VI.

Adjudicatory Powers
A. Quasi-judicial power and quasi-judicial body, defined

Smart Communications vs NTC G.R. No. 151908 12 August 2003

Facts: Petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone Corporation
filed against the National Telecommunications Commission, an action for declaration of
nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing Circular). Petitioners
allege that the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the
prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and
Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular is
oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the constitutional prohibition against
deprivation of property without due process of law; that the Circular will result in the
impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the
validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of
identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable.
Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio.

Issue :WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case

Held: Petitions are granted. The issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular No. 13-
6-2000 and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasi-legislative
or rule-making power. As such, petitioners were justified in invoking the judicial power
of the Regional Trial Court to assail the constitutionality and validity of the said
issuances. What is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation
issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative
function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The
determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative
agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to
declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts.25
This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to
determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments.26
Judicialx power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an
administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power.
This is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative
policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by
the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative
body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner
an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the
power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the

1
performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying
out their quasi-judicial functions, the administrative officers or bodies are
required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings,
weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official
action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.

Santiago, Jr. vs Bautista 32 SCRA 188

Facts: The appellant was a grade 6 pupil in a certain public elementary school. As the
school year was then about to end, the "Committee On the Rating Of Students For
Honor" was constituted by the teachers concerned at said school for the purpose of
selecting the "honor students" of its graduating class. With the school Principal, as
chairman, and the members of the committee deliberated and finally adjudged Socorro
Medina, Patricia Liñgat and Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. as first, second and third honors,
respectively. The school's graduation exercises were thereafter set for May 21, 1965; but
three days before that date, the "third placer" Teodoro Santiago, Jr., represented by his
mother, and with his father as counsel, sought the invalidation of the "ranking of honor
students" thus made, by instituting the above-mentioned civil case in the Court of First
Instance of Cotabato, committee members along with the District Supervisor and the
Academic Supervisor of the place.

Issue: WON the committee committed grave abuse of discretion

Held: "'NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION”

"Allegations relating to the alleged 'grave abuse of discretion' on the part of teachers
refer to errors, mistakes, or irregularities rather than to the real grave abuse of discretion
that would amount to lack of jurisdiction. Mere commission of errors in the exercise of
jurisdiction may not be corrected by means of certiorari.

WHAT ARE JUDICIAL OR QUASI JUDICIAL ACTS? It is difficult, if not impossible,

precisely to define what are judicial or quasi judicial acts, and there is considerable
conflict in the decisions in regard thereto, in connection with the law as to the right to a
writ of certiorari. it is clear, however, that it is the nature of the act to be performed,
rather than of the office, board, or body which performs it, that determines whether or
not it is the discharge of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. It is not essential that the
proceedings should be strictly and technically judicial, in the sense in which that word is
used when applied to courts of justice, but it is sufficient if they are quasi judicial. It is
enough if the officers act judicially in making their decision, whatever may be their
public character.

The precise line of demarkation between what are judicial and what are
administrative or ministerial functions is often difficult to determine. The
exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance of legislative or
administrative duties, and the performance of administrative or ministerial
duties, may, in a measure, involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may be
said generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what the law

2
is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in
controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and
undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.

Filipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. VS. Oil Industry Commission 145 SCRA 433

Facts: Respondent Manuel B. Yap is a gasoline dealer by virtue of a "Sublease and Dealer
Agreement" entered into with petitioner Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation
(hereinafter known as Shell) originally in the year 1965 and superseded in the year 1969.
The latter was filed and registered with the OIC.

While petitioner Shell complied with its contractual commitments, Manuel B. Yap
defaulted in his obligations upon failure to pay for his purchases of gasoline and other
petroleum products. Petitioner Shell sent demand letters to respondent Manuel B. Yap
who continued to ignore these demands letters forcing petitioner Shell to exercise its
contractual rights to terminate the contract. Petitioner Shell sent respondent Yap the
required 90-day written notice to terminate their contract as provided for by Sec. 5 of
their "Sublease and Dealer Agreement."

Despite the pendency of the controversy before the ordinary civil courts, OIC persisted
in asserting jurisdiction over it by rendering a decision stating it has jurisdiction to pass
upon the alleged contractual right of petitioner to declare Yap's contract terminated. The
OIC negated the existence of such right because the stipulation is an "unfair and onerous
trade practice." Respondent OIC also allowed respondent Yap reasonable time from
receipt of the decision within which to pay his judgment debt to petitioner as adjudged
in a Civil Case. Petitioner Shell moved for a reconsideration but respondent OIC denied
it.

Issue: WON Respondent OIC has jurisdiction to hear and decide contractual disputes
between a gasoline dealer and an oil company.

Held: the OIC has no jurisdiction. The contentions of petitioner are well-founded. A
detailed reading of the entire OIC Act will reveal that there is no express provision
conferring upon respondent OIC the power to hear and decide contractual disputes
between a gasoline dealer and an oil company. It is of course a well-settled principle of
administrative law that unless expressly empowered, administrative agencies like
respondent OIC, are bereft of quasi-judicial powers.

As We declared in Miller vs. Mardo, et al (2 SCRA 898):

" . . . It may be conceded that the Legislature may confer on administrative boards or
bodies quasi-judicial powers involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, as
incident to the performance of administrative functions, but in so doing, the legislature
must state its intention in express terms that would leave no doubt, as even such quasi-
judicial prerogatives must be limited, if they are to be valid, only to those incidental to,

3
or in connection with, the performance of administrative duties which do not amount to
conferment of jurisdiction over a matter exclusively vested in the courts."

B. Distinguished from judicial power

Carino vs CHR 204 SCRA 483

Facts: Some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the Manila Public
School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT)
undertook what they described as amass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight'
their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon
grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention. According to
them they had decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions" after the protest rally
staged at the DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last
call for the government to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response
from the Secretary of Education. Through their representatives, the teachers
participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary of Education
to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS
officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply
and to hire their replacements. "For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR
complainants (private respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the
principal's report and given five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also
preventively suspended for ninety (90) days 'pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807' and
temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the
charges in accordance with P.D. 807."

Issue: WON the Commission on Human Rights has jurisdiction, adjudicatory powers
over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of
cases, like alleged human rights violation involving civil or political rights.

Held: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power.
The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to
investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can
exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise
that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of
violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the
course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant
immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of
documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may
also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the
performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such
remedy as may be required by its findings.
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of
justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. "x x 'It may be said generally that the exercise of
judicial functions is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are,
with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that
authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.'x x."

4
 Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to
investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the
matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC

Luzon Development Bank vs Association of LDB Employees 249 SCRA 162

Facts: From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank (LDB) and the
Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration case
to resolve the following issue:

Issue: WON the company has violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement provision
and the Memorandum of Agreement dated April 1994, on promotion.

Held: It is to be noted that the Jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary arbitrator or

a panel of such arbitrators is quite limited compared to the original jurisdiction of the
labor arbiter and the appellate jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) for that matter. The state of our present law relating to voluntary arbitration
provides that "(t)he award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator x x x shall be final and
executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision
by the parties," while the "(d)ecision, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final
and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders." Hence, while there is
an express mode of appeal from the decision of a labor arbiter, Republic Act No. 6715 is
silent with respect to an appeal from the decision of a voluntary arbitrator.
What’s the ruling?

C. Distinguished from administrative function

Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs CA 171 SCRA 348

Facts: The petitioner, the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force, the President's arm
assigned to investigate and prosecute so-called "dollar salting" activities in the country.
PADS issued search warrants against certain companies.

Issue: WON the PADS is a quasi-judicial body issue search warrants under the 1973
Constitution?

Held: the court ruled that PADS was not granted by law to issue a warrant of arrest. A
quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a court and
other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either
adjudication or rule making
It is the basic function of these bodies to adjudicate claims and/or to determine
rights, and unless its decision are seasonably appealed to the proper reviewing
authorities, the same attain finality and become executory. A perusal of the Presidential
Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's organic act, Presidential Decree No. 1936, as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 2002, convinces the Court that the Task Force was not meant

5
to exercise quasi-judicial functions, that is, to try and decide claims and execute its
judgments. As the President's arm called upon to combat the vice of "dollar salting" or
the blackmarketing and salting of foreign exchange, it is tasked alone by the Decree to
handle the prosecution of such activities, but nothing more.

Cojuangco vs PCGG 190 SCRA 226

Facts: President Corazon C. Aquino directed the Solicitor General to prosecute all
persons involved in the misuse of coconut levy funds. Pursuant to the above directive
the Solicitor General created a task force to conduct a thorough study of the possible
involvement of all persons in the anomalous use of coconut levy funds. Upon the
creation of the PCGG under EO. 1 issued by President Aquino, the PCGG was charged
with the task of assisting the President not only in the recovery of illgotten wealth or
unexplained wealth accumulated by the former President, his immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates but also in the investigation of such cases of
graft and corruption as the President may assign to the Commission from time to time
and to prevent a repetition of the same in the future.
Petitioner alleges that the PCGG may not conduct a preliminary investigation of
the complaints filed by the Solicitor General without violating petitioner's rights to due
process and equal protection of the law, and that the PCGG has no right to conduct such
preliminary investigation.

Issue: WON the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) has the power
to conduct a preliminary investigation of the anti-graft and corruption cases filed by the
Solicitor General against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and other respondents for the alleged
misuse of coconut levy funds.

Held: the court ruled in the negative. Considering that the PCGG, like the courts, is
vested with the authority to grant provisional remedies of (1) sequestration, (2) freezing
assets, and (3) provisional takeover, it is indispensable that, as in the case of attachment
and receivership, there exists a prima facie factual foundation, at least, for the
sequestration order, freeze order or takeover order, an adequate and fair opportunity to
contest it and endeavor to cause its negation or nullification. Both are assured under the
foregoing executive orders and the rules and regulations promulgated by the PCGG.
The general power of investigation vested in the PCGG may be divided into two
stages. The first stage of investigation which is called the criminal investigation stage is
the fact finding inquiring which is usually conducted by the law enforcement agents
whereby they gather evidence and interview witnesses after which they assess the
evidence and if they find sufficient basis, file the complaint for the purpose of
preliminary investigation. The second stage is the preliminary investigation stage of the
said complaint. It is at this stage, as above discussed, where it is ascertained if there is
sufficient evidence to bring a person to trial.
It is in such instances that we say one cannot be "a prosecutor and judge at the
same time." Having gathered the evidence and filed the complaint as a law enforcer, he
cannot be expected to handle with impartiality the preliminary investigation of his own
complaint, this time as a public prosecutor.

6
 The Court holds that a just and fair administration of justice can be promoted if
the PCGG would be prohibited from conducting the preliminary investigation of the
complaints subject of this petition and the petition for intervention and that the records
of the same should be forwarded to the Ombudsman, who as an independent
constitutional officer has primary jurisdiction over cases of this nature, to conduct such
preliminary investigation and take appropriate action.

Sideco vs Sarenas, 41 Phil. 80

Facts: Two parties, Crispulo Sideco on the one hand, and Leocadio Sarenas and Rufino
Sarenas on the other hand, claim the exclusive right to the use of the waters flowing
through the estero for irrigation purposes. The claim of Sideco goes back to 1885 when
the predecessor in interest of his father constructed a dam in these waters; the use of the
dam was afterwards interrupted by outside causes such as imprisonment and war, but
again reasserted in 1911, 1915, and 1916. Exactly what the two Sarenas' contention is not
quite clear on the facts before us. However, it appears that they made application to the
Director of Public Works, only to meet with the opposition of Sideco, and that the
Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications, granted the two Sarenas the right, in preference to all other persons, to
use the waters of the estero Bangad. Sideco then took the proceedings to the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija. After trial, judgment was entered, dismissing the
complaint and the appeal of Sideco and confirming the decision of the administrative
authorities, with the costs against the plaintiff.
The further appeal of Sideco to this court, while conceding the correctness of the
findings of the trial court, squarely challenges its judgment.

Issue: WON the Director of public works has jurisdiction over the case?

Held: Administrative machinery for the settlement of disputes as to the use of waters is
provided by the Irrigation Act, as amended. Controversies must be submitted to the
Secretary of Commerce and Communications through the Director of Public Works. The
"decision" of the Secretary thereon is final "unless appeal therefrom be taken to the
proper court within. thirty days after the date of the notification of the parties of said
decision. In case of such appeal the court having jurisdiction shall try the controversy de
novo." (See. 4.) A more extensive method is also provided, somewhat akin to our
cadastral system, which makes it the duty of the Director of Public Works to make a
technical examination of streams and to prepare a list of priorities. In the performance of
this work, the Director of Public Works or any official especially authorized by him, may
examine witnesses under oath, and can issue for this purpose subpoenas and subpoenas
duces tecum. (Secs. 8, 41.) Certificates signed by the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications are then granted each appropriator. (Secs. 9, 18.) "Appeal" lies from the
"decision" of the Director of Public Works, as approved by the Secretary of Commerce
and Communications, to the Court of First Instance of the province in which the
property is situated. Such action must be brought within ninety days of the date of the
publication of the approved list of priorities. (Sec. 10.)
DECISION OF DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS AS PART OF JUDICIAL
RECORD.-The decision of the Director of Public Works, affirmed by the Secretary of

7
Commerce and Communications, containing as it does the technical findings of officers
especially qualified in irrigation engineering, should invariably be made a part of the
judicial record because (1) the determination of these officials would be most useful to
the courts, and (2) the exact date of the decision is of moment since it decides whether
the appeal was taken in time.

Ocampo vs US 234 US 91

D. Distinguished from legislative power or rule-making

Lupangco vs CA 160 SCRA 848

Facts: Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as part of
its "Additional Instructions to Examinees to all those applying for admission to take the
licensure examinations in accountancy. The resolution embodied the following pertinent
provisions:
"No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like
conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school,
college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer,
instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions
during the three days immediately preceding every examination day including the
examination day.
Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions.
Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy
filed in their own behalf and in behalf of all others similarly situated like them, with the
RTC a complaint for injunction with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-
mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional.

Issue: WON the Resolution is unconstitutional

Held: The Resolution is null and void. The enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a
guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at
least minimized. Making the examinees suffer by depriving them of legitimate means of
review or preparation on those last three precious days-when they should be refreshing
themselves with all that they have learned in the review classes and preparing their
mental and psychological make-up for the examination day itself-would be like
uprooting the tree to get ride of a rotten branch. What is needed to be done by the
respondent is to find out the source of such leakages and stop it right there. If corrupt
officials or personnel should be terminated from their loss, then so be it. Fixers or
swindlers should be flushed out. Strict guidelines to be observed by examiners should
be set up and if violations are committed, then licenses should be suspended or revoked.
These are all within the powers of the respondent commission as provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 223. But by all means the right and freedom of the examinees to
avail of all legitimate means to prepare for the examinations should not be curtailed.

8
 E. Rationale for vesting administrative agencies with quasi-judicial
power

C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. vs Hibionada 191 SCRA 268

Facts : The petitioner as agent of private respondent Pleasantville Development

Corporation sold a subdivision lot on installment to private respondent Efren
Diongon. The installment payments having been completed, Diongon demanded
the delivery of the certificate of title to the subject land. When neither the
petitioner nor Pleasantville complied, he filed a complaint against them for
specific performance and damages in the Regional Trial Court of Negros
Occidental. The case was set for initial hearing. It was then that C.T. Torres
Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, contending that the
competent body to hear and decide the case was the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board. The motion to dismiss was denied by the court contending
that it had jurisdiction over the matter.

Issue : WON the trial court have jurisdiction over the case.

Ratio : P.D. No. 957, promulgated July 12, 1976 and otherwise known as "The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree," provides that the
National Housing Authority shall have exclusive authority to regulate the real
estate trade and business.

P.D. No. 1344, which was promulgated April 2, 1978, and empowered the
National Housing Authority to issue writs of execution in the enforcement of its
decisions under P.D. No. 957, specified the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the
agency as follows:

SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and
business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No.
957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases of the following nature:

A. Unsound real estate business practices;

B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyer against the project owner developer, dealer, broker or
salesman; and

C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by

buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman.

9
This departure from the traditional allocation of governmental powers is justified
by expediency, or the need of the government to respond swiftly and
competently to the pressing problems of the modem world.

F. Scope of quasi-judicial powers of an administrative agency

GSIS vs CSC 202 SCRA 799

Facts : The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) dismissed six (6)
employees as being "notoriously undesirable," they having allegedly been found
to be connected with irregularities in the canvass of supplies and materials. Five
of these six dismissed employees appealed to the Merit Systems Board. The
Board found the dismissals to be illegal because affected without formal charges
having been filed or an opportunity given to the employees to answer, and
ordered the remand of the cases to the GSIS for appropriate disciplinary
proceedings. The GSIS appealed to the Civil Service Commission. By Resolution,
the Commission ruled that the dismissal of all five was indeed illegal. GSIS
appealed to the SC and affirmed the decision of the CSC with a modification that
it eliminated the payment of back salaries until the outcome of the investigation
and reinstatement of only 3 employees since the other two had died. The heirs of
the deceased sought execution of the order from the CSC which was granted.
GSIS opposed and came to the SC on certiorari contending that the CSC does not
have any power to execute its resolution or judgment.

Issue : WON the CSC had powers to execute its resolution or judgment.

Ratio : The Civil Service Commission, like the Commission on Elections and the
Commission on Audit, is a constitutional commission invested by the
Constitution and relevant laws not only with authority to administer the civil
service, but also with quasi-judicial powers. It has the authority to hear and
decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or brought to it
on appeal.

The Civil Service Commission promulgated Resolution No. 89-779 adopting,

approving and putting into effect simplified rules of procedure on administrative
disciplinary and protest cases, pursuant to the authority granted by the
constitutional and statutory provisions. The provisions are analogous and
entirely consistent with the duty or responsibility reposed in the Chairman by
PD 807, subject to policies and resolutions adopted by the Commission. In light
of all the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions, it would appear
absurd to deny to the Civil Service Commission the power or authority to
enforce or order execution of its decisions, resolutions or orders which, it should

10
be stressed, it has been exercising through the years. It would seem quite obvious
that the authority to decide cases is inutile unless accompanied by the authority
to see that what has been decided is carried out. Hence, the grant to a tribunal or
agency of adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and adjudge cases,
should normally and logically be deemed to include the grant of authority to
enforce or execute the judgments it thus renders, unless the law otherwise
provides.

Death, however, has already sealed that outcome, foreclosing the initiation of
disciplinary administrative proceedings, or the continuation of any then
pending, against the deceased employees. Whatever may be said of the binding
force of the Resolution of July 4, 1988 so far as, to all intents and purposes, it
makes exoneration in the administrative proceedings a condition precedent to
payment of back salaries, it cannot exact an impossible performance or decree a
useless exercise.

Angara vs Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139

Facts : This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A.
Angara, for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the
Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from taking further cognizance of
the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent, against the election of said
petitioner as member of the National Assembly for the first assembly district of
the Province of Tayabas. Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Electoral
Commission.

Issue : WON Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction

in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the
herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by
resolution of the National Assembly?

Ratio : The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei
the power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests
intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that
where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power
necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also
conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In
the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be
followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the
incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
exclusive powers to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by
necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

11
 Provident Tree Farms vs Batario, Jr. 231 SCRA 463

Facts : PETITIONER PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC. (PTFI), is a Philippine

corporation engaged in industrial tree planting. It grows gubas trees in its
plantations in Agusan and Mindoro which it supplies to a local match
manufacturer solely for production of matches. In consonance with the state
policy to encourage qualified persons to engage in industrial tree plantation, Sec.
36, par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code 1 confers on entities like PTFI a set of
incentives among which is a qualified ban against importation of wood and
"wood-derivated" products. Private respondent A. J. International Corporation
(AJIC) imported four (4) containers of matches from Indonesia, which the Bureau
of Customs, and two (2) more containers of matches from Singapore. Upon
request of PTFI, Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., of the Department of
Natural Resources and Environment issued a certification that "there are
enough available softwood supply in the Philippines for the match industry at
reasonable price." PTFI then filed with the Regional Court of Manila a
complaint for injunction and damages with prayer for a temporary restraining
order against respondents Commissioner of Customs and AJIC to enjoin the
latter from importing matches and "wood-derivative" products, and the Collector
of Customs from allowing and releasing the importations. AJIC moved to
dismiss the case asseverating that the enforcement of the import ban under Sec.
36, par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code is within the exclusive realm of the
Bureau of Customs, and direct recourse of petitioner to the Regional Trial Court
to compel the Commissioner of Customs to enforce the ban is devoid of any legal
basis.

Issue : WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling : PTFI's correspondence with the Bureau of Customs contesting the

legality of match importations may already take the nature of an administrative
proceeding the pendency of which would preclude the court from interfering
with it under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

Under the sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction . . . the

courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is
within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to
comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered.

12
In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative
boards or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability to
hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual
matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has
become well nigh indispensable . . .

Tejada v. Homestead Property Corporation 178 SCRA 164

Facts : Private respondent Taclin V. Bañez offered to sell to petitioner Enriqueto

F. Tejada a 200 square meter lot owned by respondent corporation. Private
respondent suggested that petitioner pay a reservation fee of P20,000.00, which
would form part of the consideration in case they reach a final agreement of sale
and which amount was to be returned to the petitioner should the parties fail to
reach an agreement. After paying the reservation fee, the respondent corporation
changed the terms of monthly amortization which resulted in the demand of the
petitioner for the return of his reservation fee. Respondent refused to return the
same and petitioner brought suit with the RTC for a collection of sum of money.
Respondents herein filed a motion to dismiss contesting the jurisdiction of the
RTC to hear the case. The same was denied and respondents appealed to the CA
who decided in their favor. Petitioner argues that inasmuch as there is no
perfected contract of sale between the parties, the claim for recovery of the
reservation fee properly falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts and not
that of the HSRC.

Issue : WON the RTC had jurisdiction over the recovery of reservation fee.

Ratio : The RTC has no jurisdiction. Under Presidential Decree No. 1344, the
NHA has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide claims involving refund and
other claims filed by a subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the
project owner, etc. There is no such qualification in said provision of law that
makes a distinction between a perfected sale and one that has yet to be perfected.
The word "buyer" in the law should be understood to be anyone who purchases
anything for money. Under the circumstances of this case, one who offers to buy
is as much a buyer as one who buys by virtue of a perfected contract of sale. Said
powers have since been transferred to the HLRB.

Moreover, upon the promulgation of Executive Order No. 90, it is therein

provided that the HLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over claims involving refund
filed against project owners, developers, and dealers, among others.

When an administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-judicial functions, all

controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to its specialization are
deemed to be included within the jurisdiction of said administrative agency or

13
body. Split jurisdiction is not favored. Since in this case the action for refund of
reservation fee arose from a proposed purchase of a subdivision lot obviously the
HLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over the case.

Cariño vs. CHR 204 SCRA 483

Ruling : Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the
power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits"
(adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it
has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in
the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question,
initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political
rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power
to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted
actions engaged in by the teachers constitute a strike and are prohibited or
otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking
part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions
and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of
Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting
administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances
complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each
individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said
acts or omissions.

These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the
Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers
granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

G. Classification of adjudicatory powers

2. Directing powers. Illustrated by the corrective powers of

public utility commissions, powers of assessment under the
revenue laws, reparations under public utility laws and awards
under;
3. Enabling powers. The grant or denial of permit or
authorization;
1. Dispensing powers. The authority to exempt from or relax a
general prohibition, or authority to relieve from affirmative duty.
The licensing power sets or assumes a standard, while the
dispensing power sanctions a deviation from a standard;

14
 2. Summary powers. To designate administrative power to
apply compulsion or force against person or property to effectuate
a legal purpose without a judicial warrant to authorize such action;
3. Equitable powers. An administrative tribunal having power
to determine the law upon a particular state of facts has the right to
and must consider and make proper application of the rules of
equity.

VII. The Power to Issue Subpoena

Carmelo vs Ramos 6 SCRA 836

Facts :

Issue :

Ruling :

Section 13 Book VII 1987 Admin. Code

Caamic vs Galaon 237 SCRA 390

Facts : Respondent MTC judge issued a subpoena against Caamic which required
her to appear before his sala under the penalty of law. Caamic was surprised for
she was not aware of any case filed against her. When she appeared at the date,
time and place stated in the subpoena, she was berated by the respondent and
demanded 8K from her. Said amount was the amount of the life insurance policy
of one Edgardo Sandagan. Said subpoena was issued upon request by Generosa
Sandagan who sought the help of respondent because she could not get a share
of the proceeds of the life insurance policy of her dead husband whose
beneficiary was Caamic.

Issue : Propriety of the subpoena issued by the respondent judge.

Ruling : Respondent should have known or ought to know that under Section 1,
Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, a subpoena "is a process directed to a person
requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or the trial of an action, or at
any investigation conducted under the laws of the Philippines, or for taking of
his deposition." Although the subpoena he caused to be issued purports to be in
a form for criminal cases pending in his court, it was not, in fact, issued in
connection with a criminal case or for any other pending case in his court nor for
any investigation he was competent to conduct pursuant to law or by direction of

15
this Court. It was designated for a specific purpose, viz., administrative
conference. That purpose was, in no way connected with or related to some of
his administrative duties because he knew from the beginning that it was for a
confrontation with the complainant as solicited by Generosa. Sandagan for the
latter to get a share in the death benefits of Edgardo Sandagan which was
received by the complainant. Generosa had not filed any action in respondent's
court for her claim; neither is there any case in respondent's court concerning
such death benefits. What Generosa wanted was for respondent to act as
mediator or conciliator to arrive at a possible compromise with the complainant,
which was, obviously, non-official and absolutely a private matter. Not being
then directly or remotely related to his official functions and duties,
accommodating the request and using his official functions and office in
connection therewith was, by any yardstick, improper.

In a suit for unfair competition, it is only through the issuance of the questioned
"subpoena duces tecum " that the complaining party is afforded his full rights of
redress.

Universal Rubber Products vs CA 130 SCRA 104

Facts : Private respondents herein sued herein petitioner for unfair competition
in the lower court. During the trial and after the presentation of some of private
respondents’ witnesses, they requested the court for a subpoena duces tecum as
regards to the books of herein petitioner. Petitioner moved to quash the
subpoena on the ground that it can only be regarded as a “fishing bill” to
discover evidence against herein petitioner and that such is not applicable in a
case for unfair competition. The trial court denied the same.

Issue : WON the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum is proper in a case for
unfair competition.

Ratio : A case for unfair competition is actually a case for injunction and
damages. As a general rule, on obtaining an injunction for infringement of a
trademark, complainant is entitled to an accounting and recovery of defendant's
profits on the goods sold under that mark, as incident to, and a part of, his
property right, and this rule applies in cases of unfair competition. In such case,
the infringer or unfair trader is required in equity to account for and yield up his
gains on a principle analogous to that which charges as trustee with the profits
acquired by the wrongful use of the property of the cestui que trust, and
defendant's profits are regarded as an equitable measure of the compensation
plaintiff should receive for the past harm suffered by him.

16
in order to entitle a parry to the issuance of a "subpoena duces tecum, " it must
appear. by clear and unequivocal proof, that the book or document sought to be
produced contains evidence relevant and material to the issue before the court,
and that the precise book, paper or document containing such evidence has been
so designated or described that it may be identified. A "subpoena duces tecum"
once issued by the court may be quashed upon motion if the issuance therof is
unreasonable and oppressive, or the relevancy of the books. documents or things
does not appear, or if the persons in whose behalf the subpoena is issued fails to
advance the reasonable cost of production thereof.

In the instant case in determining whether the books subject to the subpoena
duces tecum are relevant and reasonable in relation to the complaint of private
respondent for unfair competition.

Masangcay vs COMELEC 6 SCRA 27

Facts : Masangcay was the provincial treasurer of Aklan who was charged with
several others for CONTEMPT by the COMELEC when it opened 3 boxes
without the presence of the persons and/or parties indicated in its Resolution.
After appearing and showing cause why they should not be punished for
contempt, the COMELEC sentenced Masangcay for imprisonment and imposing
a fine. Masangcay filed a petition for review with the SC.

Issue : WON the COMELEC may punish Masangcay for contempt for his acts.

Ruling : When the Commission exercises a ministerial function it cannot exercise

the power to punish for contempt because such power is inherently judicial in
nature. In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did
not exercise any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the
power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is
inherently judicial in nature.

The Commission on Elections has not only the duty to enforce and administer all
laws relative to the conduct of elections, but also the power to try, hear and
decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in connection with the
elections. In this sense, we said, the Commission, although it cannot be classified
as a court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution (Section 30, Article
VIII), for it is merely an administrative body, may however exercise quasi-
judicial functions insofar as controversies that by express provision of law come
under its jurisdiction.

17
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the
enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently, in
the, administration of justice.

The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary incident and
attribute of courts. Its exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably
limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony. And the exercise of that
power by an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function
has been held invalid.

VIII. The Power To Punish For Contempt

People v. Mendoza 92 Phil 570

Camelo v. Ramos 116 Phil 1152

IX. Power to impose penalties

Scoty’s Department Store v. Micaller 99 Phil 762

Facts: Nena Micaller was employed as a salesgirl in the Scoty's Department Store
situated at 615 Escolta, Manila. This store was owned and operated by Yu Ki
Lam, Richard Yang, Yu Si Kiao and Helen Yang. Pursuant to section 5(b) of the
Industrial Peace Act, Nena Micaller filed charges of unfair labor practice against
her above employers alleging that she was dismissed by them because of her
membership in the National Labor Union and that, prior to her separation, said
employers had been questioning their employees regarding their membership in
said union and had interfered with their right to organize under the law.

The employers denied the charge. They claimed that the complainant was
dismissed from the service because of her misconduct and serious disrespect to
the management and her co employees so much so that several criminal charges
were filed against her with the city fiscal of Manila who, after investigation, filed
the corresponding information’s against her and the same are now pending trial
in court.
The Court of industrial relation ruled in favor of Nina Micaller and impose fine
against the petitioner.

Issue: WON the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction to impose the
penalties prescribed in section 25 of Republic Act No. 875.

18
Ruling: This is against the due process guaranteed by our Constitution. It may be
contended that this gap may be subserved by requiring the Court of Industrial
Relations to observe strictly the rules applicable to criminal cases to meet the
requirements of the Constitution, but this would be tantamount to amending the
law which is not within the province of the judicial branch of our Government.

In conclusion, our considered opinion is that the power to impose the penalties
provided for in section 25 of Republic Act No. 875 is lodged in ordinary courts,
and not in the Court of Industrial Relations, notwithstanding the definition of the
word "Court" contained in section 2 (a) of said Act. Hence, the decision of the
industrial court in so far as it imposes a fine of P100 upon petitioners is illegal
and should be nullified.

The procedure laid down by law to be observed by the Court of Industrial

Relations in dealing with unfair labor practice cases negates those constitutional
guarantees to the accused. And this is so because, among other things, the law
provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not
be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this Act that the Court (of
Industrial Relations) and its members and Hearing Examiners shall use every
and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and
objectively and without regard to technicalities of law, or procedure." It is
likewise enjoined that "the Court shall not be bound solely by the evidence
presented during the hearing but may avail itself of all other means such as (but
not limited to) ocular inspections and questioning of well-informed persons
which results must be made a part of the record". All-this means that an accused
may be tried without the right "to meet the witnesses face to face" and may be
convicted merely on preponderance of evidence and not beyond reasonable
doubt.

CAB v. PAL 63 SCRA 524

X. Power in deportation and citizenship cases

Lao Gi v. Court of Appeals 180 SCRA 756

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
I. Jurisdiction

A. Definition
People vs Mariano 71 SCRA 600

19
Facts: The Accused was convicted of the crime of abused of chastity. He filed an
appealed contending that he married the victim therefore his criminal liability
should be extinguished. The Attorney-General entered an opposition to said
petition wherein, after discussing the scope of article 448 of the Penal Code and
Act No. 1773 of the Philippine Legislature amending said article, he concluded
that the marriage of the accused with the offended party cannot extinguish his
liability as perpetrator of the crime of abuse against chastity.

Issue: Whether or not section 2 of Act No. 1773 includes the crime of abuse
against chastity among those cases in which criminal liability is extinguished by
the marriage of the accused with the offended party.

Ruling: The intention of our Legislature in enacting said Act No. 1773 was that
the marriage of the accused or convict with the offended party should extinguish
the criminal liability in the cases of seduction, abduction and rape and those
involving offenses included in said crimes, such as frustrated or attempted
seduction, abduction or rape. This is clear and logical. If the liability for a crime is
extinguished in the graver cases, it must be extinguished, and for a stronger
reason, in the lesser crimes.
Now then, if the crime of abuse against chastity is not denominated rape, it is
only for the lack of the intention to lie, both crimes being identical in every other
respect, though of different degrees of gravity. We therefore conclude that the
crime of abuse against chastity is included in the crime of rape mentioned in
section 2 of Act No. 1773 and, consequently, the marriage of the accused with the
offended party in the present case has extinguished his criminal liability.

B. Extent of jurisdiction of administrative agencies performing quasi-

judicial acts
Chin vs LBP 201 SCRA 190

Taule vs Santos 200 SCRA 512

Facts: The Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of

Catanduanes decided to hold the election of katipunan despite the absence of
five (5) of its members, the Provincial Treasurer and the Provincial Election
Supervisor walked out.
The President elect - Ruperto Taule Vice-President- Allan Aquino Secretary-
Vicente Avila Treasurer- Fidel Jacob Auditor- Leo Sales.
Respondent Leandro L Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes sent a letter to
respondent Luis T. Santos, the Secretary of Local Government,** protesting the
election of the officers of the FABC and seeking its mullification in view of
several flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted. Respondent

20
Secretary issued a resolution nullifying the election of the officers of the FABC in
Catanduanes held on June 18, 1989 and ordering a new one to be conducted as
early as possible to be presided by the Regional Director of Region V of the
Department of Local Government.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution but it was denied
by respondent Secretary. In the petition for certiorari before Us, petitioner seeks
the reversal of the resolutions of respondent for being null and void.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction to entertain an

election protest involving the election of the officers of the Federation of
Association of Barangay Councils, Assuming that the respondent Secretary has
jurisdiction over the election protest, whether or not he committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in nullifying the election?

Ruling: The Secretary of Local Government is not vested with jurisdiction to

entertain any protest involving the election of officers of the FABC. There is no
question that he is vested with the power to promulgate rules and regulations as
set forth in Section 222 of the Local Government Code. "(3) Promulgate rules and
regulations necessary to carry out department objectives, policies, functions,
plans, programs and projects;"

It is a well-settled principle of administrative law that unless expressly

empowered, administrative agencies are bereft of judicial powers. The
jurisdiction of administrative authorities is dependent entirely upon the
provisions of the statutes reposing power in them; they cannot confer it upon
themselves. Such jurisdiction is essential to give validity to their
determinations."

There is neither a statutory nor constitutional provision expressly or even by

necessary implication conferring upon the Secretary of Local Government the
power to assume jurisdiction over an election protect involving officers of the
katipunan ng mga barangay. Construing the constitutional limitation on the
power of general supervision of the President over local governments, We hold
that respondent Secretary has no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity
of the election of the officers of the katipunan.
To allow respondent Secretary to do so will give him more power than the law or
the Constitution grants. It will in effect give him control over local government
officials for it will permit him to interfere in a purely democratic and non-
partisan activity aimed at strengthening the barangay as the basic component of
local governments so that the ultimate goal of fullest autonomy may be achieved.

21
I. Procedure to be followed

Sections 1 and 2.1 Book VII, 1987 Administrative Code

A. Source of authority to promulgate rules of procedure

Section 5.5, Article VIII, Constitution

Angara vs Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139

Facts: That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara
won. The provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-
elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most
number of votes, the petitioner took his oath of office. Respondent Pedro Ynsua
filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of
the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and praying, among other things, that said
respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first
district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified.

Issue: WON the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the
election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of
such election by resolution of the National Assembly?

Ruling: The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained
originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral
Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National
Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an
express prohibition in the Constitution. If we concede the power claimed in
behalf of the National Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings of
the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the commission to lay down
the period within which protests should be filed, the grant of power to the
commission would be ineffective.

The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the
power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests intrusted to
its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a
general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary
for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also included. The
incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and

22
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by
necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

B. Limitations on the power to promulgate rules of procedure

First Lepanto Ceramics vs CA 231 SCRA 30 –lourdes

C. Technical rules not applicable

Kanlaon Construction Enterprises vs NLRC 279 SCRA 337

Facts: This is a labor case involving Kanlaon for illegal termination of employment of
publics respondents. The arbitration’s decision is appealed to the NLRC. Public
respondents in their appeal questioned the validity of the NLRC’s decision on the ground
that the NLRC erroneously, patently and unreasonably interpreted the principle that the
NLRC and its Arbitration Branch are not strictly bound by the rules of evidence.
In brief, it was alleged that the the decision is void for the following reasons: (1) there
was no valid service of summons; (2) Engineers Estacio and Dulatre and Atty.
Abundiente had no authority to appear and represent petitioner at the hearings before the
arbiters and on appeal to respondent Commission; (3) the decisions of the arbiters and
respondent Commission are based on unsubstantiated and self-serving evidence and were
rendered in violation of petitioner's right to due process.

Issue: WON publics respondents’ claim is tenable.

Held: The labor arbiters and the NLRC must not, at the expense of due process, be the
first to arbitrarily disregard specific provisions of the Rules which are precisely intended
to assist the parties in obtaining the just, expeditious and inexpensive settlement of labor
disputes. The decision of the National Labor Relations Commission, Fifth Division, is
annulled and set aside and the case is remanded to the Regional Arbitration Branch,
Iligan City for further proceedings.

Ang Tibay vs CIR 69 Phil 635

Ruling: The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules
of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and
substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not
be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such
manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It
shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the
industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any
matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of
settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (Section
13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been
especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry into effect
the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations

23
may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean
that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an
administrative character.

Police Commission vs Lood 127 SCRA 757

Facts: Petitioner Police Commission seeks the setting aside of the decision of the defunct
Court of First Instance (respondent court) of Rizal, Branch VI, which declared null and
void its decision in Administrative Case No. 48 dismissing private respondent Simplicio
C. Ibea and instead ordered then Municipal Mayor Braulio Sto. Domingo of San Juan,
Rizal to reinstate said respondent to his former position as policeman of the same
municipality with back salaries from the date of his suspension up to the date of his actual
reinstatement.

Petitioner contends that the lower court erred in holding that respondent Simplicio C.
Ibea was deprived of due process of law because the Police Commission decided
Administrative Case No. 48 even without stenographic notes taken of the proceedings of
the case.

Ruling: Respondent court's ruling against petitioner's decision as falling short of the legal
requirements of due process, because it decided the subject administrative case without
stenographic notes (which were not taken by the Board of Investigators) of the
proceedings of the case, was in error. Rep. Act No. 4864 does not provide that the Board
of Investigators shall be a "board of record," and as such it does not provide for office
personnel such as clerks and stenographers who may be employed to take note of the
proceedings of the board. The proceeding provided for is merely administrative and
summary in character, in line with the principle that "administrative rules of procedure
should be construed liberally in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in
obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their respective claims and
defenses." The formalities usually attendant in court hearings need not be present in an
administrative investigation, provided that the parties are heard and gven the opportunity
to adduce their respective evidence.

D. Justiciable controversy and forum shopping

SEC vs CA 246 SCRA 738

Facts: The petition before this Court relates to the exercise by the SEC of its powers in a
case involving a stockbroker (CUALOPING) and a stock transfer agency (FIDELITY).
The Commission has brought the case to this Court in the instant petition for review on
certiorari, contending that the appellate court erred in setting aside the decision of the
SEC which had (a) ordered the replacement of the certificates of stock of Philex and (b)
imposed fines on both FIDELITY and CUALOPING.

24
Held: The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has both regulatory and
adjudicative functions. Under its regulatory responsibilities, the SEC may pass upon
applications for, or may suspend or revoke (after due notice and hearing), certificates of
registration of corporations, partnerships and associations (excluding cooperatives,
homeowners' associations, and labor unions); compel legal and regulatory compliances;
conduct inspections; and impose fines or other penalties for violations of the Revised
Securities Act, as well as implementing rules and directives of the SEC, such as may be
warranted.
The SEC decision which orders the two stock transfer agencies to "jointly replace the
subject shares and for FIDELITY to cause the transfer thereof in the names of the buyers"
clearly calls for an exercise of SEC's adjudicative jurisdiction. The stockholders who
have been deprived of their certificates of stock or the persons to whom the forged
certificates have ultimately been transferred by the supposed indorsee thereof are yet to
initiate, if minded, an appropriate adversarial action. A justiciable controversy such as
can occasion an exercise of SEC's exclusive jurisdiction would require an assertion
of a right by a proper party against another who, in turn, contests it. The proper
parties that can bring the controversy and can cause an exercise by the SEC of its
original and exclusive jurisdiction would be all or any of those who are adversely
affected by the transfer of the pilfered certificates of stock. Any peremptory
judgment by the SEC, without such proceedings having initiated, would be
precipitat.

The question on the legal propriety of the imposition by the SEC of a P50,000 fine on
each of FIDELITY and CUALOPING, is an entirely different matter. This time, it is the
regulatory power of the SEC which is involved. When, on appeal to the Court of Appeals,
the latter set aside the fines imposed by they the SEC, the latter, in its instant petition, can
no longer be deemed just a nominal party but a real party in interest sufficient to pursuant
appeals to this Court.
Section 2.5 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Santiago, Jr. vs Bautista 32 SCRA 188
Villanueva vs Adre 172 SCRA 876
Chemphil Export & Import Corp. vs CA 251 SCRA 257
First Phil. Int’l Bank vs CA 252 SCRA 259
R. Transport Corp. vs Laguesma 227 SCRA 826
Galongco vs CA 283 SCRA 493
E. Institution of proceedings; acquisition of jurisdiction
Section 5, Rule 7 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
Santos vs NLRC 254 SCRA 675
Matanguihand vs Tengo, 272 SCRA 704
F. Pre-trial conference; default
Section 10 Book VII 1987 Admin. Code
Auyong vs CTA 59 SCRA 110
G. Hearing
Secretary of Justice vs Lantion 322 SCRA 160
Section 11.1 Book VII 1987 Admin. Code

25
 Medenilla vs CSC 194 SCRA 278
Simpao vs CSC 191 SCRA 396
Alejandro vs CA 191 SCRA 700
H. Evidence
Section 12.3 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
State Prosecutor vs Muro 236 SCRA 505
1. Proof beyond reasonable doubt
People vs Bacalzo 195 SCRA 557
2. Clear and convincing evidence
Black’s Law Dictionary 5th ed. P. 227
3. Preponderance of evidence
New Testament Church of God vs CA 246 SCRA 266
4. Substantial evidence
Velasquez vs Nery 211 SCRA 28
Malonzo ns COMELEC 269 SCRA 380
I. Decision
Section 2.8, 14 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Marcelino vs Cruz 121 SCRA 51
Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC 248 SCRA 300
1. Form of decision
Mangca vs COMELEC 112 SCRA 273
Malinao vs Reyes 255 SCRA 616
Sections 2.13 and 2.12 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
2. Publication of decisions
Section 16.1.2 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
3. Finality, promulgation and notice of decision
Section 15 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Robert Dollar Company vs Tuvera 123 SCRA 354
Lindo vs COMELEC 194 SCRA 25
Jamil vs COMELEC 283 SCRA 349
Section 14 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Zoleta vs Drilon 166 SCRA 548
4. Collegiate decision, requirement to be valid
Mison vs COA 187 SCRA 445
Aquino-Sarmiento vs Morato 203 SCRA 515
5. Finality of decisions
Section 15 Chapter III Book VII Admin Code of 1987
Administrative Order No. 18 Section 7
Uy vs COA 328 SCRA 607
Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative vs Torres 286 SCRA 666
6. Application of the doctrine of res judicata
Republic vs Neri 213 SCRA 812
Brillantes v Castro 99 Phil 497
Ipekdjian Merchandising vs CTA, L-15430, 30 Sept. 1963

26
 Teodoro vs Carague 206 SCRA 429
J. Administrative appeal in contested cases
Section 19, 20, 21, 22 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Mendez vs CSC 204 SCRA 965
PCIB vs CA 229 SCRA 560
Diamonon vs DOLE 327 SCRA 283
De Leon vs Heirs of Gregorio Reyes 155 SCRA 584
Vda de Pineda vs Pena 187 SCRA 22
Reyes vs Zamora 90 SCRA 92
Section 23 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Zambales Chromite Mining Co. v. Court of Appeals 94 SCRA 261
Ysmael v. Dep Exec Sec 190 SCRA 673
K. Execution
Divinagracia vs CFI 3 SCRA 775
GSIS vs CSC 202 SCRA 799
Vital-Gozon vs CA 212 SCRA 235
II. Due process of law in administrative adjudication
A. Substantive and procedural due process, defined
Santiago vs Alikpala 25 SCRA 356
Secretary of Justice vs Lantion 322 SCRA 160
Albert vs CFI of Manila 23 SCRA 948
B. Cardinal primary requirements of due process
Ang Tibay vs CIR 69 Phil 635
Fabella vs CA 282 SCRA 256
Air Manila vs Balatbat 38 SCRA 489
C. Necessity for notice and hearing
Philippine Movie Pictures Wokers’ Association vs Premiere Productions, Inc., G.R. No.
L-5621, 25 March 1953
Mabuhay Textile Mills vs Ongpin 141 SCRA 437
Go vs NAPOLCOM 271 SCRA 447
D. Cold neutrality of a judge
Zamboanga Chromite Mining Co. vs CA 94 SCRA 261
E. Prior notice and hearing, essential elements of procedural due
process
Villa vs Lazaro 189 SCRA 34
RCA Communications vs PLDT 110 Phil 420
Section 11 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Bolastig vs Sandiganbayan 235 SCRA 103
F. Notice and hearing, when dispensed with
1. Where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like the
summary abatement of a nuisance per se, the preventive
suspension of public servant facing administrative charges;
Central Bank vs CA 220 SCRA 536
Estate of Gregoria Francisco vs CA 199 SCRA 595

27
 Sitchon vs Aquino 98 Phil 458
2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action; where
the respondent is not precluded from enjoying the right to notice
and hearing at a later time without prejudice to the person affected,
such as the summary distraint and levy of the property of a
delinquent taxpayer and the replacement of a temporary appointee;
Lastimosa vs Vasquez 243 SCRA 497
3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the
right to exercise them had not been claimed.
Asprec vs Itchon 16 SCRA 921
Banco Filipino vs Central Bank 204 SCRA 767
G. Notice and hearing in rate-fixing
Vigan Electric Light vs PSC 10 SCRA 46
H. Motion for reconsideration as a cure
Medenilla vs CSC 194 SCRA 278
i.Right to counsel, not a due process requirement
Lumiqued vs Exevea 282 SCRA 125
III. Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
A. Definition and objective
Industrial Enterprises vs CA, 184 SCRA 426
Smart Communications vs NTC G.R. No. 151908 12 August 2003
B. Distinguished from the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies
Felizardo vs CA 233 SCRA 220
C. Effect of doctrine
Villaflor vs CA 280 SCRA 327
Machete vs CA 250 SCRA 176
Director of Lands vs CA 194 SCRA 224
Provident Tree Farms vs Batario 231 SCRA 463
Philippine Veterans Bank vs CA 322 SCRA 139
D. When doctrine does not apply
Lagua vs Cusi 160 SCRA 260
IV. Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
A. Definition and purpose
Rosales vs CA 165 SCRA 344
Gonzales vs Secretary of Education 5 SCRA 657
Carale vs Abarintos 269 SCRA 132
B. Effect of failure to exhaust remedies
De los Santos vs Limbaga 4 SCRA 224
Republic vs Sandiganbayan 255 SCRA 438
Factora, Jr. vs CA 320 SCRA 530
C. When applied
Ang Tuan Kai vs Import Control Commission L-4427, 21 April 1952
D. Exceptions to the doctrine

28
 Sunville Timber Products vs Abad 206 SCRA 482
Gonzales vs Hechanova, 60 OG 802
Paat vs CA 266 SCRA 167
Corpus vs Cuaderno L-17860 30 March 1962
Smart Communications vs NTC G.R. No. 151908 12 August 2003
Marinduque Iron Mines v. Sec. of Public Works
8 SCRA 179
Bueno vs Patanao 9 SCRA 794
Continental Marble Corp. vs NLRC 161 SCRA 151
Kilusang Bayan vs Dominguez 205 SCRA 92
Almine vs CA 177 SCRA 796
Tapales vs President of UP 7 SCRA 553
Quintos v. National Stud Farm 54 SCRA 210
Soto v. Jareno 144 SCRA 116
Sunga v. NLRC 173 SCRA 338
Sabello v. DECS 100 SCRA 623
Montes v. Civil Service Board of Appeals 101 Phil 490

29