Orlando Villanueva vs Court of Appeals and Lilia Canalita-Villanueva

In April 1988, Orly married Lilia before a trial court judge in Puerto Princesa. In
November 1992, Orly filed to annul the marriage. He claimed that threats of violence
and duress forced him to marry Lilia. He said that he had been receiving phone calls
threatening him and that Lilia even hired the service of a certain Ka Celso, a member
of the NPA, to threaten him. Orly also said he was defrauded by Lilia by claiming that
she was pregnant hence he married her but he now raises that he never
impregnated Lilia prior to the marriage. Lilia on the other hand denied Orly’s
allegations and she said that Orly freely cohabited with her after the marriage and
she showed 14 letters that shows Orly’s affection and care towards her.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is duress and fraud attendant in the case at bar.

HELD:
The SC ruled that Orly’s allegation of fraud and intimidation is untenable. On its face,
it is obvious that Orly is only seeking to annul his marriage with Lilia so as to have the
pending appealed bigamy case [filed against him by Lilia] to be dismissed. On the
merits of the case, Orly’s allegation of fear was not concretely established. He was
not able to prove that there was a reasonable and well grounded reason for fear to
be created in his mind by the alleged intimidation being done against him by Lilia
and her party. Orly is a security guard who is well abreast with self-defense and that
the threat he so described done against him is not sufficient enough to vitiate him
from freely marrying Lilia. Fraud cannot be raised as a ground as well. His allegation
that he never had an erection during their sexual intercourse is incredible and is an
outright lie. Also, there is a prolonged inaction on the part of Orly to attack the
marriage. It took him 4 and a half years to file an action which brings merit to Lilia’s
contention that Orly freely cohabited with her after the marriage.

Buccat v. Mangonon de Buccat

Facts:
Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat met in March 1938, became
engaged in September, and got married in Nov 26.

On Feb 23, 1939 (89 days after getting married) Luida, who was 9 months pregnant,
gave birth to a son. After knowing this, Godofredo left Luida and never returned to
married life with her.

On March 23, 1939, he filed for an annulment of their marriage on the grounds that
when he agreed to married Luida, she assured him that she was a virgin.
The Lower court decided in favor of Luida.
Issue:
Should the annulment for Godofredo Buccat’s marriage be granted on the grounds
that Luida concealed her pregnancy before the marriage?

Held:
No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a sacred
institution in which the State is interested and where society rests.

In this case, the court did not find any proof that there was concealment of
pregnancy constituting fraud as a ground for annulment. It was unlikely that
Godofredo, a first-year law student, did not suspect anything about Luida’s condition
considering that she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy (highly developed
physical manifestation, ie. enlarged stomach ) when they got married.

Decision:
SC affirmed the lower court’s decision. Costs to plaintiff-appellant

Aquino vs. Delizo

FACTS:
Fernando Aquino filed a complaint in September 1955 on the ground of fraud against
Conchita Delizo that at the date of her marriage with the former on December 1954,
concealed the fact that she was pregnant by another man and sometime in April
1955 or about 4 months after their marriage, gave birth to a child. During the trial,
Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco represent the state in the proceedings to prevent
collusion. Only Aquino testified and the only documentary evidence presented was
the marriage contract between the parties. Delizo did not appear nor presented
any evidence.

CFI-Rizal dismissed petitioner’s complaint for annulment of marriage, which was

affirmed by CA thus a petition for certiorari to review the decisions.

ISSUE:
Whether or not concealment of pregnancy as alleged by Aquino does not constitute
such fraud as would annul a marriage.

HELD:
The concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is a ground for
annulment of marriage. Delizo was allegedly to be only more than four months
pregnant at the time of her marriage. At this stage, it is hard to say that her
pregnancy was readily apparent especially since she was “naturally plump” or fat. It
is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman’s
abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the
abdomen more general and apparent.
In the following circumstances, the court remanded the case for new trial and
decision complained is set aside.

Manuel Almelor vs RTC of Las Piñas City & Leonida Trinidad

Manuel married Leonida in 1989. They are both medical practitioners. They begot 3
children. 11 years later, Leonida sought to annul her marriage with Manuel claiming
that Manuel is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital
obligations. Leonida testified that Manuel is a harsh disciplinarian and that his
policy towards their children are often unconventional and was the cause of their
frequent fight. Manuel has an unreasonable way of imposing discipline towards their
children but is remarkably so gentle towards his mom. He is more affectionate
towards his mom and this is a factor which is unreasonable for Leonida. Further,
Leonida also testified that Manuel is a homosexual as evidenced by his unusual
closeness to his male companions and that he concealed his homosexuality from
Leonida prior to their marriage. She once caught Manuel talking to a man
affectionately over the phone and she confirmed all her fear when she saw Manuel
kiss a man. The RTC ruled that their marriage is null and void not because of PI but
rather due to fraud by reason of Manuel’s concealment of his homosexuality (Art 45
of the FC). The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between the two can be declared as null and void due
to fraud by reason of Manuel’s concealment of his homosexuality.

HELD:
The SC emphasized that homosexuality per se is not a ground to nullify a marriage. It
is the concealment of homosexuality that would. In the case at bar however, it is not
proven that Manuel is a homosexual. The lower court should not have taken the
public’s perception against Manuel’s sexuality. His peculiarities must not be ruled by
the lower court as an indication of his homosexuality for those are not conclusive
and are not sufficient enough to prove so. Even granting that Manuel is indeed a
homosexual, there was nothing in the complaint or anywhere in the case was it
alleged and proven that Manuel hid such sexuality from Leonida and that Leonida’s
consent had been vitiated by such.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v . FREDDIE FONTANILLA

Appellant Freddie Fontanilla was charged with two counts of rape for allegedly
raping his fourteen year old step daughter on two different occasions. During the
hearing, the private complainant testified regarding the rape(s) committed by
Fontanilla. The Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City found Fontanilla guilty of the
crime of rape and imposed upon him the penalty of death. Subsequently, after the
RTC rendered its decision private complainant executed an affidavit of recantation
stating that Fontanilla never raped her. Taking advantage of this new development,
Fontanilla then filed a Motion for New Trial. The court however denied the same.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC erred in finding Fontanilla guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of rape despite the recantation made by the complainant.

HELD:
As for the trial court‘s denial of Fontanilla‘s motion for new trial arising from private
complainant‘s affidavit of recantation: Said affidavit cannot qualify as newly
discovered evidence to justify a new trial, the following requisites for which, and
these must concur, are not present: (a) the evidence was discovered after the trial;
(b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even
with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) such evidence is material, not
merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if
admitted, would probably change the judgment. Besides, affidavits of retraction of
testimonies are generally looked with disfavor because there is always the
probability that they may later be repudiated. The unreliable character of this
document is shown by the fact that it is quite incredible that after going through the
process of having Fontanilla arrested by the police, positively identifying him as the
person who raped her, enduring the humiliation of a physical examination of her
private parts, and then repeating her accusations in open court by recounting her
anguish, private complainant would suddenly turn around and declare that ―after a
careful deliberation over the case, [she] find[s] that the same does not merit or
warrant criminal prosecution.

JULIAN SIMAN vs. SATURNINO LEUS and SIMEON LEUS

Julian Siman, plaintiff, brings action against Saturnino and Simeon Leus, father and
son, defendants, to have the marriage between plaintiff's daughter, Simeona Siman,
18 years of age, and Simeon Leus annulled, and to recover damages. The grounds set
forth in the complaint are "fraud, force, threats, and intimidation." Although not
assigned as error these statements disclose on their face why we must hold with
defendants.

The father is not the legal representative of the child before the courts. (Code of Civil
Procedure, secs. 116, 117, 553, and 558; Palet vs. Aldecoa and Co. [1910], 15 Phil.,
232; Pobre vs. Blanco [1910], 17 Phil., 156.) The right of a parent to maintain an
action for the annulment of the marriage of an infant son or daughter is permitted
only when the party in whose behalf it is sought was under the age of legal consent
and such marriage was contracted without the consent of his or her parents.
(Marriage Law, sec. 10 [1]; 11 [1].) The consent of the parents to the marriage was
not necessary since the girl was not under the age of 18 years. (Marriage Law, sec. 7
[3].) In other words, it is not enough for the plaintiff to allege a cause of action in
favor of someone; he must show that it exists in favor of himself. It would certainly
be a starting proposition to announce that a judgment can be procured dissolving a
marriage contract without it being disclosed in the complaint that the alleged injured
party is desirous of being released from the bonds of matrimony. Such a rule would
permit a parent to invalidate a marriage without the consent or knowledge of a
party thereto. If it were to obtain, it would prove subversive to social order, sound
policy, and good morals. (See Fero vs. Fero [1901], 70 N. Y. Supp., 742;
Coddington vs. Larner [1902], 78 N. Y. Supp., 276; Wood vs. Baker [1904], 88 N. Y.
Supp., 854.)

The causes assigned for annulling this marriage are those enumerated in paragraphs
4 and 5, section 10, of the Marriage Law. In the succeeding section of the same law,
it is provided that the action to obtain a decree of nullity of marriage for either of
these two causes must be brought "by the injured party." But here the supposed
injured party, the girl, does not institute action nor is it instituted in her behalf by the
father. Yet, the real party in interest is the girl. She must be regarded as a married
woman until nullity is ascertained and declared by a competent court. By marriage,
although under the age of majority, she has become emancipated. (Civil Code, Book I,
Title XI, chapter 1.) The last sentence of article 317 of this chapter of the Civil Code
relative to appearance in court by the minor has been repealed by the Code of Civil
Procedure. (Code of Civil Procedure, secs. 116, 558; Willard's Notes to the Spanish
Civil Code, page 35.) Nor does the girl need a guardian ad litem in order to bring suit.
(Code of Civil Procedure sec. 115; Marriage Law, sec. 11.) It is only the infant wife
who may maintain an action to annul her marriage on the grounds alleged in the
complaint. It is for her to elect as to whether or not she desires the marriage to be
declares void.

Considering, therefore, the purpose of the law and construing together the
appropriate provisions of the Civil Code, the Code of Civil Procedure, and the
Marriage Law, in order to give effect to them, it results that, where one of the
parties to a marriage is over the age of consent but yet an infant, the father of this
minor, emancipated by marriage, has no right of action, in himself, to sue for the
nullity of such marriage, and the minor daughter does not need his aid in bringing
the suit. Nor does the minor daughter emancipated by marriage need a guardian ad
litem in order to bring action. (Delpit vs. Young [1899], 51 La. Ann., 923.)

In consonance with the foregoing, judgment is reversed, without special finding as to

costs. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, Araullo, Street, Avanceña and Fisher, JJ., concur.
Carson J., took no part.
 Lazaro Rayray vs Chae Kyung Lee

Rayray married Lee in 1952 in Pusan, Korea. Before the marriage, Lee was able to
secure a marriage license which is a requirement in Korea prior to marrying. They
lived together until 1955. Rayray however later found out that Lee had previously
lived with 2 Americans and a Korean. Lee answered by saying that it is not unusual in
Korea for a woman to have more than one partner and that it is legally permissive
for them to do so and that there is no legal impediment to her marriage with
Rayray. Eventually they pursued their separate ways. Rayray later filed before lower
court of Manila for an action to annul his marriage with Lee because Lee’s
whereabouts cannot be determined and that his consent in marrying Lee would
have not been for the marriage had he known prior that Lee had been living with
other men. His action for annulment had been duly published and summons were
made known to Lee but due to her absence Rayray moved to have Lee be declared in
default. The lower court denied Rayray’s action stating that since the marriage was
celebrated in Korea the court cannot take cognizance of the case and that the facts
presented by Rayray is not sufficient to debunk his marriage with Lee.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Rayray’s marriage with Lee is null and void.

HELD:
The lower court erred in ruling that Philippine courts do not have jurisdiction over
the case. As far as marriage status is concerned, the nationality principle is
controlling NOT lex loci celebracionis. The lower court is however correct in ruling
that Rayray’s evidence is not sufficient to render his marriage with Lee null and void.
Rayray said that the police clearance secured by Lee is meant to allow her to marry
after her subsequent cohabitation/s with the other men – which is considered
bigamous in Philippine law. The SC ruled that the police clearance is wanting for it
lacks the signature of the person who prepared it and there is no competent
document to establish the identity of the same. Also, through Rayray himself, Lee
averred that it is ok in Korea for a person who cohabited with other men before to
marry another man. This is an indication that Lee herself is aware that if it were a
previous marriage that is concerned then that could be a legal impediment to any
subsequent marriage. Rayray cannot be given credence in claiming that his consent
could have been otherwise altered had he known all these facts prior to the
marriage because he would lie to every opportunity given him by the Court so as to
suit his case.

Republic vs Iyoy
Facts:
The case is a petition for review by the RP represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General on certiorari praying for thereversal of the decision of the CA dated July 30,
2001 affirming the judgment of the RTC declaring the marriage of Crasus L.
Iyoy(respondent) and Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void based on Article 36.
On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy married each other, they had
5 children. In 1984, Fely went to the US, inthe same year she sent letters to Crasus
asking him to sign divorce papers. In 1985, Crasus learned that Fely married an
Americanand had a child. Fely went back to the Philippines on several occasions,
during one she attended the marriage of one of her children inwhich she used her
husband’s last name as hers in the invitation.

March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity alleging that Fely’s
acts brought “danger and dishonor” to the family and were manifestations of her
psychological incapacity. Crasus submitted his testimony, the certification of the
recording of their marriage contract, and the invitation where Fely used her
newhusband’s last name as evidences.

Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a drunkard, womanizer, had no
job, and thatsince 1988 she was already an American citizen and not covered by our
laws. The RTC found the evidences sufficient and granted thedecree; it was affirmed
in the CA.

Issue:
Does abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute psychological incapacity?

Held:
The evidences presented by the respondent fail to establish psychological incapacity.
Furthermore, Article 36 “contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.
Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion,
and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity under the said Article.”

Finally, Article 36 “is not to be confused with a divorce law thatcuts the marital bond
at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting aparty even before the celebration of marriage. It is a
malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.”

Sin vs. Sin

FACTS:
Florence, the petitioner, was married with Philipp, a Portuguese citizen in January
1987. Florence filed in September 1994, a complaint for the declaration of nullity of
their marriage. Trial ensued and the parties presented their respective
documentary and testimonial evidence. In June 1995, trial court dismissed
Florence’s petition and throughout its trial, the State did not participate in the
proceedings. While Fiscal Jabson filed with the trial court a manifestation dated
November 1994 stating that he found no collusion between the parties, he did not
actively participated therein. Other than having appearance at certain hearings,
nothing more was heard of him.

ISSUE:
Whether the declaration of nullity may be declared even with the absence of the
participation of the State in the proceedings.

HELD:
Article 48 of the Family Code states that “in all cases of annulment or declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to it to appear on behalf of the state to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed. The trial court should have ordered the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification briefly stating his
reasons for his agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition. The
records are bereft of an evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of
the case thus, the case is remanded for proper trial.

VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs. DITA MAQUILAN

FACTS:
Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once had a blissful
married life and out of which were blessed to have a son. However, their once sugar
coated romance turned bitter when petitioner discovered that private respondent
was having illicit sexual affair with her paramour, which thus, prompted the
petitioner to file a case of adultery against private respondent and the latter's
paramour. Consequently, both accused were convicted of the crime charged.

Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of

Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and
Damages imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner. During the
pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and private respondent entered into a
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion for the repudiation of the AGREEMENT. This
motion was denied. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
the Court of Appeals on the ground that the conviction of the respondent of the
crime of adultery disqualify her from sharing in the conjugal property. The Petition
was dismissed.

ISSUE:
Is the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery a disqualification for her
to share in the conjugal property?
HELD: No. The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil interdiction.
Article 34 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the consequences of civil
interdiction:

Art. 34. Civil Interdiction. — Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the
time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to
the person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage his
property and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance
inter vivos.

Under Article 333 of the same Code, the penalty for adultery is prision correccional
in its medium and maximum periods. Article 333 should be read with Article 43 of
the same Code. The latter provides:

Art. 43. Prision correccional — Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prision
correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right to
follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the
right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months.
The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this article although
pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly
remitted in the pardon.

It is clear, therefore, and as correctly held by the CA, that the crime of adultery does
not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction which deprives the person of the
rights to manage her property and to dispose of such property inter vivos.

De Ocampo vs. Florenciano

FACTS:
Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938. They begot several
children who are not living with plaintiff. In March 1951, latter discovered on
several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations
with Jose Arcalas. Having found out, he sent the wife to Manila in June 1951 to
study beauty culture where she stayed for one year. Again plaintiff discovered that
the wife was going out with several other man other than Arcalas. In 1952, when
the wife finished her studies, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived
separately. In June 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit
relations with Nelson Orzame. He signified his intention of filing a petition for legal
separation to which defendant manifested conformity provided she is not charged
with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, Ocampo filed a petition for legal
separation in 1955.

ISSUE:
Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the confession of judgment
disallowed by the Family Code.
HELD:
Florenciano’s admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed adultery, in
the existence of evidence of adultery other than such confession, is not the
confession of judgment disallowed by Article 48 of the Family Code. What is
prohibited is a confession of judgment, a confession done in court or through a
pleading. Where there is evidence of the adultery independent of the defendant’s
statement agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of separation should be
granted since it would not be based on the confession but upon the evidence
presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively
on defendant’s confession. The petition should be granted based on the second
adultery, which has not yet prescribed.

JAIME O. SEVILLAvs. CARMELITA N. CARDENAS

Facts:
Jaime O. Sevilla, herein petitioner, filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Carmelita N. Cardenas, herein respondent, for their marriage was
vitiated by machination, duress, and intimidation employed by the respondents
Carmelita and her father. He was forced to sign a marriage contract with
Carmelita Cardenas before a minister of the Gospel, Rev. Cirilo D Gonzales.
Moreover, he alleged that there was no marriage license presented before the
solemnizing officer as certified by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
Manila. Actually, it was certified 3 times on the following dates: March 11,
September 20, 1994 and July 25, 2000 that marriage license no. 2770792 was
nowhere to be found.

On the other hand, the respondent, Carmelita N. Cardenas refuted these allegations
of Jaime and claims that they were first civilly married on May 19, 1969 and
thereafter married at a church on May 31, 1969 at Most Holy Redeemer Parish in
Quezon City. Both were alleged to be recorded in Local Civil Registrar and NSO. He is
estopped from invoking the lack of marriage license after having been married to her
for 25 years.

The Regional Trial Court of Makati City declared the nullity of marriage of the parties
based on the petitioner’s allegations that no marriage license was presented before
a solemnizing officer. And that without the said marriage license, being one of the
formal requisites of marriage, the marriage is void from the beginning. This was
based on the 3 certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar Manila that
marriage license number 220792 was fictitious.

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the
decision of the trail court in favor of the marriage, because the Local Civil Registrar
failed to locate the said license with due effort as testified by certain Perlita
Mercader because the former Local Civil registrar had already retired. The petitioner
then filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the Court of Appeals.
thus, this case was elevated to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the certification made by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan that
Marriage License No. 2770792, as appearing in the marriage contract of the parties,
sufficient to declare the marriage void from the beginning

Held:
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative
evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The absence of logbook is not
conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. In the absence of
showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we can not easily accept
that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.

The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for
several years producing two offsprings, now adult themselves. Thus, the instant
petition was denied.

Silva vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:
Carlitos Silva and Suzanne Gonzales cohabited without the benefit of marriage and
they had two children. A rift surfaced and the two eventually separated. They agreed
that Carlitos would have the children in his company on weekends.

Claiming that Suzanne broke the agreement, Carlitos filed a petition for custodial
rights over the children before the RTC. Suzanne opposed, alleging
that Carlitos often engaged in "gambling and womanizing" which she feared could
affect the moral and social values of the children.

The RTC ruled in favor of Carlitos giving him visitorial rights to his children during
Saturdays and/or Sundays. The court however explicitly stated that in no case
should Carlitos take the children out without the written consent of Suzanne.

Suzanne appealed. In the meantime, she got married to a Dutch national and
eventually immigrated to Holland with her children. The CA reversed the ruling of
the RTC and denied the Carlitos any visitorial rights. Carlitos appealed.

Issue:
Should Carlitos be denied visitorial rights?

Held:
No. The visitation right referred to is the right of access of a noncustodial parent to
his or her child or children.

There is, despite a dearth of specific legal provisions, enough recognition on the
inherent and natural right of parents over their children. Article 150 of the Family
Code expresses that "(f)amily relations include those x x x (2) (b)etween parents and
children; x x x." Article 209, in relation to Article 220, of the Code states that it is the
natural right and duty of parents and those exercising parental authority to, among
other things, keep children in their company and to give them love and affection,
advice and counsel, companionship and understanding. The Constitution itself
speaks in terms of the "natural and primary rights of parents in the rearing of the
youth. There is nothing conclusive to indicate that these provisions are meant to
solely address themselves to legitimate relationships. Indeed, although in varying
degrees, the laws on support and successional rights, by way of examples, clearly go
beyond the legitimate members of the family and so
explicitly encompass illegitimate relationships as well. Then, too, and most
importantly, in the declaration of nullity of marriages, a situation that presupposes a
void or inexistent marriage, Article 49 of the Family Code provides for appropriate
visitation rights to parents who are not given custody of their children.

The allegations of respondent against the character of petitioner, even assuming as

true, cannot be taken as sufficient basis to render petitioner an unfit father.
The fears expressed by respondent to the effect that petitioner shall be able to
corrupt and degrade their children once allowed to even temporarily associate with
petitioner is but the product of respondent's unfounded imagination, for no man,
bereft of all moral persuasions and goodness, would ever take the trouble and
expense in instituting a legal action for the purpose of seeing his illegitimate children.
It can just be imagined the deep sorrows of a father who is deprived of his children
of tender ages.

It seems unlikely that petitioner would have ulterior motives or undue designs more
than a parents natural desire to be able to call on, even if it were only on brief visits,
his own children. The trial court, in any case, has seen it fit to understandably
provide this precautionary measure, i.e., "in no case (can petitioner) take out the
children without the written consent of the mother."