Jaravata vs.
Sandiganbayan No pronouncement as to the civil liability it appearing
G.R. No. L-56170 January 31, 1984
HILARIO JARAVATA petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Franco L. Loyola and Sabas Cacananta for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
FACTS
On or about the period from April 30, 1979 to May 25,
1979, in the Municipality of Tubao, Province of La
Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, Hilario Jaravata, being then the
Assistant Principal of the Leones Tubao, La Union
Barangay High School and with the use of his influence
as such public official and taking advantage of his moral
and official ascendancy over his classroom teachers,
with deliberate intent did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously made demand and actually
received payments from other classroom teachers,
ROMEO DACAYANAN, DOMINGO LOPEZ,
MARCELA BAUTISTA, and FRANCISCO DULAY
various sums of money, namely: P118.00, P100.00,
P50.00 and P70.00 out of their salary differentials, in
consideration of accused having officially intervened in
the release of the salary differentials of the six classroom
teachers, to the prejudice and damage of the said
classroom teachers, in the total amount of THREE
HUNDRED THIRTY EIGHT (P338.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency. (Decision, p.1-2.)
After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered the following
judgment:
WHEREFORE, accused is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for Violation of Section 3(b), Republic
Act No. 3019, as amended, and he is hereby sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate imprisonment ranging from ONE
(1) YEAR, is minimum, to FOUR (4) YEARS, as
maximum, to further suffer perpetual special
disqualification from public office and to pay the costs.
that the money given to the accused was already
refunded by him. (Id. pp, 16-17.)
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act provides, inter alia the
following:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In
addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift,
present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for
any other person in connection with any contract or
transaction between the Government and any other
party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity
has to intervene under the law.
xxx xxx xxx
ISSUE
The legal issue is whether or not, under the facts stated,
petitioner Jaravata violated the above-quoted provision
of the statute.
HELD
A simple reading of the provision has to yield a negative
answer.
There is no question that Jaravata at the time material to
the case was a “public officer” as defined by Section 2 of
R.A. No. 3019, i.e. “elective and appointive officials and
employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the
classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving
compensation, even normal from the government.” It
may also be said that any amount which Jaravata
received in excess of P36.00 from each of the
complainants was in the concept of a gift or benefit. The
pivotal question, however, is whether Jaravata, an
assistant principal of a high school in the boondocks of
Tubao, La Union, “in his official capacity has to
intervene under the law” in the payment of the salary
differentials for 1978 of the complainants. It should be
noted that the arrangement was “to facilitate its [salary
differential] payment accused and the classroom teachers
agreed that accused follow-up the papers in Manila with
the obligation on the part of the classroom teachers to
reimburse the accused of his expenses.
There is no law which invests the petitioner with the
power to intervene in the payment of the salary
differentials of the complainants or anyone for that
matter. Far from exercising any power, the petitioner
played the humble role of a supplicant whose mission
was to expedite payment of the salary differentials. In
his official capacity as assistant principal he is not
required by law to intervene in the payment of the salary
differentials. Accordingly, he cannot be said to have
violated the law afore-cited although he exerted efforts
to facilitate the payment of the salary differentials.
Medel et. al. vs Court of Appeals 299 SCRA 481
(1998)
Petitioners: LETICIA Y. MEDEL DR. RAFAEL
MEDEL and SERVANDO FRANCO
Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES
VERONICA R. GONZALES and DANILO G.
GONZALES, JR., doing lending business under the
trade name and style “GONZALES CREDIT
ENTERPRISES”
FACTS
Defendants obtained a loan from Plaintiff in the amount
P50, 000.00, payable in 2 months and executed a
promissory note. Plaintiff gave only the amount of P47,
000.00 to the borrowers and retained P3, 000.00 as
advance interest for 1 month at 6% per month.
Defendants obtained another loan from Defendant in the
amount of P90, 000.00, payable in 2 months, at 6%
interest per month. They executed a promissory note to
evidence the loan and received only P84, 000.00 out of
the proceeds of the loan.
For the third time, Defendants secured from Plaintiff
another loan in the amount of P300, 000.00, maturing in
1 month, and secured by a real estate mortgage. They
executed a promissory note in favor of the Plaintiff.
However, only the sum of P275, 000.00, was given to
them out of the proceeds of the loan.
Upon maturity of the three promissory notes, Defendants
failed to pay the indebtedness.
Defendants consolidated all their previous unpaid loans
totalling P440, 000.00, and sought from Plaintiff another
loan in the amount of P60, 000.00, bringing their
indebtedness to a total of P50,000.00. They executed
another promissory note in favor of Plaintiff to pay the
sum of P500, 000.00 with a 5.5% interest per month plus
2% service charge per annum, with an additional amount
of 1% per month as penalty charges.
On maturity of the loan, the Defendants failed to pay the
indebtedness which prompt the Plaintiffs to file with the
RTC a complaint for collection of the full amount of the
loan including interests and other charges.
Declaring that the due execution and genuineness of the
four promissory notes has been duly proved, the RTC
ruled that although the Usury Law had been repealed,
the interest charged on the loans was unconscionable and
“revolting to the conscience” and ordered the payment of
the amount of the first 3 loans with a 12% interest per
annum and 1% per month as penalty.
On appeal, Plaintiff-appellants argued that the
promissory note, which consolidated all the unpaid loans
of the defendants, is the law that governs the parties.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Plaintiff-
appellants on the ground that the Usury Law has become
legally inexistent with the promulgation by the Central
Bank in 1982 of Circular No. 905, the lender and the
borrower could agree on any interest that may be
charged on the loan, and ordered the Defendants to pay
the Plaintiffs the sum of P500,000, plus 5.5% per month
interest and 2& service charge per annum , and 1% per
month as penalty charges.
Defendants filed the present case via petition for review
on certiorari.
ISSUE
WON the stipulated 5.5% interest rate per month on the
loan in the sum of P500, 000.00 is usurious.
HELD
No.
A stipulated rate of interest at 5.5% per month on the
P500, 000.00 loan is excessive, iniquitous,
unconscionable and exorbitant, but it cannot be
considered “usurious” because Central Bank Circular
No. 905 has expressly removed the interest ceilings
prescribed by the Usury Law and that the Usury Law is
now “legally inexistent.”
Jurisprudence provides that CB Circular did not repeal
nor in a way amend the Usury Law but simply
suspended the latter’s effectivity (Security Bank and
Trust Co vs RTC). Usury has been legally non-existent
in our country’s jurisdiction. Interest can now be
charged as lender and borrower may agree upon.
Hence, the decision of the Court of Appeals was
reversed. The decision dated December 9, 1991, of the
Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 16, Malolos,
Bulacan, in Civil Case No. 134-M-90, was revived and
affirmed.
Rodrigo Enriquez Et. Al. vs. Soccoro Ramos
G.R. No. L-23616 September 30, 1976
Rodrigo Enriquez, Aurea Soriano de Dizon and Urbano
Dizon, Jr., plaintiffs-appellants,
Vs.
Socorro A. Ramos, defendant-appellee.
Castro, C.J. :
Facts:
On November 24, 1958 Enriquez and spouses Dizon
sold to Ramos 20 subdivision lots in Quezon City for the
sum of P235,056 of which only P35,056 had been paid.
The balance of P200,000 was to be liquidated within 2
years from the date of the execution of the deed of sale,
with interest at 6% for the 1st year and 12% thereafter
until fully paid. To secure the payment of that balance,
Ramos executed in the same document a deed of
mortgage in favor of the vendors on several parcels of
land variously situated in Quezon City, Pampanga and
Bulacan. The deed of mortgage embodies certain
stipulations which Ramos invoked. But according to the
appellants the defendant violated the terms of their
agreement in the following respects:
The defendant refuse to pay the sum of P200,000 within
the stipulated period.
The mortgage on Bulacan property was never registered
and,
The realty tax for 1959 on the lots mortgage were not
paid by the defendant.
Ramos admit that she has not paid the realty taxes and
has not registered the mortgage on Bulacan property but
argues that it was a minor ones and still her obligation to
pay the sum of P200,000 has not arisen as no previous
notice and demand for payment has been made and
according to her the road is not completed because the
appellants have not yet planted trees nor put up water
facilities as required by the ordinance.
The court held that the non-payment of 1959 realty taxes
as well as the non-registration of the mortgaged on
Bulacan estate by the defendant were minor matters. On
the issue of the completion of road the appellant adduced
the testimonies of 2 witnesses that the road was
completed on May 9, 1960 in accordance with the
ordinances of Quezon City and there is nothing in
Ordinance 2969 which would indicate that a street may
be considered completed with water facilities are built
on the subdivision and these activities are definitely
segregable. As to be alleged lack of previous notice
completion and demand for payment, the filling of the
case is sufficient notice to the defendant of the
completion of the roads in question and of the appellee’s
desire to be paid the purchase price of the questioned
lots.
Issue:
Whether or not Ramos should pay her balance to
Enriquez and spouses Dizon even though she is not yet
fully satisfied with her demand?
Ruling:
Yes, the effect of such demand retroacts to the day of the
constitution of the defendant obligation as it was stated
in Art. 1187 provides that “THE EEFECTS OF A
CONDITIONAL OBLIGATION TO GIVE, ONCE
THE CONDITION HAS BEEN FULFILLED, SHALL
RETROACT TO THE DAY OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE OBLIGATION.” her demand on the road is
already considered completed and the filling of the case
against her is sufficient notice to her therefore she is
obligated to pay her balance of P200,000 to the
appellant’s within 2 years from the date the roads in
question are completed.
Escaño and Silos vs Ortigas Jr.
March 25, 2016
G.R. No. 151953 (2007)
Ponente: J. Tinga
Facts:
On April 28, 1980, Private Development Corp. of the
Philippines (PDCP) entered into a loan agreement with
the Falcon Minerals, Inc. (Falcon) whereby PDCP
agreed to male available and lend to Falcon the amount
of US $320, 000.00 for specific purposes and subject to
certain terms and conditions.
Three stockholder officers of the Falcon assumed
solidary liability, in their individual capacity, with
Falcon for the due and punctual payment of the loan.
Two years later, control of Falcon was ceded to Escaño,
Silos and Matti, and the shares of deceased Scholey,
through his heirs Ortigas, Scholey and Inductivo, were
assigned to the three new stock-holders, as well as all of
their guaranteed to PDCP and PAIC.
On April 28, 1989, PDCP filed a complaint for sum of
money with the RTC of Makati. A counterclaim was
filed by Ortigas.
The other parties entered into compromise agreement
with PDCP. Ortigas pursued his claim against Escaño,
Silos and Matti, and filing a motion for Summary
Judgement in his favor against Escaño, Silos and Matti.
The RTC ruled in favor of Ortigas, ordering the three to
pay jointly and severally the amount of P1,300,000.00 as
well as P20,000.00 in attorney’s fees.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Summary
Judgement. Hence, the present petition for review.
Issue: Whether or not there was solidary obligation.
Ruling:
No. The obligation was joint.
In this case, there is a concurrence of two or more
creditors or of two or more debtors in one and the same
obligation. Article 1207 of the Civil Code states that
among them, there is a solidary liability only when the
obligation expressly so states, or when the law or the
nature of the obligation requires solidarity. Article 1210
supplies further caution against the broad interpretation
of solidarity by providing that the indivisibility of an
obligation does not necessarily give rise to solidarity.
Nor does solidarity of itself imply indivisibility.
These Civil Code provisions establish that in case of
concurrence of two or more creditors or of two or more
debtors in one and the same obligation, and in the
absence of express and indubitable terms characterizing
the obligation as solidary, the presumption is that the
obligation is only joint. It thus becomes incumbent upon
the party alleging that the obligation is indeed solidary in
character to prove such fact with a preponderance of
evidence.
The Undertaking does not contain any express
stipulation that the petitioners agreed to bind themselves
jointly and severally in their obligations to the Ortigas
group, or any such terms to that effect. Hence, such
obligation established in the Undertaking is presumed
only to be joint. Ortigas, as the party alleging that the
obligation is in fact solidary, bears the burden to
overcome the presumption of jointness of obligations.
The SC ruled that he failed to discharge such burden.
The Tayabas Land Company vs. Sharruf
G.R. No. L-15499 February 9, 1921
THE TAYABAS LAND COMPANY, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SALOMON SHARRUF, CANUTO BARTOLOME,
sheriff of Tayabas,
SALVADOR FARRE and FRANCISCO ALVAREZ,
defendants.
SALOMON SHARRUF, appellant.
STREET, J.:
Facts:
On December 10, 1914, one Salvador Farre recovered a
joint and several judgment against Salomon M. Sharruf
and Farham M. Sharruf in the Court of First Instance of
the city of Manila for the sum of P1,300, with legal
interest from September 5, 1914, and with costs. This
judgment having remained unsatisfied, and execution
was upon April 3, 1916, issued thereon at the instance of
the plaintiff. Moreover, the garnishment was effective
for the purpose of conferring upon the Tayabas Land
Company the right to pay off the judgment which Farre
had obtained against Sharruf. This right is not only
recognized in section 481 of the Code of Civil Procedure
but also in subsection 3 of article 1210 of the Civil
Code; and by satisfying Farre’s claim, regardless of the
manner in which it was accomplished, the Tayabas Land
Company absolved itself pro tanto from its indebtedness
to Sharruf. It results that, although the judgment against
the Tayabas Land Company has not yet been satisfied in
full, said company is entitled to be credited with the sum
of P1,588.24, said by it, through Francisco Alvarez, to
Farre on October 6, 1917, with interest. In the view we
take of the case it becomes unnecessary to consider at
length the fact that Sharruf’s judgment against the
Tayabas Land Company was appealed to the Supreme
Court after the process of garnishment had been served
on the company. Suffice is to say that this circumstance
would at most merely postpone the realization of the
results without defeating the garnishment.
Issue: Whether or not the case must be reverse?
Ruling: The judgment must be reserved, and the
defendants will be absolved from the complaint. It is so
ordered, without express pronouncement as to costs of
either instance.
Rallos vs. Felix Go Chan & Realty Corp., Munoz-
Palma
March 25, 2016
Plaintiff: Ramon Rallos
Defendant: Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corporation
Facts: Concepcion and Gerundia Rallos were sisters and
registered co-owners of a parcel of land known as Lot
No. 5983 of the Cadastral Survey of Cebu covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11116 of the Registry of
Cebu.They executed a special power of attorney in favor
of their brother, Simeon Rallos, authorizing him to sell
such land for and in their behalf. After Concepcion died,
Simeon Rallos sold the undivided shares of his sisters
Concepcion and Gerundia to Felix Go Chan & Sons
Realty Corporation for the sum of P10,686.90. New
TCTs were issued to the latter. Petitioner Ramon Rallos,
administrator of the Intestate Estate of Concepcion filed
a complaint praying (1) that the sale of the undivided
share of the deceased Concepcion Rallos in lot 5983 be
unenforceable, and said share be reconveyed to her
estate; (2) that the Certificate of ‘title issued in the name
of Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corporation be
cancelled and another title be issuedin the names of the
corporation and the “Intestate estate of Concepcion
Rallos” in equal undivided and (3) that plaintiff be
indemnified by way of attorney’s fees and payment of
costs of suit.
Issues:
1) WON sale was valid although it was executed after
the death of the principal, Concepcion.
2) WON sale fell within the exception to the general rule
that death extinguishes the authority of the agent
3) WON agent’s knowledge of the principal’s death is a
material factor.
4) WON petitioner must suffer the consequence of
failing to annotate a notice of death in the title
(thus there was good faith on the part of the Respondent
vendee)
5) WON good faith on the part of the respondent in this
case should be treated parallel to that of an
CFI: Sale of land was null and void insofar as the one-
half pro-indiviso share of Concepcion Rallos Ordered
the issuance of new TCTs to respondent corporation and
the estate of Concepcion in theproportion of ½ share
each pro-indiviso and the payment of attorney’s fees and
cost of litigation Respondent filed cross claim against
Simon Rallos(*Simon and Gerundia died during
pendency of case) juan T. Borromeo, administrator of
the Estate of Simeon Rallos was ordered to pay
defendant the price of the ½ share of the land
(P5,343.45) plus attorney’s fees [Borromeo filed a third
party complaint against Josefina Rallos, special
administratrix of the Estate of Gerundia] Dismissed
without prejudice to filing either a complaint against the
regular administrator of the Estate of Gerundia Rallos or
a claim in the Intestate-Estate of Cerundia Rallos,
covering the same subject-matter