QUIZON V. THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF PAMPANGA, ET.AL., 97 PHIL. 342 (1955) dañar"(Cuello Calon, Der.
quot;(Cuello Calon, Der. Penal [6th Ed.] Vol. II, p. 869; Sent. of Tribunal Supreme of Spain, 21 Dec. 1909;
G.R. No. L-6641 July 28, 1955
FRANCISCO QUIZON, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF BACOLOR, PAMPANGA, ET AL., respondents.
REYES, J. B. L., J.:
On December 19, 1952, the respondents Chief of Police of Bacolor, Pampanga, filed a criminal complaint
against the herein petitioner, Francisco Quizon, with the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality
charging Quizon with the crime of damage to property through reckless imprudence, the value of the
damage amounting to P125.00. Quizon filed a motion to quash on the ground that, under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code, the penalty which might be imposed on the accused would be a fine or from P125.00
to P375.00, which is in excess of the fine that may be imposed by the justice of the peace court. The Justice
of the Peace forwarded the case to the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, but the latter returned it to
him for trial on the merits, holding that the justice of the peace court had jurisdiction. The defendant
appealed from this ruling of the Court of First Instance to this Court on the question of law raised.
Section 44 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No. 296) provides in part as follows:
Original jurisdiction.—Courts of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction:
(f) In all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six
months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos:
Section 87 of said Acts reads as follows:.
Original jurisdiction to try criminal cases.—Justices of the peace and judges of municipal courts
of chartered cities shall have original jurisdiction over:
(c) All criminal cases arising under the laws relating to:
(6) Malicious mischief;.
In the cases of People vs. Palmon, 86 Phil., 350; People vs. Peñas Y Ferrer and Rey y Rochas, 86 Phil., 596;
andNatividad, et al. vs. Robles, 87 Phil.,, 834, it was held that in the cases provided for in Section 87 (c) of
the Judiciary Act of 1948 above quoted, the jurisdiction given to justices of the peace and judges of the
municipal courts is not exclusive but concurrent with the courts of first instance, when the penalty to be
imposed is more than six months imprisonment or a fine of more than P200.00.
The question, therefore , is whether the justice of the peace court has concurrent jurisdiction with the court
of First Instance when the crime charged is damage to property through reckless negligence or imprudence
if the amount of the damage is P125.
We believe that the answer should be in the negative. To hold that the Justice of the Peace Court has
jurisdiction to try cases of damage to property through reckless negligence, because it has jurisdiction over
cases of malicious mischief, is to assume that the former offense is but a variant of the latter. This
assumption is not legally warranted.
Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code is as follows:
ART. 327. Who are liable for malicious mischief.—Any person who shall deliberately cause to the
property of another any damage not falling within the terms of the next preceding chapter shall
be guilty of malicious mischief.
It has always been regarded of the essence of this felony that the offender should have not only the general
intention to carry out the felonious act (a feature common to all willful crimes) but that he should act under
the impulse of a specific desire to inflict injury to another; "que en el hecho concurra animo especifico de
12 Feb. 1921).
El elemento interno de este delito require, ademas de la voluntad de ejecutar el hecho dañoso
y de la conciencia de su ilegitimidad, el animo de perjudicar, la intencion de dañar. Si no existe
semejante animo el hecho no constituey delito. (II Cuello Calon, p.870-871).
The necessity of the special malice for the crime of malicious mischief is contained in the requirement of
Art. 327 of our Revised Penal Code, already quoted, that the offender "shall deliberately cause to the
property of another any damage not falling within the terms of the next preceding chapter", i.e., not
punishable as arson. It follows that, in the very nature of things, malicious mischief can not be committed
through negligence, since culpa (negligence) andmalice ( or deliberateness) are essentially incompatible.
Hence, the Supreme Court of Spain in its decisions of 12 Feb. 1912, 7 Oct. 1931, 13 Nov. 1934 and 5 Oct.
1942, has expressly recognized that this crime is one of those that can not be committed by imprudence or
negligence.
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime
in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability" is too
broad to deserve unqualified assent . There are crimes that by their structure can not be committed through
imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised
Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a
mere question of classification or terminology. In international crimes, the act itself is punished; in
negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act,
the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. Much of the confusion has
arisen from the common use of such descriptive phrases as "homicide through reckless imprudence," and
the like; when the strict technical offense is, more accurately, "reckless imprudence resulting in homicide";
or "simple imprudence causing damages to property".
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty
therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to
commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the
corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when
committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty
for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless
imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional minimum, if the willful act would constitute
a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision mayor to
death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation
to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes.
It is difficult to believe that the Legislature, in giving Justices of the Peace jurisdiction to try cases of malicious
mischief, did so in total disregard of the principles and considerations above outlined. Our conclusion is that
"malicious mischief" as used in Section 87, par. 6, of the Judiciary Act, has exclusive reference to the willful
and deliberate crimes described in Arts. 327 to 331 of our Revised Penal Code, and to no other offense.
A further reason for this restrictive interpretation of the term "malicious mischief" used in section 87 of the
Judiciary Act, is that the same constitutes an exception to the general jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace
Courts in criminal cases, which had always stood prior to the said Act at offenses punishable with not more
than 6 months' imprisonment or a fine of not more than P200.00 or both. To this traditional jurisdiction,
the Judiciary Act added eight (8) specific exceptions in the form of felonies triable in said courts without
reference to the penalty imposable; and malicious mischief is one of these exceptions, while imprudence
resulting in damage to property is not one of them.
For the foregoing reasons, we declare that the jurisdiction over the offense in question lies exclusively in
the Court of First Instance. Hence, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of remand to the Justice of
the Peace Court is reversed and set aside. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
1
 PEOPLE V. FALLER, 67 PHIL. 529 (1939)
G.R. No. L-45964 April 25, 1939
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RESTITUTO FALLER (alias R. Aguilar), defendant-appellant.
AVANCEÑA, C. J.:
Restituto Faller was charged with the crime of damage caused to another's property maliciously and
willfully. After hearing the evidence, the Court of First Instance of Rizal found that the damage was not cause
maliciously of and willfully, but through reckless imprudence, and sentenced Restituto Faller, under
paragraph 3 of article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as principal in the crime of damage through reckless
imprudence, to pay a fine of P38 and to indemnify the offended party Ramon Diokno in the same amount,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. From this decision, an appeal was taken.
In this instance the appellant assigns as sole error of the court the fact that he was sentenced for a crime
with which he was not charged, contending that a crime maliciously and willfully committed is different
from that committed through reckless imprudence.
The court has not committed this error. The appellant was convicted of the same crime of damage to
property with which he is charged. Reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself. It is simply a way of
committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability. The information alleges that the
appellant acted willfully, maliciously, unlawfully and criminally. To this information no objection was
interposed. Negligence being a punishable criminal act when it results in a crime, the allegation in the
information that the appellant also committed the acts charged unlawfully and criminally includes the
charge that he acted with negligence.
The appealed judgment is affirmed, with the costs to the appellant. So ordered.
Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, and Moran, JJ., concur.

2
 CARILLO V. PEOPLE, 229 SCRA 386 (1994)
G.R. No. 86890 January 21, 1994
LEANDRO CARILLO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
FELICIANO, J.:
Petitioner Dr. Leandro Carillo, an anesthetist, seeks review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28
November 1988, which affirmed his conviction by the Regional Trial Court of the crime of simple negligence
resulting in homicide, for the death of his thirteen (13) year old patient
Catherine Acosta. The trial court had sentenced him to suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium
period (four [4] months' imprisonment), as well as to pay the heirs of his patient an indemnity of P30,000.00
for her death, P10,000.00 as reimbursement for actual expenses incurred, P50,000.00 as moral damages
and to pay the costs of the suit.1
The information filed against petitioner and his co-accused, the surgeon Dr. Emilio Madrid, alleged the
following:
That on or about the 31st of May 1981, in the municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding with one another,
without taking the necessary care and precaution to avoid injury to person, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously operate, in a reckless, careless and imprudent manner and
neglected to exercise their respective medical knowhow and tasks and/or departed from the
recognized standard in their treatment, diagnosis of the condition, and operation of the patient,
one Catherine Acosta, 13 years old, which negligence caused the death of the said Catherine
Acosta.2
Petitioner and Dr. Emilio Madrid entered pleas of not guilty at arraignment and the case proceeded to trail
with Judge Job B. Madayag presiding.3
The prosecution presented as its principal evidence the testimony of four (4) witnesses, namely: 1) Yolanda
Acosta, Catherine's mother, who was able to observe the conduct of the accused outside the operating
theater before, during and after the appendectomy procedure carried out on her daughter;4 2) Domingo
Acosta, Catherine's father, who corroborated some parts of his wife's testimony;5 3) Dr. Horacio Buendia,
an expert witness who described before the trial court the relationship between a surgeon and an
anesthetist in the course of a surgical operation, as well as define the likelihood of cardiac arrest as a post
operative complication;6 and 4) Dr. Nieto Salvador, an expert witness who analyzed and explained the
significance of the results of the pathological study and autopsy conducted on Catherine's body by one Dr.
Alberto Reyes.7
After the prosecution had rested its case, the defense was granted leave to file a demurrer to the
evidence.8 After failing to file the demurrer within the reglementary period, Judge Manuel Yuzon, who had
in the meantime taken over as presiding judge of the sala where this case was pending, denied the defense
motion for extension of time to file demurrer and declared the case submitted for decision.9
On 19 September 1985, the trial court promulgated its decision convicting both the accused of the crime
charged. 10
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction, and specified that the civil liability of
the two (2) accused was solidary in nature. 11
Petitioner Dr. Carillo alone filed the present Petition for Review with the Court, seeking reversal of his
conviction, or in the alternative, the grant of a new trial. Dr. Madrid did not try to appeal further the Court
of Appeals Decision. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction became final insofar as the accused surgeon
Dr. Madrid is concerned.
The facts of the case as established by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
The deceased, Catherine Acosta, a 13 year old girl, daughter of spouses Domingo and Yolanda
Acosta, complained to her father at about 10:30 o'clock in the morning of May 31, 1981 of pains
in the lower part of her abdomen. Catherine was then brought to Dr. Elva Peña. Dra. Peña called
for Dr. Emilio Madrid and the latter examined Catherine Acosta. According to Dr. Madrid, his
findings might be appendicitis. Then Dr. Peña told Catherine's parents to bring the child to the
hospital in Baclaran so that the child will be observed.
At the Baclaran General Hospital, a nurse took blood sample form the child. The findings became
known at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon and the child was scheduled for operation at 5:00
o'clock in the afternoon. The operation took place at 5:45 p.m. because Dr. Madrid arrived only
at that time.
When brought inside the operating room, the child was feeling very well and they did not subject
the child to ECG (electrocardiogram) and X-ray.
The appellant Dr. Emilio Madrid, a surgeon, operated on Catherine. He was assisted by appellant,
Dr. Leandro Carillo, an anesthesiologists.
During the operation, while Yolanda Acosta, Catherine's mother, was staying outside the
operating room, she "noticed something very unfamiliar." The three nurses who assisted in the
operation were going in and out of the operating room, they were not carrying anything, but in
going out of the operating room, they were already holding something.
Yolanda asked one of the nurses if she could enter the operating room but she was refused.
At around 6:30 p.m., Dr. Emilio Madrid went outside the operating room and Yolanda Acosta
was allowed to enter the first door.
The appendicitis (sic) was shown to them by Dr. Madrid, because, according to Dr. Madrid, they
might be wondering because he was going to install drainage near the operating (sic) portion of
the child.
When asked, the doctor told them the child was already out of danger but the operation was
not yet finished.
It has also been established that the deceased was not weighed before the administration of
anesthesia on her.
The operation was finished at 7:00 o'clock in the evening and when the child was brought out
from the operating room, she was observed to be shivering (nanginginig); her heart beat was
not normal; she was asleep and did not wake up; she was pale; and as if she had difficulty in
breathing and Dr. Emilio Madrid suggested that she placed under oxygen tank; that oxygen was
administered to the child when she was already in the room.
Witness Yolanda Acosta further testified that shortly before the child was transferred from the
operating room to her room, she (witness) was requested by the anesthesiologist to go home
and get a blanket. A portion of Yolanda Acosta's testimony on what happened when she
returned to the hospital are reproduced hereunder as follows:
Q What happened afterward?
A When I arrived in the hospital, my child was being transferred to her bed.
Q What else happened?
Q I noticed that the heartbeat of my daughter was not normal. And I noticed that her
hospital gown is rising up and down.
Q What transpired after that?
3
A I asked Dr. Madrid why it was like that, that the heartbeat of my daughter is not
normal.
Q And did the doctor make any reply?
A The doctor said because of the lesion of the child.
Q What else happened?
A After they have revived the heartbeat of the child, Dr. Carillo and Dr.Madrid left.
Q Now do you remember what time was it when Dr. Carillo stepped out?
A Only a minute after they have transferred the child to the bed.
Q What happened later on after Dr. Carillo and Dr. Madrid stepped out of the
hospital?
A After 15 or 30 minutes has lapsed at about 7:15 or 7:30, the child had developed
convulsion and stiffening of the body.
Q When you observed convulsion and stiffening of the body, did you do anything?
A We requested the nurse who was attending to her to call for a doctor.
Q And the nurse who was attending to the patient called for a doctor?
A They called for Dra. Peña, their family physician.
Q What transpired afterwards?
A What Dra. Peña did was call for Dr. Madrid and the cardiologist.
Q Did this doctor arrived?
A Yes.
Q What transpired after the doctor arrived?
A They examined the child.
Q After they examined the child, did they inform you of the result of the examination?
A The cardiologist was the one whom informed us after he stepped out of the room
when we followed him. The doctor told us that she suffered severe infection which
went up to her head.
Q After you were informed of the result of his examination, what transpired next?
A According to them, they will do their best for the child and that they will call for
Dr. Carillo.
Q Did Dr. Carillo arrived?
A At around 10:30 in the evening.
Q Did Dr. Carillo do anything when he arrived on 31 May 1981?
A When he arrived, he noticed that there were two small bottles and big bottles of
dextrose which were hanging above the bed of the child. Then he said, "What is this?
Christmas tree or what?" He told us that one bottle of dextrose be removed. And the
big one will remain.
Q What happened after that?
A After that we talked to Dr. Carillo and asked him how did this happen to the child.
Q What did Dr. Carillo reply (sic) to you?
A He answered "that is nothing, the child will regain consciousness and if the child will
not regain consciousness, I will resign (sic) as a doctor."12
(Emphasis supplied)
When Catherine remained unconscious until noontime the next day, a neurologist examined her and she
was diagnosed as comatose. 13 Three (3) days later, Catherine died without regaining consciousness.14
The Court of Appeals held that Catherine had suffered from an overdose of, or an adverse reaction to,
anesthesia, particularly the arbitrary administration of Nubain, a pain killer, without benefit of prior
weighing of the patient's body mass, which weight determines the dosage of Nubain which can safely be
given to a patient. 15 The Court of Appeals held that this condition triggered off a heart attack as a post-
operative complication, depriving Catherine's brain of oxygen, leading to the brain's hemorrhage. 16 The
Court of Appeals identified such cardiac arrest as the immediate cause of Catherine's death. 17
The Court of Appeals found criminal negligence on the part of petitioner Dr. Carillo and his co-accused Dr.
Madrid, holding that both had failed to observe the required standard of diligence in the examination of
Catherine prior to the actual administration of anesthesia; 18 that it was "a bit rash" on the part of the
accused Dr. Carillo "to have administered Nubain without first weighing Catherine"; 19 and that it was an act
of negligence on the part of both doctors when, (a) they failed to monitor Catherine's heartbeat after the
operation and (b) they left the hospital immediately after reviving Catherine's heartbeat, depriving the latter
of immediate and expert medical assistance when she suffered a heart attack approximately fifteen (15) to
thirty (30) minutes later. 20
Since neither petitioner nor his co-accused presented evidence in their own behalf, the present Petition
seeks to question the soundness of the factual conclusions drawn by the Court of Appeals, upon which the
affirmance of petitioner's conviction was based.
Close examination of the instant Petition for Review shows that petitioner's main arguments are two-fold:
(1) the Court of Appeals "completely brushed aside" and "misapprehended" Catherine's death certificate
and biopsy report which allegedly showed that the cause of death was a ruptured appendix, which led to
blood poisoning, 21 rather than faulty anesthetic treatment; and (2) there was no direct evidence of record
showing that Nubain was administered to Catherine either during the appendectomy procedure or after
such operation. 22
Two (2) related issues are thus posed for the Court's consideration. The first is whether the Court of Appeals
so drastically "misapprehended" the relevant, operative facts in this case as to compel this Court to examine
and resolve question(s) of fact which would have a decisive significance for the disposition of the case. The
rule is too firmly settled to require much documentation that only questions of law may be raised before
this Court in a petition for review on certiorari, subject to certain well-known exceptions. 23 After careful
scrutiny of petitioner's contentions before us and the record of this case, we do not believe that petitioner
has shown "misapprehension of facts" on the part of the Court of Appeals which would require this Court
to overturn the judgment reached by the former.
The second issue is whether or not the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals adequately support the
conclusion that petitioner Dr. Carillo was, along with Dr. Madrid, guilty of simple negligence which resulted
in homicide. Our review of the record leads us to an affirmative answer.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals seriously erred in finding that an overdose of, or an allergic
reaction to, the anesthetic drug Nubain had led to the death of Catherine Acosta and that the true cause of
Catherine's death was that set out in the death certificate of Catherine: "Septicemia (or blood poisoning)
due to perforated appendix with peritonitis." 24 The concept of causation in general, and the cause of death
in human beings in particular, are complex and difficult notions. What is fairly clear is that death, understood
as a physical condition involving cessation of vital signs in the brain and heart, is preceded by a series of
physiological events, any one of which events can, with equal cogency, be described as a "cause of death".
The Court of Appeals found that an overdose of, or an adverse reaction to, Nubain, an anesthetic or
pain-killing drug the appropriate dose of which depends on the body weight or mass of the patient, had
4
generated or triggered off cardiac arrest, which in turn led to lack of oxygen in Catherine's brain, which then
brought about hemorrhaging in the brain. Vital activity in the brain thereupon ceased. The medical evidence
presented at the trial was quite consistent with the findings of the Court of Appeals which concluded that
cardiac arrest was the cause of Catherine's death. 25
For his part, petitioner insists that cardiac arrest is not the only cause of oxygen-starvation of the brain, that
septicemia with peritonitis or severe infection which had "gone up to the head" of Catherine was an equally
efficient cause of deprivation of the brain of oxygen and hence of brain hemorrhage. The medical testimony
of the expert witnesses for the prosecution on which petitioner relies is also consistent with petitioner's
theory that septicemia with peritonitis was, or at least could have been, the cause of Catherine's death. 26
Indeed, it appears to the Court that there was no medical proof submitted to the trial court to show that
one or the other "cause" was necessarily an exclusive cause of death in the case of Catherine Acosta; that
an overdose or allergic reaction to Nubain could not have combined with septicemia and peritonitis in
bringing about Catherine's death.
What is of critical importance for present purposes is not so much the identification of the "true cause" or
"real cause" of Catherine's death but rather the set of circumstances which both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals found constituted simple (as distinguished from reckless) negligence on the part of the
two accused Dr. Madrid and Dr. Carillo leading to the death of Catherine.
When the patient was wheeled out of the operating room after completion of surgery, she manifested signs
of medical instability (i.e., shivering, paleness, irregular breathing and weak heart beat). 27 She was not
brought to a properly equipped recovery room, or intensive care until which the hospital lacked. 28 Such
facilities and their professional staffs, of which an anesthetist is commonly a part, are essential for providing
close observation and patient care while a post-surgery patient is recovering from the effects of anesthesia
and while the normal protective mechanisms are still dull or obtunded. 29 Instead, the patient was merely
brought to her assigned hospital bed and was provided oxygen on the instructions of Dr. Madrid then
"revived" her heartbeat. 30 Both doctors then left their patient and the hospital; approximately fifteen
minutes later, she suffered convulsions and cardiac arrest. 31
The conduct of Dr. Madrid and of the petitioner constituted inadequate care of their patient in view of her
vulnerable condition. Both doctors failed to appreciate the serious condition of their patient whose adverse
physical signs were quite manifest right after surgery. And after reviving her heartbeat, both doctors failed
to monitor their patient closely or extend further medical care to her; such conduct was especially necessary
in view of the inadequate, post-operative facilities of the hospital. We do not, of course, seek to hold
petitioner responsible for the inadequate facilities of the Baclaran General Hospital. We consider, however,
that the inadequate nature of those facilities did impose a somewhat higher standard of professional
diligence upon the accused surgeon and anesthetist personally than would have been called for in a modern
fully-equipped hospital.
While Dr. Madrid and a cardiologist were containing the patient's convulsions, and after the latter had
diagnosed that infection had reached the patient's head, these two (2) apparently after consultation,
decided to call-in the petitioner. 32 There is here a strong implication that the patient's post-operative
condition must have been considered by the two (2) doctors as in some way related to the anesthetic
treatment she had received from the petitioner either during or after the surgical procedure.
Once summoned, petitioner anesthesiologist could not be readily found. When he finally appeared at 10:30
in the evening, he was evidently in a bad temper, commenting critically on the dextrose bottles before
ordering their removal. 33 This circumstance indicated he was not disposed to attend to this unexpected
call, in violation of the canons of his profession that as a physician, he should serve the interest of his patient
"with the greatest of solicitude, giving them always his best talent and skill." 34 Indeed, when petitioner
finally saw his patient, he offered the unprofessional bluster to the parents of Catherine that he would resign
if the patient will not regain consciousness. 35 The canons of medical ethics require a physician to "attend
to his patients faithfully and conscientiously." He should secure for them all possible benefits that may
depend upon his professional skill and care. As the sole tribunal to adjudge the physician's failure to fulfill
his obligation to his patient is, in most cases, his own conscience, violation of this rule on his part is
"discreditable and inexcusable". 36
Nubain was an experimental drug for anesthesia and post-operative pain and the medical literature
required that a patient be weighed first before it is administered and warned that there was no (or
inadequate) experience relating to the administration thereof to a patient less that eighteen (18) ears of
age. 37 Yet, the doctor's order sheet (Exhibit "C") did not contain this precaution but instead directed a
reader to apply the drug only when warranted by the circumstances. 38 During the offer of Exhibit "C" by
the prosecution, Dr. Madrid admitted that this prescription, which was unsigned, was made in his own
handwriting. 39 It must be observed that the instruction was open-ended in that some other individual still
had to determine if circumstances existed warranting administration of the drug to the patient. The
document thus indicated the abdication of medical responsibility on an extremely critical matter.
Sincepetitioner anesthesiologist entered subsequent prescriptions or orders in the same order sheet, which
were signed by him, at 7:15 p.m. on the same evening of 31 May 1981, he was in a position to appreciate
the dangers inherent in the prior prescription, which was within his (petitioner's) area of specialization, and
to order measures to correct this anomaly and protect his patient's well-being. So far as the condition of
the evidence shows, he failed to do so. In sum, only a low level of diligence was exhibited by petitioner and
Dr. Madrid in the prescription of medication for their patient.
As noted earlier, petitioner relied heavily in this proceeding on the testimony on cross-examination of the
expert witnesses for the prosecution to show that blood poisoning resulting from a ruptured
appendix could also be responsible for the patient's death.
No suggestion has been made that the rupture of the patient's occurred prior to surgery. After her blood
sample was examined, the patient was merely diagnosed as a case of appendicitis, without further
elaboration. 40 No intensive preoperative preparations, like the immediate administration of antibiotics, was
thereafter undertaken on the patient. This is a standard procedure for patients who are, after being
diagnosed, suspected of suffering from a perforated appendix and consequent peritonitis. 41 The mother
also testified that petitioner anesthesiologist merely injected a drug, "pre-anesthesia" intended to put the
patient to sleep, into the container of fluids being administered to her daughter intravenously at her room,
prior to surgery. 42 We note further that the surgeon Dr. Madrid was forty-five minutes late in arriving at
the operating theater. 43 Considering that delay in treatment of appendicitis increases the morbidity of the
patient, 44 Dr. Madrid's conduct can only be explained by a pre-operative diagnosis on his part that the
condition of appendicitis was not yet attended by complications (i.e., a ruptured appendix and peritonitis).
The above circumstances do strongly indicate that the rupture of the patient's appendix occurred during the
appendectomy procedure, that is, at a time and place — the operating room — where the two (2) accused
were in full control of the situation and could determine decisively what needed to be done in respect of
the patient. 45 This circumstance must be considered in conjunction with other related circumstances which
the prosecution had proven: that the patient was ambulatory when brought to the operating room; 46 that
she left the operating room two (2) hours later in obviously serious condition; and that an appendectomy
accompanied or followed by sustained antibiotic treatment is a fairly common and generally accepted
medical procedure for dealing with ruptured appendix and peritonitis, 47 a fact of which judicial note may
be taken.
As early as in People v. Vistan, 48 the Court defined simple negligence, penalized under what is now Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code, as "a mere lack of prevision in a situation where either the threatened harm
is not immediate or the danger not openly visible." Put in a slightly different way, the gravamen of the
offense of simple negligence is the failure to exercise the diligence necessitated or called for the situation
which was not immediately life-destructive but which culminated, in the present case, in the death of a
human being three (3) days later. Such failure to exercise the necessary degree of care and diligence is a
negative ingredient of the offense charged. The rule in such cases is that while the prosecution must prove
the negative ingredient of the offense, it needs only to present the best evidence procurable under the
circumstances, in order to shift the burden of disproving or countering the proof of the negative ingredient
to the accused, provided that such initial evidence establishes at least on a prima facie basis the guilt of the
accused. 49 This rule is particularly applicable where the negative ingredient of the offense is of such a nature
or character as, under the circumstances, to be specially within the knowledge or control of the
5
accused. 50 In the instant case, the Court is bound to observe that the events which occurred during the WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 November 1988 is hereby AFFIRMED, subject
surgical procedure (including whether or not Nubain had in fact been administered as an anesthesia only to the modification that the indemnity for the death of Catherine Acosta is hereby increased to
immediately before or during the surgery) were peculiarly within the knowledge and control of Dr. Carillo P50,000.00, in line with current jurisprudence. 58
and Dr. Madrid. It was, therefore, incumbent upon the two (2) accused to overturn the prima facie case
which the prosecution had established, by reciting the measures which they had actually taken to prevent SO ORDERED.
or to counter the obviously serious condition of Catherine Acosta which was evident right after surgery. This Bidin, Romero, Melo and Vitug, JJ., concur.
they failed or refused to do so.
Still another circumstance of which account must be taken is that both petitioner and Dr. Madrid failed to
inform the parents of their minor patient of the nature of her illness, or to explain to them either during the
surgery (if feasible) or at any time after the surgery, the events which comprised the dramatic deterioration
of her condition immediately after surgery as compared with her pre-surgery condition. To give a truthful
explanation to the parents was a duty imposed upon them by the canons of their profession. 51 Petitioner
should have explained to Catherine's parents the actual circumstances surrounding Catherine's death, how,
in other words, a simple appendectomy procedure upon an ambulatory patient could have led to such fatal
consequences.
By way of resume, in the case at bar, we consider that the chain of circumstances above noted, namely: (1)
the failure of petitioner and Dr. Madrid to appreciate the serious post-surgery condition of their patient and
to monitor her condition and provide close patient care to her; (2) the summons of petitioner by Dr. Madrid
and the cardiologist after the patient's heart attack on the very evening that the surgery was completed; (3)
the low level of care and diligence exhibited by petitioner in failing to correct Dr. Madrid's prescription of
Nubain for post-operative pain; (4) the extraordinary failure or refusal of petitioner and Dr. Madrid to inform
the parents of Catherine Acosta of her true condition after surgery, in disregard of the requirements of the
Code of Medical Ethics; and (5) the failure of petitioner and Dr. Madrid to prove that they had in fact
exercised the necessary and appropriate degree of care and diligence to prevent the sudden decline in the
condition of Catherine Acosta and her death three (3) days later, leads the Court to the conclusion, with
moral certainty, that petitioner and Dr. Madrid were guilty of simple negligence resulting in homicide.
In addition to the main arguments raised by petitioner earlier, he also raised an ancillary, constitutional
claim of denial of due process. He contends that he was deprived of his right to have competent
representation at trial, and to have his cause adequately heard, because his counsel of record, Atty. Jose B.
Puerto, was "incompetent" and exhibited "gross negligence" by manifesting an intent to file a demurrer to
the evidence, in failing to present evidence in his behalf and in omitting to file a defense memorandum for
the benefit of Judge Yuzon, after the latter took over the case at the end of trial and before the Judge
rendered his decision. 52Petitioner submits he is entitled to a new trial. 53
These contentions do not persuade. An examination of the record indicates that Atty. Puerto represented
petitioner during trial with reasonable competence. Except for the two hearing sessions when witnesses
Domingo Acosta was cross-examined and recross-examined by Atty. Puerto, petitioner was present during
all the sessions when the other prosecution witnesses were presented and during which Atty. Puerto
extensively cross-examined them in behalf of petitioner and Dr. Madrid. This counsel elicited from the two
(2) expert witnesses for the prosecution testimony favorable to petitioner and which was relied upon by the
latter in this proceeding. 54 The record further indicates that if petitioner indeed entertained substantial
doubts about the capability of Atty. Puerto, he could have easily terminated the services of that counsel and
retained a new one, or sought from the trial court the appointment of counsel de oficio, during the ample
opportunity given from the time Atty. Puerto manifested his intent to file a demurrer on 16 October 1985,
to the submission of the case for decision on 25 June 1986 and before the promulgation of judgment on 19
September 1986. 55 During all this time, petitioner could have obtained leave of court to present evidence
in his behalf in lieu of a demurrer, or to submit a memorandum for the defense. After promulgation of the
judgment of conviction, petitioner did not seek a new trial, but permitted Atty. Puerto to obtain leave from
the trial court to continue on bail during the pendency of the proceedings before the Court of
Appeals. 56 Indeed, petitioner replaced Atty. Puerto as counsel only upon institution of the present
petition. 57
Petitioner's constitutional objection is plainly an afterthought.

6
 GAN V. COURT OF APPEALS, 165 SCRA 378 (1988)
G.R. No. L-44264 September 19, 1988
HEDY GAN y YU, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:
Petitioner Hedy Gan was convicted of the crime of Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence in Criminal Case No.
10201 of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXII presided by Judge Federico C. Alikpala. She
was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum
and two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as maximum and was made to
indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of P12,000.00 without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs. On appeal, the trial court's decision was modified and petitioner was
convicted only of Homicide thru Simple Imprudence. Still unsatisfied with the decision of the Court of
Appeals,1 petitioner has come to this Court for a complete reversal of the judgment below.
The facts of the case as found by the appellate court are as follows:
In the morning of July 4, 1972 at about 8:00 o'clock, the accused Hedy Gan was driving a Toyota
car along North Bay Boulevard, Tondo, Manila. While in front of house no. 694 of North Bay
Boulevard, there were two vehicles, a truck and a jeepney parked on one side of the road, one
following the other about two to three meters from each other. As the car driven by the accused
approached the place where the two vehicles were parked, there was a vehicle coming from the
opposite direction, followed by another which tried to overtake and bypass the one in front of it
and thereby encroached the lane of the car driven by the accused. To avoid a head-on collision
with the oncoming vehicle, the defendant swerved to the right and as a consequence, the front
bumper of the Toyota Crown Sedan hit an old man who was about to cross the boulevard from
south to north, pinning him against the rear of the parked jeepney. The force of the impact
caused the parked jeepney to move forward hitting the rear of the parts truck ahead of it. The
pedestrian was injured, the Toyota Sedan was damaged on its front, the jeep suffered damages
on its rear and front paints, and the truck sustained scratches at the wooden portion of its rear.
The body of the old man who was later Identified as Isidoro Casino was immediately brought to
the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital but was (pronounced) dead on arrival.2
An information for Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence was filed against petitioner in view of the above
incident. She entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment and the case was set for trial.
Meanwhile, petitioner sought and was granted a re-investigation by the City Fiscal, as a result of which the
trial fiscal moved for the dismissal of the case against petitioner during the resumption of hearing on
September 7, 1972. The grounds cited therefor were lack of interest on the part of the complaining witness
to prosecute the case as evidenced by an affidavit of desistance submitted to the trial court and lack of
eyewitness to sustain the charge.
The motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal was never resolved. The Court instead ordered the prosecution to
present its evidence. After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
On December 22, 1972, the trial court rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the of- offense charged.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 14472-CR. On May 3, 1976, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
Wherefore, as modified, the accused Hedy Gan is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of homicide thru simple imprudence and, pursuant to paragraph 2, Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code, she is hereby sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of three (3) months and
eleven (11) days of arresto mayor and to indemnify the heirs of Isidoro Casino in the sum of
Twelve Thousand Pesos (Pl2,000.00) without, however, any subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs. 3
Petitioner now appeals to this Court on the following assignments of errors:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that when the petitioner saw a car travelling directly
towards her, she should have stepped on the brakes immediately or in swerving her vehicle to
the right should have also stepped on the brakes or lessened her speed, to avoid the death of a
pedestrian.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner of the crime of Homicide thru Simple
Imprudence.
III
The Court of Appeals erred in adjudging the petitioner liable to indemnify the deceased in the
sum of P12,000.00.4
We reverse.
The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage
results to the person or property of another is this: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to
whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the
course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes the duty oil the doer to take precaution against its
mischievous results and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. 5
A corollary rule is what is known in the law as the emergency rule. "Under that rule, one who suddenly finds
himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be
adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently
and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds
himself is brought about by his own negligence." 6
Applying the above test to the case at bar, we find the petitioner not guilty of the crime of Simple
Imprudence resulting in Homicide.
The appellate court in finding the petitioner guilty said:
The accused should have stepped on the brakes when she saw the car going in the opposite
direction followed by another which overtook the first by passing towards its left. She should not
only have swerved the car she was driving to the right but should have also tried to stop or lessen
her speed so that she would not bump into the pedestrian who was crossing at the time but also
the jeepney which was then parked along the street. 7
The course of action suggested by the appellate court would seem reasonable were it not for the fact that
such suggestion did not take into account the amount of time afforded petitioner to react to the situation
she was in. For it is undeniable that the suggested course of action presupposes sufficient time for appellant
to analyze the situation confronting her and to ponder on which of the different courses of action would
result in the least possible harm to herself and to others.
Due to the lack of eyewitnesses, no evidence was presented by the prosecution with respect to the relative
distances of petitioner to the parked jeepney and the oncoming overtaking vehicle that would tend to prove
that petitioner did have sufficient time to reflect on the consequences of her instant decision to swerve her
car to the light without stepping on her brakes. In fact, the evidence presented by the prosecution on this
point is the petitioner's statement to the police 8 stating::
7
 And masasabi ko lang ho umiwas ho ako sa isang sasakyan na biglang nagovertake sa sasakyan
na aking kasalubong kung kaya ay aking kinabig sa kanan ang akin kotse subalit siya
naman biglangpagtawid ng tao o victim at hindi ko na ho naiwasan at ako ay wala ng magawa .
Iyan ho ang buong pangyayari nang nasabing aksidente.9 (Emphasis supplied)
The prosecution having presented this exhibit as its own evidence, we cannot but deem its veracity to have
been admitted by it. Thus, under the circumstances narrated by petitioner, we find that the appellate court
is asking too much from a mere mortal like the petitioner who in the blink of an eye had to exercise her best
judgment to extricate herself from a difficult and dangerous situation caused by the driver of the overtaking
vehicle. Petitioner certainly could not be expected to act with all the coolness of a person under normal
conditions. 10 The danger confronting petitioner was real and imminent, threatening her very existence. She
had no opportunity for rational thinking but only enough time to heed the very powerfull instinct of self-
preservation.
Also, the respondent court itself pronounced that the petitioner was driving her car within the legal limits.
We therefore rule that the "emergency rule" enunciated above applies with full force to the case at bar and
consequently absolve petitioner from any criminal negligence in connection with the incident under
consideration.
We further set aside the award of damages to the heirs of the victim, who by executing a release of the
claim due them, had effectively and clearly waived their right thereto.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered acquitting petitioner HEDY GAN y YU of the crime of Homicide
thru Simple Imprudence. She is no longer liable for the P12,000.00 civil indemnity awarded by the appellate
court to the heirs of the victim.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.

8
 IBABAO V. PEOPLE, 132 SCRA 217 (1984)
G.R. No. L-36957 September 28, 1984
ANICETO IBABAO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
A Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of the then Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. No. 12784-CR,
increasing the penalty imposed on petitioner in People of the Philippines vs. Aniceto Ibabao, for Homicide
thru Reckless Imprudence, for his failure to lend aid to the victim.
Before the City Court of Davao, in Criminal Case No. 3091C, petitioner was charged with Homicide thru
Reckless Imprudence. The Information did not allege that the accused had failed to lend on the spot to the
injured person such help as was in his hands to give.
Among the witnesses presented by the prosecution was Jose Patalinghog, Jr., a bystander, who testified
that on April 30, 1967, at about 11:00 p.m., while he was at Bankerohan terminal, he clearly saw an owner-
type jeep bump a person; that the said jeep did not stop; that upon request of a security guard, he gave
chase, wrote down the plate No. 57675, overtook it, and recognized the driver as the petitioner, and
thereafter reported the incident to the Matina Police Sub-Station.
For his part, petitioner presented two witnesses in support of his defense of alibi.
After trial, the City Court rendered a verdict of conviction thus:
In the case at bar, there appears no cogent or sufficient reason for the accused not to lend aid
on the spot to the fatally injured victim of the accident. As such, applying the foregoing
provisions the next penalty next higher in degree is prision correccional in its medium and
maximum period shall be followed. Furthermore, the heirs of the deceased are lawfully entitled
to indemnity and moral damages.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the herein accused is hereby pronounced guilty beyond rational doubt of
the offense charged. And applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, said accused is hereby
sentenced to undergo a prison term of from one year eight months and twenty days of prision
correccional as minimum to four years, two months and one day of prision correccional as
maximum, and to pay the costs, with accessories prescribed by law.
Said accused is further sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of Six
Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00), plus moral damages in the sum of Two Thousand Pesos
(P2,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in accordance with Article 39 of
the Revised Penal Code. 1
Upon appeal, the then Court of Appeals modified the aforecited Decision by increasing the penalty as
follows:
However, we notice that the decision a quo only awards the amount of P6,000.00 as indemnity.
Following the doctrine laid down in the cases of People vs. Pantoja, L-19793, October 11, 1968
and People vs. Ompad, et al. L-23513, January 31, 1969, the same should be increased to
P12,000. 00.
The imposable penalty is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (Article 365,
Revised Penal Code). Considering that appellant failed to stop and give aid to the victim, the
penalty should be one degree higher which is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods
(R.A. 1790). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty should be from three (3)
years, six (6) months and twenty one (21) days of prision correccional as minimum, to seven (7)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision mayor. The P2,000.00 moral damages is hereby
eliminated considering that the same is already included in the P12,000.00 indemnity. No
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. (Republic Act No. 5465).
WHEREFORE, modified as indicated above, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed at
appellant's Costs. 2
Before us now, petitioner has interposed this appeal by certiorari praying for the modification of the
penalty. Subsequently, he filed a Motion for New Trial based on alleged newly discovered evidence,
particularly, the recantation by prosecution eyewitness Jose Patalinghog.
The legal issues raised are: 1) whether or not the failure of petitioner to lend aid to his victim justifies the
imposition of the penalty next higher in degree to that provided for in paragraph 2 of Article 365, as
amended, of the Revised Penal Code even though such circumstance was not alleged in the Information;
and 2) whether or not Patalinghog's affidavit of recantation is "newly discovered evidence" warranting new
trial. The pertinent provision of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, reads:
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit
any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty
of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would
have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto
menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor
in its minimum period shall be imposed.
xxx xxx xxx
In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound discretion, without
regard to the rules prescribed in article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first
two paragraphs of this article, in which case the courts shall impose the penalty next lower in
degree than that which should be imposed, in the period which they may deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, the death of a
person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods.
xxx xxx xxx
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the
offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in his hands to
give. (As amended by Rep. Act No. 1790).
Petitioner submits that the last paragraph of the aforequoted Article 365 is not applicable to offenses under
paragraph "2" of the same Article because of the opening statement that "the provisions contained in this
article shall not be applicable implying that paragraph "2" is in a class by itself and is not affected by the rest
of the provisions of the same Article
The argument is flawed. The proviso that "the provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable"
clearly refers to the preceding paragraphs. Paragraphs "1" and "2" are exceptions to the application of the
said preceding paragraphs under the circumstances mentioned. The last paragraph on failure to lend aid on
the spot necessarily applies to all situations envisioned in the said Article whenever there is an injured party.
We find merit in petitioner's contention, however, that the increased penalty is inapplicable to him because
the failure to give aid to the injured on the spot has not been alleged in the Information. So far as we have
9
been able to ascertain, this question has not been definitely passed upon by this Court. But, we agree with
the then Court of Appeals when it ruled in People vs. Beduya 3 that "the failure to render assistance,
constitutes a qualifying circumstances because the presence thereof raises the penalty by one degree (like
treachery which qualifies homicide to murder). The same must be alleged in the information to apprise the
defendant of this charge unlike an ordinary aggravating circumstance which even if not alleged in the
information, can be taken into account if proved at the trial without objection.
We are neither inclined to consider such failure to lend assistance as a generic aggravating circumstance
that would justify the imposition of the penalty in its maximum period, since it is not an aggravating
circumstance listed in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code.
Coming now to the Affidavit of recantation of Jose Patalinghog, Jr., suffice it to state that at this stage of the
proceeding, the same cannot be considered as newly discovered evidence to warrant new trial. In the first
place, the Affidavit was thought of only after this petition was initially denied for lack of merit. Secondly, as
has been the consistent ruling of this Court recantations should be taken with great caution. The reason is
that if new trial should be granted at such instance where an interested party succeeds in inducing some of
the witnesses to vary their testimony outside of court after trial, there would be no end to every
litigation. 4 As held in People vs. Saliling, et al., 5
Affidavits of retraction executed by witnesses who had previously testified in court will not be countenanced
for the purpose of securing a new trial. It would be a dangerous rule for courts to reject testimonies solemnly
taken before courts of justice simply because the witnesses who had given them later on change their mind
for one reason or another, for such a rule would make solemn trials a mockery and place the investigation
of truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. Affidavits of retraction can be easily secured from poor
and ignorant witnesses usually for a monetary consideration. Recanted testimony is exceedingly unreliable.
There is always the probability that it may later be repudiated. So courts are wary or reluctant to allow a
new trial based on retracted testimony.
WHEREFORE, the penalty imposed by respondent Appellate Court is hereby modified and petitioner-
accused is hereby sentenced, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code
as mandated by Article 365 of the same Code, to suffer an indeterminate sentence of two (2) years and four
(4) months of prision correccional as minimum, to four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day, also
of prision correccional as maximum; to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P30,000.00, and to pay
the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

10
 PEOPLE V. BUAN, 22 SCRA 1383 (1968)
G.R. No. L-25366 March 29, 1968
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE BUAN, accused-appellant.
REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:
Direct appeal by the accused from an order of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, in its Criminal
Case No. 5243 (for serious physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence),
overruling a motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy.
Stripped to essentials, the case arose in this wise:
The accused was driving a passenger bus of the La Mallorca Company on July 23, 1962, along the
MacArthur Highway in the municipality of Guiguinto, Bulacan. Allegedly because of his negligence — and
recklessness, the vehicle driven by him struck and collided with the passenger jeep of Sergio Lumidao,
damaging said jeep and causing it to turn turtle, and injuring its passengers. Six of the latter suffered slight
physical injuries requiring medical attendance for 5 to 9 days: three other riders came out with serious
bodily injuries that needed medical attention for 30 to 45 days; while the jeep was damaged to the extent
of P1,395.00.
A charge was filed against the accused-appellant, one for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, in the Justice of the Peace Court of Guiguinto, for which he was tried and acquitted on
December 16, 1963. Prior to this acquittal, however, the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed in the Court of
First Instance the information in the case now before us, for serious physical injuries, and damage to
property through reckless imprudence. Admittedly, both charges referred to the same highway collision.
When the accused was arraigned in the Court of First Instance, his counsel moved to quash the charges
on the ground that he had already been acquitted of the same offense by the Justice of the Peace Court.
The prosecution opposed the motion and the Court denied the motion quash. Unable to secure
reconsideration, the accused appealed to this Court.
Sole issue before us, therefore, is whether the second case placed the appellant twice in jeopardy for
the same offense, and is barred by the previous acquittal.
We agree with the appellant that the Court below erred in not dismissing the information for "serious
physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence," in view of the appellant's previous
acquittal by the Justice of the Peace Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, for the same imprudence.
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi
offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an
imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes
thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into
account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act
is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal
negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions. This has
been the constant ruling of the Spanish Supreme Court, and is also that of this Court in its most recent
decisions on the matter.
Thus, in People vs. Silva, L-15974, January 30, 1962, where as the result of the same vehicular accident
one man died, two persons were seriously injured while another three suffered only slight physical injuries,
we ruled that the acquittal on a charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, was a bar to
another prosecution for homicide through reckless imprudence. In People vs. Diaz, L-6518, March 30, 1954,
the ruling was that the dismissal by the Municipal Court of a charge of reckless driving barred a second
information of damage to property through reckless imprudence based on the same negligent act of the
accused. In People vs, Belga, 100 Phil. 996, dismissal of an information for physical injuries through needless
imprudence as a result of a collision between two automobiles was declared, to block two other
prosecutions, one for damage to property through reckless imprudence and another for multiple physical
injuries arising from the same collision. The same doctrine was reasserted in Yap vs. Lutero, et al., L-12669,
April 30, 1959. In none of the cases cited did the Supreme Court regard as material that the various offenses
charged for the same occurrence were triable in Courts of differing category, or that the complainants were
not the individuals.
As for the Spanish jurisprudence, Cuello Calon, in his Derecho Penal (12th Ed.), Vol. I, p. 439, has this
to say:1äwphï1.ñët
Aun cuando de un solo hecho imprudente se originen males diversos, como el hecho
culposo es uno solo, existe un solo delito de imprudencia. Esta es jurisprudencia constante del
Tribunal Supremo. De acuerdo con esta doctrinael automovilista imprudente que atropella y
causa lesiones a dos personas y ademas daños, no respondera de dos delitos de lesiones y uno
de daños por imprudencia, sino de un solo delito culposo.
The said author cites in support of the text the following decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain
(footnotes 2 and 3).
8 octubre 1887, 18 octubre 1927.
Si con el hecho imprudente se causa la muerte de una persona y ademas se ocasionan
daños, existe un solo hecho punible, pues uno solo fue el acto, aun cuando deben apreciarse dos
enorden a la responsabilidad civil, 14 diciembre 1931 si a consecuencia de un solo acto
imprudente se produjeron tres delitos, dos de homicidio y uno de daños, como todos son
consecuencia de un solo acto culposo, no cabe penarlos por separado, 2 abril 1932.
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence could not be joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of grave or less grave
felonies. This same argument was considered and rejected by this Court in the case of People vs. Diaz, supra:
... The prosecution's contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to
first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before
pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney
is not now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless
imprudence of which the defendant has been previously cleared by the inferior court.
In view of the foregoing, we must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by
the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal) Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the
consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant
in second jeopardy for the same offense.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed, and the Court of First Instance of Bulacan is directed
to quash and dismiss the charge in its Criminal Case No. 5243. No costs. So ordered.
Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Castro, J., took no part.
11
 BUERANO V. COURT OF APPEALS, 115 SCRA 217 (1982)
G.R. No. L-30269 July 19, 1982
EPITACIO BUERANO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RELOVA, J.:
Petitioner Epitacio Buerano was the driver of LTB bus with Plate No. 22-900 which collided with the
Mabuhay Bakery delivery panel bearing Plate No. T-13016 driven by Hipolito Vismonte and owned by Chu
Yu in Tanay, Rizal on September 20, 1957.
On December 3, 1957, the Chief of Police of Tanay, filed with the Municipal Judge of that municipality
Criminal Case No. 251 against herein petitioner for the crime of "Slight and Serious Physical Injuries through
Reckless Imprudence." In said Criminal Case No. 251, the complaint alleged, among other things, "causing
by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence that the said bus, driven and operated by him (petitioner)
to collide with the delivery truck of Mabuhay Bakery owned by Mr. Chu Yu alias Mariano of Tanay, Rizal,
bearing Plate No. T-13016, the result of which the right front side of the said truck (Mabuhay Bakery) was
greatly damaged and the driver, Hipolito Vismonte, including the two (2) helpers, namely, Bonifacio
Virtudazo and Sy Tian alias Martin, suffered physical injuries on the different parts of the body which
required medical attention as follows:
Hipolito Vismonte—five (5) days
Bonifacio Virtudazo—ten (10) days
Sy Tian alias Martin—one (1) month
On February 6, 1958, after trial, petitioner was found guilty of slight and less serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence and sentenced "to suffer imprisonment from one (1) month and one (1) day to two (2)
months and to pay the cost of the suit." He appealed the decision to the Court of First Instance of Rizal
where the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 7772.
On May 2, 1962, the Court of First Instance of Rizal affirmed the decision of the Municipal Court and
sentenced petitioner to suffer four months of Arresto Mayor and to pay the costs.
In the meantime, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Rizal filed against herein petitioner Criminal Case No.
7965 in the Court of First Instance charging him with the Crime of Damage to property through reckless
This view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war case of People vs.
imprudence. He filed a Motion to Quash on the ground of double jeopardy in that because he has been
Estipona decided on November 14, 1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (March
previously convicted of the offense charged, referring to the judgment of conviction by the Municipal Court
29, 1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that —
and the Court of First Instance. Opposition was filed by the Provincial Fiscal contending that the crime for
which petitioner was convicted was for less serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, whereas
the second case was for damages to property through reckless imprudence which are distinct offenses. In
support thereof, he cited the case of People vs. Estipona, 70 Phil. 513, which held that the two (2) offenses
are entirely distinct from one another, punishable under two (2) different provisions of the code and that
more evidence are necessary to sustain the complaint for injuries than those submitted in the case for
damage.
The Court of First Instance denied the motion to quash and, after trial, found petitioner guilty in Criminal
Case No. 7965 of the crime of damage to property through reckless imprudence. Petitioner appealed to the
Court of Appeals which sustained the Court of First Instance and sentenced herein petitioner "to pay a fine
of P4,387.00 which is double the amount of damages suffered by the delivery truck with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; to indemnify the offended party, the owner of the delivery truck in the
amount of P2,193.50, representing the amount of damages suffered by the said delivery truck, and to pay
the costs." The Court of Appeals held that there was no double jeopardy because —
... First. Neither in the JP Court nor in the CFI on appeal was the appellant convicted or acquitted
of the offense of Damage to Property Thru Reckless Imprudence or the case against him for that
offense dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. Second. The JP Court
which found him guilty of Slight and Less Serious Physical injuries was not a court of competent
jurisdiction to try the offense of Damage to Property Thru Reckless Imprudence involving
P2,193.50 because the imposable penalty may be three times the aforesaid
amount. Third Appellant could not have validly pleaded before the JP Court to the said offense
of Damage to Property Thru Reckless Imprudence. Fourth The offense of Damage to Property
Thru Reckless Imprudence was alleged in the Information in Criminal Case No. 7965 (the second
case) does not include and is not necessarily included in the first charge of Slight and Less Serious
Physical Injuries Thru Reckless Imprudence, as alleged in the Information filed in Criminal Case
No. 7722, the continuation of Criminal Case 251; and Fifth: Appellant was never tried at all in the
JP Court of Tanay in Criminal Case No. 7722 for the crime of Damage to Property Thru Reckless
Imprudence.
We have read the case of People vs. Jose Belga, 53 O.G. (10) 3081, May 31, 1957, cited by
appellant, and are of the opinion that the basic reason relied therein is not found in the case at
bar, first because there were three (3) cases filed in that case, to wit, Criminal Case No. 88,
Reckless Imprudence with Physical Injury; Criminal Case No. 95, Damage to Property Thru
Reckless Imprudence, and Criminal Case No. 96, for Multiple Physical Injuries thru Reckless
Imprudence, and accused Jose Belga was acquitted in the first case No. 88, after due trial
charging both physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence. In the case at
bar, the offense of damage to property thru reckless imprudence arising out of the collision has
not been passed upon or dealt with in both Criminal Case No. 251, JP Court of Tanay, and in
Criminal Case No. 7722 of the CFI, whereas Criminal Case No. 7965, the present case, is solely
for damage to property thru reckless imprudence. In fact, appellant could not have been
convicted of Damage to Property Thru Reckless Imprudence under the Information filed in
Criminal Case No. 7722, the first case, for it charges only the offense of Less Serious Physical
Injury Thru Reckless Imprudence. Obvious is the fact that no case for damage to property thru
reckless imprudence was tried in which appellant could be convicted or acquitted or the case
against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. Furthermore, under
Sec. 9 of Revised Rule 117, in order for jeopardy to be available as bar, the second offense,
Criminal Case No. 7965, must necessarily include or is necessarily included in the offense charged
in the first case, Criminal Case No. 7722. Considering that the decision of the JP in Criminal Case
No. 251 was vacated and the information filed by the Fiscal in Criminal Case 7722 (the
continuation of Criminal Case 251) charges only the offense of Less Serious Physical Injuries, it is
evident that the first offense does not include the second,nor the second, the first.
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of
reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the
essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be
punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result
thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it
does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the
injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence)
remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.
xxx xxx xxx
... the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal) Court
of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence,
prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the
Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences
12
 of one and the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in
second jeopardy for the same offense.
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated December 12, 1969
(page 82 of the Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining petitioner's plea of double
jeopardy and submits that "its affirmatory decision dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR
finding petitioner guilty of damage to property through reckless imprudence should be set aside, without
costs." He stressed that "if double jeopardy exists where the reckless act resulted into homicide and physical
injuries. then the same consequence must perforce follow where the same reckless act caused
merely damage to property—not death—and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a human life lost as a
result of a vehicular collision cannot be equated with any amount of damages caused to a motors vehicle
arising from the same mishap."
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction in Criminal Case No. CA-G.R. No. 05123-CR is hereby set aside and
petitioner is acquitted of the offense charged therein.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Acting C.J.), Plana and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Makasiar and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., took no part.
Vasquez, J., concur in the result.

13
 CUYOS V. GARCIA, 160 SCRA 302 (1988)
G.R. No. L-46934 April 15, 1988
ALFREDO CUYOS y TULOR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. NICOLAS P. GARCIA, Presiding Judge, Municipal Court, San Fernando, Pampanga and THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
Petitioner Alfredo Cuyos, in this Petition for certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction seeks to set
aside the Order dated 9 September 1977 issued by respondent Municipal Court Judge Nicolas P. Garcia in
Criminal Case No. 77-1848 (entitled " People of the Philippines, plaintiff vs. Alfredo Cuyos y Tulor, accused")
denying petitioner's Motion to Transfer said case to the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga for trial
on the merits.
Petitioner was charged before the Municipal Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, with homicide with multiple
serious physical injuries and damage to property, through reckless imprudence. Petitioner was driver of a
cargo truck which had collided with a Volkswagen automobile in a vehicular accident which resulted in the
death of one (1) person and physical injuries to four (4) other people. The Amended Complaint against
petitioner read as follows:
That on or about the 9th day of June 1977, at about 6:10 P.M., at the MacArthur Highway, barrio
San Isidro, San Fernando, Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, being then the driver and person in charge of a truck bearing plate No.
V 139 T Filipinos 1977, willfully and unlawfully drive and operate the same in a negligent,
imprudent and careless manner, and without due regard to traffic laws, rules and regulations,
and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent accident to person and damage to
property, causing by such negligence, imprudence and carelessness, the said truck driven and
operated by him bumped and hit a Volkswagen car bearing plate no. E 604 Filipinos 1977, then
driven by Antonio M. Concepcion, as a result of which one of the occupants of the said car,
Victoriana Miranda Concepcion died in the said accident, and the other occupants namely:
Antonio Concepcion, Rhinna Lin Capili, Renee Ann Capili and Lourdes Concepcion sustained
serious physical injuries, and the said car suffered damages in the amount of P18,000.00,
belonging to Antonio Concepcion, to the damage and prejudice of the offended parties.
Petitioner entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment. After arraignment, respondent Judge set the case
for trial on 12,14 and 16 September 1977.
Before trial could commence, however, petitioner filed on 6 September 1977 a " Motion to Remand the
Case to the Court of First Instance for Trial" , alleging lack of jurisdiction over the case on the part of the
Municipal Court. Petitioner's argument was that the amended criminal complaint alleged that the
Volkswagen car involved in the accident had suffered damages amounting to P18,000.00, and that under
paragraph 3, Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime with which he was charged would carry a fine
in an amount ranging from the amount of the damage to three (3) times the value of the damage alleged
(i.e. 3 x P18,000.00 or P54,000.00). Petitioner urged in his Motion that because under Section 87 (e) of the
Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended (Republic Act No. 296 as amended), the respondent Municipal Court of
the Provincial Capital of Pampanga, had jurisdiction only over offenses punishable by a fine not exceeding
P6,000.00, the case had to be transferred to the Court of First Instance. On the same date, petitioner filed
an Urgent Motion to Postpone the trial of the case relying on the same grounds set out in his Motion to
Transfer the Case to the Court of First Instance.
After a joint hearing of the two (2) Motions filed by petitioner, the respondent Municipal judge issued an
order dated 9 September 1977 denying the Motion to transfer the Case to the Court of First Instance and
set the trial of the case for 5 October 1977. A verbal Motion for Reconsideration by petitioner was denied.
Hence the present Petition for Certiorari, assailing the jurisdiction of the respondent court to try the criminal
case against petitioner on the merits.
By a Resolution dated 26 September 1977, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the
respondent Municipal Court from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 77-1848.
The sole issue raised in this Petition is whether or not the respondent Municipal Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga has jurisdiction to try the criminal case against petitioner.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment dated 27 October 1977, agreed with and adopted the position taken
by petitioner that respondent Municipal Court has no jurisdiction to try Criminal Case No. 77-1848. The
Court agrees with the Solicitor General.
Criminal Case No. 77-1848 involves a complex crime of homicide, multiple serious physical injuries and
damage to property, resulting from reckless imprudence. Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, in a
prosecution for a complex crime constituted by two (2) or more grave or less grave felonies, the penalty for
the most serious crime is to be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. In the present case,
one might, as respondent Municipal Judge did, look only at the acts which constitute the offenses
comprising the complex crime here involved. One is likely to do so through eyes which are culturally
conditioned and so is likely to assume, as did respondent Municipal Judge, that the most serious offense of
which petitioner is accused is homicide through reckless imprudence. Under paragraph 2, Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code, the penalty imposable upon petitioner, should he be found guilty of homicide through
reckless imprudence, would be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence.
xxx xxx xxx
The provisions contained in this Article shall not be applicable:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the automobile law, the death of a
person shall be caused, in which case the defendants shall be punished by prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods.
xxx xxx xxx
At the time of the filing of the criminal complaint against petitioner before the Municipal Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga, such Municipal Court in the capital of the Province of Pampanga had jurisdiction to
impose a penalty of imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine not exceeding P6,000. 00 or both.
The applicable provision was the fourth paragraph of Article 87 (c) of Republic Act No. 296 as amended
which provided as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Municipal judges in the capitals of provinces and sub-provinces and judges of city courts shall
have like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an offense
committed within their respective jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by law does not
exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding six
thousand pesos or both, and in the absence of the district judge, shall have like jurisdiction within
the province as the Court of First Instance to hear applications for bail.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, if the basic assumption made earlier as to the relative gravity of homicide through reckless
imprudence and damage to property through reckless imprudence were correct, the respondent Municipal
Judge would have to be vested with jurisdiction over the criminal charges against petitioner.
As a technical legal proposition, however, the relative seriousness of offenses is determined by the
seriousness of the penalties attached by the law to the several offenses. It was noted earlier that the
imposable penalty in case of homicide through reckless imprudence is prision correccional in its medium
14
and maximum periods, i.e., a correctional penalty in the scale of penalties set up in Article 25 of the Revised
Penal Code. Upon the other hand, the penalty for damage to property through reckless imprudence is
provided for in the third paragraph of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code which reads as follows:
When the execution of the Act covered by this Article shall have only resulted in damage to the
property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to
the value of paid damages to three-times such value, but which shall in no case be less than
P25.00. (Emphasis supplied)
Under Article 26 of the same Code, a fine may be an afflictive penalty (i.e., if it exceeds P6,000.00) or a
correctional penalty (i.e., if it is P200.00 or more but does not exceed P6,000.00). The offense so penalized
with a fine may be a grave felony (i.e. if the imposable fine is afflictive in nature) or a less grave felony (i.e.,
if the imposable fine is merely correctional). 1 In the instant case, the maximum fine which may be imposed
upon petitioner is P54,000.00 (3 x P18,000.00), obviously an afflictive penalty and hence, in the scheme of
the Revised Penal Code, more serious than the penalty imposable for homicide through reckless
imprudence.
In complex crimes, it is not uncommon that one constitutive offense carries with it an afflictive penalty while
the other or other constitutive offenses carry with them only a correctional or even a light penalty.
Jurisdiction over the whole complex crime must logically be lodged with the trial court having jurisdiction
to impose the maximum and most serious penalty imposable on an offense forming part of the complex
crime. A complex crime must be prosecuted integrally, as it were, and not split into its component offenses
and the latter made the subject of multiple informations possibly brought in different courts. This is the
thrust of our case law on the matter.
In Angeles, etc., et al, v. Jose, et al., 2 the Court had occasion to deal with a criminal information against one
Domingo Mejia before the Court of First Instance of Manila, charging him with the crime of damage to
property in the sum of P654.22 and with less serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, committed, in one single act. There, the respondent Court of First Instance dismissed the
criminal information upon the ground that the penalty prescribed by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
was only arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods which was within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Municipal Court. The prosecution then invited attention to the fact that the fine which could be imposed
by the respondent court on account of the damage to property through reckless imprudence was a sum
ranging from P654.22 to P1,962.66 (P654.22 x 3) which amount was beyond the jurisdiction of a Municipal
Court to impose as fine. In setting aside the order of dismissal by the respondent Court of First Instance and
remanding the case to the trial court further proceedings, the Supreme Court said:
[The third paragraph of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code] simply means that if there is only
damage to property the amount fixed therein shall be imposed, but if there are also physical
injuries there, should be an additional penalty for the latter. The information cannot be split into
two; one for the physical injuries, and another for the damage to property, for both the injuries
and the damage committed were caused by one single act of the defendant and constitute what
may be called a complex crime of physical injuries and damage to property. It is clear that the
fine fixed by law in this case is beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal court and within that of
the court of first instance. 3(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in Angeles, we held that the jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance of the case must be
determined, not by the penalty for the physical injuries charged but by the fine imposable for the damage
to property resulting from reckless imprudence. Damage to property through reckless imprudence need
not be a lighter offense than less serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Because the
maximum fine (P1,962.66) imposable upon the accused in the Angeles case was beyond the jurisdiction of
the Municipal Court of Manila to impose, the criminal case fell within the jurisdiction of the respondent
Court of First Instance of Manila.
People v. Villanueva 4 followed the rule set out in Angeles. In Villanueva, the accused was charged before
the Justice of Peace Court of Batangas, Batangas with the crime of serious and less serious physical injuries,
with damage to property in the amount of P2,636.00, through reckless imprudence. The Justice of Peace
Court subsequently declared itself without jurisdiction to try the case and forwarded the same to the Court
of First Instance. The latter court then declared itself similarly without jurisdiction over the complex crime
charged in the information, upon the ground that the penalty for the graver offense of physical injuries
through reckless imprudence was only arresto mayor in its, maximum and medium periods which penalty,
even if applied in its maximum degree (in view of the complex -nature of the crime), would remain within
the jurisdiction of the Justice of Peace Court. Upon appeal by the prosecution, the Court, speaking through
Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, held that the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over the complex crime there
involved:
We find the appeal well taken, for this case comes squarely under the rule laid down by us
in Angeles, et al. v. ,rose, et al. [96 Phil. 151 (1954)],, wherein we held that.—
xxx xxx xxx
Consider that it is the court of first instance that would undoubtedly have jurisdiction if the only
offense that resulted from appellant's imprudence were the damage to property in the amount
of P2,636.00, it would be absurd to hold that for the graver offense of serious and less serious
physical injuries combined with damage to property through reckless imprudence, jurisdiction
would lie in the justice of the peace court. The presumption is against absurdity, and it is the
duty of the courts to interpret the law in such a way as to avoid absurd results. Our system of
apportionment of criminal jurisdictions among the various trial courts proceeds on the basic
theory that crimes cognizable by the Courts of First Instance are more serious than those triable
injustice of the peace or municipal courts.
Moreover, we cannot discard the possibility that the prosecution may not be able to prove all
the supposed offenses constituting the complex crime charge. Were we to hold that it is the
justice of the Peace court that has jurisdiction in this case, if later the prosecution should fail to
prove the physical injuries aspect of the case and establish only the damage to property in the
amount of P2,636.00, the inferior court would find itself without jurisdiction to impose the fine
for the damage to property committed, since such fine can not be less than the amount of the
damage. Again, it is to avoid this further absurdity that we must hold that the jurisdiction lies in
the court of first instance in this case. 5
The applicable rule on the allocation of jurisdiction between an inferior court on the one hand and the
Regional Trial Court on the other, in respect of complex crimes involving reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide or physical injuries and damage to property, was summarized by Mr. Justice Barrera in People v.
Malabanan: 6
It is true that, following the ruling of this Court in the case of Lapuz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
L-6382, March 30,1954 (40 O.G. 18 supp.), in imposing the corresponding penalty, to the quasi-
offense of reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries and damage to property, Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code should be applied. However, there may be cases, as the one at
bar, where the imposable penalty for the physical injuries charged would come within the
jurisdiction of the municipal or justice of the peace court while the fine, for the damage to
property, would fall on the Court of First Instance. As the information cannot be split into two,
one for damages and another for the physical injuries, the jurisdiction of the court to take
cognizance of the case must be determined not by the corresponding penalty for the physical
injuries charged but by the fine imposable for the damage to property resulting from the reckless
imprudence. 7 (Emphasis supplied)
It remains only to point out that under B.P. Blg. 129, the law presently in effect, we would have to reach the
same result: i.e., that the criminal case against petitioner falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court. Under Section 32 (2) of B.P. Blg. 129, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts have:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not
exceeding four (4) years and two (2) months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or
both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties,
15
 including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind,
nature, value, or amount thereof Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence they should have exclusive original jurisdiction where the
imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos. (Emphasis supplied)
Since the maximum fine imposable in the present case is P54,000.00, and the maximum imprisonment
imposable (for the homicide through reckless imprudence) is six (6) years, clearly, the criminal charge
involved falls outside the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court and consequently within the jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga.
WHEREFORE, the Order of the respondent Municipal Court of 9 September 1977 is hereby SET ASIDE as null
and void and the Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 26 September 1977 is hereby made
PERMANENT. Because the proceedings before the respondent Municipal Court are null and void, the
Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga will have to file a new information against petitioner in the Regional Trial
Court, San Fernando, Pampanga. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

16
 JASON IVLER V. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO
G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City,
and EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City affirming sub-silencio
a lower court’s ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second prosecution for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property. This, despite the accused’s previous
conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries arising from the same incident
grounding the second prosecution.
The Facts
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by
respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide
and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C.
Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both
cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted
out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in
Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless
imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.3
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from
the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May
2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MeTC
proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his
arrest.4 Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings
and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest.5 Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing
of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A.
No. 2803 for petitioner’s loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding its ruling on
petitioner’s forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTC’s order to arrest
petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without reaching
the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but
this proved unavailing.6
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him to forego
participation in the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes his case from the line
of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of appeals for absconding appellants because his appeal before the
RTC was a special civil action seeking a pre-trial relief, not a post-trial appeal of a judgment of conviction.7
Petitioner laments the RTC’s failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking jurisprudence,
petitioner argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366, having been previously convicted in Criminal Case
No. 82367 for the same offense of reckless imprudence charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner
submits that the multiple consequences of such crime are material only to determine his penalty.
Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTC’s decision forfeiting petitioner’s standing
to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce calls the Court’s attention to
jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was
obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case
No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to property.
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor General’s motion not to file a
comment to the petition as the public respondent judge is merely a nominal party and private respondent
is represented by counsel.
The Issues
Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in
S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal
Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the negative, whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double
Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold that (1) petitioner’s non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not divest
him of personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection afforded by the
Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the
same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
Petitioner’s Non-appearance at the Arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape from custody or violation of the terms of his bail
bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124,8 in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion
of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement,
jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in
Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions.
The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment ancillary
question on the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds
no basis under procedural rules and jurisprudence. The RTC’s reliance on People v. Esparas9 undercuts the
cogency of its ruling because Esparas stands for a proposition contrary to the RTC’s ruling. There, the Court
granted review to an appeal by an accused who was sentenced to death for importing prohibited drugs
even though she jumped bail pending trial and was thus tried and convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas
treated the mandatory review of death sentences under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section
8 of Rule 124.10
The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s non-appearance at his arraignment in Criminal Case No.
82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of Court’s
treatment of a defendant who absents himself from post-arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule
11411 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant’s absence merely renders his bondsman
potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the accused
17
within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia
and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to produce the
accused underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert the accused’s status
to that of a fugitive without standing.
Further, the RTC’s observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he failed to attend the
scheduled proceeding"12 at the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the arraignment, petitioner
sought the suspension of the MeTC’s proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of his petition with the
RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTC’s refusal to defer arraignment (the order for which was released
days after the MeTC ordered petitioner’s arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration. His motion remained
unresolved as of the filing of this petition.
Petitioner’s Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367
Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense"13protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the
prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.14 It is not disputed that
petitioner’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon
a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No.
82367 involve the "same offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases
concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the
other does not."15
We find for petitioner.
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime, its Consequences on Persons and Property are Material Only to
Determine the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The text
of the provision reads:
Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had
it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted
a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute
a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would
have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of
another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages
to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple
imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a
light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the
rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first
two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in
degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a
person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which
material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing
or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage
impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender
who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give.
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1) the penalties
attached to the quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified penalty
scheme for either or both quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial courts in
imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of "reckless imprudence" and "simple imprudence"
(paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize "the mental attitude or condition behind the act,
the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible,"16 unlike willful offenses
which punish the intentional criminal act. These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set
them apart from the mass of intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately
defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of the
last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of
Pampanga the proposition that "reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing
it x x x"17 on three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional
crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them
under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-
crimes and intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime
in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too
broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through
imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised
Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a
mere question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence
or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. x x x x
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty
therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to
commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the
corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when
committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty
for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless
imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the willful act would constitute
a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision mayor
to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no
relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes.18 (Emphasis
supplied)
18
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their commission results
in damage, either to person or property.19
Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a case for "Damage to
Property through Reckless Imprudence," its jurisdiction being limited to trying charges for Malicious
Mischief, an intentional crime conceptually incompatible with the element of imprudence obtaining in
quasi-crimes.
Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative ancestry of our present day penal code) and since repeatedly
reiterated,21 stands on solid conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal pronouncement in People v.
Faller22 that "[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x x [but] simply a way of committing it x x x,"23 has
long been abandoned when the Court en banc promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades after the
Court decided Faller in 1939. Quizon rejected Faller’s conceptualization of quasi-crimes by holding that
quasi-crimes under Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and not merely methods of committing crimes.
Faller found expression in post-Quizon jurisprudence24 only by dint of lingering doctrinal confusion arising
from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining Article 365 crimes and the complexing of
intentional crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which, as will be shown shortly, rests on
erroneous conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a
related branch of jurisprudence applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses, barring second
prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-
offense alleging another resulting act but arising from the same reckless act or omission upon which the
second prosecution was based.
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence Bars Subsequent Prosecution for the Same Quasi-
Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a
means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent
prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s
unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People v.
Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal
of a case for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case against the same accused
for "reckless driving," arising from the same act upon which the first prosecution was based, had been
dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal question was brought before the Court, that is,
whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same
quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges, the Court unfailingly and
consistently answered in the affirmative in People v. Belga26 (promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc,
per Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero27 (promulgated in 1959, unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v.
Narvas28 (promulgated in 1960 by the Court en banc, per Bengzon J.), People v. Silva29 (promulgated in 1962
by the Court en banc, per Paredes, J.), People v. Macabuhay30 (promulgated in 1966 by the Court en banc,
per Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan31 (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting C.
J.), Buerano v. Court of Appeals32 (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and People v.
City Court of Manila33 (promulgated in 1983 by the First Division, per Relova, J.). These cases uniformly
barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the Double Jeopardy
Clause to quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a
subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence"
because of the accused’s prior acquittal of "slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," with both
charges grounded on the same act, the Court explained:34
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of
reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the
essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be
punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result
thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it
does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the
injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence)
remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.35 x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its logical conclusion the
reasoning of Quizon.
There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of authority. Preceding Diaz
by more than a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona,36 decided by the pre-war colonial Court in
November 1940, allowed the subsequent prosecution of an accused for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property despite his previous conviction for multiple physical injuries arising from the same
reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon which the second prosecution was based. Estipona’s
inconsistency with the post-war Diaz chain of jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it. At any rate, all
doubts on this matter were laid to rest in 1982 in Buerano.37 There, we reviewed the Court of Appeals’
conviction of an accused for "damage to property for reckless imprudence" despite his prior conviction for
"slight and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," arising from the same act upon which
the second charge was based. The Court of Appeals had relied on Estipona. We reversed on the strength of
Buan:38
Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war case of
People vs. Estipona decided on November 14, 1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22
SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that –
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of
reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the
essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be
punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result
thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it
does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the
injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence)
remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.
xxxx
. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal)
Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from
the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation
places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.
It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance in Silva, joined causes
with the accused, a fact which did not escape the Court’s attention:
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated December
12, 1969 (page 82 of the Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining
petitioner’s plea of double jeopardy and submits that "its affirmatory decision dated January 28,
1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner guilty of damage to property through
reckless imprudence should be set aside, without costs." He stressed that "if double jeopardy
exists where the reckless act resulted into homicide and physical injuries. then the same
consequence must perforce follow where the same reckless act caused merely damage to
property-not death-and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a human life lost as a result of a
vehicular collision cannot be equated with any amount of damages caused to a motors vehicle
arising from the same mishap."40 (Emphasis supplied)
19
Hence, we find merit in petitioner’s submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to extend in his favor
the mantle of protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence could not be
tailored to petitioner’s case than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny. There, the accused, who was also
involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in two separate Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru
Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence." Following
his acquittal of the former, the accused sought the quashal of the latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy
Clause. The trial court initially denied relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in the accused’s claim and
dismissed the second case. In affirming the trial court, we quoted with approval its analysis of the issue
following Diaz and its progeny People v. Belga:42
On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the case,
holding: —
[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double jeopardy
enunciated in People v. Belga, x x x In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were charged
in the Justice of the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of physical injuries through
reckless imprudence arising from a collision between the two automobiles driven by them (Crim.
Case No. 88). Without the aforesaid complaint having been dismissed or otherwise disposed of,
two other criminal complaints were filed in the same justice of the peace court, in connection
with the same collision one for damage to property through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case
No. 95) signed by the owner of one of the vehicles involved in the collision, and another for
multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 96) signed by the
passengers injured in the accident. Both of these two complaints were filed against Jose Belga
only. After trial, both defendants were acquitted of the charge against them in Crim. Case No.
88. Following his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the complaint for multiple physical injuries
through reckless imprudence filed against him by the injured passengers, contending that the
case was just a duplication of the one filed by the Chief of Police wherein he had just been
acquitted. The motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose Belga was convicted, whereupon
he appealed to the Court of First Instance of Albay. In the meantime, the case for damage to
property through reckless imprudence filed by one of the owners of the vehicles involved in the
collision had been remanded to the Court of First Instance of Albay after Jose Belga had waived
the second stage of the preliminary investigation. After such remand, the Provincial Fiscal filed
in the Court of First Instance two informations against Jose Belga, one for physical injuries
through reckless imprudence, and another for damage to property through reckless
imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by the Court of First Instance, upon motion of the
defendant Jose Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal by the Prov.
Fiscal, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following language: .
The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed by the
chief of police constitutes a bar to his subsequent prosecution for multiple physical injuries and
damage to property through reckless imprudence.
In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused was
charged in the municipal court of Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised
Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an automobile in a ῾fast and reckless manner ... thereby
causing an accident.’ After the accused had pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed in that
court ῾for failure of the Government to prosecute’. But some time thereafter the city attorney
filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, charging the same accused with
damage to property thru reckless imprudence. The amount of the damage was alleged to be
₱249.50. Pleading double jeopardy, the accused filed a motion, and on appeal by the
Government we affirmed the ruling. Among other things we there said through Mr. Justice
Montemayor —
The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of violation of the Motor
Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay City Municipal Court and the offense of damage to
property thru reckless imprudence charged in the Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the tests
of double jeopardy is whether or not the second offense charged necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information (Rule 113,
Sec. 9). Another test is whether the evidence which proves one would prove the other that is to
say whether the facts alleged in the first charge if proven, would have been sufficient to support
the second charge and vice versa; or whether one crime is an ingredient of the other. x x x
xxxx
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the prosecuting
attorney that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not have
been joined with the charge for homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in this case, in view of the provisions of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. The prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged
to first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before
pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney
is not now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless
imprudence of which the defendant have been previously cleared by the inferior court.43
Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz) "for the
purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application."44 We declined the invitation, thus:
The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case, on the ground of
double jeopardy, upon the basis of the acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight Physical
Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence. In the same breath said State, thru the Solicitor General,
admits that the facts of the case at bar, fall squarely on the ruling of the Belga case x x x, upon
which the order of dismissal of the lower court was anchored. The Solicitor General, however,
urges a re-examination of said ruling, upon certain considerations for the purpose of delimiting
or clarifying its application. We find, nevertheless, that further elucidation or disquisition on the
ruling in the Belga case, the facts of which are analogous or similar to those in the present case,
will yield no practical advantage to the government. On one hand, there is nothing which would
warrant a delimitation or clarification of the applicability of the Belga case. It was clear. On the
other, this Court has reiterated the views expressed in the Belga case, in the identical case of
Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30, 1959.45 (Emphasis supplied)
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed, stems from
persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural rules
in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of
crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of
multiple felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave
or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies46); and (2) when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the
accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most
serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the mental attitude
x x x behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x," 47 a single mental attitude
regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one
or more consequences.
Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a single prosecution
multiple intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, when proper; Article
365 governs the prosecution of imprudent acts and their consequences. However, the complexities of
human interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-offense not falling under either models – that of a single
criminal negligence resulting in multiple non-crime damages to persons and property with varying penalties
20
corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses. The ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how
should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48’s framework apply to "complex" the single
quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding those amounting to light offenses
which will be tried separately)? Or should the prosecution proceed under a single charge, collectively
alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to be penalized separately following the scheme of
penalties under Article 365?
Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved the issue of double
jeopardy) applied Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple consequences48 unless one
consequence amounts to a light felony, in which case charges were split by grouping, on the one hand,
resulting acts amounting to grave or less grave felonies and filing the charge with the second level courts
and, on the other hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies and filing the charge with the first level
courts.49 Expectedly, this is the approach the MeTC impliedly sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes),
even though under Republic Act No. 7691,50 the MeTC has now exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the
most serious penalty under Article 365 which is prision correccional in its medium period.
Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts penalized under
Article 365 involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies because there will be a single
prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is
penalized as a light offense and the other acts are penalized as grave or less grave offenses, in which case
Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light offense is tried separately from the
resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses.
The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all the effects of the
quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or severity,51 penalizing each
consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles v. Jose,52 we interpreted paragraph three of Article 365, in
relation to a charge alleging "reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and less serious physical
injuries," as follows:
[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the
property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to
the value of said damage to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25
pesos.
The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property the amount
fixed therein shall be imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there should be an additional
penalty for the latter. The information cannot be split into two; one for the physical injuries, and
another for the damage to property, x x x.53 (Emphasis supplied)
By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365.
Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field demands choosing
one framework over the other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-crime by breaking its
resulting acts into separate offenses (except for light felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime,
abandon its present framing under Article 365, discard its conception under the Quizon and Diaz lines of
cases, and treat the multiple consequences of a quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies defined under
Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal code; or (2) we forbid the application of Article 48 in the prosecution
and sentencing of quasi-crimes, require single prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of their
number and severity, separately penalize each as provided in Article 365, and thus maintain the distinct
concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365, articulated in Quizon and applied to double jeopardy
adjudication in the Diaz line of cases.1avvphi1
A becoming regard of this Court’s place in our scheme of government denying it the power to make laws
constrains us to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies
under our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is
conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or
less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for committing another. This is why, way
back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the Solicitor General’s argument that double jeopardy does not bar a
second prosecution for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence allegedly because the charge
for that offense could not be joined with the other charge for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence could not be joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing
of grave or less grave felonies. This same argument was considered and rejected by this Court in
the case of People vs. [Silva] x x x:
[T]he prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first
prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing
the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence.
Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a
position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which
the defendant has been previously cleared by the inferior court.
[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the Justice of the Peace x
x x of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being
prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First
Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the
same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy
for the same offense.54 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article 365,
irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally
impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state resources are conserved
and diverted to proper use.
Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the
number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the
penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of
charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level court.55
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of
their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent
effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than
compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or,
as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft
Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe
penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less
grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the
lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should
cushion the effect of this ruling.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366
against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on
the ground of double jeopardy. Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.
21
 VENANCIO SEVILLA V. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 194390, 13 AUGUST 2014
G.R. No. 194390 August 13, 2014
VENANCIO M. SEVILLA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul
and set aside the Decision2 dated February 26, 2009 and the Resolution3 dated October 22, 2010 of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 27925, finding Venancio M. Sevilla (Sevilla) guilty of falsification of
public documents through reckless imprudence punished under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Antecedent Facts
Sevilla, a former councilor of Malabon City, was charged with the felony of falsification of public document,
penalized under Article 171(4) of the RPC, in an Information,4 which reads:
That on or about 02 July 2001, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of
Malabon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, Venancio M. Sevilla, a public officer, being then a memberof the [S]angguniang
[P]anlunsod of Malabon City, having been elected a [c]ouncilor thereof, taking advantage of his
official position and committing the offense in relation to duty, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously make a false statement in a narration of facts, the truth of which he
is legally bound to disclose, by stating in his C.S. Form 212, dated 02 July 2001 or Personal Data
Sheet, an official document, which he submitted to the Office of the Secretariat, Malabon City
Council and, in answer to Question No. 25 therein, he stated that no criminal case is pending
against him, when in fact, as the accused fully well knew, he is an accused in Criminal Case No.
6718-97, entitled "People of the Philippines versus Venancio Sevilla and Artemio Sevilla", for
Assault Upon AnAgent Of A Person In Authority, pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Malabon City, Branch 55, thereby perverting the truth.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Upon arraignment, Sevillaentered a plea of not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
The prosecution alleged that on July 2, 2001, the first day of his term as councilor of the City of Malabon,
Sevilla made a false narration in his Personal Data Sheet (PDS).6 That in answer to the question of whether
there is a pending criminalcase against him, Sevilla marked the box corresponding to the "no" answer
despite the pendency of a criminal case against him for assault upon an agent ofa person in authority before
the Metropolitan Trial Court ofMalabon City, Branch 55.
Based on the same set of facts, anadministrative complaint, docketed as OMB-ADM-0-01-1520, was likewise
filed against Sevilla. In its Decision dated March 26, 2002, the Office of the Ombudsman found Sevilla
administratively liable for dishonesty and falsification of official document and dismissed him from the
service. In Sevilla v. Gervacio,7the Court, in the Resolution dated June 23, 2003, affirmed the findings of the
Office of the Ombudsman as regards Sevilla’s administrative liability.
On the other hand, Sevilla admitted that he indeed marked the box corresponding to the "no" answer vis-
à-visthe question on whether he has any pending criminal case. However, heaverred that he did not intend
to falsify his PDS. He claimed that it was Editha Mendoza (Mendoza), a member of his staff, who actually
prepared his PDS.
According to Sevilla, on July 2, 2001,since he did not have an office yet, he just stayed in his house. Ataround
two o’clock in the afternoon, he was informed by Mendoza that he needs to accomplish his PDS and submit
the same to the personnel office of the City of Malabon before five o’clock that afternoon. He then
instructedMendoza to copy the entries in the previous copy of his PDS which he filed with the personnel
office. After the PDS was filled up and delivered to him by Mendoza, Sevilla claims that he just signed the
same without checking the veracity of the entries therein. That he failed to notice that, in answer to the
question of whether he has any pending criminal case, Mendoza checked the box corresponding to the "no"
answer.
The defense likewise presented the testimony of Edilberto G. Torres (Torres), a former City Councilor. Torres
testified that Sevilla was not yet given an office space in the Malabon City Hall on July 2, 2001; that when
the members of Sevilla’s staff would then need to use the typewriter, they would just use the typewriter
inside Torres’ office. Torres further claimed that he saw Mendoza preparing the PDS of Sevilla, the latter
having used the typewriter in his office.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
On February 26, 2009, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision,8 the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, accused VENANCIO M. SEVILLA is found GUILTY of Falsification of Public
Documents Through Reckless Imprudence and pursuant to Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code
hereby imposes upon him in the absence ofany modifying circumstances the penalty of four (4)
months of arresto mayoras minimum to two (2) years ten (10) months and twenty one (21) days
of prision correccional as maximum, and to pay the costs.
There is no pronouncement as to civil liability as the facts from which it could arise do[es] not
appear to be indubitable.
SO ORDERED.9
The Sandiganbayan found that Sevilla made an untruthful statement in his PDS, which is a public
document,and that, in so doing, he took advantage of his official position since he would not have
accomplished the PDS if not for his position as a City Councilor. That being the signatory of the PDS, Sevilla
had the responsibility to prepare, accomplish and submit the same. Further, the Sandiganbayan pointed out
that there was a legal obligation on the part of Sevilla to disclose in his PDS that there was a pending case
against him. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution was able to establish all the
elements of the felony of falsification of public documents.
Nevertheless, the Sandiganbayan opined that Sevilla cannot be convicted of falsification of public document
under Article 171(4)10 of the RPC since he did not act with maliciousintent to falsify the aforementioned
entry in his PDS. However, considering that Sevilla’s PDS was haphazardly and recklessly done, which
resulted in the false entry therein, the Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of falsification of public document
through reckless imprudence under Article 36511 of the RPC. Thus:
Moreover, the marking of the "no" box to the question on whether there was a pending criminal
case against him was not the only defect in his PDS. As found by the Office of the Honorable
Ombudsman in its Resolution, in answer to question 29 inthe PDS, accused answered that he
had not been a candidate in any localelection (except barangay election), when in fact he ran
and served ascouncilor of Malabon from 1992 to 1998. Notwithstanding the negative answer in
question 29, in the same PDS, in answer to question 21, he revealed that he was a councilor from
1992 to 1998. Not to give premium to a negligent act, this nonetheless shows that the
preparation of the PDS was haphazardly and recklessly done.
Taking together these circumstances, this Court is persuaded that accused did not act with
malicious intent to falsify the document in question but merely failed to ascertain for himself the
veracity of narrations in his PDS before affixing his signature thereon. The reckless signing of the
PDS without verifying the data therein makes him criminally liable for his act. Accused is a
government officer, who prior to his election as councilor in 2001, had already served as a
councilor of the same city. Thus, he should have been more mindful of the importance of the
PDS and should have treated the said public document with due respect.
Consequently, accused is convicted of Falsification of Public Document through Reckless
Imprudence, as defined and penalized in Article 171, paragraph 4, in relation to Article 365,
paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. x x x.12
22
Sevilla’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution13 dated October 22,
2010.
Hence, this appeal.
In the instant petition, Sevilla asserts that the Sandiganbayan erred in finding him guilty of the felony of
falsification of public documents through reckless imprudence. He claims that the Information that was filed
against him specifically charged him with the commission of an intentional felony, i.e.falsification of public
documents under Article 171(4) of the RPC. Thus, he could not be convicted of falsification of public
document through reckless imprudence under Article 365 of the RPC, which is a culpable felony, lest his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him be violated.
Issue
Essentially, the issue for the Court’s resolution is whether Sevilla can be convicted of the felony of
falsification of public document through reckless imprudence notwithstanding that the charge against him
in the Information was for the intentional felony of falsification of public document under Article 171(4) of
the RPC.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is dismissed for lack of merit.
At the outset, it bears stressing that the Sandiganbayan’s designation of the felony supposedly committed
by Sevilla is inaccurate. The Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of reckless imprudence, punished under Article
365 of the RPC, which resulted into the falsification of a public document. However, the Sandiganbayan
designated the felony committed as "falsification of public document through reckless imprudence." The
foregoing designation implies that reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a modality of
committing it. Quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the RPC are distinct and separatecrimes and not a mere
modality in the commission of a crime.
In Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro,14 the Court explained that:
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime,
separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As
early as the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting
in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampangathe proposition that "reckless imprudence is not a
crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x" on three points of analysis: (1) the object
of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to
treat quasi crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating
circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and
intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless
imprudence" is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely
determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve unqualified
assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through
imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, maliciousmischief, etc. In truth, criminal
negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt
with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or
terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or
imprudence, what isprincipally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind
the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia
punible.x x x
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating
only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating
circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as
the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the
corresponding penalty should befixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for
each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there
would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our
Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto
mayor maximum, to prision correccional[medium], if the willful act would constitute
a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way
from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual
penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is
set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes.(Emphasis supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasicrimes is to state that their
commission results in damage, either to person or property.15 (Citations omitted and emphasis
ours)
Further, in Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation v. People,16 the Court clarified that:
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal negligence "is treated as a mere quasi
offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a question ofclassification or
terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itselfis punished; in negligence or imprudence, what
is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the
dangerousrecklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. Much of the
confusion has arisen from the common use of such descriptive phrase as ‘homicide through
reckless imprudence’, and the like; when the strict technical sense is, more accurately, ‘reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide’; or ‘simple imprudence causing damages to property’."
There is need, therefore, to rectify the designation of the offense without disturbing the imposed
penaltyfor the guidance of bench and bar in strict adherence to precedent.17 (Emphasis ours)
Thus, the proper designation ofthe felony should be reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public
documents and not falsification of public documentsthrough reckless imprudence.
Having threshed out the proper designation of the felony committed by Sevilla, the Court now weighs the
merit of the instant appeal. Sevilla’s appeal is anchored mainly on the variance between the offense charged
in the Information that was filed against him and that proved by the prosecution. The rules on variance
between allegation and proof are laid down under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. – When there is variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense
as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense
charged which isincluded in the offense proved.
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. – An offense charged necessarily
includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former,
as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
Accordingly, in case of variance between the allegation and proof, a defendant may be convictedof the
offense proved when the offense charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved.
There is no dispute that a variance exists between the offense alleged against Sevilla and that proved by the
prosecution – the Information charged him with the intentional felony of falsification of public document
under Article 171(4) of the RPC while the prosecution was able to prove reckless imprudence resulting to
falsification ofpublic documents. Parenthetically, the question that has to be resolved then is whether
reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public document is necessarily included in the intentional
felony of falsification ofpublic document under Article 171(4) of the RPC.
The Court, in Samson v. Court of Appeals,18 has answered the foregoing question in the affirmative. Thus:
23
 It is however contended that appellant Samson cannot be convicted of the crime of Anent the imposable penalty, under Article 365 of the RPC, reckless imprudence resulting in falsification of
estafathrough falsification by imprudence for the reason that the information filed against him public document is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium
charges only a willful act of falsification and contains no reference to any act of imprudence on period. In this case, taking into account the pertinent provisions of Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
his part. Nor can it be said, counsel argues, that the alleged imprudent act includes or is Sandiganbayan correctly imposed upon Sevilla the penalty of four ( 4) months of arresto mayor as minimum
necessarily includedin the offense charged in the information because a deliberate intent to do to two (2) years ten ( 10) months and twenty one (21) days of prision correccional as maximum.
an unlawful act is inconsistent with the idea of negligence.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated
xxxx February 26, 2009 and the Resolution dated October 22, 2010 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
27925 are hereby AFFIRMED.
While a criminal negligent act is nota simple modality of a wilful crime, as we held in Quizon v.
Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, x x x, but a distinct crime in itself, designated asa quasi offense, SO ORDERED.
in our Penal Code, it may however be said that a conviction for the former can be had under an
information exclusively charging the commission of a wilful offense, upon the theory that the
greater includes the lesser offense. This is the situation that obtains in the present case.
Appellant was charged with willful falsification but from the evidence submitted by the parties,
the Court of Appeals found thatin effecting the falsification which made possible the cashing of
checks inquestion, appellant did not act with criminal intent but merely failed to take proper and
adequate means to assure himself of the identity of the real claimants as an ordinary prudent
man would do. In other words, the information alleges acts which charge willful falsification but
which turned out to be not willful but negligent. This is a case covered by the rule when there is
a variance between the allegation and proof, and is similar to some of the cases decided by this
Tribunal.19(Emphasis ours)
Thus, Sevilla’s claim that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him was violated when the Sandiganbayan convicted him of reckless imprudence resulting to
falsification of public documents, when the Information only charged the intentional felony of falsification
of public documents, is untenable. To stress, reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public
documents is an offense that is necessarily included in the willful act of falsification of public documents,
the latter being the greater offense. As such, he can be convicted of reckless imprudence resulting to
falsification of public documents notwithstanding that the Information only charged the willful act of
falsification of public documents.
In this regard, the Court’s disposition in Sarep v. Sandiganbayan20 is instructive.1âwphi1 In Sarep, the
petitioner therein falsified his appointment paper which he filed with the CSC. An Information was then filed
against him for falsification of public document. Nevertheless, the Court convicted the accused of reckless
imprudence resulting to falsification of public document upon a finding that the accused therein did not
maliciously pervert the truth with the wrongful intent of injuring some person. The Court, quoting the
Sandiganbayan’s disposition, held that:
We are inclined, however, to credit the accused herein with the benefit of the circumstance that
he did not maliciously pervert the truth with the wrongful intent of injuring some person (People
vs. Reyes, 1 Phil. 341). Since he sincerely believed that his CSC eligibility based on his having
passed the Regional CulturalCommunity Officer (Unassembled) Examination and educational
attainment were sufficient to qualify him for a permanent position, then he should only be held
liable for falsification through reckless imprudence (People vs. Leopando, 36 O.G. 2937; People
vs. Maleza, 14 Phil. 468; People vs. Pacheco, 18 Phil. 399).
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, which punishes criminal negligence or quasi-offenses,
furnishes the middle way between a wrongful act committed with wrongful intent, which gives
rise to a felony, and a wrongful act committed without any intent which may entirely exempt
the doer from criminal liability. It is the duty of everyone to execute his own acts with due care
and diligence in order that no prejudicial or injurious results may be suffered by others from acts
that are otherwise offensive (Aquino, R.P.C. Vol. III, 1976, Ed., p. 1884). What is penalized is the
mental attitude orcondition behind the acts of dangerous recklessness and lack of care or
foresight although such mental attitude might have produced several effects or consequences
(People vs. Cano, L 19660, May 24, 1966).21

24
 ROGELIO GONZAGA V. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 195671 21 JANUARY 2015
G.R. No. 195671 January 21, 2015
ROGELIO J. GONZAGA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated September 18, 2009 and the
Resolution3dated January 26, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 00427-MIN, which
affirmed the Decision4dated July 31, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, Branch
10 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 9832-99, finding petitioner Rogelio J. Gonzaga (Rogelio) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with Double Serious Physical
Injuries and Damage to Property under Article 365 in relation to Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Facts
At around 6 o'clock in the morning of June 25, 1997, Dionesio Inguito, Sr. (Dionesio, Sr.) was driving his
motorcycle along Brgy. Kiara, Don Carlos, Bukidnon towards Brgy. Bocboc5 of the same municipality, to bring
his two (2) minor children, Dionesio Inguito, Jr. (Dionesio, Jr.) and Cherry Inguito6 (Cherry), to school.7 While
they were ascending the curving road going to Bocboc on their proper lane on the right side of the road, a
Toyota Land Cruiser (Land Cruiser)driven by Rogelio was swiftly descending the same lane from the opposite
direction. Dionesio, Sr. blew the horn of his motorcycle to signal the Land Cruiser to return to its proper lane
but the Land Cruiser remained.8 In order to avoid collision, Dionesio, Sr. tried to swerve to the left, but the
Land Cruiser suddenly swerved towards the same direction and collided head-on with the motorcycle.9
As a result of the collision, Dionesio, Sr. and his 2 children were thrown off the motorcycle. Dionesio, Sr. was
pinned beneath the Land Cruiser,10 while Cherry and Dionesio, Jr. were thrown over the hood of the Land
Cruiser and fell on the side of the road,11 causing injuries to their legs. Siblings Rolf, Cherry,12 and Jenny Ann
Aquino, who were traversing the same road aboard their own motorcycle, stopped to help and placed the
victims together13 on the rightmost side of the road facing Brgy. Bocboc,14 while Rogelio remained inside
the Land Cruiser.15
Rolf left the scene of the incident to seek further assistance, leaving his two (2) sisters to cater to the
victims.16Eventually, he chanced upon Kagawad Nerio Dadivas (Kgd. Dadivas), who had just opened his store,
and informed the latter of the vehicular accident. After reporting the incident to the police and getting his
vehicle, Kgd. Dadivas proceeded to the site and loaded the victims to his vehicle with Rolf’s
assistance.17 Meanwhile, Rolf went to Brgy. Kawilihan to inform Dionesio, Sr.’s wife, Clemencia Inguito
(Clemencia), of what had transpired.18 Thereafter, the victims were brought to the Emergency Hospital of
Maramag where they were treated.19 Operations were performed on the legs of Dionesio, Jr. and Dionesio,
Sr., but the latter eventually expired. Cherry’s leg was placed in a cast and she was confined in the hospital,
together with Dionesio, Jr., for more than one (1) month, or until July 26, 1997.20 All the expenses were
shouldered by Clemencia.21
In view of the foregoing mishap, the provincial prosecutor filed an Information22 charging Rogelio for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with Double Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property
"with the aggravating circumstance that accused failed to lend on the spot to the injured party such help
that was in his hands to give"23 before the RTC. Upon arraignment,24 Rogelio entered a plea of not guilty.25
In his defense, Rogelio claimed that he was driving the Land Cruiser on his proper lane along the descending
curving road towards the direction of Kalilangan, Bukidnon, when, from a distance of about 70 meters away,
he saw the motorcycles driven by Dionesio, Sr. and Rolf racing towards the curve from the opposite
direction.26 Dionesio, Sr. was driving his motorcycle in a zigzag manner on the Land Cruiser’s lane while Rolf
was on his proper lane.27Undecided which side of the road to take to avoid collision, Rogelio stopped the
Land Cruiser but the motorcycle of Dionesio, Sr., nonetheless, bumped into it.28 As a result of the impact,
Cherry and Dionesio, Jr. were thrown over the roof and the hood of the Land Cruiser, respectively, and fell
on the side of the road, while Dionesio, Sr. and the motorcycle were pinned beneath the land Cruiser.29 With
the use of a jack handle and the assistance of two (2) persons, i.e., Jose Bacus and Reynaldo Quidato, who
arrived at the scene, he was able to retrieve both Dionesio, Sr. and the motorcycle from beneath the Land
Cruiser. Thereafter, they loaded the victims on board the Land Cruiser so they may be brought tothe
hospital, but the vehicle turned out to have defective brakes, so he asked other persons to secure another
vehicle instead.30
The RTC Proceedings
In aDecision31 dated July 31, 2006 (July 31, 2006 Decision), the RTC found Rogelio guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide withDouble Serious Physical Injuries and
Damage to Property punishable under Article 365 in relation to Article 263 of the RPC.32
It held that Rogelio’s act of driving very fast on the wrong side of the road was the proximate cause of the
collision, resulting to the death of Dionesio, Sr. and serious physical injuries to Dionesio, Jr. and Cherry.
Considering further that Rogelio failed to offer any help to the victims,33 the RTC sentenced him to suffer a
higher indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months of prision correccional maximum, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium, as maximum, and ordered him to
pay the following civil liabilities: (a) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages for the death of Dionesio, Sr.; (b)
₱30,000.00 as moral damages for the mental anguish suffered by the family; (c) ₱200,000.00 for the medical
expenses incurred; (d) ₱25,000.00 for the expenses incurred during the wake and the burial; (e) ₱30,000.00
for the damaged motorcycle; (f) ₱60,000.00 for the loss of earning capacity; and (g) ₱30,000.00 as
attorney’s fees.34
Rogelio filed a motion for reconsideration35 which was partly granted in a Resolution36 dated February 22,
2007, reducing the penalty to four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, with the same civil liabilities. The RTC
reconsidered its opinion regarding Rogelio’s claim of having extended aid to the victims, concluding that the
jack handle that was used to get the body of Dionesio, Sr. beneath the Land Cruiser could have been his in
the absence of showing who owned the same.37 Aggrieved, Rogelio appealed to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In aDecision38dated September 18, 2009, however, the CA reinstated the RTC’s July 31, 2006 Decision,
thereby imposing on Rogelio the original indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months of prision
correccional maximum, as minimum, to eight(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium, as
maximum, and the same civil liabilities,39 hence, this petition. The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld Rogelio’s conviction
in accordance with the RTC’s July 31, 2006 Decision.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Reckless imprudence, as defined in Article 36540 of the RPC, consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing
or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on
the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment
or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time
and place.
In order to establish a motorist’s liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be shown that
there was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the injuries or damages complained of.
To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere negligence in
the operation of a motor vehicle – a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is required.41 Willful,
wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others within the meaning of reckless driving statutes has
been held to involve a conscious choice of a course of action which injures another, either with knowledgeof
serious danger to others involved, or with knowledge of facts which would disclose the danger to any
reasonable person. Verily, it is the inexcusable lack of precaution or conscious indifference to the
consequences of the conduct which supplies the criminal intent and brings an act of mere negligence and
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imprudence under the operation of the penal law, without regard to whether the private offended party
may himself be considered likewise at fault.42
In the present case, the RTC and the CA uniformly found that Rogelio’s act of driving very fast on the wrong
side of the road was the proximate cause of the collision, resulting to the death of Dionesio, Sr. and serious
physical injuries to Dionesio, Jr. and Cherry. Notably, the road where the incident occurred was a curve
sloping upwards towards Brgy. Bocboc where the Inguitos were bound and descending towards the
opposite direction where Rogelio was going. Indeed, the very fact of speeding, under such circumstances,
is indicative of imprudent behavior. As a motorist, Rogelio was bound to exercise ordinary care in such affair
by driving at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with the conditions encountered, as this would
enable him to keep the vehicle under control and avoid injury to others using the highway.43 Moreover, it is
elementary in traffic school that a driver slows down before negotiating a curve as it may be reasonably
anticipated that another vehicle may appear from the opposite direction at any moment. Hence, excessive
speed, combined with other circumstances such as the occurrence of the accident on or near a curve, as in
this case, constitutes negligence.44 Consequently, the Court finds that Rogelio acted recklessly and
imprudently in driving at a fast speed on the wrong side of the road while approaching the curve where the
incident happened, thereby rendering him criminally liable, aswell as civilly accountable for the material
damages resulting therefrom. Nonetheless, while the CA and the RTC concurred that the proximate cause
of the collision was Rogelio’s reckless driving, the CA Decision made no mention as to the presence or
absence of the limiting element in the last paragraph of Article 365 of the RPC, which imposes the penalty
next higher in degreeupon the offender who "fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as
may be in his hands to give." Based on case law, the obligation under this paragraph: (a) is dependent on
the means in the hands of the offender, i.e., the type and degree of assistance that he/she, at the time and
place of the incident, is capable of giving; and (b) requires adequate proof.45
As a final note, the Court clarifies that the order for the payment of "moral damages" in the amount of
₱50,000.00 for the death of Dionesio, Sr. should be, properly speaking, denominated as one for the payment
of "civil indemnity" as they were not awarded under the parameters of the Civil Code relevant thereto,52 but
was one "given without need of proof other than the fact of death as a result of the crime and proof of [the
accused’s] responsibility for it."53 This is a palpable legal error which the Court should correct if only for
terminological propriety. With the private complainant not herein impleaded, the rest of the RTC’s July 31,
2006 Decision with respect to the civil liabilities awarded should remain undisturbed. Note that, in line with
existing jurisprudence, interest atthe rate of six percent (6) per annum shall be imposed on all damages
awarded from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.54
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 18, 2009 and the Resolution dated
January 26, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 00427-MIN, finding petitioner Rogelio J.
Gonzaga guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with
Double Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property under Article 365 in relation to Article 263 of the
Revised Penal Code are hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(a) Petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years of prision
correccional in its minimum, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional in its maximum,
as maximum; and
(b) The award of ₱50,000.00 for the death of Dionesio Inguito, Sr. in favor of his heirs is
denominated as "civil indemnity," instead of"moral damages."
(c) All monetary awards for damages shall bear interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.

It is well to point out that the RTC’s July 31, 2006 Decision found that Rogelio failed to offer any help to the SO ORDERED.
victims46and, thus, imposed on him the penalty next higher in degree.However, upon Rogelio’s motion, the
RTC reconsidered its earlier conclusion, holding that the jack handle that was used to get the body of
Dionesio,Sr. beneath the Land Cruiser could have been his in the absence of showing who owned the same
and, accordingly, reduced the penalty.47 Nothing was said on this point by the CA which affirmed
Rogelio’sconviction based on the RTC’s July 31, 2006 Decision.
The Court has perused the records and found contradictory testimonies presented by the prosecution and
the defense on this matter.1âwphi1 Considering however, that Cherry herself admitted that the victims
were first loaded on the Land Cruiser before they were transferred to Kgd. Dadivas’s vehicle,48 the Court is
inclined to sustain Rogelio’s claim that he tried to extend help to the victims, but when hestarted the engine
with the intention to go to the hospital, he discovered that the vehicle had no brakes.49 Hence, in imposing
the proper penalty on the accused, the qualifying circumstance under the last paragraph of Article 365 of
the RPC should not be considered.
Here, Rogelio was charged with the offense of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with Double
Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property under Article 365 in relation to Article 26350 of the RPC, a
complex crime. Article 48 of the RPC provides that when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime, in this case, Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide, shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period.
Under Article 365 of the RPC, when reckless imprudence in the use of a motor vehicle results in the death
of a person, as in this case, the accused shall be punished with the penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods, i.e., two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law,51 the minimum of said penalty should be taken from arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or four (4) months and one (1) day to two
(2) years and four (4) months. Consequently, the Court finds a need to modify the penalty to be imposed
on Rogelio and thus, sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years of prision
correccional in its minimum, as minimum, to six years of prision correccional in its maximum, as maximum.

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