Crim Cases 1-20

Basic Principles
A. Generality and territoriality

1. U.S. vs. Pablo, 35 Phil. 94
2. U.S. vs. Sweet, 1 Phil. 18
3. Antonio Trillanes vs. Hon. Oscar Pimentel, et al, G.R. 179817, June 27, 2008
4. Nicolas vs. Romulo, 578 SCRA 438
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11676 October 17, 1916
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANDRES PABLO, defendant-appellant.
Alfonso E. Mendoza for appellant.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
At about noon of the 21st of October, 1915, Andres Pablo, a policeman of the municipality of
Balanga, went by order of his chief to the barrio of Tuyo to raid a jueteng game which, according to
the information lodged, was being conducted in that place; but before the said officer arrived there
the players, perhaps advised of his approach by a spy, left and ran away; however, on his arrival at a
vacant lot the defendant there found Francisco Dato and, at a short distance away, a low table. After
a search of the premises he also found thereon a tambiolo (receptacle) and 37 bolas (balls).
Notwithstanding that the officer had seen the men Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo leave the
said lot, yet, as at first he had seen no material proof that the game was being played, he refrained
from arresting them, and on leaving the place only arrested Francisco Daro, who had remained
there.
In reporting to his chief what had occurred, the policeman presented a memorandum containing the
following statement: "In the barrio of Tuyo I raided a jueteng na bilat game, seized a tambiolo and
bolas, and saw the cabecillas Maximo MAlicsi and Antonio Rodrigo and the gambler Francisco Dato. I
saw the two cabecillas escape."
In consequence, chief of police Jose D. Reyes, on October 22, 1915, filed a complaint in the court of
justice of the peace charging the said Rodrigo, Malicsi, and Dato with having gambled at jueteng, in
violation of municipal ordinance No. 5. As a result of this complaint the accused were arrested, but
were afterwards admitted to bail.
At the hearing of the case Francisco Dato pleaded guilty. The other two accused, Maximo Malicsi and
Antonio Rodrigo, pleaded not guilty; therefore, during the trial the chief of police presented the
memorandum exhibited by the policeman Andres Pablo, who testified under oath that on the date
mentioned he and Tomas de Leon went to the said barrio to raid a jueteng game, but that before
they arrived there they saw from afar that some persons started to run toward the hills; that when
witness and his companion arrived at a vacant lot they saw Francisco Dato and a low table there,
and the table caused them to suspect that a jueteng game was being carried on; that in fact they did
find on one side of the lot a tambiolo and 37 bolas, but that they did not see the accused Rodrigo
and Malicsi on the said lot, nor did they see them run; and that only afterwards did the witness learn
that these latter were the cabecillas or ringleaders in the jueteng game, from information given him
by an unknown person. In view of this testimony by the police officer who made the arrest and of
the other evidence adduced at the trial the court acquitted the defendants Antonio Rodrigo and
Maximo Malicsi and sentenced only Francisco Dato, as a gambler.
Before the case came to trial in the justice of the peace court the policeman Andres Pablo had an
interview and conference with the accused Malicsi and ROdrigo in the house of Valentin Sioson. On
this occasion he was instructed not to testify against Malicsi and Rodrigo, and in fact received
through Gregorio Ganzon the sum of P5.
By reason of the foregoing and after making a preliminary investigation the provincial fiscal, on
December 1, 1915, filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Bataan charging Andres
Pablo with the crime of perjury, under the provisions of section 3 of Act No. 1697. The following is an
extract from the complaint:
That on or about November 6, 1915, in the municipality of Balanga, Bataan, P.I., and within the
jurisdiction of this court, the said accused, Andres Pablo, during the hearing in the justice of the
peace court of Balanga of the criminal cause No. 787, entitled the United States vs. Antonio Rodrigo
and Maximo Malicsi, for violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 5 of the municipality of Balanga, did,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously affirm and swear in legal form before the justice of the peace
court as follow: `We did not there overtake the accused Antonio Rodrigo and Maximo Malicsi, nor
did we even see them run,' the said statement being utterly false, as the accused well knew that it
was, and material to the decision of the said criminal cause No. 787, United States vs. Antonio
Rodrigo and Maximo Malicsi. An act committed with violation of law.
The case came to trial and on December 28, 1915, the court rendered judgment therein sentencing
the defendant to the penalty of two years' imprisonment, to pay a fine of P100 and, in case of
insolvency, to the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay the costs. The defendant was
also disqualified from thereafter holding any public office and from testifying in the courts of the
Philippine Islands until the said disqualification should be removed. From this judgment he appealed.
Francisco Dato, on testifying as a witness, said that when the policemen Andres Pablo and Tomas de
Leon arrived at the place where the jueteng was being played, they found the defendant gamblers,
Malicsi and Rodrigo; that, prior to the hearing of the case in the justice of the peace court, Malicsi
and Rodrigo ordered him to call Andres Pablo, who, together with witness, went to the house of
Valentin Sioson, where they held a conference; that witness pleaded guilty in the justice of the
peace court, in fulfillment of his part of an agreement made between himself and his two coaccused,
Malicsi and Rodrigo, who promised him that they would support his family during the time he might
be a prisoner in jail; that Andres Pablo did not know that they were gamblers, because he did not
find them in the place where the game was in progress, but that when witness was being taken to
the municipal building by the policemen he told them who the gamblers were who had run away
and whom Andres Pablo could have seen.
Maximo Malicsi corroborated the foregoing testimony and further stated that, on the arrival of the
policemen who made the arrest and while they were looking for the tambiolo, he succeeded in
escaping; that Andres Pablo had known him for a long time and could have arrested him had he
wished to do so; that prior to the hearing he and his codefendants, ROdrigo and Dato, did in fact
meet in the house of Valentin Sioson, on which occasion they agreed that they would give the
policemen Andres Pablo P20, provided witness and Rodrigo were excluded from the charge; and
that only P15 was delivered to the said Pablo, through Gregorio Ganzon. This statement was
corroborated by the latter, though he said nothing about what amount of money he delivered to the
policeman Pablo.
The defendant Andres Pablo testified under oath that, on his being asked by the justice of the peace
how he could have seen Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo, he replied that he did not see them at
the place where the game was being conducted nor did he see them run away from there, for he
only found the table, the tambiolo, the bolas, and Francisco Dato; that he did not surprise the game
because the players ran away before he arrived on the lot where, after fifteen minutes' search, he
found only the tambiolo and the bolas; that on arriving at the place where the game was played,
they found only Francisco Dato and some women in the Street, and as Dato had already gone away,
witness' companion, the policeman Tomas de Leon, got on his bicycle and went after him; and that
he found the tambiolo at a distance of about 6 meters from a low table standing on the lot.
From the facts above related, it is concluded that the defendant Andres Pablo, who pleaded not
guilty, falsely testified under oath in the justice of the peace court of Balanga, Bataan, in saying he
had not seen the alleged gamblers Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo in the place where,
according to the complaint filed, the game of jueteng was being played and where the defendant
and his companion, the policeman Tomas de Leon, had found a table, tambiolo and bolas, used in
the game of jueteng, while it was proved at the trial that he did not them and did overtake them
while they were still in the place where the game was being played. But notwithstanding his having
seen them there, upon testifying in the cause prosecuted against these men and another for
gambling, he stated that he had not seen them there, knowing that he was not telling the truth and
was false to the oath he had taken, and he did so willfully and deliberately on account of his
agreement with the men, Malicsi and Rodrigo, and in consideration of a bribe of P15 which he had
received in payment for his false testimony he afterwards gave.
Francisco Dato and Gregorio Ganzon corroborated the assertion that the policeman Andres Pablo
undertook to exclude the gamblers, Malicsi and Rodrigo, from the charge and from his testimony in
consideration for P15 which he received through Gregorio Ganzon.
Andres Pablo was charged with the crime of perjury and was afterwards convicted under Act No.
1697, which (according to the principle laid down by this court in various decisions that are already
well-settled rules of law) repealed the provisions contained in articles 318 to 324 of the Penal Code
relative to false testimony.
By the second paragraph of the final section of the last article of the Administrative Code, or Act No.
2657, there was repealed, among the other statutes therein mentioned, the said Act No. 1697
relating to perjury, and the repealing clause of the said Administrative Code does not say under what
other penal law in force the crime of false testimony, at least, if not that of perjury, shall be
punished.
Under these circumstances, may the crime of perjury or of false testimony go unpunished, and is
there no penal sanction whatever in this country for this crime? May the truth be freely perverted in
testimony given under oath and which, for the very reason that it may save a guilty person from
punishment, may also result in the conviction and punishment of an innocent person? If all this is
not possible and is not right before the law and good morals in a society of even mediocre culture, it
must be acknowledged that it is imperatively necessary to punish the crime of perjury or of false
testimony — a crime which can produce incalculable and far-reaching harm to society and cause
infinite disturbance of social order.
The right of prosecution and punishment for a crime is one of the attributes that by a natural law
belongs to the sovereign power instinctively charged by the common will of the members of society
to look after, guard and defend the interests of the community, the individual and social rights and
the liberties of every citizen and the guaranty of the exercise of his rights.
The power to punish evildoers has never been attacked or challenged, as the necessity for its
existence has been recognized even by the most backward peoples. At times the criticism has been
made that certain penalties are cruel, barbarous, and atrocious; at other, that they are light and
inadequate to the nature and gravity of the offense, but the imposition of punishment is admitted to
be just by the whole human race, and even barbarians and savages themselves, who are ignorant of
all civilization, are no exception.lawphil.net
Notwithstanding that the said Act No. 1697 (which, as interpreted by this court in its decisions, was
deemed to have repealed the aforementioned article of the Penal Code relating to false testimony,
comprised within the term of perjury) did not expressly repeal the said articles of the Penal Code;
and as the said final article of the Administrative Code, in totally repealing Act No. 1697, does not
explicitly provide that the mentioned articles of the Penal Code are also repealed, the will of the
legislation not being expressly and clearly stated with respect to the complete or partial repeal of
the said articles of the Penal Code, in the manner that it has totally repealed the said Act No. 1697
relating its perjury; and, furthermore, as it is imperative that society punish those of its members
who are guilty of perjury or false testimony, and it cannot be conceived that these crimes should go
unpunished or be freely committed without punishment of any kind, it must be conceded that there
must be in this country some prior, preexistent law that punishes perjury or false testimony.
There certainly are laws which deal with perjury or false testimony, like Law 7 et seq. of Title 2, third
Partida.
However, since the Penal Code went into force, the crime of false testimony has been punished
under the said articles of the said Code, which as we have already said, have not been specifically
repealed by the said Act No. 1697, but since its enactment, have not been applied, by the mere
interpretation given to them by this court in its decisions; yet, from the moment that Act was
repealed by the Administrative Code, the needs of society have made it necessary that the said
articles 318 to 324 should be deemed to be in force, inasmuch as the Administrative Code, in
repealing the said Act relating to perjury, has not explicitly provided that the said articles of the
Penal Code have likewise been repealed.
This manner of understanding and construing the statutes applicable to the crime of false testimony
or perjury is in harmony with the provision of Law 11, Title 2, Book 3, of the Novisima Recopilacion
which says::
All the laws of the kingdom, not expressly repealed by other subsequent laws, must be literally
obeyed and the excuse that they are not in use cannot avail; for the Catholic kings and their
successors so ordered in numerous laws, and so also have I ordered on different occasions, and even
though they were repealed, it is seen that they have been revived by the decree which I issued in
conformity with them although they were not expressly designated. The council will be informed
thereof and will take account of the importance of the matter.
It is, then, assumed that the said articles of the Penal Code are in force and are properly applicable
to crimes of false testimony. Therefore, in consideration of the fact that in the case at bar the
evidence shows it to have been duly proven that the defendant, Andres Pablo, in testifying in the
cause prosecuted for gambling at jueteng, perverted the truth, for the purpose of favoring the
alleged gamblers, Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo, with the aggravating circumstance of the
crime being committed through bribery, for it was also proved that the defendant Pablo received
P15 in order that he should make no mention of the said two gamblers in his sworn testimony,
whereby he knowingly perverted the truth, we hold that, in the commission of the crime of false
testimony, there concurred the aggravating circumstance of price or reward, No. 3 of article 10 of
the Code, with no mitigating circumstance to offset the effects of the said aggravating one;
wherefore the defendant has incurred the maximum period of the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum degree to prision correccional in its medium degree, and a fine.
For the foregoing reasons, we hereby reverse the judgment appealed from and sentence Andres
Pablo to the penalty of two years four months and one day of prision correccional, to pay a fine of
1,000 pesetas, and, in case of insolvency, to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment,
which shall not exceed one-third of the principal penalty. He shall also pay the costs of both
instances. So ordered.
Johnson, Carson, Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Moreland, J., concurs in the result .

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 448 September 20, 1901
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,
vs.
PHILIP K. SWEET, defendant-appellant.
Theofilus B. Steele, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee.
LADD, J.:
The offense charged in the complaint is punishable under the Penal Code now in force by arresto
mayor and a fine of from 325 to 3,250 pesetas. (Art. 418.) By Act No. 136 of the United States
Philippine Commission, section 56 (6), Courts of First Instance are given original jurisdiction "in all
criminal cases in which a penalty of more than six months' imprisonment or a fine exceeding one
hundred dollars may be imposed." The offense was therefore cognizable by the court below unless
the fact that the appellant was at the time of its alleged commission an employee of the United
States military authorities in the Philippine Islands, and the further fact that the person upon whom
it is alleged to have been committed was a prisoner of war in the custody of such authorities, are
sufficient to deprive it of jurisdiction. We must assume that both these facts are true, as found,
either upon sufficient evidence or upon the admissions of the prosecuting attorney, by the court
below.
Setting aside the claim that the appellant was "acting in the line of duty" at the time the alleged
offense was committed, which is not supported by the findings or by any evidence which appears in
the record, the contention that the court was without jurisdiction, as we understand it, is reducible
to two propositions: First, that an assault committed by a soldier or military employee upon a
prisoner of war is not an offense under the Penal Code; and second, that if it is an offense under the
Code, nevertheless the military character sustained by the person charged with the offense at the
time of its commission exempts him from the ordinary jurisdiction of the civil tribunals.
As to the first proposition, it is true, as pointed out by counsel, that an assault of the character
charged in the complaint committed in time of war by a military person upon a prisoner of war is
punishable as an offense under the Spanish Code of Military Justice (art. 232), and it is also true that
under the provisions of the same Code (arts. 4, 5) the military tribunals have, with certain exceptions
which it is not material to state, exclusive cognizance of all offenses, whether of a purely military
nature or otherwise, committed by military persons. But the fact that the acts charged in the
complaint would be punishable as an offense under the Spanish military legislation does not render
them any less an offense under the article of the Penal Code above cited. There is nothing in the
language of that article to indicate that it does not apply to all persons within the territorial
jurisdiction of the law. Under articles 4 and 5 of the Code of Military Justice above cited a military
person could not be brought to trial before a civil tribunal for an assault upon a prisoner of war, but
by the commission of that offense he incurred a criminal responsibility for which he was amenable
only to the military jurisdiction. That criminal responsibility, however, arose from an infraction of the
general penal laws, although the same acts, viewed in another aspect, might also, if committed in
time of war, constitute an infraction of the military code. We are unable to see how these provisions
of the Spanish Military Code, no longer in force here and which indeed never had any application to
the Army of the United States, can in any possible view have the effect claimed for them by counsel
for the appellant.
The second question is, Does the fact that the alleged offense was committed by an employee of the
United States military authorities deprive the court of jurisdiction? We have been cited to no
provision in the legislation of Congress, and to none in the local legislation, which has the effect of
limiting, as respects employees of the United States military establishment, the general jurisdiction
conferred upon the Courts of First Instance by Act No. 136 of the United States Philippine
Commission above cited, and we are not aware of the existence of any such provision. The case is
therefore open to the application of the general principle that the jurisdiction of the civil tribunals is
unaffected by the military or other special character of the person brought before them for trial, a
principle firmly established in the law of England and America and which must, we think, prevail
under any system of jurisprudence unless controlled by express legislation to the contrary. (United
States vs. Clark, 31 Fed. Rep., 710.) The appellant's claim that the acts alleged to constitute the
offense were performed by him in the execution of the orders of his military superiors may, if true,
be available by way of defense upon the merits in the trial in the court below, but can not under this
principle affect the right of that court to take jurisdiction of the case.
Whether under a similar state of facts to that which appears in this case a court of one of the United
States would have jurisdiction to try the offender against the State laws (see In re Fair, 100 Fed.
Rep., 149), it is not necessary to consider. The present is not a case where the courts of one
government are attempting to exercise jurisdiction over the military agents or employees of another
and distinct government, because the court asserting jurisdiction here derives its existence and
powers from the same Government under the authority of which the acts alleged to constitute the
offense are claimed to have been performed.
It may be proper to add that there is no actual conflict between the two jurisdictions in the present
case nor any claim of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunals. On the contrary it appears
from the findings of the court below that the complaint was entered by order of the commanding
general of the Division of the Philippines, a fact not important, perhaps, as regards the technical
question of jurisdiction, but which relieves the case from any practical embarrassment which might
result from a claim on the part of the military tribunals to exclusive cognizance of the offense.
The order of the court below is affirmed with costs to the appellant.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Willard, and Mapa, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
COOPER, J., concurring:
I concur in the result of the decision of the court, but am not prepared to assent to all that is said in
the opinion. An offense charged against a military officer, acting under the order of his superior,
unless the illegality of the order is so clearly shown on its face that a man of ordinary sense and
understanding would know when he heard it read or given that the order was illegal, and when the
alleged criminal act was done within the scope of his authority as such officer, in good faith and
without malice, and where the offense is against the military law — that is, such law as relates to the
discipline and efficiency of the Army, or rules and orders promulgated by the Secretary of War to aid
military officers in the proper enforcement of the custody of prisoners — is not within the
jurisdiction of the courts of the Civil Government. (In re Fair, 100 Fed. Rep., 149.) The civil courts,
however, may examine the evidence for the purpose of determining whether the act alleged to be
criminal was done in the performance of duty under the circumstances above indicated, but should
cease to exercise jurisdiction upon such facts appearing.
ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV,
Petitioner,
- versus -
HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT-
BRANCH 148, MAKATI CITY; GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, VICE ADM. ROGELIO I. CALUNSAG,
MGEN. BENJAMIN DOLORFINO, AND LT. COL. LUCIARDO OBEA,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 179817
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
June 27, 2008
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
At the wee hours of July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments
in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials.
Later in the day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order
No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.[1] A
series of negotiations quelled the teeming tension and eventually resolved the impasse with the
surrender of the militant soldiers that evening.
In the aftermath of this eventful episode dubbed as the Oakwood Incident, petitioner Antonio F.
Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup detat defined under Article 134-A of
the Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. The case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 03-2784, People v. Capt. Milo D. Maestrecampo, et al
Close to four years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention,[2] threw his hat in the political
arena and won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007.[3]
Before the commencement of his term or on June 22, 2007, petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati
City, Branch 148, an Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions
and Related Requests[4] (Omnibus Motion). Among his requests were:
(a) To be allowed to go to the Senate to attend all official functions of the Senate (whether at the
Senate or elsewhere) particularly when the Senate is in session, and to attend the regular and
plenary sessions of the Senate, committee hearings, committee meetings, consultations,
investigations and hearings in aid of legislation, caucuses, staff meetings, etc., which are normally
held at the Senate of the Philippines located at the GSIS Financial Center, Pasay City (usually from
Mondays to Thursdays from 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.);
(b) To be allowed to set up a working area at his place of detention at the Marine Brig, Marine
Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, with a personal desktop computer and the appropriate
communications equipment (i.e., a telephone line and internet access) in order that he may be able
to work there when there are no sessions, meetings or hearings at the Senate or when the Senate is
not in session. The costs of setting up the said working area and the related equipment and utility
costs can be charged against the budget/allocation of the Office of the accused from the Senate;
(c) To be allowed to receive members of his staff at the said working area at his place of detention at
the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, at reasonable times of the day
particularly during working days for purposes of meetings, briefings, consultations and/or
coordination, so that the latter may be able to assists (sic) him in the performance and discharge of
his duties as a Senator of the Republic;
(d) To be allowed to give interviews and to air his comments, reactions and/or opinions to the press
or the media regarding the important issues affecting the country and the public while at the Senate
or elsewhere in the performance of his duties as Senator to help shape public policy and in the light
of the important role of the Senate in maintaining the system of checks and balance between the
three (3) co-equal branches of Government;
(e) With prior notice to the Honorable Court and to the accused and his custodians, to be allowed to
receive, on Tuesdays and Fridays, reporters and other members of the media who may wish to
interview him and/or to get his comments, reactions and/or opinion at his place of confinement at
the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, particularly when there are no
sessions, meetings or hearings at the Senate or when the Senate is not in session; and
(f) To be allowed to attend the organizational meeting and election of officers of the Senate and
related activities scheduled in the morning (9:00 or 10:00 a.m.) of 23 July 2007 at the Senate of the
Philippines located at the GSIS Financial Center, Pasay City.[5]
By Order of July 25, 2007,[6] the trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration in which he waived his requests in paragraphs (b), (c) and (f) to
thus trim them down to three.[7] The trial court just the same denied the motion by Order of
September 18, 2007.[8]
Hence, the present petition for certiorari to set aside the two Orders of the trial court, and for
prohibition and mandamus to (i) enjoin respondents from banning the Senate staff, resource
persons and guests from meeting with him or transacting business with him in his capacity as
Senator; and (ii) direct respondents to allow him access to the Senate staff, resource persons and
guests and permit him to attend all sessions and official functions of the Senate. Petitioner
preliminarily prayed for the maintenance of the status quo ante of having been able hitherto to
convene his staff, resource persons and guests[9] at the Marine Brig.
Impleaded as co-respondents of Judge Oscar Pimentel, Sr. are AFP Chief of Staff, Gen. Hermogenes
Esperon (Esperon); Philippine Navys Flag Officer-in-Command, Vice Admiral Rogelio Calunsag;
Philippine Marines Commandant, Major Gen. Benjamin Dolorfino; and Marine Barracks Manila
Commanding Officer, Lt. Col. Luciardo Obea (Obea).
Petitioner later manifested, in his Reply of February 26, 2008, that he has, since November 30, 2007,
been in the custody of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Custodial Center following the foiled
take-over of the Manila Peninsula Hotel[10] the day before or on November 29, 2007.
Such change in circumstances thus dictates the discontinuation of the action as against the above-
named military officers-respondents. The issues raised in relation to them had ceased to present a
justiciable controversy, so that a determination thereof would be without practical value and use.
Meanwhile, against those not made parties to the case, petitioner cannot ask for reliefs from this
Court.[11] Petitioner did not, by way of substitution, implead the police officers currently exercising
custodial responsibility over him; and he did not satisfactorily show that they have adopted or
continued the assailed actions of the former custodians.[12]
Petitioner reiterates the following grounds which mirror those previously raised in his Motion for
Reconsideration filed with the trial court:
I.
THE JURISPRUDENCE CITED BY THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO IS CLEARLY INAPPLICABLE TO THE
INSTANT CASE BECAUSE OF THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
A.
UNLIKE IN THIS CASE, THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE WAS ALREADY CONVICTED AT THE TIME
HE FILED HIS MOTION. IN THE INSTANT CASE, ACCUSED/PETITIONER HAS NOT BEEN CONVICTED
AND, THEREFORE, STILL ENJOYS THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE;
B.
THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOJOS (SIC) CASE WAS CHARGED WITH TWO (2) COUNTS OF STATUTORY
RAPE AND SIX (6) COUNTS OF ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS, CRIMES INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE.
HEREIN ACCUSED/PETITIONER IS CHARGED WITH THE OFFENSE OF COUP DETAT, A CHARGE WHICH
IS COMMONLY REGARDED AS A POLITICAL OFFENSE;
C.
THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE ATTEMPTED TO FLEE PRIOR TO BEING ARRESTED. THE
ACCUSED/ PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY SURRENDERED TO THE AUTHORITIES AND AGREED TO TAKE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIS ACTS AT OAKWOOD;
II.
GEN. ESPERON DID NOT OVERRULE THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE MARINE BRIGS COMMANDING
OFFICER TO ALLOW PETITIONER TO ATTEND THE SENATE SESSIONS;
III.
ACCUSED/PETITIONER SUBMITS THAT THE FACT THAT THE PEOPLE, IN THEIR SOVEREIGN CAPACITY,
ELECTED HIM TO THE POSITION OF SENATOR OF THE REPUBLIC PROVIDES THE PROPER LEGAL
JUSTIFICATION TO ALLOW HIM TO WORK AND SERVE HIS MANDATE AS A SENATOR;
- AND -
IV.
MOREOVER, THERE ARE ENOUGH PRECEDENTS TO ALLOW LIBERAL TREATMENT OF DETENTION
PRISONERS WHO ARE HELD WITHOUT BAIL AS IN THE CASE OF FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH ERAP
ESTRADA AND FORMER ARMM GOV. NUR MISUARI.[13]
The petition is bereft of merit.
In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and that of Jalosjos, petitioner chiefly points
out that former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was already convicted, albeit his conviction was
pending appeal, when he filed a motion similar to petitioners Omnibus Motion, whereas he
(petitioner) is a mere detention prisoner. He asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and political
rights since the presumption of innocence is still in his favor.
Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving moral turpitude, i.e.,
two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness, whereas he is indicted for coup
detat which is regarded as a political offense.
Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the presence of noble causes in expressing legitimate
grievances against the rampant and institutionalized practice of graft and corruption in the AFP.
In sum, petitioners first ground posits that there is a world of difference between his case and that
of Jalosjos respecting the type of offense involved, the stage of filing of the motion, and other
circumstances which demonstrate the inapplicability of Jalosjos.[14]
A plain reading of. Jalosjos suggests otherwise, however.
The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that
election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions
and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.[15]
It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody for purposes of the
administration of justice. No less than the Constitution provides:
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.[16]
(Underscoring supplied)
The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense,[17] or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal action.[18]
That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup detat cases, both being punishable by
reclusion perpetua,[19] is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of
imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral
turpitude involved in the crime charged.
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioners application for bail and for release on
recognizance was denied.[20] The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether
ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail[21] or imported from a trial courts judgment of
conviction,[22] justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional
liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is regardless of
the stage of the criminal action. Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of
public self-defense[23] applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-
appellants like Jalosjos.
As the Court observed in Alejano v. Cabuay,[24] it is impractical to draw a line between convicted
prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security; and while pre-trial
detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement, the fact of their detention
makes their rights more limited than those of the public.
The Court was more emphatic in People v. Hon. Maceda:[25]
As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the
custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to
answer for the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the
case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance. Let
it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can
not practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or
appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.[26]
These inherent limitations, however, must be taken into account only to the extent that
confinement restrains the power of locomotion or actual physical movement. It bears noting that in
Jalosjos, which was decided en banc one month after Maceda, the Court recognized that the
accused could somehow accomplish legislative results.[27]
The trial court thus correctly concluded that the presumption of innocence does not carry with it the
full enjoyment of civil and political rights.
Petitioner is similarly situated with Jalosjos with respect to the application of the presumption of
innocence during the period material to the resolution of their respective motions. The Court in
Jalosjos did not mention that the presumption of innocence no longer operates in favor of the
accused pending the review on appeal of the judgment of conviction. The rule stands that until a
promulgation of final conviction is made, the constitutional mandate of presumption of innocence
prevails.[28]
In addition to the inherent restraints, the Court notes that petitioner neither denied nor disputed his
agreeing to a consensus with the prosecution that media access to him should cease after his
proclamation by the Commission on Elections.[29]
Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos who attempted to evade trial, he is not a flight risk
since he voluntarily surrendered to the proper authorities and such can be proven by the numerous
times he was allowed to travel outside his place of detention.
Subsequent events reveal the contrary, however. The assailed Orders augured well when on
November 29, 2007 petitioner went past security detail for some reason and proceeded from the
courtroom to a posh hotel to issue certain statements. The account, dubbed this time as the Manila
Pen Incident,[30] proves that petitioners argument bites the dust. The risk that he would escape
ceased to be neither remote nor nil as, in fact, the cause for foreboding became real.
Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance as a factor in ascertaining the
reasonable amount of bail and in canceling a discretionary grant of bail.[31] In cases involving non-
bailable offenses, what is controlling is the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
Once it is established that it is so, bail shall be denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of
discretion.[32]
Petitioner cannot find solace in Montano v. Ocampo[33] to buttress his plea for leeway because
unlike petitioner, the therein petitioner, then Senator Justiniano Montano, who was charged with
multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder,[34] was able to rebut the strong evidence for the
prosecution. Notatu dignum is this Courts pronouncement therein that if denial of bail is authorized
in capital cases, it is only on the theory that the proof being strong, the defendant would flee, if he
has the opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the jury.[35] At the time Montano was indicted,
when only capital offenses were non-bailable where evidence of guilt is strong,[36] the Court noted
the obvious reason that one who faces a probable death sentence has a particularly strong
temptation to flee.[37] Petitioners petition for bail having earlier been denied, he cannot rely on
Montano to reiterate his requests which are akin to bailing him out.
Second, petitioner posits that, contrary to the trial courts findings, Esperon did not overrule Obeas
recommendation to allow him to attend Senate sessions. Petitioner cites the Comment[38] of Obea
that he interposed no objection to such request but recommended that he be transported by the
Senate Sergeant-at-Arms with adequate Senate security. And petitioner faults the trial court for
deeming that Esperon, despite professing non-obstruction to the performance of petitioners duties,
flatly rejected all his requests, when what Esperon only disallowed was the setting up of a political
office inside a military installation owing to AFPs apolitical nature.[39]
The effective management of the detention facility has been recognized as a valid objective that may
justify the imposition of conditions and restrictions of pre-trial detention.[40] The officer with
custodial responsibility over a detainee may undertake such reasonable measures as may be
necessary to secure the safety and prevent the escape of the detainee.[41] Nevertheless, while the
comments of the detention officers provide guidance on security concerns, they are not binding on
the trial court in the same manner that pleadings are not impositions upon a court.
Third, petitioner posits that his election provides the legal justification to allow him to serve his
mandate, after the people, in their sovereign capacity, elected him as Senator. He argues that
denying his Omnibus Motion is tantamount to removing him from office, depriving the people of
proper representation, denying the peoples will, repudiating the peoples choice, and overruling the
mandate of the people.
Petitioners contention hinges on the doctrine in administrative law that a public official can not be
removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office
operates as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right
to remove him therefor.[42]
The assertion is unavailing. The case against petitioner is not administrative in nature. And there is
no prior term to speak of. In a plethora of cases,[43] the Court categorically held that the doctrine of
condonation does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does
not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioners electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the
voters elected him to the Senate, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of
action [and] x x x with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he
could accomplish within the confines of prison.[44]
In once more debunking the disenfranchisement argument,[45] it is opportune to wipe out the
lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice of the people is louder than the
litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent
discord may be harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of the people yields to the
Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of law.
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse
to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the mandate of the people are multifarious.
The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of
government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives,
not to mention the 24 members
of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the
physical absence of one or a few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a
prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.[46]
Lastly, petitioner pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded certain detention prisoners who
have also been charged with non-bailable offenses, like former President Joseph Estrada and former
Governor Nur Misuari who were allowed to attend social functions. Finding no rhyme and reason in
the denial of the more serious request to perform the duties of a Senator, petitioner harps on an
alleged violation of the equal protection clause.
In arguing against maintaining double standards in the treatment of detention prisoners, petitioner
expressly admits that he intentionally did not seek preferential treatment in the form of being
placed under Senate custody or house arrest,[47] yet he at the same time, gripes about the granting
of house arrest to others.
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the
discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.[48] That this discretion was gravely abused,
petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner to register as a
voter in December 2006, file his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14,
2007, be proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his oath of office[49] on June 29, 2007. In a seeming
attempt to bind or twist the hands of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete turn-
around,[50] petitioner largely banks on these prior grants to him and insists on unending
concessions and blanket authorizations.
Petitioners position fails. On the generality and permanence of his requests alone, petitioners case
fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves. Jaloslos succinctly expounds:
x x x Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for five
(5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to
his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellants status to that of a
special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.[51
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

EN BANC
SUZETTE NICOLAS y SOMBILON, G.R. No. 175888
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION, and
PERALTA, JJ.
ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs; RAUL GONZALEZ, in his capacity as
Secretary of Justice; EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary; RONALDO PUNO, in
his capacity as Secretary of the Interior and Local Government; SERGIO APOSTOL, in his capacity as
Presidential Legal Counsel; and L/CPL. DANIEL SMITH,
Respondents.
X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
JOVITO R. SALONGA, WIGBERTO G.R. No. 176051
E. TAADA, JOSE DE LA RAMA,
EMILIO C. CAPULONG, H. HARRY
L. ROQUE, JR., FLORIN HILBAY,
and BENJAMIN POZON,
Petitioners,
- versus -
DANIEL SMITH, SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ, PRESIDENTIAL LEGAL COUNSEL SERGIO APOSTOL,
SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO, SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, The Special 16th Division of the COURT
OF APPEALS, and all persons acting in their capacity,
Respondents.
X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN G.R. No. 176222
(BAYAN), represented by Dr. Carol Araullo; GABRIELA, represented by Emerenciana de Jesus; BAYAN
MUNA, represented by Rep. Satur Ocampo; GABRIELA WOMENS PARTY, represented by Rep. Liza
Maza; KILUSANG MAYO UNO (KMU), represented by Elmer Labog; KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG
PILIPINAS (KMP), represented by Willy Marbella; LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), represented
by Vencer Crisostomo; and THE PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTER, represented by Atty. Rachel
Pastores,
Petitioners,
- versus -
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as concurrent Defense Secretary,

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO,
JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ, AND INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECRETARY
RONALDO PUNO,
Respondents. Promulgated:
February 11, 2009
X ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- X
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
These are petitions for certiorari, etc. as special civil actions and/or for review of the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith v. Hon. Benjamin T. Pozon, et al., in CA-G.R. SP No.
97212, dated January 2, 2007.
The facts are not disputed.
Respondent Lance Corporal (L/CPL) Daniel Smith is a member of the United States Armed Forces. He
was charged with the crime of rape committed against a Filipina, petitioner herein, sometime on
November 1, 2005, as follows:
The undersigned accused LCpl. Daniel Smith, Ssgt. Chad Brian Carpentier, Dominic Duplantis, Keith
Silkwood and Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr. of the crime of Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act 8353, upon a complaint under oath filed by Suzette S. Nicolas,
which is attached hereto and made an integral part hereof as Annex A, committed as follows:
That on or about the First (1st) day of November 2005, inside the Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Olongapo
City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accuseds (sic), being then
members of the United States Marine Corps, except Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr., conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping one another, with lewd design and by means of force,
threat and intimidation, with abuse of superior strength and taking advantage of the intoxication of
the victim, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sexually abuse and have sexual
intercourse with or carnal knowledge of one Suzette S. Nicolas, a 22-year old unmarried woman
inside a Starex Van with Plate No. WKF-162, owned by Starways Travel and Tours, with Office
address at 8900 P. Victor St., Guadalupe, Makati City, and driven by accused Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr.,
against the will and consent of the said Suzette S. Nicolas, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the
United States, entered into on February 10, 1998, the United States, at its request, was granted
custody of defendant Smith pending the proceedings.
During the trial, which was transferred from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zambales to the RTC of
Makati for security reasons, the United States Government faithfully complied with its undertaking
to bring defendant Smith to the trial court every time his presence was required.
On December 4, 2006, the RTC of Makati, following the end of the trial, rendered its Decision,
finding defendant Smith guilty, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, for failure of the prosecution to adduce sufficient evidence
against accused S/SGT. CHAD BRIAN CARPENTER, L/CPL. KEITH SILKWOOD AND L/CPL. DOMINIC
DUPLANTIS, all of the US Marine Corps assigned at the USS Essex, are hereby ACQUITTED to the
crime charged.
The prosecution having presented sufficient evidence against accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH, also
of the US Marine Corps at the USS Essex, this Court hereby finds him GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT of the crime of RAPE defined under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (a) of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by R.A. 8353, and, in accordance with Article 266-B, first paragraph thereof, hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua together with the accessory penalties
provided for under Article 41 of the same Code.
Pursuant to Article V, paragraph No. 10, of the Visiting Forces Agreement entered into by the
Philippines and the United States, accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH shall serve his sentence in the
facilities that shall, thereafter, be agreed upon by appropriate Philippine and United States
authorities. Pending agreement on such facilities, accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH is hereby
temporarily committed to the Makati City Jail.
Accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH is further sentenced to indemnify complainant SUZETTE S. NICOLAS
in the amount of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages plus P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.[2]
As a result, the Makati court ordered Smith detained at the Makati jail until further orders.
On December 29, 2006, however, defendant Smith was taken out of the Makati jail by a contingent
of Philippine law enforcement agents, purportedly acting under orders of the Department of the
Interior and Local Government, and brought to a facility for detention under the control of the
United States government, provided for under new agreements between the Philippines and the
United States, referred to as the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 19, 2006 which states:
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of
America agree that, in accordance with the Visiting Forces Agreement signed between our two
nations, Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith, United States Marine Corps, be returned to U.S. military
custody at the U.S. Embassy in Manila.
(Sgd.) KRISTIE A. KENNEY (Sgd.) ALBERTO G. ROMULO
Representative of the United States Representative of the Republic
of America of the Philippines

DATE: 12-19-06 DATE: December 19, 2006__
and the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 22, 2006 which states:
The Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines and the Embassy of the United
States of America agree that, in accordance with the Visiting Forces Agreement signed between the
two nations, upon transfer of Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith, United States Marine Corps, from the
Makati City Jail, he will be detained at the first floor, Rowe (JUSMAG) Building, U.S. Embassy
Compound in a room of approximately 10 x 12 square feet. He will be guarded round the clock by
U.S. military personnel. The Philippine police and jail authorities, under the direct supervision of the
Philippine Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) will have access to the place of
detention to ensure the United States is in compliance with the terms of the VFA.
The matter was brought before the Court of Appeals which decided on January 2, 2007, as follows:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, we resolved to DISMISS the petition for having become
moot.[3]
Hence, the present actions.
The petitions were heard on oral arguments on September 19, 2008, after which the parties
submitted their memoranda.
Petitioners contend that the Philippines should have custody of defendant L/CPL Smith because, first
of all, the VFA is void and unconstitutional.
This issue had been raised before, and this Court resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the VFA.
This was in Bayan v. Zamora,[4] brought by Bayan, one of petitioners in the present cases.
Against the barriers of res judicata vis--vis Bayan, and stare decisis vis--vis all the parties, the reversal
of the previous ruling is sought on the ground that the issue is of primordial importance, involving
the sovereignty of the Republic, as well as a specific mandate of the Constitution.
The provision of the Constitution is Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 which states:
Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Philippines and the United
States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be
allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the
Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum
held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.
The reason for this provision lies in history and the Philippine experience in regard to the United
States military bases in the country.
It will be recalled that under the Philippine Bill of 1902, which laid the basis for the Philippine
Commonwealth and, eventually, for the recognition of independence, the United States agreed to
cede to the Philippines all the territory it acquired from Spain under the Treaty of Paris, plus a few
islands later added to its realm, except certain naval ports and/or military bases and facilities, which
the United States retained for itself.
This is noteworthy, because what this means is that Clark and Subic and the other places in the
Philippines covered by the RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947 were not Philippine territory, as
they were excluded from the cession and retained by the US.
Accordingly, the Philippines had no jurisdiction over these bases except to the extent allowed by the
United States. Furthermore, the RP-US Military Bases Agreement was never advised for ratification
by the United States Senate, a disparity in treatment, because the Philippines regarded it as a treaty
and had it concurred in by our Senate.
Subsequently, the United States agreed to turn over these bases to the Philippines; and with the
expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the territory covered by these bases were
finally ceded to the Philippines.
To prevent a recurrence of this experience, the provision in question was adopted in the 1987
Constitution.
The provision is thus designed to ensure that any agreement allowing the presence of foreign
military bases, troops or facilities in Philippine territory shall be equally binding on the Philippines
and the foreign sovereign State involved. The idea is to prevent a recurrence of the situation in
which the terms and conditions governing the presence of foreign armed forces in our territory were
binding upon us but not upon the foreign State.
Applying the provision to the situation involved in these cases, the question is whether or not the
presence of US Armed Forces in Philippine territory pursuant to the VFA is allowed under a treaty
duly concurred in by the Senate xxx and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.
This Court finds that it is, for two reasons.

First, as held in Bayan v. Zamora,[5] the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has
been recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and certified by the duly authorized
representative of the United States government.
The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and consent of the United States Senate does not
detract from its status as a binding international agreement or treaty recognized by the said State.
For this is a matter of internal United States law. Notice can be taken of the internationally known
practice by the United States of submitting to its Senate for advice and consent agreements that are
policymaking in nature, whereas those that carry out or further implement these policymaking
agreements are merely submitted to Congress, under the provisions of the so-called CaseZablocki
Act, within sixty days from ratification.[6]
The second reason has to do with the relation between the VFA and the RP-US Mutual Defense
Treaty of August 30, 1951. This earlier agreement was signed and duly ratified with the concurrence
of both the Philippine Senate and the United States Senate.
The RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty states:[7]
MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA. Signed at Washington, August 30, 1951.
The Parties of this Treaty
Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their
desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of
peace in the Pacific area.
Recalling with mutual pride the historic relationship which brought their two peoples together in a
common bond of sympathy and mutual ideals to fight side-by-side against imperialist aggression
during the last war.
Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity and their common determination to
defend themselves against external armed attack, so that no potential aggressor could be under the
illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific area.
Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts for collective defense for the preservation of
peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security
in the Pacific area.
Agreeing that nothing in this present instrument shall be considered or interpreted as in any way or
sense altering or diminishing any existing agreements or understandings between the Republic of
the Philippines and the United States of America.
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I. The parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any
international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that
international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international
relation from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations.
ARTICLE II. In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty, the Parties separately
and jointly by self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective
capacity to resist armed attack.
ARTICLE III. The Parties, through their Foreign Ministers or their deputies, will consult together from
time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty and whenever in the opinion of either of
them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened
by external armed attack in the Pacific.
ARTICLE IV. Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the parties
would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common
dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to
the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security
Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.
ARTICLE V. For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on either of the Parties is deemed to
include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on the island
territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific Ocean, its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the
Pacific.
ARTICLE VI. This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights
and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the
United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.
ARTICLE VII. This Treaty shall be ratified by the Republic of the Philippines and the United Nations of
America in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force when
instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Manila.
ARTICLE VIII. This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year
after notice has been given to the other party.
IN WITHNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.
DONE in duplicate at Washington this thirtieth day of August, 1951.
For the Republic of the Philippines:
(Sgd.) CARLOS P. ROMULO
(Sgd.) JOAQUIN M. ELIZALDE

(Sgd.) VICENTE J. FRANCISCO
(Sgd.) DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL
For the United States of America:
(Sgd.) DEAN ACHESON
(Sgd.) JOHN FOSTER DULLES
(Sgd.) TOM CONNALLY
(Sgd.) ALEXANDER WILEY[8]
Clearly, therefore, joint RP-US military exercises for the purpose of developing the capability to resist
an armed attack fall squarely under the provisions of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. The VFA,
which is the instrument agreed upon to provide for the joint RP-US military exercises, is simply an
implementing agreement to the main RP-US Military Defense Treaty. The Preamble of the VFA
states:
The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines,
Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their
desire to strengthen international and regional security in the Pacific area
Reaffirming their obligations under the Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951;
Noting that from time to time elements of the United States armed forces may visit the Republic of
the Philippines;
Considering that cooperation between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines
promotes their common security interests;
Recognizing the desirability of defining the treatment of United States personnel visiting the
Republic of the Philippines;
Have agreed as follows:[9]
Accordingly, as an implementing agreement of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, it was not
necessary to submit the VFA to the US Senate for advice and consent, but merely to the US Congress
under the CaseZablocki Act within 60 days of its ratification. It is for this reason that the US has
certified that it recognizes the VFA as a binding international agreement, i.e., a treaty, and this
substantially complies with the requirements of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of our Constitution.[10]
The provision of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of the Constitution, is complied with by virtue of the fact that the
presence of the US Armed Forces through the VFA is a presence allowed under the RP-US Mutual
Defense Treaty. Since the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty itself has been ratified and concurred in by
both the Philippine Senate and the US Senate, there is no violation of the Constitutional provision
resulting from such presence.
The VFA being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required as a matter of international
law to abide by its terms and provisions.
The VFA provides that in cases of offenses committed by the members of the US Armed Forces in
the Philippines, the following rules apply:
Article V
Criminal Jurisdiction
xxx
6. The custody of any United States personnel over whom the Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction
shall immediately reside with United States military authorities, if they so request, from the
commission of the offense until completion of all judicial proceedings. United States military
authorities shall, upon formal notification by the Philippine authorities and without delay, make such
personnel available to those authorities in time for any investigative or judicial proceedings relating
to the offense with which the person has been charged. In extraordinary cases, the Philippine
Government shall present its position to the United States Government regarding custody, which the
United States Government shall take into full account. In the event Philippine judicial proceedings
are not completed within one year, the United States shall be relieved of any obligations under this
paragraph. The one year period will not include the time necessary to appeal. Also, the one year
period will not include any time during which scheduled trial procedures are delayed because United
States authorities, after timely notification by Philippine authorities to arrange for the presence of
the accused, fail to do so.
Petitioners contend that these undertakings violate another provision of the Constitution, namely,
that providing for the exclusive power of this Court to adopt rules of procedure for all courts in the
Philippines (Art. VIII, Sec. 5[5]). They argue that to allow the transfer of custody of an accused to a
foreign power is to provide for a different rule of procedure for that accused, which also violates the
equal protection clause of the Constitution (Art. III, Sec. 1.).
Again, this Court finds no violation of the Constitution.
The equal protection clause is not violated, because there is a substantial basis for a different
treatment of a member of a foreign military armed forces allowed to enter our territory and all
other accused.[11]
The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed to enter ones territory is immune
from local jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon. The Status of Forces Agreements involving
foreign military units around the world vary in terms and conditions, according to the situation of
the parties involved, and reflect their bargaining power. But the principle remains, i.e., the receiving
State can exercise jurisdiction over the forces of the sending State only to the extent agreed upon by
the parties.[12]
As a result, the situation involved is not one in which the power of this Court to adopt rules of
procedure is curtailed or violated, but rather one in which, as is normally encountered around the
world, the laws (including rules of procedure) of one State do not extend or apply except to the
extent agreed upon to subjects of another State due to the recognition of extraterritorial immunity
given to such bodies as visiting foreign armed forces.
Nothing in the Constitution prohibits such agreements recognizing immunity from jurisdiction or
some aspects of jurisdiction (such as custody), in relation to long-recognized subjects of such
immunity like Heads of State, diplomats and members of the armed forces contingents of a foreign
State allowed to enter another States territory. On the contrary, the Constitution states that the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land. (Art. II, Sec. 2).
Applying, however, the provisions of VFA, the Court finds that there is a different treatment when it
comes to detention as against custody. The moment the accused has to be detained, e.g., after
conviction, the rule that governs is the following provision of the VFA:
Article V
Criminal Jurisdiction
xxx
Sec. 10. The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of United States personnel shall be
carried out in facilities agreed on by appropriate Philippines and United States authorities. United
States personnel serving sentences in the Philippines shall have the right to visits and material
assistance.
It is clear that the parties to the VFA recognized the difference between custody during the trial and
detention after conviction, because they provided for a specific arrangement to cover detention.
And this specific arrangement clearly states not only that the detention shall be carried out in
facilities agreed on by authorities of both parties, but also that the detention shall be by Philippine
authorities. Therefore, the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006, which are
agreements on the detention of the accused in the United States Embassy, are not in accord with
the VFA itself because such detention is not by Philippine authorities.
Respondents should therefore comply with the VFA and negotiate with representatives of the
United States towards an agreement on detention facilities under Philippine authorities as
mandated by Art. V, Sec. 10 of the VFA.
Next, the Court addresses the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Medellin v.
Texas ( 552 US ___ No. 06-984, March 25, 2008), which held that treaties entered into by the United
States are not automatically part of their domestic law unless these treaties are self-executing or
there is an implementing legislation to make them enforceable.
On February 3, 2009, the Court issued a Resolution, thus:
G.R. No. 175888 (Suzette Nicolas y Sombilon v. Alberto Romulo, et al.); G.R. No. 176051 (Jovito R.
Salonga, et al. v. Daniel Smith, et al.); and G.R. No. 176222 (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan [BAYAN],
et al. v. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al.).
The parties, including the Solicitor General, are required to submit within three (3) days a
Comment/Manifestation on the following points:
1. What is the implication on the RP-US Visiting Forces Agreement of the recent US
Supreme Court decision in Jose Ernesto Medellin v. Texas, dated March 25, 2008, to the effect that
treaty stipulations that are not self-executory can only be enforced pursuant to legislation to carry
them into effect; and that, while treaties may comprise international commitments, they are not
domestic law unless Congress has enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an
intention that it be self-executory and is ratified on these terms?
2. Whether the VFA is enforceable in the US as domestic law, either because it is self-
executory or because there exists legislation to implement it.
3. Whether the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951 was concurred in by the
US Senate and, if so, is there proof of the US Senate advice and consent resolution? Peralta, J., no
part.
After deliberation, the Court holds, on these points, as follows:
First, the VFA is a self-executing Agreement, as that term is defined in Medellin itself, because the
parties intend its provisions to be enforceable, precisely because the Agreement is intended to carry
out obligations and undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. As a matter of fact, the
VFA has been implemented and executed, with the US faithfully complying with its obligation to
produce L/CPL Smith before the court during the trial.
Secondly, the VFA is covered by implementing legislation, namely, the Case-Zablocki Act, USC Sec.
112(b), inasmuch as it is the very purpose and intent of the US Congress that executive agreements
registered under this Act within 60 days from their ratification be immediately implemented. The
parties to these present cases do not question the fact that the VFA has been registered under the
Case-Zablocki Act.
In sum, therefore, the VFA differs from the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and the Avena
decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), subject matter of the Medellin decision. The
Convention and the ICJ decision are not self-executing and are not registrable under the Case-
Zablocki Act, and thus lack legislative implementing authority.
Finally, the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty was advised and consented to by the US Senate on March
20, 1952, as reflected in the US Congressional Record, 82nd Congress, Second Session, Vol. 98 Part 2,
pp. 2594-2595.
The framers of the Constitution were aware that the application of international law in domestic
courts varies from country to country.
As Ward N. Ferdinandusse states in his Treatise, DIRECT APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL

LAW IN NATIONAL COURTS, some countries require legislation whereas others do not.
It was not the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting Article XVIII, Sec. 25, to
require the other contracting State to convert their system to achieve alignment and parity with
ours. It was simply required that the treaty be recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.
With that, it becomes for both parties a binding international obligation and the enforcement of that
obligation is left to the normal recourse and processes under international law.
Furthermore, as held by the US Supreme Court in Weinberger v. Rossi,[13] an executive agreement

is a treaty within the meaning of that word in international law and constitutes enforceable
domestic law vis--vis the United States. Thus, the US Supreme Court in Weinberger enforced the
provisions of the executive agreement granting preferential employment to Filipinos in the US Bases
here.
Accordingly, there are three types of treaties in the American system:
1. Art. II, Sec. 2 treaties These are advised and consented to by the US Senate in accordance
with Art. II, Sec. 2 of the US Constitution.
2. ExecutiveCongressional Agreements: These are joint agreements of the President and

Congress and need not be submitted to the Senate.
3. Sole Executive Agreements. These are agreements entered into by the President. They
are to be submitted to Congress within sixty (60) days of ratification under the provisions of the
Case-Zablocki Act, after which they are recognized by the Congress and may be implemented
As regards the implementation of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, military aid or assistance has
been given under it and this can only be done through implementing legislation. The VFA itself is
another form of implementation of its provisions.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED, and the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 97212 dated January 2, 2007 is MODIFIED. The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the
Republic of the Philippines and the United States, entered into on February 10, 1998, is UPHELD as
constitutional, but the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006 are DECLARED not
in accordance with the VFA, and respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs is hereby ordered to
forthwith negotiate with the United States representatives for the appropriate agreement on
detention facilities under Philippine authorities as provided in Art. V, Sec. 10 of the VFA, pending
which the status quo shall be maintained until further orders by this Court.
The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve without delay the related matters pending
therein, namely, the petition for contempt and the appeal of L/CPL Daniel Smith from the judgment
of conviction.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Annex B of RTC Decision, CA rollo, p. 45.
[2] Annex B of CA rollo, pp. 36-96.
[3] Rollo, pp. 90-127.
[4] G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000, 342 SCRA 449.
[5] Supra, note 4.

[6] The Case-Zablocki Act, 1 U.S.C. 112b (a) (1976 ed., Supp IV). See also Weinberger v. Rossi, 456
U.S. 25 (1982), in which the U.S. Supreme Court sustained recognition as a treaty of agreements not
concurred in by the U.S. Senate.
[7] The RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty was signed in Washington, D.C. on August 30, 1951. Its
ratification was advised by the US Senate on March 20, 1952, and the US President ratified the
Treaty on April 15, 1952.
The Treaty was concurred in by the RP Senate, S.R. No. 84, May 12, 1952. The Philippine instrument
of ratification was signed by the RP President on August 27, 1952. The Agreement entered into force
on August 27, 1952 upon the exchange of ratification between the Parties.
This Agreement is published in II DFA TS No. 1, p. 13; 177 UNTS, p. 133; 3 UST 3847-3952. The RP
Presidential proclamation of the Agreement, Proc. No. 341, S. 1952, is published in 48 O.G. 4224
(Aug. 1952).
A. Diplomatic immunity
5. Liang vs. People, 335 SCRA 125
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 125865. January 28, 2000]
JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for
allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 53170 and 53171. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant
issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioners bail at P2,400.00 per criminal charge, the MeTC released
him to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an "office
of protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is covered by
immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the
Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the
country. Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC
judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases. The latter filed a motion
for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution
filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which
set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier
issued. After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner elevated the case to this Court
via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no
preliminary investigation was held before the criminal cases were filed in court.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that
petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFAs determination that a certain person is covered by
immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. In receiving ex-parte the DFAs
advice and in motu proprio dismissing the two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution, the
latters right to due process was violated. It should be noted that due process is a right of the accused
as much as it is of the prosecution. The needed inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting at the
time of the alleged utterances requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be
presented at the proper time.[1] At any rate, it has been ruled that the mere invocation of the
immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges.[2]
Second, under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides: Jksm
"Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants
performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy the following privileges and immunities:
a.).......immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity
except when the Bank waives the immunity."
the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the act was done
in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary to determine if petitioners case falls within the ambit
of Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have been given the chance to rebut the DFA protocol
and it must be accorded the opportunity to present its controverting evidence, should it so desire.
Third, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our
laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.[3] The
imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of official functions. It is well-settled principle of
law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may
have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction.[4] It appears that even the governments chief legal counsel, the Solicitor General, does
not support the stand taken by petitioner and that of the DFA.
Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming
petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case
of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in
the receiving state outside his official functions.[5] As already mentioned above, the commission of a
crime is not part of official duty.
Finally, on the contention that there was no preliminary investigation conducted, suffice it to say
that preliminary investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as the
one at bar.[6] Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when
specifically granted by law.[7] The rule on criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary
investigation is required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.[8] Besides, the absence
of preliminary investigation does not affect the courts jurisdiction nor does it impair the validity of
the information or otherwise render it defective.[9]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

B. Liberal construction
6. People vs. Ladjaalam, 340 SCRA 617
7. Gidwani vs. People, G.R. No. 195064, January 15, 2014, 713 SCRA 756
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 136149-51. September 19, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. WALPAN LADJAALAM y MIHAJIL alias WARPAN, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Republic Act No. 8294 penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that the person
arrested committed no other crime. Furthermore, if the person is held liable for murder or homicide,
illegal possession of firearms is an aggravating circumstance, but not a separate offense. Hence,
where an accused was convicted of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide for firing an
unlicensed M-14 rifle at several policemen who were about to serve a search warrant, he cannot be
held guilty of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms. Neither can such unlawful act be
considered to have aggravated the direct assault.
The Case
Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil, also known as Warpan, appeals before us the September 17, 1998
Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City (Branch 16), which found him guilty
of three out of the four charges lodged against him.
Filed against appellant were four Informations,[2] all signed by Assistant Regional State Prosecutor
Ricardo G. Cabaron and dated September 25, 1997. The first Information[3] was for maintaining a
den for the use of regulated drugs. It reads as follows:
That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Walpan Ladjaalam being then the
owner of a residential house located at Rio Hondo,[4] this City, conspiring and confederating
together, mutually aiding and assisting x x x his co-accused wife Nur-in Ladjaalam and Ahmad
Sailabbi y Hajaraini, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, maintain said house as a
den, where regulated drug [was] used in any form.[5]
The second Information[6] charged appellant with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition.
We quote it below:
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together, mutually aiding and assisting with one another, without any justifiable reason or purpose
other than to use it in the commission of crime, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously have in their possession and under their custody and control, the following weapons, to
wit: one (1) M14 rifle with SN 1555225 with magazines and seven (7) rounds of live ammunition; two
(2) magazines with twenty (20) and twenty[-one] (21) rounds of live [ammunition]; one (1)
homemade caliber .38 revolver with five (5) live ammunition; one (1) M-79 (single) rifle with pouch
and with five (5) empty shell[s]; one (1) home made caliber .38 with SN-311092 with five live
ammunition and one empty shell of [a] cal. 38 x x x Smith and Wesson; two (2) .38 Caliber paltik
revolver with Serial Number 311092 and one defaced M79 grenade launcher paltik, without first
having obtained the necessary license and or permit therefor from authorities concerned, in flagrant
violation of the aforementioned law.[7]
The third Information,[8] for multiple attempted murder with direct assault, was worded thus:
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being then armed with M-14
Armalite Rifles, M-16 Armalite Rifles and other assorted firearms and explosives, conspiring and
confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting x x x one another and with intent to kill, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously try and attempt to kill SPO1 WILLIAM B. JONES,
JR., PO3 ENRIQUE C. RIVERA[,] SPO1 AMADO A. MIRASOL, JR., and SPO1 RICARDO J.
LACASTESANTOS, in the following manner, to wit: by then and there firing their M-14 x x x Armalite
Rifles, M-16 Armalite Rifles and other assorted firearms and explosives, aimed and directed at the
fatal parts of the bodies of the above-named police officers, well known to the accused as members
of the Philippine National Police, Zamboanga City Police Office, and as such, agents of a person in
authority, who at the time of the attack were engaged in the performance of their duties, that is, on
the occasion when said officers were about to serve the Search Warrant legally issued by the
Regional Trial Court, this City, to the person of the accused thus commencing the commission of
crime of multiple murder directly by overt acts, and if the accused did not accomplish their unlawful
purpose, that is, to kill the above-named Police Officers, it was not by reason of their own voluntary
desistance but rather because of the fact that all the above-named police officers were able to seek
cover during the firing and were not hit by the bullets and explosives fired by the accused and also
by the fact said police officers were able to wrestle with two (2) of the accused namely: Walpan
Ladjaalam y Mihajil a.k.a. Warpan and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajairani, who were subdued and
subsequently placed under arrest; whereas accused PO2 Nurhakim T. Hadjula was able to make
good his escape and has remained at-large.[9]
In the fourth Information, appellant was charged with illegal possession of drugs.[10]
On December 21, 1997, the cases against Nur-in Ladjaalam and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajaraini were
dismissed upon motion of the Office of the City Prosecutor, which had conducted a reinvestigation
of the cases as ordered by the lower court. The accused were consequently released from jail.
The arraignment of appellant on all four (4) charges took place on January 6, 1998, during which he
entered a plea of not guilty.[11] After pretrial, the assailed Decision was rendered, the dispositive
part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused WALPAN LADJAALAM y MIHAJIL a.k.a. WARPAN -
1. in Criminal Case No. 14636, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of Violation of Section 15-A,
Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended, and SENTENCES said accused to the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of
FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) and to pay the costs;
2. In Criminal Case No. 14637, NOT GUILTY of Violation of Section 16, Article III, in relation to Section
21, Article IV, of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended, and ACQUITS him of said crime with costs de oficio;
3. in Criminal Case No. 14638, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Ammunition penalized under Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended
by Republic Act. No. 8294, and SENTENCES said accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6)
YEARS of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS of prision mayor as maximum and to
pay a fine [of] THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) and pay the costs;
4. in Criminal Case No. 14639, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Direct Assault
with Multiple Attempted Homicide and SENTENCES said accused to an indeterminate penalty of
TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of prision correccional as minimum to SIX (6) YEARS of prision
correccional as maximum and to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) and to pay the costs.
(emphasis in the original)
Hence, this appeal.[12]
The Facts
Prosecutions Version
In its Brief,[13] the Office of the Solicitor General presents the facts in this wise:
At 1:45 p.m. of September 24, 1997, PO3 Allan Marcos Obut filed an application for the issuance of a
search warrant against appellant, his wife and some John Does (Exh. C). After the search warrant
was issued about 2:30 p.m. of the same day, a briefing was conducted inside the office of the Anti-
Vice/Narcotics Unit of the Zamboanga City Police Office in connection with the service of the search
warrant. The briefing was conducted by SPO2 Felipe Gaganting, Chief of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics
Unit. During the briefing, PO3 Renato Dela Pea was assigned as presentor of the warrant. SPO1
Ricardo Lacastesantos and PO3 Enrique Rivera were designated to conduct the search. Other
policemen were assigned as perimeter guards (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 33-36).
After the briefing, more than thirty (30) policemen headed by Police Superintendent Edwin Soledad
proceeded to the house of appellant and his wife at Rio Hondo on board several police vehicles (TSN,
March 4, 1998, p. 32; April 22, 1998, p. 54). Before they could reach appellants house, three (3)
persons sitting at a nearby store ran towards the house shouting, [P]olice, raid, raid (Ibid., March 3,
1998, pp. 41, 43-44; April 23, 1998, p. 4). When the policemen were about ten (10) meters from the
main gate of the house, they were met by a rapid burst of gunfire coming from the second floor of
the house. There was also gunfire at the back of the house (Ibid., March 5, 1998, pp. 14-16).
SPO1 Mirasol, SPO2 Lacastesantos, PO3 Rivera, and PO3 Dela Pea who were with the first group of
policemen saw appellant fire an M14 rifle towards them. They all knew appellant. When they were
fired upon, the group, together with SPO2 Gaganting, PO3 Obut and Superintendent Soledad, sought
cover at the concrete fence to observe the movements at the second floor of the house while other
policemen surrounded the house (Ibid., March 4, 1998, pp. 50-51).
In front of the house was an extension building connected to the concrete fence (Ibid., pp. 45-46, 57-
59, 73-76). Gaganting, Mirasol, Lacastesantos, Gregorio, and Obut entered the door of the extension
building. Gaganting opened the main (steel) gate of the house. The other members of the team then
entered. Lacastesantos and Mirasol entered the house through the main door and went inside the
sala of the ground floor while other policemen surrounded the house. Two (2) old women were in
the sala together with a young girl and three (3) children. One of the old women took the children to
the second floor while the young girl remained seated at the corner (Ibid., pp. 19-21).
Lacastesantos and Mirasol proceeded to the second floor where they earlier saw appellant firing an
M14 rifle at them through the window. While they were going upstairs, appellant noticed their
presence. He went inside the bedroom and, after breaking and removing the jalousies, jumped from
the window to the roof of a neighboring house. Seeing this, Mirasol rushed downstairs and asked
help from the other members of the raiding team to arrest appellant. Lacastesantos went to the
second floor and shouted to the policemen outside not to fire in the direction of the second floor
because there were children. Mirasol and SPO1 Cesar Rabuya arrested appellant at the back of his
house after a brief chase (Ibid., pp. 21-23).
At the second floor, Lacastesantos saw an M14 rifle (Exh. B-3) with magazine on top of the sofa at
the sala on the second floor (Ibid., P. 27). The rifle bore Serial No. 1555225. He removed the
magazine from the rifle and the bullet inside the chamber of the rifle. He counted seventeen (17)
live ammunition inside the magazine. He saw two (2) more M14 rifle magazines on the sofa, one
with twenty (20) live ammunition (Exh. G-3) and another with twenty-one (21) live ammunition (Exh.
G-4). He likewise saw three (3) M16 rifle magazines (Exh. G-2) in a corner at the second floor (TSN,
March 5, 1998, pp. 23-32, 53-57).
After Lacastesantos and Mirasol entered appellants house, Rivera, Dela Pea, Gregorio and Obut
followed and entered the house. After identifying themselves as members of the PNP Anti-
Vice/Narcotics Unit, Obut presented to the old women a copy of the search warrant. Dela Pea and
Rivera then searched appellants room on the ground floor in the presence of Punong Barangay
Elhano (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 41-43). On top of a table was a pencil case (Exh. J) with fifty (50)
folded aluminum foils inside (Exhs. J-1 to J-50), each containing methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu.
Other items were found during the search, namely, assorted coins in different denominations (Exh.
W; TSN, April 28, 1998, pp. 23-25), one (1) homemade .38 caliber revolver (Exh. B-2) with five (5) live
[ammunition], one (1) M79 single rifle with [a] pouch containing five (5) empty shells of an M79 rifle
(Exh. B-4), and one (1) empty shell of an M14 rifle (TSN, April 23, 1998, pp. 30-32).
Rino Bartolome Locson was an informer of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit of the Zamboanga Police.
[O]n the morning of September 24, 1997, he was instructed by SPO2 Gaganting to go to appellants
house to buy shabu. Locson knew appellant as a seller of shabu (TSN, April 22, 1998, p. 5) and had
been to appellants house about fifteen (15) times before. He went to Rio Hondo and arrived at
appellants house at 3:20 p.m. He bought P300.00 worth of shabu from appellant. The latter got
three (3) decks of shabu from his waist bag. Appellant instructed Locson to go behind the curtain
where there was a table. There were six (6) persons already smoking. There was a lighted kerosene
lamp made of a medicine bottle placed on the table. They asked Locson to smoke shabu and Locson
obliged. He placed the three (3) decks of shabu he bought on the table (Ibid., pp. 8-15).
While they were smoking shabu, Locson heard gunfire coming from appellants house. They all stood
and entered appellants compound but were instructed to pass [through] the other side. They met
appellant at the back of his house. Appellant told them to escape because the police are already
here. They scampered and ran away because there were already shots. Locson jumped over the
fence and ran towards the seashore. Upon reaching a place near the Fisheries School, he took a
tricycle and went home (Ibid., pp. 17-19).
The following day, September 25, 1997, he went to the police station and executed an affidavit (Exh.
M) narrating what transpired at appellants house [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997.
After the search and before returning to the police station, P03 Dela Pea prepared a Receipt for
Property Seized (Exh. P & 3) listing the properties seized during the search. The receipt was signed by
Dela Pea as the seizure officer, and by Punong Barangay Hadji Hussin Elhano and radio reporter Jun
Cayona as witnesses. A copy of the receipt was given to appellant but he refused to acknowledge the
properties seized (TSN, April 23, 1998, pp. 11-12).
An examination conducted by Police Inspector Mercedes D. Diestro, Forensic Chemist of the PNP
Crime Laboratory Service Office 9, on the paraffin casts taken from both hands of appellant yielded
positive for gunpowder nitrates (Exh. A-3), giving rise to the possibility that appellant had fired a gun
before the examination (TSN, March 3, 1998, p. 11). Gunpowder residue examinations conducted on
September 26, 1997 showed that the following firearms were fired (Exh. B-5): a .38 caliber revolver
(homemade) with Serial No. 311092 (Exh. B-1), another .38 caliber revolver (homemade) without a
serial number (Exh. B-2), a Cal. 7.62 mm M14 U.S. rifle with Serial No. 1555225 (Exh. B-3), and an
M79 rifle without a serial number (Exh. B-4). They were fired within five (5) days prior to the
examination (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 16-21).
With respect to the crystalline substances, an examination conducted by Police Inspector Susan M.
Cayabyab, likewise a Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service Office 9, on the fifty (50)
pieces of folded aluminum foils each containing white crystalline granules with a total weight of
1.7426 grams (Exh. J-1 to J-50) yielded positive results for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu) (Exh. L). However, the examination of one (1) crystalline stone weighing
83.2674 grams (Exh. K) yielded negative results for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride (Exh. L).
The records of the Regional Operation and Plans Division of the PNP Firearm and Explosive Section
show that appellant had not applied/filed any application for license to possess firearm and
ammunition or x x x been given authority to carry [a] firearm outside of his residence (Exh. X)[14]
Defenses Version
Appellant Ladjaalam agrees with the narration of facts given by the lower court.[15] Hence, we
quote the pertinent parts of the assailed Decision:
Accused Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil a.k.a. Warpan, 30 years old, married, gave his occupation as
smuggling (tsn, p. 2, May 4, 1998). He used to go to Labuan in Malaysia and bring cigarettes to the
Philippines without paying taxes (tsn, pp. 40-41, id). He said that his true name [was] Abdul Nasser
Abdurakman and that Warpan or Walpan Ladjaalam [was] only his alias. However, he admitted that
more people kn[e]w him as Walpan Ladjaalam rather than Abdul Nasser Abdurakman (tsn. pp. 39-
40; 46-47, id). He testified that [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, when he was arrested by
the police, he was sleeping in the house of Dandao, a relative of his wife. He was alone. He slept in
Dandaos house and not in his house because they ha[d] a sort of a conference as Dandaos daughter
was leaving for Saudi Arabia. He noticed the presence of policemen in his neighborhood at Aplaya,
Rio Hondo when he heard shots. He woke up and went out of the house and that was the time that
he was arrested. He said he was arrested xxx [at] the other side of my house; at the other side of the
fence where I was sleeping. xxx. At the back of my house (tsn, p. 7, id.). He does not know who
arrested him considering that the one who arrested me does not have nameplate. He was arrested
by four (4) persons. Not one of those who arrested him testified in Court. He was handcuffed and
placed inside a jeep parked at Rio Hondo Elementary School. According to him, he did not fire a gun
at the policemen from [t]he second floor of his house. He said the policemen [were] the one[s] who
fire[d] at us (tsn, p. 5, id.). If he fired a gun at the policemen for sure they [would] die [b]ecause the
door is very near x x x the vicinity of my house. He does not own the M14 rifle (Exh. B-3) which
according to policemen, he used in firing at them. The gun does not belong to him. He does not have
a gun like that (tsn, p. 15, id.). A policeman also owns an M14 rifle but he does not know the
policeman (tsn, pp. 16-17, id). He said that the M79 rifle (Exh. B-4), the three (3) empty M16 rifle
magazines (Exh. G; G-1 to G-2), the two (2) M14 magazines with live ammunition (Exh. G-3; G-4); the
two (2) caliber .38 revolvers (Exhs. B-1; B-2), the fifty (50) aluminum foils each containing shabu
(Exhs. J-1 to J-50) placed inside a pencil case (Exh. J, the assorted coins placed inside a blue bag (Exh.
W) and the white crystalline stone (Exh. K) all do not belong to him. He said that the policemen just
produced those things as their evidence. The firearms do not belong to him. They were brought by
the policemen (tsn, p. 43, May 4, 1998). Regarding the blue bag containing assorted coins, he said:
that is not ours, I think this (is) theirs, xxx they just brought that as their evidence (tsn, pp. 15-24, id.)
Walpan Ladjaalam declared there were occupants who were renting his extension house. He
affirmed that he owns that house. Four (4) persons were staying in the extension house. He could
only recognize the husband whose name is Momoy. They are from Jolo. They left the place already
because they were afraid when the police raided the place. (tsn, pp. 8-10, May 4, 1998). He does not
know prosecution witness Rino Locson y Bartolome. Although Locson recognized him, in his case he
does not know Locson and he does not recognize him (tsn, p.11, id). He did not sell anything to
Locson and did not entertain him. He is not selling shabu but he knows for a fact that there are
plenty of person who are engaged in selling shabu in that place, in that area known as Aplaya, Rio
Hondo. One of them is Hadji Agbi (tsn, pp.11-14, id).
After his arrest Walpan Ladjaalam was brought to the police station where he stayed for one day
and one night before he was transferred to the City jail. While at the police station, he was not able
to take a bath. He smokes two packs of cigarette a day. While he was at the police station, he
smoked [a] cigarette given to him by his younger sister. He lighted the cigarettes with [a] match.
From the police station, he was brought to the PNP Regional Office at R.T. Lim Boulevard where he
was subject to paraffin examination (tsn, pp. 24-26, May 4, 1998).
During the raid conducted on his house, his cousin Boy Ladjaalam, Ating Sapadi, and Jecar (Sikkal)
Usman, the younger brother of his wife were killed. Walpan Ladjaalam said that he saw that it was
the policeman who shot them[,] only I do not know his name. They were killed at the back of his
house. He said that no charges were filed against the one responsible for their death (tsn, pp. 30-33-
May 4, 1998).
Anilhawa Ahamad, more or less 80 years old, a widow was in the house of Walpan Ladjaalam whom
he calls Hadji Id at the time the police raided the house. She is the mother of Ahma Sailabbi. She was
together with Babo Dandan, two small children and a helper when soldiers entered the house.
(W)hen they arrived, they kept on firing (their guns) even inside the house (tsn, p.5, May 5, 1998).
They were armed with short and long firearms. They searched the house and scattered things and
got what they wanted. They entered the room of Walpan Ladjaalam. They tried to open a bag
containing jewelry. When Anilhawa tried to bring the bag outside the room, they grabbed the bag
from her and poked a gun at her. At that time Walpan Ladjaalam was not in the house. Ahamad
Sailabbi was also not in the house. A Search Warrant was shown to Anilhawa after the search was
conducted and just before the policemen left the place. Anilhawa Ahamad said that it was already
late in the afternoon[;] before they left that was the time the Search Warrant (was) given to us by
xxx Barangay Captain Hussin Elhano (tsn, pp.6-8, May 5, 1998). Barangay Chairman Elhano arrived
already late in the afternoon, almost sundown (tsn, p. 9, id). Anilhaw declared that aside from a bag
containing jewelry and a bag full of money, she had not seen anything else that was taken from
Walpan Ladjaalams house (tsn, pp. 9-12, id).
Akmad (Ahmad) Sailabbi, 37 years old, married testified that about 4:00 oclock [o]n the afternoon of
September 24, 1997, ha was standing in front of his house when policemen arrived and immediately
arrested him. He was about to go to the City Proper to buy articles he was intending to bring to
Sabah. He had around P50,000.00 placed inside a waist bag tied around his waist. The policemen
told him to lie down in prone position and a policeman searched his back. They pulled his waist bag
and took his DiaStar wrist watch. He was shot three times and was hit on the forehead leaving a
scar. His injury was not treated. He was taken to the police station where he was detained for one
day and one night. He was detained at the City Jail for three months and five days after which he
was released (tsn, pp. 25-29, May 5, 1998).
Melba Usma, 20 years old, a widow, testified that [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, she
was in the house of her parents lying together with her husband Sikkal Usma. There is only one
house between her parents house and the house of Walpan Ladjaalam. Her husband Sikkal Usman is
the brother of Nur-in Ladjaalam, Walpans wife. When Melba heard shots, she went downstairs. A
policeman was looking for her husband. The policeman called her husband. When her husband went
down, he was instructed by the policeman to lie down in prone position. Then the policeman shot
her husband. The policeman had two other companions who also shot her husband while he was
lying down in prone position (tsn, pp.2-7, May 5, 1998).
Murkisa Usman, 30 years old, married, declared that [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, she
was sitting at the door of her house watching her children playing when a motorcyle, driven by a
person, stopped near her house. The driver was Gaganting whom she called a soldier. He went down
from his motorcycle, pulled a gun and poked it at Murkisa. Murkisa stood up and raised her hands.
She got her children and when she was about to enter the room of her house, Gaganting again
poked a gun at her and there was a shot. As a result of firing, three persons died, namely, Sikkal
Usman, Boy Ladjaalam and Atip Sapali Sali (tsn, pp. 8-10, May 5, 1998).
Barangay Captain Hadji Hussin Elhano, 51 years old, testified that about 4:00 o clock [o]n the
afternoon of September 24, 1997, he was fetched by two policemen at Catabangan where he was
attending a seminar. Because of traffic along the way, they arrived at the Rio Hondo already late in
the afternoon. He saw policemen were already inside the house. Upon entering the gate, he saw
Walpan at the gate already handcuffed. Walpan called him but the police advised him not to
approach Walpan. The search was already over and things were already taken inside the house.
When he went inside the house, he saw the things that they (policemen) searched, the firearms and
the shabu (tsn, p. 17. May 8, 1998). He did not see the Search Warrant. What was shown to him
were the things recovered during the search which were being listed. They were being counted and
placed on a table. Upon seeing the things that were recovered during the search, I just signed the
receipt (Exh. P; P-1) of the things x x x taken during the search (tsn, pp. 17-18. May 8, 1998). He saw
three dead bodies at the side of the fence when he went to the other side of the house. The three
persons were killed outside the fence of Walpan Ladjaalam (tsn, p. 18, id).[16]
The Trial Courts Ruling
The trial court observed that the house of appellant was raided on September 24, 1997 by virtue of
Search Warrant No. 20 issued on the same day. However, the lower court nullified the said Warrant
because it had been issued for more than one specific offense,[17] in violation of Section 3, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court.[18] The court a quo ruled:
It should be stated at the outset that Search Warrant No. 20 is totally null and void because it was
issued for more than one specific offense x x x contrary to Section 3, Rule 1[2]6 of the Rules of Court
which provides that A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offense xxx. In Tambasan vs. People, 246 SCRA 184 (1995), the Supreme Court ruled that
a search warrant for more than one offense - a scatter shot warrant - violates Section 3, Rule 126 of
the [R]evised Rules of Court and is totally null and void.[19] (emphasis in the original)
Nevertheless, the trial court deemed appellants arrest as valid. It emphasized that he had shot at the
officers who were trying to serve the void search warrant. This fact was established by the
testimonies of several police officers,[20] who were participants in the raid, and confirmed by the
laboratory report on the paraffin tests conducted on the firearms and appellant.[21] Additionally,
the judge noted that Appellant Ladjaalam, based on his statements in his Counter Affidavit, impliedly
contradicted his assertions in open court that there had been no exchange of gunfire during the
raid.[22] The trial court concluded that the testimonies of these officers must prevail over appellants
narration that he was not in his house when the raid was conducted.
Prescinding from this point, the court a quo validated the arrest of appellant, reasoning thus:
Under the circumstances, the policemen had authority to pursue and arrest Walpan Ladjaalam and
confiscate the firearm he used in shooting at the policemen and to enter his house to effect said
arrest and confiscation of the firearm. Under Rule 113, Section 5 (a), of the Rules of Court, A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person xxx (w)hen in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the
rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a
distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. At
the time the policemen entered the house of accused Walpan Ladjaalam after he had fired shots at
the policemen who intended to serve the Search Warrant to him, the accused was engaged in the
commission of a crime, and was pursued and arrested after he committed the crime of shooting at
the policemen who were about to serve the Search Warrant.[23]
As a consequence of the legal arrest, the seizure of the following was also deemed valid: the M14
rifle (with a magazine containing seventeen live ammunition)[24] used by appellant against the
police elements, two M14 magazines, and three other M16 rifle magazines.[25] The trial court
observed that these items were in plain view of the pursuing police officers. Moreover, it added that
these same items were evidence [of] the commission of a crime and/or contraband and therefore,
subject to seizure[26] since appellant had not applied for a license to possess firearm and had not
been given authority to carry firearm outside his residence.[27]
For being incredible and unsupported by evidence, appellants claim that the items that were seized
by the police officers had been planted was disbelieved by the trial court. It ruled that if the police
officers wanted to plant evidence to incriminate him, they could have done so during the previous
raids or those conducted after his arrest. To its mind, it was unbelievable that they would choose to
plant evidence, when they were accompanied by the barangay chairman and a radio reporter who
might testify against them. It then dismissed these allegations, saying that frame-up, like alibi, was
an inherently weak defense.[28]
The trial court also convicted the accused of the crime of maintaining a drug den. It reasoned as
follows:
The testimony of Rino Bartolome Locson, corroborated by SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos and SPO1
Amado Mirasol, Jr. clearly established that Walpan Ladjaalam operated and maintained a drug den
in his extension house where shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, was sold,
and where persons or customers bought and used shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride by
burning the said regulated drug and sniffing its smoke with the use of an aluminum foil tooter. A
drug den is a lair or hideaway where prohibited or regulated drugs are used in any form or are
found. Its existence [may be] proved not only by direct evidence but may also be established by
proof of facts and circumstances, including evidence of the general reputation of the house, or its
general reputation among police officers. The uncorroborated testimony of accused Walpan
Ladjaalam a.k.a. Warpan that he did not maintain an extension house or a room where drug users
who allegedly buy shabu from him inhales or smokes shabu cannot prevail over the testimonies of
Locson, SPO1 Lacastesantos, and SPO1 Mirasol. He admitted that he is the owner of the extension
house but he alleged that there were four (4) occupants who rented that extension house. He knew
the name of only one of the four occupants who are allegedly from Jolo, a certain Momoy, the
husband. Aside from being uncorroborated, Walpans testimony was not elaborated by evidence as
to when or for how long was the extension house rented, the amount of rental paid, or by any other
document showing that the extension house was in fact rented. The defense of denial put up by
accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. 'Warpan is a weak defense. Denial is the weakest defense and
cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Denials, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence which
deserve no weight in law and cannot be given evidentiary weight over the testimony of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As between the positive declaration of the prosecution
witnesses and the negative statements of the accused, the former deserve more credence.[29]
In conclusion, the trial court explained appellants liability in this manner:
x x x. The act of the accused in firing an M14 rifle to the policemen who were about to enter his
house to serve a search warrant constitutes the crime of direct assault with multiple attempted
homicide[,] not multiple attempted murder with direct assault[,] considering that no policeman was
hit and injured by the accused and no circumstance was proved to qualify the attempted killing to
attempted murder.
The accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. Warpan cannot be held liable [for] the crime of Violation of
Section 16, Article III, in relation to Section 21, Article IV, of Republic Act 6425 otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1992, as amended, because the fifty (50) pieces of folded aluminum foils
having a total weight of 1.7426 grams all containing methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu
allegedly found in his house are inadmissible as evidence against him considering that they were
seized after [a] search conducted by virtue of Search Warrant No. 20 which is totally null and void as
it was issued for more than one offense, and were not found in plain view of the police officers who
seized them. Neither could the accused be held liable for illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition except for the (1) M14 rifle with Serial Number 1555225 and with magazine containing
fifteen (15) live ammunition and two more M14 rifle magazines with twenty (20) and twenty-one
(21) live ammunition respectively considering that the policemen who recovered or seized the other
firearms and ammunition did not testify in court. The blue bag containing assorted coins cannot be
returned to the accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. Warpan because according to the accused the blue
bag and assorted coins do not belong to him[;] instead the said assorted coins should be turned over
to the National Treasury.[30]
The Issues
In his Brief, appellant submits the following Assignment of Errors:
I
The trial court erred when it concluded that appellant Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil [had] fired first at
the police officers who went to his house to serve a search warrant upon him which led to an
exchange of fire between Ladjaalam and the police officer.
II
The trial court erred when it denied the appellant the right and opportunity for an ocular inspection
of the scene of the firefight and where the house of the appellant [was] located.
III
The trial court erred when it ruled that the presumption of regularity in the performance of their
duties [excluded] the claim of the appellant that the firearms and methamphetamine hydrochloride
(i.e. shabu) were planted by the police.[31]
In the interest of simplicity, we shall take up these issues seriatim: (a) denial of the request for ocular
inspection, (b) credibility of the prosecution witnesses, and (c) the defense of frame-up. In addition,
we shall also discuss the proper crimes and penalties to be imposed on appellant.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
First Issue: Denial of Request for Ocular Inspection
Appellant insists that the trial court erred in denying his request for an ocular inspection of the
Ladjaalam residence. He argues that an ocular inspection would have afforded the lower court a
better perspective and an idea with respect to the scene of the crime.[32] We do not agree.
We fail to see the need for an ocular inspection in this case, especially in the light of the clear
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.[33] We note in particular that the defense had even
requested SPO1 Amado Mirasol Jr. to sketch the subject premises to give the lower court a fairly
good idea of appellants house.[34] Viewing the site of the raid would have only delayed the
proceedings.[35] Moreover, the question whether to view the setting of a relevant event has long
been recognized to be within the discretion of the trial judge.[36] Here, there is no reason to disturb
the exercise of that discretion.[37]
Second Issue: Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses
Appellant, in essence, questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.[38] Suffice it to state
that the trial courts assessment of their credibility is generally accorded respect, even finality.[39]
After carefully examining the records and finding no material inconsistencies to support appellants
claim, we cannot exempt this case from the general rule.[40] Quite the contrary, the testimonies of
these witnesses positively showed that appellant had fired upon the approaching police elements,
and that he had subsequently attempted to escape. SPO1 Amado Mirasol Jr.[41] testified thus:
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: And, this trail is towards the front of the house of the accused?
A: Yes.
Q: And its there where you were met by a volley of fire?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
Q: How far were you from the concrete fen[c]e when you were met by a volley of fire? ... You said
you were fired upon?
A: More or less, five (5) meters.
xxxxxxxxx
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: Now, you said you were able to enter the house after the gate was opened by your colleague
Felipe Gaganting ... I will reform that question.
Q: Who opened the gate Mr. Witness?
A: SPO2 Felipe Gaganting, Efren Gregorio and Allan Marcos Obut.
Q: And, at that time you were hiding at the concrete fence?
A: Yes.
Q: Now, when this gate was opened, you said you went inside the house, right?
A: Yes.
Q: What did you see inside the house?
A: I, together with SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos, entered the main door of the house of Walfran [sic]
Ladjaalam at the ground floor. We went inside the sala on the ground floor of his house[;] I saw two
old woman.
xxxxxxxxx
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: Now, what did you do with these two old women?
A: I did not mind those two old women because those two women were sitting on the ground floor. I
was concentrating on the second floor because Ladjaalam was firing towards our group so, I,
together with Ricardo Lacastesantos, went upstairs to the second floor of the house.
Q: Were you able to go to the second floor of the house?
A: Yes.
Q: What happened when you were already on the second floor?
A: While we were proceeding to the second floor, Walfan [sic] Ladjaalam, noticed our presence and
immediately went inside the bedroom [o]n the second floor and he went immediately and jumped
from the window of his house x x x leading to the roof of the neighbors house.
xxxxxxxxx
COURT:
Reform. That is leading
Q: What happened when you entered and he jumped to the roofing of the neighbors house?
A: Immediately, I myself, we immediately went downstairs and asked the assistance of the members
of the raiding team to arrest Walfan Ladjaalam.
xxxxxxxxx
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: Were you able to go down?
A: Yes.
Q: What happened when you were there?
A: We immediately went out and I asked the assistance of the members of the raiding team and the
investigator of the unit especially SPO1 Cesar Rabuya. I was able to manage to arrest Walfan
Ladjaalam.[42]
What happened thereafter was narrated by Senior Police Officer Ricardo Lacastesantos,[43] as
follows:
Q: What did you notice [o]n the second floor?
A: I went where the firing came from, so, I saw [an] M14 rifle and I shouted from the outside, do not
fire at the second floor because there [are] a lot of children here.
Q: Now, that rifle you said [was an] M14, where did you find this?
A: At the sala set.
Q: This sala set where is this located?
A: Located [on] the second floor of the house.
Q: Is there a sala [o]n the second floor?
A: Yes.
Q: Can you still identify that M14 rifle which you said you recovered from the sale set?
A: Yes.
Q: Why can you identify that?
A: The Serial No. of M14 is 1555225 and I marked it with my initial.
Q: Now, I have here M14 rifle[;] will you please tell us where is the Serial No. of this?
A: 1555225 and I put my initial, RJL.

FISCAL NUVAL:
This is already marked as our Exhibit B-3 with magazine, one magazine and seven round
[ammunition].
Q: After recovering this, what did you do with this firearm?
A: When I recovered it I removed the bullets inside the chamber[.] I removed the magazine and I
turned it over to the investigator.
Q: Where did you turn it over?
A: At the crime scene.
Q: Now, that magazine, can you still identify this?
A: Yes.
Q: Why?
A: I put x x x markings.
xxxxxxxxx
COURT:
So, a[si]de from the magazine attached to the M14 rifle you found six more magazines?
A: Yes, so, all in all six magazines, three empty M16 rifle magazines and three M14.
Q: The M16 magazines [were] empty?

A: Empty.
Q: How about the M14?
A: Found with [ammunition].
xxxxxxxxx
Q: So, where are the three M16 magazines?
A: In the corner.
Q: What did you do with [these] three magazines of M16?
A: I turned [them] over to the investigator.
Q: Can you identify them?
A: Yes, because of my initials[.]
Q: Where are your initials?
A: On the magazines.
Q: RJL?
A: RJL.[44]
These were confirmed by the results of the paraffin tests conducted on appellant and on the
weapons seized during the raid. Both of his hands as well as the weapons, particularly the M-14
which he had used, were positive for gunpowder nitrate. Police Inspector Mercedes Delfin-Diestro
explained in open court:
Q: Okay. Now, what was the result of your examination, Madam Witness?
A: The result of the examination [was] that both hands of the subject person, ha[d] presence of gun
powder nitrates.
Q: What do you mean Madam Witness, what does that indicate?
A: It indicates there is presence of powder nitrates.
Q: Can we conclude that he fired a gun?
A: I cannot conclude that he fired a gun because there are so many circumstances [why] a person
[would be] positive on his hands for gun powder nitrates.
Q: But, most likely, he fired a gun?
A: Yes.
xxxxxxxxx
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
Q: What about, Madam Witness this Exhibit B-3, which is the M14 rifle. What did you do with this?
A: SPO3 Abu did the swabbing both in the chamber and the barrel wherein I observed there [were]
black and traces of brown residue on the bolt, chamber and in the barrel.
Q: And, that indicates Madam Witness...?
A: It indicates that the gun was fired.

Q: Recently?
A: Because of the traces of brown residue, it could be possible that the gun was fired before the
incident x x x.
COURT:
Q: There is also black residue?
A: Yes.
Q: What does it indicate?
A: It indicates that the firearm was recently fired.
Q: And, where is this swab used at the time of the swabbing of this Exhibit?
A: This one.
PROSECUTOR NUVAL:
May we ask that this be marked as Exhibit B-3-A.
COURT:
Q: The firing there indicates that the gun was recently fired, during the incident?
A: Yes.
Q: And also before the incident it was fired because of the brown residue?
A: Yes, Your Honor.[45] (emphasis supplied)
Duly proven from the foregoing were the two elements[46] of the crime of illegal possession of
firearms. Undoubtedly, the established fact that appellant had fired an M-14 rifle upon the
approaching police officers clearly showed the existence of the firearm or weapon and his
possession thereof. Sufficing to satisfy the second element was the prosecutions Certification[47]
stating that he had not filed any application for license to possess a firearm, and that he had not
been given authority to carry any outside his residence.[48] Further, it should be pointed out that his
possession and use of an M-14 rifle were obviously unauthorized because this weapon could not be
licensed in favor of, or carried by, a private individual.[49]
Third Issue: Defense of Frame-up
From the convoluted arguments strewn before us by appellant, we gather that the main defense he
raises is frame-up. He claims that the items seized from his house were planted, and that the entire
Zamboanga police force was out to get him at all cost.
This Court has invariably held that the defense of frame-up is inherently weak, since it is easy to
fabricate, but terribly difficult to disprove.[50] Absent any showing of an improper motive on the
part of the police officers,[51] coupled with the presumption of regularity in the performance of
their duty, such defense cannot be given much credence.[52] Indeed, after examining the records of
this case, we conclude that appellant has failed to substantiate his claim. On the contrary, his
statements in his Counter Affidavit are inconsistent with his testimony during the trial.[53] He
testified thus:
Q Now, Mr. Witness, do you remember having executed an Affidavit/ a Counter-Affidavit?
A I could not remember.
Q I have here a Counter-Affidavit and it was signed before this representation on the 8th day of
December 1997[;] tell us whose signature is this appearing above the typewritten name
FISCAL NUVAL:
Q . . . . Walpan Ladjaalam, whose signature is this?
(Showing)
A Yes, Sir. This is mine.
Q Now, in paragraph[s] 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 and 8; you stated in this Counter-Affidavit which I quote: that I
was resting and sleeping when I heard the gunshots and I noticed that the shots were directed
towards our house.. and I inspected and x x x we were attacked by armed persons.. and I was
apprehended by the persons who attacked x x x our house; [the] house you are referring to [in] this
paragraph, whose house [are you] referring to, is this [what] you are referring to [as] your house or
the house of your neighbors [from] which you said you heard gunshots?
A Our house.
Q Now, in paragraph 6 of your Counter-Affidavit you stated and I quote: that [o]n that afternoon of
September 24, 1997, I was at home in my house Aplaya, Riohondo, Bo. Campo Muslim, my
companions in my house [were] the two old women and my children, is this correct?
A They were not there.
Q Now, in that statement Mr. Witness, you said that you were at home in [your] house at Aplaya,
Riohondo, Bo. Campo Muslim[;] which is which now, you were in your house or you were in your
neighbors[] house at that time when you heard gunshots?
A I was in the house near my house.
Q So, your statement particularly paragraph 6 of your Counter-Affidavit that you were at home in
[your] house at Aplaya Riohondo Bo. Campo Muslim, is x x x not correct?
A Yes, Sir. This is not correct.[54]
Crime and Punishment
The trial court convicted appellant of three crimes: (1) maintenance of a drug den, (2) direct assault
with attempted homicide, and (3) illegal possession of firearms. We will discuss each of these.
Maintenance of a Drug Den

We agree with the trial court that appellant was guilty of maintenance of a drug den, an offense for
which he was correctly sentenced to reclusion perpetua. His guilt was clearly established by the
testimony of Prosecution Witness Rino Bartolome Locson, who himself had used the extension
house of appellant as a drug den on several occasions, including the time of the raid. The formers
testimony was corroborated by all the raiding police officers who testified before the court. That
appellant did not deny ownership of the house and its extension lent credence to the prosecutions
story.
Direct Assault with Multiple Attempted Homicide
The trial court was also correct in convicting appellant of direct assault[55] with multiple counts of
attempted homicide. It found that [t]he act of the accused [of] firing an M14 rifle [at] the
policemen[,] who were about to enter his house to serve a search warrant x x x constituted such
complex crime.[56]
We note that direct assault with the use of a weapon carries the penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods, while attempted homicide carries the penalty of prision
correccional.[57] Hence, for the present complex crime, the penalty for direct assault, which
constitutes the most serious crime, should be imposed and applied in its maximum period.[58]
Illegal Possession of Firearms
Aside from finding appellant guilty of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide, the trial court
convicted him also of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866, as
amended by RA 8294, and sentenced him to 6 years of prision correccional to 8 years of prision
mayor.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagrees, on the ground that the trial court should not
have applied the new law. It contends that under the facts of the case, the applicable law should
have been PD 1866, as worded prior to its amendment by RA 8294.
The trial courts ruling and the OSGs submission exemplify the legal communitys difficulty in
grappling with the changes brought about by RA 8294. Hence, before us now are opposing views on
how to interpret Section 1 of the new law, which provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to
read as follows:
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or
Ammunition Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. -- The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than
Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire
handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000)
shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores
bigger in diameter than .30 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser
calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 centerfire magnum
and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided,
however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed
firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of
rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup detat, such violation shall be absorbed as an
element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup detat.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other
responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall willfully
or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity to be
used by any person or persons found guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs
or willfully or knowingly allow any of them to use unlicensed firearms or firearms without any legal
authority to be carried outside of their residence in the course of their employment.
The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed firearm
outside his residence without legal authority therefor.
Citing People v. Jayson,[59] the OSG argues that the foregoing provision does not cover the specific
facts of this case. Since another crime -- direct assault with multiple unlawful homicide -- was
committed, appellant cannot be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms under the second
paragraph of the aforecited provision. Furthermore, since there was no killing in this case, illegal
possession cannot be deemed as an aggravating circumstance under the third paragraph of the
provision. Based on these premises, the OSG concludes that the applicable law is not RA 8294, but
PD 1866 which, as worded prior the new law, penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms even if
another crime is committed at the same time.[60]
Applying a different interpretation, the trial court posits that appellant should be convicted of illegal
possession of firearms, in addition to direct assault with multiple attempted homicide. It did not
explain its ruling, however. Considering that it could not have been ignorant of the proviso[61] in the
second paragraph, it seemed to have construed no other crime as referring only to homicide and
murder, in both of which illegal possession of firearms is an aggravating circumstance. In other
words, if a crime other than murder or homicide is committed, a person may still be convicted of
illegal possession of firearms. In this case, the other crime committed was direct assault with
multiple attempted homicide; hence, the trial court found appellant guilty of illegal possession of
firearms.
We cannot accept either of these interpretations because they ignore the plain language of the
statute. A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of
any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the
other crime is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating
circumstance, not a separate offense. Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was
committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held liable for illegal possession of firearms.
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused.[62] In this case, the plain
meaning of RA 8294s simple language is most favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no other
interpretation is justified, for the language of the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to
favor the accused.[63] Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of illegal
possession of firearms and direct assault with attempted homicide. Moreover, since the crime
committed was direct assault and not homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be
deemed an aggravating circumstance.
We reject the OSGs contention that PD 1866, as worded prior to its amendment by RA 8294, should
be applied in this case. When the crime was committed on September 24, 1997, the original
language of PD 1866 had already been expressly superseded by RA 8294 which took effect on July 6,
1997.[64] In other words, no longer in existence was the earlier provision of PD 1866, which justified
a conviction for illegal possession of firearms separate from any other crime. It was replaced by RA
8294 which, among other amendments to PD 1866, contained the specific proviso that no other
crime was committed.
Furthermore, the OSGs reliance on People v. Jayson[65] is misplaced. True, this Court sustained the
conviction of appellant for illegal possession of firearms, although he had also committed homicide.
We explained, however, that the criminal case for homicide [was] not before us for consideration.
Just as unacceptable is the interpretation of the trial court. We find no justification for limiting the
proviso in the second paragraph to murder and homicide. The law is clear: the accused can be
convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that no other crime was committed by
the person arrested. If the intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to
homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph. Verily, where
the law does not distinguish, neither should we.
The Court is aware that this ruling effectively exonerates appellant of illegal possession of an M-14
rifle, an offense which normally carries a penalty heavier than that for direct assault. While the
penalty for the first is prision mayor, for the second it is only prision correccional. Indeed, the
accused may evade conviction for illegal possession of firearms by using such weapons in
committing an even lighter offense,[66] like alarm and scandal[67] or slight physical injuries,[68]
both of which are punishable by arresto menor.[69] This consequence, however, necessarily arises
from the language of RA 8294, whose wisdom is not subject to the Courts review. Any perception
that the result reached here appears unwise should be addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has
no discretion to give statutes a new meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language
of the legislature. Our task is constitutionally confined only to applying the law and
jurisprudence[70] to the proven facts, and we have done so in this case.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant is
found guilty only of two offenses: (1) direct assault and multiple attempted homicide with the use of
a weapon, for which he is sentenced to 2 years and 4 months to 6 years of prision correccional; and
(2) maintaining a drug den, for which he was correctly sentenced by the trial court to reclusion
perpetua. Costs against appellant.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Congress of the Philippines for a possible review, at its
sound discretion, of RA 8294.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 195064 January 15, 2014
NARI K. GIDWANI, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
Before us is a Petition1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision2 and the
subsequent Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 32642 dated 17 September
2010 and 6 January 2011, respectively.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner is the president of G.G. Sportswear Manufacturing Corporation GSMC), which is engaged
in the export of ready-to-wear clothes. GSMC secured the embroidery services of El Grande
Industrial Corporation El Grande) and issued on various dates from June 1997 to December 1997 a
total of 10 Banco de Oro (BDO) checks as payment for the latter’s services worth an aggregate total
of ₱1,626,707.62.
Upon presentment, these checks were dishonored by the drawee bank for having been drawn
against a closed account.
Thus, El Grande, through counsel, sent three demand letters regarding 8 of the 10 issued checks:4
Date of letter BDO Check No. Date of Check Amount
24 September 1997 0000063646 4 September 1997 P 130,000.00
24 September 1997 0000059552 12 June 1997 412,000.00
0000063643 24 July 1997 138,859.69
0000063644 7 August 1997 138,859.69
0000063650 7 August 1997 144,457.56
0000063645 28 August 1997 138,859.68
8 October 0000063647 25 September 1997 130,000.00
0000063648 2 October 1997 130,000.00
On 15 October 1997,5 petitioner wrote to El Grande’s counsel acknowledging receipt of the 8

October demand letter6 and informing the latter that, on 29 August 1997, GSMC had filed a Petition
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). It was a Petition for the Declaration of a State of
Suspension of Payments, for the Approval of a Rehabilitation Plan and Appointment of a
Management Committee.7 Acting on the Petition, the SEC issued an Order8 on 3 September 1997
ordering the suspension of all actions, claims, and proceedings against GSMC until further order
from the SEC Hearing Panel. Petitioner attached this SEC Order to the 15 October 1997 letter. In
short, GSMC did not pay El Grande.
Despite its receipt on 16 October 1997 of GSMC’s letter and explanation, El Grande still presented to
the drawee bank for payment BDO Check Nos. 0000063652 and 0000063653 dated November and
December 1997, respectively.
Thereafter, sometime in November 1997, El Grande filed a Complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila charging petitioner with eight counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
(B.P. 22) for the checks covering June to October 1997. El Grande likewise filed a similar Complaint in
December 1997, covering the checks issued in November and December 1997. Corresponding
Informations for the Complaints were subsequently filed on 1 October 2001.
For his part, petitioner raised the following defenses: (1) the SEC Order of Suspension of Payment
legally prevented him from honoring the checks; (2) there was no consideration for the issuance of
the checks, because the embroidery services of El Grande were of poor quality and, hence, were
rejected; and (3) he did not receive a notice of dishonor of the checks.
On 24 March 2008, after trial on the merits, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Manila found
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ten counts of violation of B.P. 22. It ordered him to pay
the face value of the checks amounting to ₱1,626,707.60 with interest at the legal rate per annum
from the filing of the case and to pay a fine of ₱200,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.9 The MTC held that the Petition for voluntary insolvency or a SEC Order for the
suspension of payment of all claims are not defenses under the law regarding violations of B.P. 22,
since an order suspending payments involves only the obligations of the corporation and does not
affect criminal proceedings.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the findings of the MTC and likewise denied the
Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner.10
Thereafter, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Review under Rule 42.
In its Decision dated 17 September 2010, the CA found that the prosecution was able to establish
that petitioner had received only the 8 October 1997 Notice of Dishonor and not the others. The CA
further held that the prosecution failed to establish that the account was closed prior to or at the
time the checks were issued, thus proving knowledge of the insufficiency of funds.
Thus, the CA partly granted the appeal and acquitted petitioner of eight counts of violation of B.P.
22, while sustaining his conviction for the two remaining counts and ordering him to pay the total
civil liability due to El Grande. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED and the assailed RTC
Decision dated January 29, 2009 and its Order dated June 5, 2009 are AFFIRMED with modifications:
(a) sustaining accused-appellant’s conviction in Criminal Case Nos. 301888 and 301889; (b)
acquitting him in Criminal Case Nos. 371112-13, 301883-87 and 301890; and (c) ordering him to pay
private complainant, El Grande Industrial Corporation, the aggregate amount of ₱1,626,707.62
representing the value of the ten (10) BDO checks with interest at 12% per annum reckoned from
the date of the filing of the Information until finality of this Decision, and thereafter, the total
amount due, inclusive of interest, shall be subject to 12% annual interest until fully paid.
The rest of the Decision stands.
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioner filed his Motion for Partial Reconsideration on 11 October 2010,12 raising the following as
his defenses: (1) there was no clear evidence showing that he acknowledged the Notice of Dishonor
of the two remaining checks; (2) the suspension Order of the SEC was a valid reason for stopping the
payment of the checks; and, (3) as a corporate officer, he could only be held civilly liable.
On 6 January 2011, the CA denied the motion through its assailed Resolution.13
Hence, this Petition.
Petitioner raises these two issues in the present Petition:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE ORDER FOR THE SUSPENSION OF PAYMENT
ISSUED BY THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION IS NOT A VALID REASON TO STOP
PAYMENT OF A CHECK EVEN IF SUCH ORDER WAS ISSUED PRIOR TO THE PRESENTMENT OF THE
SUBJECT CHECKS FOR PAYMENT;
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING A CORPORATE OFFICER PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR THE
CIVIL OBLIGATION OF THE CORPORATION.14
We find the appeal to be meritorious.
The elements of a violation of B.P. 22 are the following:15
1) making, drawing and issuing any check to apply on account or for value;
2) knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment;
and
3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or
dishonor of the check for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the
bank to stop payment.
In convicting petitioner of two counts of violation of B.P. 22, the CA applied Tiong v. Co,16 in which
we said:
The purpose of suspending the proceedings under P.D. No. 902-A is to prevent a creditor from
obtaining an advantage or preference over another and to protect and preserve the rights of party
litigants as well as the interest of the investing public or creditors. It is intended to give enough
breathing space for the management committee or rehabilitation receiver to make the business
viable again, without having to divert attention and resources to litigations in various fora. The
suspension would enable the management committee or rehabilitation receiver to effectively
exercise its/his powers free from any judicial or extrajudicial interference that might unduly hinder
or prevent the "rescue" of the debtor company. To allow such other action to continue would only
add to the burden of the management committee or rehabilitation receiver, whose time, effort and
resources would be wasted in defending claims against the corporation instead of being directed
toward its restructuring and rehabilitation.
Whereas, the gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is designed
to prevent damage to trade, commerce, and banking caused by worthless checks. In Lozano v.
Martinez, this Court declared that it is not the nonpayment of an obligation which the law punishes.
The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to
prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making and circulation of worthless checks. Because of
its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes
the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. The prime purpose of
the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from committing the
same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, to reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to
maintain social order. Hence, the criminal prosecution is designed to promote the public welfare by
punishing offenders and deterring others.
Consequently, the filing of the case for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is not a "claim" that can be enjoined
within the purview of P.D. No. 902-A. True, although conviction of the accused for the alleged crime
could result in the restitution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended party for the
damage or injury he sustained by reason of the felonious act of the accused, nevertheless,
prosecution for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a criminal action. (Emphasis supplied.) The CA furthermore
cited Tiong in this wise:17
Hence, accused-appellant cannot be deemed excused from honoring his duly issued checks by the
mere filing of the petition for suspension of payments before the SEC. Otherwise, an absurdity will
result such that " one who has engaged in criminal conduct could escape punishment by the mere
filing of a petition for rehabilitation by the corporation of which he is an officer." (Emphasis
supplied.)
However, what the CA failed to consider was that the facts of Tiong were not on all fours with those
of the present case and must be put in the proper context. In Tiong, the presentment for payment
and the dishonor of the checks took place before the Petition for Suspension of Payments for
Rehabilitation Purposes was filed with the SEC. There was already an obligation to pay the amount
covered by the checks. The criminal action for the violations of B.P. 22 was filed for failure to meet
this obligation. The criminal proceedings were already underway when the SEC issued an Omnibus
Order creating a Management Committee and consequently suspending all actions for claims against
the debtor therein. Thus, in Tiong, this Court took pains to differentiate the criminal action, the civil
liability and the administrative proceedings involved.
In contrast, it is clear that prior to the presentment for payment and the subsequent demand letters
to petitioner, there was already a lawful Order from the SEC suspending all payments of claims. It
was incumbent on him to follow that SEC Order. He was able to sufficiently establish that the
accounts were closed pursuant to the Order, without which a different set of circumstances might
have dictated his liability for those checks.
Considering that there was a lawful Order from the SEC, the contract is deemed suspended. When a
contract is suspended, it temporarily ceases to be operative; and it again becomes operative when a
condition occurs – or a situation arises – warranting the termination of the suspension of the
contract.18
In other words, the SEC Order also created a suspensive condition. When a contract is subject to a
suspensive condition, its birth takes place or its effectivity commences only if and when the event
that constitutes the condition happens or is fulfilled.19 Thus, at the time private respondent
presented the September and October 1997 checks for encashment, it had no right to do so, as
there was yet no obligation due from petitioner.
Moreover, it is a basic principle in criminal law that any ambiguity in the interpretation or application
of the law must be made in favor of the accused. Surely, our laws should not be interpreted in such a
way that the interpretation would result in the disobedience of a lawful order of an authority vested
by law with the jurisdiction to issue the order.
Consequently, because there was a suspension of GSMC s obligations, petitioner may not be held
liable for the civil obligations of the corporation covered by the bank checks at the time this case
arose. However, it must be emphasized that her non-liability should not prejudice the right of El
Grande to pursue its claim through remedies available to it, subject to the SEC proceedings regarding
the application for corporate rehabilitation.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 7
September 2010 and the Resolution dated 6 January 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
32642 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case Nos. 301888 and 301889 are DISMISSED, without
prejudice to the right of El Grande Industrial Corporation to file the proper civil action against G.G.
Sportswear Manufacturing Corporation for the value of the ten (10) checks.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice, Chairperson

C. Pro reo principle
8. Nuguid vs. Nicdao, 502 SCRA 93
9. Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong vs. People, 612 SCRA 272
10. People vs. Tempongko, Jr., G.R. No. L-69668, October 02, 1986
G.R. No. 150785 September 15, 2006
EMMA P. NUGUID, petitioner,
vs.
CLARITA S. NICDAO,1 respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Emma P. Nuguid assails
the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 30, 2001 in CA-G.R. No. 23054:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED and the Assailed Decision dated May 10,
1999 of the Regional Trial Court [RTC], Branch 5, Bataan, affirming the Decision dated January 11,
1999 of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Bataan is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
The petitioner CLARITA S. NICDAO is hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged. NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.2
Petitioner seeks a review of the decision with respect to the alleged lack of civil liability of
respondent Clarita S. Nicdao. Stemming from two cases of violation of BP 22,3 this petition involves
the following facts:
xxx xxx xxx
Accused Clarita S. Nicdao is charged with having committed the crime of Violation of BP 22 in
fourteen (14) counts. The criminal complaints allege that sometime in 1996, from April to August
thereof, [respondent] and her husband [,] of Vignette Superstore [,] approached [petitioner] and
asked her if they [could] borrow money to settle some obligations. Having been convinced by them
and because of the close relationship of [respondent] to [petitioner], the latter lent the former her
money. Thus, every month, she was persuaded to release P100,000.00 to the accused until the total
amount reached P1,150,000.00.
As security for the P1,150,000.00, [respondent] gave [petitioner] the following open dated Hermosa
Savings Bank (HSLB) (sic) with the assurance that if the entire amount is not paid within one (1) year,
[petitioner] can deposit the check:
Check No.
Amount
7277
P100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
7348
150,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
12118
100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
8812
50,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
12102
100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
7255
100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")

2286
50,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
8128
100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
7254
50,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
7278
100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
4540
50,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
4523
50,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
12103
50,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
7294
100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
P1,150,000.00
In June 1997, [petitioner] together with Samson Ching demanded payment of the sums [above-
mentioned], but [respondent] refused to acknowledge the indebtedness. Thus, on October 6, 1977,
[petitioner] deposited all aforementioned checks in the bank of Samson Ching totaling
P1,150,000.00 since all the money given by her to [respondent] came from Samson Ching. The
checks were all returned for having been drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF).
A verbal and written demand was made upon [respondent] to pay the amount represented by the
bounced checks, but [to] no avail. Hence, a complaint for violation of BP 22 was filed against the
[respondent]. 4(Citation omitted)
After petitioner instituted 14 criminal cases5 (docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 9458-9471) for
violation of BP 22 involving the sum of P1,150,000, corresponding warrants of arrest were issued
against respondent. On November 12, 1997, respondent was arraigned. She pleaded not guilty and
trial ensued.
In a decision dated January 11, 1999, Judge Manuel M. Tan of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Dinalupihan, Bataan found respondent guilty of the charges against her. Respondent was sentenced
to pay P1,150,000, plus interest, and to suffer imprisonment equivalent to one year for each
violation of BP 22, or a total of 14 years of imprisonment.
On appeal, the decision was affirmed in toto by the Regional Trial Court of Dinalupihan, Bataan.
Respondent elevated the case to the CA. On October 30, 2001, the CA reversed the decision of the
lower courts and acquitted respondent. According to the CA, certain substantial facts were
overlooked by the trial court. These circumstances, if properly considered, justified a different
conclusion on the case.6
Petitioner now comes to us, raising this main issue: whether respondent remains civilly liable to her
for the sum of P1,150,000. In this connection, she asserts that respondent obtained loans from her
in the aggregate amount of P1,150,000 and that these loans have not been paid.
From the standpoint of its effects, a crime has a dual character: (1) as an offense against the State
because of the disturbance of the social order and (2) as an offense against the private person
injured by the crime unless it involves the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and
others (wherein no civil liability arises on the part of the offender either because there are no
damages to be compensated or there is no private person injured by the crime7). What gives rise to
the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the damage caused to
another by reason of his act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or
not punishable by law.8
Extinction of penal action does not carry with it the eradication of civil liability, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in the final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might
arise did not exist.9
On one hand, as regards the criminal aspect of a violation of BP 22, suffice it to say that:
[t]he gravamen of BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or one that is dishonored
upon its presentment for payment [and] the accused failed to satisfy the amount of the check or
make arrangement for its payment within 5 banking days from notice of dishonor. The act is
malum prohibitum, pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Laws are created to achieve a goal
intended to guide and prevent against an evil or mischief. Why and to whom the check was issued is
irrelevant in determining culpability. The terms and conditions surrounding the issuance of the
checks are also irrelevant.10
On the other hand, the basic principle in civil liability ex delicto is that every person criminally liable
is also civilly liable, crime being one of the five sources of obligations under the Civil Code.11 A
person acquitted of a criminal charge, however, is not necessarily civilly free because the quantum
of proof required in criminal prosecution (proof beyond reasonable doubt) is greater than that
required for civil liability (mere preponderance of evidence12). In order to be completely free from
civil liability, a person's acquittal must be based on the fact that he did not commit the offense.13 If
the acquittal is based merely on reasonable doubt, the accused may still be held civilly liable since
this does not mean he did not commit the act complained of.14 It may only be that the facts proved
did not constitute the offense charged.15
Acquittal will not bar a civil action in the following cases: (1) where the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; (2) where the court
declared the accused's liability is not criminal but only civil in nature and (3) where the civil liability
does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted.16
In this petition, we find no reason to ascribe any civil liability to respondent. As found by the CA, her
supposed civil liability had already been fully satisfied and extinguished by payment. The statements
of the appellate court leave no doubt that respondent, who was acquitted from the charges against
her, had already been completely relieved of civil liability:
[Petitioner] does not dispute the fact that payments have already been made by petitioner in [the
stated] amounts but argues that the Demand Draft represented payment of a previous obligation.
However, no evidence of whatever nature was presented by the prosecution to substantiate their
claim that there was indeed a previous obligation involving the same amount for which the demand
draft was given. Except for this bare allegation, which is self-serving, no documentary evidence was
ever adduced that there were previous transactions involving the subject amount.
Likewise, [petitioner] admitted having received the cash payments from petitioner on a daily basis
but argues that the same were applied to interest payments only. It however appears that
[petitioner] was charging [respondent] with an exorbitant rate of interest…on a daily basis. xxx In
any event, the cash payments [made] were recorded at the back of the cigarette cartons by
[petitioner] in her own handwriting as testified to by [respondent] and her employees, Melanie
Tolentino and Jocelyn Nicdao. Indeed, the daily cash payments marked in evidence as Exhibits 7 to
15 reveal that [respondent] had already paid her obligation to [petitioner] in the amount of
P5,780,000.00 as of July 21, 1997 and that she stopped making further payments when she realized
that she had already paid such amount.
From the foregoing, it would appear that [respondent] made a total payment of P6,980,000.00,
inclusive of the P1,200,000.00 Demand Draft, which is definitely much more than P1,150,000.00, the
amount she actually borrowed from [petitioner]. These facts were never rebutted by [petitioner].
Moreover, we find no evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove that there was a
stipulation in writing that interest will be paid by [respondent] on her loan obligations [as required
under Article 1956 of the Civil Code].
xxx xxx xxx
By and large, the obligation of [respondent] has already been extinguished long before the
encashment of the subject checks. A check is said to apply for account only when there is still a pre-
existing obligation. In the case at bench, the pre-existing obligation was extinguished after full
payment was made by [respondent]. We therefore find the clear and convincing documentary
evidence of payment presented by [respondent] worthy of credence.17 (emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The October 30, 2001 decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. No. 23054 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
Puno, Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia, J.J., concur.

THIRD DIVISION
INTESTATE ESTATE OF G.R. No. 181409

MANOLITA GONZALES VDA.
DE CARUNGCONG, represented
by MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG, Present:
as Administratrix,
Petitioner, CORONA, J., Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
- v e r s u s - PERALTA and
MENDOZA, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

and WILLIAM SATO,
Respondents. Promulgated:
February 11, 2010
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. No criminal, but

only civil liability shall result from the commission of the crime of theft,
swindling, or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by the
following persons:
1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the

same line;
2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to

the deceased spouse before the same shall have passed into the
possession of another; and
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-
in-law, if living together.
The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to
strangers participating in the commission of the crime. (emphasis supplied)
For purposes of the aforementioned provision, is the relationship by

affinity created between the husband and the blood relatives of his wife (as well
as between the wife and the blood relatives of her husband) dissolved by the death
of one spouse, thus ending the marriage which created such relationship by
affinity? Does the beneficial application of Article 332 cover the complex crime
of estafa thru falsification?
Mediatrix G. Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed

administratrix[1] of petitioner intestate estate of her deceased mother Manolita
Gonzales vda. de Carungcong, filed a complaint-affidavit[2] for estafa against her
brother-in-law, William Sato, a Japanese national. Her complaint-affidavit read:
I, MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG Y GONZALE[S], Filipino, of legal

age, single, and resident of Unit 1111, Prince Gregory Condominium, 105
12th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, after being duly sworn, depose and state
that:
1. I am the duly appointed Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of
Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], docketed as Spec. Procs. No. [Q]-95-
23621[,] Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, being one (1) of
her surviving daughters. Copy of the Letters of Administration dated June 22,
1995 is hereto attached as Annex A to form an integral part hereof.
2. As such Administratrix, I am duty bound not only to preserve the

properties of the Intestate Estate of Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], but
also to recover such funds and/or properties as property belonging to the estate
but are presently in the possession or control of other parties.
3. After my appointment as Administratrix, I was able to confer with

some of the children of my sister Zenaida Carungcong Sato[,] who predeceased
our mother Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzales, having died in Japan in 1991.
4. In my conference with my nieces Karen Rose Sato and Wendy

Mitsuko Sato, age[d] 27 and 24 respectively, I was able to learn that prior to
the death of my mother Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], [s]pecifically on
o[r] about November 24, 1992, their father William Sato, through fraudulent
misrepresentations, was able to secure the signature and thumbmark of my
mother on a Special Power of Attorney whereby my niece Wendy Mitsuko
Sato, who was then only twenty (20) years old, was made her attorney-in-fact,
to sell and dispose four (4) valuable pieces of land in Tagaytay City. Said
Special Power of Attorney, copy of which is attached as ANNEX A of the
Affidavit of Wendy Mitsuko Sato, was signed and thumbmark[ed] by my
mother because William Sato told her that the documents she was being made
to sign involved her taxes. At that time, my mother was completely blind,
having gone blind almost ten (10) years prior to November, 1992.
5. The aforesaid Special Power of Attorney was signed by my mother

in the presence of Wendy, my other niece Belinda Kiku Sato, our maid Mana
Tingzon, and Governor Josephine Ramirez who later became the second wife
of my sisters widower William Sato.
6. Wendy Mitsuko Sato attests to the fact that my mother signed the
document in the belief that they were in connection with her taxes, not
knowing, since she was blind, that the same was in fact a Special Power of
Attorney to sell her Tagaytay properties.
7. On the basis of the aforesaid Special Power of Attorney, William

Sato found buyers for the property and made my niece Wendy Mitsuko Sato
sign three (3) deeds of absolute sale in favor of (a) Anita Ng (Doc. 2194, Page
No. 41, Book No. V, Series of 1992 of Notary Public Vicente B. Custodio), (b)
Anita Ng (Doc. No. 2331, Page No. 68, Book No. V, Series of 1992 of Notary
Public Vicente B. Custodio) and (c) Ruby Lee Tsai (Doc. No. II, Page No. 65,
Book No. II, Series of 1993 of Notary Public Toribio D. Labid). x x x
8. Per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, the considerations

appearing on the deeds of absolute sale were not the true and actual
considerations received by her father William Sato from the buyers of her
grandmothers properties. She attests that Anita Ng actually paid P7,000,000.00
for the property covered by TCT No. 3148 and P7,034,000.00 for the property
covered by TCT No. 3149. All the aforesaid proceeds were turned over to
William Sato who undertook to make the proper accounting thereof to my
mother, Manolita Carungcong Gonzale[s].
9. Again, per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, Ruby Lee Tsai
paid P8,000,000.00 for the property covered by Tax Declaration No. GR-016-
0735, and the proceeds thereof were likewise turned over to William Sato.
10. The considerations appearing on the deeds of sale were falsified as

Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato has actual knowledge of the true amounts paid by the
buyers, as stated in her Affidavit, since she was the signatory thereto as the
attorney-in-fact of Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s].
11. Wendy was only 20 years old at the time and was not in any
position to oppose or to refuse her fathers orders.
12. After receiving the total considerations for the properties sold
under the power of attorney fraudulently secured from my mother, which
total P22,034,000.00, William Sato failed to account for the same and never
delivered the proceeds to Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] until the latter
died on June 8, 1994.
13. Demands have been made for William Sato to make an accounting
and to deliver the proceeds of the sales to me as Administratrix of my mothers
estate, but he refused and failed, and continues to refuse and to fail to do so, to
the damage and prejudice of the estate of the deceased Manolita Carungcong
Y Gonzale[s] and of the heirs which include his six (6) children with my sister
Zenaida Carungcong Sato. x x x[3]
Wendy Mitsuko Satos supporting affidavit and the special power of attorney
allegedly issued by the deceased Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong in favor
of Wendy were attached to the complaint-affidavit of Mediatrix.
In a resolution dated March 25, 1997, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
dismissed the complaint.[4] On appeal, however, the Secretary of Justice reversed
and set aside the resolution dated March 25, 1997 and directed the City Prosecutor
of Quezon City to file an Information against Sato for violation of Article 315,
paragraph 3(a) of the Revised Penal Code.[5] Thus, the following Information was
filed against Sato in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87:[6]
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses WILLIAM SATO of the crime of ESTAFA under
Article 315[,] par. 3(a) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of November, 1992, in Quezon City,

Philippines, the above-named accused, by means of deceit, did, then and there,
wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud MANOLITA GONZALES
VDA. DE CARUNGCONG in the following manner, to wit: the said accused
induced said Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong[,] who was already then
blind and 79 years old[,] to sign and thumbmark a special power of attorney
dated November 24, 1992 in favor of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, daughter of said
accused, making her believe that said document involved only her taxes,
accused knowing fully well that said document authorizes Wendy Mitsuko C.
Sato, then a minor, to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of to any person
or entity of her properties all located at Tagaytay City, as follows:
1. One Thousand Eight Hundred Seven(ty) One (1,871) square meters

more or less and covered by T.C.T. No. 3147;
2. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and covered by
T.C.T. No. 3148 with Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0722,
Cadastral Lot No. 7106;
3. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and covered by
T.C.T. No. 3149 with Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0721,
Cadastral Lot No. 7104;
4. Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (888) square meters more or less with
Tax Declaration No. GR-016-1735, Cadastral Lot No. 7062;
registered in the name of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong, and once in

the possession of the said special power of attorney and other pertinent
documents, said accused made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3) Deeds of
Absolute Sale covering Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT] No. 3148
for P250,000.00, [TCT] No. 3149 for P250,000.00 and [Tax Declaration] GR-
016-0735 for P650,000.00 and once in possession of the proceeds of the sale of
the above properties, said accused, misapplied, misappropriated and converted
the same to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of
the heirs of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong who died in 1994.
Contrary to law.[7]
Subsequently, the prosecution moved for the amendment of the

Information so as to increase the amount of damages from P1,150,000, the total
amount stated in the deeds of sale, to P22,034,000, the actual amount received by
Sato.
Sato moved for the quashal of the Information, claiming that under Article 332
of the Revised Penal Code, his relationship to the person allegedly defrauded, the
deceased Manolita who was his mother-in-law, was an exempting circumstance.
The prosecution disputed Satos motion in an opposition dated March 29,

2006.
In an order dated April 17, 2006,[8] the trial court granted Satos motion and
ordered the dismissal of the criminal case:
The Trial Prosecutors contention is that the death of the wife of the
accused severed the relationship of affinity between accused and his mother-in-
law. Therefore, the mantle of protection provided to the accused by the
relationship is no longer obtaining.
A judicious and thorough examination of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code
convinces this Court of the correctness of the contention of the [d]efense. While
it is true that the death of Zenaida Carungcong-Sato has extinguished the
marriage of accused with her, it does not erase the fact that accused and
Zenaidas mother, herein complainant, are still son[-in-law] and mother-in-law
and they remained son[-in-law] and mother-in-law even beyond the death of
Zenaida.
Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, is very explicit and states no proviso.
No criminal, but only civil liability[,] shall result from the commission of the
crime of theft, swindling or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually
by xxx 1) spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the
same line.
Article 332, according to Aquino, in his Commentaries [to] Revised Penal Code,
preserves family harmony and obviates scandal, hence even in cases of theft and
malicious mischief, where the crime is committed by a stepfather against his
stepson, by a grandson against his grandfather, by a son against his mother, no
criminal liability is incurred by the accused only civil (Vicente Alavare, 52 Phil.
65; Adame, CA 40 OG 12th Supp. 63; Cristobal, 84 Phil. 473).
Such exempting circumstance is applicable herein.
WHEREFORE, finding the Motion to Quash Original Information meritorious,

the same is GRANTED and, as prayed for, case is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[9] (underlining supplied in the original)
The prosecutions motion for reconsideration[10] was denied in an order dated June
2, 2006.[11]
Dissatisfied with the trial courts rulings, the intestate estate of Manolita,
represented by Mediatrix, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals[12] which, however, in a decision[13] dated August 9, 2007, dismissed it.
It ruled:
[W]e sustain the finding of [the trial court] that the death of Zenaida did
not extinguish the relationship by affinity between her husband, private
respondent Sato, and her mother Manolita, and does not bar the application of
the exempting circumstance under Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code in
favor of private respondent Sato.
We further agree with the submission of the [Office of the Solicitor

General (OSG)] that nothing in the law and/or existing jurisprudence supports
the argument of petitioner that the fact of death of Zenaida dissolved the
relationship by affinity between Manolita and private respondent Sato, and
thus removed the protective mantle of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code
from said private respondent; and that notwithstanding the death of Zenaida,
private respondent Sato remains to be the son-in-law of Manolita, and a
brother-in-law of petitioner administratrix. As further pointed out by the OSG,
the filing of the criminal case for estafa against private respondent Sato already
created havoc among members of the Carungcong and Sato families as private
respondents daughter Wendy Mitsuko Sato joined cause with her aunt
[Mediatrix] Carungcong y Gonzales, while two (2) other children of private
respondent, William Francis and Belinda Sato, took the side of their father.
There is a dearth of jurisprudence and/or commentaries elaborating on

the provision of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code. However, from the
plain language of the law, it is clear that the exemption from criminal liability
for the crime of swindling (estafa) under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
applies to private respondent Sato, as son-in-law of Manolita, they being
relatives by affinity in the same line under Article 332(1) of the same Code.
We cannot draw the distinction that following the death of Zenaida in 1991,
private respondent Sato is no longer the son-in-law of Manolita, so as to
exclude the former from the exempting circumstance provided for in Article
332 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Basic is the rule in
statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should
not distinguish. There should be no distinction in the application of law where
none is indicated. The courts could only distinguish where there are facts or
circumstances showing that the lawgiver intended a distinction or qualification.
In such a case, the courts would merely give effect to the lawgivers intent. The
solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret and apply the law does not
include the power to correct by reading into the law what is not written therein.
Further, it is an established principle of statutory construction that penal

laws are strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the
accused. Any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused. In
this case, the plain meaning of Article 332 (1) of the Revised Penal Codes
simple language is most favorable to Sato.[14]
The appellate court denied reconsideration.[15] Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not reversing the orders of
the trial court. It cites the commentary of Justice Luis B. Reyes in his book on
criminal law that the rationale of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code
exempting the persons mentioned therein from criminal liability is that the law
recognizes the presumed co-ownership of the property between the offender
and the offended party. Here, the properties subject of the estafa case were
owned by Manolita whose daughter, Zenaida Carungcong-Sato (Satos wife), died
on January 28, 1991. Hence, Zenaida never became a co-owner because, under
the law, her right to the three parcels of land could have arisen only after
her mothers death. Since Zenaida predeceased her mother, Manolita, no
such right came about and the mantle of protection provided to Sato by the
relationship no longer existed.
Sato counters that Article 332 makes no distinction that the relationship may not
be invoked in case of death of the spouse at the time the crime was allegedly
committed. Thus, while the death of Zenaida extinguished her marriage with
Sato, it did not dissolve the son-in-law and mother-in-law relationship between
Sato and Zenaidas mother, Manolita.
For his part, the Solicitor General maintains that Sato is covered by the exemption
from criminal liability provided under Article 332. Nothing in the law and
jurisprudence supports petitioners claim that Zenaidas death dissolved the
relationship by affinity between Sato and Manolita. As it is, the criminal case
against Sato created havoc among the members of the Carungcong and Sato
families, a situation sought to be particularly avoided by Article 332s provision
exempting a family member committing theft, estafa or malicious mischief from
criminal liability and reducing his/her liability to the civil aspect only.
The petition has merit.
The resolution of this case rests on the interpretation of Article 332 of the Revised
Penal Code. In particular, it calls for the determination of the following: (1) the
effect of death on the relationship by affinity created between a surviving spouse
and the blood relatives of the deceased spouse and (2) the extent of the coverage
of Article 332.
EFFECT OF DEATH ON RELATIONSHIP
BY AFFINITY AS ABSOLUTORY CAUSE
Article 332 provides for an absolutory cause[16] in the

crimes of theft, estafa (or swindling) and malicious mischief. It limits the
responsibility of the offender to civil liability and frees him from criminal liability
by virtue of his relationship to the offended party.
In connection with the relatives mentioned in the first paragraph, it has been held
that included in the exemptions are parents-in-law, stepparents and adopted
children.[17] By virtue thereof, no criminal liability is incurred by the stepfather
who commits malicious mischief against his stepson;[18] by the stepmother who
commits theft against her stepson;[19] by the stepfather who steals something from
his stepson;[20] by the grandson who steals from his grandfather;[21] by the accused
who swindles his sister-in-law living with him;[22] and by the son who steals a
ring from his mother.[23]
Affinity is the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the other
spouse. It is a relationship by marriage or
a familial relation resulting from marriage.[24] It is a fictive kinship, a fiction
created by law in connection with the institution of marriage and family relations.
If marriage gives rise to ones relationship by affinity to the blood relatives
of ones spouse, does the extinguishment of marriage by the death of the spouse
dissolve the relationship by affinity?
Philippine jurisprudence has no previous encounter with the issue that

confronts us in this case. That is why the trial and appellate courts acknowledged
the dearth of jurisprudence and/or commentaries on the matter. In contrast, in the
American legal system, there are two views on the subject. As one Filipino author
observed:
In case a marriage is terminated by the death of one of the spouses, there are
conflicting views. There are some who believe that relationship by affinity is
not terminated whether there are children or not in the marriage (Carman vs.
Newell, N.Y. 1 [Denio] 25, 26). However, the better view supported by most
judicial authorities in other jurisdictions is that, if the spouses have no living
issues or children and one of the spouses dies, the relationship by affinity is
dissolved. It follows the rule that relationship by affinity ceases with the
dissolution of the marriage which produces it (Kelly v. Neely, 12 Ark. 657,
659, 56 Am Dec. 288). On the other hand, the relationship by affinity is
continued despite the death of one of the spouses where there are living issues
or children of the marriage in whose veins the blood of the parties are
commingled, since the relationship of affinity was continued through the
medium of the issue of the marriage (Paddock vs. Wells, 2 Barb. Ch. 331,
333).[25]
The first view (the terminated affinity view) holds that relationship by affinity
terminates with the dissolution of the marriage either by death or divorce which
gave rise to the relationship of affinity between the parties.[26] Under this view,
the relationship by affinity is simply coextensive and coexistent with the marriage
that produced it. Its duration is indispensably and necessarily determined by the
marriage that created it. Thus, it exists only for so long as the marriage subsists,
such that the death of a spouse ipso facto ends the relationship by affinity of the
surviving spouse to the deceased spouses blood relatives.
The first view admits of an exception. The relationship by affinity continues even
after the death of one spouse when there is a surviving issue.[27] The rationale is
that the relationship is preserved because of the living issue of the marriage in
whose veins the blood of both parties is commingled.[28]
The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that relationship by
affinity between the surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse
continues even after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether the
marriage produced children or not.[29] Under this view, the relationship by affinity
endures even after the dissolution of the marriage that produced it as a result of
the death of one of the parties to the said marriage. This view considers that,
where statutes have indicated an intent to benefit step-relatives or in-laws, the tie
of affinity between these people and their relatives-by-marriage is not to be
regarded as terminated upon the death of one of the married parties.[30]
After due consideration and evaluation of the relative merits of the two views, we
hold that the second view is more consistent with the language and spirit of
Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
First, the terminated affinity view is generally applied in cases of jury

disqualification and incest.[31] On the other hand, the continuing affinity view has
been applied in the interpretation of laws that intend to benefit step-relatives or
in-laws. Since the purpose of the absolutory cause in Article 332(1) is meant to
be beneficial to relatives by affinity within the degree covered under the said
provision, the continuing affinity view is more appropriate.
Second, the language of Article 332(1) which speaks of relatives by affinity in the
same line is couched in general language. The legislative intent to make no
distinction between the spouse of ones living child and the surviving spouse of
ones deceased child (in case of a son-in-law or daughter-in-law with respect to
his or her parents-in-law)[32] can be drawn from Article 332(1) of the Revised
Penal Code without doing violence to its language.
Third, the Constitution declares that the protection and strengthening of the
family as a basic autonomous social institution are policies of the State and that
it is the duty of the State to strengthen the solidarity of the family.[33] Congress
has also affirmed as a State and national policy that courts shall preserve the
solidarity of the family.[34] In this connection, the spirit of Article 332 is to
preserve family harmony and obviate scandal.[35] The view that relationship by
affinity is not affected by the death of one of the parties to the marriage that
created it is more in accord with family solidarity and harmony.
Fourth, the fundamental principle in applying and in interpreting criminal
laws is to resolve all doubts in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in
doubt, rule for the accused.[36] This is in consonance with the constitutional
guarantee that the accused shall be presumed innocent unless and until his guilt
is established beyond reasonable doubt.[37]
Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of

[38]
lenity. The rule applies when the court is faced with two possible
interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial to the accused and another
that is favorable to him. The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation which
is more lenient to the accused.
Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is viewed through the
lens of the basic purpose of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to preserve
family harmony by providing an absolutory cause. Since the goal of Article
332(1) is to benefit the accused, the Court should adopt an application or
interpretation that is more favorable to the accused. In this case, that interpretation
is the continuing affinity view.
Thus, for purposes of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, we hold
that the relationship by affinity created between the surviving spouse and the
blood relatives of the deceased spouse survives the death of either party to the
marriage which created the affinity. (The same principle applies to the justifying
circumstance of defense of ones relatives under Article 11[2] of the Revised Penal
Code, the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of grave offense
committed against ones relatives under Article 13[5] of the same Code and the
absolutory cause of relationship in favor of accessories under Article 20 also of
the same Code.)
SCOPE OF ARTICLE 332 OF

THE REVISED PENAL CODE
The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only
applies to the felonies of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Under the said
provision, the State condones the criminal responsibility of the offender in cases
of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. As an act of grace, the State waives
its right to prosecute the offender for the said crimes but leaves the private
offended party with the option to hold the offender civilly liable.
However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies

mentioned therein. The plain, categorical and unmistakable language of the
provision shows that it applies exclusively to the simple crimes of theft, swindling
and malicious mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes mentioned
under Article 332 is complexed with another crime, such as theft through
falsification or estafa through falsification.[39]
The Information against Sato charges him with estafa. However, the real
nature of the offense is determined by the facts alleged in the Information, not by
the designation of the offense.[40]What controls is not the title of the Information
or the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the
Information.[41] In other words, it is the recital of facts of the commission of the
offense, not the nomenclature of the offense, that determines the crime being
charged in the Information.[42] It is the exclusive province of the court to say what
the crime is or what it is named.[43]The determination by the prosecutor who signs
the Information of the crime committed is merely an opinion which is not binding
on the court.[44]
A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that Sato is being
charged not with simple estafa but with the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents. In particular, the Information states that Sato,
by means of deceit, intentionally defrauded Manolita committed as follows:
(a) Sato presented a document to Manolita (who was already blind at that
time) and induced her to sign and thumbmark the same;
(b) he made Manolita believe that the said document was in connection
with her taxes when it was in fact a special power of attorney (SPA)
authorizing his minor daughter Wendy to sell, assign, transfer or
otherwise dispose of Manolitas properties in Tagaytay City;
(c) relying on Satos inducement and representation, Manolita signed and
thumbmarked the SPA in favor of Wendy Mitsuko Sato, daughter of
Sato;
(d) using the document, he sold the properties to third parties but he neither
delivered the proceeds to Manolita nor accounted for the same and
(d) despite repeated demands, he failed and refused to deliver the proceeds,
to the damage and prejudice of the estate of Manolita.
The above averments in the Information show that the estafa was
committed by attributing to Manolita (who participated in the execution of the
document) statements other than those in fact made by her. Manolitas acts of
signing the SPA and affixing her thumbmark to that document were the very
expression of her specific intention that something be done about her taxes. Her
signature and thumbmark were the affirmation of her statement on such intention
as she only signed and thumbmarked the SPA (a document which she could not
have read) because of Satos representation that the document pertained to her
taxes. In signing and thumbmarking the document, Manolita showed that she
believed and adopted the representations of Sato as to what the document was all
about, i.e., that it involved her taxes. Her signature and thumbmark, therefore,
served as her conformity to Satos proposal that she execute a document to settle
her taxes.
Thus, by inducing Manolita to sign the SPA, Sato made it appear that
Manolita granted his daughter Wendy a special power of attorney for the purpose
of selling, assigning, transferring or otherwise disposing of Manolitas Tagaytay
properties when the fact was that Manolita signed and thumbmarked the
document presented by Sato in the belief that it pertained to her taxes. Indeed, the
document itself, the SPA, and everything that it contained were falsely attributed
to Manolita when she was made to sign the SPA.
Moreover, the allegations in the Information that

(1) once in the possession of the said special power of attorney and other
pertinent documents, [Sato] made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the
three (3) Deeds of Absolute Sale and
(2) once in possession of the proceeds of the sale of the above properties,
said accused, misapplied, misappropriated and converted the same
to his own personal use and benefit
raise the presumption that Sato, as the possessor of the falsified document and the
one who benefited therefrom, was the author thereof.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the prosecution moved for the

amendment of the Information so as to increase the amount of damages
from P1,150,000 to P22,034,000. This was granted by the trial court and was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals on certiorari. This meant that the amended
Information would now state that, while the total amount of consideration stated
in the deeds of absolute sale was only P1,150,000, Sato actually received the total
amount of P22,034,000 as proceeds of the sale of Manolitas properties.[45] This
also meant that the deeds of sale (which were public documents) were also
falsified by making untruthful statements as to the amounts of consideration
stated in the deeds.
Therefore, the allegations in the Information essentially charged a crime
that was not simple estafa. Sato resorted to falsification of public documents
(particularly, the special power of attorney and the deeds of sale) as a necessary
means to commit the estafa.
Since the crime with which respondent was charged was not simple estafa
but the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents, Sato
cannot avail himself of the absolutory cause provided under Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code in his favor.
EFFECT OF ABSOLUTORY CAUSE UNDER

ARTICLE 332 ON CRIMINAL LIABILITY
FOR THE COMPLEX CRIME OF ESTAFA
THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC
DOCUMENTS
The question may be asked: if the accused may not be held criminally liable
for simple estafa by virtue of the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code, should he not be absolved also from criminal liability for
the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents? No.
True, the concurrence of all the elements of the two crimes of estafa and
falsification of public document is required for a proper conviction for the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document. That is the
ruling in Gonzaludo v. People.[46] It means that the prosecution must establish
that the accused resorted to the falsification of a public document as a necessary
means to commit the crime of estafa.
However, a proper appreciation of the scope and application of Article
332 of the Revised Penal Code and of the nature of a complex crime would negate
exemption from criminal liability for the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents, simply because the accused may not be held
criminally liable for simple estafa by virtue of the absolutory cause under Article
332.
The absolutory cause under Article 332 is meant to address specific crimes
against property, namely, the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious
mischief. Thus, all other crimes, whether simple or complex, are not affected
by the absolutory cause provided by the said provision. To apply the
absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to one of the
component crimes of a complex crime for the purpose of negating the existence
of that complex crime is to unduly expand the scope of Article 332. In other
words, to apply Article 332 to the complex crime of estafa through falsification
of public document would be to mistakenly treat the crime of estafa as a separate
simple crime, not as the component crime that it is in that situation. It would
wrongly consider the indictment as separate charges of estafa and falsification of
public document, not as a single charge for the single (complex) crime of estafa
through falsification of public document.
Under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the State waives its right to
hold the offender criminally liable for the simple crimes of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief and considers the violation of the juridical right to property
committed by the offender against certain family members as a private matter and
therefore subject only to civil liability. The waiver does not apply when the
violation of the right to property is achieved through (and therefore inseparably
intertwined with) a breach of the public interest in the integrity and presumed
authenticity of public documents. For, in the latter instance, what is involved
is no longer simply the property right of a family relation but a paramount
public interest.
The purpose of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate

scandal.[47] Thus, the action provided under the said provision simply concerns
the private relations of the parties as family members and is limited to the civil
aspect between the offender and the offended party. When estafa is committed
through falsification of a public document, however, the matter acquires a very
serious public dimension and goes beyond the respective rights and liabilities of
family members among themselves. Effectively, when the offender resorts to an
act that breaches public interest in the integrity of public documents as a means
to violate the property rights of a family member, he is removed from the
protective mantle of the absolutory cause under Article 332.
In considering whether the accused is liable for the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of public documents, it would be wrong to consider the
component crimes separately from each other. While there may be two
component crimes (estafa and falsification of documents), both felonies are
animated by and result from one and the same criminal intent for which there is
only one criminal liability.[48] That is the concept of a complex crime. In other
words, while there are two crimes, they are treated only as one, subject to a
single criminal liability.
As opposed to a simple crime where only one juridical right or interest is

violated (e.g., homicide which violates the right to life, theft which violates the
right to property),[49] a complex crime constitutes a violation of diverse juridical
rights or interests by means of diverse acts, each of which is a simple crime in
itself.[50] Since only a single criminal intent underlies the diverse acts, however,
the component crimes are considered as elements of a single crime, the complex
crime. This is the correct interpretation of a complex crime as treated under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the case of a complex crime, therefore, there is a formal (or ideal)

plurality of crimes where the same criminal intent results in two or more
component crimes constituting a complex crime for which there is only one
criminal liability.[51] (The complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
document falls under this category.) This is different from a material (or real)
plurality of crimes where different criminal intents result in two or more crimes,
for each of which the accused incurs criminal liability.[52] The latter category is
covered neither by the concept of complex crimes nor by Article 48.
Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the formal plurality of crimes
(concursus delictuorum or concurso de delitos) gives rise to a single criminal
liability and requires the imposition of a single penalty:
Although [a] complex crime quantitatively consists of two or more

crimes, it is only one crime in law on which a single penalty is imposed and
the two or more crimes constituting the same are more conveniently termed as
component crimes.[53] (emphasis supplied)
∞∞∞
In [a] complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they
constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of
the offender. The offender has only one criminal intent. Even in the case where
an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the evil intent of the
offender is only one.[54]
For this reason, while a conviction for estafa through falsification of public
document requires that the elements of both estafa and falsification exist, it does
not mean that the criminal liability for estafa may be determined and considered
independently of that for falsification. The two crimes of estafa and
falsification of public documents are not separate crimes but component
crimes of the single complex crime of estafa and falsification of public
documents.
Therefore, it would be incorrect to claim that, to be criminally liable for

the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document, the liability
for estafa should be considered separately from the liability for falsification of
public document. Such approach would disregard the nature of a complex crime
and contradict the letter and spirit of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. It
would wrongly disregard the distinction between formal plurality and material
plurality, as it improperly treats the plurality of crimes in the complex crime of
estafa through falsification of public document as a mere material plurality where
the felonies are considered as separate crimes to be punished individually.
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC
DOCUMENTS MAY BE A NECESSARY MEANS
FOR COMMITTING ESTAFA EVEN UNDER
ARTICLE 315 (3[A])
The elements of the offense of estafa punished under Article 315 (3[a]) of
the Revised Penal Code are as follows:
(1) the offender induced the offended party to sign a document;
(2) deceit was employed to make the offended party sign the document;
(3) the offended party personally signed the document and
(4) prejudice is caused to the offended party.
While in estafa under Article 315(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the law
does not require that the document be falsified for the consummation thereof, it
does not mean that the falsification of the document cannot be considered as a
necessary means to commit the estafa under that provision.
The phrase necessary means does not connote indispensable means for if
it did, then the offense as a necessary means to commit another would be an
indispensable element of the latter and would be an ingredient
thereof.[55] In People v. Salvilla,[56] the phrase necessary means merely signifies
that one crime is committed to facilitate and insure the commission of the
other.[57] In this case, the crime of falsification of public document, the SPA, was
such a necessary means as it was resorted to by Sato to facilitate and carry out
more effectively his evil design to swindle his mother-in-law. In particular, he
used the SPA to sell the Tagaytay properties of Manolita to unsuspecting third
persons.
When the offender commits in a public document any of the acts of

falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code as a necessary
means to commit another crime, like estafa, theft or malversation, the two crimes
form a complex crime under Article 48 of the same Code.[58] The falsification of
a public, official or commercial document may be a means of committing estafa
because, before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another,
the crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to
cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of a public,
official or commercial document.[59] In other words, the crime of falsification was
committed prior to the consummation of the crime of estafa.[60] Actually utilizing
the falsified public, official or commercial document to defraud another is
estafa.[61] The damage to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by
the falsification of the document.[62]
Applying the above principles to this case, the allegations in the

Information show that the falsification of public document was consummated
when Sato presented a ready-made SPA to Manolita who signed the same as a
statement of her intention in connection with her taxes. While the falsification
was consummated upon the execution of the SPA, the consummation of the estafa
occurred only when Sato later utilized the SPA. He did so particularly when he
had the properties sold and thereafter pocketed the proceeds of the sale. Damage
or prejudice to Manolita was caused not by the falsification of the SPA (as no
damage was yet caused to the property rights of Manolita at the time she was
made to sign the document) but by the subsequent use of the said document. That
is why the falsification of the public document was used to facilitate and ensure
(that is, as a necessary means for) the commission of the estafa.
The situation would have been different if Sato, using the same
inducement, had made Manolita sign a deed of sale of the properties either in his
favor or in favor of third parties. In that case, the damage would have been caused
by, and at exactly the same time as, the execution of the document, not prior
thereto. Therefore, the crime committed would only have been the simple crime
of estafa.[63] On the other hand, absent any inducement (such as if Manolita
herself had been the one who asked that a document pertaining to her taxes be
prepared for her signature, but what was presented to her for her signature was
an SPA), the crime would have only been the simple crime of falsification.[64]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated

August 9, 2007 and the resolution dated January 23, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 95260 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
remanded to the trial court which is directed to try the accused with dispatch for
the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA JOSE C. MENDOZA

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-69668 October 2, 1986
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HUMBERTO TEMPONGKO, JR., defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Adriano Pagarigan for defendant-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:p
The appellant is before us to challenge his conviction of the crime of rape. He claims it was not he
who erred but the trial court. The usual plea is made: that there was a misappropriation of the
evidence, resulting in the sentence of reclusion perpetua that he now faces. He prays for a reversal.
At the time of the commission of the alleged offense, the complainant, Lolita Dacoycoy, was an 18-
year old senior student at the Manuel L. Quezon High School and undergoing citizen army training
(CAT) under the command of the appellant. 1 The appellant was 43 years old, married, with five
children, and commandant of the said course, besides being the owner of a tailoring shop. 2
These are the facts as the trial court saw them.
On November 9, 1981, the complainant and her friend, Rosalita Quinto, went to the appellant's
tailoring shop in accordance with the appointment made by them the day before. This was about 7
o'clock in the evening. Their purpose was to solicit a contribution for their high school annual. Upon
arrival one hour later, the appellant offered them beer, which they drank. Lolita became dizzy and
the appellant suggested that the two girls stay for the night. The appellant then left, at about 11:30
o'clock. Lolita slept on the sofa while Rosalita slept on the floor about two arms length from her. It
was at dawn when Lolita felt the weight of a person on her whom she immediately recognized as the
appellant. She pleaded, "Huwag mong gawin sa akin iyan, sir." The appellant kissed her and bit her
lower lip. Lolita boxed him in the back and he boxed her in the stomach, rendering her unconscious.
She did not scream or call for help because it all happened so fast. When she woke up, the deed was
done and she was bleeding. The appellant was seated on the sofa totally naked. She moaned
presumably in anguish and pain, and Rosalita woke up. Rosalita embraced and consoled Lolita. She
turned on the light and upbraided the appellant who at that time was already putting on his
trousers. The appellant soon left without saying a word, looking very nervous. As Lolita's jogging
pants were bleed, Rosalita left to get her some clothes. Lolita stayed until past noon and when
Rosalita did not return decided to leave the office. She proceeded to the house of another friend, a
certain Cecile, where she stayed for five days until she was fetched by her stepfather, Delfin Dalisay.
This was Lolita Dacoycoy's testimony. 3
Continuing the story, Delfin Dalisay related that on November 10, Rosalita and her mother informed
him of Lolita's rape. He blamed Rosalita for Lolita's misfortune, and Rosalita and her mother left in a
huff. Five days later, Cecile's sister informed them at their market stall that Lolita was in their house.
He fetched Lolita from there and later, upon advice of the lawyer to whom they had earlier been
referred by a friend, he and her mother took Lolita to the National Bureau of Investigation, where
she underwent a medical examination. 4 Part of this narration was contributed by Clarita Dacoycoy,
Lolita's mother, who also testified on the civil damages suffered by the complainant. 5
According to the medical report as explained by Dr. Orlando Salvador of the NBI in layman's terms,
the complainant was deflowered on or about the date of the alleged rape. This witness also testified
that the claimed blow inflicted on the complainant's stomach would not necessarily leave any
external sign or mark. 6
Testifying for himself, the appellant denied the charge, saying he was at home with his family when
the rape was supposedly committed. He did not deny that he offered the two girls beer and allowed
them to sleep in his office in the night of November 9, 1981. He declared, however, that having left
his office at about 11:30 p.m. of that date, he returned thereto at about 9 o'clock in the morning of
the following day and not earlier. In fact, he saw the complainant having breakfast at that time. 7
The appellant presented two witnesses to corroborate his testimony, but it seems they did him more
harm than good. We shall go to that later.
The medical report suggests that the complainant was a virgin at the time of the supposed
intercourse, but it would seem that her conduct in the night of November 9, 1981, was hardly
maidenly or at least discreet. First, she went to the office of a man she did not know very well at 7
o'clock on a Sunday evening. Then she accepted beer instead of a soft drink, which would have been
the proper refreshment for her and her companion, considering their age and sex. Not only that,
instead of taking a few sips just to be polite, what she did was drink about three-fourths of the glass,
as a result of which she felt dizzy. Then, instead of going home with her companion, she decided to
stay and sleep in the strange office of this person who, to repeat, was by her own narration not close
to her.
There is no evidence that her friend Rosalita was also dizzy and could not have taken her home that
night. In fact, Lolita herself testified that Rosalita did not complain of being dizzy. 8 The appellant's
office on C.M. Recto was not far from the complainant's house on Vicente G. Cruz, which could have
been reached by one jeep ride. Alternatively, she had a telephone at her house and could have
called one of her relatives to fetch her if she and Rosalita could not leave by themselves. 9 It is
incredible that she did not even trouble to tell her parents of her whereabouts. One might expect
such thoughtless conduct of an experienced girl of loose discipline but not of the virtuous and
virginal girl the complainant was supposed to be.
The other parts of her testimony also raise some perplexing questions. By her own account, she was
raped on the sofa while her friend Rosalita was sleeping on the floor only two arms length away and
in the same room. 10 The implication is that the appellant was reckless not only of resistance from
Lolita but also of discovery by Rosalita. The complainant testified that he immediately recognized the
appellant although she had just awakened and that when she recovered consciousness after having
been boxed in the stomach, she had already been ravished. Strangely, the appellant was then still
seated on the sofa and apparently taking his time about dressing. 11 She also said she was desperate
for clothing because her jogging pants were bloody. 12 Yet it did not occur to her to get other attire,
which must have been available in abundance in the place where she was then, which was a tailoring
shop. In fact, the shop was a contractor for the supplying of, precisely, CAT uniforms. 13
Instead of going straight home, which would have been the normal reaction of a young woman
subjected to her traumatic experience, what she did was stay with a friend, the mysterious Cecile. 14
She stayed there for five days and did not communicate with her mother even once. Neither did her
friend Cecile. In fact, it was only on the fifth day that Cecile's sister saw fit to tell the complainant's
family where Lolita was notwithstanding Lolita's alleged condition at the time. If, according to Delfin
Dalisay, the complainant was "tulala" when he saw her, it would have been the natural thing for
Cecile to inform Lolita's family of her state of shock as soon as possible.
One also wonders why Rosalita Quinto, the complainant's companion on the night of the alleged
rape, and who was supposed to be in the room when the complainant claimed she was ravished,
was not presented as a witness by the prosecution It is not often that the prosecution has the good
fortune of an actual eyewitness in cases like this, and yet neither the fiscal nor the private
prosecutor saw fit to ask Rosalita to corroborate the testimony of Lolita. Instead, they presented
only the parents of Lolita who testified on what happened after, and not before and during, the
alleged rape.
For its part, the defense was none-too-convincing either and, in the view of the trial court, fatally
flawed. The appellant relied on alibi, an inherently feeble excuse that cannot prevail as against the
positive Identification of the accused. Moreover, the appellant was living in Sisa, in Sampaloc, only
two kilometers or so from his office, 15 where the rape was allegedly committed. It could have been
reached from his house in a matter of minutes, as the trial court observed, considering the light
traffic at 5 o'clock in the morning or thereabouts.
The appellant's first witness, Remy Oriola, testified that Lolita and Rosalita slept in the appellant's
office in the morning of November 8, 1981, and that the appellant returned thereto the following
morning of November 9, 1981. 16 By contrast, the appellant's testimony was that the two girls slept
in his office on November 9, 1981, and that he returned thereto the following morning of November
10, 1981. 17 And whereas the appellant testified that the complainant came to his office with a
paper bag containing clothes, 18 the witness said Lolita was carrying only a handbag. 19
The testimony of the other defense witness, Rolando Hermilo, was not only practically useless but in
fact prejudicial to the appellant. In the first place, he testified only up to the time he left the
appellant's office at about 11 o'clock in the night of November 9, 1981, and not on what happened
later to the girls who were left behind. 20 But what makes his testimony suspect was his admission
that he learned of the charge against the appellant, and was asked to testify for him, only on the
date itself of the hearing, in the very morning when he was presented as witness, 21 and this was
more than two years after the alleged rape. On top of this, he was by his own admission reading the
transcript of the appellant's testimony before he was actually called to the witness stand. 22
The defendant argues that Lolita should have shouted for help but did not; that he would not have
attempted the rape in such a cramped place and with another person in the very room where the
crime was supposedly committed; and that there were no signs of the alleged stomach blow on the
complainant's stomach.
On the other hand, he could not explain why he offered the two girls beer when soft drinks would
have been more appropriate, and also why he allowed them to sleep in his office when they were
just trainees under his command and had no special ties with him. His claim was that they had left
home because Lolita had been scolded by her mother was belied by his own testimony that he heard
Lolita calling her mother on the telephone to say she was sleeping with a friend. 23
It is unfortunate that the trial court did little to analyze the evidence of the parties and virtually
limited itself to the defense of alibi, which it declared to be untenable. There should have been a
more careful analysis of the other evidence to get to the truth of this unfortunate mess where there
is more than meets the eye. This is not a pat case, so to speak. There are many unanswered
questions. The conduct of both the complainant and the defendant, as narrated by the requires not
a little explaining. The trial judge should have probed deeper instead of simply relying on the
question of alibi, which is only part of the intriguing mosaic.
The basic principle in every criminal prosecution is that accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The
accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved by the prosecution. If the prosecution
fails, it fails utterly, even if the defense is weak or, indeed, even if there is no defense at all. The
defendant faces the full panoply of state authority with all "The People of the Philippines" arrayed
against him. In a manner of speaking, he goes to bat with all the bases loaded. The odds are heavily
against him. It is important, therefore, to equalize the positions of the prosecution and the defense
by presuming the innocence of the accused until the state is able to refute the presumption by proof
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The appellant does not deny that he asked the two girls to see him at his office in the evening of
November 9, 1981; that he there offered them beer, which they drank; and that he permitted them
to sleep there that night.
The proper thing to do was to receive these girls at his office at the MLQ where he was working as
commandant of the CAT, and during school hours. Soft drinks would have been a more appropriate
refreshment for the young ladies, especially since such beverages were easily available. And if it is
true, as he says, that the complainant asked to sleep in his office because she had been scolded by
her mother, the appellant, exercising as he did some moral influence over her as her commandant,
should have counseled her to go home. Failing that, he should have at least caged up the
complainant's mother to tell her that Lolita was in his office.
But all these improprieties and omissions come under the heading of indiscretions and not crimes.
Serving beer instead of soft drinks and snowing the use of one's office for sleeping purposes are not
indictable offenses. Moral irresponsibility and thoughtlessness are also not prohibited under our
criminal laws. More importantly, all these indiscretion do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
the appellant raped the complainant in the morning of November 10, 1981, in his office. The
connection is too far-fetched.
The only fact conclusively established by the prosecution is that the complainant was deflowered on
or about the time of the alleged rape, but that is all. The rest of its case is based on the improbable
testimony of the complainant, whose conduct, even before the alleged rape, was hardly befitting a
proper young lady, to say the least.
The almost indifferent reaction of her family is implausible too, if we go by the recorded testimony.
After being informed of Lolita's rape, they did not immediately look for her; and when they did, their
efforts were hardly energetic. The mother testified that they later searched for her but did not
elaborate beyond saying that they asked her friends. They did not inquire from her classmates in
MLQ They did not talk to the alleged rapist, whom Rosalita had Identified. In fact, when she and her
mother informed Delfin Dalisay that Lolita had been raped, he did not ask where she was — a most
natural and logical question to ask at that time. All he did, by his own account, was blame Rosalita
for the incident.
It was only five days later that they teamed of her whereabouts, and this because Cecile's sister
came to see them and informed them. As for Cecile, in whose house the complainant supposedly
stayed for five days, she was not even presented as witness to corroborate Lolita's testimony. It is
significant that although she and Rosalita Quinto played key roles as it were in this case, they were
strangely silent and absent at the trial.
The trouble with the appellant, according to the trial court, is that he could not prove his defense of
alibi. But then how could he? He said he was sleeping in his house with his family. At five o'clock in
the morning, where else could he have been? How could he have produced third parties as
witnesses to testify that he was fast asleep in his own house? His presence in his own bedroom at
that time was not incredible or even improbable but perfectly believable.
What does strain the imagination is the complainant's own implausible story: of a virgin who visited
a casual acquaintance of the opposite sex in his own office on a Sunday evening; accepted and drank
beer with him; asked to sleep in his office; was awakened by the weight of a person on top of her
whom she immediately recognized notwithstanding that her eyes were not yet accustomed to the
dark; suffered a blow in her stomach and recovered consciousness to discover she had been raped
by the appellant who was still seated on the sofa totally naked; could not leave because her jogging
pants were bloodied notwithstanding that she was in a tailoring shop where clothes were available
in abundance; finally went to a friend's house instead of straight to her mother from whom she
normally would have sought solace. Most significantly, the alleged rape was committed within two
arms length of her companion, Rosalita Quinto, who was sleeping with her in the same room, and
could have awakened any time and in fact did so, according to Lolita, when she moaned after her
ravishment.
The theory of the prosecution has too many loose ends that it has failed to tie up to the satisfaction
of this Court. The guilt of the appellant has not been established beyond doubt and so cannot be
affirmed in this appellant The defense is weak, to be sure, but for all the persuasive arguments of
the Solicitor General and the private prosecutor, this Court remains unconvinced that the appellant
raped the complainant. The appellant may have been lying, and there is evidence of this, but we are
not prepared to accept, to the point of moral certainty, that the complainant was telling the truth.
The ambiguous evidence of the prosecution cannot justify our condemning the appellant to prison
for the rest of his life where there are whispers of doubt that he is guilty.
WHEREFORE, the decision' of the lower court is REVERSED and the appellant is ACQUITTED, without
any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera and Paras, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

D. Constitutional limitations
11. Romualdez vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 167011, December 11, 2008,
573 SCRA 639
12. Corpus vs. People, G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014, 724 SCRA 1
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 167011 April 30, 2008
SPOUSES CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ and ERLINDA R. ROMUALDEZ, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DENNIS GARAY, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This treats of the Petition for Review on Certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed by petitioners Spouses Carlos S.
Romualdez and Erlinda R. Romualdez seeking to annul and set aside the Resolutions, dated 11 June
20041 and 27 January 20052 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in E.O. Case No. 2000-36. In
the Resolution of 11 June 2004, the COMELEC En Banc directed the Law Department to file the
appropriate Information with the proper court against petitioners Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda
Romualdez for violation of Section 10(g) and (j)3 in relation to Section 45(j)4 of Republic Act No.
8189, otherwise known as The Voter’s Registration Act of 1996.5 Petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration thereon was denied.
The factual antecedents leading to the instant Petition are presented hereunder:
On 12 July 2000, private respondent Dennis Garay, along with Angelino Apostol6 filed a Complaint-
Affidavit7 with the COMELEC thru the Office of the Election Officer in Burauen, Leyte, charging
petitioners with violation of Section 261(y)(2)8 and Section 261(y)(5)9 of the Omnibus Election Code,
similarly referred to as Batas Pambansa Blg. 881; and Section 1210 of Republic Act No. 8189.
Private respondent deposed, inter alia, that: petitioners are of legal ages and residents of 113
Mariposa Loop, Mariposa Street, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City; on 9 May 2000 and 11
May 2000, petitioners Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda R. Romualdez, applied for registration as new
voters with the Office of the Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte, as evidenced by Voter Registration
Record Nos. 42454095 and 07902952, respectively; in their sworn applications, petitioners made
false and untruthful representations in violation of Section 1011 of Republic Act Nos. 8189, by
indicating therein that they are residents of 935 San Jose Street, Burauen, Leyte, when in truth and
in fact, they were and still are residents of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa Street, Bagong Lipunan ng
Crame, Quezon City, and registered voters of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV,
Quezon City, Precinct No. 4419-A, as evidenced by Voter Registration Record Nos. 26195824 and
26195823; and that petitioners, knowing fully well said truth, intentionally and willfully, did not fill
the blank spaces in said applications corresponding to the length of time which they have resided in
Burauen, Leyte. In fine, private respondent charged petitioners, to wit:
Respondent-spouses, Carlos Sison Romualdez and Erlinda Reyes Romualdez committed and
consummated election offenses in violation of our election laws, specifically, Sec. 261, paragraph (y),
subparagraph (2), for knowingly making any false or untruthful statements relative to any data or
information required in the application for registration, and of Sec. 261, paragraph (y), subparagraph
(5), committed by any person who, being a registered voter, registers anew without filing an
application for cancellation of his previous registration, both of the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg.
881), and of Sec. 12, RA 8189 (Voter Registration Act) for failure to apply for transfer of registration
records due to change of residence to another city or municipality."12
The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be conducted by the

COMELEC, and if the evidence so warrants, the corresponding Information against petitioners be
filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the prosecution of the same.
Petitioners filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss13 dated 2 April 2001. They
contended therein that they did not make any false or untruthful statements in their application for
registration. They avowed that they intended to reside in Burauen, Leyte, since the year 1989. On 9
May 2000, they took actual residence in Burauen, Leyte, by leasing for five (5) years, the house of
Juanito and Fe Renomeron at No. 935, San Jose Street in Burauen, Leyte. On even date, the
Barangay District III Council of Burauen passed a Resolution of Welcome, expressing therein its
gratitude and appreciation to petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez for choosing the Barangay as his official
residence.14
On 28 November 2003, Atty. Maria Norina S. Tangaro-Casingal, COMELEC Investigating Officer,

issued a Resolution, recommending to the COMELEC Law Department (Investigation and Prosecution
Division), the filing of the appropriate Information against petitioners, disposing, thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Law Department (Investigation and Prosecution Division),

RECOMMENDS to file the necessary information against Carlos Sison Romualdez before the proper
Regional Trial Court for violation of Section 10 (g) and (j) in relation to Section 45 (j) of Republic Act
8189 and to authorize the Director IV of the Law Department to designate a Comelec Prosecutor to
handle the prosecution of the case with the duty to submit periodic report after every hearing of the
case.15
On 11 June 2004, the COMELEC En Banc found no reason to depart from the recommendatory
Resolution of 28 November 2003, and ordered, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Law Department is hereby directed to file the appropriate
information with the proper court against respondents CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ AND ERLINDA
ROMUALDEZ for violation of Section 10 (g) and (j) in relation to Section 45 (j) of the Republic Act No.
8189.16
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereon.
Acting on the Motion, the COMELEC found no cogent reason to disturb the assailed En Banc
Resolution of 11 June 2004,17 rationalizing, thus:
However, perusal of the records reveal (sic) that the arguments and issues raised in the Motion for
Reconsideration are merely a rehash of the arguments advanced by the Respondents in [their]
Memorandum received by the Law Department on 17 April 2001, the same [w]as already considered
by the Investigating Officer and was discussed in her recommendation which eventually was made
as the basis for the En Banc’s resolution.
As aptly observed by the Investigating Officer, the filing of request for the cancellation and transfer
of Voting Registration Record does not automatically cancel the registration records. The fact
remains that at the time of application for registration as new voter of the herein Respondents on
May 9 and 11, 2001 in the Office of Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte their registration in Barangay
4419-A, Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame Quezon City was still valid and subsisting.18
On 12 January 2006, Alioden D. Dalaig, Director IV, Law Department of the COMELEC filed with the
RTC, Burauen, Leyte, separate Informations against petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez19 for violation of
Section 10(g), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, and against petitioner Erlinda R.
Romualdez20 for violation of Section 10(g), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189,
subsequently docketed as Crim. Case No. BN-06-03-4185 and Crim. Case No. BN-06-03-4183,
respectively. Moreover, separate Informations for violation of Section 10(j), in relation to Section
45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 were filed against petitioners.21
Hence, petitioners come to us via the instant Petition, submitting the following arguments:
I
RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK

OF OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION; and
II
COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT PREMISED ITS RESOLUTION ON A

MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND FAILED TO CONSIDER CERTAIN RELEVANT FACTS THAT WOULD
JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION.22
On 4 May 2006, petitioners filed a Motion Reiterating Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and to Cite for Indirect Contempt,23 alleging that two separate Informations, both dated
12 January 2006, were filed with the RTC by the COMELEC against petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez for
violation of Section 10(j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, in Criminal Case No.
BN-06-03-9184; and for violation of Section 10(g), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No.
8189, in Criminal Case No. BN-06-03-9185. Similarly, the Motion alleged that the COMELEC filed with
the RTC, two separate Informations, both dated 12 January 2006, against petitioner Erlinda R.
Romualdez, charging her with the same offenses as those charged against petitioner Carlos S.
Romualdez, and thereafter, docketed as Criminal Case No. BN-06-03-9182, and No. BN-06-03-9183.
On 20 June 2006, this Court issued a Resolution24 denying for lack of merit petitioners’ Motion
Reiterating Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to Cite for Indirect Contempt.
We shall now resolve, in seriatim, the arguments raised by petitioners.
Petitioners contend that the election offenses for which they are charged by private respondent are
entirely different from those which they stand to be accused of before the RTC by the COMELEC.
According to petitioners, private respondent’s complaint charged them for allegedly violating, to wit:
1) Section 261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of the Omnibus Election Code, and 2) Section 12 of the
Voter’s Registration Act; however, the COMELEC En Banc directed in the assailed Resolutions, that
they be charged for violations of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of the Voter’s
Registration Act. Essentially, petitioners are of the view that they were not accorded due process of
law. Specifically, their right to refute or submit documentary evidence against the new charges
which COMELEC ordered to be filed against them. Moreover, petitioners insist that Section 45(j) of
the Voter’s Registration Act is vague as it does not refer to a definite provision of the law, the
violation of which would constitute an election offense; hence, it runs contrary to Section 14(1)25
and Section 14(2),26 Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
We are not persuaded.
First. The Complaint-Affidavit filed by private respondent with the COMELEC is couched in a
language which embraces the allegations necessary to support the charge for violation of Section
10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189.
A reading of the relevant laws is in order, thus:
Section 10(g) and Section 10(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, provide as follows:
SEC. 10 – Registration of Voters. - A qualified voter shall be registered in the permanent list of voters
in a precinct of the city or municipality wherein he resides to be able to vote in any election. To
register as a voter, he shall personally accomplish an application form for registration as prescribed
by the Commission in three (3) copies before the Election Officer on any date during office hours
after having acquired the qualifications of a voter.
The application shall contain the following data:
xxxx
(g) Periods of residence in the Philippines and in the place of registration;
xxxx
(j) A statement that the application is not a registered voter of any precinct;
The application for registration shall contain three (3) specimen signatures of the applicant, clear
and legible rolled prints of his left and right thumbprints, with four identification size copies of his
latest photograph, attached thereto, to be taken at the expense of the Commission.
Before the applicant accomplishes his application for registration, the Election Officer shall inform
him of the qualifications and disqualifications prescribed by law for a voter, and thereafter, see to it
that the accomplished application contains all the data therein required and that the applicant’s
specimen signatures, fingerprints, and photographs are properly affixed in all copies of the voter’s
application.
Moreover, Section 45(j) of the same Act, recites, thus:
SEC. 45. Election Offense. – The following shall be considered election offenses under this Act:
xxxx
(j) Violation of any of the provisions of this Act.
Significantly, the allegations in the Complaint-Affidavit which was filed with the Law Department of
the COMELEC, support the charge directed by the COMELEC En Banc to be filed against petitioners
with the RTC. Even a mere perusal of the Complaint-Affidavit would readily show that Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 8189 was specifically mentioned therein. On the matter of the acts covered by
Section 10(g) and (j), the Complaint-Affidavit, spells out the following allegations, to wit:
5. Respondent-spouses made false and untruthful representations in their applications (Annexes "B"
and "C") in violation of the requirements of Section 10, RA 8189 (The Voter’s Registration Act):
5.1 Respondent-spouses, in their sworn applications (Annexes "B" and "C", claimed to be residents
of 935 San Jose [S]treet, Burauen, Leyte, when in truth and in fact, they were and still are residents
of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa [S]treet, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City and registered
voters of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City, Precinct No. 4419-A, a copy of
the Certification issued by Hon. Emmanuel V. Gozon, Punong Barangay, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame,
Quezon City is hereto attached and made an integral part hereof, as Annex "D";
5.2 Respondent-spouses knowing fully well said truth, intentionally and willfully, did not fill the blank
spaces in their applications (Annexes "B" and "C") corresponding to the length of time they have
resided in Burauen, Leyte;
6. Respondent-spouses, in (sic) all intents and purposes, were and still are residents and registered
voters of Quezon City, as evidenced by Voter Registration Record Nos. 26195824 and 26195823,
respectively; photocopies of which are hereto attached as Annexes "E" and "F"[.] Likewise, attached
is a "Certification" (Annex "G") of Ms. Evelyn B. Bautista, Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the
Election Officer, Fourth District, Quezon City, dated May 31, 2000, together with a certified copy of
the computer print-out of the list of voters of Precinct No. 4419-A (Annex "G-1" ) containing the
names of voters Carlos Romualdez and Erlinda Reyes Romualdez. The Certification reads as follows:
"THIS IS TO CERTIFY that as per office record MR. CARLOS ROMUALDEZ and MS. ERLINDA REYES
ROMUALDEZ are registered voters of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City,
Precinct Number 4419A with voters affidavit serial nos. 26195824 and 26195823, respectively.
This certification is issued for whatever legal purpose it may serve."
7. Respondent-spouses, registered as new voters of the Municipality of Burauen, Leyte, [in spite of]
the fact that they were and still are, registered voters of Quezon City as early as June 22, 1997;
7.1 That, Double Registration is an election offense.
A person qualified as a voter is only allowed to register once.
If a person registers anew as a voter in spite of a subsisting registration, the new application for
registration will be disapproved. The registrant is also liable not only for an election offense of
double registration, but also for another election offense of knowingly making any false or
untruthful statement relative to any data or information required in the application for registration.
In fact, when a person applies for registration as a voter, he or she fills up a Voter Registration
Record form in his or her own handwriting, which contains a Certification which reads:
"I do solemnly swear that the above statements regarding my person are true and correct; that I
possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications of a voter; that the thumbprints,
specimen signatures and photographs appearing herein are mine; and that I am not registered as a
voter in any other precinct."27
Petitioners cannot be said to have been denied due process on the claim that the election offenses
charged against them by private respondent are entirely different from those for which they stand
to be accused of before the RTC, as charged by the COMELEC. In the first place, there appears to be
no incongruity between the charges as contained in the Complaint-Affidavit and the Informations
filed before the RTC, notwithstanding the denomination by private respondent of the alleged
violations to be covered by Section 261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of the Omnibus Election Code
and Section 12 of Republic Act No. 8189. Evidently, the Informations directed to be filed by the
COMELEC against petitioners, and which were, in fact, filed with the RTC, were based on the same
set of facts as originally alleged in the private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit.
Petitioners buttress their claim of lack of due process by relying on the case of Lacson v. Executive
Secretary.28 Citing Lacson, petitioners argue that the real nature of the criminal charge is
determined by the actual recital of facts in the Complaint or Information; and that the object of such
written accusations was to furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him, as
will enable him to make his defense. Let it be said that, in Lacson, this court resolved the issue of
whether under the allegations in the subject Informations therein, it is the Sandiganbayan or the
Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the multiple murder case against therein petitioner
and intervenors. In Lacson, we underscored the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is
determined by the allegations in the Complaint or Information, and not by the evidence presented
by the parties at the trial.29 Indeed, in Lacson, we articulated that the real nature of the criminal
charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the Information nor from the specification
of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the
actual recital of facts in the Complaint or Information.30
Petitioners’ reliance on Lacson, however, does not support their claim of lack of due process
because, as we have said, the charges contained in private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit and the
charges as directed by the COMELEC to be filed are based on the same set of facts. In fact, the
nature of the criminal charges in private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit and that of the charges
contained in the Informations filed with the RTC, pursuant to the COMELEC Resolution En Banc are
the same, such that, petitioners cannot claim that they were not able to refute or submit
documentary evidence against the charges that the COMELEC filed with the RTC. Petitioners were
afforded due process because they were granted the opportunity to refute the allegations in private
respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit. On 2 April 2001, in opposition to the Complaint-Affidavit,
petitioners filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss with the Law Department of the
COMELEC. They similarly filed a Memorandum before the said body. Finding that due process was
not dispensed with under the circumstances in the case at bar, we agree with the stance of the
Office of the Solicitor General that petitioners were reasonably apprised of the nature and
description of the charges against them. It likewise bears stressing that preliminary investigations
were conducted whereby petitioners were informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted
against them. They were given the opportunity to adduce controverting evidence for their defense.
In all these stages, petitioners actively participated.
The instant case calls to our minds Orquinaza v. People,31 wherein the concerned police officer
therein designated the offense charged as sexual harassment; but, the prosecutor found that there
was no transgression of the anti-sexual harassment law, and instead, filed an Information charging
therein petitioner with acts of lasciviousness. On a claim that there was deprivation of due process,
therein petitioner argued that the Information for acts of lasciviousness was void as the preliminary
investigation conducted was for sexual harassment. The court held that the designation by the
police officer of the offense is not conclusive as it is within the competence of the prosecutor to
assess the evidence submitted and determine therefrom the appropriate offense to be charged.
Accordingly, the court pronounced that the complaint contained all the allegations to support the
charge of acts of lasciviousness under the Revised Penal Code; hence, the conduct of another
preliminary investigation for the offense of acts of lasciviousness would be a futile exercise because
the complainant would only be presenting the same facts and evidence which have already been
studied by the prosecutor.32 The court frowns upon such superfluity which only serves to delay the
prosecution and disposition of the criminal complaint.33
Second. Petitioners would have this court declare Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 vague, on
the ground that it contravenes the fair notice requirement of the 1987 Constitution, in particular,
Section 14(1) and Section 14(2), Article III of thereof. Petitioners submit that Section 45(j) of
Republic Act No. 8189 makes no reference to a definite provision of the law, the violation of which
would constitute an election offense.
We are not convinced.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.34 However, this Court has
imposed certain limitations by which a criminal statute, as in the challenged law at bar, may be
scrutinized. This Court has declared that facial invalidation35 or an "on-its-face" invalidation of
criminal statutes is not appropriate.36 We have so enunciated in no uncertain terms in Romualdez v.
Sandiganbayan, 37 thus:
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed
for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First
Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute.
With respect to such statute, the established rule is that 'one to whom application of a statute is
constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be
taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be
unconstitutional.' As has been pointed out, 'vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context,
like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a
matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant.'"
(underscoring supplied)
"To this date, the Court has not declared any penal law unconstitutional on the ground of
ambiguity." While mentioned in passing in some cases, the void-for-vagueness concept has yet to
find direct application in our jurisdiction. In Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, the Bookkeeping Act was found
unconstitutional because it violated the equal protection clause, not because it was vague. Adiong v.
Comelec decreed as void a mere Comelec Resolution, not a statute. Finally, Santiago v. Comelec held
that a portion of RA 6735 was unconstitutional because of undue delegation of legislative powers,
not because of vagueness.
Indeed, an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes would result in a mass acquittal of parties
whose cases may not have even reached the courts. Such invalidation would constitute a departure
from the usual requirement of "actual case and controversy" and permit decisions to be made in a
sterile abstract context having no factual concreteness. In Younger v. Harris, this evil was aptly
pointed out by the U.S. Supreme Court in these words:
"[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of
these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the
judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the
legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the
required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, x x x ordinarily results in a kind of case that is
wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided."
For this reason, generally disfavored is an on-its-face invalidation of statutes, described as a

"manifestly strong medicine" to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort." In determining the
constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions that have allegedly been violated must be
examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant has been charged. (Emphasis
supplied.)
At the outset, we declare that under these terms, the opinions of the dissent which seek to bring to
the fore the purported ambiguities of a long list of provisions in Republic Act No. 8189 can be
deemed as a facial challenge. An appropriate "as applied" challenge in the instant Petition should be
limited only to Section 45 (j) in relation to Sections 10 (g) and (j) of Republic Act No. 8189—the
provisions upon which petitioners are charged. An expanded examination of the law covering
provisions which are alien to petitioners’ case would be antagonistic to the rudiment that for judicial
review to be exercised, there must be an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, and not conjectural or anticipatory.
We further quote the relevant ruling in David v. Arroyo on the proscription anent a facial
challenge:38
Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that "reflects
legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally
unprotected conduct." Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered
"harmful" and "constitutionally unprotected conduct." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, it was held:
It remains a matter of no little difficulty to determine when a law may properly be held void on its
face and when such summary action is inappropriate. But the plain import of our cases is, at the very
least, that facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that
its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it
forbids the State to sanction moves from pure speech toward conduct and that conduct even if
expressive falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state
interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.
Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms,
seek to regulate only "spoken words" and again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have
been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to
protected conduct." Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of
conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as "manifestly strong medicine," to be used

"sparingly and only as a last resort," and is "generally disfavored;" The reason for this is obvious.
Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person
to whom a law may be applied will not be heard to challenge a law on the ground that it may
conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other situations not before the Court. A
writer and scholar in Constitutional Law explains further:
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of
the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is
unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the
unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis.
Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only
assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to
raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely
"as applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court
construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory
rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not
courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad laws "very existence may
cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression."
An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third
parties.
In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require the Court to examine
PP 1017 and pinpoint its flaws and defects, not on the basis of its actual operation to petitioners, but
on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the Court to
refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.
Xxx xxx xxx
And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that there can be no instance when the assailed law
may be valid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to show whether this situation exists.
Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of vagueness. This, too, is
unwarranted.
Related to the "overbreadth" doctrine is the "void for vagueness doctrine" which holds that "a law is
facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application." It is subject to the same principles governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also
an analytical tool for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is
said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications.
Be that as it may, the test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is
whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when
measured by common understanding and practice.39 This Court has similarly stressed that the
vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld -
not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.40
As structured, Section 4541 of Republic Act No. 8189 makes a recital of election offenses under the
same Act. Section 45(j) is, without doubt, crystal in its specification that a violation of any of the
provisions of Republic Act No. 8189 is an election offense. The language of Section 45(j) is precise.
The challenged provision renders itself to no other interpretation. A reading of the challenged
provision involves no guesswork. We do not see herein an uncertainty that makes the same vague.
Notably, herein petitioners do not cite a word in the challenged provision, the import or meaning of
which they do not understand. This is in stark contrast to the case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan42
where therein petitioner sought for statutory definition of particular words in the challenged
statute. Even then, the Court in Estrada rejected the argument.
This Court reasoned:
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void
merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without
defining them; much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive
constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an
enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so
define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of
the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which
is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law."
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be

interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that
the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words. The intention of the
lawmakers who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers to use statutory
phraseology in such a manner is always presumed.
Perforce, this Court has underlined that an act will not be held invalid merely because it might have
been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the
nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other
statutes.43
The evident intent of the legislature in including in the catena of election offenses the violation of
any of the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189, is to subsume as punishable, not only the
commission of proscribed acts, but also the omission of acts enjoined to be observed. On this score,
the declared policy of Republic Act No. 8189 is illuminating. The law articulates the policy of the
State to systematize the present method of registration in order to establish a clean, complete,
permanent and updated list of voters. A reading of Section 45 (j) conjointly with the provisions upon
which petitioners are charged, i.e., Sections 10 (g) and (j) would reveal that the matters that are
required to be set forth under the aforesaid sections are crucial to the achievement of a clean,
complete, permanent and updated list of voters. The factual information required by the law is
sought not for mere embellishment.
There is a definitive governmental purpose when the law requires that such facts should be set forth
in the application. The periods of residence in the Philippines and in the place of registration delve
into the matter of residency, a requisite which a voter must satisfy to be deemed a qualified voter
and registered in the permanent list of voters in a precinct of the city or municipality wherein he
resides. Of even rationality exists in the case of the requirement in Section 10 (j), mandating that the
applicant should state that he/she is not a registered voter of any precinct. Multiple voting by so-
called flying voters are glaring anomalies which this country strives to defeat. The requirement that
such facts as required by Section 10 (g) and Section 10 (j) be stated in the voter’s application form
for registration is directly relevant to the right of suffrage, which the State has the right to regulate.
It is the opportune time to allude to the case of People v. Gatchalian44 where the therein assailed
law contains a similar provision as herein assailed before us. Republic Act No. 602 also penalizes any
person who willfully violates any of the provisions of the Act. The Court dismissed the challenged,
and declared the provision constitutional. The Court in Gatchalian read the challenged provision,
"any of the provisions of this [A]ct" conjointly with Section 3 thereof which was the pertinent
portion of the law upon which therein accused was prosecuted. Gatchalian considered the terms as
all-embracing; hence, the same must include what is enjoined in Section 3 thereof which embodies
the very fundamental purpose for which the law has been adopted. This Court ruled that the law by
legislative fiat intends to punish not only those expressly declared unlawful but even those not so
declared but are clearly enjoined to be observed to carry out the fundamental purpose of the law.45
Gatchalian remains good law, and stands unchallenged.
It also does not escape the mind of this Court that the phraseology in Section 45(j) is employed by
Congress in a number of our laws.46 These provisions have not been declared unconstitutional.
Moreover, every statute has in its favor the presumption of validity.47 To justify its nullification,
there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful,
speculative or argumentative.48 We hold that petitioners failed to overcome the heavy presumption
in favor of the law. Its constitutionality must be upheld in the absence of substantial grounds for
overthrowing the same.
A salient point. Courts will refrain from touching upon the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly
unavoidable and is the very lis mota. In the case at bar, the lis mota is the alleged grave abuse of
discretion of the COMELEC in finding probable cause for the filing of criminal charges against
petitioners.
Third. Petitioners maintain that the COMELEC En Banc, premised its finding on a misapprehension of
facts, and committed grave abuse of discretion in directing the filing of Informations against them
with the RTC.
We are once again unimpressed.
The constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the COMELEC finds statutory expression under
Section 26549 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code.50 The
task of the COMELEC whenever any election offense charge is filed before it is to conduct the
preliminary investigation of the case, and make a determination of probable cause. Under Section
8(b), Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the investigating officer makes a determination of
whether there is a reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed.51 In Baytan v.
COMELEC,52 this Court, sufficiently elucidated on the matter of probable cause in the prosecution of
election offenses, viz:
It is also well-settled that the finding of probable cause in the prosecution of election offenses rests
in the COMELEC's sound discretion. The COMELEC exercises the constitutional authority to
investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases for violation of election laws, including acts or
omissions constituting election frauds, offense and malpractices. Generally, the Court will not
interfere with such finding of the COMELEC absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. This
principle emanates from the COMELEC's exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all
election offenses punishable under the election laws and to prosecute the same, except as may
otherwise be provided by law.53
It is succinct that courts will not substitute the finding of probable cause by the COMELEC in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to
act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility.54
According to the COMELEC En Banc, the investigating officer, in the case at bar, held that there was
sufficient cause for the filing of criminal charges against petitioners, and found no reason to depart
therefrom. Without question, on May 9 and 11 of 2001, petitioners applied for registration as new
voters with the Office of the Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte, notwithstanding the existence of
petitioners’ registration records as registered voters of Precinct No. 4419-A of Barangay Bagong
Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City. The directive by the COMELEC which affirmed the
Resolution55 of 28 November 2000 of Investigating Officer Atty. Tangaro-Casingal does not appear
to be wanting in factual basis, such that a reasonably prudent man would conclude that there exists
probable cause to hold petitioners for trial. Thus, in the aforesaid Resolution, the Investigating
Officer, found:
A violation therefore of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8189 is an election offense.
In the instant case, when respondents Carlos Romualdez and Erlinda Romualdez filed their
respective applications for registration as new voters with the Office of the Election Officer of
Burauen, Leyte on May 9 and 11, 2001, respectively, they stated under oath that they are not
registered voters in other precinct (VRR Nos. 42454095 and 07902941). However, contrary to their
statements, records show they are still registered voters of Precinct No. 4419-A, barangay Bagong
Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City, as per VRR Nos. 26195825 and 26195823. In other
words, respondents’ registration records in Quezon City is (sic) still in existence.
While it may be true that respondents had written the City Election Officer of District IV, Quezon City
for cancellation of their voter’s registration record as voter’s (sic) therein, they cannot presume that
the same will be favorably acted upon. Besides, RA 8189 provides for the procedure in cases of
transfer of residence to another city/municipality which must be complied with, to wit:
"Section 12. Change of Residence to Another City or Municipality. – Any registered voter who has
transferred residence to another city or municipality may apply with the Election Officer of his new
residence for the transfer of his registration records.
The application for transfer of registration shall be subject to the requirements of notice and hearing
and the approval of the Election Registration Board, in accordance with this Act. Upon approval, of
the application for transfer, and after notice of such approval to the Election Officer of their former
residence of the voter, said Election Officer shall transmit by registered mail the voter’s registration
record to the Election Officer of the voter’s new residence."
They cannot claim ignorance of the abovestated provision on the procedure for transfer of
registration records by reason of transferred new residence to another municipality. Based on the
affidavit executed by one Eufemia S. Cotoner, she alleged that the refusal of the Assistant Election
Officer Ms. Estrella Perez to accept the letter of respondents was due to improper procedure
because respondents should have filed the required request for transfer with the Election Officer of
Burauen, Leyte. Despite this knowledge, however, they proceeded to register as new voters of
Burauen, Leyte, notwithstanding the existence of their previous registrations in Quezon City.
In their subsequent affidavit of Transfer of Voters Registration under Section 12 of Republic Act
8189, respondents admitted that they erroneously filed an application as a new voter (sic) with the
office of the Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte, by reason of an honest mistake, which they now
desire to correct. (underscoring ours).
Respondents lose sight of the fact that a statutory offense, such as violation of election law, is mala
prohibita. Proof of criminal intent is not necessary. Good faith, ignorance or lack of malice is beside
the point. Commission of the act is sufficient. It is the act itself that is punished.
xxxx
In view of the foregoing, the Law Department respectfully submits that there is probable cause to
hold respondents Carlos Romualdez and Erlinda Romualdez for trial in violation of Section 10(g) and
(j) in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189. There is no doubt that they applied for
registration as new voters of Burauen, Leyte consciously, freely and voluntarily.56
We take occasion to reiterate that the Constitution grants to the COMELEC the power to prosecute
cases or violations of election laws. Article IX (C), Section 2 (6) of the 1987 Constitution, provides:
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion
of voters; investigate and where appropriate, prosecute cases or violations of election laws,
including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
This power to prosecute necessarily involves the power to determine who shall be prosecuted, and
the corollary right to decide whom not to prosecute.57 Evidently, must this power to prosecute also
include the right to determine under which laws prosecution will be pursued. The courts cannot
dictate the prosecution nor usurp its discretionary powers. As a rule, courts cannot interfere with
the prosecutor’s discretion and control of the criminal prosecution.58 Its rationale cannot be
doubted. For the business of a court of justice is to be an impartial tribunal, and not to get involved
with the success or failure of the prosecution to prosecute.59 Every now and then, the prosecution
may err in the selection of its strategies, but such errors are not for neutral courts to rectify, any
more than courts should correct the blunders of the defense.60
Fourth. In People v. Delgado,61 this Court said that when the COMELEC, through its duly authorized
law officer, conducts the preliminary investigation of an election offense and upon a prima facie
finding of a probable cause, files the Information in the proper court, said court thereby acquires
jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, all the subsequent disposition of said case must be subject
to the approval of the court. The records show that Informations charging petitioners with violation
of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 had been filed with the
RTC. The case must, thus, be allowed to take its due course.
It may be recalled that petitioners prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction before this Court to restrain the COMELEC from executing its Resolutions of
11 June 2004 and 27 January 2005. In a Resolution dated 20 June 2006, this Court En Banc denied for
lack of merit petitioners’ Motion Reiterating Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and to Cite for Indirect Contempt. Logically, the normal course of trial is expected to have continued
in the proceedings a quo.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed Resolutions, dated 11 June 2004 and 27 January
2005 of the COMELEC En Banc are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 180016 April 29, 2014
LITO CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated
November 5, 2007, of petitioner Lito Corpuz (petitioner), seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision1 dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution2 dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), which affirmed with modification the Decision3 dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code.
The antecedent facts follow.
Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale Casino in Olongapo
City sometime in 1990. Private complainant was then engaged in the business of lending money to
casino players and, upon hearing that the former had some pieces of jewelry for sale, petitioner
approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on
commission basis. Private complainant agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner
the following items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and
another men's bracelet, with an aggregate value of ₱98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even
date. They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to
return the same items, within a period of 60 days. The period expired without petitioner remitting
the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry. When private complainant was able to
meet petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will pay the value of the said items
entrusted to him, but to no avail.
Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa, which reads as follows:
That on or about the fifth (5th) day of July 1991, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, after having received from one
Danilo Tangcoy, one (1) men's diamond ring, 18k, worth ₱45,000.00; one (1) three-baht men's
bracelet, 22k, worth ₱25,000.00; one (1) two-baht ladies' bracelet, 22k, worth ₱12,000.00, or in the
total amount of Ninety-Eight Thousand Pesos (₱98,000.00), Philippine currency, under expressed
obligation on the part of said accused to remit the proceeds of the sale of the said items or to return
the same, if not sold, said accused, once in possession of the said items, with intent to defraud, and
with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, and far from complying with his aforestated obligation,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his
own personal use and benefit the aforesaid jewelries (sic) or the proceeds of the sale thereof, and
despite repeated demands, the accused failed and refused to return the said items or to remit the
amount of Ninety- Eight Thousand Pesos (₱98,000.00), Philippine currency, to the damage and
prejudice of said Danilo Tangcoy in the aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On January 28, 1992, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the lone testimony of Danilo Tangcoy.
On the other hand, the defense presented the lone testimony of petitioner, which can be
summarized, as follows:
Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia, who is engaged in
the financing business of extending loans to Base employees. For every collection made, they earn a
commission. Petitioner denied having transacted any business with private complainant.
However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he was made to
sign a blank receipt. He claimed that the same receipt was then dated May 2, 1991 and used as
evidence against him for the supposed agreement to sell the subject pieces of jewelry, which he did
not even see.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the
Information. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of Estafa
under Article 315, paragraph one (1), subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code;
there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary mitigating circumstance/s to vary the
penalty imposable;
accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of deprivation of liberty consisting
of an imprisonment under the Indeterminate Sentence Law of FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2)
MONTHS of Prision Correccional in its medium period AS MINIMUM, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND
EIGHT (8) MONTHS of Reclusion Temporal in its minimum period AS MAXIMUM; to indemnify
private complainant Danilo Tangcoy the amount of ₱98,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the
costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal of petitioner and affirmed
the decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment dated July 30, 2004 of the RTC of
San Fernando City (P), Branch 46, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the imposable prison
term, such that accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus 1 year for each
additional ₱10,000.00, or a total of 7 years. The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, filed with this Court the present
petition stating the following grounds:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE ADMISSION AND

APPRECIATION BY THE LOWER COURT OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE, INCLUDING ITS EXHIBITS, WHICH
ARE MERE MACHINE COPIES, AS THIS VIOLATES THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE;
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT
THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA WAS NOT FATALLY DEFECTIVE ALTHOUGH THE SAME DID
NOT CHARGE THE OFFENSE UNDER ARTICLE 315 (1) (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IN THAT -
1. THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY
SHOULD BE RETURNED, IF UNSOLD, OR THE MONEY TO BE REMITTED, IF SOLD;
2. THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE CRIME ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION AS OF 05 JULY
1991 WAS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE ONE TESTIFIED TO BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT
WHICH WAS 02 MAY 1991;
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT
DEMAND TO RETURN THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY, IF UNSOLD, OR REMIT THE PROCEEDS, IF
SOLD – AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE – WAS PROVED;
D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT
THE PROSECUTION'S CASE WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT ALTHOUGH -
1. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED ON TWO (2) VERSIONS OF THE INCIDENT;
2. THE VERSION OF THE PETITIONER – ACCUSED IS MORE STRAIGHTFORWARD AND LOGICAL,

CONSISTENT WITH HUMAN EXPERIENCE;
3. THE EQUIPOISE RULE WAS NOT APPRECIATED IN AND APPLIED TO THIS CASE;
4. PENAL STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE STATE.
In its Comment dated May 5, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated the following
counter-arguments:
The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as petitioner failed to object to their admissibility.
The information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficiently established the designation of the
offense and the acts complained of.
The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crime charged.
This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit.

The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry even more weight
when said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are
totally devoid of support in the records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave
abuse of discretion.4 Petitioner is of the opinion that the CA erred in affirming the factual findings of
the trial court. He now comes to this Court raising both procedural and substantive issues.
According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court, admitting in evidence a
receipt dated May 2, 1991 marked as Exhibit "A" and its submarkings, although the same was merely
a photocopy, thus, violating the best evidence rule. However, the records show that petitioner never
objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified, marked and testified
upon in court by private complainant. The CA also correctly pointed out that petitioner also failed to
raise an objection in his Comment to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence and even admitted
having signed the said receipt. The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a
timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be
considered as waived.5
Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the formally defective Information filed
against him. He contends that the Information does not contain the period when the pieces of
jewelry were supposed to be returned and that the date when the crime occurred was different
from the one testified to by private complainant. This argument is untenable. The CA did not err in
finding that the Information was substantially complete and in reiterating that objections as to the
matters of form and substance in the Information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. It is
true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of
the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the
owner6 and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime, hence, the
exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the
Information, do not make the latter fatally defective. The CA ruled:
x x x An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the
offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. Then Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
provides that a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused;
the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense,
and the place wherein the offense was committed. In the case at bar, a reading of the subject
Information shows compliance with the foregoing rule. That the time of the commission of the
offense was stated as " on or about the fifth (5th) day of July, 1991" is not likewise fatal to the
prosecution's cause considering that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the precise
time only when the same is a material ingredient of the offense. The gravamen of the crime of estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the appropriation or
conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the offender. Thus, aside from the fact
that the date of the commission thereof is not an essential element of the crime herein charged, the
failure of the prosecution to specify the exact date does not render the Information ipso facto
defective. Moreover, the said date is also near the due date within which accused-appellant should
have delivered the proceeds or returned the said [pieces of jewelry] as testified upon by Tangkoy,
hence, there was sufficient compliance with the rules. Accused-appellant, therefore, cannot now be
allowed to claim that he was not properly apprised of the charges proferred against him.7
It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, which reads:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow.
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other
personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though
such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such
money, goods, or other property; x x x
The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money, goods or other
personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that
there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his
part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and (d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.8
Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand by the offended party on
the offender, was not proved. This Court disagrees. In his testimony, private complainant narrated
how he was able to locate petitioner after almost two (2) months from the time he gave the pieces
of jewelry and asked petitioner about the same items with the latter promising to pay them. Thus:
PROS. MARTINEZ
q Now, Mr. Witness, this was executed on 2 May 1991, and this transaction could have been finished
on 5 July 1991, the question is what happens (sic) when the deadline came?
a I went looking for him, sir.
q For whom?
a Lito Corpuz, sir.
q Were you able to look (sic) for him?
a I looked for him for a week, sir.
q Did you know his residence?
a Yes, sir.
q Did you go there?
a Yes, sir.
q Did you find him?
a No, sir.
q Were you able to talk to him since 5 July 1991?
a I talked to him, sir.
q How many times?
a Two times, sir.

q What did you talk (sic) to him?
a About the items I gave to (sic) him, sir.
q Referring to Exhibit A-2?
a Yes, sir, and according to him he will take his obligation and I asked him where the items are and
he promised me that he will pay these amount, sir.
q Up to this time that you were here, were you able to collect from him partially or full?
a No, sir.9
No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand.10 Demand need not even be
formal; it may be verbal.11 The specific word "demand" need not even be used to show that it has
indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the
money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to a demand.12 As expounded in Asejo v.
People:13
With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand under this kind of estafa
need not be formal or written. The appellate court observed that the law is silent with regard to the
form of demand in estafa under Art. 315 1(b), thus:
When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a written demand be necessary, the
law would have stated so. Otherwise, the word "demand" should be interpreted in its general
meaning as to include both written and oral demand. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to present
a written demand as evidence is not fatal.
In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money entrusted to
the accused, we held that the query was tantamount to a demand, thus:
x x x [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the existence of the crime of
embezzlement. It so happens only that failure to account, upon demand for funds or property held
in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. The same way, however, be established by
other proof, such as that introduced in the case at bar.14
In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was able to prove the existence
of all the elements of the crime. Private complainant gave petitioner the pieces of jewelry in trust, or
on commission basis, as shown in the receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an obligation to sell or return
the same within sixty (60) days, if unsold. There was misappropriation when petitioner failed to
remit the proceeds of those pieces of jewelry sold, or if no sale took place, failed to return the same
pieces of jewelry within or after the agreed period despite demand from the private complainant, to
the prejudice of the latter.
Anent the credibility of the prosecution's sole witness, which is questioned by petitioner, the same is
unmeritorious. Settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, this Court gives great
respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity to observe the
demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied the
appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of the case.15 The assessment by the trial court is
even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence, especially when such finding is affirmed by the CA.16 Truth is
established not by the number of witnesses, but by the quality of their testimonies, for in
determining the value and credibility of evidence, the witnesses are to be weighed not numbered.17
As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was deliberating on this case, the question of
the continued validity of imposing on persons convicted of crimes involving property came up. The
legislature apparently pegged these penalties to the value of the money and property in 1930 when
it enacted the Revised Penal Code. Since the members of the division reached no unanimity on this
question and since the issues are of first impression, they decided to refer the case to the Court en
banc for consideration and resolution. Thus, several amici curiae were invited at the behest of the
Court to give their academic opinions on the matter. Among those that graciously complied were
Dean Jose Manuel Diokno, Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate
President, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The parties were later heard on oral
arguments before the Court en banc, with Atty. Mario L. Bautista appearing as counsel de oficio of
the petitioner.
After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the matter, this Court finds the
following:
There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that the courts
continue to impose on crimes against property committed today, based on the amount of damage
measured by the value of money eighty years ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot modify the
said range of penalties because that would constitute judicial legislation. What the legislature's
perceived failure in amending the penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be remedied
through this Court's decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the power of another branch of
the government. This, however, does not render the whole situation without any remedy. It can be
appropriately presumed that the framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) had anticipated this
matter by including Article 5, which reads:
ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not
covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has knowledge of any act
which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper
decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons
which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of penal legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice,
such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when
a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly
excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the
offense.18
The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts bourne out of a case which is
not punishable by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the remedy is to render the proper
decision and thereafter, report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the
reasons why the same act should be the subject of penal legislation. The premise here is that a
deplorable act is present but is not the subject of any penal legislation, thus, the court is tasked to
inform the Chief Executive of the need to make that act punishable by law through legislation. The
second paragraph is similar to the first except for the situation wherein the act is already punishable
by law but the corresponding penalty is deemed by the court as excessive. The remedy therefore, as
in the first paragraph is not to suspend the execution of the sentence but to submit to the Chief
Executive the reasons why the court considers the said penalty to be non-commensurate with the
act committed. Again, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive, this time, of the need for a
legislation to provide the proper penalty.
In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code,19 Guillermo B. Guevara opined that in Article
5, the duty of the court is merely to report to the Chief Executive, with a recommendation for an
amendment or modification of the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh. Thus:
This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum crimen, nulla poena sige lege," that is, that
there can exist no punishable act except those previously and specifically provided for by penal
statute.
No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not deem it necessary to
prohibit its perpetration with penal sanction, the Court of justice will be entirely powerless to punish
such act.
Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend the execution of a sentence on the
ground that the strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would cause excessive or harsh
penalty. All that the Court could do in such eventuality is to report the matter to the Chief Executive
with a recommendation for an amendment or modification of the legal provisions which it believes
to be harsh.20
Anent the non-suspension of the execution of the sentence, retired Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino
and retired Associate Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, in their book, The Revised Penal Code,21
echoed the above-cited commentary, thus:
The second paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the humanitarian principle that justice must be
tempered with mercy. Generally, the courts have nothing to do with the wisdom or justness of the
penalties fixed by law. "Whether or not the penalties prescribed by law upon conviction of violations
of particular statutes are too severe or are not severe enough, are questions as to which
commentators on the law may fairly differ; but it is the duty of the courts to enforce the will of the
legislator in all cases unless it clearly appears that a given penalty falls within the prohibited class of
excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment." A petition for clemency should be addressed to
the Chief Executive.22
There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes against property be based on the
current inflation rate or at the ratio of ₱1.00 is equal to ₱100.00 . However, it would be dangerous as
this would result in uncertainties, as opposed to the definite imposition of the penalties. It must be
remembered that the economy fluctuates and if the proposed imposition of the penalties in crimes
against property be adopted, the penalties will not cease to change, thus, making the RPC, a self-
amending law. Had the framers of the RPC intended that to be so, it should have provided the same,
instead, it included the earlier cited Article 5 as a remedy. It is also improper to presume why the
present legislature has not made any moves to amend the subject penalties in order to conform with
the present times. For all we know, the legislature intends to retain the same penalties in order to
deter the further commission of those punishable acts which have increased tremendously through
the years. In fact, in recent moves of the legislature, it is apparent that it aims to broaden the
coverage of those who violate penal laws. In the crime of Plunder, from its original minimum amount
of ₱100,000,000.00 plundered, the legislature lowered it to ₱50,000,000.00. In the same way, the
legislature lowered the threshold amount upon which the Anti-Money Laundering Act may apply,
from ₱1,000,000.00 to ₱500,000.00.
It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and Estafa, the present penalties do not seem to be
excessive compared to the proposed imposition of their corresponding penalties. In Theft, the
provisions state that:
Art. 309. Penalties. — Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen
is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, but if the value of the thing stolen
exceeds the latter amount the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this
paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the
penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of the thing
stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the
property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if the value of
the property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not exceed 5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed under the
circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the value of the thing
stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds said amount, the provision of any of the five
preceding subdivisions shall be made applicable.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos, when the value of the
thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have acted under the impulse of hunger,
poverty, or the difficulty of earning a livelihood for the support of himself or his family.
In a case wherein the value of the thing stolen is ₱6,000.00, the above-provision states that the
penalty is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods (6 months and 1 day to 4 years
and 2 months). Applying the proposal, if the value of the thing stolen is ₱6,000.00, the penalty is
imprisonment of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional minimum period (2
months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months). It would seem that under the present law, the penalty
imposed is almost the same as the penalty proposed. In fact, after the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law under the existing law, the minimum penalty is still lowered by one
degree; hence, the minimum penalty is arresto mayor in its medium period to maximum period (2
months and 1 day to 6 months), making the offender qualified for pardon or parole after serving the
said minimum period and may even apply for probation. Moreover, under the proposal, the
minimum penalty after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is arresto menor in its maximum
period to arresto mayor in its minimum period (21 days to 2 months) is not too far from the
minimum period under the existing law. Thus, it would seem that the present penalty imposed
under the law is not at all excessive. The same is also true in the crime of Estafa.23
Moreover, if we apply the ratio of 1:100, as suggested to the value of the thing stolen in the crime of
Theft and the damage caused in the crime of Estafa, the gap between the minimum and the
maximum amounts, which is the basis of determining the proper penalty to be imposed, would be
too wide and the penalty imposable would no longer be commensurate to the act committed and
the value of the thing stolen or the damage caused:
I. Article 309, or the penalties for the crime of Theft, the value would be modified but the penalties
are not changed:
1. ₱12,000.00 to ₱22,000.00 will become ₱1,200,000.00 to ₱2,200,000.00, punished by prision

mayor minimum to prision mayor medium (6 years and 1 day to 10 years).
2. ₱6,000.00 to ₱12,000.00 will become ₱600,000.00 to ₱1,200,000.00, punished by prision

correccional medium and to prision correccional maximum (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6
years).24
3. ₱200.00 to ₱6,000.00 will become ₱20,000.00 to ₱600,000.00, punishable by prision correccional

minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).
4. ₱50.00 to ₱200.00 will become ₱5,000.00 to ₱20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor medium to
prision correccional minimum (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).
5. ₱5.00 to ₱50.00 will become ₱500.00 to ₱5,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor (1 month and 1
day to 6 months).
6. ₱5.00 will become ₱500.00, punishable by arresto mayor minimum to arresto mayor medium.
x x x x.
II. Article 315, or the penalties for the crime of Estafa, the value would also be modified but the
penalties are not changed, as follows:
1st. ₱12,000.00 to ₱22,000.00, will become ₱1,200,000.00 to ₱2,200,000.00, punishable by prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8 years).25
2nd. ₱6,000.00 to ₱12,000.00 will become ₱600,000.00 to ₱1,200,000.00, punishable by prision

correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2
months).26
3rd. ₱200.00 to ₱6,000.00 will become ₱20,000.00 to ₱600,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor
maximum to prision correccional minimum (4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).
4th. ₱200.00 will become ₱20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor maximum (4 months and 1 day
to 6 months).
An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of our esteemed amici curiae, is that the
incremental penalty provided under Article 315 of the RPC violates the Equal Protection Clause.
The equal protection clause requires equality among equals, which is determined according to a
valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of
reasonableness,27 which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.28
According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule (IPR) does not rest on substantial
distinctions as ₱10,000.00 may have been substantial in the past, but it is not so today, which
violates the first requisite; the IPR was devised so that those who commit estafa involving higher
amounts would receive heavier penalties; however, this is no longer achieved, because a person
who steals ₱142,000.00 would receive the same penalty as someone who steals hundreds of
millions, which violates the second requisite; and, the IPR violates requisite no. 3, considering that
the IPR is limited to existing conditions at the time the law was promulgated, conditions that no
longer exist today.
Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno and declares the incremental
penalty in Article 315 unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause, what then is the
penalty that should be applied in case the amount of the thing subject matter of the crime exceeds
₱22,000.00? It seems that the proposition poses more questions than answers, which leads us even
more to conclude that the appropriate remedy is to refer these matters to Congress for them to
exercise their inherent power to legislate laws.
Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court declares the IPR unconstitutional, the remedy
is to go to Congress. Thus:
xxxx
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Now, your position is to declare that the incremental penalty should be struck down as
unconstitutional because it is absurd.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Absurd, it violates equal protection, Your Honor, and cruel and unusual punishment.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Then what will be the penalty that we are going to impose if the amount is more than Twenty-Two
Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Well, that would be for Congress to ... if this Court will declare the incremental penalty rule
unconstitutional, then that would ... the void should be filled by Congress.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
But in your presentation, you were fixing the amount at One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00)
Pesos ...
DEAN DIOKNO:
Well, my presen ... (interrupted)
JUSTICE PERALTA:
For every One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand
(₱22,000.00) Pesos you were suggesting an additional penalty of one (1) year, did I get you right?
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor, that is, if the court will take the route of statutory interpretation.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Ah ...
DEAN DIOKNO:
If the Court will say that they can go beyond the literal wording of the law...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
But if we de ... (interrupted)
DEAN DIOKNO:
....then....
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Ah, yeah. But if we declare the incremental penalty as unsconstitutional, the court cannot fix the
amount ...
DEAN DIOKNO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
... as the equivalent of one, as an incremental penalty in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand

(₱22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The Court cannot do that.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Could not be.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The only remedy is to go to Congress...
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
... and determine the value or the amount.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
That will be equivalent to the incremental penalty of one (1) year in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand
(₱22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The amount in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.
Thank you, Dean.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Thank you.
x x x x29
Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment. Citing Solem v. Helm,30 Dean Diokno avers that the United States Federal Supreme
Court has expanded the application of a similar Constitutional provision prohibiting cruel and
unusual punishment, to the duration of the penalty, and not just its form. The court therein ruled
that three things must be done to decide whether a sentence is proportional to a specific crime, viz.;
(1) Compare the nature and gravity of the offense, and the harshness of the penalty; (2) Compare
the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, i.e., whether more serious crimes
are subject to the same penalty or to less serious penalties; and (3) Compare the sentences imposed
for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.
However, the case of Solem v. Helm cannot be applied in the present case, because in Solem what
respondent therein deemed cruel was the penalty imposed by the state court of South Dakota after
it took into account the latter’s recidivist statute and not the original penalty for uttering a "no
account" check. Normally, the maximum punishment for the crime would have been five years
imprisonment and a $5,000.00 fine. Nonetheless, respondent was sentenced to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole under South Dakota’s recidivist statute because of his six prior
felony convictions. Surely, the factual antecedents of Solem are different from the present
controversy.
With respect to the crime of Qualified Theft, however, it is true that the imposable penalty for the
offense is high. Nevertheless, the rationale for the imposition of a higher penalty against a domestic
servant is the fact that in the commission of the crime, the helper will essentially gravely abuse the
trust and confidence reposed upon her by her employer. After accepting and allowing the helper to
be a member of the household, thus entrusting upon such person the protection and safekeeping of
the employer’s loved ones and properties, a subsequent betrayal of that trust is so repulsive as to
warrant the necessity of imposing a higher penalty to deter the commission of such wrongful acts.
There are other crimes where the penalty of fine and/or imprisonment are dependent on the subject
matter of the crime and which, by adopting the proposal, may create serious implications. For
example, in the crime of Malversation, the penalty imposed depends on the amount of the money
malversed by the public official, thus:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. — Any public
officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall
appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or
negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially,
or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall
suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved in
the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is more
than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period,
if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is
more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount
exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special
disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of
the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has
put such missing funds or property to personal use.
The above-provisions contemplate a situation wherein the Government loses money due to the
unlawful acts of the offender. Thus, following the proposal, if the amount malversed is ₱200.00
(under the existing law), the amount now becomes ₱20,000.00 and the penalty is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years 4 months and 1 day to 6 years). The
penalty may not be commensurate to the act of embezzlement of ₱20,000.00 compared to the acts
committed by public officials punishable by a special law, i.e., Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, specifically Section 3,31 wherein the injury caused to the
government is not generally defined by any monetary amount, the penalty (6 years and 1 month to
15 years)32 under the Anti-Graft Law will now become higher. This should not be the case, because
in the crime of malversation, the public official takes advantage of his public position to embezzle
the fund or property of the government entrusted to him.
The said inequity is also apparent in the crime of Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or
uninhabited) where the value of the thing unlawfully taken and the act of unlawful entry are the
bases of the penalty imposable, and also, in Malicious Mischief, where the penalty of imprisonment
or fine is dependent on the cost of the damage caused.
In Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited), if we increase the value of the thing
unlawfully taken, as proposed in the ponencia, the sole basis of the penalty will now be the value of
the thing unlawfully taken and no longer the element of force employed in entering the premises. It
may likewise cause an inequity between the crime of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling under Article
280, and this kind of robbery because the former is punishable by prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years) and a fine not exceeding ₱1,000.00
(₱100,000.00 now if the ratio is 1:100) where entrance to the premises is with violence or
intimidation, which is the main justification of the penalty. Whereas in the crime of Robbery with
force upon things, it is punished with a penalty of prision mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years) if the
intruder is unarmed without the penalty of Fine despite the fact that it is not merely the illegal entry
that is the basis of the penalty but likewise the unlawful taking.
Furthermore, in the crime of Other Mischiefs under Article 329, the highest penalty that can be
imposed is arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months) if
the value of the damage caused exceeds ₱1,000.00, but under the proposal, the value of the damage
will now become ₱100,000.00 (1:100), and still punishable by arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6
months). And, if the value of the damaged property does not exceed ₱200.00, the penalty is arresto
menor or a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not more than ₱200.00, if the
amount involved does not exceed ₱200.00 or cannot be estimated. Under the proposal, ₱200.00 will
now become ₱20,000.00, which simply means that the fine of ₱200.00 under the existing law will
now become ₱20,000.00. The amount of Fine under this situation will now become excessive and
afflictive in nature despite the fact that the offense is categorized as a light felony penalized with a
light penalty under Article 26 of the RPC.33 Unless we also amend Article 26 of the RPC, there will be
grave implications on the penalty of Fine, but changing the same through Court decision, either
expressly or impliedly, may not be legally and constitutionally feasible.
There are other crimes against property and swindling in the RPC that may also be affected by the
proposal, such as those that impose imprisonment and/or Fine as a penalty based on the value of
the damage caused, to wit: Article 311 (Theft of the property of the National Library and National
Museum), Article 312 (Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property), Article
313 (Altering boundaries or landmarks), Article 316 (Other forms of swindling), Article 317 (Swindling
a minor), Article 318 (Other deceits), Article 328 (Special cases of malicious mischief) and Article 331
(Destroying or damaging statues, public monuments or paintings). Other crimes that impose Fine as
a penalty will also be affected, such as: Article 213 (Frauds against the public treasury and similar
offenses), Article 215 (Prohibited Transactions),
Article 216 (Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer), Article 218 (Failure of accountable
officer to render accounts), Article 219 (Failure of a responsible public officer to render accounts
before leaving the country).
In addition, the proposal will not only affect crimes under the RPC. It will also affect crimes which are
punishable by special penal laws, such as Illegal Logging or Violation of Section 68 of Presidential
Decree No. 705, as amended.34 The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting and possessing timber
or other forest products without license as an offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of
qualified theft.35 Under the law, the offender shall be punished with the penalties imposed under
Articles 309 and 31036 of the Revised Penal Code, which means that the penalty imposable for the
offense is, again, based on the value of the timber or forest products involved in the offense. Now, if
we accept the said proposal in the crime of Theft, will this particular crime of Illegal Logging be
amended also in so far as the penalty is concerned because the penalty is dependent on Articles 309
and 310 of the RPC? The answer is in the negative because the soundness of this particular law is not
in question.
With the numerous crimes defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code and Special Laws,
and other related provisions of these laws affected by the proposal, a thorough study is needed to
determine its effectivity and necessity. There may be some provisions of the law that should be
amended; nevertheless, this Court is in no position to conclude as to the intentions of the framers of
the Revised Penal Code by merely making a study of the applicability of the penalties imposable in
the present times. Such is not within the competence of the Court but of the Legislature which is
empowered to conduct public hearings on the matter, consult legal luminaries and who, after due
proceedings, can decide whether or not to amend or to revise the questioned law or other laws, or
even create a new legislation which will adopt to the times.
Admittedly, Congress is aware that there is an urgent need to amend the Revised Penal Code. During
the oral arguments, counsel for the Senate informed the Court that at present, fifty-six (56) bills are
now pending in the Senate seeking to amend the Revised Penal Code,37 each one proposing much
needed change and updates to archaic laws that were promulgated decades ago when the political,
socio-economic, and cultural settings were far different from today’s conditions.
Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall not
usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or
construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation,
modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is
repugnant to its terms.38 The Court should apply the law in a manner that would give effect to their
letter and spirit, especially when the law is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put, the
Court should shy away from encroaching upon the primary function of a co-equal branch of the
Government; otherwise, this would lead to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of
powers by means of judicial legislation.
Moreover, it is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a Fine; hence, it can
be increased by the Court when appropriate. Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three
thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the
indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and
awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused
by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291, the
recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate
succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five
years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may
demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution
or compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the latter by the
accused, which in a sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime
where a person dies, in addition to the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the offender, the
accused is also ordered to pay the victim a sum of money as restitution. Clearly, this award of civil
indemnity due to the death of the victim could not be contemplated as akin to the value of a thing
that is unlawfully taken which is the basis in the imposition of the proper penalty in certain crimes.
Thus, the reasoning in increasing the value of civil indemnity awarded in some offense cannot be the
same reasoning that would sustain the adoption of the suggested ratio. Also, it is apparent from
Article 2206 that the law only imposes a minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity, which is
₱3,000.00. The law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount for the award
cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified and
increased when the present circumstance warrants it. Corollarily, moral damages under Article
222039 of the Civil Code also does not fix the amount of damages that can be awarded. It is
discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental anguish or the suffering of the private
offended party. The amount of moral damages can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long
as it does not exceed the award of civil indemnity.
In addition, some may view the penalty provided by law for the offense committed as tantamount to
cruel punishment. However, all penalties are generally harsh, being punitive in nature. Whether or
not they are excessive or amount to cruel punishment is a matter that should be left to lawmakers. It
is the prerogative of the courts to apply the law, especially when they are clear and not subject to
any other interpretation than that which is plainly written.
Similar to the argument of Dean Diokno, one of Justice Antonio Carpio’s opinions is that the
incremental penalty provision should be declared unconstitutional and that the courts should only
impose the penalty corresponding to the amount of ₱22,000.00, regardless if the actual amount
involved exceeds ₱22,000.00. As suggested, however, from now until the law is properly amended
by Congress, all crimes of Estafa will no longer be punished by the appropriate penalty. A
conundrum in the regular course of criminal justice would occur when every accused convicted of
the crime of estafa will be meted penalties different from the proper penalty that should be
imposed. Such drastic twist in the application of the law has no legal basis and directly runs counter
to what the law provides.
It should be noted that the death penalty was reintroduced in the dispensation of criminal justice by
the Ramos Administration by virtue of Republic Act No. 765940 in December 1993. The said law has
been questioned before this Court. There is, arguably, no punishment more cruel than that of death.
Yet still, from the time the death penalty was re-imposed until its lifting in June 2006 by Republic Act
No. 9346,41 the Court did not impede the imposition of the death penalty on the ground that it is a
"cruel punishment" within the purview of Section 19 (1),42 Article III of the Constitution. Ultimately,
it was through an act of Congress suspending the imposition of the death penalty that led to its non-
imposition and not via the intervention of the Court.
Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court cannot declare the provision
of the law from which the proper penalty emanates unconstitutional in the present action. Not only
is it violative of due process, considering that the State and the concerned parties were not given the
opportunity to comment on the subject matter, it is settled that the constitutionality of a statute
cannot be attacked collaterally because constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not
collaterally,43 more so in the present controversy wherein the issues never touched upon the
constitutionality of any of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally
aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or
amount, and applies to punishments which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete, for
instance, those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the
wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the
prohibition.44
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be
obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does
not make it cruel and unusual. Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under the
ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the
nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community."45
Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the Congress to amend the law and adapt it to our
modern time.
The solution to the present controversy could not be solved by merely adjusting the questioned
monetary values to the present value of money based only on the current inflation rate. There are
other factors and variables that need to be taken into consideration, researched, and deliberated
upon before the said values could be accurately and properly adjusted. The effects on the society,
the injured party, the accused, its socio-economic impact, and the likes must be painstakingly
evaluated and weighed upon in order to arrive at a wholistic change that all of us believe should be
made to our existing law. Dejectedly, the Court is ill-equipped, has no resources, and lacks sufficient
personnel to conduct public hearings and sponsor studies and surveys to validly effect these changes
in our Revised Penal Code. This function clearly and appropriately belongs to Congress. Even
Professor Tadiar concedes to this conclusion, to wit:
xxxx
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, Just one question. You are suggesting that in order to determine the value of Peso you have to
take into consideration several factors.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yes.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Per capita income.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Per capita income.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Consumer price index.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yeah.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Inflation ...
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yes.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
... and so on. Is the Supreme Court equipped to determine those factors?
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
There are many ways by which the value of the Philippine Peso can be determined utilizing all of
those economic terms.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, but ...
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
And I don’t think it is within the power of the Supreme Court to pass upon and peg the value to One
Hundred (₱100.00) Pesos to ...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
... One (₱1.00.00) Peso in 1930.

JUSTICE PERALTA:
That is legislative in nature.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
That is my position that the Supreme Court ...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, okay.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
... has no power to utilize the power of judicial review to in order to adjust, to make the adjustment
that is a power that belongs to the legislature.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Thank you, Professor.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Thank you.46
Finally, the opinion advanced by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno echoes the view that the
role of the Court is not merely to dispense justice, but also the active duty to prevent injustice. Thus,
in order to prevent injustice in the present controversy, the Court should not impose an obsolete
penalty pegged eighty three years ago, but consider the proposed ratio of 1:100 as simply
compensating for inflation. Furthermore, the Court has in the past taken into consideration
"changed conditions" or "significant changes in circumstances" in its decisions.
Similarly, the Chief Justice is of the view that the Court is not delving into the validity of the
substance of a statute. The issue is no different from the Court’s adjustment of indemnity in crimes
against persons, which the Court had previously adjusted in light of current times, like in the case of
People v. Pantoja.47 Besides, Article 10 of the Civil Code mandates a presumption that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the Chief Justice and my Colleagues, all
the proposals ultimately lead to prohibited judicial legislation. Short of being repetitious and as
extensively discussed above, it is truly beyond the powers of the Court to legislate laws, such
immense power belongs to Congress and the Court should refrain from crossing this clear-cut divide.
With regard to civil indemnity, as elucidated before, this refers to civil liability which is awarded to
the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution. It is truly based on the value of money. The
same cannot be said on penalties because, as earlier stated, penalties are not only based on the
value of money, but on several other factors. Further, since the law is silent as to the maximum
amount that can be awarded and only pegged the minimum sum, increasing the amount granted as
civil indemnity is not proscribed. Thus, it can be adjusted in light of current conditions.
Now, with regard to the penalty imposed in the present case, the CA modified the ruling of the RTC.
The RTC imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional in its medium period, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of
reclusion temporal in its minimum period, as maximum. However, the CA imposed the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus one (1) year for each additional ₱10,000.00, or a
total of seven (7) years.
In computing the penalty for this type of estafa, this Court's ruling in Cosme, Jr. v. People48 is highly
instructive, thus:
With respect to the imposable penalty, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 315 Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such
amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may
be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such case, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the
penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two, not three, periods, in which case,
Article 65 of the same Code requires the division of the time included in the penalty into three equal
portions of time included in the penalty prescribed, forming one period of each of the three
portions. Applying the latter provisions, the maximum, medium and minimum periods of the penalty
prescribed are:
Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years
Medium - 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days
Minimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days49
To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisión correccional maximum to prisión
mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of time each of which portion shall be
deemed to form one period in accordance with Article 6550 of the RPC.51 In the present case, the
amount involved is ₱98,000.00, which exceeds ₱22,000.00, thus, the maximum penalty imposable
should be within the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor.
Article 315 also states that a period of one year shall be added to the penalty for every additional
₱10,000.00 defrauded in excess of ₱22,000.00, but in no case shall the total penalty which may be
imposed exceed 20 years.
Considering that the amount of ₱98,000.00 is ₱76,000.00 more than the ₱22,000.00 ceiling set by
law, then, adding one year for each additional ₱10,000.00, the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months
and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor minimum would be increased by 7 years. Taking the
maximum of the prescribed penalty, which is 8 years, plus an additional 7 years, the maximum of the
indeterminate penalty is 15 years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charge
against petitioner is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next
lower would then be prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from 6 months and 1
day to 4 years and 2 months.
One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance to perform its primordial duty of lawmaking.
The Court should not pre-empt Congress and usurp its inherent powers of making and enacting laws.
While it may be the most expeditious approach, a short cut by judicial fiat is a dangerous
proposition, lest the Court dare trespass on prohibited judicial legislation.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5, 2007 of petitioner Lito Corpuz
is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution dated
September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the Decision dated July
30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the
Revised Penal Code, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and
ELEVEN DAYS of prision correccional, as minimum, to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision be furnished the
President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Justice.
Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Art.2. Application
A. Territoriality; Extra-territoriality
13. People vs. Lol-lo and Saraw, 43 Phil. 19
14. U.S. vs. Bull, 15 Phil. 7
15. U.S. vs. Look Chow, 18 Phil. 573
16. People vs. Wong Cheng, 46 Phil. 729
Sec.58, Republic Act 9372

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque buccaneers like Captain Avery and
Captain Kidd and Bartholomew Roberts gripped the imagination, when grostesque brutes like
Blackbeard flourished, seem far away in the pages of history and romance. Nevertheless, the record
before us tells a tale of twentieth century piracy in the south seas, but stripped of all touches of
chivalry or of generosity, so as to present a horrible case of rapine and near murder.
On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another Dutch
possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven
men, women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland. After a number of days of navigation, at
about 7 o'clock in the evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in
the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all
armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the
cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible
to the described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women,
were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge, although as a
matter of fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored violating
them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauder were Lol-
lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands.
There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of
piracy. A demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros, based on the grounds that
the offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of
the Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force
in the Philippine Islands. After the demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, trial was had, and a
judgment was rendered finding the two defendants guilty and sentencing each of them to life
imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to return together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in
another case, to the offended parties, the thirty-nine sacks of copras which had been robbed, or to
indemnify them in the amount of 924 rupees, and to pay a one-half part of the costs.
A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by the attorney de officio. By a
process of elimination, however, certain questions can be quickly disposed of.
The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is
robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi,
and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.
It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lover court and as is again done
in this court, that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in law
hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It
may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into
which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As
it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within
the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not
neutral to crimes." (U.S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)
The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for decision for the first time is
whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force.
Article 153 to 156 of the Penal Code reads as follows:
ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects of another nation not at
war with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with Spain, it
shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph of the next preceding
article shall suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua or death, and those who commit the crimes
referred to in the second paragraph of the same article, from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua:
1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon the same.
2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any of the physical injuries
specified in articles four hundred and fourteen and four hundred and fifteen and in paragraphs one
and two of article four hundred and sixteen.
3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity specified in Chapter II, Title IX,
of this book.
4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means of saving themselves.
5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.
ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as all others of this code, when Spain is
mentioned it shall be understood as including any part of the national territory.
ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every person, who, according to
the Constitution of the Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard shall be considered as such.
The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United States relating to the effect of
a transfer of territory from another State to the United States are well-known. The political law of
the former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal law in so far as it is consistent with the
Constitution, the laws of the United States, or the characteristics and institutions of the government,
remains in force. As a corollary to the main rules, laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to
secure good order and peace in the community, which are strictly of a municipal character, continue
until by direct action of the new government they are altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock Islands,
etc., R. Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542.)
These principles of the public law were given specific application to the Philippines by the
Instructions of President McKinley of May 19, 1898, to General Wesley Meritt, the Commanding
General of the Army of Occupation in the Philippines, when he said:
Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately operate
upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered territory, such
as affect private rights of person and property, and provide for the punishment of crime, are
considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things, until
they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and practice they are not usually
abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals,
substantially as they were before the occupations. This enlightened practice is so far as possible, to
be adhered to on the present occasion. (Official Gazette, Preliminary Number, Jan. 1, 1903, p. 1. See
also General Merritt Proclamation of August 14, 1898.)
It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy were meant
to include the Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 of the
Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the provisions of the Code applicable not
only to Spaniards but to Filipinos.
The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the same thing as piracy by the civil
law, and he has never been disputed. The specific provisions of the Penal Code are similar in tenor to
statutory provisions elsewhere and to the concepts of the public law. This must necessarily be so,
considering that the Penal Code finds its inspiration in this respect in the Novelas, the Partidas, and
the Novisima Recopilacion.
The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress shall have the power to define and
punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations.
(U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.) The Congress, in putting on the statute books the necessary ancillary
legislation, provided that whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the
law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for
life. (U.S. Crim. Code, sec. 290; penalty formerly death: U.S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5368.) The framers of the
Constitution and the members of Congress were content to let a definition of piracy rest on its
universal conception under the law of nations.
It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relating to piracy
are not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in the United States.
By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A logical construction
of articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the crime of piracy, would be that
wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the words "United States" and wherever
"Spaniards" are mentioned, the word should be substituted by the expression "citizens of the United
States and citizens of the Philippine Islands." somewhat similar reasoning led this court in the case of
United States vs. Smith ([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to give to the word "authority" as found in the Penal
Code a limited meaning, which would no longer comprehend all religious, military, and civil officers,
but only public officers in the Government of the Philippine Islands.
Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code would read as follows:
The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine
Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at war with the United States, shall be punished with a
penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with the United
States, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
We hold those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and
154, to be still in force in the Philippines.
The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal Code in relation to article 154.
There are present at least two of the circumstances named in the last cited article as authorizing
either cadena perpetua or death. The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against
chastity and (2) the abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It is,
therefore, only necessary for us to determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death
should be imposed. In this connection, the trial court, finding present the one aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity, and compensating the same by the one mitigating circumstance of lack
of instruction provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal Code, sentenced the accused to life
imprisonment. At least three aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of
the crime was deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission,
that advantage was taken of superior strength, and that means were employed which added
ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty.
Considering, therefore, the number and importance of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances
here present, which cannot be offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and
the horrible nature of the crime committed, it becomes our duty to impose capital punishment.
The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of the imposition of the death
penalty upon the defendant and appellant Lo-lo (the accused who raped on of the women), but is
not unanimous with regard to the court, Mr. Justice Romualdez, registers his nonconformity. In
accordance with provisions of Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the judgment of the trial court
as to the defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as to the defendant and
appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until
dead, at such time and place as shall be fixed by the judge of first instance of the Twenty-sixth
Judicial District. The two appellants together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another
case, shall indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and
shall pay a one-half part of the costs of both instances. So ordered.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5270 January 15, 1910
vs.
H. N. BULL, defendant-appellant.
Bruce & Lawrence, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.
ELLIOTT, J.:
The appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of a violation of section 1 of Act No. 55, as
amended by section 1 of Act No. 275, and from the judgment entered thereon appealed to this
court, where under proper assignments of error he contends: (1) that the complaint does not state
facts sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court; (2) that under the evidence the trial court was
without jurisdiction to hear and determine the case; (3) that Act No. 55 as amended is in violation of
certain provisions of the Constitution of the United States, and void as applied to the facts of this
case; and (4) that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction.
The information alleges:
That on and for many months prior to the 2d day of December, 1908, the said H. N. Bull was then
and there master of a steam sailing vessel known as the steamship Standard, which vessel was then
and there engaged in carrying and transporting cattle, carabaos, and other animals from a foreign
port and city of Manila, Philippine Islands; that the said accused H. N. Bull, while master of said
vessel, as aforesaid, on or about the 2d day of December, 1908, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and wrongly carry, transport, and bring into the port and city of Manila, aboard said
vessel, from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, six hundred and seventy-seven (677) head of cattle and
carabaos, without providing suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid
cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said animals, in this, to wit, that the said H. N. Bull, master,
as aforesaid, did then and there fail to provide stalls for said animals so in transit and suitable means
for trying and securing said animals in a proper manner, and did then and there cause some of said
animals to be tied by means of rings passed through their noses, and allow and permit others to be
transported loose in the hold and on the deck of said vessel without being tied or secured in stalls,
and all without bedding; that by reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure of the accused to provide
suitable means for securing said animals while so in transit, the noses of some of said animals were
cruelly torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon the decks and hold of said vessel,
and cruelly wounded, bruised, and killed.
All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine Commission.
Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went into effect January 1, 1901, provides that —
The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle, sheep,
swine, or other animals, from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign port
to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall carry with them, upon the vessels carrying such
animals, sufficient forage and fresh water to provide for the suitable sustenance of such animals
during the ordinary period occupied by the vessel in passage from the port of shipment to the port
of debarkation, and shall cause such animals to be provided with adequate forage and fresh water at
least once in every twenty-four hours from the time that the animals are embarked to the time of
their final debarkation.
By Act No. 275, enacted October 23, 1901, Act No. 55 was amended by adding to section 1 thereof
the following:
The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle, sheep,
swine, or other animals from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign port
to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall provide suitable means for securing such animals
while in transit so as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the animals, and suitable and
proper facilities for loading and unloading cattle or other animals upon or from vessels upon which
they are transported, without cruelty or unnecessary suffering. It is hereby made unlawful to load or
unload cattle upon or from vessels by swinging them over the side by means of ropes or chains
attached to the thorns.
Section 3 of Act No. 55 provides that —
Any owner or master of a vessel, or custodian of such animals, who knowingly and willfully fails to
comply with the provisions of section one, shall, for every such failure, be liable to pay a penalty of
not less that one hundred dollars nor more that five hundred dollars, United States money, for each
offense. Prosecution under this Act may be instituted in any Court of First Instance or any provost
court organized in the province or port in which such animals are disembarked.
1. It is contended that the information is insufficient because it does not state that the court was
sitting at a port where the cattle were disembarked, or that the offense was committed on board a
vessel registered and licensed under the laws of the Philippine Islands.
Act No. 55 confers jurisdiction over the offense created thereby on Courts of First Instance or any
provost court organized in the province or port in which such animals are disembarked, and there is
nothing inconsistent therewith in Act No. 136, which provides generally for the organization of the
courts of the Philippine Islands. Act No. 400 merely extends the general jurisdiction of the courts
over certain offenses committed on the high seas, or beyond the jurisdiction of any country, or
within any of the waters of the Philippine Islands on board a ship or water craft of any kind
registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands, in accordance with the laws thereof. (U.S. vs. Fowler,
1 Phil. Rep., 614.) This jurisdiction may be exercised by the Court of First Instance in any province
into which such ship or water upon which the offense or crime was committed shall come after the
commission thereof. Had this offense been committed upon a ship carrying a Philippine registry,
there could have been no doubt of the Jurisdiction of the court, because it is expressly conferred,
and the Act is in accordance with well recognized and established public law. But the Standard was a
Norwegian vessel, and it is conceded that it was not registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands
under the laws thereof. We have then the question whether the court had jurisdiction over an
offense of this character, committed on board a foreign ship by the master thereof, when the
neglect and omission which constitutes the offense continued during the time the ship was within
the territorial waters of the United States. No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an
offenses or crime committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country,
but when she came within 3 miles of a line drawn from the headlines which embrace the entrance to
Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new set of principles became applicable.
(Wheaton, Int. Law (Dana ed.), p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., sec 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer
Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign
subject through the proper political agency. This offense was committed within territorial waters.
From the line which determines these waters the Standard must have traveled at least 25 miles
before she came to anchor. During that part of her voyage the violation of the statue continued, and
as far as the jurisdiction of the court is concerned, it is immaterial that the same conditions may
have existed while the vessel was on the high seas. The offense, assuming that it originated at the
port of departure in Formosa, was a continuing one, and every element necessary to constitute it
existed during the voyage across the territorial waters. The completed forbidden act was done
within American waters, and the court therefore had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the
offense and the person of the offender.
The offense then was thus committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, but the
objection to the jurisdiction raises the further question whether that jurisdiction is restricted by the
fact of the nationality of the ship. Every. Every state has complete control and jurisdiction over its
territorial waters. According to strict legal right, even public vessels may not enter the ports of a
friendly power without permission, but it is now conceded that in the absence of a prohibition such
ports are considered as open to the public ship of all friendly powers. The exemption of such vessels
from local jurisdiction while within such waters was not established until within comparatively
recent times. In 1794, Attorney-General Bradford, and in 1796 Attorney-General Lee, rendered
opinions to the effect that "the laws of nations invest the commander of a foreign ship of war with
no exemption from the jurisdiction of the country into which he comes." (1, Op. U.S. Attys. Gen., 46,
87.) This theory was also supported by Lord Stowell in an opinion given by him to the British
Government as late as 1820. In the leading case of the Schooner Exchange vs. McFadden (7 Cranch
(U.S.), 116, 144), Chief Justice Marshall said that the implied license under which such vessels enter a
friendly port may reasonably be construed as "containing exemption from the jurisdiction of the
sovereign within whose territory she claims the rights of hospitality." The principle was accepted by
the Geneva Arbitration Tribunal, which announced that "the priviledge of exterritoriality accorded to
vessels of war has been admitted in the law of nations; not as an absolute right, but solely as a
proceeding founded on the principle of courtesy and mutual deference between nations."
(2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., secs. 252 and 254; Hall, Int. Law, sec. 55; Taylor, Int. Law, sec. 256; Ortolan,
Dip de la Mer, 2. C.X.)
Such vessels are therefore permitted during times of peace to come and go freely. Local official
exercise but little control over their actions, and offenses committed by their crew are justiciable by
their own officers acting under the laws to which they primarily owe allegiance. This limitation upon
the general principle of territorial sovereignty is based entirely upon comity and convenience, and
finds its justification in the fact that experience shows that such vessels are generally careful to
respect local laws and regulation which are essential to the health, order, and well-being of the port.
But comity and convenience does not require the extension of the same degree of exemption to
merchant vessels. There are two well-defined theories as to extent of the immunities ordinarily
granted to them, According to the French theory and practice, matters happening on board a
merchant ship which do not concern the tranquillity of the port or persons foreign to the crew, are
justiciable only by the court of the country to which the vessel belongs. The French courts therefore
claim exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed on board French merchant vessels in foreign
ports by one member of the crew against another. (See Bonfils, Le Droit Int. (quat. ed.), secs. 624-
628; Martens, Le Droit Int., tome 2, pp. 338, 339; Ortolan, Dip. de la Mer, tit. 1, p. 292; Masse, Droit
Int., tome 2, p. 63.) Such jurisdiction has never been admitted or claim by Great Britain as a right,
although she has frequently conceded it by treaties. (Halleck, Int. Law (Baker's ed.), vol. 1, 231;
British Territorial Waters Act, 1878.) Writers who consider exterritoriality as a fact instead of a
theory have sought to restrict local jurisdiction, but Hall, who is doubtless the leading English
authority, says that —
It is admitted by the most thoroughgoing asserters of the territoriality of merchant vessels that so
soon as the latter enter the ports of a foreign state they become subject to the local jurisdiction on
all points in which the interests of the country are touched. (Hall, Int. Law, p. 263.)
The United States has adhered consistently to the view that when a merchant vessel enters a foreign
port it is subject to the jurisdiction of the local authorities, unless the local sovereignty has by act of
acquiescence or through treaty arrangements consented to waive a portion of such jurisdiction. (15
Op. Attys. Gen., U. S., 178; 2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 204; article by Dean Gregory, Mich. Law
Review, Vol. II, No. 5.) Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of the Exchange, said that —
When merchant vessels enter for the purpose of trade, in would be obviously in convinient and
dangerous to society and would subject the laws to continual infraction and the government to
degradation if such individual merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not
amendable to the jurisdiction of the country.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently said that the merchant vessels of one country
visiting the ports of another for the purpose of trade, subject themselves to the laws which govern
the ports they visit, so long as they remain; and this as well in war as in peace, unless otherwise
provided by treaty. (U. S. vs. Diekelman, 92 U. S., 520-525.)
Certain limitations upon the jurisdiction of the local courts are imposed by article 13 of the treaty of
commerce and navigation between Sweden and Norway and the United States, of July 4, 1827,
which concedes to the consul, vice-consuls, or consular agents of each country "The right to sit as
judges and arbitrators in such differences as may arise between the captains and crews of the
vessels belonging to the nation whose interests are committed to their charge, without the
interference of the local authorities, unless the conduct of the crews or of the captains should
disturb the order or tranquillity of the country." (Comp. of Treaties in Force, 1904, p. 754.) This
exception applies to controversies between the members of the ship's company, and particularly to
disputes regarding wages. (2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 206, p. 318; Tellefsen vs. Fee, 168 Mass.,
188.) The order and tranquillity of the country are affected by many events which do not amount to
a riot or general public disturbance. Thus an assault by one member of the crew upon another,
committed upon the ship, of which the public may have no knowledge whatever, is not by this treaty
withdrawn from the cognizance of the local authorities.
In 1876 the mates of the Swedish bark Frederike and Carolina engaged in a "quarrel" on board the
vessel in the port of Galveston, Texas. They were prosecuted before a justice of the peace, but the
United States district attorney was instructed by the Government to take the necessary steps to
have the proceedings dismissed, and the aid of the governor of Texas was invoked with the view to
"guard against a repetition of similar proceedings." (Mr. Fish, Secretary of State, to Mr. Grip, Swedish
and Norwegian charged, May 16, 1876; Moore, Int. Law Dig.) It does not appear that this "quarrel"
was of such a nature as to amount to a breach of the criminal laws of Texas, but when in 1879 the
mate for the Norwegian bark Livingston was prosecuted in the courts of Philadelphia County for an
assault and battery committed on board the ship while lying in the port of Philadelphia, it was held
that there was nothing in the treaty which deprived the local courts of jurisdiction. (Commonwealth
vs. Luckness, 14 Phila. (Pa.), 363.) Representations were made through diplomatic channels to the
State Department, and on July 30, 1880, Mr. Evarts, Secretary of State, wrote to Count Lewenhaupt,
the Swedish and Norwegian minister, as follows:
I have the honor to state that I have given the matter careful consideration in connection with the
views and suggestion of your note and the provisions of the thirteenth article of the treaty of 1827
between the United States and Sweden and Norway. The stipulations contained in the last clause of
that article . . . are those under which it is contended by you that jurisdiction is conferred on the
consular officers, not only in regard to such differences of a civil nature growing out of the contract
of engagement of the seamen, but also as to disposing of controversies resulting from personal
violence involving offense for which the party may be held amenable under the local criminal law.
This Government does not view the article in question as susceptible of such broad interpretation.
The jurisdiction conferred upon the consuls is conceived to be limited to their right to sit as judges or
abitrators in such differences as may arise between captains and crews of the vessels, where such
differences do not involve on the part of the captain or crew a disturbance of the order or
tranquillity of the country. When, however, a complaint is made to a local magistrate, either by the
captain or one or more of the crew of the vessel, involving the disturbance of the order or
tranquillity of the country, it is competent for such magistrate to take cognizance of the matter in
furtherance of the local laws, and under such circumstances in the United States it becomes a public
duty which the judge or magistrate is not at liberty voluntarily to forego. In all such cases it must
necessarily be left to the local judicial authorities whether the procedure shall take place in the
United States or in Sweden to determine if in fact there had been such disturbance of the local order
and tranquillity, and if the complaint is supported by such proof as results in the conviction of the
party accused, to visit upon the offenders such punishment as may be defined against the offense by
the municipal law of the place." (Moore, Int. Law Dig., vol. 2, p. 315.)
The treaty does not therefore deprive the local courts of jurisdiction over offenses committed on
board a merchant vessel by one member of the crew against another which amount to a disturbance
of the order or tranquillity of the country, and a fair and reasonable construction of the language
requires un to hold that any violation of criminal laws disturbs the order or traquillity of the country.
The offense with which the appellant is charged had nothing to so with any difference between the
captain and the crew. It was a violation by the master of the criminal law of the country into whose
port he came. We thus find that neither by reason of the nationality of the vessel, the place of the
commission of the offense, or the prohibitions of any treaty or general principle of public law, are
the court of the Philippine Islands deprived of jurisdiction over the offense charged in the
information in this case.
It is further contended that the complaint is defective because it does not allege that the animals
were disembarked at the port of Manila, an allegation which it is claimed is essential to the
jurisdiction of the court sitting at that port. To hold with the appellant upon this issue would be to
construe the language of the complaint very strictly against the Government. The disembarkation of
the animals is not necessary in order to constitute the completed offense, and a reasonable
construction of the language of the statute confers jurisdiction upon the court sitting at the port into
which the animals are bought. They are then within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and the
mere fact of their disembarkation is immaterial so far as jurisdiction is concerned. This might be
different if the disembarkation of the animals constituted a constitutional element in the offense,
but it does not.
It is also contended that the information is insufficient because it fails to allege that the defendant
knowingly and willfully failed to provide suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so
as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering. The allegation of the complaint that the act was
committed willfully includes the allegation that it was committed knowingly. As said in Woodhouse
vs. Rio Grande R.R. Company (67 Texas, 416), "the word 'willfully' carries the idea, when used in
connection with an act forbidden by law, that the act must be done knowingly or intentionally; that,
with knowledge, the will consented to, designed, and directed the act." So in Wong vs. City of
Astoria (13 Oregon, 538), it was said: "The first one is that the complaint did not show, in the words
of the ordinance, that the appellant 'knowingly' did the act complained of. This point, I think, was
fully answered by the respondent's counsel — that the words 'willfully' and 'knowingly' conveyed
the same meaning. To 'willfully' do an act implies that it was done by design — done for a certain
purpose; and I think that it would necessarily follow that it was 'knowingly' done." To the same
effect is Johnson vs. The People (94 Ill., 505), which seems to be on all fours with the present case.
The evidence shows not only that the defendant's acts were knowingly done, but his defense rests
upon the assertion that "according to his experience, the system of carrying cattle loose upon the
decks and in the hold is preferable and more secure to the life and comfort of the animals." It was
conclusively proven that what was done was done knowingly and intentionally.
In charging an offense under section 6 of General Orders, No. 58, paragraph 3, it is only necessary to
state the act or omission complained of as constituting a crime or public offense in ordinary and
concise language, without repitition. It need not necessarily be in the words of the statute, but it
must be in such form as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended and
the court to pronounce judgment according to right. A complaint which complies with this
requirement is good. (U.S. vs. Sarabia, 4 Phil. Rep., 556.)
The Act, which is in the English language, impose upon the master of a vessel the duty to "provide
suitable means for securing such animals while in transit, so as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary
suffering to the animals." The allegation of the complaint as it reads in English is that the defendant
willfully, unlawfully, and wrongfully carried the cattle "without providing suitable means for securing
said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said animals in
this . . . that by reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure of the accused to provide suitable means
for securing said animals were cruelty torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon the
decks and hold of said vessels, and cruelty wounded, bruised, and killed."
The appellant contends that the language of the Spanish text of the information does not charge him
with failure to provide "sufficient" and "adequate" means. The words used are "medios suficientes"
and "medios adecuados." In view of the fact that the original complaint was prepared in English, and
that the word "suitable" is translatable by the words "adecuado," "suficiente," and "conveniente,"
according to the context and circumstances, we determine this point against the appellant,
particularly in view of the fact that the objection was not made in the court below, and that the
evidence clearly shows a failure to provide "suitable means for the protection of the animals."
2. The appellant's arguments against the constitutionality of Act No. 55 and the amendment thereto
seems to rest upon a fundamentally erroneous conception of the constitutional law of these Islands.
The statute penalizes acts and ommissions incidental to the transportation of live stock between
foreign ports and ports of the Philippine Islands, and had a similar statute regulating commerce with
its ports been enacted by the legislature of one of the States of the Union, it would doubtless have
been in violation of Article I, section 3, of the Constitution of the United States. (Stubbs vs. People
(Colo.), 11 L. R. A., N. S., 1071.)
But the Philippine Islands is not a State, and its relation to the United States is controlled by
constitutional principles different from those which apply to States of the Union. The importance of
the question thus presented requires a statement of the principles which govern those relations, and
consideration of the nature and extent of the legislative power of the Philippine Commission and the
Legislature of the Philippines. After much discussion and considerable diversity of opinion certain
applicable constitutional doctrines are established.
The Constitution confers upon the United States the express power to make war and treaties, and it
has the power possessed by all nations to acquire territory by conquest or treaty. Territory thus
acquired belongs to the United States, and to guard against the possibility of the power of Congress
to provide for its government being questioned, the framers of the Constitution provided in express
terms that Congress should have the power "to dispose of and make all needful rules and
regulations respecting territory and other property belonging to the United States." (Art. IV, sec. 3,
par. 3.) Upon the acquisition of the territory by the United States, and until it is formally
incorporated into the Union, the duty of providing a government therefor devolves upon Congress.
It may govern the territory by its direct acts, or it may create a local government, and delegate
thereto the ordinary powers required for local government. (Binns vs. U. S., 194 U. S., 486.) This has
been the usual procedure. Congress has provided such governments for territories which were
within the Union, and for newly acquired territory not yet incorporated therein. It has been
customary to organize a government with the ordinary separation of powers into executive,
legislative, and judicial, and to prescribe in an organic act certain general conditions in accordance
with which the local government should act. The organic act thus became the constitution of the
government of the territory which had not been formally incorporated into the Union, and the
validity of legislation enacted by the local legislature was determined by its conformity with the
requirements of such organic act. (National Bank vs. Yankton, 11 Otto (U. S.), 129.) To the legislative
body of the local government Congress has delegated that portion of legislative power which in its
wisdom it deemed necessary for the government of the territory, reserving, however, the right to
annul the action of the local legislature and itself legislate directly for the territory. This power has
been exercised during the entire period of the history of the United States. The right of Congress to
delegate such legislative power can no longer be seriously questioned. (Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138;
U. S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U. S., 370, 385.)
The Constitution of the United States does not by its own force operate within such territory,
although the liberality of Congress in legislating the Constitution into contiguous territory tended to
create an impression upon the minds of many people that it went there by its own force. (Downes
vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 289.) In legislating with reference to this territory, the power of Congress is
limited only by those prohibitions of the Constitution which go to the very root of its power to act at
all, irrespective of time or place. In all other respects it is plenary. (De Lima vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 1;
Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 244; Hawaii vs. Mankichi, 190 U. S., 197; Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138;
Rassmussen vs. U. S., 197 U. S., 516.)
This power has been exercised by Congress throughout the whole history of the United States, and
legislation founded on the theory was enacted long prior to the acquisition of the present Insular
possessions. Section 1891 of the Revised Statutes of 1878 provides that "The Constitution and all
laws of the United States which are not locally inapplicable shall have the same force and effect
within all the organized territories, and in every Territory hereafter organized, as elsewhere within
the United States." When Congress organized a civil government for the Philippines, it expressly
provided that this section of the Revised Statutes should not apply to the Philippine Islands. (Sec. 1,
Act of 1902.)
In providing for the government of the territory which was acquired by the United States as a result
of the war with Spain, the executive and legislative authorities have consistently proceeded in
conformity with the principles above state. The city of Manila was surrendered to the United States
on August 13, 1898, and the military commander was directed to hold the city, bay, and harbor,
pending the conclusion of a peace which should determine the control, disposition, and government
of the Islands. The duty then devolved upon the American authorities to preserve peace and protect
person and property within the occupied territory. Provision therefor was made by proper orders,
and on August 26 General Merritt assumed the duties of military governor. The treaty of peace was
signed December 10, 1898. On the 22d of December, 1898, the President announced that the
destruction of the Spanish fleet and the surrender of the city had practically effected the conquest of
the Philippine Islands and the suspension of the Spanish sovereignty therein, and that by the treaty
of peace the future control, disposition, and government of the Islands had been ceded to the
United States. During the periods of strict military occupation, before the treaty of peace was
ratified, and the interim thereafter, until Congress acted (Santiago vs. Noueral, 214 U.S., 260), the
territory was governed under the military authority of the President as commander in chief. Long
before Congress took any action, the President organized a civil government which, however, had its
legal justification, like the purely military government which it gradually superseded, in the war
power. The military power of the President embraced legislative, executive personally, or through
such military or civil agents as he chose to select. As stated by Secretary Root in his report for 1901
—
The military power in exercise in a territory under military occupation includes executive, legislative,
and judicial authority. It not infrequently happens that in a single order of a military commander can
be found the exercise of all three of these different powers — the exercise of the legislative powers
by provisions prescribing a rule of action; of judicial power by determination of right; and the
executive power by the enforcement of the rules prescribed and the rights determined.
President McKinley desired to transform military into civil government as rapidly as conditions would
permit. After full investigation, the organization of civil government was initiated by the
appointment of a commission to which civil authority was to be gradually transferred. On September
1, 1900, the authority to exercise, subject to the approval of the President. "that part of the military
power of the President in the Philippine Islands which is legislative in its character" was transferred
from the military government to the Commission, to be exercised under such rules and regulations
as should be prescribed by the Secretary of War, until such time as complete civil government
should be established, or congress otherwise provided. The legislative power thus conferred upon
the Commission was declared to include "the making of rules and orders having the effect of law for
the raising of revenue by taxes, customs duties, and imposts; the appropriation and expenditure of
public funds of the Islands; the establishment of an educational system to secure an efficient civil
service; the organization and establishment of courts; the organization and establishment of
municipal and departmental government, and all other matters of a civil nature which the military
governor is now competent to provide by rules or orders of a legislative character." This grant of
legislative power to the Commission was to be exercised in conformity with certain declared general
principles, and subject to certain specific restrictions for the protection of individual rights. The
Commission were to bear in mind that the government to be instituted was "not for our satisfaction
or for the expression of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the
people of the Philippine Island, and the measures adopted should be made to conforms to their
customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the
accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective government." The specific
restrictions upon legislative power were found in the declarations that "no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation; that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be
confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense; that excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted; that no person
shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense or be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself; that the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures shall
not be violated; that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist except as a punishment for
crime; that no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed; that no law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble
and petition the Government for a redress of grievances; that no law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship without discrimination or preference shall forever be
allowed."
To prevent any question as to the legality of these proceedings being raised, the Spooner
amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill passed March 2, 1901, provided that "all military, civil,
and judicial powers necessary to govern the Philippine Islands . . . shall until otherwise provided by
Congress be vested in such person and persons, and shall be exercised in such manner, as the
President of the United States shall direct, for the establishment of civil government, and for
maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of said Islands in the free enjoyment of their liberty,
property, and religion." Thereafter, on July 4, 1901, the authority, which had been exercised
previously by the military governor, was transferred to that official. The government thus created by
virtue of the authority of the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy continued to
administer the affairs of the Islands under the direction of the President until by the Act of July 1,
1902, Congress assumed control of the situation by the enactment of a law which, in connection
with the instructions of April 7, 1900, constitutes the organic law of the Philippine Islands.
The Act of July 1, 1902, made no substancial changes in the form of government which the President
had erected. Congress adopted the system which was in operation, and approved the action of the
President in organizing the government. Substantially all the limitations which had been imposed on
the legislative power by the President's instructions were included in the law, Congress thus
extending to the Islands by legislative act nor the Constitution, but all its provisions for the
protection of the rights and privileges of individuals which were appropriate under the conditions.
The action of the President in creating the Commission with designated powers of government, in
creating the office of the Governor-General and Vice-Governor-General, and through the
Commission establishing certain executive departments, was expressly approved and ratified.
Subsequently the action of the President in imposing a tariff before and after the ratification of the
treaty of peace was also ratified and approved by Congress. (Act of March 8, 1902; Act of July 1,
1902; U.S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U.S., 370; Lincoln vs. U.S., 197 U.S., 419.) Until otherwise provided by
law the Islands were to continue to be governed "as thereby and herein provided." In the future the
enacting clause of all statutes should read "By authority of the United States" instead of "By the
authority of the President." In the course of time the legislative authority of the Commission in all
parts of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or non-Christian tribes was to be transferred to a
legislature consisting of two houses — the Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly. The
government of the Islands was thus assumed by Congress under its power to govern newly acquired
territory not incorporated into the United States.
This Government of the Philippine Islands is not a State or a Territory, although its form and
organization somewhat resembles that of both. It stands outside of the constitutional relation which
unites the States and Territories into the Union. The authority for its creation and maintenance is
derived from the Constitution of the United States, which, however, operates on the President and
Congress, and not directly on the Philippine Government. It is the creation of the United States,
acting through the President and Congress, both deriving power from the same source, but from
different parts thereof. For its powers and the limitations thereon the Government of the Philippines
looked to the orders of the President before Congress acted and the Acts of Congress after it
assumed control. Its organic laws are derived from the formally and legally expressed will of the
President and Congress, instead of the popular sovereign constituency which lies upon any subject
relating to the Philippines is primarily in Congress, and when it exercise such power its act is from
the viewpoint of the Philippines the legal equivalent of an amendment of a constitution in the
United States.
Within the limits of its authority the Government of the Philippines is a complete governmental
organism with executive, legislative, and judicial departments exercising the functions commonly
assigned to such departments. The separation of powers is as complete as in most governments. In
neither Federal nor State governments is this separation such as is implied in the abstract statement
of the doctrine. For instance, in the Federal Government the Senate exercises executive powers, and
the President to some extent controls legislation through the veto power. In a State the veto power
enables him to exercise much control over legislation. The Governor-General, the head of the
executive department in the Philippine Government, is a member of the Philippine Commission, but
as executive he has no veto power. The President and Congress framed the government on the
model with which Americans are familiar, and which has proven best adapted for the advancement
of the public interests and the protection of individual rights and priviliges.
In instituting this form of government of intention must have been to adopt the general
constitutional doctrined which are inherent in the system. Hence, under it the Legislature must
enact laws subject to the limitations of the organic laws, as Congress must act under the national
Constitution, and the States under the national and state constitutions. The executive must execute
such laws as are constitutionally enacted. The judiciary, as in all governments operating under
written constitutions, must determine the validity of legislative enactments, as well as the legality of
all private and official acts. In performing these functions it acts with the same independence as the
Federal and State judiciaries in the United States. Under no other constitutional theory could there
be that government of laws and not of men which is essential for the protection of rights under a
free and orderly government.
Such being the constitutional theory of the Government of the Philippine Islands, it is apparent that
the courts must consider the question of the validity of an act of the Philippine Commission or the
Philippine Legislature, as a State court considers an act of the State legislature. The Federal
Government exercises such powers only as are expressly or impliedly granted to it by the
Constitution of the United States, while the States exercise all powers which have not been granted
to the central government. The former operates under grants, the latter subject to restrictions. The
validity of an Act of Congress depends upon whether the Constitution of the United States contains a
grant of express or implied authority to enact it. An act of a State legislature is valid unless the
Federal or State constitution expressly or impliedly prohibits its enaction. An Act of the legislative
authority of the Philippines Government which has not been expressly disapproved by Congress is
valid unless its subject-matter has been covered by congressional legislation, or its enactment
forbidden by some provision of the organic laws.
The legislative power of the Government of the Philippines is granted in general terms subject to
specific limitations. The general grant is not alone of power to legislate on certain subjects, but to
exercise the legislative power subject to the restrictions stated. It is true that specific authority is
conferred upon the Philippine Government relative to certain subjects of legislation, and that
Congress has itself legislated upon certain other subjects. These, however, should be viewed simply
as enactments on matters wherein Congress was fully informed and ready to act, and not as
implying any restriction upon the local legislative authority in other matters. (See Opinion of Atty.
Gen. of U. S., April 16, 1908.)
The fact that Congress reserved the power to annul specific acts of legislation by the Government of
the Philippine tends strongly to confirm the view that for purposes of construction the Government
of the Philippines should be regarded as one of general instead of enumerated legislative powers.
The situation was unusual. The new government was to operate far from the source of its authority.
To relieve Congress from the necessity of legislating with reference to details, it was thought better
to grant general legislative power to the new government, subject to broad and easily understood
prohibitions, and reserve to Congress the power to annul its acts if they met with disapproval. It was
therefore provided "that all laws passed by the Government of the Philippine Islands shall be
reported to Congress, which hereby reserves the power and authority to annul the same." (Act of
Congress, July 1, 1902, sec. 86.) This provision does not suspend the acts of the Legislature of the
Philippines until approved by Congress, or when approved, expressly or by acquiescence, make them
the laws of Congress. They are valid acts of the Government of the Philippine Islands until annulled.
(Miners Bank vs. Iowa, 12 How. (U. S.), 1.)
In order to determine the validity of Act No. 55 we must then ascertain whether the Legislature has
been expressly or implication forbidden to enact it. Section 3, Article IV, of the Constitution of the
United States operated only upon the States of the Union. It has no application to the Government
of the Philippine Islands. The power to regulate foreign commerce is vested in Congress, and by
virtue of its power to govern the territory belonging to the United States, it may regulate foreign
commerce with such territory. It may do this directly, or indirectly through a legislative body created
by it, to which its power in this respect if delegate. Congress has by direct legislation determined the
duties which shall be paid upon goods imported into the Philippines, and it has expressly authorized
the Government of the Philippines to provide for the needs of commerce by improving harbors and
navigable waters. A few other specific provisions relating to foreign commerce may be found in the
Acts of Congress, but its general regulation is left to the Government of the Philippines, subject to
the reserved power of Congress to annul such legislation as does not meet with its approval. The
express limitations upon the power of the Commission and Legislature to legislate do not affect the
authority with respect to the regulation of commerce with foreign countries. Act No. 55 was enacted
before Congress took over the control of the Islands, and this act was amended by Act No. 275 after
the Spooner amendment of March 2, 1901, was passed. The military government, and the civil
government instituted by the President, had the power, whether it be called legislative or
administrative, to regulate commerce between foreign nations and the ports of the territory. (Cross
vs. Harrison, 16 How. (U.S.), 164, 190; Hamilton vs. Dillin, 21 Wall. (U.S.), 73, 87.) This Act has
remained in force since its enactment without annulment or other action by Congress, and must be
presumed to have met with its approval. We are therefore satisfied that the Commission had, and
the Legislature now has, full constitutional power to enact laws for the regulation of commerce
between foreign countries and the ports of the Philippine Islands, and that Act No. 55, as amended
by Act No. 275, is valid.
3. Whether a certain method of handling cattle is suitable within the meaning of the Act can not be
left to the judgment of the master of the ship. It is a question which must be determined by the
court from the evidence. On December 2, 1908, the defendant Bull brought into and disembarked in
the port and city of Manila certain cattle, which came from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, without
providing suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and
unnecessary suffering to said animals, contrary to the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 55, as
amended by section 1 of Act No. 275. The trial court found the following facts, all of which are fully
sustained by the evidence:
That the defendant, H. N. Bull, as captain and master of the Norwegian steamer known as the
Standard, for a period of six months or thereabouts prior to the 2d day of December, 1908, was
engaged in the transportation of cattle and carabaos from Chines and Japanese ports to and into the
city of Manila, Philippine Islands.
That on the 2d day of December, 1908, the defendant, as such master and captain as aforesaid,
brought into the city of Manila, aboard said ship, a large number of cattle, which ship was anchored,
under the directions of the said defendant, behind the breakwaters in front of the city of Manila, in
Manila Bay, and within the jurisdiction of this court; and that fifteen of said cattle then and there
had broken legs and three others of said cattle were dead, having broken legs; and also that said
cattle were transported and carried upon said ship as aforesaid by the defendant, upon the deck and
in the hold of said ship, without suitable precaution and care for the transportation of said animals,
and to avoid danger and risk to their lives and security; and further that said cattle were so
transported abroad said ship by the defendant and brought into the said bay, and into the city of
Manila, without any provisions being made whatever upon said decks of said ship and in the hold
thereof to maintain said cattle in a suitable condition and position for such transportation.
That a suitable and practicable manner in which to transport cattle abroad steamship coming into
Manila Bay and unloading in the city of Manila is by way of individual stalls for such cattle, providing
partitions between the cattle and supports at the front sides, and rear thereof, and cross-cleats
upon the floor on which they stand and are transported, of that in case of storms, which are
common in this community at sea, such cattle may be able to stand without slipping and pitching
and falling, individually or collectively, and to avoid the production of panics and hazard to the
animals on account or cattle were transported in this case. Captain Summerville of the steamship
Taming, a very intelligent and experienced seaman, has testified, as a witness in behalf of the
Government, and stated positively that since the introduction in the ships with which he is
acquainted of the stall system for the transportation of animals and cattle he has suffered no loss
whatever during the last year. The defendant has testified, as a witness in his own behalf, that
according to his experience the system of carrying cattle loose upon the decks and in the hold is
preferable and more secure to the life and comfort of the animals, but this theory of the case is not
maintainable, either by the proofs or common reason. It can not be urged with logic that, for
instance, three hundred cattle supports for the feet and without stalls or any other protection for
them individually can safely and suitably carried in times of storm upon the decks and in the holds of
ships; such a theory is against the law of nature. One animal falling or pitching, if he is untied or
unprotected, might produce a serious panic and the wounding of half the animals upon the ship if
transported in the manner found in this case.
The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred and fifty pesos, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The sentence and judgment is
affirmed. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5887 December 16, 1910
vs.
LOOK CHAW (alias LUK CHIU), defendant-appellant.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.
ARELLANO, C. J.:
The first complaint filed against the defendant, in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, stated that he
"carried, kept, possessed and had in his possession and control, 96 kilogrammes of opium," and that
"he had been surprised in the act of selling 1,000 pesos worth prepared opium."
The defense presented a demurrer based on two grounds, the second of which was the more than
one crime was charged in the complaint. The demurrer was sustained, as the court found that the
complaint contained two charges, one, for the unlawful possession of opium, and the other, for the
unlawful sale of opium, and, consequence of that ruling, it ordered that the fiscal should separated
one charge from the other and file a complaint for each violation; this, the fiscal did, and this cause
concerns only the unlawful possession of opium. It is registered as No. 375, in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, and as No. 5887 on the general docket of this court.
The facts of the case are contained in the following finding of the trial court:
The evidence, it says, shows that between 11 and 12 o'clock a. m. on the present month (stated as
August 19, 1909), several persons, among them Messrs. Jacks and Milliron, chief of the department
of the port of Cebu and internal-revenue agent of Cebu, respectively, went abroad the steamship
Erroll to inspect and search its cargo, and found, first in a cabin near the saloon, one sack (Exhibit A)
and afterwards in the hold, another sack (Exhibit B). The sack referred to as Exhibit A contained 49
cans of opium, and the other, Exhibit B, the larger sack, also contained several cans of the same
substance. The hold, in which the sack mentioned in Exhibit B was found, was under the defendant's
control, who moreover, freely and of his own will and accord admitted that this sack, as well as the
other referred to in Exhibit B and found in the cabin, belonged to him. The said defendant also
stated, freely and voluntarily, that he had bought these sacks of opium, in Hongkong with the
intention of selling them as contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz, and that, as his hold had already
been searched several times for opium, he ordered two other Chinamen to keep the sack. Exhibit A.
It is to be taken into account that the two sacks of opium, designated as Exhibits A and B, properly
constitute the corpus delicti. Moreover, another lot of four cans of opium, marked, as Exhibit C, was
the subject matter of investigation at the trial, and with respect to which the chief of the
department of the port of Cebu testified that they were found in the part of the ship where the
firemen habitually sleep, and that they were delivered to the first officer of the ship to be returned
to the said firemen after the vessel should have left the Philippines, because the firemen and crew of
foreign vessels, pursuant to the instructions he had from the Manila custom-house, were permitted
to retain certain amounts of opium, always provided it should not be taken shore.
And, finally, another can of opium, marked "Exhibit D," is also corpus delicti and important as
evidence in this cause. With regard to this the internal-revenue agent testified as follows:itc-alf
FISCAL. What is it?
WITNESS. It is a can opium which was bought from the defendant by a secret-service agent and
taken to the office of the governor to prove that the accused had opium in his possession to sell.
On motion by the defense, the court ruled that this answer might be stricken out "because it refers
to a sale." But, with respect to this answer, the chief of the department of customs had already given
this testimony, to wit:
FISCAL. Who asked you to search the vessel?
WITNESS. The internal-revenue agent came to my office and said that a party brought him a sample
of opium and that the same party knew that there was more opium on board the steamer, and the
agent asked that the vessel be searched.
The defense moved that this testimony be rejected, on the ground of its being hearsay evidence, and
the court only ordered that the part thereof "that there was more opium, on board the vessel" be
stricken out.
The defense, to abbreviate proceedings, admitted that the receptacles mentioned as Exhibits A, B,
and C, contained opium and were found on board the steamship Erroll, a vessel of English
nationality, and that it was true that the defendant stated that these sacks of opium were his and
that he had them in his possession.
According to the testimony of the internal-revenue agent, the defendant stated to him, in the
presence of the provincial fiscal, of a Chinese interpreter (who afterwards was not needed, because
the defendant spoke English), the warden of the jail, and four guards, that the opium seized in the
vessel had been bought by him in Hongkong, at three pesos for each round can and five pesos for
each one of the others, for the purpose of selling it, as contraband, in Mexico and Puerto de Vera
Cruz; that on the 15th the vessel arrived at Cebu, and on the same day he sold opium; that he had
tried to sell opium for P16 a can; that he had a contract to sell an amount of the value of about P500;
that the opium found in the room of the other two Chinamen prosecuted in another cause, was his,
and that he had left it in their stateroom to avoid its being found in his room, which had already
been searched many times; and that, according to the defendant, the contents of the large sack was
80 cans of opium, and of the small one, 49, and the total number, 129.
It was established that the steamship Erroll was of English nationality, that it came from Hongkong,
and that it was bound for Mexico, via the call ports of Manila and Cebu.
The defense moved for a dismissal of the case, on the grounds that the court had no jurisdiction to
try the same and the facts concerned therein did not constitute a crime. The fiscal, at the conclusion
of his argument, asked that the maximum penalty of the law be imposed upon the defendant, in
view of the considerable amount of opium seized. The court ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction,
inasmuch as the crime had been committed within its district, on the wharf of Cebu.
The court sentenced the defendant to five years' imprisonment, to pay a fine of P10,000, with
additional subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, though not to exceed one third of the
principal penalty, and to the payment of the costs. It further ordered the confiscation, in favor of the
Insular Government, of the exhibits presented in the case, and that, in the event of an appeal being
taken or a bond given, or when the sentenced should have been served, the defendant be not
released from custody, but turned over to the customs authorities for the purpose of the fulfillment
of the existing laws on immigration.
From this judgment, the defendant appealed to this court.lawphi1.net

The appeal having been heard, together with the allegations made therein by the parties, it is found:
That, although the mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign
vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the
courts of this country, on account of such vessel being considered as an extension of its own
nationality, the same rule does not apply when the article, whose use is prohibited within the
Philippine Islands, in the present case a can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil,
thus committing an open violation of the laws of the land, with respect to which, as it is a violation
of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime, only the court established in
that said place itself had competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an
international treaty.
It is also found: That, even admitting that the quantity of the drug seized, the subject matter of the
present case, was considerable, it does not appear that, on such account, the two penalties fixed by
the law on the subject, should be imposed in the maximum degree.
Therefore, reducing the imprisonment and the fine imposed to six months and P1,000, respectively,
we affirm in all other respects the judgment appealed from, with the costs of this instance against
the appellant. So ordered.
Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18924 October 19, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), defendant-appellee.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellant.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, sustaining the demurrer presented by the defendant to the information that initiated this
case and in which the appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant
vessel Changsa of English nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half
miles from the shores of the city.
The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court, which so held and dismissed
the case.
The question that presents itself for our consideration is whether such ruling is erroneous or not;
and it will or will not be erroneous according as said court has or has no jurisdiction over said
offense.
The point at issue is whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime, like the one
herein involved, committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters.
1awph!l.net
There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with International Law; to
wit, the French rule, according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should
not be prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were
committed, unless their commission affects the peace and security of the territory; and the English
rule, based on the territorial principle and followed in the United States, according to which, crimes
perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the country within
territory they were committed. Of this two rules, it is the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction,
because at present the theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this matter are
authority in the Philippines which is now a territory of the United States.
In the cases of The Schooner Exchange vs. M'Faddon and Others (7 Cranch [U. S.], 116), Chief Justice
Marshall said:
. . . When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be obviously inconvenient and
dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to continual infraction, and the government to
degradation, if such individuals or merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were
not amenable to the jurisdiction of the country. . . .
In United States vs. Bull (15 Phil., 7), this court held:
. . . No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offense or crime committed on the
high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but when she came within three miles
of a line drawn from the headlands, which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within
territorial waters, and a new set of principles became applicable. (Wheaton, International Law [Dana
ed.], p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., secs. 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and
her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject to such limitations
as have been conceded by that sovereignty through the proper political agency. . . .
It is true that in certain cases the comity of nations is observed, as in Mali and Wildenhus vs. Keeper
of the Common Jail (120 U.., 1), wherein it was said that:
. . . The principle which governs the whole matter is this: Disorder which disturb only the peace of
the ship or those on board are to be dealt with exclusively by the sovereignty of the home of the
ship, but those which disturb the public peace may be suppressed, and, if need be, the offenders
punished by the proper authorities of the local jurisdiction. It may not be easy at all times to
determine which of the two jurisdictions a particular act of disorder belongs. Much will undoubtedly
depend on the attending circumstances of the particular case, but all must concede that felonious
homicide is a subject for the local jurisdiction, and that if the proper authorities are proceeding with
the case in the regular way the consul has no right to interfere to prevent it.
Hence in United States vs. Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573), this court held that:
Although the mere possession of an article of prohibited use in the Philippine Islands, aboard a
foreign vessel in transit in any local port, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the
courts of the Islands, such vessels being considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same
rule does not apply when the article, the use of which is prohibited in the Islands, is landed from the
vessels upon Philippine soil; in such a case an open violation of the laws of the land is committed
with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of
the crime, no court other than that established in the said place has jurisdiction of the offense, in the
absence of an agreement under an international treaty.
As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or otherwise to renouncing such
jurisdiction or a part thereof, we find nothing to this effect so far as England is concerned, to which
nation the ship where the crime in question was committed belongs. Besides, in his work "Treaties,
Conventions, etc.," volume 1, page 625, Malloy says the following:
There shall be between the territories of the United States of America, and all the territories of His
Britanic Majesty in Europe, a reciprocal liberty of commerce. The inhabitants of the two countries,
respectively, shall have liberty freely and securely to come with their ships and cargoes to all such
places, ports and rivers, in the territories aforesaid, to which other foreigners are permitted to come,
to enter into the same, and to remain and reside in any parts of the said territories, respectively;
also to hire and occupy houses and warehouses for the purposes of their commerce; and, generally,
the merchants and traders of each nation respectively shall enjoy the most complete protection and
security for their commerce, but subject always to the laws and statutes of the two countries,
respectively. (Art. 1, Commerce and Navigation Convention.)
We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this
court not triable by or courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to protect the
inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere
possession in such a ship, without being used in our territory, does not being about in the said
territory those effects that our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not
considered a disturbance of the public order.
But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is
certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it causes such drug to produce its
pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has
in mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute. Moreover, as the Attorney-General aptly
observes:
. . . The idea of a person smoking opium securely on board a foreign vessel at anchor in the port of
Manila in open defiance of the local authorities, who are impotent to lay hands on him, is simply
subversive of public order. It requires no unusual stretch of the imagination to conceive that a
foreign ship may come into the port of Manila and allow or solicit Chinese residents to smoke opium
on board.
The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings in accordance with law, without special findings as to costs. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.
REPUBLIC ACT. 9372
SEC. 58. Extra-Territorial Application of this Act. - Subject to the provision of an existing treaty of
which the Philippines is a signatory and to any contrary provision of any law of preferential
application, the provisions of this Act shall apply: (1) to individual persons who commit any of the
crimes defined and punished in this Act within the terrestrial domain, interior waters, maritime
zone, and airspace of the Philippines; (2) to individual persons who, although physically outside the
territorial limits of the Philippines, commit, conspire or plot to commit any of the crimes defined and
punished in this Act inside the territorial limits of the Philippines; (3) to individual persons who,
although physically outside the territorial limits of the Philippines, commit any of the said crimes on
board Philippine ship or Philippine airship; (4) to individual persons who commit any of said crimes
within any embassy, consulate, or diplomatic premises belonging to or occupied by the Philippine
government in an official capacity; (5) to individual persons who, although physically outside the
territorial limits of the Philippines, commit said crimes against Philippine citizens or persons of
Philippines descent, where their citizenship or ethnicity was a factor in the commission of the crime;
and (6) to individual persons who, although physically outside the territorial limits of the Philippines,
commit said crimes directly against the Philippine government.
TITLE 1. FELONIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Art. 3. Definitions
A. Intentional and non-intentional felonies

17. U.S. vs. Divino 12 Phil. 175
18. People vs. Carmen, G.R. 137268, March 26, 2001
19. Villareal v. People, G.R. Nos. 151258, 154954, 155101, 178057, 178080, February
1, 2012
20. People vs. Garcia, 423 SCRA 583
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4490 December 4, 1908
vs.
FELICIANO DIVINO, defendant-appellant.
Leodegario Azarraga, for appellant.
Attorney-General Araneta, for appellee.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
This cause was brought against Feliciano Divino for the crime of lesiones graves, and appealed by
him to this court from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Moro Province, whereby
he was sentenced to the penalty of two years eleven months and eleven days of presidio
correccional, with the accessory penalty of suspension from all public office, profession, occupation,
or right of suffrage, and to pay the costs of the proceedings. The appeal having been heard, it
appears —
That in September, 1907, a complaint was filed and proceedings were instituted by reason of a deed
which, from the findings of the court below, is said to have occurred four years ago on a certain
night, "the date of which can not be determined from the evidence," consisting of lesiones, of which
there is no further description than that made by the court below at the trial as follows:
The feet of the witness show several large scars which surround both feet, beginning at the instep
and extending to the sole all around the feet. The appearance of the said scars indicates that they
were not caused by blows inflicted by a cutting instrument, but are the result of a lesion of
considerable width. In addition to the wide scar that surrounds each foot there are several small
scars (folio 103).
The court observes that both feet are deformed at the instep as if they had been tightly bound with
a cord, and the resulting depression had become permanent. The left foot is also quite deformed,
the toes being separated to an abnormal extent; the right foot is deformed in the same manner
although not so much. The soles of both feet are deformed on account of protuberances of what
seems to be callous matter. (Folio 109.)
With regard to said lesiones the complaint reads:
That one day in the month of July, 1903, in the municipality of Davao, district of Davao, Moro
Province, the accused, in his house, tied a girl named Alfonsa by the hands and legs, laid her on the
floor, stuffed a piece of cloth into her mouth, and fastened her body to the boards of the said floor;
he then wrapped her feet around with pieces of cloth, saturating said cloth with petroleum, and
thereafter set the cloth on fire by means of a match; the cloth burned for about five minutes or
more, seriously burning the girl's feet, and causing lesiones in said members from the result of which
the said girl became disabled in the said principal members. (Folio 18.)
The so-called Alfonsa does not know her age, but the court below, however, estimated her to be 13.
Neither does she know who are her parents; her former surname was Divino but is now Esperat, and
she calls Segundo Esperat her father, because she says she lived in his house a month; when asked if
Esperat was her true father, she answered no, that she was only his adopted child. She described the
affair in the following manner:
I was in the kitchen preparing food and they sent for me to go to the sala. After I was in the sala
Feliciano's daughter took a rag and soaked it in petroleum. Feliciano then ordered me to lie down on
the floor. Feliciano's eldest daughter took a rag and forced it into my mouth. She then got another
rag and blindfolded me with it. Feliciano's daughter then got a pestle used for hulling rice and
handed it to Feliciano who placed it across my legs, tying its ends to the floor so that I was unable to
stir. While I was in this position on the floor; Feliciano's daughter caught me by the head and
shoulders and held me down. Feliciano then lighted a match and set fire to my feet. They left me
thus for the length of time required to smoke two cigarettes and until the flames were extinguished.
After half a minute Feliciano released me and took me to the storehouse; there they left me and
locked the door. At noon they gave me some food; they kept me three nights in the storehouse.
Afterwards they took me out and locked me up in the hog-pen; they left me there without any
covering and exposed to the open air, but they afterwards fixed up a temporary cover to protect me.
And in answer to questions put to her, she continued to say that there were present in the sala while
Feliciano was burning her feet, Clara, the eldest daughter of the latter, who was then 13 years old,
and the younger ones Nining and Nating together with three servants, Petra, Catalina, and Pedro;
that while they were burning her feet, her hands were tied alongside her body; that Clara, Feliciano's
daughter, held her by the head and shoulders; that a stick was placed over her legs and tied to the
floor, and another was put over her chest and also tied to the floor; that thereafter she was taken to
a storeroom beneath the house wherein she remained three days and nights, and from thence she
was taken to a hog-pen in the rear of the kitchen, which she now says had a roof, remaining there
one month, and that when she left it she continued to live in the house for three months, until one
day, at midnight, without the knowledge of Feliciano, she left in company of a girl named Irinea for
the purpose of making a complaint; that they went to the office of Mr. Wood, which gentleman was
present in the court-room (pointing him out). And when asked where Mr. Wood's office was she
pointed out the government building of the district of Davao.
On cross-examination she said that a Bagobo named Andalan had taken her over to Feliciano's house
to live; that she did not know whether her parents were Bagobos, nor who they were, and that,
when she reached the age of reason, she found herself in the house of Feliciano, so that her first
recollections are of the time of when she was in Feliciano's house, that she had reported the matter
to the American military governor, but to the questions of the counsel for the defense as to whether
any action was taken, the fiscal objected and the court sustained the objection; that, when she went
to Feliciano's house, she already had a scar on the left cheek and another near the mouth; that they
tied her body with a rope, bound her hands, place over her legs a pestle such as is used for hulling
rice, and the three daughters sat on her head and shoulders (it is no longer one daughter who held
her down by the head and shoulders). Subsequently these question were put:
Q. How many times was the rope passed around your body? — A. Three times.
Q. Before the pestle was placed over you? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. What was the rope tied to, the floor? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Tell me for the last time, is it actually true that, when the said stick was placed over you, you
were already tied down with the rope? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. When you were tied down, do you mean that the rope passed through the crevices of the
floor? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. You say that this rope passed through one crevice in the floor and came out by another,
fastening you to the floor; do you not? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was no one beneath the house when this occurred? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Before placing the rag over your feet, is it true that they first soaked it with petroleum and
then placed it on your feet? — A. Yes sir.
Q. How long did the rag burn? — A. Nearly an hour and a half.
By the court:
Q. Do you mean to say that the rag was burning on your feet for an hour and a half? — A. Yes,
sir.
Q. How many cigarettes could you have smoked while the rags were burning? — A. About two
cigarettes.
Q. How long have you been testifying this afternoon? — A. I don't know.
How many cigarettes could you have smoked since you arrived up to the present time? — A. Four
cigarettes.
Note by the court. — The witness has been testifying two hours.
Another witness called Petra, who has no surname and does not know the race to which she belongs
nor what age she is, although the court below reckons her to be between 17 and 21, and who lives in
Davao, with Maria (the accused's third wife who, according to the data contained in the
proceedings, was at the time separated from him), declares that Alfonsa's injuries were the result of
the burns caused by the accused one night; that the latter called her, laid her on the floor of the sala
of the house, tied her down, placing sticks over her chest and feet, put some rags on the latter and
set fire to them, the flames lasting the time required to smoke one cigarette and a half (Alfonsa said
two cigarettes and afterwards one hour and a half); she further testified in relation to the incidents
of the storeroom and the hog-pen, and said that, while she was still in the sala, she saw the feet,
that the skin was swollen, and that Alfonsa was kept for one year in the hog-pen. But upon being
afterwards asked by the court how many months there were in a year she said: "One crop of rice,"
and that she did not know how many months there were in a year, nor days in the week nor hours in
a day, and that, when saying one year, she mean a long time; that when she left the house Alfonsa
was still in the hog-pen. Regarding the rope with which he says Alfonsa was bound, there are the
following questions:
Q. In order to tie this rope to the floor if it true that four nails were driven in the floor? — A.
No, sir; the rope was simply tied to the floor, to the listones (strips used in filling crevices between
the boards).
Q. Did this rope with which she was tied pass entirely around her body? — A. No, it was the
stick that was tied down to the floor.
Q. Then you mean to say that the rope did not go around Alfonsa's body but that it was only
tied to the stick? — A. Yes, and the stick was tied to the boards of the floor [entirely the reverse of
what Alfonsa testified].
Q. Was anybody beneath the house? — A. No, sir.
Q. Were the trips of palma brava wide or narrow? — A. They were narrow.
Q. What distance was there between the strips? — A. There were cracks between them.
Q. Is it not true that this was the distance between the strips [showing half an inch]? — A. No,
sir; it was so [showing a quarter of an inch].
Q. When Feliciano tied the rope to the floor he did it from above; did he not? — A. I don't
know, I did not see it done.
Q. But you were in the sala at that time; were you not? — A. Yes.
Q. Where do you live now? — A. I am living with Maria.
Q. Have you had any conversations with her in connection with these matters? — A. No, sir.
Q. Is it not true that you told several people that you have had a talk with Maria Verano, the
wife of the accused? — A. No, sir.
Q. Did you go to live with Maria Verano after she separated from her husband? — A. Yes, sir.
The third witness for the prosecution is Mr. Orville Wood, 30 years of age, agriculturist, residing in
the municipality of Davao; he was formerly an assistant superintendent of schools, and later served
as secretary of the district of Davao from January, 1904, until the time when he testified; he states
that he had been in the old house of Feliciano, where the affair is said to have occurred, for about
three hours some time in 1905; that he knows Maria Verano who is married to Feliciano Divino, and
believes that he saw her the day before that on which he testified; that he has also known Feliciano
Divino since the year 1904, and that he knows Alfonsa, the girl who testified in court in his presence
on that same day; and he described a conversation that he had with Feliciano Divino on the balcony
of the government building in the following terms:
When Feliciano first came to the balcony we spoke of another matter; what he afterwards stated in
connection with this matter was in answer to a question finally addressed to him by the Governor
Bolton; Governor Bolton said to Feliciano that he, Feliciano, had informed him previously that it was
Maria who had burned Alfonsa's feet, but Governor Bolton knew at the time that this was not true,
and asked him who had burnt her feet; Feliciano replied that it was he who burnt Alfonsa's feet, but
that his wife, Maria, had ordered him to do it; the governor asked him who was the head of his
house; he or his wife.
The witness goes on to say that he subsequently spoke with Petra, Catalina, and Pedro in regard to
the affair in 1904, and also spoke with Petra, Alfonsa, and another whose name he does not
recollect, and that, when he asked Alfonsa who had burnt her feet, she at first said that she did not
know, but when he insisted on her telling him she replied that Feliciano's children had done it. On
being asked if he knew of the crime in June, 1903, he said no, that it had come to his knowledge in
the month of September, 1904; when asked whether, prior to the time that Feliciano told Governor
Bolton in the presence of the witness that he, Feliciano, had burnt Alfonsa's feet, Feliciano had told
him that another person had done it, he answered yes, that his wife, Maria, had burnt Alfonsa's feet;
this statement was made to him at his office in the month of December, 1904, the other one having
been made to the governor in October, 1905; and to the question "Why did he tell you this? he
replied:
When Alfonsa came to the office for the first time, she was very frightened, and we could hardly get
anything, from her; we relied upon Feliciano's word as to who was the guilty party; the girl was small
and sickly and we could not obtain any information from her. When she was removed from the
hands of Feliciano and turned over to another family that was not related to him, and when she
found out that she would not have return to him, it happened one day that I was at the balcony of
the office and saw her coming up the street; when she had nearly reached the road, Feliciano Divino
was coming out of the Auat's store, directly in her road; she turned round at once and ran to the
stairs of the office, and hid herself behind Segundo Esperat; as the result of a conversation that I had
with her, on said occasion I spoke to Feliciano and he then confessed his guilt; Feliciano told me that
Maria had burnt Alfonsa's feet at a time when she was absent from his house; he did not say when,
and said nothing more.
The cross-examination was of the following tenor:
Q. After Alfonsa reported the matter to the government, did she return to Feliciano's house? —
A. So far as I know, she did not; the Government placed the girl in charge of Esperat.
Q. Do you remember the date on which the girl came to the government building? — A. I can
no name the day, but only the month.
Q. What month was it? — A. December, 1904, toward the end of the month.
By the court:
Q. When Alfonsa came to report the matter, to whom did she report? — A. To the governor.
Q. Were you present when she reported it to the governor? — A. I acted as interpreter.
Q. What was Alfonsa's reason for reporting it? — A. She wanted to leave Feliciano's house.
Q. Who were present when she reported the matter? — A. Governor Bolton and myself.
Q. Was anybody with her? — A. A boy and a girl; this was the occasion on which she stated that
Feliciano's daughters had burnt her.
Q. Was Feliciano present? — A. No, sir.
Q. Tell the court as fully as you can remember everything that Alfonsa stated on said occasion.
— A. She said hardly anything; it was her friend Quirina who said the most.
Q. What did Quirina say? — A. Quirina complained of the treatment that she had received in
Feliciano's house, and asked that she be sent to some other.
Q. What did she say with regard to the burns on Alfonsa's feet? — A. She said that she did not
witness the burning and that she did not know who did it.
Q. Was Alfonsa questioned on the matter? — A. Yes.
Q. Can you state more fully what she said? — A. I think not.
Clara Divino, 16 years of age, a witness for the defense, testified; that when Alfonsa went to their
house she had several sores on her face and feet, and a bruise on her ankle; her father wanted to
apply some medicines to them but she took no heed; that one day her father said: "Let us cure her
with herbs;" the treatment took a long time, and as she would not remain quiet, her father ordered
her to stay in the house in order to cure her the better, but she always went out, and her father then
called her and put petroleum on her feet; this proved very effective and cured her to some extent;
her father, in order to prevent her going out of the house locked her in the storeroom for several
days, and afterwards in the pantry upstairs, a room for one side of the kitchen used by the servants;
and that after Alfonsa ran away from the house, she saw her in the streets; that no force was used in
treating her; that her father held her while they applied petroleum to her feet; she denied that she
ever bound or secured with a stick or laid on the floor, because she held her by the shoulders; that
she was sitting down with her feet stretched out; that her feet had been bandaged many times; that
her father was not angry on the occasion that petroleum was applied to Alfonsa's feet; that a
physician called at their house to attend to Alfonsa; that when Alfonsa came to their house, her feet
were sore and ulcerated. And it was the fiscal who put in the question "Whether at the time she had
only a small ulcer on her feet," to which she replied yes; that at that time they had previously
washed Alfonsa's feet with hot water, and that thereafter the petroleum was applied and the feet
bandaged.
Finally, Feliciano Divino, the accused, testified as follows:
Captain Tomas sent the girl to me for treatment because she was suffering from ulcers. As Captain
Tomas insisted, I admitted her to my house. When we got to my house I found out that she had a
great many sores and I kept her there in order to cure her. I took care of her and gave her food and
clothing. Her malady improved at times, but after two or three months reappeared. She had ulcers
on both feet and on the face. The sores on her face healed, but the ulcers on her feet became worse
until they finally extended to the sole of the foot. I ordered her to treat the sore with petroleum, but
she would not do it. After some time I had to look after the ulcers personally. At times they
improved, and at others became worse. The ulcer on the sole of her foot became larger. The other
ulcers did not entirely heal, the infection remained inside. The wounds on the instep and upper part
of the feet progressed fairly well, but those that she had on her soles did not, because she always
went out of the house and walked about. I continued to look after and treat all the ulcers that
appeared. As several years elapsed without the ulcers becoming entirely cured, I decided to cure
them with petroleum, but she objected and smelled badly, I called her one evening to the sala and
examined it. When I found that it had grown too large on both feet, I ordered some hot water and
told my daughters to hold the girl because she objected to having petroleum applied to her feet. I
ordered them to hold her while I washed the ulcers with hot water. I then poured petroleum over
her feet and bandaged them. Fearing that she would go out of the house and again walk in the dirt,
put her in the storeroom. After a few days I ordered her upstairs and locked her in the pantry where
the servants slept.
When questioned as to where the servants went with Alfonsa, he said that he came to know of it
because the governor had sent him word and told him that his servant girl accused him of burning
her feet, but he denied it and explained the truth of the matter, of how he had tried to cure her feet;
the governor told him to go back to his house, and that he would investigate the affair; he
afterwards ordered him to the town and when he reached it, Mr. Wood alone was there; Mr. Wood
told him that the best thing that he could do was to settle the matter as soon as possible., The court
then asked:
Was this the same conversation as to which Mr. Wood testified? — A. I did not understand what Mr.
Wood said last night, but I will only say what took place. When I asked him what kind of a settlement
he wished, he suggested to me that I support Alfonsa for four years at the rate of 5 pesos a month.
He made a written agreement with me. Inasmuch as this girl had rendered me good service, I had no
objection to allowing her 5 pesos a month. He asked me to sign the paper, telling me that the
agreement was that I was to pay Alfonsa 5 pesos a month for a period of four years. I did not read
the paper because I had great confidence in Mr. Wood. Under said agreement I have been paying for
two years and three months.
Q. In what condition were the feet of the girl when she first entered your house? — A. When
she came to my house her feet were somewhat deformed, the toes were twisted, and there was an
ulcer on her ankle.
Tomas Monteverde, the Captain Tomas to whom the accused refers, testified that he had twice
been gobernadorcillo, and twice justice of the peace; that one day as he was going beyond Talomo,
where the accused lived, in order to examine a corpse, he saw Alfonsa on the road in very bad
condition; she was covered from the face to her feet with ulcers called ibung, and which smelled
offensively; he gave her to Feliciano to be cured; this was in 1898, when he still was justice of the
peace in the time of the Spanish Government; subsequently, in answer to questions put by the
court, he said that, after the girl was delivered to Feliciano, he saw her almost every month because
when going to pueblo they called at his house; on making him describe the ulcers and scars that he
had seen, he said that the whole of the instep was red in color and denuded of the skin, and that she
had ulcers in the sole of her foot, a scar above the left ankle, and several scars on her face.
In view of the admission of the accused" — says the trial judge — "in view of the present condition
of the feet of the injured party, which positively prove that the scars which appear on them are the
result of burns, and in view of the lack of any explanation on the part of the defense as to the
manner in which said burns were produced, it limiting itself to showing that they are the result of
ulcers, the court has no doubt that Alfonsa and Petra told the truth in everything of importance.
And considering that the accused was guilty of the crime of lesiones graves, defined and punished by
article 416, paragraph 3, of the Penal Code, with the aggravating circumstances 1 and 2 of article 10
of the said code, without any mitigating circumstance, the court sentenced him to the penalties
stated in the beginning.
The testimony of Orville Wood, who at that time was secretary of the military governor of said
district, was not impugned or discredited in any way, and far from being ignored in the examination
of these proceedings, should command due attention as being the testimony that furnished the data
for the proper judgment of facts that four years later were put forward as constituting a crime,
without there appearing in the proceedings any reason or cause whereby a poor helpless girl, after
living five or six years in the house of the accused, should have been injured by the latter in so cruel
a manner as described. If Alfonsa spoke the truth, one month and three weeks after she was
tortured she was on her way to the government building, and on seeing the accused in the road she
"ran to the stairs of the office and hid herself behind Segundo Esperat." She was accompanied by
one Quirina, and Alfonsa "said hardly anything, it was her friend Quirina who said the most," and
Quirina only complained of the treatment that she had received in Feliciano's house, and requested
that she be sent elsewhere. And as Governor Bolton was aware of the circumstance, had it partaken
of the character of a crime, it can not be assumed, because nothing induces such a presumption,
that he would have let it pass without causing it to be prosecuted and punished.
That petroleum was forcibly applied to the feet of Alfonsa, there can be no doubt; but that besides
the action of the oil, fire was applied, and above all, that said application of fire was a mere stroke of
cruelty, and that the torture was kept up for an hour and a half, or the time required to smoke two
cigarettes, or one cigarette, when the testimony even regarding the manner in which said coercion
was effected was contradictory, a point which was so important, for the subjection of the tortured
girl or the patient to whom the cure was applied, is a thing that can not be conclusively established;
and even if, by means of circumstantial evidence, the burns were actually proven, it can not be
established in a conclusive manner that the injury was caused maliciously.lawphil.net
This must have been the consideration which induced the secretary, who, as an honorable man,
must have been indignant at the cruel injuries which the prosecution has attempted to exaggerate at
the trial, to limit his action to obtaining from the accused a written obligation allowing Alfonsa a
monthly pension of five pesos for her subsistence. This was confirmed by the accused, and has in no
manner been contradicted in the proceedings, although the investigations to establish the
criminality of the deed were most searching.
The expert testimony offered by the prosecution should be carefully noted, as should also the
opinion of the lower court in connection therewith contained in its judgment. The said witness
states that he rendered assistance to Alfonsa from the 29th of December, 1905, to the 16th of
December, 1906 — the burns are supposed to have been caused two years previously — on account
of a large ulcer that she had on the left foot, in a place that showed an old scar; according to the
court's remark on folio 109, said left foot was the most deformed."
It was a bad ulcer" — says the expert — "that extended over the instep under the ankle, passing to
the middle of the sole; it was two and half inches wide, and it lacked two inches of surrounding the
foot.
The soles of both feet are deformed by reason of protuberances of what appears to be callous
matter.
The witness continues his explanation of the prolonged treatment of the said ulcer, and ends thus:
After the new soft tissue was formed level with the skin, in order to avoid an excessive contraction, I
cut some pieces of the girl's skin and placed them over the wound. I did this several times before
effecting a complete cure. I presented my bill for seven hundred and sixty-six pesos (P766). (Folios
145 and 148.)
The following rulings are contained in the latter part of the judgment:
No damages are allowed as no proof has been offered whereon the court may base the amount
thereof. The court considers that the prejudice caused to the injured party by an ulcer of one of the
feet that was cured by Dr. Ames was not directly occasioned by the accused. (Folio 186.)
On cross-examination:
Q. Did you notice that Alfonsa had scars all over her body? — A. She has numerous scars.
Q. If a person placed his hand in the middle of a flame, would his hands become charred? — A.
Certainly, all the soft parts would be charred.
Q. By looking at a scar, how can you determine that it is due to a burn and not to impurities of
the blood? — A. The scar of a burn is not always characteristic. It may resemble other scars, but in
general, scars resulting from burns are superficial, and sometimes cover a large space. Other causes
which destroy the skin to a large extent may produce the same kind of scar.
Q. Have you noticed that non-Christian Bagobos have weak constitutions, and that, as a rule,
their skin is covered with eruptions? — A. They show many scars and many eruptions, and their
constitutions are weak when they are not well-fed.
Q. Have you noticed that these wounds have become worse by reason of the herbs they apply
to cure them? —A. Undoubtedly, the wounds became worse on account of their efforts to cure
them.
Q. With reference to Alfonsa's wounds, it is not possible that the contraction observed in the
scars was caused by the lack of proper treatment? — A. The contraction in a wound depends upon
the extent of the tissue embraced by the scar, and this depends on the size of the original wound
which may become larger owing to lack of proper treatment. (Folios 152 and 153.)
Granting among the admissions made by the accused, that he continued the treatment of the ulcers
of the girl until he or his daughters burned her, or that the action of the petroleum irritated the said
ulcers and caused them to spread, as may be judged from the extent of the scars, to have been
intended to cause an evil, but rather as a remedy; however, taking into account the imprudence
defined in paragraph 2 of article 568 of the Penal Code, as having been committed by an ignorant
person who was prohibited from exercising the art of healing not only by the regulations governing it
but also by the Penal Code, the penalty prescribed by the paragraph above referred to, that is,
arresto, must therefore be applied in its medium and maximum degrees.lawphil.net
In view of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and it is our opinion that,
in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3 of article 568 of the Penal Code, Feliciano Divino
should be, and he is hereby, sentenced for simple imprudence to the penalty of four months of
arresto mayor, to suspension from office and right to suffrage during the period of his sentence, and
to pay the costs of both instances. So ordered.
Torres, Mapa, Carson, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137268. March 26, 2001]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EUTIQUIA

CARMEN @ Mother Perpetuala, CELEDONIA FABIE @ Isabel
Fabie, DELIA SIBONGA @ Deding Sibonga,
ALEXANDER SIBONGA @ Nonoy Sibonga, and REYNARIO NUEZ
@ Rey Nuez, accused-appellants.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City,
finding accused-appellants Eutiquia Carmen @ Mother Perpetuala, Celedonia Fabie @ Isabel
Fabie, Delia Sibonga @ Deding Sibonga, Alexander Sibonga @ Nonoy Sibonga, and Reynario
Nuez @ Rey Nuez guilty of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity as well as
the costs.
The information[2] against accused-appellants alleged:
That on or about the 27th day of January, 1997 at about 2:00 oclock p.m., in the
City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping one
another, with deliberate intent, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there inflict fatal physical injuries on one Randy
Luntayao which injuries caused the death of the said Randy Luntayao.
Accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge, whereupon they were tried.
The prosecution presented evidence showing the following: At around 2 oclock in the
afternoon of January 27, 1997, Honey Fe Abella, 10, and her friend Frances Claire Rivera, 7,
were playing takyan in front of the house of one Bebing Lastimoso in Quiot, Pardo, Cebu City,
when suddenly they heard a child shout, Tabang ma! (Help mother!). The cry came from the
direction of the house of accused-appellant Carmen, who is also known in their neighborhood
as Mother Perpetuala. The two children ran towards Mother Perpetualas house.[3] What Honey
Fe saw on which she testified in court, is summarized in the decision of the trial court, to wit:
While there[,] she saw a boy, whose name . . . she [later] came to know as one
Randy Luntayao, . . . being immersed head first in a drum of water. Accused
Alexander Sibonga was holding the waist of the body while accused Reynario
Nuez held the hands of the boy at the back. Accused Eutiquia Carmen, Delia
Sibonga, and Celedonia Fabie were pushing down the boys head into the
water. She heard the boy shouting Ma, help for two times. Later, she saw accused
Reynario or Rey Nuez tie the boy on the bench with a green rope as big as her little
finger. . . . After that Eutiquia Carmen poured [water from] a plastic container
(galon) . . . into the mouth of the boy. Each time the boy struggled to raise his
head, accused Alexander Sibonga banged the boys head against the bench [to]
which the boy was tied down. She even heard the banging sound everytime the
boys head hit the bench. For about five times she heard it.According to this witness
after forcing the boy to drink water, Eutiquia Carmen and accused Celedonia Fabie
alias Isabel Fabie took turns in pounding the boys chest with their clenched
fists. All the time Rey Nuez held down the boys feet to the bench. She also
witnessed . . . Celedonia Fabie dropped her weight, buttocks first, on the body of
the boy. Later on, Eutiquia Carmen ordered Delia or Deding Sibonga to get a knife
from the kitchen. Eutiquia Carmen then slowly plunged the stainless knife on the
left side of the boys body and with the use of a plastic gallon container, the top
portion of which was cut out, Eutiquia Carmen [caught] the blood dripping from
the left side of the boys body.Honey Fe heard the moaning coming from the
tortured boy. Much later she saw Nonoy or Alexander Sibonga, Reynario Nuez,
Delia Sibonga, Celedonia Fabie, and Eutiquia Carmen carry the boy into the
house.[4]
Eddie Luntayao, father of the victim, testified that he has five children, the eldest of whom,
Randy, was 13 years old at the time of the incident. On November 20, 1996, Randy had a
nervous breakdown which Eddie thought was due to Randy having to skip meals whenever he
took the boy with him to the farm. According to Eddie, his son started talking to himself and
laughing. On January 26, 1997, upon the suggestion of accused-appellant Reynario Nuez,
Eddie and his wife Perlita and their three children (Randy, Jesrel, 7, and Lesyl, 1) went with
accused-appellant Nuez to Cebu. They arrived in Cebu at around 1 oclock in the afternoon of
the same day and spent the night in Nuezs house in Tangke, Talisay.
The following day, they went to the house of accused-appellant Carmen in Quiot,
Pardo,[5] where all of the accused-appellants were present. Eddie talked to accused-appellant
Carmen regarding his sons condition. He was told that the boy was possessed by a bad spirit,
which accused-appellant Carmen said she could exorcise. She warned, however, that as the
spirit might transfer to Eddie, it was best to conduct the healing prayer without him. Accused-
appellants then led Randy out of the house, while Eddie and his wife and two daughters were
locked inside a room in the house.[6]
After a while, Eddie heard his son twice shout Ma, tabang! (Mother, help!). Eddie tried to
go out of the room to find out what was happening to his son, but the door was locked. After
about an hour, the Luntayaos were transferred to the prayer room which was located near the
main door of the house.[7]
A few hours later, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon, accused-appellants carried Randy
into the prayer room and placed him on the altar. Eddie was shocked by what he saw. Randys
face was bluish and contused, while his tongue was sticking out of his mouth. It was clear to
Eddie that his son was already dead. He wanted to see his sons body, but he was stopped from
doing so by accused-appellant Eutiquia Carmen who told him not to go near his son because
the latter would be resurrected at 7 oclock that evening.[8]
After 7 oclock that evening, accused-appellant Carmen asked a member of her group to
call the funeral parlor and bring a coffin as the child was already dead. It was arranged that the
body would be transferred to the house of accused-appellant Nuez. Thus, that night, the
Luntayao family, accompanied by accused-appellant Nuez, took Randys body to Nunezs house
in Tangke, Talisay. The following day, January 28, 1997, accused-appellant Nuez told Eddie
to go with him to the Talisay Municipal Health Office to report Randys death and told him to
keep quiet or they might not be able to get the necessary papers for his sons burial. Nuez took
care of securing the death certificate which Eddie signed.[9]
At around 3 oclock in the afternoon of January 28, 1997, accused-appellant Carmen went
to Tangke, Talisay to ensure that the body was buried. Eddie and his wife told her that they
preferred to bring their sons body with them to Sikatuna, Isabela, Negros Occidental but they
were told by accused-appellant Carmen that this was not possible as she and the other accused-
appellants might be arrested. That same afternoon, Randy Luntayao was buried in Tangke,
Talisay.[10]
After Eddie and his family had returned home to Negros Occidental, Eddie sought
assistance from the Bombo Radyo station in Bacolod City which referred him to the regional
office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in the city. On February 3, 1997, Eddie
filed a complaint for murder against accused-appellant Nuez and the other members of his
group.[11] He also asked for the exhumation and autopsy of the remains of his son.[12] As the
incident took place in Cebu, his complaint was referred to the NBI office in Cebu City.
Modesto Cajita, head of NBI, Region VII (Cebu), took over the investigation of the
case. He testified that he met with Eddie Luntayao and supervised the exhumation and autopsy
of the body of Randy Luntayao.[13] Cajita testified that he also met with accused-appellant
Carmen and after admitting that she and the other accused-appellants conducted a pray-over
healing session on the victim on January 27, 1997, accused-appellant Carmen refused to give
any further statement. Cajita noticed a wooden bench in the kitchen of Carmens house, which,
with Carmens permission, he took with him to the NBI office for examination. Cajita admitted
he did not know the results of the examination.[14]
Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez, the NBI medico-legal officer who conducted the autopsy on
Randy Luntayao, testified that he, the victims father, and some NBI agents, exhumed the
victims body on February 20, 1997 at Tangke Catholic Cemetery in the Tangke, Talisay,
Cebu. He conducted the autopsy on the same day and later submitted the following report
(Exhs. E and F):[15]
FINDINGS
Body in advanced stage of decomposition wearing a white shirt and shorts

wrapped in printed blanket (white and orange) placed in white wooden coffin and
buried underground about 4 feet deep.
Contusion, 3.0 x 4.0 cms. chest, anterior, left side.
Fracture, 3rd rib, left, mid-clavicular line.
Fracture, linear, occipital bone right side extending to the bases of middle cranial
fossae right to left down to the occipital bone, left side.
Fracture, diastatic, lamboidal suture, bilateral.

Internal organs in advanced stage of decomposition.
Cranial vault almost empty.
CAUSE OF DEATH: [The victim] could have died due to the internal effects
of a traumatic head injury and/or traumatic chest injury.
Dr. Mendez testified that the contusion on the victims chest was caused by contact with a
hard blunt instrument. He added that the fracture on the rib was complete while that found on
the base of the skull followed a serrated or uneven pattern. He said that the latter injury could
have been caused by the forcible contact of that part of the body with a blunt object such as a
wooden bench.[16]
On cross-examination, Dr. Mendez admitted that he did not find any stab wound on the
victims body but explained that this could be due to the fact that at the time the body was
exhumed and examined, it was already in an advanced state of decomposition rendering such
wound, if present, unrecognizable.[17]
Accused-appellants did not testify. Instead, the defense presented: (a) Ritsel Blase, an
alleged eyewitness to the incident; (b) Maria Lilina Jimenez, Visitacion Seniega, and Josefina
Abing, alleged former patients of accused-appellant Carmen; (c) Dr. Milagros Carloto, the
municipal health officer of Talisay, Cebu and; (d) Atty. Salvador Solima of the Cebu City
Prosecutors Office.
Ritsel Blase, 21, testified that since 1987 she had been with the group of accused-appellant
Carmen, whom she calls Mother Perpetuala. She recounted that at around 2 oclock in the
afternoon of January 27, 1997, while she was in the house of accused-appellant Carmen, she
saw Eddie Luntayao talking with the latter regarding the treatment of his son. The boy was
later led to the kitchen and given a bath prior to treatment. After water was poured on the boy,
he became unruly prompting accused-appellant Carmen to decide not to continue with the
treatment, but the boys parents allegedly prevailed upon her to continue. As the boy continued
to resist, accused-appellant Carmen told accused-appellants Delia Sibonga and Celedonia
Fabie to help her (Carmen) lay the boy on a bench. As the child resisted all the more, Eddie
Luntayao allegedly told the group to tie the boy to the bench. Accused-appellant Delia Sibonga
got hold of a nylon rope which was used to tie the child to the bench. Then Carmen, Delia
Sibonga, and Fabie prayed over the child, but as the latter started hitting his head against the
bench, Carmen asked Nuez to place his hands under the boys head to cushion the impact of the
blow everytime the child brought down his head. To stop the boy from struggling, accused-
appellant Fabie held the boys legs, while accused-appellant Nuez held his shoulders. After
praying over the boy, the latter was released and carried inside the house. Accused-appellant
Alexander Sibonga, who had arrived, helped carry the boy inside. After this, Blase said she no
longer knew what happened inside the house as she stayed outside to finish the laundry.[18]
Blase testified that the parents of Randy Luntayao witnessed the pray-over of their son
from beginning to end. She denied that accused-appellants Fabie and Delia Sibonga struck the
victim on his chest with their fists. According to her, neither did accused-appellant Carmen
stab the boy. She claimed that Randy was still alive when he was taken inside the house.[19]
The defense presented Maria Lilia Jimenez, 20, Visitacion Seniega, 39, and Josefina
Abing, 39, who testified that accused-appellant Carmen had cured them of their illnesses by
merely praying over them and without applying any form of physical violence on them.[20]
Milagros Carloto, Municipal Health Officer of Talisay, Cebu, was also presented by the
defense to testify on the death certificate she issued in which she indicated that Randy Luntayao
died of pneumonia. According to her, Eddie Luntayao came to her office on January 28, 1997
to ask for the issuance of a death certificate for his son Randy Luntayao who had allegedly
suffered from cough and fever.[21]
On cross-examination, Dr. Carloto admitted that she never saw the body of the victim as
she merely relied on what she had been told by Eddie Luntayao. She said that it was a
midwife, Mrs. Revina Laviosa, who examined the victims body.[22]
The last witness for the defense, Assistant City Prosecutor Salvador Solima, was presented
to identify the resolution he had prepared (Exh. 8)[23] on the re-investigation of the case in which
he recommended the dismissal of the charge against accused-appellants. His testimony was
dispensed with, however, as the prosecution stipulated on the matters Solima was going to
testify with the qualification that Solimas recommendation was disapproved by City Prosecutor
Primo Miro.[24]
The prosecution recalled Eddie Luntayao to the stand to rebut the testimonies of Ritsel
Blase and Dr. Milagros Carloto. Eddie denied having witnessed what accused-appellants did
to his son. He reiterated his earlier claim that after accused-appellants had taken Randy, he and
his wife and two daughters were locked inside a room. He disputed Blases statement that his
son was still alive when he was brought into the prayer room. He said he saw that his sons head
slumped while being carried by accused-appellants.[25]
As for the testimony of Dr. Carloto, Eddie admitted having talked with her when he and
accused-appellant Nuez went to her office on January 28, 1997. However, he denied having
told her that his son was suffering from fever and cough as he told her that Randy had a nervous
breakdown. He took exception to Dr. Carlotos statement that he was alone when he went to her
office because it was Nuez who insisted that he (Eddie) accompany him in order to secure the
death certificate.[26]
On November 18, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing facts and circumstances, [the] accused are
all found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and are hereby
[sentenced] to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the accessory
penalties of the law; to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased
Randy Luntayao in the sum of P50,000.00; and to pay the costs. The accused, are,
however, credited in full during the whole period of their detention provided they
will signify in writing that they will abide by all the rules and regulations of the
penitentiary.[27]
In finding accused-appellants guilty of murder, the trial court stated:
Killing a person with treachery is murder even if there is no intent to kill. When
death occurs, it is presumed to be the natural consequence of physical injuries
inflicted. Since the defendant did commit the crime with treachery, he is guilty of
murder, because of the voluntary presence of the qualifying circumstance of
treachery (P v. Cagoco, 58 Phil. 530). All the accused in the case at bar had
contributed different acts in mercilessly inflicting injuries to the victim.For having
immersed the head of the victim into the barrel of water, all the herein accused
should be held responsible for all the consequences even if the result be different
from that which was intended (Art. 4, par. 1, RPC). It is pointed out that in P. v.
Cagoco, 58 Phil. 524, even if there was no intent to kill[,] in inflicting physical
injuries with treachery, the accused in that case was convicted of murder. In
murder qualified by treachery, it is required only that there is treachery in the
attack, and this is true even if the offender has no intent to kill the person
assaulted. Under the guise of a ritual or treatment, the accused should not have
intentionally immersed upside down the head of Randy Luntayao into a barrel of
water; banged his head against the bench; pounded his chest with fists, or plunged
a kitchen knife to his side so that blood would come out for these acts would surely
cause death to the victim. . . .
One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences
which may naturally and logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended
or not. Ordinarily, when a person commits a felony with malice, he intends the
consequences of his felonious act. In view of paragraph 1 of Art. 4, a person
committing a felony is criminally liable although the consequences of his felonious
acts are not intended by him. . . .
....
Intent is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act. The presumption of

criminal intent may arise from the proof of the criminal act and it is for the accused
to rebut this presumption. In the case at bar, there is enough evidence that the
accused confederated with one another in inflicting physical harm to the victim (an
illegal act). These acts were intentional, and the wrong done resulted in the death
of their victim. Hence, they are liable for all the direct and natural consequences of
their unlawful act, even if the ultimate result had not been intended.[28]
Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellants allege that the trial court erred in convicting
them of murder.[29]
First. It would appear that accused-appellants are members of a cult and that the bizarre
ritual performed over the victim was consented to by the victims parents. With the permission
of the victims parents, accused-appellant Carmen, together with the other accused-appellants,
proceeded to subject the boy to a treatment calculated to drive the bad spirit from the boys
body. Unfortunately, the strange procedure resulted in the death of the boy. Thus, accused-
appellants had no criminal intent to kill the boy. Their liability arises from their reckless
imprudence because they ought that to know their actions would not bring about the cure. They
are, therefore, guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and not of murder.
Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that reckless imprudence consists
in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage
results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing such
act. Compared to intentional felonies, such as homicide or murder, what takes the place of the
element of malice or intention to commit a wrong or evil is the failure of the offender to take
precautions due to lack of skill taking into account his employment, or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place.
The elements of reckless imprudence are apparent in the acts done by accused-appellants
which, because of their lack of medical skill in treating the victim of his alleged ailment,
resulted in the latters death. As already stated, accused-appellants, none of whom is a medical
practitioner, belong to a religious group, known as the Missionaries of Our Lady of Fatima,
which is engaged in faith healing.
In United States v. Divino,[30] the accused, who was not a licensed physician, in an attempt
to cure the victim of ulcers in her feet, wrapped a piece of clothing which had been soaked in
petroleum around the victims feet and then lighted the clothing, thereby causing injuries to the
victim. The Court held the accused liable for reckless imprudence resulting in physical
injuries. It was noted that the accused had no intention to cause an evil but rather to remedy the
victims ailment.
In another case, People v. Vda. de Golez,[31] the Court ruled that the proper charge to file
against a non-medical practitioner, who had treated the victim despite the fact that she did not
possess the necessary technical knowledge or skill to do so and caused the latters death, was
homicide through reckless imprudence.
The trial courts reliance on the rule that criminal intent is presumed from the commission
of an unlawful act is untenable because such presumption only holds in the absence of proof to
the contrary.[32] The facts of the case indubitably show the absence of intent to kill on the part
of the accused-appellants. Indeed, the trial courts findings can be sustained only if the
circumstances of the case are ignored and the Court limits itself to the time when accused-
appellants undertook their unauthorized treatment of the victim. Obviously, such an evaluation
of the case cannot be allowed.
Consequently, treachery cannot be appreciated for in the absence of intent to kill, there is
no treachery or the deliberate employment of means, methods, and manner of execution to
ensure the safety of the accused from the defensive or retaliatory attacks coming from the
victim.[33] Viewed in this light, the acts which the trial court saw as manifestations of treachery
in fact relate to efforts by accused-appellants to restrain Randy Luntayao so that they can effect
the cure on him.
On the other hand, there is no merit in accused-appellants contention that the testimony of
prosecution eyewitness Honey Fe Abella is not credible. The Court is more than convinced of
Honey Fes credibility. Her testimony is clear, straightforward, and is far from having been
coached or contrived. She was only a few meters away from the kitchen where accused-
appellants conducted their pray-over healing session not to mention that she had a good vantage
point as the kitchen had no roof nor walls but only a pantry. Her testimony was corroborated
by the autopsy findings of Dr. Mendez who, consistent with Honey Fes testimony, noted
fractures on the third left rib and on the base of the victims skull. With regard to Dr. Mendezs
failure to find any stab wound in the victims body, he himself had explained that such could be
due to the fact that at the time the autopsy was conducted, the cadaver was already in an
advanced state of decomposition. Randy Luntayaos cadaver was exhumed 24 days after it had
been buried. Considering the length of time which had elapsed and the fact that the cadaver
had not been embalmed, it was very likely that the soft tissues had so decomposed that, as Dr.
Mendez said, it was no longer possible to determine whether there was a stab wound. As for
the other points raised by accused-appellants to detract the credibility of Honey Fes testimony,
the same appear to be only minor and trivial at best.
Accused-appellants contend that the failure of the prosecution to present the testimony of
Frances Claire Rivera as well as the knife used in stabbing Randy Luntayao puts in doubt the
prosecutions evidence. We do not think so.The presentation of the knife in evidence is not
indispensable.[34]
Finally, accused-appellants make much of the fact that although the case was tried under
Judge Renato C. Dacudao, the decision was rendered by Judge Galicano Arriesgado who took
over the case after the prosecution and the defense had rested their cases.[35] However, the fact
that the judge who wrote the decision did not hear the testimonies of the witnesses does not
make him less competent to render a decision, since his ruling is based on the records of the
case and the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimonies of the witnesses.[36]
Second. The question now is whether accused-appellants can be held liable for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide, considering that the information charges them with
murder. We hold that they can.
Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in pertinent parts:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is
variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that
proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the
offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is
included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the
offense proved.
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged

necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the
latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when
the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting
the latter.
In Samson v. Court of Appeals,[37] the accused were charged with, and convicted of, estafa
through falsification of public document. The Court of Appeals modified the judgment and
held one of the accused liable for estafa through falsification by negligence. On appeal, it was
contended that the appeals court erred in holding the accused liable for estafa through
negligence because the information charged him with having wilfully committed estafa. In
overruling this contention, the Court held:
While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, as we

held in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, G.R. No. L-6641, July 28, 1955,
but a distinct crime in itself, designated as a quasi offense in our Penal Code, it
may however be said that a conviction for the former can be had under an
information exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense, upon the
theory that the greater includes the lesser offense. This is the situation that obtains
in the present case. Appellant was charged with willful falsification but from the
evidence submitted by the parties, the Court of Appeals found that in effecting the
falsification which made possible the cashing of the checks in question, appellant
did not act with criminal intent but merely failed to take proper and adequate
means to assure himself of the identity of the real claimants as an ordinary prudent
man would do. In other words, the information alleges acts which charge willful
falsification but which turned out to be not willful but negligent. This is a case
covered by the rule when there is a variance between the allegation and proof. . . .
The fact that the information does not allege that the falsification was committed
with imprudence is of no moment for here this deficiency appears supplied by the
evidence submitted by appellant himself and the result has proven beneficial to
him. Certainly, having alleged that the falsification has been willful, it would be
incongruous to allege at the same time that it was committed with imprudence for a
charge of criminal intent is incompatible with the concept of negligence.
In People v. Fernando,[38] the accused was charged with, and convicted of, murder by the
trial court. On appeal, this Court modified the judgment and held the accused liable for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide after finding that he did not act with criminal intent.
Third. Coming now to the imposable penalty, under Art. 365, reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period. In this case, taking into account the pertinent provisions of
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused-appellants should suffer the penalty of four (4)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum.
As to their civil liability, accused-appellants should pay the heirs of Randy Luntayao an
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 and moral damages also in the amount
of P50,000.00.[39] In addition, they should pay exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00
in view of accused-appellants gross negligence in attempting to cure the victim without a
license to practice medicine and to give an example or correction for the public good.[40]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City, is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellants are hereby declared guilty of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and are each sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
prison term of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition, accused-appellants are ORDERED
jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Randy Luntayao indemnity in the amount
of P50,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and exemplary damages in the
amount of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur
Quisumbing, J., on leave.
Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, G.R. No. 151258

Petitioner,
- versus -
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
x-------------------------x
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 154954
Petitioner,
- versus -
THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO
ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM, JR.,
JUNEL ANTHONY AMA,
ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO,
VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO
GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA
III, NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME
MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO
MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI,
VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE
GUERRERO, JUDE FERNANDEZ,
AMANTE PURISIMA II, EULOGIO
SABBAN, PERCIVAL BRIGOLA,
PAUL ANGELO SANTOS, JONAS
KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO
BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS,
JOSEPH LLEDO, andRONAN DE
GUZMAN,
Respondents.
x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 155101
FIDELITO DIZON,
Petitioner,
- versus -
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
x-------------------------x
G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080
GERARDA H. VILLA,
Petitioner, Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA REYES, JJ.
II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN
RAMOS, CRISANTO CRUZ Promulgated:
SARUCA, JR., and ANSELMO February 1, 2012
ADRIANO,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
The public outrage over the death of Leonardo Lenny Villa the victim in this case
on 10 February 1991 led to a very strong clamor to put an end to hazing. [1] Due
in large part to the brave efforts of his mother, petitioner Gerarda Villa, groups
were organized, condemning his senseless and tragic death. This widespread
condemnation prompted Congress to enact a special law, which became effective
in 1995, that would criminalize hazing.[2] The intent of the law was to discourage
members from making hazing a requirement for joining their sorority, fraternity,
organization, or association.[3]Moreover, the law was meant to counteract the
exculpatory implications of consent and initial innocent act in the conduct of
initiation rites by making the mere act of hazing punishable or mala prohibita.[4]
Sadly, the Lenny Villa tragedy did not discourage hazing activities in the
country.[5] Within a year of his death, six more cases of hazing-related deaths
emerged those of Frederick Cahiyang of the University of Visayas in Cebu; Raul
Camaligan of San Beda College; Felipe Narne of Pamantasan ng Araullo in
Cabanatuan City; Dennis Cenedoza of the Cavite Naval Training Center; Joselito
Mangga of the Philippine Merchant Marine Institute; and Joselito Hernandez of
the University of the Philippines in Baguio City.[6]
Although courts must not remain indifferent to public sentiments, in this

case the general condemnation of a hazing-related death, they are still bound to
observe a fundamental principle in our criminal justice system [N]o act
constitutes a crime unless it is made so by law.[7] Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine
lege. Even if an act is viewed by a large section of the populace as immoral or
injurious, it cannot be considered a crime, absent any law prohibiting its
commission. As interpreters of the law, judges are called upon to set aside
emotion, to resist being swayed by strong public sentiments, and to rule strictly
based on the elements of the offense and the facts allowed in evidence.
Before the Court are the consolidated cases docketed as G.R. No. 151258
(Villareal v. People), G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals), G.R. No.
155101 (Dizon v. People), and G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona).
FACTS
The pertinent facts, as determined by the Court of Appeals (CA)[8] and the
trial court,[9] are as follows:
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila
University School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris
Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar Bogs Asuncion, Samuel Sam
Belleza, Bienvenido Bien Marquez III, Roberto Francis Bert Navera, Geronimo
Randy Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo Lenny Villa (neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members
of the Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They
all proceeded to Rufos Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the
house of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to
expect during the initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be
physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were
scheduled to last for three days. After their briefing, they were brought to the
Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation.
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats
and insults from the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van
and walked towards the pelota court of the Almeda compound, some of the
Aquilans delivered physical blows to them. The neophytes were then subjected
to traditional forms of Aquilan initiation rites. These rites included the Indian
Run, which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of
Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the neophytes; the Bicol Express, which
obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs against the wall and their
legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the
Rounds, in which the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the
auxiliaries (the Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes
during initiation rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms
or with knee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and the Auxies Privilege
Round, in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical pain
on the neophytes. During this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with
the fraternity principles. They survived their first day of initiation.
On the morning of their second day 9 February 1991 the neophytes were
made to present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also
required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternitys principles. Whenever they
would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the
afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to
torment them physically and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to
the same manner of hazing that they endured on the first day of initiation. After
a few hours, the initiation for the day officially ended.
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity

members[10] Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded
that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino
(Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal,
however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including
Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to paddling and to additional
rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which was
so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him
complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of
physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the
auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended,
and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys

shivering and incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed
these rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting. When they realized,
though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping
him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep
him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital.
Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following
35 Aquilans:
In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)

1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)
4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)
5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)
6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)
7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)
8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)
9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)
13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
16. Antonio General (General)
17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)
20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)
21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
25. Adel Abas (Abas)
26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)
In Criminal Case No. C-38340

1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)
Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were
jointly tried.[11] On the other hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in
Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held in abeyance due to certain matters that had
to be resolved first.[12]
On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case

No. C-38340(91), holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code.[13] A few weeks after the trial court rendered its
judgment, or on 29 November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the
remaining nine accused commenced anew.[14]
On 10 January 2002, the CA in (CA-G.R. No. 15520)[15] set aside the finding of
conspiracy by the trial court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified
the criminal liability of each of the accused according to individual
participation. Accused De Leon had by then passed away, so the following
Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:
1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants Victorino, Sabban, Lledo,
Guerrero, Musngi, Perez, De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim,
Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez,
Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.) were acquitted, as their
individual guilt was not established by proof beyond reasonable
doubt.
2. Four of the accused-appellants Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony

Ama, Antonio Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et
al.) were found guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries and
sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor. They were also ordered to
jointly pay the heirs of the victim the sum of ₱30,000 as indemnity.
3. Two of the accused-appellants Fidelito Dizon and Artemio

Villareal were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Having
found no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the CA sentenced
them to an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17
years of reclusion temporal. They were also ordered to indemnify,
jointly and severally, the heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum of ₱50,000
and to pay the additional amount of ₱1,000,000 by way of moral
damages.
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed
the charge against accused Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to
speedy trial.[16] Meanwhile, on different dates between the years 2003 and 2005,
the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.[17] On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos.
89060 & 90153[18] reversed the trial courts Orders and dismissed the criminal case
against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of their
right to speedy trial.[19]
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions

were individually brought before this Court.
G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People

The instant case refers to accused Villareals Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45. The Petition raises two reversible errors allegedly
committed by the CA in its Decision dated 10 January 2002 in CA-G.R. No.
15520 first, denial of due process; and, second, conviction absent proof beyond
reasonable doubt.[20]
While the Petition was pending before this Court, counsel for petitioner
Villareal filed a Notice of Death of Party on 10 August 2011. According to the
Notice, petitioner Villareal died on 13 March 2011. Counsel thus asserts that the
subject matter of the Petition previously filed by petitioner does not survive the
death of the accused.
G.R. No. 155101 Dizon v. People

Accused Dizon filed a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari,
questioning the CAs Decision dated 10 January 2002 and Resolution dated 30
August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520.[21]Petitioner sets forth two main issues first,
that he was denied due process when the CA sustained the trial courts forfeiture
of his right to present evidence; and, second, that he was deprived of due process
when the CA did not apply to him the same ratio decidendi that served as basis
of acquittal of the other accused.[22]
As regards the first issue, the trial court made a ruling, which forfeited
Dizons right to present evidence during trial. The trial court expected Dizon to
present evidence on an earlier date since a co-accused, Antonio General, no
longer presented separate evidence during trial. According to Dizon, his right
should not have been considered as waived because he was justified in asking for
a postponement. He argues that he did not ask for a resetting of any of the hearing
dates and in fact insisted that he was ready to present
evidence on the original pre-assigned schedule, and not on an earlier hearing date.
Regarding the second issue, petitioner contends that he should have

likewise been acquitted, like the other accused, since his acts were also part of
the traditional initiation rites and were not tainted by evil motives.[23] He claims
that the additional paddling session was part of the official activity of the
fraternity. He also points out that one of the neophytes admitted that the
chairperson of the initiation rites decided that [Lenny] was fit enough to undergo
the initiation so Mr. Villareal proceeded to do the paddling.[24] Further, petitioner
echoes the argument of the Solicitor General that the individual blows inflicted
by Dizon and Villareal could not have resulted in Lennys death. [25] The Solicitor
General purportedly averred that, on the contrary, Dr. Arizala testified that the
injuries suffered by Lenny could not be considered fatal if taken individually, but
if taken collectively, the result is the violent death of the victim.[26]
Petitioner then counters the finding of the CA that he was motivated by ill
will. He claims that Lennys father could not have stolen the parking space of
Dizons father, since the latter did not have a car, and their fathers did not work in
the same place or office. Revenge for the loss of the parking space was the alleged
ill motive of Dizon. According to petitioner, his utterances regarding a stolen
parking space were only part of the psychological initiation. He then cites the
testimony of Lennys co-neophyte witness Marquez who admitted knowing it was
not true and that he was just making it up.[27]
Further, petitioner argues that his alleged motivation of ill will was negated
by his show of concern for Villa after the initiation rites. Dizon alludes to the
testimony of one of the neophytes, who mentioned that the former had kicked the
leg of the neophyte and told him to switch places with Lenny to prevent the latters
chills. When the chills did not stop, Dizon, together with Victorino, helped Lenny
through a sleeping bag and made him sit on a chair. According to petitioner, his
alleged ill motivation is contradicted by his manifestation of compassion and
concern for the victims well-being.
G.R. No. 154954 People v. Court of Appeals

This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal of the CAs Decision
dated 10 January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No.
15520, insofar as it acquitted 19 (Victorino et al.) and convicted 4 (Tecson et al.)
of the accused Aquilans of the lesser crime of slight physical
injuries.[28] According to the Solicitor General, the CA erred in holding that there
could have been no conspiracy to commit hazing, as hazing or fraternity initiation
had not yet been criminalized at the time Lenny died.
In the alternative, petitioner claims that the ruling of the trial court should
have been upheld, inasmuch as it found that there was conspiracy to inflict
physical injuries on Lenny. Since the injuries led to the victims death, petitioner
posits that the accused Aquilans are criminally liable for the resulting crime of
homicide, pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.[29] The said article
provides: Criminal liability shall be incurred [b]y any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
Petitioner also argues that the rule on double jeopardy is inapplicable.

According to the Solicitor General, the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in setting aside the trial courts finding
of conspiracy and in ruling that the criminal liability of
all the accused must be based on their individual participation in the commission
of the crime.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 Villa v. Escalona

Petitioner Villa filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, praying
for the reversal of the CAs Decision dated 25 October 2006 and Resolution dated
17 May 2007 in CA-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 and 90153.[30] The Petition involves
the dismissal of the criminal charge filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano.
Due to several pending incidents, the trial court ordered a separate trial for
accused Escalona, Saruca, Adriano, Ramos, Ampil, Concepcion, De Vera, S.
Fernandez, and Cabangon (Criminal Case No. C-38340) to commence after
proceedings against the 26 other accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) shall
have terminated. On 8 November 1993, the trial court found the 26 accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. As a result, the proceedings in Criminal Case No. C-
38340 involving the nine other co-accused recommenced on 29 November 1993.
For various reasons, the initial trial of the case did not commence until 28 March
2005, or almost 12 years after the arraignment of the nine accused.
Petitioner Villa assails the CAs dismissal of the criminal case involving 4 of the
9 accused, namely, Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. She argues that the
accused failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of
time. She also points out that the prosecution cannot be faulted for the delay, as
the original records and the required evidence were not at its disposal, but were
still in the appellate court.
We resolve herein the various issues that we group into five.

ISSUES
1. Whether the forfeiture of petitioner Dizons right to present evidence
constitutes denial of due process;
2. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano for violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial;
3. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction, when it set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial
court and adjudicated the liability of each accused according to individual
participation;
4. Whether accused Dizon is guilty of homicide; and

5. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it pronounced
Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug guilty only of slight physical injuries.
DISCUSSION
Resolution on Preliminary Matters
G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People

In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the Petition was pending
resolution, this Court took note of counsel for petitioners Notice of Death of
Party.
According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for
personal penalties is totally extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast,
criminal liability for pecuniary penalties is extinguished if the offender dies prior
to final judgment. The term personal penalties refers to the service of personal or
imprisonment penalties,[31] while the term pecuniary penalties (las pecuniarias)
refers to fines and costs,[32] including civil liability predicated on the criminal
offense complained of (i.e., civil liability ex delicto).[33] However, civil liability
based on a source of obligation other than the delict survives the death of the
accused and is recoverable through a separate civil action.[34]
Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished his

criminal liability for both personal and pecuniary penalties, including his civil
liability directly arising from the delictcomplained of. Consequently, his Petition
is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against him deemed closed and
terminated.
G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People)
In an Order dated 28 July 1993, the trial court set the dates for the reception
of evidence for accused-petitioner Dizon on the 8th, 15th, and 22nd of September;
and the 5th and 12 of October 1993.[35] The Order likewise stated that it will not
entertain any postponement and that all the accused who have not yet presented
their respective evidence should be ready at all times down the line, with their
evidence on all said dates. Failure on their part to present evidence when required
shall therefore be construed as waiver to present evidence.[36]
However, on 19 August 1993, counsel for another accused manifested in

open court that his client Antonio General would no longer present separate
evidence. Instead, the counsel would adopt the testimonial evidence of the other
accused who had already testified.[37] Because of this development and pursuant
to the trial courts Order that the parties should be ready at all times down the line,
the trial court expected Dizon to present evidence on the next trial date 25 August
1993 instead of his originally assigned dates. The original dates were supposed
to start two weeks later, or on 8 September 1993.[38] Counsel for accused Dizon
was not able to present evidence on the accelerated date. To address the situation,
counsel filed a Constancia on 25 August 1993, alleging that he had to appear in
a previously scheduled case, and that he would be ready to present evidence on
the dates originally assigned to his clients.[39] The trial court denied the
Manifestation on the same date and treated the Constancia as a motion for
postponement, in violation of the three-day-notice rule under the Rules of
Court.[40] Consequently, the trial court ruled that the failure of Dizon to present
evidence amounted to a waiver of that right.[41]
Accused-petitioner Dizon thus argues that he was deprived of due process
of law when the trial court forfeited his right to present evidence. According to
him, the postponement of the 25 August 1993 hearing should have been
considered justified, since his original pre-assigned trial dates were not supposed
to start until 8 September 1993, when he was scheduled to present evidence. He
posits that he was ready to present evidence on the dates assigned to him. He also
points out that he did not ask for a resetting of any of the said hearing dates; that
he in fact insisted on being allowed to present evidence on the dates fixed by the
trial court. Thus, he contends that the trial court erred in accelerating the schedule
of presentation of evidence, thereby invalidating the finding of his guilt.
The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed by no less than

the Constitution itself.[42] Article III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides that in all
criminal prosecutions, the accusedshall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel This constitutional right includes the right to present
evidence in ones defense,[43] as well as the right to be present and defend oneself
in person at every stage of the proceedings.[44]
In Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan,[45] the Sandiganbayan set the hearing of
the defenses presentation of evidence for 21, 22 and 23 June 1995. The 21 June
1995 hearing was cancelled due to lack of quorum in the regular membership of
the Sandiganbayans Second Division and upon the agreement of the parties. The
hearing was reset for the next day, 22 June 1995, but Crisostomo and his counsel
failed to attend. The Sandiganbayan, on the very same day, issued an Order
directing the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Crisostomo and the
confiscation of his surety bond. The Order further declared that he had waived
his right to present evidence because of his nonappearance at yesterdays and
todays scheduled hearings. In ruling against the Order, we held thus:
Under Section 2(c), Rule 114 and Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of
Court, Crisostomos non-appearance during the 22 June 1995 trial was
merely a waiver of his right to be present for trial on such date only and
not for the succeeding trial dates
xxxxxxxxx
Moreover, Crisostomos absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing should

not have been deemed as a waiver of his right to present evidence. While
constitutional rights may be waived, such waiver must be clear and must be
coupled with an actual intention to relinquish the right. Crisostomo did not
voluntarily waive in person or even through his counsel the right to present
evidence. The Sandiganbayan imposed the waiver due to the agreement of the
prosecution, Calingayan, and Calingayan's counsel.
In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as in the

present case, the court is called upon to see to it that the accused is
personally made aware of the consequences of a waiver of the right to
present evidence. In fact, it is not enough that the accused is simply warned
of the consequences of another failure to attend the succeeding hearings.
The court must first explain to the accused personally in clear terms the exact
nature and consequences of a waiver. Crisostomo was not even forewarned. The
Sandiganbayan simply went ahead to deprive Crisostomo of his right to present
evidence without even allowing Crisostomo to explain his absence on the 22
June 1995 hearing.
Clearly, the waiver of the right to present evidence in a criminal case

involving a grave penalty is not assumed and taken lightly. The presence of
the accused and his counsel is indispensable so that the court could personally
conduct a searching inquiry into the waiver x x x.[46] (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to present
evidence on 25 August 1993 as a waiver of his right to present evidence. On the
contrary, it should have considered the excuse of counsel justified, especially
since counsel for another accused General had made a last-minute adoption of
testimonial evidence that freed up the succeeding trial dates; and since Dizon was
not scheduled to testify until two weeks later. At any rate, the trial court pre-
assigned five hearing dates for the reception of evidence. If it really wanted to
impose its Order strictly, the most it could have done was to forfeit one out of the
five days set for Dizons testimonial evidence. Stripping the accused of all his pre-
assigned trial dates constitutes a patent denial of the constitutionally guaranteed
right to due process.
Nevertheless, as in the case of an improvident guilty plea, an invalid waiver

of the right to present evidence and be heard does not per se work to vacate a
finding of guilt in the criminal case or to enforce an automatic remand of the case
to the trial court.[47] In People v. Bodoso, we ruled that where facts have
adequately been represented in a criminal case, and no procedural unfairness or
irregularity has prejudiced either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the
invalid waiver, the rule is that a guilty verdict may nevertheless be upheld if the
judgment is supported beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record.[48]
We do not see any material inadequacy in the relevant facts on record to

resolve the case at bar. Neither can we see any procedural unfairness or
irregularity that would substantially prejudice either the prosecution or the
defense as a result of the invalid waiver. In fact, the arguments set forth by
accused Dizon in his Petition corroborate the material facts relevant to decide the
matter. Instead, what he is really contesting in his Petition is the application of
the law to the facts by the trial court and the CA. Petitioner Dizon admits direct
participation in the hazing of Lenny Villa by alleging in his Petition that all
actions of the petitioner were part of the traditional rites, and that the alleged
extension of the initiation rites was not outside the official activity of the
fraternity.[49] He even argues that Dizon did not request for the extension and he
participated only after the activity was sanctioned.[50]
For one reason or another, the case has been passed or turned over from
one judge or justice to another at the trial court, at the CA, and even at the
Supreme Court. Remanding the case for the reception of the evidence of
petitioner Dizon would only inflict further injustice on the parties. This case has
been going on for almost two decades. Its resolution is long overdue. Since the
key facts necessary to decide the case have already been determined, we shall
proceed to decide it.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona)

Petitioner Villa argues that the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano should not have been dismissed, since they failed to assert their right to
speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She points out that the accused
failed to raise a protest during the dormancy of the criminal case against them,
and that they asserted their right only after the trial court had dismissed the case
against their co-accused Concepcion. Petitioner also emphasizes that the trial
court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss filed by Saruca, Escalona, Ramos,
and Adriano, because it found that the prosecution could not be faulted for the
delay in the movement of this case when the original records and the evidence it
may require were not at its disposal as these were in the Court of Appeals.[51]
The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in Sections
14(2) and 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.[52] This right requires that there
be a trial free from vexatious, capricious or oppressive delays.[53] The right is
deemed violated when the proceeding is attended with unjustified postponements
of trial, or when a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the case being
tried and for no cause or justifiable motive.[54] In determining the right of the
accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation
of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case.[55] The
conduct of both the prosecution and the defense must be weighed.[56] Also to be
considered are factors such as the length of delay, the assertion or non-assertion
of the right, and the prejudice wrought upon the defendant.[57]
We have consistently ruled in a long line of cases that a dismissal of the

case pursuant to the right of the accused to speedy trial is tantamount to
acquittal.[58] As a consequence, an appeal or a reconsideration of the dismissal
would amount to a violation of the principle of double jeopardy. [59] As we have
previously discussed, however, where the dismissal of the case is
capricious, certiorarilies.[60] The rule on double jeopardy is not triggered when a
petition challenges the validity of the order of dismissal instead of the correctness
thereof.[61] Rather, grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and
lack of jurisdiction prevents double jeopardy from attaching.[62]
We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CAs dismissal of the case
against accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the
violation of their right to speedy trial. The court held thus:
An examination of the procedural history of this case would reveal that
the following factors contributed to the slow progress of the proceedings in the
case below:
xxxxxxxxx
5) The fact that the records of the case were elevated to the Court of
Appeals and the prosecutions failure to comply with the order of the
court a quo requiring them to secure certified true copies of the same.
xxxxxxxxx
While we are prepared to concede that some of the foregoing factors that
contributed to the delay of the trial of the petitioners are justifiable, We
nonetheless hold that their right to speedy trial has been utterly violated in this
case x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
[T]he absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the fact that the
records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals, and
the prosecutions failure to comply with the order of the court a quo
requiring it to secure certified true copies of the same. What is glaring from
the records is the fact that as early as September 21, 1995, the court a quo
already issued an Order requiring the prosecution, through the Department of
Justice, to secure the complete records of the case from the Court of Appeals.
The prosecution did not comply with the said Order as in fact, the same directive
was repeated by the court a quo in an Order dated December 27, 1995. Still,
there was no compliance on the part of the prosecution. It is not stated when
such order was complied with. It appears, however, that even until August 5,
2002, the said records were still not at the disposal of the trial court because
the lack of it was made the basis of the said court in granting the motion to
dismiss filed by co-accused Concepcion x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until August 5,

2002, or for a period of almost seven years, there was no action at all on the
part of the court a quo. Except for the pleadings filed by both the
prosecution and the petitioners, the latest of which was on January 29, 1996,
followed by petitioner Sarucas motion to set case for trial on August 17, 1998
which the court did not act upon, the case remained dormant for a
considerable length of time. This prolonged inactivity whatsoever is precisely
the kind of delay that the constitution frowns upon x x x.[63] (Emphasis supplied)
This Court points out that on 10 January 1992, the final amended Information
was filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, Ampil, S. Fernandez, Adriano,
Cabangon, Concepcion, and De Vera.[64] On 29 November 1993, they were all
arraigned.[65] Unfortunately, the initial trial of the case did not commence until 28
March 2005 or almost 12 years after arraignment.[66]
As illustrated in our ruling in Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, the unexplained interval

or inactivity of the Sandiganbayan for close to five years since the arraignment
of the accused amounts to an unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases a clear
violation of the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of cases.[67] Thus, we
held:
The delay in this case measures up to the unreasonableness of the delay
in the disposition of cases in Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, where the Court
found the delay of six years by the Ombudsman in resolving the criminal
complaints to be violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to a
speedy disposition of cases; similarly, in Roque vs. Office of the Ombudsman,
where the Court held that the delay of almost six years disregarded the
Ombudsman's duty to act promptly on complaints before him; and
in Cervantes vs. Sandiganbayan, where the Court held that the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in not quashing the
information which was filed six years after the initiatory complaint was
filed and thereby depriving petitioner of his right to a speedy disposition of
the case. So it must be in the instant case, where the reinvestigation by the
Ombudsman has dragged on for a decade already.[68] (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the CA in CA-G.R.

SP No. 89060 that accused Escalona et al.s right to speedy trial was violated.
Since there is nothing in the records that would show that the subject of this
Petition includes accused Ampil, S. Fernandez, Cabangon, and De Vera, the
effects of this ruling shall be limited to accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano.
G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals)

The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal justice system. It
dictates that when a person is charged with an offense, and the case is terminated
either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of
the accused the accused cannot again be charged with the same or an identical
offense.[69] This principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice and
conscience.[70] It is embodied in the civil law maxim non bis in idem found in the
common law of England and undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence. [71] It
found expression in the Spanish Law, in the Constitution of the United States,
and in our own Constitution as one of the fundamental rights of the citizen,[72] viz:
Article III Bill of Rights
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, which implements this particular
constitutional right, provides as follows:[73]
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has
been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction,
upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the
charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case
shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt
to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information.
The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the
judgment in order to reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either
through a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an appeal
by certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules. [74] The
requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the following: (a) there is a valid
complaint or information; (b) it is filed before a competent court; (c) the
defendant pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted or convicted,
or the case against him or her was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
defendants express consent.[75]
As we have reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, [a] verdict

of acquittal is immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such
acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the
same offense. The finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several avowed purposes.
Primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument
of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated
trials. It also serves the additional purpose of precluding the State, following an
acquittal, from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a
conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying
the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty. [76] We further
stressed that an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct
consequence of the finality of his acquittal.[77]
This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the
lower courts acquittal of the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the
latter in the following recognized exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is
deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to a
deprivation of due process;[78] (2) where there is a finding of mistrial;[79] or (3)
where there has been a grave abuse of discretion.[80]
The third instance refers to this Courts judicial power under Rule 65 to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.[81] Here, the party asking for the review must show the presence of
a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction;
a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty
or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation
of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility;[82] or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so
severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice.[83] In such an
event, the accused cannot be considered to be at risk of double jeopardy.[84]
The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, which seeks
the reversal of (1) the acquittal of Victorino et al. and (2) the conviction of
Tecson et al. for the lesser crime of slight physical injuries, both on the basis of
a misappreciation of facts and evidence. According to the Petition, the decision
of the Court of Appeals is not in accordance with law because private complainant
and petitioner were denied due process of law when the public respondent
completely ignored the a) Position Paper x x x b) the Motion for Partial
Reconsideration x x x and c) the petitioners Comment x x x.[85] Allegedly, the CA
ignored evidence when it adopted the theory of individual responsibility; set aside
the finding of conspiracy by the trial court; and failed to apply Article 4 of the
Revised Penal Code.[86] The Solicitor General also assails the finding that the
physical blows were inflicted only by Dizon and Villareal, as well as the
appreciation of Lenny Villas consent to hazing.[87]
In our view, what the Petition seeks is that we reexamine, reassess, and
reweigh the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties.[88] In People
v. Maquiling, we held that grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court
simply because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and the evidence.[89] Mere
errors of judgment are correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, and not by an application for a writ
of certiorari.[90] Therefore, pursuant to the rule on double jeopardy, we are
constrained to deny the Petition contra Victorino et al.the 19 acquitted fraternity
members.
We, however, modify the assailed judgment as regards Tecson, Ama,

Almeda, and Bantug the four fraternity members convicted of slight physical
injuries.
Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that the rule on double jeopardy
similarly applies when the state seeks the imposition of a higher penalty against
the accused.[91] We have also recognized, however, that certiorari may be used to
correct an abusive judgment upon a clear demonstration that the lower court
blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power
to dispense justice.[92] The present case is one of those instances of grave abuse
of discretion.
In imposing the penalty of slight physical injuries on Tecson, Ama,
Almeda, and Bantug, the CA reasoned thus:
Based on the medical findings, it would appear that with the exclusion
of the fatal wounds inflicted by the accused Dizon and Villareal, the injuries
sustained by the victim as a result of the physical punishment heaped on
him were serious in nature. However, by reason of the death of the victim,
there can be no precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity
or the medical attendance required. To do so, at this stage would be merely
speculative. In a prosecution for this crime where the category of the offense
and the severity of the penalty depend on the period of illness or incapacity for
labor, the length of this period must likewise be proved beyond reasonable doubt
in much the same manner as the same act charged [People v. Codilla, CA-G.R.
No. 4079-R, June 26, 1950]. And when proof of the said period is absent, the
crime committed should be deemed only as slight physical injuries [People
v. De los Santos, CA, 59 O.G. 4393, citing People v. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398]. As
such, this Court is constrained to rule that the injuries inflicted by the appellants,
Tecson, Ama, Almeda and Bantug, Jr., are only slight and not serious, in
nature.[93] (Emphasis supplied and citations included)
The appellate court relied on our ruling in People v. Penesa[94] in finding

that the four accused should be held guilty only of slight physical injuries.
According to the CA, because of the death of the victim, there can be no precise
means to determine the duration of the incapacity or medical attendance
required.[95] The reliance on Penesa was utterly misplaced. A review of that case
would reveal that the accused therein was guilty merely of slight physical injuries,
because the victims injuries neither caused incapacity for labor nor required
medical attendance.[96] Furthermore, he did not die.[97] His injuries were not even
serious.[98] Since Penesa involved a case in which the victim allegedly suffered
physical injuries and not death, the ruling cited by the CA was patently
inapplicable.
On the contrary, the CAs ultimate conclusion that Tecson, Ama, Almeda,
and Bantug were liable merely for slight physical injuries grossly contradicts its
own findings of fact. According to the court, the four accused were found to
have inflicted more than the usual punishment undertaken during such
initiation rites on the person of Villa.[99] It then adopted the NBI medico-legal
officers findings that the antecedent cause of Lenny Villas death was the multiple
traumatic injuries he suffered from the initiation rites. [100] Considering that the
CA found that the physical punishment heaped on [Lenny Villa was] serious
in nature,[101] it was patently erroneous for the court to limit the criminal liability
to slight physical injuries, which is a light felony.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be
liable for the consequences of an act, even if its result is different from that
intended. Thus, once a person is found to have committed an initial felonious act,
such as the unlawful infliction of physical injuries that results in the death of the
victim, courts are required to automatically apply the legal framework governing
the destruction of life. This rule is mandatory, and not subject to discretion.
The CAs application of the legal framework governing physical injuries

punished under Articles 262 to 266 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for
culpable felonies is therefore tantamount to a whimsical, capricious, and abusive
exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. According to the Revised
Penal Code, the mandatory and legally imposable penalty in case the victim dies
should be based on the framework governing the destruction of the life of a
person, punished under Articles 246 to 261 for intentional felonies and Article
365 for culpable felonies, and not under the aforementioned provisions. We
emphasize that these two types of felonies are distinct from and legally
inconsistent with each other, in that the accused cannot be held criminally liable
for physical injuries when actual death occurs.[102]
Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon as if only their

acts, in and of themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa is contrary to the CAs
own findings. From proof that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect
of the multiple injuries he suffered,[103] the only logical conclusion is that criminal
responsibility should redound to all those who have been proven to have directly
participated in the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny. The accumulation of
bruising on his body caused him to suffer cardiac arrest. Accordingly, we find
that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug criminally liable for
slight physical injuries. As an allowable exception to the rule on double jeopardy,
we therefore give due course to the Petition in G.R. No. 154954.
Resolution on Ultimate Findings
According to the trial court, although hazing was not (at the time) punishable as
a crime, the intentional infliction of physical injuries on Villa was nonetheless a
felonious act under Articles 263 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, in ruling
against the accused, the court a quo found that pursuant to Article 4(1) of the
Revised Penal Code, the accused fraternity members were guilty of homicide, as
it was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the physical injuries they had
intentionally inflicted.[104]
The CA modified the trial courts finding of criminal liability. It ruled that
there could have been no conspiracy since the neophytes, including Lenny Villa,
had knowingly consented to the conduct of hazing during their initiation rites.
The accused fraternity members, therefore, were liable only for the consequences
of their individual acts. Accordingly, 19 of the accused Victorino et al.were
acquitted; 4 of them Tecson et al. were found guilty of slight physical injuries;
and the remaining 2 Dizon and Villareal were found guilty of homicide.
The issue at hand does not concern a typical criminal case wherein the
perpetrator clearly commits a felony in order to take revenge upon, to gain
advantage over, to harm maliciously, or to get even with, the victim. Rather, the
case involves an ex ante situation in which a man driven by his own desire to join
a society of men pledged to go through physically and psychologically strenuous
admission rituals, just so he could enter the fraternity. Thus, in order to
understand how our criminal laws apply to such situation absent the Anti-Hazing
Law, we deem it necessary to make a brief exposition on the underlying concepts
shaping intentional felonies, as well as on the nature of physical and
psychological initiations widely known as hazing.
Intentional Felony and Conspiracy

Our Revised Penal Code belongs to the classical school of thought.[105] The
classical theory posits that a human person is essentially a moral creature with an
absolute free will to choose between good and evil.[106] It asserts that one should
only be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will
appears unimpaired.[107] The basic postulate of the classical penal system is that
humans are rational and calculating beings who guide their actions with reference
to the principles of pleasure and pain.[108] They refrain from criminal acts if
threatened with punishment sufficient to cancel the hope of possible gain or
advantage in committing the crime.[109] Here, criminal liability is thus based on
the free will and moral blame of the actor.[110] The identity of mens rea defined
as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent is the
predominant consideration.[111] Thus, it is not enough to do what the law
prohibits.[112] In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the act
be committed by means of dolo or malice.[113]
The term dolo or malice is a complex idea involving the elements

of freedom, intelligence, and intent.[114] The first element, freedom, refers to an
act done with deliberation and with power to choose between two things.[115] The
second element, intelligence, concerns the ability to determine the morality of
human acts, as well as the capacity to distinguish between a licit and an illicit
act.[116] The last element, intent, involves an aim or a determination to do a certain
act.[117]
The element of intent on which this Court shall focus is described as the
state of mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act.[118] It refers to the
purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a person proceeds.[119] It does not
refer to mere will, for the latter pertains to the act, while intent concerns the result
of the act.[120] While motive is the moving power that impels one to action for a
definite result, intent is the purpose of using a particular means to produce the
result.[121] On the other hand, the term felonious means, inter alia, malicious,
villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart or purpose.[122] With these
elements taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer
to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind
accompanying a forbidden act. Stated otherwise, intentional felony requires the
existence of dolus malus that the act or omission be done willfully, maliciously,
with deliberate evil intent, and with malice aforethought.[123] The maxim is actus
non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea a crime is not committed if the mind of the person
performing the act complained of is innocent.[124] As is required of the other
elements of a felony, the existence of malicious intent must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt.[125]
In turn, the existence of malicious intent is necessary in order for

conspiracy to attach. Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that
conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it is to be interpreted to refer
only to felonies committed by means of dolo or malice. The phrase coming to an
agreement connotes the existence of a prefaced intent to cause injury to another,
an element present only in intentional felonies. In culpable felonies or criminal
negligence, the injury inflicted on another is unintentional, the wrong done being
simply the result of an act performed without malice or criminal design.[126] Here,
a person performs an initial lawful deed; however, due to negligence,
imprudence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill, the deed results in a wrongful
act.[127] Verily, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act, which is a requisite in
conspiracy, is inconsistent with the idea of a felony committed by means
of culpa.[128]
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital

ingredient in establishing the commission of the intentional felony of
homicide.[129] Being mala in se, the felony of homicide requires the existence of
malice or dolo[130] immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of
injuries.[131] Intent to kill or animus interficendi cannot and should not be
inferred, unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such
intent.[132] Furthermore, the victims death must not have been the product of
accident, natural cause, or suicide.[133] If death resulted from an act executed
without malice or criminal intent but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or
negligence the act must be qualified as reckless or simple negligence or
imprudence resulting in homicide.[134]
Hazing and other forms of initiation rites
The notion of hazing is not a recent development in our society.[135] It is

said that, throughout history, hazing in some form or another has been associated
with organizations ranging from military groups to indigenous tribes.[136] Some
say that elements of hazing can be traced back to the Middle Ages, during which
new students who enrolled in European universities worked as servants for
upperclassmen.[137] It is believed that the concept of hazing is rooted in ancient
Greece,[138] where young men recruited into the military were tested with pain or
challenged to demonstrate the limits of their loyalty and to prepare the recruits
for battle.[139] Modern fraternities and sororities espouse some connection to these
values of ancient Greek civilization.[140] According to a scholar, this concept lends
historical legitimacy to a tradition or ritual whereby prospective members are
asked to prove their worthiness and loyalty to the organization in which they seek
to attain membership through hazing.[141]
Thus, it is said that in the Greek fraternity system, custom requires a student
wishing to join an organization to receive an invitation in order to be a neophyte
for a particular chapter.[142] The neophyte period is usually one to two semesters
long.[143] During the program, neophytes are required to interview and to get to
know the active members of the chapter; to learn chapter history; to understand
the principles of the organization; to maintain a specified grade point average; to
participate in the organizations activities; and to show dignity and respect for their
fellow neophytes, the organization, and its active and alumni members.[144] Some
chapters require the initiation activities for a recruit to involve hazing acts during
the entire neophyte stage.[145]
Hazing, as commonly understood, involves an initiation rite or ritual that
serves as prerequisite for admission to an organization.[146] In hazing, the recruit,
pledge, neophyte, initiate, applicant or any other term by which the organization
may refer to such a person is generally placed in embarrassing or humiliating
situations, like being forced to do menial, silly, foolish, or other similar tasks or
activities.[147] It encompasses different forms of conduct that humiliate, degrade,
abuse, or physically endanger those who desire membership in the
organization.[148] These acts usually involve physical or psychological suffering
or injury.[149]
The concept of initiation rites in the country is nothing new. In fact, more
than a century ago, our national hero Andres Bonifacio organized a secret society
named Kataastaasan Kagalanggalangang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng
Bayan (The Highest and Most Venerable Association of the Sons and Daughters
of the Nation).[150] The Katipunan, or KKK, started as a small confraternity
believed to be inspired by European Freemasonry, as well as by confraternities
or sodalities approved by the Catholic Church.[151] The Katipunans ideology was
brought home to each member through the societys initiation ritual.[152] It is said
that initiates were brought to a dark room, lit by a single point of illumination,
and were asked a series of
[153]
questions to determine their fitness, loyalty, courage, and resolve. They were
made to go through vigorous trials such as pagsuot sa isang lungga or
[pagtalon] sa balon.[154] It would seem that they were also made to withstand the
blow of pangherong bakal sa pisngi and to endure a matalas na punyal.[155] As a
final step in the ritual, the neophyte Katipunero was made to sign membership
papers with the his own blood.[156]
It is believed that the Greek fraternity system was transported by the

Americans to the Philippines in the late 19th century. As can be seen in the
following instances, the manner of hazing in the United States was jarringly
similar to that inflicted by the Aquila Fraternity on Lenny Villa.
Early in 1865, upperclassmen at West Point Academy forced the fourth

classmen to do exhausting physical exercises that sometimes resulted in
permanent physical damage; to eat or drink unpalatable foods; and in various
ways to humiliate themselves.[157] In 1901, General Douglas MacArthur got
involved in a congressional investigation of hazing at the academy during his
second year at West Point.[158]
In Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, decided in 1985, the candidate-

victim was injured during the shriners hazing event, which was part of the
initiation ceremonies for Hejaz membership.[159] The ritual involved what was
known as the mattress-rotating barrel trick.[160] It required each candidate to slide
down an eight to nine-foot-high metal board onto connected mattresses leading
to a barrel, over which the candidate was required to climb.[161] Members of Hejaz
would stand on each side of the mattresses and barrel and fun-paddle
candidates en route to the barrel.[162]
In a video footage taken in 1991, U.S. Marine paratroopers in Camp
Lejeune, North Carolina, were seen performing a ceremony in which they pinned
paratrooper jump wings directly onto the neophyte paratroopers chests. [163] The
victims were shown writhing and crying out in pain as others pounded the spiked
medals through the shirts and into the chests of the victims.[164]
In State v. Allen, decided in 1995, the Southeast Missouri State University

chapter of Kappa Alpha Psi invited male students to enter into a pledgeship
program.[165] The fraternity members subjected the pledges to repeated physical
abuse including repeated, open-hand strikes at the nape, the chest, and the back;
caning of the bare soles of the feet and buttocks; blows to the back with the use
of a heavy book and a cookie sheet while the pledges were on their hands and
knees; various kicks and punches to the body; and body slamming, an activity in
which active members of the fraternity lifted pledges up in the air and dropped
them to the ground.[166] The fraternity members then put the pledges through a
seven-station circle of physical abuse.[167]
In Ex Parte Barran, decided in 1998, the pledge-victim went

through hazing by fraternity members of the Kappa Alpha Order at the Auburn
University in Alabama.[168] The hazing included the following: (1) having to dig
a ditch and jump into it after it had been filled with water, urine, feces, dinner
leftovers, and vomit; (2) receiving paddlings on the buttocks; (3) being pushed
and kicked, often onto walls or into pits and trash cans; (4) eating foods like
peppers, hot sauce, butter, and yerks (a mixture of hot sauce, mayonnaise, butter,
beans, and other items); (5) doing chores for the fraternity and its members, such
as cleaning the fraternity house and yard, being designated as driver, and running
errands; (6) appearing regularly at 2 a.m. meetings, during which the pledges
would be hazed for a couple of hours; and (7) running the gauntlet, during which
the pledges were pushed, kicked, and hit as they ran down a hallway and
descended down a flight of stairs.[169]
In Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, decided in 1999, the victim
Sylvester Lloyd was accepted to pledge at the Cornell University chapter of the
Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity.[170] He participated in initiation activities, which
included various forms of physical beatings and torture, psychological coercion
and embarrassment.[171]
In Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, decided in 2002, the initiate-

victim suffered injuries from hazing activities during the fraternitys initiation
rites.[172] Kenner and the other initiates went through psychological and physical
hazing, including being paddled on the buttocks for more than 200 times. [173]
In Morton v. State, Marcus Jones a university student in Florida sought
initiation into the campus chapter of the Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity during the
2005-06 academic year.[174] The pledges efforts to join the fraternity culminated
in a series of initiation rituals conducted in four nights. Jones, together with other
candidates, was blindfolded, verbally harassed, and caned on his face and
buttocks.[175] In these rituals described as preliminaries, which lasted for two
evenings, he received approximately 60 canings on his buttocks. [176] During the
last two days of the hazing, the rituals intensified.[177] The pledges sustained
roughly 210 cane strikes during the four-night initiation.[178] Jones and several
other candidates passed out.[179]
The purported raison dtre behind hazing practices is the proverbial birth
by fire, through which the pledge who has successfully withstood the hazing
proves his or her worth.[180] Some organizations even believe that hazing is the
path to enlightenment. It is said that this process enables the organization to
establish unity among the pledges and, hence, reinforces and ensures the future
of the organization.[181] Alleged benefits of joining include leadership
opportunities; improved academic performance; higher self-esteem;
professional networking opportunities; and the esprit dcorpassociated with close,
almost filial, friendship and common cause.[182]
Anti-Hazing laws in the U.S.

The first hazing statute in the U.S. appeared in 1874 in response to hazing
in the military.[183] The hazing of recruits and plebes in the armed services was so
prevalent that Congress prohibited all forms of military hazing, harmful or
not.[184] It was not until 1901 that Illinois passed the first state anti-hazing law,
criminalizing conduct whereby any one sustains an injury to his [or her] person
therefrom.[185]
However, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s, due in large part to the
efforts of the Committee to Halt Useless College Killings and other similar
organizations, that states increasingly began to enact legislation prohibiting
and/or criminalizing hazing.[186] As of 2008, all but six states had enacted criminal
or civil statutes proscribing hazing.[187] Most anti-hazing laws in the U.S. treat
hazing as a misdemeanor and carry relatively light consequences for even the
most severe situations.[188] Only a few states with anti-hazing laws consider
hazing as a felony in case death or great bodily harm occurs.[189]
Under the laws of Illinois, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, except hazing
that results in death or great bodily harm, which is a Class 4 felony.[190] In a Class
4 felony, a sentence of imprisonment shall be for a term of not less than one year
and not more than three years.[191] Indiana criminal law provides that a person
who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally
performs hazing that results in serious bodily injury to a person commits criminal
recklessness, a Class D felony.[192]
The offense becomes a Class C felony if committed by means of a deadly

weapon.[193] As an element of a Class C felony criminal recklessness resulting in
serious bodily injury, death falls under the category of serious bodily injury.[194] A
person who commits a Class C felony is imprisoned for a fixed term of between
two (2) and eight (8) years, with the advisory sentence being four (4)
years.[195] Pursuant to Missouri law, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, unless the
act creates a substantial risk to the life of the student or prospective member, in
which case it becomes a Class C felony.[196] A Class C felony provides for an
imprisonment term not to exceed seven years.[197]
In Texas, hazing that causes the death of another is a state jail
felony.[198] An individual adjudged guilty of a state jail felony is punished by
confinement in a state jail for any term of not more than two years or not less than
180 days.[199] Under Utah law, if hazing results in serious bodily injury, the hazer
is guilty of a third-degree felony.[200] A person who has been convicted of a third-
degree felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not to exceed five
years.[201] West Virginia law provides that if the act of hazing would otherwise be
deemed a felony, the hazer may be found guilty thereof and subject to penalties
provided therefor.[202] In Wisconsin, a person is guilty of a Class G felony if
hazing results in the death of another.[203] A
Class G felony carries a fine not to exceed $25,000 or imprisonment not to exceed
10 years, or both.[204]
In certain states in the U.S., victims of hazing were left with limited
remedies, as there was no hazing statute.[205] This situation was exemplified
in Ballou v. Sigma Nu General Fraternity, wherein Barry Ballous family resorted
to a civil action for wrongful death, since there was no anti-hazing statute in South
Carolina until 1994.[206]
The existence of animus interficendi or intent

to kill not proven beyond reasonable doubt
The presence of an ex ante situation in this case, fraternity initiation rites

does not automatically amount to the absence of malicious intent or dolus malus.
If it is proven beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators were equipped with
a guilty mind whether or not there is a contextual background or factual premise
they are still criminally liable for intentional felony.
The trial court, the CA, and the Solicitor General are all in agreement that
with the exception of Villareal and Dizon accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and
Bantug did not have the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa or the
other neophytes. We shall no longer disturb this finding.
As regards Villareal and Dizon, the CA modified the Decision of the trial
court and found that the two accused had the animus interficendi or intent to kill
Lenny Villa, not merely to inflict physical injuries on him. It justified its finding
of homicide against Dizon by holding that he had apparently been motivated by
ill will while beating up Villa. Dizon kept repeating that his fathers parking space
had been stolen by the victims father.[207] As to Villareal, the court said that the
accused suspected the family of Bienvenido Marquez, one of the neophytes, to
have had a hand in the death of Villareals brother.[208] The CA then ruled as
follows:
The two had their own axes to grind against Villa and Marquez. It was very
clear that they acted with evil and criminal intent. The evidence on this matter
is unrebutted and so for the death of
Villa, appellants Dizonand Villareal must and should face the consequence
of their acts, that is, to be held liable for the crime of
homicide.[209] (Emphasis supplied)
We cannot subscribe to this conclusion.

The appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of Bienvenido Marquez
to determine the existence of animus interficendi. For a full appreciation of the
context in which the supposed utterances were made, the Court deems it
necessary to reproduce the relevant portions of witness Marquezs testimony:
Witness We were brought up into [Michael Musngis] room and we were briefed
as to what to expect during the next three days and we were
told the members of the fraternity and their batch and we
were also told about the fraternity song, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness We were escorted out of [Michael Musngis] house and we were made
to ride a van and we were brought to another place in
Kalookan City which I later found to be the place of Mariano
Almeda, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness Upon arrival, we were instructed to bow our head down and to link our
arms and then the driver of the van and other members of the
Aquilans who were inside left us inside the van, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness We heard voices shouted outside the van to the effect, Villa akin
ka, Asuncion Patay ka and the people outside pound the
van, rock the van, sir.
Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall in what tone of voice and how strong a voice
these remarks uttered upon your arrival?
Witness Some were almost shouting, you could feel the sense of excitement in
their voices, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar During all these times that the van was being rocked through and
through, what were the voices or utterances that you heard?
Witness Villa akin ka, Asuncion patay ka, Recinto patay ka sa amin, etc.,
sir.
Atty. Tadiar And those utterances and threats, how long did they continue
during the rocking of the van which lasted for 5 minutes?
xxxxxxxxx
Witness Even after they rocked the van, we still kept on hearing voices, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar During the time that this rounds [of physical beating] were being
inflicted, was there any utterances by anybody?
Witness Yes sir. Some were piercing, some were discouraging, and some
were encouraging others who were pounding and beating
us, it was just like a fiesta atmosphere, actually some of
them enjoyed looking us being pounded, sir.
Atty. Tadiar Do you recall what were those voices that you heard?
Witness One particular utterance always said was, they asked us whether
matigas pa yan, kayang-kaya pa niyan.
Atty. Tadiar Do you know who in particular uttered those particular words that
you quote?
Witness I cannot particularly point to because there were utterances
simultaneously, I could not really pin point who uttered those
words, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar Were there any utterances that you heard during the conduct of this
Bicol Express?
Witness Yes, sir I heard utterances.
Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall to this Honorable Court what were the
utterances that you remember?
Witness For example, one person particularly Boyet Dizon stepped on my

thigh, he would say that and I quote ito, yung pamilya
nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko, so that would in turn
sort of justifying him in inflicting more serious pain on me.
So instead of just walking, he would jump on my thighs and
then after on was Lenny Villa. He was saying to the effect
that this guy, his father stole the parking space of my
father, sir. So, thats why he inflicted more pain on Villa and
that went on, sir.
Atty. Tadiar And you were referring to which particular accused?
Witness Boyet Dizon, sir.
Atty. Tadiar When Boyet Dizon at that particular time was accusing you of
having your family have his brother killed, what was your
response?
Witness Of course, I knew sir that it was not true and that he was just
making it up sir. So he said that I knew nothing of that
incident. However, he just in fact after the Bicol Express, he
kept on uttering those words/statements so that it would in
turn justify him and to give me harder blows, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar You mentioned about Dizon in particular mentioning that

Lenny Villas father stole the parking space allotted for
his father, do you recall who were within hearing distance
when that utterance was made?
Witness Yes, sir. All of the neophytes heard that utterance, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness There were different times made this accusation so there were different
people who heard from time to time, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar Can you tell the Honorable Court when was the next accusation
against Lenny Villas father was made?
Witness When we were line up against the wall, Boyet Dizon came near to us
and when Lenny Villas turn, I heard him uttered those
statements, sir.
Atty. Tadiar What happened after he made this accusation to Lenny Villas
father?
Witness He continued to inflict blows on Lenny Villa.
Atty. Tadiar How were those blows inflicted?
Witness There were slaps and he knelt on Lenny Villas thighs and sometime he
stand up and he kicked his thighs and sometimes jumped at
it, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar We would go on to the second day but not right now. You
mentioned also that accusations made by Dizon you or
your family had his brother killed, can you inform this
Honorable Court what exactly were the accusations that
were charged against you while inflicting blows upon you
in particular?
Witness While he was inflicting blows upon me, he told me in particular if I

knew that his family who had his brother killed, and he said
that his brother was an NPA, sir so I knew that it was just
a story that he made up and I said that I knew nothing
about it and he continued inflicting blows on me, sir. And
another incident was when a talk was being given, Dizon was
on another part of the pelota court and I was sort of looking
and we saw that he was drinking beer, and he said and I
quote: Marquez, Marquez, ano ang tinitingin-tingin mo
diyan, ikaw yung pamilya mo ang nagpapatay sa aking
kapatid, yari ka sa akin, sir.
Atty. Tadiar What else?
Witness Thats all, sir.
Atty. Tadiar And on that first night of February 8, 1991, did ever a doctor or a
physician came around as promised to you earlier?
Witness No, sir.[210] (Emphasis supplied)
On cross-examination, witness Bienvenido Marquez testified thus:

Judge Purisima When you testified on direct examination Mr. Marquez, have
you stated that there was a briefing that was conducted
immediately before your initiation as regards to what to
expect during the initiation, did I hear you right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Judge Purisima Who did the briefing?
Witness Mr. Michael Musngi, sir and Nelson Victorino.
Judge Purisima Will you kindly tell the Honorable Court what they told you to
expect during the initiation?
Witness They told us at the time we would be brought to a particular place, we

would be mocked at, sir.
Judge Purisima So, you expected to be mocked at, ridiculed, humiliated etc.,
and the likes?
Witness Yes, sir.
Judge Purisima You were also told beforehand that there would be physical
contact?
Witness Yes, sir at the briefing.
xxxxxxxxx
Witness Yes, sir, because they informed that we could immediately go back to
school. All the bruises would be limited to our arms and legs,
sir. So, if we wear the regular school uniforms like long
sleeves, it would be covered actually so we have no thinking
that our face would be slapped, sir.
Judge Purisima So, you mean to say that beforehand that you would have
bruises on your body but that will be covered?
Witness Yes, sir.
JudgePurisima So, what kind of physical contact or implements that you expect
that would create bruises to your body?
Witness At that point I am already sure that there would be hitting by a paddling
or paddle, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Judge Purisima Now, will you admit Mr. Marquez that much of the initiation
procedures is psychological in nature?
Witness Combination, sir.[211] (Emphasis supplied)
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Jimenez The initiation that was conducted did not consist only of physical
initiation, meaning body contact, is that correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez Part of the initiation was the so-called psychological

initiation, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez And this consisted of making you believe of things calculated
to terrify you, scare you, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, the initiating masters made belief situation
intended to, I repeat, terrify you, frighten you, scare you
into perhaps quitting the initiation, is this correct?
Witness Sometimes sir, yes.
Atty. Jimenez You said on direct that while Mr. Dizon was initiating you, he
said or he was supposed to have said according to you that
your family were responsible for the killing of his brother
who was an NPA, do you remember saying that?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez You also said in connection with that statement said to you by
Dizon that you did not believe him because that is not
true, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, he was only psychologizing you perhaps, the
purpose as I have mentioned before, terrifying you,
scaring you or frightening you into quitting the initiation,
this is correct?
Witness No, sir, perhaps it is one but the main reason, I think, why he was
saying those things was because he wanted to inflict
injury.
Atty. Jimenez He did not tell that to you. That is your only perception, correct?
Witness No, sir, because at one point, while he was telling this to Villareal, he
was hitting me.
Atty. Jimenez But did you not say earlier that you [were] subjected to the same
forms of initiation by all the initiating masters? You said that
earlier, right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez Are you saying also that the others who jumped on you or kicked
you said something similar as was told to you by Mr. Dizon?
Witness No, sir.
Atty. Jimenez But the fact remains that in the Bicol Express for instance, the
masters would run on your thighs, right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez This was the regular procedure that was followed by the initiating
masters not only on you but also on the other neophytes?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, it is fair to say that whatever forms of

initiation was administered by one master, was also
administered by one master on a neophyte, was also
administered by another master on the other neophyte,
this is correct?
Witness Yes, sir.[212] (Emphasis supplied)
According to the Solicitor General himself, the ill motives attributed by the
CA to Dizon and Villareal were baseless,[213] since the statements of the accused
were just part of the psychological initiation calculated to instill fear on the part
of the neophytes; that [t]here is no element of truth in it as testified by Bienvenido
Marquez; and that the harsh words uttered by Petitioner and Villareal are part of
tradition concurred and accepted by all the fraternity members during their
initiation rites.[214]
We agree with the Solicitor General.
The foregoing testimony of witness Marquez reveals a glaring mistake of
substantial proportion on the part of the CA it mistook the utterances of Dizon for
those of Villareal. Such inaccuracy cannot be tolerated, especially because it was
the CAs primary basis for finding that Villarreal had the intent to kill Lenny Villa,
thereby making Villareal guilty of the intentional felony of homicide. To repeat,
according to Bienvenido Marquezs testimony, as reproduced above, it was Dizon
who uttered both accusations against Villa and Marquez; Villareal had no
participation whatsoever in the specific threats referred to by the CA. It
was Boyet Dizon [who] stepped on [Marquezs] thigh; and who told witness
Marquez, [I]to, yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko. It was also
Dizon who jumped on Villas thighs while saying, [T]his guy, his father stole the
parking space of my father. With the testimony clarified, we find that the CA had
no basis for concluding the existence of intent to kill based solely thereon.
As to the existence of animus interficendi on the part of Dizon, we refer to
the entire factual milieu and contextual premise of the incident to fully appreciate
and understand the testimony of witness Marquez. At the outset, the neophytes
were briefed that they would be subjected to psychological pressure in order to
scare them. They knew that they would be mocked, ridiculed, and intimidated.
They heard fraternity members shout, Patay ka, Recinto, Yari ka, Recinto,
Villa, akin ka, Asuncion, gulpi ka, Putang ina mo, Asuncion, Putang ina nyo,
patay kayo sa amin, or some other words to that effect.[215] While beating the
neophytes, Dizon accused Marquez of the death of the formers purported NPA
brother, and then blamed Lenny Villas father for stealing the parking space of
Dizons father. According to the Solicitor General, these statements, including
those of the accused Dizon, were all part of the psychological initiation employed
by the Aquila Fraternity.[216]
Thus, to our understanding, accused Dizons way of inflicting
psychological pressure was through hurling make-believe accusations at the
initiates. He concocted the fictitious stories, so that he could justify giving the
neophytes harder blows, all in the context of fraternity initiation and role playing.
Even one of the neophytes admitted that the accusations were untrue and made-
up.
The infliction of psychological pressure is not unusual in the conduct of

hazing. In fact, during the Senate deliberations on the then proposed Anti-Hazing
Law, former Senator Lina spoke as follows:
Senator Lina. -- so as to capture the intent that we conveyed during the period
of interpellations on why we included the phrase or psychological pain and
suffering.
xxxxxxxxx
So that if no direct physical harm is inflicted upon the neophyte or the recruit
but the recruit or neophyte is made to undergo certain acts which I already
described yesterday, like playing the Russian roulette extensively to test the
readiness and the willingness of the neophyte or recruit to continue his
desire to be a member of the fraternity, sorority or similar organization or
playing and putting a noose on the neck of the neophyte or recruit, making the
recruit or neophyte stand on the ledge of the fourth floor of the building facing
outside, asking him to jump outside after making him turn around several times
but the reality is that he will be made to jump towards the inside portion of the
building these are the mental or psychological tests that are resorted to by
these organizations, sororities or fraternities. The doctors who appeared
during the public hearing testified that such acts can result in some mental
aberration, that they can even lead to psychosis, neurosis or insanity. This is
what we want to prevent.[217] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, without proof beyond reasonable doubt, Dizons behavior must not
be automatically viewed as evidence of a genuine, evil motivation to kill Lenny
Villa. Rather, it must be taken within the context of the fraternitys psychological
initiation. This Court points out that it was not even established whether the
fathers of Dizon and Villa really had any familiarity with each other as would
lend credence to the veracity of Dizons threats. The testimony of Lennys co-
neophyte, Marquez, only confirmed this view. According to Marquez, he knew it
was not true and that [Dizon] was just making it up.[218] Even the trial court did
not give weight to the utterances of Dizon as constituting intent to kill: [T]he
cumulative acts of all the accused were not directed toward killing Villa, but
merely to inflict physical harm as part of the fraternity initiation rites x x
x.[219] The Solicitor General shares the same view.
Verily, we cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon guilty of

homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code on the basis of the
existence of intent to kill. Animus interficendicannot and should not be inferred
unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent. [220] Instead, we
adopt and reinstate the finding of the trial court in part, insofar as it ruled
that none of the fraternity members had the specific intent to kill Lenny
Villa.[221]
The existence of animus iniuriandi or

malicious intent to injure not proven beyond
reasonable doubt
The Solicitor General argues, instead, that there was an intent to inflict
physical injuries on Lenny Villa. Echoing the Decision of the trial court, the
Solicitor General then posits that since all of the accused fraternity members
conspired to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa and death ensued, all of them
should be liable for the crime of homicide pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised
Penal Code.
In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles 262
to 266 of the Revised Penal Code,[222] the employment of physical injuries must
be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is mala in se, the existence of
malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of the
wrongdoer iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the
accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in case of physical
injuries under the Revised Penal Code, there must be a specific animus
iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against the physical integrity or
well-being of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain
bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus
iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical injuries per se merely satisfies the
elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony. The commission of
the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions are.[223]
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances[224] that the mere infliction of
physical injuries, absent malicious intent, does not make a person automatically
liable for an intentional felony. In Bagajo v. People,[225] the accused teacher,
using a bamboo stick, whipped one of her students behind her legs and thighs as
a form of discipline. The student suffered lesions and bruises from the corporal
punishment. In reversing the trial courts finding of criminal liability for slight
physical injuries, this Court stated thus: Independently of any civil or
administrative responsibility [w]e are persuaded that she did not do what she had
done with criminal intent the means she actually used was moderate and that she
was not motivated by ill-will, hatred or any malevolent intent. Considering the
applicable laws, we then ruled that as a matter of law, petitioner did not incur any
criminal liability for her act of whipping her pupil. In People v. Carmen,[226] the
accused members of the religious group known as the Missionaries of Our Lady
of Fatima under the guise of a ritual or treatment plunged the head of the victim
into a barrel of water, banged his head against a bench, pounded his chest with
fists, and stabbed him on the side with a kitchen knife, in order to cure him of
nervous breakdown by expelling through those means the bad spirits possessing
him. The collective acts of the group caused the death of the victim. Since
malicious intent was not proven, we reversed the trial courts finding of liability
for murder under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code and instead ruled that the
accused should be held criminally liable for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide under Article 365 thereof.
Indeed, the threshold question is whether the accuseds initial acts of
inflicting physical pain on the neophytes were attended by animus
iniuriandi amounting to a felonious act punishable under the Revised Penal Code,
thereby making it subject to Article 4(1) thereof. In People v. Regato, we ruled
that malicious intent must be judged by the action, conduct, and external acts of
the accused.[227] What persons do is the best index of their intention.[228] We have
also ruled that the method employed, the kind of weapon used, and the parts of
the body on which the injury was inflicted may be determinative of the intent of
the perpetrator.[229] The Court shall thus examine the whole contextual
background surrounding the death of Lenny Villa.
Lenny died during Aquilas fraternity initiation rites. The night before the
commencement of the rites, they were briefed on what to expect. They were told
that there would be physical beatings, that the whole event would last for three
days, and that they could quit anytime. On their first night, they were subjected
to traditional initiation rites, including the Indian Run, Bicol Express, Rounds,
and the Auxies Privilege Round. The beatings were predominantly directed at the
neophytes arms and legs.
In the morning of their second day of initiation, they were made to present
comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize
and recite the Aquila Fraternitys principles. Late in the afternoon, they were once
again subjected to traditional initiation rituals. When the rituals were officially
reopened on the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, the neophytes were subjected
to another traditional ritual paddling by the fraternity.
During the whole initiation rites, auxiliaries were assigned to the

neophytes. The auxiliaries protected the neophytes by functioning as human
barriers and shielding them from those who were designated to inflict physical
and psychological pain on the initiates.[230] It was their regular duty to stop foul
or excessive physical blows; to help the neophytes to pump their legs in order that
their blood would circulate; to facilitate a rest interval after every physical activity
or round; to serve food and water; to tell jokes; to coach the initiates; and to give
them whatever they needed.
These rituals were performed with Lennys consent.[231] A few days before
the rites, he asked both his parents for permission to join the Aquila
Fraternity.[232] His father knew that Lenny would go through an initiation process
and would be gone for three days.[233] The CA found as follows:
It is worth pointing out that the neophytes willingly and voluntarily consented
to undergo physical initiation and hazing. As can be gleaned from the
narration of facts, they voluntarily agreed to join the initiation rites to become
members of the Aquila Legis Fraternity. Prior to the initiation, they were given
briefings on what to expect. It is of common knowledge that before admission
in a fraternity, the neophytes will undergo a rite of passage. Thus, they
were made aware that traditional methods such as mocking, psychological
tests and physical punishment would take place. They knew that the
initiation would involve beatings and other forms of hazing. They were
also told of their right and opportunity to quit at any time they wanted to.
In fact, prosecution witness Navera testified that accused Tecson told him that
after a week, you can already play basketball. Prosecution witness Marquez for
his part, admitted that he knew that the initiates would be hit in the arms
and legs, that a wooden paddle would be used to hit them and that he
expected bruises on his arms and legs. Indeed, there can be no fraternity
initiation without consenting neophytes.[234] (Emphasis supplied)
Even after going through Aquilas grueling traditional rituals during the first
day, Lenny continued his participation and finished the second day of initiation.
Based on the foregoing contextual background, and absent further proof showing
clear malicious intent, we are constrained to rule that the specific animus
iniuriandi was not present in this case. Even if the specific acts of punching,
kicking, paddling, and other modes of inflicting physical pain were done
voluntarily, freely, and with intelligence, thereby satisfying the elements
of freedom and intelligence in the felony of physical injuries, the fundamental
ingredient of criminal intent was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the
contrary, all that was proven was that the acts were done pursuant to tradition.
Although the additional rounds on the second night were held upon the insistence
of Villareal and Dizon, the initiations were officially reopened with the consent
of the head of the initiation rites; and the accused fraternity members still
participated in the rituals, including the paddling, which were performed pursuant
to tradition. Other than the paddle, no other weapon was used to inflict injuries
on Lenny. The targeted body parts were predominantly the legs and the arms. The
designation of roles, including the role of auxiliaries, which were assigned for the
specific purpose of lending assistance to and taking care of the neophytes during
the initiation rites, further belied the presence of malicious intent. All those who
wished to join the fraternity went through the same process of traditional
initiation; there is no proof that Lenny Villa was specifically targeted or given a
different treatment. We stress that Congress itself recognized that hazing is
uniquely different from common crimes.[235] The totality of the circumstances
must therefore be taken into consideration.
The underlying context and motive in which the infliction of physical

injuries was rooted may also be determined by Lennys continued participation in
the initiation and consent to the method used even after the first day. The
following discussion of the framers of the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law is enlightening:
SENATOR GUINGONA. Most of these acts, if not all, are already
punished under the Revised Penal Code.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.

SENATOR GUINGONA. If hazing is done at present and it results in
death, the charge would be murder or homicide.
SENATOR GUINGONA. If it does not result in death, it may be

frustrated homicide or serious physical injuries.
SENATOR GUINGONA. Or, if the person who commits sexual abuse

does so it can be penalized under rape or acts of lasciviousness.
SENATOR GUINGONA. So, what is the rationale for making a new

offense under this definition of the crime of hazing?
SENATOR LINA. To discourage persons or group of persons either

composing a sorority, fraternity or any association from making this
requirement of initiation that has already resulted in these specific acts or
results, Mr. President.
That is the main rationale. We want to send a strong signal across the
land that no group or association can require the act of physical initiation before
a person can become a member without being held criminally liable.
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. Yes, but what would be the rationale for that
imposition? Because the distinguished Sponsor has said that he is not punishing
a mere organization, he is not seeking the punishment of an initiation into a club
or organization, he is seeking the punishment of certain acts that resulted in
death, et cetera as a result of hazing which are already covered crimes.
The penalty is increased in one, because we would like to discourage

hazing, abusive hazing, but it may be a legitimate defense for invoking two or
more charges or offenses, because these very same acts are already punishable
under the Revised Penal Code.
That is my difficulty, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. x x x
Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is a very telling

difference: When a person or group of persons resort to hazing as a
requirement for gaining entry into an organization, the intent to commit a
wrong is not visible or is not present, Mr. President. Whereas, in these specific
crimes, Mr. President, let us say there is death or there is homicide, mutilation, if
one files a case, then the intention to commit a wrong has to be proven. But
if the crime of hazing is the basis, what is important is the result from the
act of hazing.
To me, that is the basic difference and that is what will prevent or deter
the sororities or fraternities; that they should really shun this activity called
hazing. Because, initially, these fraternities or sororities do not even
consider having a neophyte killed or maimed or that acts of lasciviousness
are even committed initially, Mr. President.
So, what we want to discourage is the so-called initial innocent

act. That is why there is need to institute this kind of hazing. Ganiyan po ang
nangyari. Ang fraternity o ang sorority ay magre-recruit. Wala talaga silang
intensiyong makamatay. Hindi ko na babanggitin at buhay pa iyong kaso. Pero
dito sa anim o pito na namatay nitong nakaraang taon, walang intensiyong
patayin talaga iyong neophyte. So, kung maghihintay pa tayo, na saka lamang
natin isasakdal ng murder kung namatay na, ay after the fact ho iyon. Pero, kung
sasabihin natin sa mga kabataan na: Huwag ninyong gagawin iyong hazing.
Iyan ay kasalanan at kung mamatay diyan, mataas ang penalty sa inyo.
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. I join the lofty motives, Mr. President, of the

distinguished Sponsor. But I am again disturbed by his statement that the
prosecution does not have to prove the intent that resulted in the death, that
resulted in the serious physical injuries, that resulted in the acts of
lasciviousness or deranged mind. We do not have to prove the willful intent
of the accused in proving or establishing the crime of hazing. This seems, to
me, a novel situation where we create the special crime without having to
go into the intent, which is one of the basic elements of any crime.
If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the intent were merely to

initiate, then there is no offense. And even the distinguished Sponsor admits
that the organization, the intent to initiate, the intent to have a new society
or a new club is, per se, not punishable at all. What are punishable are the
acts that lead to the result. But if these results are not going to be proven
by intent, but just because there was hazing, I am afraid that it will disturb
the basic concepts of the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, the act of hazing, precisely, is being

criminalized because in the context of what is happening in the sororities
and fraternities, when they conduct hazing, no one will admit that their
intention is to maim or to kill. So, we are already criminalizing the fact of
inflicting physical pain. Mr. President, it is a criminal act and we want it
stopped, deterred, discouraged.
If that occurs, under this law, there is no necessity to prove that the
masters intended to kill or the masters intended to maim. What is important is
the result of the act of hazing. Otherwise, the masters or those who inflict the
physical pain can easily escape responsibility and say, We did not have the
intention to kill. This is part of our initiation rites. This is normal. We do
not have any intention to kill or maim.
This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as well have been
charged therefore with the ordinary crime of homicide, mutilation, et
cetera, where the prosecution will have a difficulty proving the elements if
they are separate offenses.
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. Mr. President, assuming there was a group

that initiated and a person died. The charge is murder. My question is: Under
this bill if it becomes a law, would the prosecution have to prove conspiracy or
not anymore?
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, if the person is present during hazing

xxx
SENATOR GUINGONA. The persons are present. First, would the

prosecution have to prove conspiracy? Second, would the prosecution have to
prove intent to kill or not?
SENATOR LINA. No more. As to the second question, Mr. President,

if that occurs, there is no need to prove intent to kill.
SENATOR GUINGONA. But the charge is murder.
SENATOR LINA. That is why I said that it should not be murder. It

should be hazing, Mr. President. [236] (Emphasis supplied)
During a discussion between Senator Biazon and Senator Lina on the issue
of whether to include sodomy as a punishable act under the Anti-Hazing Law,
Senator Lina further clarified thus:
SENATOR BIAZON. Mr. President, this Representation has no
objection to the inclusion of sodomy as one of the conditions resulting from
hazing as necessary to be punished. However, the act of sodomy can be
committed by two persons with or without consent.
To make it clearer, what is being punished here is the commission of

sodomy forced into another individual by another individual. I move, Mr.
President, that sodomy be modified by the phrase without consent for purposes
of this section.
SENATOR LINA. I am afraid, Mr. President, that if we qualify sodomy

with the concept that it is only going to aggravate the crime of hazing if it is
done without consent will change a lot of concepts here. Because the results
from hazing aggravate the offense with or without consent. In fact, when a
person joins a fraternity, sorority, or any association for that matter, it can
be with or without the consent of the intended victim. The fact that a person
joins a sorority or fraternity with his consent does not negate the crime of
hazing.
This is a proposed law intended to protect the citizens from the

malpractices that attend initiation which may have been announced with or
without physical infliction of pain or injury, Mr. President. Regardless of
whether there is announcement that there will be physical hazing or
whether there is none, and therefore, the neophyte is duped into joining a
fraternity is of no moment. What is important is that there is an infliction
of physical pain.
The bottom line of this law is that a citizen even has to be protected
from himself if he joins a fraternity, so that at a certain point in time, the State,
the individual, or the parents of the victim can run after the perpetrators
of the crime, regardless of whether or not there was consent on the part of
the victim.
xxxxxxxxx
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, I understand the position taken by the

distinguished Gentleman from Cavite and Metro Manila. It is correct that
society sometimes adopts new mores, traditions, and practices.
In this bill, we are not going to encroach into the private proclivities of
some individuals when they do their acts in private as we do not take a peek into
the private rooms of couples. They can do their thing if they want to make love
in ways that are not considered acceptable by the mainstream of society. That
is not something that the State should prohibit.
But sodomy in this case is connected with hazing, Mr. President. Such
that the act may even be entered into with consent. It is not only sodomy. The
infliction of pain may be done with the consent of the neophyte. If the law
is passed, that does not make the act of hazing not punishable because the
neophyte accepted the infliction of pain upon himself.
If the victim suffers from serious physical injuries, but the initiator
said, Well, he allowed it upon himself. He consented to it. So, if we allow
that reasoning that sodomy was done with the consent of the victim, then
we would not have passed any law at all. There will be no significance if we
pass this bill, because it will always be a defense that the victim allowed the
infliction of pain or suffering. He accepted it as part of the initiation rites.
But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that we would want to
prohibit. That the defense of consent will not apply because the very act of
inflicting physical pain or psychological suffering is, by itself, a punishable
act. The result of the act of hazing, like death or physical injuries merely
aggravates the act with higher penalties. But the defense of consent is not
going to nullify the criminal nature of the act.
So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can only aggravate the
offense if it is committed without consent of the victim, then the whole
foundation of this proposed law will collapse.
SENATOR BIAZON. Thank you, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. Thank you very much.
THE PRESIDENT. Is there any objection to the committee amendment?

(Silence.) The Chair hears none; the same is approved.[237]
(Emphasis supplied)
Realizing the implication of removing the states burden to prove intent,

Senator Lina, the principal author of the Senate Bill, said:
I am very happy that the distinguished Minority Leader brought out the
idea of intent or whether there it is mala in se or mala prohibita. There can be a
radical amendment if that is the point that he wants to go to.
If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we can just make this a

special law on hazing. We will not include this anymore under the Revised
Penal Code. That is a possibility. I will not foreclose that suggestion, Mr.
President.[238](Emphasis supplied)
Thus, having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and
the core principle of mala in se adhered to under the Revised Penal Code,
Congress did not simply enact an amendment thereto. Instead, it created a special
law on hazing, founded upon the principle of mala prohibita. This dilemma faced
by Congress is further proof of how the nature of hazing unique as against typical
crimes cast a cloud of doubt on whether society considered the act as an inherently
wrong conduct or mala in se at the time. It is safe to presume that Lennys parents
would not have consented[239] to his participation in Aquila Fraternitys initiation
rites if the practice of hazing were considered by them as mala in se.
Furthermore, in Vedaa v. Valencia (1998), we noted through Associate

Justice (now retired Chief Justice) Hilario Davide that in our nations very recent
history, the people have spoken, through Congress, to
deem conduct constitutive of hazing, [an] act[] previously considered
harmless by custom, as criminal.[240] Although it may be regarded as a
simple obiter dictum, the statement nonetheless shows recognition that hazing or
the conduct of initiation rites through physical and/or psychological suffering has
not been traditionally criminalized. Prior to the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law, there was
to some extent a lacuna in the law; hazing was not clearly considered an
intentional felony. And when there is doubt on the interpretation of criminal laws,
all must be resolved in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo.
For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is constrained
to rule against the trial courts finding of malicious intent to inflict physical
injuries on Lenny Villa, there being no proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
existence of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries or animus iniuriandi as
required in mala in se cases, considering the contextual background of his death,
the unique nature of hazing, and absent a law prohibiting hazing.
The accused fraternity members guilty of

reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however,

that the accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability.
The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that are committed by means of
fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act
results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done

without malice, from which an immediate personal harm, injury or material
damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence on
the part of the person committing it.[241] In this case, the danger is visible and
consciously appreciated by the actor.[242] In contrast, simple imprudence or
negligencecomprises an act done without grave fault, from which an injury or
material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack of foresight or skill.[243] Here,
the threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not openly visible. [244]
The test[245] for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing
an act is as follows: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom
negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable
consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer
the duty to take precaution against the mischievous results of the act. Failure to
do so constitutes negligence.[246]
As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with

recklessness, the degree of precaution and diligence required varies with the
degree of the danger involved.[247] If, on account of a certain line of conduct, the
danger of causing harm to another person is great, the individual who chooses to
follow that particular course of conduct is bound to be very careful, in order to
prevent or avoid damage or injury.[248] In contrast, if the danger is minor, not
much care is required.[249] It is thus possible that there are countless degrees of
precaution or diligence that may be required of an individual, from a transitory
glance of care to the most vigilant effort.[250] The duty of the person to employ
more or less degree of care will depend upon the circumstances of each particular
case.[251]
There was patent recklessness in the hazing of Lenny Villa.
According to the NBI medico-legal officer, Lenny died of cardiac failure

secondary to multiple traumatic injuries.[252] The officer explained that cardiac
failure refers to the failure of the heart to work as a pump and as part of the
circulatory system due to the lack of blood.[253] In the present case, the victims
heart could no longer work as a pumping organ, because it was deprived of its
requisite blood and oxygen.[254] The deprivation was due to the channeling of the
blood supply from the entire circulatory system including the heart, arteries,
veins, venules, and capillaries to the thigh, leg, and arm areas of Lenny, thus
causing the formation of multiple hematomas or blood clots. [255] The multiple
hematomas were wide, thick, and deep,[256] indicating that these could have
resulted mainly from injuries sustained by the victim from fist blows, knee blows,
paddles, or the like.[257] Repeated blows to those areas caused the blood to
gradually ooze out of the capillaries until the circulating blood became so
markedly diminished as to produce death. [258] The officer also found that the
brain, liver, kidney, pancreas, intestines, and all other organs seen in the
abdominals, as well as the thoracic organ in the lungs, were pale due to the lack
of blood, which was redirected to the thighs and forearms.[259] It was concluded
that there was nothing in the heart that would indicate that the victim suffered
from a previous cardiac arrest or disease.[260]
The multiple hematomas or bruises found in Lenny Villas arms and thighs,
resulting from repeated blows to those areas, caused the loss of blood from his
vital organs and led to his eventual death. These hematomas must be taken in the
light of the hazing activities performed on him by the Aquila Fraternity.
According to the testimonies of the co-neophytes of Lenny, they were punched,
kicked, elbowed, kneed, stamped on; and hit with different objects on their arms,
legs, and thighs.[261] They were also paddled at the back of their thighs or
legs;[262] and slapped on their faces.[263]They were made to play rough
basketball.[264] Witness Marquez testified on Lenny, saying: [T]inamaan daw sya
sa spine.[265] The NBI medico-legal officer explained that the death of the victim
was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries suffered by the latter. [266] The
relevant portion of the testimony is as follows:
Atty. Tadiar Doctor, there was, rather, it was your testimony on various cross
examinations of defense counsels that the injuries that you
have enumerated on the body of the deceased Lenny Villa
previously marked as Exhibit G-1 to G-14 individually by
themselves would not cause the death of the victim. The
question I am going to propound to you is what is the
cumulative effect of all of these injuries marked from Exhibit
G-1 to G-14?
Witness All together nothing in concert to cause to the demise of the victim. So,
it is not fair for us to isolate such injuries here because we
are talking of the whole body. At the same manner that as a
car would not run minus one (1) wheel. No, the more humane
in human approach is to interpret all those injuries in whole
and not in part.[267]
There is also evidence to show that some of the accused fraternity members
were drinking during the initiation rites.[268]
Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were

tantamount to recklessness, which made the resulting death of Lenny a culpable
felony. It must be remembered that organizations owe to their initiates a duty of
care not to cause them injury in the process.[269] With the foregoing facts, we rule
that the accused are guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Since
the NBI medico-legal officer found that the victims death was the cumulative
effect of the injuries suffered, criminal responsibility redounds to all those who
directly participated in and contributed to the infliction of physical injuries.
It appears from the aforementioned facts that the incident may have been
prevented, or at least mitigated, had the alumni of Aquila Fraternity accused
Dizon and Villareal restrained themselves from insisting on reopening the
initiation rites. Although this point did not matter in the end,
as records would show that the other fraternity members participated in the
reopened initiation rites having in mind the concept of seniority in fraternities the
implication of the presence of alumni should be seen as a point of review in future
legislation. We further note that some of the fraternity members were intoxicated
during Lennys initiation rites. In this light, the Court submits to Congress, for
legislative consideration, the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the
fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members
during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable
penalties.
It is truly astonishing how men would wittingly or unwittingly impose the

misery of hazing and employ appalling rituals in the name of brotherhood. There
must be a better way to establish kinship. A neophyte admitted that he joined the
fraternity to have more friends and to avail himself of the benefits it offered, such
as tips during bar examinations.[270] Another initiate did not give up, because he
feared being looked down upon as a quitter, and because he felt he did not have
a choice.[271] Thus, for Lenny Villa and the other neophytes, joining the Aquila
Fraternity entailed a leap in the dark. By giving consent under the circumstances,
they left their fates in the hands of the fraternity members. Unfortunately, the
hands to which lives were entrusted were barbaric as they were reckless.
Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless imprudence

resulting in homicide shall cover only accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug,
and Dizon. Had the Anti-Hazing Law been in effect then, these five accused
fraternity members would have all been convicted of the crime of hazing
punishable by reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment).[272] Since there was no law
prohibiting the act of hazing when Lenny died, we are constrained to rule
according to existing laws at the time of his death. The CA found that the
prosecution failed to prove, beyond reasonable doubt,
Victorino et al.s individual participation in the infliction of physical injuries upon
Lenny Villa.[273] As to accused Villareal, his criminal liability was totally
extinguished by the fact of his death, pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Furthermore, our ruling herein shall be interpreted without prejudice to the

applicability of the Anti-Hazing Law to subsequent cases. Furthermore, the
modification of criminal liability from slight physical injuries to reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide shall apply only with respect to accused
Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
The accused liable to pay damages
The CA awarded damages in favor of the heirs of Lenny Villa in the

amounts of ₱50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto and ₱1,000,000 as moral
damages, to be jointly and severally paid by accused Dizon and Villareal. It also
awarded the amount of ₱30,000 as indemnity to be jointly and severally paid by
accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
Civil indemnity ex delicto is automatically awarded for the sole fact of

death of the victim.[274] In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,[275] we
sustain the CAs award of indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000.
The heirs of the victim are entitled to actual or compensatory damages,

including expenses incurred in connection with the death of the victim, so long
as the claim is supported by tangible documents.[276] Though we are prepared to
award actual damages, the Court is prevented from granting them, since the
records are bereft of any evidence to show that actual expenses were incurred or
proven during trial. Furthermore, in the appeal, the Solicitor General does not
interpose any claim for actual damages.[277]
The heirs of the deceased may recover moral damages for the grief suffered
on account of the victims death.[278] This penalty is pursuant to Article 2206(3) of
the Civil Code, which provides that the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate
descendants and the ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for
mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.[279] Thus, we hereby we
affirm the CAs award of moral damages in the amount of ₱1,000,000.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 155101 finding

petitioner Fidelito Dizon guilty of homicide is hereby MODIFIED and SET
ASIDE IN PART. The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954 finding Antonio
Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson
guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries is also MODIFIED and SET
ASIDE IN PART. Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel
Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide defined and penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code. They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison
term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition,
accused are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil
indemnity ex delicto in the amount of ₱50,000, and moral damages in the amount
of ₱1,000,000, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 12% from
the date of the finality of this Decision until satisfaction.[280] Costs de oficio.
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is

hereby AFFIRMED. The appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080,
dismissing the criminal case filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano,
are likewise AFFIRMED. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal
Code, the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case
against Artemio Villareal deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives for possible consideration of the
amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and the
presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as
aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the Opinion of the
Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 153591. February 23, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RENATO GARCIA y

ROMANO, appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Appellant Renato Garcia y Romano was charged with Murder before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Criminal Case No. Q-98-79961 in an
Information[1] which reads:
That on or about the 22 day of May, 1998, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
nd
accused, being then the driver and/or person in charge of an Isuzu Jitney bearing
Plate No. NPJ-948 did then and there unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage
and operate the same along Zabarte Road in said City, in a careless, reckless,
negligent and impudent manner, by then and there making the said vehicle run at a
speed greater than was reasonable and proper without taking the necessary
precaution to avoid accident to person/s of the traffic at said place at the time,
causing as consequence of his said carelessness, negligence, impudence and lack of
precaution, the said vehicle so driven, managed and operated by him to hit and
bump, as in fact it hit and bumped Sanily Billon y Trinidad, a pedestrian,
thereafter, with intent to kill, qualified by evident premeditation and use of motor
vehicle, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously ran said vehicle
over the victim thereby causing her serious and mortal wounds which were the
direct and immediate cause of her untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of
the heirs of the said Sanily Billon y Trinidad.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits

followed.
The prosecution alleged that at around 12:00 noon of May 22, 1998, Bentley Billon
and his younger sister, Sanily, boarded a passenger jeepney on their way to Sacred
Heart School in Barangay Kaligayahan, Novaliches, Quezon City to attend remedial
classes. They alighted on Zabarte Road in front of the school. Bentley crossed the
street and waited on the center island for Sanily to cross. While Sanily was crossing
the street, a passenger jeepney driven by appellant, coming from Camarin and
heading towards Quirino Highway, hit her on the left side of the body. Sanily fell and
was thrown to the ground a meter away from the vehicle. The jeepney stopped. But
as Bentley was running towards his sister, the vehicle suddenly accelerated with its
front tire running over Sanilys stomach. Bentley and appellant pulled Sanily, who was
writhing in excruciating pain, from underneath the vehicle and brought her to the Sta.
Lucia Hospital but due to lack of medical facilities, she was transferred to the Quezon
City General Hospital (QCGH) where she was operated. However, she died four days
later.
Dr. Emmanuel Reyes,[2] Medico-legal of the Southern Police District, Fort
Bonifacio, testified that the attending physician, Dr. Santiago C. Sagad, noted
lacerations in Sanilys liver and spleen which was caused by a blunt/strong force on
the victims body, resulting to her death due to internal bleeding. He opined that the
blunt force may have also caused lacerations in the victims intestine and the abrasions
on the arm, from the elbow to the shoulder could be the result of the skins contact with
a rough surface.
Appellant admitted having ran over the victim, but claimed that it was an accident.
He narrated that at around noon on May 22, 1998, while driving his passenger jeepney
along Zabarte Road, he saw a boy crossing the street followed by the victim. While
the vehicle was running, he heard a thud. He immediately applied his breaks and
alighted to check what it was. He saw to his horror a girl sprawled underneath his
vehicle between the front and the rear tires. He and the victims brother rushed the girl
to the Sta. Lucia Hospital, but they transferred her to the Quezon City General Hospital
which has better facilities. A week later, he learned that the victim died.
On May 2, 2002, the trial court rendered judgment, [3] finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, the dispositive portion of which reads:[4]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, for which, said RENATO GARCIA y
ROMANO is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of Sanily Billon the sum of One Hundred and Twenty Three
Thousand and Five Hundred Pesos (P123,500.00) as actual damages including
attorneys fees; Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity for the death
of Sanily and Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as moral damages.
Cost against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
The trial court held that appellant is guilty of murder qualified by evident
premeditation because he deliberately ran over the slumped body of the victim.
Hence this appeal, raising the following errors, to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING

AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF EVIDENT PREMEDITAION
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
OF THE CRIME OF MURDER AS CHARGED.
The issue to be resolved is whether or not appellant is guilty of murder or reckless

imprudence resulting in homicide.
Appellant argues that the trial court gravely erred in finding that the qualifying
circumstance of evident premeditation attended the commission of the offense. He
contends that the mere allegation by the prosecution that he bumped the victim and
intentionally ran over her body is not sufficient to establish evident premeditation. He
claims that he did not intentionally run over the victim when his vehicle bumped her
because he was rattled and was no longer aware of what he was doing.
We find from a careful review of the facts on record that the unfortunate incident
was more the result of reckless imprudence than of malicious intent. Therefore, the
trial court erred in convicting appellant of the crime of murder qualified by evident
premeditation.
The elements of evident premeditation are: (1) a previous decision by the
appellant to commit the crime; (2) an overt act/acts manifestly indicating that the
appellant clung to his determination; and (3) a lapse of time between the decision to
commit the crime and its actual execution sufficient to allow appellant to reflect upon
the consequences of his acts.
The victims brother, Bentley, testified that the vehicle stopped after it bumped the
victim, but it moved forward and ran over the prostrate body of her sister. From his
narration, we find that no sufficient time elapsed for appellant to decide to commit the
crime and reflect on its consequences. Moreover, there was no showing that appellant
performed other overt acts to show that he was determined to commit murder.The
essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be
preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal
intent, during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. [5] These
circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar.
Appellant could have reacted on instinct and relied on sheer impulse to respond
to the situation at hand. While it is possible that appellant deliberately ran over the
victim, it is equally possible, if not more probable, that the vehicle moved forward
because appellant failed to control its momentum. Indeed, this is more consistent with
the unrebutted evidence that the jeepney, which had no handbrake, was moving fast
and that appellant became confused when the accident occurred. Furthermore,
appellants act of bringing the victim to the hospital despite numerous opportunities to
flee from the scene is more compatible with a state of mind devoid of criminal intent.
In view of the gravity of the offense involved, the trial court should have been more
circumspect in weighing the evidence of both parties. Our own evaluation of the
evidence reveals that appellant had no intention to kill the victim. As such, he cannot
be held liable for an intentional felony. All reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate
negligence, and not criminal intent, must be resolved in favor of appellant. [6]
Thus, appellant is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide defined in
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In U.S. v. Maleza,[7] we explained
the rationale behind this crime as follows:
A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his
duty to be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of
incurring punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee
and for acts which no one would have performed except through culpable abandon.
Otherwise his own person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-beings,
would ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury.
In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what

is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible.[8] Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that reckless imprudence consists in
voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage
results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing such act. Compared to intentional felonies, such as homicide or murder,
what takes the place of the element of malice or intention to commit a wrong or evil is
the failure of the offender to take precautions due to lack of skill taking into account
his employment, or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other
circumstances regarding persons, time, and place.[9]
Appellant showed an inexcusable lack of precaution when he disregarded a traffic
sign cautioning motorists to slow down[10] and drove his vehicle in full speed despite
being aware that he was traversing a school zone and pedestrians were crossing the
street. He should have observed due diligence of a reasonably prudent man by
slackening his speed and proceeding cautiously while passing the area.
The imposable penalty, under Art. 365 (2)[11] of the Revised Penal Code, homicide
resulting from reckless imprudence in the use of motor vehicle is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods, which ranges from two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Under Article 65 of the Revised Penal
Code, the penalty shall be divided into three equal portions of time, each of which shall
form one period. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the proper
penalty shall be within the medium period, which is three (3) years, six (6) months and
twenty-one (21) days to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days. Applying
the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant is entitled to a minimum
term to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto mayor,
maximum to prision correccional, minimum. Accordingly, appellant should be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
maximum.[12]
The trial court correctly awarded P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. However, the
award of moral damages in the amount of P500,000.00 should be reduced to
P50,000.00.[13] The award of P30,000.00 as actual damages must likewise be modified.
The mother of the victim presented receipts that they, in fact, spent P58,257.90 [14] for
hospital bills and funeral expenses. The fact that she received P40,000.00 from
insurance will not affect the award of actual damages.[15] The award of exemplary
damages is deleted for lack of factual basis.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-98-79961, convicting appellant of the
crime of murder is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Renato Garcia y Romano
is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide, and he is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months
and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as maximum. Appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim,
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P58,257.90 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as
moral damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Panganiban, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

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Basic Principles

A. Generality and territoriality

G.R. No. L-11676 October 17, 1916

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

ANDRES PABLO, defendant-appellant.

Alfonso E. Mendoza for appellant.

Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.

Johnson, Carson, Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Moreland, J., concurs in the result .

G.R. No. 448 September 20, 1901

THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,

PHILIP K. SWEET, defendant-appellant.

Theofilus B. Steele, for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Willard, and Mapa, JJ., concur.

COOPER, J., concurring:

G.R. No. 179817

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and

June 27, 2008

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The petition is bereft of merit.

A plain reading of. Jalosjos suggests otherwise, however.

The Court was more emphatic in People v. Hon. Maceda:[25]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

SUZETTE NICOLAS y SOMBILON, G.R. No. 175888

E. TAADA, JOSE DE LA RAMA,

EMILIO C. CAPULONG, H. HARRY

L. ROQUE, JR., FLORIN HILBAY,

and BENJAMIN POZON,

BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN G.R. No. 176222

PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as concurrent Defense Secretary,

The facts are not disputed.

(Sgd.) KRISTIE A. KENNEY (Sgd.) ALBERTO G. ROMULO

Representative of the United States Representative of the Republic

of America of the Philippines

and the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 22, 2006 which states:

Hence, the present actions.

The provision of the Constitution is Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 which states:

This Court finds that it is, for two reasons.

The RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty states:[7]

The Parties of this Treaty

Have agreed as follows:

IN WITHNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE in duplicate at Washington this thirtieth day of August, 1951.

For the Republic of the Philippines:

(Sgd.) CARLOS P. ROMULO

(Sgd.) JOAQUIN M. ELIZALDE

(Sgd.) DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL

For the United States of America:

(Sgd.) DEAN ACHESON

(Sgd.) JOHN FOSTER DULLES

(Sgd.) TOM CONNALLY

(Sgd.) ALEXANDER WILEY[8]

Have agreed as follows:[9]

Again, this Court finds no violation of the Constitution.

On February 3, 2009, the Court issued a Resolution, thus:

After deliberation, the Court holds, on these points, as follows:

As Ward N. Ferdinandusse states in his Treatise, DIRECT APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL

Furthermore, as held by the US Supreme Court in Weinberger v. Rossi,[13] an executive agreement

Accordingly, there are three types of treaties in the American system:

2. ExecutiveCongressional Agreements: These are joint agreements of the President and