:
Petitioner/s: Sunrise Garden
Whether First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. was denied due process when the
Respondent/s: CA
trial court issued its January 29, 2003 Order requiring respondent First Alliance Real
Estate Development, Inc. to comply with the Amended Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Doctrine: No man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a
stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by a judgment rendered by
Ratio:
the court. Corollarily, an ancillary writ of remedy cannot affect non-parties
to a case.
1. Due process requires that a party be given the chance to be heard. The general rule is
that "no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers
to a case are not bound by a judgment rendered by the court." Corollarily, an ancillary
Facts: writ of remedy cannot affect non-parties to a case.
1. Antipolo City passed an ordinance creating a technical committee to conduct 2. It may be argued that respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. should
feasibility study for the construction of a city road connecting 4 barangays. have intervened in the case filed before the trial court. However, respondent First
Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc.'s interests, or its properties, were not part of the
2. Sunrise Garden owns a property that will be affected by the construction so Sunrise issues raised in petitioner Sunrise Garden Corporation's Complaint. That Complaint
Garden executed an undertaking to construct the road at its own expense, subject to was against Hardrock Aggregates, Inc. and not respondent First Alliance Real Estate
reimbursements through tax credits. Development, Inc. or its properties.
3. Sunrise Garden began to bring in its equipment but armed guards allegedly hired by 3. Sunrise Garden Corporation additionally argues that the trial court acquired
Hardrock Aggregates Inc prevented Sunrise Garden from using an access road to move jurisdiction because respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc.
the construction equipment. Sunrise Garden filed a complaint for damages with prayer voluntarily appeared in court to argue why it should not be cited in contempt. Rule 14,
for TRO and writ of preliminary injunction (WPI). WPI was issued. Section 20 of the Rules of Court provides that voluntary appearance is equivalent to
service of summons, the same rule also provides that "[t]he inclusion in a motion to
4. Informal settlers started encroaching the area so an amended WPI was issued. The dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
amended WPI stated: defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance." In this case, The appearance
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the undersigned Judge of this Court, that, until further of respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. and K-9 Security Agency
orders, you, the said defendant and all your attorneys, representatives, agents and any should not be deemed as a voluntary appearance because it was for the purpose of
other persons assisting you including any and all persons or groups of persons questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court.
from interfering, preventing or obstructing all of plaintiff's contractors,
equipment personnel and representatives in proceeding with the Dispositive: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petitions in G.R. Nos. 158836
construction of a new access road as authorized by the Antipolo City Government and 158967 are DISMISSED for being moot and academic.
and Barangay Cupang, leading to its memorial project site. As necessary, the services
of Deputy Sheriff Rolando P. Palmares can be sought to enforce this Writ. The Petitions in G.R. Nos. 160726 and 160778 are DENIED, and the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SPNo. 75758 is AFFIRMED.
5. Construction continued but later on, armed guards of K-9 Security Agency allegedly
hired by First Alliance Real Estate Development Inc blocked Sunrise Garden's
employees from continuing with the construction. Sunrise Garden sought to have K-9
Security and First Alliance for violating the amended WPI. K-9 and First Alliance
argued that the amended WPI cannot be enforced against them because they were not
parties to the case [between Sunrise and Hardrock] so the court never acquired
jurisdiction over them. Trial court issued an order requiring First Alliance to comply
with the amended WPI. CA annulled the trial court's order.
GARRIDO VS. TORTOGO affecting foreshore land would be unjust to the occupants or possessors of the
property, including themselves
Petitioner/s: ANGELINA PAHILA-GARRIDO
● MTCC denied the MR and the motion to quash.
Respondent/s: ELIZA M. TORTOGO, LEONILA FLORES, ANANIAS
● Respondents Tortogo filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer
SEDONIO, ADELINO MONET, ANGIE MONET, JUANITO GARCIA,
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order in
ELEONOR GARCIA, BENITA MOYA, JULIO ALTARES, LEA ALTARES,
the RTC in Negros Occidental (SCA case)
CLARITA SABIDO, JULIE ANN VILLAMOR, JUANITA TUALA, VICTOR
○ This was granted because there appears an imminent danger of
FLORES III, JOHNNY MOYA, HAZEL AVANCEÑA, SONIA EVANGELIO,
demolition of the structures of herein petitioners at the premises in
and GENNY MONTAÑO
question, pending the trial and final determination of the merits in
this case
Doctrine: A remedy intended to frustrate, suspend, or enjoin the
○ Wherein the Garrido does not appear to have prior possession of the
enforcement of a final judgment must be granted with caution and upon a
premises in question, and, wherein although it appears that the title
strict observance of the requirements under existing laws and
of the premises in question is in the name of respondent Pahila, there
jurisprudence.
also is a showing that the same title may have been illegally issued
● Petitioner Garrido then directly came to the Court through "petition for review
Facts: on certiorari," seeking to annul and set aside the writ of preliminary
● Domingo Pahila commenced in the MTCC in Bacolod City an action for prohibitory injunction issued by the RTC. She contended that the writ of
ejectment with prayer for preliminary and restraining order to evict several preliminary prohibitory injunction to enjoin the execution was issued long
defendants, including the respondents (along with others) from his after the judgment of the MTCC had become final and executory.
properties.
● He amended the complaint to implead the spouses of some of the defendants. Issue:
However, he died during the pendency of the action, and his surviving spouse, ● WN the present petition is proper - YES. The order of the RTC is an
petitioner Angelina Pahila-Garrido, was substituted for him. interlocutory order that was not subject of appeal.
○ MTCC ruled in favor of petitioner, ordering the affected defendants ● WN RTC lawfully issued the TRO and the writ of preliminary prohibitory
or any person or persons in acting in their behalf, assignees or injunction to enjoin the execution of the already final and executory decision
successors-in-interests including members of their family to vacate of the MTCC - NO.
and pay for costs. Ratio:
○ Defendants appealed. MTCC decision was affirmed by RTC. ● The order of the RTC is an interlocutory order that was not subject of appeal.
● Respondents Tortogo (in the SC case) were the only ones who appealed the ○ The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is
RTC decision to the CA. CA denied. In the SC, dismissed the petition for interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something
certiorariand entered judgment. to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If
○ In the meantime, MTCC amended its decision to correct it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
typographical errors in the description of the properties involved. ○ The order granting the application for the writ of preliminary
None of the parties objected to or challenged the corrections. injunction, was an interlocutory, not a final, order, and should not be
○ MTCC issued the writ of execution upon the petitioner's motion. The the subject of an appeal.
writ of execution was duly served upon ALL the defendants, ● Petitioner has satisfied the requirements to justify giving due course to her
including the respondents, as indicated in the sheriff's return of petition as a petition under Rule 65. She has identified therein some acts as
service. constituting the RTC Judge’s manifestly grave abuse of discretion amounting
○ Respondents filed a motion to quash and motion to stay execution. to lack or excess of jurisdiction, namely:
They anchored their motions on the supposedly supervening finding ○ Despite the final and executory nature of the judgment sought to be
that the lot covered by the writ of execution was foreshore land enjoined, the RTC still issued the TRO and, later on, the assailed writ
belonging to the State. of preliminary prohibitory injunction to enjoin the implementation
● Respondents argued that such supervening event directly affected the of the writ of execution
execution of the said decision and its amendment, whose continued execution
○ RTC issued the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction to protect
the respondents’ alleged right in the subject properties, but the right
did not appear to be in esse
○ The issuance of the TRO and the writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction was in violation of the requirements imposed by Rule 58
of the Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence.
● Decision of the MTCC, being already final and executory, could not be
assailed; nor could its execution be restrained. The dismissal became final and
executory because the respondents did not timely file a motion for
reconsideration.
○ Consequently, the MTCC rightly issued the writ of execution.
○ Based on the sheriff’s return of service, the writ of execution was duly
served upon all the defendants.
○ Therefore, under the circumstances, the principle of immutability of
a final judgment must now be absolutely and unconditionally applied
against the respondents. They could not anymore be permitted to
interminably forestall the execution of the judgment through their
interposition of new petitions or pleadings.
● That the petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration in the RTC before
coming to this Court did not preclude treating her petition as one for
certiorari. The requirement under Section 1 of Rule 65 that there must be no
appeal, or any plain or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law admits
exceptions
Dispositive: We NULLIFY and SET ASIDE the writ of preliminary prohibitory

injunction issued on November 12, 2002 for being devoid of legal and factual bases;
and DIRECT the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, in Bacolod City to dismiss SCA Case
No. 01-11522.
Presiding Judge Gorgonio J. Ybañez (LOL) of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, in
Bacolod City is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE in writing within ten days from notice
why he should not be administratively sanctioned for gross ignorance of the law and
procedure for his manifest disregard of the prohibition under the Rules of Court against
unwarranted restraining orders and writs of injunction, and for issuing a temporary
restraining order effective until furthers of the court.
Costs of suit to be paid by the respondents.
SO ORDERED.

There have been instances when the Supreme Court has issued a status quo order
GARCIA V. MOJICA which, as the very term connotes, is merely intended to maintain the last, actual,
peaceable and uncontested state of things which preceded the controversy.
Petitioner/s: MAYOR ALVIN B. GARCIA,
Respondent/s: HON. ARTURO C. MOJICA, in his capacity as Deputy
This was resorted to when the projected proceedings in the case made the conservation
Ombudsman for the Visayas, VIRGINIA PALANCA-SANTIAGO, in his
of the status quo desirable or essential, but the affected party neither sought such relief
capacity as Director, Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), ALAN
or the allegations in his pleading did not sufficiently make out a case for a temporary
FRANCISCO S. GARCIANO, in his capacity as Graft Investigation Officer I,
restraining order. The status quo order was thus issued motu proprio on equitable
Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), and JESUS RODRIGO T. TAGAAN
considerations.
Doctrine: unlike a temporary restraining order or a preliminary
Also, unlike a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, a status quo
injunction, a status quo order is more in the nature of a cease and desist
order is more in the nature of a cease and desist order, since it neither directs the doing
order, since it neither directs the doing or undoing of acts as in the case of
or undoing of acts as in the case of prohibitory or mandatory injunctive relief. The
prohibitory or mandatory injunctive relief. The further distinction is
further distinction is provided by the present amendment in the sense that, unlike the
provided by the present amendment in the sense that, unlike the amended
amended rule on restraining orders, a status quo order does not require the posting of
rule on restraining orders, a status quo order does not require the posting
a bond
of a bond.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED insofar as it seeks to
Facts: declare that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in conducting an inquiry
Petitioner Garcia, in his capacity as Cebu City mayor, signed a contract with F.E. Zuellig on complaints against petitioner, and ordering their investigation pursuant to
for the supply of asphalt to the city. Subsequently, news reports came out on anomalies respondents mandate under the Constitution and the Ombudsman Law. But the
regarding the transaction. This prompted the Ombudsman to conduct an inquiry, both petition is hereby GRANTED insofar as it seeks to declare that respondents committed
criminal and administrative. grave abuse of discretion concerning the period of preventive suspension imposed on
The investigating officers recommended the issuance of preventive suspension order petitioner, which is the maximum of six months, it appearing that 24 days the number
against Garcia, which the Ombudsman thus issued. of days from the date petitioner was suspended on June 25, 1999, to the date of our
Garcia then assailed the validity of the said order before the SC through certiorari and status quo order on July 19, 1999 were sufficient for the purpose. Accordingly,
prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary petitioners preventive suspension, embodied in the order of respondent Deputy
injunction. Ombudsman, dated June 25, 1999, should now be, as it is hereby, LIFTED immediately.
The SC directed the parties to maintain the status quo until further orders. On the same
day, Garcia issued a memorandum informing employees and officials of the Office of
the City Mayor that he was assuming the post of mayor effective immediately.
Thus, respondents filed a motion seeking clarification of the status quo order.
● Respondents claimed that the status quo referred to in the order should be
that where petitioner is already suspended and vice mayor Renato Osmea is
the acting city mayor.
● Garcia on the other hand argued that the status quo refers to the last actual
peaceable uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.Thus,
the status quo could not be that where petitioner is preventively suspended
since the suspension did not precede the present controversy; it is the
controversy.
Issue: WON the status quo order pertained to the time when Garcia was already
suspended --- NO
Ratio: The Court agreed with Garcia. Quoting Justice Regalado, it ruled:

○ Noel Repol, is hereby ordered to cease and desist from assuming the
REPOL V. COMELEC duties and functions of Municipal Mayor of Pagsanghan, Western
Samar until further orders from this Commission.
Petitioner/s: Noel Y. Repol
● At the scheduled hearing on of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction, the
Respondent/s: COMELEC and Violeto Ceracas
COMELEC First Division issued an order
○ Parties are given 5 days to file their respective memoranda
Doctrine: COMELEC is not empowered to issue a status quo ante in effect
containing authorities and arguments on the life span of a status quo
overturning the effective enforcement of the writ of execution issued by the
ante Order issued by the Commission.
trial court. This status quo ante order is in fact a TRO which, according to
● Repol argues that
the applicable rules, only lasts 20 days.
○ the COMELEC First Division acted with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the status quo ante Order which indefinitely suspended and
Facts: effectively nullified the trial court's writ of execution
● Noel Repol and Violeto Ceracas were candidates for Municipal Mayor of ○ the law, rule and jurisprudence limit the COMELEC's power to issue
Pagsanghan, Samar in the May 2001 elections. On 16 May 2001, Ceracas was temporary restraining orders to a non-extendible period of 20 days
proclaimed as the duly elected mayor with 66 votes more than Repol from the date of issuance.
● Repol filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court ● Ceracas argues that
● Claiming that fraud and other irregularities marred the elections in 3 ○ the COMELEC's power to issue temporary restraining orders and
precincts, Repol prayed for revision of the ballots in these precincts preliminary injunctions necessarily includes the power to issue
● Judge Mazo dismissed the election but on certiorari, the COMELEC First status quo ante orders.
Division reversed the dismissal order of Judge Mazo in a Resolution "for being Issue:
issued with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction." ● WHETHER COMELEC is empowered to issue a status quo ante in effect
● COMELEC First Division directed the trial court "to reinstate the subject overturning the effective enforcement of the writ of execution issued by the
election protest, conduct the revision of ballots from the protested precincts trial court and suspending indefinitely, without notice and hearing, the
and render its Decision with immediate dispatch." implementation of the writ - NO
● On 30 December 2003, the trial court declared Ceracas's proclamation void Ratio:
and proclaimed Repol the duly elected mayor of Pagsanghan, Samar. ● A cursory reading of the status quo ante Order reveals that it was actually a
○ it is clearly evident that the electoral fraud was perpetrated by the temporary restraining order.
use of some ballots as shuttles [lanzadera], by which device, the ● It ordered Repol to cease and desist from assuming the position of municipal
ballots of the voters who are not skilled in the act of writing or whose mayor of Pagsanghan, Samar and directed Ceracas to assume the post in the
fidelity to party is in doubt is illegally written out for them by others meantime.
● Repol filed before the trial court a motion for execution pending appeal, which ● The status quo ante Order had a life span of more than 20 days since the
was granted. Meanwhile, Ceracas appealed the trial court's judgment to the directive was qualified by the phrase "until further orders from this
COMELEC. Commission."
● On 6 January 2004, Repol took his oath of office as the duly elected mayor of ● This violates the rule that a temporary retraining order has an effective period
Pagsanghan, Samar. of only 20 days and automatically expires upon the COMELEC's denial of the
● During the pendency of Ceracas's appeal with the COMELEC, Ceracas filed preliminary injunction.
with the COMELEC a Petition for Certiorari (with prayer for temporary ● Thus, the status quo ante Order automatically ceased to have any effect after
restraining order, writ of preliminary injunction and/or status 20 days since the COMELEC First Division did not issue a writ of preliminary
quo ante) assailing the writ of execution. injunction.
● On 12 January 2004, the COMELEC First Division issued the assailed Order ● While the hearing on Ceracas's application for a writ of preliminary injunction
directing the parties to maintain the status quo ante. was held, the COMELEC First Division failed to resolve the application.
○ Comelec hereby directs the parties to maintain the STATUS QUO ● Instead, it issued an Order directing the parties to file their memoranda on
ANTE, which is the condition prevailing before the issuance and their respective positions "on the life span of status quo ante orders and
implementation of the questioned Order of the court a quo whether a writ of preliminary injunction should be granted in the case."
● Clearly, the COMELEC First Division's indecision on the matter not only
worked injustice to Repol but also failed to dispel the uncertainty beclouding
the real choice of the electorate for municipal mayor.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Order dated 12
January 2004 of the COMELEC First Division in SPR Case No. 1-2004 is ANNULLED
and said case is ordered DISMISSED on the ground of forum-shopping. The Order
dated 5 January 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarangnan, Samar, Branch 40,
granting the execution pending appeal of its decision in Election Case No. T-001, and
the Writ of Execution issued pursuant thereto, are REINSTATED. The full enforcement
of the said Writ must forthwith be made.

SIY VS. TOMLIN process a PNP clearance of the vehicle with a view to
transferring ownership thereof.
Petitioner/s: William Anghian Siy
i) Petitioner Siy thus prayed that a writ of replevin be issued for the
Respondent/s: Alvin Tomlin
return of the vehicle to him, and that the defendants be ordered to
pay him P100,000.00 attorney's fees and the costs of suit.
Doctrine: Rule 60 allows a plaintiff, in an action for the recovery of
3) The RTC granted the Prayer for Replevin of Petitioner Siy.
possession of personal property, to apply for a writ of replevin if it can be
4) Respondent Tomlin then filed an Omnibus Motion seeking to quash the Writ
shown that he is 'the owner of the property claimed . . . or is
of Replevin.
entitled to the possession thereof. The plaintiff need not be the owner
a) Respondent Tomlin argued that Petitioner Siy could not prove his
so long as he is able to specify his right to the possession of the
ownership of the vehicle as the only pieces of evidence he presented
property and his legal basis therefor.
in this regard were a manager's check and cash voucher as proof
of payment,
A principal who has sold his personal property through an agent loses
b) and the affidavit of Lopez attesting to the sale between him and
ownership and the right of possession over the property. In such a case the
petitioner which are insufficient;
remedy of the principal is to go against the agent, and not the buyer of the
c) that in fact, he is the registered owner of the vehicle, as shown by the
personal property in a case for Replevin.
Official Receipt and Certificate of Registration 13 dated March 7,
2011 issued in his name by the (LTO);
d) that it has not been shown that he wrongfully detained the vehicle,
Facts: as petitioner was never in possession thereof, since the same was
1) Siy filed before the QC RTC a Complaint for Recovery of Possession with already detained and seized by the HPG at the time;
Prayer for Replevin against Frankie Ong, Chris Centeno, John Chua, and Alvin e) that Petitioner Siy failed to allege, as required under Section 2 of Rule
Tomlin. 60 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure 14 (1997 Rules), that the
2) In Siy’s Complaint, he alleged that: vehicle has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine
a) He is the owner of a 2007 model Range Rover pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary
i) Which he purchased from Alberto Lopez III (Lopez) on July attachment, or otherwise placed under custodia legis, or if so seized,
22, 2009; that it is exempt from such seizure or custody;
b) Iin 2010, he entrusted the said vehicle to Ong, 5) The RTC denied Tomlin’s Omnibus Motion.
i) A businessman who owned a second-hand car sales a) That the issues of ownership and insufficiency of the allegations in
showroom ("Motortrend" in Katipunan, Quezon City), after the complaint are best determined during trial; and that an
the Ong claimed that he had a prospective buyer therefor; allegation of undervaluation of the vehicle cannot divest the court of
c) Ong then failed to remit the proceeds of the purported sale nor return jurisdiction.
the vehicle; 6) Tomlin then filed a Petition for Certiorari in the CA, which then granted his
d) Petitioner (Siy) later found out that the vehicle had been transferred Petition and reversed the RTC Order.
to Chua; a) That petitioner Siy failed to comply with the requirements under
e) In December, 2010, petitioner Siy led a complaint before the Quezon Section 2, Rule 60 of the 1997 Rules,
City Police District's Anti-Carnapping Section; i) In that he failed to allege therein that the vehicle has not
f) Ong, upon learning of the complaint, met with petitioner Siy to been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine
arrange the return of the vehicle; pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of execution or
g) However Ong still failed to surrender the vehicle; preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed under
h) Petitioner Siy then learned that the vehicle was being transferred to custodia legis.
respondent Tomlin; 7) Petitioner Siy now contends that there is nothing in the 1997 Rules which
i) And that the vehicle was later impounded and taken into requires him to copy the requirements in Section 2 of Rule 60 and incorporate
custody by the PNP-Highway Patrol Group (HPG) at Camp them to the letter in his complaint,
Crame, Quezon City after respondent Tomlin attempted to
a) As the rule merely requires an applicant in replevin to show the 8) As the registered and rightful owner of the subject vehicle, the trial court must
circumstances in his complaint or affidavit of merit, which he claims return the same to respondent Tomlin.
he did.
Dispositive:
Issue:
● WoN the CA erred in not granting the Writ of Replevin in favor of Siy who WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The October 9, 2012 Decision and February
argues that he was the owner of the car. -- NO HE WAS NO LONGER THE 19, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 124967 are AFFIRMED
OWNER. WITH MODIFICATION, in that the subject Land Rover Range Rover, with Plate
Ratio: Number ZMG 272 and particularly described in and made subject of these proceedings,
1) In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he is is ORDERED RETURNED to respondent Alvin Tomlin as its registered owner.
either the owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought to be
recovered, and that the defendant, who is in actual or legal possession thereof,
wrongfully detains the same."
2) "Rule 60 x x x allows a plaintiff, in an action for the recovery of possession of
personal property, to apply for a writ of replevin if it can be shown that he
is 'the owner of the property claimed . . . or is entitled to the
possession thereof.
○ The plaintiff need not be the owner so long as he is able to
specify his right to the possession of the property and his legal
basis therefor."
3) Since Ong (whom Siy duly constituted as his agent) was able to sell the subject
vehicle to Chua, petitioner Siy thus ceased to be the owner thereof.
○ Nor is he entitled to the possession of the vehicle;
■ Together with his ownership, petitioner lost his right of
possession over the vehicle.
4) His argument that respondent Tomlin is a buyer in bad faith, when the latter
nonetheless proceeded with the purchase and registration of the vehicle on
March 7, 2011, despite having been apprised of petitioner Siy’s earlier
November, 2010 "Failed to Return Vehicle" report led with the PNP-HPG, is
unavailing.
○ Petitioner Siy had no right to file said report, as he was no longer the
owner of the vehicle at the time;
○ indeed, his right of action is only against Ong, for collection of the
proceeds of the sale.
5) Considering that he was no longer the owner or rightful possessor of the
subject vehicle at the time he led the Civil Case, petitioner SIy may not seek a
return of the same through replevin.
6) Quite the contrary, respondent Tomlin, who obtained the vehicle from Chua
and registered the transfer with the Land Transportation Office, is the rightful
owner thereof, and as such, he is entitled to its possession.
7) For this reason, the CA was correct in decreeing the dismissal of Civil Case No.
Q-11-69644, although it erred in ordering the return of the vehicle to the PNP-
HPG, which had no further right to hold the vehicle in its custody.

DBP V. CARPIO 9. RTC denied the subject motion and the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari
which DBP filed to the CA.
Petitioner: DBP
10. CA: It noted that DBP did not move for reconsideration of the September 25, 2001
Respondents: Emmanuel Carpio
Order of dismissal. It considered the RTC decision as final and executory. It added that
Section 20, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court provided that the claim for damages against
the bond must be 􀀯led before trial or before appeal was perfected or before the
DOCTRINE: Nowhere in the Rules of Court is it stated that an application
judgment became executory.
for damages bars the filing of a motion for a writ of seizure, a writ of
execution or any other applicable remedy.
ISSUE/S:
1. W/N the CA erred in its blind adherence to strict application of Sec. 20, Rule
DBP, from the beginning, had already perceived the attachment to be
57 of the 1997 Rules of Court - NO
improper; hence, it could have easily filed an application before the
judgment became executory.
RATIO:
1. SEC. 20. Claim for damages on account of illegal attachment. — If the judgment on
FACTS: the action be in favor of the party against whom attachment was issued, he may recover,
1. On August 21, 2001, Dabay Abad, Hatab Abad, Omar Abas, Hanapi Abdullah, Rojea upon the bond given or deposit made by the attaching creditor, any damages resulting
Ab Abdullah, Abdullah Abedin, Alex Abedin, et al. (Abad, et al.), represented by their from the attachment. Such damages may be awarded only upon application and after
attorney-in-fact, Manuel L. Te, filed a complaint for delivery of certificates of title, proper hearing, and shall be included in the final judgment. The application must be
damages, and attorney's fees against DBP and GFSME before the RTC 􀀯led before the trial or before appeal is perfected or before the judgment becomes
2. Abad, et al. prayed, among others, for the issuance of a writ of seizure, pending executory, with due notice to the attaching creditor and his surety or sureties, setting
hearing of the case, for delivery of their certificates of title they claimed to be unlawfully forth the facts showing his right to damages and the amount thereof. If the judgment of
detained by DBP and GFSME. the appellate court be favorable to the party against whom the attachment was issued,
3. They alleged that their certificates of title were submitted to DBP for safekeeping he must claim damages sustained during the pendency of the appeal by filing an
pursuant to the loan agreement they entered into with DBP. The same certificates of application with notice to the party in whose favor the attachment was issued or his
title were turned over by DBP to GFSME because of its call on GFSME's guarantee on surety or sureties, before the judgment of the appellate court becomes executory. The
their loan, which became due and demandable, and pursuant to the guarantee appellate court may allow the application to be heard and decided by the trial court.
agreement between DBP and GFSME. 2. To recover damages on a replevin bond (or on a bond for preliminary
4. RTC issued the Writ of Seizure accompanied by Plaintiff's Bond for Manual attachment, injunction or receivership), it is necessary:
Delivery of Personal Property issued by Country Bankers Insurance Corporation. a. that the defendant-claimant has secured a favorable judgment in the main
5. DBP filed its Omnibus Motion to Dismiss Complaint and to Quash Writ of Seizure action, meaning that the plaintiff has no cause of action and was not, therefore, entitled
on the ground of improper venue, among others. Abad, et al. to the provisional remedy of replevin;
filed their Opposition and later, their Supplemental Opposition to which they b. that the application for damages, showing claimant's right thereto and the
attached the Delivery Receipt showing that the court sheriff took possession of 22 amount thereof, be 􀀯led in the same action before trial or before appeal is perfected or
certificates of title from GFSME. before the judgment becomes executory;
6. Abad, et al. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court praying, c. that due notice be given to the other party and his surety or sureties, notice to
among others, for the nullification and reversal of the January 27, 2003 Order of the the principal not being sufficient;
RTC. d. that there should be a proper hearing and the award for damages should be
7. DBP filed its Motion for Writ of Execution 16 of the January 27, 2003 Order before included in the final judgment.
the RTC which the RTC executed and the served by the Sheriff but the Sheriff's Return 3. In this case, DBP filed the application for damages long after the order of dismissal
of Service indicated that Abad, et al. failed to deliver the certificates of title. had become final and executory. It explained that this belated 􀀯ling was due to its
8. Due to the non-delivery of the certificates of title by Abad, et al., DBP filled its recourse to other remedies, such as the enforcement of the writ of execution. The Court,
Motion/Application to Call on Plaintiff's Surety Bond , dated February 3, 2004, praying however, finds this reason to be wanting in persuasiveness.
for the release of the bond issued by CBIC to answer for the damages it sustained as a 4. To begin with, the filing of an application for damages does not preclude resort to
result of the failure to return the 228 certificates of title. other remedies.
5. Nowhere in the Rules of Court is it stated that an application for damages bars the
filing of a motion for a writ of seizure, a writ of execution or any other applicable
remedy.
6. DBP, from the beginning, had already perceived the attachment to be improper;
hence, it could have easily filed an application before the judgment became executory.
7. The Court is not unmindful of the plight of DBP. Its chosen remedy, however,
cannot be countenanced as it disregards the Rules of Court and the settled
jurisprudence on the matter. Nevertheless, this is not to say that DBP has no other
available remedies in order to recover respondents' indebtedness.
a. DBP could enforce its guarantee agreement with GFSME. A contract of
guaranty gives rise to a subsidiary obligation on the part of the guarantor.
b. It may file an action for damages based on Article 19 of the New Civil Code
against respondents for unlawfully taking the certi􀀯cates of title, which served as
security for their loan.
Nothing precludes DBP from instituting an action for collection of sum of money
against respondents

ALIM VS. COURT OF APPEALS ● Respondent corporation's counsel, Patajo, formally informed Alim in a letter
that under the amended contract wherein payment of rentals, the latter failed
Petitioner/s: LUCIO TAN ALIM
to pay rentals for seven months, in the amount of P70,000.00, for which
Respondent/s: HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PACIFIC COAST
reason the contract of lease as well as the option to buy, are automatically
TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC.
terminated.
● The same counsel likewise sent a notice of default in obligation secured by the
Doctrine:
Chattel Mortgage.
● However, the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure thereon was returned by
A replevin bond is simply intended to indemnify the defendant against any
the sheriff unsatisfied.
loss that he may suffer by being compelled to surrender the possession of
● Thereafter, a complaint for recovery of possession with replevin of a unit of,
the disputed property pending the trial of the action. He cannot recover on
was filed by private respondent before the then CFI of Quezon City due to
the bond as for a reconversion when he has failed to have the judgment
Alim’s refusal to pay the arrears and to deliver the subject equipment.
entered for the return of the property. Nor is the surety liable for payment
● Upon the filing of a bond by Pacific Coast Timber Products, Inc., furnished by
of the judgment for damages rendered against the plaintiff on a
Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation in the sum of P300,000.00, the
counterclaim or punitive damages for fraudulent or wrongful acts
trial court issued a writ of replevin for the seizure and delivery of the property
committed by the plaintiffs and unconnected with the defendant's
in question.
deprivation of possession by the plaintiff.
● Deputy Sheriff Reynaldo P. Lopez of the then CFI of Aurora Sub-province at
Baler, Quezon, seized the tractor from the petitioner and turned it over to the
Facts: respondent corporation.
● The case arose out of a Lease Contract with Option To Buy, which was entered ● In his answer, Alim denied having defaulted in the payment of rentals and
into by and between respondent PACIFIC COAST TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC., claimed to have sustained damages for unrealized income in his logging
as lessor, and petitioner LUCIO TAN ALIM, as lessee, for a term of 15 months business as a result of the wrongful seizure of the tractor.
over a unit of tractor at a monthly rental of P10,000.00. ● Both parties having failed to reach an agreement at the pre-trial, the case was
○ Subject to the stipulation, among others, that after payment of 5 tried on the merits.
months, the lessee is given an option to purchase the equipment at ● In the order of the trial court, respondent corporation's motion to recall or lift
the price of P150,000.00, in which event the rental paid shall be the Order of Seizure and to cancel the replevin bond the same having already
considered as part payment of the consideration and that the subject served their purposes, which was opposed by Alim, was denied for lack of
equipment has to remain at the lessee's jobsite at PARCEL III-R merit since the case was still pending in court.
between Dianawan Creek and Bazal, San Joaquin, Baler. ● On the scheduled hearing, both parties failed to attend.
● However, upon its delivery, the tractor was discovered to be defective. ● Hence, the dismissal of the case.
● Petitioner Alim informed the private respondent's manager in Quezon of such ● However, the order of dismissal was reconsidered upon explanation of the
fact in his letter, relaying likewise the need for the tractor's reconditioning or parties.
replacement with another unit in good running condition and the immediate ● RTC: Resolved case in favor of petitioner Alim.
repair thereof as may be arranged by him with the Manila Office. ○ The said decision was, however, partially modified upon motion for
● The Logging Manager of the respondent corporation, Barredo, issued a reconsideration of the petitioner.
certification that a defective tractor was delivered to Alim. ● CA: Affirmed RTC decision.
● The amount of P5,000.00 for the repair of the tractor was then paid by the ○ Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.
private respondent to petitioner Alim. ● Hence, this petition.
● Petitioner Alim expended the amount of P36,130.60 for its repair and
reconditioning, as specifically contained in his letter to respondent Issue:
corporation. 1. W/N Alim is entitled to collect/recover damages as prayed for in the
● The parties amended the lease contract with Alim's obligation to execute a complaint. - NO.
Deed of Chattel Mortgage for his 3 motor vehicles in favor of the respondent 2. W/N Alim is entitled to recover the sum of P300,000.00 from the replevin
to guarantee his undertaking in the amended lease contract. bond. - NO.
● A replevin bond is simply intended to indemnify the defendant against any
Ratio: loss that he may suffer by being compelled to surrender the possession of the
● Nothing is more settled than the rule that the terms of written contract are disputed property pending the trial of the action.
binding on the parties thereto. ● He cannot recover on the bond as for a reconversion when he has failed to
● In the interpretation of the provisions of a written contract, the courts should have the judgment entered for the return of the property.
follow the literal meaning of the stipulation. ● Nor is the surety liable for payment of the judgment for damages rendered
● Otherwise, the evident intention of the parties must prevail (Art. 1370, Civil against the plaintiff on a counterclaim or punitive damages for fraudulent or
Code). wrongful acts committed by the plaintiffs and unconnected with the
● There is therefore no merit in the petitioner's allegation that the seizure was defendant's deprivation of possession by the plaintiff.
wrongful for which he must be compensated. ● Even where the judgment was that the defendant was entitled to the property,
● The ownership or right of possession over the subject equipment belonged to but no order was made requiring the plaintiff to return it or assessing damages
the Pacific Coast Timber Products, Inc. at the time it was seized. in default of a return, it was declared that until judgment was entered that the
● The seizure of the equipment was ordered by the trial court for its restoration property should be restored, there could be no liability on the part of the
by means established in the laws of procedure. Thus, the requisites for the sureties.
issuance of the writ of replevin (Sec. 2, Rule 60) have been satisfied.
● The writ is a provisional remedy in replevin suits. Dispositive:
● It is in the "nature of a possessory action and the applicant who seeks the
immediate possession of the property need not be the holder of the legal title PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is DISMISSED and the assailed
to the property." It is sufficient that at the time he applied for a writ of replevin decision is AFFIRMED.
he is found to be "entitled to a possession thereof as stated in Section 2, Rule
60 of the Rules of Court (Yang v. Valdez, 177 SCRA 141 [1989]).
● The trial court was right in holding that "the plaintiff may not anymore be
judicially compelled to deliver the tractor to the defendant since after the
expiration of the lease period, it is legally entitled to its possession, as the
owner thereof.”
● It is very clear therefore, that Alim is not entitled to any award of damages
based on the foregoing facts and evidence presented.
● Neither can he claim moral and exemplary damages.
● The records show that the petitioner was not able to adduce any evidence
before the trial court to prove facts upon which the award for such damages
may be predicated.
● In fact, even in the petition and memorandum for the petitioner, there was no
discussion of the evidence upon which Alim relies for his claim.
● Moral damages have to do with injury personal to the awardee such a physical
sufferings and the like, while exemplary damages are imposed by way of
example or correction for the public good.
○ Indisputably, moral damages cannot generally be awarded in the
absence of bad faith.
● Otherwise stated, moral damages can be awarded if they are the proximate
results of a wrongful act or omission, while exemplary damages are not
awarded if the defendant had not acted in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent
manner, neither can claim for exemplary damages be granted in the absence
of gross or reckless, which misfeasance is not true in the case at bar.

ALLIED LEASING CORP. VS. COURT OF APPEALS return of the property as in this section provided; but if he does not so object,
he may, at any time before the delivery of the property to the plaintiff, require
Petitioner/s: Allied Leasing & Finance Corp.
the return thereof, by filing with the clerk or judge of the court a bond executed
Respondent/s: CA, Hon. Milagros Caguioa, Judge RTC-Pasig, Emeterio
to the plaintiff, in double the value of the property stated in the plaintiff's
Sia and Lucia Sia doing business under Emiluz Printing Industries
affidavit, for the delivery of the property to the plaintiff, if such delivery be
adjudged, and for the payment of such sum to him as may be recovered against
Doctrine: There was grave abuse in the RTC when it quashed the writ of
the defendant, and by serving a copy of such bond on the plaintiff or his
replevin considering that Spouses never offered a counterbond and neither
attorney.
did the RTC demand one as required in Secs. 5 & 6 of Rule 60.
● Sec. 6. Disposition of property by officer. - If within five (5) days after the
taking of the property by the officer, the defendant does not object to the
Facts: sufficiency of the bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon, or require the
● Allied leased to Spouses Sia several printing equipment (4 lease agreements). return of the property as provided in the last preceding section; or if the
○ Contained an acceleration clause where failure to pay any monthly defendant so objects and the plaintiff's first or new bond is approved; or if the
rental will make all amounts demandable without notice or demand defendant so requires, and his bond is objected to and found insufficient and
■ Spouses defaulted in paying rent despite demand does not forthwith file an approved bond, the property shall be delivered to
● Allied filed a complaint for sum of money with petition for issuance of the plaintiff. If for any reason the property is not delivered to the plaintiff, the
writ of replevin against Spouses. officer must return it to the defendant.
○ Granted upon Allied’s filing of a P2M bond ● Spouses never offered a counterbond and neither did the RTC demand one
○ Writ was issued ex parte entitling Allied to the possession of the before quashing the writ of replevin.
equipment. ○ There was patent abuse of discretion on the part of RTC.
○ RTC declared Spouses in default. ○ The fact that Spouses claimed ownership of the equipment does not
● Spouses filed a motion to quash writ of replevin and motion to set aside order alter the situation - common defense in replevin.
of default. ○ The first RTC judge who granted the writ did not find the issuance
○ Procedural matters in RTC28 where RTC quashed the writ. irregular and was fully satisfied of Allied’s showing of its entitlement.
● Allied filed a petition for certiorari with CA saying that the quashal was ● The writ is a provisional remedy in replevin suits.
without the necessary counterbond and compliance with the requirements in ○ It is in the "nature of a possessory action and the applicant who seeks
Secs. 5 & 6 of Rule 60. the immediate possession of the property need not be the holder of
○ CA dismissed Allied’s petition for certiorari saying that Allied was the legal title to the property."
guilty of laches, filing it 102 days after the order denying the MR (July ○ It is sufficient that at the time he applied for a writ of replevin he is
14, 1989 to Oct 24, 1989). found to be "entitled to a possession thereof" as stated in Sec 2, Rule
60.
Issues: 2.
1. W/N the RTC was correct in quashing the writ of replevin - NO ● CA wrongfully counted the date from the order denying the MR since it should
2. W/N Allied was guilty of laches - NO be from the receipt (July 21, 1989 - 1 week after the order denying the MR).
○ Counting from the receipt, it was only 95 days.
Ratio: ■ SC found this to be reasonable since Rule 65 does not
1. specify any period for filing but only SC considers
● Sec. 5. Return of property. - If the defendant objects to the sufficiency of the reasonableness.
plaintiff's bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon, he cannot require the Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED...
28Judge of RTC inhibited, re-raffled to Judge Caguioa. Spouses claimed ownership of the equipment and alleged that the lease agreements
RTC set aside order of default. did not reflect the true agreement of the parties.

CITIBANK, N.A. VS. COURT OF APPEALS by citibank was insufficient and non-compliance with the req of receivers
bond and oath of office
Petitioner/s: Citibank, N.A. (Formerly First National City Bank)
Issue:
Respondent/s: CA, Douglas Anama
● Whether or not the assailed order of seizure was issued in accordance with
law, that is, whether the provisions of the Rules of Court on delivery of
Doctrine:
personal property or replevin as a provisional remedy were followed? No
Sec. 2. Affidavit and Bond. - Upon applying or such order the plaintiff must
Ratio:
show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who personally
● The Court of Appeals did not pass upon the issue of who, as between Douglas
knows the facts:
Anama and Citibank, is entitled to the possession of subject machineries, as
(a) That the plaintiff is the owner of the property claimed particularly
asserted by the latter. When it ordered the restoration of the said machineries
describing it, or is entitled to the possession thereof;
to Douglas Anama (now the private respondent), it merely brought the parties
(b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, alleging the
to a status quo, by restoring the defendant to the possession of his properties,
cause of detention thereof according to his best of knowledge, information
since there was a finding that the issuance of the writ was not in accordance
and belief;
with the specific rules of the Rules of Court.
(c) That it has not been taken for a tax assessment or fine pursuant to law,
● Substantial compliance with the affidavit requirement may be permissible.
or seized under an execution, or an attachment against the property of the
There is substantial compliance with the rule requiring that an affidavit of
plaintiff, or is so seized, that is exempt from such seizure; and
merit to support the complaint for replevin if the complaint itself contains a
(d) The actual value of the property.
statement of every fact required to be stated in the affidavit of merit and the
complaint is verified like an affidavit.
Facts: ● Citibank’s complaint does not allege all the facts that should be set forth in an
● Douglas obtained a loan from Citibank and executed a PN of 418k in 60 equal affidavit of merit. Although the complaint alleges that petitioner is entitled to
successive monthly installments the possession of subject properties by virtue of the chattel mortgage executed
● Douglas also constituted a chattel mortgage on various machineries and by the private respondent, upon the latters default on its obligation, and the
equipment in EDSA, QC defendants alleged wrongful detention of the same, the said complaint does
● Douglas failed to pay despite repeated demands so Citibank filed a verified not state that subject properties were not taken by virtue of a tax assessment
complaint against Douglas to collect unpaid balance and foreclose the or fine imposed pursuant to law or seized under execution or attachment or,
mortgage if they were so seized, that they are exempt from such seizure.
● Douglas filed an Answer with Counterclaim denying the material averments ● Petitioner stated the value of subject properties at a probable value of
of the complaint P200,000.00, more or less. Pertinent rules require that the affidavit of merit
- He signed the PN without receiving any amount from Citibank should state the actual value of the property subject of a replevin suit and not
- The amount released was not the amount stated in the PN just its probable value. Actual value (or actual market value) means the price
● Trial court upon default of Douglas issued an order of replevin over the which an article would command in the ordinary course of business, that is to
machineries and equipment covered by mortgage say, when offered for sale by one willing to sell, but not under compulsion to
● Despite the issuance of the said order, it did not take place bc negotiations for sell, and purchased by another who is willing to buy, but under no obligation
an amicable settlement were encouraged to purchase it.
● Pre trial conference was held and the court issued a joint management of the ● Therefore, when the petitioner failed to declare the actual value of the
business of Douglas, Citibank as the receiver machineries and equipment subject of the replevin suit, there was non-
● Amicable settlement failed so the trial court try the case compliance with Section 2, Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court.
● Citibank presented a motion for issuance of an alias writ of seizure ● Bond posted by the petitioner is questionable and/or insufficient. (Bond is
● Trial court granted the motion posted to indemnify the defendant against any loss that he may suffer by
● Petitioner took possession of the mortgaged chattels reason of its being compelled to surrender the property pending trial)
● Douglas filed in CA and CA set aside the TC decision holding that the ● As there was a disagreement on the valuation of the properties in the first
provisions of the Rules of Court on Replevin was not complied with: no place, proper determination of the value of the bond to be posted by the
affidavit of merit accompanying the complaint of replevin and the bond posted plaintiff cannot be sufficiently arrived at.
● Petitioner also maintains that, assuming for the sake of argument that its ● Under the Revised Rules of Court, the property seized under a writ of replevin
replevin bond was grossly inadequate or insufficient, the recourse of the is not to be delivered immediately to the plaintiff.This is because a possessor
respondent should be to post a counterbond or a redelivery bond as provided has every right to be respected in its possession and may not be deprived of it
under Section 5 of Rule 60. without due process.
● The Court held in a prior case that the remedies provided under Section 5,
Rule 60, are alternative remedies. xxx If a defendant in a replevin action
wishes to have the property taken by the sheriff restored to him, he should, Dispositive
within five days from such taking, (1) post a counter-bond in double the value WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. No
of said property, and (2) serve plaintiff with a copy thereof, both requirements pronouncement as to costs.
as well as compliance therewith within the five-day period mentioned being
mandatory.This course of action is available to the defendant for as long as he
does not object to the sufficiency of the plaintiffs bond.
● In the case under consideration, the private respondent did not opt to cause
redelivery of the properties to him by filing a counter-bond precisely because
he objected to the sufficiency of the bond posted by plaintiff.Therefore, he
need not file a counter-bond or redelivery bond. When such objection was not
given due course in the court below - when, instead of requiring the plaintiff
to post a new bond, the court approved the bond in the amount of
P400,000.00, claimed by respondent to be insufficient, and ordered the
seizure of the properties - recourse to a petition for certiorari before the Court
of Appeals assailing such order is proper under the circumstances.
● Petitioner contends that although it is in agreement with the Court of Appeals
that a receivers bond is separate and distinct from a replevin bond, under the
circumstances it was not required to file a receivers bond because it did not
assume receivership over the properties
● The order of the trial court dated March 24, 1975 provided, among others, that
the properties shall be under joint management for a period of ten days, after
which period the bank, by virtue of the stipulations under the chattel
mortgage, becomes the Receiver to perform all the obligations as such
Receiver and in the event that the bank decides not to take over the
receivership, the joint management continues.
● From the evidence on record, it is palpably clear that petitioner Citibank did,
in fact, assume receivership.
● Petitioner cannot therefore deny that nine days after the trial court issued the
order of receivership, it informed the private respondent that it would, as it
did, assume receivership.
● The Court of Appeals found that the requirements of Section 5, Rule 59 on
receivership were not complied with by the petitioner, particularly the filing
or posting of a bond and the taking of an oath.
● . For erroneously issuing the alias writ of seizure without inquiring into the
sufficiency of the replevin bond and for allowing petitioner to assume
receivership without the requisite oath, the Court of Appeals aptly held that
the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in dealing with the
situation.
SEBASTIAN VS. VALINO writ of seizure. He said that if he did not implement the writ, he would have been
accused by PDCP of non-performance of his duties as a sheriff.
Petitioner/s: REYNALDO SEBASTIAN
Issue:
Respondent/s: SHERIFF ALBERTO A. VALINO
● WON the respondent sheriff committed gross abuse of authority? YES.
Ratio:
Doctrine: Under the Revised Rules of Court, the property seized under a
● The administrative complaint was referred to Judge Villarama, Jr. of the RTC
writ of replevin is not to be delivered immediately to the plaintiff. The
Pasig, for investigation, report and recommendation.
sheriff must retain it in his custody for five days and he shall return it to the
● In his report, Judge Villarama found respondent guilty of partiality
defendant, if the latter, as in the instant case, requires its return and files a
when he immediately turned over the seized items to PDCP, and of
counterbond (Sec. 4, Rule 60, Revised Rules of Court).
willful refusal to enforce the November 14, 26 and December 11, 1990 Orders
of the RTC, Makati.
Facts: ● SEE DOCTRINE
● Marblecraft, Inc., represented by its Assistant General Manager, Reynaldo ● In violation of said Rule (in the doctrine), respondent immediately turned
Sebastian, charges Alberto A. Valino, Senior Deputy Sheriff, Office of the over the seized articles to PDCP.
Regional Sheriff, Pasig, Metro Manila, with (1) gross abuse of authority ● His claim that the Office of the Regional Sheriff did not have a place to store
committed in connection with the implementation of the writ of seizure issued the seized items, cannot justify his violation of the Rule.
by the RTC Makati and (2) refusal to enforce the trial court's orders for the ● As aptly noted by the Investigating Judge, the articles could have been
return of the seized items. deposited in a bonded warehouse.
Petitioner Sebastian alleges that: ● Respondent must serve on Marblecraft not only a copy of the order of seizure
● Private Development Corporation of the Philippines (PDCP) filed a replevin but also a copy of the application, affidavit and bond (Sec. 4, Rule 60, Revised
suit against Marblecraft in order to foreclose the chattels mortgaged by Rules of Court).
Marblecraft. (3 March 1989) ○ Respondent did not furnish defendant with a copy of the application,
● RTC Makati, issued a writ of seizure directed against Marblecraft covering the affidavit and bond. By his own admission, he only served it with a
chattels sought to be replevined. (30 March 1989) copy of the order of seizure. LLpr
● Nov. 9, 1990, at around 10:37 A.M., respondent Valino, accompanied by ● The more serious infraction of respondent is his refusal to implement the
several policemen and PDCP employees, went to the office of Marblecraft to orders of the RTC Makati for him to return to complainant the articles
implement the writ of seizure. seized.
● Respondent only showed to complainant's counsel a copy of the writ but did ● Valino ignored the orders dated Nov. 14 and 26. On the Dec. 11 order, Valino
not furnish him with a copy of the application for the writ, the supporting wrote a letter on Dec. 12, 1990, addressed to the counsel of PDCP, requesting
affidavit and the bond. the turnover of seized articles.
● In the course of the implementation of the writ, which lasted four days, several ● As expected, PDCP's counsel refused to part with the possession of the seized
machines and equipment were destroyed or taken away by respondent. articles and to issue a letter of authorization to withdraw the same from the
● Respondent turned over the seized articles to the counsel of PDCP and allowed warehouse.
these items to be stored in PDCP's warehouse. ● Instead of taking possession of the articles, respondent merely reported to the
● Nov. 14, 1990, complainant posted a counterbond and the RTC approved the RTC that "[i]t is now clear that the undersigned cannot implement the Court
bond and directed the immediate return of the seized items. order dated December 11, 1990 by reason of the refusal of PDCP to accept or
● After denying PDCP's motion to set aside the Nov. 14 Order, the trial court to honor said Court order".
reiterated the directive for the return of the seized items in its Nov 26 Order. ● Respondent could have avoided getting into his present predicament had he
● Respondent did not implement the orders. not turned over the possession of the seized goods prematurely to the PDCP.
● PDCP filed a MR of the Nov. 26 Order, which was denied in an Order dated ● The complainant cannot be blamed if it harbored the suspicion that
Dec. 11, 1990. respondent was beholden to PDCP.
Respondent Valino branded the administrative complaint against him as pure ● The zeal with which respondent enforced the order of seizure in favor of PDCP
harassment filed by Marblecraft after he had refused to defer the implementation of the was in sharp contrast with his inaction in enforcing the three orders of the trial
court directing him to return the seized items to complainant.
● It is not for respondent to question the validity of the orders of the trial court.
It is for him to execute them.
● As observed by the Investigating Judge, "[t]here is therefore no excuse for
respondent's willful refusal to implement the Order.
● Disobedience by court employees of orders of the court is not conducive to the
orderly administration of justice. The display of partiality in favor of a party
as against the other party erodes public confidence in the integrity of the
courts.
Dispositive
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds respondent guilty of serious
misconduct and RESOLVED to impose upon him the penalty of FOUR (4) MONTHS
SUSPENSION without pay, the period of which should not be charged to his
accumulated leave, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or of acts calling for
disciplinary action will be dealt with more severely. This resolution is IMMEDIATELY
EXECUTORY, and respondent is hereby ordered to forthwith desist from performing
any further official functions appertaining to said office. SO ORDERED.

TOPIC XXX – SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS Ordinance, but lessees of her properties who had been ordered
ejected after she filed several unlawful detainer cases against them.
ORTEGA VS. QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT ● The QC Government, through the Office of the City Attorney, alleges
○ that the present petition is premature and raises questions of fact
Petitioner/s: Zenaida Ortega, represented by Her Attorney-in Fact
which entail reception of evidence;
Octavio Alvarez and/or Zemve Ortega Alvarez
○ that petitioner has not yet established her right of ownership over the
Respondent/s: The Quezon City Government, The National Housing
property referred to in the ordinance, whereas QC’s right is
Authority & The National Home Mortgage Corp
evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 issued in its name.
● NHA, by Comment, prayed for the dismissal of the petition, pointing out that
Doctrine: A petition for declaratory relief may be treated as one for
the petition is actually one for declaratory relief under Section 1, Rule 63 of
prohibition if it has far reaching implications and raises questions that need
the Rules of Court over which this Court has no original jurisdiction.
to be resolved. The Court will not entertain direct resort to it, except when
● NHMFC, by Comment, alleged that it is not a party to any of the transactions
the redress sought cannot be obtained in the proper courts or when
with any of the parties in the present case. It nevertheless adopted the
exceptional and compelling circumstances warrant availment of a remedy
comment of the Quezon City government that the petition is premature and
within and calling for the exercise of this Court’s primary jurisdiction.
alleges facts which still need to be proven.
Issue:
Facts: ● Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the case at bar
● Ortega is questioning the validity of a QC ordinance which reclassified as Ratio:
residential a parcel of land or converted from its original classification to ● Under Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court shall have
residential for distribution or for sale to its informal settlers a parcel of land the power to ―review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
which may be considered an accretion/excess lot and previously conceived certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and
and referred to in the original proposal. orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of
● The provisions of the assailed ordinance read: any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
○ SECTION 1. A parcel of land which may be considered an proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
accretion/excess lot and previously conceived and referred to in ● The Supreme Court can only review, revise, reverse, modify on appeal or
proposed ordinance no. PO 2002-07 and proposed ordinance no. PO certiorari final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the
2002-13 as portion of easement, situated between Block 14. Psd- constitutionality or validity of, among other things, an ordinance is in
39577 of the original subdivision plan and Culiat Creek, Barangay question.
Vasra, Quezon City, is hereby classified as residential or converted ● There must be first a final judgment rendered by an inferior court before the
from its original classification to residential for distribution or for Supreme Court can assume jurisdiction over a case of this nature. It does not
sale to its informal settlers. analyze or weigh evidence brought before it at the first instance, otherwise, it
○ SECTION 2. This Ordinance shall take effect immediately upon its would preempt the primary function of the lower court to try the case on the
approval. merits, receive evidence, and decide the case definitively.
● Ortega, who claims to be the rightful owner of the land subject of the ● if this petition was to be considered as one for declaratory relief,it is not
ordinance, alleges that in enacting the ordinance, her various letter-protests embraced within the original jurisdiction of this Court. Rule 63 of the Rules of
to the City Council against proposed Resolutions were not heeded in the City Court provides:
Council, thus violating her constitutional rights to due process and equal ○ SECTION 1: any person interested under a deed, will, contract or
protection of the law. other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute,
○ the lot referred to in the ordinance overlaps her properties and that executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other government
assuming that there exists accretion or easement of the Culiat Creek, regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in
she, being the owner of the adjoining land, is the rightful owner the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of
thereof following Articles 457and Article 620 of the Civil Code. construction or validity arising from, and for a declaration of his
○ the intended beneficiaries under the proposed ordinance and rights or duties, thereunder.
resolution are not informal settlers as required under City
An action for the reformation of an instrument, or to quiet title to real property or
remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil
Code may be brought under this Rule.
○ SECTION 4: In any action involving the validity of a local
government ordinance, the corresponding prosecutor or attorney of
the local government unit involved shall be similarly notified and
entitled to be heard.
● Petitioner’s assertion that the invalidity of the ordinance is premised on her
claim that she has a better right to the parcel of land referred to in the
ordinance is a factual issue. Even if this petition delves on questions of law,
there is no statutory or jurisprudential basis for according to this Court
original and exclusive jurisdiction over declaratory relief which advances only
questions of law.
● While a petition for declaratory relief may be treated as one for prohibition if
it has far reaching implications and raises questions that need to be resolved,
there is no allegation of facts by petitioner tending to show that she is entitled
to such a writ. The judicial policy must thus remain that this Court will not
entertain direct resort to it, except when the redress sought cannot be obtained
in the proper courts or when exceptional and compelling circumstances
warrant availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of this
Courts primary jurisdiction.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

MALANA VS. TAPPA ● An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual
breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder.
Petitioner/s: CARMEN DANAO MALANA, MARIA DANAO ACORDA,
● Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an
EVELYN DANAO, FERMINA DANAO, LETICIA DANAO and LEONORA
authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a
DANAO, the last two are represented herein by their Attorney-in-Fact,
statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or
MARIA DANAO ACORDA
compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach
Respondent/s: BENIGNO TAPPA, JERRY REYNA, SATURNINO
thereof, it may be entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute,
CAMBRI and SPOUSES FRANCISCO AND MARIA LIGUTAN
deed, or contract to which it refers.
● A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending
Doctrine: An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been
controversies that have not reached the state where another relief is
no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder.
immediately available; and supplies the need for a form of action that will set
controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an
Facts: invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs.
● Malana et.al (petitioners) filed before the RTC their Complaint for ● Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of
Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and Damages against Tappa et.al an action for declaratory relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction
(respondents). over the action. In other words, a court has no more jurisdiction over an action
● Malana etal alleged in their Complaint that they are the owners of a parcel of for declaratory relief if its subject has already been infringed or transgressed
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title situated in Tuguegarao City, before the institution of the action.
Cagayan (subject property.) ● In the present case, petitioners’ Complaint for quieting of title was filed after
● Malana etal claimed that Tappa etal, Consuelo’s family members, continued petitioners already demanded and respondents refused to vacate the subject
to occupy the subject property even after her death, already building their property. In fact, said Complaint was filed only subsequent to the latter’s
residences thereon using permanent materials. They also learned that express claim of ownership over the subject property before the Lupong
respondents were claiming ownership over the subject property. Tagapamayapa, in direct challenge to petitioners’ title.
● Petitioners referred their land dispute with respondents to the Lupong ● Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had already been
Tagapamayapa of Barangay Annafunan West for conciliation. During the deprived of the possession of their property, the proper remedy for them is the
conciliation proceedings, respondents asserted that they owned the subject filing of an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not a case for
property and presented documents ostensibly supporting their claim of declaratory relief. An accion publiciana is a suit for the recovery of possession,
ownership. filed one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful
● RTC ruled it has no jurisdiction over the action, it being a real action involving withholding of possession of the realty. An accion reivindicatoria is a suit that
a real property with assessed value less than ₱20,000.00 and hereby dismisses has for its object one’s recovery of possession over the real property as owner.
the same without prejudice. ● Petitioners’ Complaint contained sufficient allegations for an accion
● Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied reivindicatoria. Jurisdiction over such an action would depend on the value of
● Petitioners filed another pleading, simply designated as Motion, in which they the property involved. Given that the subject property herein is valued only at
prayed that the RTC Orders dated 4 May 2007 and 30 May 2007, dismissing ₱410.00, then the MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over an action to recover
their Complaint, be set aside. They reiterated their earlier argument that the same. The RTC, therefore, did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court states that an action to quiet title falls dismissing, without prejudice, petitioners’ Complaint in Civil Case No. 6868
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. They also contended that there for lack of jurisdiction.
was no obstacle to their joining the two causes of action, i.e., quieting of title ●
and reivindicacion, in a single Complaint Dispositive: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The
● RTC did not grant the motion. Orders dated 4 May 2007, 30 May 2007 and 31 October 2007 of the Regional Trial
Court of Tuguegarao City, Branch 3, dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No. 6868,
Issue: without prejudice, are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court is ordered to REMAND
● W/N an action for declaratory relief is proper in this case. NOOOOOoooooo the records of this case to the Municipal Trial Court or the court of proper jurisdiction
Ratio: for proper disposition. Costs against the petitioners.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY VS. NE MAGNO CONSTRUCTION As prayed for by [respondent] thru counsel, let the evidence introduced in the petition
for injunction by the [respondent] be considered as reproduced in this case.
Petitioner/s: Meralco
Respondent/s: NE Magno Construction
As prayed for by [respondent] thru counsel, let [respondent] be given five (5) days from
today within which to file its comment to the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
Doctrine: The unmistakable import of Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of
defendant thru counsel. After which time, consider the same submitted for the
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, mandates that in case of denial
resolution of this court."
of the motion for reconsideration, the petition shall be filed within 60 days
● The RTC order was received by petitioner, Meralco, on 19 April 2005
from the receipt of the notice of such denial. That the second motion for
● MR was filed on May 5, 2005, which was opposed by the respondent on the
reconsideration raised fresh arguments that need to be addressed anew by
ground that it failed to comply with the three day notice rule on motions as
the court is of no moment, otherwise, there will be no end in the litigation.
mandated by sec 4, rule 15 of the rules of court
● RTC denied the motion for reconsideration on July 28, 2008
Facts: ● Meralco received a copy of the order on August 5, 2008. It had therefore 60
● Petitioner, Meralco entered into a service contract with respondent NE Magno days from the receipt of the order denying its motion for reconsideration to
Construction where petitioner agreed to supply electricity to respondent’s ice file a petition for certiorari before the CA
plaint in Cavite ● Instead of filing a petition for certiorari, however, Meralco filed a second
● Sometime in October 2002, petitioner’s representatives went to respondent’s motion for reconsideration on August 20, 2008 and denied February 23,
ice plant operation to conduct an inspection of its metering facilities where 2010. A copy was received on March 8, 2010
they found that the meters were tampered with ● Meralco filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA on May 6,
● The suspected theft was confirmed when petitioner compared previous 2010 assailing the April 2008, July 2008 and February 2010 orders
electric consumption respondent made ● CA dismissed the petition for being filed beyond the 60 day reglementary
● To avert pilferage petitioners temporarily severed the electric supply period as the first motion for reconsideration was received on August 5, 2008.
● To recover its lost income from the purported pilferages, Meralco sent a Thus petitioner only had until October 4, 2008 to assail the ruling under Rule
differential billing to NE Magno demanding for the payment of its unpaid 65
electric consumption computed on the basis of the previous billings.
● Due to failure to settle its account, the electric services were permanently Issue:
removed after NE Magno was served a notice of disconnection ● WON CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition? No
● Ne Magno initiated an action for mandatory injunction with damages against
petitioner before the RTC praying that the petitioner be ordered to restore its Ratio:
electric services on the ground that its disconnection was effected in an ● Under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-
unlawful manner causing grave damage to respondent business 12-SC, an aggrieved party has sixty (60) days from receipt of the assailed
● Ne Magno claimed that the disconnection was made without prior notice and decision, order or resolution within which to file a petition for certiorari
in the absence of its representatives and that Ne Magno paid its monthly bill
and insisted that no manipulation occurred ○ Sec. 4. When and where to file the petition. — The petition shall be
● RTC granted Ne Magno application for preliminary injunction filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order
● During the date scheduled for Pre-Trial Conference on 8 April 2005, neither or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is
petitioner, Meralco, nor its counsel appeared before the RTC. Their absence timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the petition
impelled the court to receive the evidence of the respondent ex-parte and shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days counted from the notice
issued the foregoing Order of an even date: of the denial of the motion.
"This is the second call of this case and it is now 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, despite
notice to [petitioner] and counsel, this being pre-trial, let [respondent] be allowed to ● It is explicitly stated that certiorari should be instituted within a 60 day period
present evidence ex-parte before the clerk of court of this court. from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed
● The 60 day period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would
violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of the case
● While there are recognized exceptions to such strict observance, there should
be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable
or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules
● No basis in the rules and jurisprudence that the 60 day period to file a
certiorari petition should be reckoned from the denial of the second motion
for reconsideration
● The unmistakable import of Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, mandates that in case of denial of the
motion for reconsideration, the petition shall be filed within 60 days from the
receipt of the notice of such denial. That the second motion for
reconsideration raised fresh arguments that need to be addressed anew by the
court is of no moment, otherwise, there will be no end in the litigation.
● Having established that the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition of the
petitioner has been filed beyond the reglementary period which inevitably
resulted in the attainment of finality of the RTC Orders dated 8 April 2005
and 28 July 2008, the Court finds it no longer necessary to delve into the
merits of the said RTC Orders.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.

CONCEJERO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ○ The MR challenging this Resolution was also denied.
Petitioner/s: Dennis Concejero
Issue: WoN the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal - YES
Respondent/s: Court of Appeals and Philippine National Bank
Ratio:
Doctrine: A petition for certiorari questioning the judgment, order or
● The decisions of the NLRC is appealable to the Court of Appeals through a
resolution of a quasi-judicial agency must be filed within 60 days from
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
notice of the questioned judgment, order or resolution.
SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. — The petition shall be filed not later than
Facts: sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a
● Dennis Concejero was the AVP and Head of the Branch Operations Review motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required
Department (BORD) of PNB. or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said
● In a Memorandum, PNB, through its Administrative Board, charged motion.
Concejero with several acts constituting abuse of authority, concealment of
knowledge of commission of fraud, deceit or other forms of irregularity, willful xxx If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi--judicial agency, unless otherwise
breach of trust resulting in loss of confidence and gross misconduct. provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the
● The Board found him guilty of willful breach of trust resulting in loss of Court of Appeals.
confidence and was meted the penalty of dismissal.
● Concejero filed a Complaint for illegal suspension and dismissal before the xxx
Labor Arbiter.
● LA: dismissed his complaint; held that the dismissal was for a just and valid ● Concejero had 60 days to file the petition. Since he received the NLRC
cause and he was afforded due process Resolution on Sept. 23, he only had until Nov. 22.
● NLRC: affirmed the LA’s dismissal ○ However, since Nov. 22 is a Saturday, he had until the next working
○ He received a copy of the NLRC Resolution on Sept. 23 day or Nov. 24 to file the petition.
● On Oct. 8 or 21 days after receipt of the NLRC Resolution, Concejero filed with ● Even if Concejero, who sought an extension of 15 days, or until October 23,
the CA a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Certiorari. 2014 to file the petition for certiorari, failed to do so, the case was not yet
○ He stated that he had until Oct. 8 (or 15 days from Sept. 23) to appeal dismissible because he was entitled to a 60--day period within which to file
the Resolution to the CA. the petition and had until November 24, 2014 to file it.
○ He prayed that he be granted 15 days extension or until Oct. 23 to file ○ Concejero timely filed his petition on November 24, 2014.
his petition for certiorari ● The CA could have recalled its Resolution dated November 3, 2014 when
● On Nov. 3, the CA promulgated a Resolution dismissing the case for failure Concejero timely filed his petition.
to file the petition in conformity with the Motion for Extension, which stated ● In effect, the CA gravely abused its discretion since Concejero was deprived of
that the petition would be filed until Oct. 23 the right to file his petition for certiorari within the 60--day period provided
● However, on Oct. 23, Concejero’s counsel filed a Manifestation and by Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
Motion, which stated that when he filed the Motion for Extension:
○ He overlooked Section 4, Rule 65, which provides a period of 60 days Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated November
to file a petition for certiorari 3, 2014, June 18, 2015, and March 4, 2016 in CA- G.R. SP No. 137479 are ANNULLED
○ Hence, his last day to file was on Nov. 22, 2014 and prayed that he and SET ASIDE, and the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further
be allowed to file on or before such date proceedings with dispatch. SO ORDERED.
● Nov. 24: Concejero filed his Petition for Certiorari with the CA
● However, the CA promulgated a Resolution ordering the Entry of the
Resolution dated Nov. 3, 2014, where it merely noted the counsel’s
Manifestation but dismissed the case nevertheless since no MR was filed
challenging the same.
MONETARY BOARD VS. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK ● Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court governs petition for declaratory relief,
- Declaratory relief not available against the decision of a quasi-judicial agency viz:
○ SECTION 1. Who may 􀀯le petition. — Any person interested under
Petitioner/s: THE HONORABLE MONETARY BOARD and GAIL U.
a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights are
FULE, Director, Supervision and Examination Department II, and
affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS
other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation
Respondent/s: PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK
thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to
determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a
Doctrine: Court decisions, decisions of quasi-judicial agencies cannot be
declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
the proper subjects of a petition for declaratory relief because if a party is
● In CJH Development Corporation v. BIR, it was held that court decisions,
not agreeable to a decision either on questions of law or of fact, it may avail
decisions of quasi-judicial agencies cannot be the proper subjects of a petition
of the various remedies provided by the Rules of Court.
for declaratory relief because if a party is not agreeable to a decision either on
questions of law or of fact, it may avail of the various remedies provided by the
Facts: Rules of Court.
● The Philippine Veterans Bank (Veterans) established a pension loan product ● The decision of the BSP Monetary Board cannot be a proper subject matter for
for bona fide veterans or their surviving spouses and salary loan product for a petition for declaratory relief since it was issued by the MB in the exercise of
teachers and low-salaried employees. It devised a program by charging a its quasi-judicial powers. The authority of the MB to issue the questioned MB
premium in the form of a higher fee known as Credit Redemption Fund (CRF) Resolution emanated from its powers under RA 7653 and RA 8791.
from said borrowers. ● Also, the fact that the Order was dated September 24, 2007 means the decision
● An examination was conducted by BSP and found that the Veterans’ collection had long become final and executory.
of premiums from the proceeds of various salary and pension loans of ● The said order was received by Veterans on October 17, 2007, as evidenced by
borrowers to guarantee payment of outstanding loans violated Section 54 of the Certification issued by the Philippine Postal Corporation. A year later, or
RA 8791 which states that banks shall not directly engage in insurance on October 15, 2008, Veterans moved for reconsideration of the Order of
business as insurer. dismissal, claiming it received a copy of said Order only on September 3,
● Veterans was requested by BSP to discontinue the collection of said fees. The 2008.
Bank complied with BSP’s order. ○ The Veterans self-serving claim should not have prevailed over the
● The Monetary Board issued MB Resolution No. 1139 directing Veterans to Certification by the Postal.
return to the borrowers all the balances of the CRF. ○ Error for the trial court to entertain it for the second time despite the
● Veterans filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with the RTC of Makati. The lapse of almost a year before the Veterans filed a MR against said
Monetary Board filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the petition for Order.
declaratory relief cannot prosper due to Veterans’ prior breach of Sec. 54 of
RA 8791. In September 24, 2007, RTC dismissed the petition for declaratory Dispositive: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby
relief. GRANTED. The Decision dated June 15, 2009 and Order dated August 25, 2009 of the
● A year later, Veterans filed a Motion to Admit its Motion for Reconsideration Regional Trial Court of Makati City in Civil Case No. 07-271 are REVERSED and SET
against said order alleging that it did not receive a copy until September 3, ASIDE. The Order dated September 24, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City
2008. The Monetary Board opposed said petition showing proof of an official is hereby REINSTATED.
copy of the RTC’s order duly served by Veterans on October 17, 2007.
● RTC allowed Veterans’ MR and required the Monetary Board to file their
answer. RTC granted the petition for declaratory relief.
Issue: WON the petition for declaratory relief is proper? - NO
Ratio:

LAGUNA METTS CORPORATION VS. CA  In De Los Santos v. Court of Appeals, we ruled: Section 4 of Rule 65 prescribes
a period of 60 days within which to file a petition for certiorari. The 60-day
Petitioner/s: Laguna Metts Corp. period is deemed reasonable and sufficient time for a party to mull over and
Respondent/s: CA and Aries Caalam and Geraldine Esguerra to prepare a petition asserting grave abuse of discretion by a lower court. The
period was specifically set to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate
Doctrine: The rationale for the amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC the constitutional rights of the parties to a speedy disposition of their case.
is essentially to prevent the use (or abuse) of the petition for certiorari  While the proper courts previously had discretion to extend the period for
under Rule 65 to delay a case or even defeat the ends of justice. Deleting filing a petition for certiorari beyond the 60-day period, the amendments to
the paragraph allowing extensions to file petition on compelling Rule 65 under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC disallowed extensions of time to
grounds did away with the filing of such motions. As the Rule now file a petition for certiorari with the deletion of the paragraph that
stands, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from previously permitted such extensions.
notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration  The amended portion of Section 4, Rule 65 previously read: “No extension of
time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in
no case exceeding 15 days.”
Facts:  Amendment deleted the above-quoted phrase.
 The present case arose from a labor case filed by respondents Caalam and  As a rule, an amendment by the deletion of certain words or phrases indicates
Esguerra against Laguna Metts Corp. (LMC). an intention to change its meaning. It is presumed that the deletion would not
 The labor arbiter in the labor case decided in favor of private respondents have been made if there had been no intention to effect a change in the
finding them to be illegally dismissed. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the meaning of the law or rule. The amended law or rule should accordingly be
decision of the LA. given a construction different from that previous to its amendment.
 Counsel for respondents received the resolution denying their motion for  If the Court intended to retain the authority of the proper courts to grant
reconsideration on May 26, 2008. On July 25, 2008, respondent’s counsel extensions under Section 4 of Rule 65, the paragraph providing for such
filed a motion for extension of time to file a petition for certiorari under Rule authority would have been preserved. The removal of the said paragraph
65. under the amendment by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC of Section 4, Rule 65 simply
 The CA granted the motion for extension and gave respondents a non- meant that there can no longer be any extension of the 60-day period within
extendible period of 15 days within which to file their petition for certiorari. which to file a petition for certiorari.
 LMC moved for reconsideration claiming that extensions of time to file a  The rationale for the amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC is essentially to
petition for certiorari are no longer allowed under Sec. 4, R65. CA denied the prevent the use (or abuse) of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to delay
MR ruling that while the amendment of Sec. 4 calls for a stricter application a case or even defeat the ends of justice. Deleting the paragraph allowing
to discourage the filing of unwarranted motions for extension, it did not strip extensions to file petition on compelling grounds did away with the
the CA of discretionary power to grant such motion in exceptional cases to filing of such motions. As the Rule now stands, petitions for certiorari
serve the ends of justice. must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order
denying a motion for reconsideration.
 LMC now assails the resolutions of the CA contending that CA committed
grave abuse of discretion when it granted respondent’s motion for extension  In granting the private respondents’ motion for extension of time to file
of time to file petition since CA had no power to grant such pursuant to the petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals disregarded A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC.
amendment of Sec. 4, R65. The action amounted to a modification, if not outright reversal, by the Court
of Appeals of A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. In so doing, the Court of Appeals arrogated
Issue: to itself a power it did not possess, a power that only this Court may exercise. 14
For this reason, the challenged resolutions dated August 7, 2008 and October
 W/N CA had no power to grant motion for extension of time to file petition. -
22, 2008 were invalid as they were rendered by the Court of Appeals in excess
YES
of its jurisdiction.
Ratio:
 Even assuming that the Court of Appeals retained the discretion to grant
 Rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with and should not be
extensions of time to file a petition for certiorari for compelling reasons, the
discarded with the mere expediency of claiming substantial merit.
reasons proffered by private respondents’ counsel did not qualify as
 As a corollary, rules prescribing the time for doing specific acts or for taking compelling. Heavy workload is relative and often self-serving. Standing alone,
certain proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to prevent it is not a sufficient reason to deviate from the 60-day rule.
needless delays and to orderly and promptly discharge judicial business. By
their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory. Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The resolutions dated

August 7, 2008 and October 22, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 104510
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the petition in the said case is ordered
DISMISSED for having been filed out of time.

REPUBLIC VS. ST. VINCENT DE PAUL COLLEGES, INC., ● On April 30, 2009, the Republic filed its petition for certiorari assailing the
lower court's orders dated November 25, 2008 and January 29, 2009 for
Petitioner/s:
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
Respondent/s:
excess of jurisdiction.
● On June 19, 2009, the CA, motu proprio, issued a Resolution ordering the
Doctrine:
Republic to show cause why its petition for certiorari should not be dismissed
Facts: for being filed out of time, pursuant to A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC.
● The republic sought to expropriate 2 parcels of land in the name of St. Vincene ● The Republic filed its Compliance with Explanation dated July 1, 2009
de Paul Colleges, Inc. for the construction of the Manila-Cavite Toll pleading for the relaxation of the rules by reason of the transcendental
Expressway Project (MCTEP) importance of the issues involved in the case and in consideration of
● Later, the republic amended their complaint alleging that the land originated substantial justice.
from a free patent and should be adjudicated without payment of just ○ St. Vincent filed its Comment/Opposition dated July 15, 2009
compensation pursuant to CA No. 141 alleging among others that the said explanation is merely pro forma
● The Republic then filed a motion for the issuance of an order of expropriation due to the Republic's failure to justify its explanation.
which was granted without the pronouncement as to just compensation ● On October 30, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed resolution dismissing
● the trial court denied St. Vincent's motion for reconsideration of its Order the Republic's petition for certiorari on the ground that the
dated August 16, 2005 granting expropriation. petition was filed out of time inasmuch as extensions of time are now
○ no appeal was taken by St. Vincent from said orders. disallowed by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC and as applied in Laguna Metts
● After almost 2 years, St. Vincent filed a Manifestation with Motion for Corporation v. Court of Appeals.
Clarification of the Order contending that although it does not oppose the ○ (Basically, the CA Resolution was not effective due to the said AM
ruling regarding the determination of public purpose and the Republic's right and case)
to expropriate the subject land, it, however, claims that it is entitled to just ● On November 26, 2009, the Republic filed its motion for reconsideration
compensation alleging that it merely relied in good faith on the appellate court's resolution
● Meanwhile, the Republic attempted to implement the Order by entering the granting the former an additional period of fifteen (15) days within which to
subject portion of St. Vincent's property. file the subject petition.
○ Due to this, the Respondent demanded upon the Republic and its ○ But CA stated that it cannot disobey the ruling in Laguna Metts
agents to immediately vacate, and remove any and all equipment or Corporation.
structures they introduced on its property through a demand-letter ● The Republic relies on the CA resolution granting its motion for extension of
● Due to St. Vincent's refusal to honor the order of expropriation, the Republic time and upon the strength of the substantial merits of its petition. The
filed an urgent motion for the issuance of a writ of possession, which was Republic also invokes Domdomv. Third and Fifth Divisions of the
denied by the lower court Sandiganbayan, where the Court ruled that absent a prohibition, motions for
● The lower court, however, modified its Order (the one for expropriation) and extensions are allowed, subject to the Court's sound discretion.
required the Republic to immediately pay St. Vincent in an amount equivalent ● St. Vincent, however, contends that the present petition fails to neither allege
to one hundred percent (100%) of the value of the property sought to be any circumstance nor state any justification for the deliberate disregard of a
expropriated. very elementary rule of procedure like Section 4 of Rule 65 of the Rules of
○ The Republic moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the Court
lower court on January 29, 2009 ○ And in the absence of any such circumstance or justification, the
● Seeking to avail the extra ordinary remedy of certiorari under Rule 65, the general rule on pro forma motions/pleadings must apply
Republic filed with the CA a motion for additional time of fifteen (15) days
within which to file its petition. Issue:
● The CA granted the motion in its Resolution dated April 30, 2009 and the ● WON the CA erred in ruling that the petition for certiorari was filed out of
Republic was given a non-extensible period of fifteen (15) days or until May 4, time? - YES.
2009 within which to file its petition for certiorari. Ratio:

● The Court notes that the CA Resolution dated April 30, 2009, which initially ● Under exceptional circumstances, however, and subject to the sound
granted the Republic’s motion for extension, was premised on the mistaken discretion of the Court, said period may be extended pursuant to Domdom,
notion that the petition filed by the latter was one for petition for review as a Labao and Mid-Islands Power cases.
mode of appeal. ● Accordingly, the CA should have admitted the Republic’s petition: first, due to
● The CA granted extension inasmuch as motions for this purpose are allowed its own lapse when it granted the extension sought by the Republic per
by the rules. The present petition may thus be allowed, having been filed Resolution dated April 30, 2009; second, because of the public interest
within the extension sought and, at all events, given its merits. involved, i.e., expropriation of private property for public use (MCTEP); and
● What seems to be a “conflict” is actually more apparent than real. finally, no undue prejudice or delay will be caused to either party in admitting
● A reading of the foregoing rulings leads to the simple conclusion that Laguna the petition.
Metts Corporation involves a strict application of the general rule that
petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within sixty (60) days from notice Dispositive:
of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated
● Domdom, on the other hand, relaxed the rule and allowed an extension of the October 30, 2009 and July 15, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 108499
sixty (60)-day period subject to the Court’s sound discretion. Labao v. Flores are NULLIFIED. The Court of Appeals is hereby ORDERED to REINSTATE and
subsequently laid down some of the exceptions to the strict application of the ADMIT the petition for certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines in CA-G.R. SP
rule: The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that No. 108499 and to proceed with the case with dispatch. SO ORDERED.
would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of
their case.
● However, there are recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as:
○ (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons;
○ (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his
failure to comply with the prescribed procedure;
○ (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a
reasonable time from the time of the default;
○ (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances;
○ (5) the merits of the case;
○ (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the
party favored by the suspension of the rules;
○ (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous
and dilatory;
○ (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby;
○ (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without
appellant’s fault;
○ (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each
case;
○ (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play;
○ (12) importance of the issues involved; and
○ (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the
attendant circumstances.
● To reiterate, under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and as applied in
Laguna Metts Corporation, the general rule is that a petition for certiorari
must be filed within sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order, or
resolution sought to be assailed.

THENAMARIS PHILIPPINES, INC VS. COURT OF APPEALS ● Private respondent, through counsel, received the June 29, 2009 Resolution
of the NLRC on July 8, 2009. Sixty-two days thereafter, or on September 8,
Petitioner/s: THENAMARIS PHILIPPINES, INC. (Formerly INTERMARE
2009, she filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Certiorari
MARITIME AGENCIES, INC.)/ OCEANIC NAVIGATION LTD. and CAPT.
before the CA.
NICANOR B. ALTARES (General Manager),
● Private respondent alleged that she had until September 7, 2009 (as
Respondent/s: . COURT OF APPEALS and AMANDA C. MENDIGORIN (In
September 6, 2009, the actual last day for filing, fell on a Sunday) within
behalf of her deceased husband GUILLERMO MENDIGORIN),
which to file a petition for certiorari. However, as her counsel was then
saddled and occupied with equally important cases, it would be
Doctrine: Thus, the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it
impossible for him to file the petition on time, especially since the
extended underserved and unwarranted liberality to private respondent
case involves voluminous documents necessary in the preparation
because of CA's obstinate refusal to dismiss the case despite the late filing
thereof. Accordingly, private respondent asked for an extension of 15 days
of the motion for extension and the flimsy excuse for the extension sought,
from September 7, 2009, or until September 22, 2009, within which to file the
the late filing of the petition and the numerous infirmities attending the
petition.
same, and private respondent's continued defiance of its directive. These
● On September 22, 2009, private respondent filed her Petition for Certiorari
circumstances serve to highlight private respondent's propensity to
before the CA
disregard the very rules that the courts, the litigants and the lawyers are
● CA: the CA noted that private respondent's Petition for Certiorari was filed 15
duty-bound to follow.
days late and suffers from procedural infirmities. Nonetheless, in the
interest of substantial justice, the CA entertained the petition and directed
Facts: private respondent to cure the technical flaws in her petition and
● This Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the ROC assailing the CA directed petitioner to submit anew a Verification/Certification of Non-
Resolution for allegedly having been issued with GADFALEJ because the CA, Forum Shopping within ten (10) days from receipt of notice hereof. FLAWS:
entertained private respondent's Petition for Certiorari despite ○ (1) The attached Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping
having been filed 15 days late and allowed her to correct the does not conform with the requirements under Section 12, Rule II of
technical infirmities therein. Also assailed is the CA's February 10, 2010 the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice, as a Community Tax Certificate
Resolution denying petitioner's' Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer to is no longer considered competent evidence of an affiant's identity;
Dismiss and giving private respondent another chance to cure the remaining and
deficiencies of the petition. ○ (2) Except for the copy of the Motion for Reconsideration filed with
● This case stemmed from a complaint for death benefits, unpaid salaries, the National Labor Relations Commission, no other copies of
sickness allowance, refund of medical expenses, damages and attorney's fees pertinent and relevant pleadings/documents are attached therewith,
filed by PRespondent Amanda. C. Mendigorin against petitioner Thenamaris such as petitioner's Complaint,respondent's Memorandum of
Philippines, Inc. Appeal, petitioner's Opposition to Respondent's Appeal, if any, all of
● Private respondent is the widow of seafarer Guillermo M. Mendigorin who which may aid this Court in judiciously resolving the issues raised in
was employed by Thenamaris for 27 years as an oiler and eventually, as second the petition
engineer in the latter's vessels. Guillermo was diagnosed with and died of ● Petitioners filed a MR with Prayer to Dismiss, strongly opposing private
colon cancer during the term of the employment contract between him and respondent's Motion for Extension to File Petition for Certiorari for being an
Thenamaris. absolutely prohibited pleading. Citing Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of
● LA Ruling: Ruled in favor of Respondent and awarded death benefits Appeals, petitioners argued that A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC effectively
($50,000.00), reimbursement of medical expenses (P102,759.74), moral and rendered the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari non-
exemplary damages (P100k and P50k), attorney’s fees (10% of the total extendible after it deleted portions of Rule 65 pertaining to
monetary award). All other claims are DENIED extension of time to file petition. Thus, as the rule now stands, petitions
● NLRC: reversed LA’s ruling for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or
● Private respondent moved for reconsideration dated June 29, 2009 but from the order denying a motion for reconsideration.
denied for lack of merit. ● Lastly, petitioners asserted that as private respondent's motion for extension
is a prohibited pleading, as well as one filed outside of the reglementary
period, then private respondent's Petition for Certiorari is a mere scrap of ○ (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the
paper with no remedial value whatsoever. Consequently, the Decision of the party favored by the suspension of the rules;
NLRC has become final and executory and is beyond the ambit of judicial ○ (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous
review. and dilatory;
Issue: ○ (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud,
● CA committed GADALEJ when it noted the petition for certiorari filed by the accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellant's fault;
private respondent instead of dismissing it outright for having been filed ○ (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each
beyond the mandatory and jurisdictional 60-day period required by section 4, case;
rule 65 of the ROC rules of court, as amended by a.m. no. 07-7-12-sc. -YES ○ (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play;
● CA committed GAD when, in noting the very late petition filed by the private ○ (12) importance of the issues involved; and
respondent, it grossly ignored SC’s very recent ruling in laguna metts ○ (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the
corporation v. court of appeals, aries c. caalam and geraldine esguerra attendant circumstances. Thus, there should be an effort on the part
which disallowed any motions for extension of time to file a petition of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or
for certiorari under rule 65 -YES meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules.
ratio: ● In this case, counting 60 days from her counsel's receipt of the June 29, 2009
● In Republic v. St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc. NLRC Resolution on July 8, 2009, private respondent had until September 7,
○ GR (Laguna Metts Corporation v. CA): a petition for certiorari must 2009 to file her petition or a motion for extension, as September 6, 2009, the
be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the last day for filing such pleading, fell on a Sunday. However, the motion was
order denying a motion for reconsideration. This is in accordance filed only on September 8, 2009. It is a fundamental rule of remedial law that
with the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC where no a motion for extension of time must be filed before the expiration of the period
provision for the filing of a motion for extension to file a petition for sought to be extended; otherwise, the same is of no effect since there would no
certiorari exists, unlike in the original Section 4 of Rule 65 which longer be any period to extend, and the assailed judgment or order will have
allowed the filing of such a motion but only for compelling reason become final and executory.
and in no case exceeding 15 days. ● Additionally, as cited earlier in Labao, there should be an effort on the part of
● In Domdom v. Third and Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan (ex of the litigant invoking liberality to satisfactorily explain why he or she was
exceptional case) unable to abide by the rules. Here, the reason offered for availing of the
○ the 60-day period may be extended subject to the court's sound motion for extension is the heavy workload of private respondent's counsel,
discretion. which is hardly a compelling or meritorious reason as enunciated in Labao.
○ the deletion of the provisions in Rule 65 pertaining to extension of Time and again, we have held that the excuse of "heavy workload is relative
time did not make the filing of such pleading absolutely prohibited. and often self-serving. Standing alone, it is not a sufficient reason to deviate
"If such were the intention, the deleted portion could just have from the 60-day rule." Thus, private respondent's motion for extension
simply been reworded to state that 'no extension of time to file the should have been denied outright.
petition shall be granted.' Absent such a prohibition, motions for ● Even assuming that the late filing of the petition would merit relaxation of the
extension are allowed, subject to the court's sound discretion." rules, the CA's resolution would have only been acceptable had private
● In Labao v. Flores, SC laid down some of the exceptions to the strict respondent shown respect for the rules by submitting a petition for certiorari
application of the 60-day period rule: which is sufficient in form. In contrast, what private respondent filed was a
○ 1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; petition plagued by several infirmities. Worse, when the CA allowed petitioner
○ (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his to cure the deficiencies, she failed to fully comply such that she had to be given,
failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the albeit undeservingly, one last chance to submit the still lacking copies of the
defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time pertinent pleadings required of her by the CA.
from the time of the default; ● The CA should have dismissed the petition outright in view of the fact that the
○ (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the June 29, 2009 Resolution of the NLRC denying private respondent's Motion
merits of the case; for Reconsideration had already become final and executory as of July 18,

2009. Thus, it has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition, except to order its
dismissal.
● Thus, the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it extended
underserved and unwarranted liberality to private respondent because of CA's
obstinate refusal to dismiss the case despite the late filing of the motion for
extension and the flimsy excuse for the extension sought, the late filing of the
petition and the numerous infirmities attending the same, and private
respondent's continued defiance of its directive. These circumstances serve to
highlight private respondent's propensity to disregard the very rules that the
courts, the litigants and the lawyers are duty-bound to follow.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Court of

Appeals Resolutions dated November 20, 2009 and February 10, 2010 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Petition for Certiorari filed by private respondent
Amanda C. Mendigorim in CA-G.R. SP No. 110808 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

CITY OF MANILA VS. CUERDO no perceivable reason why the transfer should only be considered as partial,
not total.
Petitioner/s: City Of Manila
● Consistent with the above pronouncement, the Court has held as early as the
Respondent/s: Honorable Caridad Cuerdo
case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al. [118 Phil. 1022 (1963)] that
“if a case may be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body,
Doctrine: The CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari
then said court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the
assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case.
extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.” This
principle was affirmed in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 101630,
Facts: August 24, 1992) where the Court stated that “a court may issue a writ of
● Petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer, petitioner Liberty Toledo, certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to
assessed taxes for the taxable period from January to December 2002 against review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the lower
the private respondents. In addition to the taxes purportedly due from private court.
respondents pursuant to Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of the Revised Revenue Code of ● Based on the foregoing disquisitions, it can be reasonably concluded that the
Manila (RRCM), said assessment covered the local business taxes. private authority of the CTA to take cognizance of petitions for certiorari questioning
respondents were constrained to pay the P 19,316,458.77 assessment under interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in a local tax case is included in the
protest. powers granted by the Constitution as well as inherent in the exercise of its
● On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed before the RTC of Pasay City appellate jurisdiction.
the complaint denominated as one for “Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/or ● Finally, it would bear to point out that this Court is not abandoning the rule
Erroneously–Collected Local Business Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue that, insofar as quasi-judicial tribunals are concerned, the authority to issue
TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction writs of certiorari must still be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by
● The RTC granted private respondents’ application for a writ of preliminary law and cannot be implied from the mere existence of their appellate
injunction. jurisdiction. This doctrine remains as it applies only to quasi-judicial bodies.
● Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the RTC denied. Petitioners
then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA but the CA dismissed Dispositive:
petitioners’ petition for certiorari holding that it has no jurisdiction over the WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
said petition. The CA ruled that since appellate jurisdiction over private
respondents’ complaint for tax refund, which was filed with the RTC, is vested
in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction under
Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282), it follows that a petition for certiorari
seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said case should,
likewise, be filed with the CTA.
Issue:
● Whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for
certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax
case.
Ratio:
● The CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an
interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case. In order for any
appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must have
the authority to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring
exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be
assumed that the law intended to transfer also such power as is deemed
necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There is

BUREAU OF CUSTOMS VS. HON. DEVANADERA elevating its rank to the level of a collegiate court with special
jurisdiction, it is no longer clear which between the CA and the CTA has
Petitioner/s: Bureau of Customs
jurisdiction to review through a petition for certiorari the DOJ resolution in
Respondent/s: Hon. Devanadera
preliminary investigations involving tax and tariff offenses.
● In City of Manila v. Hon. Grecia-Cuerdo where the Court en banc declared
Doctrine: The CA’s original jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari
that the CTA has appellate jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari
assailing the DOJ resolution in a preliminary investigation involving tax
assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case, despite
and tariff offenses was necessarily transferred to the CTA pursuant to
the fact that there is no categorical statement to that effect under R.A. No.
Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) 9282, amending RA 1125. Simply stated, a
1125, as well as the amendatory R.A. No. 9282. Thus:
petition for certiorari by the taxpayer questioning the finding of probable
○ x x x Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution grants power
cause to institute a criminal action for tax evasion or by the BIR questioning
to the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, to
the dismissal of its complaint for lack of probable cause is now to be filed
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. With respect to
with the CTA, not the CA.
the Court of Appeals, Section 9 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP
129) gives the appellate court, also in the exercise of its original
Facts: jurisdiction, the power to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari,
● In a complaint-affidavit, Atty. Valdez, a member of the petitioner BOC's Anti- whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. As to Regional Trial
Oil Smuggling Coordinating Committee that investigated the illegal Courts, the power to issue a writ of certiorari, in the exercise of their
withdrawal by UNIOIL of oil products consigned to OILINK, valued at P181M original jurisdiction, is provided under Section 21 of BP 129.
with corresponding duties and taxes in the amount of P35M, accused the ● The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such power,
private respondents of violation of the Tariff and Customs Code of the with respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
Philippines. provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
● In a Resolution, public respondent Arman A. De Andres, State Prosecutor of Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law and that judicial
the Department of Justice (DOJ), recommended the dismissal of the power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
complaint-affidavit for lack of probable cause. involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
● The Resolution was approved by public respondents Assistant Chief State determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
Prosecutor Pedrito L. Ranees and Chief State Prosecutor Zuflo. On automatic discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
review, the Resolution was affirmed by then Secretary of Justice Gonzales.nad of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
● Dissatisfied, the BOC filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by ● On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly
the public respondent. interpreted that the power of the CTA includes that of determining whether or
● On March 11, 2010, the BOC filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
● In the Resolution dated March 26, 2010, the CA dismissed outright the jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases
petition due to procedural defects. falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus,
Issue: follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to
● W/N the CA has certiorari jurisdiction over the resolution of the Acting issue writs of certiorari in these cases.
Secretary of Justice, affirming the dismissal of the complaint-affidavit for ● Indeed, in order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate
violation of provisions of the TCCP due to lack of probable cause—NO, the jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue, among others, a writ of
CTA has jurisdiction. certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the
Ratio: CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer also such
● The elementary rule is that the CA has jurisdiction to review the resolution of power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such appellate
the DOJ through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the transfer should only be
on the ground that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of his considered as partial, not total.
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. However, with the ● If this Court were to sustain petitioners' contention that jurisdiction over their
enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9282,amending R.A. No. 1125 by certiorari petition lies with the CA, this Court would be confirming the
expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA,enlarging its membership and exercise by two judicial bodies, the CA and the CTA, of jurisdiction over
basically the same subject matter - precisely the split-jurisdiction situation
which is anathema to the orderly administration of justice. The Court cannot
accept that such was the legislative motive, especially considering that the law
expressly confers on the CTA, the tribunal with the specialized competence
over tax and tariff matters, the role of judicial review over local tax cases
without mention of any other court that may exercise such power.
● Thus, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that since appellate
jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for tax refund is vested in the
CTA, it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an
interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the
same court. To rule otherwise would lead to an absurd situation where one
court decides an appeal in the main case while another court rules on an
incident in the very same case
● Lastly, it would not be amiss to point out that a court which is endowed with
a particular jurisdiction should have powers which are necessary to enable it
to act effectively within such jurisdiction. These should be regarded as powers
which are inherent in its jurisdiction and the court must possess them in order
to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to
defeat any attempted thwarting of such process.
● In this regard, Section 1 of RA 9282 states that the CTA shall be of the same
level as the CA and shall possess all the inherent powers of a court of justice.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Court of

Appeals Resolutions dated March 26, 2010 and August 4, 2010, in CA-G.R. SP No.
113069, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution dated December 28, 2009
of the Acting Secretary of Justice Agnes VST Devanedera, which upheld the State
Prosecutor's dismissal of the complaint-affidavit filed by the Bureau of Customs for lack
of probable cause, is AFFIRMED.

BUCAL VS. BUCAL, the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice
Petitioner/s: Cherith A. Bucal
the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter
Respondent/s: Manny P. Bucal
of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due
Doctrine: The settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a
process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case,
condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari. However,
relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the
an exception to the rule is where the questions raised in the certiorari
trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a
proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or
nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding were ex-parte or in
are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; or where
which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue
there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any
raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the
● The records do not show that Manny prayed for visitation rights. Cherith also
Petitioner.
never sought the award of visitation rights for her estranged husband.
● The Court concludes that the grant of visitation rights by the RTC in favor of
Facts: Manny, as contained in the PPO, and reiterated in its assailed Orders, being
● Cherith Bucal filed for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) both unexplained and not prayed for, is an act of grave abuse of discretion
and petitioned the trial court that after hearing, the TPO be made into a amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction which deserves correction through
Permanent Protection Order (PPO). the prerogative writ of certiorari
● The TPO was granted for 30 days.
● Manny Bucal, without asking for visitation rights, was given the same every Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
Saturday from 8:00 am to 5:00 pm. October 16, 2012 and the Resolution dated April 15, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
● The RTC subsequently granted the PPO ordering Manny to provide support G.R. SP No. 117731 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
to Francheska, and clarified that the visitation rights would only be from 8:00
am to 5:00pm on Saturdays, where Francheska will be brought to Manny’s The portions of the Orders dated June 22, 2010 and November 23, 2010 of the Regional
residence by Cherith’s relatives. Trial Court of Trece Martires City, Branch 23granting visitation rights to respondent
● Cherith, without filing a M/R, elevated the case to the CA and argued that Manny P. Bucal are hereby declared VOID.
continuing Francheska’s weekly visits to her father defeated the purpose of the
protection order as the obligation made her and the child vulnerable to
Manny’s abuse.
● She also claimed that the RTC had no authority to grant visitation rights
because it was not prayed for.
Issue:
● W/N the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari on account of her
failure to file a MR of the assailed RTC orders granting vistitation rights to
Manny
Ratio:
● The settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua
non for the filing of a petition for certiorari.
● The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as: (a)
where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the
certiorariproceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by
the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in
PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES VS. PHILTRANCO SERVICE
UNION Issue: WON the motion for reconsideration filed with DOLE was valid? Yes
Petitioner/s: PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC., represented
Ratio:
by its Vice- President for Administration, M/GEN. NEMESIO M. SIGAYA
● It has long been settled that the remedy of an aggrieved party in a decision or
resolution of the Secretary of Labor is to timely file a motion for
Respondent/s:
reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent remedy, and
PHILTRANCO WORKERS UNION-ASSOCIATION OF
then seasonably file a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
GENUINE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS (PWU-AGLO), represented by
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.
JOSE JESSIE OLIVAR
● The moment that the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor
case, he is given wide discretion to find a solution to the dispute. The power is
Doctrine: While a government office may prohibit the filing of a motion
plenary and discretionary in nature to enable him to effectively and efficiently
for reconsideration with respect to its decisions or orders, the fact remains
dispose of the primary dispute.
that certiorari inherently requires the filing of a motion for reconsideration,
● Though the labor code does not explicitly provide for any mode for reviewing
which is the tangible representation of the opportunity given to the office to
the decisions of the Secretary of labor, it is provided that his decisions are final
correct itself. Unless it is filed,
and executory after 10 days from receipt of notice. Yet, like decisions of the
there could be no occasion to rectify. Worse, the remedy of certiorari would
NLRC which under Art. 223 of the Labor Code become final after 10 days,
be unavailing.
decisions of the Secretary of Labor come to this Court by way of a petition for
certiorari even beyond the 10 day period provided in the Labor Code and the
implementing rules but within the reglementary period set for Rule 65
Facts: petitions under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus it was proper that the
● Philtranco Sevices Inc, a local land transportation company engaged in the petition for certiorari was filed in the CA.
business of carrying passengers and freight, retrenched 21 of its employees. ● The petition for certiorari was timely filed. Rule 65 states that where a motion
● Consequently, the company union, Philtranco Workers Union-Association of for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is
Genuine Labor Organizations (PWU-AGLU), filed a Notice of Strike with the required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than 60 days counted from
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) for unfair labor practices. the notice of the denial of the motion. This can only mean that even though a
● Due to failure to settle the case during arbitration, the case was forwarded to motion for reconsideration is not required or even prohibited by the
the Secretary of Labor. concerned government office, and the petitioner files the motion just the
● The Acting DOLE Secretary Danilo P. Cruz issued a Decision reinstating the same, the 60-day period shall nonetheless be counted from notice of the denial
17 employees of Philtranco that were illegally dismissed. of the motion.
● Philtranco filed an appeal to DOLE however it was not acted upon due to a ● The very nature of certiorari — which is an extraordinary
DOLE regulation which provided that voluntary arbitrators' decisions, orders, remedy resorted to only in the absence of plain, available, speedy and adequate
resolutions or awards shall not be the subject of motions for reconsideration. remedies in the course of law — requires that the office issuing the decision or order be
● Philtranco then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to the CA. given the
● The petition under Rule 65 was dismissed by the CA because they claim that opportunity to correct itself. This opportunity does not arise if no motion for
the appeal should have been filed under Rule 43 which properly covers reconsideration has been filed
decisions of voluntary labor arbitrators. Moreover, the CA held that since the ● Thus, while a government office may prohibit the filing of a motion for
even assuming for the that certiorari was the correct remedy, still the petition reconsideration with respect to its decisions or orders, the fact remains that
should be dismissed for being filed out of time. Petitioner's unauthorized certiorari inherently requires the filing of a motion for reconsideration, which
Motion for Reconsideration fied with the Secretary of Labor did not toll the is the tangible representation of the opportunity given to the office to correct
running of the reglementary 60-day period within which to avail of certiorari; itself. Unless it is filed, there could be no occasion to rectify. Worse, the
thus, they only had until August 13 to file the petition — yet it filed the same remedy of certiorari would be unavailable.
only on August 29. ● As such, since the MR was filed on June 25, and was denied on August 15 and
notice which was received on August 17 by Philtranco, the Petition for
Certiorari filed on August 29 was well within the fresh 60-day period allowed
by the Rules from
August 17.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed September 20, 2007 and
December 14, 2007 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
The Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 100324 is ordered REINSTATED and the Court of
Appeals is DIRECTED to RESOLVE the same with DELIBERATE DISPATCH.

DE LEON VS. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY proceedings therein in the absence of a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order.
Petitioner/s: Bernardo de Leon
Respondent/s: Public Estates Authority, City of Parañaque, et al.
● It is true that there are instances where, even if there is no writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order issued by a higher court, it would
Doctrine: The mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari
be proper for a lower court or court of origin to suspend its proceedings on the
commenced in relation to a case pending before a lower court or court of
precept of judicial courtesy. The principle of judicial courtesy, however,
origin does not stay the proceedings therein in the absence of a writ of
remains to be the exception rather than the rule. As held by this Court in Go
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order.
v. Abrogar, the precept of judicial courtesy should not be applied
indiscriminately and haphazardly if we are to maintain the relevance of
Facts: Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
● De Leon filed a complaint for damages against Public Estates Authority
hinging on alleged unlawful destruction of De Leon’s fence and houses ● Indeed, in the amendments introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, a new
constructed on Lot 5155 in San Dionisio, Parañaque. paragraph is now added to Section 7, Rule 65, which provides as follows:
● The case was eventually resolved with the Supreme Court declaring that the ● The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten (10)
land where De Leon’s properties are situated is a public land, and hence, no days from the filing of a petition for certiorari with a higher court or tribunal,
right arises as to protect De Leon’s nebulous right of possession. absent a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, or upon its
expiration. Failure of the public respondent to proceed with the principal case
● PEA then sought for the execution of the judgment, to which the RTC issued may be a ground for an administrative charge.
an order. This order is the subject of the first case in this consolidated
petitions. The same order was the subject of a special civil action filed by De ● While the above quoted amendment may not be applied in the instant case, as
Leon before the SC, seeking to annul and set aside the same RTC Orders. A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC was made effective only on December 27, 2007, the
provisions of the amendatory rule clearly underscores the urgency of
● During the pendency of the above cases, PEA filed a very urgent motion for proceeding with the principal case in the absence of a temporary restraining
issuance of a writ of demolition before the RTC. The RTC, in response, order or a preliminary injunction.
issued an order holding in abeyance the resolution of PEA’s
motion. ● This urgency is even more pronounced in the present case, considering that
this Courts judgment in PEA v. CA (where the land was declared a public land),
● And as the CA denied De Leon’s petition for certiorari, the PEA filed another finding that De Leon does not own the subject property and is not entitled to
urgent motion to resolve. Yet again, the RTC issued an order holding in its possession, had long become final and executory. As a consequence, the
abeyance the resolution of PEA’s motion pending receipt by the trial court of writ of execution, as well as the writ of demolition, should be issued as a matter
the entry of judgment pertaining to the certiorari case. This is the subject of of course, in the absence of any order restraining their issuance. In fact, the
the second case in this consolidated petitions, as PEA filed its own special civil writ of demolition is merely an ancillary process to carry out the Order
action for certiorari, assailing the aboce RTC orders holding its motions in previously made by the RTC for the execution of this Courts decision in PEA
abeyance. v. CA. It is a logical consequence of the writ of execution earlier issued.
Issue:
● Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding in abeyance ● Neither can De Leon argue that he stands to sustain irreparable damage. The
the resolution of PEA’s motions – YES Court had already determined with finality that he is not the owner of the
disputed property and that he has no right to possess the same independent
Ratio: of his claim of ownership.
● Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides the general rule that the mere
pendency of a special civil action for certiorari commenced in relation to a case ● Furthermore, the Order of the RTC holding in abeyance the resolution of PEAs
pending before a lower court or court of origin does not stay the Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Demolition also appears to be a
circumvention of the provisions of Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court,
which limit the period of effectivity of restraining orders issued by the courts.
In fact, the assailed Orders of the RTC have even become more potent than a
TRO issued by the CA because, under the Rules of Court, a TRO issued by the
CA is effective only for sixty days. In the present case, even in the absence of a
TRO issued by a higher court, the RTC, in effect, directed the maintenance of
the status quo by issuing its assailed Orders. Worse, the effectivity of the said
Orders was made to last for an indefinite period because the resolution of
PEAs Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Demolition was made to depend
upon the finality of the judgment in G.R. No. 181970. Based on the foregoing,
the Court finds that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the assailed Orders dated December 28, 2007 and March 4, 2008.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the Court disposes and orders the following:
The petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 181970 is DENIED. The challenged
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90328 dated
November 21, 2007 and March 4, 2008, respectively, are AFFIRMED.
The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 182678 is GRANTED. The assailed Orders of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 135, dated December 28, 2007 and
March 4, 2008, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court of Makati is hereby DIRECTED to hear and resolve PEAs
Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Demolition with utmost dispatch. This Decision is
IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to remand the
records of the case to the court of origin.
SO ORDERED.
NOTES:
Case dragged on for more than 15 years lol la lang.

REPUBLIC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN ● The PCGG then filed with the SC a Very Urgent Petition for Authority to Hold
Special Stockholders Meeting for the Sole Purpose of Increasing ETPI’s
Petitioner: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Authorized Capital Stock. In the proceedings to resolve the Urgent Petition,
Respondent/s: SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), JOSE L.
the testimony of Mr. Maurice V. Bane (former director and treasurer-in-trust
AFRICA (substituted by his heirs), MANUEL H. NIETO, JR., FERDINAND
of ETPI) was taken at the petitioner’s instance and after serving notice of the
E. MARCOS (substituted by his heirs), IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND
deposition-taking on the respondents by way of deposition upon oral
R. MARCOS, JR., JUAN PONCE ENRILE, and POTENCIANO ILUSORIO
examination before Consul General Ernesto Castro of the Philippine Embassy
(substituted by his heirs)
in London, England.
● Invoking Section 1, Rule 24 (of the old Rules of Court), purportedly allowing
Doctrine: The aggrieved party is afforded the chance to question an
the petitioner to depose Bane without leave of court, i.e., as a matter of right
interlocutory order through a special civil action of certiorari under Rule
after the defendants have filed their answer, the notice stated that the purpose
65. However, for a petition for certiorari to prosper neither an appeal nor
of the deposition is for Bane to identify and testify to prove the ownership
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law should
issue in favor of the petitioner and/or establish the prima facie factual
be available to the aggrieved party.
foundation for sequestration of ETPI’s Class A stock.
● The Sandiganbayan resolved the Urgent Petition by granting authority to the
Facts: PCGG (a) to cause the holding of a special stockholders meeting of ETPI for
● The Republic of the Philippines, through the PCGG filed a complaint against the sole purpose of increasing ETPI’s authorized capital stock and (b) to vote
Jose L. Africa, Manuel H. Nieto, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, therein the sequestered Class A shares of stock.
Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, and Potenciano Ilusorio for ● On April 1998, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution (1998 resolution)
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages before the which denied the petitioner’s prayer to adopt the testimonies on oral
Sandiganbayan. deposition of Maurice V. Bane and Rolando Gapud as part of its evidence in
● The petitioner alleged that the respondents illegally manipulated the purchase Civil Case No. 0009 for the reason that said deponents according to the
of the major shareholdings of Cable and Wireless Limited in Eastern petitioner are not available for cross-examination in this Court by the
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), which shares were held for the respondents.
benefit of the Marcoses. ● The petitioner did not in any way question the 1998 resolution, and instead
● Africa, as an ETPI stockholder, filed a petition for certiorari, with prayer for a made its Formal Offer of Evidence on December 14, 1999. Significantly, the
temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction with the Sandiganbayan, Bane deposition was not included as part of its offered exhibits. The petitioner
seeking to nullify the August 5 and 9, 1991 Orders of the PCGG. These Orders then again filed a motion to admit the deposition of Bane. However, this was
directed Africa: to account for his sequestered shares in ETPI and to cease and again denied by the Sandiganbayan.
desist from exercising voting rights on the sequestered shares, from ● For its third try, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its resolution in this wise:
representing himself as a director, officer, employee or agent of ETPI, and “x x x Indeed, We do not see any need to dwell on these matters in view of this Courts
from participating, directly or indirectly in the management of ETPI. Resolution rendered on April 1, 1998 which already denied the introduction in evidence
● Africa filed a motion with the Sandiganbayan, alleging that the PCGG had of Banes deposition and which has become final in view of plaintiff’s failure to file
been illegally exercising the rights of stockholders of ETPI, especially in the any motion for reconsideration or appeal within the 15-day reglementary period.
election of the members of the board of directors. The Sandiganbayan Rightly or wrongly, the resolution stands and for this court to grant plaintiffs motion at
thereafter resolve the motion by ordering the calling a stockholders meeting. this point in time would in effect sanction plaintiffs disregard for the rules of procedure.
● The PCGG assailed this resolution before the SC via a petition for certiorari, Plaintiff has slept on its rights for almost two years and it was only in February of 2000
imputing grave abuse of discretion on the Sandiganbayan for holding that the that it sought to rectify its ineptitude by filing a motion to reopen its case as to enable
registered stockholders of ETPI had the right to vote. The SC resolves this it to introduce and offer Banes deposition as additional evidence, or in the alternative
matter by enjoining the Sandiganbayan from implementing its assailed for the court to take judicial notice of the allegations of the deposition. x x x”
resolution.
● the Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation of Civil Case No. 0130, among Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in in holding that its 1998
others, with Civil Case No. 0009, with the latter as the main case and the interlocutory order had become final. YES.
former merely an incident.
Ratio: through the 1998 Resolution came at a time when the petitioner had not even
● The petitioner argues that the 1998 resolution of the Sandiganbayan is merely concluded the presentation of its evidence. Plainly, the denial of the motion
an interlocutory order; thus, the petitioners failure to question this 1998 did not resolve the merits of the case, as something still had to be done to
resolution could not have given it a character of finality so long as the main achieve this end. We clarify, too, that an interlocutory order remains under
case remains pending. the control of the court until the case is finally resolved on the merits. The
○ On this basis, the petitioner concludes that the Sandiganbayans court may therefore modify or rescind the order upon sufficient grounds
denial of its 3rdmotion was plainly tainted with grave abuse of shown at any time before final judgment.
discretion. ● In this light, the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution which merely denied the
● In its comment, the respondents claim that the present petition was filed out adoption of the Bane deposition as part of the evidence in Civil Case No. 0009
of time (beyond the 60-day reglementary period). This assertion proceeds could not have attained finality despite the petitioner’s failure to
from the view that the petitioners 3rd motion, being a mere rehash of similar move for its reconsideration or to appeal.
motions earlier filed by the petitioner, likewise simply assails the
Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution. THE 1998 RESOLUTION WAS NOT RIPE FOR A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
○ Along the same line, they posit that the petitioners 3rd motion ● Under Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an aggrieved party may appeal
actually partakes of a proscribed third motion for reconsideration of from a judgment or final order which completely disposes of a case or from an
the Sandiganbayans 1998 resolution. order that the Rules of Court declares to be appealable.
○ They likewise assert, on the assumption that the 1998 resolution is ○ While this provision prohibits an appeal from an interlocutory order,
interlocutory in character, that the petitioners failure to contest the the aggrieved party is afforded the chance to question an
resolution by way of certiorari within the proper period gave the interlocutory order through a special civil action of certiorari under
1998 resolution a character of finality. Rule 65; the petition must be filed within 60 days from notice of the
● The respondents further claim that after a party has rested its case, the assailed judgment, order, resolution, or denial of a motion for
admission of a supplemental offer of evidence requires the reopening of the reconsideration.
case at the discretion of the trial court; the Sandiganbayan simply exercised ● On the premise that the 1998 resolution is interlocutory in nature, the
its sound discretion in refusing to reopen the case since the evidence sought respondents insist that the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari
to be admitted was within the knowledge of the petitioner and available to it should be reckoned from the petitioners notice of the Sandiganbayan’s 1998
before it rested its case. resolution. They argue that since this ruling had long been rendered by the
court, the petitioners subsequent filing of similar motions was actually a
THE INTERLOCUTORY NATURE OF THE 1998 RESOLUTION OF THE devious attempt to resuscitate the long-denied admission of the Bane
SANDIGANBAYAN deposition.
● In determining the appropriate remedy or remedies available, a party ● While the 1998 resolution is an interlocutory order., the claim that the 1998
aggrieved by a court order, resolution or decision must first correctly resolution should have been immediately questioned by the petitioner on
identify the nature of the order, resolution or decision he intends certiorari is not totally correct as a petition for certiorari is not
to assail. In this case, we must preliminarily determine whether the 1998 grounded solely on the issuance of a disputed interlocutory ruling.
resolution is final or interlocutory in nature. ● For a petition for certiorari to prosper, Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
● A judgment or order is considered final if the order disposes of the requires, among others, that neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy and
action or proceeding completely, or terminates a particular stage of the adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is available to the aggrieved
same action; in such case, the remedy available to an aggrieved party is party. As a matter of exception, the writ of certiorari may issue
appeal. notwithstanding the existence of an available alternative remedy, if such
● If the order or resolution, however, merely resolves incidental matters and remedy is inadequate or insufficient in relieving the aggrieved party of the
leaves something more to be done to resolve the merits of the case, the order injurious effects of the order complained of.
is interlocutory and the aggrieved party’s remedy is a petition for certiorari ● We note that at the time of its 1st motion in Civil Case No. 0009, the
under Rule 65. petitioner had not yet concluded the presentation of its evidence,
● Under these guidelines, we agree with the petitioner that the 1998 resolution much less made any formal offer of evidence. At this stage of the case,
is interlocutory. The Sandiganbayan’s denial of the petitioners 1st motion the prematurity of using the extraordinary remedy of certiorari to question the
admission of the Bane deposition is obvious. After the denial of the 1st motion,
the plain remedy available to the petitioner was to move for a
reconsideration to assert and even clarify its position on the
admission of the Bane deposition. The petitioner could introduce
anew the Bane deposition and include this as evidence in its formal
offer as the petitioner presumably did in Civil Case No. 0130.
● Thus, at that point, the case was not yet ripe for the filing of a petition for
certiorari, and the denial of the 1st motion could not have been the reckoning
point for the period of filing such a petition.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the petition for lack

of merit.

PATACSIL VS. COURT OF APPEALS ● Dapliyan prayed that the RTC nullify the Deeds of Absolute Sale and all the
other documents issued by virtue of the Deeds
Petitioner/s: MILA GRACE PATACSIL PIOTROWSKI, REP. BY HER
● The RTC dismissed the complaint against Simeon because there was no proof
ATTORNEY-IN- FACT, VENUS G. PATACSIL
that the case passed through the barangay conciliation proceedings
Respondent/s: HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND GINA Q. DAPLIYAN
● The RTC, however, declared Piotrowski in default and found the complaint
meritorious as against her.
Doctrine: The CA had basis to deny the motion for additional time because
● Almost four years after the promulgation of the August 31, 2004 RTC decision,
the provision previously allowing extension of time to file a petition for
Piotrowski filed on July 14, 2008, an omnibus motion for new trial and to set
certiorari (for compelling reason) had been deleted by A.M. No. 07-7-12-
aside the decision, the order of default, and the writ of execution
SC.
● Piotrowski claimed that:
○ she learned of the judgment against her only on July 7, 2008, when
There are recognized exceptions to the strict observance of the Rules, such
she went to the RTC to confirm the information she gathered about
as: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an
the case
injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed
○ the omnibus motion was timely filed on July 14, 2008, or within the
procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying
fifteen-day reglementary period counted from July 7, 2008, when
within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of
she was made aware of the decision
special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause
○ RTC had no jurisdiction to hear the case because no summons was
not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by
ever issued
the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought
○ the dismissal of the complaint against Simeon rendered all
is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly
subsequent actions of the RTC null and void
prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence
● RTC issued an order partly granting Piotrowski's omnibus motion "to give her
without appellant's fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances
a fighting chance to dispute the claim of [Dapliyan] by adducing her evidence,
attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play;
all in the interest of justice"
(12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion
● During the "new trial," Piotrowski testified and presented her witnesses
by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances.
● Dapliyan did not present any rebuttal evidence
● RTC declared that its decision had become final and executory and could not
Facts: be assailed by a mere motion
● This case stemmed from a complaint for annulment of documents with ○ Piotrowski's omnibus motion was an improper remedy and that the
recovery of possession and damages filed by respondent Gina Q. Dapliyan final and executory decision "should have been assailed in a new case
(Dapliyan) against her father Simeon Dapliyan (Simeon) and petitioner ● Piotrowski then filed a notice of appeal → amended it due to typographical
Piotrowski before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agoo, La Union error
○ involved a parcel of land with an area of 3,577 square meters located ● RTC later denied due course to the amended notice of appeal and granted
at Barangay Saytan, Pugo, La Union Dapliyan's motion for reconsideration
● RTC dismissed the original complaint against Simeon (because of condeition ● RTC held that the decision, which had become final and executory, could no
precedent - Barangay conciliation proceedings) longer be appealed
● Dapliyan then filed an amended complaint alleging that she failed to ● Piotrowski moved but failed to obtain a reconsideration of the RTC order
compromise with her father despite earnest efforts ● Her counsel then filed with the CA the motion for additional time to file a
● Dapliyan alleged that: petition for certiorari, on the ground, among others, of heavy workload.
○ Simeon sold portions of the undivided land to Piotrowski in 2002 ● The CA denied the motion for additional time to file a petition for certiorari.
○ Simeon and Piotrowski made it appear that her mother who died in ○ the ground invoked by the petitioner - i.e., Section 4 (3) of Rule 65 of
1992 signed the Deeds of Absolute Sale the Rules of Court, which provides that "[n]o extension of time to file
○ Piotrowski registered the falsified Deeds of Absolute Sale with the the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no
Office of the Register of Deeds and consequently took possession of case exceeding 15 days" - has been deleted on December 27, 2007 by
the lots A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC
Issue: ● On the first ground, we held that heavy workload is relative and often self-
● WON the CA gravely abused its discretion when it denied Piotrowski's motion serving, and that standing alone, it is not a sufficient reason to deviate from
for additional time to file a petition for certiorari - NO the sixty-day rule. On the second ground (lack of funds), we ruled that it was
Ratio: a bare allegation unsubstantiated by any proof or affidavit of merit.
● The CA had basis to deny the motion for additional time because the provision
previously allowing extension of time to file a petition for certiorari (for Dispositive:
compelling reason) had been deleted by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC
● the CA cited Laguna Metis Corp. v. Court of Appeals as basis for the denial of WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings and legal premises, we DISMISS
Piotrowski's motion. The counsel for the employees filed with the CA a motion the petition and AFFIRM the March 15, 2010 and July 19, 2010 resolutions of the
for extension of time to file a petition for certiorari, citing among others, the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. SP No. 113020.
counsel's heavy workload. The CA granted the motion. The employer filed
with this Court a petition for certiorari questioning the grant of extension. The
Court ruled that the CA had no power to grant something that had already
been expressly deleted from the rules.
● There are recognized exceptions to the strict observance of the Rules, such as:
(1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an
injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed
procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within
a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension
of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous
and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9)
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellant's fault; (10)
peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the
name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues
involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the
attendant circumstances.
● In the present case, Piotrowski's counsel manifested that he needed additional
time to prepare the petition for certiorari because: (1) he had "some difficulty
in consulting with [Piotrowski] who is residing abroad and is now in old age
and in ailment [sic]"; (2) he was "burdened with duties as an officer of the
court, in the preparation of some other petitions...which heavily toll on his
time to finalize the petition"; and (3) "there is an urgent need for additional
time to secure the certified true copies of the voluminous documents xxx
required by the rules to support the petition."
● We do not find these general and bare allegations sufficient to relax the
application of the Rules.
● Ideally, the CA should have tackled the merits of the grounds raised by
Piotrowski and not merely held that the sixty-day period is non-extendible.
Nonetheless, its failure to do so does not amount to grave abuse of discretion
because Piotrowski's counsel gave no compelling reason that would have
justified extension.

WILSON VS. ERMITA ○ That the previous compensation awarded by the Philippines was not
in connection with violation under Arts. 7 and 10 of the ICCPR
Petitioner/s: ALBERT WILSON
○ Philippines has the duty to undertake a comprehensive and impartial
Respondent/s: THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
investigation of the issues raised in connection with Wilson’s
EDUARDO ERMITA, SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ALBERTO
detention and take appropriate penal and disciplinary consequences
ROMULO, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE RAUL GONZALES, BUREAU OF
for the individuals responsible
JAIL MANAGEMENT AND PENOLOGY, BOARD OF CLAIMS,
○ Philippines should also refund Wilson’s payment for the imposition
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SOLICITOR GENERAL AGNES
of immigration fees and visa exclusion
DEVANADERA, AND BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION
○ All payments must be made at the venue of choice of Wilson
● On September 9, 2009, Wilson filed the present petition for mandamus,
Doctrine: There must be a ministerial duty and a clear legal right proven
insisting his entitlement to the writ owing to the ICCPR and the Optional
to be existing to justify the issuance of a writ of mandamus.
Protocol.
● He argues that by virtue of the doctrine of transformation, the RP is in breach
Facts: of an international obligation since any View issued by the Committee
● On September 16, 1996, Wilson, a British national, was accused and charged constitutes part of international law and that the RP is obligated to enforce the
with the crime of consummated rape4 by a 12-year-old girl, the daughter of his same.
Filipina live-in partner. ● The Philippines, through the OSG, believes that the petition is without merit
● After trial, Wilson was found guilty and was imposed the death penalty. He since Wilson failed to prove that there is any national law giving life to the
was also ordered to indemnify the victim the amount of P50, 000. ICCPR and Optional Protocol in order for it to have force and effect in our
● The case was elevated to the SC for automatic review. jurisdiction. Furthermore, PH argues that the findings of the Committee are
● Pending the review, Wilson filed with the UN Human Rights Committee merely recommendatory
(Committee), pursuant to Article 5, par 4 of the Optional Protocol, a case
against the RP for violation of the ICCPR. Issue:
● The SC subsequently revered the RTC ruling after finding out that there were ● Whether mandamus lies to compel the enforcement of the View. – NO.
serious discrepancies and inconsistent statements in the testimony of the Ratio:
victim. It concluded that there was not enough evidence to support the finding ● Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, mandamus is a writ issued to
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. compel a tribunal to perform an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting
● After being acquitted, Wilson was released from detention. He thereafter fled from an office, trust or station
to UK. ● the Court held several times that a purely ministerial duty must exist and a
● Upon his return to UK, Wilson sought compensation from the Board of Claims clear legal right must be established by the petitioner for mandamus to lie:
of the DOJ as one who was unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned but (a) one is that mandamus would lie only to compel a tribunal, board or officer to comply
released by virtue of an acquittal. with a purely ministerial duty, or to allow a party to exercise a right or to occupy and
● The BOC-DOJ awarded him P14,000 as compensation. But, Wilson was enjoy the privileges of an office to which he is lawfully entitled;
informed that he had to claim the compensation in person. (b) the others is that for the writ of mandamus to issue, petitioner must establish a clear
● Wilson moved for reconsideration arguing that under the law, he was entitled legal right to the relief sought, and a mandatory duty on the part of the respondent in
to P40,000. relation thereto.
● BOC-DOJ thereafter informed Wilson that a memorandum was issued ● In the case at bar, there is no ministerial duty on the part of PH
ordering the BOC to raise the compensation to the maximum award ○ a ministerial duty must be clear and specific as to leave no room for
● With this foregoing, Wilson applied, but was denied, a tourist visa to travel to the exercise of discretion in its performance.
the Philippines due to his presence in the Bureau of Immigration watch list. ○ A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal
The BI said his presence in the watch list may be due to the fact of his performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
overstaying and his previous conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or
● Meanwhile, the Committee issued the View stating: the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety
○ State Party (Philippines) should compensate the author (Wilson) of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and
gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be
performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty
is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither
the exercise of official discretion or judgment
● It is clear from the facts that Wilson was qualified, and granted, compensation
under RA 7309. In fact, the BOC-DOJ granted him the maximum allowed
compensation. It was Wilson’s decision not to collect the money granted to
him.
● Contrary to Wilson’s view, there is no clear and complete legal right to enforce
○ Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of
the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or
incorporation.
○ Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation
○ In sum, there must be an act more than ratification to make a treaty
applicable in our jurisdiction.
○ To be sure, what was ratified were the ICCPR and the Optional
Protocol, nowhere in the instrument does it say that the View of the
Committee forms part of the treaty.
● The Court finds that there is no ministerial duty and clear legal right which
would justify the issuance of a writ of mandamus.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit.

REPUBLIC VS. SERENO SALNs filed in her 20-year government service in UP.No SALNs were
filed from 2003 to 2006 when she was employed as legal counsel for the
Petitioner/s: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY
Republic. Neither was there a SALN filed when she resigned from UP-COL as
SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA
of June 1, 2006 and when she supposedly re-entered government service as of
Respondent/s: MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
August 16, 2010.
● On August 13, 2010, Sereno was appointed by Pres. Noynoy as justice.
Doctrine: (SEE TABLE)
When the position of CJ was declared vacant in 2012, the JBC announced the
opening for application. The announcement was preceded by an en banc
Facts: meeting where the JBC agreed to require the applicants for CJ to submit,
● From November 1986 to June 1, 2006, respondent Sereno served as faculty of instead of the usual submission of SALNs for the last 2 years of
UP-COL, initially as temporary faculty member from Nov 1986 to Dec 31, public service, all previous SALNs up to Dec 31, 2011for those in
1991, and thereafter as a permanent faculty member until her resignation government service. The announcement said that applicants with
therefrom on June 1, 2006. As regular faculty member, Sereno was paid by incomplete documentary requirements will not be interviewed or considered.
the month by UP. From October 2003 to 2006, while employed at UP-COL, ● On June 25, 2012, JBC enbanc resolved not to require incumbent SC justices
Sereno concurrently was employed as legal counsel of the Republic in two who are candidates for CJ to submit other documentary requirements.
international arbitrations: 1) PIATCO v. Republic and 2) Fraport AG Frankfurt Instead, it required them to submit only the SALNs, bank waiver, med cert,
Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic (PIATCO cases). Sereno’s Personal lab results, and PDS.On July 2, 2012, Sereno accepted several nominations
Data Sheet (PDS) also details her engagement for various government from the legal and evangelical community for CJ and submitted to ORSN
agencies, particularly as legal counsel from 1994-2008 for OP, OSG, MIAA etc. her SALNs for 2009, 2010, and 2011.
and Deputy Commissioner of the CHR. ● On July 20, 2012, the JBC in its en banc meeting deliberated on the candidates
● Despite having been employed at UP-COL from Nov 1986 to June 1, 2006, the with incomplete documentary requirements. Their deliberation reveal:
record of the UP HR Development Office (UP-HRDO) only contains the 10. Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno
SALN for 1985, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, and 2002 filed by The Executive Officer informed the Council that she had not submitted her SALNs for
Sereno. On the other hand, the records of the ombudsman reveal that there is a period of ten (10) years, that is, from 1986 to 2006. Senator Escudero mentioned that
no SALN filed for 1999-2009 except for the SALN ending December 1998 Justice Sereno was his professor at U.P. and that they were required to submit SALNs
which was subscribed only in August 2003 and transmitted by UP-HRDO to during those years
ombudsman only on Dec 16, 2003. Also, despite having been employed as ● Because there were several candidates with incomplete documentary
legal counsel of various government agencies from 2003 to 2009, there is no requirements, JBC en banc agreed to extend the deadline for submission of
showing that Sereno filed her SALNs for these years, except the SALN ending lacking requirements to July 23, 2012 and those who fail to complete the
Dec 31, 2009 which was unsubscribed and filed before the Clerk of Court only requirements are to be excluded. On July 20, the ORSN, thru its then Chief
on June 22, 2012. Atty. Pascual, inquired as to Sereno’s SALNs for 1995, 1996, 1997, and
● After serving as professor at UP-COL until 2006 and thereafter as practitioner 1999(*acc to Sereno), although Atty. Pascual testified in the congressional
including as legal counsel for Republic until 2009, Sereno submitted her hearing for Sereno’s impeachment that he had asked for 1995-2006.
application for associate justice of SC in July 2010. In support of her ● In response, Sereno sent a letter of even date, saying that most of her
application, she submitted to the JBC her SALN for 2006 which bears no government records in the academe are more than 15 years old and thus it is
stamp received by UP-HRDO and was signed on July 27, 2010. infeasible to retrieve those files. The UP had cleared her already of
● According to Sereno, JBC considered her nomination for associate justice as academic/administrative responsibilities and thus considered her SALN
that of a private practitioner and not as government employee. Recently in a requirements to have been met. She says that since she had a break in
letter to Office of Recruitment Selection and Nomination (ORSN) of JBC, she government service from 2006 until her appointment as justice on 2010, and
explained that such SALN was intended to be her SALN for July 27, 2010. She that since she had been cleared, she requests that the requirements she needs
downloaded the SALN form and forgot to erase the year “2006” printed to comply with be viewed as that from a private sector before her appointment
thereon and she was not required by ORSN to submit a subscribed SALN. to the government again in 2010.But the letter was neither examined by
● The only SALNs available on record and filed by Sereno were those for 1985, JBC nor deliberated upon by JBC enbanc or the Execom. They could
1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, and 2002 or eleven
not produce any minutes of the meeting that the JBC members deliberated on ● Sereno claims that on the strength of S2, Art. XI, the CJ may be ousted from
the letter. office only by impeachment. She claims that she was not required to file
● On the scheduled date of interview on July 24, despite Sereno’s submission of her SALN during the time she was on official leave without pay. She continues
only 3 SALNs, Atty. Pascual prepared a report where Sereno was listed as to recover her missing SALNs and will present them before the Senate sitting
applicant No. 14 with an annotation that she had “COMPLETE as Impeachment Tribunal and not to SC considering her objections to SC’s
REQUIREMENTS” and a note stating “Letter 7/23/12- considering that her jurisdiction. The question of whether an applicant for CJ is a person of “proven
government records in the academe are more than 15 yo, it is reasonable to integrity” is a question constitutionally committed to JBC and is a political
consider it infeasible to retrieve all those files.” On August 6, 2012, ORSN question.
prepared a list of the 20 candidates, Sereno included, vis-à-vis their SALN ● OSG cites Estrada v. Desierto and Lawyer’s League for a Better PH and
submissions. Opposite her name was an enumeration of the SALNs she Oliber Lozano v. Pres. Corazon Aquino where the SC took cognizance of a
submitted- 2009, 2010, and 2011, and the same excerpt from her July 23, 2012 petition for quo warranto to oust an impeachable official
letter.
● On August 24, 2012, Sereno was appointed by President Noynoy. ISSUE:
● On August 30, 2017 5 yrs later, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Whether SC can assume jurisdiction and give due course to this petition for quo
Larry Gadon against Sereno with the Committee on Justice (COJ) of HoR for warranto against Sereno who is an impeachable officer and against whom an
culpable violation of the constitution etc. and for failing to make truthful impeachment complaint has already been filed with HoR.
declarations in her SALNs. This was endorsed by several members of the HoR
and was found sufficient in form and substance. The COJ held several
hearings to determine probable cause. HELD:YES.
● During these hearings, it was revealed that Sereno purportedly failed to file ● S5, Art. VIII provides that SC shall exercise original jurisdiction over
her SALNs while she was a member of UP-COL and that she filed her petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and
SALN only for 1998, 2002, and 2006. Justice Peralta, as resource person being habeas corpus. This Court, the CA, and RTC have concurrent jurisdiction to
then the ex-officio chairman of JBC, claimed that during the JBC deliberations issue the extraordinary writs including quo warranto.
in 2012, he was not made aware that Sereno submitted incomplete ● S7, Rule 66 provides that the venue of an action for quo warranto when
SALNs nor that Sereno’s letter of July 23, 2012 to JBC was ever commenced by solgen is either the RTC in Manila, in CA, or in SC.
deliberated upon. This was confirmed by Atty. Cayosa and Atty. Capacite, ● While the hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the
who emphasized that based on the rubber stamp received, only the offices of appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs, a direct invocation
the JBC regular members, ORSN, and OEO were furnished copies of SC’s original jurisdiction is allowed when there are special and
on the letter and by Atty. Pascual. important reasons therefor. Here, direct resort to SC is justified
● This spawned two incidents: 1) proposal of COJ for the SC to investigate on considering that the petition questions the qualification of no less than a
the JBC proceedings on the nomination of Sereno as CJ, and 2) letter dated member of SC. This petition is a case of transcendental importance and of first
Feb. 21, 2018 of Atty. Mallari to OSG requesting that the latter, in impression. The qualification of an incumbent CJ are being scrutinized.
representation of the Republic, initiate a quo warranto against Sereno. Hence ● Sereno argues that she is an impeachable officer. Thus, quo warranto cannot
this petition. OSG files this case for quo warranto against the incumbent be lodged against her especially when there is an impending impeachment
CJ Sereno, to declare her ineligible to hold CJ for failing to case against her. This argument is misplaced.
regularly disclose her SALN as a member of the career service prior ● While both may result in the ouster of a public official, the origin, nature,
to her appointment as justice, and later as CJ, in violation of the and purpose of impeachment and quo warranto are materially
constitution, anti-graft Law, and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards different.
for Public Officials and Employees.
● OSG claims that quo warranto is the proper remedy to question the validity
QUO WARRANTO IMPEACHMENT
of Sereno’s appointment. He claims that quo warranto is available as a remedy
even as against impeachable officers like Sereno. He claims that Sereno failed
to show that she is a person of proven integrity which is an indispensable
qualification for membership in the Judiciary under S7(3), Art. VIII.
Judicial in nature, Political in nature, This remedy is vested in the elected IMPEACHABLE official
people and not in any private may be removed from office.
individual or group, because
involves a judicial determination of exercised by the legislative as disputes over title to public office are
the eligibility or validity of the representatives of the sovereign to viewed as a public question of
election or appointment of a public vindicate the breach of trust of the governmental legitimacy and not
official based on predetermined people merely a private quarrel. The only
rules. time that an individual, in his own
name, may bring an action for quo
warranto is when he has a claim
Can PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY and SIMULTANEOUSLY of each other
over the position in question
as these remedies are distinct as to 1) jurisdiction, 2) grounds, 3) applicable
(S5, Rule 66).
rules of initiation, filing, and dismissal, and 4) limitations.
Quo warranto tests the right of a impeachment concerns actions
A quo warranto proceeding is an Section 2, Article XI of the person to occupy a public position. that make the officer unfit to
action by the government against Constitution Quo warranto involves matters that continue exercising his office,
individuals unlawfully holding an render him ineligible to hold the
office. S1, Rule 66 reads: Sec. 2. The President, the Vice- position to begin with.
1. Action by Government against President, the Members of the
individuals. -An action for the Supreme Court, the Members of the
● The role of the courts thru quo warranto complements separation of
usurpation of a public office, Constitutional Commissions, and
powers. The Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over quo warranto does not
position or franchise may be the Ombudsman may be removed
preclude Congress from enforcing its own prerogative of
commenced by a verified petition from office on impeachment for,
determining probable cause for impeachment, to transmit the Articles
brought in the name of the Republic and conviction of, culpable
of Impeachment, nor will it preclude the Senate from exercising its power of
of the Philippines against: violation of the Constitution,
impeachment.
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes treason, bribery, graft and
● The Senate, as impeachment tribunal, cannot be expected to rule on the
into, or unlawfully holds or exercises corruption, other high crimes,
validity of the CJ’s appointment as this would disturb checks and balances and
a public office, position or franchise; or betrayal of public trust. All
dilute judicial power of courts upon which jurisdiction is exclusively vested to
(b) A public officer who does or other public officers and employees
rule on actions for quo warranto.Its ruling thereon would not be with
suffers an act which, by the may be removed from office as
jurisprudential binding effect because rulings of the impeachment court,
provision of law, constitutes a provided by law, but not by
being a political rather than judicial body, do not form part of the laws of the
ground for the forfeiture of his impeachment.
land.
office; or
● The Court demarcates that an act or omission committed PRIOR to or AT
(c) An association which acts as a
THE TIME of appointment or election relating to an official’s
corporation within the Philippines
qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment/election invalid is
without being legally incorporated Impeachment is NOT an
properly subject of quo warranto. Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even
or without lawful authority so to act. EXCLUSIVE remedy by which an
if it relates to the qualification of integrity, being a continuing requirement but
INVALIDLY APPOINTED or
nonetheless committed DURING the incumbency of a VALIDLY
appointed/elected official CANNOT be the subject of quo warranto, but
of something else, either impeachment, if impeachable, or disciplinary,
administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.

● An outright dismissal of the petition based on speculation that Sereno will
eventually be tried on impeachment is a clear abdication of the Court’s duty to
settle actual controversy squarely presented before it.
● Sereno’s inclusion in the matrix of candidates with complete requirements
and in the shortlist nominated by JBC does not ratify her compliance with the
SALN requirement. The invalidity of Sereno’s appointment springs from her
lack of qualifications. Her inclusion in the shortlist does not negate nor
supply her with the requisite proof of integrity. She should have
been disqualified at the outset. Her letter of July 23, 2012 was not
deliberated by JBC en banc. Thus, JBC en banc cannot be deemed to have
considered her eligible because the failure to submit her SALNs was not
squarely addressed by the body. Her nomination in the shortlist and
subsequent appointment do not estop the Republic or the SC from looking
into her qualifications. It appears that her inclusion was made under the
erroneous belief that she complied with all the legal requirements.
● Sereno’s failure to submit to JBC her SALNs for several years means that her
integrity was not established at the time of her application.
❖ Thus, Sereno is a de facto officer removable thru quo
warranto.The effect of a finding that a person appointed to office is
ineligible is that his presumably valid appointment will give him the
color of title that confers on him the status of a de facto officer.
❖ A de facto judge is one who exercises the duties of a judicial office
under color of an appointment or election thereto. He differs from a
mere usurper who undertakes to act officially without any color
of right and from a judge de jure who is in all respects legally
appointed and qualified.For lack of a constitutional
qualification, Sereno is ineligible to hold the CJ position and is
merely holding a colorable right or title thereto.
❖ Thus, she never attained the status of an impeachable official.

PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK VS. BASES CONVERSION
DEVELOPMENT Issue:
AUTHORITY W/N the CA erred in holding that PVB was not entitled to intervene in the expropriation
cases before Branch 58 of the Angeles City RTC. - NO
Petitioner/s: PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK,
Ratio:
● PVB maintains that in deciding the case, the RTC and the CA ignored Section
Respondent/s: BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
9, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which authorizes the court
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, ARMANDO SIMBILLO, CHRISTIAN
adjudicating the expropriation case to hear and decide conflicting claims
MARCELO, ROLANDO DAVID, RICARDO BUCUD, PABLO SANTOS,
regarding the ownership of the properties involved while the compensation
AGRIFINA ENRIQUEZ, CONRADO ESPELETA, CATGERUBE CASTRO,
for the expropriated property is in the meantime deposited with the court.
CARLITO MERCADO and ALFREDO SUAREZ
Section 9 provides:
○ Sec. 9. Uncertain ownership; conflicting claims. — If the ownership
Doctrine: Rule 68, Sec. 9 empowers the court to order payment to itself of
of the property taken is uncertain, or there are conflicting claims to
the proceeds of the expropriation whenever questions of ownership are yet
any part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums awarded as
to be settled. This rule applies even where the settlement of such questions
compensation for the property to be paid to the court for the benefit
is to be made by another tribunal.
of the person adjudged in the same proceeding to be entitled thereto.
But the judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums
Facts: awarded to either the defendant or the court before the plaintiff can
● Respondent Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) filed several enter upon the property, or retain it for the public use or purpose if
expropriation actions before the various branches of the RTC of Angeles City, entry has already been made.
for acquisition of lands needed for the construction of the Subic-Clark-Tarlac ● PVB's point regarding the authority of the court in expropriation cases to hear
Expressway Project. Ten of these cases were raffled to Branch 58 of the court. and adjudicate conflicting claims over the ownership of the lands involved in
● The defendants (respondents) in Branch 58 cases were the registered owners such cases is valid. But such rule obviously cannot apply to PVB for the
of the expropriated lands that they acquired as beneficiaries of the CARP. following reasons:
● On learning of the expropriation cases before Branch 58, petitioner Philippine ○ 1. At the time PVB tried to intervene in the expropriation cases, its
Veterans Bank (PVB) filed motions to intervene in all the cases with attached conflict with the farmer beneficiaries who held CLOAs, EPs, or TCTs
complaints-in-intervention. emanating from such titles were already pending before Angeles City
● PVB alleged that the covered properties actually belonged to Belmonte Agro- RTC Branch 62, a co-equal branch of the same court. Branch 58 had
Industrial Development Corp. which mortgaged the lands to PVB in 1976. PVB no authority to pre-empt Branch 62 of its power to hear and
had since foreclosed on the mortgages and bought the same at public auction adjudicate claims that were already pending before it.
in 1982. Unfortunately, the bank had been unable to consolidate ownership in ○ 2. Of course, subsequently, after the CA dismissed PVB's petition on
its name. January 26, 2006, the latter filed a motion for reconsideration,
● Branch 58 denied PVB's motion for intervention on the ground that the pointing out that it had in the meantime already withdrawn the
intervention amounts to a third-party complaint that is not allowed in actions it filed with Branch 62 after learning from the decision of the
expropriation cases. Besides, said Branch 58, PVB had a pending action for Supreme Court in Department of Agrarian Reform v. Cuenca, that
annulment of the titles issued to the individual defendants and this was jurisdiction over cases involving the annulment of CLOAs and EPs
pending before Branch 62 of the court. were vested by Republic Act 6657 in the DARAB.
● PVB filed its MR but Branch 58 denied the same. PVB filed a petition for ● PVB now points out that, since there was no longer any impediment in RTC
certiorari with the CA. CA rendered a decision, dismissing the petition for lack Branch 58 taking cognizance of its motion for intervention and adjudicating
of merit. MR also denied. the parties' conflicting claims over the expropriated properties, the CA was in
● Meanwhile, Branch 58 issued separate decisions in all 10 cases before it, error in not reconsidering its decision.
granting the expropriation of the subject properties. ● But PVB's withdrawal of its actions from Branch 62 cannot give Branch 58
comfort. As PVB itself insists, jurisdiction over the annulment of the
individual defendants' CLOAs and EPs lies with the DARAB. Branch 58 would
still have no power to adjudicate the issues of ownership presented by the
PVB's intervention.
● Actually, PVB's remedy was to secure an order from Branch 58 to have the
proceeds of the expropriation deposited with that branch in the meantime,
pending adjudication of the issues of ownership of the expropriated lands by
the DARAB. Section 9 above empowers the court to order payment to itself of
the proceeds of the expropriation whenever questions of ownership are yet to
be settled. There is no reason why this rule should not be applied even where
the settlement of such questions is to be made by another tribunal.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 26, 2006 and its resolution dated June
2, 2006 in CA- G.R. SP 88144. c

REPUBLIC VS. MANGOTARA of two original certificates of title (OCTs). RTC granted Teofilo's petition and
ordered the reconstitution and reissuance of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969.
The original issuance of these decrees presupposed a prior judgment that had
Respondent/s: Hon Mamindiara P. Mangotara, in his capacity as
become final. CA reversed the RTC Decision. Teofilo appealed to the SC. The
Presiding Judge of RTC-Br. I, Iligan City, Lanao del Norte
SC reversed the judgment of the CA and reinstated the decision of the RTC
Doctrine: Defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the
approving the re-issuance of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969. The Court found
owners of the property to be expropriated, and just compensation is not due
that such decrees had in fact been issued and had attained finality, as certified
to the property owner alone. As this Court held in De Knecht v. Court of
by the Acting Commissioner, Deputy Clerk of Court III, Geodetic Engineer,
Appeals: The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the
and Chief of Registration of the then Land Registration Commission. MR
owners of the property condemned. They include all other persons owning,
denied. Hence, the decrees of registration were re-issued bearing new
occupying or claiming to own the property. When [property] is taken by
numbers and OCTs were issued for 2 parcels of land in Dona Demetria‘s name.
eminent domain, the owner x x x is not necessarily the only person who is
● THE ANTECENT FACTS OF THE PETITIONS AT BAR: The dispute did not
entitled to compensation. In the American jurisdiction, the term ‘owner’
end with the termination of the 1997 Cacho case. Another 4 cases involving
when employed in statutes relating to eminent domain to designate the
the same parcels of land were instituted before the trial courts during and after
persons who are to be made parties to the proceeding, refer, as is the rule
the pendency of the 1997 Cacho case.
in respect of those entitled to compensation, to all those who have lawful
● These cases are: (1) Expropriation Case (2) Quieting of Title Case (3)
interest in the property to be condemned, including a mortgagee, a lessee
Ejectment or Unlawful Detainer Case and (4) Cancellation of Titles and
and a vendee in possession under an executory contract. Every person
Reversion Case. These cases proceeded independently of each other in the
having an estate or interest at law or in equity in the land taken is entitled
courts a quo until they reached the SC, that consolidated the seven Petitions.
to share in the award. If a person claiming an interest in the land sought to
● The Complaint for Expropriation was originally filed by the Iron and Steel
be condemned is not made a party, he is given the right to intervene and lay
Authority (ISA), now the NSC, against Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation
claim to the compensation.
(MCFC), and the latter's mortgagee, the Philippine National Bank (PNB).
During the existence of ISA, Pres. Marcos issued Presidential Proclamation
Facts: No. 2239, reserving in favor of ISA a parcel of land in Iligan City. MCFC
● 7 consolidated cases stemmed from the 1914 case of Cacho v. Government of occupied certain portions of this parcel of land. When negotiations with MCFC
the United States (1914 Cacho case). failed, ISA was compelled to file a Complaint for Expropriation. When the
● 1914 Cacho Case: In the early 1900s, the late Dona Demetria applied for the statutory existence of ISA expired during the pendency of Civil Case No. 106,
registration of 2 parcels of land in the Municipality of Iligan, Moro Province the RTC-Branch 1 allowed the substitution of the Republic for ISA as plaintiff
(now called Iligan City, Lanao Del Norte). Only the Government opposed in Civil Case No. 106. Alleging that the lots involved in the 1997 Cacho case
Doña Demetria's applications for registration on the ground that the two encroached and overlapped the parcel of land subject of the case, Republic
parcels of land were the property of the United States and formed part of a filed with the RTC a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Complaint and to
military reservation, generally known as Camp Overton. Admit the Attached Supplemental Complaint, seeking to implead Teofilo
● The land registration court ruled that the applicant Doña Demetria Cacho is Cacho and Demetria Vidal and their respective successors-in-interest,
owner of the portion of land occupied and planted by the deceased Datto LANDTRADE and AZIMUTH. However, the RTC denied the Motion of the
Anandog only; and her application as to all the rest of the land solicited in said Republic for leave to file and to admit its Supplemental Complaint. RTC
case is denied. Moreover, the applicant should present the corresponding deed agreed with MCFC that the Republic did not file any motion for execution of
from Datto Darondon on or before the above-mentioned 30th day of March, the judgment of this Court in the ISA case.
1913. Final decision in these cases is reserved until the presentation of the said ● Since no such motion for execution had been filed within the prescriptive
deed and the new plan. Dissatisfied, Doña Demetria appealed to the Supreme period of 5 years, RTC ruled that its Order dated November 16, 2001, which
Court. SC affirmed the LRC Decision. 83 years later, the Court was again called effected the substitution of the Republic for ISA as plaintiff in the case, was an
upon to settle a matter concerning the registration of the Lots in the case of honest mistake. MR of the Republic denied because MCFC (the only
Cacho v. CA. defendant left in the case) is NOT a proper party defendant in the complaint
● 1997 Cacho Case: Teofilo Cacho (Teofilo), claiming to be the late Doña for expropriation. Hence, the case was dismissed.
Demetria's son and sole heir, filed before the RTC a petition for reconstitution
● The Republic filed with the SC the consolidated Petition for Review on ● According to Rule 67, Section 1, expropriation proceedings may be instituted
Certiorari and Petition for Certiorari under Rules 45 and 65. even when "title to the property sought to be condemned appears to be in the
Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals." The
Issue: same rule provides that a complaint for expropriation shall name as
1. Whether the owner of the property is the indispensable property in an defendants "all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part
expropriation proceeding. NO (Not necessarily!). thereof or interest" in the property sought to be condemned.
2. Whether the Republic is precluded from filing Expropriation proceedings ● Clearly, when the property already appears to belong to the Republic, there is
after having filed Reversion proceedings. NO. no sense in the Republic instituting expropriation proceedings against itself.
It can still, however, file a complaint for expropriation against the private
Ratio: persons occupying the property. In such an expropriation case, the owner of
FIRST ISSUE: the property is not an indispensable party.
● Defendants in an expropriation case are NOT limited to the owners of the ● To recall, Presidential Proclamation No. 2239 explicitly states that the parcels
property to be expropriated, and just compensation is not due to the property of land reserved to NSC are part of the public domain, hence, owned by the
owner alone. They include all other persons owning, occupying or claiming to Republic.
own the property. ● Letter of Instructions No. 1277 recognized only the occupancy rights of MCFC
● In the American jurisdiction, the term 'owner' when employed in statutes and directed NSC to institute expropriation proceedings to determine the just
relating to eminent domain to designate the persons who are to be made compensation for said occupancy rights.
parties to the proceeding, refer, as is the rule in respect of those entitled to ● Therefore, the owner of the property is not an indispensable party in the
compensation, to all those who have lawful interest in the property to be original Complaint for Expropriation. Moreover, the right of the Republic to
condemned, including a mortgagee, a lessee and a vendee in possession under be substituted for ISA as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106 had long been affirmed
an executory contract. by no less than this Court in the ISA case.
● Every person having an estate or interest at law or in equity in the land taken ● The failure of the Republic to actually file a motion for execution does not
is entitled to share in the award. If a person claiming an interest in the land render the substitution void. A writ of execution requires the sheriff or other
sought to be condemned is not made a party, he is given the right to intervene proper officer to whom it is directed to enforce the terms of the writ.
and lay claim to the compensation. ● The Order of the RTC should be deemed as voluntary compliance with a final
● At the time of the filing of the Complaint for Expropriation, and executory judgment of this Court, already rendering a motion for and
possessory/occupancy rights of MCFC over the parcels of land sought to be issuance of a writ of execution superfluous.
expropriated were undisputed. Letter of Instructions No. 1277 expressly SECOND ISSUE:
recognized that portions of the lands reserved by Presidential Proclamation ● The Republic did not commit Forum Shopping.
No. 2239 for the use and immediate occupation by the NSC, were then ● Forum-shopping takes place when a litigant files multiple suits involving the
occupied by an idle fertilizer plant/factory and related facilities of MCFC. It same parties, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable
was ordered in the same Letter of Instruction that NSC shall negotiate with judgment.
the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for the ● Thus, it exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, namely: (a)
compensation of MCFC's present occupancy rights on the subject lands. Being identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in
the occupant of the parcel of land sought to be expropriated, MCFC could very both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
well be named a defendant in the case. being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two
● The RTC evidently erred in dismissing the Complaint for Expropriation preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment that may be
against MCFC for not being a proper party. Also erroneous was the dismissal rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would
by the RTC of the original Complaint for Expropriation for having been filed amount to res judicata in the other case. Here, the elements of litis pendencia
only against MCFC, the occupant of the subject land, but not the owner/s of are wanting.
the said property. Dismissal is not the remedy for misjoinder or non-joinder ● There is no identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for in Civil Case No.
of parties. The owner of the property is not necessarily an indispensable party 106 (expropriation) and Civil Case No. 6686 (cancellation of OCTs of Dona
in an action for expropriation. Demetria because the certificates exceeded the areas granted by the LRC –
reversion).
● Expropriation vis-à-vis reversion The Republic is not engaging in 3. In G.R. No. 170505 (The Ejectment or Unlawful Detainer Case—execution
contradictions when it instituted both expropriation and reversion pending appeal before the Regional Trial Court), the Court DENIES the
proceedings for the same parcels of land. The expropriation and reversion Petition for Review of Landtrade Realty Corporation for being moot and
proceedings are distinct remedies that are not necessarily exclusionary of each academic given that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 of Iligan City, Lanao
other. del Norte had already rendered a Decision dated December 12, 2005 in Civil
● The filing of a complaint for reversion does not preclude the institution of an Case No. 6613. No costs.
action for expropriation. Even if the land is reverted back to the State, the 4. In G.R. Nos. 173355-56 and 173563-64 (The Ejectment or Unlawful Detainer
same may still be subject to expropriation as against the occupants thereof. Case—execution pending appeal before the Court of Appeals), the Court
● Also, Rule 67, Section 1 of the Rules of Court allows the filing of a complaint GRANTS the consolidated Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition of the
for expropriation even when "the title to any property sought to be condemned National Power Corporation and National Transmission Corporation. It SETS
appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private ASIDE the Resolution dated June 30, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
individuals, or if the title is otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff SP Nos. 00854 and 00889 for having been rendered with grave abuse of
cannot with accuracy or certainty specify who are the real owners." discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It further ORDERS the
● Hence, the filing by the Republic of the Supplemental Complaint for Court of Appeals to issue a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the
Expropriation impleading Teofilo, Vidal, LANDTRADE, and AZIMUTH, is not execution of the Decision dated December 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial
necessarily an admission that the parcels of land sought to be expropriated are Court, Branch 1 of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, in Civil Case No. 6613, while
privately owned. the same is pending appeal before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos.
● At most, the Republic merely acknowledged in its Supplemental Complaint 00854 and 00889. It finally DIRECTS the Court of Appeals to resolve without
that there are private persons also claiming ownership of the parcels of land. further delay the pending appeals before it, in CA G.R. SP Nos. 00854 and
● The Republic can still consistently assert, in both actions for expropriation 00889, in a manner not inconsistent with this Decision. No costs.
and reversion, that the subject parcels of land are part of the public domain. 5. In G.R. No. 173401 (Cancellation of Titles and Reversion Case), the Court
In sum, the RTC erred in dismissing the original Complaint and disallowing GRANTS the Petition for Review of the Republic of the Philippines. It
the Supplemental Complaint. The Court reinstates the Complaint for REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Orders dated December 13, 2005 and May
Reversion of the Republic. 16, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4 of Iligan City in Civil Case No.
6686. It further ORDERS the reinstatement of the Complaint in Civil Case No.
Dispositive: 6686 and the return of the original record of the case to the court of origin for
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders the following judgment in the further proceedings. No costs. SO ORDERED.
Petitions at bar:
1. In G.R. No. 170375 (Expropriation Case), the Court GRANTS the Petition for
Review of the Republic of the Philippines. It REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the
Resolutions dated July 12, 2005 and October 24, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 1 of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte. It further ORDERS the
reinstatement of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 106, the admission of the
Supplemental Complaint of the Republic, and the return of the original record
of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings. No costs.
2. In G.R. Nos. 178779 and 178894 (Quieting of Title Case), the Court DENIES
the consolidated Petitions for Review of Landtrade Realty Corporation,
Teofilo Cacho, and/or Atty. Godofredo Cabildo for lack of merit. It AFFIRMS
the Decision dated January 19, 2007 and Resolution dated July 4, 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 00456, affirming in toto the Decision
dated July 17, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of Iligan City, Lanao
del Norte, in Civil Case No. 4452. Costs against Landtrade Realty Corporation,
Teofilo Cacho, and Atty. Godofredo Cabildo.

BARING VS. ELENA LOAN AND CREDIT ● On the other hand, after the lapse of the redemption period, a writ of
possession may be issued in favor of the purchaser in a foreclosure sale as the
Petitioner/s: NORMA I. BARING
mortgagor is now considered to have lost interest over the foreclosed property.
Respondent/s: ELENA LOAN AND CREDIT COMPANY, INC
● Consequently, the purchaser, who has a right to possession after the
expiration of the redemption period, becomes the absolute owner of the
Doctrine: The court need not look into the validity of the mortgages or the
property when no redemption is made. In this regard, the bond is no longer
manner of their foreclosure. The writ issues as a matter of course, and the
needed. The purchaser can demand possession at any time following the
court neither exercises its official discretion nor judgment.
consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new TCT.
● After consolidation of title in the purchaser's name for failure of the mortgagor
Facts: to redeem the property, the purchaser's right to possession ripens into the
● Baring, Sps Bernardino, and Hernaez obtained a series of loans and other absolute right of a confirmed owner. At that point, the issuance of a writ of
credit accommodations from Elena Loan and executed an REM as security possession, upon proper application and proof of title, to a purchaser in an
● the debtors failed to pay their obligations extrajudicial foreclosure sale becomes merely a ministerial function
● Elena Loan filed a Petition for Foreclosure ● It is well-settled that the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure of real
● Eventually, the period of redemption expired without Baring exercising her property becomes the absolute owner of the property if no redemption is made
right of redemption within one year from the registration of the certificate of sale by those entitled
● Elena Loan requested them to vacate the subject property. However, the to redeem.
demand remained unheeded. ● Since Elena Loan is the absolute and registered owner of the subject property,
● Baring et al reiterates their contention that per the Certification issued by the and entitled to the possession thereof, the CA correctly ruled that it was the
SEC, Elena Loan has not been issued a secondary franchise to operate as a RTC's ministerial duty to issue the writ of possession.The issuance of the writ
lending company; that at the time the petition for foreclosure was filed, the of possession becomes a ministerial function upon the proper application and
public auction and the ex-parte petition for the issuance of a writ of proof of title.
possession, Elena Loan had not been granted any authorization by the SEC to ● The court need not look into the validity of the mortgages or the manner of
operate and conduct business as a lending company; their foreclosure. The writ issues as a matter of course, and the court neither
Issue: exercises its official discretion nor judgment.
● W/N Elena Loan is not authorized to initiate the petition of foreclosure - ● Clearly then, until the foreclosure sale of the property in question is annulled
Doesn’t matter when issuing a writ of possession by a court of competent jurisdiction, the issuance of a writ of possession
Ratio: remains the ministerial duty of the trial court. The same is true with its
● The court need not look into the validity of the mortgages or the manner of implementation; otherwise, the writ will be a useless paper judgment - a result
their foreclosure. The writ issues as a matter of course, and the court neither inimical to the mandate of Act No. 3135 to vest possession in the purchaser
exercises its official discretion nor judgment. immediately.
● a writ of possession may be issued in favor of a purchaser in a foreclosure sale Dispositive:
of a real estate mortgage either WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 18, 2015 and
○ (1) within the one-year redemption period, upon the filing of a bond; the Resolution dated March 22, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95956
or are hereby AFFIRMED.
○ (2) after the lapse of the redemption period, without need of a bond.
Within the one-year redemption period, a purchaser in a foreclosure
sale may apply for a writ of possession by filing a petition in the form
of an ex-parte motion under oath for that purpose.
● Upon the filing of such motion with the RTC having jurisdiction over the
subject property and the approval of the corresponding bond, the law, also in
express terms, directs the court to issue the order for a writ of possession.

6. CA denied the Sps Co's appeal and ruled that BPI is entitled to the writ of possession.
BPI VS. CO Sps. Co's MR denied. Sps Co elevated the case to the SC through petition for review on
(*Same as Co vs. BPI - next assigned case) certiorari. Sps Co argue that the foreclosure is void because of the pending corporate
rehabilitation proceedings and the stay order issued in connection therewith.
Petitioner/s: BPI
Respondent/s: Sps, John and Evelyn Co; Jupiter Real Estate Ventures
ISSUES:
1. Was the writ of possession was validly issued-- YES
Doctrine:
2. Is ordinary appeal the proper remedy to question an order granting a writ of
1. Upon expiration of the redemption period under Act 3135, a writ
possession?-- YES
of possession may be issued in favor of the purchaser even without
3. Is Act No. 3135 unconstitutional on due process grounds because it allows ex parte
the posting of a bond.
issuance of writ of possession?-- NO
2. Appeal is the proper remedy to question an order granting a writ
of possession.
RATIO
3. The ex parte issuance of a writ of possession under Act 3135 does
not violate the due process clause because the writ of possession
Issue 1:
proceedings is non-litigious authorized under Act 3135.
1. Under Sec. 7 of Act 3135, a writ of possession may be issued in favor of the purchaser
FACTS: in the foreclosure proceedings during the redemption period, upon posting of
appropriate bond. Upon expiration of the redemption period, the right of the purchaser
1. Jupiter Real Estate Ventures and Sps. Co obtained a loan from Far East Bank and to the possession of the foreclosed property becomes absolute. This right to possession
Trust Company (now BPI) for Php 9.4 million. To secure the loans, Jupiter and Sps. Co is based on the purchaser’s ownership of the property.54 In like manner, the mere filing
mortgaged 8 parcels of land. of an ex parte motion for the issuance of the writ of possession would suffice and the
filing of a bond is no longer necessary. This is because possession has become the
2. Jupiter and Sps. Co defaulted. BPI foreclosed. After the lapse of redemption period, absolute right of the purchaser as the confirmed owner.
BPI consolidated ownership and new titles were issued in its name.
2.The mere pendency of a petition for corporate rehabilitation and the issuance of a
3. Sps. Co filed an action to nullify the foreclosure. BPI, on the other hand, filed a stay order do not and cannot enjoin the courts from the enforcement of claims. A stay
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession. Sps. Co moved to consolidate the two order or the suspension of the enforcement of all claims against the corporation shall
cases but it was denied. MR denied. commence only from the time the rehabilitation receiver is appointed and a stay order
is issued.
4. Later, Jupiter filed a petition for corporate rehabilitation. Sps Co and Jupiter
moved to suspend the writ of possession proceedings, arguing that a stay order was In this case, the auction sale on July 12, 2000, the registration and annotation of the
issued (in connection with the rehabilitation proceedings) which covers the properties certificate of sale on August 22, 2000 and the issuance of new titles in favor of BPI in
subject of the real estate mortgage. Sps Co and Jupiter further alleged that because of 2001 as well as the petition for issuance of the writ of possession were all completed
the Stay Order, the writ of possession may not be issued. before the filing of the petition for rehabilitation and the issuance of the stay order in
September 2003. Thus, after the redemption period expired without respondent
5. RTC issued the writ of possession to BPI. Sps Co filed a notice of appeal to question redeeming the foreclosed property, BPI became the absolute owner of the property and
the issuance of the writ of possession. RTC granted the notice of appeal and ordered it was within its right to move for the consolidation of title and the issuance of new title
that the case be elevated to the CA. BPI filed a petition for certiorari, arguing that the in its name as a consequence of ownership; thus, it is entitled to the possession and
order granting the writ of possession cannot be appealed because it is an interlocutory enjoyment of the property
order (hence the proper remedy is certiorari under Rule 65) and the proceedings was
ex parte. BPI also argued that as the registered owner, it has the right to immediate Issue 2 (Appeal is the proper remedy)
possession. 1. it is the ministerial duty of the trial court to issue a writ of possession in favor of the
purchaser who has already consolidated its title. After the consolidation of title in the
buyer’s name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the writ of possession DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED for lack of merit. The
becomes a matter of right. Its issuance to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure orders of the R TC Br. 196 dated December 15, 2005 and January 13, 2006 assailed in
sale is merely a ministerial function. The trial court has no discretion on this matter. G.R. No. 171172, as well as the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated June 27,
Hence, any assertion of discretion in connection with such issuance is misplaced, and 2011 and its Resolution dated January 9, 2012 assailed in G.R. No. 200061 are hereby
a petition for certiorari is not a proper remedy. The order for the issuance of a writ of AFFIRMED. The sheriff of the RTC Br. 196 is ordered to PROCEED with the
possession being final, it is a proper subject for appeal. implementation of the writ of possession without prejudice to the outcome of Civil Case
No. 02-0331.
2. The court, however, clarified that that this remedy of appeal is different from the SO ORDERED
remedy provided in Section 829 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118. Upon the
lapse of the redemption period without the debtor exercising his right of redemption
and the purchaser consolidates his title, it becomes unnecessary to require the
purchaser to assume actual possession thereof before the debtor may contest it.
Possession of the land becomes an absolute right of the purchaser, as this is merely an
incident of his ownership. In fact, the issuance of the writ of possession at this point
becomes ministerial for the court. The debtor contesting the purchaser’s possession
may no longer avail of the remedy under Section 8 of Act No. 3135, but should pursue
a separate action e.g., action for recovery of ownership, for annulment of mortgage
and/or annulment of foreclosure
Issue 3:
1. An ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession under Section 7 of Act No.
3135 is not, strictly speaking, a "judicial process" as contemplated in Article 433 of the
Civil Code. It is a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one’s right of possession as
purchaser in a foreclosure sale. It is not an ordinary suit filed in court, by which one
party "sues another for the enforcement of a wrong or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong." It is a non-litigious proceeding authorized in an
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage pursuant to Act No. 3135, as amended, and is
brought for the benefit of one party only, and without notice to, or consent by any
person adversely interested. It is a proceeding where the relief is granted without
requiring an opportunity for the person against whom the relief is sought to be heard.
No notice is needed to be served upon persons interested in the subject property.
29SECTION 8: The debtor may, in the proceedings in which possession was complaint of the debtor justified, it shall dispose in his favor of all or part of the bond
requested, but not later than thirty days after the purchaser was given possession, furnished by the person who obtained possession. Either of the parties may appeal
petition that the sale be set aside and the writ of possession cancelled, specifying the from the order of the judge in accordance with section fourteen of Act Numbered Four
damages suffered by him, because the mortgage was not violated or the sale was not hundred and ninety-six; but the order of possession shall continue in effect during the
made in accordance with the provisions hereof, and the court shall take cognizance of pendency of the appeal.
this petition in accordance with the summary procedure provided for in section one
hundred and twelve of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six; and if it finds the
DBP VS. SPOUSES GATAL SECTION 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period; by
whom executed or given. If no redemption be made within one (1) year from the date
Petitioner/s: DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
of the registration of the certificate of sale, the purchaser is entitled to a conveyance and
Respondent/s: SPOUSES WILFREDO GATAL and AZUCENA GATAL
possession of the property; x x x.
Doctrine: The pendency of a separate civil suit questioning the validity of
Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be
the sale of the mortgaged property cannot bar the issuance of the writ of
substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor
possession, since its issuance becomes a ministerial duty on the part of the
to the property as of the time of the levy. The possession of the property shall be given
court once title has been consolidated in the mortgagee.
to the purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually
holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor.
Facts: Spouses Wilfredo and Azucena Gatal, respondents, obtained a loan from the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), petitioner, secured by a real estate Once a mortgaged estate is extrajudicially sold, and is not redeemed within the
mortgage over a commercial in Tagbilaran City. reglementary period, no separate and independent action is necessary to obtain
● For failure of respondents to pay their loan, petitioner foreclosed the mortgage possession of the property. The purchaser at the public auction has only to file a petition
in and in 1996, the title of the lot was consolidated in the name of petitioner for issuance of a writ of possession pursuant to Section 33 of Rule 39 of the Rules of
DBP. Court.
DBP then offered the property for negotiated sale on condition that the buyer must pay To give effect to the right of possession, the purchaser must invoke the aid of the court
20% of the selling price as down payment, the balance payable under the terms of the and ask for a writ or possession without need of bringing a separate independent suit
interested buyer. for this purpose.
● Respondents Sps Gatal submitted their bid in the amount of P2,160,000.00
and made a deposit equivalent to 10% of the bid price. Records show that title to the property has been consolidated to petitioner DBP. Thus,
● However, another buyer, Jimmy Torrefranca, offered a bid of P2,300,000.00, its petition for a writ of possession is in order.
higher than respondents’ bid. Upon learning of Torrefrancas offer,
respondents wrote petitioner requesting that they will match his bid. But Obviously, the RTC (Branch 47) erred when it granted respondents motion to dismiss
petitioner rejected respondents request because Torrefranca was already and recalled the writ of possession it earlier issued. Where, as here, the title is
declared the preferred bidder. consolidated in the name of the mortgagee, the writ of possession becomes a matter
of right on the part of the mortgagee, and it is a ministerial duty on the part of the
Thus, Sps Gatal filed a complaint for injunction with the RTC, seeking to annul the sale trial court to issue the same. The pendency of a separate civil suit questioning the
to TorreFranca. validity of the sale of the mortgaged property cannot bar the issuance of the writ of
possession. The rule equally applies to separate civil suits questioning the validity of
In the meantime, DBP filed with a different branch of RTC a petition for issuance of a the mortgage or its foreclosure and the validity of the public auction sale.
writ of possession. The RTC initially granted the petition, but later dismissed on the
same upon motion of Sps Gatal, on the ground of litis pendencia due to the pendency Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
of DBP’s complaint for injunction. Appeals dated January 18, 1999 and its Resolution dated April 27, 1999 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 47736 are REVERSED.
Issue: WON the RTC erred in dismissing DBP’s petition on the ground of litis pendencia
--- YES. No litis pendencia. More importantly, DBP is entitled to the writ of possession
as a matter of right.
Ratio:
The rights asserted and the reliefs sought by the parties in both cases are not identical.
Thus, respondents claim of litis pendentia is unavailing.
Section 33, Rule 39 of the same Rules provides:
SPS. DATO VS. BANK OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS The lot was sold at a public auction held on August 9, 1993, with BPI as the
sole bidder in the amount of ₱10,060,080.20. The certificate of sale was issued
Petitioner/s: SPOUSES PIO DATO and SONIA Y. SIA, on August 10, 1993 upon payment of all the required registration fees.
Respondent/s: BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
 In the course of the trial proceedings, Spouses Sia alleged that they discovered
that the document embodying the cancellation of the real estate mortgage
Doctrine: The pending suit questioning the validity of the extrajudicial presented by BPI (over the four lots previously released by BPI for the Credit
foreclosure of mortgage does not entitle the Mortgagor to a suspension of Line Agreement Facility), stated the following:
the issuance of writ of possession in favor of the Mortgagee. o [T]he consideration for this cancellation being the full and complete
payment made by the said debtor/s- mortgagor/s to the creditor-
mortgagee of the obligation secured thereby in the principal amount
Facts: of FIVE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND ONLY PESOS
 Petitioner Spouses Pio Dato and Sonia Sia applied for a P240,000 loan from ([P]5,700,000.00) Philippine Currency, together with the
BPI with a term of six months secured by a REM over a parcel of land in corresponding interest thereon up to this date.
Labangon Cebu, which was owned by the Spouses.The Spouses also availed of  Spouses Sia thereafter amended their complaint claiming that the bank
a P4M Revolving Promissory Note Line with a term of one year, secured by inserted and annotated a falsified/illegal Real Estate Mortgage of ₱5.7 Million,
the same REM over the same property. purportedly availed of by Spouses Sia. They alleged that the foreclosed
 Spouses Sia alleged that their loan was "precipitated by the representation of property never intended to secure a fabricated and falsified loan of
the [BPI] that the same will be indorsed to [Industrial Guarantee and Loan P5,700,000 or for any loan by whomever accommodated by BPI using their
Fund] (IGLF) [in order] for the spouses to be able to avail of a much lower collaterals.
interest rate and longer payment terms."  Lastly, the spouses claimed extinguishment of their obligation. They alleged
 Before the maturity of the two loans, the Spouses approached a branch officer that as BPI credited the payment of ₱5.7 Million to their account, which is
of BPI (Mona Padilla) for additional loans. One was for ₱2 Million, and more than sufficient to cover their promissory notes of ₱240,000.00 and ₱4
another was for ₱2.8 Million. After some discussion with Padilla, Spouses Sia Million, their obligation with the BPI was totally extinguished as of August 5,
agreed to obtain a Credit Facility of ₱5.7 Million using the same collaterals 1991 and that the foreclosure proceedings on TCT No. 102343 is illegal and
baseless for they have the right as of August 5, 1991 to secure full release of
offered in their previous loans and four additional parcels of land. Thereafter,
said lot by such payment of ₱5.7 Million
the Spouses obtained P800,000 from their Credit Facility of P5.7M which was
credited to their current account with BPI after executing a Promissory Note.  During the pendency of the instant case, the one-year redemption period had
 The Spouses paid some of the interest on their loans but the amount was lapsed without Spouses Sia exercising their right to redeem the subject
insufficient to cover the principal amount of thr loans. property. Thus on January 27, 1995, BPI filed a supplemental answer with
counterclaim, alleging therein that with the expiration of the period of
 On February 13, 1991, Padilla sent a written reminder to Spouses Sia to settle redemption, BPI is entitled to a writ of possession over foreclosed property
all unpaid interest before February 22, 1991. Yet the spouses failed to pay the and the occupancy of Spouses Sia on the foreclosed property entitles BPI to a
same. Another demand letter was sent but the Spouses still failed to pay the reasonable compensation which is conservatively pegged at ₱10,000.00 per
principal amount of P, 240, 000, exclusive of interest, penalties and other month from the date of the issuance of the certificate of sale in favor of BPI.
charges. But the amount of ₱800,000.00 from the ₱5.7 Million Credit Facility
was paid through a Letter of Credit.  After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of BPI and declared the August 8, 1993
extrajudicial foreclosure sale as valid and binding and the BPI is now the
 As the ₱240,000.00 and ₱4 Million loans of Spouses Sia were not yet settled, absolute and legal owner of the foreclosed lot including the residential house
BPI cancelled the ₱5.7 Million Credit facility. and all improvements thereon.
 To facilitate and assist Spouses Sia in paying off their loans, the four lots which o The RTC found that "there is no logical and valid reason to support
secured the ₱5.7 Million Credit Line Facility were released. Spouses Sia the allegations in the complaint for Breach of Contract, Rescission
agreed to sell the lots and use the proceeds thereof to make partial payments and Cancellation of Contract with Damages."
of their loans. o The RTC also found that BPI could not be held guilty of delay in
 Despite the cancellation of the real estate mortgage, Spouses Sia failed to make endorsing the loan to IGLF because BPI, through Padilla, never
good their promise to sell the lots. committed itself to make such endorsement.
 After receiving another demand letter, the Spouses still failed to pay the o As regards the testimony of petitioner Pio that the real estate
principal, interest and penalty charges. mortgage covering the ₱5.7 Million credit facility was falsified, the
 Spouses Sia failed to pay notwithstanding the numerous demands made by RTC also found no legal and factual basis therein because petitioner
BPI, leading to the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage over Pio admitted the authenticity of their signatures appearing on the
the land which secured Spouses Sia’s Loans of P240,000 and P4 million.
Promissory Notes and Real Estate Mortgages evidencing the various  It is settled [that] the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner
loans and credit facility from BPI. of the property purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of one year
o It is a mistaken notion of [Spouses Sia] that the cancellation of Real after the registration of the sale. As such, he is entitled to the possession of the
Estate Mortgage presupposed an alleged payment made by a third property and can demand it at any time following the consolidation of
person to [BPI] of the sum of ₱5.7 Million. There is no iota of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of
evidence establishing any payment in the sum of ₱5.7 Million from title.
[Spouses Sia] or from any third persons to [BPI] to settle any account
of [Spouses Sia]. The cancellation of mortgage refers only to the Real
Estate Mortgage covering the Credit Facility.
 On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling except the award to BPI of
compensatory and exemplary damages.
 Pending the resolution of this case, the Spouses filed an Urgent Motion for
Issuance of TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction alleging that the RTC
already ordered the issuance of a Writ of Possession over the foreclosed
property in favor of BPI
Issue: Was the August 8, 1993 extrajudicial foreclosure valid and binding?
– YES.
Ratio:
 BPI did not commit Breach of contract. Petitioner Pio admitted the execution
and genuineness of the notarized contract of real estate mortgage and
promissory note, including the signature of Spouses Sia on the letter of advice
to signify their conformity with the terms and conditions during his oral
testimony
 There is no legal issue as regards to the cancellation of the P5.7M Credit Line
Facility
o Initially, Spouses Sia insisted that the foreclosure of their real estate
mortgage was premature because BPI violated their agreement to
have their loan endorsed to IGLF. Thereafter, Spouses Sia changed
their stance and insisted that there was no Credit Line Facility
agreement of ₱5.7 Million. Spouses Sia further alleged that it was the
banking officers of BPI who borrowed the ₱5.7 Million and who
prepared the Cancellation of the Real Estate Mortgage. But the
cancellation was credited in favor of Spouses Sia.
o The contention of the Spouses is untenable. It is clear in their
contract with BPI that BPI has the right at its election to foreclose the
mortgage should the Spouses fail or refuse to pay any of the amount
secured by the mortgage
o In any case, the extrajudicial foreclosure which is the subject of the
present case pertains to Spouses Sia’s failure to pay their
₱240,000.00 and ₱4 Million loans.
o It is a settled rule of law that foreclosure is proper when the debtors
are in default of the payment of their obligation. Their failure to pay
the loans covered by two Promissory Notes, the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the REM is valid and binding as against them.
 Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction must be denied. The
pending suit questioning the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage does not entitle Spouses Sia to a suspension of the issuance of writ
of possession.
VILLANUEVA VS. CHERDAN LENDING INVESTORS CORPORATION ● Cherdan instituted a special civil action for certiorari before the CA, praying
that the RTC be directed to issue a writ of possession
Petitioner/s: EMMANUEL C. VILLANUEVA
○ CA held that the pendency of the case for annulment of the
Respondent/s: CHERDAN LENDING INVESTORS CORPORATION
foreclosure proceedings was not a bar to the issuance of the writ of
possession. CA granted the petition.
Doctrine: Unlike a judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage under Rule
Issue:
68 of the Rules of Court where an action for foreclosure is filed before the
● Whether or not it was proper to issue the writ of possession over the property
RTC, any property brought within the ambit of Act 3135 is foreclosed by the
- NOOO
filing of a petition with the office of the sheriff of the province where the
Ratio:
sale is to be made. As such, a third person in possession of an extrajudicially
● A writ of possession may be issued in an extrajudicial foreclosure of a real
foreclosed property, who claims a right superior to that of the original
estate mortgage under Section 7 of Act 3135 either
mortgagor, is given no opportunity to be heard on his claim. Such third
○ within the one-year redemption period, upon the filing of a bond, or
person may not be dispossessed on the strength of a mere ex parte
○ after the lapse of the redemption period, without need of a bond or
possessory writ, since to do so would be tantamount to his summary
of a separate and independent action.
ejectment, in violation of the basic tenets of due process.
● The buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property
purchased if it is not redeemed within one year after the registration of the
Facts: sale.
● Spouses Fortunato and Rachel Peñaredondo (Sps Peñaredondo) obtained ● It is ministerial upon the court to issue a writ of possession after the
from Cherdan Lending Investors Corporation a loan amounting to P2.2 foreclosure sale and during the period of redemption.
million, secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land ● HOWEVER, under Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the possession
● Despite demand, spouses Peñaredondo failed to pay the obligation. of the mortgaged property may be awarded to a purchaser in the extrajudicial
● Cherdan extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. Cherdan was declared foreclosure unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to
as the highest bidder. A Certificate of Sale was issued and was later registered. the judgment debtor
● Upon the expiration of the redemption period, the title to the property was ● The obligation of the court to issue an ex parte writ of possession in favor of
consolidated and a new title was issued in Cherdan's name. the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial once
● On September 28, 2001, Cherdan filed before the RTC of Parañaque City, it appears that there is a third party in possession of the property who is
Branch 258, an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession claiming a right adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor.
○ RTC granted the petition ● Article 433 of the Civil Code provides:
● Emmanuel C. Villanueva moved for the reconsideration of the order and the ○ Actual possession under claim of ownership raises disputable
setting aside of the writ of possession on the ground that he is the owner and presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial
is in actual possession of the subject property. process for the recovery of the property.
● Sps Peñaredondo also filed a separate Motion to Quash the Writ of Possession ● One who claims to be the owner of a property possessed by another must bring
on two grounds: the appropriate judicial action for its physical recovery. The "judicial process"
○ that there was a pending civil case for the declaration of nullity of could mean no less than an ejectment suit or a reivindicatoria action, in which
mortgage the ownership claims of the contending parties may be properly heard and
○ that a third party is in adverse possession of the property. adjudicated.
● RTC ruled: ● The ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession filed by Cherdan
○ Motion to Set Aside Writ of Possession is GRANTED and the movant is not the kind of judicial process contemplated in Article 433 of the Civil Code.
is allowed to be in possession of the subject property until after the Dispositive WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
pending case/s has/have been resolved. GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated October 31, 2006 and Resolution
● The RTC of Parañaque City dismissed the pending Civil Case for Declaration dated May 10, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 89910 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
of Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage filed by Fortunato Peñaredondo against Orders dated December 20, 2004 and March 8, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court,
Cherdan. Parañaque City, Branch 258 in LRC Case No. 01-0123, are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
MARQUEZ VS. ALINDOG  The sale to the Sps. Alindog was never registered, hence not binding
upon them (Sps. Marquez).
Petitioner/s: Sps. Nicasio and Anita Marquez
Respondent/s: Sps. Carlito and Carmen Alindog  The TCT in their favor was already indefeasible hence cannot be
attacked collaterally.
6. In the meantime, Anita Marquez filed an ex-parte petition for the
Doctrines: issuance of a writ of possession before the RTC.
 Claiming that it is ministerial on the part of the Court following the
1. The phrase unless a third party is actually holding the property consolidation of the title in their name.
by adverse title or right under the Rules, contemplates a situation 7. The RTC granted Anita Marquez’ ex-parte petition.
in which a third party holds the property by adverse title or right,  Directed the issuance of a writ of possession in her favor.
such as that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary. The co-owner, 8. The Sps. Marquez then sought the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of
agricultural tenant, and usufructuary possess the property in their preliminary injunction.
own right, and they are not merely the successor or
 This was granted by the RTC.
transferee of the right of possession of another co-owner or
o Enjoining the Sps. Marquez from taking possession until
the owner of the property.
the controversy has been fully resolved on the merits,
notwithstanding the consolidation of title in the name of the
2. The purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale is entitled to the Sps. Marquez.
possession of the property and can demand that he be placed in possession  Based on the evidence presented by the Sps.
either during the redemption period (with bond) or after the expiration of Alindog that they appear to have a right to be
the redemption period (without bond). A writ of possession applied for by protected and that further dispossession will cause
such purchaser should issue as a matter of right. It is a ministerial duty on them irreparable injury.
the part of the Court. 9. The MR of the Sps. Marquez was denied. On elevation of the case to the CA
through certiorari (R65), the CA denied the petition, finding no GADLEJ.
 Observed that Sps. Alindog had indeed "adduced prima facie proof
of their right to possess the subject property" while the annulment
Facts:
case was pending,
1. Anita Marquez extended a loan to Benjamin Gutierrez.
o That the latter's "right to remain in possession" proceeds
 As security, Gutierrez executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage from the fact of the subject property's earlier sale to them.
o Over a land located in Tagaytay, registered under the name
 Thus, while Sps. Marquez concededly had a right to possess the
of Sps. Gutierrez.
subject property on account of the consolidation of the title in their
2. Gutierrez defaulted in the payment of his loan.
names, the CA nonetheless found no fault on the part of the RTC for
 Hence Anita Marquez sought the extra-judicial forclosure of the "proceeding with caution" in weighing the conflicting claims of the
property. parties and subsequently issuing the writ of preliminary injunction
 Anita Marquez was the highest bidder. in Sps. Alindog's favor.
3. The Title of the property was consolidated in the name of the Sps. Marquez
 But there was an annotation of adverse claim by the Sps. Issue:
Alindog. WoN CA erred in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it
4. The Sps. Alindog filed a civil case for annulment of real estate mortgage issued the injunctive writ which enjoined Sps. Marquez from taking possession of the
and certificate of sale against Sps. Marquez and a certain Gonzales. subject property. --YES.
 Alleging that they purchased the property from Gutierrez
 But Gonzales, to whom they entrusted the task of securing a Title,
failed to do so and even deceived them that it was already being Ratio:
processed. 1. The purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale is entitled to the possession
 Eventually they found out that the property had been mortgaged to of the property and can demand that he be placed in possession either during
the Sps. Marquez. the redemption period (with bond) or after the expiration of the redemption
period (without bond).
 They tried to contact Gonzales but she never answered. 2. A writ of possession applied for by such purchaser should issue as a matter
5. Sps. Marquez interposed the ff. Defenses:
of right. It is a ministerial duty on the part of the Court.

3. The procedure for extrajudicial foreclosure sale of REM is governed by Act No. as well as the Orders dated November 14, 2005 and January 17, 2007 of the Regional
3135. Trial Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18 in SCA No. TG-05-2521 are hereby
 Which expressly provides that the purchaser at the public auction REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the writ of preliminary injunction in SCA
sale of an extrajudicially foreclosed real property may seek No. TG-05-2521 is NULLIFIED, while the Writ of Possession in LRC Case No. TG-05-
possession thereof and the CFI shall give him possession during the 1068 is REINSTATED.
redemption period (with bond). SO ORDERED.
o That upon approval of the bond, the Court shall order that
a writ of possession shall be executed immediately.
4. The ministerial issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale, however, admits of an exception.
a. Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (Rules) pertinently provides that
 The possession of the mortgaged property may be awarded
to a purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure
o unless a third party is actually holding the
property by adverse title or right.
b. In the recent case of Rural Bank of Sta. Barbara (Iloilo), Inc. v.
Centeno, citing the case of China Banking Corp. , the Court illumined
that "the phrase 'a third party who is actually holding the property
adversely to the judgment obligor'
 Contemplates a situation in which a third party
holds the property by adverse title or right,
o such as that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary.
The co-owner, agricultural tenant, and
usufructuary possess the property in their own
right,
 and they are not merely the successor or transferee
of the right of possession of another co-owner or
the owner of the property.
 Notably, the property should not only be possessed
by a third party, but also held by the third party
adversely to the judgment obligor."
 In other words, the third person must therefore claim a
right superior to that of the original mortgagor.
5. In this case, it is clear that the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of Sps.
Marquez, who had already consolidated their title over the extra-judicially foreclosed
property, is merely ministerial in nature.
 The general rule as herein stated — and not the exception found
under Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules — should apply since Sps.
Alindog hinged their claim over the subject property on their
purported purchase of the same from its previous owner,
i.e., Sps. Gutierrez (with Gutierrez being the original mortgagor).
 Accordingly, it cannot be seriously doubted that Sps. Alindog are
only the latter's (Sps. Gutierrez) successors-in-interest
who do not have a right superior to them.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 29, 2008
and Resolution dated August 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97744,
HEIRS OF MAGLASANG V. MANILA BANKING CORP 7. During the pendency of the intestate proceedings, Edgar and Oscar were able
to obtain several loans from respondent, secured by promissory notes which they
Petitioner: Heirs of Maglasang
signed.
Respondents: Manila Banking Corp
8. The probate court terminated the proceedings with the surviving heirs
executing an extra-judicial partition of the properties of Flaviano's estate. The loan
DOCTRINE: Section 7, Rule 86 governs the parameters and the extent to
obligations owed by the estate to respondent, however, remained unsatisfied due to
which a claim may be advanced against the estate, whereas Act No. 3135
respondent's certification that Flaviano's account was undergoing a restructuring.
sets out the specific procedure to be followed when the creditor
9. Nonetheless, the probate court expressly recognized the rights of respondent
subsequently chooses the third option.
under the mortgage and promissory notes executed by the Sps. Maglasang, specifically,
its "right to foreclose the same within the statutory period."
In this case, respondent sought to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage of
10. Respondent proceeded to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage covering the Sps.
the properties previously belonging to Sps. Maglasang (and now, their
Maglasang's properties and emerged as the highest bidder at the public auction for the
estates) and, therefore, availed of the third option. Lest it be
amount of P350,000.00.
misunderstood, it did not exercise the first option of directly filing a claim
11. There remained a deficiency on Sps Maglasang's obligation to respondent.
against the estate, as petitioners assert, since it merely notified the probate
12. Thus, on June 24, 1981, respondent filed a suit to recover the deficiency amount of
court of the outstanding amount of its claim against the estate of Flaviano
P250,601.05 as of May 31, 1981 against the estate of Flaviano, his widow Salud and
and that it was currently restructuring the account.
petitioners,
13. RTC: found that it was shown, by a preponderance of evidence, that petitioners,
Thus, having unequivocally opted to exercise the third option of extra-
after the extra-judicial foreclosure of all the properties mortgaged, still have an
judicial foreclosure under Section 7, Rule 86, respondent is now precluded
outstanding obligation in the amount and as of the date as above-stated.
from filing a suit to recover any deficiency amount as earlier discussed.
14. CA: At the outset, it pointed out that the probate court erred when it, through the
December 14, 1978 Order, closed and terminated the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 1604-
FACTS: 0 without first satisfying the claims of the creditors of the estate — in particular,
1. Spouses Flaviano and Salud Maglasang (Sps. Maglasang) obtained a credit respondent — in violation of Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules.
line from respondent in the amount of P350,000.00 which was secured by a real estate 15. CA held that Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules does not apply to the present case since
mortgage executed over seven of their properties located in Ormoc City and the the same does not involve a mortgage made by the administrator over any property
Municipality of Kananga, Province of Leyte. belonging to the estate of the decedent. According to the CA, what should apply is Act
2. They availed of their credit line by securing loans in the amounts of No. 3135 33 which entitles respondent to claim the deficiency amount after the extra-
P209,790.50 and P139,805.83 on October 24, 1975 and March 15, 1976, respectively, 9 judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage of Sps. Maglasang's properties.
both of which becoming due and demandable within a period of one year. ISSUE/S:
3. Flaviano died intestate on February 14, 1977, his widow Salud Maglasang 1. W/N Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules which applies in this case. YES
(Salud) and their surviving children and appointed their brother petitioner Edgar RATIO:
Maglasang (Edgar) as their attorney-in-fact. 1. Claims against deceased persons should be filed during the settlement
4. Edgar filed a verified petition for letters of administration of the intestate proceedings of their estate.
estate of Flaviano before the then Court of First Instance of Leyte, Ormoc City, Branch 2. Such proceedings are primarily governed by special rules found under Rules
5 (probate court) 73 to 90 of the Rules, although rules governing ordinary actions may, as far as
5. In view of the issuance of letters of administration, the probate court, on practicable, apply suppletorily.
August 30, 1977, issued a Notice to Creditors for the filing of money claims against 3. Among these special rules, Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules (Section 7, Rule 86)
Flaviano's estate. provides the rule in dealing with secured claims against the estate.
6. Accordingly, as one of the creditors of Flaviano, respondent notified 17 the 4. As the foregoing generally speaks of "[a] creditor holding a claim against the
probate court of its claim in the amount of P382,753.19 as of October 11, 1978, exclusive deceased secured by a mortgage or other collateral security" as above-highlighted, it
of interests and charges. may be reasonably concluded that the aforementioned section covers all secured
claims, whether by mortgage or any other form of collateral, which a creditor may
enforce against the estate of the deceased debtor.
5. On the contrary, nowhere from its language can it be fairly deducible that the
said section would — as the CA interpreted — narrowly apply only to mortgages made
by the administrator over any property belonging to the estate of the decedent.
6. To note, mortgages of estate property executed by the administrator, are also
governed by Rule 89 of the Rules, captioned as "Sales, Mortgages, and Other
Encumbrances of Property of Decedent."
7. Jurisprudence breaks down the rule under Section 7, Rule 86 and explains
that the secured creditor has three remedies/options that he may alternatively adopt
for the satisfaction of his indebtedness. In particular, he may choose to:
a. waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor
as an ordinary claim;
b. foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove the deficiency as an ordinary
claim; and
c. rely on the mortgage exclusively, or other security and foreclose the same
before it is barred by prescription, without the right to file a claim for any deficiency.
8. These remedies are distinct, independent and mutually exclusive from each other;
thus, the election of one effectively bars the exercise of the others.
9. Anent the third remedy, it must be mentioned that the same includes the option of
extra-judicially foreclosing the mortgage under Act No. 3135, as availed of by
respondent in this case.
10. However, the plain result of adopting the last mode of foreclosure is that the
creditor waives his right to recover any deficiency from the estate.
11. Court observes that the operation of Act No. 3135 does not entirely discount the
application of Section 7, Rule 86, or vice-versa. Rather, the two complement each other
within their respective spheres of operation.
12. SEC 7. Rule 86: lays down the options for the secured creditor to claim against the
estate and, according to jurisprudence, the availment of the third option bars him from
claiming any deficiency amount.
13. Act No. 3135: after the third option is chosen, the procedure governing the manner
in which the extra-judicial foreclosure should proceed would still be governed by this
provision.
14. Section 7, Rule 86 governs the parameters and the extent to which a claim may be
advanced against the estate, whereas Act No. 3135 sets out the specific procedure to be
followed when the creditor subsequently chooses the third option.
15. In this case, respondent sought to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage of the
properties previously belonging to Sps. Maglasang (and now, their estates) and,
therefore, availed of the third option. Lest it be misunderstood, it did not exercise the
first option of directly filing a claim against the estate, as petitioners assert, since it
merely notified the probate court of the outstanding amount of its claim against the
estate of Flaviano and that it was currently restructuring the account.
16. Thus, having unequivocally opted to exercise the third option of extra-judicial
foreclosure under Section 7, Rule 86, respondent is now precluded from filing a suit to
recover any deficiency amount as earlier discussed.

● In their Answer, the Defendants-Appellants averred that they do not object to
TABASONDRA VS. CONSTANTINO a partition provided that the same should be made only with respect to
Cornelio's share.
Petitioner/s: ARSENIO TABASONDRA, et. al.
● They contended that they already own the shares of Valentina and Valeriana
in the subject land by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale that the said sisters
Respondent/s: SPOUSES CONRADO CONSTANTINO AND TARCILA
executed in their favour.
TABASONDRA-CONSTANTINO, et. al.
● RTC: Ruled in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the partition of the three (3)
parcels of land covered by TCT No. 16012 among the compulsory and legal
Doctrine:
heirs of Cornelio, Valentina, and Valeriana, all surnamed Tabasondra.
If actual partition of property is made, the judgment shall state definitely,
● CA: Affirmed the RTC with modification in that the partition and the
by metes and bounds and adequate description, the particular portion of
accounting is ordered to be made only with respect to a 33,450.66 sq.m.
the real estate assigned to each party, and the effect of the judgment shall
portion of the property.
be to vest in each party to the action in severalty the portion of the real
estate assigned to him
Issue:
● W/N the CA correctly ordered the partition and accounting with respect to
Facts: only 33,450.66 square meters of the property registered under TCT No. 10612.
● The parties herein were the children of the late Cornelio Tabasondra from two – YES.
marriages.
● The respondents Tarcila Tabasondra-Constantino and the late Sebastian Ratio:
Tabasondra were the children of Cornelio by his first wife, Severina; ● There is no question that the total area of the three lots owned in common by
● The petitioners, namely: Arsenio Tabasondra, Fernando Tabasondra, Cornelio, Valentina and Valeriana was 100,352 square meters; and that each
Cornelio Tabasondra, Jr., Mirasol Tabasondra-Mariano, Fausta Tabasondra- of the co-owners had the right to 1/3 of such total area.
Tapacio, Myrasol Tabasondra-Romero, Marlene Tabasondra-Maniquil, and ● It was established that Valentina and Valeriana executed the Deed of Absolute
Guillermo Tabasondra, were children of Cornelio by his second wife, Sotera. Sale, whereby they specifically disposed of their shares in the property
● Valentina, and Valeriana, all surnamed Tabasondra, were siblings. registered under TCT No. 10612 in favor of Sebastian Tabasondra and Tarcila
○ They were also the registered owners of the three (3) parcels of land Tabasondra.
located at Dalayap, Tarlac City, identified as: ● The Court upheld the right of Valentina and Valeriana to thereby alienate their
■ Lot No. 2536, containing an area 77,147 sq. m.; pro indiviso shares to Sebastian and Tarcila even without the knowledge or
■ Lot No. 3155, with an area of 13,659 sq. m.; and, consent of their co-owner Cornelio because the alienation covered the
■ Lot No. 3159, with an area of 9,546 sq. m., covered by TCT disposition of only their respective interests in the common property.
No. 106012. ● According to Article 493 of the Civil Code, each co-owner "shall have the
● Cornelio died, while Valentina and Valeriana both died single. full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and
● They all died intestate and without partitioning the property covered by TCT he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
No. 106012. person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved," but "the
● Thus, the Plaintiffs-Appellees and the Defendants-Appellants, as descendants effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall
of Cornelio, possessed and occupied the property. be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
● The Plaintiffs-Appellees filed the complaint below against the Defendants- termination of the co-ownership."
Appellant claiming that the parcels of land are owned in common by them and ○ Hence, the petitioners as the successors-in-interest of Cornelio could
the Defendants-Appellants but the latter does not give them any share in the not validly assail the alienation by Valentina and Valeriana of their
fruits thereof. shares in favor of the respondents.
● Hence, they asked for partition but the Defendants-Appellants refused ● The SC affirmed the CA's ruling that there is no denying that the RTC erred in
without valid reasons. granting the complaint and ordering a partition without qualifying that such
should not include the shares previously pertaining to Valeria and Valentina.

○ Since the aggregate area of the subject property is 100,352 sq.m., it Dispositive
follows that Cornelio, Valentina, and Valeriana each has a share WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS WITH MODIFICATION the decision of the
equivalent to 33,450.66 sq. m. portion thereof. Court of Appeals promulgated on November 30, 2010 in CA-G.R. CV No. 92920 in that
● Accordingly, when Valentina and Valeriana sold their shares, the Defendants- the accounting is to be made only with respect to the fruits of the one-third portion of
Appellants became co-owners with Cornelio. the property still under the co-ownership of all the parties; REMANDS the case to the
● Perforce, upon Cornelia's death, the only area that his heirs, that is, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, in Tarlac City for further proceedings in accordance
Plaintiffs-Appellees and the Defendants-Appellants, are entitled to and which with •this decision, and to determine the technical metes and bounds and description
may be made subject of partition is only a thirty three thousand four hundred of the proper share of each co-owner of the property covered by Transfer Certificate of
fifty point sixty-six (33,450.66) sq.m. portion of the property. Title No. 10612, including the improvements thereon, in accordance with the Civil Code
● As a result of Valentina and Valeriana's alienation in favor of Sebastian and and Rule 69 of the Rules of Court; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
Tarcila of their pro indiviso shares in the 3 lots, Sebastian and Tarcila became
co-owners of the 100,352-square meter property with Cornelio (later on, with
the petitioners who were the successors-in-interest of Cornelio).
● In effect, Sebastian and Tarcila were co-owners of 2/3 of the property, with
each of them having one-third pro indiviso share in the three lots, while the
remaining one-third was co-owned by the heirs of Cornelio, namely,
Sebastian, Tarcila and the petitioners.
● Although the CA correctly identified the co-owners of the three lots, it did not
segregate the 100,352-square meter property into determinate portions
among the several co-owners. To do so, the CA should have followed the
manner set in Section 11, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, to wit
○ Section 11. The judgment and its effect; copy to be recorded in
registry of deeds. If actual partition of property is made, the
judgment shall state definitely, by metes and bounds and adequate
description, the particular portion of the real estate assigned to each
party, and the effect of the judgment shall be to vest in each party to
the action in severalty the portion of the real estate assigned to him.
xxxs (Bold emphasis supplied.)
● Accordingly, there is a need to remand the case to the court of origin for the
purpose of identifying and segregating, by metes and bounds, the specific
portions of the three lots assigned to the co-owners, and to effect the physical
partition of the property in the following proportions: Tarcila, 1/3; the heirs
of Sebastian, 1/3; and the petitioners (individually), along with Tarcila and the
heirs of Sebastian (collectively), 1/3.
○ That physical partition was required, but the RTC and the CA
uncharacteristically did not require it.
● Upon remand, therefore, the RTC should comply with the express terms of
Section 2, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
○ Should the parties be unable to agree on the partition, the next step
for the RTC will be to appoint not more than 3 competent and
disinterested persons as commissioners to make the partition, and to
command such commissioners to set off to each party in interest the
part and proportion of the property as directed in this decision.

QUILO VS. BAJAO o To abate losing litigants' attempt to defer and circumvent summary
ejectment proceedings, the rules mandate that decisions
Petitioner/s: Edgardo Quilo & Adnaloy Villahermosa involving ejectment cases are immediately executory.
Respondent/s: Teodula Bajao  The decision ordering Q&V to vacate must be immediately
executed, especially so without any substantial defense to
Doctrine: The decision ordering Q&V to vacate must be immediately oppose the ejectment order.
executed, especially so without any substantial defense to oppose the
Dispositive:
ejectment order.
Wherefore, the Petition is DENIED…
Facts: Notes:
 Bajao filed an Ejectment Complaint against Saclag, Flulong, Bertos  With regard to 5-year period, Bajao timely moved for execution on Aug 8,
(defendants). 2000.
o Nov 20, 1998 - MeTC: in favor of Bajao; RTC affirmed o Sec 6, Rule 39 - if the prevailing party fails to have the decision
o Sept 13, 1999 - became final and executory enforced after the lapse of 5 years, the judgment is reduced to a right
o CA denied appeal and MR. of action which must be enforced by institution of a complaint in a
o July 28, 2000 - SC denied petition and issued an Entry of Judgment. regular court within 10 years from the time the judgment becomes
final.
 Aug 8, 2000 - Bajao filed a Motion for Execution.
 Here, despite the timely motion to execute, it was not
o Oct 23, 2007 - Motion was acted upon by RTC by remanding the
implemented by the court.
records to the MeTC.
o Nov. 13, 2007 - MeTC granted (sa ruling lumabas na Bajao filed a  Proper remedy of Bajao was to file a complaint for revival of
second Motion for Execution on the same date). judgment and not another motion for execution.
o Nov 28, 2007 - MeTC issued a Writ of Execution.  In pursuit of equity justice, SC resolved to regard the second motion for
execution as a complaint for revival of judgment.
 Quilo and Villahermosa (Q&V) the MeTC.
o Q&V filed a motion to quash the writ stating that o Failure to execute was not Bajao’s fault as the delay in the execution
was caused by some reasons unknown.
 It was issued beyond the lapse of the 5-year period within
which to execute a judgment based on Sec 6, Rule 39
 Thus, Bajao’s second motion for execution was within the
10-year period.
 Property subject of the writ which is 2519 Granate St., Sta.
Ana, Manila is not the same property they are occupying:
2518 Granate St., San Andres Bukid, Manila
o MeTC denied.
Issue:
 W/N the MeTC committed grave abuse in denying Q&V’s motion to quash -
NO
Ratio:
 Ejectment cases are governed by Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Summary
Procedure (eto nakalagay sa case pero walang ganyan, Rules of CivPro
dapat).
o Its summary nature is designed to restore physical possession of a
real property to one who has been illegally or forcibly deprived
thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of the parties' opposing
claims in an expeditious and inexpensive manner.
o The court's jurisdiction is limited to the issue of physical or de facto
possession; hence, adjudications made on questions of ownership
are provisional.

BALIBAGO FAITH BAPTIST CHURCH VS. FAITH IN CHRIST 4. While plaintiff BFBC was in possession of the subject premises, defendant Reynaldo
Galvan and his companions joined the regular religious services of plaintiff BFBC at the
Petitioner/s: Balibago Faith Baptist Church Inc., Philippine Baptist S.B.C,
subject premises;
Inc.
5. It turned out that defendants have an interest in the subject premises and defendant
Respondent/s: Faith in Christ Jesus Baptist Church, Inc., Reynaldo Galvan
Reynaldo Galvan formed and incorporated the defendant FCJBC and took control of
the subject premises;
Doctrine: What determines the cause of action is the nature of defendants'
6. The take-over of the defendants was brought to the attention of the Luzon
entry into the land. If entry is illegal, then the cause of action which may be
Convention of Southern Baptist Churches, Inc., (LCSBC) and the latter, in letter dated
filed against the intruder within one year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on
September 5, 2001, has affirmed the right of the plaintiff BFBC, headed by Rev.
the other hand, entry is legal but thereafter possession became illegal, the
Rolando T. Santos, to occupy the subject premises.
case is one of illegal detainer which must be filed within one year from the
Xxx
date of the last demand.
● FCJBC's occupancy was unlawful from the start and was bereft of contractual
or legal basis.
Facts: ● no allegation that BFBC and PBSBC tolerated FCJBC's possession of the
● A contract of loan was entered into between PBSBC and BFBC where the latter subject property. Neither was there any averment in the complaint which
borrowed money from the former to enable it to purchase the subject property. shows any overt act on the part of BFBC and PBSBC indicative of permission
● BFBC took possession of the subject property and held therein their religious to occupy the land.
activities. ● However, while BFBC sufficiently alleged that they had prior physical
● While BFBC was still in possession of the subject property, Galvan and his possession of the subject property, nothing has been said on how
companions began attending BFBC's religious activities at the subject FCJBC's entry was effected or when dispossession started.
property. ● The Court ruled that the present complaint is similarly defective even if we are
● BFBC alleged that Galvan apparently was interested on the property because to treat the same as forcible entry as it failed to allege how and when entry was
after some time Galvan formed and incorporated FCJBC and took control of effected.
the subject property. ● The bare allegation of BFBC that "[i]t turned out that defendants have an
● Galvan's actuations came to the attention of the Luzon Convention of interest in the subject premises and defendant Reynaldo Galvan formed and
Southern Baptist Churches, Inc. (LCSBC). incorporated the defendant FCJBC and took control of the subject premises,"
● LCSBC upheld BFBC's right over the subject property and recognized BFBC's would not suffice since it only shows that FCJBC entered the land and
pastor, Rev. Rolando T. Santos, as its legitimate pastor. occupied the house thereon without BFBC and PBSBC's consent or permission
● However, FCJBC continued to occupy the subject property, thus, in a Demand which are constitutive of forcible entry.
Letter, BFBC demanded that FCJBC vacate the property within five (5) days ● Unfortunately, BFBC and PB SBC's failure to allege when the dispossession
from notice and to pay the amount of P10,000.00 per month beginning took place and how it was effected leaves the complaint wanting in
October 2001 as reasonable compensation for its use. jurisdictional ground.
● Due to non-compliance with its demand, BFBC and PBSBC filed a Complaint ● If the dispossession did not occur by any of the means stated in Section 1, Rule
for unlawful detainer and damages against FCJBC and Galvan. 70, as in this case, the proper recourse is to file a plenary action to recover
Issue: possession with the Regional Trial Court.
● WON the case is unlawful detainer or forcible entry? FORCIBLE ENTRY Dispositive
Ratio: WHEREFORE, all premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of
● The cause of action in a complaint is not what the designation of the complaint merit. Accordingly, the Decision dated March 5, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
states, but what the allegations in the body of the complaint define and G.R. SP No. 97292 is AFFIRMED in toto.
describe.
● BFBC presented the following allegations in support of its unlawful detainer
complaint:
xxx

UNIONBANK VS PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES  RTC also dismissed Unionbank’s appeal and denied the MR.
Petitioner/s: Union Bank of the Philippines  CA also denied Unionbank’s petition for review.
Respondent/s: Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.
Petitioner’s Argument: since the contract to sell was already rescinded, it was no
longer required to make a demand for payment prior to filing an ejectment suit;
Doctrine: An ejectment case is not limited to lease agreements or
In UBP v. Maunlad,which involved a similar Contract to Sell executed by it,
deprivations of possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or this Court declared that:
stealth. It is as well an available remedy against one who withholds  in a contract to sell, the non-payment of the purchase price renders
possession after the expiration or termination of his right of possession the agreement without force and effect, and the buyer's act of
under an express or implied contract, such as a contract to sell. withholding installment payments deprived it of the right to continue
possessing the property subject matter of the agreement;
 that since its ejectment case is anchored not on failure to pay rent,
Facts: but on violation of the contract to sell, no demand for payment was
 Petitioner Union Bank owns 2 parcels of land in Pangasinan. Respondent required; and that, just the same, a demand to pay was made on
Philippine Rabbit was the former owner of the lots but it lost the same by December 10, 2003.
foreclosure to petitioner; nonetheless, Philippine Rabbit continued to occupy
the same.
Respondent’s Arguments: Respondent finds no cogent or compelling reason to
 Nov 8, 2001: petitioner and respondent executed a Contract to Sell covering reverse the CA Decision, arguing that since there was no demand to pay, the MTCC did
the subject property for P12M payable within 7 years. It stipulated, among not acquire jurisdiction over the petitioner's ejectment case.
others,
o that all payments required under this Contract to Sell shall be made
by the buyer without need of notice, demand, or any other act or Issue:
deed, at the principal office address of the seller;"  Whether or not a demand for payment was necessary to the ejectment case?
o that if respondent fail to fully comply with the agreement or in case NO.
the contract is canceled or rescinded, all its installment payments Ratio:
shall also be forfeited by way of penalty and liquidated damages and  It must have escaped the attention of the MTCC, the RTC, and the CA that an
"applied as rentals for its use and possession of the property without ejectment case is not limited to lease agreements or deprivations of possession
need for any judicial action or notice to or demand upon the buyer.” by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.
 Respondent failed to fully pay the stipulated price in the contract to sell.  It is as well available against one who withholds possession after the
 After petitioner sent its December 10, 2003 letter-demand to pay the amount expiration or termination of his right of possession under an express or
of P9.9M respondent was unable to pay and petitioner rescinded the contract implied contract, such as a contract to sell.
to sell on February 28,2004.  Under Section 1, Rule 70, "a x x x vendor, vendee, or other person against
 Despite the fact that the contract to sell has been rescinded, respondent whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the
proposed to continue with the same and issued and tendered to the petitioner expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any
3 postdated checks in the amount of PI.5M as payment. contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such
 However, only 1 check in the amount of P500K cleared. lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within 1 year after
such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the
 Petitioner thus sent another March 17, 2004 letter to respondent stating that
proper MTC against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or
the said P500k has been applied as rental payment; respondent replied in an
depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for
April 16, 2004 letter proposing to proceed with the sale.
the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs."
 Petitioner thereafter sent the May 24, 2004 letter-demand to vacate, which
 In such cases, it is sufficient to allege in the plaintiff’s complaint that -
respondent received on May 26, 2004.
o 1. The defendant originally had lawful possession of the property,
 Petitioner filed a Complaint with the MTCC for "Ejectment with Prayer for either by virtue of a contract or by tolerance of the plaintiff; 2.
Fixation of Rentals" prayed that respondent be evicted from the subject Eventually, the defendant's possession of the property became illegal
property. or unlawful upon notice by the plaintiff to defendant of the expiration
 MTCC dismissed the case of Unionbank for lack of jurisdiction. It held that or the termination of the defendant's right of possession; 3.
petitioner's case is one for rescission and enforcement of the stipulations in Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property
the contract to sell. and deprived the plaintiff the enjoyment thereof; and 4. Within one

year from the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
 In examining the Complaint and evidence in the MTCC, it appears that
petitioner complied with the above requirements.
 Unionbank alleged that respondent acquired the right to occupy the subject
property by virtue of the Contract to Sell; that respondent failed to pay the
required amortizations and thus was in violation of the stipulations of the
agreement; that petitioner made a written "Demand to Pay with Rescission of
3 Contracts to Sell” but respondent was unable to heed the demand; that
respondent lost its right to retain possession of the subject property, and it
was illegally occupying the premises; that petitioner made a written demand
to vacate on May 24, 2004, that respondent refused to vacate the premises;
that on May 26, 2005, or within the one-year period required by the Rules, the
ejectment case was filed; and that there is a need to determine the rents and
damages owing to petitioner.
 It was plainly erroneous for the lower courts to require a demand
to pay prior to filing of the ejectment case. This is not one of the
requisites in an ejectment case based on petitioner's contract to
sell with respondent.
Dispositive
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed July 31, 2012 Decision and
January 25,2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 102065 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. is ORDERED TO: 1) IMMEDIATELY

VACATE the subject property upon the finality of this Decision, and 2) PAY petitioner
Union Bank of the Philippines all rentals-in-arrears and accruing rentals until it vacates
the property.
The case is REMANDED to the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Alaminos,

Pangasinan, or to any branch thereof or court handling Civil Case No. 2171, for the
determination of the amount of rentals; attorney's fees and costs, if any; and interest,
which are all due to petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

TUAZON VS. ISAGON Issue:
 who has the better right of physical possession between the registered owner
Petitioner/s: TERESA D. TUAZON as shown in the certificate of title and the mortgagor as shown in the
Respondent/s: SPOUSES ANGEL and MARCOSA ISAGON Kasulatan ng Sanglaan. – Registered Owner
Ratio:
Doctrine: See first bullet  An action for unlawful detainer is summary in nature and cannot be delayed
by a mere assertion of ownership as a defense. When the parties to an
ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the court may pass upon that
Facts: issue only if needed to determine who between the parties has a better right
 Sps Melencio Diaz and Dolores Gulay (Dolores) owned a 499 sq.m. lot (Lot to possess the property. Furthermore, the adjudication on the issue of
103) in Sta. Rosa, Laguna. They had three daughters: Maria, Pacencia, and ownership is only provisional, and subject to a separate proceeding that the
Esperanza. Melencio and Maria predeceased Dolores. parties may initiate to settle the issue of ownership.
 Through a Deed of Settlement, Lot 103 was adjudicated to Dolores. Maria’s  A person who possesses a title issued under the Torrens system is entitled to
children who were still minors at that time were not included in the all the attributes of ownership including possession. A certificate of title
settlement. cannot be subject to a collateral attack in an action for unlawful detainer. A
 Dolores sold Lot 103 to Isabel Torres through a Bilihang Tuluyan (Deed of collateral attack is made when, in an action to obtain a different relief, the
Absolute Sale). Subsequently, Isabel Torres sold Lot 103 to Teresa in validity of a certificate of title is questioned.
September 1973.  Respondents alleged in their answer that the certificate of title issued in the
 In October 1973, Maria’s children (Gloria, Angel, Felix, and Flaviano) name of Teresa was fraudulently obtained. This defense constitutes a
executed a Deed of Conformity. They honored the Deed of Extrajudicial collateral attack on the title and should not therefore be entertained. To
Settlement executed by their grandmother and aunts, subject to the condition directly assail the validity of the TCT, a direct action for reconveyance must be
that they would get 1/6 of Lot 103 as their share. filed.
 Gloria, Felix, and Flaviano also sold their shares to Teresa. On the other hand,  Based on the TCT, Teresa is the owner of the subject property and is entitled
Angel mortgaged his share to Teresa through a Kasulatan ng Sanglaan. to its physical possession.
Angel thereafter refused and failed to redeem the mortgaged property. Dispositive
 In 1972, Teresa’s brother, Antonio, allowed Sps Angel and Marcosa to build a WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition for review on certiorari. The
small hut on a portion of Lot 103 without Teresa’s knowledge. In 2000, they Decision dated October 28, 2009, and the Resolution dated February 11,
started to construct a house on the disputed property despite Teresa’s protest. 2010, of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 107937 are hereby
Teresa tolerated their possession and use of the contested area. REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision dated October 15, 2008, of
 In 2007, Teresa filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court, Biñan, Laguna, in Civil Case No. B-
respondents before the MTCC of Sta. Rosa, Laguna. 7472, is hereby REINSTATED.
o In their answer, the respondents alleged that they were occupying
the subject property as owners. They also alleged that Teresa
fraudulently obtained a TCT
 MTCC ruled in favor of Teresa.
o Teresa was the owner of the property as shown by TCT, and as owner,
she was entitled to enjoy the right of possession over the subject
property. A property registered under the Torrens system could not
be collaterally attacked in an action for unlawful retainer.
o RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTCC and subsequently
denied the respondents’ motion for reconsideration.
 CA reversed the RTC ruling.
o Angel Isagon executed a REM in favor of Teresa over a portion of Lot
103 but had failed to redeem it. Teresa was a mere mortgagee and
had no right to eject the respondents. Instead of foreclosing the
property, Teresa filed this action for unlawful detainer. A mortgage
was not an instrument that transferred ownership, thus property still
belonged to respondents.
AMPIL VS. MANAHAN ● Indeed, as a rule, petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
Court are limited only to questions of law and not of fact.
Petitioner/s: HEIRS OF ALBINA G. AMPIL, namely PRECIOUS A.
● The rule, however, admits of several exceptions, to wit: "(1) the factual
ZAVALLA, EDUARDO AMPIL, PENAFRANCIA A. OLANO, VICENTE G.
findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory;
AMPIL, JR., FROILAN G. AMPIL and EXEQUIEL G. AMPIL, represented
● In this case, the factual findings of the CA are contrary to those of the MTC
by EXEQUIEL G. AMPIL
and the RTC. Hence, a review of the case is imperative.
Respondent/s: TERESA MANAHAN and MARIO MANAHAN
● In an unlawful detainer case, the physical or material possession of the
property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the
Doctrine: Tax declarations though not conclusive constitute proof of a claim
parties, is the sole issue for resolution.
over a title over the proeprty
● But where the issue of ownership is raised, the courts may pass upon said issue
in order to determine who has the right to possess the property. This
Facts: adjudication, however, is only an initial determination of ownership for the
● Ampil (Exequiel), as representative of the heirs of the late Albina G. Ampil purpose of settling the issue of possession, the issue of ownership being
(Albina), filed a complaint for ejectment, against spouses Perfecto Manahan inseparably linked thereto. As such, the lower court’s adjudication of
(Perfecto) and Virginia Manahan, Teresita Manahan, Almario Manahan, Irene ownership in the ejectment case is merely provisional and would not bar or
Manahan and all persons claiming rights under them. prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property.
● In the complaint, it was alleged that Albina was the owner of two (2) adjoining ● In the case at bench, the Court sustains the findings of both the MTC and the
residential lots RTC.
● They asserted that during her lifetime, Albina allowed Perfecto and his family ● The bare allegation of respondents, that they had been in peaceful and
to occupy a portion of the said properties on the condition that they would continuous possession of the lot in question because their predecessor-in-
vacate the same should the need to use it arise. interest had been in possession thereof in the concept of an owner from time
● After the death of Albina in 1986, her heirs, represented by Exequiel, immemorial, cannot prevail over the tax declarations and other documentary
requested Perfecto and family to vacate the property in question but the latter evidence presented by petitioners. In the absence of any supporting evidence,
refused. that of the petitioners deserves more probative value.
● Petitioners, through counsel, sent a demand letter to the respondents to ● A perusal of the records shows that respondents’ occupation of the lot in
surrender possession of the lands in question but to no avail. question was by mere tolerance.
● Petitioners filed a complaint for ejectment ● Well established is the rule that ownership over the land cannot be acquired
● Petitioners aver that their claim of ownership over the disputed lots was not by mere occupation. While it is true that tax declarations are not conclusive
solely based on tax declarations but also anchored on the Sinumpaang evidence of ownership, they, nevertheless, constitute at least proof that the
Salaysay, executed by Perfecto holder has a claim of title over the property. It strengthens one's bona fide
● Respondents, on the other hand, move for the dismissal of the petition for claim of acquisition of ownership.
being defective in form. They question the special power of attorney submitted Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The .July 11, 2006 Decision
by Exequiel because it neither shows that the persons who executed the said and the December 13, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No.
affidavit were the real heirs of Albina nor does it authorize him to institute the 91568, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The February 23, 2004 Decision of the
petition. Municipal Trial Court, affirmed in toto by the Regional Trial Court, is ordered
● MTC ruled in favor of petitioners REINSTATED.
● RTC affirmed
● CA reversed
Issue:
● W/N Exequiel can file the complaint on behald of his co-heirs? Yes
● W/N petitioners own the land. YESsssssss
Ratio:

FAIRLAND KNITCRAFT V PO subject property. There was no evidence presented to support its claim against
Po either.
Petitioner/s: Fairland Knitcraft Corporation
● Fairland filed an appeal before the RTC under Rule 40 of the Rules of Court
Respondent/s: Arturo Loo Po
● The RTC required the parties to submit their respective memoranda
● According to Fairland, the failure to file an answer in an ejectment case was
Doctrine: As Po failed to file his answer on time, judgment shall be
tantamount to an admission by the defendant of all the ultimate facts alleged
rendered based only on the complaint of Fairland without the need to
in the complaint.
consider the weight of evidence as the complaint of Fairland had a valid
● Po filed his memorandum and countered that there was no merit in Fairland’s
cause of action for unlawful detainer.
insistence that evidence was unnecessary when no answer had been filed
● RTC affirmed the MeTC ruling
● Fairland filed a motion for reconsideration and then a petition for review
Facts: under Rule 42 of the ROC before the CA
● Fairland before the MeTC alleged that it was the owners of a condo unit no. ● The CA dismissed the petition and ruled that an action for unlawful detainer
205 in Cedar Mansion II. The unit was leased by Fairland to Po by verbal would not lie against Po
agreement. Issue:
● They agreed the rent would be 20,000. From March 2011, Po failed to ● WON a failure to answer seasonably is an error of law to base judgment on
continue to pay rent, which led to Fairland to not or renew the lease agreement preponderance of evidence? YES
anymore ● WON holding that evidence in an ejectment case should have been attached
● Fairland sent a formal letter demanding payment of 220,000 representing the to the complaint is an error of law? NO
rental arrears and that he vacate the leased premises within fifteen days from Ratio:
the receipt of the letter ● Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court lays down the requirements for filing
● Despite receipt of the demand letter and lapse of the 15 days to comply, Po a complaint for unlawful detainer, to wit:
neither tendered payment nor vacated the premises. ○ Section 1. - Who may institute proceedings, and when. - Subject to
● On February 6, 2013 Fairland filed a complaint for unlawful detainer before the provision of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the
the MeTC possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat,
● In February 21, 2013 the MeTC considered the case submitted for decision strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person
● Po’s counsel filed his entry of appearance with motion for leave of court to file against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully
comment/opposition to motion to render judgment. withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
● In the attached Comment/Opposition, Po denied the allegations against him possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal
and commented that there was no supporting document that would show that representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or
Fairland owned the property; that there was no lease contract between them; other person, may, at any time within one (l) year after such unlawful
that there were no documents attached to the complaint which would show deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the
that previous demands had been made and received by him; that the alleged proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons
unpaid rental was P220,000.00, but the amount of damages being prayed for unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or
was P440,000.00; that the issue in the case was one of ownership; and that it persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession,
was the RTC which had jurisdiction over the case. together with damages and costs.
● The MeTC treated the comment/opposition as Po's answer to the complaint. ● Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession of real
Considering, however, that the case fell under the Rules of Summary property.
Procedure, the same was deemed filed out of time. Hence, the motion was ● A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it
denied. recites the following:
● The MeTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit due to fairland’s failure ● (1) initially, possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with
to prove its claim by preponderance of evidence. or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
● The MeTC explained that although the complaint sufficiently alleged a cause ● (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to
of action, Fairland failed to prove that it was entitled to the possession of the the defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession;
● (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property, and ● Similarly, under Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which governs the
deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and rules for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, if the defendant fails to answer
● (4) within one (1) year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the the complaint within the period provided, the court has no authority to declare
property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment the defendant in default. Instead, the court, motu proprio or on motion of the
● the complaint sufficiently alleged that Fairland was the owner of the subject plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in
property being leased to Po by virtue of an oral agreement. There was a the complaint and limited to what is prayed for.
demand by Fairland for Po to pay rent and vacate before the complaint for ● In this case, Po failed to file his answer to the complaint despite proper service
unlawful detainer was instituted. The complaint was seasonably filed within of summons. He also failed to provide a sufficient justification to excuse his
the one-year period prescribed by law. With all the elements present, there lapses. Thus, as no answer was filed, judgment must be rendered by the court
was clearly a cause of action in the complaint for unlawful detainer. as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint.
● Under the Rules of Summary Procedure, the weight of evidence is not ● Failure to attach annexes is not fatal if the complaint alleges a sufficient cause
considered when a judgment is rendered based on the complaint of action; evidence need not be attached to the complaint
● The summons, together with the complaint and its annexes, was served upon ● The lower courts erroneously dismissed the complaint of Fairland simply on
Po on December 28, 2012. This presupposes that the MeTC found no ground the ground that it failed to establish by preponderance of evidence its
to dismiss the action for unlawful detainer. Nevertheless, Po failed to file his ownership over the subject property. As can be gleaned above, the rules do not
answer on time and the MeTC had the option to render judgment motu compel the plaintiff to attach his evidence to the complaint because, at this
proprio or on motion of the plaintiff. inception stage, he only has to file his complaint to establish his cause of
● In relation thereto, Sections 5 and 6 of the Rules on Summary Procedure action. Here, the court was only tasked to determine whether the complaint of
provide: Fairland alleged a sufficient cause of action and to render judgment thereon.
○ Sec. 5. Answer. - Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the ● Also, there was no need to attach proof of ownership in the complaint because
defendant shall file his answer to the complaint and serve a copy the allegations therein constituted a sufficient cause of action for unlawful
thereof on the plaintiff. Affirmative and negative defenses not detainer. Only when the allegations in the complaint are insufficient to form a
pleaded therein shall be deemed waived, except for lack of cause of action shall the attachment become material in the determination
jurisdiction over the subject matter. Cross-claims and compulsory thereof.
counterclaims not asserted in the answer shall be considered barred. ● As Po failed to file his answer on time, judgment shall be rendered based only
The answer to counterclaims or cross-claims shall be filed and served on the complaint of Fairland without the need to consider the weight of
within ten (10) days from service of the answer in which they are evidence as the complaint of Fairland had a valid cause of action for unlawful
pleaded. detainer.
○ Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. - Should the defendant fail to ● Consequently, there is no more need to present evidence to establish the
answer the complaint within the period above provided, the court, allegation of Fairland of its ownership and superior right of possession over
motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as the subject property. Po's failure to file an answer constitutes an admission of
may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited his illegal occupation due to his non-payment of rentals, and of Fairland's
to what is prayed for therein. The court may in its discretion reduce rightful claim of material possession.
the amount of damages and attorney's fees claimed for being Dispositive:
excessive or otherwise unconscionable, without prejudice to the WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The October 31, 2014 Decision and the
applicability of Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, if there are March 6, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 134701 are
two or more defendants. herebyREVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Arturo Loo Po is ORDERED TO
● Section 6 clearly states that when a defendant fails to file his answer, the court VACATE Condominium Unit No. 205 located in Cedar Mansion II on Ma. Escriba
shall render judgment either motu proprio or upon plaintiffs motion, based Street, Pasig City.
solely on the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for Respondent Po is further ORDERED TO PAY the rentals-in-arrears, as well as the
● The failure to timely file an answer and to controvert the claim against rentals accruing in the interim until he vacates the property. The unpaid rentals shall
him/her constitutes an acquiescence to every allegation stated in the incur a legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from January 30, 2012, when the
complaint demand to pay and to vacate was made, up to the finality of this decision. Thereafter,

an interest of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on the total amount due
until full payment is made.
Notes:
Why there was no need for documentary attachments to prove Fairland's ownership
over the subject property.
First, the present action is an action for unlawful detainer wherein only de facto or
material possession is required to be alleged. Evidently, the attachment of any deed of
ownership to the complaint is not indispensable because an action for unlawful
detainer does not entirely depend on ownership.
Second, Fairland sufficiently alleged ownership and superior right of possession over
the subject property. These allegations were evidently manifest in the complaint as
Fairland claimed to have orally agreed to lease the property to Po. The Court is of the
view that these allegations were clear and unequivocal and did not need supporting
attachments to be considered as having sufficiently established its cause of action. Even
the MeTC conceded that the complaint of Fairland stated a valid cause of action for
unlawful detainer. It must be stressed that inquiry into the attached documents in the
complaint is for the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations in the
complaint.
Third, considering that Po failed to file an answer within the prescribed period, he was
deemed to have admitted all the allegations in the complaint including Fairland's claim
of ownership. To reiterate, the failure of the defendant to timely file his answer and
controvert the claim against him constituted his acquiescence to every allegation stated
in the complaint. In the Entry of Appearance with Motion for Leave of Court to file
Comment/Opposition to Motion to Render Judgment, which was belatedly filed and so
was denied by the MeTC, Po merely denied the allegations against him without even
bothering to aver why he claimed to have a superior right of possession of the subject
property.
Fourth, it is only at the later stage of the summary procedure when the affidavits of
witnesses and other evidence on factual issues shall be presented before the court.

ROBERTS VS. PAPIO had a cause of action against him since the only elements in an
unlawful detainer action are the fact of lease and the expiration of its
Petitioner/s: Amelia Roberts
term.
Respondent/s: Martin Papio
○ Martin as tenant cannot controvert the title of the plaintiff or assert
any right adverse thereto or set up any inconsistent right to change
Doctrine: The sole issue for resolution in an action for unlawful detainer
the existing relation between them.
is material or de facto possession of the property. The METC or MTC
○ Roberts need not prove her ownership over the property inasmuch
decides the question of ownership only if it is intertwined with and
as evidence of ownership can be admitted only for the purpose of
necessary to resolve the issue of possession.
determining the character and extent of possession, and the amount
of damages arising from the detention.
Facts: ● The RTC affirmed the METC’s decision.
● To secure a P59,000 loan from Amparo Investments, Spouses Papio (Martin ● The CA reversed the lower courts’ decisions, after finding that:
and wife) executed a real estate mortgage on their lot in Makati. ○ Although the lower courts were correct in holding that the METC had
● Upon failure to pay their loan, Amparo filed a petition for extrajudicial jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case, there was in fact an
foreclosure of the mortgage. equitable mortgage, as alleged by Martin
● Since the Papios needed money to redeem the property and prevent the ● MEANWHILE IN ANOTHER CASE: Martin filed a complaint with the RTC
foreclosure, they executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in favor for specific performance with damages. He claimed that:
of Martin’s cousin, Roberts. ○ He and Roberts entered into a contract of sale with right to
○ The purchase price was used to settle the loan with Amparo. repurchase and prayed that the latter be ordered to execute a Deed
● Roberts and Martin executed a two-year contract of lease with the former as of Sale
lessor and the latter as lessee.
● Martin paid the rentals for the first two years, but failed to pay for the next Issue:
thirteen years where his family remained in possession. ● Whether the METC had jurisdiction in an action for unlawful detainer to
● Roberts, through counsel, reminded Martin to pay his rentals or vacate if he determine who is the owner and entitled to possession - YES
fails to pay within 15 days. ● Whether there is an equitable mortgage - NO
○ Martin failed to pay but refused to vacate.
● Roberts, through her attorney-in-fact Aguilar, filed a complaint for unlawful Ratio:
detainer and damages against Martin before the METC. ● Section 18, Rule 70 provides that when the defendant raises the defense of
● In his Answer, Martin stated: ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved
○ That Roberts offered to redeem his property so that he could retain without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be
his ownership over it resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
○ That he was alarmed when Roberts had a Deed of Absolute Sale ○ The judgment rendered in an action for unlawful detainer shall be
and asked him to sign it conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in no wise
○ That he asked Roberts to allow him to redeem the property at any bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building.
time for a reasonable amount, to which Roberts agreed ○ Such judgment would not bar an action between the same parties
○ Pursuant to this right of redemption, Martin said that he remitted respecting title to the land or building.
P250,000 to purchase the property, but Roberts’ representative ● The summary nature of the action is not changed by the claim of ownership of
(since she was in the US) misappropriated P39,000 out of the total the property of the defendant.
amount ● The METC is not divested of its jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer action
○ Despite Martin’s demands, Roberts refused to execute the Deed of simply because the defendant asserts ownership over the property.
Absolute Sale ● The sole issue for resolution in an action for unlawful detainer is material or
● The METC rendered a Decision in favor of Roberts, ordering Martin to vacate. de facto possession of the property.
○ The MeTC held that Roberts merely tolerated the stay of Martin in ○ Even if the defendant claims juridical possession or ownership over
the property after the expiration of the contract of lease; hence, she the property based on a claim that his transaction with the plaintiff
relative to the property is merely an equitable mortgage, or that he ○ He is estopped from asserting that the contract under the deed of
had repurchased the property from the plaintiff, the MeTC may still absolute sale is an equitable mortgage.
delve into and take cognizance of the case and make an initial or
provisional determination of who between the plaintiff and the Dispositive: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The
defendant is the owner and, in the process, resolve the issue of who assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69034 is REVERSED and
is entitled to the possession. SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, affirmed with modification
○ The MeTC, in unlawful detainer case, decides the question of by the Regional Trial Court, is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
ownership only if it is intertwined with and necessary to resolve the
issue of possession.
○ The resolution of the MeTC on the ownership of the property is
merely provisional or interlocutory.
○ Any question involving the issue of ownership should be raised and
resolved in a separate action brought specifically to settle the
question with finality, which is why Martin instituted another
specific performance case in the RTC.
● The ruling of the CA, that the contract between Roberts and Martin was an
equitable mortgage, is incorrect.
Equitable Mortgage Pacto de Retro Sale
Real intention of the parties: to Ownership of the property sold is

make the real property as security immediately transferred to the
for a debt vendee a retro subject only to the
right of the vendor a retro to
Requisites: repurchase the property upon
● Denominated as a contract compliance with legal requirements
of sale for the repurchase.
● Intention was to secure an
existing debt by way of The failure of the vendor a retro to
mortgage exercise the right to repurchase
within the agreed time vests upon
The mortgagor retains ownership the vendee a retro, by operation of
over the property but subject to law, absolute title over the property
foreclosure and sale at public
auction upon failure of the
mortgagor to pay his obligation
● The right to repurchase presupposes a valid contract of sale between the same
parties.
● By insisting that he had repurchased the property, Martin thereby admitted
that the deed of absolute sale executed by him and Roberts was, in fact and in
law, a Deed of Absolute Sale and not an equitable mortgage.
TERAÑA_VS._HON. DE_SAGUN  RTC affirmed MTC’s decision. Terana filed a MR and/or for New Trial. In her
motion for new trial, Terana argued that her failure to submit her position
Petitioner/s: FLORAIDA TERAÑA paper and affidavits within the 10-day period was due to excusable negligence.
Respondent/s: HON. ANTONIO DE SAGUN, PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH XIV, NASUGBU, BATANGAS AND  RTC: Granted MR. Reversed its own judgment and that of MTC. Ground for
ANTONIO B. SIMUANGCO granting MR/new trial -> denial of such will result to a miscarriage of justice
 In RTC’s order: “The lower court to which the records were heretofore
remanded is hereby ordered to conduct further proceedings in this case,
Doctrine: An action for reimbursement or for recovery of damages may after giving the plaintiff-appellee an opportunity to file his position paper and
not be properly joined with the action for ejectment. The former is an affidavits of witnesses as required by Section 10, Rule 70, of the 1997 Rules of
ordinary civil action requiring a full-blown trial while an action for unlawful Civil Procedure.”
detainer is a special civil action which requires a summary procedure.  Terana challenged the order of remand through another MR. She argued that
since the original action for unlawful detainer had already been elevated from
MTC to RTC, the RSP no longer governs the disposition of the case.
Facts: o RTC should have conducted a trial de novo instead of remanding the
 Antonio owned a house and lot at 138 J.P. Laurel St., Nasugbu, Batangas, case to the MTC.
which he leased to Terana. In 1996, the latter demolished the leased house and  RTC: Denied MR
erected a new one. Antonio alleged that this was without his consent. The  CA: Affirmed
Contract of Lease (Contract) contained the following provisions:
o 3. That the lessee obligated herself with the Lessor by virtue of this Issue:
Lease, to do the following, to wit: 1. WON the remand is proper - No
a)... 2. WON the Court should appreciate Terana’s position paper and affidavits of
b) To keep the leased property in such repair and condition her witnesses - No
as it was in the commencement of the Lease with the 3. WON the complaint for unlawful detainer should be dismissed - No
exception of portions or parts which may be impaired due to
reasonable wear and tear; Ratio:
c)...
d) Not to make any alterations in the Leased property Remand is Not Necessary
without the knowledge and consent of the Lessor; . . .
 The remand of the case to the lower courts is no longer necessary, given the
 When Antonio learned what Terana did, he confronted her and asked that she pleadings and submissions filed, and the records of the proceedings below. A
vacate the premises. She refused. remand would delay the overdue resolution of this case and would run counter
 Antonio filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Terana on the ground to the intent of the RSP.
of violation of the terms of the Contract.
 Terana denied the allegations saying that Antonio had knowledge and the act Terana’s Position Paper and the Affidavits of Her Witnesses Cannot Be
of demolition was with his consent. That without the timely repairs by Terana, Admitted
the house’s collapse would have caused the death of Terana and her family.  The purpose of the RSP is to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive
 TC required the parties to file their position papers and affidavits of their determination of the cases. To achieve this purpose, the RSP expressly
witnesses. Instead of filing their position papers, both parties moved for an prohibits certain motions and pleadings that could cause delay, among them,
extension of time to file the necessary pleadings. TC denied on the ground that a motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits, or any other paper.
Rules of Summary Procedures (RSP) and Rules of Court, Rule 70, Sec. 13(5)  If the extension for the filing cannot be allowed, it would be illogical to admit
prohibit the filing of a motion for extension of time. a pleading that is already filed late. Effectively, the court would then allow
 MTC: Rendered decision despite parties’ failure to timely file their respective indirectly what it prohibits to be done directly.
position papers. It rendered decision in favor of Antonio.  The strict adherence to the reglementary period is due to the essence of this
 Terana filed a letter entitled Kahilingan, to which she attached her position rule that the law looks with compassion upon a party who has been illegally
paper and affidavits of her witnesses. The submission was essentially a MR of dispossessed of his property.
the denial of motion for extension of time.  Failure of one party to submit his position paper does not bar at all the MTC
 MTC: Denied. Terana filed a Notice of Appeal. The records of the case were from issuing a judgment on the ejectment complaint.
ordered elevated to the RTC. o Section 10 of the RSP:

Section 10. Rendition of judgment. — Within thirty (30) days after joined with the action for ejectment. The former is an ordinary civil action
receipt of the last affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of requiring a full-blown trial while an action for unlawful detainer is a special
the period for filing the same, the court shall render judgment. civil action which requires a summary procedure.
 The rules on joinder of 2 actions specifically excludes special civil actions or
xxx actions governed by special rules.
 Thus, it was correct for the MTC to render a judgment after one party failed to
file their position paper and supporting affidavits. Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-48534 is REVERSED
Unlawful Detainer AND SET ASIDE. The petitioner FLORAIDA TERANA and all persons
 The special civil action for unlawful detainer has the following essential claiming right under her are ordered to vacate and surrender possession
requisites: of the subject property to the respondent ANTONIO SIMUANGCO. No
o The fact of lease by virtue of a contract, express or implied costs.
o The expiration or termination of the possessor’s right to hold
possession
o Withholding by the lessee of possession of the land/building after the
expiration/termination of the right to possess
o Letter of demand upon lessee to pay the rental or comply with the
terms of the lease and vacate the premises
o Filing of the action within one year from the date of the last demand
received by the defendant.
 Requisites 1, 4 and 5 have been duly established. To determine is whether
Terana’s right to possess the property may be terminated due to violation of
the terms of the contract. If the answer is affirmative, her continued detention
of property is illegal.
 Under Sec. 1673 (3) of the Civil Code, the lessor may terminate the lease
contract for violation of any of the conditions agreed upon and may judicially
eject the lessee.
 Terana contends: Antonio had the burden to prove his allegation with positive
evidence after she frontally denied it in her answer. She argues that since
Antonio failed to discharge such burden, she no longer needs to prove her
defense that the demolition were done with Antonio’s knowledge and consent.
 Court: Terana’s argument is misplaced. The material allegations in a
complaint must be specifically denied by the defendant in his answer. Material
allegations which are not specifically denied are deemed admitted. We do not
find Terana’s denial to be specific as she failed to set forth the substance of the
matters in which she relied upon to support her denial. How and why consent
was given, she did not elaborate. If indeed consent was given, it would be easy
to fill in the details.
Damages recoverable in an unlawful detainer action are limited to

rentals or reasonable compensation for the use of the property
 This Court has no jurisdiction to award the reimbursement prayed for by both
parties. Both parties seek damages other than rentals/reasonable
compensation for use of property. Rule 70, Sec. 17 of the Rules of Court
authorizes the trial court to order the award of an amount representing arrears
of rent or reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises
if it finds that the allegations of the complaint are true.
 Reason: Only issue raised in ejectment cases is that of rightful possession. An
action for reimbursement or for recovery of damages may not be properly
ERORITA VS. DUMLAO also prohibited the defendants from accepting enrolees to the San Mariano
Academy.
Petitioner/s: SPOUSES HERMINIO E. ERORITA and EDITHA C.
● The petitioners Erorita appealed to the CA arguing that the complaint patently
ERORITA
shows a case for unlawful detainer. Thus, the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
Respondent/s: SPOUSES LIGAYA DUMLAO and ANTONIO DUMLAO
subject matter of the case.
● In their petition before the SC, the Spouses Erorita essentially argue that: (a)
Doctrine: it is settled that issues that have not been raised before the lower
the RTC had no jurisdiction because the allegations in the complaint show a
courts cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Basic consideration of
case for unlawful detainer; and (b) Hernan and Susan were improperly
due process dictates this rule. We note that the second issue raised by the
impleaded as parties to this case (not raised in the lower court)
petitioners were not raised before the lower courts. The petitioners only
● the respondents argue that: (a) the RTC had jurisdiction because this case
raised this issue in their petition before this Court. Thus, we need not
involves issues other than physical possession; (b) even assuming the RTC
discuss this issue at our level.
initially had no jurisdiction, the petitioners’ active participation during the
proceedings bar them from attacking jurisdiction; (c) Hernan and Susan are
Facts: real parties in interest as the lease contract’s primary beneficiaries; and (d)
● Spouses Antonio and Ligaya Dumlao (Spouses Dumlao) are the registered this last issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
owners of a parcel of land located at Barangay San Mariano, Roxas, Oriental
Mindoro, Issue:
○ The San Mariano Academy structures are built on the property. ● WON the RTC had jurisdiction - NO
○ The Spouses Dumlao bought the property in an extrajudicial ● WON the issue not raised in the lower court can still be raised on appeal to the
foreclosure sale Because the former owners, Spouses Herminio and SC? - NO
Editha Erorita (Spouses Erorita), failed to redeem it, the title was Ratio:
consolidated in the buyers’ name. ● To make a case for unlawful detainer, the complaint must allege that: (a)
● The Spouses Dumlao agreed to allow the petitioners to continue to operate the initially, the defendant lawfully possessed the property, either by contract or
school on the property. by plaintiff’s tolerance; (b) the plaintiff notified the defendant that his right of
○ The Spouses Erorita appointed Hernan and Susan Erorita as the San possession is terminated; (c) the defendant remained in possession and
Mariano Academy’s administrators. deprived plaintiff of its enjoyment; and (d) the plaintiff filed a complaint
● The Spouses Dumlao alleged that the Eroritas agreed on a monthly rent of within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property.
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), but had failed to pay rentals since ○ A complaint for accion publiciana or recovery of possession of real
1990. property will not be considered as an action for unlawful detainer if
● The Spouses Erorita countered that the Dumlaos allowed them to continue to any of these special jurisdictional facts is omitted
run the school without rental out of goodwill and friendship. ● Thus, although the complaint bears the caption "recovery of possession," its
● Spouses Dumlao asked the petitioners to vacate the property. allegations contain the jurisdictional facts for an unlawful detainer case.
○ Although the Spouses Erorita wanted to comply, they could not ● Under RA 7691, an action for unlawful detainer is within the MTC’s exclusive
immediately close the school without clearance from the Department jurisdiction regardless of the property’s assessed value.
of Education, Culture, and Sports to whom they are accountable. ● On the second issue, it is settled that issues that have not been raised before
● the Spouses Dumlao filed a complaint for recovery of possession before the the lower courts cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
Regional Trial Court (RTC) against the defendants Hernan, Susan, and the ○ Basic consideration of due process dictates this rule
Spouses Erorita. ● We note that the second issue raised by the petitioners were not raised before
● the defendants prayed that the complaint be dismissed because they cannot the lower courts. The petitioners only raised this issue in their petition before
be forced to vacate and to pay the rentals under their factual circumstances. this Court. Thus, we need not discuss this issue at our level.
● the RTC decided in the Spouses Dumlao’s favor. It ordered the defendants (1)
to immediately vacate the property and turn it over to the Spouses Dumlao, Dispositive:
and (2) to pay accumulated rentals, damages, and attorney’s fees. The RTC

WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition. The July 28, 2010 decision and January
4, 2011 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 92770 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, we DECLARE the June 4, 2007 decision of
the RTC in Civil Case No. C-492 void for lack of jurisdiction.

the three survey plans he had used was correct without a full-blown
MANALANG VS. BACANI trial.
Petitioner/s: RUBEN MANALANG, CARLOS MANALANG, Issue:

CONCEPCION GONZALES AND LUIS MANALANG  WON the act of the RTC in receiving additional evidence at the stage of appeal
Respondent/s: BIENVENIDO AND MERCEDES BACANI is valid? - NO.
 WON this case was one of unlawful detainer or accion reivindicatoria -
Doctrine: ACCION REIVINDICATORIA
Ratio:
Facts:  the RTC, in an appeal of the judgment in an ejectment case, shall not conduct
a rehearing or trial de novo.26 In this connection, Section 18, Rule 70 of the
 Petitioners Ruben Manalang, Amado Manalang, Carlos Manalang, Rules of Court clearly provides:
Concepcion M. Gonzales, Ladislao Manalang and Luis Manalang were the co- o Sec. 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not
owners of Lot No 4236 with an area of 914 square meters of the Guagua conclusive in actions involving title or ownership.
Cadastre, and declared for taxation purposes in the name of Tomasa B. Garcia. o The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the
 Adjacent to Lot 4236 was the respondents’ Lot No. 4235 appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the
 The petitioners caused the relocation and verification survey of Lot 4236 and same on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings
the adjoining lots, and the result showed that the respondents had encroached had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or
on Lot No. 4236 to the extent of 405 square meters as confirmed by the Lands briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the
Management Section of the Department of Environment and Natural Regional Trial Court. (7a)
Resources (DENR)  the RTC violated the foregoing rule by ordering the conduct of the relocation
 When the respondents refused to vacate the encroached portion and to and verification survey “in aid of its appellate jurisdiction” and by hearing the
surrender peaceful possession thereof despite demands, the petitioners testimony of the surveyor, for its doing so was tantamount to its holding of a
commenced this action for unlawful detainer trial de novo.
 the MTC (Branch 2) dismissed the Case for lack of jurisdiction based on its  The violation was accented by the fact that the RTC ultimately decided the
finding that the action involved an essentially boundary dispute that should appeal based on the survey and the surveyor’s testimony instead of the record
be properly resolved in an accion reivindicatoria. of the proceedings had in the court of origin
 RTC reversed the MTC, and remanded the case for further proceedings
 Upon remand, the MTC, Branch 1 ultimately dismissed the complaint and  Given the foregoing allegations, the case should be dismissed without
counterclaim for lack of merit prejudice to the filing of a non-summary action like accion reivindicatoria. In
 Once more, the petitioners appealed to the RTC our view, the CA correctly held that a boundary dispute must be resolved in
o RTC ordered the petitioners to conduct a relocation survey the context of accion reivindicatoria, not an ejectment case. The boundary
to determine their allegation of encroachment dispute is not about possession, but encroachment, that is, whether the
property claimed by the defendant formed part of the plaintiff’s property.
 RTC then reversed and set aside the MTC’s decision
 CA Reversed the RTC decision
 A boundary dispute cannot be settled summarily under Rule 70 of the Rules
of Court, the proceedings under which are limited to unlawful detainer and
o That the RTC, by ordering the relocation and verification survey “in
forcible entry. In unlawful detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds the
aid of its appellate jurisdiction” upon motion of the petitioners and
possession of the premises upon the expiration or termination of his right to
over the objection of the respondents, and making a determination
hold such possession under any contract, express or implied. The defendant’s
of whether there was an encroachment based on such survey and
possession was lawful at the beginning, becoming unlawful only because of
testimony of the surveyor, had acted as a trial court in complete
the expiration or termination of his right of possession.
disregard of the second paragraph of Section 18, Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court.  In forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the very
o It declared such action by the RTC as unwarranted because it beginning, and the issue centers on which between the plaintiff and the
amounted to the reopening of the trial, which was not allowed under defendant had the prior possession de facto.
Section 13(3) Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. It observed that the
relocation and verification survey was inconclusive inasmuch as the
surveyor had himself admitted that he could not determine which of Dispositive

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on October 18, 2002;
and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.
Other Matters:
On MTC/RTC Jurisdiction:
 It is correct that the MTC dismissed the action because it did not have
jurisdiction over the case.
 It is fundamental that the allegations of the complaint and the character of the
relief sought by the complaint determine the nature of the action and the court
that has jurisdiction over the action.
 To be clear, unlawful detainer is an action filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or
other person against whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied.
 To vest in the MTC the jurisdiction to effect the ejectment from the land of the
respondents as the occupants in unlawful detainer, therefore, the complaint
should embody such a statement of facts clearly showing the attributes of
unlawful detainer.
 However, the allegations of the petitioners’ complaint did not show that they
had permitted or tolerated the occupation of the portion of their property by
the respondents; or how the respondents’ entry had been effected, or how and
when the dispossession by the respondents had started.
 All that the petitioners alleged was the respondents’ “illegal use and
occupation” of the property. As such, the action was not unlawful detainer.
On evidence:
 the conclusion by the MTC that the petitioners failed to show by clear and
convincing evidence that the respondents had encroached on the petitioners’
property was also warranted.
 In contrast, the only basis for the RTC’s decision was the result of the
relocation and verification survey as attested to by the surveyor, but that basis
should be disallowed for the reasons earlier mentioned.
 Under the circumstances, the reinstatement of the ruling of the MTC by the
CA was in accord with the evidence

AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE VS. COURT OF APPEALS (2) Such judgment of the RTC is not stayed by an appeal taken
 There from, unless otherwise ordered by the RTC or, in the appellate court's
Petitioner/s: AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (ATO) discretion, suspended or modified.
Respondent/s: HON. COURT OF APPEALS and BERNIE G.
MIAQUE  The RTC's duty to issue a writ of execution under Section 21 of Rule
70 is ministerial and may be compelled by mandamus.
 Section 21 of Rule 70 presupposes that the defendant in a forcible
Doctrine: Judgment of the RTC in ejectment cases are immediately entry or unlawful detainer case is unsatisfied with the RTC's judgment and
executory without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken appeals to a higher court. It authorizes the RTC to immediately issue a writ
therefrom. Judgment of the RTC is also not stayed by an appeal taken of execution without prejudice to the appeal taking its due course.
therefrom, unless otherwise ordered by the RTC or, in the appellate court’s  The rationale of immediate execution of judgment in an ejectment case
discretion, suspended or modified. Despite these, CA may still issue a writ is to avoid injustice to a lawful possess or.Nevertheless, it should be stressed
of preliminary injunction that will restrain or enjoin the judgment, while that the appellate court may stay the writ of execution should in connection
with the second characteristic of the RTC judgment in an ejectment case
being aware that such grant rests on the sound discretion of the court and
appealed to it, the consequence of the above distinctions between
that it should be made with great caution discretionary execution and the execution of the RTC's judgment in an
ejectment case on appeal to the Court of Appeals is that the former may be
availed of in the
Facts:
 RTC only before the Court of Appeals gives due course to the appeal while the
 Air Transportation Office (ATO) was able to obtain favorable judgment for
latter may be availed of in the RTC at any stage of the appeal to the Court of
a complaint for unlawful detainer against Miaque. The MTCC ordered
Appeals. But then again, in the latter case, the Court of Appeals may stay the
Miaque to permanently vacate the premises, and such order was affirmed by
writ of execution issued by the RTC should circumstances so require.
the RTC. Miaque questioned the RTC decision in the Court of Appeals by filing
a petition for review, docketed CA - GR. SP No. 79439, and in a Decision dated  To reiterate, despite the immediately executory nature of the judgment of
April 29, 2005, the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the RTC the RTC in ejectment cases, which judgment is not stayed by an appeal
decision. When petitioner was able to obtain a writ of execution from the RTC taken therefrom, the Court of Appeals may issue a writ of preliminary
on March 20, 2006, Miaque obtained a TRO and the subsequent writ of injunction that will restrain or enjoin the execution of the RTC's judgment.
preliminary injunction with the CA enjoining the enforcement writ of In the exercise of such authority, the Court of Appeals should constantly
execution, dated March 29, 2006, and May 30, 2006 respectively. be aware that the grant of a preliminary injunction in a case rests on the
sound discretion of the court with the caveat that it should be made with
 Petitioners now question the Order and Resolution issued by the CA.
great caution.
 A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event which must be
Issue: granted only in the face of actual and existing substantial rights. The duty of
 WON CA committed GADALEJ in issuing the Resolution dated May 30, 2006 the court taking cognizance of a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is
which granted petitioner’s application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary to determine whether the requisites necessary for the grant of an injunction
injunction.- YES are present in the case before it. In the absence of the same, and where facts
are shown to be wanting in bringing the matter within the conditions for its
Ratio: issuance, the ancillary writ must be struck down for having been rendered
 Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court reflects Section 21 of the Revised Rule in grave abuse of discretion.
on Summary Procedure: The judgment or final order shall be appealable to  In this case, the decisions of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 01 (38), of the RTC in
the appropriate RTC which shall decide the same in accordance with Section Civil Case No. 02-27292, and of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
22 of B.P. 129. The decision of the Regional Trial Court in civil cases 79439 unanimously recognized the right of the ATO to possession of the
governed by this Rule, including forcible entry and unlawful detainer, shall property and the corresponding obligation of Miaque to immediately
be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may vacate the subject premises. This means that the MTCC, the RTC, and
be taken therefrom. Section 10 of Rule 70 shall be deemed repealed. the Court of Appeals all ruled that Miaque does not have any right to
 The totality of all the provisions above shows the following significant continue in possession of the said premises. It is therefore puzzling how
characteristics of the RTC judgment in an ejectment case appealed to it: the Court of Appeals justified its issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
(1) The judgment of the RTC against the defendant-appellant is immediately with the sweeping statement that Miaque "appears to have a clear legal right
executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom; to hold on to the premises leased by him from ATO at least until such time
and when he shall have been duly ejected therefrom by a writ of execution of
judgment caused to be issued by the MTCC in Iloilo City, which is the court of
origin of the decision promulgated by this Court in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439."
Unfortunately, in its Resolution dated May 30, 2006 granting a writ of
preliminary injunction in Miaque's favor, the Court of Appeals did not state
the source or basis of Miaque's "clear legal right to hold on to the [said]
premises." This is fatal.
 In Nisce v. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc., this Court stated that, in granting
or dismissing an application for a writ of preliminary injunction, the court
must state in its order the findings and conclusions based on the evidence
and the law. This is to enable the appellate court to determine whether the
trial court committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction in resolving, one way or the other, the plea for injunctive
relief.
 In the absence of proof of a legal rightand the injury sustained by
one who seeks an injunctive writ,an order for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction will be nullified.
 There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to
the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or (2) executed whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias.
 In this case, the Court of Appeals issued the Resolution dated May 30,
2006 granting Miaque's prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction contrary
to Section 21, Rule 70 and other relevant provisions of the Rules of Court,
as well as this Court's pronouncements in Teresa T. Gonzales La'O & Co.,
Inc. and Nisce. Thus, the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion when it issued the Resolution dated May 30, 2006 in CA-G.R.
CEB-SP No. 01603
Dispositive WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolution dated

May 30, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603 is ANNULLED for
having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals is directed
to conduct its proceedings in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603 expeditiously and without
delay.
SO ORDERED

BENEDICTO VS. CA  The Court of Appeals ruled saying that the writ of preliminary injunction be
issued in this case upon the posting of a P100,000.00 injunction bond
Petitioner/s: George Benedicto restraining the respondents from prohibiting the petitioner from entering the
Respondent/s: CA subject premises and/or from conducting business thereon just like before the
controversy between the parties had arisen
Doctrine: Even if RTC judgments in unlawful detainer cases are
immediately executory, preliminary injunction may still be granted. Issue:
 W/N the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned writ of preliminary
Facts: injunction, despite the immediately executory character of RTC judgments in
 Petitioner George V. Benedicto is the owner of a parcel of land with an area of ejectment cases? NO
736 square meters located in Carlos Hilado Highway, Bacolod City. He entered Ratio:
into a contract of lease with private respondent Romeo G. Chua on October  First, a preliminary injunction may be granted even if not prayed for as long
2000. Under the contract, the lease was to start on November 2000. 7k per as the requisites therefor are present. More so if it is prayed for. Second,
month. contrary to petitioner's contention, the questioned writ of preliminary
 Chua immediately started constructing a hollow-block fence in accordance injunction did not dispose of the main case without trial. The writ merely
with their contract. suspended the execution of the RTC judgment pending appeal. It bears
 Chua subsequently did not pay. Hence, Benedicto filed a case against Chua for stressing that the main case, subject of the Petition for Review , is still yet to
unlawful detainer and damages. In turn, Chua filed with the same court a be resolved by the Court of Appeals. Lastly, it is evident from Judge Pagapong-
petition for consignation docketed as Civil Case No. 26911. Agraviador's letter that the impugned judgment is not yet fully executed. Thus,
 The MTCC dismissed the consignation case for lack of jurisdiction as the said the acts sought to be enjoined by the assailed writ of preliminary injunction
case falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC. The MTCC found merit in the are not yet fait accompli.
complaint for unlawful detainer and damages.  Rule 70, Section 21 of the Revised Rules of Court on Forcible Entry and
 Chua appealed. The RTC modified the MTCC judgment. It dismissed the case Unlawful Detainer states:
for consignation, for lack of tender of payment and prior notice; ordered Chua  Immediate execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. - The
to immediately vacate or peacefully surrender possession to Benedicto; judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be
ordered the Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial Court in the City of Bacolod immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be
to turn over to Benedicto P46,500 and P18,000 upon presentation of the taken therefrom.
original receipts; ordered Benedicto to pay Chua P6,136.39 representing the  This section presupposes that the defendant in a forcible entry or unlawful
remaining value of the improvement constructed by the former, which is the detainer case is unsatisfied with the judgment of the Regional Trial Court and
perimeter hollow block fence, and deliver to Chua P4,672.64 deposited by the decides to appeal to a superior court. It authorizes the RTC to immediately
latter with the aforementioned judicial authorities in the excess of the rental issue a writ of execution without prejudice to the appeal taking its due course.
of the property as computed by the Court and ordered Chua to pay Benedicto It is our opinion that on appeal the appellate court may stay the said writ
the P10,000, attorney's fees and P5,000 for cost and other expenses. The RTC should circumstances so require.
also denied all other claims and counterclaims of the parties.  For the Court in which the issue of legal possession, whether involving
 November 2002, Chua filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review ownership or not, is brought to restrain, should a petition for preliminary
with prayer for temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or decision in the unlawful
 Meanwhile, on November 2002, the RTC of Bacolod City, issued a Writ of detainer case in order to await the final judgment in the more substantive case
Execution. involving legal possession or ownership. It is only where there has been
 However, in view of the aforesaid Petition for Review , the Court of Appeals forcible entry that as a matter of public policy the right to physical possession
issued a temporary restraining order on December 23, 2002, enjoining the should be immediately set at rest in favor of the prior possession regardless of
RTC from enforcing its decision the fact that the other party might ultimately be found to have superior claim
 On April 2003, Benedicto filed with the Court of Appeals an Urgent to the premises involved thereby to discourage any attempt to recover
Manifestation and Motion to Dissolve/Quash Temporary Restraining Order possession thru force, strategy or stealth and without resorting to the courts.
on the ground that the TRO had already become moot and academic.  Patently, even if RTC judgments in unlawful detainer cases are immediately
 Chua replied that the writ of execution issued by the RTC had not been fully executory, preliminary injunction may still be granted. There need only be
implemented because his properties and the improvements were still within clear showing that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against
the subject premises. which the writ is to be directed violate said right.

 In this case, we note that the Petition for Review filed with the Court of
Appeals raises substantial issues meriting serious consideration. Chua's
putative right to continued possession of the premises stands to be violated if
the adverse judgment of the RTC were to be fully executed. Hence, the
complete execution of the RTC judgment could be held in abeyance, through
a writ of preliminary injunction, until final resolution of the main controversy.
Dispositive
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
assailed Resolution, dated March 21, 2003, of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 73919 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

QUINAGORAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS 1. W/N the RTC has jurisdiction over all cases of recovery of possession regardless of
the value of the property involved? --NO
Petitioner/s: VICTORINO QUINAGORAN, Petitioner,
Respondent/s: COURT OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF JUAN DE LA
2. W/N the complaint must allege the assessed value of the property --YES
CRUZ, Respondents.
Held:
Doctrine: The doctrine that all cases of recovery of possession or accion
publiciana lies with the RTC regardless of the value of the property -- no
1. The doctrine that all cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies with the
longer holds true. As things now stand, a distinction must be made between
RTC regardless of the value of the property -- no longer holds true. As things now stand,
those properties the assessed value of which is below P20,000.00, if outside
a distinction must be made between those properties the assessed value of which is
Metro Manila; and P50,000.00, if within. A complaint must allege the
below P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila; and P50,000.00, if within.
assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest
thereon to determine jurisdiction.
Republic Act No. 7691 expressly provides:
Jurisdiction of the court does not depend upon the answer of the defendant
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
or even upon agreement, waiver or acquiescence of the parties.
original jurisdiction:
Facts: (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty
● The heirs of Juan dela Cruz filed a complaint for recovery of a parcel of land thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value
with damages before RTC of Cagayan against Quinagoran. exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except for forcible entry into and unlawful
● Quinagoran filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that the RTC has no detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the
jurisdiction over the case under R.A. No. 7691, which expanded the exclusive Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
original jurisdiction of the MTC to include all civil actions which involve title
to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein which does not In Atuel v. Valdez (G.R. No. 139561, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 517), the Court likewise
exceed P20,000.00. He argued that since the 346 sq m lot which he owns expressly stated that: Jurisdiction over an accion publiciana is vested in a court of
adjacent to the contested property has an assessed value of P1,730, the general jurisdiction. Specifically, the regional trial court exercises exclusive original
assessed value of the lot under controversy would not be more than the said jurisdiction “in all civil actions which involve x x x possession of real property.”
amount. However, if the assessed value of the real property involved does not exceed
● The RTC denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on the basis that the action is P50,000.00 in Metro Manila, and P20,000.00 outside of Metro Manila, the municipal
accion publicciana and therefore, its jurisdiction lies in the RTC, regardless of trial court exercises jurisdiction over actions to recover possession of real property.
the value of the property. The CA affirmed decision of the RTC.
● Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court claiming that under RA 7691, the
jurisdiction falls in the MTC. He likewise avers that it is an indispensable 2. In no uncertain terms, the Court has already held that a complaint must allege the
requirement that the complaint should allege the assessed value of the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to
property involved. The complaint does not alleged that the assessed value of determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. This is because the nature of the
the land in question is more than P20,000.00. There was also no tax action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is
declaration attached to the complaint to show the assessed value of the determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by
property. Respondents, therefore, failed to alleged that the RTC has the plaintiff and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the
jurisdiction over the case. plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein.
Issues: Nowhere in said complaint was the assessed value of the subject property ever
mentioned. There is therefore no showing on the face of the complaint that the RTC has
exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the respondents. Indeed, absent any allegation
in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it cannot be determined whether
the RTC or the MTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioner's action.
The courts cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of the land.
Jurisdiction of the court does not depend upon the answer of the defendant or even
upon agreement, waiver or acquiescence of the parties. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the
court over the nature of the action and the subject matter thereof cannot be made to
depend upon the defenses set up in the court or upon a motion to dismiss for, otherwise,
the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant.
Considering that the respondents failed to allege in their complaint the assessed value
of the subject property, the RTC seriously erred in denying the motion to dismiss.
Consequently, all proceedings in the RTC are null and void, and the CA erred in
affirming the RTC.

TABUJARA VS. JUDGE ASDALA co-equal and concurrent jurisdiction, respondent could not amend, revise,
modify or disturb the orders of the other courts;and that respondent violated
Petitioner/s: Atty. Ernesto Tabujara III
Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court on litigated motions which Rule calls
Respondent/s: Judge Fatima Gonzales-Asdala
for the setting of such motions for hearing and the service of copy thereof upon
the opposing party at least three days before the scheduled hearing.
Doctrine: Indirect or constructive contempt is committed “outside of the
● Complainant adds that respondents May 31, 2006 Order was issued after the
sitting of the court and may include misbehavior of an officer of the court
opposing counsel personally met and conferred with respondent in her
in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions,
chambers without the presence of his (complainants) counsel; and that after
disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or
issuing the Order, respondent personally summoned via telephone
command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or a judge, any abuse
complainants counsel to her chambers where she personally furnished him a
or any unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a court not
copy of the Order in the presence of opposing counsel.
constituting direct contempt, or any improper conduct tending directly or
Issue:
indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice.
● W/N Judge Asdala is guilty of gross ignorance of law
Ratio:
Facts: ● SC found the respondent guilty of gross ignorance of law and procedure.
● Petitioner charged Judge Asdala, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court ● As found by the CA, respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she
of Quezon City, Branch 87, with gross ignorance of the law and procedure, acted on the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Order Respondent to Comply with the
gross misconduct constituting violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, graft Writ of Habeas Corpus with Urgent Motion For Partial Reconsideration (Of
and corruption, knowingly rendering an unjust order, and culpable violation the Order dated May 31, 2006).
of the Constitution. ● That Judge Bay may have left the court premises in the afternoon of May
● Complainant was a party to these cases which were originally raffled to 31,2006 did not justify her acting on even date on motion of complainant’s
different branches but which were ordered consolidated and assigned to wife, asher authority as pairing judge commenced only the following day, June
Branch 86 presided by Judge Teodoro Bay (Judge Bay), they having involved 1, 2006, when Judge Bay’s leave of absence started; Nor did respondent’s
the same parties (complainant and his wife): 1) Violation of Republic Act No. opinion on the urgency of the case justify her sacrificing law and settled
9262 or the Violence Against Women and Their Children Act, filed by jurisprudence for the sake of expediency.
complainants wife against him praying for, among others, the issuance of ● Respondent also abused her contempt powers. If at all, complainant was guilty
Temporary Protection Order (TPO); 2) complainant against his wife for of indirect contempt.
declaration of nullity of marriage; and 3) petition for a writ of habeas corpus ● Indirect or constructive contempt is committed “outside of the sitting of the
filed by complainants wife against him involving their son Carlos Iigo R. court and may include misbehavior of an officer of the court in the
Tabujara (habeas corpus case). performance of his official duties or in his official transactions, disobedience
● On the same day (May 31) of the hearing in the habeas corpus case, of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a
complainant’s wife filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Order Respondent to court, or injunction granted by a court or a judge, any abuse or any unlawful
Comply with the Writ of Habeas Corpus with Urgent Motion For Partial interference with the process or proceedings of a court not constituting direct
Reconsideration. The motion contained no notice of hearing and no copy was contempt, or any improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede,
furnished herein complainant, albeit a copy was sent to his counsel via obstruct or degrade the administration of justice.
registered mail. ● For not affording complainant the opportunity to explain why he should not
● Also on May 31, 2006, respondent Presiding Judge of Branch 87, the pairing be cited in contempt, she blatantly disregarded Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
Judge of Branch 86 presided by Judge Bay who had filed a Leave of Absence In Lim v. Domagas where the therein judge declared the therein complainant
effective the following day or on June 1, 2006, acted on the motion of guilty of contempt and ordered his arrest for failure to bring three minors
complainants wife and amended Judge Bays May 31, 2006 order by advancing before the court without the benefit of a hearing, the Court faulted the therein
the production of the parties child from July 14, 2006 to June 1, 2006. judge not only for grave abuse of discretion but also for gross ignorance of the
● Hence, arose the present complaint, complainant contending that when law.
respondent issued her May 31, 2006 Order, Judge Bay was not yet on official
leave as it was yet to start the following day, June 1, 2006; that as a judge of a
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent GUILTY of gross
ignorance of law and procedure. She having been earlier dismissed from the service,
she is FINED the amount of Forty Thousand (P40,000) Pesos to be deducted from the
Eighty Thousand (P80,000) Pesos which this Court withheld pursuant to its January
15, 2008 Resolution in Edao v. Asdala.
SO ORDERED.

TOKIO MARINE MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY INC. VS. VALDEZ ● Afterwards, Valdez filed with the CA an "Urgent Notice of Taking of
Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Private Respondent Jorge Valdez For
Consolidated petitions
Purposes of the Above-Captioned Pending Case And For Such Other Legal
GR 150107
Purposes As May Be Warranted By Existing Law and Jurisprudence." This was
Petitioner/s: TOKIO MARINE MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY
due to the fact that respondent was already 75 years old and sickly
INCORPORATED, ALMA PEÑALOSA, KIMIO HOSAKA, SUMITOMI
● As such, petitioners filed with the CA a petition to cite respondent in
NISHIDA, TERESITA
contempt. They claim that he violated preliminary injunction issued by the
H. QUIAMBAO and ANTONIO B. LAPID,
court when he filed for the urgent notice of taking his deposition.
Respondent/s: JORGE VALDEZ
Issue:
GR 150108
● WON Valdez should be cited in contempt? No
Petitioner: TOKIO MARINE MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY
Ratio:
INCORPORATED and TERESITA H. QUIAMBAO
● Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court.
Respondent: JORGE VALDEZ
Such conduct tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into
disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice the parties or their witnesses
Doctrine:
during litigation. Rule 71 provides for two forms of contumacious acts — direct
Indirect contempt refers to contumacious acts perpetrated outside of the
and indirect.
sitting of the court and may include misbehavior of an officer of a court in
● Indirect contempt refers to contumacious acts perpetrated outside of the
the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions,
sitting of the court and may include misbehavior of an officer of a court in the
disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or
performance of his official duties or in his official transactions, disobedience
command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or a judge, any abuse
of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a
or any unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a court not
court, or injunction granted by a
constituting direct contempt, or any improper conduct tending directly or
court or a judge, any abuse or any unlawful interference with the process or proceedings
indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice.
of a court not constituting direct contempt, or any improper conduct tending directly
or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice.
Facts: ● It is governed by Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
● Tokio Marine Malayan Insurance Company Incorporated , is a domestic amended, which provides:
corporation engaged in the insurance business. The petitioners are its SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in
corporate officers. writing has been 􀀯filed and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment
● Respondent, Jorge Valdez, was a former unit manager of Tokio Marine thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or
pursuant to a Unit Management Contract entered into between them on by counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect
August 16, 1977. contempt:
● Subsequently, Valdez filed a complaint for damages against petitioner in the
RTC for violation of the terms of the Unit Management Contract. He claims (a) Misbehavior of an officer of court in the performance of his official duties or in his
that petitioners refused to pay him his commission and bonuses. This was official transactions;
docketed as Civil Case No. 98- 91356.
● Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss. During this period, Valdez also (b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court,
manifested that he had filed various criminal complaints against the including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or rejected from any real
petitioners in Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati. The RTC denied the property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or
motions to dismiss and MRs of the petitioners. attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the
● Petitioners then filed their "Answer Ad Cautelam" in Civil Case No. 98-91356. purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the
They also filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
order and preliminary injunction with the CA assailing the Order of the trial (c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the process or proceeding of a court
court denying their motions to dismiss. This was granted by the CA. not constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct, or degrade
the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court and acting as such without
authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of any person or property in the custody of an
officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.
● Before one may be convicted of indirect contempt, there must be compliance
with the following requisites:
(a) a charge in writing to be filed;
(b) an opportunity for respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be
fixed by the court; and
(c) an opportunity to be heard by himself or by counsel. These were all complied with
in this case.
● In this case, Valdez’s depositions was done in good faith. It was only triggered
by Petitioner’s use of June 09 and 28, 1999 depositions when at that time no
orders were issued by CA enjoining any of the proceedings. The use of the
petitioners of June 09 and 28 depositions have been vigorously objected to by
the private respondent, contending that there was a misunderstanding created
when the private respondent was cross-examined by the counsel for the
petitioners. In Valdez’s honest belief of the need to clarify such
misunderstanding in the previous depositions, the December 14, 1999
deposition was taken.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitions. The challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 52914 and CA-G.R. SP No. 56579 is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners. SO ORDERED

DIGITAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. CANTOS 2. Whether respondent-treasurer, not being a party to Digitel’s cited case,
can be held in contempt for refusing to abide by the decision therein - no
Petitioner/s: Digital Telecommunications Philippines, Inc.
Respondent/s: Jessie E. Cantos Ratio:
 1. Indeed, contempt is not a criminal offense. However, a charge for
Doctrine: The dismissal of an indirect contempt charge amounts to an contempt of court partakes of the nature of a criminal action. Rules that
acquittal, which effectively bars a second prosecution. govern criminal prosecutions strictly apply to a prosecution for contempt. In
fact, Section 11 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides that the
appeal in indirect contempt proceedings may be taken as in
Facts: criminal cases. This Court has held that an alleged condemner should be
 Digital Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (Digitel) was granted a accorded the same rights as that of an accused. Thus, the dismissal of the
legislative franchise to install, operate and maintain telecommunications indirect contempt charge against respondent amounts to an acquittal, which
systems throughout the Philippines. effectively bars a second prosecution.
 Seeking renewal of its Mayor’s permit, Digitel was informed by then Mayor  2. "Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in
Martinez that its business operation would be estrained should it fail to pay opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity. It signifies not only a willful
the assessed real property taxes. And as Digitel failed to pay, a cease and desist disregard or disobedience of the court’s order, but such conduct which tends
order was issued against it. to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute
or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice. It is a
 An annulment of said cease and desist order was filed by Digitel and such was
defiance of the authority, justice, or dignity of the court which tends to bring
granted. In addition to the annulment, the RTC further ruled that a cease and
the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with
desist is not one of the remedies granted the local government for the
or prejudice party-litigants or their witnesses during litigation."
collection of real property taxes; that such RPT is only applicable for
properties not used in connection with Digitel’s operation of its franchise. This  In this case, the acts of respondent in issuing the Warrants of Levy and in
ruling became final and executory. effecting the public auction sale of petitioner’s real properties, were neither
intended to undermine the authority of the court nor resulted to disobedience
 Some years after, Respondent-Treasurer issued several warrants of levy
to the lawful orders of Branch IX. He merely performed a ministerial function
against the properties of Digitel due to its delinquency in payment of RPT. To
which he is bound to perform under Sections 176 and 177 of RA 7160.
these warrants, Digitel raised the previously adjudicated case decreeing its
exemption and claimed it to be binding against respondent-treasurer.  Sec 176 provides for the issuance of the warrant of levy for delinquency in
paying RPT, while 177 provides for penalties against local treasurers who fail
 Because the warrants remained unlifted (court’s word lol), Digitel filed a
to issue or execute warrants of distraints or levy after the time prescribed/ or
petition for indirect contempt and prohibition with prayer for the
who is found guilty of abusing the exercise thereof.
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO.
 Respondent-treasurer is not bound by the Decision in Civil Case No. 3514.
 RTC dismissed the indirect contempt petition,ruling that since respondent
was not a party in Civil Case No. 3514, he had no duty to render obedience to  On digitel’s claim that respondent is barred by the Decision in the said case
the Decision therein. Furthermore, there being no identity of causes of action under the principle of res judicata, the Court declared such contention as
between Civil Case No. 3514 and Civil Case No. 4051, the former being an specious. "Res judicata means ‘a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted
action in personam, the Decision in said case binds only the parties impleaded upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment.’"
therein and their successors in interest, which do not include the respondent.  For res judicata to apply there must among others be, between the first and
 In an appeal before the CA, it noted that the dismissal of the case for the second actions, identity of the parties, identity of subject matter, and
indirect contempt by the RTC amounted to an acquittal from which identity of causes of action.Here, there is no identity of parties between Civil
an appeal is not allowed.In any case, respondent’s act of issuing the Case No. 3514 and the instant case. "Identity of parties exists ‘where the
warrants of levy did not constitute indirect contempt in Civil Case No. 3514 parties in both actions are the same, or there is privity between them, or they
since the final Decision issued in said case was not directed against him but to are successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the
the Mayor and the Chief of the Permit and License Division of Balayan, action, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same
Batangas. capacity.’"
  In Civil Case No. 3514, the action was directed against Benjamin E. Martinez,
Jr. and Francisco P. Martinez in their capacities as Mayor and Chief of the
Permit and License Division of the Municipality of Balayan, Batangas,
Issue: respectively.
1. Whether double jeopardy applies in a contempt proceeding - yes
 On the other hand, respondent, in the instant case, is being sued in his
capacity as Provincial Treasurer of the Province of Batangas. While the
defendants in both cases similarly sought to enforce the tax obligation of
petitioner, they were sued under different capacities. Moreover, there is no
identity in the causes of action between the two cases. In Civil Case No. 3514,
the propriety of the municipal officials’ closure/stoppage of petitioner’s
business operation in Balayan, Batangas was the one in question while what
is involved in this case is respondent’s act of issuing Warrants of Levy and
proceeding with the auction sale of the real properties of petitioner. Clearly,
the principle of res judicata does not apply. The RTC and the CA are therefore
correct in ruling that respondent, not being a party thereto, is not bound by
the Decision rendered in Civil Case No. 3514.
 Petitioner’s reliance on the rulings in Civil Case No. 3514 and Digital
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. v. Province of Pangasinan is misplaced.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision

dated July 24, 2007 and the Resolution dated October 11, 2007 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-GR. CR No. 29009 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LISTANA ● According to the Rules of Court, there are only two ways a person can be
charged with indirect contempt, namely, (1) through a verified petition; and
Petitioner/s: LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
(2) by order or formal charge initiated by the court motu proprio.
Respondent/s: SEVERINO LISTANA, SR.
● Justice Regalado explains that the requirement that there be a verified
petition is a regulatory mechanism against parties merely filing a motion for
Doctrine: Quasi-judicial agencies that have the power to cite persons for
commencing indirect contempt proceedings without paying any docket or
indirect contempt pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court can only do so
lawful fees.
by initiating them in the proper Regional Trial Court. It is not within their
● In this case, none of the modes were adopted to charge LBP’s manager with
jurisdiction and competence to decide the indirect contempt cases.
indirect contempt.
● The Rules of Court further provides, “The Regional Trial Court of the place
Facts: wherein the contempt has been committed shall have jurisdiction over such
● Listana is the owner of a parcel of land in Sorsogon. charges as may be filed therefore.”
● He voluntarily offered to sell his land to DAR under the Comprehensive ● Thus, quasi-judicial agencies that have the power to cite persons for indirect
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). contempt pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court can only do so by initiating
● DAR valued the property at P5,871,689.03, but as rejected by Listana. them in the proper Regional Trial Court. It is not within their jurisdiction and
● DARAB commenced summary administrative proceedings to determine the competence to decide the indirect contempt cases.
just compensation of the land; it valued the property at P10,956,963.25 ● Hence, the contempt proceedings initiated through an unverified "Motion for
● A Writ of Execution was issued by the PARAD directing the manager of Land Contempt" filed by the respondent with the PARAD were invalid for the
Bank to pay Listana. following reasons:
● Listana filed a Motion for Contempt with PARAD, alleging that Land Bank ○ First, the Rules of Court clearly require the filing of a verified petition
failed to comply with the Writ of Execution. with the Regional Trial Court, which was not complied with in this
● Land Bank filed with the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), a case. The charge was not initiated by the PARAD motu proprio;
petition for the determination of just compensation rather, it was by a motion filed by respondent.
● PARAD issued an Order granting the Motion for Contempt, as follows: ○ Second, neither the PARAD nor the DARAB have jurisdiction to
● Land Bank filed an MR, but was denied. Land Bank filed a Notice of Appeal decide the contempt charge filed by the respondent.
with the PARAD, manifesting its intention to appeal the decision to the
DARAB, Dispositive: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for review is
● The SAC dismissed the petition for determination of just compensation. MR GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65276, dated
was denied December 11, 2001, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the Regional Trial
● PARAD also denied the Notice of Appeal and ordered the issuance of an Alias Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 51, dated January 29, 2001, which enjoined the
Writ of Execution; it eventually directed the issuance of an Arrest Order Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB or anyone acting in its stead from enforcing its
against Land Bank’s Manager order of arrest against Mr. Alex A. Lorayes pending the final termination of the case
● Land Bank filed a petition for injunction with WPI to restrain PARAD from before Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52, is REINSTATED.
issuing the order of arrest. It was granted
● On a special civil action for certiorari, the CA nullified the decision
● Hence, this petition
Issue: WoN thee order for the arrest of LBP’s manager by the PARAD was valid - NO.
Ratio:
● The DARAB Rules provide that the Board may cite and punish any person for
indirect contempt on any of the grounds and in the manner prescribed under
Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.

TIONGCO VS. SALAO INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO RULE THAT TIONGCO IS GUILTY OF DIRECT
CONTEMPT OF COURT
Petitioner: JOSE B. TIONGCO
● We are unable to determine whether the acts and words uttered by
Respondent: JUDGE EVELYN E. SALAO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
complainant are contemptuous because of the unavailability of the
BRANCH 25, ILOILO CITY
transcript which would contain the verbal exchanges between the
complainant and respondent Judge and the description of the behavior of the
Doctrine: An order finding a person guilty of direct contempt may not be
complainant during such exchanges.
appealed. However, he may avail of certiorari or prohibition. The execution
● While it may be true that complainant committed direct contempt by his
of the order shall then be suspended pending the resolution of the petition.
disrespectful behavior in arguing his point in court, Judge Salao erred in
directing the police officers to place the complainant "in prison immediately."
Facts:
● Tiongco charges RTC Judge Evelyn Salao with gross ignorance of the law, IS IT IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY? NO.
gross incompetence, grave abuse of judicial power amounting to ● Rule 71, Section 2, of the Rules of Court provides that —
vindictiveness and unlawful imprisonment, arising from the Judge's Order, SEC. 2. Remedy therefrom. — The person adjudged in direct contempt by any court
citing him in direct contempt, sentencing him to 10 days imprisonment, may not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or
and ordering the police to place him in prison immediately. prohibition. The execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of
● Tiongco is a lawyer engaged in the practice of law. He is the counsel for the such petition, provided such person files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the
accused in 3 criminal cases. Several motions were set for hearing before Judge judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the
Salao. Tiongco alleged that after the prosecutor had argued against the petition be decided against him.
motions, he stood up to argue in support of the same, but he was allegedly ● An order of direct contempt is not immediately executory or enforceable. The
prevented because Judge Salao declared the motions submitted for contemner must be afforded a reasonable remedy to extricate or purge himself
resolution. When he vehemently objected to the Judge's order and protested of the contempt.
his being prevented from speaking, Judge Salao cited him for direct contempt. ● Evidently, respondent Judge erred in ordering the immediate imprisonment
○ He further stated that while he was frantically manifesting his of the complainant after declaring him in direct contempt of court. She should
readiness to post a bond and to appeal the order by certiorari to stay have given complainant the opportunity to avail himself of the remedies
its execution, the Judge Salao suddenly left the courtroom, entered provided by law. Complainant cannot be faulted for not availing the remedies
her chambers and locked herself up. Thus, the policemen present had of posting of a bond and filing a certiorari case questioning respondent
no choice but to immediately execute the order by placing him in jail. Judge's order of contempt, as he was immediately arrested.
● Judge Salao denied she prevented the complainant from expressing his
arguments in support of his motions. She averred that complainant had been Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, we find Judge Evelyn
talking in support of his motions for at least 5 minutes before she suggested to E. Salao GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of authority and a fine
submit his motions for resolution as there were 10 other cases to be heard for of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS is hereby IMPOSED upon her, with a
the day. However, Tiongco refused to stop talking. He even shouted louder in STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be
a defiant manner uttering derogatory remarks. That was the time respondent dealt with more severely. Atty. Jose B. Tiongco is also REMINDED of his professional
Judge declared him in contempt, but the latter continued shouting at the top duty as a member of the bar to observe proper decorum both in language and behavior
of his voice threatening to file an administrative case against the former. in his dealings with the courts and the Judges thereof.
Issue:
● Whether or not Atty. Tiongco is guilty of direct contempt of court.
INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION
● Whether the Order finding Tiongco guilty of direct contempt is immediately
executory. NO.
Ratio:
TOPIC XXXI – EXECUTION c. Petitioner-buyers moved for its execution, which was granted. The
TCT in favor of the Eranas and Aquinos was cancelled and the TCT
DAVIS VS. DAVIS in the names of the respondent-buyers restored.
(2018) - J. Velasco, Jr. 6. On July 13, 2016, petitioner-buyers filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation
and Motion for the implementation of the Decision of Malolos RTC (Br. 78)
Petitioner/s: Spouses Larry and Flora Davis
[Fact #3a], praying for the issuance of a writ of execution to direct the
Respondent/s: Spouses Florencio and Lucresia Davis
respondent-buyers to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor, or in the
absence of the former, to appoint the clerk of court to execute the same.
NOTE: WILL USE PETITIONER-BUYERS AND RESPONDENT-
7. In an Order, Malolos RTC (Br. 78) denied the petitioner-buyers’ Urgent Ex-
SELLERS SINCE THEY’RE BOTH SPOUSES DAVIS
Parte Manifestation and Motion, explaining that the consequent filing of
annulment of title involving the subject property before Malolos RTC (Br. 15)
Doctrine: Under Rule 39, Section 6, a "judgment may be executed within five
does not toll the running of the period. The CA affirmed.
(5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and
executory.” However, when delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the
Issue: WoN a writ of execution may still be issued - YES
judgment debtor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage, the Court may
allow the execution by motion even after the lapse of five years.
Ratio:
1. [General rule] Under Rule 39, Section 6, a "judgment may be executed within
Facts: five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and
1. Petitioner-buyers and respondent-sellers entered into a Contract to Sell executory.”
over a lot in Bulacan. 2. [Exception] However, there had been many instances where the Court allowed
a. Respondent-sellers agreed to execute the Deed of Absolute Sale upon execution by motion even after the lapse of five years, upon meritorious
full payment. grounds.
2. After full payment and despite repeated demands, respondent-sellers failed a. These exceptions have one common denominator: the delay is
and refused to execute the Deed. caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment debtor and/or is
3. Petitioner-buyers filed a Complaint for Specific Performance and incurred for his benefit or advantage.
Damages before Malolos RTC (Br. 78). A notice of lis pendens was 3. Here, the decision sought to be enforced became final and executory on
attached to the TCT. October 2, 2004.
a. In its Decision, Malolos RTC (Br. 78) ruled in favor of petitioner- a. A writ of execution was issued in 2005, which was well within the
buyers. The CA affirmed. said five-year period. The writ was repeatedly returned unserved and
b. The Br. 78 Decision became final and executory after the CA affirmed unimplemented because respondent-sellers sold the subject
it on October 2, 2004. property to other parties. Worse, a new title has already been issued
4. A writ of execution was issued, but it was not properly implemented because to the latter.
respondent-buyers sold the subject property to the Eranas and Aquinos, who b. As such, the petitioner-buyers were compelled to file an action for
were issued a new TCT. annulment of title and document. The court ruled in petitioners-
a. The petitioner-buyers moved for the cancellation of TCT and for the buyers’ favor and the execution of the judgment resulted into the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan to issue a new one in their favor, but cancellation of the title.
this was denied on the ground that the new registered owners were c. The motion for execution filed on July 13, 2016 was almost 12 years
not privies to the case. after the decision became final and executory.
5. Petitioner-buyers filed an action for annulment of title and document before 4. Petitioner-buyers, however, maintain that the period during which it was
Malolos RTC (Br. 15) against the Eranas and Aquinos. compelled to file another action involving the subject property just to enable
a. Malolos RTC (Br. 15) ruled in favor of the petitioner-buyers. a complete and effective relief in their favor should not be taken into account
b. This Decision became final and executory. in the computation of the five-year period.
a. The Court sustained the petitioners-buyers’ position.

b. Considering that the delay was due to the fault of respondent-buyers,
it is only logical, just, and equitable that the period during which an
action for annulment of title and document was being litigated upon
shall be deemed to have tolled the running of the five-year period for
enforcement of a judgment by mere motion. Otherwise, the
respondent-sellers were rewarded for escaping the fulfillment of
their obligation.
5. In computing the time limited for suing out an execution, the time during
which execution is stayed should be excluded, and the time will be extended
by any delay occasioned by the debtor.
6. The purpose of the law in prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgments
or actions is to prevent obligors from sleeping on their rights.
a. The statute of limitations was not devised against those who wish to
act but cannot do so for causes beyond their control.
b. In the case under consideration, there has been no indication that
the petitioner-buyers had ever slept on their rights to have the
judgment executed by mere motions within the reglementary period.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The CA Resolutions

dated May 22, 2017 and August 10, 2017 in CA-G.R. SP No. 150626 and the Order dated
February 7, 2017 of the RTC Malolos, Branch 78 in Civil Case No. 581-M-95 are, thus,
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion filed by
petitioners on July 13, 2016 in said civil case is hereby GRANTED. The RTC Malolos,
Branch 78 is ordered to immediately issue a writ of execution in favor of petitioners-
spouses Larry and Flora Davis to execute and implement the Decision dated February
13, 1998, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, this Court resolves the instant case in favor
of plaintiffs Larry and Flora Davis and against defendants Florencio and Lucresia Davis
ordering the aforesaid defendants to:
1. Execute the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of herein plaintiffs covering the
500-square meter land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-226201,
and cause the necessary registration thereof to the Register of Deeds of
Meycauayan;
2. Pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiffs the following amounts, to wit:
a. 50k as moral damages
b. 30k as exemplary damages
c. 40k as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses
3. Pay, jointly and severally, the costs of suit

BPI VS. GUEVARRA
Petitioner/s:
Respondent/s:
Doctrine:
Facts:
●
Issue:
●
Ratio:
●
Dispositive:

ACBANG VS. LUCZON, JR., appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as
determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract,
Petitioner/s: HERMINIA ACBANG
he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use and
Respondent/s: HON. JIMMY H.F. LUCZON, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE,
occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 01, SECOND JUDICIAL REGION,
by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month
TUGUEGARAO CITY, CAGAYAN, and SPOUSES MAXIMO LOPEZ and HEIDI
or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with
L. LOPEZ,
the papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed.
Doctrine: To stay the immediate execution of the judgment in an ejectment
.HELD:
case, the defendant must perfect an appeal, file a supersedeas bond, and
● Here, there was no indication of the date when the petitioner filed her notice
periodically deposit the rentals becoming due during the pendency of the appeal.
of appeal. Her petition stated simply that she had filed a "timely notice of
Otherwise, the writ of execution will issue upon motion of the plaintiff.
appeal which was given due course without the respondents filing a motion
for execution in the Municipal Trial Court of Alcala, the court a quo."11 On the
Facts: other hand, the Spouses Lopez filed in the RTC their motion for execution
● Respondent Sps. Lopez commenced an ejectment suit against the petitioner, pending appeal on February 19, 2004.
her son Benjamin Acbang, Jr. and his wife Jean (Acbangs) in the MTC of ● The judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately
Alcala, Cagayan. The defendants did not file their answer. Thus, the MTC executory, but the defendant, to stay its immediate execution, must: (1) perfect
rendered its decision in favor of the Spouses Lopez. an appeal; (2) file a supersede s bond; and (3) periodically deposit the rentals
● The petitioner appealed to the RTC. becoming due during the pendency of the appeal. Although the petitioner
● In the meantime, the Spouses Lopez moved for the execution of the decision correctly states that the Spouses Lopez should file a motion for execution
pending appeal in the RTC, alleging that the defendants had not filed a pending appeal before the court may issue an order for the immediate
supersedeas bond to stay the execution. The Acbangs opposed the motion for execution of the judgment, the spouses Lopez are equally correct in pointing
execution pending appeal,insisting that the failure of the Spouses Lopez to out that they were entitled to the immediate execution of the judgment in view
move for the execution in the MTC constituted a waiver of their right to the of the Ac bangs failure to comply with all of the three abovementioned
immediate execution; and that, therefore, there was nothing to stay, rendering requisites for staying the immediate execution. The filing of the notice of
the filing of the supersedeas bond unnecessary. appeal alone perfected the appeal but did not suffice to stay the immediate
In his assailed order dated March 31, 2004, Judge Luczon granted the motion for execution without the filing of the sufficient supersede s bond and the deposit
immediate execution, viz: of the accruing rentals.
xxxxx ● The foregoing notwithstanding, the decision of the R TC favored the petitioner
The Motion for Execution is hereby granted, there being no Motion to Fix Supersedeas because it declared the judgment of the MTC void as far as she was concerned
bond filed by [the Acbangs] as of the date of the filing of the Motion for lack of jurisdiction over her person. The RTC thus directed the MTC to
xxxx. cause the service of the summons on her and to conduct further proceedings
ISSUE: without any delay. In effect, the supervening declaration of the nullity of the
WON JUDGE LUCZON COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN GRANING MOTION FOR judgment being sought to be executed against her has rendered moot and
IMMEDIATE EXECUTION OF THE SPS.LOPEZ WITHOUT FIRST FIXING THE academic the issue in this special civil action as far as she was concerned.
SUPERSEDEAS BOND AS PRAYED FOR BY THE ACBANGS
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for prohibition for being moot and
Relevant Provision academic, without pronouncement on costs of suit.
Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reads: SO ORDERED.
Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. — If judgment is
rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion unless
an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient
supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the
plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment
appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the
SAN BUENAVENTURA VS. MIGRINO ● Complainant maintained that respondent Migriño should be administratively
sanctioned for setting the hearings of various motions in their case over long
Petitioner/s: RAUL K. SAN BUENAVENTURA
periods of time and for unduly interfering in Civil Case No. 6798.
Respondent/s: TIMOTEO A. MIGRIÑO, CLERK OF COURT III,
Issue:
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 69, PASIG CITY
● W/N the respondent clerk of court is guilty of simple neglect for the delay in
scheduling the Motion for Issuance of the Writ of Execution? - Yes
Doctrine: Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a
● W/N a separate administrative complaint should be filed against the judge? -
judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration
Yes
of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.
Ratio:
● In a Resolution, the Court referred the same to the Executive Judge of the
Facts: MeTC, Pasig City, for investigation, report and recommendation.
● This administrative case originates from a complaint for gross neglect of duty, ● In a Report, Executive Judge Marina Gaerlan-Mejorada recommended that
undue interference on a case, and violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical respondent Migriño be found guilty of simple neglect of duty, for which he
Standards for Public Officials and Employees filed by complainant San should be fined an amount equivalent to his two months salary.
Buenaventura against respondent Migriño, Clerk of Court III of the MeTC, ● Court referred the instant administrative matter to the Office of the Court
Branch 69 of Pasig City, relative to Civil Case No. 6798 for unlawful detainer. Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and recommendation.
● Complainant alleged that after the decision of this SC in Civil Case No. 6798 ● The OCA modified the penalty recommended by Executive Judge from a fine
became final and executory on April 3, 2006, he filed a Motion for Issuance of equivalent to two months salary to suspension of two months without salary
Writ of Execution on August 17, 2006, requesting that the said motion be and benefits after finding respondent Migriño guilty of simple neglect of duty.
heard on August 22, 2006. However, respondent Migriño set the hearing on ● In the instant case, it is incumbent upon respondent Migriño as the Clerk of
October 13, 2006 and refused to grant complainant’s request for an earlier Court and the administrative assistant of the judge, to assist in the
setting. management of the calendar of the court, particularly in the scheduling of
● Complainant asked respondent Migriño if the MeTC had already received a cases and in all other matters not involving the exercise of discretion or
copy of the SC decision and entry of judgment, emphasizing upon respondent judgment of the judge.
that there was no need for the records of the case and that a certified true copy ● Here, respondent Migriño showed carelessness and indifference in the
of the decision and its entry of judgment were sufficient for the issuance of a performance of his duties. He cannot simply reason that "he had nothing to
writ of execution. do with the resetting and the setting of the hearings.
● According to complainant, respondent claimed that the MeTC was not yet ● Indeed, as found by the Investigating Judge and the OCA, respondent Migriño
served a copy of the SC decision and entry of judgment, however, upon further was guilty of delay in scheduling the Motion for Issuance of the Writ of
inquiries complainant discovered that the MeTC had already received its Execution particularly when the subject decision in Civil Case No. 6798, an
copies as early as August 7, 2006. unlawful detainer case that is governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure,
● Complainant further alleged that he and his counsel requested respondent had already become final and executory.
Migriño on several occasions to inform the MeTC Presiding Judge of the SC ● As such, respondent Migriño should have given preference to complainant
decision and the entry of judgment so that their pending motion could be San Buenaventura's motion which was filed on August 17, 2006. Granting that
resolved. These requests, however, were not acted upon by respondent the requested date for hearing fell on a Tuesday, a non-hearing day for the
Migriño, forcing complainant to file a Motion with Leave of Court for the Acting Presiding Judge, respondent Migriño should have set the date of the
Immediate Resolution of Plaintiff's Motion for the Issuance of Writ of next hearing well within the 10-day period mandated under Section 5, Rule 15
Execution. of the Rules of Court.
● It was only on July 20, 2007 when the said motion for the issuance of a writ ● In a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss dated June 1, 2011, Emelinda P.
of execution was finally resolved, or after almost a year from the date of filing Migriño, wife of respondent Migriño, wrote to the Court and prayed for the
of said motion. With regard to the issuance of the writ of execution, dismissal of the instant case due to respondent Migriño's death on December
complainant also stated that despite repeated follow-ups and requests, 11, 2010
respondent Migriño belatedly issued the said writ only on November 14, 2007,
or after almost four months from the time the order of its issuance was given.
● The OCA modified and reduced the said penalty, and recommended a fine
equivalent to one month salary for humanitarian consideration by reason of
the death of the respondent
● The recommendation of the OCA to file a separate administrative complaint
against Judge Ongpauco for undue delay in resolving the motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 6798 is well-taken. We quote
the findings of the OCA, thus:
● However, the delay in the execution of the judgment could not be wholly
attributed to the respondent, but also to Acting Presiding Judge Ongpauco as
it concerned judicial orders issued by her.
● It must be pointed out that the subject decision in Civil Case No. 6798 had
already become final and executory. In fact, an entry of judgment was already
issued by the Supreme Court where the case was elevated. Hence, as such,
execution of the said decision should have been issued as a matter of right, in
accordance with Section 1, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
● "Section 1. Execution upon judgment or final orders. — Execution shall issue
as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the
action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if
no appeal has been duly perfected."
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, this Court nds Timoteo A. Migriño, former Clerk of Court III,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 69, Pasig City, GUILTY of simple neglect of duty and
imposes upon him a FINE equivalent to his one (1) month salary to be deducted from
the retirement benefits due him. Thereafter, let this matter be considered CLOSED
AND TERMINATED with regard to respondent Migriño.
Furthermore, let a separate administrative complaint be led against Judge Jacqueline

J. Ongpauco, Acting Presiding Judge, MeTC (Branch 69), Pasig City for undue delay in
resolving the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 6798, to be
re-docketed as a regular administrative matter.

ANAMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS ● W/N the decision should be executed - YES
Ratio:
Petitioner/s: Douglas Anama
● The court finds no compelling reason to stay the execution of the judgment
Respondent/s: Phil. Savings Bank, Sps. Co and the Register of Deeds of Manila
because Spouses Co complied with the notice and hearing requirements under
Rule 15.
Doctrine: Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party
● It is basic that every motion must contain the mandatory requirement s of
can have it executed as a matter of right, and the judgment debtor need not be
notice and hearing and that there must be proof of service thereof.
given advance notice of the application for execution.
● The Court has consistently held that a motion that fails to comply with the
above requirements is considered a worthless piece of paper which should not
Facts: be acted upon.
● Anama and Phil. Savings Bank (PSB) entered into a contract to buy on ● The rule, however, is not absolute. There are motions that can be acted upon
installment basis of a real property owned by PSB. Anama defaulted in paying, by the court ex parte if these would not cause prejudice to the other party.
thus PSB rescinded the contract. They are not strictly covered by the rigid requirement of the rules on notice
● PSB sold the property to Sps. Co, who, after paying in full, caused the and hearing of motions.
registration of the property in their names. ● Sps. Co’s motion is such kind of motion. The judgment sought to be executed
● Anama filed in the RTC a complaint for declaration of nullity of deed of sale, in this case had already become final and executory. As such, sps. Co have
cancellation of TCT, and specific performance against PSB and Sps. Co. every right to the issuance of a writ of execution and the RTC has the
● RTC dismissed the complaint and upheld the validity of the sale between PSB ministerial duty to enforce the same.
and Sps. Co. The decision became final and executory on July 12, 2004. Sps. ● Such right is based on Rule 39, Sec. 1 and 2. “ Execution shall issue as a matter
Co moved for execution. of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or
● Anama moved for reconsideration alleging that the Sps. Co’s motion for proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal
execution was pro forma because it lacked the required affidavit of service and has been duly perfected.”
has a defective notice of hearing. RTC denied the MR. ● It is clear that Sec. 1 does not prescribe that a copy of the motion for the
● Anama questioned the order before CA. execution of a final and executory judgment be served on the defeated party.
● (In 2008) CA dismissed the petition and held that the issue on the validity of ● We ruled that once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing
the sale had long been laid to rest considering that it became final and party can have it executed as a matter of right, and the judgment debtor need
executory on July 12, 2004. Hence, the execution was already a matter not be given advance notice of the application for execution.
of right on part of the respondents and the RTC had the ministerial ● In the present case, the decision ordering partition and the rendition of
duty to issue a writ of execution enforcing the decision. accounting had already become final and executory. The execution thereof
○ Although notice of hearing and affidavit of service in a motion is thus became a matter of right on the part of the plaintiffs, herein private
mandatory, the motion for execution of a final and executory respondents, and is a mandatory and ministerial duty on the part of the court.
decision could be acted upon by the RTC ex parte, and is therefore Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have
excused from the mandatory requirements. it executed as a matter of right, and the judgment debtor need not be given
● Petitioner argues that respondents failed to substantially comply with the rule advance notice of the application for execution nor be afforded prior hearings
on notice and hearing, thus the motion for execution was a mere scrap of thereon.
paper.
● Sps. Co argues that the petition should be dismissed for raising questions of Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED
facts and law in violation of Sec. 1 Rule 45. That the issues had long been
threshed out by the Court.
● PSB points out that the notice of hearing appended to the motion for execution
filed by the Spouses Co substantially complied with the requirements of the
Rules since petitioner’s then counsel of record was duly notified and furnished
a copy of the questioned motion for execution.
Issue:
RUBIO VS. ALABATA inform petitioners of the issued entry of judgment before she resigned from
PAO sometime in November 1997
Petitioner/s: RUFA A. RUBIO
● In November 2007, or more than ten (10) years from the date when the RTC-
Respondent/s: LOURDES ALABATA
43 decision was entered in the CA Book of Entries of Judgments, petitioners
found out that the said decision had become final and executory when their
Doctrine: Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party
nephew secured a copy of the Entry of Judgment.
can have it executed as a matter of right by mere motion within five (5) years
● Petitioners, through PAO-Dumaguete, filed an action for revival of judgment
from the date of entry of judgment. If the prevailing party fails to have the
● RTC dismissed petitioners' case for revival of judgment on the ground of
decision enforced by a motion after the lapse of five (5) years, the said judgment
prescription
is reduced to a right of action which must be enforced by the institution of a
● CA affirmed
complaint in a regular court within ten (10) years from the time the judgment
Issue:
becomes final.
● WON THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN STRICTLY APPLYING THE
PROCEDURAL RULES ON PRESCRIPTION AND DISMISSING THE CASE
To allow a strict application of the rules, however, would result in an injustice to
DESPITE THE FACT THAT PETITIONERS WILL SUFFER MANIFEST
petitioners considering (1) that respondent decided not to contest the RTC-43
INJUSTICE AND DEPRIVATION OF THEIR PROPERTY, DUE TO A FAULT
decision and withdrew her appeal and (2) that no fault could be attributed to
NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO THEM - YES
petitioners.
Ratio:
● This case falls under Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
Although strict compliance with the rules of procedure is desired, liberal
which states:
interpretation is warranted in cases where a strict enforcement of the rules will
● SEC.6. Execution by motion or by independent action. A final and executory
not serve the ends of justice; and that it is a better rule that courts, under the
judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the
principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of
date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the
limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice
statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived
would result.
judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date
of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of
Facts: limitations.
● Petitioners Rufa A. Rubio, Bartolome Bantoto, Leon Alagadmo, Rodrigo ● It appears from the records that a copy of the Entry of Judgment was sent to
Delicta, and Adriano Alabata and respondent Lourdes Alabata (respondent) Atty. Ma. Lourdes Naz, the SAC-PAO lawyer in charge of their case, who had
were protagonists in an earlier case for annulment of declaration of heirship resigned. Unfortunately, she failed to inform petitioners of the said entry of
and sale, reconveyance and damages before the RTC Dumaguete judgment before her resignation.
● The case was decided in favor of petitioners ● It was only in November 2007, when petitioners actually discovered that their
● In its October 31, 1995 Decision, the RTC-43 (1) voided the "Declaration of victory was already final after their nephew secured a copy of the entry of
Heirship and Sale;" (2) ordered respondent to reconvey the entire subject judgment from RTC-43.
property to petitioners; (3) dismissed respondent's counterclaim; and (4) ● Indeed, both the RTC-42 and the CA were acting in accordance with the rules
ordered her to pay moral and exemplary damages plus the cost of suit. and jurisprudence when they dismissed the action for revival of judgment.
● Not in conformity, respondent elevated the RTC-43 case to the CA. She, ● Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have
however, later withdrew her appeal which paved the way for the RTC-43 it executed as a matter of right by mere motion within five (5) years from the
Decision to lapse into finality. The CA resolution granting respondent's date of entry of judgment. If the prevailing party fails to have the decision
motion to withdraw became final and executory enforced by a motion after the lapse of five (5) years, the said judgment is
● Unfortunately, the judgment was not executed. Petitioners claim that their reduced to a right of action which must be enforced by the institution of a
counsel at the Public Attorney's Office, Dumaguete City (PAO-Dumaguete), complaint in a regular court within ten (10) years from the time the judgment
was never informed that the entry of judgment had already been issued. becomes final.
● They explained that although a copy of the Entry of Judgment was sent to Atty. ● To allow a strict application of the rules, however, would result in an injustice
Ma. Lourdes Naz, the SAC-PAO lawyer in charge of their case, she failed to to petitioners considering (1) that respondent decided not to contest the RTC-
43 decision and withdrew her appeal and (2) that no fault could be attributed
to petitioners.
● Petitioners could not afford to engage the services of a private counsel and so
were represented by the PAO. As has been repeatedly stated all over the
records, PAO, SAC-PAO in particular, failed them. SAC-PAO never informed
them of the abandonment by respondent of her appeal or of the entry of
judgment. Under the circumstances, they could not be faulted for their
subsequent actions.
● Due to their penury and unfamiliarity or downright ignorance of the rules,
they could not be expected to bypass PAO-Dumaguete and directly verify the
status of the case with the SAC-PAO.
● No prejudice is caused to respondent because she withdrew her appeal.
● Due to the peculiarities of this case, the Court, in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction, relaxes the rules and decides to allow the action for the revival of
judgment filed by petitioners.
● Although strict compliance with the rules of procedure is desired, liberal
interpretation is warranted in cases where a strict enforcement of the rules
will not serve the ends of justice; and that it is a better rule that courts, under
the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of
limitations or the doctrine of laches when to do so, manifest wrong or injustice
would result.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The November 16, 2011 Decision and the
September 26, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 02497 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court
for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.

ABRIGO VS. FLORES  Court denied petitioner’s motion to defer resolution of respondents’ motion
for a special order of demolition and directed the issuance of an alias writ of
Petitioner/s: SIMPLICIA O. ABRIGO and DEMETRIO ABRIGO execution.
Respondent/s: JIMMY F. FLORES, EDNA F. FLORES, DANILO FLORES,
BELINDA FLORES, HECTOR FLORES, MARITES FLORES, HEIRS OF MARIA  Petitioners instituted a special civil action for certiorari in the CA against
F. FLORES, JACINTO FAYLONA, ELISA FAYLONA MAGPANTAY, respondents and the RTC, alleging GADALEJ by RTC in denying their motion
MARIETTA FAYLONA CARTACIANO, and HEIRS of TOMASA BANZUELA to defer resolution and motion for reconsideration.
VDA. DE FAYLONA  CA: Dismissed the petition for certiorari
Doctrine: A supervening event is an exception to the execution as a matter of Issue:

right of a final and immutable judgment only if it directly affects the matter  WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari - NO
already litigated and settled or subsequently changes the rights or relations of
the parties. Ratio:
 CA correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari. The November 20, 1989
decision of RTC became final after its affirmance by the CA and having no
Facts: further appellate proceedings after such. The CA then issued its entry of
 Petitioners seek to reverse the decision of the CA where it directed the RTC to judgment.
issue a special order of demolition to implement the RTC judgment.  The contention of petitioners that the sale by Jimmy Flores to them was a
 The subject property is a 402 sqm lot in Alaminos, Laguna, inherited by both supervening event that rendered the execution inequitable is devoid of
Francisco Faylona (respondents) and Gaudencia Faylona (petitioner) from merit.
their deceased parents. There was no partition that took place so the heirs of  It is true that there are exceptions to the execution as a matter of right of a
Francisco Faylona filed a complaint for judicial partition in the RTC. final and immutable judgment, one of which is supervening event, but only if
 In November 20, 1989, RTC granted such petition and ordered the partition. it directly affects the matter already litigated and settled or substantially
Heirs of Gaudencia, petitioners included, went on appeal to CA. Affirmed. changes the rights or relations of the parties. Such did not obtain here.
Without further appellate proceedings, an Entry of Judgment was issued.  A supervening event consists of facts that transpire after the judgment became
 Petitioners filed with the court a quo a motion for execution to enforce and final and executory. Here, however, the sale by Jimmy Flores of the ¼ share
implement its decision. Pending action and pursuant to the parties’ agreement in the western portion did not modify or alter the judgment. It was also
to engage the services of a geodetic engineer to survey and subdivide the land, regarded with suspicion by the CA because petitioners had not adduce
RTC issued an order appointing Engr. Donato to cause the survey and evidence of such transaction.
subdivision of the land within 30 days from receipt thereof.  The correct course of action by petitioners was to initiate a proceeding for
 The Court directed the petitioners to remove all their improvements which partition of the western portion based on the supposed sale to them by Jimmy
encroached on the western half. Flores.
 Petitioners prayed for a final extension of 60 days within which to comply with  The petitioners have delayed the full implementation of the final and
the order. RTC denied motion for extension of time. On February 6, 1998, the immutable decision for 17 years now. It is high time then that the Court puts
court issued a writ of execution. a firm stop to the long delay to finally enable the heirs of Francisco Faylona to
 On Feb. 12, 1998, the sheriff served the writ on petitioners, giving them a enjoy the fruits of the judgment in their favor.
period of 20 days from notice or until March 4, 1998. On March 6, the sheriff
returned the writ “PARTIALLY SATISFIED” stating that petitioners failed to Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review;
remove that portion of their residence as well as their garage and poultry AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on September 25, 2002 in C.A.-G.R. SP
fence. No. 48033; DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, in San Pablo City
 Respondents filed with the RTC a Motion for Issuance of Special Order of to issue forthwith the special order of demolition to implement its final and
Demolition. Subsequently, petitioners filed a Motion to Defer Resolution on executory decision of November 20, 1989, as modified by the Court of
Motion for Demolition, alleging that they have become one of the co-owners Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 25347; DECLARES this decision to be
of the western half to the extent of 53.75 sqm, because one of the successors-
immediately executory; and ORDERS petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
in-interest of Francisco Faylona, Jimmy Flores, sold to them his share in the
western half.

PAREL VS. PRUDENCIO be inequitable to order him to pay monthly rentals “until he actually vacates”
when it has not been determined when he actually vacated. He would be
Petitioner/s: DANILO L. PAREL paying monthly rentals indefinitely.
Respondent/s: HEIRS OF SIMEON PRUDENCIO  RTC should have determined via hearing if Danilo’s allegation were true and
accordingly modified the period Danilo is to be held accountable for monthly
Doctrine: In judgments final and executory, one of the exceptions in enforcing rentals.
such is that when there has been a change in the situation of parties making  Banaga v. Majaducon enumerates the instances where a writ of execution may
execution inequitable or unjust. In ejectment cases, when the party is ordered be appealed:
to pay monthly rentals “until he actually vacates”, there must be a final 1) the writ of execution varies the judgment;
determination of when he actually vacated to prevent an inequitable or 2) there has been a change in the situation of the parties
unjust execution, which is one of the exceptions in enforcing a judgment making execution inequitable or unjust;
3) execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from
already final and executory.
execution;
4) it appears that the controversy has never been subject to the
Facts: judgment of the court;
5) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains
 Complaint for recovery of possession and damages was filed by Simeon
room for interpretation thereof; or
Prudencio (Simeon) against Danilo Parel (Danilo) with the RTC Baguio.
6) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently
 Simeon alleged that he was the owner of a 2-story house at Forbes Park issued, or that it is defective in substance, or is issued against the
National Reservation in Baguio. Simeon allowed Danilo and his parents to live wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise
on the ground floor since his wife was the elder sister of Danilo’s Father, satis􀀯ed, or the writ was issued without authority.
Florentino.
 The instant case falls under one of the exceptions above. The fact that Danilo
 Simeon needed the whole house back and informed Danilo that they had to has left the property under dispute is a change in the situation of the parties
vacate. Danilo remained in the house despite repeated demands to surrender that would make execution inequitable or unjust.
the premises.
 Danilo’s situation merits a relaxation of the rules since special circumstances
 Danilo: The land was in his father’s name, Florentino. His father did not have are involved; to determine if his allegation were true would allow a final
enough funds to build a house and made a deal with Simeon for them to resolution of the case.
contribute money for the construction of a house on Florentino’s land. Simeon
and Florentino were thus co-owners of the house.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R.
 Simeon instituted an action for recovery of possession and damages. RTC
SP No. 105709 is hereby SET ASIDE. The RTC, Branch 60 in Baguio City is ORDERED
ruled in favor of Danilo. CA reversed.
to determine the actual date petitioner left the subject premises before issuing the writ
 Danilo challenged the CA decision before SC via an appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45. SC affirmed CA’s decision. of execution in Civil Case No. 2493-R that will be based on the resolution of said issue.
 Simeon sought to enforce SC’s decision and filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ
of Execution. Danilo filed a Comment praying that the 2,000 monthly rental
he was ordered to pay be computed from April 1988 to March 1994 only since
he had vacated the premises by April 1994. Denied.
 Danilo filed a Supplemental Petition with Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the RTC from enforcing the
judgment against Danilo for him to pay 2k monthly rentals from April 1994
onwards.
Issue:
 WON CA committed an error of law in upholding RTC’s order - Yes
Ratio:
 It is true that Danilo should have brought to the Court’s attention the date he
actually left the subject premises at an earlier time. RTC is also correct in
ruling that the judgment was already final and executory. However, it would

2D Civpro Digests Compilation Judge Boom PDF

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2D CIVPRO DIGESTS COMPILATION BPI V HONTANOSAS .................................................................................................

TOPIC II – JURISDICTION ...................................................................................... 10 DE LEON V DELA LLANA ......................................................................................... 69

SIBAL VS BUQUEL ..................................................................................................... 10 TOPIC IV – PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS ........................................................... 71

SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD. v. ASUNCION...................................................... 16 DE LA CRUZ V JOAQUIN .......................................................................................... 73

TACAY VS. RTC OF TAGUM ...................................................................................... 18 LIMBAUAN V ACOSTA .............................................................................................. 74

TIJAM VS SIBONGHANOY ........................................................................................ 25 GUY V. GACOTT ......................................................................................................... 82

RIVERA v. HON. CATALO ......................................................................................... 27 TOPIC V – CAUSE OF ACTION ............................................................................... 84

AALA v. UY ..................................................................................................................29 TOPIC VI – PLEADINGS .......................................................................................... 84

AGARRADO VS. LIBRANDO-AGARRADO ............................................................... 32 TATLONGHARI V. BANGKO KABAYAN-IBAAN RURAL BANK............................ 84

PT&T V SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. ............................................................ 35 MUNICIPALITY OF TIWI V. BETITO ....................................................................... 89

ORIBELLO VS CA .......................................................................................................38 SPS SANTOS V. ALCAZAR ......................................................................................... 92

BUENAFLOR v. RAMIREZ .........................................................................................42 PADILLA VS GLOBE ASIATIQUE ............................................................................. 97

BAUTISTA VS. LINDO................................................................................................ 43 MBTC V. CPR PROMOTIONS.................................................................................... 99

MASLAG V MONZON ................................................................................................. 45 QUINTOS VS. NICOLAS .......................................................................................... 100

PADLAN V DINGLASAN ............................................................................................ 47 GO V. RICO ............................................................................................................... 102

ERORITA VS DUMLAO ..............................................................................................50 BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS UY.............................. 104

BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES V. CA ...................................................................... 52 MEDISERV INC. VS CA ........................................................................................... 106

HINOG v. MELICOR ................................................................................................... 54 GAJUDO V. TRADERS ROYAL BANK .................................................................... 108

TOPIC III - VENUE ..................................................................................................... 56 MARTINEZ V REPUBLIC ......................................................................................... 110

3 | 2D CIVPRO DIGESTS COMPILATION | JUDGE BOOMSRI RODOLFO

5 | 2D CIVPRO DIGESTS COMPILATION | JUDGE BOOMSRI RODOLFO

7 | 2D CIVPRO DIGESTS COMPILATION | JUDGE BOOMSRI RODOLFO

8 | 2D CIVPRO DIGESTS COMPILATION | JUDGE BOOMSRI RODOLFO

9 | 2D CIVPRO DIGESTS COMPILATION | JUDGE BOOMSRI RODOLFO

11 | 2D CIVPRO DIGESTS COMPILATION | JUDGE BOOMSRI RODOLFO

Notes: Contents of PN + Deed of Chattel Mortgage

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of

15 | 2D CIVPRO DIGESTS COMPILATION | JUDGE BOOMSRI RODOLFO

16 | 2D CIVPRO DIGESTS COMPILATION | JUDGE BOOMSRI RODOLFO

17 | 2D CIVPRO DIGESTS COMPILATION | JUDGE BOOMSRI RODOLFO

19 | 2D CIVPRO DIGESTS COMPILATION | JUDGE BOOMSRI RODOLFO

Dispositive: Petition denied

21 | 2D CIVPRO DIGESTS COMPILATION | JUDGE BOOMSRI RODOLFO

23 | 2D CIVPRO DIGESTS COMPILATION | JUDGE BOOMSRI RODOLFO

24 | 2D CIVPRO DIGESTS COMPILATION | JUDGE BOOMSRI RODOLFO

7 No summary hearing in the issuance of the writ of execution; in ordering the

26 | 2D CIVPRO DIGESTS COMPILATION | JUDGE BOOMSRI RODOLFO

28 | 2D CIVPRO DIGESTS COMPILATION | JUDGE BOOMSRI RODOLFO

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus

31 | 2D CIVPRO DIGESTS COMPILATION | JUDGE BOOMSRI RODOLFO

33 | 2D CIVPRO DIGESTS COMPILATION | JUDGE BOOMSRI RODOLFO

35 | 2D CIVPRO DIGESTS COMPILATION | JUDGE BOOMSRI RODOLFO

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED . The Decision

37 | 2D CIVPRO DIGESTS COMPILATION | JUDGE BOOMSRI RODOLFO

39 | 2D CIVPRO DIGESTS COMPILATION | JUDGE BOOMSRI RODOLFO

40 | 2D CIVPRO DIGESTS COMPILATION | JUDGE BOOMSRI RODOLFO

41 | 2D CIVPRO DIGESTS COMPILATION | JUDGE BOOMSRI RODOLFO

42 | 2D CIVPRO DIGESTS COMPILATION | JUDGE BOOMSRI RODOLFO

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The

44 | 2D CIVPRO DIGESTS COMPILATION | JUDGE BOOMSRI RODOLFO

46 | 2D CIVPRO DIGESTS COMPILATION | JUDGE BOOMSRI RODOLFO

RTC Jurisdiction under BP 129:

48 | 2D CIVPRO DIGESTS COMPILATION | JUDGE BOOMSRI RODOLFO

49 | 2D CIVPRO DIGESTS COMPILATION | JUDGE BOOMSRI RODOLFO

51 | 2D CIVPRO DIGESTS COMPILATION | JUDGE BOOMSRI RODOLFO

2. Jurisdiction over the person of a defendant is acquired through a valid service of

In a suit or proceeding in personam of an adversary character, the court can acquire no

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for

55 | 2D CIVPRO DIGESTS COMPILATION | JUDGE BOOMSRI RODOLFO

57 | 2D CIVPRO DIGESTS COMPILATION | JUDGE BOOMSRI RODOLFO

60 | 2D CIVPRO DIGESTS COMPILATION | JUDGE BOOMSRI RODOLFO

62 | 2D CIVPRO DIGESTS COMPILATION | JUDGE BOOMSRI RODOLFO