Architecture and Eternity: Physis in Nietzsche

and Empedocles

Michael M. Shaw

Empedocles stands at the juncture of radically different modes of thought—think-

ing in the interstices between poetry and philosophy, mythology and theology,
materialism and idealism, mechanism and teleology. With respect to the question of
nature, he exists between the archaic conception of sublime and beautiful force and
the classical Greek notion of self-replicating substance. Friedrich Nietzsche points
out this unique position in The Pre-Platonic Philosophers, calling Empedocles the
“most motley” of the Ancients (Nietzsche 1995, 119). His direct and prolonged
treatment of Empedocles in this text reveals discussions propaedeutic to his mature
conceptions of the will to power and the eternal return. Their powerful conceptions
of the natural link these two liminal philosophers, so central and foreign to what the
Western tradition owes to Platonism. Investigating the meaning of nature in
Nietzsche and Empedocles provides an understanding of motion that is neither
mechanistic, like that initiated by Anaxagoras’ nous, nor teleological, such as
Aristotelian motion, but rather always fulfilled and therefore self-affirming. Such a
conception can prove valuable in the search for solutions to our contemporary social
and environmental crises.
This paper first formulates the influence of Empedocles on Nietzsche by devel-
oping models of nature and culture in the Gay Science, especially as they pertain to
Baubo and Genoa. It then turns to an examination of the origins of Empedoclean
physis by tracing the meaning of the noun, φύσις and the verb, φύειν in Homer,
emphasizing the Homeric notions of inner character and continuous growth cap-
tured by these terms. Section 3 develops Empedocles’ transformative sublation of
Homer’s sublime nature, which hovers between the beautiful and nihilistic, with a
more precise understanding of Empedoclean nature emerging as a result. Unlike
Platonic or Aristotelian idealism that grants eternity to certain eidetic forms,
Empedocles bestows the eternal subsistence of nature upon his primary sources of

M.M. Shaw (*)

Utah Valley University, Orem, UT, USA
e-mail: Michael.Shaw@uvu.edu

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017 3

G. Kuperus, M. Oele (eds.), Ontologies of Nature, Contributions To
Phenomenology 92, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-66236-7_1
4 M.M. Shaw

the four roots and the two co-primordial forces of love and strife. These six princi-
ples foster an understanding of nature consisting of eternal beings and eternal
motions, which, in spite of continuous becoming, perpetually express fulfillment
through their very existence. For Empedocles, this ontology of nature supports a
remarkable program for the purification of humanity, including vegetarianism,
social unity, the elimination of property, and universal peace.
Sections Four and Five develop Nietzsche’s interpretation of Empedocles, focus-
ing on two core ideas: self-affirming motion and the unity of all life. By examining
Nietzsche’s reflections on Genoa, architecture, and purpose in the Gay Science in
light of his interpretation of the relationship between Acragas and Empedocles, a
future philosophy of the polis begins to emerge. Nietzsche employs Empedoclean
views in his own conception of nature-as-Baubo. Yet, in his move away from
Empedocles’ divine knowledge of the primordial roots and forces, perhaps he gives
up too much. A return to Empedocles through Nietzsche maintains nature not only
as a mysterious source but also a principle of respect for the eternal ground of being.
Such a life-, self-, and earth-affirming morality promotes a philosophy of the polis
in which the creation of architectural beauty and the stewardship of the earth for
current and future generations become central values.

1  Acragas and Genoa

Beyond The Pre-Platonic Philosophers, two moments in The Gay Science join
Nietzsche’s thinking in this text with Empedocles, albeit obscurely. In the 1886
Preface to the Second Edition, Nietzsche wonders about “the relation of health and
philosophy” (Nietzsche 1974, GS 33). He longs for a philosophical physician
because he recognizes that, “what was at stake in all philosophizing was not at all
‘truth’ but something else—let us say, health, future, growth, power, life” (Nietzsche
1974, GS 35). Through his convalescence, he has found all sorts of health, and an
equal number of philosophies. The experience of sickness and healing has given
Nietzsche a new perspective on philosophy, declaring, “this art of transfiguration is
philosophy” (Nietzsche 1974, GS 35). To overcome the perpetual suffering of exis-
tence requires an ever-renewed convalescence. This can be understood as an art of
creative transformation of the self, demanding “cheerfulness, any cheerfulness”
(Nietzsche 1974, GS 35). As such, it insists upon moving away from the teachers of
the purpose of existence, away from the will to truth’s desire to uncover “whatever is
kept concealed for good reasons” (Nietzsche 1974, GS 36). Philosophical transfigu-
ration, and the cheerfulness needed for convalescence, will require a different moti-
vation than the Socratic will to truth so dominant in the West for at least 2,500 years.
In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche identifies “truth as a woman” (Nietzsche
1989a, BGE 1). The Gay Science develops this through the Ancient Greek concep-
tion of nature. “One should have more respect for the bashfulness with which nature
has hidden behind riddles and iridescent uncertainties. Perhaps truth is a woman
who has reasons for not letting us see her reasons? Perhaps her name is—to speak
Architecture and Eternity: Physis in Nietzsche and Empedocles 5

Greek—Baubo?” (Nietzsche 1974, GS 36). An obscure fertility goddess considered

the possible nurse of Demeter, Baubo also holds a direct connection to Empedoclean
thought: DK B153 reads simply, “Βαυβώ,” which Hesychius explains means the
womb in Empedocles.1 Nietzsche chooses an Empedoclean fragment to describe the
conception of nature and truth needed for a joyous wisdom. Baubo, insinuated as
the very name of truth, signifies a hidden, withdrawn, secret origin that reveals no
purpose and provides no comfort. By understanding truth in terms of Βαυβώ,
Nietzsche first deploys the mysterious, unknown, and obscure connotations of the
womb as an indefinite, indeterminate, uncognizable source of all determinateness
and cognition. Baubo signifies the intraversable abyss between existence and its
origin. Yet as a womb, it also views truth in terms of fertility, reproduction, and
creative force; as such, truth is like the fertility of nature.
Φύσις as hidden behind riddles and uncertainty recalls Heraclitus’ aphorism that
“Nature is wont to hide” (B123).2 Nietzsche, however, does not merely reproduce a
hidden φύσις. Instead, Βαυβώ presents truth as creative ἀρχή (source), as ἀπεῖρον
in the Anaximandrian sense of indefinite, unknowable origin. Nietzsche weaves
together multiple aspects of early Greek conceptions of nature—apeiron, hidden-
ness, fertility—to reconfigure nature as a creative force bursting forth from unknown
roots. While the passage suggests other conceptions as well, the reference to Βαυβώ
points most directly to Empedocles.
Nietzsche mentions the “Acragantine” here and there in The Gay Science,3 but
another more cryptic reference to a controversial testimony can be found in Book
IV. What Empedocles says of Acragas, Nietzsche quizzically asserts of Genoa. In
Diogenes Laertius we find, “Because they lived luxuriously, Empedocles said, “The
Acragantines party (τρυφῶσι) as if they were going to die tomorrow, but they build
their houses as if they were going to live forever” (Graham 2010, A1, 335). With
striking similarity, Nietzsche writes of Genoa, “They have lived and wished to live
on: that is what they are telling me with their houses, built and adorned to last for
centuries and not for a fleeting hour” (Nietzsche 1974, GS 233). Both Empedocles
and Nietzsche situate architectural strength and beauty within a conception of nature
dominated by strife, obscurity, and impermanence. This provides insight into how
grounding truth in a Bauboic conception of nature can give direction to transforma-
tive philosophy. One need not express love for existence through the techniques of
ressentiment, which lead to nihilism. One need not live forever, or desire the perma-
nence of eternal being, to express a lasting love of existence and the earth, to think
with Zarathustra.4 Rather, Nietzsche and Empedocles embrace strife and imperma-
nence while demanding love and laughter, and a polis that strives for immortality.

1
 Hesychius also notes that βαυβῶ is the “nurse of Demeter,” as well as the womb for Empedocles
(Graham 2010, B153, TEGP 418–19, all translations of the Presocratics are from Graham 2010
unless otherwise noted); see also Nietzsche 1974, GS 38 footnote 8.
2
 Graham 2010, TEGP 163, translation modified.
3
 See Nietzsche 1974, GS Sections 84 and 149, in addition to 291 and Section 4 of the Preface.
4
 Nietzsche 1982, TSZ Zarathustra’s Prologue, Section 3, 125, and Nietzsche 1989a, b GM II
24–25, 96.
6 M.M. Shaw

Nietzsche’s Genoans and Empedocles’ Acragantines both transfigure their own

lives through culture and architecture. The love of existence is expressed through
human achievement. No desire to escape to a beyond, nor to exist in any sort of
everlasting manner, need be present in order to transform the perpetual struggle of
creation and destruction into a lasting celebration of life. This requires a conception
of nature as a source of creation and of motion as neither mechanistic nor teleologi-
cal; for to be understood, mechanistic motion requires perfect knowledge of the
origin, and teleological motion requires perfect knowledge of the end. Both cases
result in a conception of truth as given rather than existential. In Schopenhauer as
Educator, Nietzsche finds the answer to the question, “what is life worth as such,”
to lie in a conception of “the realm of transfigured physis” (Nietzsche 1996, 146).
To this question, Nietzsche proclaims that Schopenhauer provides “the answer of
Empedocles.” Perhaps the old story of Empedocles jumping into Aetna to return to
his immortal sources holds relevance here. Empedocles recognizes that he himself
is transfigured physis, and affirms his existence with his return to his roots.
Empedocles’ understanding of nature in terms of the four roots, love, and strife
provides Nietzsche with a model of ever-changing building blocks undergoing con-
stant transformation through the operation of omnipresent creative forces. Βαυβώ,
as a strife-ridden womb of mystery, obscures any possible origin, and offers no telos
outside of the creative individual. Instead, as Nietzsche’s interpretation of
Empedocles will show, the archē is everywhere and the telos is everything—a notion
that has the potential to reconfigure our current orientation toward the natural world
such that we eschew any sort of transcendent or eternal beyond, and instead to
make, as Nietzsche urges us, “the great decision that liberates the will again and
restores its goal to the earth and his hope to man” (Nietzsche 1989a, b, GM96).

2  Φύσις in Homer

In Homer, the verb φύειν (which is older than φύσις) means, “to bring forth or pro-
duce” in the active voice.5 Iliad VI contains an early paradigm instance at lines
145–149: “High-hearted son of Tydeus, why ask about my birth? Like the genera-
tions of leaves, the lives of mortal men. Now the wind scatters the old leaves across
the earth, now the living timber (ὕλη) bursts (φύει) with new buds and spring comes
round again. And so with men: as one generation comes to life (φύει), another dies
away (ἀπολήγει)” (Homer 1991, 200). Homer contrasts the growth of φύειν with
ἀπολήγειν (to leave off, cease, or desist, such as to desist from battle at Iliad
VII.263).6 Here, as one generation of living things comes forth or is produced,
another is left off or ceases, whether leaves or humans. This conception of φύσις
bears only tangential resemblance to a conception of nature as unspoiled land

5
 The primary meanings are to bring forth, produce, or beget in the active and to grow, wax, spring
up or forth in the passive, among many senses; see Liddell and Scott 1996, 1966–7.
6
 Liddell and Scott 1996, 207. Compare with “ἀπολήγει” at Empedocles B17.30.
Architecture and Eternity: Physis in Nietzsche and Empedocles 7

r­ oaming with wildlife. It also lacks the teleological drive of the Aristotelian system.
Instead, Homer portrays a continuous bursting forth of leaves and animals only to
wither and pass away, to desist into nothingness.
Kierkegaard alludes to this passage in Fear and Trembling, developing an inter-
pretation of Homeric nature as a writhing, terrifying, force reminiscent of a
Schopenhaurean will:
If a human being did not have an eternal consciousness, if underlying everything there were
only a wild, fermenting power that writhing in dark passions produced everything, be it
significant or insignificant, if a vast, never appeased emptiness hid beneath everything, what
would life be then but despair? If such were the situation, if there were no sacred bond that
knit humankind together, if one generation emerged after another like forest foliage, if one
generation succeeded another like the singing of birds in the forest, if a generation passed
through the world as a ship through the sea, as a wind through the desert, an unthinking and
unproductive performance, if an eternal oblivion, perpetually hungry, lurked for its prey and
there were no power strong enough to wrench that away from it—how empty and devoid of
consolation life would be! (Kierkegaard 1983, 15)

For Johannes de Silentio, the Iliad’s conception of one generation emerging after
another like forest foliage posits life as an empty and lonely voyage through an
uncaring and oblivious nature. Purpose—whether divine command, categorical
imperative, or final cause—provides meaning and comfort to an otherwise terrify-
ing reality. When it comes to nature, only the divine purpose can save Silentio from
succumbing to the darkness of his interpretation of Homer.
The meeting of Glaucus and Diomedes is considerably more beautiful than
Silentio lets on through his brief reference. The warriors realize that their lineages
share a relationship as xenoi (family friendship), and proceed to exchange armor
(Iliad VI). While Glaucus wonders why Diomedes would care about something so
trivial as leaves on a tree, Diomedes rejoices (line 213) at the connection shared by
the two amidst the writhing forces of the elements. Diomedes understands the
Nietzschean perspective that within this foliage metaphor, what one makes out of
existence is all that there is. He embraces this by joyously exchanging armor with
his ancestral xenos, receiving gold armor worth one hundred oxen for his own
bronze armor worth merely nine.
Perhaps if Glaucus appreciated the tragic beauty of Homeric nature, he would
not have fallen prey to such a foolish bargain. At least, his own malaise at genealogi-
cal connections within the foliage prefigures the trade. Here we see the opposite of
Silentio’s fear: embracing historical and creative connections leads to riches and the
lavish enjoyment of existence. Diomedes embodies the early tragic understanding
of nature by finding beauty and joy within meaninglessness. As a result, he receives
an abundance of strength as proof of his strength: his joy in existence, in his family,
culture, and history, earns him beautiful rewards. Glaucus and Diomedes crystalize
the ambiguity within Homeric nature: pessimistic nihilism or joyful self-­affirmation.
Life is for Homer what you make of it.
While φύειν is prevalent throughout Homeric literature, φύσις appears just once,
at Odyssey X.303.
So saying, Argeiphontes offered the drug (φάρμακον)
8 M.M. Shaw

Pulling it from the earth, and showed its nature to me (καὶ μοι φύσιν αὐτοῦ ἔδειξε)
On the one hand it was black at the root (ῥίζͅͅῃ), on the other its flower was like milk
Moly (μῶλυ) the gods call it, and indeed it is difficult (καλεπὸν)
For mortals to dig up, but the gods are capable of all things. (Lines 302–306, translation
modified)
The exact meaning of this conception of nature is debatable, ranging from a Platonic
ἰδέα to a movement of unconcealment. Dennis J. Schmidt points out that to know
its physis is “to know the way the hidden root is connected to the visible flower.”7
Certainly, physis in Homer means to understand the entirety of a thing, all of its
capacities and hidden parts. That Hermes must dig up the plant for Odysseus, and
that Homer gives only the divine name for it, shows much of physis to lie beyond
the capacities of human understanding. Thus only the gods truly know physis.8 The
plant is difficult (καλεπόν) to dig up. While in this context καλεπόν most directly
means difficult or hard, the word carries connotations of “grievous” and “painful”
as well. Homer chooses a plant to illustrate physis, reminiscent of the leaves on a
tree in Iliad VI. The growing plant, from the mysterious capacities of its flower to
the divinely discovered roots, echoes in the metaphor of nature as forest foliage
eternally undergoing a process of growth and decay. Absolute knowledge of nature
may be not only difficult to achieve, but also hard to bear, as seen in Glaucus’
response to questions of natural lineage.
The Odyssey’s conception of φύσις bears meaningful resemblance to φύειν in
Iliad VI and elsewhere in Homer. The growth and decay of the flower, together with
the difficult and painful knowledge, conjure images of Glaucus’ lamentations. Yet,
the dual possibilities of the φάρμακον, with the Moly plant expressly characterized
as a useful drug, offers justification for the Diomedean attitude. While nature’s
obliviousness to human suffering provides little help to the teleologically inclined,
the wonders of its secrets offer possibilities for a joyous and creative life.
Homeric physis lies within the inner nature of a thing, from its darkest roots to
its most brilliant expressions. Following Charles Kahn, a conceptual understanding
of the internal organization of living things belongs to physis; yet Schmidt is right
to temper this with an emphasis not only on concealment, but also motion and
growth.9 In linking physis to the union of the distinct growing parts of a living
plant, Odyssey X.303 anticipates Empedocles’ novel reworking of physis. The root
of the Moly plant—“black at the root (ῥίζͅͅῃ)”—holds obvious connections with
ῤιζομάτα, a central concept in Empedoclean nature. Likewise, the hidden internal
movements of becoming emphasize conceptions of growth and internal force, as do

7
 Schmidt 2013, emphasizes that this constitutes a movement from root to blossom at 169 and
endnote 12.
8
 See Schmidt 2013, 169 and endnotes 10 and 11. He points out that of the six instances of divine
names in the Iliad and Odyssey, this is the μολῦ is the only one not followed by the human name,
which is never given.
9
 See Schmidt 2013,168, Hülsz 2013, 181, and Kahn 1994, 201, footnote 2 on “φύσις” in Odyssey
X.
Architecture and Eternity: Physis in Nietzsche and Empedocles 9

love and strife.10 With this understanding of φύσις as the hidden inner nature of the
thing, we turn to Empedocles.

3  Φύσις in Empedocles

The Homeric conception of φύσις not only informs the interpretation of nature in
Empedocles, but also emphasizes a difficulty for his thought to overcome. The prob-
lem of meaningless becoming-unto-death that haunts Glaucus and is ignored by
Diomedes will require a unique solution by Empedocles: a perpetual motion of
partially revealed hidden natures, engaging in constant rearrangement without gen-
eration. That Empedocles demands a different interpretation of φύσις from Homer
is made clear by his contradicting accounts, which constitute both a criticism and
sublation of the earlier view. His direct treatment of it in Fragment B8 begins by
denying the very being of φύσις.11
I shall tell you another thing: there is no birth (φύσις) of any of all
Mortal things (θνητῶν), neither any end of destructive death (θανάντοιο),
But only mixture (μίξις) and separation of the mixed things
Exists, and birth (φύσις) is a term applied to them by men (Graham 2010, TEGP 346–7).
Strangely, Empedocles appears to discuss φύσις only to reject its very existence. By
contrasting it directly with death (θανάντοιο), Empedocles gives φύσις the mean-
ing of birth, or γενέσθαι,12 both of which he insists exist in human naming only.
Ontologically, only mixture (μίξις) of the eternal existents occurs. For this reason,
Hesychius reports that Empedocles’ elements are “ἀγέννητα (unbegotten)”(B7,
Graham 2010, TEGP 346–7). This denial of φύσις, then, applies solely to a precise
meaning of the term: birth. This meaning finds one of its earliest philological ori-
gins in this fragment, but Sophocles’ use of “φύσει” as “birth” at Ajax 1301 con-
firms its popularity in the fifth century BCE.13 Empedocles rejects φύσις as birth, a
meaning that develops from φύειν as bursting forth and being born, and is more
contemporary than the hidden character of the Moly plant.
Fragment B8 indicates a break from the Homeric understanding of living things
with withdrawing principles continually coming to be and passing away without
divine purpose. Empedocles avoids a view of nature understood as birth and death,

10
 See Kahn 1994, 201–2 on the conception of φύσις in Heraclitus and Parmenides, where φύσις is
argued to be “the process of natural development, or growth” for Parmenides (emphasizing
φύομαι) (201) and “essential character” for Heraclitus (201). Hülz 2013, argues that “φύσις” in
Heraclitus involves a deepening of Homer and indicates the totality of reality (179); see also
Burnet 1968, 362–4.
11
 In addition to B8 (lines 1 and 4), Empedocles employs φύσις Two other fragments: B63 (line 1)
and B110 (line 5). See Wright 1995, 349 for φύσις as well as the six uses of φύειν.
12
 See Wright 1995, 175–6 for interpretation and references.
13
 See Liddell and Scott 1996, 1964 for references. At Ajax 1301, Ajax describes the birth of his
mother from a noble king. This instance could predate or be contemporary with Empedocles.
Oedipus at Colonus 1295 suggests a consistent use by Sophocles throughout his life.
10 M.M. Shaw

preferring an ontology based upon the mixture and separation of eternally existing
components, or “mixed things (μιγέντων).” Contrasted with death and finality,
φύσις (falsely) describes birth and coming to be. By criticizing this conception of
φύσις, Empedocles rejects not only birth and death, but also the discreet realities
that are born and die. Leaves on trees replace each other, generation after genera-
tion, without reason; but for Homer nature still consists of leaves, trees and their
own hidden characters. Strikingly, Empedocles both denies the birth of ephemeral,
mortal individuals and claims φύσις itself to be merely a nominal term.
Does this mean that Empedocles denies the existence of φύσις altogether?
Fragment B110 suggests otherwise. Here, φύσις is used more consistently with the
Homeric meaning of “hidden inner character.”
For if putting them into your crowded wits
you behold them kindly with pure thoughts,
they will all surely accompany you through life,
and you will gain many other thoughts from them. For these will grow
in each character (αὐτὰ γὰρ αὔξει ταῦτα’ εἰς ἦθος ἕκαστον), according to its own nature
(ὅπη φύσις ἐστὶν ἑκάστωι).
But if you seek after the other sort of concerns, such as among men
Countless arise and blunt the thoughts,
They will suddenly leave you as the year rolls round,
Longing to reach their own kind,
For know that all things have thought and a portion of understanding. (B110, Graham 2010,
TEGP 342–43, translation modified following Wright)
This difficult passage offers a positive use of φύσις in the sense of the nature of each
thing with an ἦθος (ēthos). B17 line 27 contains the identical phrase, “ἧθος
ἕκαστον,” indicating a connection between the two passages. In B17, it is the four
roots, love and strife that each have an ἦθος. As the roots are “ἀγέννητα,” or
ungenerated, Empedocles rejects φύσις as relating to the birth of ephemerata,14 but
he accepts the meaning of φύσις as inner character belonging to things. Following
Wright, the character that is the nature of each thing refers to one of the four roots,
as well as likely love and strife.15 The eternal sources of Empedocles’ universe des-
ignate the inner character of things and his own conception of nature.
Ἦθος also indicates the disposition or character, as of Pandora’s nature in Hesiod’s
Works and Days lines 67 and 78. Further, in Homer it can mean an abode or accus-
tomed place, as at Iliad VI, line 511.16 This indicates that the four roots can be thought
of as each having their own inner character or disposition, as well as an accustomed
place, bestowing upon φύσις a relationship to inner character and spatial motion.
Only the four roots, along with love and strife, can have a nature for Empedocles. To
use Aristotle’s language, living things such as humans or the Moly plant are not

14
 Ἐφημερίος at B3.4 and B131.1
15
 Whether love and strife are to be included with the four roots among the things that have their
own ἦθος seems an open question based upon interpretation of B17 16–20. See Wright 1995, 30,
175–6 and 258–60. Graham notes their co-eternality at Graham 2010, TEGP 424 in reference to
B16. Graham considers love and strife forces at Graham 2010, TEGP 327, while Burnet argues for
their corporeality at Burnet 1968, 231–33.
16
 See also Hesiod 2004, 167 and 525.
Architecture and Eternity: Physis in Nietzsche and Empedocles 11

nature and do not have a nature, but they are by nature. B8 clarifies that these are only
mixtures, ephemeral conglomerates of more permanent, and therefore more natural,
being. For Empedocles, only that which is eternal is nature. All else is ephemeral.
Originating from Aristotle and appearing to be only a partial thought, B63 also
employs φύσις in a positive, if obscure, sense: “But the nature of organs has been
drawn apart, this part in man’s (ἀλλὰ διέσπασται μελέων φύσις· ἡ μὲν ἐν ἀνδρός)”
(Graham 2010, TEGP 386–7). Διασπάσθαι means to tear asunder, break up, be
(widely) scattered, or, to pull different ways. Here, it is the nature of organs that has
been torn apart in a human. This does not indicate that organs or individuals are
torn asunder at death, but that in being formed something is broken up or scattered.
Nature itself, φύσις, is the subject of διέσπασται in this fragment. B63 indicates
that the organs that form a human being are themselves created by the breaking
apart of their original nature. The perpetual being of the four roots together with
love and strife are the only candidates for this sense of nature within Empedoclean
cosmology.
Fragments B63 and B110 affirm that a proper understanding of nature is as an
inner character. This dialectical reversal of the Homeric view provides a paradox
whose resolution lies in a different conception of the inner character. Only the
deathless four roots, together with love and strife, meet Empedocles’ standards for
the true inner character of all things. Nature is the unique character of each of the
six perpetual existents that together constitute reality. Nature as birth or death does
not exist because nature, in its innermost essence and character, is eternal.
Neither the Moly plant nor Aristotelian substance exists ontologically as nature,
rather, all that exists is the mixture and separation of four roots through the forces
of love and strife. The existence of the φύσις of θνητῶν, (a nature of mortal things)
is explicitly denied; yet the existence of φύσις as some sort of inner ἦθος is explic-
itly maintained. While B8 rejects a Homeric φύσις of individuals, B110 preserves a
Homeric sense of φύσις of inner character. Through their ἦθος, the four roots, love,
and strife can fulfill the conception of nature as the character of the perpetually
existing things in Empedocles. Largely unchecked until Nietzsche, the Platonic-­
Aristotelian tradition will favor a conception of permanent essences of one sort or
another. For Empedocles, these eternal existents—especially the four roots—are the
everlasting primary constituents of reality, each with a unique inner character.
Rejecting a Homeric understanding of ephemerata while preserving the concep-
tion of inner character, Empedocles reconfigures the hidden nature of Homer’s
Moly plant into his four roots, together with love and strife. Recall that the Moly
plant is “black at the root.” Ῥίζͅͅη (root) is a medicinal, purgative root in Homer; in
early usage it also means a foundation, even of the earth, as in Hesiod (Works and
Days, Line 19).17 Empedocles’ own conception of the primary constituents of real-
ity draws from this Homeric image: “The four roots of all things (τέσσαρα γὰρ
πάντων ῥιζώματα) hear first: shining (ἀργὴς) Zeus, life-giving (φερέσβιος) Hera,
Aidoneus, and Nestis, who by her tears moistens the mortal spring” (B6, Graham
2010, TEGP 344–45). In another dialectical maneuver, Empedocles appropriates

17
 Liddell and Scott 1996, 1570.
12 M.M. Shaw

“ῥίζͅͅῃ” (root), representing the opaque hidden nature of the Moly plant known only
to the gods, and transforms it into his own conception of “ῥιζώματα” (masses of
roots) understood as the gods.
Ῥίζωμα seems to originate with Empedocles, and the translation of “roots” for
the plural ῥιζώματα is a bit misleading.18 A singular Moly plant has a root, but a tree
has a Ῥίζωμα, a clump, cluster, or mass of roots. This term is derived from the noun
“ῥίζα,” a root, medicinal root, or foundation, and the verb ῥιζόω, to cause to strike
root, plant, or fix firmly. A ῥίζωμα, then, is a planted thing, but not merely a planted
root. It is a foundation of a clump of planted, firmly fixed roots. In the plural,
ῥιζώματα in Empedocles indicates four firmly fixed foundations of root-clumps
from which all things grow. Thus a ῥίζωμα is not a single root, but a cluster or con-
glomeration of foundational roots capable of spreading through and mixing with
other ῥιζώματα in limitless ways.
Empedocles’ universe has four roots: τέσσαρα γὰρ πάντων ῥιζώματα.19 In his
ontology, they form the fundamental building blocks of all things by being combined
and separated by love and strife in various precise ratios. Yet, these are not four indi-
vidual roots from which all things come to be, but four masses of roots that through
the activity of love and strife conglomerate and congeal together, loosen and drift
apart, and spread throughout all things. Rather than four roots that grow together to
make a single tree, Empedoclean ῥιζώματα are root-clumps: four unique masses that
love and strife weave together to make all things. The individual ἦθος and obscure
character of each of these four masses—fire, aither, earth and water—is φύσις.
Empedocles rejects φύσις-as-birth in favor of an inner character belonging to
these roots. Empedocles proclaims of the roots (and likely love and strife):
For these things are all equal and of the same age,
each rules its own domain and has its own character
(τιμῆς δ’ ἄλλης ἄλλο μέδει, πάρα δ’ ἦθος ἐκάστον),
and they rule in succession as time rolls round.
And besides these, nothing comes to be or ceases to be,
for if they perished thoroughly, they would no longer be.
What could increase this totality, and whence would it come?
Into what would it perish, since nothing is void of these things?
But these are the very things that are, which running through each other
come to be now this, now that, yet always continually alike. (B17.27–35, Graham 2010,
TEGP 350–53)
The roots, each with their own ἦθος (character, abode) and τιμῆς (domain), are the
true reality of all things, their φύσις, running through each other and causing the sem-
blance of the birth and death of ephemerata, but always remaining true to their own
character, changing only in appearance through mixture. Empedoclean nature involves
the perpetual existence of the mixed or unmixed roots, governed by the character,
domain, and abode of these ῥιζώματα, together with the forces of love and strife.

18
 Ῥζώματα is the nominative/accusative plural of ῥιζώμα, “mass of roots” (Liddell and Scott 1996,
1571).
19
 See Guthrie 1980, 141–147; Kirk et al. 1999, 286; Longrigg 1976; and Kingsley 1994.
Architecture and Eternity: Physis in Nietzsche and Empedocles 13

Φύσις in Empedocles indicates neither plant nor animal, neither birth nor death;
yet it holds primary significance in his thought. He often uses cognates of φύειν and
its compounds to describe the continual influence of love and strife on the root-­
clumps. He uses the verb with a generally consistent meaning. Fragment B26.7–9
serves as a paradigm instance.
They rule in succession as the cycle rolls round,
And they dwindle into each other and grow (αὔχψξεται) in their appointed turns,
For these are the very things that are (ἀυτὰ γὰρ ἔστιν ταῦτα), which running through each
other
Become men and the races of other beasts,
At one time coming together by Love into one order,
At another time each being borne apart by the enmity of Strife,
Until growing (συμφύντα) to be one they are completely subjected.
Thus, inasmuch as they are wont to become (φύεσθαι) one from many,
And in turn with the one growing apart (διαφύντος) they produce many,
They are born (γίγνονταί) and they do not enjoy a steadfast life;
But inasmuch as they never cease continually alternating,
They are ever immobile in the cycle (Graham 2010, TEGP 358–61).
The verbal variants of φύειν (to grow, become) describe the generation and destruc-
tion of the One from the four roots, love and strife.20 “The very things that are”
(ἀυτὰ γὰρ ἔστιν ταῦτα) refers to the four roots, made clear not only by context, but
by Empedocles using the same phrase at B17.34, where it continues a direct discus-
sion of the roots listed at B17.18. The fragment likely means that each root has an
appointed turn of rule. The great cosmic cycle involves them mixing with each
other, and separating out in turns. Presumably, then, in addition to the ascendancy
of the One under love and of Multiplicity under strife, there are also moments of
domination of each of the roots, when one conglomerates while the others remain
more thoroughly mixed. Ultimately, the mixture of these roots generates all mortal
beings, and either the roots, these beings, or both21 are brought together into one by
love and borne apart into many by strife in an unending cycle.
The flow of φύεσθαι encompasses all things. Lines 7–9 capture the complete
process of the Empedoclean cycle in terms of this verb. Συμφύντα, φύεσθαι, and
διαφύντος22 describe a growing together into a unity, a growing or springing forth,
and a growing apart. These growths describe the movements of Empedoclean
φύσις: under the influence of love and strife, the four roots grow together and apart,
turning into other growing things that grow together and apart, which are them-
selves finally resolved back into their originary root-clumps. In this way, a finite
whole in constant motion experiences, prefiguring Nietzsche, an eternal return of
the same. Nothing lies outside of the continuous, cyclical growth of that which
­eternally persists. Nature consists neither of discrete substances nor pointless repro-
duction and decay. Nature is the all: love and strife driving the four roots, both caus-
ing and becoming all things. Because they neither come to be nor pass away

20
 B17.6-13 uses extremely similar language in describing love and strife’s influence on the four
roots lines 1–5 and 18–20.
21
 For controversy, see Wright 1995, 182–3.
22
 Συμφύντα and διαφύντος are a middle participles and φύεσθαι a passive infinitive.
14 M.M. Shaw

absolutely, but only cyclically transform between pure or mixed states for eternity,
no true birth or death overcomes the everlasting natures. Through their movements
of mixture and separation, love, strife and the four masses of roots are both the
nature of all things and the originary forces of all natural motion.
From the fall of the gods to the procession of creatures, Empedocles’ poetry
reveals the mixture of original sources as the origin of all things. Fragment B115
tells of a daimon (δαίμονες) who has been exiled from the gods for a crime. At line
7, Empedocles describes this being, “through time growing to be all kinds of crea-
tures (φυόμενον παντοῖα διὰ χρόνου εἴδεα θνητῶν)” (Graham 2010, TEGP 344–
45), as undergoing a transformation through the four roots in lines 9–11. From
divine aither to sea (water) to earth to sun (fire) and back to aither, a divine being
grows (φυόμενον) into all kinds of perishable creatures (θνητῶν), presumable all
the kinds of ephemerata that are born from the earth, describing a cycle that pro-
duces all living things from mixture of the four roots. Through the mixture of the
four root-­clumps, mortal beings come to be.
Empedocles also discusses this theme in B35. Much of the fragment describes
the influence of love and strife upon the cosmic whole.23 Through mixture and sepa-
ration, Φιλότης and Νεῖκος produce “the myriad races of mortal things” (B35.7,
Graham 2010, TEGP 361). The process involves a natural growth from the immortal
to the mortal:
And suddenly those things grew mortal (θωήτ’ ἐφύοντο) which before were wont to be
immortal
and what was before pure became mixed, exchanging paths.
When these things are mingled the myriad races of mortal things flowed out,
Fitted with all sorts of shapes, a marvel to behold (θαῦμα ἰδέσθαι). (B35.14–17, Graham
2010, TEGP 360–61)
Like B26, B35 confirms the conception of immortal sources mixing together to
become perishable beings. The pure immortal roots, through the motions of love
and strife, become living organisms, all the while remaining their fundamental
nature. The mixture and growth of the ungenerated masses of roots replaces birth
and death.
The conclusion of this fragment alludes to Homer: at Iliad 18.377, “θαῦμα
ἰδέσθαι (a marvel to behold)” describes the marvel of Hephaestus’ automatic stat-
ues. For Empedocles, the wonder of divine natural production replaces the miracle
of Homeric divine technical production. Likewise, Empedocles prefers divine mix-
ture, or the mixture of the divine, to the artistically productive model of Hesiod’s
Zeus molding humanity from clay. He describes the procession of creatures in the
language of his predecessor, but with a transfigured nature underlying his ontology.
Mixture, rather than generation, designates the primary activity of nature.
The positive sense of φύσις in Empedocles may be drawn from the very denial
of its alternative meaning. By repudiating nature-as-birth, Empedocles rejects both
the significance of generation and destruction as well as the essential reality of the
things born. With this turn away from death, he also discards any belief that mortal
things have a nature in the sense of an inner character unique to the individual or

23
 Following Graham 2010, TEGP 425–426.
Architecture and Eternity: Physis in Nietzsche and Empedocles 15

species. Instead, he advocates the permanence underlying ephemerality as φύσις:

the root-clumps and love and strife. Through φύειν and its compounds, Empedocles
describes the natural motions of these roots as the mixtures and separations that
humans call birth and death.

4  Nietzsche on Motion and Life in Empedocles

It is difficult to ascertain whether only the four roots or also love and strife are
nature for Empedocles. In either case, love and strife produce natural motion (or
perhaps are natural motion) by bringing the roots together and apart, thereby facili-
tating the possibility of the mixture, separation, growth and decay of composite
organisms. Excepting the liminal moments of the cosmic cycle, love and strife are
present in every mixture: every rock, tree, animal, artifact, cloud, etc. In the current
state of the universe, both love and strife are present everywhere and in everything.
Love holds a river together, while strife separates it from the air and surrounding
land, and vice versa.24
In his interpretation of Empedocles, Nietzsche develops this omnipresence of
love and strife into a unique conception of motion that is neither mechanistic nor
teleological. Aristotle points out that Empedocles and Anaxagoras make contribu-
tions to the theory of motion through love, strife, and nous.25 Nietzsche deepens this
reading by examining Empedocles for his own sake, rather than as an incomplete
step in the more perfect Aristotelian system.
The more definite love and strife replace the indefinite mind. Of course, he thereby dis-
solves all mechanical motion, whereas Anaxagoras ascribed only the [primal] onset of
motion to mind and considered all further motion as indirect effects thereof.—Yet this was
its consequence, for how can something dead, one rigid being (ὄν), have an effect on
another rigid being? No mechanical explanation of motion whatsoever exists; rather, only
one from drives, from souls. Only they move—hence not merely once but continually and
everywhere. (Nietzsche 1995, PPP 116)

This passage captures the distinction between Anaxagorean and Empedoclean

motion. Anaxagoras, serving as a paradigm of mechanistic motion, allows free
motion to his νοῦς, but everything else is moved mechanistically from that source.
In Empedocles, Nietzsche identifies a non-teleological, non-mechanistic omnipres-
ence of motion consisting of immanent, internal moving forces. Nietzsche aligns
this conception of motion with force and soul, which move “continually and every-
where.” It is as if the free, self-determining motion of Anaxagoras’ nous found its
locus at every point, together with an antagonistic drive, in Empedoclean thought.
For Nietzsche, neither Anaxagoras nor Empedocles succumbs to a teleological
conception of motion. Anaxagoras’ free nous moves, and all other motion exists as
a consequence of that; not for the sake of a goal, but because free, self-determining

24
 In the tradition of Parmenides, Empedocles Fragment B13 maintains a plenum: “there is no place
in the totality that is empty or overflowing” (Graham 2010, TEGP 350–51).
25
 Aristotle, Metaphysics 984b10–985b3.
16 M.M. Shaw

motion simply happened. In Empedocles, every motion emerges from the forces of
love and strife, which themselves are immanent everywhere in everything.26 Love
attracts and strife repels, as Aristotle points out at On Generation and Corruption
II.6 333b12–13. They do not move towards goals. Love is attraction and strife is
repulsion. They are how they move. They do not move for a purpose, rather, their
purpose is their activity. This is why Empedoclean motion provides such a signifi-
cant model for Nietzsche: because love and strife exist in the moment, in this world,
their good found in their very activity. Together with the perpetual omnipresence of
the roots in the mixed universe, this view of nature can appropriately ground a life
affirming value system, as from this perspective the essence is everything and the
goal is everywhere, always.
Nietzsche finds love and strife, understood as forces of attraction and repulsion,
capable of explaining all things, including life and thought. “Desire and aversion,
the ultimate phenomena of life, were sufficient, both being results of forces of
attraction and repulsion. If they empower the elements, then all things, including
thought, were to be explained from them” (Nietzsche 1995, PPP 116).27 Movements
toward and away from, bringing together and carrying apart, permeate the inner and
outer worlds, explaining everything from the movements of nature and the heavens
to the human capacities for desire and thought. As the fundamental ingredients of all
mixtures, Nietzsche concurs that the elements, or roots, compose all things. If the
roots, in their primacy, are empowered by love and strife, then all things are imbued
with these two ubiquitous forces. Whether Nietzsche’s interpretation is correct on
all counts is debatable, but his conception of Empedoclean natural motion holds
regardless of the details of the system. All motion in Empedocles finds its purpose
in its very activity, and for this reason is neither mechanistic nor teleological but
rather self-affirming.
Such motion lies within each thing, as do the ῥιζώματα of B6. Empowered by
love and strife, the roots perpetually mix and separate, being brought together
always for the sake of bringing together, being carried apart always for the sake of
carrying apart. This drive infiltrates the entire universe, so that each motion accord-
ing to Empedocles exists only for its own sake. Nietzsche notes that “Here the pur-
posiveness of those that continue to exist is reduced to the continued existence of
those who act according to purposes” (Nietzsche 1995, PPP 116). The perpetual
existence of purposiveness, of love and strife specifically, becomes its own goal.
Empedocles takes from Homeric nature the continuous growth of the Moly plant,
which is not a particular example of the universal conception any living thing, but
rather as a metaphor for the whole. The plant, a single entity of continuous growth
from beginning to end—a plenum of growth—with powers and mysteries known
only to the gods, represents the Empedoclean cosmos, growing from hidden masses
of roots to the most delicate outward beauty.

26
 Except perhaps for a motion intrinsic to each of the four roots, such as fire’s “desire to reach its
like” in B62, line 6 (Graham 2010, TEGP 385).
27
 On thought, or phrēn (φρὴν) see Darcus 1977, where thought as is argued to result from love and
strife (182), as are daimones (188).
Architecture and Eternity: Physis in Nietzsche and Empedocles 17

Nietzsche turns to Fragment B112, where Empedocles refers to himself as

divine: “hail! I like an immortal god, no longer mortal go about in your midst (ἐγὼ
δ’ ὑμῖν θεὸς ἄμβροτος οὐκέτι θνητός πωλεῦμαι)” (Line 4, Graham 2010, TEGP
404–5).28 He quotes the fragment beginning at line four until the penultimate line,
where Empedocles describes his own glory, being revered in every city by countless
multitudes for his superhuman knowledge. Without interjection, Nietzsche immedi-
ately presents Fragment B113: “But why do I stress such matters, as if there were
anything surprising in the fact that I am superior to mortal perishable men?”
(Nietzsche 1995, PPP 109). Nietzsche reads Empedocles’ self-avowed divinity as a
proclamation of the union of mortal and immortal life, and therefore as the funda-
mental unity of all life. From B112 and B113 he concludes, “[Empedocles] sought
to impress the oneness of all life most urgently, that carnivorism is a sort of self-
cannibalism, a murder of the nearest relative. He desired a colossal purification of
humanity” (Nietzsche 1995, PPP 109). The prohibition against eating meat comes
from the union of all life as a single force. The somewhat unlikely idea that the
animal one eats would be their nearest relative is explained through the view that
every living thing is the closest kin of every other. Even more, because of the unity
of all life, eating another animal is like eating yourself, which Nietzsche calls “self-­
cannibalism.” Here, the Empedoclean ontology of nature demands the cultural prac-
tice of absolute kindness toward all living things.
The call for a “colossal purification of humanity” emerges from a particular
ontology of nature, which Nietzsche understands as love and strife infusing the
roots with various forces of desire and aversion. The eternity of the six sources per-
sisting through the continuous flux of becoming grounds a conception of a purified
humanity that seeks to eliminate violence of all forms. In the Empedoclean ontol-
ogy that maintains the persistence of the roots as φύσις, Nietzsche also identifies a
conception of life as eternal, unified, and singular. He repeatedly emphasizes the
conception of the unity of all life as the core, fundamental thought for Empedocles.
“Empedocles’ entire pathos comes back to this point, that all living things are one;
in this respect the gods, human beings, and animals are one” (Nietzsche 1995, PPP
109). He understands that mortal beings are insignificant to Empedocles because of
their connection to the eternal sources,29 and finds the culminating natural and ethi-
cal thought to be: the unity of life.
Nietzsche identifies this as the most significant and original Empedoclean thought.
He interprets the distinction between animate and inanimate to be that between the
forces of love and strife on the one hand and the four roots on the other: “Empedocles
by means of φιλία νεῖκος (living) and the four elements (nonliving)” (Nietzsche
1995, PPP 87). Together, love and strife form singular life, likely with love’s desire
for sameness providing the main source of the unity. Nietzsche understands soul in
terms of love’s desire for identity: “Innermost to this drive (love, φιλία) is the search

28
 Nietzsche reads a more direct, “All hail! I go about among you an immortal god, no more a mor-
tal” (Nietzsche 1995, PPP 108).
29
 “Whereas Anaxagoras accepted all qualities as real and accordingly as eternal, Empedocles dis-
covers only four true realities” (Nietzsche 1995, PPP 116).
18 M.M. Shaw

for equality: with inequality for everyone, Aversion arises; with equality for all,
want. In this sense everything possesses soul, insofar as it has the sensations of the
drive (Trieb) to equality and the desire for sameness, as well as aversion to inequal-
ity” (Nietzsche 1995, PPP 115). The drive to equality, the desire for sameness, and
the aversion to inequality all describe the outcomes of love, so that love may be
understood as the main source of soul, sameness, equality, and therefore unity.30
Empedoclean non-teleological and non-mechanistic natural motion does not
describe one kind of motion among others. Rather, it describes the essence of all
motion, all nature, and all things in his ontology. Motion begins at every point and
from everywhere. In order to avoid the conflict that results from an Anaxagorean
free first source of motion originating from multiple (or even infinite) centers,
Empedoclean motion begins as agonistic. “The genuine Empedoclean idea is the
oneness of all living things: it is one part of all things that presses them toward mix-
ture and unification yet likewise an antagonistic power that renders them asunder.
Both drives struggle with each other” (Nietzsche 1995, PPP 115). On Nietzsche’s
interpretation, love and strife infuse the elements with the capacities of attraction
and repulsion providing the living soul to non-living material. The struggle of these
drives ensures that no force can ascend to dominance like Anaxagorean nous
because the antagonistic force ensures inhibition and challenge before any move-
ment towards dominance can be initiated. Thus it is through the omnipresence of
originary agonistic motion that Empedocles conceives of the unity of all life within
a multifarious universe.31 The force of love describes the basic impulse of life, while
the force of strife makes becoming and difference possible.
Empedocles not only maintains a unity of life, as Nietzsche insists, but also a
unity of all nature. On this account of nature, all things—the roots, love, and strife—
contain originary characters, places, or sources of motion that infuse all things.
These find unity as the intertwined roots of self-moving, intrinsically driven activity
joined in a perpetual struggle through the conflict of the binary sources of motion.
Destined to the momentary domination of the antagonistic forces—first attraction,
then repulsion—in a perpetually returning cycle, the cosmos dances from limit
moment to opposed limit moment, while leaving a wondrous trail of temporary
beings in its wake. Φύσις, for Empedocles, is the intrinsic, self-actualizing drive
possessed by every force in this cycle throughout every moment of duration.
This can be understood as self-determined motion, which must be neither teleo-
logical nor mechanistic. For Empedocles, the forces of love and strife reflect back
always to their own motion itself as their purpose. That is, love, the force of attrac-
tion, attracts in order to attract; and strife repels only in order to repel. The roots
conglomerate in order to conglomerate, and exhibit an ἦθος for their own sakes.
Here, there is never a purpose beyond the activity itself. The goal of the Empedoclean

30
 On Nietzsche’s reading, the aversion of strife tends toward inequality. It is not clear whether the
aversion for inequality requires some participation on the part of strife.
31
 In Shaw 2014, I argue that aither should be considered a root rather than air, and that this root
provides, or is, the force of life in Empedocles. On the view that love is not the force of life, see
Kahn 1960, 27; Trepanier 2003, 3; and Guthrie 1980, 265.
Architecture and Eternity: Physis in Nietzsche and Empedocles 19

cycle is actualized by each part and the whole at every instant. As Nietzsche puts it,
“the purposiveness of those that continue to exist is reduced to the continued exis-
tence of those who act according to purposes” (Nietzsche 1995, PPP 116).

5  From Acragas to Genoa: An Eternal Return

Such a reconfiguration of the Homeric conception allows for internal force, produc-
tivity, and creativity in Empedocles’ cosmology. There is no Aristotelian telos, inter-
nal or external. One can follow neither Glaucus nor Diomedes: the former because
the internal motion provides its own power and meaning to every instant, the latter
because the lack of discrete natures makes his genealogy pointless. The singularity
of Anaxagorean free movement and the corresponding determinism of all subse-
quent motion are replaced with the omnipresence of force in an eternal whole. The
permanence of nature, whether as four roots, love and strife, or the will to power,
underlies the view of those who would live for the moment but construct works and
deeds for the ages. The hidden character of things shows that any nature of an indi-
vidual, what comes to be known as Aristotelian substances and artifacts, has no per-
manence, nature, or ἦθος. Only love, strife, earth, water, fire, and aither are eternal.
While the resulting mixtures will perish in a day, the primal sources last forever.
Whether proceeding from Nietzsche’s unity of life, or the unity of Empedoclean
nature, near identical results follow for a political model based upon this ground.
Such a notion exists in contradistinction to an Aristotelian teleological model.
Certainly, these interpretations of Empedoclean self-determined motion and inter-
nal character would exercise influence on Aristotle and his own understanding of
nature as an internal source of motion. But Aristotle identifies a final cause. Even if
that cause is conceived as the intrinsic essence of a living being in a process of con-
stant self-actualization, the mere difference of aspect between formal and final
cause is enough to derail Empedoclean thinking.32
According to Nietzsche and Hyppolytus, Empedocles desired to transform his
ideals into political reality, whether a truly egalitarian democracy or more radical
proto-communism. “His political views may be democratic, but the real fundamen-
tal idea is nonetheless to lead humanity across to the universal friendship (κοινὰ
τῶν φίλων) of the Pythagoreans and thus to social reform with a dissolution of
private property” (Nietzsche 1995, PPP 113). Social reform, elimination of prop-
erty, universal friendship, and the end of violence follow from Empedocles’ belief
in the unity of all life as well as his Pythagorean ideals.33 Nietzsche finds in

32
 See Aristotle’s Physics II.7 on the relationship between formal and final causes, and Physics II.8
for the natural principle of motion toward an internal end, developed in the context of Empedoclean
thought.
33
 While he does not cite the source, Nietzsche likely draws this interpretation from Hyppolytus’
Refutations (Text 204, Graham 2010, TEGP 414–417), which mentions the prohibition against
marriage and eating meat, as well as pursuing Friendship or Love. See also Kahn 1960, 20–21 and
Graham 2010, TEGP 430 on the prohibition against violence. See Laertius 1995, 376–381 on
Empedocles’ political involvement in Acragas.
20 M.M. Shaw

Empedocles the union of ontological conviction and social practice. Through his
praise for the Acragantine lifestyle, Empedocles offers another example of a natural
foundation for cultural beauty.
Aristotle’s ontology of nature also serves as a foundation for his political ideal.
He understands φύσις as a process of actualization of a latent essence aimed at
attaining a telos.34 Many, even most, of these motions lack self-determination. While
some maintain this characteristic, other motions become fully mechanistic or
entirely subordinated to a higher end. Teleological motion involves beginning a
process and fulfilling a goal, so that only the completion receives highest value.
Most of the motions in this system lack the perfection of the ultimate expression of
ends. For Aristotle, the city too exists by nature, but much within it—citizens,
slaves, places, occupations—lacks the perfection of the highest goods. Much is a
cog in a machine. From significant perspectives, many achieve little more than ever
being a part in a whole.
For Empedocles, on the contrary, nature is not continuous motion towards an
end; it is always present everywhere, in everything. It does not come to be or pass
away, become momentarily more or less fulfilled. As such, it is not distinct from
culture, but a core aspect of every part of the polis. An Empedoclean Acragas begins
from this union of nature, infusing all things, including architecture and city plan-
ning. At least two texts give us insight into Acragas, A1 and B112. Additionally,
Nietzsche not only comments on A1 in The Pre-Platonic Philosophers, showing his
awareness of it, but also references it in Section 291 of the Gay Science, borrowing
from Empedocles’ description in bestowing his own praise on Genoa. From these
idealized, and perhaps in some ways ideal, poleis we may glimpse a philosophy of
the city advocating a natural polis that grows out of a self-determining conception
of nature. Such a conception can prove fruitful for thinking about the current rela-
tionships between our cities and nature. Ultimately, this political theory demands a
luxurious, beautiful, and controlled architecture that thoroughly accommodates a
Nietzschean lifestyle of self-affirmation and desperate love of existence.
Both Acragas and Genoa express a connection between the lifestyle of their inhab-
itants and the architecture of the cities that intimates a union of nature and culture.
Testimony A1 may very well be a rhetorical fragment of Empedocles himself. “The
Acragantines party as if they were to die tomorrow, but they build their houses as if
they were going to live forever (Ἀκραγαντῖνοι τρυφῶσι μὲν ὡς αὔριον ἀποθανούμενοι,
οἰκίας δὲ κατασκευάζονται ὡς πάντα τὸν χρόνον βιωσόμενοι)” (Graham 2010,
TEGP 334–35). Examined through the lens of Empedoclean nature, all the familiar
themes resonate in this Testimony—life, death, mortality, eternity—but here in con-
nection with how this impacts culture: how they live, how they construct their abodes.
Τρυφῶσι, from τρυφάω, first means to live luxuriously as well as to fare sumptu-
ously. It also means living with luxury to the point of licentiousness, and so to run riot
or wax wanton; and finally, being fastidious, dainty, and having airs about oneself.35

34
 The uses of φύσις at Aristotle’s Politics I.3, 1252b29-34 show that Aristotle understands the
household and polis in terms of how one would understand living individual substances.
35
 Liddell and Scott 1996, 1831.
Architecture and Eternity: Physis in Nietzsche and Empedocles 21

If we take the three meanings together (as they all seem to be equiarchaic), then we
have an intensely indulgent, luxurious, lifestyle, yet in such a way as to involve a
cleanliness, softness, even a prideful gentleness. Here, Empedocles contrasts this
fleeting truphoic lifestyle (that never encroaches on the territory of Sade) with the
permanence of the Acragantines’ architectural accomplishments.
This compound of φύειν highlights the distinction between Empedocles and
Homer by emphasizing a kind of life, rather than mere life. Such a truphoic lifestyle
indulges in the moment, but without hedonism. Homer’s bleak, writhing nature that
so troubles Silentio is nowhere to be found in Acragas. The Acragantines live so
luxuriously as to squander their resources, giving the impression that they will die
tomorrow out of lack of care for their individual futures. For Empedocles, all mortal
creatures perish in short time, whether tomorrow or in many decades. Yet even these
are immortal too. Recall that in B35 Empedocles describes how mortal life emerges
from the immortal being of the four root-clumps being mixed together. Therefore,
the Acragantines live luxuriously, celebrating as if they would die tomorrow; for
they are ephemeral creatures that will die. Nevertheless, they build their houses
(οἰκίας δὲ κατασκευάζονται) as if they would live for all time (ὡς πάντα τὸν
χρόνον βιωσόμενοι); for emerging from life in wondrous Acragas, the inner charac-
ter, or ἦθος, of Empedoclean nature does so persist.
This distinction between Empedoclean truphoic living, and mere Homeric
growth and decay (captured by φύειν) originates in the very different ontologies of
φύσις maintained by each poet. In Empedocles’ use of the Homeric phrase θαῦμα
ἰδέσθαι, the marvel is the connection between the divine and the mortal, whereas in
Homer the wonder belongs only to the divine. His account of how mortal creatures
emerge from the mixture of the eternal roots helps mark the difference between liv-
ing as growth and decay and living in the prideful luxury as the momentary expres-
sion of perpetual being. The Acragantines don’t fear their impermanence, embodying
their unity with all life and of the unity of life with all things.
Returning to fragment B112, in the four lines not quoted by Nietzsche,
Empedocles hails his fellow citizens, praising the glory of his city.
Friends, who inhabit the great city of yellow Acragas, on the heights of the citadel, careful
for good works, reverent harbors of strangers, innocent of evils, Hail! (Graham 2010, TEGP
404–5)

The fragment reveals the impact of truphoism on the fortunate polis: lack of evils,
kindness to strangers, beautiful buildings, and thoughtful cultural achievements.
Recall that Nietzsche uses the remainder of this fragment, along with B113, to
develop his thesis that the unity of all life is the core thought in Empedocles. On
Nietzsche’s interpretation then, living a celebratory, affirming existence follows
from the recognition of the unity of all animate being.
Empedocles’ relationship to his home city holds great significance in The Pre-­
Platonic Philosophers. Nietzsche thoroughly incorporates the historical context of
fifth century BCE Acragas into his lecture on Empedocles. He explains the signifi-
cance of the city’s alliance with Gelon of Syracuse and the rewards following the
siege of Himera. “This begins the happiest time in Agrigentum for seventy years,
22 M.M. Shaw

private citizens having five hundred slaves at their service: it built itself up in grandi-
ose fashion. Empedocles says of it, ‘The Agrigentines live delicately as if tomorrow
they would die, but they build their houses well as if they thought they would live
forever’” (Nietzsche 1995, PPP 110). The material conditions of Acragas allowed
the citizens to create a remarkable polis that left a lasting legacy on both its favorite
son and his philosophical admirer. Nietzsche’s reference to Testimony A1 confirms
his familiarity with, and even interest in, Acragas. For both great philosophers, the
relationship of culture to ontology determines the possibility of the good life.
Strikingly, Nietzsche echoes this fragment with haunting precision in Section
291 of  The Gay Science, called Genoa: “They have lived and wished to live on: that
is what they are telling me with their houses, built and adorned to last for centuries
and not for a fleeting hour” (Nietzsche 1974, GS 291). The emphasis on “lived”
shows that they have lived well, just like the Acragantines. Also like them, they
construct their houses to last forever, as death is nothing to those who recognize the
natural unity of all being and life. They build their cities to last for all inhabitants
and celebrate the perpetuity of existence. Empedocles’ poetic and philosophical
development of his city’s golden age is reflected not only in his own ontology of
nature, but also in a Nietzschean ideal for human civilization.

6  Conclusion

With βαυβῶ, Nietzsche uses Empedoclean language to reject and sublate

Empedocles’ conception of nature: the knowledge of the roots purported to be the
true character of nature is concealed behind the secrets of sleeping βαυβῶ. In fact,
the verb βαυβάω means “to sleep,” emphasizing the hidden womb of nature; and
while we may be her dreams, the secrets of that sleeping mind are forever concealed
from mortals. Following Heraclitus, for Nietzsche too, “Nature is wont to hide”
(Heraclitus B123). In order to imbue nature with the power of Nietzschean affirma-
tion, the eternal character of the sleeping womb is essential. Rather than Empedoclean
or Schopenhaurean knowledge of the primal sources of nature, βαυβῶ suggests a
more hidden, Heraclitean, nature, which, through the reference to Empedocles, con-
notes both a womb-like source and an ontology that, albeit mysterious, lends itself
to highlighting that which is permanent within the flux.36
Empedocles’ view that nature is not the essence or inner character of the indi-
vidual, but rather that the roots are the inner character of all things, opens the pos-
sibility for Nietzsche’s conception of a transformative philosophy. The individual
only exists insofar as it is already a transformation of a persistent archē. To repro-
duce that process of transformative natural creation would be to transform one’s
own being into something new from out of the originary components. In Acragas
and Genoa, the ephemerata transform themselves into spectacular cities. For

36
 For example, will to power.
Architecture and Eternity: Physis in Nietzsche and Empedocles 23

Empedoclean nature, life and culture are at one with roots, as all things continu-
ously exhibit the self-determined intrinsic motion of love and strife while maintain-
ing an inner essence of perpetual being. Aristotelian teleological nature finds the
city as the purpose of human existence, and all things that can be used for life in the
city exist for the sake of such life. This leads to the resource-extraction model of
human culture. The Homeric conception of nature opens up a near pessimistic nihil-
ism (certainly, it causes that reaction in Johannes De Silentio). Here, nature consists
of life succeeding life, continuously. All one can do is struggle against forces living/
natural and nonliving/unnatural until death. As Diomedes observes: mortal man,
doomed to die.
Βαυβώ, the secret womb of nature’s inner self, the sleeping source of waking life
forever hidden from appearance, affords greater creativity to mortal creatures than
the determinate four masses of roots, love, and strife. It avoids the pessimism of
Homer and the moral constrictions of Aristotelian substance and its teleological
essence. Nietzsche finds in Empedocles a conception of motion, more than growth,
less than teleological, and without mechanism, that can ground a life-affirming,
creative moral system. Through Βαυβώ, he obscures the precise character of per-
petual being, and opens the possibility of transformative creative philosophy.
Nietzsche’s corpus provides much more than the brief Empedocles fragments to
work with in seeking a philosophy of the polis. The need to abandon functionalism,
purpose, and teleology in order to embrace the moment more thoroughly, love exis-
tence, and create a beautiful world emerges equally from his own thought as well as
from his interpretation of Empedocles. Love and strife permeate the four roots,
fulfilling the goal of their motion through the motion itself. The antipodes of his
cosmological system are not goals; rather, they express moments within an ontology
that attains its goal at every instant. By expressing the forces of attraction and repul-
sion, and perpetually realizing the possibilities of the four masses of roots,
Empedoclean nature actualizes all purpose by its very existence. In this way, it
provides a model for Nietzschean self-affirming and life-affirming morality—one
that is highly valuable to our current state of global precariousness.
Our world faces difficulties beyond those of Ancient Greeks or Nineteenth
Century Germans. The consequences of Western development grounded in an
anthropocentric telos and a mechanistic, intrinsically valueless conception of nature
present dire obstacles to the future. Nietzsche recognizes that to restore meaning to
the earth and love to this existence, a new conception of nature, and of the human
relationship to it, is needed. He overcomes the dualistic conception of love and strife
with the singular focus of will to power. In On the Genealogy of Morals, Book II,
Section 10, he describes mercy as the “self-overcoming of justice,” the overcoming
of punishment itself. “What are my parasites to me,” he asks of criminals in a far
future society, “May they live and prosper. I am strong enough for that”
(Nietzsche1989b, 72–3). This radical mercy shows the same compassionate ten-
dency exhibited by Empedocles. Here, just as he overcomes love and strife, his
conception of power overcomes punishment, revenge, and even violence.
24 M.M. Shaw

We, too, must overcome Nietzsche and the Greeks: slavery, tyranny, aristocracy,
power, war, Empedocles’ apocryphal suicide, Nietzsche’s call for destruction.37
There is much in them to be overcome for the future of our own world. We should
not forget the slaves of Acragas or the dangerous depths of Nietzsche’s thought.
Neither provides the model for the future, but their efforts show the transformative
power of a particular ontology of φύσις, persisting enigmatically or multifariously,
across the infinite mixtures of the multitude.
The Gay Science echoes the Genealogy’s call for mercy with affirming laughter.
“Even laughter may yet have a future. I mean, when the proposition ‘the species is
everything, one is always none’ has become part of humanity, and this ultimate
liberation and irresponsibility has become accessible to all at all times. Perhaps
laughter will then have formed an alliance with wisdom, perhaps only ‘gay science’
will then be left” (Nietzsche 1974, GS 74). Such laughter proceeds from a founda-
tion, a ῥίζωμα, of laughter in the face of all seriousness and terror. This comes from
a conception of unity, in this case the unity of species, meant to free humanity from
the seriousness of individual fates and judgment. Both Nietzsche and Empedocles
seek to ground their own social transformations in conceptions of persistent nature.
A merciful society that does not punish cannot find the individual harmed to
require retribution. This can be achieved through the realization of the insignifi-
cance of the individual with respect to nature. Rather than lead to a nihilistic dark-
ness of terror engulfing humanity, this insight leads Nietzsche to value every
moment as an expression of the whole. Rather than increased strife and violence,
Nietzsche finds in Empedocles an ontology of nature that grounds respect for the
earth and kindness to humanity. Φύσις in Empedocles constitutes an all encompass-
ing, continuous growth from eternal sources, whether together, apart, or otherwise.
Recognition of this can facilitate the unification of self with others, citizens with
their surroundings, and the polis with the earth.
Nietzsche desires precisely such a union of self, others, rocks, and plants: “We
wish to see ourselves translated into stone and plants, we want to take walks in our-
selves when we stroll around these buildings and gardens” (Nietzsche 1974, GS
280). In the architecture of “our big cities” (Nietzsche 1974, GS 280) Nietzsche
seeks an Acragantine polis: one where the persistence and beauty of great works of
city planning represent and promote the joy of existence across generations. He
desires “quiet and wide, expansive places for reflection…places where no shouting
or noise of carriages can reach” (Nietzsche 1974, GS 280). This shows a respect for
the natural and human environment. The rattle of carriages, the noise of industry, the
values of the technologically obsessed industrial world, all must be muted in the
gardens of the godless.
The teleological imperatives of capitalism recede into architectural peace like
that of Nietzsche’s Genoa. Within “its villas and pleasure gardens and the far-flung
periphery of its inhabited heights and slopes” (Nietzsche 1974, GS 291), Nietzsche

37
 Consider Diogenes Laertius 1995, 382–385 on Empedocles and Mt. Etna, and Nietzsche 1974,
GS Book I, Section 4. “What preserves the species— The strongest and most evil spirits have so
far done the most to advance humanity” (79).
Architecture and Eternity: Physis in Nietzsche and Empedocles 25

finds a powerful model for the transformative architecture of the free spirit. “I keep
seeing the builders, their eyes resting on everything near and far that they have built,
and also on the city, the sea, and the contours of the mountains, and there is violence
and conquest in their eyes. All this they want to fit into their plan and ultimately
make their possessions by making it part of their plan” (Nietzsche 1974, GS 291).
These Zarathustrian warriors, “unconcerned, mocking, violent” (Nietzsche 1989b,
GM 97), through their love of building, masonry, and architecture, portend
Zarathustra’s call for, “the creative spirit whose compelling strength will not let him
rest in any aloofness or beyond” (Nietzsche 1989b, GM 96). Through ageless beauty
the Genoan builders express their eternal singularity: “each rebelled against each at
home, too, and found a way to express his superiority and to lay between himself
and his neighbor his personal infinity. Each once more conquered his homeland for
himself by overwhelming it with his architectural ideas and refashioning it into a
house that was a feast for his eyes” (Nietzsche 1974, GS 291). Nietzsche offers a
glimpse at a philosophy of the polis. The citizens of Acragas and Genoa share a
truphoic lifestyle expressed through their architectural achievements. In the Gay
Science and Empedocles’ On Nature, these idealized cities express a beauty
grounded in each philosopher’s understanding of φύσις.
These disparate but related conceptions of nature—as persistent mystery driven
by power and persistent roots driven by love and strife—provide meaning by deny-
ing birth and death. Ethical focus may be turned away from individuals and their
essential being toward the immortality of their roots. Mercy may be granted to the
failings of the past, the present, and the individual. To overcome crimes against
nature, humanity must see itself transformed into nature, and thereby transform its
relationship to nature from that between self and other to that between self and self.
In recognizing our essential connection to nature, humanity may embark on a new
overcoming and convalescence through actions such as the stewardship of nature
and showing compassion to all living things.

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